[Cite as State v. Stevens, 2017-Ohio-8692.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

STARK COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: 

 : Hon. John W. Wise, P.J. 

 Plaintiff - Appellee : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. 

 : Hon. Earle E. Wise, J. 

-vs- : 

 : 

DOUGLAS LYNN STEVENS : Case No. 2017CA00024 

 : 

 Defendant - Appellant : O P I N I O N 

 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Stark County Court 

of Common Pleas, Case No. 2016 

CR 1606 

 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT: November 20, 2017 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

JOHN D. FERRERO JEFFREY R. JAKMIDES 

Prosecuting Attorney 325 East Main Street 

 Alliance, Ohio 44601 

By: RONALD MARK CALDWELL 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

Appellate Section 

110 Central Plaza South, Suite 510 

Canton, Ohio 44702-1413 
Stark County, Case No. 2017CA00024 2 

Baldwin, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Douglas Lynn Stevens appeals his sentence from the 

Stark County Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE 

{¶2} On August 30, 2016, the Stark County Grand Jury indicted appellant on one 

count of illegal manufacture of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.04(A)(C)(2), a felony of the 

second degree, one count of illegal cultivation of marijuana in violation of R.C. 

2925.04(A)(C)(5)(f), a felony of the second degree, and one count of possession of 

marijuana in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(3)(f), a felony of the second degree. 

Appellant was also indicted on one count of trafficking in marijuana in violation of R.C. 

2925.03(A)(2)(C)(3)(f), a felony of the second degree, and one count of illegal assembly 

or possession of chemicals for the manufacture of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.041(A), 

a felony of the third degree. At his arraignment on September 2, 2016, appellant entered 

a plea of not guilty to the charges. 

{¶3} Thereafter, on January 11, 2017, appellant withdrew his former plea of not 

guilty and entered a plea of no contest1 to all of the charges. The trial court found appellant 

guilty. At the January 17, 2017 sentencing hearing, the trial court indicated that it had 

considered defense counsel’s arguments that mandatory minimum prison sentences 

were unconstitutional, but noted that it did not have discretion because “[t]he legislature 

has not allowed the judges in the State of Ohio complete discretion in their sentencing.” 

Transcript at 6. The trial court also considered appellant’s argument that the mandatory 

 

1 The trial court, in its January 20, 2017 Judgment Entry, incorrectly stated that appellant had pleaded 

guilty. 
Stark County, Case No. 2017CA00024 3 

sentence of eight years constituted cruel and unusual punishment and rejected such 

argument. 

{¶4} As memorialized in a Judgment Entry filed on January 20, 2017, appellant 

was then sentenced to two mandatory minimum eight year sentences for illegal 

manufacture of drugs and illegal cultivation of marijuana, two mandatory minimum 

sentences of five years for possession of marijuana and trafficking in marijuana and a 

sentence of three years for illegal assembly or possession of chemicals for the 

manufacture of drugs. The trial court ordered that the sentences be served concurrently, 

for an aggregate prison sentence of eight years. 

{¶5} Appellant now raises the following assignment of error on appeal: 

{¶6} THE MANDATORY MINIMUM TERMS OF INCARCERATION PURSUANT 

TO R.C. 2925.04(A)(C)(2)(f), R.C. 2925.04(A)(C)(5)(f), R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(3)(f), R.C. 

2925.03(A)(2)(C)(3)(f), R.C. 2925.041(A) ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE THEY 

CONSTITUTE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT AS THEY ARE SO 

DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE OFFENSE AND SHOCKING TO THE SENSE OF 

JUSTICE IN THE COMMUNITY. 

I 

{¶7} Appellant, in his sole assignment of error, challenges his sentence. 

Appellant argues that his mandatory minimum terms of incarceration are unconstitutional 

“because they constitute cruel and unusual punishment as they are so disproportionate 

to the offense and shocking to the sense of justice in the community.” We disagree. 

{¶8} The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits 

excessive sanctions and provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
Stark County, Case No. 2017CA00024 4 

fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” Section 9, Article I of the 

Ohio Constitution likewise sets forth the same restriction: “Excessive bail shall not be 

required; nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” The 

Ohio Supreme Court has noted, “Central to the Constitution's prohibition against cruel 

and unusual punishment is the ‘precept of justice that punishment for crime should be 

graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.’ ” In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012–

Ohio–1446, 967 N.E.2d 729, ¶ 25, quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 

30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910). 

{¶9} “‘The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between 

crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are “grossly 

disproportionate” to the crime.’ “ State v. Weitbrecht, 86 Ohio St.3d 368, 372, 1999-Ohio113, 715 N.E.2d 167, quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 

115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) , (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in judgment). Our 

proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be guided by objective 

criteria, “including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the 

sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences 

imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.” State v. Morin, 5th Dist. 

Fairfield No.2008–CA–10, 2008–Ohio–6707, ¶ 69, citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 

290–292, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983). It is well established that sentences do 

not violate these constitutional provisions against cruel and unusual punishment unless 

the sentences are so grossly disproportionate to the offenses as to shock the sense of 

justice in the community. State v. Chaffin, 30 Ohio St .2d 13, 282 N.E.2d 46 (1972), 

syllabus. 
Stark County, Case No. 2017CA00024 5 

{¶10} “As a general rule, a sentence that falls within the terms of a valid statute 

cannot amount to a cruel and unusual punishment.” McDougle v. Maxwell, 1 Ohio St.2d 

68, 69, 203 N.E.2d 334 (1964). “[P]unishments which are prohibited by the Eighth 

Amendment are limited to torture or other barbarous punishments, degrading 

punishments unknown at common law, and punishments which are so disproportionate 

to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.” Id.

{¶11} The trial court, in the case sub judice, cited to State v. Campa, 1st Dist. No. 

C–010254, 2002-Ohio-1932 at the sentencing hearing. In Campa, after the appellant was 

convicted of trafficking in marijuana, the trial court imposed the mandatory maximum 

sentence of eight year's incarceration for a drug conviction involving over twenty thousand 

grams of marijuana. On appeal, the appellant argued, in part, in his final assignment of 

error that that the imposition of a mandatory eight-year term of incarceration pursuant to 

R.C. 2925.11(C)(3)(f) was unconstitutional because it constituted cruel and unusual 

punishment. In overruling the assignment of error, the court, in Campa, held, in relevant 

part, as follows at *6: 

This same issue has been addressed by the Eleventh District Court 

of Appeals in State v. Powell (Dec. 31, 1998), Lake App. No. 97–L–253, 

unreported, appeal not allowed (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 1477, 709 N.E.2d 

849. We agree that as R.C. 2925.11(C)(3) sets forth a reasonable 

progression of harsher sentences for possession of a larger quantities of 

marijuana, and the mandatory eight-year sentence is not disproportionate 

to other crimes of similar stature, it does not constitute cruel and unusual 

punishment. Moreover, the General Assembly has the authority to define 
Stark County, Case No. 2017CA00024 6 

criminal conduct and to determine the appropriate punishment. See State 

v. Thompkins (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 558, 560, 664 N.E.2d 926, 928–929. 

Mandatory sentencing laws enacted pursuant to this authority do not usurp 

the judiciary's power to determine the sentence of individual offenders. 

{¶12} In State v. Rosado, 8th Dist. No. 88504, 2007-Ohio-2782, the court 

addressed whether or not imposition of the mandatory ten year term of imprisonment for 

a major drug offender constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The court, in holding 

that the sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, stated, in relevant 

part, as follows at paragraph 14. 

There can be no serious contention, then, that a sentence which is 

not otherwise cruel and unusual becomes so simply because it is 

‘mandatory.’ “Harmelin v. Michigan (1991), 501 U .S. 957, 995. A 

punishment is cruel and unusual only if it is so disproportionate to the 

offense as to shock the community's sense of justice. State v. Chaffin

(1972), 30 Ohio St.2d 13, paragraph three of the syllabus. A ten-year term 

of imprisonment for possession of more than one hundred grams of crack 

cocaine is not disproportionate to the sentences imposed for crimes of 

similar stature. Cf. State v. Conner, Cuyahoga App. No. 84073, 2005-Ohio1971, ¶ 61. Therefore, the mandatory ten-year term of imprisonment is not 

cruel and unusual. Accordingly, we overrule the sixth and seventh 

supplemental assignments of error. 

{¶13} Based on the foregoing, we find that appellant’s sentence does not 

constitute cruel and unusual punishment. As noted by appellee, “Ohio appellate courts 
Stark County, Case No. 2017CA00024 7 

have consistently and repeatedly rejected constitutional challenges to the mandatory 

nature of various provisions of Ohio’s felony sentencing scheme.” Moreover, we note that 

the trial court, in rejecting appellant’s argument that his sentence was disproportionate, 

noted that appellant had “258 plants in various stages of growth” and that “[t]he crime lab 

weighed only 16 of the [55 to 60] bags [of plants] for a total weight of 66,708 grams which 

was, I believe, more than three times the minimum weight required under the statute,...” 

Transcript at 11-12. We find that appellant’s sentence is not so disproportionate to the 

offenses as to shock the community’s sense of justice. 

{¶14} Appellant’s sole assignment of error is, therefore, overruled. 

{¶15} Accordingly, the judgment of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas is 

affirmed. 

By: Baldwin, J. 

John Wise, P.J. and 

Earle Wise, J. concur.