U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Office of Enforcement 

Washington, DC 20555

ENFORCEMENT PROG

 ANNUAL REPORT

 Calendar Year 2011

RAM 
OE Annual Report

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OE Annual Report

iii 

Contents 

Executive Summary ................................................................................................................. v 

I. Program Overview ..................................................................................................... 1 

A. Mission and Authority ................................................................................................ 1 

B. Assessment of Escalated Enforcement Actions ...................................................... 4 

1. Escalated Enforcement Trends .............................................................................. 6 

2. Civil Penalty Actions .............................................................................................. 7 

3. Notices of Violation without Civil Penalties ........................................................ 10 

4. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) ................................................................. 11 

II. Enforcement Case Work .......................................................................................... 13 

A. Significant Enforcement Actions ............................................................................ 13 

B. Hearing Activities ..................................................................................................... 15 

C. Orders ....................................................................................................................... 16 

D. Enforcement Actions Supported by the Office of Investigations ......................... 16 

E. Actions Involving Individuals and Nonlicensee Organizations ............................. 16 

F. Enforcement Action Involving Discrimination ....................................................... 17 

G. Use of Judgment and Discretion in Determining Appropriate Enforcement 

Sanctions .................................................................................................................. 17

1. Discretion Involving Enforcement Guidance ...................................................... 17 

2. Discretion Involving Special Circumstances ...................................................... 18 

3. Discretion Used to Forego Proposing a Civil Penalty ........................................ 19 

4. Notices of Enforcement Discretion ...................................................................... 19 

H. Withdrawn Actions ................................................................................................... 20 

III. Ongoing Activities ................................................................................................... 21 

A. Enforcement Policy .................................................................................................. 21 

1. Interim Enforcement Policy Guidance ................................................................. 21 

2. Future Enforcement Policy Revision Activities .................................................. 22 

B. Enforcement Guidance Memoranda ....................................................................... 23 

C. Knowledge Management.......................................................................................... 24 

D. Regional Accomplishments ..................................................................................... 26 

 
OE Annual Report

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- TABLES – 

Table 1. Escalated Action Trends ....................................................................... 6 

Table 2. Civil Penalty Information ....................................................................... 8 

Table 3. CY 2011—Escalated Enforcement Actions by Region and 

 Program Office ..................................................................................... 27 

Table 4. CY 2011—Escalated Enforcement Actions by Type of Licensee, 

 Nonlicensee, or Individual ................................................................... 28 

- FIGURES - 

Figure 1. How the NRC Regulates ........................................................................ 1 

Figure 2. Escalated Enforcement by Type of Enforcement Action .................... 4 

Figure 3. Escalated Enforcement by Type of Licensee ....................................... 5 

Figure 4. Escalated Action Trends (CY 2006—CY 2011) ..................................... 7

Figure 5. Comparison of Amount of Proposed Civil Penalties 

(in U.S. Dollars) by Licensee Type for CY 2006—CY 2011 .................. 9 

Figure 6. Percentage of Proposed Civil Penalties 

by Licensee Type for CY 2006—CY 2011 ........................................... 10 

Figure 7. ADR Confirmatory Orders Issued in CY 2005—2011 ......................... 12 

Figure 8. Calendar Days from NRC Action to Issuance of Confirmatory 

 Order ..................................................................................................... 12 

- APPENDICES - 

A. Summary of Cases Involving Civil Penalties ................................................. A1 

B. Summary of Escalated Notices of Violation without Civil Penalties ............ B1 

C. Summary of Orders ......................................................................................... C1

D. Summary of Escalated Enforcement Actions against Individuals ............... D1 

E. Summary of Escalated Enforcement Actions against Nonlicensees 

(Vendors, Contractors, and Certificate Holders) ........................................... E1 
OE Annual Report

v 

Executive Summary 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) effectively implemented the Enforcement 

Policy and Program in Calendar Year (CY) 2011. The relevant NRC Headquarters offices and 

regional offices continued to focus on appropriate and consistent enforcement of the agency’s 

regulations. 

Escalated Enforcement Action Data 

In CY 2011, the agency issued 96 escalated enforcement actions, which included 14 actions 

involving civil penalties totaling $146,750 and 82 escalated notices of violation without a civil 

penalty. No civil penalties were assessed against reactor facilities in CY 2011. Five of the 14 

actions involving civil penalties totaling $50,000 were confirmatory orders issued as a result of 

successful mediation sessions conducted through the agency’s Alternative Dispute Resolution 

(ADR) Program. In addition, the NRC issued five enforcement orders in CY 2011, including a 

prohibition of an individual from involvement in NRC-licensed activities and an order to suspend 

a license. The number of escalated enforcement actions without civil penalties is consistent 

with that of previous years and is equal to the 5-year average. The total number of escalated 

enforcement actions decreased in CY 2011 largely because of a decrease in the number of 

enforcement actions related to civil penalties. Although the number and monetary amount of 

civil penalties in CY 2011 decreased from CY 2010 levels, these values are comparable to the 

number of civil penalties the agency issued in CY 2009. Of the 96 escalated enforcement 

actions issued in CY 2011, the agency withheld 35 from the public because they involved 

security or safeguards violations. 

Noteworthy Program Accomplishments 

The Office of Enforcement (OE) issued two Interim Enforcement Policy guidance documents 

and seven Enforcement Guidance Memoranda to give the staff and outside stakeholders 

information on the dispositioning of specific enforcement actions. In addition, OE assessed 

implementation of the agency’s enforcement program at two regions in CY 2011. The agency 

continued the successful use of the ADR Program in nine enforcement cases. 

Significant Cases 

In CY 2011, the agency processed a number of significant cases that required extensive 

coordination and cooperation between internal and external stakeholders. These significant 

cases included: (1) a Severity Level III violation issued to the U.S. Department of the Army, 

(2) a notice of violation associated with a red significance determination process finding issued 

to Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant, (3) a notice of violation associated with a yellow 

significance determination process finding issued to Oconee Nuclear Station, and (4) an Atomic 

Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) order that the agency issued after it successfully reached 

settlement agreements in prehearing negotiations with Mattingly Testing Services. 
OE Annual Report

vi 
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1 

I. Program Overview 

A. Mission and Authority 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) regulates 

the civilian uses of nuclear 

materials in the United States 

to protect public health and 

safety, the environment, and 

the common defense and 

security. The agency 

accomplishes this mission 

through: licensing of nuclear 

facilities and the possession, 

use, and disposal of nuclear 

materials; the development 

and implementation of 

requirements governing 

licensed activities; and 

inspection and enforcement 

activities to ensure compliance 

with these requirements. 

The NRC conducts various types of inspections and investigations designed to ensure 

that the activities it licenses are conducted in strict compliance with the Commission’s 

regulations, the terms of the licenses, and other requirements. 

The sources of the NRC’s enforcement authority are the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 

as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and the Energy 

Policy Act of 2005. These statutes give the NRC broad authority. The Energy Policy 

Act of 2005 expanded the definition of byproduct material, placing additional byproduct 

material under the NRC’s jurisdiction including both naturally occurring and 

accelerator-produced radioactive materials (NARM). The agency implements its 

enforcement authority through Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 

Part 2, “Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings and Issuance of 

Orders,” Subpart B, “Procedures for Imposing Requirements by Order, or for 

Modification, Suspension, or Revocation of a License, or for Imposing Civil Penalties.” 

The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 provides the statutory framework 

for the Federal Government to use alternative dispute resolution (ADR). 

 

Figure 1: How the NRC Regulates 
OE Annual Report

2 

The NRC Enforcement Policy establishes the general principles governing the NRC’s 

Enforcement Program and specifies a process for implementing the agency’s 

enforcement authority in response to violations of NRC requirements. This statement 

of policy is predicated on the NRC’s view that compliance with NRC requirements 

serves a key role in ensuring safety, maintaining security, and protecting the 

environment. The Enforcement Policy applies to all NRC licensees, to various 

categories of nonlicensees, and to individual employees of licensed and 

nonlicensed firms involved in NRC-regulated activities. 

The NRC enforces compliance as necessary. Enforcement actions serve as a 

deterrent, emphasize the importance of compliance with regulatory requirements, and 

encourage prompt identification and prompt, comprehensive correction of violations. 

In addition, because violations occur in a variety of activities and have varying levels of 

significance, the NRC Enforcement Policy contains graduated sanctions. 

Enforcement authority includes the use of notices of violation, civil penalties, demands 

for information, and orders to modify, suspend, or revoke a license. The NRC staff 

may exercise discretion in determining the appropriate enforcement sanctions to be 

taken. Most violations are identified through inspections and investigations and are 

normally assigned a severity level (SL) ranging from SL IV for those of more than 

minor concern to SL I for the most significant. 

The Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) supplements the enforcement process for 

operating nuclear reactors. Under the ROP, violations are not normally assigned a 

severity level but instead are assessed through the ROP and usually referred to as 

“findings.” Under this program, the NRC determines the risk significance of inspection 

findings using the significance determination process (SDP), which assigns the colors 

of green, white, yellow, or red with increasing risk significance. Findings under the 

ROP may also include licensee failures to meet self-imposed standards. As such, an 

ROP finding may or may not involve a violation of a regulatory requirement. While the 

ROP can process most violations at operating power reactors, it cannot address 

aspects of some violations; such violations require the NRC to follow the traditional 

enforcement process. 

These violations include violations that resulted in actual safety or security 

consequences, violations that may affect the ability of the NRC to perform its 

regulatory oversight function, and violations that involve willfulness. In addition, while 

ROP findings are not normally subject to civil penalties, the NRC does consider civil 

penalties for any violation that involves actual consequences. SL IV violations and 

violations associated with green ROP findings are normally dispositioned as noncited 

violations (NCVs). Inspection reports or inspection records document NCVs and 

briefly describe the corrective action that the licensee has taken or plans to take, if 

known at the time the NCV is documented. Additional information about the ROP is 

available at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/index.html. 

OE develops policies and programs for the enforcement of NRC requirements. In 

addition, OE oversees NRC enforcement, giving programmatic and implementation 

direction to regional and Headquarters offices that conduct or are involved in 

enforcement activities, and ensures that regional and program offices consistently 

implement the agency’s enforcement program. 

 
OE Annual Report

3 

The Director of OE reports directly to the Deputy Executive Director for Materials, 

Waste, Research, State, Tribal, and Compliance Programs (DEDMRT), and is 

responsible for ensuring that the DEDMRT is kept apprised of certain escalated 

actions. The DEDMRT is consulted in any case that involves novel issues; substantial 

legal, programmatic, or policy issues raised during the enforcement review process; or 

in any case in which the Director of OE believes the DEDMRT’s involvement is 

warranted. OE works in partnership with NRC Headquarters and regional offices to 

enforce the agency’s requirements. 

The NRC’s enforcement Web site (http://www.nrc.gov/aboutnrc/regulatory/enforcement.html) presents a variety of information, such as the 

Enforcement Policy; the Enforcement Manual; and current temporary enforcement 

guidance contained in enforcement guidance memoranda. This Web site also has 

information about significant enforcement actions the NRC has issued to reactor and 

materials licensees, nonlicensees (vendors, contractors, and certificate holders), and 

individuals. Consistent with NRC practices and policies, most security-related actions 

and activities are not available on the NRC’s public Web site. However, OE’s 

collection of enforcement documents includes security orders that impose 

compensatory security requirements on various licensees. 

In addition to enforcement activities, OE’s oversight responsibilities include, in part, the 

Allegations Program, Employee Protection and Discrimination, and the ADR Program 

(both early-ADR and post-investigation ADR). More information about OE’s 

responsibilities is available on the NRC’s public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/aboutnrc/organization/oefuncdesc.html. 

 
OE Annual Report

B. Assessment of 

Escalated enforcement act

• notices of violatio

• NOVs associated

reactor facilities) 

• civil penalty action

• orders (including 

Figure 2: Escalated E

Figure 2 (above) shows the

issued in Calendar Year (C

throughout the year to all li

was an NOV without a civil

77 NOVs without a civil pen

Section 2.3.4, civil penaltie

corrective action to prevent

speaking, the large percen

trend because it reflects a 

adequately responding to e

of the ADR orders issued in

number of escalated enforc

issued in CY 2010, it is app

CY 2007, and CY 2006. T

significant increase in the i

Escalated NOVs 

with Civil Penalties

Orders

11% 

9

4 

Escalated Enforcement Actions

tions include the following: 

ns (NOVs) including SL I, II, or III violations 

d with red, yellow, or white SDP findings (for oper

ns 

confirmatory orders that result from the ADR pro

Enforcement by Type of Enforcement Act

e distribution of escalated enforcement actions th

CY) 2011 by type of action for the 96 total actions

censees. The most common escalated enforcem

l penalty. Table 1 (below) shows that the agency

nalty in CY 2011. According to the Enforcement 

es may not be warranted if a licensee takes adequ

t recurrence of an identified SL III violation. Gen

tage of NOVs without civil penalties is considered

strong licensee program with the majority of licen

escalated enforcement actions. Nine of the NOV

n CY 2011 included a civil penalty. Although the 

cement actions with a civil penalty is less than the

proximately equivalent to the number issued in C

he five ADR orders issued with civil penalties ref

ssuance of civil penalties associated with enforce

Escalated N

w/o CP

80%

9%

rating 

cess) 

ion

he NRC 

s issued 

ment action 

y issued 

Policy, 

uate 

erally

d a positive 

nsees 

Vs and five 

 total 

e number 

CY 2009, 

lect a 

ement 

NOVs 

Ps
OE Annual Report

5 

mediation activities. In previous years, the NRC issued only one ADR order with a civil 

penalty. Including the ADR orders with civil penalties, there were 10 actions involved 

the issuance of an order. This is a decrease from the 17 orders issued in CY 2010 

and is below the 5-year average. 

Figure 3 (below) shows the distribution of enforcement actions based on the types of 

licensees to whom the NRC issued escalated enforcement actions were issued in CY 

2011. For this chart, individual actions were included in the appropriate category of 

licensee, instead of being counted separately. The following charts and the tables at 

the end of this report give further detail by identifying the region or program office that 

initiated the action, as well as the licensees, nonlicensees, and individuals involved. 

Figure 3: Escalated Enforcement by Type of Licensee 

The larger number of escalated enforcement actions issued to materials licensees 

reflects the significantly larger number of materials licenses (approximately 3,000) 

when compared to licenses for operating reactors (104) and fuel facilities (13). The 

majority of escalated enforcement actions issued to materials licensees without civil 

penalties were issued for gauge users and hospitals, as shown in Table 4. This is 

consistent with the distribution of escalated enforcement actions issued to materials 

licensees in past years and reflects the increased emphasis on inspections for security 

and control of licensed materials. The number of escalated enforcement actions 

associated with reactor facilities in CY 2011 is relatively consistent with that of past 

years; however, CY 2011 saw a noticeable decrease in the number of escalated 

30

4

43

0

3

11

1 1 3

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

Reactor Fuel Facility Materials

Escalated NOVs w/o Civil Penalties

NOVs and Orders w/ Civil Penalties

Orders w/o Civil Penalties
OE Annual Report

6 

enforcement actions associated with materials licensees (25 percent) from CY 2010. 

This decrease may be attributable to three states (New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and 

Virginia) achieving agreement state status in the past few years. The 57 escalated 

enforcement actions are comparable to the number of actions issued in CY 2006. The 

NRC will evaluate this trend in the future. The total number of escalated enforcement 

actions issued to fuel cycle facilities decreased, but is comparable to that of CY 2010. 

1. Escalated Enforcement Trends 

In CY 2011, the agency issued 96 escalated enforcement actions. Although this 

number is a 22 percent decrease from that of CY 2010, the 96 escalated enforcement 

actions are comparable to the number of actions issued in CY 2006. The NRC will 

evaluate this trend in the future. Table 1 shows a breakdown of the number of 

escalated enforcement actions from CY 2006 to CY 2011 by type of enforcement 

action. Figure 4 displays this information in graphical form. 

Table 1 – Escalated Action Trends 

CY 2011 CY 2010 CY 2009 CY 2008 CY 2007 CY 2006 Average 

Escalated 

NOVs 

(w/o CPs) 

77 84 76 94 77 57 78 

NOVs and 

Orders 

w/CPs 

14 24 17 28 18 15 19 

Orders (w/o 

CPs) 5 15 25 35 22 15 20 

Orders 

Imposing 

CPs 

0 1 3 0 1 0 1 

Total 96 124 121 157 118 87 117 
OE Annual Report

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Figure 4: Escalated Action Trends (CY 2006—CY 2011) 

As shown in Table 1 above, the total number of escalated enforcement actions issued 

in 2011 is less than the 6-year average. The number of enforcement actions not 

associated with a civil penalty is consistent with the 6-year average. The number of 

enforcement actions associated with civil penalties, although smaller than in previous 

years, is comparable to the 6-year average. Table 1 shows a noticeable declining 

trend in the issuance of orders not associated with civil penalties. This is cause, in 

part, by the maturation of the ADR Program and the increased use of civil penalties in 

the mediation process. 

2. Civil Penalty Actions

In CY 2011, the agency processed 14 cases that involved civil penalties. Five of the 

14 cases were associated with ADR settlements following successful mediation 

sessions. This number represents a significant increase over previous years in which 

no more than one ADR order involved a civil penalty. 

Nine of these cases involved willfulness which is defined as either deliberate 

misconduct or careless disregard. The Commission is particularly concerned with the 

identification of willful violations. The NRC’s regulatory program is based on licensees 

and their contractors, employees, and agents acting with integrity and communicating 

with candor; therefore, the agency may consider a violation involving willfulness to be 

more egregious than the underlying violation, taken alone, would have been, and it 

may increase the severity level accordingly. 

 

57

77

94

76

84

77

15

18

28

17

23

15 14

23

35

28

17

5

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Escalated NOVs w/o Civil Penalties

NOVsand Orders w/Civil Penalties

Orders w/o Civil Penalties
OE Annual Report

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Table 2 – Civil Penalty Information 

Table 2 compares civil penalty assessments proposed, imposed, and paid for the 

current calendar year to those of the previous five years and the 6-year average. 

When reviewing the information in this table, it is important to note that an enforcement 

action may include more than one civil penalty or more than one violation. In addition, 

a civil penalty may be proposed in one year and paid or imposed in another year. In 

some cases, the NRC has approved a civil penalty payment plan whereby a licensee 

is permitted to pay the civil penalty in regular installments. Finally, the amount of a 

proposed civil penalty may be reduced, for example, as a result of exercising 

discretion as part of a settlement agreement developed during ADR. 

The total number of civil penalties proposed in CY 2011 decreased from the number 

proposed in CY 2010 and is below the average number proposed over the last six 

years. No civil penalties were assessed against reactor facilities in CY 2011. The total 

dollar amount of proposed civil penalties decreased significantly in CY 2011 compared 

with CY 2010, mainly as a result of the civil penalties issued in CY 2010 to the 

U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Philadelphia Medical Center, Nuclear Fuel 

Services (NFS), and Florida Power and Light’s Turkey Point Plant. The amount of civil 

penalties proposed in CY 2011 is comparable to the amount proposed in CY 2009. 

 1 The NRC issues an “order imposing civil monetary penalty” when a licensee chooses not to pay a 

proposed civil penalty, unless a basis exists for withdrawal of the proposed penalty. 

CY 2011 CY 2010 CY 2009 CY 2008 CY 2007 CY 2006 Average 

Number of 

Proposed Civil 

Penalties 14 23 17 28 18 15 19 

Number of Orders 

that Imposed Civil 

Penalties 0 1 3 0 1 0 1 

Number of Civil 

Penalties Paid 11 21 15 29 17 16 18 

Amount of Proposed 

Civil Penalties $146,750 $673,700 $174,000 $1,185,900 $383,200 $332,350 $482,650 

Amount of Imposed 

Civil Penalties1 $0 $32,500 $29,250 $0 $3,250 $0 $10,833 

Amount of Civil 

Penalties Paid $123,529 $639,480 $279,750 $1,039,850 $446,500 $375,500 $484,102 
OE Annual Report

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Figure 5: Comparison of Amount of Proposed 

Civil Penalties (in U.S. Dollars) by Licensee Type for CY 2006—2011 

Figures 5 (above) shows the dollar amount of civil penalties proposed for reactor, 

materials, and fuel facility licensees in CY 2011 and the preceding five years. Figure 6 

(below) shows a significant increase in the percentage of the total civil penalty amount 

issued to fuel cycle and materials licensees in CY 2011. This is because no civil 

penalties were issued to reactor licensees in CY 2011. The largest peaks are 

frequently the result of a single civil penalty (e.g., Indian Point Nuclear Station in 2008 

and the Philadelphia VA Medical Center in 2010). As a consequence, a single year 

may not indicate a trend—an important factor to consider in assessing possible trends. 

 

0

100,000

200,000

300,000

400,000

500,000

600,000

700,000

800,000

900,000

1,000,000

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Proposed Civil Penalty in U.S. Dollars

Calendar Year

Reactor

Fuel Facility

Materials
OE Annual Report

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Figure 6: Percentage of Proposed Civil Penalties 

by Licensee Type for CY 2006—2011 

Appendix A to this report includes a brief description of each of the civil penalty actions 

for CY 2011. Security related issues involving NOVs with civil penalties are not 

addressed in Appendix A; however, the number of NOVs associated with security 

related issues is included in the data discussed in this report. 

3. Notices of Violation without Civil Penalties

In accordance with Section 2.3.4 of the Enforcement Policy, a civil penalty may not be 

warranted for escalated enforcement actions if certain criteria are met. For instance, 

(1) the identified violation is the first non-willful SL III violation identified in the past two 

years or two inspections at the licensee’s facility and the licensee took adequate 

corrective action to prevent its recurrence, or (2) this was not the first non-willful SL III 

violation identified in the past two years or two inspections, but the licensee selfidentified the violation and took adequate corrective action to prevent its recurrence. 

In addition, the agency may use enforcement discretion, when deemed appropriate, to 

refrain from proposing a civil penalty, regardless of the normal civil penalty 

assessment process described above. 

In CY 2011, the NRC issued 77 escalated NOVs without civil penalties. Of these 

violations, 24 were associated with white SDP findings under the ROP. One violation 

was associated with a yellow SDP finding, and one violation was associated with a red 

SDP finding. The NRC issued five NOVs associated with green SDP findings to 

reactor licensees. NOVs associated with green SDP findings are not considered 

escalated enforcement actions. 

 

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

% of Total Proposed Civil Penalties

Calendar Year

Materials

Fuel Facility

Reactor
OE Annual Report

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Appendix B to this report summarizes each of these NOVs without civil penalties 

issued to licensees, as well as the NOVs associated with SDP findings. Security 

related issues involving NOVs without civil penalties are not addressed in Appendix B; 

however, the number of NOVs associated with security related issues is included in 

the data discussed in this report. 

4. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 

The term ''post-investigation ADR'' refers to the use of mediation after the NRC Office 

of Investigations (OI) has completed its investigation and an enforcement panel has 

concluded that pursuit of an enforcement action appears to be warranted. Under the 

NRC’s post-investigation ADR process, mediation may be offered at three points in the 

enforcement process for discrimination and other wrongdoing cases: (1) before a 

predecisional enforcement conference; (2) after the initial enforcement action is taken, 

typically the issuance of an NOV; or (3) after cases result in the issuance of an order 

imposing a civil penalty, but before a hearing request. Mediation is an informal and 

voluntary process in which a neutral mediator with no decision-making authority helps 

the parties attempt to reach an agreement. The staff believes that for certain 

escalated enforcement actions mediation affords the staff an opportunity to institute 

broader or more comprehensive corrective actions to better ensure public health and 

safety than outcomes typically achieved through the traditional enforcement process. 

As Figure 7 shows, the number of confirmatory orders arising from the postinvestigation ADR program generally stayed at the same typical levels of 

approximately 5 to 10 confirmatory orders per year (excluding the uncharacteristically 

high number in CY 2009). In CY 2011, the NRC participated in seven postinvestigation ADR mediations that resulted in orders confirming the terms of the 

parties’ agreement (one reactor licensee and six materials licensees). 

In CY 2011, the staff continued its focus on enhancing the post-investigation ADR 

program’s timeliness, transparency and overall effectiveness by implementing several 

initiatives. Those initiatives included (1) holding a public meeting to solicit feedback 

from the program’s public stakeholders; (2) redesigning the program’s public Web 

page, thereby making more information available; (3) revising several program 

documents, such as the post-investigation brochure; and, (4) issuing more internal and 

external guidance documents. Although the realization of the impact of the NRC’s 

ADR initiatives is more evolutionary than instantaneous, the timeliness data (Figure 8) 

reflects a positive trend. 

 
OE Annual Report

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Figure 7: ADR Confirmatory Orders Issued in CY 2005—2011 

Figure 8: Calendar Days from NRC Action to Issuance of Confirmatory 

Order

5

2 1 2 1 1

6

7

7

12

22

8

6

0

5

10

15

20

25

CY 2005 CY 2006 CY 2007 CY 2008 CY 2009 CY 2010 CY 2011

Wrongdoing Cases

Discrimination Cases

143

173 168 165 161

130

104

0

50

100

150

200

CY 2005 CY 2006 CY 2007 CY 2008 CY 2009 CY 2010 CY 2011
OE Annual Report

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II. Enforcement Case Work 

A. Significant Enforcement Actions 

In CY 2011, the agency was involved in several significant enforcement actions that 

required coordination among internal and external stakeholders beyond the typical 

enforcement case and were noteworthy in some aspects. 

 

U.S. Department of the Army—U.S. Army Installation Management Command

 

On August 1, 2011, an NOV was issued to the U.S. Department of the Army (Army) for 

a violation associated with possession of depleted uranium (DU) without an NRC 

license following the expiration of its associated license in April 1978. The Army 

continued to possess DU, in the form of spent fragments of spotting rounds (obtained 

from 1962 to 1968, and expended before 1968), at firing ranges located at the Army’s 

two Hawaiian installations, Schofield Barracks and Pohakuloa Training Area; as well 

as other installations across the United States. 

This violation of 10 CFR 40.3, “License Requirements,” which states, in part, that 

persons may not receive title to own, receive, possess, use, transfer, or dispose of 

source material unless authorized in a specific or general license issued by the NRC, 

was categorized at Severity Level III in accordance with the Enforcement Policy. The 

NRC considered this violation significant because the requirements in 10 CFR 40.3 

give reasonable assurance that control of radioactive material will be adequate to 

prevent unauthorized removal or access, and to ensure that exposures to workers, 

members of the public, and the environment do not exceed NRC dose limits. 

On April 4, 2011, the NRC conducted a meeting with the Army Installation 

Management Command staff, to discuss the basis for the violation. The NRC also 

described the violation in detail in a letter to the Army dated April 5, 2011 (Agencywide 

Documents Access and management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML110660245. 

A public predecisional enforcement conference with the Army was held on 

May 10, 2011, in the NRC’s Region IV offices to give the Army an opportunity to 

present its perspective on the violation before the NRC made a final enforcement 

decision. 

In response to the NOV, the Army committed to take a number of actions to correct the 

violation and prevent recurrence. These actions include, in part, (1) submitting a 

license application, and (2) ensuring that appropriate access control of areas 

suspected of containing DU is maintained to protect workers and members of the 

public. 

Because the Army identified the issue and took or planned to take adequate corrective 

actions in a timely manner, the NRC did not propose a civil penalty, in accordance with 

the enforcement policy. 

 
OE Annual Report

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Violations Associated with Red and Yellow Findings 

In CY 2011, the NRC issued NOVs associated with a red SDP finding to one reactor 

licensee and a yellow SDP finding to another reactor licensee. The NRC issued no 

violations associated with a red SDP finding and four violations associated with yellow 

findings issued in CY 2010. Short summaries of the cases issued in CY 2011 follow: 

• On May 9, 2011, an NOV was issued to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for a 

violation associated with a red SDP finding identified in an inspection at the Browns 

Ferry Nuclear Power Plant. The violation involved the failure to implement an 

inservice testing program in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical 

Engineers (ASME) Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants 

(OM Code), 1995 Edition, 1996 Addenda, Section ISTC 4.1. In a letter dated June 8, 

2011, TVA appealed the final significance determination of this red finding. The NRC 

performed an independent review of this finding and in a letter dated 

August 16, 2011, concluded that TVA failed to establish adequate programs, as 

required by 10 CFR 50.55a(b)3(ii), to ensure that motor-operated valves continued to 

be capable of performing their design-basis safety functions. The inadequacy of 

TVA’s programs resulted in the Unit 1 Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) 

outboard injection valve, 1-FCV-74-66, being left in a significantly degraded condition 

and the Unit 1 LPCI/RHR Loop II unable to fulfill its safety function. The basis and 

outcome of the final risk significance determination evaluation on this red finding 

remained unchanged. As a result of this enforcement action, the NRC conducted 

additional inspection activities. On January 23, 2012, an NOV was issued to TVA for 

a SLIII violation of 10 CFR 50.9, “Completeness and Accuracy of Information” 

associated with this issue. Specifically, TVA gave information to the Commission 

that was not complete and accurate in all material respects, about its NRC Generic 

Letter 89-10, “Safety-Related Motor-Operator Valve Testing and Surveillance” testing 

program. Because the violation had occurred more than five years previously, the 

statute of limitation provisions in Title 28 to the United States Code, Section 2462, 

“Time for Commencing Proceedings,” had tolled and no civil penalty could be 

assessed for this violation. 

• On December 6, 2011, an NOV was issued to Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC 

(Licensee) for a violation associated with a yellow SDP finding identified in an 

inspection at the Oconee Nuclear Station. The Licensee identified that the installed 

pressurizer heater breakers supplying power from the standby shutdown facility (SSF) 

may not be able to withstand the expected containment temperatures during certain 

casualty scenarios and declared the system inoperable. Later the Licensee replaced 

these breakers and declared the system operable. However, the licensee performed 

limited environmental testing performed on these breakers and during subsequent 

environmental qualification testing it discovered that these new breakers could not 

perform their design-basis function at the expected elevated containment 

temperatures, so the Licensee declared them inoperable. The system was later 

declared operable when the Licensee replaced these breakers with environmentally 

qualified fuses. An NOV was included with the finding for a violation of 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, “Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,” 

Criterion III, “Design Control.” From 1983 to June 1, 2011, the Licensee implemented 

a modification to the SSF that used installed breakers that had not been tested to 

verify that they would function at elevated containment temperatures and maintain 

SSF functionality in accordance with the licensing and design basis. 
OE Annual Report

15 

B. Hearing Activities

In CY 2011, a request was made for a hearing before the ASLB relating to 

enforcement actions against Mattingly Testing Services, Inc. (MTS or the Licensee) 

and its former president and owner. Although the ASLB established a review board, 

the case was successfully closed before the conduct of any adjudicatory proceeding 

when the board approved a settlement agreement that the NRC reached with the 

affected parties. 

Mattingly Testing Services, Inc. 

On September 2, 2010, an Immediately Effective Order Revoking License was issued 

to MTS for multiple violations that the NRC identified during an NRC inspection and 

investigation. On the same day, the NRC issued an Immediately Effective Order 

Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed Activities for a period of seven years to 

Mr. Mark Ficek, president and owner of MTS. Mr. Ficek did not agree with NRC’s 

characterization of the issues and on September 22, 2010 requested, in accordance 

with the Order and 10 CFR 2.205, “Civil Penalties,” that the ASLB conduct a hearing 

into these matters. 

On October 6, 2010, the ASLB granted Mr. Ficek’s request for a hearing to resolve 

issues associated with the two Orders the NRC issued on September 2, 2010. On the 

same date, the ASLB denied a request by Ms. Dayna Thompson, an employee of 

MTS, to forgo the immediate effectiveness of the MTS Order. On November 4, 2010, 

the Licensee and the NRC jointly submitted a motion asking the board to hold this 

administrative enforcement proceeding in abeyance, pending the outcome of proposed 

settlement negotiations. 

On February 22, 2011, the ASLB approved a settlement agreement successfully 

negotiated between the NRC and Mr. Ficek. The board found that its terms reflected a 

fair and reasonable settlement of these matters in keeping with the objectives of the 

NRC’s Enforcement Policy, and that they satisfied the requirements of 

10 CFR 2.338(g) and 10 CFR 2.338(h). The ASLB Order approving and incorporating 

the settlement agreement superseded the September 2, 2010, Enforcement Orders to 

MTS and Mr. Ficek. The board’s Order stipulates, in part, that Mr. Ficek will not own a 

controlling share or interest of an NRC licensee, Mr. Ficek will refrain from engaging in 

NRC-licensed activities until September 2, 2017, the revoked MTS license will not be 

reinstated, and for a period of three years, Mr. Ficek will give notice to the OE Director 

10 days before beginning employment involving certain specified NRC-licensed 

activities. The complete Order can be viewed in ADAMS at Accession No. 

ML110530327. This action required extensive interaction and cooperation between 

Region IV, OE, OI, the Office of the General Counsel (OGC), and the Office of Federal 

and State Materials and Environmental Management (FSME) within the NRC and with 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the State of Wyoming. 

 
OE Annual Report

16 

C. Orders

In CY 2011, the NRC issued 10 orders to licensees and to individuals. These included 

seven confirmatory orders that were issued to confirm commitments associated with ADR 

settlement agreements. Five of these orders included a requirement to pay a civil penalty 

as a result of the settlement agreements. One order was issued to a materials licensee 

suspending its licensed activities for failing to provide financial assurance for 

decommissioning. 

Two of the orders were issued to individuals. One individual is prohibited from 

involvement in NRC-licensed activities until specific actions are taken to ensure 

reasonable assurance is provided for the protection of public health and safety. Another 

individual, who is no longer employed in NRC-licensed related activities, must notify the 

NRC of future involvement in NRC-licensed or Agreement State regulated activities. 

As shown in Table 1, the number of orders the NRC issued in CY 2011 decreased from 

CY 2010 partly because of a decrease in the number of cases involving ADR and a 

decrease in the number of cases involving individuals. 

 

Appendix C includes a brief description of the enforcement orders issued in CY 2011. 

D. Enforcement Actions Supported by the Office of Investigations

In CY 2011, an OI investigation supported 21 percent of the escalated enforcement 

actions (20 of the 96). This figure is consistent with the percentage supported by OI 

investigations in CY 2010. The escalated actions supported by OI investigations include 

the following: 

• 9 of the 14 escalated NOVs with civil penalties (64 percent) 

• 7 of the 77 escalated NOVs without civil penalties (9 percent) 

• 9 of the 10 enforcement orders (90 percent) 

The 21 enforcement actions supported by OI investigations are comparable to the 27 

enforcement actions supported in CY 2010 and are a decrease in the average number of 

OI supported cases over previous years. The number of enforcement actions supported 

by an OI investigation also decreased from the 45 cases in CY 2009. 

E. Actions Involving Individuals and Nonlicensee Organizations

In CY 2011, the agency issued seven escalated enforcement actions to licensed and 

unlicensed individuals. This number is included in the total number of escalated 

enforcement actions (NOVs and orders) that the agency issued in CY 2011. Appendix C 

summarizes the orders that were issued to individuals and Appendix D summarizes the 

NOVs issued to individuals in CY 2011. These appendices do not include individual 

enforcement actions involving security related violations. The number of escalated actions 

issued to individuals in CY 2011 decreased from 11 escalated actions issued to individuals 

in CY 2010 and 17 issued in CY 2009. 

The agency issued one escalated enforcement action to a nonlicensee organization in 

CY 2011. Appendix E summarizes this action. 
OE Annual Report

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F. Enforcement Action Involving Discrimination 

In CY 2011, one case involving an allegation of discrimination was resolved using 

post-investigation ADR. This is equivalent the number processed in CY 2010. On 

August 22, 2011, the NRC issued a confirmatory order (EA-11-096) to confirm 

commitments made as result of an ADR mediation session held on July 18, 2011, 

between Entergy Corporation and the NRC. This confirmatory order arose out of an 

apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.7, “Employee Protection,” in which the NRC had 

reached a preliminary conclusion that an employee at the River Bend Station was 

rated lower in the 2008 annual performance appraisal, in part because the employee 

questioned the qualifications necessary to perform certain work activities in 

compliance with applicable plant procedures. 

G. Use of Judgment and Discretion in Determining Appropriate 

Enforcement Sanctions

The NRC may choose to exercise discretion and either escalate or mitigate 

enforcement sanctions or otherwise refrain from taking enforcement action within its 

statutory authority. The exercise of discretion allows the NRC to determine which 

actions should be taken in a particular case, notwithstanding the guidance contained in 

the Enforcement Policy. After considering the general tenets of the Enforcement 

Policy and the safety and security significance of a violation and its surrounding 

circumstances, the NRC may exercise judgment and discretion in determining the 

severity levels of violations and the appropriate enforcement sanctions. 

In CY 2011, the NRC exercised enforcement discretion in 34 cases to address 

violations of NRC requirements, the same number as CY 2010. Below is a discussion 

of the more significant cases dispositioned with discretion in CY 2011. 

1. Discretion Involving Enforcement Guidance 

In 22 cases the NRC used discretion in accordance with either the Interim 

Enforcement Policy guidance related to fire protection issues or Enforcement 

Guidance Memoranda (EGM). 

• The NRC continued to perform fire protection inspections at power reactor sites to 

verify compliance with requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, “Fire Protection 

Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979.” 

Violations of these requirements that were identified at sites transitioning to the 

National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 (NFPA 805) and met the criteria 

as stated in the Interim Enforcement Policy, “Enforcement Discretion for Certain 

Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48)” warranted enforcement discretion and 

notices of violation were not issued. Five documented cases involved this type of 

discretion. Violations that involved multiple fire-induced circuit faults identified at 

sites that are not transitioning to NFPA 805 and that meet the criteria as stated in 

the Enforcement Guidance Memoranda (EGM)-09-002, “Enforcement Discretion 

For Certain Fire Induced Circuit Faults”, also warranted enforcement discretion. 

Two documented case involved this type of discretion. 
OE Annual Report

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• The agency dispositioned nine violations using discretion in accordance with 

EGM-09-004, “Interim Guidance for Dispositioning Violations of Naturally Occurring 

and Accelerator-Produced Radioactive Materials (NARM) Requirements,” dated 

May 13, 2009. Enforcement discretion may be exercised for violations of the 

NARM requirements if certain criteria are met as described in EGM-09-004. 

• The NRC dispositioned five violations using discretion in accordance with 

EGM-11-004, “Interim Guidance for Dispositioning Violations of Security 

Requirements for Portable Gauges," dated April 28, 2011. Enforcement discretion 

may be exercised for violations of 10 CFR 30.34(i) if certain criteria are met as 

described in EGM-11-004. 

• The NRC dispositioned one violation using discretion in accordance with 

EGM-09-007, Revision 2, “Interim Guidance for Dispositionng Violations of 

National Source Tracking System (NSTS) Requirements,” dated March 2, 2011. 

Enforcement discretion may be exercised for violations of NSTS requirements if 

certain criteria are met as described in EGM-09-007, Revision 2. 

2. Discretion Involving Special Circumstances 

Eleven cases involved use of discretion in accordance with Section 3.5 of the 

Enforcement Policy, “Special Circumstances.” In each case, the staff determined that 

the facts supported issuance of a closeout letter to the licensee in lieu of an NOV. 

Below is a discussion of the more significant cases dispositioned in CY 2011. 

• A violation of 10 CFR 20.1301(a)(1), normally categorized at SL III, was 

dispositioned using enforcement discretion in accordance with Section 3.5 of the 

Enforcement Policy. Because of a malfunctioning fixed nuclear gauge at a 

materials licensee, six individuals received radiation exposures in excess of 

regulatory limits for non-radiation workers, which is 0.1 rem. The NRC determined 

that the gauge was defective and concluded that the equipment failure could not 

have been avoided or detected by the licensee. The licensee responded 

appropriately when aware of the defect to prevent additional unintended personnel 

radiation exposures. In recognition of the corrective actions taken by the licensee 

and the circumstances surrounding the event, the NRC refrained from issuing any 

violation in this case. 

• The NRC dispositioned violations involving small reactor coolant system leakage at 

four operating reactors in accordance with Section 3.5 of the Enforcement Policy. 

In each case, the staff concluded that although any reactor coolant system leakage 

at power constitutes a violation, the licensee’s actions did not contribute to a 

degraded condition, and were reasonable to identify and address the matter. 
OE Annual Report

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• Violations of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, “Design Control,” normally 

categorized at SL IV, were dispositioned at four reactor facilities in accordance with 

Section 3.5 of the Enforcement Policy. In two cases, the licensees failed to ensure 

that the power supplies for steam generator power operated relief valves met the 

design bases. The NRC concluded that because a compliance backfit was issued 

to resolve the technical issue, the violation resulted from matters not reasonably 

within the licensee’s ability to foresee and correct. The other two cases involved 

(1) failure to protect safety-related equipment from flooding, and (2) failure to 

ensure adequate electrical separation between a safety-related and a nonsafety 

related system. In both of these cases, the NRC concluded that the violation 

resulted from matters not reasonably within the licensee’s ability to foresee and 

correct. 

3. Discretion Used to Forego Proposing a Civil Penalty 

The staff exercised enforcement discretion, in accordance with Section 3.6 of the 

Enforcement Policy, to forego proposing a civil penalty in one case to ensure that the 

enforcement action properly reflected the significance of the circumstances of the 

violation. This enforcement action differed from the action that would have resulted 

from application of the normal civil penalty assessment process described in Section 

2.3.4 of the Enforcement Policy. In CY 2010, the staff exercised enforcement 

discretion to forego proposing a civil penalty in one case and exercised enforcement 

discretion in another case to escalate the amount of a proposed civil penalty. 

• The NRC concluded that enforcement discretion to forego proposing a civil penalty 

was appropriate in the case of an Alaska Industrial X-Ray SLIII violation involving a 

security issue identified in an NRC letter dated June 7, 2011. The basis for the 

agency’s conclusion was that the licensee had significantly improved its 

compliance with NRC requirements since the last enforcement action and 

timeliness factors associated with plant security systems. Normally, a base civil 

penalty in the amount of $7,000 would be proposed for a violation of this type. 

Further details are not provided because of the security nature of the violation. 

4. Notices of Enforcement Discretion 

Occasionally, circumstances may arise in which a power reactor licensee’s compliance 

with a technical specification or other license condition would require a plant transient 

or performance testing, inspection, or other system realignment that is of greater risk 

than the current specific plant conditions. In these circumstances, the NRC staff may 

choose not to enforce the applicable requirements. The staff exercises this 

enforcement discretion, designated as a notice of enforcement discretion (NOED) in 

accordance with Section 3.7 of the Enforcement Policy, only if it is clearly satisfied that 

the action is consistent with protecting the public health and safety. The staff may also 

issue NOEDs in cases involving severe weather or other natural phenomena when it 

determines that exercising this discretion will not compromise safety. NOEDs require 

justification from a licensee or certificate holder that documents the safety basis for the 

request and provides whatever other information the staff deems necessary to issue 

an NOED. The NRC issued two NOEDs in CY 2011. 

 
OE Annual Report

20 

• NOED 11-4-001, verbally granted enforcement discretion on August 14, 2011, to 

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (Wolf Creek Generating Station), that 

allowed the license to extend the 72-hour completion time for Technical 

Specification 3.7.5, “Auxiliary Feedwater System,” Required Actions C.1 and C.2, 

by 24-hours to restore the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump to an 

operable status or commence a plant shutdown. The licensee commenced a 

shutdown of the unit approximately one hour before the expiration of the NOED 

and returned the unit to full power when the TDAFW pump was declared operable 

approximately one hour after the NOED expired. 

• NOED 11-3-001, verbally granted enforcement discretion on September 29, 2011, 

to Northern States Power Company (Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant), that 

allowed the licensee to extend the 12-hour completion time for Technical 

Specification 3.8.1, “AC Sources – Operating,” Required Action F.1., by 5 days to 

restore a diesel generator to operable status or commence a plant shutdown. On 

October 3, 2011, the 11 emergency diesel generator was declared operable 

following successful testing. 

NOEDs issued to power reactor licensees and gaseous diffusion plants can be found 

on the NRC’s Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/enforcement/notices/. 

H. Withdrawn Actions 

Licensees can challenge enforcement actions for several reasons; for example, a 

licensee might dispute the requirements, the facts of the case, the agency’s 

application of the Enforcement Policy, or the significance of the violation. Licensees 

may provide clarifying information that was not available at the time of the inspection, 

and this may affect a finding of noncompliance. 

In addition, OE has established a metric for quality of enforcement actions based on 

the number of disputed and withdrawn nonescalated enforcement actions. The goal is 

less than 30 withdrawn nonescalated enforcement actions in a calendar year. This 

metric does not include violations that are withdrawn on the basis of supplemental 

information that was not available to an inspector before the assessment of an 

enforcement sanction. In CY 2011, the agency issued approximately 1,200 

nonescalated enforcement actions to reactor, materials, and fuel facility licensees. 

This is an increase of approximately 20 percent over the number of nonescalated 

enforcement actions issued annually in the past two years. Of these actions, 10 

nonescalated enforcement actions were disputed. This is a slight decrease from the 

12 nonescalated enforcement actions disputed in CY 2010. In CY 2011, the NRC 

withdrew four of these disputed actions. This is an increase from the one 

nonescalated enforcement action withdrawn in CY 2010. 

In CY 2011, the agency issued 96 escalated enforcement actions to reactors, 

materials, and fuel facility licensees, of which none were disputed. In CY 2010, two 

escalated enforcement actions were disputed and both were withdrawn. 

 
OE Annual Report

21 

III. Ongoing Activities 

A. Enforcement Policy 

The NRC Enforcement Policy is a living document that is periodically revised to reflect 

regulatory changes, experience, and stakeholder input. On August 27, 2010, the 

Commission approved the latest revision to the Enforcement Policy (Staff 

Requirements Memorandum (SRM) -SECY-09-0190). This SRM also directed the 

NRC staff to evaluate specific topics for inclusion in a future policy revision. Those 

topics included guidance for (1) determining when daily civil penalties are appropriate; 

(2) providing credit to fuel cycle licensees with effective corrective action programs; 

and (3) reevaluating the Enforcement Policy related to construction activities, including 

cases for which discretion may be appropriate. 

This latest revised Policy became effective on September 30, 2010 (75 FR 60485). 

Some of the significant changes in the 2010 Policy included: (1) increasing from eight 

to 14 the violation example activity areas; (2) adding base civil penalties for uranium 

enrichment facilities and high level waste repositories; (3) increasing the base civil 

penalty for uranium conversion facilities; and (4) adding a glossary of enforcement 

terms. 

1. Interim Enforcement Policy Guidance 

In CY 2011, the staff developed two Interim Enforcement Policy guidance documents 

that were incorporated into the existing Enforcement Policy available (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML093480037). 

• In March of 2008, the NRC updated the requirements in 10 CFR Part 26, “Fitness 

for Duty Programs,” by reorganizing the rule and adding Subpart I, “Managing 

Fatigue.” Subsequently, between 2009 and 2010, the NRC received several 

petitions from outside stakeholders for rulemaking related to the new rule, along 

with a request for enforcement discretion on the minimum days off (MDO) 

provision of the rule. The staff evaluated the petitions and determined that an 

alternative to the MDO requirement of the new rule was needed until the rule 

could be amended. As a result, the staff developed guidance to grant 

enforcement discretion for violations of the MDO requirement if certain criteria are 

met and incorporated this relief through the issuance of an Interim Enforcement 

Policy, “Enforcement Discretion for the Minimum Days Off Requirements of 

§ 26.205(d)(3). The Interim Enforcement Policy became effective on 

April 25, 2011. On July 21, 2011, the NRC issued the final rule amending 

10 CFR Part 26, including the alternative to the MDO requirement. At that time, 

the Interim Enforcement Policy regarding the MDO requirement expired. 
OE Annual Report

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• Because of the unforeseen complexity involved in the transition process to 

National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 (NFPA 805), the Interim 

Enforcement Policy, “Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues 

(10 CFR 50.48)” has undergone a number of revisions that have changed the 

license amendment request (LAR) submittal due date for many licensees. This 

change in submittal dates created a “grouping effect,” and the NRC expected to 

receive approximately 23 LARs by the end of June 2011. The Commission 

approved a staggered submittal schedule that was necessary to ensure timely 

review of these and other LARs. On July 12, 2011, the staff issued Interim 

Enforcement Policy that granted enforcement discretion to incorporate this new 

submittal schedule. 

2. Future Enforcement Policy Revision Activities

In CY 2011, the staff focused on activities related to the Commission’s directives for 

further revisions to the Enforcement Policy. 

• On March 21, 2011, SRM – SECY-10-0140, “Options for Revising the 

Construction Reactor Oversight Process Assessment Program,” (Adams 

Accession No. ML110800557) directed the staff to develop a construction 

assessment program for nuclear power plants that includes (1) a regulatory 

framework; (2) the use of a construction significance determination process to 

determine the significance of findings identified during the construction inspection 

program; and, (3) the use of a construction action matrix to determine the 

appropriate NRC response to findings. 

• On August 9, 2011, a Federal Register Notice (76 FR 48919) announced that the 

NRC was reevaluating construction-related topics in the Enforcement Policy and 

was soliciting comments on revisions recommended by the staff. The proposed 

changes would clarify sections that had not explicitly included construction 

activities, revise how the NRC dispositions NCVs and clarify and revise how the 

NRC expects to exercise enforcement discretion at construction sites. 

• On August 30, 2011, the NRC conducted a public meeting to discuss the 

proposed changes to the Construction Policy. 

• On September 6, 2011, the NRC published a Federal Register Notice 

(76 FR 54986) announcing that it was proposing several changes to the 

Enforcement Policy to address additional items in SRM-SECY-09-0190 and 

additional changes proposed by the staff. 

• On November 1, 2011, OE issued SECY-11-0155, “Proposed Changes to the 

Enforcement Policy Associated with Construction Activities.” Proposed changes 

to the Policy included, but were not limited to, changes to clarify the current Policy, 

revisions to Section 2.3.2, “Noncited Violation,” and revisions to Policy sections on 

Enforcement discretion. 
OE Annual Report

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• On December 6, 2011, the NRC published a Federal Register Notice 

(76 FR 76192) requesting comments from the public and other stakeholders on 

the additional proposed changes to the Policy. This notice also solicited 

comments on the effectiveness of the September 30, 2010, revision of the Policy, 

which the staff committed to do in SECY-09-0190. 

• On January 24, 2012, the NRC Office of International Programs and OE held a 

public meeting, in part to provide an opportunity for the Nuclear Energy Institute, 

industry representatives, and the public to discuss changes to the Policy related to 

the export and import of nuclear equipment and material. 

B. Enforcement Guidance Memoranda 

OE issues EGMs to provide guidance on the interpretation of specific provisions of the 

Enforcement Policy. A link to the full text of all publicly available EGMs appears in 

Appendix A to the NRC Enforcement Manual. The office issued seven EGMs in 

CY 2011 summarized below. 

 March 2, 2011, EGM-09-007 (rev 2), "Interim Guidance for Dispositioning 

Violations of National Source Tracking System (NSTS) Requirements”. The 

purpose of this EGM is to provide guidance for the disposition of inspection 

findings related to a licensee’s implementation of national source tracking system 

requirements. 

 April 28, 2011, EGM 11-004, "Interim Guidance for Dispositioning Violations of 

Security Requirements for Portable Gauges". The purpose of this EGM is to 

provide guidance for the disposition of violations involving the failure to maintain 

the required minimum of two independent physical controls to include a provision 

for enforcement discretion for certain violations related to the security requirements 

for portable gauges. 

 June 3, 2011, EGM 11-002, "Enforcement Discretion for Licensee-Identified 

Violations at Power Reactor Construction Sites Pursuant to 10 CFR Part 52". The 

purpose of this EGM is to clarify the guidance for exercising enforcement discretion 

in dispositioning SL IV licensee-identified violations at power reactors that are 

under construction as NCVs. 

 August 31, 2011, EGM 11-001, “Pilot Program for Modified Enforcement Panel 

Process”. The purpose of this EGM is to provide guidance for implementing a 

modified enforcement panel pilot program for enforcement cases that meet certain 

criteria and to improve efficiency, timeliness, and effectiveness. 
OE Annual Report

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 October 4, 2011, EGM 11-003, “Dispositioning Boiling Water Reactor Licensee 

Non-Compliance with Technical Specification Containment Requirements During 

Operations with a Potential for Draining the Reactor Vessel”. The purpose of this 

EGM is to provide guidance on how to disposition boiling water reactor licensee 

noncompliance with technical specification containment requirements during 

operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRV). 

 December 5, 2011, EGM 11-005, "Post-Investigation Alternative Dispute 

Resolution Program". The purpose of this EGM is to offer guidance for 

agreements reached between parties engaged in the NRC’s post-investigation 

alternative dispute (ADR) program. 

 December 21, 2011, EGM 11-006, “Enforcement Actions Related to the 

Construction Reactor Oversight Process”. The purpose of this EGM is to provide 

guidance for dispositioning enforcement actions during the Construction Reactor 

Oversight Process (cROP) pilot program. A 1 year pilot program for the draft 

process discussed in SRM-SECY-10-0140, “Options for Revising the Construction 

Reactor Oversight Process Assessment Program,” began on January 1, 2012. 

The staff recognized that additional Enforcement Policy changes related to 

construction may be required on the basis of experience gained during this pilot 

and issued this EGM. 

C. Knowledge Management 

In CY 2011, OE engaged in several knowledge-management activities. Some of the 

ongoing activities being conducted to maintain an adequate knowledge base included 

supporting training, completing reviews and self assessments, developing internal 

office procedures, and conducting counterpart meetings. 

Enforcement Counterpart Meetings 

In May 2011, regional and Headquarters enforcement staff held a counterpart meeting 

to discuss ways to improve the enforcement process and communications among 

staff. The meeting resulted in a number of action items to improve the enforcement 

program. Examples included: (1) coordinate with OGC to obtain more definitive 

guidance regarding licensee accountability as it relates to the offsite activities of an 

individual (specifically, the failure to report arrest); (2) ensure the proposed revision to 

Management Directive 3.5 specifies that ADR sessions are to be publicly noticed; 

(3) develop SLIV example for Emergency Action Level (EAL); (4) develop a nonpublic 

system for capturing OGC interpretations; (5) revise the Prohibition Order boilerplate to 

reflect the agency’s views; and (6) support discussions about the severity level 

structure of medical event reporting violations. In addition, a working group was 

established to develop recommendations to improve efficiency of the enforcement 

panel process. Improvement of this specific area was an ongoing effort during the 

year. 

 
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Training

OE supported members of the Leadership Potential Program and the Nuclear Safety 

Professional Development Program on rotational assignments to the office. The 

knowledge gained by those staff members will improve understanding of the 

Enforcement Program in the field. In addition, OE staff members participated in 

rotational assignments in other offices (FSME, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 

(NRR), and the Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards (NMSS)) and 

Region IV. OE staff supported the regions in a number of ways. Examples include 

(1) participating in the minor/greater than minor working group for the construction 

inspection program; and (2) acting as a regional enforcement specialist for an extended 

period of time in two separate regions. 

Headquarters and regional enforcement staff engaged in outreach opportunities to 

internal stakeholders on enforcement and ADR processes during counterpart meetings 

and other office training sessions. Examples included multiple training sessions 

provided by OE gave on the revised Enforcement Policy. 

Reviews and Self Assessments 

The OE Operating Plan requires that OE staff annually conduct specific topic focused 

assessments of the materials and reactor enforcement programs to assess consistent 

application of the Enforcement Policy. In CY 2011, OE completed self-assessments of 

(1) the use of 591 forms for dispositioning nonescalated violations by materials 

licensees; and, (2) the 3-week e-mail process for the disposition of unsubstantiated 

allegations. These assessments developed a number of recommended improvement 

items but generally found the enforcement process was being effectively implemented 

In CY 2011, OE completed two Regional Enforcement Assessments conducted in 

accordance with Office Instruction ADM-110, “Conduct of Enforcement Program 

Assessments.” In February 2011, an assessment was completed in Region III and in 

August 2011, an assessment was completed in Region IV. Each assessment was 

performed by a team of enforcement specialists from OE and one of the other regions. 

The primary purpose of these assessments was to ensure that the enforcement program 

is being consistently implemented in the region. The assessments also provided the 

opportunity to share “best practices” between the regions and to enhance knowledge 

management of the enforcement process. The assessments involved the review of 

nonescalated enforcement actions and processes, which do not normally involve 

Headquarters. The teams concluded that both Region III and Region IV maintain strong 

regional enforcement programs and are effectively implementing the NRC Enforcement 

Policy largely because of the efficient and effective collaboration among inspectors, 

enforcement and allegation coordination staff, and regional and division management. 

 
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D. Regional Accomplishments 

In CY 2011, the regions conducted both routine and focused self assessments of the 

enforcement area to ensure effective performance and to identify opportunities for 

continuous improvement. The self-assessments encompassed both the reactor and 

materials arenas; considered performance associated with development and issuance 

of both nonescalated and escalated enforcement actions; and included activities that 

required a high degree of coordination with other NRC stakeholders, such as OI. 

These assessments included the following reviews:

• new reactor and fuel facility construction inspection reports related to nonescalated 

enforcement actions 

• nonescalated enforcement actions containing safeguards information 

• the inadvertent distribution of an individual closeout letter not intended for public 

release 

• management of low-level wrongdoing issues that resulted in NCVs 

• comparison of regional instructions compared to guidance in the Enforcement 

Policy, Enforcement Manual, management directives, and inspection procedures 

Overall, the self-assessments showed that the regions were effectively implementing 

the Enforcement Program. Recommendations were made for expediting the 

investigation, evaluation, and issuance of enforcement actions issues of low-level 

wrongdoing. 

In addition to assessments, the enforcement staff trained regional technical staff, in 

part, on the revised Enforcement Policy, recent EGMs, and proper enforcement 

documentation requirements for inspectors and participated on inspector qualification 

review boards as necessary. 

Regional enforcement representatives supported agency enforcement initiatives and 

activities including the following: 

• the Lean Six Sigma Post-Investigation project 

• the intermediate timeliness goal improvement project 

• escalated enforcement working group 

 
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Table 3: CY 2011—Escalated Enforcement Actions by 

Region and Program Office

Program Office 

Escalated 

NOVs 

(w/o Civil 

Penalty) 

Civil 

Penalties1 Orders2

Orders 

Imposing 

Civil Penalty 

TOTAL 

Region I 22 4 1 0 27 

Region II 10 3 1 0 14 

Region III 23 1 2 0 26 

Region IV 18 6 0 0 24 

FSME 1 0 0 0 1 

NMSS 1 0 0 0 1 

NSIR 2 0 0 0 2 

OE 0 0 1 0 1 

TOTAL 77 14 5 0 96 

 

1

 Includes Orders with Civil Penalties (1 for Region I; 1 for Region III; 3 for Region IV) 

2

 Does not include 5 Orders with Civil Penalties
OE Annual Report

28 

Table 4: CY 2011—Escalated Enforcement Actions by Type of 

Licensee, Nonlicensee, or Individual

 

1

 Includes Orders with Civil Penalties (1 for Well Logger; 1 for Hospital; 3 for Radiographer) 

2

 Does not include 5 Orders with Civil Penalties 

Type of Licensee 

Escalated 

NOVs 

(w/o Civil 

Penalty) 

Civil Penalty1 Orders2

Orders 

Imposing 

Civil Penalty 

TOTAL 

Operating Reactor 27 0 1 0 28 

Gauge User 13 2 0 0 15 

Hospital 13 1 0 0 14 

Radiographer 8 3 0 0 11 

Fuel Facility 3 3 1 0 7 

Irradiator 3 0 0 0 3 

Materials Distributor 1 1 1 0 3 

Unlicensed Individual 

(Materials) 1 0 1 0 2 

Unlicensed Individual 

(Reactor) 2 0 0 0 2 

Well Logger 0 2 0 0 2 

Unlicensed Individual 

(Fuel Facility ) 1 0 0 0 1 

Licensed Individual 

(Reactor) 1 0 0 0 1 

Nonlicensee 1 0 0 0 1 

Physician 0 0 1 0 1 

Pharmacy 0 0 0 0 0 

Academic 0 0 0 0 0 

UF Conversion Facility 0 0 0 0 0 

Research Reactor 0 0 0 0 0 

Mill 0 0 0 0 0 

Radiographer Fabricator 0 0 0 0 0 

Waste Disposal 0 0 0 0 0 

Other 3 3 0 0 6 

TOTAL 77 14 5 0 96
OE Annual Report

A1 

Appendix A: Summary of Cases Involving Civil Penalties*

Civil Penalties Issued To Reactor Licensees

NONE 

Civil Penalties Involving Confirmatory Orders Issued To Material Licensees

Accurate NDE and Inspection, LC EA-11-043 

Broussard, LA 

On December 19, 2011, an Immediately Effective Confirmatory Order was issued to 

Accurate NDE and Inspection, LLC (Accurate), to confirm commitments made as a result of 

an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mediation session held on September 28, 2011. 

This enforcement action is based on two willful violations involving (1) the failure to maintain 

accurate personnel monitoring information; and (2) the failure to comply with a state license 

requirement for radiographers to notify the licensee radiation safety officer (RSO) before 

attempting to retrieve a disconnected source. Three additional violations were identified 

involving (1) the failure to wear personnel dosimeters while performing radiographic 

operations; (2) the failure to conduct a radiation survey when a radiographic exposure 

device was placed into storage; and (3) the failure to immediately report the loss of a sealed 

source. Accurate agreed to take a number of actions including (1) providing and recording 

initial and annual training to deter willful violations and address specified related topics; (2) 

developing and submitting procedures for training the RSO or any manager designated to 

be on-call; (3) submitting copies of procedures to the NRC when performing radiographic 

operations in NRC jurisdiction; and (4) paying a civil penalty in the amount of $13,500.

Alaska Industrial X-Ray, Inc. EA-10-231 

Anchorage, AK 

On June 7, 2011, an Immediately Effective Confirmatory Order was issued to Alaska 

Industrial X-Ray Inc. (AIX) to confirm commitments made as a result of an Alternative 

Dispute Resolution (ADR) mediation session held on April 19, 2011. This enforcement 

action is based on a deliberate violation associated with two conditions of the Order 

Modifying License (EA-08-196): (1) failure to have an independent consultant or contractor 

perform field audits and submit the audit reports to AIX and the NRC, as required by 

Condition 1 of the Order, from August 2008 through March 2010 and (2) failure to have an 

independent consultant or a contractor evaluate the effectiveness of AIX’s radiation safety 

program, as required by Condition 3 of the Order, from September 2008 through October 

2010. AIX agreed to take a number of actions including (1) training all AIX employees 

engaged in licensed activities on what is meant by willfulness; (2) conducting an annual 

review of its radiation safety and compliance program by an independent auditor; (3) 

conducting quarterly audits of AIX radiographers as they perform radiography; and (4) 

paying a civil penalty in the amount of $1,000. 

 

 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included 
OE Annual Report

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Bozeman Deaconess Hospital EA-10-258 

Bozeman, MT 

On July 8, 2011, an Immediately Effective Confirmatory Order was issued to Bozeman 

Deaconess Hospital (BDH) to confirm commitments made as a result of an ADR mediation 

session held on May 25, 2011. This enforcement action is based on two willful violations 

involving (1) the failure to secure licensed materials from unauthorized removal or access as 

required by 10 CFR 20.1801; and (2) the failure to control and maintain constant 

surveillance of licensed material as required by 10 CFR 20.1802. BDH agreed to take a 

number of actions including (1) providing training to hospital staff and managers involved in 

NRC licensed activities by an independent third-party organization; (2) modifying the internal 

requirements for new worker training for its annual refresher training; (3) developing and 

implementing a procedure that allows hospital employees and contractors to raise radiation 

safety concerns to hospital management; and (4) paying a civil penalty in the amount of 

$3,500. 

Professional Service Industries, Inc. EA-10-161 

Oakbrook Terrace, IL 

On August 18, 2011, an Immediately Effective Confirmatory Order was issued to 

Professional Service Industries, Inc. (PSI), to confirm commitments made as a result of an 

ADR mediation session held on July 11, 2011. This enforcement action is based on eight 

violations as well as security-related violations involving the performance of industrial 

radiography in the Rock Springs, Wyoming area. In addition, the NRC indicated that 

willfulness on the part of an office manager and a radiographer appeared to have been a 

factor in two of the violations. PSI made no admission that they deliberately violated any 

NRC requirement. PSI agreed to take a number of actions including (1) developing and 

implementing a disciplinary program managed by the corporate staff that provides a graded 

approach for radiation safety and security infractions; (2) enhanced routine and refresher 

training for staff; (3) annual safety culture training for Radiation Safety Officers; (4) 

enhanced annual audits of the Radiation Safety Program; (5) advance notification if PSI will 

be working in NRC jurisdiction under reciprocity; and (6) paying a civil penalty in the amount 

of $15,000. Prior to issuance of this enforcement action PSI voluntarily terminated its NRC 

license for radiography but maintains Agreement State licenses for radiography and an NRC 

license for other non-radiographic, regulated activities. 

Superior Well Services, Itd. EA-10-077 

Indiana, PA 

On February 8, 2011, an Immediately Effective Confirmatory Order was issued to the 

Superior Well Services, Ltd. (SWS) to confirm commitments made as a result of an ADR 

mediation session held on January 4, 2011. The licensee requested ADR following the 

NRC’s October 21, 2010 Notice of Violation and Proposed Civil Penalty in the amount of 

$34,000, involving five violations that were categorized into two severity level (SL) III 

problems. The first SL III problem involved three violations related to the temporary loss of 

two radioactive well logging sources. The second SL III problem involved two violations 

related to the deliberate failure to conduct radiological surveys and the creation of 

inaccurate survey records. SWS agreed to (1) take corrective actions addressing all of the 

violations; (2) ensure that the corrective actions are effective; and (3) ensure that lessons 

learned from these events are extended to the well logging industry. In addition, SWS took 
OE Annual Report

A3 

several corrective actions prior to the ADR mediation session. In recognition of SWS’s 

proposed corrective actions, in addition to corrective actions already taken, the NRC agreed 

to reduce the civil penalty originally proposed to $17,000. 

Civil Penalties Involving Notices of Violation Issued To Material Licensees

International Cyclotron, Inc. EA-11-086 

Hato Rey, PR 

On December 19, 2011, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of a Civil Penalty in 

the amount of $7,000, and an Order suspending licensed activities within 60 days, was 

issued to International Cyclotron, Inc. (ICI), for a Severity Level III violation involving the 

failure to provide a decommissioning funding plan as required by 10 CFR 30.35. 

Specifically, on August 20, 2009, ICI was issued an NRC license authorizing the possession 

and use of unsealed byproduct material of applicable quantities set forth in Appendix B to 10 

CFR Part 30 and ICI had not provided a decommissioning funding plan that contains a 

signed original of the financial instrument obtained to provide financial assurance for 

decommissioning, as required by 10 CFR 30.35. Further, based on ICI’s failure to fully and 

timely respond to repeat NRC requests for information, and to compel ICI to comply with 

NRC regulations, the NRC issued an Order Suspending Licensed Activities (Order). 

According to this Order, if ICI does not submit to the NRC an acceptable financial assurance 

instrument within 60 days of the date of the Order, ICI is required to suspend all activities 

authorized under its License. This Order will remain in effect until ICI submits a financial 

assurance instrument and the NRC informs ICI that the instrument is accepted. 

Luzenac America, Inc. EA-11-022 

Three Forks, MT 

On July 7, 2011, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the 

amount of $8,500 was issued to Luzenac America, Inc., for a Severity Level III violation 

involving the failure to transfer a device containing byproduct material to a licensee 

authorized to receive it, as required by 10 CFR 31.5(c)(8)(i). Specifically, as of December 2, 

2010, Luzenac transferred a fixed nuclear gauge containing byproduct material to a 

recycling company that was not authorized to receive it. 

 
OE Annual Report

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Civil Penalties Issued To Fuel Cycle Licensees

Global Nuclear Fuel – Americas EA-11-095 

Wilmington, NC 

On November 14, 2011, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the 

amount of $17,500 was issued to Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas, LLC for a Severity Level III 

problem involving the failure to maintain the double contingency principle as it was 

compromised during the operation of the sinter test grinder and the risk of a high 

consequence event (criticality accident) increased. The NRC determined that five violations 

of NRC requirements directly related to the root causes that allowed the event occurred. 

Specifically, (1) on March 1, 2011, the licensee failed to ensure that a process design 

incorporated sufficient margins of safety to require at least two unlikely, independent, and 

concurrent changes in process conditions before a criticality accident was possible; (2) on 

March 1, 2011, the licensee failed to apply sufficient controls to the extent needed to reduce 

the likelihood of occurrence of a criticality, high-consequence event, in the sinter test grinder 

HEPA filter enclosure so that, upon implementation of such controls, the event was highly 

unlikely; (3) on February 4, 2009, the licensee failed to verify as part of the change process 

that the controls selected and installed for the sinter test grinder HEPA enclosure would limit 

the UO2 holdup to less than 25 kgs by controlling a differential pressure across the 

ventilation housing to 4-inches of water or less; (4) on February 18, 2009, the licensee 

failed to conduct a criticality safety analysis (CSA) on the sinter test grinder; and (5) on 

August 1, 2010, and January 23, 2011, the licensee failed to notify HVAC and the area 

manager and request a clean out of the effected Sinter Test Grinder Primary HEPA Filter 

housing transition when the survey results for the transition exceeded the action limit of 0.5 

mr/hr above background. 

Orders Imposing a Civil Penalty

NONE 
OE Annual Report

B1 

Appendix B: Summary of Escalated Notices of Violation 

Without Civil Penalties*

Notices Issued To Power Reactor Licensees

Carolina Power and Light Company EA-11-251 

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant 

On December 27, 2011, an NOV was issued to Carolina Power and Light Company for a 

violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action” identified as a 

result of an inspection at the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant. The violation was 

associated with a White SDP finding involving the failure of personnel to promptly 

identify and correct a condition adverse to quality involving the external flood barrier for 

the emergency diesel generator fuel oil tank rooms as of April 20, 2011. Specifically, the 

entrance enclosures that house the emergency diesel generator fuel oil tanks had 

several openings, unsealed pinholes, and a narrow gap along the perimeter of the base 

walls, which would allow water intrusion into the emergency diesel generator fuel oil tank 

rooms during a design basis external event (hurricane). 

Carolina Power and Light Company EA-10-257 

H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant 

On January 31, 2011, an NOV was issued to Carolina Power and Light Company for two 

violations associated with two White SDP findings identified as a result of an inspection 

at the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant. The first violation involved the failure to 

adequately implement multiple procedures during an uncontrolled cooldown of the 

Reactor Coolant System and subsequent safety injection as required by Technical 

Specifications 5.8.1, “Procedures.” Specifically, on March 28, 2010, following a reactor 

trip, the licensee: (1) failed to take required procedural actions to stop an uncontrolled 

cooldown that resulted in a safety injection; (2) failed to identify a loss of component 

cooling water flow to the thermal barrier heat exchangers coincident with a failure to 

identify a loss of charging pump suction that resulted in inadequate seal injection flow; 

and (3) re-energized electrically faulted equipment that damaged surrounding equipment 

and resulted in electrical ground alarms, which required an Alert emergency declaration. 

The second violation involved failure to adequately design and implement operator 

training based on learning objectives as required by 10CFR55.59(c)4. Specifically, prior 

to March 28, 2010, training lesson material failed to identify the basis of a procedural 

action involving reactor coolant pump seal cooling required by a systems approach to 

training as defined in 10CFR55.4. 

 

 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included
OE Annual Report

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Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc EA-11-047 

Millstone Power Station 

On August 8, 2011, an NOV was issued to Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc for two 

violations associated with a White SDP finding identified as a result of an inspection at 

the Millstone Power Station. The first violation involved the failure to implement 

procedures for safe operation and shutdown as required by Technical Specification 6.8, 

“Procedures.” The second violation involved the failure to develop adequate procedures 

recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, February 1978, as required by Technical 

Specification 6.8. These failures caused and/or exacerbated an unanticipated eight 

percent reactor power increase at Unit 2 during main turbine control valve testing, which 

occurred on February 12, 2011. 

Duke Energy Carolinas EA-11-226 

Oconee Nuclear Station 

On December 6, 2011, an NOV was issued to Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC for a 

violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, “Design Control” identified as a result of 

an inspection at the Oconee Nuclear Station. The violation was associated with a 

Yellow SDP finding involving the failure to perform a review for suitability of application 

of equipment essential to safety-related functions of structures, systems, and 

components. Specifically, Oconee personnel failed to maintain the Standby Shutdown 

Facility pressurizer heater breakers and associated electrical components in accordance 

with the licensing and design basis of the plant, which resulted in the Standby Shutdown 

Facility being inoperable from 1983, until June 1, 2011. (See Section II of this report for 

additional information). 

Entergy Nuclear Operations EA-11-174 

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 

On November 21, 2011, an NOV was issued to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. for a 

violation of Technical Specification 5.4, “Procedures” identified as a result of an 

inspection at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. The violation was associated with a 

White SDP finding involving multiple examples of failure to conduct safety-related 

activities as described in written procedures prior to and during a reactor startup 

operation. Specifically, on May 10, 2011, Pilgrim personnel failed to implement conduct 

of operations and reactivity control standards and procedures during a reactor startup 

which resulted in a reactor scram. 

Exelon Generation Company, LLC EA-11-014 

Byron Station 

On March 14, 2011, an NOV was issued to Exelon Generation Company, LLC for a 

violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and 

Drawings” identified as a result of an inspection at the Byron Station. The violation was 

associated with a White SDP finding involving the failure to provide appropriate 

quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria related to maintenance on the 2A 

emergency diesel generator. Specifically, on January 17, 2010, a work order package 

did not contain a final torque verification to ensure that the 2A diesel generator upper 

lube oil cooler spool piece connections were torqued to the required values. As a result, 
OE Annual Report

B3 

the spool piece flange connection to the upper lube oil cooler did not meet the minimum 

torque ranges, and, subsequently, during routine testing on November 17, 2010, the 

flange connection on the 2A diesel generator upper lube oil cooler failed. Because the 

2A diesel generator was inoperable since January 17, 2010, and because the licensee 

was not aware of the inoperability, the Technical Specification allowed outage time of 14 

days was also exceeded. 

Exelon Generation Company EA-11-221 

Limerick Generating Station 

On December 8, 2011, an NOV was issued to Exelon Generation Company, LLC for two 

violations associated with a White SDP finding identified as a result of an inspection at 

the Limerick Generating Station. The first violation involved the failure to establish 

adequate procedures as of April 23, 2011, for securing feedwater long-path flushing as 

required by Technical Specification 6.8, “Procedures.” The second violation involved 

operating in Modes 1, 2, and 3 between April 23, 2011 and May 23, 2011, when a 

Primary Containment Isolation Valve and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System 

were inoperable, contrary to the requirements of Technical Specification 3.6.3, “Primary 

Containment Isolation Valves.” 

First Energy Nuclear Operating Company EA-11-148 

Perry Nuclear Power Plant 

On August 25, 2011, an NOV was issued to First Energy Nuclear Operating Company 

for three violations associated with a White SDP finding identified as a result of an 

inspection at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant involving the retraction of a stuck source 

range monitor (SRM) from the reactor vessel. The first violation involved the failure to 

perform an evaluation of the potential radiological hazards associated with the work 

activity, as required by 10 CFR 20.1501. The second violation involved the failure to 

perform a complete radiological characterization of the SRM, as required by Technical 

Specification 5.7.1.b. The third violation involved the failure to establish a procedure that 

addressed the control of highly radioactive materials removed from the reactor vessel, 

as well as, the failure to implement a procedure to ensure that the licensee’s ALARA 

plan contained steps to ensure that the ambient radiation field in the work areas were 

being controlled and that the workers actions were in accordance with ALARA 

considerations, as required by Technical Specification 5.4.1. 

Nebraska Public Power District EA-11-024 

Cooper Nuclear Station 

On June 10, 2011, an NOV was issued to Nebraska Public Power District for a violation 

of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action,” and Criterion V, 

“Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings” identified as a result of an inspection at the 

Cooper Nuclear Station. The violation was associated with a White SDP finding 

involving the failure to establish measures to assure a condition adverse to quality was 

corrected and ensure the activities affecting quality were prescribed by documented 

procedures appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, a violation issued on June 

13, 2008, identified a condition adverse to quality in that two procedures would not work 

as written. While correcting that violation, the licensee failed to perform sufficient 

evaluation of the circuits to identify and correct a problem with three motor-operated 

valves needed to establish core cooling. Failure to correct the condition adverse to 
OE Annual Report

B4

quality resulted in inadequate procedures in that they contained steps that were 

inappropriate to the circumstances because they would not work as written to reposition 

the three motor-operated valves. 

Northern States Power Company EA-11-110 

Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant 

On August 17, 2011, an NOV was issued to Northern States Power Company for a 

violation associated with a White SDP Process finding identified as a result of an 

inspection at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant. The violation involved the 

failure to maintain the direct current electrical power subsystems operable in Modes 1 

through 4, as required by Technical Specification 3.8.4. Specifically, from December 21, 

1994 to approximately October 22, 2010, all battery chargers in Unit 1 were susceptible 

to a common mode failure under design basis accident conditions. Under those 

conditions, the battery chargers would stop providing an output, or “lock-up,” when their 

alternating current input voltage dropped below their nameplate minimum voltage at the 

battery charger motor control center. 

Omaha Public Power District EA-11-025 

Fort Calhoun Station 

On July 18, 2011, an NOV was issued to Omaha Public Power District for a violation of 

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action,” identified as a result of an 

inspection at the Fort Calhoun Station. The violation was associated with a White SDP 

finding involving the failure to assure that the cause of a significant condition adverse to 

quality was determined and corrective actions taken to preclude repetition. Specifically, 

between November 3, 2008 and June 14, 2010, the licensee failed to preclude shading 

coils from repetitively becoming loose material in the M2 reactor trip contactor. The 

licensee failed to identify that the loose parts in the trip contactor represented a potential 

failure of the contactor if they became an obstruction and therefore, failed to preclude 

repetition of this significant condition adverse to quality, that subsequently resulted in the 

contactor failing. 

Progress Energy EA-11-208 

Crystal River Nuclear Plant 

On December 20, 2011, an NOV was issued to Progress Energy for a violation of 

10 CFR 50.54(q) identified as a result of an inspection at the Crystal River Nuclear Plant. 

The violation was associated with a White SDP finding involving the failure of Crystal 

River personnel to maintain in effect a standard emergency classification scheme that 

included facility effluent parameters. Specifically, for several years prior to June 2011, 

the General Emergency classification contained effluent radiation monitors threshold 

values greater than those that the instruments could accurately measure. During an 

actual emergency, these monitors would have been relied upon to determine initial 

offsite response measures, to assess the impact of the release of radioactive materials, 

and to provide criteria for determining the need for notification and participation of local 

and State agencies. 

 
OE Annual Report

B5 

Southern California Edison Company EA-11-083 

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station 

On August 4, 2011, an NOV was issued to Southern California Edison Company for a 

Severity Level III violation identified as a result of an inspection at the San Onofre 

Nuclear Generating Station. The violation involved the failure to certify that the 

qualifications and status of a senior operator licensee were current and valid and that the 

senior operator licensee had completed a minimum of 40 hours of shift functions under 

the direction of an operator or senior operator, as required by 10 CFR 55.53(e) and (f). 

Specifically, on October 21 and October 27, 2010, the licensee did not certify that 

qualifications of the senior operator licensee were current and valid and scheduled the 

senior operator to perform licensed activities (core alterations) as refueling senior 

operator supervisor while his license was INACTIVE. Additionally, the senior operator 

was not medically qualified in accordance with ANSI 3.4 (1996) to perform licensed 

duties. 

Tennessee Valley Authority EA-11-018 

Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant 

On May 9, 2011, an NOV was issued to Tennessee Valley Authority for a violation 

associated with a Red SDP finding identified as a result of an inspection at the Browns 

Ferry Nuclear Power Plant. The violation involved the failure to implement an In-Service 

Testing program in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 

Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants, 1995 Edition, 1996 

Addenda, Section ISTC 4.1. Specifically, the inadequacy of TVA’s programs resulted in 

the Unit 1 LPCI outboard injection valve, 1-FCV-74-66, being left in a significantly 

degraded condition and the Unit 1 LPCI/RHR Loop II unable to fulfill its safety function. 

(See Section II of this report for additional information). 

Notices Issued To Material Licensees

Associated Specialists, Inc. EA-11-179 

Bridgeport, WV 

On September 21, 2011, an NOV was issued to Associated Specialists, Inc. (ASI), for a 

Severity Level III problem involving two violations. The first violation involved the failure 

to limit operation with a temporary radiation safety officer (RSO) to a period of 60 days, 

as required by 10 CFR 35.24(c). The second violation involved the failure to ensure that 

an authorized user provided adequate supervision to licensee staff who were involved in 

the receipt, possession, use, transfer or preparation of byproduct material, as required 

by 10 CFR 35.27. 

 
OE Annual Report

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Bristol Hospital, Inc. EA-11-008 

Bristol, CT 

On February 17, 2011, an NOV was issued to Bristol Hospital, Inc for a Severity Level III 

violation involving the failure to notify the NRC Operations Center of two medical events 

as required by 10 CFR 35.3045(c). Specifically, on January 12, 2010, Bristol Hospital 

experienced two medical events involving patients receiving less than the intended 

prescribed dose during two different permanent prostrate brachytherapy seed implants. 

The licensee should have reported the events to the NRC by March 2, 2010, but did not 

do so until June 2, 1010. 

Cardinal Health PET Manufacturing Services, Inc. EA-11-146 

Dublin, OH 

On November 9, 2011, an NOV was issued to Cardinal Health PET Manufacturing 

Services, Inc for a Severity Level III violation involving the failure to monitor the 

occupational exposure to an adult who was likely to receive, in one year from sources 

external to the body, an extremity dose in excess of 5 rem as required by 10 CFR 

20.1502(a)(1). Specifically, on June 16, 2010, a Cardinal Health PET Manufacturing 

Services employee removed his extremity (ring) dosimetry on two separate occasions 

prior to handling a chemical cartridge containing approximately 4 curies of fluorine-18. 

Carmeuse Lime, Inc. EA-11-145 

River Rouge, MI 

On September 2, 2011, an NOV was issued to Carmeuse Lime, Inc. for a Severity Level 

III Problem involving three violations. The first violation involved the failure to have an 

individual specifically authorized to fulfill the duties and responsibilities as the Radiation 

Safety Officer (RSO) as required by Condition 12.A of the license. Specifically, the 

specified RSO left the company in 2007, and the licensee failed to appoint a new RSO 

and amend its license. The second violation involved the failure to conduct a physical 

inventory every six months, or at other intervals approved by the NRC, to account for all 

sealed sources and devices received and possessed under the license as required by 

Condition 15 of the license. The third violation involved the failure to test each gauge for 

the proper operation of the on-off mechanism (shutter) and indicator, if any, at intervals 

not to exceed six months or at intervals specified in the certificate of registration as 

required by Condition 16.B of the license. 

Charleston Radiation Therapy Consultants, PLLC EA-11-115 

Charleston, WV 

On June 30, 2011, an NOV was issued to Charleston Radiation Therapy Consultants, 

PLLC (CRTC) for a Severity Level III violation involving the failure to meet the physical 

presence requirements of 10 CFR 35.615(f)(2) during high dose radiation (HDR) 

treatments. Specifically, on an indeterminate number of occasions on and prior to April 

28, 2011, neither a CRTC authorized user (AU), nor a physician under the supervision of 

an AU, was physically present during continuation of patient treatments involving the 

HDR unit. 

 
OE Annual Report

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Community Hospitals of Indiana EA-11-016 

Indianapolis, IN 

On April 20, 2011, an NOV was issued to the Community Hospitals of Indiana for a 

Severity Level III violation involving the failure to fully implement procedures to provide 

high confidence that a brachytherapy treatment was in accordance with the written 

directive as required by 10 CFR 35.41(a). Specifically, on September 30, 2010, an 

authorized medical physicist missed a step in the procedure that established the starting 

position for the high dose remote afterloader brachytherapy treatment. The failure to 

implement this step resulted in a medical event. 

Crittenton Hospital EA-11-165 

Rochester, MI 

On September 2, 2011, an NOV was issued to Crittenton Hospital for a Severity Level III 

violation involving the failure to develop written procedures to provide high confidence 

that each administration was in accordance with the written directive as required by 10 

CFR 35.41(a). Specifically, between September 2009 and January 2011, the licensee 

failed to address in its written procedure the need to verify that the step size used in the 

treatment plan was correctly translated into the high dose rate remote afterloader unit. 

As a result, the device’s control unit default step size of 2.5 mm was used instead of the 

5 mm used in the treatment planning system. 

Del Valle Group EA-11-009 

Toa Baja, PR 

On May 11, 2011, an NOV was issued to Del Valle Group (DVG) for a Severity Level III 

violation involving the failure to obtain authorization in a specific NRC license to own and 

possess three portable moisture density gauges as required by 10 CFR 30.3(a). 

Specifically, from November 30, 2008 through October 28, 2010, DVG owned or 

possessed byproduct material (discrete radium-226 sources contained in three portable 

moisture density gauges) without authorization in a specific or general license issued in 

accordance with NRC regulations. 

Escanaba Paper Company EA-11-061 

Escanaba, MI 

October 17, 2011, an NOV was issued to Escanaba Paper Company for a Severity Level 

III violation involving the failure to ensure that only persons specifically licensed by the 

NRC or an Agreement State perform services involving the dismantling and non-routine 

maintenance or repair of components related to the radiological safety of a gauge 

containing licensed material. Specifically, on May 9, 2011, the licensee performed nonroutine maintenance on a fixed level gauge by using a rod to change the position of the 

shutter contrary to NRC License No. 21-17630-01, Condition 17.B. The licensee was 

not specifically licensed by the NRC or an Agreement State to perform this service. 

 
OE Annual Report

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Henry Ford Macomb Hospital EA-11-088 

Clinton Township, MI 

On June 24, 2011, an NOV was issued to Henry Ford Macomb Hospital for a Severity 

Level III violation involving the failure to develop, implement, and maintain written 

procedures to provide high confidence that each administration is in accordance with the 

written directive as required by 10 CFR 35.41(a). Specifically, as of December 9, 2010, 

the licensee’s procedure did not include steps to verify that the transfer tube assembly 

used at the time of the administration was the same length as the one identified in the 

treatment plan implementing the written directive. This resulted in four patients receiving 

radiation doses to areas not included within the planned treatment area. 

Liberty Hospital EA-11-109 

Liberty, MO 

On July 22, 2011, an NOV was issued to Liberty Hospital for a Severity Level III violation 

involving the failure to develop, implement, and maintain written procedures to provide 

high confidence that each administration was in accordance with the written directive as 

required by 10 CFR 35.41(a). Specifically, as of October 6, 2010, the licensee’s 

procedure did not require the position of the prostate to be verified prior to seed 

placement. As a result, the prostate received a dose of 16.9 Gray (Gy) as opposed to 

the prescribed dose of 125 Gy. 

Mercy Hospital EA-11-094 

Muskegon, MI 

On June 8, 2011, an NOV was issued to Mercy Hospital for a Severity Level III violation 

involving the failure to develop, implement, and maintain written procedures to provide 

high confidence that each administration is in accordance with the written directive as 

required by 10 CFR 35.41(a). Specifically, between June 18, 2008 and February 23, 

2011, the licensee performed approximately 200 high dose-rate (HDR) remote 

afterloader administrations requiring written directives and failed to develop written 

procedures to provide high confidence that each administration was in accordance with 

the written directive. 

Oakwood Hospital – Annapolis Center EA-11-010 

Wayne, MI 

On March 4, 2011, an NOV was issued to Oakwood Hospital – Annapolis Center for a 

Severity Level III problem involving two violations. The first violation involved the failure 

to ensure that an administered dose did not differ from the prescribed dose by more than 

20 percent as required by 10 CFR 35.63(d). The second violation involved the failure to 

verify that the assayed dosage was within 10 percent of the prescribed activity as 

required by License Condition 15.A. Specifically, the licensee administered 

approximately 124.5 millicuries of sodium pertechnetate technetium-99m (Tc-99m) to a 

patient instead of the prescribed dosage of 10 millicuries of Tc-99m tetrofosmin, a 

difference in excess of 20 percent. The licensee also failed to verify that it had the 

correct syringe, which resulted in the incorrect radiopharmaceutical and dosage being 

administered to the patient. 
OE Annual Report

B9 

Owensby and Kritikos, Inc. EA-11-100 

Gretna, LA 

On June 8, 2011, an NOV was issued to Owensby and Kritikos, Inc., for a Severity Level 

III violation involving the licensee’s failure to control and maintain constant surveillance 

of licensed material in an unrestricted area as required by 10 CFR 20.1801 and 20.1802. 

Specifically, on July 29, 2010, a radiography camera containing licensed radioactive 

material was found on the floor of an unlocked darkroom and no radiography personnel 

were maintaining constant surveillance over the material. 

Providence Hospital EA-11-037 

Southfield, MI 

On May 17, 2011, an NOV was issued to Providence Hospital for a Severity Level III 

violation involving the failure to develop, implement, and maintain written procedures to 

provide high confidence that each administration was in accordance with the written 

directive as required by 10 CFR 35.41(a). Specifically, as of August 30, 2010, the 

licensee’s brachytherapy procedure did not provide high confidence that the needles 

would be inserted to the right depth as the licensee did not require the use of available 

means such as biological or needle markers. 

U. S. Department of the Army EA-10-129 

Arlington, VA 

On August 1, 2011, an NOV was issued to the U. S. Department of the Army (Army) for 

a Severity Level III violation involving the failure to have authorization in a specific or 

general license to possess depleted uranium (DU), a source material in quantities in 

excess of the exempt and general use limits, as required by10 CFR 40.3. Specifically, 

from April 1978, when NRC license SUB-459 expired, to August 2011, the Army 

continued to possess DU associated with the Davy Crockett weapons system in the form 

of spent fragments of spotting rounds (obtained from 1962 to 1968, and expended prior 

to 1968) at firing ranges located at the Army's two installations in Hawaii; Schofield 

Barracks and Pohakuloa Training Area. In addition to the two installations in Hawaii, the 

Army has also identified the presence of spent DU spotting rounds at other Army 

installations across the United States. 

Warner Brothers, LLC EA-11-209 

East Deerfield, MA 

On November 8, 2011, an NOV was issued to Warner Brothers, LLC for a Severity Level 

III violation involving the failure to file NRC Form 241 “Report of Proposed Activities in 

Non-Agreement States,” at least three days prior to engaging in licensed activities within 

NRC jurisdiction as required by 10 CFR 150.20. Specifically, on December 6, 2006, and 

July 7, 2008, Warner Brothers LLC, which only holds a Massachusetts (an agreement 

state) license, used a portable gauge containing a sealed source, at temporary jobsites 

within the State of Connecticut (a non-agreement state), without obtaining a specific 

license issued by the NRC or filing NRC Form-241 with the NRC. 

 
OE Annual Report

B10

West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. EA-11-027 

Morgantown, WV 

On March 25, 2011, an NOV was issued to West Virginia University Hospitals Inc. 

(WVUH) for a Severity Level III violation involving the failure to notify the NRC 

Operations Center by telephone no later than the next calendar day after discovery of a 

medical event as required by 10 CFR 35.3045(c). Specifically, WVUH did not notify the 

NRC until July 7, 2010, after discovering that a dose administered on January 20, 2010 

differed from the prescribed dose. 

William Beaumont Hospital EA-11-163 

Royal Oak, MI 

On September 2, 2011, an NOV was issued to William Beaumont Hospital for a Severity 

Level III violation involving the failure to develop, implement, and maintain written 

procedures to provide high confidence that each administration was in accordance with 

the written directive as required by 10 CFR 35.41(a). Specifically, as of May 5, 2011, the 

licensee’s written procedures for yttrium-90 treatments did not specify how personnel 

should administer a treatment using a fine bore catheter and a high concentration of 

microspheres in order to prevent blockage within the catheter. 

Notices Issued To Fuel Cycle Licensees

Westinghouse Electric Company (Commercial Nuclear Fuels Division) EA-10-153 

Columbia, SC 

On February 25, 2011, an NOV was issued to Westinghouse Electric Company, 

Commercial Nuclear Fuel Division, for a Severity Level III problem involving three 

violations associated with the Integral Fuel Burnable Absorber (IFBA) Filter Press used 

in the waste water handling system. The first violation involved the failure to establish 

double contingency for the IFBA filter press to protect against an inadvertent criticality as 

required by License Condition 6.1.1. The second violation involved the failure to 

designate items relied on for safety (IROFS) to limit the risk of a high consequence event 

as required by 10 CFR 70.61(e). The third violation involved the failure to designate the 

passive engineered controls of the IFBA filter press as an IROFS as required by the 

license and license application based on the conclusion that the accident scenario was 

not credible. In addition, two Severity Level IV violations were issued involving the 

failure to establish adequate operating procedures for the filter press and the failure to 

make a change to facility equipment in accordance with approved procedures. These 

violations existed on and before July 23, 2010. 
OE Annual Report

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Appendix C: Summary of Orders*

Orders Issued To Reactor Licensees

Entergy Operations, Inc. EA-11-096 

River Bend Station 

On August 24, 2011, an Immediately Effective Confirmatory Order was issued to Entergy 

Nuclear Operations Inc. and Entergy Operations Inc. (Entergy) to formalize commitments 

made as a result of an ADR mediation session held on July 18, 2011. By letter dated May 

20, 2011, the NRC identified an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.7 to Entergy based on the 

NRC’s Office of Investigations, March 17, 2011 report (OI Case No. 4-2010-053). 

Specifically, the NRC had reached a preliminary conclusion that an employee at the River 

Bend Station was rated lower in their 2008 annual performance appraisal based in part on 

the employee questioning the qualifications necessary to perform certain work activities in 

compliance with applicable plant procedures. 

Prior to the issuance of the NRC’s May 20, 2011 letter but following a separate NRC inquiry, 

Entergy conducted its own internal investigation of the circumstances giving rise to the 

apparent violation. The NRC recognized that as a result of its investigation, Entergy took 

several specific actions at the River Bend Station and several fleet-wide actions. The fleetwide actions included conducting supervisory and Employee Concerns Program personnel 

training on 10 CFR 50.7; reviewing all closed internal retaliation type cases in 2008 and 

2009; reviewing all 2009 appraisals for employees with overall “improvement required” 

rating; and revising several quality-affecting procedures. 

As a result of the settlement agreement from the ADR mediation session, Entergy agreed to 

take a number of additional fleet-wide actions. A summary of those fleet-wide actions are: 

(1) reorganizing the quality control organization’s reporting structure; (2) reinforcing the 

company’s commitment to a safety conscious work environment through a written 

communication from a senior Entergy nuclear executive; (3) reviewing and, as necessary, 

revising the existing general employee training on 10 CFR 50.7 to include insights from the 

circumstances giving rise to this matter; (4) reviewing and, as necessary, revising training to 

new supervisors for 10 CFR 50.7 to include insights from the circumstances giving rise to 

this matter; and (5) conducting an effectiveness review of the Employee Concerns Program 

enhancements and training that were implemented relating to the underlying matter. Entergy 

also agreed to conduct a plant wide safety culture survey at the River Bend Station prior to 

December 31, 2012. 

In recognition of Entergy’s prior actions and in exchange for the additional actions Entergy 

agreed to take as described in the enclosed confirmatory order, the NRC agreed not to 

pursue further action relating to this matter which may have otherwise resulted in the 

issuance of a Notice of Violation with a base civil penalty had it not reached a settlement 

agreement. 

 

 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included
OE Annual Report

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Orders Issued To Material Licensees

Four Confirmatory Orders issued to Material Licensees involved civil penalties and are 

discussed in Appendix A. 

Orders Issued To Fuel Cycle Licensees

United States Enrichment Corporation EA-11-056 

Paducah Facility 

On August 17, 2011, an Immediately Effective Confirmatory Order was issued to the United 

States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) to confirm commitments made as a result of an ADR 

mediation session held on July 22, 2011. This enforcement action is based on a violation 

involving an incident in which an operator deliberately violated applicable radiation 

protection procedures. Specifically, the violation involved the failure to adhere to the 

requirements of a USEC Paducah procedure that requires personnel to perform a whole 

body frisk when exiting from areas controlled for removable contamination. USEC agreed to 

take a number of actions including (1) conducting a prompt investigation into the incident; 

(2) conducting multiple staff briefings by USEC-Paducah management, procedural reviews 

and revisions as warranted, appropriate retraining and communicating lessons learned to 

staff; (3) reviewing the circumstances that took place during the routine operational activities 

that resulted in the existence of contaminated material; and (4) taking disciplinary action 

against the employee involved in the incident. In addition, USEC committed to enhancing 

new employee orientation and General Employee Training at Paducah to ensure that 

personnel clearly understand the consequences of deliberate acts of non-compliance with 

regulations or procedures, and expanding its independent, Safety Conscious Work 

Environment assessment to include an assessment of the safety culture components of 

decision making and work practices. In recognition of USEC’s proposed extensive 

corrective actions, in addition to corrective actions already taken, the NRC agreed to not 

issue a Notice of Violation, and refrain from proposing a civil penalty for this matter. 

Orders Issued To Individuals

Gregory Desobry IA-10-010 

On February 23, 2011, an Order was issued to Mr. Gregory Desobry requiring him to notify 

the NRC prior to any future involvement in NRC licensed or Agreement State regulated 

activities This enforcement action was taken in order to provide the NRC with an 

opportunity to verify the effectiveness of corrective actions that Mr. Desobry has taken in 

response to his involvement in the medical events that occurred at the VA Philadelphia 

Medical Center from February 2002 through June 2008 (EA-09-038). Specifically, the Order 

requires Mr. Desobry to make a one-time notification to the NRC within 20 days of his 

accepting employment as a medical physicist in NRC licensed or Agreement State regulated 

activities. The Order noted that Mr. Desobry provided a description of the corrective actions 

he had taken in a June 28, 2010 reply to a Demand for Information that the NRC issued on 

May 24, 2010. 

 
OE Annual Report

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Gary Kao IA-09-035 

On February 23, 2011, an Order prohibiting involvement in NRC licensed activities was 

issued to Dr. Gary Kao. This enforcement action was taken in order to provide the NRC with 

reasonable assurance that the protection of public health and safety will not be 

compromised until such time that Dr. Kao provides NRC with sufficient information relative to 

the corrective actions he has taken to address his part in the medical events that occurred at 

the VA Philadelphia Medical Center from February 2002 through June 2008 (EA-09-038). 

Specifically, the Order prohibits Dr. Kao’s involvement in any NRC licensed activity until 

rescinded by the NRC, contingent upon Dr. Kao’s completing specialized training, 

demonstrating the ability to correctly identify and report medical events, and providing other 

documentation to the NRC supporting completion of the requirements specified in the 

Order. The Order noted that Dr. Kao voluntarily stopped performing brachytherapy 

treatments and committed to take all necessary and appropriate steps to ensure that he was 

current on all applicable requirements should he perform brachytherapy treatments in the 

future. 

Action Involving the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel

Mattingly Testing Services, Inc. EA-10-100 

Molt, MT 

On September 2, 2010 the NRC issued two orders: (1) an order revoking the license of 

Mattingly Testing Services, Inc. (MTS) (EA-10-100); and (2) an order to Mark M. Ficek 

prohibiting involvement in NRC-licensed activities (IA-10-028). In response to these orders, 

two employees of MTS requested a hearing. After submitting the hearing requests, the 

NRC staff entered into settlement negotiations with the parties, and on February 22, 2011, 

an NRC Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) issued a Memorandum and Order 

(Order) accepting the settlement and dismissing the hearing proceeding. Specifically, the 

NRC staff and two parties, employees of MTS agreed to a settlement on February 4, 2011, 

in lieu of continuing the hearing proceeding. The Settlement Agreement was forwarded to 

the ASLB and approved. The February 22, 2011 Order superseded the September 2, 2010 

Order issued to MTS and the Order issued to Mark M. Ficek. The approved settlement 

included the following terms and conditions: (1) the MTS license remains revoked and 

parties agree that it will not be reinstated; (2) Mr. Ficek is prohibited from engaging in NRClicensed activities until September 2, 2017 (the settlement further defines NRC-licensed 

activities); (3) for a three year period after September 2, 2017, Mr. Ficek is required to notify 

NRC of employment involving NRC-licensed activities; (4) Mr. Ficek is allowed noncontrolling ownership in an NRC licensee, subject to conditions specified in the settlement 

prohibiting Mr. Ficek’s engagement in licensed activities; (5) Mr. Ficek is allowed to own 

and/or sell the radiographic exposure devices that were listed on the former MTS license, 

subject to conditions specified in the settlement; and, (6) all parties agree that all further 

procedural steps before the ASLB and any right to challenge or contest the validity of the 

Order entered into in accordance with the Settlement Agreement, and all rights to seek 

judicial review or otherwise contest the validity of the Order are expressly waived. 
OE Annual Report

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OE Annual Report

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Appendix D: Summary of Escalated Enforcement Actions 

against Individuals*

Orders

Two Orders were issued to individuals during 2011 and are discussed in Appendix C. 

 

An Atomic and Safety Licensing Board Settlement Agreement Order involving an individual 

is also discussed in Appendix C. 

Notices of Violation 

Christopher A. Moore IA-11-037 

On November 9, 2011, an NOV was issued to Christopher A. Moore, former Radiation 

Safety Officer at Cardinal Health PET Manufacturing Services, Inc., in St. Louis, Missouri, 

for a Severity Level III violation involving 10 CFR 30.10, “Deliberate Misconduct.” 

Specifically, on June 16, 2010, Mr. Moore caused Cardinal Health PET Manufacturing 

Services, Inc., an applicant for an NRC license, to be in violation of 10 CFR 20.1502(a)(1) 

which requires that a licensee (in this case, an applicant) monitor the occupational exposure 

to adults likely to receive, in one year from sources external to the body, a dose in excess of 

10 percent of the limits in 10 CFR 20.1201(a). The nature of Mr. Moore’s position made him 

subject to 10 CFR 20.1502(a)(1). However, Mr. Moore deliberately removed his extremity 

(ring) dosimetry on two separate occasions prior to handling a chemical cartridge containing 

approximately 4 curies of fluorine-18. 

Craig M. Rice IA-11-056 

On September 21, 2011, an NOV was issued to Mr. Craig M. Rice, formerly a licensed 

reactor operator at the Fermi Power Plant, Unit No. 2, for a Severity Level III violation 

involving the failure to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 55.53(j). Specifically, on 

April 25, 2011, Mr. Rice participated in the Detroit Edison Company random fitness for duty 

testing program and subsequently tested positive for an illegal substance. 

Roger A. Shaffer IA-11-012 

On March 18, 2011, an NOV was issued to Mr. Roger A. Shaffer, formerly a licensed reactor 

operator at the Palisades Nuclear Plant, Unit No. 1, for a SLIII violation involving the failure 

to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 55.53(j). Specifically, on December 20, 2010, 

Mr. Shaffer participated in the Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. random fitness for duty 

testing program and subsequently tested positive for an illegal substance. 

 

 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included
OE Annual Report

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OE Annual Report

E1 

Appendix E: Summary of Escalated Enforcement Actions 

against Nonlicensees

(Vendors, Contractors and Certificate Holders)*

Notice of Violation

Carro & Carro Enterprises, Inc. EA-10-272 

Ciales, PR 

On February 11, 2011, a Notice of Violation was issued to Carro & Carro Enterprises, Inc. 

(CCE) for a Severity Level III violation involving the failure to obtain authorization in a 

specific NRC license to own and possess a portable moisture density gauge, which 

contained byproduct material. Specifically, from November 30, 2008, through June 28, 2009, 

CCE owned or possessed byproduct material, a discrete radium-226 source contained in a 

portable moisture density gauge, without authorization in a specific or general license issued 

in accordance with NRC regulations. 

 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included