COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Bray and Senior Judge Hodges 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

FORD MOTOR COMPANY 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 0821-97-1 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR. 

 DECEMBER 23, 1997 

LARRY I. HUNT 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 Barry Dorans (Samuel W. Meekins, Jr.; 

Wolcott, Rivers, Wheary, Basnight & Kelly, 

P.C., on briefs), for appellant. 

 Matthew H. Kraft (Betty M. Tharrington; 

Rutter & Montagna, L.L.P., on brief), for 

appellee. 

 Ford Motor Company appeals from the commission's award of 

disability benefits to Larry I. Hunt. Ford argues that Hunt's 

activity restrictions were unrelated to his compensable injury, 

that the commission improperly applied the "two causes" rule, and 

that Hunt failed to adequately market his residual work capacity. 

 We affirm the commission's award. 

 I. 

 Hunt suffered an injury to his right knee while working in a 

Ford assembly plant. He was treated by Dr. Sheldon Cohn, who 

placed Hunt on work restrictions, including no crawling, 

squatting, or lifting over thirty pounds. When Ford accepted the 

claim as compensable, the commission awarded Hunt benefits from 

March 30, 1993 until May 16, 1993. 

 Hunt returned to work at Ford in a light duty capacity and 
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continued to experience pain in his knee for several months. In 

October 1993, Dr. Cohn performed an "arthroscopic partial medial 

meniscectomy and open lateral release of [Hunt's] right knee" and 

reported that Hunt was unable to work. On February 25, 1994, Dr. 

Cohn released Hunt for limited duty and noted that Hunt was "not 

to squat, crawl, or climb." In March and April, Hunt 

participated in a work-hardening program which also recommended 

limits "on prolonged standing/walking." In a report dated 

April 8, 1994, Dr. Cohn "released [Hunt] with permanent work 

restrictions of limited squatting, climbing, crawling, and not to 

stand over four hours at a time." Several weeks later, Hunt 

returned to Dr. Cohn complaining of pain. Dr. Cohn gave him 

injections and removed him from work until April 27. When Hunt 

returned to work, Dr. Cohn continued his work restrictions. 

 In July, Dr. Cohn noted that Hunt was experiencing pain 

while at work and removed him from work until August. In a 

report dated August 1994, Dr. Cohn again noted that Hunt was not 

to stand or walk for prolonged periods; was not to stoop, climb, 

squat, crawl, or kneel; and could not carry heavy materials. 

However, after several weeks, Dr. Cohn removed the restrictions 

on prolonged standing and walking and noted that "otherwise, his 

work restrictions are the same." 

 When Hunt returned to work in a modified light duty 

capacity, he drove a forklift for three months until Ford moved 

the job to another plant. Hunt then drove a forklift for two 
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weeks until he was taken off that job because of Ford's seniority 

policy. 

 Hunt returned to Dr. Cohn on April 5, 1995, complaining of 

swelling in the right knee. Dr. Cohn diagnosed Hunt with 

arthrosis of the right knee and stated, "I do not believe his 

present condition is related to his previous work related 

injury." 

 Ford had no positions within Hunt's restrictions and 

released Hunt in December 1995. In a December 12, 1995 letter 

written in response to Ford's request for information regarding 

Hunt's restrictions, Dr. Cohn stated that, although Hunt's work 

restrictions barred squatting, crawling, or climbing, "[a]ny 

further restrictions, which would include the walking and 

standing restrictions, would be due to arthrosis of his knee, not 

related to a work injury." A month later, Dr. Cohn noted: 

 At this time, I will continue his permanent 

work restrictions of no squatting, crawling, 

or climbing. These are work related. At 

this time, I will make his nonwork related 

restrictions, which is mainly for arthritis, 

of not to stand over 30 minutes at one time 

with 10 minute breaks in-between. 

 Hunt filed an application alleging a change in his condition 

due to temporary total disability as of December 6, 1995. At the 

evidentiary hearing, Hunt testified that he did not have 

arthritis in his right knee prior to his 1993 work injury or the 

surgery that was performed on his knee. He also testified that 

he did not have arthritis at any place except in his injured 
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knee. In addition, the evidence at the hearing proved that Hunt 

sought a second opinion from Dr. Michael T. Longstreet on May 28, 

1996. Dr. Longstreet opined that the knee injury was not 

arthritis and that the injury to Hunt's knee was work-related. 

 The deputy commissioner ruled that Hunt's current partial 

disability was the result of two causes, one work-related and one 

non-work-related. Applying the "two causes" rule, the deputy 

commissioner ruled that Ford was liable for the entire resulting 

disability. The deputy commissioner also found, however, that 

Hunt failed to adequately market his residual capacity and, 

therefore, denied Hunt any benefits. 

 Hunt and Ford each requested review by the commission. The 

commission applied the "two causes" rule and found that the 

evidence sufficiently established that Hunt's work injury was a 

contributing factor to the disability because the standing and 

walking restrictions were partly caused by Hunt's work-related 

injury. In holding that the restrictions were not exclusively 

caused by the arthritis condition, the commission cited Dr. 

Cohn's January 23, 1996 letter and stated that "[i]f the 

claimant's restrictions result 'mainly' from his arthritis, some 

portion of it must result from his industrial injury." The 

commission also relied on the proof that the two injuries were to 

the same body member, the right knee. In addition, the 

commission upheld the deputy commissioner’s finding that Hunt 

failed to market his residual capacity and was not entitled to 
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benefits from December 1995 to April 28, 1996. The commission 

found, however, that Hunt was entitled to temporary partial 

disability benefits beginning on April 29, 1996 when he found 

employment within his residual capacity. 

 II. 

 The standard of our review of the commission's findings of 

fact is well established. 

 We do not retry the facts before the 

Commission nor do we review the weight, 

preponderance of the evidence, or the 

credibility of witnesses. If there is 

evidence or reasonable inference that can be 

drawn from the evidence to support the 

Commission's findings, they will not be 

disturbed by this Court on appeal, even 

though there is evidence in the record to 

support contrary findings of fact. 

Caskey v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 225 Va. 405, 411, 302 S.E.2d 

507, 510-11 (1983). The commission's interpretation of the 

medical evidence is a finding of fact. See Ohio Valley Constr. 

Co. v. Jackson, 230 Va. 56, 59, 334 S.E.2d 554, 556 (1985). 

 Viewed in the light most favorable to Hunt, see R.G. Moore 

Bldg. Corp. v. Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 

(1990), the evidence proved that in 1993 and in 1994, Dr. Cohn 

limited Hunt from stooping, climbing, squatting, crawling, 

kneeling, carrying heavy objects, prolonged standing, and 

prolonged walking. All of those restrictions were caused by 

Hunt's work-related injury. In August of 1994, Dr. Cohn removed 

the restrictions on prolonged walking and standing. However, he 

noted that Hunt still had "permanent work restrictions of no 
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squatting, crawling, or climbing," which flowed from his 

work-related injury. 

 In 1995, Dr. Cohn also noted that Hunt then had a 

restriction on his standing "which is mainly from arthritis." 

Interpreting Dr. Cohn's explanation of the restrictions, the 

commission found that because Hunt's standing restriction in 1995 

was not based solely on his arthritis, a portion of that 

restriction resulted from Hunt's work-related injury, which was 

the only other source of his knee disability. Credible evidence 

supports that factual finding. The commission's interpretation 

of Dr. Cohn's report is based on the reasonable inference that 

Dr. Cohn understood that "mainly" means "in the principal 

respect" or "for the most part." Webster's Third New 

International Dictionary 1362 (Unabridged, 1965). 

 The principle is well established that when medical evidence 

is not conclusive, it "is subject to the commission's 

consideration and weighing." Hungerford Mechanical Corp. v. 

Hobson, 11 Va. App. 675, 677, 401 S.E.2d 213, 215 (1991). As the 

trier of fact, the commission is also free to consider "[t]he 

testimony of a claimant . . . in determining causation, 

especially where the medical testimony is inconclusive." Dollar 

General Store v. Cridlin, 22 Va. App. 171, 176, 468 S.E.2d 152, 

154 (1996). Although the evidence proved that in 1995 the 

restriction against standing for prolonged periods was "mainly" 

based on Hunt's arthritis, which Dr. Cohn deemed a 
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non-work-condition, the evidence also proved that on several 

occasions prior to 1995 Dr. Cohn barred Hunt from "prolonged 

standing/walking" because of his work-related injury. The 

commission's interpretation of Dr. Cohn's 1995 report was made 

within the context of Hunt's medical history and Hunt's testimony 

that, apart from his work-related injury and his arthritis, he 

had no other physical ailments that contributed to the problems 

with his knee. Credible evidence proved that Hunt's only other 

disability to that same knee was a work-related injury. 

Accordingly, we hold that the commission's finding is supported 

by credible evidence. 

 III. 

 The principle is well established that "where a disability 

has two causes: one related to the employment and one unrelated 

[to the employment] . . . full benefits will be allowed." 

Bergmann v. L&W Drywall, 222 Va. 30, 32, 278 S.E.2d 801, 803 

(1981). The evidence proved that Hunt suffered disability in the 

knee from both a work-related injury and a non-work-related 

condition. Thus, the evidence proved Hunt's disability to the 

knee resulted from two causes. Accordingly, we affirm the 

commission's finding regarding Hunt's disability. 

 IV. 

 Hunt testified regarding the job search he conducted after 

being released from Ford. He spoke with Ford and his union 

representatives several times, he contacted the employers listed 
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on his Work Search Contacts Record, he contacted potential 

employers verbally, and he checked the newspaper employment 

advertisements. Eventually, on April 29, 1996, Hunt obtained a 

part-time position as a painter's helper earning an average of 

$125 per week. Prior to his release, Hunt had been earning 

approximately $614 per week at Ford. 

 The evidence proved that in April 1996, Hunt obtained 

employment that he could perform consistent with his 

restrictions. The commission made the following findings 

regarding Hunt's efforts to locate that employment: 

 In April 1996, he found a part-time job with 

J.M. Jolly, painting contractor, earning $125 

per week. The claimant, who is 49 years old, 

has worked for his preinjury employer in an 

assembly plant for 16 years. There is no 

information in the record concerning his 

education or training. The claimant 

indicated that he looked in the want ads but 

could not perform the required job duties due 

to his restrictions. . . . Considering the 

evidence before us concerning the nature and 

extent of his disability and his experience, 

we find that he has found suitable employment 

within his residual capacity. 

 Unlike the facts in National Linen Service v. McGuinn, 8 Va. 

App. 267, 380 S.E.2d 31 (1989), where the employee "did not 

attempt to find any other job," id. at 270, 380 S.E.2d at 33, the 

evidence proved, and the commission found, that Hunt sought other 

employment. Because the record contains credible evidence to 

support the commission's findings, we affirm the ruling that Hunt 

made reasonable efforts to market his residual work capacity. 

 For these reasons, we affirm the commission's award. 
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 Affirmed.