UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-7196

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL EUGENE LOCKLEAR,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. Terrence W. Boyle, 

District Judge. (7:09-cr-00021-BO-1)

Argued: March 20, 2012 Decided: June 19, 2012

Before KEENAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and Norman K. MOON, 

Senior United States District Judge for the Western District of 

Virginia, sitting by designation.

Reversed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: G. Alan DuBois, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, 

Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. John Samuel Bowler, 

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, 

for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public 

Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. 

Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine

L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorneys, OFFICE OF THE 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Section 4241 of Title 18 of the United States Code sets 

forth a framework for district courts to use in determining if a 

defendant is competent to stand trial and, if not, whether 

“there is a substantial probability that in the foreseeable 

future he will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to 

go forward.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1). If a defendant is 

incompetent and unable to be restored to competency, however, 

the court must proceed to evaluate him for possible civil 

commitment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246. 

There are two primary questions presented in this appeal. 

The first is whether the district court actually remanded 

Appellant Michael Eugene Locklear to FMC Butner for the purpose 

of being reevaluated for mental competency to stand trial and, 

if so, whether such decision was an abuse of discretion. And 

second, in that those charged with determining if Locklear is a 

candidate for civil commitment already have determined twice 

that he is not, we consider whether the district court erred in 

continuing to have him detained for further evaluation. For the 

reasons that follow, we answer both questions in the 

affirmative. Consequently, we reverse and remand the district 

court’s decision.
3

I.

Locklear went to the offices of United States 

Representative Mike McIntyre in Lumberton, North Carolina, on 

November 4, 2008, to meet personally with the congressman. 

After learning that Representative McIntyre was unavailable, 

Locklear allegedly became belligerent and violent. As a result, 

he was charged with assault on a federal official, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1), and threatening to murder a federal 

official, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B). 

Locklear suffers from mental illness, which causes him to 

experience delusions. As part of his delusions, Locklear 

believed that an unknown government agency was monitoring his 

computer. According to Locklear, this monitoring somehow 

stemmed from the purported prominent role that he played in the 

2004 John Kerry presidential campaign, for which he thinks he 

never received proper credit.

Soon after Locklear’s arrest, it became evident that 

Locklear might not be competent to stand trial. Thus, on 

February 4, 2009, pursuant to the government’s motion and with 

Locklear’s consent, the district court ordered an evaluation of 

Locklear’s mental competency. 

Locklear underwent several competency evaluations at the 

Federal Medical Center in Butner, North Carolina (FMC Butner), 

the last of which, dated August 10, 2010, concluded that “there 
4

is not a substantial probability [Locklear] will regain 

competency to stand trial in the foreseeable future.”

Subsequently, the district court conducted a competency hearing. 

The district court then issued an order signed on September 22, 

2010, stating, in relevant part, the following:

[T]he Court finds that the defendant does in fact 

remain incompetent to stand trial and that there is 

currently no substantial probability that he will be 

restored to competency within the foreseeable future. 

Furthermore, given the nature of the charges against 

him and evidence supportive thereof, as well as the 

delusional condition which continues to afflict him, 

the Court finds that his release would create a 

substantial risk of bodily harm to another person as 

well as serious risk to the property of another. The 

Court therefore concludes that it must proceed in 

accordance with the provisions of [18 U.S.C. § 4246]. 

Almost four months later, however, in a report signed on 

January 18, 2011, the doctors at FMC Butner informed the 

district court that Locklear “does not meet the criteria for 

commitment pursuant to [§ 4246].” According to these doctors, 

“although [Locklear] is presently suffering from a mental 

illness, Delusional Disorder, Grandiose type, his release to the 

community would not create a substantial risk of bodily injury 

to another person or serious damage to the property of another.” 

Nevertheless, acting on a motion filed by the government 

over Locklear’s objection, the district court held in a 

February 9, 2011, order that the recommendation was 

“dramatically at odds with the facts of the case and the 

psychiatric condition of the defendant.” “In short,” stated the 
5

district court, “the report’s conclusion is wholly at odds with 

the facts and psychiatric conclusions recited therein.” 

Accordingly, the court “order[ed] the medical authorities at FMC 

Butner to reconsider the matter and, at a minimum, redraft or 

supplement the report.” In a July 12, 2011, report, however, 

the doctors “continue[d] to opine [Locklear] does not meet [the] 

criteria for commitment pursuant to [18 U.S.C. § 4246].”

Locklear then filed a motion for immediate release, which 

the government opposed. The district court held a hearing on 

the motion on August 25 and September 2, 2011. Afterwards, in 

an order signed on September 2, 2011, the district court held, 

in relevant part, the following:

After full consideration of the arguments of counsel 

and the reports submitted by [FMC Butner] staff, the 

Court concludes that, given the nature of the crimes 

for which [Locklear] has been indicted and the fact 

that more than seven months have elapsed since 

[Locklear’s] potential for dangerousness to the 

community has been evaluated, it would be 

inappropriate to release [Locklear] from custody at 

this time.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that [Locklear] 

again be REMANDED to FMC Butner for thirty (30) days 

to receive further evaluation regarding competency to 

proceed to trial, his potential for dangerousness to 

the community, and his ability to be released under 

conditions of confinement imposed by the U.S. 

Probation Office.

This appeal followed. 
6

II.

The district court’s September 2, 2011, order has two parts 

that we will consider here: (1) reevaluation of Locklear 

regarding his mental competency to stand trial and (2) 

reevaluation of his dangerousness to the community. In light of 

our ruling, for purposes of this appeal, we need not consider 

the third part of the order, evaluation of his ability to be 

released under conditions of confinement imposed by the United 

States Probation Office.

A.

Section 4241 “authorizes the commitment of a criminal 

defendant who, as a result of a mental disease or defect, lacks 

the mental competency to stand trial or undergo post-release 

proceedings.” United States v. Broncheau, 645 F.3d 676, 682 n.8 

(4th Cir. 2011). As such, it “provides a mechanism to secure a 

judicial determination of a criminal defendant’s competency, 

thereby protecting the defendant’s fair trial rights and the 

integrity of judicial proceedings.” Id.

Pursuant to this statute, a court must order a competency 

hearing if it has “reasonable cause to believe that the 

defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or 

defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he 

is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the 
7

proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.”

§ 4241(a). 

“Prior to the date of the hearing, the court may order that 

a psychiatric or psychological examination of the defendant 

be conducted[.]” § 4241(b). “A psychiatric or psychological 

examination ordered pursuant to this chapter shall be conducted 

by a licensed or certified psychiatrist or psychologist, or, if 

the court finds it appropriate, by more than one such examiner.” 

§ 4247.

“[W]e review a district court’s determination of whether to 

order a competency examination for an abuse of discretion.” 

United States v. Martinez-Haro, 645 F.3d 1228, 1232 (10th Cir. 

2011). Here, our careful review of the record leads us to the 

conclusion that there is nothing in it to suggest anything has 

changed since August 2010—when the doctors at FMC Butner last 

determined Locklear was not competent to stand trial—that would 

cause them now to find otherwise. Instead, the record 

establishes that Locklear suffers from a serious mental illness, 

which prevents him from working with his counsel or assisting in 

his own defense. Moreover, the medical staff at FMC Butner 

determined that there is no substantial probability that he will 

regain competency to stand trial in the foreseeable future. The 

district court accepted this finding in its September 22, 2010, 

order, concluding that it would then proceed under § 4246, to 
8

obtain a determination of Locklear’s future dangerousness for 

purposes of civil confinement. 

On appeal, the government argues that the district court’s 

colloquy with Locklear during the August and September 2011 

hearing prompted the court to reconsider its earlier competency 

rulings pursuant to § 4241. Hence, according to the government, 

the district court properly ordered a competency reevaluation. 

But the record belies this contention. 

Although the district court stated in the August 25, 2011, 

hearing, “I think [Locklear is] competent[,]” it continued the 

hearing on the matter until September 2, 2011. At that time, 

after all exchanges between the district court and Locklear had 

occurred, the district court stated the following: “And if I 

were going to release him and he was competent, I would put him 

under conditions. So, releasing him while he is incompetent 

would be irresponsible not to put him under conditions.” Thus, 

the district court indicated that it did not think that Locklear 

was competent.

And, as both parties recognize, the government’s argument 

now that Locklear may be competent is at odds with its position 

on September 2, 2011. Then, after all exchanges between the 

district court and Locklear had occurred, the government’s 

counsel stated, “I think [Locklear] is incompetent.” 
9

Even so, on appeal, the government attempts to establish 

that there was a genuine question concerning Locklear’s 

competency after the August and September 2011 hearing. And it

goes to great lengths to explain how certain of Locklear’s 

answers to the district court’s questions suggest that he may be 

competent. We need not, however, address each instance in the 

record that, according to the government, indicates Locklear’s

potential competence. Suffice it to say that it is clear this 

was not the district court’s belief after having heard from 

Locklear. Moreover, it was not the reason given by the district 

court in the September 2011 order for remanding Locklear to FMC

Butner for further evaluation. 

In that order, although the district court directed that 

Locklear “receive further evaluation regarding competency to 

proceed to trial,” the court justified its decision by stating 

that “given the nature of the crimes for which [Locklear] has 

been indicted and the fact that more than seven months have 

elapsed since [Locklear’s] potential for dangerousness to the 

community has been evaluated, it would be inappropriate to 

release [Locklear] from custody at this time.”

In sum, in light of the district court’s comment at the 

hearing on September 2, 2011, that Locklear was incompetent, as 

well as the purpose that it gave for remanding Locklear for 

further evaluation, we are unpersuaded that the district court 
10

remanded Locklear to FMC Butner for the purpose of reevaluating 

his competency to stand trial. We reject the government’s 

arguments to the contrary. But to the extent that the district 

court did so without support in the record or any explanation,

such decision was an abuse of discretion. 

 

B.

Section 4246 provides, in relevant part, the following:

If the director of a facility in which a person is

hospitalized certifies that a person in the custody of 

the Bureau of Prisons . . . who has been committed to 

the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to 

section 4241(d), . . . is presently suffering from a 

mental disease or defect as a result of which his 

release would create a substantial risk of bodily 

injury to another person or serious damage to property 

of another, . . . he shall transmit the certificate to 

the clerk of the court for the district in which the 

person is confined.

18 U.S.C. § 4246(a). “[N]oncompliance with th[is] statute is 

not a mere technicality—it is directly contrary to Congress’[s]

command.” United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 487 (4th 

Cir. 1987).

Thus, without a certificate from the director of FMC Butner

providing that Locklear “is presently suffering from a mental 

disease or defect as a result of which his release would create 

a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious 

damage to property of another,” § 4246(a), the district court 

was without authority to have Locklear held simply because he is 
11

not of the same opinion as the doctors charged with making that 

determination. But this appears to be what the district court 

attempted to do, as evidenced by its statement toward the end of 

the hearing on September 2, 2011. Specifically, the district 

court told Locklear’s counsel that he was “not comfortable” with 

releasing Locklear right away and that he did not “accept the 

Butner findings.”

But it is not the province of the district court to make 

that decision in the first instance. Instead, as previously 

noted, Congress has conferred that authority only upon the 

director of FMC Butner. See id. Yet, the director of FMC 

Butner has refused to make the requisite certification, despite 

two opportunities to do so. 

The government does not argue to the contrary. In fact, 

although acknowledging that it adopted a different approach in 

the court below, it appears now to agree that the district court 

had no authority to remand Locklear for a third time to be 

reevaluated for civil commitment pursuant to § 4246. We agree 

and, for that reason, will reverse and remand.

III.

Wherefore, for the reasons stated above, the district 

court’s denial of Locklear’s motion for immediate release is

REVERSED AND REMANDED.