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87–821 PDF 2003

S. HRG. 108–51

AN AGREED FRAMEWORK FOR DIALOG WITH

NORTH KOREA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 6, 2003

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia

JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Staff Director

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ... 5

Brownback, Hon. Sam, U.S. Senator from Kansas, prepared statement ............ 36

Carter, Hon. Ashton B., co-director, Preventive Defense Project, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA ................. 7

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 11

Einhorn, Mr. Robert J., senior advisor, International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], Washington, DC ............. 19

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 22

Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, prepared statement .. 47

Kanter, Dr. Arnold, principal, The Scowcroft Group, Washington, DC .............. 14

Nelson, Hon. E. Benjamin, U.S. Senator from Nebraska, statement submitted

for the record ........................................................................................................ 51

(III)

(1)

AN AGREED FRAMEWORK FOR DIALOG WITH

NORTH KOREA

THURSDAY, MARCH 6, 2003

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar

(chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Chafee, Brownback, Alexander, Biden,

Sarbanes, Dodd, Feingold, Boxer, Bill Nelson and Rockefeller.

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee is called to order.

Today the Foreign Relations Committee again turns its attention

toward North Korea. On February the 4th, the committee held a

hearing to review issues surrounding weapons of mass destruction

on the Korean Peninsula. That same week we welcomed Secretary

of State Powell, who addressed many questions related to North

Korea. Last week, the committee considered the issue of global

hunger with specific reference to North Korea. Our primary goal at

this hearing is to explore the possible structure and objectives of

diplomatic engagement between the United States and North

Korea.

The events of the last several weeks have confirmed and reconfirmed how volatile and unpredictable the situation on the Korean

Peninsula has become. The North Korean regime has taken highly

provocative actions toward the United States and its neighbors. All

of us remain concerned about the potential for miscalculation that

could lead to a deadly incident or broader conflict.

North Korea is a foreign policy problem that requires immediate

attention by the United States, thoughtful analysis about our options, and vigorous diplomacy to secure the cooperation and the

participation of nations in the region. Compared to most nations,

our information on North Korean decisionmaking is scant. The actions of the North Korean regime and the military often stray from

a course that we perceive as consistent with rational self-preservation. But we must not be deterred in our pursuits of valid analysis.

We must avoid simplistic explanations of North Korean behavior.

Today, to a degree possible in a public hearing, we will undertake

the timely challenge of thinking through our diplomatic options.

In 1994, the United States and North Korea signed the ‘‘Agreed

Framework,’’ the agreement under which North Korea was to shut

down its nuclear facilities in return for shipments of heavy oil and

the construction of two light water nuclear reactors. Since 1994,

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North Korea has engaged in activities that clearly violate the terms

of the Agreed Framework.

Specifically, the pact stipulates that North Korea should freeze

its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities. This suspension of activity was to be monitored by the International Atomic

Energy Agency. North Korea also was required to store the 8,000

fuel rods removed from its five megawatt reactor ‘‘in a safe manner

that does not involve reprocessing in North Korea.’’ Based on intelligence data and the acknowledgments of the North Korean regime,

we know that Pyongyang is taking active steps to implement a nuclear weapons program.

The Clinton administration had hoped to secure a freeze of North

Korea’s nuclear program and to prevent it from producing nuclearweapons-grade plutonium. It also intended that the Agreed Framework would be the basis for ongoing contacts with Pyongyang, but

these goals have not been realized, and circumstances require the

United States to develop a new approach.

The Bush administration has been reluctant to agree to a bilateral dialog with North Korea until the North Korean regime satisfies U.S. concerns over its nuclear program. The administration has

instead focused on proposals for multilateral talks involving North

Korea and other countries. Multilateral diplomacy is a key element

to any long-term reduction of tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

But, in my judgment, it is vital that the United States not dismiss

bilateral diplomatic opportunities that could be useful in reversing

North Korea’s nuclear program and in promoting stability. We

must be creative and persistent in addressing an extraordinarily

grave threat to our national security.

While some American analysts oppose any dialog with North

Korea, especially in the wake of extraordinarily provocative events,

I do not believe we have the luxury to be this absolute. The risks

are too immediate and the stakes are too high. The United States

must maintain military preparedness and should not tolerate

North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs. But the mere initiation

of a bilateral dialog, with American authorities concurrently consulting with the South Korean Government, does not compromise

our national security interests.

In that regard, today’s hearing is based on the presumption that

some engagement must eventually occur between the United States

and North Korea. Our witnesses have been asked to provide their

perspective on the Agreed Framework on how multilateral and bilateral diplomacy between the two countries could be structured.

They each bring substantial expertise to the committee, and I am

grateful that they have joined us today.

Let me, at this juncture, recognize the distinguished ranking

member of our committee, Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for being here. I agree with the chairman,

we always say we have a distinguished panel, but I think you are

a distinguished panel. And I cannot think of three people that it

is better to hear from today than the three of you on this issue.

Let me begin by saying to you that I have no idea, and I have

some skepticism about whether or not an initiated bilateral discussion will produce anything, so I am not one, nor do I know are any

3

of you, nor is the chairman, one who thinks that merely by talking

there is a resolution. But I am convinced that there is no option

other than talking at this point.

The President is in a very difficult place right now. A lot of his

critics are suggesting that his preoccupation with Iraq, his preoccupation with this, that, or the other thing, is the reason why he

is not moving. I think it is because—that all may be true, but I do

not think that is the central point. The central point is there are

not many options on the table here. But what disturbs me is we

seem to have no policy.

The initial policy that has been proffered as a good idea, there

should be multilateral discussions, and a multilateral umbrella, I

think, is the way it was phrased by the Secretary, under which to

have serious discussions with the North Koreans. Holding up that

umbrella would be Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea, along

with us. And that is obviously, in my view, obviously, the preferred

course. The problem is no one else wants to get under the umbrella. No one else is willing to sponsor or participate in that

forum.

Now, I can understand the administration up to now, up to the

Secretary of State’s visit to the region last week, saying that, not

giving up on that option. But I do not know how anyone can draw

any solace from anything that happened on that visit of the Secretary of State. And I ask myself in trying to figure out what is

going on, why are the Chinese, because it is clearly in the Chinese

interest and the interest of the Chinese to have North Korea cease

and desist, it is clearly against their interest for the Korean Peninsula to become nuclearized, which is what many of you have said

and others have said and I have said, that it is a probable outcome

over the next year or so or more if North Korea continues on this,

hellbent on increasing their nuclear capability and stockpile.

And so I ask myself, why is it that the Chinese will not be more

aggressive? Whether they could succeed or not is another question,

but they clearly have the most leverage over North Korea. Why is

it that the Russians seem almost to be mute on this subject? And

the South Koreans, I understand, they have several hundred thousand people at stake if this goes wrong.

Now, I get to the point where I wonder: What are the U.S. options, if the multilateral option is not an option? And I am told that

we are still pursuing that option. We are still pushing diplomatically. But if it is not an option, it seems to me there are only three

options and you could catagorize them in different ways I am sure,

but my rough calculation is there is either, on the one hand, one

option, war, or relent; in other words, the North Koreans blink.

They are fearful that diplomatically, politically, militarily, economically they will be damaged, more damaged if they continue on this

course and they will cease and desist, or war.

The second option is on our part, it appears to me, is resignation

and containment. We resign to the fact that they are going to have

x number of additional nuclear weapons or amounts of plutonium

that is potentially available for export, but we believe we can contain it. Listening to President Bush yesterday, it sounds like for

the first time, in a vocal way, he has raised one option, war, more

vocally, and two, the second option, containment, in terms of naVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:15 Jun 24, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 87821 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
4

tional missile defense. As I read his statement in this morning’s

paper, he talked about, in this long interview, what we have to do

is we have to get to national missile defense.

The third option is a negotiated deal, a potential option. But you

have got to talk to get to that option, if it is an option. And as I

examine this, it seems that everyone knows—it is sort of like the

Middle East; everyone knows in the Middle East that any final

deal is going to have to be no more settlements and no right of return. I mean, you know, there are certain things that everybody

knows is going to have to be part of a final deal.

Well, if there is a negotiated deal, if that is possible—and, again,

I want to say I am not at all sure it is possible. But if there is a

negotiated deal, it will have to have two pieces, everybody knows.

One is that the North Koreans will have to cease and desist from

their nuclear program, as well as their rocket program, as well as

their missile program. And I would hope, and if there were any

such deal, and also from being the exporters, proliferators to the

world. But the other side of that deal means that there would have

to be some commitment relative to North Korean security in that

we would not—regime change would be off the table, which leads

me to my concluding point. As I have tried to figure this out as to

why there is no policy now, it seems to me the policy—and this,

I am going to ask you to speak to this and you may not want to.

You may say, ‘‘I just do not know, Joe, so I don’t want to speak

to it at all.’’ But it seems to me, this lack of a policy seems to be a reflection

of a split within the administration between those who see as the

ultimate objective in North Korea regime change, and those who

see—as a primary objective, and those who see as the primary objective as getting the cease, desist, bottle up, and end their weapons programs here.

But you cannot have both in all probability. You are not going

to get a negotiated deal where they agree to regime change and no

weapons of mass—no nuclear program or missile program.

And so it takes me to the next point, and I just want you to, you

know, think out loud with me when we get to the question period

because that is what I am doing with you. I have thought a lot

about this. Why would not the Chinese act more reasonably in

their own self-interest here? Well, my staff, experts in my staff, tell

me, well, they are worried about population flows. They are worried about significant migration. They are worried—all legitimate.

I do not think that is the reason. I think the reason is they know

they are going to be given a choice. They can sign on, I think, if

they knew for sure we were talking about elimination of weapons.

But they cannot sign on to regime change. They cannot be the only

Communist nation left in the world taking on the only other Communist dictator in the world in terms of regime change. So I think

that is the reason why we have had no traction with the Chinese

that I am aware of, none.

This new vaulted relationship we are talking about, the new

vaulted relationship with Putin and the Russians, no traction that

I can see.

Now, maybe there is something going on, back channels, that I

am going to wake up tomorrow morning and be surprised and elatVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:15 Jun 24, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 87821 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
5

ed about, but I do not see anything. And so, the inability to get

China to move, the inability to get them to act in what everyone

would acknowledge, and what they acknowledge privately, is in

their own self-interest, it seems to me is cabined by our inability

in this administration to resolve a policy. And what is the policy?

Is the policy—which it was, Secretary Carter, when you were Assistant Secretary, of many of those who were in the administration,

although it was split even then. Of some of those in the administration, it was, ‘‘You are making a mistake in anything having to

do with these discussions in this Agreed Framework, because we

are appeasing and we are prolonging the administration of the

North.’’

I mean, that is the ideological—or maybe that is the wrong word.

That is the policy disagreement. That was at the root of why the

criticism of the Agreed Framework bubbled up from 1994 on. And

yet you have other people in the administration who signed on a

report, both those who are viewed as far right and those viewed as

centrist or whatever, however you want to call it, both in the State

Department and in the Defense Department who are there now,

who signed on to a report saying that, ‘‘You have got to talk. You

have got to work out an agreement.’’

And so my opening statement is more almost a plaintive plea for

some enlightenment of whether or not my deducing as to how we

got to where we are and why we do not have a policy is correct,

because I do not know how to figure this out. I do not know how

to approach this unless I can get a handle on how I think the administration—what is the impediment? It cannot be merely that we

want to prove that we are tough guys and we are not going to be

blackmailed. It cannot be that alone, because the war option is not

a credible option as long as our chief ally, South Korea, says, ‘‘We

are not in the deal.’’ And so I would like to talk about those things.

And I would like to ask unanimous consent that my formal opening statement be placed in the record.

But that is what I hope we can get into a little bit, at least in

my questioning period with the three of you.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Your statement will be published in full, Senator

Biden.

[The opening statement of Senator Biden follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Mr. Chairman, North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear arms, in clear breach of its international treaty obligations has brought Pyongyang to the edge of the same precipice

it approached in 1994.

Our challenge is clear: we must stop North Korea from going into serial production of fissile material. We must not acquiesce to the North’s nuclear ambitions.

If North Korea becomes a fissile material factory or even a declared nuclear weapons state, our national security will be gravely undermined. Asked what he would

tell nervous Americans about North Korea, the President said Monday, ‘‘First, I’ll

say that, let us accelerate the development of an. anti-ballistic missile system,’’ so

no nation could threaten the United States.

But National Missile Defense, even if it worked, wouldn’t prevent a desperate and

isolated North Korean regime from selling plutonium to Al Qaeda or some other terrorist organization.

And if a conventional war erupts on the Korean Peninsula, National Missile Defense will not help us if Kim Jong-il, in desperation, uses nuclear weapons against

U.S. or South Korean forces in a futile effort to forestall the end of his regime.

6

Mr. Chairman, this is serious business that demands urgent action by the administration.

Remarkably, the same administration that assured us that they would not let the

world’s most dangerous regimes threaten us with the world’s most dangerous weapons seems utterly resigned to the prospect of North Korea building a substantial nuclear arsenal.

I’m amazed that we would sit back and let North Korea become a plutonium factory, churning out the world’s most dangerous material and possibly selling it to the

highest bidder.

We need to treat this problem for what it is—a crisis—and listen to all our allies

in the region who say we can still head it off if we’d just sit down and talk to the

North.

Why is the administration so reluctant to talk to North Korea? I’m not sure, but

there are several possible answers.

It may be a question of face. We have said this is a multilateral issue and that

it should be resolved multilaterally. To accept direct talks would constitute some

kind of blow to our prestige. If this is true, I would say let’s not put form over substance.

Perhaps the administration is distracted with Iraq and can’t muster the attention

to work both problems at the same time. I don’t think that’s the case. We have to

be able walk and chew gum at the same time.

Perhaps it is because the administration seems to think that talking to North

Korea is the same as appeasement. I guess it depends on what message we deliver

in any talks.

Telling North Korea what it must do if it wants a more normal relationship with

us is not appeasement. It is common sense, and it is the best way to advance our

security.

Perhaps they worry that if they prove willing to talk to North Korea, people might

ask them why they won’t give diplomacy more time with Iraq. I think the two cases

are so different that this is not a valid concern.

Perhaps the administration has concluded that any agreement they might reach

with North Korea would not be verifiable? Maybe, but how can they know what

kind of verification regime is possible until they try?

Or is the real reason behind their reluctance the fact that talks, if successful,

would have to take regime change off the table as a U.S. policy objective, resigning

us to live with an evil, if non-nuclear, North Korean state? I hope this is not the

case, because it would constitute a gross mis-prioritization of U.S. interests on the

Korean Peninsula.

I don’t know why they won’t talk with the North. But I do know what the result

of not talking will be: a North Korea with enough plutonium to build 6 nukes in

six months, or to sell the world’s most dangerous material to the highest bidder.

Our witnesses today know the score. They know that only through direct, high

level, dialog with North Korea do we have any chance to change North Korea’s path.

And only by trying dialog can we secure the support of South Korea, Japan, China,

and others, if dialog fails.

I look forward to the sage counsel of our expert witnesses, each of whom has considerable expertise on dealing with the North Korea challenge.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me now welcome, officially, our three witnesses. First of all, I will introduce you in the order that we will

ask you to testify: Ash Carter, who is now a co-director of the Preventive Defense Project at Harvard University. As many of you

know, I paid tribute to Ash Carter many times because he was sort

of a founding advisor to former Senator Sam Nunn and to me as

we tried to work on the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act.

And Arnold Kanter, a principal and founding member of the

Scowcroft Group; I want to just say, Arnie, when Sam Nunn and

I were in Korea in 1994, we were reading your papers, even then,

on Korea to the South Koreans. We did not have contact with the

North at that occasion.

And Robert Einhorn, senior advisor of the International Security

Program at CSIS, has been before this committee many, many

times, a trusted advisor.

7

We really appreciate all three of you very much. All of your prepared statements have been made a part of the record, so you do

not need to ask for permission to do that. And we will ask you to

present and summarize your presentations in ways that you find

helpful.

I would just mention, as a point of business, there will be a 10:30

vote in the Senate on the Estrada cloture situation. And so at that

point, we will recess at 10:30 so that everybody may go and vote

immediately and come back, and resume the hearing as rapidly as

possible, at that point.

At this point I would like to recognize Secretary Carter.

STATEMENT OF HON. ASHTON B. CARTER, CO-DIRECTOR, PREVENTIVE DEFENSE PROJECT, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF

GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, CAMBRIDGE, MA

Dr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and other members of the

committee. I appreciate the opportunity to be back here again before you to talk about the loose nukes crisis in North Korea. Last

time I was here, which was in early February, I described why this

really is a crisis, what the stakes were for the United States in this

situation, and some recollections about previous crises, in 1994 and

1998. This time you have asked me to analyze the prospect for

talks with North Korea at this point, and I am happy to do so. But

I thought first we ought to ask ourselves: Why talk to North Korea

at all?

When he appeared with me before this committee on February

4, Deputy Secretary of State Armitage indicated that the U.S. Government intends to conduct direct talks with North Korea. And this

is the right decision for the Bush administration. But it is worth

pausing to ask why. After all, North Korea has a record of honoring

its agreements with us that is, to put it charitably, mixed.

While North Korea kept the plutonium-containing fuel rods at

Yongbyon under international inspections and its research reactor

frozen for 8 years, ending this freeze only a few months ago, we

also now know that it was cheating on other provisions of its international agreements by enriching uranium. And so this means

that, at a minimum, any understanding in the future with North

Korea will have to be very rigorously verified.

And in addition, the government of North Korea is very far, and

both the chairman and Senator Biden made this point, once again

to put it charitably, from sharing our values. Still, one is led to

talks, to the idea of talks with North Korea, by reasoning through

the full range of alternatives and from seeing the relationship

among them.

One alternative is to let North Korea go nuclear, but to isolate,

to contain, and to await the collapse of the North Korean regime.

President Bush said in his State of the Union Message that, ‘‘Nuclear weapons will only bring isolation to North Korea.’’ But isolation must seem like pretty light punishment to the most isolated

country on Earth.

Those who speak of containment envision a hermetic seal around

North Korea, embargoing imports and interdicting shipments of exports, especially ballistic missiles. But the export we should worry

most about is plutonium. After North Korea gets five or six bombs

8

from the fuel rods at Yongbyon, it might reckon that it has enough

to sell a few and still have enough left over for itself, to sell to

other rogues or to terrorists.

And it is entirely implausible, and I can say this as a technical

matter, entirely implausible that we could effectively prevent a few

baseball-sized lumps of Plutonium–239 from being smuggled out of

Yongbyon and then out of North Korea. So containment in that

sense, which is the most important sense of containment as regards

North Korea, is technically unrealistic.

Not only is a nuclear weapons-sized quantity of Plutonium–239,

as I said, small in size, this is material that is not highly radioactive, it does not emit an easily detected, strong signature that

could be used to detect it if it were smuggled out of North Korea

to a destination where terrorists could receive it.

The problem with awaiting the collapse of North Korea’s regime

is that there is no particular reason to believe it will occur soon.

And in the meantime, between now and the time when it might

collapse, North Korea can create lasting damage to our security

and to international security, damage that will extend beyond the

Korean Peninsula and well beyond the lifetime of the North Korean

regime. The half-life of Plutonium–239 is 24,400 years. I do not

how long the North Korean regime is going to last, but it is not

going to last that long. So in the period while we are waiting for

it to collapse, it can damage our security.

In my last appearance before the committee, I cited the five reasons why letting North Korea go to serial production of nuclear

weapons is really a disaster for U.S. security. And let me just remind you of those five reasons, any one of which would be a disaster.

First, and both the chairman and Senator Biden said this already, North Korea might sell the plutonium that it judges to be

surplus to its own needs to States or terrorist groups. That is a

pretty riveting prospect, because while hijacked airlines and anthrax-containing letters and so forth are a dangerous threat to civilized society, it would change the way we are forced to live if it

were actually a realistic prospect that at any moment a great city,

American or other, could disappear in a mushroom cloud. That is

not a prospect we regard as realistic today because we believe all

the metal from which one can make nuclear weapons is in the custody of a government somewhere that is responsible in its custodianship. But it would change the way we were forced to live if we

believed that there were truly loose nukes.

Second, in a collapse scenario, you do not know into whose hands

the material the North Korean regime makes while it persists will

fall when the regime does collapse.

Third, even if the bombs remain firmly in the hands of the North

Korean regime, their possession of nuclear weapons might lead the

North Koreans to miscalculate that they had somehow tipped the

balance of deterrence on the Korean Peninsula, deterrence which

is now very strong. And that could, in turn, make war on the Korean Peninsula more likely. That is a third reason.

Fourth reason, if North Korea goes nuclear, then all of its neighbors need to ask themselves whether the choice they have made

not to have nuclear weapons, is a safe and self-respecting choice for

9

them. And that means Japan; it means South Korea, of course; it

means Taiwan, and possibly others.

And fifth, the domino effect could go worldwide. If the world’s

strangest, Stalinist throwback, impoverished, isolated country goes

nuclear, and everybody sits back and just watches, what does that

mean for the nonproliferation regime worldwide?

So those are five reasons, any one of which is pretty attentiongetting.

It appears from reading the press that the path of letting North

Korea go nuclear, coupled with isolation, containment, and awaiting collapse, is, as a practical matter, the path we are on. And this

is the worst path, the worst alternative of all.

A second alternative is to use military force to arrest North Korea’s race to nuclear weapons. I described last time I was here the

strike plan on Yongbyon that was devised in 1994, the last time

North Korea was moving toward reprocessing at Yongbyon. A

strike with conventionally armed precision weapons at Yongbyon’s

fuel rods and reprocessing facility would not eliminate North Korea’s nuclear program, but it would set it back for years. And I do

not think there is any doubt that that strike is technically feasible.

If we were to strike Yongbyon, North Korea would have a choice.

It could respond by lashing out at South Korea through an invasion

across the DMZ, but that would precipitate a war that would surely lead to the end of the North Korean regime. There is no guaranteeing that the North would not make such a foolish choice, but

that is the risk we must run in this option. It is a risk worth taking to avoid the disaster associated with the first alternative of letting North Korea go nuclear.

As a practical matter, we are in a much better position to threaten or conduct such a strike if we have previously made an effort

to talk North Korea out of its nuclear programs. Even if you are

a pessimist about the success of talks, they are a prerequisite for

exercising this second alternative.

A third alternative is to try to talk North Korea out of its nuclear

ambitions. And as was mentioned previously, I share the assessment that—a year ago I would have assessed that it was likely we

could reach an agreement on terms acceptable to us to stop North

Korea from going nuclear in a verifiable way. Since then we have

let our options narrow. And now I fear that North Korea might

have concluded that it could dash across the nuclear finish line into

a zone where it is invulnerable to American attempts to force regime change, since it suspects that is our objective.

We must, therefore, view talks as an experiment. If the experiment succeeds, we will have stopped North Korea’s nuclear program without war. If it does not, it was in any event the necessary

step toward making the alternative of military force realistic.

How should talks be conducted? I will just say a few words about

that. The two negotiators to either side of me have much more experience in those matters than I. It is clear that we cannot conduct

direct talks with North Korea while it is advancing its nuclear programs. So we must, therefore, insist that during talks North Korea

reinstate the freeze at Yongbyon. And in return, we can refrain

from taking any steps toward military action during the period of

talks.

10

Secretary Armitage indicated the United States would participate in direct talks, meaning that Americans and North Koreans

would be in the same room. This is necessary. We cannot outsource

our deepest security matters to China, Russia, or the United Nations. And only the United States can convincingly tell North Korea

that it will be less safe, not more safe, if it proceeds with nuclear

weapons. This is the crux of the matter. That is the reason why

we have to be in the room.

Now, that said, others can be in the room at the same time, and

there can be more than one room, and having others in the room

with us might be advantageous. Certainly, we will have a richer set

of sticks and carrots if our negotiating strategy is closely coordinated with our allies, Japan and South Korea. And coordination is

necessary in any event with those two parties, our allies there, in

order to maintain the critical alliance relationships that have an

importance, and goes well beyond North Korea. They buttress our

entire strategy in the region.

In the past we have conducted parallel bilateral talks. That is

U.S./North Korean, South Korean/North Korean, and Japanese/

North Korean, all in parallel-coordinated fashion, rather than

meeting in one room. But when we have done this, we have been

careful to coordinate the three tracks.

China and Russia have also strongly supported the proposition

that North Korea must not go nuclear. But their influence, and this

was mentioned earlier by Senator Biden, is not apparent yet, at

least to me. They might be willing to play a more effective role once

we have set out a strategy into which they can play a part.

The United Nations can also play a critical role, particularly if

North Korea were to agree to IAEA inspectors returning. We

should continue to proceed at the United Nations, but as a complement, not a substitute, for direct talks.

What should our position be in these direct talks? We should

enter the talks with a clear sense of our objectives. At the top of

the list, above all other objectives we might have with North Korea,

should be the complete and verifiable elimination of North Korea’s

nuclear weapons programs, both plutonium-based and uraniumbased, and its long-range missile programs. This objective includes,

but goes beyond, the obligations contained in previous agreements

made by North Korea, well beyond.

The United States should also make it clear to North Korea that

it cannot tolerate North Korean progression to reprocessing or any

other steps to obtain fissile material for nuclear weapons, and that

we are prepared to take all measures of coercion, including military

force, to prevent this threat to U.S. security.

In return, there are two things that it should be easy for the

United States to offer. First, we should be prepared to make a

pledge to North Korea that the United States will not seek to eliminate the North Korean regime by force if North Korea agrees to the

complete and verifiable elimination of its nuclear weapons and

long-range missile programs.

Absent a realistic plan or timetable for regime change—and that

is a matter I discussed when I was here previously. That was a

matter that we looked at very carefully in the North Korea policy

review, led by former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry in the 1999/

11

2000 period. Absent a realistic plan or timetable for regime change,

we must deal with North Korea as it is, rather than as we might

wish it were. Turning that reality, unless somebody can give me a

plan I have not seen, into a pledge should not be difficult.

Second, we should be prepared to offer assistance for weapons

elimination as the U.S. has done in a very different context to the

States of the former Soviet Union under the famous Nunn-Lugar

program.

Over time, if the talks are bearing fruit, we can broaden them

to encompass other issues of deep concern to the United States,

such as conventional forces, avoidance of provocations and incidents, and human rights; and other issues of interest to North

Korea, such as energy security and economic development. We

should also offer a longer-term vision of gradual and conditional relaxation of tension, including the possibility of enhanced economic

contacts with the United States, South Korea, and Japan.

In this approach, the U.S. diplomatic position should be a component of a common overall position shared with our allies, in which

we pool our diplomatic tools: sticks and carrots. In a shared strategy, we will also need to pool our objectives, so that we are seeking

a set of outcomes that South Korea and Japan also share.

If an agreement emerges from direct talks, it will supersede and

replace the 1994 Agreed Framework, which has been controversial

in the United States and, it appears, not even entirely to the liking

of the North Korean leadership. As in 1994, the agreement must,

of course, include the freezing and progressive dismantlement of

the plutonium program, but we now know it has to also include

verifiable provisions for eliminating the uranium enrichment program, and to the Agreed Framework’s emphasis on nuclear weapons must be added verifiable elimination of North Korea’s ballistic

missile program.

In return, the United States and its allies must make it convincing to North Korea, and this is the crux of the matter, that

foreswearing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles is its best

course, the only safe course for it.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, as I stressed earlier,

I am by no means certain that a diplomatic approach including direct talks will succeed, but it is a necessary prelude to any military

action, and it is far preferable to just standing back and watching

the disaster of North Korea going nuclear. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Carter.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Carter follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ASHTON B. CARTER, CO-DIRECTOR, PREVENTIVE DEFENSE PROJECT, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

ALTERNATIVES TO LETTING NORTH KOREA GO NUCLEAR

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me back

to testify before this Committee on the loose nukes crisis in North Korea. In my last

appearance I described why this was a crisis, how enormous the stakes are for our

security, and my recollections of the last two crises in 1994 and 1998. This time you

have asked me to analyze the prospect for direct talks with North Korea, and I am

happy to do so.

12

Why talk to North Korea at all?

When he appeared here before this Committee shortly before me on February 4th

Deputy Secretary of State Armitage indicated that the U.S. government intends to

conduct direct talks with North Korea. This is the right decision for the Bush administration.

But it is worth pausing to ask why.

After all, North Korea’s record of honoring its agreements with us is, to put it

charitably, mixed. While the North kept the plutonium-containing fuel rods at

Yongbyon under international inspections and its reactor frozen for eight years, ending this freeze only a few months ago, we now know it was cheating on other provisions of its international agreements by enriching uranium. This means, at a minimum, that any future understandings with North Korea will need to be rigorously

verified.

In addition, the government of North Korea is very far, once again to put it charitably, from sharing our values.

Still, one is led to direct talks by reasoning through the full range of alternatives

and from seeing the relationship between them.

One alternative is to let North Korea proceed to go nuclear, but to isolate, contain,

and await the collapse of the North Korean regime.

President Bush said in his State of the Union message that ‘‘nuclear weapons will

only bring isolation, economic stagnation, and continued hardship’’ to North Korea.

Isolation must seem like pretty light punishment to the most isolated country on

earth.

Those who speak of containment envision a hermetic seal around North Korea,

embargoing imports and interdicting shipments of exports, especially ballistic missiles. But the export we should worry most about is plutonium. After North Korea

gets five or six more bombs from the fuel rods at Yongbyon, it might reckon it has

enough to sell to other rogues or, far worse, to terrorists. It is entirely implausible

that we could effectively prevent a few baseball-sized lumps of plutonium from being

smuggled out of Yongbyon. Not only is a nuclear weapon-sized quantity of Plutonium-239 small in size, but it is not highly radioactive and does not emit a strong

signature that could be detected if it were to be smuggled out of North Korea to

a destination where terrorists could receive it.

The problem with awaiting collapse in North Korea’s regime is that there is no

particular reason to believe it will occur soon, and in the meantime North Korea

can create lasting international damage—damage that will extend beyond the Korean Peninsula and beyond the lifetime of the North Korean regime.

In my last appearance before the Committee, I cited the five reasons why letting

North Korea move to serial production of nuclear weapons is a disaster for U.S. and

international security:

First, North Korea might sell plutonium it judges excess to its own needs to other

states or terrorist groups. North Korea has few cash-generating exports other than

ballistic missiles. Now it could add fissile material or assembled bombs to its shopping catalogue. Loose nukes are a riveting prospect: While hijacked airlines and anthrax-dusted letters are a dangerous threat to civilized society, it would change the

way Americans were forced to live if it became an ever-present possibility that a

city could disappear in a mushroom cloud at any moment.

Second, in a collapse scenario loose nukes could fall into the hands of warlords

or factions. The half-life of Plutonium-239 is 24,400 years. What is the half-life of

the North Korean regime?

Third, even if the bombs remain firmly in hands of the North Korean government

they are a huge problem: having nukes might embolden North Korea into thinking

it can scare away South Korea’s defenders, weakening deterrence. Thus a nuclear

North Korea weakens deterrence, thereby making war on the Korean Peninsula

more likely.

Fourth, a nuclear North Korea could cause a domino effect in East Asia, as South

Korea, Japan, and Taiwan ask themselves if their non-nuclear status is safe for

them.

Fifth and finally, if North Korea, one of the world’s poorest and most isolated

countries, is allowed to go nuclear, serious damage will be done to the global nonproliferation regime, which is not perfect but which has made a contribution to

keeping all but a handful of problem nations from going nuclear.

It appears from reading the press that the path of letting North Korea go nuclear,

coupled with isolation, containment, and awaiting collapse, is the path we are on

at this moment. This is the worst alternative.

A second alternative is to use military force to arrest North Korea’s race to nuclear

weapons. I described previously the attack plan on Yongbyon we devised in 1994,

the last time North Korea was moving towards reprocessing at Yongbyon. A strike

13

with conventionally-armed precision weapons at Yongbyon’s fuel rods and reprocessing facility would not eliminate North Korea’s nuclear program, but it would set it

back for years. If we were to strike Yongbyon, North Korea would have a choice.

It could respond by lashing out at South Korea through an invasion over the DMZ,

but that would precipitate a war that would surely mean the end of the North Korean regime. There is no guaranteeing that the North would not make such a foolish

choice. But that is the risk we must run in this option; it is the risk worth taking

to avoid the disaster associated with the first alternative of letting North Korea go

nuclear. As a practical matter, we are in a much better position to threaten or conduct such a strike if we have previously made an effort to talk North Korea out of

its nuclear programs. Even if you are a pessimist about the success of talks, therefore, they are a prerequisite for exercising this alternative.

The third alternative is to try to talk North Korea out of its nuclear ambitions.

A year ago I would have assessed that it was likely we could reach an agreement

on terms acceptable to us to stop North Korea’s nuclear programs and ballistic missile programs in a verifiable way. Since then we have let our options narrow. Now

I fear that North Korea might have concluded that it could dash over the nuclear

finish line into a zone where it is invulnerable to American attempts to force regime

change, since it suspects that is our objective. We must therefore view talks as an

experiment. If the experiment succeeds, we will have stopped North Korea’s nuclear

program without war; if it does not, it was in any event the necessary step towards

making the alternative of military force realistic.

How should direct talks be conducted?

It is clear that the United States cannot conduct direct talks with North Korea

while it is advancing its nuclear programs. We must therefore insist that during

talks, North Korea reinstate the freeze at Yongbyon. In return the United States

can refrain from any military buildup on the peninsula.

Secretary Armitage indicated that the U.S. would participate in direct talks,

meaning that Americans and North Koreans would be in the same room. This is

necessary. We cannot outsource our deepest security matters to China, Russia, or

the United Nations. Only the U.S. can convincingly tell North Korea that it will be

less safe, not more safe, if it proceeds with nuclear weapons—and this is the crux

of the matter.

Others can be in the room at the same time, and having them with us in the room

might be advantageous. Certainly we will have a richer set of sticks and carrots if

our negotiating strategy is closely coordinated with our allies, Japan and South

Korea—and coordination is necessary in any event to maintain the critical alliance

relationships that buttress our entire strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. In the past

we have conducted parallel bilateral negotiations—U.S.-DPRK, ROK-DPRK, and

Japan-DPRK all in coordinated fashion—rather than meeting in one room with

North Korea. But when we have done this, we have been careful to coordinate closely with Japan and South Korea.

China and Russia have also strongly supported the proposition that North Korea

must not go nuclear. But their influence is not apparent, at least to me. They might

be more willing to play a constructive role once we have set out a strategy into

which they can play.

The United Nations can also play a critical role, particularly if North Korea were

to agree to IAEA inspectors returning. We should continue to proceed at the U.N.,

but as a complement, not a substitute, for direct talks.

What should be the U.S. position in direct talks?

We should enter direct talks with a clear sense of our objectives. At the top of

the list, above all other objectives we might have with North Korea, should be the

complete and verifiable elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons (both plutonium-based and uranium-based) and long-range missile programs nationwide. This

objective includes, but goes beyond, all the obligations contained in previous agreements made by North Korea.

The United States should also make it clear to North Korea that it cannot tolerate

North Korean progression to reprocessing or any other steps to obtain fissile material for nuclear weapons, and that we are prepared to take all measures of coercion,

including military force, to prevent this threat to U.S. security.

In return, there are two things that it should be easy for the United States to

offer.

First, we should be prepared to make a pledge to North Korea that the U.S. will

not seek to eliminate the North Korean regime by force if North Korea agrees to

the complete and verifiable elimination of its nuclear weapons and long-range missile programs. Absent a realistic plan or timetable for regime change, we must deal

14

with North Korea as it is, rather than as we might wish it to be. Turning a reality

into a pledge should not be difficult.

Second, we should be prepared to offer assistance for weapons elimination, as the

U.S. has done to the states of the former Soviet Union under the Nunn-Lugar program.

Over time, if the talks are bearing fruit, we can broaden them to encompass other

issues of deep concern to the United States, such as conventional forces, avoidance

of provocations and incidents, and human rights; and to North Korea, such as energy security and economic development. We should also offer a longer-term vision

of gradual and conditional relaxation of tension, including the possibility of enhanced economic contacts with the United States, South Korea, and Japan.

The U.S. diplomatic position should be a component of a common overall position

shared with our allies, in which we pool our diplomatic tools—carrots and sticks.

In a shared strategy, we will also need to pool our objectives, so that we are seeking

a set of outcomes that South Korea and Japan also share.

If an agreement emerges from direct talks, it will supersede and replace the 1994

Agreed Framework, which has been controversial in the United States and, it appears, not entirely to the liking of the North Korean leadership, either. As in 1994,

the agreement must of course include the freezing and progressive dismantlement

of the plutonium program at Yongbyon. We now know it must also include verifiable

provisions for eliminating the uranium enrichment program. To the Agreed Framework’s emphasis on nuclear weapons must also be added verifiable elimination of

North Korea’s ballistic missile program.

In return, the U.S. and its allies must make it convincing to North Korea that

foreswearing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles is its best course—the only safe

course.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, as I stressed earlier, I am by no

means certain that a diplomatic approach including direct talks will succeed. But

it is a necessary prelude to any military action, and it is far preferable to standing

back and watching the disaster of North Korea going nuclear.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kanter.

STATEMENT OF DR. ARNOLD KANTER, PRINCIPAL, THE

SCOWCROFT GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. KANTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I appreciate this opportunity to join my colleagues here on

the panel to discuss the North Korea issue and the relevance of the

1994 Agreed Framework to where we go from here. And as it will

be clear from my remarks, I think we have all pretty much figured

out that this animal we are all groping, is an elephant.

We are facing a crisis. If the term ‘‘crisis’’ means anything, it

means a dangerous problem that requires urgent attention. As a

result of deliberate North Korean provocations, that is the situation

we face today on the Korean Peninsula. It is, moreover, a situation

that is likely to grow steadily more dangerous unless and until it

is actively addressed.

I think it also should be noted that this escalating series of

North Korean actions places two additional obstacles in the way of

finding an effective political solution.

First, it tends to split and polarize opinion among precisely those

allies, and other regional actors, whose support will be indispensable to the success of any approach.

Second, it makes it harder and harder for the United States itself

to show flexibility, lest that flexibility look like a response to escalating North Korea blackmail.

Against this backdrop, let me turn to the question of what a U.S.

approach should look like. I think there is a natural tendency to

take the Agreed Framework as the point of departure. I believe,

15

however, that that is the wrong place to begin, because it begs or

assumes answers to what I believe are the right questions, namely,

‘‘What are the North Korean problems or threats that we properly

should be addressing? That is, what is the appropriate scope of a

U.S. approach? And then, how can we best deal with these problems and threats?’’

What I do not find to be a particularly useful question in fashioning a strategy, is to agonize over whether North Korea really

would be willing to abandon its nuclear ambitions. First, there is

no way to make confident predictions about the behavior, much

less the objectives, of an isolated, demonstrably unpredictable regime.

Second, it is reasonable to assume that North Korea, like my

mother, wants to have it both ways.

That is, they presumably would want all of the benefits of a deal

and the benefits they think they would achieve by a covert continuation of their nuclear and missile programs, that is, by cheating.

And so our challenge is to design an approach that, at a minimum, denies them the possibility of having it both ways and,

ideally sets in motion indigenous forces that both reduce the incentives to cheat and increase the chances of whistleblowing if cheating is attempted.

Third, we cannot know the answers to the question until we

make an authentically good-faith effort to find out, that is, until we

really try to negotiate a reasonable deal.

And, finally, and in some ways to me most important, if we do

make such a good-faith effort, and if that proves to be unsuccessful,

we will be in an immensely stronger position internationally to

deal with a North Korea that has, by its failure to agree, shown

to be determined to be a dangerous nuclear and missile

proliferator.

So to reiterate, I believe we should start with a clean sheet of

paper in fashioning the U.S. approach, rather than just assume

that we should pick up where the Agreed Framework left off. That

said, I do believe that it is useful to briefly review the terms of the

Agreed Framework, to generate a kind of checklist of issues that

will need to be considered in fashioning any new U.S. strategy.

As we all know, the Agreed Framework was most of all a limited

deal. It was the best the U.S. side thought it could get to address

an immediate crisis. It was confined to the North Korean nuclear

program. Within the nuclear program, it was predominantly about

plutonium-related activities, and addressed highly enriched uranium [HEU] only by implication. It did no more than freeze these

plutonium-related activities until we would be well along the implementation timetable. And as we have now seen, the limits on

North Korean actions were easily reversible by Pyongyang.

In exchange for the undertakings by the North Korean side, the

United States and other members of the international community

offered some inducements. The North Koreans were offered light

water reactors, which as the U.S. side fully recognized at the time,

make no economic sense whatsoever in terms of modernizing North

Korea’s energy sector or meeting its pressing development needs.

They were simply the price of getting North Korea’s agreement.

16

The North Koreans also got interim supplies of heavy fuel oil for

their thermal power plants. We made a commitment to move toward more normal political and economic relations, and we offered

security assurances, specifically, assurances against the threat or

use of nuclear weapons.

In form, the Agreed Framework was a bilateral agreement. In

substance, I think it was multilateral in important respects. First,

the whole process of negotiations involved very close and continuous consultations and coordination between the United States,

Japan, and South Korea, and the Perm Five. Second, implementation of the Agreed Framework was accomplished through a multilateral consortium, KEDO.

Armed with this checklist, I conclude that the Agreed Framework would be the wrong point of departure both for fashioning

U.S. policy on North Korea, and for engaging the North Koreans.

Politically, the Agreed Framework is damaged goods. But more important, substantively, its focus is too narrow and its ambitions are

too limited.

Let me hasten to add, however, that I think it would be a mistake, a serious mistake, to declare the Agreed Framework dead before we have anything to take its place.

Let me address what I think would be the proper scope of a new

approach, and this very much follows what Ash has said. North

Korea poses a whole host of issues, problems, and threats. I do not

believe, however, that we should try to address all of them, much

less simultaneously, because it is a near certainty that if we do try

to do so, we will overreach and we will fail.

At the other extreme, while the current preoccupation with the

North Korean nuclear program is understandable, I believe it is too

narrow a focus. I believe the U.S. approach should address as a

first priority the twin issues that are at the core of the North Korean WMD threat; that is, it should encompass the North Korean

ballistic missile problem, as well as the nuclear problem.

Our approach should address North Korean capabilities to

threaten its neighbors, and the North Korean capacity to provide

these WMD capabilities to others. And we should do so in ways

that give us confidence that the actions that North Korea takes are

not easily reversible. Accordingly, our objective ought to be the

verifiable dismantlement of North Korean nuclear and missile programs.

Conversely, I believe that other than possible confidence-building

measures, we should defer efforts to reduce the North Korean conventional military threat. We, likewise should defer efforts to address such problems as North Korea’s horrifying human rights

practices and other issues that are not related to immediate security concerns.

Next, let me turn to the form and process of the U.S. approach.

I think this is a good place to make explicit that which is both obvious but fundamental: North Korea is not just a problem for the

U.S., but for the international community. It is, in a word, a multilateral problem. And any strategy for addressing it must take this

essential fact as its point of departure.

As we all know, often from bitter experience, virtually any unilateral approach that aims at a political solution is vulnerable to

17

being undermined by others. To be effective, therefore, any moves

by us to pressure, leverage, or isolate North Korea until it abandons its nuclear and missile ambitions must be taken in close coordination with the other key actors. And so it follows that the first

challenge for U.S. diplomacy is to persuade our allies, friends, and

others in the region that North Korea is not just a U.S. problem

that is amenable to a purely U.S. solution. On the contrary, we

have a common fate and we must make common cause.

And our diplomatic objective should be to persuade each of the

key regional actors to make clear to Pyongyang, by word and by

deed, that they are not just messengers for the United States, but

that North Korean actions are threatening their respective core interests.

Now, time does not allow me to go into detail, but I think, at the

same time, we need to be candid in recognizing that the concerns

and the priorities of these other key regional actors are unlikely to

coincide perfectly with our own, and our strategy needs to take account of those differences as well. The approach to North Korea

also needs to be multilateral because, as in the case of the Agreed

Framework, it is hard to imagine any proposal that would be attractive to North Korea that would not depend on the active cooperation and tangible support from others for its implementation.

And, finally, and key, North Korea requires a multilateral approach because, as has become increasingly obvious over the last

several weeks, the crisis is putting our key relationships, starting

with the relationship we have with South Korea, at risk.

These considerations tell me that a framework for dealing with

North Korea must be multilateral at least in the sense that there

is genuine and sustainable consensus on the objectives, approach,

quid pro quos, and so forth. Absent real agreement on these kinds

of issues, I do not know what a multilateral strategy means or

looks like. But given real agreement, I think the modalities of how

we engage with the North Koreans matter a lot less; that is,

whether the negotiations with Pyongyang take place in a multilateral forum or whether the United States takes the lead in ‘‘direct

talks,’’ while others have parallel reinforcing engagements with the

North Koreans.

Put another way, I think the debate about form—whether talks

with the North Koreans should be multilateral or could be direct

and bilateral—is somewhere between irrelevant and distracting,

and in no event should it be allowed to be a major stumbling block.

Finally, let me say a word about how we should get started. I believe we face an urgent, essentially tactical, yet critically important

task that is a first step in a broader, more strategic approach.

What is perhaps most striking about North Korea’s recent actions,

is not just the number of steps it has recently taken toward the nuclear brink, but also the speed with which it has taken them. We

need to stop this momentum. We need to get the North Koreans

to immediately freeze both their nuclear and ballistic missile programs in place before the problem becomes even more dangerous

and difficult, and before we are left with only profoundly unattractive options.

This means, on the one hand, we need to be clear with North

Korea about our red lines, starting with the reprocessing of plutoVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:15 Jun 24, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 87821 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
18

nium in the spent fuel rods. On the other hand, I believe that in

exchange for an immediate freeze, we should offer to meet with the

North Koreans. For our part, it need be nothing more than a preview of coming attractions; for example, telling the North Koreans

in general terms, both what the international community requires

of them and why it would be in their interest to respond positively.

I believe such an offer could offer several benefits.

First, it might be a face-saving way for the North Koreans to

stop their self-destructive march toward the brink. Second, countries that thus far have been unwilling or unable to press North

Korea to meet our demands might see such an offer by us as a reason to engage Pyongyang in exactly the kind of concerted way that

an effective multilateral approach demands. And, third, it could

help end the sterile debate over ‘‘form’’ that is increasing strains

among those who need to work together on North Korea.

But, again, freezing the North Korean nuclear and missile programs is just a tactical first step to create conditions that would

be more conducive to a lasting arrangement. I have already indicated what I believe our core goal should be. And in pursuing these

objectives, the approach to the North Koreans should convey pretty

much the sense that everything is on the table.

Specifically, we should be willing to provide security assurances

to North Korea that affirm that we have no hostile intent toward

them; that is, the problem is the North Korean programs and actions that pose a threat to regional and international stability. We,

therefore, should be prepared to assure North Korea that if and as

that threat disappears, it need have no concern about its own security.

We also should be prepared to take steps to end North Korea’s

political and economic isolation. Not only are such measures likely

to be the price of a deal, I think it is also important to recognize

that they additionally would be in our self-interest.

First, we have a clear interest in a stable Korean Peninsula and,

therefore, in avoiding an abrupt North Korean implosion.

Second, much of North Korea’s isolation is self-imposed. That isolation is the source of the regime’s control over the North Korean

people. And it is very likely a root cause of North Korea’s paranoia.

And so it follows that steps that erode that isolation would serve

both the immediate objectives and our longer-term objectives.

Obviously, everything would depend upon the specific terms of a

deal, but just as obviously, the goal of any deal must be much more

than simply to return to the Agreed Framework and to restore the

status quo ante. This is not, and cannot be, about paying twice for

the same horse. The idea is to buy a whole new horse.

In conclusion, it must be said that there is nothing in the history

of North Korean agreements that give any grounds for optimism

that they would honor a new, more lasting deal. That is why our

objective should be the verifiable dismantlement of North Korean

nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, and that is why anything

we offer to Pyongyang in return must be at least as reversible as

any undertakings they make.

There, likewise, as Senator Biden suggested, is just too much history to be confident that there is even a new deal to be made, and

just as—much less be confident that there is a deal to be made that

19

Pyongyang will keep. But it is unarguably in the U.S. interest to

make every effort to lead an international campaign to achieve a

political solution. Not only do the stakes require it, but it also

would pay big dividends if, in the end, there is no political solution

and other alternatives must be considered.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. Kanter.

Mr. Einhorn.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT J. EINHORN, SENIOR ADVISOR,

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. EINHORN. Thank you Mr. Chairman, other members of the

committee for giving me the opportunity to testify this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if you might pull that microphone closer, or turn it on.

Mr. EINHORN. OK. I think just turning it on will help.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Recent North Korean behavior has tended to give a boost to the

theory that the DPRK, rather than being willing to trade away its

nuclear option, is determined to acquire and retain nuclear weapons. But the implications of North Korea becoming a nuclear power

are so disturbing that before we resign ourselves to that outcome,

we should put Pyongyang’s declared willingness to give up nuclear

weapons to the test, and the best way to test it is at the negotiating table. We need to engage very soon, because in a matter of

weeks North Korea could reprocess enough plutonium for about

five nuclear weapons.

I would like to offer the committee some suggestions on getting

that engagement underway and carrying it forward. The question

of who would participate in negotiations with the DPRK has recently become a stumbling block. The U.S. has favored a multilateral approach, while North Korea has adamantly rejected a multilateral framework, and instead has insisted on engaging the United

States bilaterally.

The Bush administration is right that the challenge posed by

North Korea is not simply a bilateral matter between the United

States and the DPRK. North Korea’s neighbors and the rest of the

international community have a huge stake in the outcome, and

they should participate both in the development and in the implementation of any solution. At the same time, it is clear that mutual

threat perceptions between Washington and Pyongyang are a central feature of the current situation, and that any solution will

have to take the particular needs of these two protagonists into account.

I agree with Ash Carter; we cannot outsource such questions as

achieving an effectively verifiable means of ensuring compliance.

In these circumstances, it is reasonable to begin the negotiating

process with bilateral U.S./North Korean talks, primarily on the

nuclear issue. In parallel, a multilateral group could be convened,

consisting perhaps, of the P–5, South Korea, Japan, European

Union, and Australia. It could initially serve as a mechanism in

which the United States could consult the others on its plans for

dealing with the North Koreans on the nuclear issue.

20

Eventually, perhaps after a general framework had been developed on the nuclear issue, the multilateral forum, now with the

North Koreans participating, could become the umbrella under

which a variety of bilateral and multiparty engagements with

North Korea could take place.

A number of promising variants of this idea could be devised.

What is critical is to get the talks started right away, and to get

other governments to recognize their responsibility for helping

achieve a solution. Once a workable formula on participation can

be found, it will be important to create an environment in which

neither the United States nor the DPRK has to negotiate under duress.

Therefore, North Korea should pledge that while the talks are

underway it will not reprocess its spent fuel, and it will permit the

International Atomic Energy Agency to return to Yongbyon for the

purpose of reapplying monitoring seals at its reprocessing facility.

For its part, the United States should pledge that as long as

those seals are intact, it will not engage in military action against

Yongbyon and will not support United Nations sanctions against

North Korea. There should be no other preconditions for getting

the talks started.

For the talks to have any chance at succeeding, North Korea

must be given a clear choice between a much brighter future without nuclear weapons and a much bleaker one with them. This requires both carrots and sticks.

The U.S. administration is right that the North Koreans should

not be rewarded for simply coming into compliance with their existing obligations. But that principle does not mean the DPRK should

not be offered additional incentives for accepting additional obligations. In other words, more for more. I think this is what Arnie

Kanter was talking about when he spoke about the ‘‘whole new

horse.’’

In exchange for verifiable commitments by North Korea that

would terminate its nuclear weapons program and address a range

of other concerns, the United States and other countries should be

prepared to address the DPRK’s needs in the energy, food, infrastructure, and other economic areas, as well as its concerns about

sovereignty and security.

The vision of a better future must be credible to North Korea if

we want to influence their behavior, but the high cost of continuing

on their current reckless course should also be clear. So far, this

message has not been conveyed clearly enough.

Chinese leaders should use private channels to tell their obstreperous old friends that China will not use its veto to block U.N.

sanctions if North Korea disregards their advice and opts for nuclear weapons.

The message from Seoul is probably even more important. But

so far, South Korea’s new President, Roh Moo-hyun, has spoken as

if a peaceful diplomatic solution could be achieved with only carrots

and no sticks. His administration should be frank with Pyongyang

that a DPRK decision to become a nuclear power would put a brake

on inter-Korean relations.

21

With regard to the agenda for negotiations, the nuclear issue deserves the highest priority. Beyond that, there is a wide-range of

subjects that various countries wish to take up with Pyongyang.

The Bush administration previously spoke about a comprehensive agenda that, in addition to the nuclear issue, also covered missile exports, North Korea’s indigenous missile program, conventional arms, and human rights.

Administration officials said that they would insist on making

progress across the board, and would not conclude separate agreements on some issues if deliberation on other issues was not getting anywhere.

All the items on the administration’s agenda, in my view, are important and should be pursued with North Korea. But insisting on

progress on all issues as a condition for reaching agreement on any

of them, could lead to a prolonged stalemate. And it could preclude

near-term agreements on items of urgency, such as stopping North

Korea’s long-range missile exports. So while progress should be

sought on a wide-range of issues, the items should not be tightly

linked.

Finally, close coordination with South Korea will be critical both

to improving prospects for a negotiated solution to the nuclear

issue, and to preserving the strength of an alliance relationship

that is vital to stability in Northeast Asia, but that has become

quite strained in the last few years.

In the weeks ahead, the Bush and Roh administrations should

make every effort to forge a common approach on the nuclear issue.

In the absence of such a common approach, Pyongyang will have

every incentive to prolong the crisis in the hope of exacerbating

U.S.-ROK differences and stimulating anti-Americanism in South

Korea.

Mr. Chairman, we have all read news reports in recent days that

the Bush administration is now accepting as inevitable that North

Korea will reprocess the spent fuel and become a nuclear power.

According to those reports, the administration has essentially given

up on preventing such a development and is now falling back to a

policy of trying to stop a nuclear armed North Korea from selling

fissile material to hostile States and terrorist groups.

I hope these reports are inaccurate. North Korea may well have

decided that its survival depends on having nuclear weapons and

that it must proceed rapidly to amass a small nuclear arsenal. But

at this stage, we certainly do not know that, and given the huge

stakes involved it would be a monumental error if, out of an aversion to dealing with the regimes we do not like, we fail even to explore whether an agreement could be reached that could credibly

terminate North Korea’s nuclear program.

If North Korea has indeed decided that it must have nuclear

weapons, then any negotiations will fail. In that event, we will

have no choice but to turn to the policy of pressure, isolation, and

containment. And having tried the path of negotiations, we will be

in a stronger position to mobilize international support for such an

approach. But before setting ourselves on such a troublesome

course, we should find out at the negotiating table whether a better

outcome is possible.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

22

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Einhorn.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Einhorn follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT J. EINHORN, SENIOR ADVISOR, CENTER FOR

STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

NEGOTIATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Committee this

morning on the question of negotiating with North Korea.

As the current nuclear impasse grows more serious, we still do not know for sure

whether North Korea is irrevocably committed to having nuclear weapons or is instead prepared to give up the nuclear option in exchange for security assurances

and other benefits. The succession of steps North Korea has taken in recent months

to end the plutonium freeze at Yongbyon—together with its clandestine uranium enrichment program begun in the late 1990s—have cast increasing doubt on the relatively benign explanation that Pyongyang is willing to trade away its nuclear program. In a matter of weeks, it could take the fateful step of starting the reprocessing of spent fuel rods that could produce enough plutonium for about five additional

nuclear weapons.

If the North Koreans are indeed determined to acquire and retain nuclear weapons, there is little we can do short of war to stop them. But the implications of the

DPRK becoming a nuclear power are so disturbing that, before we accept that outcome as a fait accompli, we should put Pyongyang’s declared willingness to give up

nuclear weapons to the test at the negotiating table. And while the U.S. Administration is understandably reluctant to convey the impression that it is eager for talks

and susceptible to North Korea’s notorious brinksmanship tactics, the fact of the

matter is that time is fast running out to head off actions that would be very difficult to reverse.

So the U.S. should engage with North Korea, and should do so soon. My testimony

provides some suggestions on getting that engagement underway and on carrying

it forward.

Participation in the negotiations

The question of who would participate in negotiations with the DPRK has recently been a serious stumbling block. The U.S. has favored a multilateral framework and has reportedly considered a number of variants, including a forum that

included the five Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council,

North and South Korea, Japan, the European Union and Australia. The North Koreans, however, have adamantly opposed a multilateral approach and have insisted

on direct, bilateral talks between themselves and the U.S.

The Bush Administration is right that the challenge posed by North Korea is not

simply a bilateral matter between the U.S. and DPRK, North Korea’s neighbors and

others in the international community have a huge stake in the outcome of the crisis, and they should therefore participate in both the development and implementation of any solution. At the same time, it is clear that mutual threat perceptions

between Washington and Pyongyang are a central factor in the current situation,

especially on the nuclear issue, and that any solution will have to deal with the particular requirements of those two protagonists (including the North Korean requirement for security assurances from the United States and the U.S. requirement that

commitments by the DPRK be verifiable).

In these circumstances, it is reasonable to begin the negotiating process on two

separate tracks. The U.S. and North Korea would engage in direct, bilateral talks,

primarily on the nuclear issue. In parallel, a multilateral group would convene that

could include the P-5, Japan, the two Koreas, the E.U., and Australia. North Korea

would have a place reserved for it in the group but would not be required to participate from the outset. Indeed, at the outset, the multilateral group would serve primarily as a mechanism in which the U.S. could consult the others on its approach

for handling the nuclear issue in the bilateral talks. It might enable the U.S., in

some sense, to represent the views of the others in its talks with North Korea and

to discuss solutions with the North in which the others would play a significant role.

Eventually, perhaps after a general framework for resolving the nuclear issue had

been developed bilaterally, the multilateral forum would become the umbrella, or

steering group, under which various forms of engagement with North Korea would

take place. Under that umbrella, some combination of participants (including the

DPRK) might discuss North Korea’s energy requirements; another combination

might work on food aid and other humanitarian needs; another might address

Northeast Asian transportation links; and so forth. Further bilateral engagement,

23

including DPRK-Japanese normalization talks and any other U.S.-DPRK talks,

could take place within this multilateral framework, with the steering group meeting from time to time to take stock and coordinate efforts.

Explicit North Korean approval of this framework for engagement should not be

a requirement for getting the U.S.-DPRK bilateral talks on the nuclear issue underway. What should be a requirement is support from the other participants. They

should agree that, in exchange for the U.S. getting the talks started bilaterally, they

would participate in the multilateral process, bear their fair share of the implementation burden, and press the DPRK to join the multilateral framework at the appropriate time if it wants to reap the benefits of engagement.

This suggested approach is one of any number of promising variants that might

be devised. The U.S. Administration is reportedly exploring with interested parties

a variety of formulas that may involve bilateral talks within a multilateral framework. The precise formula is less important than the need to get talks on the nuclear issue started right away and the need for North Korea’s neighbors and the

wider international community to recognize their responsibility for helping to meet

the challenge North Korea has posed.

Avoiding negotiations under duress

Another stumbling block in the way of finding a solution is the preconditions that

both Pyongyang and Washington seem to have established for negotiations on the

nuclear issue. The North Koreans have suggested that, before their nuclear program

can be addressed, the U.S. must first provide assurances about the DPRK’s security.

The U.S. has indicated that, before any such assurances can be discussed, the North

must first convincingly dismantle its nuclear program and that, until then, the U.S.

is willing to meet only for the purpose of discussing how Pyongyang is prepared to

carry out such dismantlement.

Such preconditions are a recipe for paralysis. But there are steps the two sides

can take in parallel, before the talks begin, to increase prospects for success—and

to ensure that neither side will have to negotiate under duress. North Korea should

undertake that, while the talks are underway, it will not reprocess its spent fuel

and it will permit the International Atomic Energy Agency to return to Yongbyon

for the purpose of re-applying monitoring seals to its reprocessing facility. For its

part, the U.S. should pledge that, as long as those seals are intact, it will not engage

in military action against Yongbyon and will not support United Nations sanctions

against North Korea.

The U.S. pledge, which could be provided in writing at a senior level, would temporarily preclude two forms of pressure about which the North Koreans have expressed serious concern—namely, U.S. military strikes and Security Council sanctions. While the DPRK pledge would not restore the entire freeze at Yongbyon (e.g.,

would not halt the recently re-started operation of the 5 mw reactor), it would remove, also temporarily, the most urgent threat posed by North Korea—namely, its

ability to reprocess enough plutonium to have an arsenal of six or more nuclear

weapons within about a year.

Presenting a clear choice

Whether in an initial bilateral phase or a subsequent multilateral phase, negotiations with North Korea will only succeed if Pyongyang is given a clear choice between a much brighter future without nuclear weapons and a much bleaker one

with them. That means the U.S. and others who will engage with the North must

come prepared with both carrots and sticks.

The U.S. Administration is right that the North Koreans should not be rewarded

for coming into compliance with existing obligations. What that means is that their

illegal uranium enrichment program and their provocative lifting of the plutonium

freeze should not entitle them to a better deal than they had under the 1994 Agreed

Framework. Indeed, they should pay a penalty for those actions. For example, instead of expecting in any new negotiations to have the Agreed Framework restored

intact (or even improved from their perspective), they should recognize that they

may have to forfeit some of the features they favored (e.g., nuclear reactors) or be

required to do more than under the 1994 deal (e.g., send spent fuel rods out of

North Korea at an earlier date).

But the principle of not rewarding the DPRK for simply living up to previous commitments does not mean that it should not be offered additional incentives for accepting additional obligations—that is, more for more. In exchange for credible and

verifiable DPRK commitments that alleviate U.S. concerns and those of other interested countries, we and those others should be prepared to address North Korea’s

needs in the energy, food, infrastructure, and other economic areas as well as its

concerns about its security and sovereignty. Moreover, while it may be tempting,

24

given Pyongyang’s checkered compliance record, to insist that the North Koreans

first take steps to meet our concerns before we meet theirs, we will only succeed

in inducing them to do what we want them to do if we adhere to the principle of

simultaneity, with both sides moving ahead together in a carefully calibrated way.

The vision of a better future must be credible to the North Koreans if we want

to influence their behavior. The incentives must be spelled out as specifically as possible and as early as possible. But if we want the North Koreans to reverse the reckless course on which they are now embarked, the high costs of continuing on that

course must also be made clear to them.

That does not mean imposing penalties now, even though such penalties may already be justified on the basis of Pyongyang’s behavior. At this stage, imposing penalties, especially U.N. Security Council-mandated sanctions, would likely result in

the North Koreans digging in their heels or even stepping up their provocations. For

the time being, sanctions should be held in reserve.

But the U.S., North Korea’s neighbors, and the rest of the international community should be sending the message now that, if Pyongyang chooses the wrong

path—the path of acquiring nuclear weapons—then it can expect to be the target

of a concerted multilateral effort to ensure that it will pay a high price for its choice.

While it is premature at this stage to impose sanctions, it is not too early to start

developing them in case they are needed. One approach—both as a punitive measure and as a means of impeding North Korea’s nuclear and other weapons programs—would be for the Security Council to prohibit all U.N. members from exporting to or importing from North Korea all military and dual-use goods and technologies. Such an embargo could be accompanied by means of making it effective,

such as authorization for U.N. members (or a multilateral interdiction force) to

search suspect ships or aircraft and seize prohibited cargoes.

To send the message that choosing nuclear weapons will entail huge costs, the

international community must speak with one voice. But clearly, the most important

voices will be China and South Korea. Chinese leaders should use their private

channels to tell their obstreperous old friends that a North Korean nuclear weapons

capability is unacceptable to China and that China will not use its veto to block

U.N. sanctions if North Korea does not heed its advice.

The message from Seoul is probably even more important. But so far, South Korea’s new president, Roh Moo-hyun, has spoken as if a peaceful, diplomatic solution

can be achieved with only carrots and no sticks. President Roh and his Administration must be frank with Pyongyang that North-South engagement cannot be insulated from the nuclear issue. They must convey clearly that, as much as the new

government in Seoul wishes to move forward with North-South reconciliation, a

DPRK decision to become a nuclear power would put a brake on inter-Korean engagement and make it impossible to go ahead with business as usual.

Pursuing a broad agenda with North Korea

Taken together, the issues that the U.S., ROK, the DPRK’s other neighbors, and

other members of the international community would wish to pursue in negotiations

with North Korea are broad and diverse. Those various agendas overlap considerably, but they are not identical and there are differences of priority. Such diversity

can be accommodated, however, by establishing a multilateral umbrella (as discussed above) under which a variety of bilateral and multi-party engagements can

take place.

The nuclear issue deserves the highest priority. It should be addressed, at least

initially, in U.S.-DPRK bilateral talks, although elements of a possible solution (e.g.,

IAEA verification, security assurances) might be worked out and implemented in a

multilateral framework.

The Bush Administration has previously spoken of pursuing a ‘‘comprehensive’’

agenda with the DPRK that, in addition to the nuclear issue, would cover North Korea’s missile exports and indigenous long-range missile programs, conventional military forces and military confidence-building measures, and humanitarian and

human rights issues. A number of these items might lend themselves to multilateral

attention, while a few others could be pursued bilaterally.

North Korea’s neighbors each have similarly wide-ranging matters to take up

with the DPRK. For Japan, the list includes the question of Japanese citizens previously abducted by North Korea, the threat from medium-range No Dong missiles,

provocative DPRK actions such as sending spy ships into Japanese waters, and

large-scale Japanese assistance as a form of compensation for Japan’s colonization

of Korea early last century. For China and Russia, the list includes a broad array

of political and economic questions. The inter-Korean agenda between the DPRK

and the ROK is, of course, the broadest agenda of all, dealing with every facet of

the process of reconciliation between the two halves of the long-divided Peninsula.

25

The content of multilateral engagement with North Korea is too complicated and

diverse to expect to resolve all the issues at once, as part of a large package. It

would be essential to proceed incrementally.

When the U.S. Administration announced its comprehensive agenda with North

Korea in the summer of 2001, it said that it recognized that progress on the various

agenda items could not be made at the same speed. Nonetheless, it called for making headway on all the issues ‘‘across the board.’’ It was not prepared to conclude

separate agreements on some issues if deliberations on other issues were not getting

anywhere.

All of the items on the Administration’s comprehensive agenda are important and

should be pursued with Pyongyang. But insisting on progress on all issues as a condition for reaching agreement on any of them could lead to a prolonged stalemate

across the board, and could preclude near-term agreements on items of considerable

urgency (e.g., stopping North Korean missile exports). Therefore, while progress

should be sought on all items on the comprehensive agenda, they should not be

tightly linked. If agreements can be reached on individual items that serve U.S. and

allied interests, they should not be held hostage to further progress on other matters.

Coordinating with South Korea

To improve prospects for success in engaging with North Korea, the United States

and North Korea’s neighbors must seek to coordinate their approaches to the negotiations. But by far and away, the most crucial coordination will be between Washington and Seoul.

In the coming weeks and months, the Bush Administration and the new administration of President Roh Moo-hyun should make every effort to forge a common approach for dealing with the North on the nuclear issue. In the absence of such a

common approach, Pyongyang will have little incentive to come to agreement and

every incentive to prolong the crisis in the hope of exacerbating differences between

the U.S. and ROK and of stoking up anti-Americanism in South Korea.

But forging a common approach is not only essential for dealing effectively with

the North on the nuclear issue. It is also crucial to the future of the U.S.-ROK bilateral relationship. That relationship has deteriorated significantly over the last few

years, in part because of the widely-shared perception in the South that the Bush

Administration’s tough policies and rhetoric toward Pyongyang have increased tensions on the Peninsula and become an obstacle to progress in inter-Korean relations.

The failure to narrow the large gap that currently exists between Washington and

Seoul on policy toward the North could put in jeopardy a bilateral relationship that

is a key to stability in the Northeast Asia region and to America’s influence and

military presence throughout East Asia.

Achieving a common approach will require intensive bilateral consultations between the two administrations in the period ahead. But it will require more than

putting a good consultative process in place. It will require both sides to make real

adjustments in the positions they have taken so far. At a minimum, it will require

the U.S. Government to swallow hard and agree to begin bilateral talks with a

North Korean regime it doesn’t trust and finds distasteful. It will require the ROK

Government to swallow hard and make clear to the North that its becoming a nuclear power would inevitably place serious limitations on the assistance that Seoul

can provide and on the progress that can be expected in inter-Korean relations.

Mr. Chairman, the news media have reported in recent days that the Bush Administration has come to the conclusion that North Korea is determined to reprocess

its spent fuel and become a nuclear power. Instead of using military force or negotiations to try to prevent such a development, the Administration, according to these

news reports, is inclined to accept it as inevitable, to begin preparing to deal with

its consequences, and to fall back to a policy of trying to stop a nuclear-armed North

Korea from selling fissile material or other sensitive technologies to hostile states

or terrorists.

I hope these reports are inaccurate. The regime in Pyongyang may well have decided that its survival depends on having nuclear weapons and that it must therefore proceed as rapidly as possibly to amass a small nuclear arsenal. But we certainly don’t know that at this stage. And given the huge stakes involved, it would

be a monumental error if, out of a moral aversion to negotiating with regimes we

don’t like, we failed to explore face-to-face whether North Korea was indeed irrevocably committed to nuclear weapons and whether a deal could be worked out that

credibly ended the DPRK’s nuclear program and served the interests of the U.S. and

its friends and allies.

Success in any negotiations with North Korea is far from assured. If North Korea

has indeed decided that it must have nuclear weapons—or is unwilling to accept a

26

reasonable arrangement—then the talks will fail. In that event, the U.S. will have

no choice but to resort to a policy of pressure, isolation, and containment. But before

resigning ourselves to such a worrisome course, we should first find out, at the negotiating table, whether a much better outcome is possible.

The CHAIRMAN. I am advised that the vote is going to occur in

5 to 10 minutes. There are additional speeches being made at the

moment. So, if we can have a 7-minute limit, I will commence questioning, and if the vote comes in the middle of my questions, members should feel free to leave and head to vote. Or we will recess

when the vote comes, and come back so we can all hear each other.

Let me just ask as a starter: It is ideal that each of the parties,

China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, have objectives. We understand that they might be very diverse and that these be incorporated, as you have suggested, whether we are talking bilaterally

or multilaterally in one or more rooms. But what if the situation

exists here in which the interest of these countries are so diverse

and really so different from our own that, in fact, this kind of coalition becomes impossible?

For example, what if the other countries are not as concerned as

we are about nuclear proliferation? We just assume that they all

would be, and that they would see security risks. But what if the

South Koreans come to the conclusion that really the North Koreans would not use those weapons on other Koreans? And, as a matter of fact, some South Koreans have professed that the United

States is the provocative instrument in this situation. It is very,

very difficult to think of a multilateral approach, and yet the necessity of working with our South Korean friends is obviously of the

essence.

In other words, without drawing the Iraq problem into this one,

because this one is big enough, what if a situation exists in which

our national interests appear to be diverse from other major countries to such a point that they are prepared, physically, to say, ‘‘We

are not a part of those objectives?’’

So then, at that point, what do we do? In other words, we all

would agree, at least, I think, today, that the building of more nuclear weapons, the genie out of the bottle, the dispersal of uranium

in ways it can never be found again, the sale of all of this to alQaeda or whomever else might pick it up, and an overt attempt by

the North Koreans to sell it because they need the money without

being covert about it at all—there is testimony that in small

amounts, as you have said, Dr. Carter, it could be beyond any surveillance, even our very best ability to interdict this becomes impossible, so that the proliferation situation is immediate and intense.

Now, under those situations we have, as you have suggested, the

talks, but we may find out that they want to have the bomb anyway, as well as the ability to sell.

We could take the containment situation which you have described as the worst of all alternatives, namely, just acknowledge

they are going to have weapons, and you sort of hope that the regime will go away in due course of old age, that missile defense will

work, or for some reason it will all work out. Or we take military

action and maybe a surgical strike with the thought that there

27

could be retaliation; just the fear the South Koreans have, or

maybe the Japanese.

Now, you know, in these stark terms, what do we do? Is this

something that is serious enough that the United States ought to

contemplate the fact that it might be alone again because it is not

in the interest right now of any of the other countries to enter

physically and dangerously in this way to the point of drawing the

red line? As I hear about a red line, that means if you cross it,

something happens. And something happening is likely to lead to

a military conflict. Do we do that? Will you start, Dr. Carter?

Dr. CARTER. Absolutely. It is an excellent question, and it is important for us all to go in with our eyes open. Our interests are not

identical to those of South Korea, Japan, China, Russia. There is

no question about that. But you use the word ‘‘divergent.’’ I think

they are far from divergent. They are not identical, but they overlap very strongly.

Let us take South Korea and the United States. The South Koreans have never been as exercised about a nuclear North Korea as

we have been. They reckon they are in trouble anyway, if a war

starts on the Korean Peninsula. The intensity of violence is so

great that adding nuclear weapons to that does not materially

change the calculus for them, and they do not have the same global

perspective that we do on proliferation. So, yes, there is a little bit

of difference there.

At the same time, we do have two very deep common interests.

The first is that deterrence not be upset on the Korean Peninsula,

and nuclear weapons could do that. That could make a war that

would destroy much of South Korea more likely, and the South Koreans need to understand that they do have something at stake

here in a nuclear North Korea.

And second, they have a stake in North Korea not collapsing precipitously and on some progressive process of warming of relations

between North and South. And that is not going to be possible if

North Korea goes nuclear and then forces the rest of the world to

isolate it. So their interests do, actually, overlap with ours, simultaneously.

I do not know whether the new President has entirely thought

this through. Sometimes we speak as though we don’t understand

that our interests, while not identical, do overlap. But the reality

is they overlap strongly. That is the basis for the common interest,

and that is why I do not think divergence is in the cards.

You could say similar things about China. I do not want to take

any more time. But you do have to walk around the table, at this

hypothetical table where others sit as well, and say: What does the

situation look like from their point of view? But, I believe, that

from the point of view of everybody sitting at that table, a nuclear

North Korea is bad medicine, and that is a common interest, but

it is not the only common interest we have, and we cannot just pursue what we want. If you are in a common diplomatic strategy, you

have to want a little bit what everybody else wants; if you want

them to want a little bit of what you want.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Kanter, do you have a thought?

Dr. KANTER. Yes. This may sound excessively pedantic, but I

think there is a useful distinction to be made between interests and

28

priorities among interests. That is, I think we have interests that

are substantially in common with those of the other regional actors. The problem arises because our priorities among interests,

where you always have to make tradeoffs, may be different, and

that is important because it means that the risks you are prepared

to run may be different.

At the end of the day, if it turns out that we cannot find common

cause, then we and our allies will confront the consequences of the

United States having to do things alone and that, in turn, directly

impinges on their interests. They are not going to like that. That

will help forge a common approach.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we have come to the end of my time, and

we also are having a vote.

Do you have a thought, Mr. Einhorn?

Mr. EINHORN. I would just comment on the other part about the

red line.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. EINHORN. Clearly, the step of reprocessing the spent fuel is

the most worrisome, dangerous, near-term step. But I am not sure

it is a good idea at this stage to say, ‘‘If you do that, there will be

inevitable consequences.’’ You have to be prepared to followup on

that threat.

I think a better approach would be to make a proposal along the

lines that all three of us have made. Be prepared to sit face-to-face

with the North Koreans, but say, ‘‘Before we sit down, we have to

create the right environment. So you need to pledge that you are

not going to reprocess, and you are going to invite the IAEA back

in to seal that reprocessing facility. And then we will make a corresponding pledge about not attacking Yongbyon, a nuclear facility.’’

It seems to me that may be a better way of dealing with that red

line. If we do what most of North Korea’s neighbors want us to do,

which is sit down bilaterally at the negotiating table, then, I think,

they would give strong support to that proposal for a freeze on reprocessing.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. We will recess and come back as soon

as members can vote. Thank you.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing is reconvened. The Chair will take

advantage of the fact that no one else has reappeared to ask another question.

Secretary Carter, you mentioned the military option is not your

preference or anyone’s, but if there was to be a military option involved here, obviously the fear on the part of most people that this

might lead to a retaliation of guns that are above Seoul or other

means that North Korea might employ. Certainly this has been a

fearsome prospect for our South Korean friends and for others.

What are the reasons to believe that a strike upon the plutonium

facility would lead to these consequences? Or is it a problem that

we know so little about the South Korean mind-set, and the talks

or the communication has been so sparse in the past that it is almost random as to what might occur at that point? From your own

experience analyzing this through the last administration which

you were involved, what views do you have?

29

Dr. CARTER. The North Korean military is told all the time that

we are going to attack them. North Korea is in the third generation

of Stalinist political indoctrination, and so you cannot rule out the

thought that even though it would be clearly self-destructive that

if the order were given for North Korean forces to pour over the

DMZ, they would do so. It is also possible that any military action

by us would lead, through the unraveling of move/countermove and

miscalculation/counter-miscalculation, to a conflict which North

Korea did not initially intend to be a full-scale war, but could end

up as full-scale war. So there is no question that if one contemplates a strike of the kind that we described that that could be

the consequence.

At the same time, I think the North Koreans also have to look

at this situation and ask themselves whether at that point they

would have the choice whether to lash out to the South, at their

South Korean brethren, and to initiate a war which we are absolutely confident would be over within a few weeks and would lead

to the destruction of the North Korean regime. It would be helpful

also if at that time China indicated to North Korea that it was not

prepared to come to its assistance, if through its nuclear ambitions,

North Korea had precipitated such a strike.

So we should try to contrive a situation that leads to the result

we want, namely setting back the nuclear program without leading

to that larger war. But I think we would be foolish not to think

that there was a reasonable possibility that that larger war would

eventuate, and that is what makes it so risky.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I call upon the distinguished ranking member for his questions.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I truly appreciate the three of you and your testimony. And there

may be slightly different emphasis in priorities, but all of you end

up at the same place basically, and coming from three such distinguished people, I hope people are listening beyond this room.

And I want to make it clear in case my mother is watching:

Mom, if you get up to walk away from the television, I was not one

of the guys who said, ‘‘My mother wants it both ways.’’ It was not

me.

So I want the record to show that in case she was walking away

and heard that phrase and thought maybe I used it—— The CHAIRMAN. Right.

Senator BIDEN. I am not going to identify the gentleman, Mom,

who said it, but it wasn’t me. I know you never want it both ways.

There is an irony here, it seems to me, and I think maybe there

is an opportunity as well. The irony to me is that—and I am not

connecting the two in Iraq and North Korea in terms of what the

solutions to each are, but the irony is here: The administration has

made a very compelling case, at least home, that containment is

not an option with regard to the much less or least dangerous foe,

Saddam Hussein, but containment—at least the signal being sent

is containment may be an option with regard to the foe that is capable of doing much more severe damage to us short-term, longterm, and interim-term in my view.

And it seems to me ironically, if we were to move in the direction

the three of you suggest with regard to North Korea, it may have

30

some ancillary benefits beyond what we may find out and what our

options may be in clarifying our situation with regard to North

Korea. And that is that I think part of the problem is we tend to—

and those of you who are genuine regional experts, as well as strategists, we tend sometimes—I am not suggesting that you do this,

but we up here tend not to connect the dots. We tend to think that

we can have clearly enunciated positions on one set of policies and

even if they are at odds with a set of principles stated or enunciated in a second set of concerns we have, and they do not necessarily—as if people only read in time zones.

And so my problem is with the failure to understand that a precondition to enhancing our prospects of success in whatever action

we take, diplomatically, militarily, economically, in any way, is

that we have to demonstrate we are willing to talk. It is a pre-condition. I do not know what we lose; I do not know what we lose

by talking, even though I do not think any of the five of us or the

six of us here are particularly optimistic that we would get a result

as a consequence of those talks that would lead to a complete cessation of concern here.

So what I would like you to expand on a little bit for me if you

are willing to, is: What do you think is the root of this? What is

the root of the present position adopted by the administration, a refusal to talk other than in a forum that the rest of the participants

indicate they will not participate in, so it is not the table?

What is at the root of that? I mean, what could be—not that you

know specifically, but I mean go through it, analyze for me: What

are the possible lines of reasoning that would lead one to conclude

that we do not talk at all? Is it because they truly believe we can

contain? I mean, do you think that is it? Or do you think it is because they think if we do not talk, North Korea will blink and accommodate what we want done anyway? Or is it because they

think there is going to be a breakthrough diplomatically, not with

North Korea, but with South Korea and China and Japan?

I mean, what are the—give me the positions. If you were making

the case not to talk, what are the arguments you make that have

any credibility?

Dr. KANTER. Let me try my hand in here. I am responding in the

spirit of ‘‘let me try and make the case’’ rather than convey the

Bush administration’s foreign policy.

Senator BIDEN. I realize that it is not your position. I just wanted—I am trying to figure this out.

Dr. KANTER. First, as I understand the administration’s position,

the United States is willing to talk to North Korea. It has said it

is willing to talk. The question is: Under what circumstances? With

what pre-conditions? And in what forum?

Senator BIDEN. Bilateral discussions, let me be precise. We are

all—you all are saying there is no option at this moment but bilateral discussions. You may have an ancillary discussion going on,

you may have a large room, we may be in a—everybody may be

in a big hotel and we are in a small room with a—you know, that

is all—but there is a flat, so far, refusal by the President of the

United States to say he is prepared to talk one on—not necessarily

‘‘he,’’ but his negotiators, one on one with the North Koreans, notVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:15 Jun 24, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 87821 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
31

withstanding with what Mr. Armitage said, who was severely rebuked for having said what he said before our committee.

Dr. KANTER. He is tough.

Senator BIDEN. Well, he can handle it—— Dr. KANTER. He can take it.

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. But I am just saying he was severely

rebuked.

Dr. KANTER. As I have stated, North Korea is a multilateral

problem that requires a multilateral approach. But if the United

States just says, ‘‘Well, look—you know, we will do this all bilaterally. Thank you very much,’’ I think the other countries with important stakes in this issue will be all too happy to hold our coats

and let us go off and do it and, frankly, not be willing to bear some

of the burden, bear some of the risk that is entailed in dealing with

the North Korea issue.

So I think that there is a good reason to try and make sure that

whatever the modalities that everyone is pretty much on the same

wave length before you engage with North Korea, or we are going

to be there alone.

Senator BIDEN. So we all agree on that. I assume that that has

to be done. I mean, I assume that or at least I know from the

South Korean position, because I have spoken to them, and I assume from the Japanese and Chinese position that they are prepared to work out with us as we seek a common approach, but that

they are not prepared to set the modality as you guys use the—

you know, it is kind of a foreign policy phrase; the American people

wonder why we make everything sound so complicated—you know,

the shape of the table, they do not want to sit down at the table

initially, with us at the table and the North Koreans.

They want to sit down with us at the table; they are prepared

to sit down with us now and talk about what they think about

whatever our enunciated policy is and try to work out something,

but they are not prepared to go to Pyongyang or some hotel in Hawaii or in Tokyo, whatever, to sit down with us in the same room.

They are saying, ‘‘Go talk first.’’ Is that not what they are saying?

Dr. KANTER. Again, trying to make the case, if you want to have

confidence that the folks who say they are with you really are with

you, they ought to be there with you. If there are other ways to

achieve that confidence, then it gives you some more flexibility to

engage in direct talks knowing that they are with you and they are

doing their thing in their way.

Senator BIDEN. At what point do you say, knowing the clock is

ticking, going to the reprocessing, ‘‘They are not with me. They are

not going to do it’’? Now, we are into the situation that the Senator,

that the chairman talked about where our interests are different;

or our judgments are different, if not interest.

Do we say, ‘‘OK. They are not with us. They are not going to sit

down with us. They are not willing to come up with a common

strategy,’’ whatever—however you want to characterize it? At what

point do we say—with the clock ticking toward reprocessing, the

possibility of reprocessing, at what point do we say, ‘‘Well, we are

going to do it alone’’?

I mean I thought you guys, all three, are saying, ‘‘It is time to

talk.’’

32

So I am trying to figure it out. I mean, is the decision you think

that they think they can contain, that this administration thinks

they can contain North Korea? Have some adopted the position

that the South Koreans have, that this is not that fundamentally

different if they have six more nuclear weapons? I mean, what—

yes, please.

Mr. EINHORN. Senator Biden——

Senator BIDEN. Oh, my time is up.

Mr. EINHORN [continuing]. My guess is that a number of those

neighbors of North Korea would be happy to sit down in multilateral talks. Their concern is that the North Koreans would not do

it. And because the North Koreans have been so obstinate on the

point, they are saying to the United States: Look, why do you not

sit down with them bilaterally? Maybe later we can join. We are

not opposed to multilateral. It is just that it would not work multilaterally from the beginning.

And as to your question on when is the time, I think the time

is now for the administration to say, yes, we are prepared to sit

down bilaterally. I think perhaps they could put in place a parallel,

multilateral structure that eventually could become the umbrella,

the multilateral umbrella we are looking for, but I think the time

is now.

Senator BIDEN. What is their reasoning?

Dr. CARTER. I do not have any particular insight or visibility into

the administration. My impression is that they are—that our administration is wrestling with the problem and trying to put together a strategy that answers all these questions: Why talk to

North Korea in the first place? What kind of agreement are we

after? What is the modality for talks?

It is unfortunate that we are short of time to come up with a

strategy of that kind. That is because the North Koreans are trying

to drive the train as rapidly as they can, but this is a hard problem. It is a multi-body problem, as we say in physics. It is not just

us. It is not even just us and the North Koreans. There are others

involved.

And one thing that I think both of these negotiators have emphasized is the effect that getting talks started would have of slowing

the pace of events down. That is very important. And if we can arrive at some modality for beginning talks, and the condition on

both sides for the talks is that we slow the ball down and in particular that they slow the ball down at Yongbyon, then we have a

little bit more time to figure all of this out. So we do not have to

have figured everything out before we embark. And I think that is

important. The pace of events, the momentum as Arnie called it,

is pretty fearsome here.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.

Senator Brownback.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you

for holding this hearing. I missed the previous hearing on North

Korea. I was attending the Columbia funeral, and I apologize for

my absence. Hopefully, we can hold some subcommittee hearings

on North Korea as well because there are a number of facets to the

33

problem that I think bear looking at in totality. Time is short, and

I think we need to have some intense focus.

First, let me say clearly that from my perspective, the United

States must not allow North Korea to develop nuclear weapons, period. And I have also contacted the NSC of the administration, and

they do not support nuclear weapons being developed in North

Korea as I think Mr. Einhorn had said in his testimony.

They are not saying, OK, you can go ahead and develop them.

We are going to try to contain them once you develop them, North

Korea. They do not support that position either of North Korea developing nuclear weapons. It should not even be a question.

Kim Jong-il is one of the largest proliferators of missiles now,

selling them to the very worst parts of the world where the intent

to destroy America is clear. He has nuclear weapons. The selling

of these weapons would surely follow. He would have a nuclear

storehouse open for business.

In retrospect, it is clear to me that the Agreed Framework did

not work. It was nothing more than a tactic of deceit used by the

North Koreans to lull the United States into thinking that postponing a problem is as good as dealing with it. We now have evidence that the North Koreans began pursuing nuclear weapons almost before the ink was dry on the agreement that they made with

the United States to abandon this destructive path.

This week’s events, where North Korean MiGs shadowed an

American observation plane in international airspace make it clear

upon playing the one and only card they have: Escalating tensions

to the point of forcing America to pay up once again.

These are dangerous tactics by Kim Jong-il and his Stalinist regime. We cannot afford to give the North Koreans the impression

that their tactics are working, that they will pressure the President—pressure this administration into caving and negotiating

with the blackmail artist. And that is exactly what Kim Jong-il

wants to do and is doing.

He has launched a surface-to-ship missile as a test. He has sent

MiGs into South Korean airspace. He sent even people, gardeners

I guess, across the DMZ line, all as a way of trying to rattle the

international cage and to do two things: Have us leave him alone,

the international community to leave him alone; and send money.

Engaging in a sequel of the failed Agreed Framework, not only

risks our immediate security in the region, but it allows Kim Jongil to proliferate any and all missile and nuclear technology he can

develop. Now, perhaps if we had started off with the Agreed

Framework being a multilateral approach, they would have had

more leverage to get the necessary concessions from the North that

could have prevented this current mess. Specifically, it should have

been an absolute requirement that the nuclear fuel rods and other

materials in the Yongbyon facility be removed.

As we have seen, the agreement cannot guarantee a freeze in the

North’s nuclear pursuit. It did not freeze it, but the agreement

could have at least removed the material we knew they had.

Now, I have been following this issue for some time from another

perspective and here I want to speak for myself and a partner of

mine that is no longer here, Paul Wellstone, and that is on the

34

human rights issue. And I am—frankly, I am very disappointed

that you just waved past that one.

We have held hearings in the Judiciary Committee on the atrocities. And let me just give you a few eyewitness testimonies that

we have had of people testifying, of watching North Korean guards

suffocate newborn babies, of people that have had to live on tree

bark as they escaped from the regime, of mothers who have given

their children rat poison rather than watching them die slowly

from starvation. These are people who have been tortured, starved

and executed for no reason other than the bad fortune of being

born in North Korea under the Kim Jong-il regime.

And we do not know exactly how many it is. Some people think

it is one to two million who have died of starvation over the last

5 years. There are somewhere between 30,000 and 300,000 now living off the land in China fleeing this regime. They operate a Gulag.

The North Koreans operate a Gulag system of a large, fenced-in

area that is a mining camp, and you go in as a political prisoner

and the likelihood of you coming out is small.

I am presently reading, ‘‘The Aquariums of Pyongyang,’’ it is

about a young boy that went in and made it out some way; ten

years in one of these Gulags. Or the book, ‘‘Eyes of the Tailless

Animals,’’ about serving in one of these Gulags.

These are horrific conditions. This is probably the worst systematic human rights’ abuses by a government on its people anywhere

in the world today. Maybe you argue that Sudan is there with it,

but it is in the top two or three. This is horrific. And we are going

to just walk past that one and say, ‘‘We cannot deal with it in this

setting’’?

China is the country most directly able to put pressure on this

regime by letting the people of North Korea simply stay in China

instead of sending them back in a procedure called refoulment. I

mean they could at least be forced to live up to their own international obligations to allow these people to stay in China. The

people will vote with their feet, and many already have. They will

leave North Korea if given the chance. And then this failed State

of North Korea will have that pressure put on them.

To merely make another deal that will not be abided by is not

in the security interests of the United States, and it is a malicious

neglect of the horrific behavior of this regime.

Now, we should not cower to the demands of this dictator who

is starving and torturing millions of his own people, as well as kidnaping citizens from Japan. I met this week with three family

members from Japan and four members of the Japanese Diet.

These three people had family members who had been abducted,

kidnaped by the North Koreans 20 years ago. And last year the

North Koreans admitted, ‘‘Yes, we did it. We are not going to send

them back or let the family members come back. Or if we do, we

are going to keep their children in North Korea.’’

It is a multilateral issue. We need to work with the Japanese,

the South Koreans, the Chinese, the Russians at least, and probably in the future, we are going to have to work with the Taiwanese as well, if North Korea continues operating in such a

threatening manner.

35

The world has urged the United States to take a multilateral approach on Iraq and we have, and I do not see why we should be

doing any less with North Korea. This is a very troubling issue

with all these prongs within it, and I think that we have got to

deal with the various facets of the prongs.

And one of the key routes that we have not even been addressing, that none of you have addressed here, is the real key of what

these refugees do represent, of people willing to walk. And the Chinese Government that has signed agreements with the UNHCR,

High Commission on Refugees, that they will treat refugees without sending them back into harm’s way, and now the Chinese are

saying they are economic migrants, but in the very agreements

that they signed, if there is a dispute between the two bodies, this

is to be submitted to arbitration. The Chinese say they are economic migrants; the world says they are refugees. This is to be submitted to binding arbitration, and the Chinese should be forced to

live up to their own obligations to these refugees.

And if you allow these refugees out, they will come and the international community and the United States can work with them.

And this is a key area that we should be working on and pressure

that we should apply.

Mr. Chairman, I have taken past my time.

If one of you would like to respond, I would particularly appreciate a response on the refugee issue, why that has just been so

much put aside and not even spoken hardly about.

The CHAIRMAN. Please proceed.

Dr. CARTER. I was not actually going to address the refugees

issue. Maybe someone who knows more about that can.

I would like to address or just second what you said about the

nature of the North Korean regime. The last time I appeared before

this committee, we were not just talking about the nuclear issue,

but the larger question of North Korea’s destiny and future.

I was explaining that in 1998 when I was first given the task of

looking at North Korea in the large, the so-called Perry process,

run by former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry, we came to basically

the same assessment you did of the North Korean regime. The evidence, the kind you have adduced, is abundant. It is a remarkable

situation. This is a third generation of Stalinism which we have not

seen anywhere else in the world.

We looked at a couple of possibilities that are still possibilities

to the United States. One is to try to undermine the North Korean

regime, and we looked quite hard at that. And in the end, we set

that aside for two reasons. The first was that we could not come

up with any realistic plan or prospect for accomplishing that. It is

not like Afghanistan where you sort of throw in an ingredient of

disorder and you can expect an uprising. We could not produce

Presidential quality information that a strategy of undermining

was likely to succeed any time soon.

Senator BROWNBACK. But you know these refugees have walked

already. A number of them have walked—— Dr. CARTER. You are talking about as a whole—— Senator BROWNBACK [continuing]. Into China already.

Dr. CARTER. I understand the refugee situation. I am talking

about——

36

Senator BROWNBACK. I am not talking about undermining here,

but talking about even the Indochina situation in the 1970s that

did not undermine the regimes, but it put pressure on them, but

at least the people got out.

Dr. CARTER. No, I was not suggesting that you were suggesting

the strategy of undermining. I am trying to respond to the general

question about the North Korean regime, how long can it last.

And one possibility is to try to hasten what human nature and

history suggests will happen eventually in North Korea. And we

looked at that and I would be happy to talk to you further about

our analysis of that, but in the end, we could not figure out any

way to do that quickly and the nuclear issue was pressing. The nuclear issue was on a time scale of months, where the larger question of North Korea’s destiny was on a time scale of years, maybe

even decades.

The same thing can be said of reform. Many people have suggested that North Korea follow the path of reform, Deng Xiaopingstyle reform. One would like to see it do that also. North Korea certainly does not show any inclination to do that. But in any event,

that is a long-term project and we have a short-term emergency

with the nuclear problem, and that is the one that we have been

addressing here.

But what you say about the nature of the North Korean regime

and the question of its long-term future, I could not agree with

more.

Senator BROWNBACK. Well, I want to dispute the answer, but my

point being that the refugees can be a clear key to a near-term

pressure on the North Korean regime. And the key, or the door

there is China. It is an unguarded border. I have been there. I have

met with many of the North Korean refugees, and they will walk

if China will simply live up to its international obligations against

refoulment. That is the simple direct point, and it is a near-term

answer.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Brownback follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM BROWNBACK

In retrospect, it is clear that the Agreed Framework was nothing more than a tactic of deceit used by the North Koreans to lull the U.S. into thinking that postponing a problem is as good as dealing with it. We now have evidence that the

North Koreans began pursuing nuclear weapons almost before the ink was dry on

the agreement they made with the U.S. to abandon this destructive path.

This week’s events, where North Korean MiGs shadowed an American observance

plane in international airspace make it clear that the North Korean regime is intent

upon playing the one and only card they have: escalating tensions to the point of

forcing America to pay up once again.

Some of my colleagues have chided the administration for not calling the tensions

in the Korean Peninsula a ‘‘crisis.’’ These colleagues have also criticized the administration for refusing to cave into the North’s demand for bilateral negotiations on

the nuclear issue. Unfortunately, while these criticisms are, I’m sure, well intentioned, they miss the major point—which is that engaging in the sequel to the

Agreed Framework not only risks our immediate security in the region, but it prolongs the efforts of a dictator intent upon proliferating any and all missile and nuclear technology he can develop.

Perhaps if the Agreed Framework had insisted upon a multi-lateral approach,

there would have been more leverage to get the necessary concessions from the

North that could have prevented this current mess. Specifically, it should have been

an absolute requirement that the nuclear rods and other materials in the Yanbian

37

facility be removed. As we have seen, the agreement could not guarantee a freeze

in the North’s nuclear pursuit—but the agreement could have at least removed the

material we knew they had.

Now is the time to remain calm, steady, and strong. We cannot cower to the demands of a deranged dictator who is starving and torturing his own people—as well

as kidnapping citizens of surrounding countries. The world has urged the U.S. to

take a multi-lateral approach on Iraq. We have. Why should we do any less with

North Korea?

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Brownback.

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me commend you once again. This has been a wonderful testimony this morning and very, very helpful. Dr. Kanter, yours is

not prepared testimony I gather, or at least we did not get copies

of your testimony.

Dr. KANTER. No, I am sorry, Senator. I just got back in the country and had to speak from notes.

Senator DODD. Well, we will get it from the transcript here. It

was very, very worthwhile. And I thank all three of you.

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this. It was most timely and

appropriate.

Mr. Chairman, I want to ask unanimous consent—there is a yet

unpublished article that is going to appear shortly by Kevin Kim.

He was a Fulbright scholar in South Korea between 2001 and 2002

and has written a very, very good article which is going to appear

shortly—I am trying to—where is that going to appear?

STAFF MEMBER. The Institute of Public Affairs.

Senator DODD. The Institute of Public Affairs is about to publish

this. It is not published yet, but, Mr. Chairman, I think you might

find it worthwhile, to sort of complement, in a little more blunt

terms in some ways, but complement what has been said here this

morning.

And I have, as much as I am obviously—trying to figure out

what motivates the North Koreans is something we could spend

days trying to sort out here. But let me ask you to focus your attention, because I am trying to sort out what the motivations are here

in terms of our own administration’s view of this. And obviously

there have been varying reports.

But let me ask you to comment on something, and I am a bit concerned that there seems to be almost, by some anyway, a desire to

delay taking any action on the North Korean issue until there is

some ‘‘resolution of the Iraqi issue.’’ And the argument being and

I will make the argument—I am not suggesting that anyone has

made this argument—that in a sense, if Iraq turns out well as a

result of the use of military force, and I am not being terribly articulate in describing this, but if that turns out well, then that may

be the model of how we would then deal with North Korea.

Without suggesting that that is the motivation, I am curious as

to whether or not any of you believe that waiting for the resolution

of Iraq is part of the motivations of why we are not seeing more

clarity out of the administration in terms of how they want to proceed with North Korea.

And second, where is this heading right now in the absence of

doing anything else? I gather we are now going to fly F–15s along

with these reconnaissance missions and the like. There have been

38

examples, at least people who have followed the events in the Korean Peninsula more closely than I have, who indicate that in the

past when these events have occurred in the late ’70s, they were

not just single events; there were usually a series of them that happened. And I am wondering whether or not you believe that we

may be seeing that here.

And if our only response seems to be providing additional protection, military protection, reconnaissance flights and sort of appearing to have sort of a quasi-military answer to these events as they

are occurring, to what extent would you want to calibrate the risks

of seeing this series of events explode into something far more serious than what we presently have seen?

But I would be interested in having you try and give me some

sense of what is the thinking going on by those who are advising

the administration inside about how to proceed here? What is the

rationale behind this, other than just—there is more than just an

internal debate that seems to be going on. There seems to be a rationale for proceeding this way without having some clarity to it,

and I am curious if any of you would be willing to take that one.

Dr. KANTER. Senator, I do not have any great insight into what

rationale the administration is pursuing here.

I would say, however, that I see no evidence that the administration is, as I think you put it, is waiting for a successful outcome

for Iraq and that will become the model for dealing with North

Korea. I see no indication of that whatsoever, and I think President

Bush has said repeatedly that North Korea is a different kind of

problem than Iraq.

I think it is fair to ask whether North Korea is concerned about

whether it might be the next Iraq. So I acknowledge that there

may be that North Korean concern or worry, but I do not believe

that kind of rationale is in any way a relevant factor in U.S. policy.

With respect to where is the situation headed, as I tried to indicate in my remarks, I think it is headed toward an increasingly

dangerous situation, which is why I think it is essential that steps

be taken urgently to arrest this momentum. And I tried to indicate

some steps that I thought would help accomplish that outcome.

That is the first step, arresting the momentum, freezing the situation in place, but it is only the first step.

Senator DODD. Let me throw in one additional question to you

here. If you go back and look at the events since the Framework

Agreement, there were obviously events that were—decisions were

delayed, between the time we promise things and things happen.

Obviously, North Korea made a number of bad decisions as well

here.

To what extent, I will ask—I should add this on here: To what

extent would it help move this along—and I know administrations

are loathe to do this, to admit that we might have done things a

bit differently here. But to some extent the admission that maybe

we missed some opportunities here, would that help at all in trying

to move this process along here?

And I again, understanding the unwillingness of people to want

to do this, but would that help, in your mind, if there was some

message here that maybe some missed opportunities occurred on

the light water reactor issue, on the economic assistance issues?

39

There were periods in which those events were to occur and obviously some months or, in some cases, years transpired between the

promise and the actual delivery.

Dr. KANTER. There were obviously missed opportunities in the

implementation of the Agreed Framework on everybody’s side.

Senator DODD. I agree.

Dr. KANTER. Everybody agrees with that. If you remember, the

Agreed Framework was a phased agreement.

Senator DODD. Right.

Dr. KANTER. We agreed to do certain things in phase one, and

then additional steps in phase two. The two sides never got beyond

phase one.

Senator DODD. Yes.

Dr. KANTER. And certainly we are disappointed in that because

we are facing one of the consequences of that which is we did not

get the fuel rods out, which came in a later phase, and now the

fuel rods are still there.

I presume the North Koreans are disappointed that we did not

get into further phases with them either, other things that were

promised in that agreement. So from that point of view, there are

plenty of regrets all the way around. The larger picture that was

painted by the Agreed Framework of something that was a stepby-step, reciprocal, as Bob Einhorn said, and gradually grew into

something larger is a perfectly reasonable model for an agreement

now if one is in the cards, phased, reciprocal, step-by-step, getting

wider and wider.

As far as your question on timing is concerned, the only timing

situation that disturbs me right now besides the plutonium are the

provocations by North Korea. Those provocations are clearly going

to make it harder for us to enter into talks with the North Koreans

and they are creating a pace of events. I think it is clear why they

are doing it. I do not think our timing has anything to do with

Iraq, but I suspect that North Korea’s timing has everything to do

with Iraq.

And so this is a situation that is going to get worse before it gets

better. It has been doing that for several months, and that by itself

is a reason to try to pull our strategy together as soon as we can

and get started.

Senator DODD. And how about motivations? What is—why, beyond some of the—you know, the argument of the public statements being made. What is going on here, in your view?

And I realize none of you are part of the administration. You are

not privy necessarily to that, but I want your speculation as to why

there seems to be such a delay and with some clarity on a strategy

here dealing with North Korea? What is going on here? Bob.

Mr. EINHORN. I think one of the reasons for it is that there is

a split within the administration. That is not a deep secret. And

I think some in the administration simply would not like to engage

for a number of reasons. They believe it would reward bad behavior. They believe it would confer a legitimacy on this regime in

Pyongyang that it does not deserve. They believe that any new deal

would not be complied with by North Korea, so it would not solve

the problem in the first place. So I think there is an element that

is simply opposed to engagement.

40

There is another element I believe that would welcome the opportunity to engage, maybe in a tough-minded way, but it would

like to engage and find out whether an effective deal can be made.

But I think that is the principal reason why there is uncertainty

about where the administration stands.

Senator DODD. Ash, did you want to comment on that at all?

Dr. CARTER. Only to say that I think there is plenty of room for

doubt about what North Korea is up to. It is a mysterious place.

The spirit in which I would enter into talks with them is the spirit

in which I think we all use the word ‘‘experiment.’’ Senator DODD. Yes.

Dr. CARTER. This is worth a try. You cannot be sure where it will

lead. I do not know how the North Koreans will respond. I do not

know whether they are prepared to agree with us or they can make

an agreement with us of the kind we require; for example,

verification.

Senator DODD. Right.

Dr. CARTER. They do not know what they are in for in the way

of verification in a certain sense. Having the record they do, we are

not going to settle for anything less than a very rigorous

verification scheme. And that will be something very difficult for an

insular, paranoid kind of political system to deal with.

So I think we have to look at this as an experiment. And from

that point of view, I think everybody who has different views and

different takes on North Korea is entitled to their different views

and different takes. Right now, let us go forward and learn by

doing. I do not know what factions there are or what different

points of view there are. I just know that this is a hard enough

question that there is plenty of room for different points——

Senator DODD. Right.

Dr. CARTER [continuing]. Of view, and I think we ought to get

together in the spirit of learning by doing and conducting this experiment.

Senator DODD. Last—and I do not want to put words in all your

mouths—but I heard all three of you and you said this different

ways. It seemed to me your unanimous conclusion that every day

delayed on engaging in this conversation, call it whatever words

you want to, is extremely dangerous.

Dr. CARTER. The North Koreans are trying to use time to narrow

our options and they are succeeding at that at the moment, and we

need to reverse that narrowing of options.

Senator DODD. But the conclusion that every day delayed heightens the degree of dangerousness with regard to North Korea and

that is—all three of you have drawn that conclusion; is that true?

Dr. CARTER. I would certainly subscribe to that.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd.

Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

A Washington Post article, March 5, says, ‘‘The United States

has begun to accept the idea of a nuclear-armed North Korea. Increasingly, the Bush Administration is turning its attention to preventing the communist government in Pyongyang from selling nuclear material to the highest bidder.’’ The article implies that the

41

United States is acquiescing that North Korea would remain a nuclear power and, therefore, is trying to contain its proliferation. Is

that acceptable, in your opinion?

Dr. CARTER. It is not acceptable in my opinion. I tried to explain

in my statement why a nuclear North Korea is a disaster for our

security in a number of ways.

Senator NELSON. And you did it very well, by the way.

Dr. CARTER. So I do not think that is something that we ought

to be prepared to acquiesce in or that we need to acquiesce in.

Dr. KANTER. Excuse me, Senator. I agree that that is not an outcome that we should tolerate. I have just mentioned that, I think

while you were out of the room, Senator Brownback said he had

checked with the NSC and they had rather firmly denied that

story.

Senator NELSON. Well, that is good to hear. I increasingly find

myself frustrated with the style and the tone of the administration

as we confront this problem, as we confront other problems, Iraq,

the way diplomatically we have handled Turkey, where increasingly we appear to be the big bad boy bully on the schoolyard and

people are or other countries are reacting to that.

Do you have any idea what went on in the President’s mind as

to why a year ago in that State of the Union Speech he would lump

North Korea in, calling them part of the ‘‘axis of evil?’’

Dr. KANTER. No more than has been reported in the press, Senator.

Senator NELSON. And would you care to characterize the aftermath of that, how North Korea has responded to being so called?

Dr. KANTER. They did not like it.

But that is not the test of whether it was a correct or appropriate

thing to do. I would also notice that in this year’s State of the

Union President Bush addressed Iraq, Iran, and North Korea separately rather than lumping them together.

Dr. CARTER. May I add just one other thing?

Senator NELSON. Of course.

Dr. CARTER. Quite apart from anything we have said, the North

Koreans have believed for a long time that we are out to get them

in some way, and I do not think—that is an article of faith with

North Korea, a concern they have had for many, many years, and

certainly predates anything that has been said in the last 2 years.

The only reason I chime in at this point is: This is the crux of

the matter as far as the North Koreans are concerned. They would

like to continue to run this rather odd and objectionable, as Senator Brownback correctly indicated, regime.

We would, of course, like for the North Koreans to have a better

government, but we are not prepared to run the risks that it would

take actually to deliver that to them. And in the meantime, while

this regime continues to exist, we need to protect our security from

it and that means making sure it does not take steps that will endanger our security long after it is gone. And that is one of the key

points that I think all of us talked about in negotiating this strategy with North Korea.

One has to say: ‘‘Your security as you see it, which is your survival and your prospects for bettering your lot, the lot of your people, those prospects are much brighter if you do not go nuclear. You

42

think that nuclear weapons are somehow your salvation, but just

the opposite is true.’’ That is the essence of the case that needs to

be made to them.

Mr. EINHORN. On this question of the Bush administration rhetoric and the impact it had, clearly the Bush administration rhetoric

did not create the North Korean nuclear program. It clearly did not

motivate the North Koreans to begin the clandestine uranium enrichment program in the late ’90s.

But I think under the Agreed Framework, one of the reasons

that it was concluded was because the question of how much plutonium they had hidden away before 1994 was deferred; no resolution about that. There was ambiguity about how much they had.

I think they saw value in that uncertainty. They believed it provided some deterrent value. And whether the uranium enrichment

program was designed as another kind of hedge, we do not know.

Perhaps it was designed as more than that.

But it is possible that some of the statements by the administration over the last few years have convinced the North Koreans that

ambiguity as a deterrent is not enough. They have to go beyond

ambiguity and, substantially more than that, to demonstrate that

they have a credible, unambiguous nuclear deterrent capability. I

think it perhaps had that impact. Thank you.

Senator NELSON. At the end of the day, I agree with you all that

we cannot allow a nuclear-armed and proliferating North Korea.

And at the end of the day, if we have to, there is the military option. That is not a palatable option, but it is an option. Were we

to exercise that option, in your opinion, can we fight two wars at

the same time?

Dr. CARTER. Secretary Rumsfeld has indicated we can. That was

the strategy, the bedrock of the military strategy of the United

States from 1989 when the Wall came down until right now, for the

very good reason—and I remember because I used to testify on the

Defense budget and people would say, ‘‘You have got to be kidding.

You have got to buy enough stuff for two wars at the same time.

What are the odds that two wars are going to take place at the

same time?’’ And the answer always was, ‘‘Well, if one opponent

knew that we would be all tied up with the first war that got started, that would create the opportunity for the second war.’’ And that

is why we had a war machine that could simultaneously do the two

major regional contingencies.

And what we are seeing now in the behavior of North Korea,

which is trying to take advantage of the fact that we are busy in

the Middle East, is evidence that we were right, that two different

things are likely to take place simultaneously. But Secretary

Rumsfeld says, and I certainly believe it is true, that we could

carry out the joint plan with South Korea for the defense of South

Korea against North Korea today even as we are doing things in

Iraq. I certainly hope the North Koreans understand that.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.

I just have one more question sort of following along the reasoning of Senator Nelson. Recently when the aircraft, the United

States aircraft, was accompanied by North Korean aircraft, this

43

was a different kind of activity than progressing along the plutonium production line or reopening that situation, and I am just

querying you as experts as to what the mind-set is there. In other

words, the North Koreans probably were not enticing us into military action, although our response was to send two dozen aircraft

out with the explicit thought they were now within range, and we

spelled out why these aircraft are better than anything that was

out there to begin with in terms of their armament, their accuracy.

So the North Koreans, at least if you follow the sequence of provocative events, have been suggesting military activity. Or was the

purpose of that just simply, in the sequence of the nuclear situation, sort of a front for commerce, if they want to get in the way

as they try to sell material to save a bankrupt economy?

In other words, it seems to me there are two different sets of activities here. And if the second set, the military one, is such, what

kind of activity might we anticipate as the next stage? This has

been a pretty rapid set of activities, just one after another. It may

be to get our attention. This is what the press suggests sometimes,

that we just cannot seem to get with it because then we will have

to do more.

But I think we all understand what is happening, but this

seemed to be ratcheted into a different area. Did you have that impression? And, if so, what does this mean in terms of the next step,

what next week?

Dr. KANTER. In all such cases one relies primarily on speculation

because we are talking about North Korea. I would speculate that

the North Korean action first helped to increase the number of

things they could do. That is, it is in addition to taking nuclear

steps because, frankly, they are running out of nuclear steps to

take. So this helps to increase the volume.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, they are almost to the point that

you just flow right into the plutonium separation and the building

of weapons.

Dr. KANTER. They may be looking for additional things to do so

they do not have to take the few remaining nuclear steps.

Second, precisely because it was so provocative, they may see it

not only as a way to get our attention, as the press likes to put

it, but also to increase the pressure on us from our allies and other

actors to enter into the direct talks that North Korea has been demanding. So they may have seen it as a pressure tactic. Beyond

that, my imagination fails me.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Dr. CARTER. If I may, it certainly illustrates two things. The first

is that the North Koreans are the experts at not being on the back

burner. The one thing they are good at is that. So they cannot be

counted on to slow the momentum down, to limit, modulate, moderate, their behavior. We have to provide that moderation, modulation, slowing of momentum. They will not do it. There is the other

thing that it reminds me of, which is just how dangerous the Korean Peninsula is and how quickly things could get out of control.

We talked earlier about the possibility of the military option and

possible retaliation by North Korea. Well, in addition to a deliberate action, in a regime like that and with a situation like that,

there are all kinds of possibility for unintended consequences.

44

So as the momentum picks up and people begin taking steps

against one another, this is a regime that looks through the world

with a very thick lens, and the possibility of accident and miscalculation is very large. And that leads to a third thing, which is

since they are where they are, we have to be very clear about

where we are. You cannot count on them to read the tea leaves,

look behind the scenes, connect the dots of our actions, which is another reason why an explicit strategy conveyed to them directly is

so important, because their sensors are just not as acute as they

ought to be.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, your responses are appreciated, but disquieting because if they have almost gone through the steps in the

nuclear sequence and are running out of room there and have

started military provocation and want to continue the pace that

has been suggested thus far, we cannot anticipate a lot of time.

There could very well be activities that are even more provocative,

and so I do not anticipate what they are either. I did not anticipate

the military activity this week. But we appreciate once again your

expertise.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. On that point, if we could just expand while we

are on the point—and the time is not up on the Senator here, so

if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. My staff points out that they in effect did advertise. They hinted at a cruise missile test. They have criticized our

surveillance flights before they acted. Now they are publicly criticizing our upcoming military exercises.

So I would not be surprised if the next step is, since they advertised it, a conventional military provocation such as moving their

mechanized forces up, seeing them move; because the interesting

thing to me, and I may be misreading it, and it is—my staffer is

an expert on Korea and not me. But what they did, do you agree

that they did in each of these provocative non-nuclear steps, advertise ahead of time in a sense that they raised the issued publicly?

I mean, is there any connection there, Ash, do you think?

Dr. CARTER. I have heard the same thing. I do not have any specific information on that. As far as the exercises are concerned—

and so I think we can expect more provocations of this kind. As far

as the exercises are concerned, they always object to our exercises.

Senator BIDEN. No, I understand that, and I am not saying that

we do not do the exercises. I am not suggesting that we do not do

the overflights. I was just trying to get a sense into what the Senator, what the chairman was asking about.

Dr. CARTER. Anticipate the next step.

Senator BIDEN. Anticipate the next step so we do not overreact.

I mean, you know, so that we figure it out. Anyway, thanks for letting me——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Dr. KANTER. Senator, the problem is, the North Koreans object

and complain about so many things——

Senator BIDEN. That you cannot tell, yes.

45

Dr. KANTER [continuing]. All the time, that you cannot know

which of the ones they are complaining about is a signal.

Senator BIDEN. That is a valid point, and thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for

coming in late. I was pleased to be here for all the testimony,

which was excellent, and this is such an important hearing. I had

to be at Judiciary, but I thank you for allowing me to go forward

and I will try not to use the whole time.

I thank the chairman and Senator Biden for holding this important hearing. And by focusing on what can be done and what might

be possible, I think this committee is playing a very important role

in resisting, what I could call, the forces of resignation and complacency with regard to this crisis. And I believe that those forces are

truly dangerous ones.

My staff tells me that Senator Nelson referred to these recent articles. Yesterday, both the Washington Post and the Los Angeles

Times reported that the administration has accepted the idea of a

nuclear-armed North Korea. And like many of my colleagues, I

read those reports with a great deal of alarm. And it is especially

because of the good work of the chairman here that we have a

number of hearings where we can follow these issues through.

And just last month, in this committee, I asked Deputy Secretary

of State Armitage to assure me and to assure the committee, that

the administration was not resigned to the reality of a nucleararmed, nuclear-weapons-producing North Korea. And he gave me

his solemn assurance that there was no such sentiment of resignation in the administration and no such acceptance. Yet these reports continue to surface.

Given North Korea’s history of proliferation, a history that the

administration acknowledges is far more serious than Iraq’s proliferation history, this is a cause for grave concern.

Wishing that the situation in North Korea was not a grave security threat does not make it true. Wishing that the United States

could focus solely on Iraq does not mean that we can. Operating

on wishful thinking is irresponsible. And I think on this one, the

American people deserve far better and I think our constituents are

just very confused about how one approach can be taken vis-a`-vis

Iraq and such a different attitude vis-a`-vis North Korea.

Let me just ask a couple of questions. At this point, based on the

information available to you, do you believe that the United States

has succeeded in communicating to North Korea that nuclear

weapons production will not be tolerated? Or might there be some

ambiguity on that point in the North Korean perceptions of the situation? Dr. Carter.

Dr. CARTER. Well, if they read the newspapers as you did, they

might be confused. It has been clarified, our understanding is, by

The White House today that that is not the case, that the United

States emphatically does not acquiesce in North Korea’s going nuclear.

But the fact that there is all of this speculation about where we

might come out in terms of our overall strategy is another good

reason, knowing how difficult it is for the North Koreans to read

the tea leaves, for us, as quickly as we can, to come to a common

46

strategy and to articulate that strategy to them in the most direct

possible way, which is being in the same room with them.

So whatever you think about what we ought to say to North

Korea, whatever you think about the prospects of an agreement

with them, whether you are an optimist or a pessimist about that,

that is an experiment we need to run now, because our options are

narrowing and there is plenty of room for them to be confused. And

if they are confused about us and our strategy—the fact that they

are going nuclear, threatens the deepest security interests of the

United States. If they are truly confused about that, that is real

trouble because I do not think we can be or are confused about that

as a country.

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Einhorn.

Mr. EINHORN. Senator, my guess is that the North Koreans are

seeing ambiguous signals from this administration; and I think the

administration needs to be more disciplined in adopting a consistent line. It is not just a question of these news stories in the

last few days and the welcomed clarification that they are not accepting the North Korean nuclear capability or resigning themselves to it. That is a welcome clarification, but on a number of

issues, Deputy Secretary Armitage’s testimony before this committee, gave a lot of people the impression that we were prepared

to sit down bilaterally. But then we heard, a few days later, a different position, that it was really multilaterally and multilaterally

only.

A month or two ago, the administration was speaking as if the

military option was simply off the table; we were going to be focused exclusively on peaceful, diplomatic means. But then I think

the administration felt that it was sending the wrong signal there;

we had to make a correction and indicate that the military option

was on the table. And a few days ago, the President talked about

the military option and, perhaps, created the impression that—it

may not be accurate, but the impression that it was not a last resort option.

I think the North Koreans may be seeing and hearing all of these

things and drawing the wrong conclusion. I think we do have to

maintain a much more disciplined, consistent line.

Senator FEINGOLD. Dr. Kanter.

Dr. KANTER. I have nothing to add, Senator.

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me ask one other question. Are there any

sound models for the kind of intensive and comprehensive

verification mechanisms that would have to be part of any viable

agreement with North Korea, or would we have to sort of enter uncharted territory?

Dr. CARTER. I do not think it is uncharted territory. We had

verification concerns with the Soviet Union. That was similarly a

State that was good at keeping secrets. And we had a series of

arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union and now with Russia, which are verifiable and verified. And even with respect to

North Korea, those provisions of the agreement which dealt with

plutonium at Yongbyon were thoroughly verified. We had inspectors there. We had Americans there for sometime at Yongbyon, so

we knew exactly what they were doing at Yongbyon.

47

Now, it is going to be something new to them to have inspections

that move outside of Yongbyon, that cover other things, like ballistic missiles, not just the nuclear program. So they need to understand that an undertaking with us to eliminate their nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs has to be verifiable, and they are

going to have to understand that we, particularly given their record

of cheating, are going to insist upon rigorous verification. But there

is no fundamental reason why that cannot be done. They are just

going to have to agree to it.

Senator FEINGOLD. I thank you. Yes, doctor.

Dr. KANTER. We do have a very rich experience with arms control verification, and what we learned from that experience is that

it can be immensely complicated. The START II treaty spends considerably more time on verification provisions than it does on reductions. It is immensely complicated, immensely difficult. It is always imperfect. The North Koreans have no idea what they are in

for. Not only of the nature of the North Korean regime, but also

because of their specific practices, including very, very extensive

tunneling, the verification challenges in the case of North Korea

will be very substantial.

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Einhorn.

Mr. EINHORN. I just want to reinforce what Arnie Kanter just

said. Even if the North Koreans were prepared to accept

verification measures much more intrusive than anyone has ever

accepted, even along the lines of what Iraq is now permitting by

UNMOVIC and the IAEA, the fact of the matter is: We are not

going to have high confidence that they are not engaged in some

clandestine uranium enrichment effort. We are simply not going to

get that, and we need to recognize that up-front.

And what we need to do is compare the uncertainties and the

risks of that situation of an imperfect verification, an imperfect

confidence, against the risks of adopting a policy of pressure, isolation, containment, because of the risks of that strategy as well. And

you have to weigh these two possibilities. But you are not going to

get a perfectly verifiable agreement with the North Koreans.

Senator FEINGOLD. I thank the witnesses and thank you, Mr.

Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

I thank the Chairman and Senator Biden for holding this important hearing and

engaging in a discussion of the North Korea crisis through such a constructive approach. By focusing on what can be done and what might be possible, I think this

committee is playing a very important role in resisting the forces of resignation and

complacency with regard to this crisis. And I believe that those forces are truly dangerous ones.

Yesterday both the Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times reported that the

administration has accepted the idea of a nuclear-armed North Korea. Like my colleagues, I read these reports with a great deal of alarm. Just last month, in this

committee, I asked Deputy Secretary of State Armitage to assure me, and to assure

the committee, that reports that the administration was not resigned to the reality

of a nuclear-armed, nuclear-weapons-producing North Korea. And he did assure me

that there was no such sentiment of resignation in the administration and no such

acceptance. Yet these reports continue to surface. Given North Koreats history of

proliferation—a history that the administration acknowledges is far more serious

than Iraq’s proliferation history—this is cause for grave concern. Wishing that the

situation in North Korea was not a grave security threat does not make it true.

Wishing that the U.S. could focus solely on Iraq does not mean that we can. OperVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:15 Jun 24, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 87821 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
48

ating on wishful thinking is irresponsible, and the American people deserve far better.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. In running the risk of trespassing on everybody’s

time too much, I have two questions and I will cease and desist.

And again, I cannot tell you how much I appreciate your testimony

and how enlightening it is.

In a discussion several weeks ago with an administration official

who is in a significant position, and I was pressing the case in a

private conversation that you have got to talk. This particular person said basically, I agree. We have to talk, but we have plenty of

time, Joe. We have plenty of time, and went on to suggest two

things. And I want to make it clear because he is already in

enough trouble: I am not talking about Secretary Armitage, and I

am really not. It was not Secretary Armitage.

But it has been said, No. 1, ‘‘I think they will blink,’’ that is the

North Koreans. And two, ‘even if they restart the reprocessing facility, we still have time.’’ Now, I assume what he meant by that is if reprocessing started

tomorrow, if we got up from this—if as we walked out, the press

grabbed us and said, ‘‘They have just announced they have started

and we have confirmed they have started the reprocessing facility,’’ that it is going to be a month or so before the first baseball-size

piece of plutonium, not piece, but a chunk of plutonium is available.

First of all, from a scientific standpoint, to use a colloquial kind

of term here, is that true? From the moment they start it, how

much time is there before there is a product that is able to be, if

they wish to, transported to some other part of the world against

our interests?

Dr. CARTER. The situation is as you described it, namely within

a matter of a few weeks after beginning the reprocessing process,

they would begin to accumulate at the rate of every few weeks a

bomb’s worth up until five or six bombs. It is exactly as you described.

Senator BIDEN. Now, so my second question is that, when I come

back to where I began—and I realize this is not your responsibility,

and I realize that it is not something that any of you are comfortable with, so I am not going to ask you to pursue it again, but

I keep coming back to trying to figure out—let me back up.

Let us assume, and I think most of us assume in varying degrees, that there is some disagreement within the administration

on what policy to pursue. Otherwise, there would be a clear definition and they have not been stated by now. At least that is my assumption. And so the reason why I—just so you do not think I am

just engaged in a sort of an unusual exercise here of trying to divine what the motivation is, but it is to try to figure out, quite

frankly, to the very limited degree I have any influence and to a

larger degree that the chairman may and other senior Republicans,

is how to weigh-in internally, not publicly.

I have no interest in seeing a public debate and disagreement between me as a Democrat and a spokesperson in part at least for

foreign policy for my party, and the President. That is not a useful

49

thing in my view. That is not something I am looking to have happen. So I just want to—as by way of background, I think you all

understand this, but if anybody’s listening, what my motivation

here is. And I for one do not think at this point, it is particularly

relevant whether or not statements by the administration or failure

to pursue the Agreed Framework has got us to where we are. We

are where we are.

And so I have to make sure I understand one thing from two

very seasoned, serious negotiators, among other things, in two different administrations and one very seasoned and significant strategist as well as negotiator, whether the premise upon which I am

basing my attempt to seek an answer to what is going on downtown is correct. And that is: Is it, as I have perceived it to be, correct that no matter how you dice it or slice it, that there is no negotiated end to this rush to nuclear weapons and long-range missiles

that does not contain an acknowledgment on our part that regime

change is not our policy? In other words, can you think of any circumstances—you are seasoned negotiators. You sit down across the

table and as they say, to get to yes you have to figure out—you either have to figure out how to take advantage of a very stupid adversary and get everything so, like your mom, Mr. Kanter, you get

both.

Dr. KANTER. Now, you have turned me in.

Senator BIDEN. I did. That was lousy of me; I apologize.

But seriously, you either have to assume that. Or you have to figure out: What do you believe to be the bottom line for them in

terms of a minimum requirement in order for them to get into a

deal? And so, it is in that context I ask the question.

Do you believe that the minimum, the drop-dead position that

needs to be met, assuming they met all of our needs, the drop-dead

position from the North Korean side is you guys foreswear regime

change. You guys, in some form, like an executive agreement, a

multilateral agreement, a treaty or whatever the heck they may

want to talk about it, how they want to talk about it, but the bottom line is they would have to be convinced that we have, at least

for the time being, foresworn active efforts to bring down their regime. Am I right about that?

Dr. KANTER. Yes.

Mr. EINHORN. Yes, it is a—it is certainly a necessary

condition——

Senator BIDEN. It is not sufficient necessarily.

Mr. EINHORN. It is not sufficient. We do not know what else is

there.

Senator BIDEN. No, I understand, but without that——

Mr. EINHORN. I think it is a necessary condition.

Senator BIDEN. Ash?

Dr. CARTER. It is a necessary condition.

Senator BIDEN. OK. Because I——

Dr. CARTER. May I just——

Senator BIDEN. Yes.

Dr. CARTER. There is just one other thing I should add though

which is I do not think that that means that stasis is our policy.

Senator BIDEN. No, I understand. I was trying to——

50

Dr. CARTER. We are trying to offer them a better future for them,

and in that sense we are in favor of change.

Senator BIDEN. Well, I would argue, quite frankly, it would be

totally consistent with the remainder of our policy. This administration, the last administration engaged China. Nobody in this administration, no one in the last administration, no one in the previous administration is happy with the fact that there is still a

minimum oligarchy and a dictatorship there where human rights

are being violated, but we have concluded, we have made—we have

reached at what we are always searching for here, a bipartisan

consensus that goes well beyond the Congress, that the key to dealing with China now and in the future is engagement, and the underlying principal that Democrats, Republicans, liberals, conservatives, everyone shares who shares that view is that the very engagement will be, the very exposure to the world will be the very

thing that will undermine this human-rights-abusing regime that

we do not like.

So I would argue that it is totally consistent. It does not mean

if we foreswear the use of military force and a regime change, we

are not going to, by totally peaceful means of engaging, have as our

objective the end of a repressive regime in the region. But I just

want to make sure, because I have found—I have never in the

seven Presidents I have served with, I have never found as large

a segment of any other administration being driven by, to put the

best spin on it, a pure ideological perspective, as pure an ideological perspective on how the world should be moving now, as I have

with this administration. And it is not a majority. I am not talking

about—I am not talking about the President of the United States,

and I sincerely am not. But the President is getting advice, and I

am trying to figure out—well, I have already stated what I am trying to figure out, and I am not sure even if I figure it out, it is particularly relevant to the outcome. But it would sure as heck make

me feel a little better knowing what, well, what it was that had we

had to do and had to be helpful to do, or what we should refrain

from doing up here to get the administration to the clear enunciation of a policy that—and I do not think we have a lot of time,

and I know you do not either.

Thank you all very much.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden.

Let me just mention that the committee will have the privilege

on March 12, which is just 6 days away, of hearing from Assistant

Secretary Kelly of the State Department. And the topic then will

be regional implications of the changing nuclear equation on the

Korean Peninsula. So it will be a continuation of our discussions

about Korea, and I want to mention that for public notice because

I know there is a very large interest in our country and in the Senate, obviously.

We thank each one of you for your remarkable contributions

today. And the hearing is recessed.

Dr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

51

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

[For Immediate Release—February 26, 2003]

STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA

NELSON OFFERS ‘‘SIMULTANEOUS MODEL’’ FOR ENGAGEMENT IN NORTH KOREA

WASHINGTON, DC.—Nebraska’s Senator Ben Nelson will call on the Bush Administration to adopt a ‘‘simultaneous model’’ of engagement with North Korea to resolve the standoff over negotiations on the rogue nation’s nuclear weapons program.

North Korea is seeking bilateral meetings with the United States to discuss their

nuclear program and is also seeking a non-aggression pact from the United States.

Secretary of State Colin Powell has been working to build a coalition of nations to

initiate multi-lateral negotiations with North Korea, but has yet to convince regional nations to participate.

‘‘North Korea presents an immediate and growing threat to the United States and

our allies,’’ said Senator Nelson. ‘‘After visiting with Secretary Powell during our

trip to the Korean Peninsula and meeting with South Korean President Rho, I believe the best course of action to follow is to use a simultaneous model of engagement where North Korea would freeze its nuclear program and allow inspectors to

confirm their actions while the United States agrees to hold off on military action

and economic sanctions before negotiations begin.’’

Nelson says that the only course of action in North Korea is engagement because

of the threat the new nuclear power poses to South Korea and other allies and the

U.S. military interests in the region. North Korea’s refusal to allow multi-lateral

talks has delayed negotiations.

‘‘I support Secretary Powell’s efforts to build a coalition for talks, but North Korea

is balking at negotiations that include other regional powers,’’ said Nelson. ‘‘With

the clock ticking, I think we need to pursue an approach that will get talks initiated

immediately.’’

Nelson hopes that engagement now, before North Korea further expands its nuclear program, can prevent the proliferation of nuclear material to terrorist organizations. He also thinks that additional economic sanctions before negotiations may

be ineffective.

‘‘Ultimately, the United States needs to prevent North Korea from becoming a

clearinghouse where terrorists can one-stop-shop for nuclear weapons,’’ Nelson said.

‘‘Because of the significant threat posed by North Korea, we must engage in diplomatic discussions with them to freeze the nuclear program and bring about economic reform to prevent them from selling weapons and material to survive economically.’’

Nelson said the options of sanctions should not be taken off the table as part of

the negotiations once they begin but that offering to withhold sanctions before the

talks could jumpstart the process.

Nelson will forward his recommendations to Secretary Powell in a letter he will

send this week.

Nelson Simultaneous Model for Engagement with North Korea

North Korea presents an immediate and growing threat to the United States and

our allies.

• North Korea will meet with us only in bilateral talks, not through a multilateral approach the Administration is pursuing. Our allies in the region are encouraging us to meet with North Korea one-on-one.

• The United States should immediately open a dialogue with North Korea and

pursue a simultaneous model of engagement with the following mutual preconditions:

—North Korea freezes their nuclear program and allows nuclear inspectors to

confirm their compliance.

—The United States agrees not to attack North Korea or call for economic

sanctions.

• If we wait, North Korea’s nuclear arsenal will grow and North Korea will become a one-stop-shop for terrorists and pose an even greater threat to the Korean Peninsula and the world.

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