THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR 

AND AID TO RUSSIA 
~_I. 

N~,l94.3 

Tha Pre91dent ot the Up! ted Sta tel!!, the l'rerner ot the 

U'.S.S.R., and the PriM IUnl.ster or the United Ktncd<JID, 

h.-lying eonculted dth each other and .1th the Prime MinlsUlr 

of Inn, d~Blreo to declare the mutual a.gree~nt of their 

The Gov~rl\!!lCntb or Ole United States, the lJ.S.S.R., 

aM U. United Kingdom t'9Co&nise the assistance "Which Iran 

enelllJ", particull;lrly by t.eilitat.i~ thft tr8.n!!lportat.ion of 

INppllae f1"0111 over8tl'ss to the Sovlat Union. 

The Three Governments realise tha t the "tiT" has 

eaWlHd 15~c1al economic dIffioulties for lru!l., and they 

Q~ agroead that th",y ,,111 cont1nae to ma.~p. 9ovtd.lablB to t.he 

Governr~~nt of Iran such eennornic assistli;'!ce as may 

be possihle, having: regard to the! heavy deJll<inds made 

u.po!:! lheu\ by their Vlorld-..... lde military operatiom: am} t.o 

W1t.b, re.ape~ to the ~st-.. 1" pe rlad.. the i1C:I'Wl":'Iaents ot 

the United States, the U.S.S.R., an3 tl':.e Unitoi U!l£dOEli 

are In aeeot'd with. the Gorel"'JlJI8t'Jt o€ Iran that B.ny 

eCO:lOoL:: pI"Oblens c:onfrontt~i: Iran Ilt the c:loS(': of 

hO$t1l1Ues should recei"vQ full consideration, alo~ with 

th(lsO o€ o\h~r lIIe .. b.lrs or the United Natialls 7 by£:-.-J conferen.ces or internationAl aelJncies h .. 1d ~ c:-eated 

w deal \!lith I.nternaUo:\al eCQnc:nlc lIIattl!r-s. 

fhe Govl'!~enWl of the Unlt!l'd State:;., the U.S.S.R., 

and the Unite<! XtngdO!!l ore at U~ .. i~h the ';'7Ve.rTlIQEHtt of 

Iran 1n U1a1r de.,1.re Car the- !IIaintenance oC UlI:'1 indepQndence-f 

sovereigDty Al'Id territ<ri::u integrity of I:-!l.::I. The.)' count 

upan tlll'l' pV'ti~lp-lltiO!l DC Iran~ tog~ther with all otherpeace-lovirc nations, In the establishment of intet'Mtiol'llll 

_Hll thR p- tnciples of the Atlantic Chat"ler, to which all 

fl)ur Go'vern.en\.s have subscdbed. 

DECLARATION OF THE THREE POWERS REGARDING IRAN 

[For text see page 444.] 
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 

The Middle East Theater 

THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR 

AND AID TO RUSSIA 

by 

T. H. Vail Motter 

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D. c., 2000 
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 52-60791 

First Printed 1952-CMH Pub 8-1 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 
· . . to Those Who Served 

Foreword 

This volume relates the problems faced by Allies who met in strange 

lands without the benefit of tested and well co-ordinated policies to 

govern their diplomatic and military relations. The jealousies and conflicting interests of nations and of government agencies, together with 

the overlapping of authorities, aggravated an already complex situation. The history here presented seems to make axiomatic the necessity 

for a single commander in the field who has clear-cut instructions 

based on long-range plans that have been evolved from past experience 

and precedent. 

Because of its valuable information and acute analysis, this book 

is essential reading for those faced with the responsibility of future planning in the realms of strategy and its logistical clements. Soldier, 

diplomat, and financier will find in the following pages a forewarning 

of the type of problems to be encountered whether in the field of transportation, communications, access to raw materials, the insurance of 

uninterrupted oil supplies, or in the unpredictable and delicate job of 

international relations. 

Those on the ground struggled with immediate problems not always 

clearly seen from a distance. Anticipation, planning, and study of history may reduce, jf not eliminate, such difficulties in the future. 

The author, who holds a Ph.D. from Yale, spent more than two 

years with the U.S. Army in the Middle East during the war and served 

for nearly seven years as Chief of the Middle East Section, Office of the 

Chief of Military History. He has published books and articles in the 

field of literary and historical scholarship. 

Washington, D. C. 

15 December 1951 

VII 

ORLANDO WARD 

Maj. Gen., U. S. A. 

Chief of Military History 

Preface 

No book which takes years to write and another year to bring to 

publication can hope to keep up with events in Iran. I have therefore 

dropped a chapter on the postwar years because I could only record in 

it confused and ever graver incidents without being able, at such close 

range, to assess their meaning. 

Moreover, my purpose has been to tell the story of United States 

Army activity in the Persian Corridor during the war years 1941-1945. 

Since the true historical significance of that activity may well prove 

to be not the success of the aid-to-Russia supply effort-significant as 

that was to the victory-but the intimate association of the United 

States with the state of Iran, I have set the Army's story within the 

larger framework of economic, social, and political factors, without, I 

hope, taking my eye from the object, which was to show how the Army 

got there, what it did, and what its activity meant. 

I have drawn for primary sources upon official documents and upon 

interviews and correspondence, and for secondary sources upon narratives prepared during the war at U.S. Army headquarters, Tehran. 

The location of documents cited in the footnotes may in some instances 

be ascertained by reference to the Glossary, where designations of collections are explained. The chief of these include the files of headquarters and subheadquarters of the American commands at Tehran and 

Cairo; and at Washington the files of the War Department General 

Staff, War Plans and Operations Divisions, the Historical Records Section, Departmental Records Branch, Adjutant General's Office, the 

Control and International Divisions, Army Service Forces, the Military 

Intelligence Division, the files of the North Atlantic Division Engineer 

and of the New York Ordnance Department (both at New York) ; and 

at Washington again, the files of the Office of the Chief of Engineers, 

the Office of the Chief of Transportation, the Department of State, and 

the Foreign Economic Administration. Smaller selected files assembled 

by the historical sections at Tehran and Cairo (cited as the Persian Gulf 

Files and the Middle East Files respectively) have also been heavily 

drawn upon. I am obliged to the officials of the Historical Section, Cabinet Office, London, for their courtesy in furnishing copies of British 

documents not available in American files; and to the following civilian 

contractors who allowed access to the records of their Persian Corridor 

operations and, through conference and correspondence, supplied valuable information or commentary: Foley Brothers, Inc.; Spencer, White 

ix 
and Prentis, Inc.; the General Motors Overseas Corporation; the 

Douglas Aircraft Company; the J. G. White Engineering Corporation; 

the Bahrein Petroleum Company; and the Bechtel-McCone Company. 

Specific obligations in these and all other instances are cited in the 

footnotes. 

Many persons, through interviews, correspondence, and memoranda, have supplied information, criticism, and a variety of points of 

view useful in the hi,ghest degree. I am especially grateful to the following: Col. Philip T. Boone, Brig. Gen. Donald P. Booth, Maj. Gen. 

Donald H. Connolly, Col. L. D. Curtis, Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr., Arthur 

W. DuBois, C. Vaughan Ferguson, John W. Frey, Maj. Gen. Patrick 

.J. Hurley, Col. Milford F. Henkel, Philip C. Kidd, James M. Landis, 

John Lawrence, Col. Albert C. Lieber, Jr., Derwood W. Lockard, 

Maj. Gen. Russell L. Maxwell, Wallace Murray, Maj. Gen. Clarence S. 

Ridley, Brig. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Charles H. Sells, Brig. 

Gen. Don G. Shingler, Col. John B. Stetson, Jr., Brig. Gen. Joseph B. 

Sweet, Frederick Winant, Edwin M. Wright, T. Cuyler Young, and 

Brig. Gen. Paul F. Yount. 

Most useful of secondary sources were the studies prepared in the 

Historical Section, Office of Technical Information, Headquarters, 

Persian Gulf Command, by 1st Lt. Francis J. Lewis, Acting Chief of 

the Section, and the following noncommissioned officers: Laurence P. 

Corbett, Ralph W. Kerns, Victor H. Pentlarge, Jr., Ogden C. Reed, 

Wallace P. Rusterholtz, and George B. Zeigler. They are narratives 

(cited with their authors' names in the footnotes) totaling a quarter 

of a million words, written at the level of the operating units. The 

studies provided information, background, and a reservoir of incident 

and comment of the sort that does not reach papers produced at the 

highest levels. Three of these narratives, abridged by Sylvia Josif 

(11:rs. Harold Josif), provided the starting point for my chapters on 

port, railway, and trucking operations. 

Of help received from members of the Office of the Chief of Military History I particularly mention the expert collaboration in statistical matters of George Powell and the skill, tact, and taste with which 

Miss Ruth Stout, for two years as my editorial assistant and thereafter 

as Associate Editor, shepherded the manuscript into print.- Finally, I 

wish to note that this project was undertaken in 1944 by invitation 

of Dr. Walter L. Wright, Jr., first Chief Historian of the Army, whose 

interest continued after he left the Pentagon in 1946 and persisted to 

his untimely death at Princeton University in 1949. 

Washington, D. C. 

15 December 1951 

x 

T. H. VAIL MOTTER 
Contents 

PART ONE 

The Coming of the Americans 

Chapter 

1. EXPERIMENT IN CO-OPERATION 

SuPPi)'ing the Soviet War "\1achine • 

The British and the Americans . 

The Russians and the Americans 

The Iranians and the Americans 

II. YEAR OF CONFUSION 

Wheels Within Wheels . 

Planning and Action . . 

The Civilian Contractors 

III. SIX MONTHS IN IRAQ. 

The Engineer Tasks . . 

The Ordnance Program . . 

The Mission's Tasks 

Arrival in Iraq . . . . . 

All Change-New Priority 

IV. INTERLUDE OF THE MISSION TO THE USSR. 

Wiry and Where? . . 

Fifth Wheel . . . . 

Command and Conflict 

Russia Unvisited 

V. THE IRANIAN MISSION AND ITS SUCCESSORS 

Jobs, GeograpJry, and .Manpower . . . 

Unification oj the Middle East Missions 

lvf ilitar/zation oj Contract Activities . . 

VI. WHAR VES, ROADS, AND BARGES 

Making Bricks Without Straw 

Barge Assembry at Kuwait . . 

Administrative Problems. . . . . . . 

The Contract Terminated . . . . . . 

VII. AIRCRAFT ASSEMBLY AND DELIVERY 

Earry Plans. . . . . . 

The Battle oj the Backlog 

AI ilitarizalion. . . . . . 

Xl 

Page 

3 

3 

7 

19 

26 

28 

29 

35 

42 

44 

44 

48 

53 

56 

59 

65 

65 

68 

72 

77 

82 

82 

8S 

93-

101 

101 

109' 

112 

118 

124 

124 

127 

136. 
ChapteT Page 

VIII. MOTOR VEHICLE ASSEMBLY AND DELIVERY. 139 

141 

145 

Plans and Plants. . . . . 

Problems and Performance . 

IX. STRENGTHENING IRAN 

Before World War II. . . 

Inception of the American Advisory Missions 

The Ridley and Schwarzkopf Appointments 

PART TWO 

The Persian Gulf Command 

156 

157 

161 

169 

X. NEW JOB, NEW TOOLS: THE SOS PLAN 175 

The Midsummer Crisis, 7942 175 

Ways and Means 180 

The SOS Plan 192 

The Plan Approved . 198 

Unfinished Business . 200 

Implementing the Plan . 206 

Xl. BLUEPRINT FOR THE MACHINE. 212 

The Structure of American Headquarters . 213 

The Districts . . . . . . . . . . . 222 

Evolution of the Persian Gulf Command . 226 

Division of Responsibility With the British 233 

XII. THE MACHINE AT WORK. . 240 

A Bird's-Eye View . . . . . . . 240 

The Army Takes Over Construction 246 

Signal Communications . . . . . 253 

The Command and Air Activities 256 

Logistical Support of FRANTIC Mission 258 

The Command and Project Lux . . . 260 

XIII. THE AIR CORP~ TAKES OVER AIRCRAFT ASSEMBLY. 264 

The Pressure of the Protocols . . . . 264 

Afanpower, Procedures, and Production 266 

Abadan Air Base ...... 270 

Xl\". THE ARMY TAKES OVER THE TAP'S 274 

Plant . 274 

Problems . . . . . . 277 

The End of Operations 281 

X\". OIL FOR THE WAR 284 

Early Pipeline Projects . 285 

Increase of Middle East Refinery Capacity--Bahrein 291 

Container Plants at Abadan and Bahrein . 298 

Supply of POL Within the Command 302 

Gasoline for Russia . . . 306 

xii 
Chapler 

XVI. TRUCK TRANSPORT . 

Page 

309 

310 

316 

322 

328 

The Preliminaries 

The Trucks Start Rolling 

Operations and Obstacles . 

The Score . . . . .. 

XVII. THE RAILWAY .... 

Authority and Responsibility 

The Power oj the Purse . 

The Americans Take Over 

Men at Work . ... 

Probler:s and Solutions 

The Last Months 

XVIII. PORT OPERATIONS 

Evolution of American Responsibility 

The American Organization and Its Functions 

The Ports and Their Problems 

Performance ..... 

331 

333 

339 

346 

353 

360 

375 

379 

380 

385 

392 

407 

XIX. TARGET ZERO ..... 417 

418 

425 

427 

432 

The Process of Contraction . 

Evacuation and Redeployment 

Liquidation oj Property 

Comparative Score . . . . 

PART THREE 

Iran: The Fourth Partner 

XX. THE U.S. ARMY AND AID TO IRAN 435 

The Question oj Status . . . . . . . . 437 

Broadening the Directive . . . . . . . . 447 

XXI. THE MILITARY ADVISORY MISSIONS 461 

The Contracts . . . . . 462 

The Work oj the Missions . . . . . . 464 

Priorities and Policy . . . . . . . . 468 

The Question of Continuing the Missions 473 

Appendix 

A. TABLES 

1. Cargo Shipped from the Western Hemisphere to the USSR by 

Route of Delivery, 22 June 1941-20 September 1945 ... " 481 

2. Cargo Shipped from the Western Hemisphere to Persian Gulf 

Ports for the USSR, by Type, November 1941-May 1945 " 484 

3. Cargo Discharged at American-Operated Ports in the Persian Gulf, 

January 1943-May 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 486 

4. Supplies Delivered to the USSR through the Persian Corridor, by 

Type of Transport, 1942-1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . " 488 

xiii 
Appendix 

A. TABLES·-Continued Page 

5. Freight Hauled by Rail North of Andimeshk, Iran, August 1942-

May 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 490 

6 Freight Hauled in the Persian Corridor by the Motor Transport 

Service,1943-1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 492 

7. Number of Vehicles Assembled at Truck Assembly Plants in the 

Persian Corridor, March 1942-April 1945 . . . . . . . .. 494 

8. Monthly Output of Assembled Vehicles at Truck Assembly Plant 

II, Khorramshahr, Iran, 26 January 1943-19 April 1945 . .. 495 

9. Monthly Output of Assembled Vehicles at Truck Assembly Plant I, 

Andimeshk, Iran, March 1942-December 1944 . . . . . .. 496 

10. Monthly Deliveries of Aircraft, to the USSR by U.S. Army in the 

Persian Corridor, 1942-1945 . . . . . . . . . . .. 498 

11. Aircraft Delivered to the USSR by U.S. Army in the Persian 

Corridor, by Type, 1942-1945 . . .. ........ 498 

12. Assigned Strength of U.S. Army Forces in the Persian Corridor, 

1943-1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 499 

13. Distribution of U.S. Army Civilian Employees in the Persian 

Corridor, 1943-1945. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 500 

14. Estimated Costs of Constructing Fixed Installations in the Persian 

Corridor, 1943-1945. . . . . . . . 501 

15. Drum Production at Bahrein, 1944-1945 ........... , 502 

B. CHARTS 

1. United States Army Forces in the Middle East. . . . . . . .. 502 

2. Manpower in U.S. Army Operations in the Persian Corridor, 

1941-1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 503 

3. Aircraft Delivered to the USSR at Abadan, Iran, 1942-1945 . .. 504 

4. Vehicles Assembled at Truck Assembly Plant I, Andimeshk, Iran, 

1942-1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 504 

5. Vehicles Assembled at Truck Assembly Plant II, Khorramshahr, 

Iran, 1943-1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 505 

6. Freight Hauled in the Persian Corridor by the Motor Transport 

Service, 1 943-1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 505 

7. Freight Hauled North of Andimeshk, Iran, on Iranian State Railway, 

August 1942-May 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 506 

8. Cargo Discharged at American-Operated Ports in the Persian Gulf, 

January 1943-May 1945 . . . . . .......... " 506 

9. Discharge and Inland Clearance Operations at Khorramshahr, Iran, 

August 1942-~lay 1945 ............... l' 507 

10. Discharge and Inland Clearance Operations at Bandar Shahpur, 

Iran, August 1942-January 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . .. 507 

11. USSR Cargo Landed at Cheybassi, Iraq, July 1943-September 

1944. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 508 

12. Cargo Shipped to the USSR from the Western Hemisphere, by 

Route, 22 June 1941-20 September 1945 508 

GLOSSARY 509 

INDEX. . . 515 

XIV 
Maps 

No. 

1. Approaches to the Middle East 

2. Principal Russian-Aid Routes 

3. The Districts, 1942-1945 . 4. American-Operated Routes 

5. The Ports . . . . . . . 

Illustrations 

Declaration of the Three Powers Regarding Iran 

Aerial Photo of Khorramshahr . . 

Aerial Photo of Bandar Shahpur . . . . . . . 

The Frontispiece, supplied by the Department 

of State, is from the White House files. 

The two photos are from the U. S. Air Forces, 

Department of Defense. 

xv 

Pagt 

Inside back cover 

Inside back cover 

. . .. 223 

. . .. 314 

Inside back cover 

Pagt 

Frontispiece 

392 

393 

THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR 

AND AID TO RUSSIA 

PART ONE 

THE COMING OF THE AMERICANS 

CHAPTER I 

Experiment in Co-operation 

The story of United States Army activity in the Persian Corridor 

during World War II has a central theme, supply. Its major development, lend-lease aid to the Soviet Union, grows out of its minor, lendlease aid to Great Britain in supplying Russia and in preparing against 

threatened Axis invasion of the area. The fighting war, the war of 

guns, is but a muted obbligato to the central theme. The strategic unity 

of the Middle East and its vital importance to the final victory, the 

bloody struggle to fend off Axis drives toward Suez and the oil fields 

of Iraq and Iran, of Saudi Arabia and the Caucasus-these are high 

themes, but not the subject of this book. 

This is not the story of guns and fighting. Here, men do not kill, 

though they are sometimes killed. The story of supply tells of another 

kind of fight, not without its own brand of courage, its own price of 

endurance. 

Supply is the theme, the fighting war all but an echo. There will be 

dissonance; for in this story the United States finds itself upon a stage 

long trodden in rivalry by Britain and Russia. From the mingled motifs 

arise overtones, troubled echoes of the past, jarring notes of the present, 

and unfinished phrases awaiting the future. 

Supplying the Soviet War Machine 

Military supply is a means, not an end. Mechanized warfare has 

made it a prime factor in planning and in operations. Skill, spirit, 

supply-these are essentials to victory; but without the third, the first 
two cannot prevail in a struggle of industrialized antagonists, The pooling of supply, the American idea which culminated in the Lend-Lease 

Act of 1941, produced one of the most potent weapons of World War 

II. Conceived as a defensive measure, on the principle that defense of 

Axis enemies was defense of the United States, the Lend-Lease Act 

was in effect a declaration of economic belligerency in a war that 

intertwined industrial with military power. It was lend-lease which, 

long before Pearl Harbor brought military belligerency to the United 

States, furnished the means by which American economic strength 

could be shared with Great Britain in 1941 in the Middle East. In that 

crucial area Britain waged a David and Goliath struggle against Italian 

and German armies in North and East Africa, in Greece and Crete, 

and against pro-Nazi elements in Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Defeat would 

have entailed the loss of an area necessary to the victor in a global war. 

Defeat would have cut off Britain from her best source of essential 

petroleum. American aid in the form of war materials and logistic 

services, brought to Africa in 1941 and 1942, weighed fully in the 

reckoning which took place at El Alamein in October 1942. There, 

spirit, skill, and superior supply overcame spirit, skill, and vanishing 

supply, and the Axis threat from the west against the Middle East was 

eliminated. (Map I-inside back cover) 

It was lend-lease which, in September 1941 after the German 

attack on the Soviet Union, made the United States an auxiliary of 

Great Britain in the task of delivering supplies to the USSR through 

the Persian Corridor. This route, joining Soviet territory to warm water 

across the mountains and deserts of Iran, was one of five by which 171⁄2 

million long tons of lend-lease supplies were carried from Western 

Hemisphere ports to Soviet destinations. It is difficult to visualize 171⁄2 

million long tons in the abstract; but 2,803 ships crossed the seas to 

carry them, a fleet more than nine times as numerous as that which 

mounted the Anglo-American invasion of North Africa in November 

1942. The total tonnage figure nearly matches the 22 million long 

tons landed on the Continent of Europe for the American forces 

between January 1942 and May 1945. Russia’s share of the common 

pool was therefore considerable, befitting her share in the common 

conflict. In committing munitions and equipment to the titanic defense 

of Stalingrad, the USSR knew that material losses could be mitigated 

in ever mounting quantities by future lend-lease receipts.1 The expulhalf of 1941. The first American planes were shipped to Russia in September 1941; the 1The British sent large amounts of goods and raw materials to the USSR during the latter 

first ship to leave the United States for the Persian Gulf sailed in November. “Enough supplies did get to Russia, however, to be of real value in the summer fighting of 1942.” Edward 

4 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

two cannot prevail in a struggle of industrialized antagonists. The pooling of supply, the American idea which culminated in the Lend-Lease 

Act of 1941, produced one of the most potent weapons of World War 

II. Conceived as a defensive measure, on the principle that defense of 

Axis enemies was defense of the United States, the Lend-Lease Act 

was in effect a declaration of economic belligerency in a war that 

intertwined industrial with military power. It was lend-lease which, 

long before Pearl Harbor brought military belligerency to the United 

States, furnished the means by which American economic strength 

could be shared with Great Britain in 1941 in the Middle East. In that 

crucial area Britain waged a David and Goliath struggle against Italian 

and German armies in North and East Africa, in Greece and Crete, 

and against pro-Nazi elements in Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Defeat would 

have entailed the loss of an area necessary to the victor in a global war. 

Defeat would have cut off Britain from her best source of essential 

petroleum. American aid in the form of war materials and logistic 

services, brought to Africa in 1941 and 1942, weighed fully in the 

reckoning which took place at El Alamein in October 1942. There, 

spirit, skill, and superior supply overcame spirit, skill, and vanishing 

supply, and the Axis threat from the west against the Middle East was 

eliminated. (Map I-inside back cover) 

It was lend-lease which, in September 1941 after the German 

attack on the Soviet Union, made the United States an auxiliary of 

Great Britain in the task of delivering supplies to the USSR through 

the Persian Corridor. This route, joining Soviet territory to warm water 

across the mountains and deserts of Iran, was one of five by which 171'2 

million long tons of lend-lease supplies were carried from Western 

Hemisphere ports to Soviet destinations. It is difficult to visualize 171'2 

million long tons in the abstract; but 2,803 ships crossed the seas to 

carry them, a fleet more than nine times as numerous as that which 

mounted the Anglo-American invasion of North Africa in November 

1942. The total tonnage figure nearly matches the 22 million long 

tons landed on the Continent of Europe for the American forces 

between January 1942 and May 1945. Russia's share of the common 

pool was therefore considerable, befitting her share in the common 

conflict. In committing munitions and equipment to the titanic defense 

of Stalingrad, the USSR knew that material losses could be mitigated 

in ever mounting quantities by future lend-lease receipts.' The expul1 The British sent large amounts of goods and raw materials to the USSR during the latter 

half of 1941. The first American planes were shipped to Russia in September 1941; the 

first ship to leave the United States for the Persian Gulf sailed in Novembf'r. "Enough supplies did get to Russia, however, to be of real value in the summer fighting of 1942." Edward 
EXPERIMENT IN CO-OPERATION 5 

sion of the last Nazis from Stalingrad, completed by 2 February 1943, 

removed the enemy threat to the Middle East from the north as EI 

Alamein had done from the west. Supply tipped the scales in both 

battles that saved the Middle East. Afterward, as the German armies 

withdrew from the passes of the Caucasus and receded westward round 

the Black Sea, the task of supplying Russia through the Persian Corridor increased in intensity. The change in the American role in late 

1942, from auxiliary to full partner of the British in the supply effort, 

raised the Corridor's tonnage to second place among the five routes to 

the USSR, and brought to the Persian Gulf ports nearly one fourth of 

the total lend-lease tonnage shipped to the Soviet Union from the 

Western Hemisphere.2 

How important for the Russians Anglo-American reinforcement 

through the Persian Corridor might prove was accurately anticipated 

as early as the spring of 1942 by a German study prepared for Hitler. 

I t reads, in part, as follows: 

In their endeavor to support Soviet Russia, Great Britain and the United 

States will make every effort during the coming weeks and months to increase shipment of equipment, materiel, and troops to Russia as much as possible. In particular 

the supplies reaching Russia on the Basra-Iran route will go to the Russian Caucasus 

and southern fronts. All British or American war materiel which reaches Russia by 

way of the Near East and the Caucasus is extremely disadvantageous to our land 

offensive. Every ton of supplies which the enemy manages to get through to the 

Near East means a continuous reinforcement of the enemy war potential, makes our 

own operations in the Caucasus more difficult, and strengthens the British position 

in the Near East and Egypt.s 

Written before EI Alamein and Stalingrad extinguished the German 

drive for the Middle East, the document stands as eloquent tribute to 

the effectiveness of the logistical partnership of Great Britain and the 

United States in the Persian Corridor. A few figures will indicate the 

reality Hitler feared. 

A total of 4,159,117 long tons of Russian-aid cargo was shipped 

from the Vvestern Hemisphere to all Persian Gulf ports between N 0-

vember 1941 and May 1945; but this was only a fraction of the traffic 

R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory (New York: The Macmillan Company, 

1944), pp. 208, 215. (Quoted by permission of the publishers.) 2 (1) Report on War Aid Furnished by the United States to the USSR, Foreign Economic 

Sec, Office of Foreign Liquidation, Dept State, 28 Nov 45, p. 14. (2) Tables 1, 2 and Chart 

12. For the five routes see Ch. XIX, pp. 432ff, below. (3) Hist Rpt, The Transportation Corps 

in the European Theater of Operations, Vol. VII, Apr, May, Jun 45, Pt. 3, Appendixes. 

ETO Admin 582, HRS DRB AGO (Historical Records Section, Departmental Records 

Branch, Adjutant General's Office). (4) British Battle Summary 38. BR 1736 (31) Operation 

"Torch," Nov 42-Feb 43, 1948, pp. 14ff. • Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German Navy 1942, Office of Naval 

Intelligence, Washington, D. C., 1946, pp. 65-66, Annex 5 to Rpt by the CinC, Navy, to the 

Fuehrer, 13 Apr 42. 
6 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

handled by British and American agencies in the area during that 

period. Supplies and equipment destined for the Soviets came also from 

Great Britain, Africa, and India; aircraft were flown in for delivery to 

the Russians; and over half a million long tons of petroleum products 

originating in Iran were carried north to Soviet receiving points. In 

addition to all this were the supplies to maintain the British and American forces in the area, and to support large numbers of Polish refugees, 

British and American civilian agencies, and the Iranian and Iraqi civilian economies. All told, about 7,900,000 10nK tons of imports were discharged at Persian Gulf ports between 1941 and 1945. Of this amount 

3,900,815 long tons, 90 percent of it destined for the USSR, were discharged at ports operated by the U.S. Army. British and American 

agencies together, between 1942 and 1945, delivered to the Soviets 

5,149,376 long tons of which the Americans accounted for 4,417,243 

long tons. The figures show that, although the British and Americans 

handled approximately equal tonnages, the bulk of Russian-aid tonnage was delivered by the Americans. It has been estimated that 

American deliveries through the Persian Corridor to the USSR were 

sufficient, by U.S. Army standards, to maintain sixty combat divisions 

in the line. 4 

But while statistics furnish an accurate measure of achievement, 

they ignore the factor which made it possible and which was itself of 

equal significance. The Persian Corridor operation was an experiment 

in international co-operation with no exact parallel or historical precedent. Here was Iran, forcibly occupied by Great Britain and the 

USSR, two long-standing rivals for its control, serving as a highway 

over which one of the rivals, calling upon the assistance of a fourth 

nation, the United States, delivered supplies to the other rival, now, 

by the fortunes of war, an ally. As an American officer put the case during the first months of confusion, one nation was attempting to deliver 

supplies to a second nation with the occasional interference of a third 

through the country of a fourth in which none of the first three, save 

• (1) The Amnican share includes the weight of motor vehicles assembled in Americanoperated plants in Iran and the cargoes they hauled north to the USSR and the weight of 

aircraft assembled at the American-operated plant in Iran, as wt'll as the pt>tro1cum products 

originating in Iran and carried overland to Soviet rect>iving points. See Tables 1, 2, 3, 4. 

Because of inadequate data, estimates of British accomplishmt>nt are only approximate. They 

are taken from or based upon figures in History of the Persian Gulf Command, Historical 

Section, Office of Technical Information, Hq, PGC (cited hereafter as HOTI), Pt. VII, 

Ch. 6, Transport Routt>s and USSR Deliveries through the Persian Corridor, by Ogden C. 

Reed, pp. 28, 34, 36, 39. PGF (Historical Files, Office of Technical Information, Hq, PGC, 

now at Office of the Chief of Military History). (2) Estimate in l<tst sentence is from Operations in the Iran-Iraq Area, address before the National War College, 18 January 194-8, by 

Maj. Gen. Donald H. Connolly. 
EXPERIMENT IN CO-OPERATION 7 

for the war, had any business to be. But the strange combination 

worked. 

Even with war needs acting as a spur, the experiment in cooperation was from the start both delicate and difficult. This would 

have been true had the United States not been a newcomer to an area 

recognized internationally as within the sphere of British influence. 

The United States, though long represented in the Middle East by educational and philanthropic undertakings, had entered substantially into 

Middle Eastern commerce by way of oil only after the first world war. 

The second war found the United States unprovided with a long-range 

policy. None had been needed up to 1939 save general friendliness, 

since the United States had neither political nor military interests in 

the area. Americans were so unfamiliar with the area that, in the 

feverish planning of 1941, War Department intelligence had to tum 

for information on highways and transport routes in Iran to the Consultant in Islamic Archaeology at the Library of Congress. When the 

accident of history brought the United States to Iran, problems of 

supply called for immediate solution. Nobody asked what implications 

the future held. Action first, questions later. There would be time 

enough to learn whether America had come to the madhouse of Middle 

Eastern politics as visitor, doctor, or inmate. 

The British and the Americans 

Building docks and highways, assembling trucks and planes, running 

trains and unloading ships-these were compassable, concrete jobs. 

But the exigent, active present was haunted by the long, slothful past, 

and the past is nowhere so long as in the parched valley where Eden 

once was green and fruitful. It was to be a new experience for Americans, this dealing with the past as they learned to adjust themselves to 

three main stresses in the urgent present. First, there were certain British 

rights and obligations in Iraq and Iran which were applicable to Britain's new American collaborator. Second, there were unforeseen difficulties inherent in lend-lease aid to the Soviet Union. And finally, there 

were the conditions accepted by Iran under the Anglo-Soviet 

occupation. 

When the first Americans reached the Persian Gulf late in 1941, 

forerunners of some 30,000 U.S. Army service troops to come, the 

British position east of Suez reflected three campaigns fought earlier 

that year. The first was in Iraq, oil-rich geographical core of the Middle 

East. Iraq had been mandated to the British after World War I at the 

carving up of the old Ottoman Empire. In 1932 the mandate had 
8 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

been terminated and Iraq became an independent state and member 

of the League of Nations. Independence had been buttressed by a treaty 

of alliance with Great Britain, signed in 1930, whereby Iraq was 

guaranteed "against external aggression." In return the treaty (revisea 

in 1936) had granted Britain air bases at Habbaniya near Baghdad 

and Shu'aiba ncar Basra, to be occupied during the life of the treaty. 

The treaty further provided, in its fourth article, as follows: 

Should . . . either of the High Contracting Parties become engaged in war, 

the other High Contracting Party will . . . immediately come to his aid in the 

c:;apacity of an ally. In the event of an imminent menace of War the High Contracting Parties will immediately concert together the necessary measures of defence. 

The aid of His Majesty the King of Iraq in the event of war or the imminent 

menace of war will consist in furnishing to His Britannic Majesty on Iraq territory 

all facilities and assistance in his power including the use of railways, rivers, ports, 

aerodromes and means of communication. 

The Iraqi part of the railway, connecting the Persian Gulf via Baghdad 

with the Mediterranean at Tripoli and the Bosporus at Istanbul, was 

British controlled. So was the pipeline network from the Kirkuk oil 

fields to Tripoli and Haifa. The treaty thus recognized British interest 

in the defense of an essential part of British economy. The fifth article 

of the treaty stated: 

I t is understood between the High Contracting Parties that responsibility for 

the maintenance of internal order in Iraq and ... for the defense of Iraq from 

external aggression rests with His Majesty the King of Iraq. Nevertheless His 

Majesty the King of Iraq recognizes that the permanent maintenance and protection in all circumstances of the essential communications of His Britannic Majesty 

is in the common interest of the High Contracting Parties. For this purpose and in 

order to facilitate the discharge of the obligations to His Britannic Majesty under 

Article 4 above [air bases were granted as previously stated]'5 

In April 1941, as a corollary of the swift German triumphs in 

Greece and Crete, a coup d'etat in Iraq deposed the pro-British Regent, 

Prince Abdul Illah, whose escape to Habbaniya and thence by a.ir to 

Basra on 2 April was assisted by the American Legation at Baghdad.s 

At Basra the regent was smuggled aboard H.M.S. Falmouth to await 

a more propitious time to show himself. An anti-British government 

took over. The transformation was aided by the covert and wellorganized encouragement of German agents. The hospitality which 

• Quotations from treaty here and above from Samuel Van Valkenburg, Whose Promised 

Lands? (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series 57, May-June 1946), pp. 

32-34 . 

• The following account draws upon History of PAl Force, revised MS, by Colonel Hutchinson, Hist Sec, Cabinet Office, London (cited hereafter as PAl Force History), Pt. I, pp. IS, 

16-28, 36, 41. This manuscript, expanded and altered in some details, was published as 

PAIFORCE: The official story of the Persia and Iraq Command 1941-1946 (London: His 

Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948). 
EXPERIMENT IN CO-OPERATION 9 

Vichy airfields in Syria offered to German war planes may have seemed 

to Iraqi Anglophobe elements a more concrete assurance of support 

than the protection afforded Iraq under the treaty with Great Britain. 

British prestige fell. 

Nevertheless, the British moved as provided by treaty to protect 

their vital interests. By an operation planned and executed by the 

British India theater under Gen. Sir Claude J. E. Auchinleck, British 

forces, predominantly Indian, landed at Basra on 18 April and moved 

north toward the oil fields and Habbaniya. Reinforcements from India 

followed on 29 April and Gen. Sir Archibald P. Wavell, as Middle East 

theater commander, moved troops into Iraq from Palestine. Contact 

was made on 6 May south of Habbaniya between British forces and two 

infantry brigades of the Iraqi Army which suffered severe casualties. 

There was also air contact with German aircraft. What amounted to 

a siege of the British Embassy at Baghdad was lifted and the Iraqi 

forces sued on 31 May for an armistice. Members of the British community who had withdrawn to the hospitality of the American Legation came back into circulation, and on 1 June the regent returned to 

his capital from a short vacation. The crisis was surmounted in Iraq. 

Surmounted, but highly dangerous in view of the insistent pressure 

of the Axis west of Suez which only the month before had driven the 

British inside the Egyptian border at Halfaya Pass. Firm control of 

Iraq would save the Mosul-Kirkuk oil fields if the threat from the west 

were contained. There was as yet no threat from the north. Hitler had 

not yet invaded Russia. 

But there were other dangers nearer than Suez. The lurking menace 

of German intrigue and German aircraft having been subdued in Iraq, 

the British moved forthwith to root these elements out of Syria. The 

ensuing campaign, under command of Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, involved forces sent from Palestine by General Wavell as well as 

assistance from the Indian divisions which had occupied strategic 

points along the Iraqi line of communication between Basra and Baghdad. Begun on 8 June, it was concluded by the capitulation of the Vichy 

French signed on the anniversary of Bastille Day, 14 July. With Syria 

and Iraq now free of Axis influence, the way was cleared for the events 

which were to take place in Iran the following month. 

The Fertile Crescent, linking the Nile Delta withthe head of the 

Persian Gulf, would now have been secure and the Suez Isthmus defended from the east had it not been for the wholly new danger to the 

Middle East posed by Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 

1941. His rapid and apparently inexorable sweep eastward was to 

bring him by the year's end past Odessa to Rostov at the head of the 
10 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

Sea of Azov. It was all too apparent, even in midsummer, that he was 

driving for the Caucasus, nor did the changing fortunes of battle that 

winter reduce Allied concern lest he succeed. Success in penetrating 

that barrier and winning the Soviet oil lands lying between the Black 

and Caspian Seas would expose not only Iraq but Iran also, with its 

British oil fields in the south and vital corridor linking the USSR with 

the Persian Gulf. 

To cope with any such calamitous sequel to German penetration 

beyond the Caucasus, the Soviet Union and Great Britain, now allied 

in the common struggle, determined upon a joint invasion of Iran. With 

no illusions that they could stop the Germans in Iran if the Russians 

could not contain them north of the mountains, the British sought 

merely to delay the invader and to destroy anything useful to him. 

Moreover, Iran's despotic ruler, Reza Shah Pahlevi, was openly partial 

to the Axis cause, and the presence of some two thousand German subjects in Iran created a powerful counterweight to Allied interests there. 

Joint Anglo-Soviet military action began on 25 August, when 40,000 

Soviet troops entered Iran from the north and headed for Tehran. On 

the same day about 19,000 British troops, mostly in Indian brigades, 

entered from various directions; half of them moved straight for the 

oil fields in the neighborhood of Ahwaz, and some airborne units went 

to Abadan to protect British subjects there and the great refinery of 

the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, then the largest in the world. There 

was some slight resistance on the part of Iranian troops and some blood 

was shed. No force Iran could have brought to bear could have withstood the power of the occupying armies of Britain and Russia, and, 

thanks to the recent British actions in Syria and Iraq, German help 

by air was now as far away as Crete. On 30 August identical notes were 

submitted by the invading powers to the Iranian Government which accepted their terms on 9 September. On 16 September the Shah abdicated in favor of his son, Mohammed Reza Pahlevi, and left the country, to die in exile in South Africa. The next day Tehran was jointly 

occupied by the British and Russians, but without show of military 

force, the troops having bypassed the city en route to barracks on the 

outskirts. Local civilian authority continued uninterruptedly.7 

The terms imposed in September 1941 by the occupying powers 

, (1) Maj Gen Sir Francis de Guingand, Operation VictoTY (New York: Charles Scribner's 

Sons, 1947), pp. 87, 101. (2) India at War, 1939-1943, Hist Sec, India, pp. 77-79,81-83, 

89. Accession 618, OCMH. (3) A Review of the Joint British-Soviet Action Against Iran, by 

Harold B. Minor, 1 Nov 41. Dept State. (4) State Dept Rpt, British Controls in Iraq, by 

Richard E. Gnade, 25 Feb H. MID (Military Intelligence Division) 330 Great Britain, 3 

Apr 44 (12 Mar 43). (5) MA Rpts 1, 2, 3 from Baghdad, 5, 6,10 Sep 41. MID 370.2 Great 

Britain, 9-10-41 (9-5-41). (6) PAl Force History, I, 57-65. 
EXPERIMENT IN CO-OPERATION 11 

were designed to secure the control by them of an area vital to their 

survival in the war against Germany. They disavowed any designs 

against the territorial integrity or independence of Iran and promised 

withdrawal when the military situation permitted; and they provided 

for the co-operation of Iran in what had perforce become the common 

cause. Iran agreed to remain neutral in the war and to refrain from 

any act contrary to British or Soviet interests. These and other provisions were incorporated into a Tri-Partite Treaty of alliance which 

was signed on 29 January 1942 by Great Britain, the Soviet Union, 

and Iran. The treaty provided for withdrawal from Iranian territory of 

British and Russian troops six months after the cessation of hostilities 

against Germany and its associates. It stipulated that Iran's contribution to security was to be restricted to internal security only; and it 

provided by Article 9 that on the date fixed for withdrawal of the 

forces of the Allied Powers, the treaty would cease to be binding on 

any of its signatories.8 

Two clauses of the treaty proved of especial significance, in the light 

of subsequent events which were to make the Persian Corridor a principalline of communication linking the American source of vital war 

materials with the Soviet battlefields. By Article 3 ii (b), Iran granted 

Britain and Russia "the unrestricted right to use, maintain, guard 

and, in case of military necessity, control in any way that they may 

require, all means of communications throughout Iran, including railways, roads, rivers, aerodromes, ports, pipelines, and telephone, telegraph and wireless installations .... " By paragraph (d) of the same 

clause, Iran agreed "to establish and maintain, in collaboration with 

the Allied Powers, such measures of censorship control as they may 

require for all the means of communication referred to in paragraph 

(b) ." Thus by September 1941 Britain in the south and Russia in the 

north found themselves firmly in control of Iranian communications. 

There were other consequences of the Anglo-Russian occupation. 

For a time following it, a considerable pro-German sentiment flourished among a population which resented the invaders and longed for 

"liberation" by Germany. Until EI Alamein and Stalingrad their longings seemed all too near realization. A second consequence, likewise 

undesirable, was the division of Iran into areas of control allotted to the 

occupying powers-Russia north of Tehran, Britain south; both at the 

capital. The numerous authorities resulting did not always work together efficiently. But these disadvantages were far outweighed by the 

• The treaty is printed in Philip W. Ireland, ed., The Near East (Chicago: University of 

Chicago Press, 1942: 2d impression, 1945) ; also in The Middle East, 1948 (London: Europa 

Publications, Ltd., 1948), pp. 29-30. 
12 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

value of the Corridor as a line of supply into the Soviet Union. The 

occupation, although conceived and carried out to deny the area to the 

Axis, provided a supply route to the USSR just when the north Russia 

route to Murmansk and Archangel was beginning to prove unduly 

hazardous to Allied convoys. 

So here, in September 1941, were the British and the Russians once 

again in Iran, whose occupation by their forces was the price it innocently incurred for its strategic location. It was also the price of the 

sins of Reza Shah. It was not the first time armed forces of Britain and 

Russia had invaded Iranian soi1.9 For a hundred years Russia had 

pressed upon the northern borders. Three times in the twentieth century Russian troops had crossed them against the Iranian people's will. 

Opposed steadily by British counterpressures, these Russian incursions 

had twice been matched in the twentieth century by the presence of 

British troops. After Napoleon, the southward sweep of Russia in 

Asia was met by Britain's strengthening her position in the North West 

Frontier Province of India, Baluchistan, and the area of the Persian 

Gulf. With only Iran, Afghanistan, and Tibet as buffers, Russia penetrated culturally and economically into northern Iran and dominated 

Tehran. 

In due course Germany's drive to the east forced Russia and England into each other's arms. The Convention of 1907, while affirming the integrity and independence of Iran, virtually partitioned it 

into English and Russian spheres with a neutral zone between. So 

complete was the disregard of Iran's independence that her declared 

neutrality in the war of 1914 was ignored, while Russia, Britain, and 

Turkey made her territory their battlefield. In that period Britain used 

22,000 troops to quell a German-encouraged revolt of Iranian tribes. 

From 1907 to the Russian Revolution, Britain and Russia cooperated in Iran. With the revolution and Russian preoccupation with 

internal affairs, Britain seized the chance to outwit her Asiatic rival 

and negotiated with Iran the abortive Anglo-Persian treaty of 1919 

whereby Iran was to become a virtual protectorate. Even so, Bolshevist 

troops occupied the Caspian province of Gilan and did not withdraw 

until the British, realizing the Iranian l\1ajlis would not ratify the 

proposed treaty, removed their own troops in 1921. These maneuvers, 

as Chapter IX will show, were played to off-stage gesticulations by a 

United States unhappily divided between Wilsonian advocates of inter-

• For a panorama, from Peter the Great's occupation of Gilan in 1724 and Catherine the 

Great's conquests of Iran's Causasian provinces, down to World War II, see George Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948: A Study in Big-Power Rivalry (Ithaca, N. Y.: 

Cornell University Press, 1949), Introduction, pp. 1-5. 
EXPERIMENT IN CO-OPERATION 13 

national responsibility and those who wished to escape backward into 

"normalcy." In a world which did not at Versailles wholly abandon 

the old diplomacy for the new, a United States with no vital material 

interest in Iran could do little but gesture at a situation it protested. 

But Lansing and Wilson, if they were not heeded, were observed; and 

the American voice, though but a stage aside in support of Iranian 

sovereignty, was heard in Britain, in the USSR, and in Iran. 

That year-1921-the Soviets countered the British agreement with 

a Soviet-Iranian treaty of friendship containing an important concession which allowed the USSR to advance troops into Iranian territory 

if any third power should threaten Iran or the Soviet Union from Iranian territory. The treaty was signed in February just after a coup 

d> etat put Reza Khan into the government for the first time. After serving as Minister of War and Prime Minister he became Shah in 1926. 

There followed a period of iron rule during which, by borrowing American and German technical skills for the improvement of the country's 

economy, and by playing off Britain and Russia against one another, 

Reza Shah made Iran relatively strong and independent. All this came 

to an end when the situation in 1941 brought about the new AngloSoviet occupation and the tripartite alliance of January 1942 with its 

guarantee of Iranian integrity and of withdrawal of foreign troops after 

the cessation of hostilities. Uneasy as the alliance was in the area of 

ancient rivalry, it was no combination, as in 1907, of two strong powers 

to exploit a weaker. The spirit of 1941 was one of co-operation in common defense. When Britain called upon the United States to aid her, 

the spirit was significantly fortified. American aid in the Corridor 

proved important not only in the supply task but also politically as a 

kind of counterweight in the intricate clockwork of a troubled area.10 

Events which preceded the American arrival in 1941 had strained 

British resources in both regional areas of the Middle East. The suppression of the pro':'German revolt in Iraq, completed in May 1941, 

left the British forces in control of the line of communications running 

between their treaty bases near Basra and near Baghdad; but in that 

same month the Germans were occupying Crete and were driving 

British forces back in the North African fighting inside the border of 

Egypt. The newly passed Lend-Lease Act having provided a procedural framework for American aid, conversations were going forward in London between the British Joint Planning Staff and members 

"" (1) R&A 1206, Conflicts and Agreements of Interest of the United Nations in the Near 

East, 10 Jan 44, Research and Analysis Br, Office of Strategic Services. (2) Middle East Oil a Vital Military Factor, 21 Dec 45. MIS MID WD (Military Intelligence Service, Military 

Intellgence Division, War Department). 
14 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

of an American Special Observer Group under Maj. Gen. James E. 

Chaney. The object of the conversations was to determine where and 

how Americah aid could be effectively applied in that dark spring. 

Prominently under study was the Middle East; but because it was less 

in need than the area west of Suez, the Persian Gulf area of the Middle 

East was scarcely mentioned.ll 

Previous to the German invasion of the USSR, the commander of 

British forces in Iraq, Lt. Gen. Sir E. P. Quinan, arriving at Basra 

early in May, had been directed by GHQ, India, to secure the line of 

communications, and to provide for the maintenance of "such forces 

as may be required to operate in the Middle East, including Egypt, 

Turkey, Iraq .... " 12 Hitler's sweep across Russia in the summer led 

to the enlargement of General Quinan's responsibilities. He was not 

only to maintain the Basra-Baghdad line of communications, with such 

port development as that entailed, but was to provide for maintenance 

of ten divisions, increased from the three of his original directive; and 

he was to prepare against invasion of Iraq via either Anatolia or the 

Caucasus. The events in Syria in June and July and the occupation of 

Iran in August measurably expanded the British task. 'Vhen in September General Wilson took over command of the newly designated 

Persia and Iraq Force (P AI Force), his Tenth Army included 3 corps 

headquarters, 7 infantry divisions, 1 armored division, 1 independent 

armored brigade, 1 independent motor brigade, and some antiaircraft 

artillery. With more area to defend, more troops had to be maintained. 

Not until early 1943, after EI Alamein and Stalingrad, was it possible 

to reduce British defensive strength or base installations in Iran. 

The new German threat from the north to the British position in 

Iraq in midsummer 1941 brought that country into Anglo-American 

discussions of aid to Britain in the Middle East. In July President 

Franklin D. Roosevelt dispatched W. Averell Harriman, who visited the 

British bases in Iraq and informed himself on the defense of the oil 

fields. At that time British responsibilities were confined to security 

and communications, and American aid was being considered on the 

basis of those British responsibilities. The Anglo-Soviet occupation of 

Iran in August and the feasibility of opening there a ne\\' supply route 

11 The Special Observer Group Prior to the Activation of the European Theater of Operations, October 1944, pp. 25, 27, 40, 41, 51-52, 77, 80, 81--83, Hist Sec, ETO. Study 

superseded by The Predecessor Commands: The Special Observers and United States Army 

Forces in the British Isles, by Warrant Officer (jg) Henry G. Elliott, Part I of The Administrative and Logistical History of the European Theater of Operations. L2 This and the following paragraph draw upon PAl Force History, I, 28, 46, 72-74, and 

II,26. 
EXPERIMENT IN CO-OPERATION 15 

to Russia further extended British responsibilities and, as a corollary, 

the scope of American aid. Without waiting for the acceptance by the 

Iranian Government of the terms submitted to it in the identical notes 

of 30 August, the British Government promptly charged the United 

Kingdom Commercial Corporation with procurement of commodities 

for the USSR and their delivery through the Persian Corridor. The 

British task now embraced not only security and communications but 

supply to the Soviet Union. It was immediately recognized that in this 

new undertaking the Iranian State Railway (ISR) would playa vital 

role. After informally ascertaining from President Roosevelt American 

willingness to help in equipping the railway, Prime Minister Winston 

Churchill, through a cable from Lord Beaverbrook to the Messrs. 

Harry Hopkins and Harriman, on 6 September expressed the hope 

that the United States would send certain quantities of locomotives 

and freight cars inasmuch as the best available route into the Soviet 

Union during the winter months was that via the ISR.13 

At the same time the London War Office instructed the British 

Supply Council in North America in details of similar requests to be 

made direct to the fountainhead of lend-lease in Washington, emphasizing the needs for the ISR as the most pressing transportation requirement in the entire Middle East. The ensuing memorandum, presented 

by E. P. Taylor, Chairman of the British Supply Council, to the Division of Defense Aid Reports in Washington,14 while dealing mainly 

with requirements for the hard-pressed Red Sea area and Egypt, 

embodied in its final paragraph the British intention of raising the 

capacity of the ISR from 200 tons to 2,000 tons per day, and of the 

Iranian highways to 12,000 tons per month. The expanded highway 

program was needed to supplement rail haulage in a country whose 

aridity set limitations on the use of the steam locomotives then planned 

for and on order. On 10 September Brig. Gen. George R. Spalding 

11 Rad 4105, American Ambassador, London, from Beaverbrook to Hopkins and Harriman, 

6 Sep 41. Iran 44/1.2, NADEF (North Atlantic Division Engineer Files, New York). Another 

copy PGF 242. 

"The Division of Defense Aid Reports, created 2 May 1941 by Executive Order 8751, was an instrument within the civilian executive agency, the Office for Emergency Management, designed to take over all the administrative details of the lend-lease program, to clear 

transactions and reports, and to co-ordinate the processing of requests for aid submitted by 

foreign countries. Its first executive officer was Maj. Gen. James H. Burns, with whom were associated Brig. Gens. Sidney P. Spalding and George R. Spalding, as heads of the Production 

Section and the Shipping and Storage Section respectively. Eventually the Division of Defense 

Aid Reports was abolished by the executive order of 28 October 1941 which created the 

Lend-Lease Administration. (1) A Brief Historical Statement, Records Analysis Div, Office 

of Budget and Adm Planning, Foreign Economic Administration, 10 May 44, p. 5. (2) Stettinius, Lend-Lease, p. 96. (3) WD Cir 59, par. 8, 2 Mar 42. (4) Ann Rpt, SOS, 30 Jun 42, 

p.15. 
16 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

requested that the ISR be made an approved lend-lease project under 

aid to Britain.15 

Meanwhile, the conversations held in London the previous May 

regarding lend-lease aid to the British in the Middle East had been 

evolving machinery for rendering that aid. On 11 September the War 

Department notified General Chaney that, "to comply with the desires 

of the British Government/' it contemplated setting up supply and 

maintenance depots in the Middle East.Is Two days later, a presidential 

directive to the Secretary of War to render lend-lease aid to Great 

Britain in the Middle East embodied the principles of the message to 

Chaney and set in motion the plans which had been brewing since 

spring. Though the plans were the product of many minds, the Middle 

East Directive of 13 September 1941 bears the stamp of the President's 

peculiar skill in sensing public opinion. Where the draft presented to 

him had borne the words "expressed wishes" of the British Government, the President's pen had substituted the words "expressed needs." 

This slight but significant change recognized both the undoubted need 

of aid and the equally ponderable sensibilities of a par.t of the American 

public.If 

Two salient features of the Middle East Directive need underscoring at this point: first, the method by which it was proposed to 

furnish the aid; and second, the strictly auxiliary status of American 

aid. Under the first point, the directive made plain that the aid was to 

be furnished not by an expeditionary force, but through the Defense 

Aid Division of the War Department,la This consideration, made expedient by the fact of continued American military neutrality, confined the war aid to be furnished Britain to the economic sphere and 

determined that, though under Army supervision, it was to be furnished 

by private contract and civilian personnel. Second, the status of American aid was determined by the method, whereby the British were to 

requisition the War Department for aid through the Defense Aid 

11 (1) AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 1, under dates 5, 6, 10, and 23 Sep 41. (2) Memo, 

10 Sep 41. Iran 44/1.2, NADEF. For estimates see also Memo, Gen George Spalding, 23 

Sep 41, sub: Trans Facilities in Iran. PGF 122. 11 Rad 49, WD to Gen Chaney, 11 Sep 41. AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 1. .. (1) Memo for Secy War, 13 Sep 41. AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 1. (2) The draft 

presented to the President was agreed upon by General Burns, Averell Harriman, and Harry 

Hopkins in Hopkins' office, later approved "in principle" by the War Department, and forwarded 9 September by Burns to Hopkins for Roosevelt. Memo, Burns for Hopkins, 9 Sep 

41. WPD4596 to -15 Iran (Persia),HRSDRBAGO. 10 EstaPIished 8 April 1941 within the Office of the Under Secretary of War "to coordinate the functioning of the War Department," under the Lend-Lease Act, it was placed under 

the Commanding General, Services of Supply, effective 9 March 1942, and designated the 

International Division. On 1 October 1941 Col. H. S. Aurand became director. (1) Office 

Order, Secy War, 8 Apr 41. Folder 2, Drawer 3, Cabinet 65, Lend-Lease File-England, 

Defense Aid Papers, Intn Div. (2) See n. 14 above. 
EXPERIMENT IN CO-OPERATION 17 

director in accordance with normal lend-lease procedure. "The British 

authorities should be consulted," the directive stated, "on all details 

as to location, size, and character of depots and transport facilities. 

Their needs should govern." The auxiliary status of the Americans was 

thus clearly established. 

Some indication of the scale of the September planning for the 

Persian Corridor, even in this early and tentative stage, appears in a 

memorandum prepared for Harry Hopkins: 

The entrance of Russia into the war has given the Iranian theater urgent 

priority. The demands of the new theater are tremendous-250,OOO ship tons of 

railroad material in one project, more than the total shipments to the Middle East 

to date, requiring from 50 to 75 ships, with the distance so great that only three 

trips a year can be made. A big automotive project is superimposed on the railroad 

project. Diversions of material hitherto destined for Egypt arc being made to the 

new theater.19 

If there had been any thought in the War Department that the 

Persian Corridor aid could be administered under the Middle East 

Directive through General Chaney's mission in London, or even 

through a War Department mission for the entire Middle East, a War 

Plans Division paper disposed of it. It was urged that, in view of the 

"rapidly changing Russian situation with the threat of a German 

offensive south through Turkey," the need of extensive supply facilities, 

not only for the British in the Persian Gulf area now commanded by 

General "Vavell from India, but also for the support of the Soviet 

Union, called for the establishment of a separate American military 

mission. It was therefore recommended that an independent Iranian 

mission be formed under "an officer of broad engineering experience," 

and on 27 September Col. Raymond A. Wheeler, Acting Assistant 

Chief of Staff, G-4, who had served as Engineer of Maintenance of the 

Panama Canal and as Acting Governor of the Canal Zone, and who 

was a specialist in rail and highway matters, was appointed Chief, 

United States Military Iranian Mission. At the same time a parallel 

mission, the United States lVlilitary North African Mission, Brig. Gen. 

Russell L. Maxwell, Chief, with headquarters at Cairo, was set up 

to aid the British forces under General Auchinleck. These two missions 

were designed to carry out the responsibilities for implementing lendlease aid to Britain in the Middle East which President Roosevelt had 

laid upon the Secretary of War in his directive of 13 September.20 

,. Memo, Gen Sidney Spalding for Harry Hopkins [no d., but after 18 Sep 41J. Iran 43/1, 

NADEF. 

"" (1) Memo, signed by Col Robert W. Crawford, Actg ACofS, WPD, 24 Sep 41. AG 

400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 4. Another copy Iran 2/8, NADEF. (2) Ltr, 27 Sep 41, sub: 

Iranian Mission. AG 400.3295 (9-26-41). Another copy AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 1. 

Wheeler was promoted to brigadier general on 29 September 1941. 
18 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

That directive, however, had specifically confined itself to aid to 

the British, and it was under its provisions that the Iranian Mission was 

established on 27 September to support the British forces in the Persian 

Corridor. But in this area, aid to Britain meant participation, on the 

supply side, in two different British responsibilities, namely, security 

of the line of communications (a vital part of a third British responsi. 

bility, defense against invasion) and supply to the Soviet Union. This 

indirect responsibility for Russian aid differentiated the two missions, 

the Iranian and the North African, which were established under the 

Middle East Directive. 

Almost simultaneously, instructions were handed to British and 

American commanders in the field which recognized the Russian task 

in so many words. After a conference at Baghdad in September be· 

tween General 'Vavell for India and General Auchinleck for Middle 

East, General Quinan's directive was widened to include taking "steps 

to develop such road, rail, and river communications as are necessary 

to ensure . . . the maximum possible delivery of supplies to Russia." 21 

And on 21 October the Secretary of War instructed Wheeler, now a 

brigadier general, "to assure the timely establishment and operation 

of supply, maintenance and training facilities as required by present 

and contemplated British, Russian and other friendly operations within 

or based upon" his area. 

In the years that followed, it was to be the destiny of the Iranian Mis· 

sion and its successors to be primarily concerned with the Russiansupply aspects of British aid, rather than with the strengthening of British communications for area defense. But at the beginning, although 

lumped with British and other friendly operations, the Russian-aid 

aspect of this mission was not stressed. Indeed, in describing the two 

Middle East missions to the Secretary of State in a letter of 30 October, 

the Secretary of War referred only to "contemplated British operations." Russia was unnamed. Such an omission suggests either a 

politic underemphasis or imperfect information. Neither explanation 

suffices. The plain fact is that aid to Russia was necessarily being set up 

as a part of aid to Britain. Why was this so? 22 

" (1) PAl Force History, I, 66, 70. The published version, page 74, says October. (2) 

Generals Auchinleck and Wavell exchanged commands earlier in the year. 

%>(1) Ltr, Secy War to Gen Wheeler, 21 Oct 41, sub: Ltr of Instructions. AG 400.3295 

(9-26--41). Another copy Iran 4/4, NADEF. (2) Ltr, Secy War to Secy State, 30 Oct 41. 

AG 400.3295 (9 Aug 41) Sec 1. 
EXPERnfENT IN CO-OPERATION 19 

The Russians and the Americans 

The main reason was that Britain, enjoying treaty rights in Iraq 

and Iran, had requested neutral American aid in the field of supply. 

Furthermore, not only was the United States neutral, but the Soviet 

Union had not yet been declared eligible for lend-lease aid. Yet in the 

face of clear and urgent need to utilize the Persian Corridor supply 

route to the USSR, and in view of the British machinery at hand, the 

means adopted under the presidential directive for Middle East 

aid to Britain were the most practicable. Behind the continued ineligibility of Russia for lend-lease aid lay intangibles which added 

immensely to the material difficulties in establishing the new supply 

route. 

The relations of the Americans to the British in the Corridor were 

conditioned by the responsibilities of the British in that area. They 

were also conditioned by the relations of the Americans to the Russians. 

Aid to the Soviet Union, catapulted into American public concern by 

the German invasion, created political puzzles more baffling than those 

inherent in aid to Britain. During the debate over the adoption of 

lend-lease, objections to British aid had stemmed largely from Anglophobia, but even Anglophobes knew instinctively that the force of logic 

behind such help was inescapable. Hitler's attack of 22 June 1941 

caught the American people completely unprepared in their minds. 

Always stronger on the side of championing the weak against the strong 

than on the side of viewing situations with the cold perspective of, say, 

the professional strategist or European diplomatist, the American 

people in 1941 were still shocked and grieved over the Russo-Finnish 

'Var of 1939-40 which resulted in expulsion of the USSR from the 

League of Nations. One summer the Soviet building at the New York 

'Vorld's Fair had been "the" spot to visit; the next summer, the building had vanished, and with it nearly every trace of Soviet-American 

good feeling. It was inevitable that, reflecting this drastic shift in 

public opinion and buttressed by the Hitler-Stalin pact of August 1939, 

the policy of the American Government toward the Soviet Union 

should ha.ve been one of austere aloofness tinged with suspicion. The 

American people, having gradually come to admire the postrevolutionary Russian people and having suffered a violent revulsion follmving 

the Soviet attack on Finland, now, in June of 1941, were stunned and 

puzzled. It was difficult for them to make another about-face overnight and suddenly champion the newly attacked USSR. Soon after 

Hitler's invasion a former American ambassador to the Soviet Union 
20 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

publicly proclaimed that country's government "a godless tyranny, 

the sworn enemy of all free peoples of the earth." 23 

The delicacy of the American Government's position, even as late as 

the date of the formation of the Iranian Mission, was therefore reflected 

in the somewhat indirect approach that mission took toward the problem of Soviet aid. Inasmuch as the United States was still militarily a 

neutral and the Soviet Union not yet officially eligible for lend-lease, the 

mission, while undertaking to aid Great Britain and Russia, was to proceed to aid the latter by aiding Britain. The reasons were not only that 

the southern part of the Persian Corridor was under British authority by 

yirtue of the Anglo-Soviet occupation of August 1941 and that American forces were going in as an economic auxiliary furnished under 

military auspices by a neutral friend. The indirection as to aid to the 

Soviet Union was also still politically necessary in September, and 

requires further explanation. 

For a considerable period prior to the sudden German attack, the 

Soviet Union, along with the Axis Powers and Vichy France, had been 

subject to economic blockade by the Allicd Powers. The United States 

had set up machinery for waging economic warfare and after the conclusion of the Hitler-Stalin pact had taken various measures against 

the Russians. Only the week before the attack upon the Soviet Union 

the United States Treasury had frozen forty million dollars of Soviet 

credits, and as late as 20 June rcports of leakage in the economic 

blockade against the Soviet Union had been discussed by members of 

General Chaney's Special Observer Group in London as among disturbing elements in the :r-,·fiddle East picture.Z4 

When the attack came, Prime Minister Churchill, in an early 

broadcast to his people referring to Hitler as "this bloodthirsty guttersnipe," pledged British aid to the Soyiet Union. The American official 

reaction was bound to be slower in the light of the shock to public 

opinion a similar announcement would have caused."" The next day, 

23 June-with a background of gloomy predictions in the newspapers 

that the German armies would smash through to the Black Sea in a 

few weeks, consolidate their supply lines, and drive on through the 

Caucasus to Iraq and Iran-The New York Times, in a front-page 

article headed, "Washington \Vaits," stated, somewhat cryptically, 

" William C. Bullitt, in accepting a degree from the University of Montre<ll. Washington 

Post, July 15,1941. 

'" Rpt cited n. 11, especialJy p. 41. 

,. (1) On the difficulty of procJajming immediate support and of expanding aid thereafter until public opinion caught up, see Foster Rhea Dulles, The Road to Teheran: The Story 

of Russia and Amnica, 1781-1943 (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton Uni\'ersity Press, 1945), Ch. 

XIV passim, especially p. 232. (2) See also n. 36 below. 
EXPERIMENT IN CO-OPERATION 21 

"If Britain wants the United States to extend lend-lease aid the attempt 

will be made." As for official utterance, the government contented 

itself with Acting Secretary of State Sumner 'Welles' statement of that 

same day, "Hitler's armies are today the chief dangers of the Americas." One day later the President was quoted indirectly in a press 

conference as prepared to implement the policy announced by 'Welles; 

but the President's remarks, mainly anti-Hitler, stressed American 

inability, through prior commitments to Britain, to be of much present 

help to the Soviets. After all, the United States was still a nonbelligerent. But that same day, the 24th, the Times quietly reported release of 

the Soviet credits frozen ten days before. 

The Department of State did not share the shock and surprise of 

the less well informed general public. It had long been formulating a 

policy of American aid in case Germany attacked the Soviet Union, 

and when the attack came it was ready with recommendations for 

reconsideration of restrictive anti-Soviet export control regulations. 

Then on 9 July the President told Sumner 'Welles that he was anxious 

to send Russia substantial aid at once, preferably before October, when 

winter would interfere with transportation. The Department of State 

set to work to devise a modus operandi for handling requests from the 

Soviet ambassador outside the established machinery of lend-lease, 

which, for obvious political reasons, could not yet be ~xtended to the 

Soviet Union.26 

By mid-July a committee had been created, consisting of the Soviet 

ambassador, the chairman of the British Supply Council in North 

America,27 and Harry Hopkins, the moving spirit in lend-lease affairs 

and the President's deputy in their administration. Hopkins' dramatic 

flight from Great Britain to Moscow via Archangel, bearing to Stalin 

a reassuring message from Roosevelt, bridged far more than the vast 

distances of land and sea that separated those two chiefs of state. In 

his conversations, following his arrival at Moscow on 30 July, Hopkins 

obtained from the Russians a detailed statement of their supply needs. 

He also won their confidence to an extent not hitherto achieved by 

others; and he returned to Washington equipped to speed the ma-

.. For this and following paragraphs, see The Role of the Department of State in Connection with the Lend-Lease Program, Manuscript prepared in the Division of Research and 

Publication, Department of State, by George M. Fennemore, May 1943, pp. 205, 208, 

210-12. 

'" Arthur B. Purvis, a Canadian whose death in an RAF Ferry Command flight accident 

while en route to join Churchill at the Atlantic Conference ended a close and fruitful association with Harry Hopkins. See Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate 

History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 373. 
22 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

chinery of Russian aid. An early sequel to Moscow was a joint ChurchillRoosevelt statement of 5 August regarding aid to the Soviets. 28 

Meanwhile, on 12 July, Maj. Gen. James H. Burns of the Division 

of Defense Aid Reports brought to Washington for consultation Col. 

Philip R. Faymonville, who had served from 1934 to 1939 as United 

States Military Attache in Moscow, winning from Ambassador Joseph 

E. Davies praise for his "unusual good judgment," a quality called for 

particularly in the newly developing Soviet-American relationship. 

"He speaks Russian fluently," M1'. Davies wrote, "and apparently is 

most highly thought of by the leaders of the Army here," that is, in 

Moscow. 29 

Shortly after reaching Washington, Faymonville joined Burns' staff 

and was useful in receiving the Soviet Military Mission which arrived 

in the capital on 23 July. He was also present at a series of conferences 

held in the office of Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy from 

9 to 11 August to determine the extent of American aid and the means 

of furnishing it:o The policy arrived at was that no War Department 

materials could be made available to the Union of Soviet Socialist 

Republics without prior release by the British of materials allocated to 

them. Since the British were committed to aid Russia, the question 

became one of three-cornered negotiations, with the arrangement of 

quantities and priorities subject to three valid points of view with the 

Americans in the middle. A sampling of October cables and letters will 

indicate how the machinery worked.31 On 3 October a consignment of 

tanks went off to the Soviet Union by arrangement with the United 

Kingdom, ,,,,,hose quotas were affected by the amounts diverted to 

Russia. On 24 October the Assistant Secretary of War wrote the Secretary of State on the procedure adopted for speeding shipments to 

Russia of goods originally contracted for by the United Kingdom. 

On 29 October General Chaney in Washington cabled his Army 

Special Observer Group in London that the Anglo-American agreement (Balfour-Arnold) on aviation aid, approved by the Secretary of 

War on 28 October, corresponded exactly with the previous agreements 

with the Soviet authorities. 

In September the President sent Averell Harriman, his special representative in London on material aid to the British Empire, to Moscow 

28 The message to Stalin is given in full in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 321-22. 

:l&Ltr by Davies, 20 Mar 37. Abstract PGF 262. Faymonville became a brigadier general 

on 1 February 1942. 30 AG 400.3295 (8-14--41) Sec 1. Among those present were Maj. Gen. Richard C. Moore, 

Deputy Chief of Staff, and Colonel Aurand of G-4, War Department General Staff, supply 

experts. 

81AG400.3295 (8-14--41) Sec 1. 
EXPERIMENT IN CO-OPERATION 23 

for important three-cornered conferences there with a Soviet commissiOIi under Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov and a British 

group under Lord Beaverbrook. Travel orders naming the expedition 

the Special Mission for War Supplies to the Union of Soviet Socialist 

Republics were made out for Mr. Harriman, General Burns, Colonel 

Faymonville, acting as secretary, Admiral William H. Standley, shortly 

thereafter to become American Ambassador to Moscow, 'William L. 

Batt of ,\Villiam S. Knudsen's Office of Production Management, and 

General Chaney.32 The discussion following, in which Marshal Joseph 

V. Stalin participated on three occasions, produced the signing at 

:\10scow on 1 October by Beaverbrook, Harriman, and Molotov of 

the First (Moscow) Protocol, described as "a binding promise by this 

Government to make specific quantities of supplies available for shipment to Russia by a specific date." 33 

The Moscow Protocol was the first of four similar instruments for 

aid to Russia. It called for shipment from the United States through 

30 June 19-!2 of roughly a million and a half tons of supplies. The 

Second (,\V ashington) Protocol, signed 6 October 1942 and covering 

the period to 1 July 1943, promised 3,300,000 tons to be shipped by 

the northern Russian ports and 1,100,000 via the Persian Gulf route. 

The Third (London) Protocol, running through 30 June 1944, promised 2,700,000 tons via the Pacific route and 2,400,000 by either the 

northern Russian ports or the Persian Gulf. It was signed 19 October 

1943. The Fourth (Ottawa) Protocol, signed 17 April 1945, promised 

2,700,000 tons via Pacific routes and 3,000,000 via Atlantic routes 

including the Persian Gulf and the route into the Black Sea, the!! newly 

available. It covered the period to 12 May 1945. These protocols were 

definite commitments on the diplomatic level, different from those 

given to any other lend-lease recipients. While they contained escape 

clauses, President Roosevelt was always intensely concerned that they 

be honored to the letter. Behind every other circumstance that was to 

affect the supply program which the United States was to undertake 

in the Persian Corridor stood the protocols and the inflexible necessity 

of meeting their tonnage promises, come what may.S4 

12 AG 400.3295 (8-14-41) Sec 3. The travel orders were of 6 Sep 41. Information from 

Memo, Harriman for CofS, 4 Sep 41; and from the Role of the Department of State cited 

n.26. 

'" Stcttinius, Lend-Lease, p. 205. (Quoted by permission of The Macmillan Company.) 

The United States made good its word by the stated date, 30 June 1942 . .. (1) Rpt cited n. 2 (1). (2) Lend-lease to the USSR is fully treated by Robert W. 

Coakley in chapters on international supply before Pearl Harbor, in R. M. Leighton and 

Coakley, Logistical Support of Overseas Theaters, a volume in this series now in preparation. 

(3) The protocols are published in Soviet Supply Protocols, Wartime International Agreements, Department of State, Publication 2759, European Series 22. 
24 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

The commitment of October 1941 had been carefully prepared for 

by the President's statement to Congress on 11 September, "The Soviet 

Government's purchases here are being made with its own funds 

through its regular purchasing agency." 35 This statement followed 

the making available on 24 August of five billion dollars for lend-lease 

expenditures, from which the Soviet Union was excluded. At the time 

of the Moscow Protocol, the situation was that the United States had 

joined Britain in pledging almost unlimited aid, that much could be 

done through lend-lease aid to Britain, and that it was by then apparent 

that the President deemed the American public not unfavorable to 

Russian aid.36 

So far, Russian supply was on a cash basis. During SeptemberOctober, for instance, the United States loaned the USSR ninety 

million dollars with which on 21 October to purchase ammunition 

then available in the United States. 37 In an exchange of messages between Roosevelt and Stalin of 30 October and 4 November respectively, 

the Cnited States agreed to advance one billion dollars to Russia to be 

repaid without interest over a 10-year period, commencing five years 

after the end of the war. The arrangement was in accordance with the 

Soviet's expressed preference and was similar to that granted the 

Netherlands and Iceland, which paid cash for aid procured, for efficiency's sake, through the usual lend-lease channels. On 7 November 

1941 the Soviet Union was officially declared eligible for lend-lease 

as a nation whose defense was vital to the defense of the United States. 

When a second billion was allocated to the Russians on 20 February 

1942, the President took steps to formulate an agreement for repayment in kind, to allay Soviet fears that they would have to repay in 

dollars. Signed 11 June, this became the Master Agreement, superseding the first billion loan arranged.38 

The financial aspects have been labored at this point for two reasons. 

First, their complexity was largely a product of the political difficulties 

of launching the program in the face of American opinion toward the 

.. Second Report under the Act of March I I, 1941 (Lend-Lease Art) (Washington: 

Government Printing Office, 1941), Letter of Transmittal, p. IV . 

.. Early in September Harry Hopkins wrote Brendan Bracken, Minister of Information in 

the English cabinet: "We are having some difficulty with our public opinion with regard 

to Russia. The American people don't take aid to Russia easily. The whole Catholic popUlation is opposed to it, al1 the Nazis, all the Italians and a lot of people who sincerely believe 

that Stalin is a great menace to the world. Still I think it will come out all right in the end." 

Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 372-73. 

" The Role of the Department of State cited n. 26, pp. 218-19 . .. (1) The Role of the Department of State, pp. 220-22. (2) Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations for Year Ended March II, 1942 (Washington: Government Printing 

Office, 1942), p. 34. (3) Stettinius, Lend-Lease, p. 130. (4) As of June 195J the USSR had 

not yet settled its lend-lease account with the United States. 
EXPERIMENT IN CO-OPERATION 25 

Soviet Union before Hitler's attack. Second, Soviet property rights over 

the goods shipped had been first determined when the Soviet Union 

was purchasing on a cash basis. These rights, carried over into the lendlease period, gave rise to much of the friction that developed later 

during the stages of shipment and delivery for they permitted the Soviet 

agents to exact the most scrupulous adherence to the letter of their 

bond at every stage of the process.39 

The severity of Soviet inspections can be traced quite as much to 

these financial arrangements as to their national traits. In this connection it must be borne in mind that the Russians enforced upon their own 

people equally strict personal responsibility all along the chain of command. Their readiness to punish individuals of their own forces who 

passed inferior goods became legendary among the Americans who 

worked with them in the field. It is unrealistic to deplore the Slav's lack 

of easygoing Anglo-Saxon adaptability.40 

After the signing of the protocol it was decided, on the recommendation of Harry Hopkins, to leave in Moscow an American representative of lend-lease who had been a member of the Special Mission 

for ''\Tar Supplies to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which had 

negotiated the protocol. Colonel Faymonville, secretary of the mission, thus remained for some years as chief of the special mission, first 

in his capacity as a representative of the Division of Defense Aid Reports, thereafter as a member of the Lend-Lease Administration. 41 

To the Iranian Mission, authorized to render aid to Great Britain, the 

Soviet Union, and other friendly powers in the Persian Corridor, and 

to the civilian lend-lease mission in Russia, the War Department added 

a second military mission charged with aiding the Soviets. This was 

the United States Military Mission to the Union of Soviet Socialist 

., Rad AMPSC 466, Lt Gen Brehon Somervell to Gen Connolly, 26 Mar 43. 400.3295 

Lend-Lease Russia, SL (Material formerly filed in Persian Gulf Service Command 

boxes at St. Louis, now filed at the Kansas City Records Center, AGO, Kansas City, Mo.) 

9021: "Your records should operate with the assumption that British and American authorities are acting as agents, expediters and forwarders for thc Russians and that the goods 

handled are property of the Russians. . . . As soon as the vessels are loaded in American 

ports the goods become Soviet property." .0 Maj. Gen. John N. Greely, in "Iran in Wartime," National Geographic Magazine, 84 

(1943) 141, describes the barbed-wire enclosure where acres of American-built motor 

'Thicles were guarded by Soviet troops with orders to shoot all unauthorized intruders. 

tl In a memorandum of 30 September, prepared for the Chief of Staff by Brig. Gen. 

Sherman Miles, G-2, opposition was expressed to Faymonville's staying on in Moscow. The 

Deputy Chief of Staff, General Moore, however, wished Faymonville to stay (memorandum 

of 4 October). For fuller treatment of War Department differences of opinion concerning 

Faymonville, see Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pages 395-96. In Volume I of the 

}.1anuscript Index to the Hopkins Papers (under Book IV, Harriman-Beaverbrook Mission, 

page 6, Item 19) is noted a letter from Hopkins to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, 4 October 

1941, transmitting a radio to the U.S. Embassy in Russia designating Faymonville as U.S. 

l,.nd-lease representative in the USSR. 
26 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

Republics, established on 5 November, with Maj. Gen. John N. Greely 

as chief.42 

The Iranians and the Americans 

The United States Military Iranian Mission and the United States 

Military 11ission to the USSR formalized the logistical partnership 

entered into before Pearl Harbor between neutral America and belligerent Britain and Russia. But there was a fourth partner, Iran, whose 

role it was to smile appreciatively while the bigger fellows tramped 

up and down in her house. To be sure, the presence of British and 

Soviet forces, backed by the tripartite agreement, provided Iran with 

a protection against the Axis which she did not herself possess, whether 

or not she might have wished to use it. The large matter of external 

security was thus taken care of, and neither the Americans nor the 

Iranians were concerned with it. 

Internal security, though also an assumed responsibility of the 

occupying powers-the United States was not at any time during the 

war an occupying power in Iran-was another matter. Protection 

of trains and truck convoys against marauding tribesmen, patrol of 

tracks, roads, docks against sabotage, vigilance against pilferagethese primarily local functions should theoretically be performed by 

the Iranian authorities, lest a populace made hostile by foreign surveillance become itself a rearward threat to communications. 

In the fall of 1941 the forces at Iran's disposal were inadequate to 

assume so staggering a task of policing as the ambitious supply plans 

of the Allies involved. Although the Allies permitted Iran in September 

1941 to break off diplomatic relations with certain of the Axis Powers, 

it was two years before they allowed that country to declare war 

against Germany. Meanwhile, the Allies discouraged development of 

military power by Iran. These were policies and decisions in which 

the United States as an auxiliarv remained silent. But there was a 

feeling in some quarters that the iranian partner in the logistical task 

might relish a less passive role than that of the appreciative smile 

originally called for by the script of 1941. It was less a problem in 

logistics and security than in diplomacy. 

After American entrance into the war Iran's eligibility for lend· 

lease, declared on 10 March 1942, offered a fresh approach. The 

"This mission is not to be confused with that of the same name (1 November 1943-31 

October 1945) under Maj. Gen. John R. Deane for the purpose of establishing American 

airfields for shuttle bombing at Poltava, Mirgorod, and Piryatin in the Ukraine. John R. 

Deane, The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Co-operation with 

Russia (New York: The Viking Press, 1947). 
EXPERIMENT IN CO-OPERATIOK 27 

establishment in that year of two additional American military missions, one to advise Iran on certain matters affecting its Army, the other 

to reorganize and command its Gendarmerie, brought Iran, though on 

a modest scale, into direct partnership with the United States. These 

missions also brought the United States for the first time directly into 

the four-sided Corridor partnership. 

The advisory missions, under Maj. Gen. Clarence S. Ridley and 

Col. H. Norman Schwarzkopf respectively, performed two important 

functions. By aiding Iran's ability to preserve law and order along the 

supply line, they helped the lend-lease operations. But even more 

importantly, by demonstrating American concern for Iranian sovereignty, they contributed something new to the historic situation, easing, 

if only briefly, dangerous tensions. 

One thing remains to note before commencing an account of the 

American effort in the Persian Corridor. It was not like the historical 

facts of enemy threat, Allied need, American planning, tonnages delivered. It could not be felt, as a swirling sandstorm is felt; it was not 

visible as were swarms of stevedores unloading ships, or convoys of 

trucks creeping through snow-choked mountains. It was a thing as 

intangible as discouragement, as impalpable as heat. 

It was a spirit shaped by diplomatists and expressed by the sheer 

obstinacy of men's guts, a spirit animated by Roosevelt, who "considered Iran as something of a testing ground for the Atlantic Charter 

and for the good faith of the United Nations." 43 

.. Rad 462, Stettinius to American Embassy, Tehran, 31 Jul 44. State Dept Cable Book, 

Near East, Iran. 
CHAPTER II 

Year of Confusion 

The American Army served in the Persian Corridor just over four 

years. In November 1941 officers of the U.S. Military Iranian Mission 

reached Basra. On the last day of 1945, not regretfully, the remnant 

of what was then called the Persian Gulf Service Command sailed 

away from Khorramshahr. Behind them the forces of Britain and the 

USSR remained in uneasy watchfulness while in the chancelleries of 

Moscow and London diplomats debated what date the Tri-Partite 

Treaty had appointed for Anglo-Soviet evacuation. Soviet reluctance 

to leave, discussed at :Moscow in December by the American Secretary 

of State, combined with the revolt in Azerbaijan against Iran's authority the next spring to rock the United Nations with its first major crisis. 

But the departing American service troops, whose country was not a 

signatory to the treaty, were content to be the first to go. Argument 

was not their business. Their mission was to supply Russia, and their 

mission was completed. 1 

The period of American service in the Corridor falls into two 

phases. The first was characterized by the purely auxiliary status of the 

Americans, who performed construction and industrial tasks nominated by the British. These were connected with maintenance of the 

British line of communications and with fulfillment of the British commitment to deliver supplies to the USSR. In September 1942, only a 

few days more than a year after the President's Middle East Directive 

was signed, the Combined Chiefs of Staff ushered in the second phase 

by assigning to the United States direct responsibility for moving an 

ever increasing flow of supplies through the Persian Corridor to the 

Soviet Union.2 In October 1942, almost exactly a year from the date 

of the Letter of Instructions given to General Wheeler, Maj. Gen. 

Donald H. Connolly arrived in Iraq to assume command of the ex-

, (1) See James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), 

pp.118-21. (2) The American military missions to the Iranian Army and Gendarmerie re- mained as required by their contracts with the Iranian Government. See Ch. XXI below. 

• CCS 109/1, Rpt, CSP for CCS, approved 22 Sep 42, sub: Development of Persian 

Trans Facilities. 323.361 General Connolly's Letter of Instructions, SL 9008. 
YEAR OF CONFUSION 29 

panded supply forces required to carry out the Combined Chiefs' 

directive. There followed some months of transition during which, 

while the Americans developed their Motor Transport Service and 

gradually militarized their construction and assembly activities, the 

British handed over operation of the railway from Tehran to the Gulf 

and of certain ports, and delegated numerous other responsibilities 

which had remained in their hands the first year. By 1 May 1943, with 

American assumption of effective control of movements which concerned American operations within the British zone, the transition 

to co-ordinate status in transport was completed. The narratives of the 

two phases unavoidably overlap, inasmuch as activities originating in 

the first survived into the second, while some activities functionally 

identified with the second phase actually began in the earlier period. 

Wheels Within Wheels 

There is something almost too neat, too precise, in the fact that the 

first phase of the American effort ended one year after it began. The 

calendar suggests a well planned and executed timetable, but nothing 

could be farther from actuality. The first year was marked by uncertainties, contradictions, false starts and reversals, improvisation, and 

experimentation. Planning and foresight often proved discouragingly 

futile. It was a year of confusion. 

When General Wheeler reached Baghdad on 30 November 1941 to 

establish his headquarters there near the headquarters of the British 

General Officer Commanding, Iraq, all of the elements which were to 

complicate the American task were already in being. First were those 

already detailed: the involved relationships of the British, Soviets, 

Iranians, and Americans, and the procedural difficulties in delivering 

supplies to the USSR. But there were also questions as to the American 

task itself: what it was; when, where, how, and by whom it was to be 

performed. So many and varied were the factors governing the answers 

to these questions that an entire year passed before a clear-cut program 

evolved. 

Numerous policy papers were produced in Washington to guide 

early planning, but these, widely separated from the practical realities 

in the field, seem oddly irrelevant when inspected among the archives. 

There is the War Department message of 11 September referred to in 

the previous chapter. It listed objectives for American aid to Great 

Britain in the Middle East as follows: provision for the assembly, 

storage, overhaul, and repair of American aviation, ordnance, quartermaster, and signals equipment furnished to British forces in the Middle 
30 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

East; provision in depots for instruction centers to train British personnel in the operation and repair of American equipment, with necessary housing; and expansion or construction of necessary port, rail, 

and highway transportation facilities. 

In addition the message stipulated that the establishment and 

operation of all depots and transportation facilities be by American 

private contractors and American civilian personnel. All of these provisions were incorporated in the Middle East Directive two days later, 

and reappeared in the War Plans Division's specifications for the 

Iranian Mission dated 24 September. This paper listed mission functions as follows: the study of British and Russian operational methods 

and tactics in desert country; the exchange of information and experimental equipment regarding new design, as influenced by terrain and 

climate; the testing and observation of American equipment in actual 

campaigns; the training of British and Russian personnel in the operation and maintenance of American equipment; the representing of the 

'Var Department in matters pertaining to lend-lease, especially in the 

supervision of supply and maintenance of equipment which would 

include adequate dockage, transportation, and depot facilities. 

The Secretary of 'War's Letter of Instructions to General Wheeler, 

dated 21 October, was even broader. It authorized vVheeler to represent the '-Var Department in the area and to administer and co-ordinate 

all War Department matters pertaining to the area; to command all 

military personnel, and to direct, control, and supervise all civilian 

personnel assigned or attached to the mission; to control and supervise 

American or other companies or agencies engaged under contract to 

further execution of the mission's functions; to establish and operate 

essential port, transportation, storage, assembly, maintenance, and 

training facilities "subject to the approval of requests for lend-lease 

assistance submitted by foreign governments"; to advise and assist the 

British, Russian, and other friendly governments in obtaining appropriate military defense aid as contemplated in the Lend-Lease Act. 

and to assure the most effective and economic use of such aid; to study 

operational methods to facilitate the use of American equipment in 

any future American operations; and to advise and assist the British, 

Russian, and other friendly governments in all phases of procurement, 

transport, and maintenance of United States materials, equipment, and 

munitions requisite to the prosecution of their military effort, and to 

advise and assist them in the training of their personnel in the use and 

maintenance of American equipment. 

The several statements of objectives and duties should be taken 

as indicating not so much a considered program as an attempt to an-
YEAR OF CONFUSION 31 

ticipate any situation which might arise. Some of the duties, like the 

training of Russian personnel, were never put into effect. Others, like 

operation of port and transportation facilities, did not come into effect 

for more than a year, until certain British treaty rights over movement 

and transportation were delegated to the United States after the Combined Chiefs' directive. Still others, like the establishment of port, storage, assembly, and maintenance facilities, were put into effect immediately. The advantage of broad and general definitions lay in their 

flexibility; the disadvantage lay in their vagueness. Here was another 

elemen.t in the confusion which attended the reduction of generalities 

to speCIfic tasks. 

In that process there were wheels within wheels. There were many 

planners, many plans to be fitted together, many uncontrollable factors, 

like the progress of the war, to affect planning. Under the Middle East 

Directive the Iranian Mission existed to comply with "the expressed 

needs" of the British. Over-all plans had therefore first to be decided 

upon by the British, whose primary concern was with their line of 

communications and with their readiness to meet not only the German 

attack, which until late in 1942 appeared imminent from the west and 

north, but also the looming threat of a German-Japanese junction in 

the Persian Gulf.8 Supply to the Soviet Union through the Corridor 

necessarily came second in their planning. The Americans, who were 

committed to aid both the Russians and the British in the area, strove 

to reconcile the two obligations. The inability of some Americans in 

the field to understand the direction of the British effort in the area 

contributed not only to the general confusion but to the evidences of 

misunderstanding on this point with which the early files abound. This 

was a price the Americans had to pay for coming into the madhouse 

with relatively clean hands and pure hearts. They did not know enough 

and the few who never learned continued to feel that the British were 

not so serious about aid to Russia as were the Amercians. American 

planning, then, was conditioned by British planning, which in turn 

was conditioned by British local responsibilities for security; and both 

sets of planning were affected by the relative weight to be given from 

a (1) Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, in April 1942, feared such 

a junction, as well as Axis capture of the Iranian oil fields on which "the whole of our effort 

in both theaters [Middle East and India] depended." See Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel 

Attack, in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington: Government 

Printing Office, 1951), p. 17. (2) German sources reveal that although Japanese Ambassador 

Hiroshi Oshima at Berlin in the summer of 1942 suggested such a possibility, no German 

staff studies to that end were made. Generalleutnant Adolf Heusinger, Chief, Operations 

Division, German Army General Staff, called the idea "too fantastic and outside the field 

of military science." Historical Interrogation Commission, WDGS, MID, Interv with Brig 

Gen R. C. Brock and Lt ColO. J. Hale, 10-11 Slop 45. OCMH. (3) For the Oshima proposal, 

see Interrog Rpt 5782, 24 Sep 45, p. 3. OCMH. 
32 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

time to time to the aid-to-Russia program. Since there was no final 

authority for priorities save that at the very top in London and Washington, priorities assigned or agreed at intermediate and lower levels 

were subject to change, with resultant confusion. 

Aside from such large obstacles to smooth operations, there was the 

task of intermeshing British and American machinery for planning and 

action. General planning had taken certain British needs in Iraq into 

consideration previous to the issuance of the Middle East Directive, 

while planning for Iranian projects started from scratch in September 

with the British instructions to General Quinan to prepare such road, 

rail, and river communications as were required to move maximum 

possible supplies to the USSR. By the time the first Americans reached 

Iraq in November 1941 the British were spread over Iraq and Iran, 

their hands very full indeed with the new Russian-aid task superimposed upon those necessary to secure the area against Axis attack. 

Although American help was for a time extended to strictly Britishaid projects in Iraq, it was the British commitment to supply the USSR 

through the Persian Corridor that soon claimed the full efforts of the 

American mission and its successors. In construction (highways, docks, 

buildings) and in the assembly of aircraft and motor vehicles, the 

American projects paralleled and multiplied similar activities by the 

British. In transport, the core of the program of Russian aid, the British 

attempted to carry the entire burden themselves along with all their 

other commitments. But time and the pressure of mounting tonnages 

proved this to be unworkable. Late in 1942 the decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to assign the operation of certain ports, the railroad, and a supplementary trucking service to an augmented American 

military force overcame the long-standing arguments of those who had 

hitherto opposed sharing with the Americans British treaty rights over 

Iranian communications. 

One transport operation the British neither shared nor delegated. 

Inland "Vater Transport, established as a branch of the British Army 

in October 1941, operated interport and river barges and certain other 

port functions in Iraq and Iran. In time this military office employed 

200 Army officers, 600 British other ranks, and 12,000 soldiers and 

civilians of Indian and other nationalities. In its first year of operation 

(through September 1942) it moved 680,000 tons of cargo for all 

purposes! 

Those British activities which were shared or delegated, while not 

the subject of this book, are tied to the subject. The work of Brigadier 

• Unless otherwise noted the account of .ertain British activities is based upon PAl Force 

(published version) p. BB and passim. 
YEAR OF CONFUSION 33 

Sir Godfrey Rhodes and a staff of approximately four thousand officers 

and men in supervising, regulating, and assisting Iranian operation of 

the ISR solidly constructed a firm foundation for the American stint 

on the railway. In dock and road building, as well as in the organization 

and operation of trucking services, the British were equally busy when 

the first Americans arrived. 

General Quinan's directive stressed the improvement of transport 

facilities. Under it the British brought to completion in 1942 the branch 

line of the railway from Ahwaz to Khorramshahr which enabled that 

port soon to outstrip Basra in the Russian-aid program. Basra, too, 

came in for improvement. The town of Basra lies about two miles 

inland from the south bank of the Shatt al Arab River, its dock areas 

being concentrated at Margil 5 and on the opposite or north bank of 

the river at Tanuma-Cheybassi. When the British landed at-Basra in 

1941 they found a workmanlike port with six deepwater berths and 

enough labor and machinery to work them. To accommodate the heavy 

demands upon Basra as the seaport of their Basra-Baghdad line of 

communications, the British set about adding six more berths on the 

river. To provide an alternative port, in case the Shatt should be 

blocked by enemy action, they were committed to an ambitious dockbuilding program at a desolate, almost uninhabited sand and clay 

waste called Umm Qasr, south of Basra on the waters of the Khor 

Abdullah at the border between Iraq and Kuwait. The occupation of 

Iran in August-September offered the Iranian ports for use in the 

aid-to-Russia program, thus permitting the Basra port area to concentrate chiefly on traffic necessary for British military needs. The 

British therefore undertook to increase dock facilities at Bandar Shahpur, sea terminus of the ISR; at Khorramshahr; and at Bushire, an 

ancient Persian port served by lighterage from ships anchored miles 

offshore, whose landward communication relies upon a rudimentary 

road to Isfahan. British dock construction was performed for the most 

part by British civilian contractors under Army supervision; while 

local civilian stevedoring firms and the United Kingdom Commercial 

Corporation (UKCC) were relied upon to unload ships and provide 

the sorting and warehousing at dockside that is an important link in the 

chain of inland clearance. The vagaries of these British contractors 

added only another set of complications for the joint Anglo-American 

effort as American responsibilities for cargoes increased. 

Of all the civilian contractors, the semiofficial UKCC, with its early 

assignment to procure and deliver Russian-aid supplies, was the most 

• Margil, spelled in British documents Maqil or Ma'qil, is said to be an Iraqi corruption 

of the name of a Scots trader, McGill, who long ago left his mark upon the map. 
34 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

formidable. The inconsequential capacity of the railway in 1941 emphasized the vital part trucking would have to play in inland clearance, 

and this required not only the organization of trucking servicesaccomplished by UKCC and later supplemented by convoys of British 

Army drivers who took over haulage of strictly military stores and 

ammunition-but also the improvement of primitive roadways to 

carry vastly increased traffic. In September 1941 the British Chief 

Engineer, Iraq, sent Lt. Col. A. J. R. Hill, Royal Engineers, into Iran 

to reconnoiter the roads. A pattern for road construction and maintenance was evolved whereby the Iranian Government, with large 

British grants-in-aid, undertook improvement and maintenance of 

roads in the British zone. A contract was agreed to and the work put 

into the hands of Consortium Kampsax, the Danish firm which had 

shared in building the ISR for Reza Shah. Under the supervision of the 

Corps of Royal Engineers, Kampsax, as supervising and consulting 

engineers, administered and subcontracted locally. It did not directly 

construct or maintain highways. From Tehran a British Army engineer 

staff of fewer than twenty officers and other ranks supervised Kampsax, 

which in turn administered far-flung operations. By 1-1arch 1942 a 

force of 67,000 native workmen and 14.000 donkeys were working on 

roads. Using shovels and rakes and little straw baskets, hand-filled with 

earth, men toiled much as in the days of Cyrus and Darius. Floods 

washed away some roads in the east and these were rebuilt; but this 

happened too when the Americans built roads with their laborsaving 

machines.s 

At one time or another British trucking organizations, either military or UKCC, used four routes to haul goods to Soviet receiving 

points. (Map 2-inside back cover) The easternmost of these picked 

up at Zahidan loads brought by rail from Karachi. Trucks carried 

on from Zahidan to Meshed. This route, used intermittently in 1941, 

1942, and 1943 for supplies arriving from overseas at Karachi and for 

raw materials en route from India to the USSR, was abandoned in 

1943 through a combination of bad highway conditions and Soviet 

objections to its usc. 

A second route provided inland clearance north from the port of 

Bushire, where lend-lease trucks were being assembled for the Soviets. 

This route ran via Shiraz, Isfahan, Qum, and Tehran to Tabriz and 

was used not only for delivery of assembled trucks under their own 

power but for UKCC convoys carrying cargoes unloaded at Bushire. 

·U.S. MA Rpt 122 from Tehran, 9 Ju143. MID 611 Iran, 7-9-43 (11-28-41). 
YEAR OF CONFUSION 35 

The route was abandoned because in the early days it was too costly 

in manpower to protect against tribal raiders. 

At Andimeshk British military trucking units and the UKCC convoys took over certain cargoes which had come up by rail from Bandar 

Shah pur and forwarded them by truck via Ramadan and Kazvin to 

Tabriz. The British used this route until mid-July 1943 when it became 

a part of the road system prepared by the Americans for their trucking 

service. Between this route and the Bushire-Isfahan-Qum route, the 

British also repaired a connecting road from 1hlayer to Qum via Sultanabad (sometimes called Arak) which was used in due course by 

Russian-driven convoys of American trucks assembled at Andimeshk 

and Khorramshahr. 

The fourth British-used route, the Khanaqin Lift, came ultimately 

to bear the chief burden of British trucking for the Soviets, although in 

the beginning its Basra-Baghdad leg was heavily pre-empted for 

British military needs. This route started at Basra from which three 

types of clearance served it: the railway from Basra to Baghdad, barges 

on the Tigris between the two cities, and a highway. From Baghdad 

all cargo proceeded by rail to Khanaqin on the Iranian border, whence 

trucks took over by road via Kermanshah, Ramadan, and Takistan to 

Tabriz.' 

In addition to their transport and construction activities the British 

forces established in the Basra area two large assembly plants. At 

Shu'aiba, site of the airfield maintained under the Anglo-Iraqi treaty 

and of a large base ordnance depot, American lend-lease aircraft were 

being assembled for the Royal Air Force. Near by, at Rafadiyah, where 

the British had large engineer base workshops, American lend-lease 

motor vehicles were being assembled for both British and Russian 

account. 

Planning and Action 

I t was a formidable list of tasks which the Americans offered to 

share, and no small item in the inventory of early confusion was the 

fact that the urgency of war needs forced the work to proceed even 

while tasks were planned and allocations discussed. As happened elsewhere in the war, the machine had to be made to run even while it was 

being built. Two objectives vied for priority: the readiness of the British 

forces to meet invasion, and aid to the USSR which held top priority 

7 Upon completion in early 1943 of a rail spur from Kut al Imara to Ba'quba, the 

Khanaqin Lift consisted of barge from Basra to Kut al Imara, rail from there to Khanaqin, 

and road to Tabriz. 
36 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

in all Anglo-American global planning through the first half of 1942. 

A minor example will illustrate how those interrelated yet conflicting 

purposes increased the confusion. In his planning late in 1941 for road 

construction tasks in Iran and Iraq, the American engineer in charge 

relied upon advice from the field that adequate stocks of explosives for 

blasting stone would be available from local British stores. Therefore, 

to save scarce shipping space explosives were not sent abroad; but, 

v.,-hen it was time to begin the blasting, it was discovered that local 

British stocks had been earmarked for demolition purposes in case of 

invasion and were unavailable for blasting. Thus British need temporarily frustrated the road building essential to Russian aid. 8 

As a result of the Pearl Harbor attack, existing shipping had to be 

spread over the whole world, while the mounting loss of ships by enemy 

action which followed Pearl Harbor aggravated an already bad situation. The allocation of dwindling tonnages was a factor to frustrate 

the most careful and foresighted planning. In the case of shipping 

priorities for the Persian Corridor, the very zeal of the President to 

render maximum aid to Russia paradoxically contributed to the long 

list of situations making for confusion. Deeply concerned lest the 

solemn promise of the First (Moscow) Protocol be violated because 

of unlooked-for demands on shipping, Roosevelt wrote the Secretary 

of 'Var: 

I desire that the Soviet aid program as provided in the Protocol Agreement be 

re-established beginning January 1. Existing deficits are to be made up and shipped 

from this country not later than April 1. ... The whole Russian program is so 

vital to our interests I know that only the gravest consideration will lead you to 

recommend our withholding longer the munitions our Government has promised 

the USSR.9 

After shipments to the Soviet Union had again fallen behind the protocol schedule in the following spring, the President directed Donald 

Nelson of the War Production Board to get materials "released ... 

regardless of the effect of these shipments on any other part of our war 

program," and told Rear Adm. Emory S. Land of the "\t\Tar Shipping 

Administration to give Russian aid "a first priority in shipping." 10 

Increased tonnage of lend-lease supplies flowed out to all of the Russian 

supply routes, including the Persian Gulf route; there the paradox was 

that the high priorities which stimulated the increased flow did not 

apply in the same degree to the additional shipments of men and mate-

, Inter\' with Col Albert C. Lieber, Jr., Pentagon, 7 Feb 49. (This form of citation is 

used for interviews conducted by the author.) 

9 Ltr, President Roosevelt to Secy War, 28 Dec 41. AG 400.3295 (8-14-41) Sec 1. 

lO Stettinius, Lend.Lease, p. 205. (Quoted by permission of The Macmillan Company.) 
YEAR OF CONFUSION 37 

rials needed to build and operate the facilities for handling the flow of 

supplies. The consequent accelerating imbalance between the arrival 

of supplies and the ability to move them on to the Russians was perhaps 

the most troublesome phenomenon of the year of confusion. 

From the foregoing account of complexities it is apparent that the 

business of determining which of the many British tasks were to be 

assumed by the Americans would have been difficult enough even had 

the machinery involved in that determination been simple. But here 

again nothing was simple. There was no neat funnel through which 

screened and co-ordinated plans could be transmitted from X to Y; 

and although both the British and the Americans maintained clearance 

and liaison agencies, translating general directives into field tasks was 

cumbersome. 

On the British side, for example, the War Office in September 1941 

instructed the Commander-in-Chief, India, to prepare lists of tasks 

for the United States to perform in Iraq, Iran, and India.ll One of the 

first of these, supply of rolling stock for the ISR, reached the British 

Supply Council in Washington via Lord Beaverbrook, Minister of 

Supply, and \'vas transmitted to Harry Hopkins through Generals Burns 

and George Spalding of the Division of Defense Aid Reports.'2 At the 

same time Lord Beaverbrook communicated requests for aid through 

the American Ambassador at London directly to Hopkins and Harriman. Data gathered by Sir Oliver Lyttleton, Minister of State, in the 

Middle East were transmitted to the British Supply Committee at 

London, who sent recommendations for dispatch via the Foreign Office 

to the British Supply Council at Washington. The process in general 

was to funnel recommendations up from the field agencies to coordinating agencies at the top and from them across to similar American agencies which transmitted them on down to the field. As it had 

not been decided by early October whether General Wheeler's mission 

was to be attached to the General Officer Commanding, Iraq, whose 

command embraced Iran, or to the Commander-in-Chief, India, who 

commanded Iraq, tasks nominated for the Iranian Mission originated 

at both of these British headquarters. Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary, notified Sir Miles Lampson, British Ambassador, Cairo, on 7 

October that discussion of needed tasks should go forward promptly 

"By Msgs, 25 Sep, 3 Oct 41, cited Summary and Index, p, 2, American Aid in the ME, 

1941 and 1942 (a collection of documents from British sources supplied the author through 

the courtesy of the Historical Section, Cabinet Office, London). MEF (Middle East Files, 

OCMH). 

'" (1) AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec I, under dates of 5, 6, 10, 23 Sep 41. (2) Notes 

on Conf at Office for Emergency Management, 9 Sep 41, atchd to AG Ltr to CofEngrs, 31 

Oct 41, sub: North African Mission, 381 (Middle East) (11-1-41) 3,OCofEngrs. 
38 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

to enable the Americans to decide "which of these projects they will be 

able to undertake and when they will be able to start." To provide machinery for screening proposals from various British field agencies, Gen. 

Sir Robert H. Haining, Intendant-General, Middle East, a special 

emissary acting at Cairo for the Prime Minister, on 15 October organized within the Middle East \'\Tar Council at Cairo an American 

Aid Subcommittee. Under his chairmanship this body undertook to 

remedy a condition of serious confusion which, in his opinion, arose 

from the independence of the several British services and agencies that 

found themselves competing for American-aid projects.13 

On the American side the general process of planning was similar 

to the British. Before the arrival of the missions in the field, British 

requests reached mission planning staffs via lend-lease and the War 

Department. At this stage the Amercians were handicapped by their 

unfamiliarity with the regions and conditions involved; but personal 

consultation with British opposite numbers after the Americans arrived overseas reduced the handicap, while some early planning had to 

be modified to fit the realities. The Iranian Mission thus received nominations of tasks both from Washington and through its direct contact 

with British Army representatives in Iraq, Iran, and India. Selection 

of tasks, assignment of local priorities, and the devising of means of 

performing the work devolved, in the last analysis, upon the chief 

of the mission, General Wheeler, subject to the direction and approval 

of the Secretary of War and to the inevitable and frequent shifts of 

plan arising from the several causes already discussed. 

General vVhceler's plans were subject to still other limitations, for 

he was by no means the only American charged with interest in, or 

responsibility for, decisions and actions in his area. There was Colonel 

Faymonville, already at Moscow as head of the civilian Lend-Lease 

Administration office there. His interest in seeing that the Russians got 

what had been promised them required that he keep a very close check 

on what was going on in the Persian Corridor. He could make inquiries, 

suggest investigations, consult, transmit Soviet wishes and requirements, and report to Washington his observations and suggestions. 

Every decision of General Wheeler affecting aid to Russia was of conr:ern to Colonel Faymonville. 

General Maxwell, who established the headquarters of the U.S. 

Military North African Mission at Cairo on 22 November, attended 

shortly thereafter the third meeting of the American Aid Subcommittee of the Middle East War Council. Although discussion at that 

13 (1) Msg, 7 Oct 41, App. 2, American Aid in the ME, 1941 and 1942. MEF. (2) 

Summary and Index, pp. 9-10, American Aid in the ME, 1941 and 1942. MEF. 
YEAR OF CONFUSION 39 

meeting turned chiefly upon projects in the area within General Maxwell's responsibility, the British aircraft assembly operations in the 

Basra area and proposals for establishment there of American-operated 

assembly plants were also discussed by General Maxwell as the American representative. In this informal way began an arrangement of 

convenience by which General Maxwell came increasingly to speak 

for General Wheeler's interests at British headquarters in Cairo. As 

time went on, and GHQ, British Middle East Forces, at Cairo, extended 

its responsibilities to Iraq and Iran, the interest of American headquarters at Cairo in operations in the Persian Corridor likewise increased until its command responsibility for those operations was 

formalized the following June 1942 by the activation of the U.S. 

Army Forces in the Middle East under General Maxwell.u 

Another American agency whose presence in the Persian Corridor 

affected the decisions and acts of the Iranian Mission was the USSR 

l\Iission under General Greely. Organized as a lend-lease instrumentality on the pattern of the North African and Iranian Missions, the 

Greely mission had been instructed to proceed into the Soviet Union 

and to carry out its tasks from there. To this end its chief was provided 

on 5 November 1941 with a Letter of Instructions identical with those 

given Generals Wheeler and Maxwell, except that Greely was to 

render advice and assistance to Russian and other friendly governments, in contrast to Wheeler's aid to British, Russian, and other 

friendly governments, and Maxwell's aid to British and other friendly 

governments. Greely's functions and authorized powers relative to lendlease aid to Russia were described in the same words as Wheeler's. 

Furthermore the War Department had left to their mutual agreement 

the delimitation of the geographical areas to be commanded by each. 

Greely arrived at Basra on 31 January 1942 and proceeded to Tehran 

where he established his headquarters; but the Soviet Union refused 

"(1) Min, 3d Mtg of American Aid Subcommittee, 24 Nov 41, App. 11, American Aid 

in the ME, 1941 and 1942. MEF. (2) See Chart 1. (3) The administrative and command 

relationships of British forces in Iraq and Iran to GHQ, India, and GHQ, Middle East 

Forces, Cairo, during 1941 and 1942 are somewhat obscure. From May 1941 Iraq appears 

to have been within the Middle East "sphere of interest," though the General Officer 

Commanding, Iraq, with headquarters at Baghdad commanded British forces in Iran and 

was in turn under the command of Commander-in-Chief, India. "For administration only," 

Iran was placed under the command of GHQ, Middle East Forces, "during the period midFebruary 1942 to mid-September 1942." Ltr and atchd Memo, Brig H. B. Latham, Chief, 

Hist Sec, Cabinet Office, London, to author,S Mar 48. (4) In January 1942 the War 

Department received notification from London that Iraq and Iran had been transferred from 

India to Middle East. This information, not wholly exact, as the above shows, was simultaneously cabled 15 January 1942 to Generals Maxwell and Wheeler. Memo, Brig Gen Leonard 

T. Gerow for TAG, 15 Jan 42, sub: Transfer of Iraq and Persia to Middle East Comd. 

AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 6. (5) For relevance of British command and jurisdictional 

matters to the creation of USAFIME, see Ch. V below. 
40 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

entry of the USSR Mission as a whole, and so the War Department, 

early in May, abolished it. During the intervening three months, the 

USSR and Iranian Missions jostled one another uncomfortably in a 

Corridor which was already crowded.'s 

The number of American missions in the field directly or indirectly 

involved in operations in the Corridor was matched by the several 

agencies of the War Department concerned in the planning and execution of Iranian Mission tasks. The Air Corps was charged with the 

assembly of lend-lease aircraft at a site to be designated by the chief of 

the mission, and three of the technical services, Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Engineers, divided among them the planning and execution of tasks suitable to their special functions. A considerable tug of 

war ensued over the determination of the activities to be undertaken 

by each; data available to one set of planners were not always known 

to the others, overlapping and confusion continued for many months. 

The ordnance plan, largest of all from a monetary aspect, was abandoned after months of busy planning because of a re-estimate of the 

requirements in the light of changing conditions overseas. The Quartermaster Corps as late as February 1942 expected to operate two or 

three of the chief Persian Gulf ports although, as has been stated, 

American responsibility for port operation did not become effective 

for more than a year after that.ls It also planned for the operation of 

'motor vehicle assembly plants, a function transferred in the War 

Department reorganization of 1942 to Ordnance. 

Upon the Corps of Engineers fell the duty of planning and executing necessary engineering and construction tasks for the mission. On 

22 September 1941 the Lend-Lease Administrator, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., wrote the Secretary of War of the British requirements for 

the railway, thus setting in motion the machinery of engineer planning. 

Transmitted to the Chief of Staff, the problem was referred to General 

George Spalding and by him to the Chief of Engineers, who appointed 

a committee to explore and recommend. On 29 September the Chief 

of Engineers reported progress to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G--4, 

and on 24 October, at General Wheeler's request, instructions were 

dispatched to the Chief of Engineers by The Adjutant General "to 

permit essential collaboration between" him and the chief of the 

Iranian Mission.17 The Chief of Engineers was directed in addition to 

10 Ltr of Instructions, 5 Nov 41. AG 400.3:!95 (8-14-41). See also Ch. IV below for an 

account of the USSR Mission. 

"Memo, 1 Mar 42, sub: Mtg of Anns and Sen's, L:. S. Mil Mission to Iran, 27 Feb 42. 

323.61 EstablishIIJent of Military Districts, Binder t, SL 9008. 

"The first two documents cited are in Iran 2/8, ~ADEF; the third, in AG 400.3295 

(8-9-41) Sec 4. 
YEAR OF CONFUSION 41 

furnish technical engineering advice and assistance relative to port, 

transport, storage, assembly, maintenance, and training facilities; to 

purchase and ship equipment and supplies needed by the mission; to 

negotiate and execute contracts for construction necessary to his tasks; 

and to provide the necessary engineer commissioned, enlisted, and 

civilian personnel. On 28 October the Office of the Chief of Engineers 

assigned to the Division Engineer, North Atlantic Division, New York, 

"the duty of carrying out the War Department instructions through a 

new engineer district to be established and known as the Iranian District. Lieut. Colonel Albert C. Lieber, Jr. will be ordered to report 

to you for duty as District Engineer for the Iranian District." Establishment of the new district with headquarters in New York, and the 

appointment of Colonel Lieber, followed on 31 October.'s 

The collaborative relationship established by War Department directive between the chief of the Iranian Mission and the Iranian District engineer requires further notice. Colonel Lieber moved his 

headquarters to Iraq in February 1942, and therefore, as an Army 

officer located in the territory of the Iranian ~1ission, came under the 

command of the chief of the mission. His responsibility for the execution of engineer tasks, however, derived via the North Atlantic Division 

from the Chief of Engineers. The Iranian District engineer maintained a staff of his own and his headquarters were separate and distinct from Iranian Mission headquarters. His function, subject to the 

control of the chief of the mission, was to execute certain mission 

projects; but as the Iranian District engineer was the contracting officer 

for the U.S. Government, the purse strings for engineer tasks were in 

his hands, and he exercised full control over matters of finance, procurement, and personnel related to his projects. 't\Tith regard to 

engineer work, the functions of the chief of the mission were to make 

plans through his own engineer planning staff, to adopt projects and 

assign them priorities, and to allocate the tonnages requested to bring 

materials from the United States. The co-ordination necessary .to the 

successful carrying out of mission tasks by a district engineer whose 

authority stemmed from the Chief of Engineers rather than from the 

chief of 'the mission was achieved by a v~luntary working agreement 

in the field that recognized the efficacy of reposing final on-the-spot 

authority in the chief of the mission. The district engineer was not 

under General Wheeler in matters covered by the War Department's 

directive to the Chief of Engineers; but the work proceeded as though 

,. (1) Ltr. Brig Gen Thomas M. Robins to Div Engr, NAD, NY, 28 Oct 41, sub: 

Iranian Mission. 381 (Middle East) O&T Sec Files, Folio 1, Serials 1-175, OCofEngrs. (2) 

GO 7, OCofEngrs, 31 Oct 41. 
42 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

he were. Difficulties inherent in a parallel or collaborative procedure 

were in this way reduced to a minimum.19 

The Civilian Contractors 

One further factor in the catalogue of confusion remains to be 

noted. The British forces in the Corridor had found it expedient to employ a variety of civilian contractors to carry out or to supervise, under 

military direction, certain tasks. Rail, highway, and dock construction, 

housing, stevedoring at the ports, and inland motor transport, were 

handled in varying degree in this fashion. Partly because of the British 

example, partly because preliminary American planning was carried 

on while the United States was still neutral, but chiefly because American resources of trained military personnel were wholly inadequate to 

meet anticipated requirements, the President's Middle East Directive 

had stipulated use of civilian contractors acting under military direction. Accordingly, the Air Corps, the Ordnance Department, the Quartermaster Corps, and the Corps of Engineers engaged civilian contractors, three of whom shipped men and machinery to the field during 

the first part of 1942. Serious difficulties were inherent in the contractor 

system: overlapping, such as that which produced in Iran in 1942 a 

situation where four American agencies and one British felt themselves 

responsible for construction of essentially the same sort of buildings in 

the same general location; the delicate balance of management controls between military and civilian authorities; and the still more 

delicate problem of the status of American civilians, legal and military, 

in war areas. But no other means were available to the planners to 

accomplish tasks largely technical in nature on the scale called for by 

the emergency. Furthermore, since a nation still neutral could not send 

an expeditionary force even if it possessed enough trained officers 

and men, all early planning, procurement, and shipment had to proceed 

on the assumption of continuance of the civilian contractor system. 

Pearl Harbor removed one set of obstacles to militarization. On the 

day after the attack the Iranian District engineer conferred on the subject of troops with the Deputy Chief of Engineers, Brig. Gen. Thomas 

M. Robins. They agreed that during the period required to train 

engineer forces it would be necessary to carry on with the civilian 

contractors.20 

,. This working arrangement was continued between the district engineer and General 

Wheeler's successor, Col. Don G. Shingler. (1) Interv cited n. 8. (2) Interv, Gen Shingler 

with Victor H. Pentlarge, Jr., Pentagon, 22 Apr 46 . .. Int'erv cited n. 8. 
YEAR OF CONFUSION 43 

Systematic militarization of overseas contract activities throughout 

the world was decreed by a "Var Department directive on 18 February 

1942. In accordance with this directive, such activities, with listed exceptions, were to be "terminated as soon as possible, and in each case 

within six months from the date of this directive." 21 Activities were to 

be "carried out by military organizations and units to be organized in 

the United States and sent overseas" to replace the contractor forces. 

In the case of the Iranian Mission local circumstances delayed militarization well past the year of confusion and into the period of reorganization initiated by the Combined Chiefs' directive of September 194:2. 

The first of the civilian contractors for this area to go was the one 

retained by the Ordnance Department. It was released on 14 March 

1942. This company, alone of all the contractors, put no men into the 

field. The termination of contracts by the Engineers and by the Air 

Corps followed on 1 January and 31 March 1943 respectively; while 

the Quartermaster contractor (whose contract was transferred to Ordnance) remained in the field until 30 June 1943. Uncertainty as to 

the continuation of the several contracts hampered all stages of the 

work, from planning and procurement, through shipment of men and 

equipment, to actual operations; while the difficulties of transition from 

civilian to military operation, protracted during a six months' period 

in 1943, slowed the attainment of targets set by early planning. 

As one reviews the months from September 1941 to October 1942, 

and those following months of long-drawn-out transition, it is apparent 

that the one thing needful to prevent confusion, besides the rare qualities of divination and absolute wisdom, was unified command. Unified 

command in the Persian Corridor was, however, impossible. Instead 

there evolved, through improvisation, through trial and error, and in 

spite of a host of difficulties, a working co-operation among the representatives of the four nations involved, which brought order out of what 

'vas, for a time, very nearly chaos. 

nAG Ltr, 18 Feb 42, sub: Closing Out of Overseas Contracts and Militarization of 

Contract Activities. AG 160 (2-15-42) MSC-D-M. 
CHAPTER III 

Six Months In Iraq 

The story of early planning explains how it came about that the 

first American effort was in Iraq and why that effort was short-lived. 

For six months from November 1941 the Iraqi chapter was longer on 

planning than on performance. The ordnance plan is an extreme 

instance: almost all planning, almost no performance in the field. 

The case of the Iranian Mission's first job in Iraq was less extreme, 

though more than a million dollars and the best working months of the 

year pad been expended on projects when change of plan transferred 

them to the British before they were fairly started." In the early stages 

of new ventures, trial and error take their toll of the best-laid plans. 

The Engineer Tasks 

The first plans were very large indeed. Broached by the British 

before Pearl Harbor put a global strain upon American resources, 

these plans indicated both a belief that the Americans could do anything and the hope that they would. British needs were great, and 

the President had directed that their needs should govern. 

Following the 'Vashington decision in September 1941 to establish 

the Iranian Mission, the 'Var Office, London, instructed the Commander-in-Chief, India, to make suggestions for American projects in 

road construction and maintenance, port development with rail connections, maintenance of American vehicles being operated by the 

United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, and development of inland 

water transport. This last field of activity, as has been pointed out, was 

never entrusted in whole or in part to the Americans; but tasks in the 

other fields named by the 'Var Office were duly considered for assignment to the Iranian :Mission.2 The command relationship between India 

1 The figure of $1,188,000 for the work in Iraq is included in Report of Foreign M8nagcr 

on Fee Earned, WD Contract DA-W-1098-Eng-109, 20 Mar 43. Head Office, Spencer, 

White and Prentis, New York (referred to hereafter as SWP Office). 2 War Office Rad, 6 Oct 41, quoted Summary and Index, p. 9, American Aid in the ME, 

1941 and 1942. MEF. 
SIX :MONTHS IN IRAQ 45 

and the British forces in Iraq and Iran made New Delhi the appropriate 

clearinghouse for plans for that area. When General Wheeler left the 

United States in late October arrangements had been concluded for 

him to stop at New Delhi for consultation with General Wavcll. At 

Honolulu \Vheeler joined his chief of staff, Lt. Col. Don G. Shingler, 

and General Maxwell, who was on his way to Cairo in command of the 

North African Mission. From Karachi, while Maxwell continued by 

air to Cairo, Wheeler and Shingler proceeded by train to New Delhi. 

There from 20 to 26 November they met with the Commander-inChief, India. 

On 25 November General Wavell's headquarters reported "works 

suitable for American aid agreed with General Wheeler. ... " On 

the day before, Wheeler cabled from New Delhi his list of "nine 

items ... essential for American aid to Russia and to British Army 

in Iraq and Iran." On the same day, in Washington-after conferences 

participated in by Generals Burns and George Spalding and Brig. Gen. 

Sidney P. Spalding representing War Department responsibility for 

lend-lease, General Robins and others of the Office of the Chief of 

Engineers, the Iranian District engineer and his contractors, and representatives of the Iranian Mission-a third list of tasks was drawn Up.B 

These lists are interesting both for their agreements and for their 

points of difference. General vVavell noted 10 projects: 5 for India, 

3 for Iran, 1 each for Iraq and for an undesignated site at the head of 

the Persian Gulf. General Wheeler included 6 projects for India, and 

1 each for Iran, Iraq, and the head of the Gulf. The \Vashington list, 

being primarily concerned with engineer tasks, will be separately considered. Perhaps the most striking difference between the Wavell and 

the \Vheeler lists is the omission from the American list of two British 

proposals: development of docks at Umm Qasr in Iraq (the task which 

soon received top priority) and development of ports on the Caspian 

Sea, inside the Soviet-occupied zone of Iran, with communications 

thereto. The Caspian task, to which General ,,.y avell's list attached the 

first importance and which, it noted, would require Soviet co-operation 

to be obtained by General Wheeler, ,,,'as quietly and promptly abandoned for lack of Soviet approval. 

The Wavell and ,,.yheeler lists agreed, with a difference in phrasing, 

on establishment of motor vehicle assembly plants at Karachi. The 

\,.yheeler list noted that the vehicles assembled at Karachi were for 

, (I) Msg ARM INDIA 18886/Q. (Q. 1), New Delhi to Troopers Mideast, Cairo, 25 

~ov 41, App. 12, American Aid in the ME, 1941 and 1942. MEF. (2) Msg 18786/Q, GHQ, 

India, 24 Nov 41. Iran 5/13, NADEF. (3) Memo, signed by Capt Paul F. Yount, 24 Nov 

41, sub: Rpt on Cons Needs. Iran 2/8, NADEF. 
46 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

delivery to Russia via eastern Iran; \'Vavell's list made no mention of 

a delivery route but noted that some of the vehicles were to be for 

British use "for leave supplies." The lists also agreed on: establishment 

of a motor vehicle assembly plant at the head of the Persian Gulf; a 

small motor repair shop near Bombay; a repair shop at Agra, India, 

for signals equipment of American make; an ordnance repair shop 

at Karachi for tank engines and bodies; a base ordnance workshop at 

Tehran to assemble, service, and check equipment being handed over 

to the Russians, the British list noting that they attached great importance to putting the delivery of supplies to the Russians into American hands; and provision of American instructional personnel for advice to Indian Army engineers on the use of certain machinery of 

American make. The British list alone carried an item for American 

development and maintenance of one thousand miles of road on the 

Ahwaz-Hamadan-Khanaqin route, a part of which the Americans 

were later to undertake. The American list named the provision of river 

craft for work on the Tigris and Karun Rivers, a project later undertaken by the Iranian Mission. This was included in the Wavell list, 

but with a low priority. The absence from both lists of an American 

aircraft assembly plant for the Basra area is explained by the fact that 

this project was planned through British headquarters in Cairo. The 

British list noted that General Wheeler had indicated in the New Delhi 

conversations that he did not feel his directive authorized him to discuss 

British proposals for pipeline construction; the American list did not 

mention pipeline work. The two lists represent not specifically agreed 

tasks but general agreement on the kind of task. No agreement on 

priorities was put to paper; but it is clear, from later project lists, that 

specific tasks as well as priorities were carefully considered by the 

conferees and, because of the changing situation, were left unrecorded 

and flexible. 

The Washington list of construction items was drawn up to enable 

the Iranian District engineer to plan for procurement of men, equipment, and shipping. It indicated that details of the general construction 

schemes would be dependent on information that would be gathered 

at sites yet to be selected, but it did not specifically locate any projects 

beyond noting that they would be in the Basra area, at Bandar Shahpur 

(not mentioned in the Wavell or Wheeler lists), at Bombay, and at 

inland points in Iraq and Iran. Dock, housing, plant, shop, and depot 

construction, road repair and improvement, and a limited amount of 

railroad construction were listed; but the paper shows, as do all the 

early planning papers, the differing bases of information upon which 

the various planners proceeded. For instance, the Washington list, not 
SIX MONTHS IN IRAQ 47 

having been derived exclusively from nominations by the Commanderin-Chief, India, mentioned airport construction; and its provision for 

construction of six hundred miles of pipeline in Iran reveals how far 

the British idea of a great pipeline network to be built with materials 

imported from the United States had advanced in Washington, though 

at the same time, in New Delhi, General ,",,'heeler had indicated that 

pipelines lay outside the scope of his directive. Again, the Washington 

list, providing only for very limited rail construction, came much closer 

to eventual American commitments than did later plans which ranged 

from creating an extensive rail network in Syria and Palestine to 

double-tracking the ISR. 

\Vith planning in late November still in the broad preparatory stage, 

it had meanwhile been necessary to appoint a civilian contractor for 

the Iranian District engineer and to develop a specific program of 

work. The certainty that there would be dock construction, high\\·ay 

work, and a variety of building assignments suggested the firm of 

Spencer, \Vhite and Prentis, Inc., who, in the years 1932 to 1938, had 

been the contractor when Major Wheeler was building cofferdams, 

locks, and dams on the upper Mississippi for the Corps of Engineers. 

To handle an undetermined amount of railway construction, Foley 

Brothers, Inc., for two generations experienced in railroad work, were 

called in and the two companies together (called for convenience 

Folspen) sigI)ed on 10 November a contract for service abroad! Lt. 

Col. John A. 'Gillies, formerly General Manager of the Santa Fe Railway, appointed to the Iranian Mission by General Wheeler to undertake advance railway surveys in Iran and Iraq, arrived in the field on 

20 November and established field headquarters at Marine House, 

Ashar, in the business district of modern Basra. W'ith General Wheeler's 

headquarters established ten days later at Baghdad and the district 

engineer, Colonel Lieber, still at New York, Colonel Gillies, as mission 

representative in the south, found rail surveys swamped by pressing 

problems connected with making lend-lease work locally. 

The first orientation of the mission was toward the British line of 

communications, Basra to Baghdad. Both considerations of security 

and the indeterminate state of planning prevented the writing into 

the engineer constructor's contract of exact specifications for the work 

'The contract, DA-W-l098-Eng-l09, was approved 18 NO"fmber 1941 by Undf'r 

Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson. See Edmund A. Prentis, Progr('ss Review of Constru('-

tion Work. American Militarv Mission to P('rsia, 10 Mar 43: and A. J. Ruge, Project 

Manager, Report on Iranian Operations, 9 Mar 43. Both filed SWP Office. Information on 

the overseas operations of the engineer constructor was obtained in interviews with Ruge 

and Charles H. Sells, Foreign Manager, on 28 October 1944 at the Head Office of Foley 

Brothers, Inc., Pleasantville, N. Y.; and with Prentis, Lazarus White, C. L. Sw('nson, and 

Eugene W. Kortjohn on 19 October 1944 at the SWP Office. 
48 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

to be done. But examination of the contract and of the first detailed 

instructions issued under it shows that the Americans had decided to 

concentrate their initial efforts around the head of the Persian Gulf. 

The contract, without mentioning sites, called for wharf construction, 

rail approaches to docks, highway building and improvement in Iran, 

and temporary housing and warehousing which would be appropriate 

for either the Basra-Umm Qasr area or Iran. In the first directive 

under the contract, issued just after the vVavell-Wheeler lists, a motor 

vehicle assembly plant for the Ahwaz-Andimeshk region was among 

projects listed. Camps for the constructor's men were also specified for 

the same area. Otherwise, this directive followed the general statement 

of tasks written into the contract. 

The process of determining construction tasks was carried still further in early January when the Iranian District engineer assigned sites 

now decided upon by the mission. The construction of an au..;jliary port 

at Umm Qasr with wharves, access roads, and railway yards, a construction camp and storage yard, and highway and rail connections 

with Basra came first on the list. It also called for construction and 

administrative offices, camp, mess, hospital, storage facilities, repair 

shops, and an equipment yard for the Basra area. Because no field reconnaissance had yet been made, absence of information as to sources 

of rock and gravel 'left one thousand miles of highway construction and 

improvement unlocated. In addition the constructor was notified to 

prepare to build shops at Basra and Karachi as called for by the 

ordnance program. 5 

The Ordnance Program 

The implementing of the lend-lease process at the receiving end 

in the Persian Corridor la~d upon the Iranian Mission many more 

responsibilities than those involved in the construction of docks, highways, railways, and buildings. By the tum of the year these engineer 

tasks had received top priority; but both their determination and execution were affected by decisions in other fields such as Ordnance, Quar-

• (1) The'so-called New York Letter was issut"d by the North Atlantic Division engineer 

under date of 27 November 1941. See Rpt cited n. 1. (2) Ltr, Col Lieber to Folspen, 5 Jan 

42. Iran 4/4, NADEF. (3) After this date the constructor's work was notified to it through 

five foreign directives dating from 4 to 27 April 1942, and twenty-one change orders with 

amendments dating from 10 April to 10 December 1942. They may be compared with the 

summary of work done contained in Information To Be Furnished to the North Atlantic 

Division for the Purpose of Preparing a Completion Report for Contract DA-W-I098-

Eng-I09, as requested by letter dated 10 May 1943 from the North Atlantic Division and 

signed by Capt, H, G, Groves. NA 7205 (AMSIR) 13/2, and NA 319.2 (AMSIR) 38/2. 

NADEF. Another copy PGF 239. 
SIX MONTHS IN IRAQ 

term aster, and Air. Kinds of projects, location of sites, division of responsibilities, local arrangements for labor and procurement-all these 

posed questions for which the mission had to find prompt answers. 

Most important, in its effect on early planning, was the ordnance 

program. 

Unlike the Corps of Engineers which set up separate district 

engineers for North Africa and Iran to be attached to the Maxwell 

and Wheeler missions respectively, the Ordnance Department elected 

to handle its Middle East projects under a single plan for both missions. 

Direction of work in the field was to be under Col. Francis H. Miles, 

Jr., ordnance officer on the staff of General Maxwell and acting 

ordnance officer for the Wheeler mission. The civilian contractor, 

The J. G. White Engineering Corporation, of New York, after protracted negotiations starting in November and conducted by the New 

York Ordnance District office, was appointed on 26 January 1942. 

The basic program was outlined in an advance plan, dated 12 November 1941.6 

The advance plan provided for "supervision of and co-ordination 

,vith any Ordnance activities which may develop in the area of the 

Iran Mission," and made Ordnance responsible for the design, location, 

operation, and maintenance of projected installations, leaving construction to the Engineers. Notwithstanding this definition of responsibilities, the ordnance contractor, by his letter contract, was given 

"incidental construction" responsibilities, as the following indicates. 

He was 

. . . to organize, establish, equip and operate one or more depots in the Middle 

East, India, and Africa for the supply, maintenance and repair of tanks and miscellaneous ordnance, signal, engineer, chemical warfare, or other military equipment . . .; to assist in, or carryon, the instruction of British or other personnel 

assigned for that purpose, in the supply, maintenance and repair of such equipment . . .; to do such incidental construction as may be directed by the Contracting Officer.1 

• (I) List of Officers, North African Mission, 3 Nov 41. Afr.M. 6/6, NADEF. (2) Ltr 

Contract DA-W--ord-58, dated 24 Jan 42, approved by Secy War 26 Jan 42. J. G. White 

Engrg Corp DA-W-0098, Contract and General Folder, NYODF (New York Ordnance 

District Files, New York). See also Chronology of Development of Contract DA-''''--ord-5S. 

Head Office, J. G. White Engineering Corporation, New York (referred to hereafter as White Office). Background and information supplied in interviews with Lt. Col. Edward Gluck, 

Contracting Officer's Representative, New York Ordnance District on 16 October 1944; 

and with E. N. Chilson, Vice President of White, D. M. Crawford, Secretary, and R. W. 

Gausmann, Engineer, at White Office on 17 October 1944. (3) Memo, Col Miles for CofOrd, 

12 Nov 41, sub: Plans by North African Mil Mission for Aid to British Activities in Near East. 

AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 6. 

7 Ltr, Maj Cen Charles M. Wesson to CofEngrs, 11 Feb 42. J. G. White, Confidential 

Correspondence 160/DA-005S, NYODF. 
50 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

Since simultaneous supervision and co-ordination implies some overlapping of function and responsibility, and since the planning functions 

of the engineer and ordnance officers and their contractors, particularly 

in structural and engineering design, inevitably overlapped, there was 

some duplication of effort, and some confusion as to final authority 

which was at last resolved by the Chief of Ordnance. In forwarding 

plans and drawings for Middle East ordnance depots to the Engineers, 

Ordnance explained that they were to be considered by the Engineers 

as suggestive only, final decision to be reached in the field by the appropriate chiefs of missions acting through representatives of the Corps 

of Engineers. 

In the case of the ordnance program the familiar pattern of the 

early period was repeated. Planning and procurement had somehow 

to go ahead at full speed while policy, determined by all sorts of warinspired factors, remain fluid. The ordnance planners had therefore to 

determine what installations were to be established, by whom and how 

they were to be constructed, and how they were to be operated and 

maintained. Under the first heading the program was precise. It provided that of seven depots for the Middle East, called Ol\.fET 1 to 7, 

three were to be established within the area of the Iranian ~Iission. 

The largest of these. OMET 1. at Karachi, was to be capable of serving 

the entire Middle East area from the standpoint of supply and distribution. Some thirty-six installations there, ranging from small shops 

to new docks, were called for. Twenty-eight more buildings had been 

planned for at Umm Qasr and Baghdad (OMET 4 and 7). The program covered installations for the Signal and Quartermaster Corps 

and Chemical Warfare Service work, as well as for Ordnance. It 

envisaged putting optical shops and some other buildings underground. 

Most difficult of all, it involved importation of large quantities of 

structural steel from overseas.s 

Construction decisions were complicated by the Corps of Engineers' 

over-all responsibility in that field assigned by the War Department in 

October. Yet as late as 2 February 1942 the ordnance contractor. 

having been put on notice by the Ordnance Department to prepare 

to do necessary construction, believed that design, construction, arid 

installation of machines and equipment for overseas bases was a func-

• (1) Revised Plan, ]. G. Whitt', 12 Ft'b 42, initialt'd by R. W. Gausmann, Actg Gen 

Mgr, Overseas Div. Col Gluck's file, Routine Corrcspondcnct' ITI, NYODF. That plan 

based upon: (2) Memo, Col Miks for Brig Gt'n Jame'S K. Crain, Chid of Field Sery, Ord 

Dept, 26 Nov 41, sub: Status of Ord Participation in North African and Iran Mil Missions, 

White Office; and (3) Memo, Col Miles, 28 Nov 41, sub: Recommendations for Contractors 

for Middle East Activities, quoted Rpt by Paul D. Okjar, 15 Jun 44, sub: Ord Artivitil"s 

in Middle East Missions, pp. 11, II-a, and n. 16. Hist Sec, Ord Dept, Pentagon. 
SIX MONTHS IN IRAQ 51 

tion under its contract. And as late as 27 January the Quartermaster 

Corps, seeking funds for operation of proposed motor vehicle assembly 

plants at Tehran, Karachi, and Bombay, made provision also for possible construction of buildings by its contractor, the General Motors 

Overseas Corporation. Engineer construction of installations under the 

ordnance program, however, was definitely confirmed by the date of 

the contractor's revised plan of 12 February.9 

Just as overlapping had developed in the fields of structural and 

engineering design and in provisions for construction of installations, 

so the determination of policy as to operation of projected overseas 

bases ran into even heavier problems of division of labor and assignment 

of responsibilities. At a late stage in planning, in mid-January 1942, 

the Ordnance Department expected its contractor at the several bases 

to operate facilities for repair of tanks, guns, aircraft armaments, optical 

instruments, locomotives, and motor vehicles. In the last-named category, however, a distinction was drawn between operation of projected 

quartermaster repair shops to be done by the ordnance contractor and 

operation of shops for the repair of motor transport vehicles to be done 

by the quartermaster contractor.'o This problem was not wholly solved 

by the subsequent transfer of the General Motors contract from the 

Quartermaster Corps to the Ordnance Department; and fresh problems arose when, as will shortly appear, the ordnance contractor was 

dispensed with and, soon after, the ordnance program itself canceled. 

These decisions were forced in no small degree by the peculiar 

difficulties inherent in assigning to a civilian contractor tasks concerned 

with munitions, which were essentially military. No comparable difficulties existed in the purely constructional duties of the engineer's 

civilian contractor. From the start of its negotiations with the Ordnance Department the White Corporation had urged that the overseas 

part of its contract "be conducted as a military organization to protect 

workmen in event of capture." 11 The contractor had estimated that 

• (1) Memo, Overseas Div, J. G. White [n. d.], sub: Confs of 13-15 Jan 42 with Mil 

Missions Sec, Ex Div, Field Serv, OCofOrd, p. 12. White Office. (2) Interoffice Memo, J. G. 

White, 2 Feb 42. White Office. (3) Interoffice Memo, 27 Jan 42; and Ltr, Col Lieber to 

CofEngrs, 27 Dec 41, and Inds, 19 Jan 42 and 20 Feb 42, which noted that a radio from 

General Wheeler of 13 January 1942 indicated that construction of most installations 

would be performed by the British, the American engineers to handle the rest. Iran 24/2-A, 

NADEF. (4) Revised Plan cited n. 8(1). 

,. Notes of Conference held at the offices of Johnson, Drake and Piper, Inc., 15 January 

1942, presided over by Colonel Miles and attended by representatives of Quartermaster, 

Ordnance, the North African Military Mission, its engineer contractor, the ordnance contractor, but by no representative of the Iranian Mission, save its acting ordnance officer, 

Colonel Miles. J. G. White Folder, MEF. 

11 See chronology cited note 6(2), and Overseas File, White Office, for this and follow. 

ing dated references unless otherwise noted. 
52 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

over thirteen hundred American civilians and over sixty-five hundred 

locally employed laborers would be required for the depots at Karachi, 

Umm Qasr, and Baghdad.12 For some time the military authorities were 

of divided opinion and on 9 December 1941 insisted that, because of the 

need of speed and the dearth of qualified military technical personnel, 

civilians would have to be used. On 2 January 1942 Gano Dunn, President of the White Corporation, wrote to Brig. Gen. James K. Crain 

that, while continuing to urge that civilian employees overseas "have 

some form of government or related agency status," the contractor 

would carryon. On the date of the signing of the letter contract, 24 

January, the contracting officer instructed the contractor to make no 

commitments on engaging personnel for overseas pending solution of 

the problem of military or civilian operation. That the military then 

were in some doubt of the feasibility of civilian operation was reflected 

in provisions of the letter contract calling for its automatic termination if a formal contract was not executed on or before 15 April. On 

31 January a message was dispatched to the North African Mission 

stating that Ordnance favored militarization of the overseas projects. 

On 10 February the contractor was informed, by telephone, that the 

project was to be completely militarized, and on 18 February, by letter, 

of the termination of the contract, effective 14 March. The Chief of 

Ordnance, Maj. Gen. Charles M. Wesson, in a letter congratulating 

the contractor on "the highly efficient manner in which your organization attacked this difficult problem," stated that "the sole reason for 

terminating this contract was a War Department decision as to 

policy." 13 

Termination of the ordnance contract reflected a policy decision 

not to operate overseas ordnance depots through a civilian agency. 

The \Vhite Corporation was thus the first of the civilian contractors to 

be replaced by the gradual process of militarization. In time the Army 

would possess adequate manpower to militarize the ordnance projects; 

but meanwhile there was the matter of building the required depots. 

The first step in transferring this task to the engineer constructor was 

taken when on 12 March the North Atlantic Division engineer directed 

Folspen to place orders for quotations and deliveries for the proposed 

construction. Henceforward, the engineer constructor moved toward 

U Total estimate for all seven Middle East bases was 15,280 employees, of whom 80 percent 

would be locally hired laborers. Rpt by Overseas Div, J. G. White to WD, OCofOrd, Mar 

42. White Office. l.3 (I) Rad 496 AMSEG 170,31 Jan 42. AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 6. (2) Ltr, Lt 

Col S. F. Clabaugh, Ord Contracting Off, 18 Feb 42. J. G. White, Confidential Correspondence, 160/DA-0058, RC 24209, NYODF. (3) Ltr, Gen Wesson to J. G. White, 27 Feb 42. 

White Office. 
SIX MONTHS IN IRAQ 53 

full responsibility for all phases of construction without the complications inherent in collaboration with an ordnance contractor. On 27 

March the Chief of Ordnance inquired of Karachi whether Folspen 

was to erect the more than sixty buildings planned for Karachi, Dmm 

Qasr, and Baghdad, and stated that the necessary steel had been procured in the United States but that Folspen would have to obtain and 

ship abroad the necessary skilled labor.14 

At this point the critical shortage of shipping provided the immediate reason for cancellation of the ordnance program. On 6 April the 

War Department decided that "due to shipping conditions ... no 

fixed installations will be established in the territory of the Iranian 

Mission." 15 Although the episode with its ala rums and excursions 

suggests the King of France marching up the hill and then marching 

down' again, it is a significant part of the story of early planning. 'Vith 

invasion threatening from Suez, Anatolia, and the Caucasus, the ordnance program provided for urgent strategic needs. The cancellation 

of planned fixed installations within the area of the Iranian Mission, 

one of those sudden shifts in direction forced by war conditions, recognized that the odds against the program, including complexities in the 

planning process, had proved for the time being insuperable. 

The A1 ission~ s Tasks 

General 'Vheeler's broad instructions-to advise and assist the 

British, Russian, and other friendly governments within the area of his 

mission in all phases of the transport of American materials for their 

war requirements-embraced the engineer program to establish port 

and transportation facilities as well as the ordnance program to establish and operate facilities for the maintenance and repair of Americanmade lend-lease defense articles. His instructions gave General 

Wheeler a direct interest in all phases of the delivery process; but, as 

has been noticed, this interest was in practice circumscribed by the 

Iranian Mission's auxiliary status. General Wheeler could not, there14 (1) See under date of 12 March 1942. NA 5440 (Iran DO), NADEF. (2) Rad, 

OCofOrd to Karachi, 27 Mar 42. AG 400,3295 (8-9-41) Sec 4. (3) Early in March, Colonel 

Miles visited General Wheeler, made recommendations for ordnance personnel in Wheeler's 

area, and received Wheeler's approval of the general ordnance plan providing for a great 

base at Karachi. This was reported by Colonel Miles to a meeting of General Maxwell's 

staff on 5 March 1942. Min, Stf Mtg at Cairo, 5 Mar 42. Maxwell Papers (Personal files 

lent by General Maxwell to the Middle East Section of the Office of the Chief of Military 

History and returned to him upon his retirement from the Army). 

"Memo, Gen Aurand, Dir, Intn Div, for CofOrd, 6 Apr 42. NA 7205 (Iran DO-2/1), 

NADEF. Messages concerning erection of shop buildings at Umm Qasr continued to pass 

between General Somervell's office and the Iranian Mission as late as 21 April. Folder, Umm 

Qasr Assembly Plant, SL X-ll,737. 
54 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

fore, concern himself directly with the berthing of ships, their unloading, and the transportation of their cargoes to Soviet destinations. 

Direct as was the mission's concern with these steps, such matters, in 

the first phase of the American effort, rested wholly in British hands. 

The port of Basra was operated by a port directorate maintained by the 

government of Iraq under the firm wartime guidance (granted by 

treaty rights) of the British dock directorate. All military traffic was 

handled by the British Army and Navy representatives. General 

Wheeler learned that cargoes destined for the Iranian District engineer's construction projects would be unloaded by commercial agents 

long established at Basra, and that clearing such cargoes from the docks 

to the site of the American jobs would be done through the British dock 

directorate. 

General Wheeler also found that there was little he could do} 

beyond offering advice and assistance, to facilitate the flow of lend-lease 

goods destined for the Soviet Union. As has already been noted, the 

desire of President Roosevelt to speed help to Russia was providing 

the port of Basra with a steady flow of materiel. William C. Bullitt, 

the President's roving ambassador, visited Basra on 7 January and 

asked questions. General Wheeler told him that the facilities of the 

port were not being used to capacity and that goods were piling up at 

dockside faster than they could be removed. General Wheeler estimated that only about one quarter of Basra port's tonnage capacity 

was actually clearing the docks. Important as was the flow of goods 

to Anglo-American projects and to Soviet receiving points, and direct 

as was General Wheeler's interest in this flow, the responsibility for 

management and control of port and transportation facilities was 

not his.l6 

Movement of traffic, being closely bound up with British treaty 

obligations for security, was not easily shared with an auxiliary which 

possessed no combat troops in the region and, until late 1942, only a 

handful of service forces. But industrial operations could be shared. 

In addition to those planned for Engineers and Ordnance, there were 

operations for the assembly of motor vehicles and aircraft. To supplement aircraft assembly being carried on by the British at their base 

at Shu'aiba, one or more new plants had been included in planning 

talks at Cairo. Prompt selection of a site was essential. After conference 

with British headquarters, Tenth Army, Baghdad, and with the concurrence of the Royal Air Force, of Maj. Gen. George H. Brett, Chief 

of the Air Corps, and of Brig. Gen. Elmer E. Adler, Chief of the Air 

" (1) Memo, Gm Whf'eler for Bullitt, 7 Jan 42. 323.91 Ports, SL 9008. (2) DE File 

P-9, Ports and Harbor Facilities, NADEF. 
SIX MONTHS IN IRAQ 55 

Section, U.S. Military North African Mission, General 'Vheeler chose 

the island of Abadan in the Shatt al Arab below Khorramshahr. Selection of a site for the motor vehicle assembly plant, which had been included in early planning for somewhere at the head of the Persian 

Gulf, follm,\red the Abadan decision. The choice, concurred in by the 

Russians, fell upon Andimeshk, an Iranian town on the main line of 

the Iranian State Railway, and was approved by the Commander-inChief, India. when on 8 January General Wheeler conferred with 

him at New Delhi. A second assembly plant for motor vehicles, also 

included in the early planning, was determined upon for Karachi on 

the assumption, not yet invalidated by developments, that delivery to 

the Soviets would be effected via the east Iranian overland route which 

ended at Meshed. While the American plants at Abadan and Andimeshk were being made ready for operations, the Iranian Mission, initially through Colonel Gillies, furnished technical assistance to the 

British assembly operations.rr 

On 19 January General Wheeler sent to Washington a list of projects for the Iranian Mission.18 These projects comprised dock, railway, 

and highway construction in Iraq and Iran; motor vehicle assembly 

in Iran and India; motor vehicle reconditioning-, rebuilding, repairing, 

and servicing in Iran and India; the ordnance projects for Iraq and 

India, later canceled; projects for the assembly, repair, and transfer 

of lend-lease aircraft at points in Iraq, Iran, and India; repair of radio 

direction-finding equipment at Agra, India; establishment of schools 

in Iraq, Iran, and India to teach operation and maintenance of American-made motor vehicles, tanks, and aircraft; and American participation in a proposed joint commission of representatives of Iran, Great 

Britain, and the USSR to supervise operation of the railway. In all, 

there were 31 projects, spread over a large area. Of these 15 were 

eliminated by subsequent planning, 4 were undertaken by the British, 

2 were started by the Americans but transferred to the British, and 10 

17 (1) For an account of the considf'rations affecctinl!; the df'cision and of r~qllf'sts to the 

British to facilitate arrangements, see 092.2 Agreement Concerning Use of Abadan Air Field, 

SL 8978, especially documents dated 29 December 1941 and 13 January 1942 ;:md inc)osur('s. 

(2) History; United States Military Iranian Mission, 20 Mar 43, prepared for Col Don G. 

Shingler, Chief of Mission, by 1st Lt Victor E. Dietze, lEst Off. PCF 242. (3) The Karachi 

motor vehicle assembly plans were abandoned because of Soviet objection to the east Iran 

delivery route as landing cargoes too far from the battle lines. See radio, Faymonville to 

Wheeler, 22 January, and reply, Shingler (for Wheeler) to Faymonville, 24 January 1942, 

stating the Zahidan-Meshed route would not be used for lend-lease deliveries by the Americans. 323.91 Ports, SL 9008. 

" Inclosed in Ltr, Gen Wheeler to Gen Moore, 19 Jan 42. WDCSA 381 Egypt (1-19-42). 

A similar list, but differing in some details, included in Memo, Chief, Home Office, Iranian 

Mission, for Defense Aid Dir, 23 Jan 42. 320 Mis Br, Intn Div, ASF NCF (Army Service 

Forces Noncurrent Classified Files). 
56 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

were undertaken and carried out by the Americans. Of these 10, 2 

represented American technical assistance to British projects at 

Shu'aiba and Bushire. The remaining 8 were all located in Iran. 

The breakdmvn of projects, not all of which, of course, were to be 

undertaken at once, is sufficient reminder of the hazards of planning 

and the obstacles to performance. Under such conditions, procurement 

and shipment of personnel and the allocation of limited field resources 

to specific projects were as systematic and dependable as the game of 

roulette. 

Arrival in Iraq 

The first to learn this hard fact were the civilians of the Iranian 

District engineer's constructor, Folspen, who, together with military 

members of the Iranian, USSR, and North African Missions, and the 

North African District engineer's civilian contractor's men, sailed from 

Brooklyn in the U.S. Army Transport Siboney on a coldly raining 

Christmas Eve, 1941. On the following 14 February they disembarked 

in the bri,ght sunshine of Basra.19 

The Dmm Qasr job had received highest priority in early January 

while the men were at sea; so, without stopping to savor the attractions 

of Basra, home port of Sinbad the Sailor, for the Folspen men it was 

Umm Qasr the day after landing. A long line of borrowed British lorries 

took the group of 117 civilians, and some of the 9 officers and 10 enlisted 

men who had landed with them, forty or fifty miles across the desert 

to Umm Qasr by the waters of the Khor Abdullah. Exactly how far 

they drove it is impossible to say, for they traversed a waste space 

marked only by camel caravans. For the last miles there was no road. 

They had come to build one. And they drove that day only to a name 

on a map. "There is absolutely nothing there," reported a British survey of late 1941. What had once stood when there was a sort of port at 

Umm Qasr in World War I had long since sunk into the low shores 

of the Khor, or been consumed by the desert. As it was not known 

whether the site was accessible by sea, the Americans' ship had gone on 

to Basra while the British suiveyed the Khor to detennine the navigability of the channel to the site of the proposed docks at Umm Qasr. 20 

,. The North African Mission people had landed at Massawa, Eritrea, on 2 February. 

The Basra landing date, because of contradictions in Army radios and reports, is fixed by 

the personal diary of Arthur W. DuBois, Chief of Party of the Folspen men on the voyage. 

Margil, the dock area of Basra, was the landing point . .. (1) Ltr cited n. 5 (2). (2) Strength figures in available reports for this period are inconsistent. See Chart 2, Those given for Iranian Mission personnel on the Siboney are from 

a memorandum from the Chief of Staff prepared for the President, 17 January 1942. 

AG 400.3295 (8-9--41) Sec 1. Previous to the arrival at Margil there were about 15 officers 
SIX MONTHS IN IRAQ 57 

There was something on the map besides the name when the 

Americans arrived. They found a rough camp prepared for them by 

the British. Nissen huts for two hundred men had been promised, and 

seventeen, all incomplete, were standing, six of which were needed at 

once for warehousing. Water, brought from Basra in a British-built 

pipeline, was subject to occasional interruption by Bedouin attracted 

by its accessibility for their parched flocks. Reservoirs being built by 

the British were not finished. There was no light save what could be 

provided by lanterns and candles until a small generator arrived in 

March on the first supply ship, the City of Dalhart, when there was 

power enough for the mess and recreation huts. The camp, with only 

the desert track behind it and the Khor Abdullah before it, was well 

guarded by British Gurkhas against the curiosity of Arabs and camels. 

There was no refrigeration-and consequent food spoilage. This was 

war in the Middle East and the men settled down to fight it out. 21 

The Iranian Di.strict engineer's first jobs were to build two berths 

at Dmm Qasr with necessary rail and road approaches, shops, warehouses, and housing; to build a rail line 27 miles north across the desert 

to Rafadiyah Station on the meter-gauge line from Basra to Baghdad, 

and 8.4 miles of highway between Shu'aiba and Margil; and to build 

an equipment yard and machine shops at Rafadiyah. 22 There were 

other jobs to come, at Baghdad and in Iran; but these had top priority. 

The engineer's most pressing problems were housing and moving 

equipment off the ship and down to the site of work at Dmm Qasr. 

Division of construction responsibility between the British and the 

Americans, assigned at higher levels, entailed overlapping which had 

to be ironed out on the spot through the co-operation of the British 

forces and the Iranian Mission. The earliest discussions in Washington 

had led to a general undertaking by the British to provide necessary 

and 10 enlisted men in the field. Colonel Lieber had arrived at Baghdad on 2 February 

with Prentis and Sells of Folspen. By late February there were about 26 officers, 2 warrant 

officers, and 18 enlisted Men divided between the mission headquarters at Baghdad, the 

mission field office at Marine House, Ashar, Basra, and the Iranian District engineer's 

headquarters at Umm Qasr. By 10 April, with the military numbers essentially the same and about equally divided between the mission and the district en~ineer, the number of 

civilians at the site of work was 192 with Folspen and 21 on the dlstrict engineer's staff. 

Ltr, Col Shingler to CG, SOS, 10 Apr 42, sub: Status of U. S. Mil Iranian Mission. 

PGF 26-A. (3) British Rpt, Persian Gulf Ports and Inland Transport Facilities and Organizations: Report on a Visit to Iraq and Persia, October 5th-November 2d, by R. S. Mactier, 

Basra, 1 Nov 41. PGF 26-A. (4) Memo, Col Gillies for Gen Wheeler, 17 Feb 42. Folder, 

Khor Abdullah Survey, SL X-ll,737. :n Charles H. Sells, Report of the Foreign Manager, 10 Mar 43. SWP Office. 

'" A memorandum from Colonel Lieber to the Iranian Mission field office, Basra, 16 February 1942, notes that the rail line from Umm Qasr to Rafadiyah Station was to. be built by British 

troop labor; but Foreign Directive 1 of 4 April to Folspen assigned the work to the American 

constructors. Unmarked folder, SL X-ll,737. For engineer directives to the constructor, 

see note 5 ( 3 ) . 
58 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

construction for the proposed American installations, an arrangement 

consistent with the provision of the President's Middle East Directive 

concerning division of financial responsibility. Under the directive, 

it was 

... contemplated that a major part of the cost of the proposed projects will be 

incurred in Sterling or local currencies and will be discharged by the British. 

Defense Aid funds should be used only to the extent of unavoidable dollar expenditures, such as for pay and allowances for American overhead and skilled 

mechanics, and materials to be procured in the United States. 

The record shows that in January it was understood in Washington 

that the British would accomplish construction, but that if any should 

have to be done by the Americans it would be handled by the Iranian 

District engineer. Under date of 21 January Washington asked General 

Wheeler to confirm that "construction for both personnel and equipment everywhere in your area will be handled by the British," to which 

he replied, on 17 February, "All houses, equipment and personnel for 

project, including truck [assembly], ordnance depots, and airplane 

assembly plants are to be built by British." He went on to report that, 

the War Office in London having recently raised the question of division of work and financial responsibility between American and British 

forces, it had been arranged that all local expense was to be borne 

by the British, who were also to prepare sites and construct shops and 

housing before the arrival of the Americans. The ambiguities in the 

arrangement were reflected in a further passage stating, "Americans 

will necessarily provide some housing of their own, shops and warehouses, and will furnish practically all materials and equipment for 

their projects." This understanding, he explained, was to assuage 

British fears "that all work should have to be done by them and that 

all we provided were technicians who would supervise complete running installations." General Wheeler's message paid warm tribute to 

the British: "Cooperation and assistance by British Headquarters, in 

all preparatory work, have been very cordial, both at Delhi and 

Iraq." 23 

Nevertheless, there stood the seventeen Nissen huts and the uninviting desert to greet the new arrivals. They soon learned that the 

23 (1) Ltr and Inds cited n. 9(3). Rad AMSIR 10, 21 Jan 42. MID 400.3295, 

1-21-42 (1-6-42). (3) Rad AMSIR BAG 19, 17 Feb 42. AG 400.3295 (2-17-42) MSC. 

Another copy NA 2051 (Iran DO) 4/1-S, NADEF. (4) A note of caution had been struck 

by an American air officer doing preliminary reconnaissance for Air Corps proposed installations in the Basra area. He is quoted in a quartermaster memorandum of 15 November 

1941 as saying, "There are no adequate living quarters at Basra worth mentioning and the 

Air Corps figures on going into this area 100 per cent independent." The memorandum 

suggests "that we depend on the British for nothing, despite any assurances to the contrary." 

Iran 43/3, NADEF. 
SIX MONTHS IN IRAQ 59 

British had troubles of their own and that, with them as with the 

Americans in those early days, plan was not always translat~d instantly 

into performance. The Americans therefore set to work to build, a 

process which led to some further on-the-spot adjustment of the general 

high-level arrangements for division of financial responsibility. It was 

held by some of the British that they were to attend to local procurement of labor and materials-in accordance with the general practice 

of the first year or so of the American effort-and that the Americans 

would act in this respect through established local channels. There 

was no clear understanding on the details of this point, which affected 

considerations of local currency and economic conditions. When, therefore, the British presented bills to the Iranian District engineer for 

certification and reimbursement in dollar exchange, convenience 

dictated occasional direct procurement by the Americans.24 

The serious delays experienced in unloading American materials 

and equipment from the first two ships were only partly attributable 

to absence of direct American controls over the operations at shipside. 

Cargo from the Siboney was got down to Umm Qasr by the end of 

February. When the City of Dalhart arrived, the district engineer 

learned with consternation that the crane which he had designated 

before he left New York to be carried as a deckload in order to speed 

discharge at Basra had been stowed by transportation experts at the 

port of embarkation in the very bowels of the ship and heaped over 

with loose wheat. Weeks were lost in unloading the City of Dalhart, 

delaying work on dock construction at Umm Qasr until 1 Apri1.25 

Meanwhile work continued on housing at Umm Qasr; but British 

construction at Shu'aiba and Rafadiyah languished. Colonel Lieber 

reported on 28 March: 

The British authorities are far behind expectations in providing housing for 

our administrative group at Shu'aiba and have just started the footers for the 

warehouse and shop at the Rafadiyah Yard where we are assembling vehicles in 

the open with occasional dust or sandstorms. I have been pressing this and finally 

got action by stating that I should have to trim off the Umm Qasr [housing and 

ordnance shop] projects to do the Rafadiyah and Shu'aiba construction.2/! 

All Change-New Priority 

On the shore by the Khor Abdullah, April started auspiciously. 

The sun and the desert wind, stirring up dust and sand, spurred the 

Americans at Umm Qasr to get on with their job before summer, the . 

.. Interv with Col Lieber, Pentagon, 10 Feb 49. ,. Ibid. 

'" Ltr, Col Lieber to Engr, NAD, 28 Mar 42. NA 2144 (Iran DO) I-A, NADEF. 
60 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

enemy, arrived. Plant and enough equipment to begin had been brought 

down from the ships at Basra. There were 3 pile rigs and 5 tractors, a 

grader, 3 shovels, 2 truck cranes, 2 concrete mixers, 8 air compressors, 

11 dump trucks, and 20 miscellaneous vehicles. In the first five days of 

work the wharf approach fill had been graded, the rigs set in place, and 

pile driving begun. There were materials enough at the site for housing 

the constructor's men and for about thirty-five hundred feet of wharf. 

Two more ships, the Texmar and the Granville, layoff Umm Qasr and 

the discharge of their cargoes of timber and piling was under way, 

made no easier by the fact that there was as yet no wharf.27 

Then, on the fifth day, suddenly and without previous intimation 

of what was impending, a message arrived from Washington: "Consideration is now being given to a revision of your projects. Suspend all 

operations on Umm Qasr project until further instructions." 28 

The order was received by the American command with surprise, by 

British headquarters at Baghdad with dismay. Uncertain as to its implications for the future, Colonel Shingler immediately stopped the unloading of the two ships, since reloading across the beach would be 

impossible should the timber and piling be required at other sites. On 7 

April Shingler told the Folspen officials that both the wharf and railway 

projects were to be abandoned. Messages flew to Washington and back. 

In a few days projects were resumed on the condition that only local 

materials be used. At this time Folspen was given the first hint that 

construction was to be militarized. On 10 April Washington confirmed 

that the Iraqi construction projects would be indefinitely suspended. 

Top priority had been shifted to the Iranian projects. On 17 April dock 

construction with local materials was stopped by oral order, confirmed 

in writing on the 25th. The highway construction from Shu'aiba to 

Margil was canceled on 9 May, and work on the railway from Umm 

Qasr to Rafadiyah Station stopped on 11 May. Meanwhile, the ordnance program for buildings at Umm Qasr and Baghdad had been canceled on 6 April. Only the technical assistance to the British assembly 

operations at the shops at Rafadiyah and Shu'aiba was to go on. Leav-

" Ltr cited n. 20 (2) . .. (1) Received at the site 5 April, the radio, No. 57, Somervell to Shingler, was dated 

4 April 1942. PGF 259. Another copy 323.61 Estab\jshment of Military Districts, Binder 1, 

SL 9008. (2) Other documents basic to the account of the suspension at Umm Qasr: RAD 

28, Gen George C. Marshall to Lt Gen Joseph W. Stilwell and Gen Wheeler, 3 Apr 42. 

PGF 259. Rad, Lt Col Maxwell W. Tracy, Chief, Home Office, Iranian Mission, to Col 

Shingler, 10 Apr 42. AG 323.61, Hq PGC (AG decimal files seen at Headquarters, Persian 

Gulf Command, Tehran, now filed at the Kansas City Records Center, AGO, Kansas City, 

Mo.). Ltr, Hq, Tenth Army to GHQ, MEF, 17 Apr 42. PGF 26-A. (3) Other dates in 

text are from Progress Review cited in n. 4. (4) Incidental information on the suspension 

supplied by interviews already cited. 
SIX MONTHS IN IRAQ 61 

ing a handful of men behind in Iraq, the Americans moved across the 

boundary to begin again in Iran. On 27 May the Iranian District engineer established his headquarters at Ahwaz, followed on 1 June by 

Folspen. Regretfully they refused British pleas that they leave their 

equipment behind for Tenth Army, which was to take over the Iraqi 

commitments in support of the British line of communications. 

Behind this sudden termination of the American construction projects in Iraq and the transfer of the engineer forces to Iran lay a fundamental change ir.. high policy. Whereas, following General Wheeler's 

conferences with General Wavell in India, the first weight of the American effort had been throvv'll into support of the British line of communications in Iraq, the emphasis was now shifted to the building up of 

the Persian Corridor supply line to the Soviet Union. During the early 

planning period before Pearl Harbor it had been expected that the 

Iranian Mission would be able to carry out both of these lend-lease 

functions. As the President put it in his report to Congress on the first 

year of lend-lease, the Iranian Mission was organized "to improve 

transport and communications in the area from Baghdad to Agra, 

India, and from Umm Qasr, Iraq, to Tehran, Iran, a region strategically important as a supply line to Russia and as a barrier on the 

road from the west to India." 29 But as this narrative has shown, the 

increased demands upon American resources after Pearl Harbor made 

it necessary for the Iranian Mission to do one thing at a time. The 

January decision to begin in Iraq followed. 

Nevertheless, even as the Iraqi projects got under way, the impelling need to strengthen aid to Russia was slowly but surely shaping 

the decisions which led to the shift to Iran. To recapitulate: first came 

the President's order of 28 December 1941 to the Secretary of War 

to meet the protocol commitments to Russia. Next was the President's 

inquiry of 16 January 1942 to the Chief of Staff as to the possible reinforcement of the two Middle East missions. Then came the War 

Department directive of 18 February on the militarization of overseas 

contract activities, looking forward to the time when service troops 

could undertake an increased program to move supplies to the Soviet 

Union. Next was the President's directive to Donald Nelson ordering 

top priority for the release of Russian-aid lend-lease materials, followed 

by the order to Admiral Land to give top priority to Russian-aid shipping. By early April preliminary plans to militarize the Iranian Mission 

called for the dispatch to the Corridor of large numbers of service 

troops in the latter part of the year, and these plans made urgent the 

.. Report to Congress on Lend·Lease Operations for Yea,. Ended March 11,1942, p. 30. 
62 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

preparation of housing and installations for their, use upon arrival. At 

the time of the suspension of American construction work in Iraq, General Somervell informed Colonel Shingler, "movement of materiel to 

Russia must be accorded top priority"; to achieve maximum movement Washington believed, as did London, that it would be essential 

to build up the capacity of the Iranian ports of Khorramshahr and 

Bandar Shahpur in order to make the best use of the ISR. 30 

The overriding urgency of stepping up aid to Russia was the basic 

reason for the sudden alteration in the priority of the Iranian Mission's 

tasks; but there was another factor, India. In accordance with early 

planning, General Wheeler's responsibilities had included projects for 

Karachi, Bombay, and Agra. In consequence he was frequently at New 

Delhi, leaving his chief of staff, Colonel Shingler, in charge at Baghdad 

headquarters.31 As it related to the Iranian Mission, the first problem 

of India for the American planners was the extent to which American 

bases of activity should be planted there and used for Middle East and 

Russian-aid supply; and the second, the problem of command, grew 

out of the first. 

In October 1941, in Washington, Maj. Gen. Richard C. Moore, 

Deputy Chief of Staff, discussed with Lt. Gen. H. C. B. Wemyss, of the 

British Joint Staff Mission, the extent to which the United States should 

route supplies for the Persian Corridor via India. Minutes of a conference held On 6 October at the War Plans Division, War Department, 

reveal some difference of opinion. The British view was that, pending 

the improvement of Persian Gulf ports, Indian ports should be used. 

The Americans were disinclined to commit themselves and, in a memorandum of 18 October for the Chief of Staff, observed that the use of 

India as a supply base might result in the damming up of the flow of 

American supplies to Iran because of "physical or military restrictions 

or both," and that if there should be such a stoppage, it should occur 

in "territory where United States authority predominates," whence 

material could be diverted elsewhere. The problem was the degree of 

control Americans could exercise over their lend-lease shipments 

through foreign lands. General Wheeler had at this time already been 

appointed chief of the Iranian Mission, his Letter of Instructions was 

.. (I) Rad AMSIR WASH 96, Somervell to Shingler, 10 Apr 42. 323.91 Ports, SL 

9008. (2) Some weeks before the stop order was received at Umm Qasr, Colonel Shingler, 

anticipating that general planning for militarization later in the year would require greatly 

increased housing, requested and received from General Wheeler authority to proceed to 

housing construction on the assumption that this sort of project lay beyond the scope of 

British construction commitments. Memo, Shingler for Wheeler, 21 Mar 42. 323.61 Establishment of Military Districts, Binder I, SL 9008. 11 Moved to Basra, 15 Mar 42. Memo, Col Shingler for Q-I, Hq, Tenth Army, Baghdad. 

File, Iranian Mission, SL X-Il,n7. 
SIX MONTHS IN IRAQ 63 

issued three days later, and he was soon to leave for Hawaii en route via 

New Delhi to Baghdad. The conferences at New Delhi seem to have 

clarified the problem. When General Wheeler reported to Washington during the talks with General Wavell in November, he accepted the 

British desire to use western Indian ports for Iranian shipments with no 

fears such as had been expressed previously in Washington. He strongly 

urged the use of Bombay and Karachi to take the strain from Basra, 

Bandar Shah pur, and Bushire. When the ordnance and quartermaster 

plans were added to other American plans to assist the British in the 

Middle East, India figured prominently as a site for installations.32 

In fact, India increasingly figured in American planning as a base 

not only for Persian Corridor and other Middle East needs, but also for 

lend-lease aid to India and, even more important, American Army 

requirements in the area. Because of uncertainty as to Japanese intentions in the Indian Ocean, Bombay and Karachi were more likely candidates than more exposed Indian ports. On 28 February 1942 the 

War Department, taking into consideration the supply needs of American and Chinese forces in China, India, and Burma, assigned General 

Wheeler to the command of a Services of Supply (SOS) organization 

for the American Army forces in the region. Wheeler was to continue 

as chief of the Iranian Mission.33 

By this time it was already apparent, from developments in J anuary, that the overland delivery route, Zahidan-Meshed, would not be 

acceptable to the Russians for lend-lease deliveries. Karachi, Bombay, and India itself were thus all but eliminated as points in the American supply line to Russia. The new Commanding General, Services 

of Supply, China-Burma-India, was therefore concerned not with 

Russian aid, but with supply for the CBI theater. After his arrival 

in India to take over his command, Wheeler informed Washington 

that in his opinion all proposed American installations in India should 

be under the "American commander in India, General Stilwell, including Iranian Mission projects .... " 34 The separation of the Iranian 

Mission's Persian Corridor activities from its Indian projects followed, 

accompanied by command rearrangements. 

On 3 April General Marshall by radio relieved Wheeler as chief of 

the Iranian Mission, detached India from the area included in that 

mission's responsibilities, continued Karachi nevertheless as a base for 

the two American Middle East missions, and instructed Wheeler to 

'" (1) Memo for CofS, 18 Oct 41, points 4, 5. Filed, with other documents alluded to, 

AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 8. (2) Msg cited n. 3 (2). 33 Rad AMSIR BAG 120, Gen Marshall to Gen Wheeler, 28 Feb 42. AG 381 (2-24·-

42) (2). 

"Rad AMSIR 61,7 Mar 42. AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 4. 
64 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

make further plans for Karachi and elsewhere solely on the basis of the 

requirements of SOS, CBI. The message added that Colonel Shingler 

would replace Wheeler as chief of mission. Next day, 4 April, General 

Somervell appointed Shingler chief and notified him that the Iranian 

Mission and its personnel were no longer under the Secretary of War 

but under his own SOS command.35 

The brief Iraqi episode, beset with the confusion that attends new 

and untried enterprises, ended upon a note of clear-cut decision. Henceforth, as the Americans established themselves in Iran, their strength 

was to be applied to an ever increasing assumption of that part of the 

British program in the Corridor which was concerned with aid to 

Russia . 

.. (1) Rads, 4, 3 Apr cited n. 28 ( 1 ), (2). (2) Control of the War Department's Overseas 

lend-lease missions passed, in the reorganization of March 1942, to Operations Division; 

but OPD agreed on 29 March to its being taken over by SOS. Memo, Maj Gen Dwight D. 

Eisenhower to Somervell, 29 Mar 42, sub: Conti of Missions. OPD 210.684, 3. Effective 

1 April, the Secretary of War transferred all such missions from OPD to SOS. On 9 April 

they were officially assigned to International Division (General Aurand, Director), formerly 

the Defense Aid Division, with the intention of combining all the separate home offices of 

missions into a single Missions Branch. Rpt by Home Office, U.S. Mil Mission to USSR, 

for period 5-25 Apr 42, SL X-ll,737. 
CHAPTER IV 

Interlude of the Mission 

to the USSR 

While the Iranian Mission was tackling its first assignment in Iraq, 

a second War Department mission was at large in the Persian Corridor. 

Conceived in logic, born in ambiguity, the U.S. Military Mission to 

the USSR 1 was doomed to the functionlessness of a fifth wheel on a 

cart. After six months, only three of them spent in the field, it expired in 

frustration. Its brief career is as much a part of the Russian-aid program as are the more successful efforts which followed it. 

Why and Where? 

Lend-lease to Great Britain involved not only the procurement and 

shipment of defense materials, but a permissive follow-through in 

certain instances on the part of the United States until the recipient 

was able to use the materials himself. In the case of complicated machines like tanks and aircraft, American technicians sometimes went 

along with shipments to British recipients and were as indispensable as 

the doctor's directions on a bottle of medicine. In Egypt American 

officers observed the performance of American materials, and American technicians organized the means for instructing the British in the 

operation and maintenance of unfamiliar American products. 

After the First (Moscow) Protocol of 1 October 1941 pledged 

specific quantities of American materials for Russian aid and a mission 

under Colonel Faymonville-representing the civilian-controlled 

Lend-Lease Administration-was established in Moscow, steps were 

taken to provide the same sort of accommodation for the Soviets in 

anticipation of the impending declaration (to come on 7 November) 

1 CalJed at first by various names; this designation became official by 3d Ind by TAG 

of 2 Dec 41 to Memo, USSR Mission Home Office for TAG, 18 Nov 41. Folder, U.S. Military 

Mission to USSR, SL X-ll,737. 
66 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

of USSR eligibility for lend-lease. The Air Force developed a plan to 

make available a detachment of officers, enlisted men, and civilians "to 

render technical advice and to supervise the maintenance of American 

aircraft" to be furnished the Soviets under lend-lease. The Ordnance 

Department proposed organizing "a group of civilian experts" under 

contract to Amtorg, Soviet-American trading company, to instruct 

the Russians in the care and maintenance of ordnance, especially tanks. 

Technicians were engaged and held in readiness late in October to 

depart, when word reached Washington that the Moscow government 

would issue no visas for them. Although Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt was assured by Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, Vice-Chairman, Council of 

Peoples' Commissars, that visas would be immediately telegraphed to 

Washington, they were not promptly forthcoming. The plan languished 

as the United States made clear that it did not insist on sending this sort 

of aid, its wish being to make technical assistance available only if 

desired. 2 

This reluctance to receive civilian technicians wi thin Soviet borders, 

prophetic of the rock in the stream of co-operation upon which the 

USSR Mission was later to founder, was making itself manifest just as 

that mission was being established by the designation on 28 October of 

Maj. Gen. John N. Greely as its chief.s The Maxwell and Wheeler 

missions, established under the provisions of the Middle East Directive, 

had been in existence for one month. The time lag in the organization 

of the Greely mission is explained on two grounds. First, the status of 

the Soviet Union relative to lend-lease was not yet fixed as was the 

status of Great Britain; and secondly, there was the Faymonville mission at Moscow. At the time that Colonel Faymonville was designated 

to remain in Moscow in charge of lend-lease matters, there was some 

War Department opinion in favor of replacing him by "the assignment 

of a Brigadier General to head that mission with a status similar to that 

of Generals Magruder, Maxwell, and Wheeler."" After a month's 

time, and with no alteration in the status of the Faymonville mission, 

the U.S. Military Mission to the USSR was established. It was logical 

to set up a War Department lend-lease mission for the USSR on the 

analogy of those created for Great Britain. It was ambiguous to do so 

2 (1) Memo, Lt Gen Henry H. Arnold for CofS, 27 Oct 41; Memo, Gen Crain for 

Defense Aid Dir, 27 Oct 41; and Memo, Gen Moore for CofS, 28 Oct 41. AG 400.3295 

(8-14-41) Sec 3. (2) Rad, Hopkins to Col Faymonville, 28 Oct 41, and other papers, 

cited MS Index to the Hopkins Papers, Vol. I, Bk. IV, Harriman·Beaverbrook Mission, 

p. 9, Items 37,38. 3 Bv oral instructions of CofS. See Ltr of Instructions, Secy War to Gen Greely, 5 Nov 41. 

AG 400.3295 (8-14-41) Sec 1. Another copy Folder, U.S. Military Mission to USSR, 

SLX-ll,737. • Memo, Gen Miles, G-2, for CofS, 30 Sep 41. AG 400.3295 (8-14-41) Sec 3. 
INTERLUDE OF THE MISSION TO THE USSR 67 

without settling the relationship between the new military mission and 

the existent civilian one. The new USSR Mission was ordered to proceed by an undesignated route to Kuybyshev, the auxiliary Russian 

capital some five hundred miles east of Moscow. On 19 November The 

New Yark Times reported that an American military mission was 

about to leave for Archangel. On that same day, having heard the 

news via a London broadcast, Colonel Faymonville addressed an inquiry to \Vashington: "With regard to mission of John Greely to North 

Russia, announced in London broadcast, information is requested as 

to duration, object and composition of said mission." To job seekers 

who wanted to go along, General Greely wrote that the publicity was 

"unauthorized and inexact." To Faymonville went a vague but reassuring reply and the promise that he would be kept informed. 5 

General Greely's Letter of Instructions defined his "principal function" as assurance of "the timely establishment and operation of supply, 

maintenance, and training facilities as required by present and contemplated Russian or other friendly operations within or based upon 

your area." The area was to be that controlled by the USSR with 

boundaries, for administrative purposes, to be settled in agreement 

with the chiefs of the China and Iranian Missions with notice to the 

Secretary of 'Var. In all other respects the authority and duties granted 

and enjoined were identical with those contained in General Wheeler's 

Letter of Instructions. 

Two points require stress. First, at the time of the formation of the 

USSR Mission its training and observation functions bulked large in 

the minds of the planners. Although published months after the situation had altered drastically, the President's report to the Congress on 

the first year of lend-lease described the early conception of the Greely 

mission. It read: 

Russian Mission: The major assignments of this mission will be to instruct 

Russia's soldiers in the characteristics of American-made weapons, and to decide 

by observation on the spot, supplemented by knowledge of our domestic problems, 

what types of aid we can best supply. Aside from what they can contribute to 

Russia's effort, the experience these officers will gain from their participation in the 

Russian campaign will be of priceless value to the general staff of our own Army.s 

Second, General Greely has recorded that it was first intended that 

his mission would enter Russia through Archangel, to which port, along 

with Murmansk, supplies for the Soviet Union were still flowing in 

1941. By the end of November, however, plans had crystallized suffi-

• (1) Rad, Col Faymonville to Gen Sidney Spalding, 19 Nov 41, with reply, 25 Nov 41. 

334.8 USSR, Intn Div, ASF NCF. (2) Private Ltrs. Folder, U.S. Military Mission to USSR, 

SLX-ll,737. • Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations for Year Ended March 11, 1942, p. 27. 
68 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

ciently for him to write that he expected to depart for Iran, going 

thence into the Soviet Union. T These two points, the purpose of the 

mission as an operating entity and its admission into Russia, were to 

loom large during the ensuing five months. Purpose and destination 

were separate but interacting problems. Both were affected, during the 

period when effort was made to solve them, by the fact of the mission's 

creation by analogy with other War Department lend-lease missions 

in spite of the existence of the civilian mission in Russia. The interaction 

of all forces made for ambiguity. The cloudy vagueness grew yet more 

cloudy after the decision to go to the USSR via Iran. Would there be 

room in the Corridor for two military missions with overlapping powers 

and duties? Under the circumstances, what were Greely's duties? 

Fifth Wheel 

In requesting the Secretary of War for twelve officers and twelve 

enlisted men for foreign service and five officers to staff the home office 

in Washington, Greely described the primary duty of the mission as 

supervisory. His staff as approved for overseas duty included, besides 

Col. John N. Hauser, chief of staff, an executive officer, an adjutant, 

an interpreter; and quartermaster, finance, air, medical, ordnance, and 

signals officers. At the first staff meeting, held in Washington on 3 December, it was brought out that General Greely planned to fly to Basra 

in January. Discussion of the change in destination of cargoes, formerly 

intended for Archangel and now awaiting ships for Basra, indicated 

that the USSR Mission's home office, which gathered information on 

Soviet needs and how to meet them, was occupied with the procurement and shipping aspects of the Letter of Instructions. The supervisory 

duties, regarded at the beginning by Greely as primary, would fall 

within the shipping and delivery aspects of the lend-lea~e process. 

But inasmuch as late November planning by the USSR Mission definitely envisaged a stay of uncertain duration in Iran en route to the 

USSR, supervision of the delivery of tanks, planes, and other materials 

of war within the Persian Corridor immediately raised the question of 

division of labor between the Greely and Wheeler missions. To be sure, 

General Wheeler's primary function at the start was construction; but 

by his Letter of Instructions he was as deeply involved in all other 

stages of the delivery process as was Greely. The engineer report drawn 

7 (1) John N. Greely, Rpt of the U.S. Military Mission to the USSR, 1941-42, with 

attachments, 11 May 42. 334.8 USSR, Intn Div, ASF NCF. (Cited hereafter as Final Rpt.) 

(2) Ltr, Gen Greely to Col Walter M. Robertson. 27 Nov 41. Folder. U.S. Military Mission 

to USSR, SL X-ll,737. 
INTERLUDE OF THE MISSION TO THE USSR 69 

up in Washington in late November attempted to distinguish between 

Wheeler's sole control of all War Department operations in the theater 

based on the Persian Gulf including supervision of direct deliveries of 

war materials in Iraq and Iran, and Greely's responsibility for delivery 

to Russia. But it was a distinction without a difference. The two functions were virtually identica1. 8 

More serious even was the inadequate realization in Washington at 

this time of what the word delivery meant in actual practice in the 

field. If it meant assembly of aircraft and motor vehicles and their dispatch from the assembly plants to near-by or remote Soviet receiving 

points by a variety of means of transport, then General \Vheeler's mission was clearly responsible for this aspect of the lend-lease delivery 

process. If, on the other hand, planners in Washington thought of 

delivery as the movement and transportation of cargoes within the 

Persian Corridor, then the British Army was clearly responsible, and 

all any American could do was to advise and assist, which was just 

what General Wheeler was already doing. 

General Greely was aware of the potential overlap of two missions 

in one area. It is not clear what Washington thought delivery meant. At 

all events, Greely saw no reason to unfold American uncertainties to 

the Russians. He therefore suggested that the War Department inform 

Maxim M. Litvinov, Soviet Ambassador at Washington, as follows: 

In order to comply with delivery of supplies to the USSR under the Protocol, 

a U.S. Military Mission is operating in Iran to develop lines of supply from the 

head of the Persian Gulf. 

In addition a small military Mission of about 25 including 10 officers and 

headed by Major General John N. Greely is leaving shortly for Iran with the 

principal responsibility of furthering delivery of military materiel to the USSR 

along this route. General Greely's Mission will naturally operate through the 

Iranian Mission and British authorities in that area. The United States Government would like to be informed by the Government of the USSR as to which of 

its representatives in Iran it would be most advantageous for General Greely to 

contact, in order to best meet this responsibility. 

It would certainly be advantageous for some or all of General Greely's Mission 

to be furnished with visas for the USSR prior to departure from this country, 

in order to facilitate communication with the Embassy of the United States in 

the USSR. In case any objection exists to this procedure, it is desired that the 

• (I) Ltr, Gen Greely to Secy 'Var, 6 Nov 41. 200 Personnel General, USSR, Intn Div, 

ASF NCF. (2) Data on personnel allotments and strength are in other papers in this file. 

See also 334.8 USSR, Intn Div, ASF NCF; Folder, U.S. Military Mission to USSR, 

SL X-11,737; and Rpt, Chief, Home Office, to Defense Aid Dir, 22 Jan 42,320 Mis Br, 

Intn Div, ASF NCF. The strength of the mission fluctuated within narrow limits close to 

the original request. At termination there were 12 officers and 14 warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men overseas. (3) 300.6 USSR, Intn Div, ASF NCF. 

(4) 319.1 Rpts Home Office to Mission USSR, Intn Div, ASF NCF. (5) Memo, signed 

by Capt Paul F. Yount, 24 Nov 41, sub: Rpt on Cons Needs. Iran 2/8, NADEF. 
70 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

representative of the USSR in Iran be directed to furnish visas to the personnel 

of General Greely's Mission if and when it appears desirable.9 

Here, along with a clear statement of the paramount responsibilities 

of the British and their auxiliary, the Iranian Mission, was a declaration of the USSR Mission's "principal responsibility of furthering 

delivery" through the Persian Corridor. Here also was an intimation, 

delicately cushioned, tha.t the USSR Mission, which had, after alL 

been established by the War Department for the express purpose of 

operating from Soviet soil, would like visas for "some or all" of its 

members "if and when it appears desirable," preferably before the 

mission left the United States, if not, upon arrival in Tehran. 

There is no discoverable record that the War Department sent 

General Greely's information and request to the Soviet Ambassador 

at Washington; but Greely himself did shortly afterward call upon 

Mr. Litvinov and came away, as he wrote General Moore, with that 

official's "agreement . . . to make contact with the Ambassador of 

the USSR at Tehran." 10 Four months later Greely recalled that 

Litvinov "agreed to notify the Ambassador of the USSR in Iran" that 

the Americans, recognizing the reluctance of the Russians to admit 

technicians capable of assembling and operating lend-lease goods at 

the northern Russian ports, had decided. to send a mission to Iran to 

carry on further negotiations from there." The upshot of the conversation between the general and the ambassador was an assurance to the 

Department of State by the War Department that the Greely mission 

would proceed to Russia, and a message sent at Greely's request to the 

United States military attache at Tehran stating that Greely would 

establish headquarters "probably" at Tehran "to facilitate delivery of 

materiel to USSR authorities at that point." 12 Here was optimism tempered by realism. The optimism would have been less had it been 

realized at the time, as it was later, that Ambassador Litvinov did not 

regard General Greely's call upon him as formal notification by the 

government of the United States to the government of the USSR of 

• Memo, Gen Greely for Gen Bums, Div of Defense Aid Rpts, 4 Dec 41. Folder, U.S. 

Military Mission to USSR, SL X-ll,737. Other copies AG 400.3295 (8-14-41) Sec 1; 

and 336 USSR, Intn Div, ASF NCF. 

'0 Memo, Gen Greely for Gen Moore, DCofS, 12 Jan 42. 334.8 USSR, lntn Div, 

ASF NCF. 

11 Final Rpt. 12 (1) See Memo reviewing history of mission, prepared for CofS by Gen Eisenhower, 

ACofS, OPD, 25 Mar 42. 334.8 USSR, lntn Div, ASF NCF. (2) Rad 29 to U.S. MA, 

Tehran, 7 Jan 42. MID 400.32951-7-42 (1-6-42). (3) Optimism as to ability of the mission 

to obtain entry into the USSR reached its height in a report prepared by Assistant Secretary 

of War McCloy for the Lend-Lease Administration, 20 February 1942, stating that the 

USSR Mission's "foreign component has only recently landed in Russia." Rpts, Defense 

Aid Papers, Drawer 1, Cabinet 67, Intn Div, ASF CCF (Current Classified Files). 
American intention to dispatch a military mission to the Soviet Union. 

Until such notice was formally served upon it, the Soviet Government 

would take no steps to provide entrance visas. Indeed it is doubtful 

if the Department of State would have regarded the call as anything 

but a personal courtesy.13 

With the question of admittance of the mission into Soviet territory 

still open, General Greely now completed his preparations for departure. One officer and eleven enlisted men had already sailed on 

the Siboney for Basra, and Greely with six officers departed by air from 

Miami for Cairo on 19 January. Just before his departure, Greely 

presented the Deputy Chief of Staff with his immediate plan of 

operation. Because General Wheeler’s mission was located at Baghdad, 

Greely would establish his headquarters at Tehran, would spread his 

personnel out over the line of delivery from the Gulf ports northward, 

and would proceed to get deliveries to the USSR under control first 

in the south, then in the north, and finally inside the USSR.14

After stopping in Cairo for conferences with Generals Maxwell 

and Adler and British officials from 27 to 31 January, Greely proceeded 

on the 31st to Basra. En route, at Habbaniya, he found the commander 

of the Royal Air Force in Iraq, Air Vice-Marshal Sir John H. d’Albiac, 

desirous that delivery of American planes assembled in the Basra area 

be effected by the United States, inasmuch as it was undesirable, from 

the British point of view, to billet a sufficient number of Soviet pilots 

in Basra to make their own deliveries, and there were not enough 

British pilots available.15 His conferences at Cairo and Habbaniya had 

convinced Greely that “since the Iranian Mission had in hand supply 

to the USSR in that area, General Greely’s mission would not interfere 

with this local activity, but would enter the USSR as promptly as 

possible and concern itself with supply and kindred activities to that 

nation as a whole.”16 

Promptly after his arrival in Tehran on 4 February, Greely called 

upon Andrei A. Smirnov, the Soviet Ambassador. On the 6th he dispatched a letter to him, stating that Greely’s first duty had been “to 

assist in sending military matériel from the United States to the Union 

of the Soviet Socialist Republics. I came to Iran to observe passage of 

13 

Washington, and Loy W. Henderson, Asst Chief, Div of European Affairs, Dept State, 

Memo of conversation between Andrei A. Gromyko, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy, 

26 Feb 42, atchd to Memo cited n. 12 (1). 

(1) Itinerary Rpt, USSR Mission. 319.1 Progress Rpts USSR, Intn Div, ASF NCP. 

(2) Memo cited n. 10. 

15 (1) Min, Stf Mtg at Cairo, 27 Jan 42. Maxwell Papers. (2) Rad Wheeler to Moore, 

4 Feb 42. AG 371 (12–17–41) Sec 2. (3) Rpt cited n. 14(1). 

Final Rpt. 
72 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

such materiel through Iran, but responsibility for passage through this 

area remains with General Wheeler. I was advised by your Ambassador 

in the United States, Mr. Litvinov, to contact you to determine future 

action." 17 The letter explained that in the view of the United States 

it would be advantageous to both countries if Greely's mission could 

observe, and assist in, the use of lend-lease materials, and requested 

Smirnov to issue visas "for my Mission of eleven officers and thirteen 

non-commissioned officers." A copy of this letter was transmitted to 

General Moore with the request that he ask Litvinov to approve the 

letter in order "to make sure of quick action." 18 

Ten days later, in a dispatch to \Vashington, Greely raised the 

question as to whether his mission should go to Russia after all. His 

message follows: 

On receiving your decision, urgently requested, as to whether threatening 

situation in Middle East alters desirability my Mission's proceeding to Russia, 1 can 

and will to my best judgment issue all orders required, advising you if emergency 

demands. Ambassador of USSR in Tehran should be instructed make all arrangements for entry, including visas, if Mission is to proceed to Russia. Otherwise, since 

it would be foolish to intrude on Wheeler who has in hand transfer of supplies to 

Russia in this region, my Mission should be used somewhere else-in my opinion, 

at nearest point where American troops are to be sent: if in Middle East, which 

I believe needs rear installations far less than divisions, my headquarters should be 

Cairo to make plans for employing troops there and for coordinating Maxwell 

and Wheeler missions; if no American troops are to be employed in Middle East, 

I recommend we move to Far East, to Australia first, presumably, to join troops 

there. Threat to entire position in Middle East within 60 days seem likely to me.19 

Command and Conflict 

There were now three problems to be untangled: the question of 

entrance into the USSR; the definition of the purposes of the USSR 

Mission; and, the inevitable corollary of the second, the question of 

command relationships among the Americans. All three were thrown 

squarely into Washington's lap. Yet, until the Russians resolved the 

first, Washington could do nothing about the second; while the third, 

involving General Wheeler's late February appointment to General 

Stilwell's staff in India, depended upon changes in the status of the 

Iranian Mission, recounted in the previous chapter, which culminated 

17 (1) Memo, cited n. 12 (1). (2) Ltr, Gen Greely to Andrei Smirnov, 6 Feb 42, 

atched to Final Rpt. A transcript in PGF 261. 

"Rad 9 AMRUS 2, Greely to MILID Washington, 6 Feb 42. PGF 261. ,. (1) Rad AMRUS 4 to MILID Washington (Gen Greely to Gen Moore), 16 Feb 42. 

Folder, U.S. Military Mission to USSR, SL X-ll,737. (2) See also Memo, Maj Willet 

J. Baird, Chief, Home Office, USSR Mission, for Gen Moore, 27 Feb 42. 334.8 USSR, 

Intn Div, ASF NCF. 
INTERLUDE OF THE MISSION TO THE USSR 73 

in Colonel Shingler's succession to the command of that mission on 

4 April. 

Sensing that the continuing Soviet inaction in the matter of the 

visas indicated an indefinite stay for the USSR Mission in Iran, General Greely on 9 March suggested to Washington that he absorb 

Wheeler's functions for Iran, leaving Iraq to Wheeler, and that Greely 

take over shipments to Russia from the south while Faymonville 

handled them from the north.20 Numerous similar suggestions followed 

throughout March, accompanied by a steady stream of reports to 

Washington on the functioning of the Wheeler mission. 

The Iranian Mission, in addition to its responsibilities for engineering construction works, furnished the British technical advice and 

assistance in the assembly of motor vehicles and aircraft at plants in 

the Basra area and at Bushire. There were also the unloading of ships 

and the movement of their cargoes by inland transport. General 

Wheeler found himself forced to serve the needs of both the British 

and the Russians. Into this complicated three-cornered situation 

General Greely threw himself with enthusiasm. His officers explored 

the supply routes, south, north, and east, all the way to the port of 

Pahlevi on the Caspian Sea.21 When the Soviet Ambassador at Tehran 

complained to Greely that "more than 1,000 trucks, enough to move 

two divisions," were lying in crates scattered in the fields around Andimeshk, Greely dispatched a party which reported on 29 March that it 

was true. 22 Delays in British construction at Andimeshk had held up 

the commencement of assembly operations there by General Motors 

until 26 March. General Greely also reported to Washington on port 

operations, the matter about which Ambassador Bullitt had questioned 

General \'\Theeler in January. He felt that the small deliveries via the 

Gulf ports, of which the Russians were complaining, were attributable 

to British commercial agents. The "necessity of dealing with the British 

in general" was cited in a later message as impeding aid to Russia. 

Greely reported that he agreed with the Soviets that "logically" they 

should take delivery direct at the ports without Anglo-American intervention. He concluded, "International politics seem to forbid this." 23 

The dissatisfaction of the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Trade over the 

"unsatisfactory condition of trucks which arrive through Bushire under 

,. Rad, Gen Greely to G-2, Washington, 9 Mar 42. AG 400.3295 (8-14--41) Sec 1. 

:n File, Reconnaissance Trips, passim, SL X-ll,737. 22 (l) Rad AMRUS 13, Greely to Washington, 21 Mar 42. AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) 

Sec 4. (2) Rpt by Maj Addison V. Dishman, 29 Mar 42, atchd to Weekly Rpt 6 of Col 

Hauser, CofS, USSR Mission. 319.1 USSR, Intn Div, ASF NCF. 23 (1) Rad AMRUS 9, Tehran to Washington, 12 Mar 42. AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) 

Sec 4. (2) Rad cited n. 22(1). 
i4 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

British supervision and [are] delivered to the Russians at Tehran" was 

relayed to Greely from Faymonville via the USSR Mission's home office 

in Washington. 2-1 A report to Washington from the USSR Mission noted 

friction between Russians and Americans at Basra over trucks, of 

which the Soviets had rejected forty out of two hundred delivered:5 

The severity of Soviet inspections of American materials caused a 

good deal of friction which in one instance was referred to higher levels. 

On 16 February there arrived at Basra a Russian mission-headed by 

Ivan S. Karmilitsin, Chief of Engineering, Division of Peoples' Commissariat of Foreign Trade-with the purpose of testing for acceptance 

seventy-seven twin-motored light Boston bombers and arranging for 

their delivery to the USSR. On 28 February General Faymonville informed Mr. Stettinius, at lend-lease headquarters, Washington, that 

"one Mr. Gillis, allegedly an American who is understood here to be 

an assistant to General Wheeler," had considered as insufficient the 

credentials of Mr. Karmilitsin.26 As the "Mr. Gillis" was Lt. Col. 

John A. Gillies, commanding Wheeler's field headquarters at Basra, 

The Adjutant General ordered General Greely to investigate and 

report. On 10 March Greely Drdered his chief of staff, Colonel Hauser, 

to proceed to Basra, adding, "Advise General Wheeler en route if 

you contact him." 27 

The planes, designed for the British, to be rearmed by them, and 

diverted by high-level agreement to the Russians, were to be delivered 

by the Americans. The affair, complicated by misinformation and misunderstanding, produced in Hauser's report recommendations which 

met as far as possible every demand of the Russians and which contributed to better co-ordination of the activities of the USSR and 

Iranian Missions. By an unhappy irony, on the very date of General 

Faymonville's cable, Colonel Gillies and Mr. Karmilitsin perished together in a Soviet plane accident.28 

The report and attached papers show the Russians to have been 

captious and overexacting about living quarters and the supply of 

quinine assigned to them. On the other hand, they also show that the 

military and civilian members of the Soviet mission proved to be 

highly qualified and hard working, technically well informed, and 

.. Rad AMRUS 22, Col Baird to Gen Greely, 1 Apr 42. AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 4 . •• Progress Rpt, 16 Mar 42.319.1 USSR, Intn Div, ASF NCF . 

.. Rad, Faymonville to Stettinius, 28 Feb 42. 336 USSR, Intn Div, ASF NCF. :n (1) Rad AMRUS 11 Washington, TAG to Amlegation Tehran, 8 Mar 42, ordering 

a report and requiring extension of "all courtesies necessary to assure friendly relations in 

the future .... " 333 USSR, Intn Div, ASF NCF. (2) Gredy's order of 10 Mar 42 filed with 

Col Hauser's Rpt to Chief, USSR Mission, 16 Mar 42. Folder, Hauser Investigation, SL 

X-I 1,737. 

28 Rad AMSIR 64, 7 Mar 42. AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 1. 
INTERLUDE OF THE MISSION TO THE USSR 75 

fair in their demands concerning the condition and equipment of 

delivered aircraft. Assembly at Shu'aiba they had found not too efficient, nor the condition of the aircraft uniformly satisfactory. The 

Americans had combined a large degree of obligingness with some 

show of condescension, and there had been a clash of personalities. 

Colonel Hauser recommended no formal finding, owing to the death 

of the principals. His suggestions were happily accepted on the Soviet 

side and promptly applied on the Anglo-American. 

The Hauser report was perhaps the most constructive act of the 

USSR Mission; but as a report by one American mission on the work 

of another American mission in the same area with similar responsibilities, it was evidence of confusion in the command relationship. 

Accordingly, Greely pursued the question of command. On the date, 

16 March, of the submission to him of the Hauser report, Greely cabled 

Washington: 

Now convinced I must keep officers at assembly plants erected or controlled 

by Wheeler. This should include Abadan plant [for aircraft assembly]. To have 

it controlled from Cairo would mean impossible complications. Senior officer in 

each area [North Africa, Iran] must co-ordinate all activities therein. Have asked 

Wheeler to come here [Tehran] on return from India with recommendations for 

future action. No criticism of him personally intended. In case he not return I 

recommend that Hauser be promoted and placed in command of all activities 

in Iran on basis that supply to USSR is most immediately important.29 

On 21 March Greely asked the War Department whether Wheeler, 

who had gone to India on the 7th, was to return to Basra. If so, Greely 

would arrange with Wheeler for improving the situation; if not, Greely 

announced that he would assume command of the Iranian Mission, 

subject to War Department confirmation, leaving Colonel Hauser "in 

charge" of unspecified duties, presumably those of the USSR Mission. 

On 27 March Greely cabled Maj. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower at 

Operations Division, Washington, that he was expecting General 

Wheeler's views to be submitted immediately. On 2 April General 

Greely again proposed himself to command the Iranian Mission.so 

This proposal was supported in the War Department by Brig. Gen. 

Henry S. Aurand, Director, International Division, SOS, with the 

concurrence of General Somervell and Brig. Gen. Robert W. Crawford, 

General Eisenhower's deputy in OPD:'ll On 2 April General Wheeler 

.. Rad AMRUS 11, Greely to Washington, 16 Mar 42. AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 4 . .. (I) Rad ci ted n. 22 (1). (2) Referred to by Rad, Gen Wheeler to Gen Somervell, 

2 Apr 42.323.61 Establishment of Military Districts, Binder 1, SL 9008. (3) Rad AMRUS 

19, 2 Apr 42. AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 4. Another copy Mis Br, Intn Div, ASF NCF. 

" (1) Memo, Gen Aurand for Maj David Wainhouse, 31 Mar 42. OPD 210.684 Iran, 36. 

(2) Memo, Lt Col Thomas S. Timberman for Chief, Theater Group, 4 Apr 42, sub: 

Status of Missions. OPD 210.634, 2. (3) At a meeting in Washington on 31 March 1942 
76 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

sent General Somervell at Washington his view that Colonel Shingler 

should carryon for the Iranian Mission and that the program outlined 

to General Moore was being followed, with various concessions to the 

Russians, "even though extra expense or delay were involved. Relations between British and Russians did not favor expeditious handling 

of supplies and frequently required American co-ordination." S2 

Wheeler continued: 

Colonel Shingler has high executive ability, energy, tact and professional qualifications. We have planned all details together since organization of the Mission 

and I have confidence in his judgment and actions during my absence and assume 

full responsibility therefor. I shall visit the area from time to time as soon as 

certain projects are under way in India. All Mission projects can be handled more 

expeditiously from India than from Russia because of port, ordnance, vehicle 

assembly and command co-ordination. 

Meanwhile the USSR Mission's home office had been reporting 

that Greely was considered the number one man in the area and that 

highly secret information in Washington was going about to the effect 

that General Greely might "assume command of the entire area which 

would include the Iranian Mission. . . . Everyone here believes that 

you are doing the best job that has been done to date in the Far East 

[sic] in co-ordinating activities in the Persian Gulf up to Tehran and 

from there further north and feels that our Mission is indispensable." 33 

The interest of the North African Mission in some of the responsibilities of the Iranian Mission added a stimulus for Greely's proposal 

of 2 Apr,il. On 1 April he received from his home office a report that 

Colonel Miles, North African Mission ordnance officer, who was also 

acting ordnance officer for the Iranian Mission, had arrived at Washington with a "strong plea to authorities for Maxwell to control both 

Iran and Iraq areas. As British control area, nothing can be done 

without their authority. Miles stated his belief that Maxwell can better 

control situation at Cairo." 34 

in which representatives of SOS and the Middle East missions conferred, Colonel Miles 

stated that OPD had prepared a directive relieving Wheeler of his Iranian Mission command to free him to take over Indian assignments, especially the Karachi base. Colonel 

Miles added that General Somervell wished Wheeler to continue both of his assignments. 

This testimony conflicts with the concurrence, just cited, of Somervell with Aurand's approval 

of Greely to succeed Wheeler in the Iranian command. Mf"mo, Melvin Sims for Lt Col 

Laurence K. Ladue, 31 Mar 42. Contl Div ASF, HRS DRB AGO . 

.. Rad cited n. 30 (2). 33 Rpt, Home Office to USSR Mission, 22 Mar-4 Apr 42. Folder, Weekly Home Office 

Reports from U.S. Military Mission to USSR, SL X-ll,737. Another copy 319.1 Rpts 

Home Office to Mission, Intn Div, ASF NCF. 

"Rad cited n. 24. Colonel Baird reported that General Maxwell had lately sent to 

Washington a "lengthy cable with respect to requirement for remedial action on delivery 

of airplanes to Russians and conditions at Basra." Rad AMRUS 27, 19 Apr 42. AG 400.3295 

(8-9-41) Sec 4. Maxwell stated to his staff on 9 March that since Wheeler commanded 

Stilwell's SOS in India, Maxwell should take over all Iraq and Iran, handling all lend-lease 
INTERLUDE OF THE MISSION TO THE USSR 77 

The Chief of Staff's solution of the command problem-the appointment of Colonel Shingler to succeed General Wheeler as chief of 

the Iranian Mission-was communicated to General Greely on 7 

Apri1.35 But there were still two American military missions in the 

Persian Corridor, and the USSR Mission had not yet received its 

visas for the Soviet Union. If the problem of command was temporarily 

set at rest, there yet remained the questions of what the USSR Mission 

was to do and where it was to do it. 

Russia Unvisited 

General Greely's Letter of Instructions ordered his mission to proceed to Kuybyshev. His call upon Ambassador Smirnov in February, 

his letter to that dignitary, and his appeals to Washington for help, had 

failed to advance the USSR Mission on the road to Russia. On 11 

March Greely tried another tack. He ordered his signals officer, Capt. 

Carl J. Dougovito, to proceed to Kuybyshev, having obtained for him a 

diplomatic visa as a courier for the Department of State. Captain 

Dougovito was instructed to urge the American diplomatic representatives in the USSR to apply to the Soviet Government to issue the visas 

necessary if the mission was to carry out its War Department instructions. Captain Dougovito was supplied with a copy of General 

Greely's Letter of Instructions and was told to be guided by it in 

discussing the purposes of the mission and to proceed on the assumption that the USSR would admit the mission.3

£ Dougovito remained 

in Russia from 13 March to 2 June. His report was submitted more 

than a month after the USSR Mission had been terminated. It indicated that it had not been possible to enlist the aid of the American 

diplomatic representatives. The U.S. Minister at Kuybyshev, Walter 

Thurston, felt, Dougovito reported, "that the objectives listed in the 

memorandum from General Greely could not be accomplished, and 

that our efforts would be ineffectual if we did enter the Soviet Union." 

In Dougovito's opinion General Faymonville was "apparently accomplishing his objective." 37 

In Dougovito's absence, General Greely continued his efforts from 

Tehran. He told Washington that Soviet Ambassador Smirnov had 

needed for the British Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Armies under General Auchinleck's command. 

Min, Stf Mtg at Cairo, 9 Mar 42. Maxwell Papers. 

'" Rad 84 to Greely, 7 Apr 42. AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 4 . .. Memo, Gen Greely for Capt Dougovito, 11 Mar 42, sub: Instructions on Entering 

the USSR. Folder, Unnumbered Memorandums U.S. Military Mission to the USSR, SL 

X-ll,737. 87 Rpt to Home Office, USSR Mission, 12 Jun 42. 334.8 USSR, Intn Div, ASF NCF. 
78 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

been authorized to issue visas for Greely and two others and that Greely 

hoped to fly to Russia in two weeks.3s It should be observed that in this 

entire affair Moscow never refused to grant temporary visas for individuals or groups of individuals, members of the mission, to make short 

visits. It was permanent entry for the mission as a whole that was found 

objectionable.39 On '21 March Greely again wrote Ambassador Smirnov 

to tell him that the Chief of Staff, Gen. George C. Marshall, believed 

that the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs intended to issue visas 

to Greely "and party." The visas now issued for Greely and two others 

were sufficient, the letter continued, for the present; but "my government" is under the impression that twenty-one more will be authorized. 

"It will possibly be desirable for me," General Greely wrote, "to have 

some of this personnel join me in Moscow later"; and, "It would seem 

best to clear up what seems to be a misunderstanding in order to prevent delay in the future." 40 

While awaiting a reply to this announcement of intention to proceed 

to Russia in expectation of later arrival of the rest of his mission, General Greely tried to hop a ride to Moscow which was refused, and 

refused a lift which was offered. In the first instance the plane was 

one carrying the new American Ambassador to the USSR, Admiral 

Standley; but fhe admiral, while disclaiming any authority over the 

USSR Mission, declined to permit Greely to board his plane, insisting 

that to do so might, in the absence of a clearly expressed desire for the 

mission on the part of the Soviet Government, make the admiral appear 

to sponsor the mission. At this point, the Soviets offered General Greely 

flight in one of their planes. Greely declined, and decided not to budge 

until the War Department, which had ordered him to proceed to 

Russia, could resolve the matter with the Department of State.41 

Greely's mild and unhurried letter to Smirnov was counterbalanced 

by an urgent appeal to the War Department to enlist the good offices 

of the Department of State in requesting Ambassador Smirnov to 

issue twenty-one additional visas. The Secretary of War promptly 

complied with a letter to the Secretary of State summarizing Greely's 

Letter of Instructions and suggesting that the Soviet Government be 

formally requested to admit within its borders eleven officers and 

fourteen enlisted men of the USSR Mission.42 

"(I) Rad cited n. 29. (2) Rad, Greely to Washington, 17 Mar 42. 334.8 USSR, 

Intn Div, ASF NCF . .. Memo cited n. 19(2} . •• Ltr, Gen Greely to Smirnov, 21 Mar 42. Folder, Greely, John N., Orders and Instructions, SL X-l1,737. ft Final Rpt . ., (I) Rad cited n. 22(1). (2) Ltr, Secy War to Secy State, 30 Mar 42. AG 400.3295 

(8-14--41 ) Sec 1. 
INTERLUDE OF THE MISSION TO THE USSR 79 

General Fayrnonville now informed the Lend-Lease Administration 

in Washington that General Greely had requested that Captain Dougovito, who was admitted into the Soviet Union as a State Department 

courier, be transmogrified into a military attache and added to Faymonville's staff. As it was necessary to request Soviet approval of this alteration in Dougovito's status, the American Embassy was requested by 

Fayrnonville to make suitable representations!3 If in some quarters the 

change in Dougovito's status was looked upon as a minor infiltration 

and in others as illustrating that there are more ways than one to skin 

a cat, it provided off-stage noises while Ambassador Standley, at the 

request of Sumner Welles, considered the question of visas for the 

USSR Mission. 

Admiral Standley sent in his opinion on 18 April and it was adverse.44 He advised the Department of State that there was a British 

military mission in Russia, but that the Americans executed similar 

functions through their military attache and their lend-lease mission 

under General Fayrnonville. He noted that "the Soviet has not, with 

minor exceptions, taken any advantage of the repeated offers made by 

General FaYIDonville of the services of technicians and of any other 

help which might be needed," thus calling attention to Soviet reluctance to agree to that part of General Greely's Letter of Instructions 

which authorized American assistance to the Soviet Union in training 

Soviet personnel in maintenance and use of American-made materiel, 

equipment, and munitions. Other provisions of that letter seemed to 

Ambassador Standley to raise obstacles to smooth operations because 

of potentially overlapping responsibilities. The authority given to the 

chief of the USSR Mission to control all military personnel in his area 

would, the ambassador noted, enable Greely to "embody in his office 

the Military Attache or the functions of the Military Attache," functions associated with the office of the ambassador, Furthermore, the 

Letter of Instructions issued by the ""Var Department stipulated that 

the chief of the USSR Mission would inform American diplomatic 

representatives in his area of such matters as seemed to him appropriate; and this provision, the ambassador wrote, would render Greely 

wholly independent as to informing the ambassador of mission activities within the Soviet Union. Admiral Standley did not therefore 

discuss the matter of visas for the Greely mission with the Soviet 

Commissariat of Foreign Affairs . 

.. See Rad, Gen Faymonville to Thomas B. McCabe, Actg Lend-Lease Administrator, 

6 Apr 42. Folder, Weekly Home Office Reports from U.S. Military Mission to USSR, SL 

X-ll,7S7 . .. Rad, Admiral Standley to Dept State, 18 Apr 42, atchd to Ltr, Under Seey Welles 

to Secy War, 22 Apr 42. AG 400.3295 (8-14-41) See 1. 
80 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

General Greely's home office relayed him an account of Standley's 

views, noted that General Aurand was urging the Department of State 

to clarify the situation, and concluded that it was generally felt that 

Greely should establish himself in Tehran and operate from there.4S 

But events failed to confirm the home office's information, just as they 

had similarly contradicted its intimations as to command a few weeks 

earlier. Although the War Department was willing to give up the 

effort to put the mission into Russia and to leave it in the Corridor 

along with the Iranian Mission, the Department of State saw the 

mission as a closed book. On 1 May Cordell Hull telephoned Henry L. 

Stimson and asked him to get the Greely mission out of Tehran forthwith. Mr. Stimson said he would. There was nothing further to do 

except to send a letter from the Secretary of War to General Greely 

revoking the Letter of Instructions of six months previous. The letter 

of revocation, dated 2 May, stated that dissolution of the USSR Mission 

cast no reflection upon General Greely, but was caused by failure 

to obtain the necessary diplomatic clearance from the Soviet 

Government.46 

Promptly following upon dissolution of the mission came assignment to the Iranian Mission of what was called additional responsibility 

for handling and forwarding through Iran all military materiel 

destined for the USSR. The assignment indicates that even at that 

late date there were those in 'Vashington who did not realize that such 

duties were already implicit in the tasks of the Iranian Mission, subject 

only to its auxilia;-y status vis-a-vis the British. But, thanks to the decision of Secretary Hull, all three problems which had dogged the 

USSR Mission's short life were solved at one stroke of the pen. Nine 

of Greely's officers and fourteen of his men were immediately transferred to the Iranian Mission. One officer was returned to the United 

States. Greely and Hauser stood by for further orders,,1 

It is an oversimplification to attribute the end of the mission solely 

to the reluctance of the USSR to admit its membership as a whole. 

Determination of causes requires an examination of opinion within 

the American Embassy in Russia impossible within the limits of this 

.. Rpt, Home Office to USSR Mission, 5-25 Apr 42. Folder, Weekly Home Office 

Reports from U.S. Military Mission to USSR, SL X-1l,737. Another copy 319.1 Rpts 

Home Office to Mission, USSR, Intn Div, ASF NCF . •• (1) Ltr, Stimson to Welles, 1 May 42, drafted in accordance with Memo, Gen Somerveil for Gen Marshall, to the effect that the WD would make no further effort to send the 

mission into the USSR. AG 400.3295 (8-14-41) Sec 1. (2) Rad AMRUS 30 to Gen 

Greely, 2 May 42, quotes Ltr of Secy War. AG 400.3295 (8-9--41) Sec 4. <T (1) Rad AMSIR 157 Washington, Gen Somervell to Col Shingler, 2 May 42. 

334.8 USSR, Intn Div, ASF NCF. Other copies OPD, Iran-Iraq, Vol. I, 20E 42 (IM-Q); 

AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 4. (2) 334.8 USSR, Intn Div, ASF NCF. 
INTERLUDE OF THE MISSION TO THE USSR 81 

history!S For whatever reasons, Greely's personal calls and letters were 

the only American requests for visas made directly to the Soviets. Incomplete co-ordination of policy by the State and War Departments 

weighed in the final outcome. The record further shows that the fate, 

unforeseen, but nevertheless perhaps not unforeseeable, of being a 

fifth wheel on the Russian-aid cart contributed to the mission's demise; 

and the record is clear that up to the last, the War Department maintained its support for two parallel missions in the Persian Corridor. 

On the credit side of the ledger, the USSR Mission performed 

useful field surveys and satisfactorily smoothed out the difficulties which 

arose over the Shu'aiba assembly operations. Something of the frustration which shrouded its short existence may be mitigated if the lessons 

its story teaches are studied and learned. 

" (1) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 395-96, and unpublished material in the 

Hopkins papers. (2) General Greely has recorded that his appointment was suggested by 

General Burns of the Division of Defense Aid Reports, who had brought Colonel Faymonville 

to Washington for Russian-aid talks in July 1941 and who took Faymonville to the USSR 

where he became head of the lend-lease mission. At the time the USSR Mission was established it was expected that Burns would become U.S. Ambassador to the USSR. Burns 

believed that there were distinct functions to be served by the Faymonville and Greely 

missions. Faymonville, with direct access to Harry Hopkins, would channel USSR requests 

into procurement and shipment; Greely, with War Department machinery behind him, would 

instruct the Russians in the use and maintenance of American lend-lease goods. It was believed that as ambassador, Burns could direct these complementary functions toward the 

single aim of aiding the USSR. (Ltr, Greely to Maj Gen Orlando Ward, 30 Apr 49. PGF.) 

But Burns did not become ambassador and the Russians did not want to be instructed. 

In consequence the mission became something of an orphan. 
CHAPTER V 

The Iranian Mission and Its 

Successors 

Jobs, Geography, and Manpower 

Although the remaining months of 1942 were to produce problems 

enough, the decisions of April and May eliminated some of the early 

confusion. The assignment of highest priority to the movement of goods 

to the USSR dictated handing over American construction activities 

in Iraq to the British, whose line of communication from Basra to 

Baghdad the projects. were designed to strengthen. The removal of 

India from the territory of the Iranian Mission, the appointment of 

Colonel Shingler to succeed General Wheeler, and the dissolution of 

the USSR Mission all clarified the Iranian Mission's tasks and tended 

to simplify its machinery. Responsibility for handling and forwarding 

through Iran all military materiel destined for the USSR, assigned 

the Iranian Mission at the termination of the USSR Mission, remained 

nominal because of paramount British responsibilities for movements 

and transportation. It was exercised through the rendering of advice 

and assistance, until American assumption, by direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in September, of enlarged operational powers and 

duties. This development was not envisaged during the first half of the 

year, and consequently, until late summer, all planning for increased 

Russian aid proceeded on the basis of reinforcing the Iranian Mission 

and its successor organizations rather than on the basis, determined 

late in the year, of creating a radically new machine to do the job. 

Throughout the remainder of 1942 and on into the early months of the 

new regime established by the Combined Chiefs, the Americans' main 

concern was with construction of wharves, highways, and housing, and 

with assembly of motor vehicles, aircraft, and barges. 

In the early planning period, when it might be said the planners 

bit off more than they could chew, it had been supposed that the 

American field force could handle a large proportion of the thirty-one 
THE IRANIAN MISSION AND ITS SUCCESSORS 83 

tasks to be spread over Iraq, Iran, and India, as listed by General 

Wheeler in January. Although first priority had been given early that 

month to the Iraqi projects, Wheeler had assured Colonel Faymonville 

that on the arrival of the engineer constructor "systematic improvement of 1,000 miles of Persian road net to provide permanent two-lane 

highways" would be begun. On the day before the Folspen men reached 

Basra, the British Tenth Army set up priorities for American construction of highways, the first to run from Ahwaz north to Andimeshk, the 

second from Ahwaz south to Khorramshahr and across to Tanuma in 

the Basra port area, and the third to connect Umm Qasr with 

Shu'aiba. The small number of Americans made it expedient to concentrate upon the Iraqi projects; but even while the majority ,vorked 

in Iraq, surveys for the Iranian highway were carried out and plans 

made which awaited only the coming of additional plant, equipment, 

and personnel to be put into effect. Similar reconnaissance looking 

toward construction of docks at Khorramshahr took place during the 

Iraqi period, and a construction crew and some equipment were furnished at the same time by Folspen to speed work being done by the 

British on a motor vehicle assembly plant for American operation at 

Andimeshk.1 

The shift of priorities to Iran freed the American working forces 

for tasks already planned but postponed by the earlier priority rating 

given to Iraq. The transfer of men and equipment from Iraq to Iran 

was completed by 1 June, by which date both the Folspen and Iranian 

District engineer headquarters had been established at Ahwaz. The 

Iranian Mission headquarters remained at Basra until January 1943 

when, as the headquarters of a successor organization under General 

Connolly, it was removed to Tehran. (See Chart 1, Appendix B.) 

Ahwaz, which was to be the nerve center of American construction 

activity, is situated at the head of navigation about 100 miles up the 

Karun River, or 75 miles by desert track, above Khorramshahr. It is at 

the junctjon between the main line of the railway and a branch south 

to Khorramshahr being built in 1942 by the British. Khorramshahr, 

whose capacity in late 1941 was variously estimated at from 200 to 700 

long tons per day, stands at the confluence of the Shatt al Arab and 

Karun Rivers, well inland from the Persian Gulf and about 21 miles 

downstream from Basra. Eight miles down the Shatt al Arab from 

Khorramshahr, connected by a paved road, is the island of Abadan, 

1 (1) Rad, Col Shinf(ler (for Gen Wheeler) to Col Faymonville, 24 Jan 42. 323.91 

Portst SL 9008. (2) Memo 258/15/29/1, Hq, Tenth Army, QMG Br, for Hq, U.S. Mil 

Iranian Mission, 13 Feb 42. Folder, Roads: Umm Qasr-Basra, SL X-ll,737. (3) Ltr, 

Col Shingler to CG, SOS, 10 Apr 42, sub: Status of U.S. Mil Iranian Mission. PGF 26-A. 

(4) Notes and comments by Col one! Lieber for the author, 10 February 1949. 
84 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

provided with docks used by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company refinery 

on the island. From Abadan a road runs north to Ahwaz. The main line 

of the ISR, which reaches Ahwaz from Tehran via Andimeshk 87 miles 

to the north, continues about 70 miles to the southeast to the Persian 

Gulf port of Bandar Shahpur. This port relies wholly on the railway for 

its communication overland with Ahwaz, there being no highway. In 

1942 it had a pier extending far into the shallow water, and a British 

civilian contractor was adding additional wharfage. Farther to the 

south along the Gulf coast stands Bushire, more than 190 air-line miles 

from Khorramshahr, joined to interior points by inadequate roads. 

Cargoes at Bushire were lightered mainly in native craft from an exposed anchorage 7 miles offshore. The port's relative isolation and the 

shallowness of its waters made it the least useful for Russian-aid 

tonnage.2 

Improvement of some of these facilities to bring them up to the 

capacities called for by increased tonnages for Russia was being effected 

by the British when the Americans came over to Iran to share the 

burden. By 1 July 1942 the broad list of proposed American tasks 

had been narrowed. Of the tasks named in General Wheeler's January 

list there remained the following: construction of additional docks at 

Khorramshahr; first-priority highway construction from Ahwaz north 

to Andimeshk; second-priority highway from Ahwaz south to Khorramshahr, with a road across to Tanuma; following completion of these 

roads, a 750-mile two-lane highway north from Andimeshk; operation 

of a motor vehicle assembly plant at Andimeshk; operation of vehicle 

repair stations at Andimeshk and Kazvin; and operation of an aircraft 

assembly plant at Abadan and of a point for aircraft delivery at Tehran. 

Technical advice and assistance were also to be rendered at the Britishoperated motor vehicle assembly plant at Bushire and the British 

aircraft assembly operations at Shu'aiba. Additional tasks undertaken 

by 1 July included the laying (begun in the spring) of concrete flooring 

for the motor vehicle assembly plant being built by the British for 

American operation at Andimeshk; operation by subcontract through 

the district engineer of a barge assembly plant at Kuwait on the Gulf 

coast south of Umm Qasr; and construction of housing for 100 men at 

Khorramshahr, wharf approaches there, and housing for 750 men 

along the highway route between Ahwaz and Andimeshk, with hospital 

and warehouse facilities at Ahwaz.s 

'Rpt, Office of Naval Intelligence, 17 Dec 41. WPD 4596 to -15 Iran (Persia), HRS 

DRB AGO. 3 Iranian Engr Dist Project Map, 1 Jul 42. Na 2146 (Iran) 25/3, NADEF. Photostatic 

copy Map File, PGF. 
THE IRANIAN MISSION AND ITS SUCCESSORS 85 

The working force entrusted with these operations had expanded 

from the handful of men in Iraq in April to 190 military and 817 

American civilians by 1 July. Of the latter, 427 were employees of 

Folspen and 390 of the Douglas Aircraft Company. The military force 

com prised 69 members of the Air Corps and 121 from other services, 

chiefly technical. There were 58 officers and 132 enlisted men all told. 

By the end of August the number of Folspen civilians had risen to 745, 

the Douglas roster to 397, while the military aggregate was 357. Native 

laborers employed on five engineer projects totaled 1,280. By the end 

of October, when the auxiliary civilian-contractor phase of American 

operations began the transition to the wholly militarized phase under 

General Connolly, the military aggregate was 413, the Folspen employees totaled 740, and there were 6,320 natives directly hired or 

employed by subcontract on engineer projects. Contradictory data on 

motor vehicle and aircraft assembly provide an unreliable census of 

civilian employees at that date. 4 

Lack of manpower was one problem among many which beset 

civilian-contractor operations. ·While construction and assembly tasks 

,,,,ere being carried on, the military organization passed through a 

series of changes, resulting in the merging of the Iranian Mission and 

the North African Mission into an American Middle East theater of 

operations with headquarters at Cairo. Simultaneously the militarization of civilian contract activities was in contemplation. These two 

developments of the organizational structure marked a turning point 

midway in the first phase of the American job in the Persian Corridor. 

Unification of the Middle East Missions 

The stream of events leading to the unification of the Iranian and 

North African Missions into an American Middle East organization, 

U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East (USAFIME), flowed from a 

source which has yet to be precisely located on the historical map. The 

first suggestion, according to General Maxwell, came from British headquarters in Cairo.s Maxwell himself advanced the idea to his staff in 

early March. It was proposed in February in Washington by General 

Wemyss of the British Joint Staff Mission; and it will be recalled that 

• (1) Rpt of Opns, CO, Iranian Mission, to CG, USAFIME, for 1 May-3D J un 42, 

2 Jul 42. 334.8 American Aid Subcommittee, SL 9011. (2) Chart 2. (3) Monthly Rpt 

of Activities of PGSC, Aug 42, to CG, USAFIME, 3 Sep 42. PGF 259. Another copy 

titled First Monthly Progress Report, same date, differs slightly. 323.61 Establishment of 

Military Districts, Binder 2, SL 9008. (4) Monthly Rpt of Activities of PGSC, Oct 42, 

to CG, PGSC, 5 Nov 42. PGF 259. , Min, Stf Mtg at Cairo, 9 Apr 42. Maxwell Papers. 
86 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

General Maxwell had represented the interests of the Iranian Mission 

at a meeting of the American Aid Subcommittee of the Middle East 

War Council in Cairo in November 1941 when installations at Basra 

were under discussion. It is reasonably certain that the proposal to 

unify the American missions was originally British. 

On 5 February 1942 General Wemyss wrote to General Marshall 

suggesting that the two missions be combined.6 The matter, he stated, 

had been considered by the British Chiefs of Staff, the Minister of 

State at Cairo, the commanders-in-chief for Middle East, and had, he 

believed, been unofficially discussed with Ambassador Bullitt when 

he was in the Middle East. General Wemyss pointed out that, "when, 

however, as is intended, the Middle East Command is extended to 

include Persia and Iraq, Wheeler will be partly in the sphere of Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, and partly in that of Commancler-inChief, India." The new mission, he added, would "far exceed in scope 

the present Missions." It would canalize, through its chief, information 

both of intelligence and operational natures between the Middle East 

sphere and the United States and would provide a framework for any 

increase in participation of the U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East. 

General Wemyss suggested that the War Department add to the new 

mission an officer, to sit with the British Joint Planning Staff for the 

Middle East, and civilians for co-operation with the Minister of State 

at Cairo. 

Circulated for comment within the War Department, the British 

proposal was approved by General Aurand whose office was the one 

in closest administrative touch with the two Middle East missions. G-2 

urged that intelligence activities in the Middle East should continue to 

be channeled directly to Washington and not diverted through the 

missions. 

The War Plans Division (WPD) recommended leaving everything 

unchanged, pointing out that General Maxwell's relations with British 

Army headquarters in Cairo would be unchanged by any consolidation, 

and that General Wheeler's effectiveness would be unimpaired by 

British command changes putting part of his area in the British India 

area and part of it in the British Middle East area. "The missions 

• The following five paragraphs refer to: (1) Ltr, Gen Wemyss to Gen Marshall, 5 Feb 42. 

OPD 4511-35 to -72, Africa, General (includes N. African Mission Sec 3), HRS DRB AGO. 

Another copy MID 311.9 Co-ordination, ME (2-7-42). (2) Memo, Gen Aurand for 

WPD, 8 Feb 42, sub: Consolidation of North African and Iranian Missions, North African 

Mission File .008, Intn Div, ASF NCF. (3) Memo, Brig Gen Raymond E. Lee, ACofS, 

G-2, for ACofS, WPD. OPD File as in (1). Another copy MID File as in (I). (4) Memo, Gen 

Gerow, ACofS, WPD, for CofS, 12 Feb 42, sub: Proposed Consolidation of All American Activities in the Middle East, approved by CofS, 19 Feb 42. OPD File as in (1). (5) Ltr, Gen 

Marshall to Gen Wemyss, 19 Feb 42. OPD File as in (1). 
THE IRANIAN MISSION AND ITS SUCCESSORS 87 

assigned Generals Maxwell and Wheeler in their respective letters of 

instruction," the WPD memorandum noted, "do not place them in 

any British command channels." On the question of the Iranian Mission's obligations toward the USSR, the WPD memorandum stated: 

Of primary importance among the specific duties assigned General Wheeler is 

the routing of lend-lease materials to the Soviet Union and the training of their 

personnel in the use and maintenance of American equipment. A complete reorganization of the Wheeler and Maxwell Missions might well disrupt the relations 

General Wheeler has established with the Russians. This would be undesirable. 

The passage indicates a correct realization of the importance of the 

Russian-aid program and of General Wheeler's responsibility for it. 

It is well to remember, however, that at the same time (February) toppriority Iranian Mission tasks were those in Iraq for aid to Great 

Britain; that General Greely's USSR Mission was currently at large 

in General Wheeler's territory with responsibilities paralleling and 

overlapping Wheeler's; that the "routing" of lend-lease materials to 

the Soviet Union was a British responsibility; and, finally, that training 

of Soviet personnel existed only on paper because of consistent Soviet 

refusal to accept it. 

The War Plans Division further objected to the British suggestion 

that an American officer sit with the British Joint Planning Staff for 

the Middle East, pointing out that "suitable provision for co-operation 

and long-term planning" already existed through the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff; that nowhere else, not even in England where there were 

numerous American troops, was such an arrangement in existence; 

and that presence of an American officer on the British Joint Planning 

Staff for the Middle East "might serve to complicate matters." 

General Marshall, on WPD's recommendation, wrote General 

Wemyss on 19 February that he appreciated "the informal presentation of your ideas on consolidation," but did not feel that any change 

was "justified." He added, "Personally, I anticipate no disruption in 

the present smooth operations of the two Missions." And there, for the 

time being, the matter rested. The events of the following four months 

produced in themselves further points in the debatable question of 

command. 

There were straws in the wind. Early in May, following the dissolution of the USSR Mission, the War Department informed Colonel 

Shingler, chief of the Iranian Mission, that General Maxwell had 

become a member of the Middle East Supply Council, an official agency 

for economic controls, and would, along with the American Minister 

at Tehran, consult Shingler on economic matters affecting Shingler'S 

area. The VVar Department instructed Shingler to keep Maxwell in-
88 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

formed of all agreements made with the British or transmitted to 

Shingler by the War Department, and to advise Maxwell of decisions 

involving policy with the British. The message added pointedly that 

Shingler was not under Maxwell's jurisdiction. In conformity with 

these instructions Shingler wrote Maxwell a letter in an effort to bridge 

the differences in time, space, and ·circumstance between Basra and 

Cairo. He stated that since the new British command arrangements 

had oriented Iraq and Iran toward Cairo rather than toward New 

Delhi, "There has been a radical change in attitude towards all 

American-sponsored projects," and he cautioned ~1axwell not to commit the Iranian Mission "too rigidly on policies until I have had an 

opportunity to discuss the local situation with you." British policy for 

Iraq and Iran was now being directed from Cairo where there was a 

close identification with Afro-Mediterranean areas and problems; 

whereas American policy in Iraq and Iran had only lately been shifted 

decisively toward support of the Soviet Union's line of supply.7 

Colonel Shingler's point was communicated by General Maxwell 

to the British a few days later in Cairo at a meeting attended by Richard 

G. Casey, British Minister of State, and by a representative of Colonel 

Shingler. Lt. Gen. Sir Thomas S. Riddell-Webster, top Army administrative official at GHQ, Middle East Forces, asked General Maxwell 

if he had any infonnation as to taking over the Iranian Mission. Maxwell replied that "he felt the War Department didn't desire" to act at 

this time "because it might appear to decrease the importance of supplies to Russia." General Maxwell could, however, arrange to represent 

Colonel Shingler "in the event quick decisions were necessary." Not 

long after, General Maxwell sent a note to General Aurand reiterating 

his own belief that the Iranian Mission ought to become a service command of the North African Mission. There was one more straw to blow 

in the wind before the War Department decision was reached. On 10 

June the Iranian Mission was placed under the North African Mission 

for general courts-martial purposes.s 

On 13 June, by order of General Marshall, USAFIME was created 

and Iraq and Iran placed within its geographical area. Four days later 

a message summarized the new Letter of Instructions to be issued 

'(1) Rad AMSIR 162, Washington to Shingler, 4 May 42. AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) 

Sec 4. (2) Rad AMSIR 165, Washington to Shingler, 5 May 42. Same file. (3) Ltr, Col 

Shingler to Gen Maxwell, 8 May 42. 334.8 American Aid Subcommittee, SL 9011. • (1) Notes of mtg of 12 May 42 taken by Capt Garrett Fonda, Adj, Iranian Mission. 

334.8 American Aid Subcommittee, SL 9011. (2) Msg, Maxwell to Aurand, 25 May 42, 

carried by Col Louis ]. Claterbos, North African Dist Engr, who was returning to the United 

States. DE File (A) Drawer 1, Cabinet 8, NADEF. (3) Ltr, JA, U.S. Mil North African 

Mission, to Chief, U.S. Mil Iranian Mission, 10 Jun 42, following authorization from 

Washington dated 27 May 42. 323.61 Establishment of Military Districts, Binder 1, SL 9008. 
THE IRANIAN MISSION AND ITS SUCCESSORS 89 

to General Maxwell as commanding general. His command was to 

include all U.S. Army personnel in his area except the Army Air 

Forces Ferrying Command and General Greely's special mission in 

Iran, a new assignment following collapse of the mission to Russia. 

On the same day, 17 June, Maxwell accepted the appointment. On 19 

June he issued his first general order activating the new theater. On 

23 June the Iranian Mission was discontinued, being redesignated the 

Iran-Iraq Service Command under Headquarters, USAFIME, effective 24 June, with Colonel Shingler as commanding officer.9 

The new Letter of Instructions given by the Chief of Staff to General Maxwell, in so far as it affected Iranian Mission matters, gave to 

the Commanding General, USAFIME, control not only of military 

personnel, but of all Services of Supply activities, including construction, transport, and maintenance. General Maxwell received control 

of all War Department intelligence activities in his area, subject to 

certain local arrangements which did not concern the activities in the 

Persian Corridor. He was also to represent the War Department in all 

dealings with the British and other friendly forces in his area.10 

Colonel Shingler's headquarters at Basra were a thousand miles, 

as the crow flies, from General Maxwel1's headquarters at Cairo. The 

new command relationship seemed to alter the autonomy formerly 

enjoyed by the Iranian Mission in its dealings with Washington and 

with the British. General Maxwell's control over construction and all 

military personnel, moreover, appeared to affect the working arrangement by which the co-ordinate powers granted the Iranian District 

engineer and the chief of the mission had been made to function. 

Colonel Shingler accordingly asked Washington on 24 June for clarification of his responsibilities in supplying the USSR, and in his construction and assembly activities. "It is desirable," he stated, "that I 

make clear my status to Russian and British officials concerned with 

activities of the Mission. I am eager to have my direct responsibilities 

clarified; also the channel of command regarding supplies to construc-

• (1) Rad, Gen Marshall to Gen Maxwell, 13 Jun 42. AG 320.2 (13 Jun 42) 15, 

Hq AMET (AG decimal files seen at Headquarters, Africa-Middle East Theater, Cairo, now filed at the Kansas City Records Center, Kansas City, Mo.). (2) Rad, Gen Marshall 

to Gen Maxwell, 17 Jun 42. AG 381 (2-24-42) 2, Hq AMET. (3) Rad AMSEG 1494, 

Gen Maxwell to Gen Marshall, 17 Jun 42. AG 320.2 (13 Jun 42) 15, Hq AMET. In this 

message Maxwell recommended appointment of Colonel Hauser, former chief of staff of 

the USSR Mission, as commanding officer of the new Iran-Iraq Service Command, and 

attachment of Colonel Shingler to Cairo headquarters for staff duty. (4) GO 1, Hq, 

USAFIME, 19 Jun 42. (5) GO 3, Hq, USAFIME, 23 Jun 42. (6) SO 4, Hq, USAFIME, 

appointing Shingler CO, Iran-Iraq Serv Comd. By GO 1, Hq, Iran-Iraq Serv Comd, 

USAFlME, 1 Ju142, the comd was activated effective 24 Jun 42. (7) Chart 1. lD Ltr of Instructions, Gen Marshall to Gen Maxwell, 20 Jun 42. AG 320.2 (13 Jun 42) 

I5,HqAMET. 
tion, truck and plane assembly projects.” In reply the War Department 

instructed Shingler to continue to deal directly with Washington on 

all matters previously handled by the Iranian Mission, “including supplies to Russia, construction projects, and truck and plane assembly,” 

furnishing General Maxwell with copies of all actions taken, and consulting him in all matters ofoperational policy. The reply suggests that 

Washington had solved the problem of keeping the British happy by 

unifying the two missions and of keeping the Russians happy by not 

unifying them. In a letter to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 

War explained that USAFIME was created “for the purpose of establishing a headquarters to control and co-ordinate U.S. Army activities 

in that area, and to centralize dealings with the British Middle East 

Forces.” That meant that, although Cairo was in the saddle, the reins 

were lightly held. There was to be close oversight by the new theater 

headquarters of its easternmost service command, but working contacts 

and habits established by the Iranian Mission were not to be seriously 

disturbed.11

The Iran-Iraq Service Command of USAFIME was set up with 

headquarters at Basra, and co-ordinate headquarters for the Iranian 

District engineer at Ahwaz and for the Air Section at Abadan. At the 

service command headquarters, in addition to the usual staff sections, 

there were a Defense Aid director through whom lend-lease matters 

with the British and Russians were channeled; a financial adviser taken 

over from the district engineer; a surgeon; an engineer officer; and 

sections for ordnance, signals, and Army postal service. In the field 

were outlying detachments posted at Tabriz, farthest point of motor 

vehicle deliveries to the Soviets, Tehran, Baghdad, Andimeshk, 

Bushire, and Bandar Shahpur. On the staff of the Iranian District 

engineer, besides an adjutant and an executive, were chiefs of sections 

for engineering, operations, administration, contract and legal matters, 

and area engineers with subheadquarters located at Khorramshahr, 

Sabz-i-Ab12—just south of Andimeshk, where therewas a construction 

camp—Ahwaz, and Kuwait, site of the barge construction project. 

Folspen’s staff, under their foreign manager, Charles H. Sells, comprised, in part, a chief engineer, a highway engineer, a superintendent 

of equipment, office manager, chief accountant, camp and commissary 

steward, purchasing agent, warehouse controller, and recreational 

director. The Air Section, under Maj. Charles P. Porter, had a small 

11 (1) Rad AMSIR 389, Shingler to WD, 24 Jun 42. AG 400.3295 (8–9–41) Sec 4. 

(2) Rad AMSIR 310, Gen Marshall to Col Shingler, 26 Jun 42. AG 381 (2–24–42) 2, Hq AMET. (3) Ltr, Secy War to Secy State, 2 Jul 42. WD 320.2 (6–25–42) MS. 

17 Zabzab to the Americans. 

90 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

tion, truck and plane assembly projects." In reply the War Department 

instructed Shingler to continue to deal directly with Washington on 

all matters previously handled by the Iranian Mission, "including supplies to Russia, construction projects, and truck and plane assembly," 

furnishing General Maxwell with copies of all actions taken, and consulting him in all matters of operational policy. The reply suggests that 

Washington had solved the problem of keeping the British happy by 

unifying the two missions and of keeping the Russians happy by not 

unifying them. In a letter to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 

War explained that USAFIME was created "for the purpose of establishing a headquarters to control and co-ordinate U.S. Army activities 

in that area, and to centralize dealings with the British Middle East 

Forces." That meant that, although Cairo was in the saddle, the reins 

were lightly held. There was to be close oversight by the new theater 

headquarters of its easternmost service command, but working contacts 

and habits established by the Iranian Mission were not to be seriously 

disturbed.ll 

The Iran-Iraq Service Command of USAFIME was set up with 

headquarters at Basra, and co-ordinate headquarters for the Iranian 

District engineer at Ahwaz and for the Air Section at Abadan. At the 

service command headquarters, in addition to the usual staff sections, 

there were a Defense Aid director through whom lend-lease matters 

with the British and Russians were channeled; a financial adviser taken 

over from the district engineer; a surgeon; an engineer officer; and 

sections for ordnance, signals, and Army postal service. In the field 

were outlying detachments posted at Tabriz, farthest point of motor 

vehicle deliveries to the Soviets, Tehran, Baghdad, Andimeshk, 

Bushire, and Bandar Shah pur. On the staff of the Iranian District 

engineer, besides an adjutant and an executive, were chiefs of sections 

for engineering, operations, administration, contract and legal matters, 

and area engineers with subheadquarters located at Khorramshahr, 

Sabz-i-Ab 12_just south of Andimeshk, where there was a construction 

camp-Ahwaz, and Kuwait, site of the barge construction project. 

Folspen's staff, under their foreign manager, Charles H. Sells, comprised, in part, a chief engineer, a highway engineer, a superintendent 

of equipment, office manager, chief accountant, camp and commissary 

steward, purchasing agent, warehouse controller, and recreational 

director. The Air Section, under Maj. Charles P. Porter, had a small 

11 (1) Rad AMSIR 389, Shingler to WD, 2,1 Jun 42. AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 4. 

(2) Rad AMSIR 310, Gen Marshall to Col Shingler, 26 Jun 42. AG 381 (2-24-42) 2, 

Hq AMET. (3) Ltr, Seey War to Seey State, 2 Jul 42. WD 320.2 (6-25-42) MS. 

" Zahzah to the Americans. 
THE IRANIAN MISSION AND ITS SUCCESSORS 91 

headquarters staff and outlying detachments at Tehran and Shu'aiba 

as well as the offices of the Douglas Aircraft Company under Norman 

H. Millstead.13 

In a July statement to his staff on their mission Shingler said, "The 

highest priority will be given to measures contributing directly and 

immediately to aid-to-Russia." 14 While including much of the substance of General 'Wheeler's Letter of Instructions respecting training 

Russian and British personnel in the use of American equipment and 

supplies and studying and reporting on operational methods "to facilitate the use of American equipment in future American operations," 

Shingler's statement reiterated the original purposes of the Iranian 

Mission in expediting the flow of war materials to the USSR, advising 

and assisting Allied forces in procurement, delivery, and proper utilization of American equipment, and maintaining close liaison with, and 

rendering technical assistance to, Allied forces in connection with lendlease materials. The memorandum also provided for harmonizing 

plans for emergency military operations in the area with those made by 

the Commanding General, USAFIME, and local Allied commanders. 

I t was not long before the reins, held in Cairo, were tightened. On 

11 August the Iran-Iraq Service Command was redesignated the 

Persian Gulf Service Command (PGSC), remaining directly under 

Headquarters, USAFIME. Colonel Shingler became its commanding 

officer on 13 August, and on 25 August received a Letter of Instructions 

from General Maxwell.15 The area of the new PGSC was defined as 

comprising Iraq, Iran, and those parts of Saudi Arabia bordering on 

the Persian Gulf. Colonel Shingler was made responsible for the construction, maintenance, supply, and administration of all installations 

in his area including the Air Forces project at Abadan, but excluding 

all other Air Forces stations. Service to U.S. Army Air Forces units 

within the PGSC was to be such as would be directed by Headquarters, 

USAFIME. The PGSC would be responsible for the movement of 

U.S. military supplies within its area, and for aid as before to British 

and other Allied forces. The Commanding Officer, PGSC, was authorized to hire and contract locally but to make his requests for military 

personnel to Cairo. Direct communication with the War Department 

,. (1) Organization Chart, Iran-Iraq Serv Comd. 131 U.S. Military Mission to IranMiscellane-ous. SL X-ll,737. (2) Organization Lists. SWP Office. 

" Stf Memo 2, Hq, Iran-Iraq Serv Comd, USAFIME, 22 Jul 42, sub: Mission of the 

Iran-Iraq Serv Comd. PGF 236. 11 (1) GO 9, Hq, USAFIME, 11 Aug 42, under authority in WD Rad AMSME 308, 

8 Aug. 42. (2) GO 1, Hq, PGSC, USAFIME, 13 Aug 42. (3) Ltr of Instructions, Gen 

Maxwell to PGSC, USAFIME, 25 Aug 42. 323.61 Establishment of Military Districts, 

SL 9008. Another copy PGF 259. 
92 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

was to be restricted to "matters specified in Army Regulations for 

direct communication, on project matters covering administrative details of projects established by War Department, and routine details. 

All matters involving policy, operational details, personnel, matters 

involving the Command as a whole, and details of service to U.S. 

troops," the letter concluded, "will be communicated through" Cairo 

headquarters. Colonel Shingler was further instructed to submit to 

Cairo a monthly progress report. Except for the reference to maintenance of previous responsibilities for aid to Allied forces, the letter was 

silent as to direct consultation with local Allied commanders, leaving 

the impression that where these involved policy, operational details, 

and matters involving the command as a whole, consultation with local 

commanders would take place through Cairo, one thousand miles 

away. Unification of the American forces in the Middle East was now 

a fact. But it was a fact of short duration; for only two months later the 

pendulum began its swing back toward autonomy for the Persian Gulf 

area. 

During the intervening period Colonel Shingler established within 

the PGSC a system of decentralized area administration which was to 

leave its mark upon the structural organization of the new regime of 

the following October. (See Map 3, p. 223.) This was a scheme of administrative areas, analogous to, but not patterned upon, the area 

system long used by the Corps of Engineers, and already in effect under 

the Iranian District engineer. The new areas, effective 1 September, 

were the Southwestern, with headquarters at Basra, the Central, at 

Ahwaz, and the Northern at Tehran. A fourth, the Eastern, at Zahidan, 

was never activated. The commanders of the respective areas were 

made directly responsible to the Commanding Officer, PGSC, for construction, maintenance, supply, and administration of all Army installations in their areas, as well as of civilian agencies operating directly 

under contract with the War Department; for the movement of all 

U.S. military supplies therein; and for all personnel connected therewith excepting those on the Air Forces project at Abadan, which 

remained directly under Headquarters, PGSC, and other Air Forces 

units.Ie 

The areas were established to vest local responsibility for procurement and other strictly local dealings with the British forces in an 

American opposite number hitherto lacking. Previous to 1 September 

the heads of the various American operating agencies would go with 

their conflicting and overlapping requests to the local British repre-

"GO 2, Hq, PGSC, USAFIME, 30 Aug 42. PGF 259. Another copy DE File E-l.l 

General Orders Mission, NADEF. 
sentatives, who, in turn, would refer these requisitions to the Commanding Officer, PGSC, for correlation.Under thenew area system the 

area commander would be the funnel through which these matters 

would flow.17 

To supervise and co-ordinate the work of the area commanders, a 

special staff of eighteen officers was created to act for and in the name 

of the Commanding Officer, PGSC. The Iranian District engineer thus 

became a special staff officer who both supervised his construction 

activities throughout theseveral areas and carriedon normal engineering work, such as maintenance and repair of buildings, utilities, engineer supply, mining, demolition, mapping, traffic control, and camouflage. Similar technical supervision was necessary, as a further example, 

on the part of the ordnance officer, who, as representative of the Commanding Officer, PGSC, co-ordinated as between the areas the work 

of unloading, assembling, and forwarding motor vehicles. The special 

staff were without authority as individuals when engaged in area activities, but possessed the full authority of the commanding officer 

when acting as his representative on technical matters appropriate to 

the staff position and when putting into effect the policies and instructions of the commanding officer. Special staff officers acted through 

the commanders of other units or their staff representatives except in 

emergency. Area commanders were fully advised of all technical instructions applicable to their commands. The area headquarters were 

small, numbering only two or three officers. With the bulk of operational 

work focused in the eighteen special staff officers at headquarters, a 

military staff of three divided the duties of S–1, S–2, S–3, and S–4. 

This arrangement continued until the arrival of General Connolly on 

20 October.18 

Militarization of Contract Activities 

Militarizing contract activities was a good deal like rebuilding a 

complicated structure, such as a railroad station, without interrupting 

service. Boarded-up areas appeared and disappeared, commuters detoured through unfamiliar burrows, there was a thunder of riveting 

and hammering and shouting. When the dust cleared away, the old 

station was gone and a new one had been conjured out of the clang 

and confusion. Through it all the trains kept on runing. In the Persian 

Corridor the transformation required more than a year. 

17 Interv, Gen Shingler with Victor Pentlarge, Pentagon, 22 Apr 46. 18 (1) Stf Memo 3, Hq, PGSC, USAFIME, 31 Aug 42. (2) SO 13, Hq, PGSC, 

USAFIME, 1 Sep 42. 

 

THE IRANIAN MISSION AND ITS SUCCESSORS 93 

sentatives, who, in turn, would refer these requisitions to the Commanding Officer, PGSC, for correlation. Under the new area system the 

area commander would be the funnel through which these matters 

would flow.17 

To supervise and co-ordinate the work of the area commanders, a 

special staff of eighteen officers was created to act for and in the name 

of the Commanding Officer, PGSC. The Iranian District engineer thus 

became a special staff officer who both supervised his construction 

activities throughout the several areas and carried on normal engineering work, such as maintenance and repair of buildings, utilities, engineer supply, mining, demolition, mapping, traffic control, and camouflage. Similar technical supervision was necessary, as a further example, 

on the part of the ordnance officer, who, as representative of the Commanding Officer, PGSC, co-ordinated as between the areas the work 

of unloading, assembling, and forwarding motor vehicles. The special 

staff were without authority as individuals when engaged in area activities, but possessed the full authority of the commanding officer 

when acting as his representative on technical matters appropriate to 

the staff position and when putting into effect the policies and instructions of the commanding officer. Special staff officers acted through 

the commanders of other units or their staff representatives except in 

emergency. Area commanders were fully advised of all technical instructions applicable to their commands. The area headquarters were 

small, numbering only two or three officers. With the bulk of operational 

work focused in the eighteen special staff officers at headquarters, a 

military staff of three divided the duties of S-l, S-2, S-3, and S-4. 

This arrangement continued until the arrival of General Connolly on 

20 October.18 

Militarization of Contract Activities 

Militarizing contract activities was a good deal like rebuilding a 

complicated structure, such as a railroad station, without interrupting 

service. Boarded-up areas appeared and disappeared, commuters detoured through unfamiliar burrows, there was a thunder of riveting 

and hammering and shouting. When the dust cleared away, the old 

station was gone and a new one had been conjured out of the clang 

and confusion. Through it all the trains kept on running. In the Persian 

Corridor the transformation required more than a year. 

11 Interv, Gen Shingler with Victor Pentlarge, Pentagon, 22 Apr 46. 18 (1) Stf Memo 3, Hq, PGSC, USAFIME, 31 Aug 42. (2) SO 13, Hq, PGSC, 

USAFIME, 1 Sep 42. 
94 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

Of the four civilian contractors connected with Persian Corridor 

projects, only the J. G. White Corporation raised the question of the 

status of civilian employees overseas and urged from the start of conversations with the Army that the work ought to be militarized. The 

Ordnance Department, lacking manpower to operate overseas commitments on the scale called for by its program, preferred at first to get 

on with the job by means of civilian help, but ultimately accepted the 

argument that its special problems could not be solved by the contractor 

system and canceled the White program. Construction and assembly 

offered fewer immediate obstacles to civilian operation than did the 

ordnance program, and so the Army, sore pressed for manpower, 

launched three contractors into the field to carryon until the Army 

itself could take over. This logical sequence is what happened; not 

what was clearly foreseen in late 1941 as likely to happen. Indeed, the 

engineer, quartermaster, ordnance, and Air Corps contractors received 

no hint that their undertakings were to be of a stopgap nature, nor 

is there any evidence that the contracts were so regarded by the Army 

when they were signed. 

Some of the impetus for militarization may be attributed to British 

initiative just as was the case in the unification of the Middle East 

missions. In the period between Pearl Harbor and Christmas, ''''illiam 

Bullitt, the President's ambassador-at-Iarge, was in Cairo where he 

talked with "the highest British authority," who requested prompt dispatch to the Middle East of 14,000 American service troops and 500 

officers to perform definite tasks allotted by the British but to be under 

General Maxwell's mission and commanded by their own officers. With 

flattering confidence in American ability to take Pearl Harbor in stride, 

the British impressed upon Mr. Bullitt the strategic importance of the 

Middle East, and provided him with detailed information as to British 

needs in holding the fort against the Axis. Hitherto British needs had 

been expressed in terms of materiel to be furnished through lend-lease 

by a nonbelligerent America. Pearl Harbor permitted extension of the 

list into the field manpower. It was indicated to Bullitt at GHO that 

what the British had in mind was something like an advance component for a base ordnance workshop, signals units, construction sections, railway maintenance sections, transport companies, railway 

telegraph operators, electrical and mechanical companies, engineer 

base workshop personnel, not to overlook such combat troops as antiaircraft and coast defense units. This was not an official proposal, and 

the record of it states that Bullitt made no commitments. \Vhen the 

War Department had thought it over for a few days, General Maxwell 

was notified on 3 January 1942 that no U.S. service troops would be 
THE IRANIAN MISSION AND ITS SUCCESSORS 95 

sent to the 1\fiddle East "under present conditions." For Maxwell's sole 

information it was also stated that no U.S. combat troops would be 

sent either.19 

The talk of military manpower, however, shows how promptly 

British thinking adjusted itself to the possibilities created by American 

belligerency. In October the Supply Committee of the cabinet had informed the British Supply Council and the J oint Staff Mission in Washington, "\Ve should prefer that any of the projects undertaken [by the 

Americans] are established and operated by contracts executed and 

administered by United States War and Navy Departments with 

American Companies. It will, however, be essential that heads of 

American Missions should have full authority over all contractors. In 

the absence of any such control it would be quite impracticable for 

Commander-in-Chief to exercise any authority over development of 

these projects." In October the British cabinet had been thinking of the 

small military missions that were to supervise the civilian contractor 

forces as closely associated with GHQ, Middle East Forces. The same 

message to Washington said, "We note with satisfaction that the United 

States propose to send Generals Maxwell and Wheeler to Middle East 

and Iraq to initiate agreed action without delay. We suggest that General Maxwell should report to and work direct with General Headquarters Middle East." The conversations of December opened the 

prospect of expanding American military forces concurrently with 

sending out contractor companies. There was certainly no talk of dropping the contractors, whatever implications lurked in talk of military 

expansion.20 

The President, appraised of Bullitt's conversations, wrote General 

Marshall, "Will you let me know what your plans are for reinforcing 

General1\faxwell's Mission in Egypt and General Wheeler's at Basra." 

N ext day General Marshall replied that General Maxwell in a series 

of radios had requested 1,000 officers and 24,000 enlisted men for supply services in North Africa. "General Wheeler has not requested any 

services of supply from the armed forces of the United States." This 

indicates that there was greater British interest in American troops at 

"(1) Rad, Col Bonner F. Fellers, U.S. MA, Cairo, to TAG, 21 Dec 41. cors 

21276-21350. HRS DRB AGO. (2) Msgs, GHQ, MEF, Cairo, to War Office, London, 

23 Dec 41 and 8 Jan 42, App. 7, American Aid in the ME, 1941 and 1942. MEF. (3) Rad 

316, by direction Secy War to Gen Maxwell, 3 Jan 42. CofS File as in (1). 

,. (1) Msg LO~US 40, Supply Committee to Supply Council, 7 Oct 41, App. 2, American 

Aid in the ME, 1941 and 1942. MEF. Another copy AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 1. 

(2) The association was intended to be close, but not organic. Lt. Gen. Sir Balfour Hutchinson, who was the supply chief at GHQ in late 1941, has written: "As regards the H. Q. 

we planned to have them [the Americans] as close as possible but at no time did we ever 

propose to amalgamate them into one and absorb the American Mission into our H. Q." 

Quoted in Ltr, Brig W. P. Pessell, Hist Sec, Cabinet Office, London, to author, 21 Jun 48. 
96 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

Cairo than at Baghdad. General Marshall's letter continued, "These 

requests have been discussed with Genenil Wemyss of the British [Joint 

Staff] Mission who has stated that he has heard nothing from the London office about it. Furthermore, lack of shipping which is needed for 

more important purposes prevents the dispatch of such a force. The 

armed forces/' concluded the Chief of Staff, "do not have the skilled 

supervisory personnel needed for certain work being undertaken under 

contract. The most expeditious means of accomplishing the work desired by the British in both the North African and Iranian areas is by 

using personnel under contract." 21 

Although the Chief of Staff's opinion disposed of the question of 

immediate plans to assign additional service troops to the Middle East, 

the Under Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson, on 21 January prepared a memorandum summarizing his objections to indefinite continuation of the civilian-contractor system. Citing the unfavorable experience of the War Department with civilian contractors in France 

in 1917-18, and referring to the organization in January 1942 by the 

Navy of a regiment (the Seabees) to build overseas bases in combat 

zones, Mr. Patterson's memorandum stated: 

These civilians will be in the probable theater of military operations, but 

will not be under military control. As a result the contractors may abandon the 

work, or the employees may leave when they see fit. There is no assurance that 

the contemplated work will be done. The contractors and their employees will 

receive exorbitant compensation in comparison with soldiers with similar responsibili ties. 22 

By February the determination of the War Department to militarize 

contract activities throughout the world was given force in a directive 

which provided that by 18 August 1942 all War Department contract 

activities would be terminated. These, and others approved but not yet 

initiated, were to be carried out thereafter by military organizations to 

be activated in the United States and sent overseas. Military personnel 

were also to be recruited from those employed on overseas contracts 

which would be terminated.23 

n (1) Ltr, President to CofS, 16 Jan 42. AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 1. (2) Memo, 

CofS for President, 17 Jan 42. AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 1. An earlier draft in the file 

bears, in Marshall's hand, the words: "General Wheeler, incidentally, has not requested 

the large forces desired by General Maxwell." .. (1) Memo, Under Secy War for Secy War, 21 Jan 42. AG 160 (2-15-42) MSC-D-M. 

(2) Another memorandum covered much the same ground, adding reference to difficulties in 

the case of the death, wounding, or capture of civilian employees in combat areas, and 

recommended militarization where practicable with termination of contracts whenever military 

units would be ready to take over. G-3 for CofS, 29 Jan 42. AG 160.0, Hq AMET. 

,. (1) Rad 568 AMSEG 224, WD to Gen Maxwell, 10 Feb 42, announced that there would 

be certain necessary exceptions. AG 160.0, Hq AMET. (2) AG Ltr, 18 Feb 42, sub: 

Closing out of Overseas Contracts and Militarization of Contract Activities. AG 160 

(2-15-42) MSC-D-M. There is a draft of 11 Feb. AG 160.0, Hq AMET. Memo, Gen 
THE IRANIAN MISSION AND ITS SUCCESSORS 97 

The basic principle having been adopted and a date fixed by which 

it was to be applied, it remained to figure out ways and means-a procedure, as events developed, which put the cart before the horse. The 

North Atlantic Division engineer wrote to the Chief of Engineers to 

propose that some engineer units should be sent overseas which could 

be trained on arrival by the civilians already on the job. Then, he 

suggested, the civilians could be inducted into the units, and those 

not liable under the draft law could be returned home. A great many 

plans were made, and estimates of required troop strength sprang up 

in all directions. The Corps of Engineers calculated that 15,852 men 

would be required for the two Middle East missions, to be organized in 

March and April and depart in May. The Ordnance Department estimated five regiments for the two missions, including provision for mobile ordnance establishments requested by the British to operate in the 

rear of British division shops and in advance of U.S. Army fixed shops 

and depots, a request caused by the tremendous amount of battle 

damage to American ordnance materiel in recent operations and great 

scarcity of British maintenance troops, previously reported by General 

Maxwell. At a meeting in Washington on 31 March General Aurand 

summed up the status of estimates then available to him. A maximum 

limit of 40,000 troops for purposes of militarization had been set, he 

said, by vVPD, as against total estimates of 48,000 submitted by the 

various services. The estimates had forthwith been scaled dO\vn to 

41,000 "and may eventually be reduced still further." General Aurand 

added that changing events would probably require the revamping of 

the approach toward the militarization of bases.24 

In another part of the Services of Supply, the Plans and Operations 

Division, a considerably reduced set of figures was hatched. As of 

1 April requirements for the missions were presented by this office in 

the form of two objectives, the first of 5,000 troops to be shipped by 

September, the second of 19,478 troops to be shipped by December. 

The memorandum estimated that 23,600 troops were required for 

Somervell, ACofS, G-4, through Secy, Gen Staff, for TAG, transmitted the direction of 

Secy War that the directive be dispatched. AG 160 (2-15--42) MSC-D--M. Attached to 

the directive are comments of General Staff divisions pointing out contradictions, inconsistencies, and difficulties in effectuating the directive; but there were no exceptions affecting 

Middle East projects . .. (1) Ltr, Col John N. Hodges to CofEngrs, 24 Feb 42. AG 004.001, Hq AMET. 

(2) Ltr, Actg Chief, Troops Div, Corps of Engineers, to TAG, 7 Mar 42. AG 320.2 

(1-27--42) 7. This estimate differs from that in Memo, Opns and Training Br, Troops 

Div, OCofEngrs, 3 Mar 42, sub: Commissioned Pers for Cons Units. 381 (Middle East) 

O&T Sec Files, Folio 1, Serials 1-175, OCofEngrs. (3) Memo, for TAG, 5 Mar 42. 

AG 320.2 (1-27--42) 7. (4) Rad AMSEG 87, Gen Maxwell to Maj Theodore S. Riggs, 

16 Dec 41. Same file. (5) Memo, Melvin Sims for Col Ladue, 31 Mar 42. Conti Div ASF, 

HRSDRBAGO. 
98 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

complete militarization of contract activities in North Africa and Iran. 

This figure greatly exceeded the total number of civilians ever gathered 

at one time in the field because it included estimates for additional 

projects of the sort mentioned by the British to Ambassador Bullitt.25 

At Baghdad Colonel Shingler immediately took up with the British 

Tenth Army headquarters the disposition of the proposed American 

troops. The British account of the meeting records that the discussion 

was held in view of plans to militarize American projects effective 

1 August, by which date there would be 23,400 American soldiers employed on American projects. Colonel Shingler arranged with the 

Tenth Army for housing, supplies and rations, ordnance, communications, medical services, vehicle repair and maintenance, petroleum 

products, postal service, water supply, security, command, and liaison. 

The Tenth Army commander decided that headquarters of "the U.S. 

Military Mission with Tenth Army shall be located at Basra." The 

arrangements envisaged a very close administrative connection between American and British forces, with British control over everything, including "co-ordinating the system of administration, discipline 

and command in the particular places where American troops are 

stationed." 26 

As the summer advanced and the arrival of ordnance heavy maintenance and quartermaster light maintenance companies and a base 

ordnance battalion grew imminent, a British plan to locate these 

American units at Shu'aiba and Rafadiyah was abandoned in favor of 

a suggestion by Colonel Shingler that, since the American effort was 

concentrated in the Persian line of communications, the grouping of 

U.S. Army units close to one another in that area would be preferable 

to spreading them out in Iraq and Iran. Tenth Army not only accepted 

the American suggestion but made available workshops and installations prepared for it at Andimeshk. It was agreed between Head-

'" Memo, Brig Gen LeRoy Lutes, Dir, Plans and Opns Div, SOS, for ACofS, G--4, 9 Jul 42. 

AG 160 (2-15-42) MSC-D-M . .. (1) "Precis of a discussion which took place at Headquarters, Tenth Army, on Monday 

6th April 1942 between the Anny Commander, Col Shingler, U.S. Army, and D.A. and 

Q.M.G., Tenth Army, as amplified by telephone conversation, L.G.A., G.H.Q. M.E.F. 

speaking to D.A. and Q.M.G., Tenth Army." 206/32/2/Q1. Copy transcribed for the 

author by courtesy of the Historical Section, Cabinet Office, London. (2) Just before he was relieved as Commanding General, USAFIME, to become Commanding General, SOS, 

USAFIME, General Maxwell concluded similar arrangements for placing American detachments for the time being under the control of British commanders. Because of constitutional 

difficulties, no "formal ordinance" was entered into, disposition of units by "unilateral 

decision" of Maxwell and his "very ready co-operation" being relied upon as an informal 

working basis. The British did not, therefore, diminish their own units in compensation for 

those looked for from the Americans. General Connolly did not continue these arrangements 

after his arrival in the Corridor. :Msg, War Office, London, to ME and Persia-Irc.q, 

25 Oct 42, and reply, Mideast to Troopers, PAIC, 4 Nov 42, transcribed for author by Hist 

Sec, Cabinet Office, London. 
THE IRANIAN MISSION AND ITS SUCCESSORS 99 

quarters, Tenth Army, and Colonel Shingler that Tenth Army would 

be the co-ordinating authority for the allocation of work, priorities, and 

production in maintenance and repair work; but that "the technical 

operation" of the quartermaster light maintenance company at Andimeshk after it should take over the wrecking and road service on the 

motor convoy route north of Andimeshk, as well as supervision of the 

lubrication and checking service at Tabriz, should remain under 

American control.'7 

It should be realized that until adoption of the Combined Chiefs' 

new plan in September, all plans and estimates for troops and troop 

assignments were on a basis of militarizing current civilian contract 

operations and of adding supplementary activities as required. Meanwhile, as small units of signal, ordnance, and engineer personnel went 

overseas under the normal plans made for the Iranian Mission and its 

successors, it had become apparent in Washington by July that militarization could not be effected by the date fixed. On 9 July Brig. Gen. 

LeRoy Lutes of SOS presented a memorandum to G-4 stating that 

"the militarization contemplated ... has not been carried out, nor 

is it likely that it can ever be completely accomplished unless Operations Division, "Var Department General Staff, authorizes the necessary 

troops, equipment, and shipping to accomplish the projects." He 

noted that the engineer units authorized in March for militarization 

had been diverted to BOLERO, the operation for build-up in England 

of men and equipment for the invasion of Europe, "because no transportation was in prospect for shipment to missions." He recommended 

rescinding the directive of 18 February and adoption of more realistic 

measures.'s 

Accordingly, The Adjutant General by order of the Secretary of 

"Var issued 011 17 July a letter rescinding so much of the directive of 

18 February as required completion of militarization by 18 August, 

and amending that directive "to require the closing out of overseas contracts and their militarization as rapidly as can be accomplished within 

the limitations of the availability of troops, equipment, and transportation." 29 

In consequence of this decision the relatively small numbers of 

civilian employees overseas whose projects were to have been taken 

over and expanded by thousands of troops continued at their jobs, some 

of them well into 1943. The three contractors in the Persian Corridor 

1'7 Ltr, Hq, Tenth Army, to Hq, Iran-Iraq Serv Comd, 13 Aug 42; and Ltr, Col 

Shingler to QMG, Tenth Army, 24 Aug 42. PGF 259. ,. Memo cited n. 25. ,. Ltr, TAG, 17 Ju142. AG 160 (2-15-42) 1. 
100 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

were dispensed with in varying fashion. In general the transition was 

effected by a compromise with plans previously advanced. Contracts 

were closed out in whole or in part, while certain contract employees 

were placed as civilians on the War Department payroll, serving either 

directly under Army control or nominally so, with instructions coming 

to them from the Army through their own civilian foremen and supervisors. Very few of the civilian-contractor employees enlisted or accepted Army commissions. Many of them, particularly in the aircraft 

assembly operations, were of service in breaking in the inexperienced 

troops sent over to replace them. 

The year 1942 began with a handful of men, soldiers, and civilians, 

set down in a far country to undertake heavy labors amidst the changing 

circumstances and pressing urgencies of war. The confusions endured 

and surmounted during that harassed year made more certain the 

achievements that came in 1943. 
CHAPTER VI 

Wharves, Roads, and Barges 

'When the War Department in February 1942 decided to militarize 

the civilian contractor projects in the Persian Corridor and in April 

shifted priorities from the British line of communications in Iraq to 

the Soviet supply line in Iran, it was preparing to assume a larger share 

of the British Russian-aid burden in the Corridor in two of its three 

categories-construction and assembly. The third category, transport, 

including both port operation and inland clearance by road and rail, 

remained in Bri tish hands until 1943. 

In construction the British increased the wharf facilities at Bandar 

Shahpur and extended the ISR south from Ahwaz to Khorramshahr, 

linking that port by July 1942 to the main line of the railway. To the 

Americans fell the construction of additional wharfage at Khorramshahr, a permanent all-weather two-lane highway with a parallel 

temporary road north to Andimeshk, and necessary housing, storage, 

and shop installations. Completion of the Anglo-American tasks would 

forge a chain of facilities each of whose three links, ports, highways, 

and railway, was essential to the smooth delivery of an increasing flow 

of supplies to the Soviet Union. Construction was the critical operation 

of 1942, for not only must facilities attempt to keep pace with incoming 

shipping throughout the year but they must also be sufficiently advanced to be usable by December, the time planned for the arrival of 

the U.S. Army service troops. In addition, the assembly of motor 

vehicles and aircraft, the second main task assumed by the Americans, 

depended upon adequate port facilities for the landing of cased vehicles 

and aircraft, as well as upon adequate highway and rail capacity for 

delivery overland to Soviet receiving points. 

Making Bricks Without Straw 

Because of his primary responsibility for construction, the Iranian 

District engineer was a key factor in the American task. He and his 

constructor, Folspen, were to share many headaches, chief among them 
102 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

shortages in personnel, supplies, and equipment. An estimate prepared 

in Washington shortly before Pearl Harbor had prophesied that within 

a few months perhaps four or five thousand American civilians would 

go to Iran. While the entrance of the United States into the war greatly 

enlarged its potential responsibilities, resultant shipping stringencies 

reduced the manpower, supplies, and equipment that could be delivered to the field. Writing to General 'Wheeler in January from his 

New York headquarters, the district engineer, Colonel Lieber, estimated that given a force of 1,300 American civilians he could complete 

the engineer tasks in four hundred days.l The ultimate failure to complete the task was in large part attributable to shortages. It was a case 

of making bricks without straw. 

American methods of road building require a high degree of 

mechanized equipment such as tractors, bulldozers, mechanical shovels 

and graders, large capacity dump trucks, rock gravel plants, concrete 

mixers, and asphalt distributors. Without skilled operators this equipment is useless. The program assumed, therefore, provision of regular 

and adequate shipping to deliver the men, materials, and equipment. 

The War Department had promised a ship every two weeks for the 

Iranian projects and it was anticipated in the preliminary planning 

that all men and materials would reach the base before 1 May 1942. 

But for many crucial months after Pearl Harbor, while the Iranian 

projects languished, a combination of factors in the world-wide demand 

for American shipping made the Iranian Mission a stepchild. In consequence an adequate force of skilled American personnel did not reach 

the base until 1 September, and "sufficient and necessary construction 

equipment" did not reach the site until October.2 A Folspen report 

states that War Department approval of a traffic manager for shipments overseas was granted in December 1941 "too late to be of service 

in the first and second shipments," and that "after Colonel Lieber left 

for Persia there was no one in the War Department who really had the 

job at heart and in hand." 3 On 19 January 1942 Folspen wrote the 

Chief of Engineers that they had hired men on the basis of promised 

transportation which had been successively withdrawn until their work 

was being dislocated and their planning and procurement were reaching a point that "now prejudiced the progress of work in Iraq and 

1 (J) Memo, 26 Nov 41, sub: Procurement of Supplies for the Iranian Mission. AG 

400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 4. (2) Ltr. Col Lieber to Gen Wheeler, 13 Jan 42, carried by 

Gen Greely. Afr. M. 24/3, NADEF. (3) Ltr, Col Lieber to Engr, NAD, 14 Jan 42. 

Iran 46/30, NADEF. 

'Report of Foreign Manager on Fee Earned, WD Contract DA-W-I098-Eng-109, 

20 Mar 43. SWP Office. 

sA. J. Ruge, Project Manager, Report on Iranian Operations, 9 Mar 43. SWP Office. 
WHARVES, ROADS, AND BARGES 103 

Iran." The Deputy Chief of Staff replied that every effort was being 

made to find shipping, but that "an investigation reveals that delays 

in providing water transportation have been occasioned by scarcity of 

ships." 4 

The serious handicap of personnel shortages is illustrated by a 

few figures. Against Colonel Lieber's estimate of 1,300 men required, 

only 900 altogether were shipped to the base during the life of the 

Folspen contract and of these the peak number at the site at anyone 

time was 751, reached in October. Hundreds of men were hired only 

to wait in New York for weeks on stand-by pay and per diem until 

shipping was provided. One shipment of 432 men, at a cost of $135,000 

in stand-by pay and per diem, embarked in March on the ill-fated 

voyage of the Agwileon and did not reach Iran until July and August. 

Their ship, badly overcrowded, developed engine trouble off Freetown, 

Sierra Leone. With food, water, and medical supplies running low, they 

lay there for repairs and then limped on to Capetown. From there, after 

ten weeks' layover-during which the cost of housing and feeding the 

constructor's men ran to $83,000 exclusive of their pay-the last of 

them were transshipped to the Persian Corridor, many of them, by 

arrival, hardly fit for work. Three weeks before 19 November, when 

Folspen was ordered to cease further hiring, there were 358 men awaiting shipment from the United States.~ 

To offset the lack of American men and machinery it was determined in February to employ native workmen up to an estimated total 

of ten thousand, to be used chiefly in highway construction. Instead of 

bulldozers and tractors, primitive manpower, equipped with litde 

shovels, filled potholes and heaped embankments against floodtime 

inch by inch with earth poured from small woven baskets filled by hand. 

Native labor was obtained at first through British agencies, and this 

sometimes resulted in the Americans getting less desirable workers. 

Later when the Americans issued coupons entiding the laborers to 

rations of tea, bread or rice, and sugar, they got their pick of the market 

without upsetting established wage scales. Labor was hired direcdy 

and, for certain projects, through labor contractors according to a 

• (1) Ltr, Folspen to CofEngrs, 19 Jan 42. AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 1. (2) Ltr, 

DCofS, 4 Feb 42. Same file. • (1) Agwileon File. PGF 260. (2) Data on personnel shipments in Charles H. Sells, 

Report of the Foreign Manager, 10 Mar 43, SWP Office (cited hereafter as Sells Rpt); 

Final Report of the Safety Engineer, App. I, SWP Office; Memo, 2 Jan 42, Afr. M. 11/12, 

NADEF; Memo, 17 Jan 42, AG 400,3295 (8-9-41) Sec 1; Rpt cited n. 3; Ltr, to Col Lieber, 

11 Apr 42, quoted in Edmund A. Prentis, Progress Review of Construction Work, American 

Military Mission to Persia, 10 Mar 43, SWP Office; Report, Personnel Manager to Foreign 

Project Manager, Ahwaz, 21 Oct 42, DE File R-2, Reports, NADEF; Rad AMSIR 819, 

29 Oct 42, quoted in Ltr, Dir, Conti Div, SOS, Hq 1616--A, Munitions Bldg, Washington, 

to Engr, NAD, 4 Nov 42, NA 2051 (AMSIR) 159, NADEF. 
104 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

system used by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the British Army. 

Skilled native labor, especially in the north, was adaptable, eager, and 

quick to learn new methods. They were certified for security by the 

British. As the labor force was a variable, no exact census is available 

for 1942; but as of 15 October there were only about 2,000 native 

laborers on direct hire, increased to 3,500 by 1 November, while 

contract labor on a unit-price basis accounted for some 3,500 more.s 

No less serious than personnel shortages was the lack of mechanized 

equipment and construction supplies. With 10,000 long tons of engineer materials at sea in December 1941, the district engineer in January 

requested shipping for 12,000 additional long tons of space and noted 

that 10,000 long tons of road construction and quarry equipment were 

being procured, all of which should be shipped by 15 April. Between 

14 February and 2 July, seven ships discharged cargoes of about 8,150 

long tons 7 of construction supplies and equipment for engineer projects. Then came a disaster of the first magnitude when the eighth ship, 

the Kahuku, carrying 7,480 long tons of excavating, transportation, 

gravel, rock plant, and asphalt equipment was sunk on 15 June near 

Trinidad by enemy action. At one blow 60 percent of the required 

equipment for highway building was lost. 8 

In July Colonel Lieber reported to Colonel Shingler that the permanent road north from Ahwaz to Andimeshk, scheduled for completion 

by 1 September, was only 2 percent completed, and that with only 

about 20 percent of needed machinery on hand "the existing equipment situation in this district is critical." He noted the serious consequences, through the loss of the Kahuku, of having put all the eggs in 

one basket and urged that in future cargoes be divided among several 

ships in 500-ton lots. 9 

Intense efforts were made to obtain desperately needed items for 

use in the wharf and highway projects. A serious obstacle to wharf building was lack of piling. Under early high-level planning the British had 

• (1) Rad 77 to Washington, 13 Feb 42. AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 4. (2) Sells Rpt. 

(3) Ltr, Foreign Mgr to Folspen, New York, 15 Oct 42. NA 2146 (AMSIR) 2, NADEF. 

(4) Chart 2. T Converted from figure of 16,300 ship tons given in Shipping Rpts. SWP Office. • (1) Monthly Rpt of Opns for Dec 41, Iranian Dist Engr to Engr, NAD. Iran 46/30 

(another copy Iran 24/2-a), NADEF. (2) Memo, Iranian Dist Engr, 14 Jan 42. Iran 

46/30, NADEF. (3) Shipping Rpts. SWP Office. (4) Rad AMSIR 296, 21 Jun 42. AG 

400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 4. (5) Memo, OpNav, 12 Jul 42, with Summaries of Statements 

by Survivors, 6 Aug. 42. Ships Casualty File, Water Trans Serv Div, OCofTrans. (6) Work on procuring replacements did not begin until April 1943, ten months after the sinking and 

four months after cancellation of the constructor's contract. It was estimated that replacements would not reach the field until November. Rpt from Washington Office of PGSC 

to CG, PGSC, on Activities for Week Ending 20 Apr 43, 21 Apr 43. PGF 225. 

• Ltr, Col Lieber to Col Shingler, 12 Jul 42. DE File S-4, Ships, Shipping, and Sailings, 

NADEF. . 
WHARVES, ROADS, AND BARGES 105 

undertaken to supply all piling; but the capture of the Andaman 

Islands by the Japanese on 23 March 1942 cut off the British source of 

promised timber. Many months were to pass before the British were 

able to deliver teakwood piles. These presented serious problems in 

construction which were satisfactorily solved by the Folspen technicians 

by an ingenious method of splicing. 

In July, following the loss of the Kahuku, Colonel Lieber dispatched 

a representative to India to obtain buses for transporting men from the 

road construction camps to their sites of work, and to locate sources of 

pipe, reinforcing and structural steel, I-beams, blasting dynamite, drills, 

rock crushers, road rollers, pumps, and dump trucks. The report of the 

survey indicated that co-ordination between the various Allied services 

in Iran and India was not yet highly developed. For example, in the 

face of need of pipe for American projects, the British "had recently 

moved about 75 miles of six inch pipe from Iran to India." It was reported that some fifty crates of trucks and passenger cars had been 

standing idle on the docks at Karachi for the past three months. Machinery and equipment were scarce and expensive. Diversion of defense 

materials from China was investigated, but "General Wheeler stated 

that it would be impossible to secure anything from this source without 

an O.K. from Chungking which he knew would not be granted." 10 

Diversion from India of goods formerly designated for Singapore was 

explored, in view of the loss of Singapore to the Japanese five months 

earlier; but the record does not reveal the results of the inquiry. There 

was a considerable reserve in India of construction equipment as well as 

of transport trucks, but it was held by the British and could not be obtained by the Americans for their Iranian projects except by the timeconsuming process of making application to Tenth Army at Baghdad 

which would in turn apply to New Delhi. Fortunately, back in the Corridor, certain materials were plentiful along the route of the highway. 

Near Ahwaz was a quarry of low-grade sandstone which provided 

stone for the base course of the road. Twenty miles north of Ahwaz 

alluvial gravel was obtainable in ample quantities; and the Abadan 

refinery produced asphalt for top surfacing. 

No catalogue of handicaps and discouragements that affected construction would be complete without mention of the climate. Although 

winter temperatures in the region from Ahwaz to the Gulf ranged from 

35° to 70° F., with rain, the period between June and September rarely 

fell below 100° F. Average shade temperature at noon fluctuated be-

,. Report of a Trip to Karachi, India, by Capt Lawson T. Blood, 18 Aug 42. DE File 

R-2, Reports, NADEF. 
106 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

tween 1200 and 140° F. Colonel Lieber has stated that in July and 

August at Ahwaz he would wait until the temperature dropped to 1240 , 

an hour before midnight, before going to the roof of his billet to sleep." 

The handicaps under which the constructor forces worked took less 

toll of wharf construction than of highway building. After preliminary 

reconnaissance, undertaken while the Iraqi projects were still in progress, and after the ships Texmar and Granville were moved from 

Umm Qasr to Khorramshahr in April 1942 to off-load their cargoes of 

dock lumber and equipment, personnel were assigned on 26 April to 

begin construction of two deepwater berths with the necessary rail and 

road approaches. A completion date of 1 August was set.12 Because the 

move from Iraq was still under way and engineer and Folspen headquarters were not permanently established at Ahwaz until June, the 

force was small. Khorramshahr at this time possessed only one small 

concrete wharf built in 1937 by European engineers. When the Americans arrived this wharf was covered by a large pile of coal and was not 

used for shipping. Its single crane has been described as "capable of 

lifting a ton or so when in working order." 13 The port was resorted to 

only when Bandar Shahpur was crowded.14 The two additional berths 

1.mdertaken by the Amedcans were designed, in conjunction with completion of the branch line of the ISR being built by the British, to raise 

Khorramshahr's capacity to 2,200 long tons per day from the early 

1942 estimated capacity of between 200 and 70010ngtons.l~ 

Using materials brought from the United States, supplemented 

after midyear by British piling, the two new berths had been brought 

to 46 percent of completion by the end of June. 16 The British Tenth 

Army then requested construction of a third berth, increasing this 

later by three more. By the end of the year Folspen had built five opendeck pile trestle wharves sixty feet wide and had brought the sixth 

berth to 25 percent of completion, providing the equivalent of 2,125 

11 Notes and comments by Colonel Lieber for the author, 10 February 1949. 12 Rad, Hq, Iranian Mission, Basra to Iranian Dist Engr, Ahwaz, 26 Apr 42, sub: 

Revision of Projects, cited HOTI, Pt. IV, History of the Ports, by Ogden C. Reed, p. 7 

and n. 15. PGF. 13 Notes and comments cited n. 11. ,. Rpt by W. H. Lock, British Ministry of War Transport, quoted in General Summary 

Report of the Program of the War Shipping Administration for the Delivery of Russian-Aid 

to the Persian Gulf Ports and the Relations of the War Shipping Administration with Other 

Agencies, Public and Private, for the Period Ending December 1944, by Nels Anderson, 

ME Representative for Recruitment and Manning, WSA. PGF 257. 10 Data sheet forwarded by Dist Engr to U.S. Naval Observer, Basra, 20 Jul 42. DE 

File P-9, Ports and Harbor Facilities, NADEF, A 1,000-foot lighterage wharf directed to be 

built was never begun "because of the failure to reach a decision as to the desired location." 

Sells Rpt. 

,. Rpt of Opns, Iran-Iraq Serv Comd, 1 May-30 Jun 42. PGF 239. 
WHARVES, ROADS, AND BARGES 107 

linear feet of deepwater berthing space. This represented 86 percent 

completion of the wharf construction task.17 

Although the new wharf construction of 1942 provided for the 

greatly increased port capacity that was to follow the adoption of new 

methods of port operation in 1943, there was no great increase in tonnage discharge during the civilian construction period above the 700 

long tons per day maximum estimated at the beginning of the year. 

1vIoreover, Soviet-bound goods tended by October to pile up in the 

Khorramshahr storage areas for lack of adequate inland clearance. 

\Vhile the British struggled with their transport responsibilities, 

completion of the highway by the Americans increased in importance. 

Early planning for one thousand miles of highway construction, predicated upon adequate manpower and equipment, had contemplated 

that twelve construction units would operate out of four main road 

camps to be established in desert, plateau, and mountain areas. There 

were to be five quarry or gravel plant units.'8 By midsummer, with only 

about four hundred Americans on the highway task, there were six 

road camps: Desert Camps 1 and 2 close to Khorramshahr and Ahwaz 

respectively; the Kharkeh River, Shaur River, and Sabz-i-Ab Camps 

between Ahwaz and Andimeshk; and the Quarry Camp, called Foleyabad, three miles west of Ahwaz. 

Although handicapped by early uncertainties in planning, bridge 

construction turned in a better percentage-of-completion record than 

the highway program as a whole. During the planning period in late 

1941 it was not known how many bridges would be required for a roadbuilding program not yet definitely located on the map. Indeed, Folspen 

were under the impression that the British would build all necessary 

bridges.'9 The general British commitment to provide construction materials at the site was relied upon during the stage of procurement of 

11 (1) Estimate in Tabulation of Directives, Change Orders, and Percentages Completed 

as of 15 Dec 42. DE File C-l1.2, Correspondence on Directives, NADEF. (2) An estimate 

of 94 percent completion of wharf construction appears in Weekly Rpt of Opns to CG, PGSC, 

by Lt Col R. G. McGlone, Iranian Dist Engr, 26 Dec 42. DE File 0-1, Operations, 

NADEF. (3) An estimate of 88 percent completion of wharf construction appears in Information To Be Furnished to the North Atlantic Division for the Purpose of Preparing 

a Completion Report for Contract DA-W-I098-Eng-l09, as requested by letter dated 

10 May 1943 from the North Atlantic Division and signed by Capt. H. G. Groves. NA 

7205 (AMSIR) 13/2 and NA 319.2 (AMSIR) 38/2, NADEF. Another copy PGF 239. 

Varying estimates result from differing bases of calculation. (4) See also Ltr, Col McGlone 

to Dist Serv Comdr, Ahwaz, 27 Apr 43. DE File A-l.8/1, Contracts, NADEF. (5) Also 

Ltc, Capt Enos B. Cape, Actg Dist Engr, Ahwaz to Folspen, 20 Jan 43, DE File S-4, 

Ships, Shipping, and Sailings, NADEF. (6) Completion by the Army of the sixth berth 

in 1943, together with the original concrete wharf brought the installation up to 3,251 linear 

feet of berthing space. 11 Ltr cited n. 1 (2). 

,. Ltr, Sells to author, 10 Oct 49. 
supplies. Arrived in the field, where they were ordered to build bridges 

from the start, the Americans had to hustle for materials. On the initiative of George Paaswell, Folspen chief engineer, who died of an 

illness contracted in Iran, steel girders from the recently demolished 

Sixth Avenue “El” of New York were shipped to Iran where they 

helped to bridge the Shaur River south of Andimeshk. Some steel 

beams from an underground cut-and-cover trench warehouse erected 

at Umm Qasr were brought over to Iran and worked into another 

bridge. A 900-foot concrete viaduct was built across the Bala Rud south 

of Andimeshk. All told, Folspen constructed twenty bridges totaling 

fifty-seven spans for an over-all length of 1,717.98 feet. By the end 

of 1942 the bridge-building task was 90 percent completed, although 

on the Ahwaz-Andimeshk leg of the highway completion was only 40 

percent of the goal.20

There is no general agreement in the mass of reports by different 

hands as to percentage of completion during 1942 of the permanent 

highway from Khorramshahr to Andimeshk. The temporary highway, 

which was a resurfaced stretch of desert track generally paralleling the 

railway with .occasional forages across country, was completed all but 

for bitumen surfacing over the 172 miles of its length between Khorramshahr and Andimeshk. Folspen estimated the all-weather 24-foot 

paved highway between Ahwaz and Andimeshk, which received first 

priority, was 50 percent complete; estimates for the section between 

Khorramshahr and Ahwaz range from 28 to 48 percent.21 

Delayed by manpower and equipment shortages, the highway program was also haunted by changes in specifications. In the early spring 

of 1943 the normal rains and spring floods inundated an area of 1,200 

square miles through which the American-built highway route lay, 

washing out two of the twenty bridges so laboriously and ingeniously 

built the previous year, and eight miles of road. Half the remaining 

mileage of completed highway was badly undermined and the trucking 

of Russian-aid cargoes inland away from the ports seriously slowed. 

Following this calamity recriminations sputtered on all sides, particularly bitter on the part of the U.S. Army which took over from the 

engineer constructor in 1943 and was pushing the vitally needed artery 

northward with service troops and native labor. Flooding along the 

route was a known phenomenon taken into consideration in the preliminary planning by the J. G. White Corporation when it was engaged 

20 (1) Interv with A. J. Ruge, Project Mgr, SWP Office, 28 Oct 44. (2) Sells Rpt. 

(3) Ltr cited n. 6 (3). (4) Information for Completion Report cited n. 17 (3). (4) Tabulation cited n. 17 (1). 

21 (1) Interv, Gen Shingler with Victor Pentlarge, Pentagon, 22 Apr 46. (2) Documents 

cited n. 17(1), (2), (3); and Sells Rpt. 

108 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

supplies. Arrived in the field, where they were ordered to build bridges 

from the start, the Americans had to hustle for materials. On the initiative of George Paaswell, Folspen chief engineer, who died of an 

illness contracted in Iran, steel girders from the recently demolished 

Sixth Avenue "El" of New York were shipped to Iran where they 

helped to bridge the Shaur River south of Andimeshk. Some steel 

beams from an underground cut-and-cover trench warehouse erected 

at Umm Qasr were brought over to Iran and worked into another 

bridge. A 900-foot concrete viaduct was built across the Bala Rud south 

of Andimeshk. All told, Folspen constructed twenty bridges totaling 

fifty-seven spans for an over-all length of 1,717.98 feet. By the ~nd 

of 1942 the bridge-building task was 90 percent completed, although 

on the Ahwaz-Andimeshk leg of the highway completion was only 40 

percent of the goal,2° 

There is no general agreement in the mass of reports by different 

hands as to percentage of completion during 1942 of the permanent 

highway from Khorramshahr to Andimeshk. The temporary highway, 

which was a resurfaced stretch of desert track generally paralleling the 

railway with 'occasional forages across country, was completed all but 

for bitumen surfacing over the 172 miles of its length between Khorramshahr and Andimeshk. Folspen estimated the all-weather 24-foot 

paved highway between Ahwaz and Andimeshk, which received first 

priority, was 50 percent complete; estimates for the section between 

Khorramshahr and Ahwaz range from 28 to 48 percent.21 

Delayed by manpower and equipment shortages, the highway program was also haunted by changes in specifications. In the early spring 

of 1943 the normal rains and spring floods inundated an area of 1,200 

square miles through which the American-built highway route lay, 

washing out two of the twenty bridges so laboriously and ingeniously 

built the previous year, and eight miles of road. Half the remaining 

mileage of completed highway was badly undermined and the trucking 

of Russian-aid cargoes inland away from the ports seriously slowed. 

Following this calamity recriminations sputtered on all sides, particularly bitter on the part of the U.S. Army which took over from the 

engineer constructor in 1943 and was pushing the vitally needed artery 

northward with service troops and native labor. Flooding along the 

route was a known phenomenon taken into consideration in the preliminary planning by the J. G. ''''hite Corporation when it was engaged 

.. (1) Interv with A. J. Ruge, Project Mgr, SWP Office, 28 Oct 44. (2) SelIs Rpt. 

(3) Ltr cited n. 6 (3). (4) Information for Completion Report cited n. 17 (3). (4) Tabulation cited n. 17 (1). 21 (1) Interv, Gen Shingler with Victor Pcntlarge, Pentagon, 22 Apr 46. (2) Documents 

cited n. 17 (1 ), (2), (3) ; and Sells Rpt. 
WHARVES, ROADS, AND BARGES 109 

under the ordnance program. The country around Khorramshahr, 

with the exception of a narrow strip along the riverbanks, is barren, flat 

desert subject to floods during the rainy season between November and 

April when precipitation averages 6.57 inches. To the north in the 

region of Ahwaz, the average precipitation reaches 8.92 inches, with 

flooding increased by the clayey nature of the flat desert and by drainage from a group of soft sandstone ridges northwest of the town. In 

their planning, Folspen, aware of the J. G. White recommendations, 

proposed a lO-foot elevation at the southernmost end of the highway 

and, beyond the coastal region, a minimum elevation of 3.6 feet with 

matched openings and flood-control dykes where the highway paralleled the railway. On 28 August 1942 Colonel Lieber approved these 

specifications, but later, for speed's sake, left the southernmost section 

at 10 feet but reduced the rest to a minimum of 3 feet and a maximum 

of 4 feet above the floor of the desert. His successor reduced the elevation of the first four miles inland from the river to 8.5 feet; and in November the third Iranian District engineer eliminated the control 

dykes, reduced the number of culverts, and cut the elevation of the 

road above the desert floor to only a foot and a half for all but a 25-mile 

stretch on the north end and a 4-mile stretch on the south, and for a 

short stretch encompassing five small bridges. The serious damage to 

completed roadways inevitably followed in the ensuing rainy season.22 

Less harried by adverse circumstances than the highway and port 

tasks, the erection of necessary buildings was completed in 1942. The 

list of accomplished objectives included the laying of 8,000 square feet 

of concrete paving for the motor vehicle assembly plant being erected 

by the British at Andimeshk, buildings at Ahwaz providing 69,500 

square feet of floor space, and offices, carpenter shops, equipment 

repair shops, motor service facilities, refrigerator installations, and cool 

rooms for food at Ahwaz and elsewhere.23 

Barge Assembly at Kuwait 

Included in the lists of American tasks drawn up by Generals 

Wheeler and WavellinNovember 1941 was the assembling, for delivery 

to the Inland Water Transport agency of the British Tenth Army, of 

knocked-down prefabricated barges shipped from the United States. 

Before the war there was considerable barging up the Tigris River to 

Baghdad and some on the Euphrates. On the Karun River in Iran, 

.. David F. Giboney, Report on Drainage Conditions, Highways-Ahwaz to Khorramshahr 

(Iran), 22 May 43. SWPOffice. 

"Documents cited n. 17(1), (3). 
110 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

barges had furnished the chief means, before the British extended the 

railway to Khorramshahr, of carrying cargoes inland to Ahwaz, 

although at times of low water it was an uncertain means. By request 

of the British authorities early in 1942 the Americans undertook to 

provide large numbers of new barges for the Inland Water Transport 

to meet increasing demands of river traffic controlled by that agency_ 

The assignment went to the Iranian District engineer. On 5 March 

Colonel Lieber earmarked $100,000 for the cost of local assembly; on 

13 April General Somervell notified Colonel Shingler that the first 

shipment of sixty-two disassembled barges which had been designed 

and procured in the United States would be shipped two days later; 

and Folspen, having been orally instructed to take charge of the project, 

notified their home office on 29 April that they \vere prepared to take 

over on 1 June. 24 

The site chosen for the barge assembly operation was the picturesque Arab town of Kuwait in the Sheikdom of Kmvait, a British 

protectorate sandwiched between Iraq and Saudi Arabia at the north-

\\'est corner of the Persian Gulf. Here an ancient hereditary guild of 

shipwrights, whose oral tradition claims that they once sent a party to 

the Mediterranean to instruct the Phoenicians, carried on a thriving 

native boatbuilding industry.25 An adequate force of native craftsmen 

and carpenters was available to work under the supervision of a small 

number of American civilians responsible to an area engineer delegated 

by the Iranian District engineer. On 21 Maya conference was held at 

Kuwait attended by Colonel Lieber, Charles Sells for Folspen, the 

British political agent for Kuwait, a representative of the Kuwait Oil 

Company, representatives of the U.S. Navy and Maritime Commission, and the adaptable and co-operative chief of the native boatbuilders' guild, Haji Ahmed bin Salmon. 2G 

Because the sheik objected to the erection of an assembly plant 

within the walls of his city, a location was chosen in the quarter called 

Shuwaikh on a level beach near the oil company's pier. Since inade-

" (I) The account of barge assembly draws upon History of Al Kuwait Station, 19 Jun 

42-10 May 43, by Ben W. Ferrell, PGF 28-Dj Folspen Rpts cited in this chapter; HOTI, 

Pt. I, Ch. 8, Sec. 3, History of Movements Branch, Operations Division, Hq, PGC, prepared 

by Movements Branch, Operations Division, with Supplement by Laurence P. Corbett, and 

statistical appendix, Complete Summary of Port and Transportation Agencies Performance 

of PGC Operations through 31 May 1945, 5 July 1945, PGF; General Summary Rpt cited 

n. 14; Notes and comments cited n. II; and Documents cited n. 17(1), (2), (3). 

(2) Fonnal authority to Folspen was Change Order 14, 8 Jun 42, effective retroactively. 

File, Foreign Directives and Change Orders, NA 7205 (AMSIR) 13/2, NADEF. Another 

copy PGF 239. 

"For an account see Alan J. Villiers, Sons of Sin bad (New York: Charles Scribner's 

Sons, 1940), Ch. 18, "Kuwait-Port of Booms." .. Col Lieber, Record of Conference-Kuwait Barge Assembly, 21 May 42, at Kuwait, 

I Jun 42. DE File C-3, Conferences, NADEF. 
WHARVES, ROADS, AND BARGES 111 

quate or contradictory information arrived from the War Department 

on the number of barges being shipped, their unit weights, measurements, and delivery schedules, it was decided that the local guild would 

assemble a sample barge under engineer pay and supervision. Cost and 

time records were to be kept as a guide to future compensation on a 

contract basis under conditions of quantity production. Arrangements 

were made for construction of necessary plant facilities or adaptation 

of existing buildings, for unloading the barges, and for improvising 

necessary machinery and housing for the Americans. At this stage the 

number of barges was indefinite, but it was later set tentatively at five 

hundred. On 22 June an engineer lieutenant 21 and twenty-two Folspen 

employees reached the site. By 2 July, with the aid of local labor, they 

had constructed enough plant to commence assembly operations. 

Camp facilities were prepared by renovating, repairing, and adapting two stone buildings formerly used as a community isolation hospital. 

These provided space for dormitories, offices, recreation, kitchen, and 

mess hall. Frame wash and latrine buildings were erected along with 

two Quonset huts for additional sleeping quarters and a first-aid station. 

A small stone house was put up for the area engineer and the camp 

manager. Other construction provided 2,000 square feet of floor area 

in two warehouses, and about 16,000 square feet of other space, of 

which nearly 11,000 were for two planking sheds, and the rest divided 

among repair shop, power plant, paint shop, carpenter shop, fuel storage, huts for interpreters and guards, and sun and cutting shelters. 

On 7 July assembly of the first barge was begun and was finished 

on 21 July. The next day quantity production was started on a twin 

assembly line, one barge being started each day until, by the end of 

October, 23 were simultaneously under assembly. It was a new technique for the Kuwaiti workmen, but they took to it expertly. The 

barges, measuring 60 by 15 by 5 feet, weighed about seven tons and 

had a capacity of sixty tons. They arrived at the site knocked down, 

and their bolted framework was assembled upside down, the bottoms 

planked, and the canvas sides glued between two layers of planking. 

They were then turned over by cranes using improvised turning rigs. 

After the barges were turned over, their deck planking and hardware 

were fitted and the finished barges were ready to be towed away by 

sailing ships or motor launches to the waiting Inland Water Transport 

at Basra or Khorramshahr. The United States furnished the British 

\vith twenty-eight Eureka motor launches for this purpose, and a crew 

of men to instruct in their operation. 

n Lt Walter W. Santelman, succeeded, Jan 43, by Capt Earl L. Icke. 
112 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

The first shipment of barges to arrive for assembly consisted of 48 

craft made by Higgins Industries, Inc., of New Orleans. These arrived 

complete with blueprints and planking schedules, and little difficulty 

was experienced in their assembly. Assembly of barges from other companies began before blueprints or planking schedules arrived and, as 

there were differences in specifications, considerable delay arose in the 

process of fitting. Forty barges furnished by another company showed 

a variation of a quarter of an inch in the~r planking, causing assembly 

trouble. The lumber proved more than normally susceptible to softening in water, making tight sealing of seams difficult.28 

In the first month 20 barges were completed. By the end of 1942, 

186 had been assembled of 213 received from the United States. The 

original American force of 22 men had become 18. After the termination of the Folspen contract, the district engineer continued to operate 

the Kuwait plant using about 185 native carpenters and about 85 

unskilled laborers. With the launching of the 368th barge on 23 June 

1943, the work was completed. The project was terminated on 28 June. 

Ten incompleted barges were sent to Khorramshahr and turned over 

to the Russians.29 

Administrative Problems 

Set down in a strange land, the constructor force found other problems in addition to those encountered in building wharves and roads 

and assembling knocked-down barges. Methods of local procurement 

had to be devised and carried out. Arrangements had to be tactfully 

agreed upon with local sheiks, khans, and tribal leaders. Security 

for the American operations and personnel had to be contrived in an 

area where the westerners' business was not always welcomed or understood. And there were problems connected with the health, status, and 

discipline of the American civilian employees. 

Responsibility for procurement under the engineer contract belonged to the contracting officer, the North Atlantic Division engineer, 

New York, who delegated all field responsibility and authority to the 

Iranian District engineer, through whose finance officer all of Folspen's 

field expenses, including purchases of materials and supplies, building 

rentals, field payrolls less allotments, field contracts, and miscellaneous 

'S Barges also supplied by the Palatka Shipbuilding Company, Palatka, Fla.; the Scott-Graff 

Company, Duluth, Minn.; the Brownsville Shipbuilding Corporation, Brownsville, Tex.; the 

Lyons Construction Company, Whitehall, Mich.; and the C. D. Johnson Lumber Company, 

Toledo, Oreg. 

"" (1) Hist Rpt, 9th Port, Mobile, for Jun 43. PGF 12-F. (2) Hist Rpt, Kuwait Barge 

Assembly Project, for Jun 43. PGF 28-F. 
WHARVES, ROADS, AND BARGES 113 

accounts were met.30 Procurement was not, for the American command, 

what it is for the housewife, who buys a pound of sugar at her neighborhood grocery. Procurement had to fit into agreed Anglo-American 

procedures which were in turn conditioned by the local economy. Then 

there were the stipulations about procurement and payments contained 

in the President's Middle East Directive, and, when it came to the final 

transaction, there were complications of foreign exchange. 

The general theory was that local goods, services, accommodations, 

and rentals would be supplied in all possible cases by the British, and 

that necessary American local procurement would be conducted 

through existing British agencies and within price and wage categories 

determined by the British, so as to avoid competitive bidding and the 

upsetting of established practices. But Colonel Lieber soon noted objections to the literal implementation of the theory when, in practice, 

American requisitions upon the British for needed items might, in some 

cases, have to be referred to Baghdad, or where, in practice, economies 

of time and effort could be achieved by direct American procurement 

and settlement of local debts. 

There was also the question of accounting for what was furnished 

by the British and efforts were made in Washington to define methods 

and procedures. The principle of reverse lend-lease was developed, 

sometimes called reciprocal aid, under which it was proposed to regularize aid furnished the United States by beneficiaries of lend-lease 

and to account for that aid. The Adjutant General issued instructions 

in June that "the services, supplies, equipment, or facilities will be 

inventoried, assessed as to value, and receipted for by the receiving 

unit. Agreement on estimated values will be sought with responsible 

representatives of the foreign government concerned. A record of 

dollar value of services . . . will be maintained in order that the 

government concerned may receive appropriate credit against his 

account on the lend-lease books." Items covered by American requisitions upon British Army authorities in Iraq and Iran were to be valued 

when possible in sterling. The principle of reverse lend-lease was officially put to work in the Persian Corridor on 1 August, but the arrangements were modified in the important matter of pricing and record 

keeping by an Anglo-American agreement published at British 

headquarters, Cairo, in September. By this time there were small but 

steady accretions of American military strength in the area, and the 

financial arrangements applied increasingly to transactions between 

British and American military forces. The basic principle of the Middle 

.0 Minu tes of meeting at Washington, 14 October 1942, where Colonel Lieber explained 

the procedures to a group of PGSC supply officers. NA 2175 (AMSIR) 2, NADEF. 
114 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

East financial agreement, and in particular of those portions of it which 

applied in the Persian Corridor, was the abandonment of pricing. "The 

guiding principle to be followed in the case of all issues ... as between 

the United States Forces and the British Army, and cash payments by 

the British Army on behalf of the United States Forces .•. is that 

no financial adjustment will be made. It will be necessary, however, to 

maintain a record of the transactions on simple lines .... " The principle was reciprocally applied. In greater detail, Anglo-American 

agreed practice in the Persian Corridor was 

. . . that any facilities or services requisitioned or requested by the United 

States Government in connection with the Aid-to-Russia program . . . would be 

furnished by or through the British, rent free or without charge; and further, the 

United States forces ... likewise reciprocated in furnishing facilities constructed 

by the United States, rent free, to Allied Forces where such facilities were not 

required by the United States during the period in question.s1 

The policy was not followed in other commands or theaters. While its 

adoption facilitated the peculiarly complex problems of doing business 

in the Persian Corridor, it produced numerous financial riddles to be 

solved only by the final Anglo-American lend-lease settlement of 1948.32 

As American Army strength increased in 1942 it was determined 

that in so far as possible American personnel would receive supplies 

from American sources. Bulk issue of basic ration components was 

drawn from British sources and reinforced by importation or local purchase. A central purchasing agency was created in each area of the 

American command for the co-ordinated procurement of supplies 

and the employment of labor. In view of the severe inflation and nearfamine conditions which had developed in Iran by late 1942, the effect 

of heavy purchases upon local markets called for such controls as this 

n (1) Memo, Col Lieber for Col Shingler, 18 May 42. DE File C-3, Conferences, NADEF. 

(2) Ltr, TAG, 22 Jun 42. AG 400.3295, Hq PGC. (3) Request to British by Hq, Iran-Iraq 

Serv Comd, 12 Aug 42. AG 400.3295, Hq PGC. (4) Cirs 23 and 25, Hq, USAFIME, 

27 Jul and 7 Aug 42. (5) GO 1175, GHQ, MEF, 4 Sep 42, covered all financial arran)i!;ements 

for the maintenance of U.S. military forces. AG 323.61 Establishment of Military Districts, 

Binder 2, Hq PGC. The provisions of this general order were supplemented by an agreement 

on reciprocal arrangements for building and land occupancy reached at a meeting of British 

hirings officers and American reciprocal aid officer, PGSC, at the British Area Hirings Office, 

Ashar, Basra, on 26 October 1943. Otherwise the Anglo-American financial agreement of 

September 1942 was neither rescinded nor modified. (6) Last two quotations from Financial 

Agreements between British and United States Forces in the Area of the Persian Gulf Command [undated, but July 1945]. Details of Anglo-American procedures in financial matten In the Middle East are reviewed in this document. Real Property Record, Item 10 (1 i-Part A, 

PGC, Iranian State Railway, Real Property Record, MRS, PGC, K, Part A-Vol. 1. Drawer 2, 

Cabinet 2477, SL AMET (AG decimal files from Hq AMET formerly filed in drawers ".nd 

cabinets at St. Louis, now filed at the Kansas City Records Center, AGO, Kansas City, MOiJ 60. 

Twenty-seventh Report on Lend-Lease Operations, Covering the Period from March 

11, 1941, through March 31, 1948 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), 

('"specially App. II, pp. 59-60. 
WHARVES, ROADS, AND BARGES 115 

agency could exercise. From February through November 1942, such 

foods as mutton, bread, rice, and flour were obtained locally through 

the British. In December the U.S. Army began purchasing meats locally. To help mitigate the conditions which produced local bread riots, 

the American command sold wheat or rice, sugar, and tea at legal 

prices and in rationed quantities to its native laborers. This practice 

increased the attractiveness of employment by the Americans, who--

in their effort to protect the native workmen from the exploitation of 

millers, bakers, native labor foremen, and other elements in the local 

society that preyed upon the weak-hired native bakers and ovens and 

went into the baking business. The improved strength, efficiency, and 

morale of the native working force benefited the American war 

projects.sa 

Other local arrangements had to be made besides the financial to 

provide needed water and rail transport, rights of way, and clearances 

of various sorts. In making contacts of this kind the Iranian District 

engineer had the advice of four members of his staff who were familiar, 

through prewar experience, with the country, the languages, and local 

tribes and customs. 34 Iran, in spite of the centralization imposed under 

Reza Shah, possesses an ancient tradition of local and tribal autonomy. 

Great care was taken not to infringe local rights in obtaining such materials as earth for mud bricks and gravel and rock for construction. 

There is record, for example, of a conference at Ahwaz in May 1942 

with His Excellency, the Governor of Khuzistan Province, at which 

Colonel Lieber inquired v,'hat arrangements were necessary in regard 

to such matters, including provision for damage which might be caused 

property holders. The governor stated that there would be no question 

about local materials and that he did not believe there would be any 

damage claims. Colonel Lieber offered to present a written plan of 

operations, but the governor replied most positively that while he 

desired to know the plan of operations, he requested that information 

be given orally and informally, inasmuch as written record would 

require reference to Tehran with resultant delay.as 

.. (1) Sells Rpt. (2) Arthur C. Millspaugh, Americans in Persia (Washington: The 

Brookings Institution, 1946), p. 45. (3) Notes and comments cited n. 11. 

.. Lt: Col. H. G. Van Vlack, chief of the health section; Capt. Paul D. Troxler, chief 

of the engineering section; Arthur W. DuBois, assistant to the foreign manager of Folspen; 

and David F. Giboney, assistant chief engineer of Folspen . 

.. (l) See Kermit Roosevelt, Arabs, Oil and History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 

1949), Ch. XVIII, "Iran: Tribesmen, Soldiers and Intrigue." (2) Memo of Conf, 9 May 42. 

DE File C-3, Conferences, NADEF. Present: the Governor of Khuzistan; Colonel Lieber; 

Maj. C. M. Hearn, chief of operations for the district engineer; Charles Sells; and the local 

Iranian labor contractor, Mr. Nassery. (3) Some dental work performed at Colonel Van 

Vlack's hospital at Ahwaz for certain local personages contributed to co-operative and friendly 

relations. Notes and comments cited n. 11. 
116 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

Security of American supplies and operations in southwestern Iran 

was noticeably enhanced by adoption of a policy of mutual trust rather 

than of force. After consultation with Iranian and British authorities, 

friendly negotiations were carried on by Lt. Col. H. G. Van Vlack and 

Arthur W. DuBois, of the Iranian Engineer District, with all important 

Arab sheiks and Lur khans in the area of operations in the province 

of Khuzistan. There, tribal chiefs who ruled thousands of followers as" 

sumed responsibility for enforcing upon the tribes respect for the 

security of American personnel employed on highway construction 

through lonely areas, and for the safety of American camps, stockpiles, 

and equipment. These chiefs supplied needed local labor, furnished 

guards and guides, and provided local supplies and incidental services. 

In return for their assistance the chiefs were paid a monthly honorarium 

of about thirty dollars, a sum wholly nominal to sheiks and khans already rich enough, but accepted by them proudly as a token of the 

confidence in which the foreigners held them. 

Had the Americans chosen to assume toward the tribesmen an 

attitude of suspicion and hostility, the American projects in 1942, when 

British security forces were unequal to patrolling the territory, would 

have been helpless to withstand the incursions and raids that were 

customary, especially in the remoter regions. As it was, the policy of 

co-operating with self-respecting tribesmen, on the assumption that 

aims were held in common, limited petty pilfering to a minimum in 

spite of economic conditions which, as Mr. DuBois' report states, 

"brought the native population to extreme poverty and near starvation." According to the same report, the American alliance with the 

tribes established and maintained tranquillity in the area of operations, 

one traditionally harried by tribal raids. Furthermore, "a friendly 

hinterland was created to provide listening posts and a barrier to enemy 

activity," while the free offers of service by many tribal chieftains 

ranged them on the Allied side at a time when German agents were 

still operating in other sections of Iran. Reliance on the pledged word of 

the tribal leaders justified itself in practice. After considerable negoti" 

ation with the British, who were convinced of the effectiveness of American methods, DuBois obtained from them rifles and ammunition which 

he turned over on loan to the chiefs for distribution among their tribesmen. Every rifle was returned despite the fact that good weapons were 

scarce and the tribesmen cherished firearms above all else.36 

B' (1) Memo, by DuBois, Jan 43, sub: Report on Relations with Tribal Elements with 

Special Reference to American Operations in Southwestern Iran. Submitted to MID where 

it was impossible to locate a copy. Copy seen during interview with Mr. DuBois, Washington, 

2 May 1947. (2) Ltr, DuBois to author, 25 May 50. 
WHARVES, ROADS, AND BARGES 117 

In the northy where no such arrangements prevailed, the presence 

of unfriendly tribes and bandits persuaded a planning group in Washington not to extend American civilian contractor highway operations 

northward. The tribal arrangements were not continued after full 

militarization of the American projects was achieved in 1943. In view 

of the American experience with the tribes in southwest Iran in 1942, 

it is interesting to note a report that in 1949 the government of Iran took 

steps to enlist the tribes as a part of the country's internal defense 

system.sr 

Despite the severity of the climate the health of the Folspen employees held up well-no small part of the credit going to the medical 

plans, preparations, and skill of Colonel Van Vlack. Between 4 February and 26 July 1942, 6.8 percent of total man-days worked were 

lost through illness; between 4 February and 1 December, however, 

the loss of time had averagd down to 2.7 percent of man-days worked. 

There were three deaths in line of duty.sS 

Discipline among the American civilians employed on engineer 

tasks was at no time a major problem. Of the nine hundred men shipped 

to the base, only fifty-five were discharged for cause during the life of 

the contract. There were some among them who had been hastily selected in the United States. The arrival in July and August of the large 

group of more than four hundred men who had experienced the demoralizing effects of the voyage on the Agwileon ushered in a brief 

period in September and October marked by shirking, drunkenness, 

and disorder, centered at Ahwaz. That this was confined to a minority 

of malcontents is attested not only by the small total of discharges for 

cause, but by the fact that peak construction activity was reached during 

those same months, the first in which adequate manpower and equipment were available. The bad behavior of the few does not reflect upon 

the achievement of the majority. It is recorded to illustrate how the few 

were dealt with by the military. As Colonel Lieber has written, "The 

loneliness and heat rapidly separated th~ men from the boys." 39 

On 10 September Colonel Shingler informed General Maxwell that 

some Folspen men were refusing to work in hope of being sent home . 

., (1) Conference at Washington, 14 October 1942, attended by CoL Stanley L. Scott, 

Chief of Staff, Persian Gulf, SOS; Colonel Lieber; Mr. Ruge; CoL Roy C. L. Graham, G-4, 

SOS; and Col. Theodore M. Osborne. NA 2175 (AMSIR) 2, NADEF. After the success of the American plan, Brigadier Douglas, British commander responsible for the security 

of the area in which the Americans were operating, abandoned plans to post 3,000 armed 

guards in Luristan, and entered into arrangements with the Lurs for safeguarding the ISR 

between Andimeshk and Dorud. Interv cited n. 36 (1). (2) Sam Pope Brewer, "Iran Incorporates Tribes into Army," The New York Times, May 14, 1949. 

" (1) Health and Time Studies. SWP Office. (2) Sells Rpt . .. (1) Sells Rpt. (2) Notes and comments cited n. 11. 
118 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

War work was thereby being delayed. Colonel Lieber had recommended that a Selective Service board be established to induct a few 

men, and Colonel Shingler concurred "that such action on a few malcontents is necessary." Inasmuch as civilians accompanying or serving 

the Army are subject to military law, General Maxwell replied that 

"against all civilians whose refusal to work delays war work, you are directed to institute proceedings under the 64th and 96th Articles of 

War." The first of these articles concerns assaulting a superior officer or 

disobeying his command, and carries a maximum death penalty. The 

second covers general and miscellaneous acts to the prejudice of good 

order. The Army therefore invoked the Articles of War, assembled the 

men, and read the articles to them. Three civilians were court-martialed 

and locked up. The British authorities had also complained that drunkenness and disorderly conduct were rather prevalent and were notified 

in reply that the American civilians, who had no American military 

police to look after them, "have been informed that they are subject to 

the authority of British MP's on the streets and in public places in 

Ahwaz." On 10 October Colonel Shingler requested the co-operation 

of Folspen leaders, and ordered the commanding officer of the Central 

District, PGSC, at Ahwaz to see that steps were taken to control 

drunkenness and brawling, to establish a curfew, and to inform all 

concerned that out-of-bounds zones would be established and culprits 

tried by American military courts. Matters promptly quieted down, and 

the Folspen foreign manager informed his home office on 15 October 

that "discharges have dropped so as to be almost negligible." He attributed improved conduct to the recent courts-martial, and to the 

fact that "we have reached the end of the rotten apples in the 

barrel. ... There is also the added factor that the job is going ahead 

and interest in the work is growing daily." 40 

The Contract Termin.ated 

In problems and uncertainties the last months of the year of confusion were no exception to their predecessors. In the period from September to the end of the year the Persian Gulf Service Command was 

reorganized to discharge the new mission, assigned it by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff, to assume direct responsibility for the delivery of war 

materiel to the USSR. In the same period the War Department's policy 

40 (I) Ltr, Col Shingler to Gen Maxwell, 10 Sep 42.250.1 Morals and Conduct, SL 8991. 

(2) Msg, Gen Maxwell to Col Shingler, quoted in Ltr, Actg Iranian Dist Engr to Foispen, 

22 Sep 42. SWP Office. (3) Sells Rpt. (4) Ltr, Ex Off, PGSC, to British Asst Provost 

Marshal, Tehran, 25 Sep 42. SWP Office. (5) Ltr, Col Shingler to CO, Central Area, 

10 Oct 42. 250.1 Morals and Conduct, SL 8991. (6) Ltr cited n. 6 (3). 
WHARVES, ROADS, AND BARGES 119 

of militarizing overseas contract activities was applied to the Iranian 

District engineer's constructor, Folspen. Militarization was a policy determined long in advance of the change in the status of the American 

command in the Persian Corridor. But militarization in the Corridor 

was hastened by the rapid development of the new organization under 

General Connolly whose advance personnel reached the area in October, and whose first shipment of more than five thousand service 

troops went ashore at Khorramshahr on 11 and 12 December.'1 The 

termination of the engineer construction contract and plans to carry 

on construction by military instead of civilian personnel were distinct 

from the reception, accommodation, and employment of the service 

organization sent to Iran under the directive of the Combined Chiefs. 

It should be borne in mind, therefore, that the gradual increase of military personnel which raised military strength from 190 in July to over 

400 at the end of October was a reinforcement of the Iranian Mission 

and its successors, the Iran-Iraq Service Command and the Persian 

Gulf Service Command, designed only to further their tasks in construction, assembly, and advice and assistance to the British in movement of cargoes to Soviet receiving points. In the final months of 1942, 

militarization of construction work and the establishment of General 

Connolly's command coincided in time; but almost to the end of the 

year they remained distinct but complementary activities. This accounts in part for uncertainties which accompanied termination of the 

Folspen contract. 

This step was implicit in the War Department's policy decision of 

February 1942; but it did not become practicable until November. 

Even then some weeks were required to reconcile the views of Washington, Cairo, and Basra as to when and how it was to be accomplished.u 

On 18 November Services of Supply headquarters at Wa~hington made 

to General Maxwell, Commanding General, SOS, USAFIME, alternative proposals: to terminate the Folspen contract, transferring the civilian personnel to Army payroll to carryon construction activities; or 

"History: United States Military Iranian Mission, 20 Mar 43, prepared for Col Don 

G. Shingler, Chief of Mission, by 1st Lt Victor E. Dietze, Hist Off. PGF 242. 

" For proposals, plans, and authorizations respecting termination and subsequent military 

construction activity, see: Rad AMSME 1869, Somervell to Maxwell, 18 Nov 42; Rad 

AMSME, 2797, Maxwell to Somervell, 27 Nov 42, repeated, Rad, Maxwell to Connolly, 

4 Dec 42; Ltr, Maxwell to Connolly, 3 Dec 42, sub: Termination of Spencer, White & 

Prentis and Foley Bros. Contracts, with 1st wrapper ind, Scott, CofS, PGSC, to Osborne, 

Dir of Cons, PGSC, 14 Dec 42, and 2d wrapper ind, Osborne to Connolly, 14 Dec 42; 

Ltr, Osborne to CG, PGSC, 5 Dec 42, sub: Cancellation of Contract DA-W-I098-Eng-109 

with Foley Bros., Inc., and Spencer, White & Pre ntis, Inc.; Rad C-368, Connolly to Maxwell, 

12 Dec 42; Rad 279-Z, Maxwell to Connolly, 14 Dec 42; Rad AMSME 3305, Lt Gen 

Frank M. Andrews, CG, USAFIME, to Somervell, 18 Dec 42; Rad AMSME 2510, Somervell 

to Maxwell, 25 Dec 42; Rad AMSIR BASRA 321-Z, Maxwell to Connolly, 30 Dec 42. 

PGF 239. 
120 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

to militarize construction completely, and return to the United States 

any civilians not inducted. Maxwell replied on 27 November that militarizing by enlisting the civilians in the Army was impracticable inasmuch as a census just conducted revealed that only a few of the men 

would enlist and that under the draft laws and labor agreements their 

entry into military service was a voluntary matter. He therefore suggested placing under direct employment of SOS, USAFIME, all suitable and willing civilians then employed by Folspen, to be followed by a 

progressive discontinuance of construction by this working force until 

it had been supplanted by service troops who would complete both 

scheduled and new construction projects. 

This plan was communicated to Headquarters, PGSC, on 3 December with a proposal that the progressive militarization of construction 

work be carried out by a general construction battalion of one thousand 

Corps of Engineers officers and men to be organized in the United 

States and shipped to Iran. In the opinion of Col. Theodore M. 

Osborne, Director of Construction, PGSC, the work could be accomplished by available civilian and military personnel before such an 

outfit could be trained and shipped to the site. He also pointed out in a 

letter to General Connolly that it was considered desirable to divorce 

the Iranian Engineer District from the Engineer Department and the 

North Atlantic Engineer Division at the earliest practicable date, 

transferring its activities to the jurisdiction of the PGSC under SOS, 

USAFIME. This suggestion indicates that consideration was being 

given in the field to ending the parallel responsibilities of the district 

engineer and the commanding general, and to finding a better means 

of centering control and authority in construction matters. Colonel 

Osborne proposed establishment in \Vashington of a section at SOS 

headquarters to take over the administrative functions being handled 

by the Folspen New York office; but this problem was to be handled 

otherwise. General Maxwell suggested, along the same lines, that personnel be transferred from the Folspen New York and overseas staffs 

and from the North Atlantic Division to the port of embarkation to 

carryon procurement and shipment functions after termination of the 

contract; but on 25 December General Somervell disapproved. 

Washington, Cairo, and Basra, though considering different means, 

were pursuing the same end: to continue construction operations 

according to the general pattern of 1942 rather than as an integral 

part of the new American responsibilities which were primarily 

concerned with transport. 

Meanwhile, on 12 December, General Connolly notified General 

Maxwell that he was ready to take over the Folspen tasks; but General 
WHARVES, ROADS, AND BARGES 121 

Maxwell cautioned him that the contract could not be canceled without approval from Washington, and then only by the North Atlantic 

Division engineer in New York. Word that all necessary steps had 

been taken was dispatched to General Connolly from Cairo on 

30 December. The 'Var Department and the Corps of Engineers had 

decided to terminate those portions of the Folspen contract that dealt 

with construction and engineering work, but to leave in effect Folspen's 

responsibility for administration of matters relating to personnel supply 

and service. 

The Folspen organization both at home and in the field was seriously affected by the uncertainties inherent in the Army's efforts to 

determine when and how to wield the ax. Personnel recruitment in the 

United States continued up to 19 November, when it was stopped. It 

was obvious that an adequate supply of trained technicians would be 

required in the field for some time to come regardless of what details 

were agreed upon for termination and progressive militarization. 

Other factors, too, contributed to uncertainty in the field and to a 

deterioration in relations of the constructor with the district engineers. 

Perhaps not the least of these was the departure of Colonel Lieber for 

Washington on 13 September to take part in consultations, at the office 

of the Chief of Engineers and in SOS, concerned with the planning 

and organization of the new regime to be headed by General Connolly. 

After Colonel Lieber four district engineers served in succession before 

their office was abolished.48 

The lack of continuity in the office of District Engineer was reflected in a variety of ways, all of which tended to interfere with the 

performance of its, work by the constructor. Folspen was called upon to 

furnish work, men, and materials outside the scope of the directives. 

The morale of Folspen employees was not improved as Army officers 

increasingly undertook direct personal supervision of work instead of 

issuing orders and directives through constituted civilian supervisors. 

There were many breaches of the established relationship between the 

engineer and his constructor: Folspen men were called upon to unload 

ships whose cargoes were not related to their projects; to handle, sort, 

transport, and store materials, supplies, and equipment pertaining to 

other organizations; to service, repair, and maintain such equipment; 

to transport personnel not connected with the constructor's work; to 

furnish engineering, designing, surveying, and blueprinting services to 

organizations other than the engineer's; to provide personnel, equipment, and materials for construction work other than that falling within 

.. The second Iranian District engineer was Lt. Col. Carl L. Meng; the third, Colonel 

Osborne; the fourth, Colonel McGlone; and the fifth, Captain Cape. 
122 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

the engineer contract and directives; to surrender materials, supplies, 

equipment, and personnel to other organizations; and, in connection 

with the arrival of the five thousand U.S. seIVice troops at Khorramshahr, to supply military personnel--often hundreds of men at a timewith food, housing, transportation, and equipment, at all hours, and 

with no advance notice.44 Fearful that noncompliance or even determined protest would bring cancellation of their contract, Folspen attempted to co-operate until.the work to which they were committed by 

contract was seriously obstructed. 45 Then, on 12 December, after the 

last of the troops had landed, Charles H. Sells wrote a letter to the district engineer. He stated that persistent but unconfirmed rumors of the 

termination of the contract reaching the employees had shattered 

morale and made continued orderly planning and prosecution of the 

work very difficult. He added: 

Consistent and continuing demands are made upon our warehouse by Army 

officers for supplies and materials entrusted to our custody pursuant to our contract, 

and orders and directions given by your officers to our workmen and foremen. 

Under the conditions, therefore, you are requested to immediately advise the Constructor . . . to the end that confusion may be eliminated, an orderly and 

efficient plan of future operations established, and the present violations of contract 

provisions eliminated. {8 

On 15 December Lt. Col. R. G. McGlone, district engineer, replied 

that the contract would be terminated on 1 January or as soon as possible thereafter. Individual personnel contracts would be transferred 

to the United States and the men placed under the direct orders of the 

district engineer. On 31 December Sells requested the engineer to 

speed the day inasmuch as the increasing extent to which Army officers 

were making extracontractual demands had drastically cut production 

below the highs of September-October. Formal termination followed 

by letter to Folspen dated 1 January 1943, relieving them "of all responsibility for construction and engineering work in this command," 

adding, "It has been agreed by your home office to continue in force 

those sections of the subject contract relating to personnel supply and 

service." On that date all equipment and materials in the custody of 

Folspen were turned over to the United States, and the district engineer 

took over direction of some seven hundred civilians and their projects. 41 

On 31 December the district engineer issued instructions so detailed 

"List in Information for Completion Report cited n. 17(3), pp. 12-13 . .. InteIV'With Sells, Pleasantville, N. Y., 28 Oct 44 . .. Ltr, Sells to Dist Engr, 12 Dec 42. DE File, unnumbered folder, Administration NADEF . ., (1) Ltr, Col McGlone to Folspen, 15 Dec 42; Ltr, Sells to Dist Engr, 31 Dec 42; 

Ltr, Dist Engr to Folspen, 1 Jan 43. DE file, unnumbered folder, Administration, NADEF. 

(2) Sells Rpt. 
WHAR YES, ROADS, AND BARGES 123 

as to list the assignment of named individual truck drivers to specified 

road camps. Certain newly arrived troop units were moved into sections 

of the incomplete Khorramshahr-Andimeshk temporary highway, 

whose completion depended on ability to move supplies of bitumen 

from Abadan. An effort was made to dispose available civilian and 

troop workers in such a way as to keep plant and equipment in continuous operation. A completion date of 15 February was set for the 

temporary road.48 

In view of the difficulties which had dogged the construction program from its inception in 1941 to termination of the operational 

features of the Folspen contract at the end of 1942, it is noteworthy 

that final costs and the contractor's fee, estimated upon the basis of 

cost plus a fixed fee, fell well within original estimates. In 1941, when 

planning was necessarily highly tentative because tasks were as yet 

undetermined in detail, construction costs had been estimated at $25,-

000,000, for a fee of $1,250,000. Construction completed by Folspen 

amounted to $22,563,093, for a fee of $884,457.49 To recapitulate the 

work done: Folspen had built five wharf berths at Khorramshahr and 

one fourth of a sixth berth. Twenty bridges, constituting 90 percent 

of projected bridge construction, were finished. The temporary highway between Khorramshahr and Andimeshk was ready except for bitumen surfacing. The permanent highway averaged less than 50 percent of completion. All buildings undertaken had been erected; and 

186 barges assembled at Kuwait. With the termination of the Folspen 

contract, remaining construction was up to the Army . 

.. (1) Plan of Operation on Work under Direction of United States District Engineer, 

31 Dec 42. DE File C-l1.2, Correspondence on Directives, NADEF. (2) Ltr, Dir of 

Cons to CofS, PGSC, Basra, 31 Dec 42. 611 Roads, SL 9042. ,. (1) Rpt cited n. 8 (1). (2) Ltr, Contracting Off, NAD, to Folspen, 22 Apr 44, citing 

Final Estimate for Work Performed to Dec 31,1942, and Rpts submitted to Div Engr, 27 Apr 

43 and 10 May 43. SWP Office. (3) Rpt cited n. 2. 
CHAPTER VII 

Aircraft Assembly and 

Delivery 

The British commitment to deliver supplies to the USSR through 

the Persian Corridor involved undertakings in three categories in 

which the United States participated. In construction and assembly, 

the United States aided as a British auxiliary in 1941 and 1942. From 

1943 on, the United States, acting in logistic matters as a co-ordinate 

partner, added aid in transport to that previously rendered in the other 

two categories. 

Early Plans 

American aid to Great Britain in the assembly, storage, overhaul, 

and repair of United States aviation equipment sent to the Middle East 

was authorized by the President's Middle East Directive to the Secretary of War in September 1941, and implemented for the Iran-Iraq 

area by the Secretary of War's instructions in October to General 

Wheeler to establish and operate essential assembly facilities. The First 

(Moscow) Protocol of 1 October obligated the United States to make 

available to the Soviets large numbers of aircraft and posed the formidable question of their delivery. In November the Special Observer 

Group at London (General Chaney's mission) dispatched a representative to Russia to investigate routes over which American planes could 

be delivered. The Americans hoped at the time that aircraft could be 

flown via Alaska across Siberia to Soviet receiving points convenient to 

the battle areas in the USSR. After long delays they learned that the 

Russians, suspecting the Americans wished flight route information for 

strategic reasons, would refuse to approve any arrangement for delivery 

which involved flight by American pilots across Soviet territory. The 

Russians proposed that delivery be accomplished by ship to Archangel 
AIRCRAFT ASSEMBLY AND DELIVERY 125 

and Murmansk, and at or outside the Soviet frontier in the Middle 

Ease 

American aircraft were delivered to the USSR over three routes: 

by flight to Fairbanks, Alaska, where they were taken onward by Soviet 

pilots; by ship to Archangel and Murmansk, while those beleaguered 

ports were practicable for convoys; and by flight and ship to the Persian 

Gulf, the only all-year route. Of the 14,834 American aircraft made 

available to the Soviet Union under lend-lease, slightly less than one 

third, or 4,874, were delivered via the Persian Gulf, of which 995 were 

flown in and 3,879 were shipped.2 Upon arrival these aircraft required 

refitting or assembly, as well as test flights. The variety of types and 

models, the complexity of aircraft construction, the need for skilled 

technical personnel, were special problems increasing the normal 

difficulties of the Russian-aid program in the Corridor. 

The Douglas Aircraft Company had been selected in October 1941 

to operate a British-aid air depot as contractor for the Air Corps within 

the framework of the North African Mission.s Project 19, as this operation was called, was located at Gura, Eritrea. In November General 

Maxwell took part in discussions of the American Aid Subcommittee at 

Cairo concerning possible American participation, through the Iranian 

Mission, in British aircraft assembly at Shu'aiba. In December General 

Wheeler, after inspection of sites in the Basra area and at Abadan, 

and with the concurrence of British and American air authorities, including a representative of Douglas, selected as the location of an 

American aircraft assembly plant the airfield three miles north of the 

Anglo-Iranian Oil Company refinery on Abadan Island. 

Meanwhile, the Douglas Aircraft Company was authorized, by a 

War Department letter of intent dated 25 November 1941, to undertake the assembly task in the Persian Gulf. It was called Cedar Project, 

short for Civilian Emergency Defense Aid to Russia. The word civilian 

is a reminder that the United States was not yet a belligerent. A letter 

proposal by Douglas to the Materiel Division, Wright Field, Ohio, 

dated 1 December, specified that the contractor would undertake 

1 The Special Observer Group Prior to the Activation of the European Theater of Operations, October 1944, pp. 102-03, 105. Hist Sec, ETO. Study superseded by The Predecessor 

Commands: The Special Observers and United States Army Forces in the British Isles, by 

Warrant Officer (jg) Henry G. Elliott, Part I of The Administrative and Logistical History 

of the European Theater of Operations. • The total given is that of the U.S. proposal to the USSR for settlement of the lend-lease 

account in 1947. See The New York Times, April 15, 1947. An earlier figure of 14,018 

aircraft delivered by all routes between 22 June 1941 and 20 September 1945 is in Report on War Aid Furnished by the United States to the USSR, Foreign Economic Sec, Office 

of Foreign Liquidation, Dept State, 28 Nov 45, p. 18. See Tables 10, II, and Chart 3. • Lt Col Elmer E. Adler, Advance Air Force Plan for the North African Mission, 13 

Oct 41. 319.1, ASF NCF. 
126 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

Cedar Project, then planned for Basra, and would construct all buildings, hangars, power supply, improvements to real property, airfields, 

transmission lines, telephone, radio, water and sewage systems, storage 

warehouses, living quarters, mess halls, miscellaneous subsistence facilities and hospital, "and all other items incident to said depot," and that 

the contractor would supply equipment and spare parts and would 

operate and maintain the depot. 4 The Douglas proposal was followed 

on 20 December by a supplementary letter of intent increasing from 

two to five million dollars the amount allowable for preparatory expenses. The contract, signed 3 January 1942 and approved by the 

Under Secretary of War on 6 January, stipulated an estimated cost for 

Cedar Project of $7,259,548.08 and a fixed fee of $435,572.88. This Air 

Corps contract for "construction and operation of depot at or near 

Basra, Iraq, Asia," was to run until 30 June 1942. It was twice extended 

by change orders, first to 31 December 1942, later to 17 November 

1943.5 

Although the contract as signed omitted from the contractor's duties 

the construction of airfields listed in the letter proposal, its other provisions respecting construction are noteworthy as overlapping both the 

general Anglo-American arrangements for construction of Iranian 

Mission installations by the British and the responsibilities in construction assigned the Iranian District engineer. In its operational provisions 

the contract clearly stipulated that Douglas "shall organize, equip and 

operate" the depot, and exercise "exclusive direction and control" over 

all contractor civilian employees. The administrative status of Cedar 

Project with relation to the Iranian Mission and the Air Corps was 

from the start ambiguous. As described by Colonel Shingler in April 

1942, the Iranian Mission acted in an administrative capacity, but 

technical supervision of operations "is exercised by the U.S. Army Air 

Corps through the Air Section" of the North African Mission at Cairo, 

whose air officer acted for the Iranian Mission.6 There was no representative of the Air Corps contracting officer in Iran until May. The 

effect of the contract as planned before Pearl Harbor, but necessarily 

carried out under war conditions, was to place a civilian organization 

• Letter Proposal, 1 Dec 41. Drawer 69, Prime Contract No.1, Project 19, Douglas Files 

(Foreign Projects File, Storage Files, Douglas Aircraft Company, Santa Monica, Calif.). • (1) Draft of Minutes, Board of Directors, concerning Project 19 and Cedar. Drawer 

69, Board of Directors-Minutes. Douglas Files. (2) Harold Courlander, Paul L. Hoefler, 

and others, History of Project 19, Abadan Ch., pp. 65-87. Drawer 101, Douglas Files. 

(3) With the second extension of the Cedar contract to 17 November 1943, costs for 1943 were estimated at $1,946,160. Drawer 69, Prime Contract No.1, Project 19, Douglas Files. 

(4) Contract DA-W-535-ac-870. Same file. 

'Col Shingler, Rpt to American Aid Subcommittee, Cairo, sub: Status of Projects as of 

April 30, 1942.334.8 American Aid Subcommittee, SL 9011. 
AIRCRAFT ASSEMBLY AND DELIVERY 127 

in almost complete authority over its operations, including selection, 

hiring, and training of personnel; procurement of equipment, tools, 

and parts; the operation of aircraft assembly and disassembly; and 

maintenance, overhaul, and repair of aircraft, engines, propellers, and 

instruments. The contract stipulated that the Persian Gulf plant ought 

to handle each month 100 twin-engine light attack bombers (A-20's), 

100 single-engine pursuit fighters (P-40's), and 12 twin-engine medium 

bombers (B-25's), subject to certain contingent circumstances named 

in Clause I (b) (4). This target, as the story will show, was not 

achieved. Inasmuch as the contract stipulated that American personnel would work at the site of the Persian Gulf plant, Douglas obtained 

a modification to allow as costs under the contract work performed 

by its employees away from this plant. During the life of the contract 

there was considerable fluidity in the assignment of Douglas employees 

to projects in Eritrea, Egypt, Iraq, and Iran. 7 

The Battle of the Backlog 

A long road stretched between planning and expectations, as expressed in the contract, ~nd performance. From the outset more planes 

arrived than could be processed. Throughout the history of plane assembly, both in the contractor period and in the period of Army operation after cancellation of the Douglas contract in March 1943, the 

battle of the backlog was fought against a variety of odds. The flow of 

planes to the Persian Gulf under the Moscow Protocol began with a 

first shipment from New York of four Boston light twin-engine bombers 

(A-20's) on 28 November 1941. 'When these reached Basra on 23 

January 1942, one American Air Corps lieutenant and eight Douglas 

mechanics were there to supervise their erection.s This was an advance 

force, not the start of assembly operations under Douglas management. 

The first Boston bomber was delivered to the Soviets in February. During March only 5 additional craft were delivered, and an accumulated 

backlog of 33 planes warned that the flow was greater than the ability 

to take care of it. Yet at that time, the first shipload of Douglas materials was only just leaving New York. Not until early May was it offloaded at Abadan, to be followed on 17 May by the arrival of 356 

Douglas employees, 122 of them transferred from Project 19 at Gura. 

T Ltr, Chief, Contract Sec, Materiel Center, OofCG, Army Air Forces, 27 Jun 42. 

Tollefson's file, Douglas Files. • (1) Unless, otherwise noted, dates and figures are from PGC Historical Charts: PGF. 

(2) Aircraft Assembly Chronology. PGF 245. (3) Backlog figures from tables complIed by 

Hist Br, OTI, Hq, PGC. PGF 245. (4) History cited n. 5(2). 
128 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

These, along with 9 Air Corps officers and 42 enlisted men, commenced 

aircraft assembly at Abadan under the Douglas contract on 20 May. 

Although 120 planes were delivered to the USSR by 31 May, the 

backlog had reached nearly 200. 

Before the start in May of Douglas operations at Abadan, the Royal 

Air Force (RAF) undertook to assemble planes for the USSR until 

Douglas could take over. This agreement, reached on 22 December 

1941, went beyond the earlier Anglo-American arrangements respecting establishment of an American plant at Abadan, under which the 

RAF was to erect planes for British use at Shu'aiba and elsewhere in the 

Basra area, reserving Abadan for Russian-aid assembly.9 In an effort to 

cope with the backlog problem, the British, under the supervision of 

the American advance force, began on 2 February to modify the first 

Boston bombers, originally designed to RAF specifications, to make 

them suitable for delivery to the Russians. The alterations were chiefly 

in radio and armament. British willingness to surrender to the Soviets 

planes consigned to them was reciprocated later in the year when, 

because of the critical need for aircraft in the desert fighting west of 

Cairo, 40 A-20's consigned to the USSR were released on 11 July and 

flown to Egypt. It was during the interim period early in 1942 that 

Soviet complaints about the quality of assembly at Shu'aiba were referred to General Greely's mission for adjustment.io 

Under the Abadan agreement the British were to provide local 

labor, utilities and land, and necessary housing and shedding; while 

the Americans would furnish tools, accessories and equipment for assembly, the planes to be assembled, and the skilled personnel for the 

operation, including instruction in flying and servicing the American 

machines. Construction, begun on 30 December 1941, was sufficiently 

advanced by early April to enable the RAF to begin limited assembly 

operations on Russian-aid planes at Abadan. The fifty RAF mechanics 

assigned on 8 April from the Basra area were soon increased to two 

hundred.ll 

Back in the Basra area the RAF assembled planes for both British 

• (I) Rad, Air Ministry, Whitehall, from Air Vice Marshal Sir Arthur W. Tedder, 

to RAF, ME, 10 Dec 41. Chronology cited n. 8(2); another copy PGF 2. (2) First 

Progress Rpt, by Lt Col Robert C. Oliver, Actg Chief, Air Sec, U.S. Mil North African 

Mission, 11 Jan 42. NA 319.1 Progress Reports, Cairo (11-27--41), ASF NCF. (3) Memo, 

Hq, U.S. Mil Mission, Baghdad, 17 Jan 42, sub: Projects. PGF 125. (4) Rad AMSIR 10, 

to Gen Wheeler, 21 Jan 42, on agreement at Washington between Gens Sidney Spalding 

and Moore and British RAF representatives. MID 400.3295 1-21--42 (1-6--42). '0 (1) Ltr, Capt A. B. Swank, Conti Div, Hq, PGSC, to CofS, PGSC, 18 Apr 43, sub: 

Status of Aircraft Deliveries at Abadan, PGF 2. (2) Ch. IV, p. 75, above. 11 Memo, Hq, British Forces in Iraq, 27 Jan 42. AG 323.61, Hq PGC. 
AIRCRAFT ASSEMBLY AND DELIVERY 129 

and Soviet account. The first twin-engine Mitchell medium bombers 

(B-25's) reached Basra on 12 March and nine days later, because 

Basra was considered unsuitable to process them, Shu'aiba became the 

B-25 receiving point. Russian-bound planes arriving by sea were offloaded at Margil. Some were trucked overland to Shu'aiba for assembly; others were assembled at Basra and Margil and flown to 

Shu'aiba for further processing, final inspection, and check. American 

plans made before Pearl Harbor had contemplated the delivery, by 

American pilots flying to the Soviet border, of planes assembled in the 

Persian Gulf area; but after Pearl Harbor the shortage of available 

American pilots led to agreement by the Russians to take delivery themselves, first at Shu'aiba, and, after Abadan got into operation, at 

Abadan. It had also been contemplated that certain American planes 

could be flown direct to Tehran from the United States or from intermediate assembly points outside Iran. For a period later in the spring 

this plan was accomplished; but at the beginning planes arriving by 

air were delivered in the Basra area. 

The processing of B-25's constituted a special problem. After the 

first delivery accomplished in the Basra area on 17 April 1942, it was 

decided on 24 May to remove B-25 assembly from Shu'aiba to Tehran, 

where on 12 January the British had rented an aircraft factory for the 

use of the Iranian Mission. The B-25's could fly direct to Tehran from 

Habbaniya without touching at Persian Gulf bases. To prepare them 

for delivery, thirty-two of the newly arrived Douglas technicians were 

loaned to Tehran from Cedar Project along with fourteen Air Corps 

personneL On 31 July, upon completion of their work on the B-25's 

provided under the First (Moscow) Protocol, this small force of Americans returned to Abadan but went back to Tehran on 1 September to 

take care of B-25's arriving under the Second (Washington) Protocol. 

The Tehran plant was outstanding for its smooth operation and lack of 

friction with Soviet inspectors. Much credit is due to its commanding 

officer, Capt. John Allison, who later became a combat commander 

and Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Air. Colonel Shingler met 

Allison while the latter was on leave at Tehran after a period of service 

in the USSR as a technical expert in processing P-40's that arrived 

through north Russian ports. Impressed by Allison's knowledge of Russian and the Russian people, Shingler obtained his transfer to direct the 

work at the Tehran check point. On 15 September, in compliance with 

a Soviet request transmitted by Col. Leonid 1. Zorin, the B-25 project 

was removed to Abadan, thus marking the final step in a process of 
130 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

concentrating American aircraft assembly for the USSR at the Abadan 

depot.1z 

This process was first undertaken to relieve the pressure on the 

British plant at Shu'aiba and was accelerated both by the establishment of the Douglas organization at Abadan and by British agreement 

in midsummer to permit the assignment of Soviet mechanics to that 

plant. By 26 June congestion at Shu'aiba brought about the removal 

from Shu'aiba to Abadan of the final assembly operation hitherto done 

by the RAF. The small American group remaining at Shu'aiba followed 

on 4 September. 

At Abadan the backlog was a pressing problem to be solved only 

by a sufficiency of mechanics. Colonel Shingler, now commanding 

officer of the Iran-Iraq Service Command, responsible to General Maxwell, commanding officer of USAFIME, reported to Cairo on 22 July 

1942 that he had for some time fruitlessly urged Maj. Gen. G. de la P. 

Beresford, commanding general of the British Basra Line of Communications Area, to permit the transfer from Shu'aiba to Abadan of Soviet 

mechanics. Some 30 of them were sent to Shu'aiba on 26 May and 

their number had increased to 148 by midsummer. The British Foreign 

Office had allowed only 10 Russian technicians at Abadan, notwithstanding an absence of objection to the presence of Russians in that 

strategic location on the part of the AIOC, and the "apparent" approval of the British Air Ministry. Colonel Shingler stated, "Cannot 

continue as in past to cover up British reluctance to Soviet at 

Abadan. . . . Soviet after exclusion from our Abadan project is 

sending complaint from Moscow and Washington, D. C., while the 

same matters are probably being investigated by Faymonville while 

en route to Tehran." 13 

Although the British had officially abandoned in January 1942 

an earlier policy to prohibit flight of Soviet aircraft over the British 

zone, the underlying caution behind that policy survived in the continuing British objection to the presence of Soviet mechanics at 

Abadan.14 

General Maxwell promptly took the matter up with the Royal Air 

" (1) Memoranda exchanged between Harry Hopkins and General Burns on 3 June 1942 

in the course of the discussions with Molotov which preceded agreement on the Second 

(Washington) Protocol, indicate that Molotov was told the United States would fly 12 B-25 

bombers monthlv across Africa for delivery at Basra or Tehran, and would ship 100 A-20's 

to the Persian Gulf monthly for assembly there. Sherwood, Rooseuelt and Hopkins, pp. 

575-76. (2) Notes supplied the author by General Shingler, 16 May 1950. 11 (1) Rad, Col Shingler to Gen Maxwell, 22 Ju1 42. AG 600.12 Abadan, Hq AMET. 

(2) Attached papers, same file, for material in following paragraph. ,. Rad 7, signed Walter Thurston, Kuybyshev, citing Faymonville, to State Dept, 3 Jan 42. 

635 Airplane Assembly Bases (Aircraft for Russia), ASF NCF. 
AIRCRAFT ASSEMBLY AND DELIVERY 131 

Force and the Middle East Forces in Cairo. While he was doing this, 

General Adler, whose Air Service Command, U.S. Army Middle East 

Air Force, Cairo, shared responsibility for Abadan operations, had 

cabled Lt. Gen. Henry H. Arnold in Washington. By the time General 

Arnold called upon General Maxwell for information, Maxwell was 

able to report the removal of British objections. The Soviet mechanics 

began arriving at Abadan on 22 August and by 8 September ·all 148 

of them were there to help attack the backlog. Thus by mid-September 

the interim period of British help was over and plane assembly for 

Russia was concentrated at Abadan under American responsibility. 

Meanwhile, the months immediately preceding the arrival of the 

main body of Douglas operatives in May 1942 had been marked by 

much confusion and delay in delivering planes to the Soviet Union. 

On 2 April General Wheeler had sent General Somervell a statement 

of difficulties. The inexperience of the RAF in the assembly of American 

machines, the necessity of familiarizing Russian pilots with them, and 

delays arising from changing the Bostons from British to Soviet specifications bulked large in the list.15 

Prominent also was the insistence of the Soviets that planes be 

without flaw. Russian fastidiousness in inspection and Russian complaints brought, on 16 May, a detailed explanation to the Soviets by 

General Faymonville, head of lend-lease at Moscow, that in the opinion 

of Iranian Mission officers plane delivery was being impeded because 

of unnecessary objection on the part of Soviet officials. :Matters were 

ironed out after the visit of Russian officers to Basra and adoption of 

more reasonable demands by Col. Ivan I. Obrazkov, chief of the 

Russian Air Force personnel in Iran.1s In this connection it must be 

recalled that, under agreement, lend-lease goods became Soviet property at the point of departure from the United States.17 Furthermore, 

as the commanding officer of Cedar Project reported in August to General Maxwell, hundreds of the first planes sent from the United States 

were old machines recognized by pilots as having been ferried by them 

earlier in the United States. Some had been used there for pilot training 

and had been repeatedly overhauled. They arrived without logbooks 

or spare parts. They were reconditioned upon arrival in the Persian 

Gulf and 339 out of 360 such craft were accepted by the Russians.1s 

"Rad, Gen Wheeler to Gen SomervelI, 2 Apr 42. 323.61 Establishment of Military 

Districts, Binder 1, SL 9008. ,. HOTI, Pt. I, Chs. 1-5, Administration, by George B. Zeigler and (Ch. 5 only) WalIace 

P. Rusterholtz, with Annex by Victor H. Pentlarge, Jr., pp. 21-22. PGF. 

" Ch. I, p. 25 and n. 39, above. 1! Rpt, Col Charles P. Porter to Gen Maxwell; and min of mtg in Gen Maxwell's office, 

Cairo, 22 and '25 Aug. 42. AG 600.12 Abadan, Hq AMET. 
132 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

The most serious early handicap, in the opinion of General Wheeler, 

was "the lack of a senior air officer of field grade who is an expert in 

technical details and capable of co-ordinating airplane matters." 19 At 

the beginning, although his staff included two railway consultants and 

a pipeline consultant, there was no air officer, nor, in spite of Wheeler's 

appeal, was one assigned. Not until 25 May did Maj. Charles P. Porter, 

appointed earlier that month, arrive at Abadan to become commanding 

officer of Cedar Project. 

Being under Air Corps contract, the Douglas-operated Cedar Project and Air Corps personnel connected with it found themselves involved in several chains of command. Functioning physically within the 

area of the Iranian Mission they fell administratively under its jurisdiction. But inasmuch as the Iranian Mission possessed no air officer and 

as air command for the Middle East was centered in Cairo at the seat 

of the North African Mission, they fell technically under the jurisdiction of the Air Section of that mission. Moreover, being engaged in 

highest priority Russian-aid work under lend-lease, they came logically 

within the purview not only of the Iranian Mission but (until its dissolution) of General Greely's mission to the USSR. Finally, as a further 

complication, the contractor, lacking for many months a representative 

on the spot as Air Corps contracting officer, was entitled, as was the 

Air Corps commanding officer of Cedar after his arrival in the field, 

to communicate directly with Air Corps officials in the United States. 

The resultant confusion inevitably affected problems of supply, operation, continuity of policy, and relations with the British and Russians. As General Adler, chief of General Maxwell's Air Section, remarked in a message to General Arnold, instead of the original plan 

whereby Cedar was to be administratively under the Iranian Mission 

and technically under the Air Section of the North African Mission, the 

project found itself by mid-April 1942 embarrassed by a plethora of 

advisers, since the Maxwell, Wheeler, and Greely missions "are all 

involved in attempt to manage the project and to co-ordinate matters 

with the British and Russians." 20 This was, of course, the situation even 

before the arrival of the main Douglas contingent in May created daily 

problems in command responsibility; while on the other hand, the situation was somewhat eased by the abandonment of the Greely mission 

some two weeks after the Adler message. 

The undefined boundary between administrative and technical responsibility created a no man's land of multiple command responsibility 

11 Rad cited n. 15. 20 Rad 860, Gen Adler to Gen Arnold, 19 Apr 42. Russian Mission File, AME Theater 

Office,OPD. 
AIRCRAFT ASSEMBLY AND DELIVERY 133 

which was to plague the project throughout its existence. At the start, 

as reported by General Maxwell's Air Section in early January 1942, 

"The Air Section has established excellent relations with Headquarters, 

RAF, Middle East and Air Headquarters, Egypt, the Chief of the Air 

Section having clearly established in their minds that he acts as the 

representative in this area of the Chief of the Army Air Forces, as 

well as the Air Officer on the Staff of the U.S. Military North African 

Mission." Soon afterward, in a letter to the vice president of the Douglas Aircraft Company, even more sweeping responsibility was claimed 

for the Air Section, when General Adler wrote that it was "charged 

with the administration of all air matters in the Middle East, including 

the Gura and Abadan projects." Yet the chief of the Air Corps, in a 

directive defining the authority of the Air Corps representative at 

Cedar over Douglas, appeared to overlook Maxwell's Air Section while 

stressing the primary responsibility of the Iranian Mission. The Air 

Corps representative, ran the directive, exercises jurisdiction over the 

contractor "under instructions from the Headquarters of the Iranian 

Mission, in the same manner as the district supervisor or factory inspector exercises jurisdiction over a contractor's plant in the United 

States." Matters were further clarified by General Maxwell's declaration in July to General Adler, formerly his air officer, and now, upon 

the organization of USAFIME, with its new authority over the IranIraq Service Command, commanding general of the ~1iddle East Air 

Service Command. With the single exception of aid from General 

Adler in technical matters, said Maxwell, he, as commanding general 

of USAFIME, was responsible for both the Douglas projects at Abadan 

and Gura.21 

Although construction responsibility at Abadan was divided between the British Army and the Douglas Aircraft Company, with the 

Iranian District engineer helping out, necessary building was achieved 

with a minimum of confusion. The first Douglas ship, which arrived in 

May 1942, brought to Abadan 2 hangars, 14 warehouses, 120 Quonset 

huts, and 10 Dimaxion circular huts-all prefabricated and ready for 

quick erection at the site. Upon their arrival at Abadan the Douglas 

personnel found among the installations there-some of them recently 

erected by the British-3 hangars, 8 brick office and shop buildings, 36 

India huts for living quarters, and 3 all-weather paved runways, one 

5,500 feet long which was later extended by the AIOC to 6,500 feet. 22 

.. (1) Rpt cited n. 9 (2). (2) Ltr, Cen Adler to Carl Cover, 9 Feb 42. Drawer 69, 

Cairo Office, Douglas Files. (3) Directive, Chief, U.S. Army Air Corps, to CO, Cedar 

Project, 13 Feb 42. Drawer 69, Prime Contract No.1, Project 19, Douglas Files. (4) Min 

Stf Mtg at Cairo, 14 Ju142. AC 334.8, Hq AMET. D Hist Rpt, Abadan Air Base, for Nov 41 through Nov 43, 1 Jul 44, pp. 7-8. PCF 2-K. 
134 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

With their own equipment and locally secured materials, the Douglas 

people erected warehouses, a hospital, garage, shops, and living 

quarters; using bitumen from the AIOC plant on the island, they also 

laid hard-surface aprons in front of Hangars 1 and 2. 

While construction proceeded, the personnel fluctuated both as to 

numbers and component elements of the staff. Unlike the engineer constructor, who worked under a small military staff, the Air Corps contractor had a considerable military staff to deal with at the start, and 

one which grew, proportionately, faster than did the numbers of 

civilians. By mid-August 1942, when Colonel Porter reported to General Maxwell in Cairo, there were 65 officers and men of the Air Corps 

assigned to Cedar and 354 Douglas civilians, of whom about a hundred, 

borrowed from Project 19, would soon return to Gura. Some 600 

natives, principally employed upon construction work, plus the first 

arriving Soviet mechanics and the RAF men sent over from Basra and 

Shu'aiba completed the Cedar staff. As the construction program gradually attained its objective the number of natives diminished. The total 

number of Douglas men at Abadan tended to remain in the neighborhood of 200, although the number borro~ed from Gura during 1943 

varied from a low of 41 to a high of 199 in May. At mid-March 1943 

there were 436 Air Corps officers and men assigned to the project, with 

193 Douglas civilians, 165 Russians, and 54 native workmen.23 

The relatively large numbers of military personnel, coupled with 

the contractual stipulation giving the Douglas Company full authority 

over its own civilian employees, led to considerable conflict as to local 

responsibility for the operation of the plant. On 10 June 1942 Colonel 

Porter, claiming that the Douglas management had failed to control 

its employees, placed them under military regulation. In an appeal to 

the men made also on that date, Colonel Shingler, chief of the Iranian 

Mission, reminded them that their work was as essential to the war 

effort as actual combat. In August Colonel Porter was able to report 

that, although internal quarrels among the local Douglas managerial 

staff had adversely affected morale and work for a time, the civilian 

staff was working well. But on 3 November he found it necessary to 

dismiss the Douglas project manager and one other for what he termed 

inefficient leadership, and for permitting feuds, absenteeism, inefficiency, and the violation of military regulations imposed through 

Colonel Porter by the PGSC or the British Tenth Army. At the same 

time Porter praised the work of the Douglas employees and, taking note 

21 (1) Rpt cited n. 18. (2) History cited n. 5 (2). (3) Rpt, Plant Opns Office, .Basra 

Dist, PGSC, 20 Mar 43. PGF 125-G. 
AIRCRAFT ASSEMBLY AND DELIVERY 135 

that their contracts were soon to expire, hoped that they would see fit 

to renew and stay on at the base.24 

Personnel, ambiguities in the chain of command, overlapping construction responsibilities-these were some of the factors affecting production of assembled aircraft ready to be flown away to Soviet 

battlefields. Although in any event production was dependent upon the 

number of skilled mechanics available, the highly variable rate of arrival of craft to be processed must be taken into consideration in any 

assessment of the efficiency of operations. For example, in one week in 

March 1943-the last month of Douglas management-90 aircraft 

arrived in the Persian Gulf, while only 18 were accepted by the Russians: 14 A-20's and 4 P-40's. In the following week only 14 aircraft 

arrived, and only 8 were accepted: 2 A-20's, 1 B-25, and 5 P-40's. 

The net total of unassembled (backlog) aircraft, under such circumstances, becomes quite meaningless as a measure of systematic 

operations. 

Because aircraft of the same make and model differ in some small 

detail from each other, and since planes cannot be stamped out with 

a die like a piepan, assembly of any two planes of the same make and 

model cannot be standardized down to the last split second of time-study 

measurement. When a single assembly plant, moreover, handles a variety of models and makes and does not know from one day to the 

next which to prepare for, no standard routine can be established that 

can turn out work with the mechanical regularity of a doughnut machine in a shop window. The first P-40's (single-engine Kittyhawk pursuit planes) reached the Persian Gulf by ship on 15 November 1942. 

These were latecomers to Abadan, having been preceded since late 

1941 by large numbers of Boston bombers (A-20's). The first Bell 

Airacobra fighter (P-39) arrived at Abadan by sea on 8 December 

and, though a new type at the plant, was finished and flown out on 13 

December, to be followed the next year by over a thousand more.25 

Because of the foregoing factors, the battle of the backlog was an 

uneven contest with the odds too often stacked against the human 

factor. At the end of the first month of Douglas operation-May 

1942-nearly 200 aircraft were awaiting assembly. By the end of June 

this number had fallen to a little over 100, as against total deliveries 

that month of 128 craft. During the next few months, the backlog 

.. (1) Page 11 of Rpt cited n. 22. (2) Rpt cited n. 18. (3) History cited n. 5(2), 

pp. 76ff. The dismissals were concurred in by General Connony and the air officer of 

USAFIME. Walter Beck, chief Douglas representative for the Middle East, considered them a question of personalities, with trivial aspects. The dismissed manager was Norman H. 

Millstead . .. Table 11. 
136 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

averaged less than 25 unassembled machines, but rose again at year's 

end to about 75. By this time a total of 742 aircraft had been delivered 

to the Russians.2G In February 1943, as greater quantities of crated 

planes were received, the backlog rose rapidly, reaching about 170 by 

the end of the month, and rising to 200 during March as against only 

114 deliveries in that month. This was the state of affairs as the Douglas 

contract came to an end. 

M ilit arization 

It was ordained by the Washington directive of February 1942 that 

overseas contract activities should be militarized as soon as practicable. 

As the personnel figures have indicated, the Air Corps was able to 

throw military personnel into the Abadan project relatively faster than 

its contractor could supply civilians, with the result that Cedar Project, 

in a sense, automatically militarized itself. But so long as the Douglas 

contract was in force the preponderance of military over civilian personnel remained, from the point of view of control and management, 

an anomaly. The Douglas Aircraft Company, therefore, became the 

third civilian contractor to be dispensed with. The first Douglas contract, expiring in June 1942, had been renewed until the end of the 

year. On 15 November General Maxwell, as Commanding General, 

SOS, USAFIME, recommended that it be renewed only through 31 

March 1943 and that two air depot repair squadrons and a headquarters and headquarters squadron of an air base group be assigned to 

reduce the backlog. On 17 November Air Corps officials in the United 

States renewed the contract for one year from that date instead of the 

period recommended by Maxwell; but at a meeting in Cairo on 14 

January 1943, Lt. Gen. Frank M. Andrews, Commanding General, 

USAFIME, decided that sufficient military personnel were available 

to militarize Cedar Project as soon as possible. A few days later it was 

informally communicated to Bert N. Snow, Douglas representative at 

Abadan, that militarization would be accomplished by 1 Apri1.27 

At the end of 1942, while the change to militarization was merely 

a rumor among the men at Abadan, only 30 percent of them had ex-

'" Table 10. This figure includes craft assembled by the RAF with American supervision 

and all craft delivered before the commencement of Douglas management and operation. 

The Douglas officials estimated 600 deliveries by their organization through 31 January 1943. 

Ltr, Bert N. Snow to Douglas Aircraft Company, 31 Jan 43. Drawer 211, Status ReportsProject 19 and Combined, Douglas Files. 2T (1) Ltr cited n. 26. (2) Ltr, Maintenance Div, Hq, Air Serv Comd, Patterson Field, 

Ohio, to Douglas Aircraft Company, 23 Jan 43, transmitting rad from Bert Snow. Drawer 

211, Status Reports-Project 19 and Combined, Douglas Files. 
AIRCRAFT ASSEMBLY AND DELIVERY 137 

pressed a desire to renew their individual contracts into the new year. 

After the new situation was clarified, 87 percent of the available Douglas mechanics at Cedar Project signed on, to 31 March 1943, while 

Colonel Porter agreed with the Douglas representative that during that 

final contract period Air Corps officers would transmit orders only 

through the Douglas civilian superintendents.2B In January 1943 the 

82d Air Depot Group arrived at Abadan for a period of orientation 

before taking over from Douglas in April. 

Notice of termination of the Douglas Cedar contract was given by 

Colonel Porter to Jack A. Ahern, the new Douglas manager, and Bert 

Snow, Douglas representative, under date of 2 March 1943. The notice 

stated that on or about 31 March the company would cease construction, the hiring, selecting, and training of personnel, and the procurement, warehousing, and all other work on aircraft, so that after that 

date "the Contractor shall have no further affirmative duty to perform" 

save evacuation of the site and return of his personnel to the United 

States. 20 On the same date Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, now commanding general of USAFIME, ratified General Andrews' previous 

decision to terminate the contract, and forwarded Colonel Porter a 

tentative draft of a comprehensive release of the Douglas Company 

which had been prepared by George Lupton, that company's legal 

counsel. The letter of termination declared: 

The Government hereby states that this notice is not being given because of 

the fact that the Contractor at any time has refused, neglected, or failed to prosecute 

the work required [but because] conditions have arisen in connection with the 

direction and prosecution of the current war ... that [require that] work under 

the contract be discontinued. 

Colonel Porter, having discharged an earlier Douglas project manager, 

gagged a bit at signing the release sent him ready-made from Cairo; 

but after a trip there and conferences at headquarters, he signed on 

26 April a modified Release, Receipt, and Certificate of Performance 

in eight Whereases, one Now Therefore, and twenty-four Clauses. This 

document stated that all procurement was wise and prudent, all wage 

scales proper, all waste necessary, and all work of whatsoever nature 

performed at the command of, and by the specific authority of, the 

contracting officer under circumstances as healthful and free of hazard 

"as has been possible under the existing conditions"; and that not only 

did the contractor comply, clause by clause, with his contract, but that 

os Ltr cited n. 26 • .. History cited n. 5 (2) . 
138 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

at all times his operations, books, and records were open and known 

in minute detail to Colonel Porter.so 

Up to 1 April 1943, when the Air Corps took over management and 

operation of Cedar Project at Abadan, 1,025 aircraft were delivered to 

the USSR in the Persian Corridor, or an average of about 75 a month. 

Of these, 197 A-20's and 111 B-25's were flown in to the area, leaving 

717 craft which were assembled after arrival by sea. The cost of the 

work performed under the Douglas contract was $3,795,735, about half 

the original estimate; but it must be realized that the target contemplated by the contract was not achieved. The fee to the Douglas Aircraft 

Company was $435,572, as originally estimated.31 

.. (1) Ibid. (2) Memo, Snow for Cover, 5 Mar 43. (3) Ltr, Snow to Cover, 28 Apr 43. 

With copies of documents cited, in Drawer 211, Status Reports--Project 19 and Combined, 

Do~las Files. 

(1) Table 10. Breakdown from source given in table. (2) Cost figures from Ltr, L. E. 

Tollefson, Contract Administrator, Douglas Aircraft Company, to author, 16 Jan 47. 
CHAPTER VIII 

Motor Vehicle Assembly 

and Delivery 

In the manufacture of motor vehicles American methods of mass 

production have achieved quantitative results unequaled by any other 

industrial power. This industrial potential, a valuable asset in mechanized warfare, the United States shared with its Allies through lendlease. To the Soviet Union through 20 September 1945 went 409,526 

lend-lease trucks of United States origin. Some idea of the extent to 

which the United States shared its output with the USSR may be 

gained from figures of its production of military trucks during the war 

years. Total output during the peak year of 1943 was 648,404 military 

trucks. The trucks sent to Russia were thus the equivalent of seven and 

a half months of United States output at the highest annual rate 

achieved during the war years. It has been estimated that the lend-lease 

trucks received by the USSR from the United States represented two 

years and seven months of the prewar capacity of the less highly developed Soviet motor industry. American trucks therefore bulked large 

as an addition to Russian production capacity. Nearly 45 percent of 

these American trucks reached the USSR via the Persian Corridor. 

Of these, 88 percent were assembled in the American-operated plants 

at Andimeshk and Khorramshahr from March 1942 through April 

1945.1 

Though the Russians were the chief beneficiaries of the motor vehicle assembly program in the Persian Corridor, assemblies were also 

performed for the British Army, for the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, for the American Army, and for the Iranian 

1 (1) Report on War Aid Furnished by the United States to the USSR, Foreign Economic 

Sec, Office of Foreign Liquidation, Dept State, 28 Nov 45, p. 19. (2) Official Munitions 

Production of the United States by Months, July 1, 1940-August 31, 1945 (Special Release, 

May 1, 1947), Civilian Production Administration (formerly War Production Board), p. 233. 

(3) Military Intelligence Division, Review of Europe, Russia and the Middle East, I 

(2 Jan 46), No. 10, estimates 370,000 trucks as equivalent to twenty-eight months of prewar 

Soviet production. (4) Table 7 and Charts 4, 5. 
140 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

Government; nor were the American truck assembly plants (TAP's) 

the only ones in the region. Truck assembly was an important British 

activity which, by the Middle East Directive of September 1941, the 

Americans undertook to share. 

Certain terms used in this chapter require explanation. After manufacture the vehicles were partly disassembled and crated for overseas 

shipment according to several patterns. The designation TUP covers 

several types of packing called two-unit, double-unit, or twin-unit 

packs, comprising two chassis and one cab or two cabs and one chassis. 

The so-called Beta Pack, a form designed by the British, included one 

complete vehicle with or without body packed in one, two, or more 

cases and required variations in the assembly process after unpacking. 

Properly this term is applicable only to British-specified vehicles, but 

the Americans seem to have employed it loosely and interchangeably 

to designate packed knocked-down vehicles in general, as well as the 

assembly apparatus used to put them together again after uncrating. 

The term Beta Pack is even applied sometimes in the records to the 

lumber used in the crates. The term motor vehicle includes trucks, 

trailers, jeeps, and weapons carriers. The generic term truck is employed in this text for the output of the TAP's. 

In 1938, after Munich, the Overseas Division of General Motors 

Corporation had foreseen the need for locating emergency vehicle 

assembly plants at strategic sites. Foreseeing also the likelihood that 

the closing of the Mediterranean to shipping would heighten the importance of the Persian Gulf, General Motors at that time submitted to 

the British vVar Office a recommendation to establish emergency assembly plants at or near Basra. After the invasion of Poland a year 

later, the company designed an emergency TUP assembly unit with 

a bolted structural framework on a poured concrete floor, to be housed 

under canvas or other temporary shelter. Equipped with cranes, tractors, trailers, and battery chargers, this plant would have a capacity 

of fifty trucks per each eight-hour shift. A single such plant could 

therefore turn out 1,300 trucks in a month of twenty-six working days 

on a one-shift basis. The significant saving of shipping space by overseas 

assembly of cased knocked-down vehicles recommended the assembly 

plant idea, and in May of 1941 the British Purchasing Commission 

bought four of these plants for shipment to the Middle East. It was 

thus through the arrangements made between General Motors and 

the British, and through the availability of trained General Motors 

personnel in India, that the company was selected to carry out the truck 
MOTOR VEHICLE ASSEMBLY AND DELIVERY 141 

assembly operations undertaken by the Americans for the British in 

the Persian Gulf area.2 

Plans and Plants 

After some negotiation a letter of intent was issued by the Office of 

the Quartermaster General on 5 January 1942 under which the company operated while details of a contract were worked out. Later, the 

unsigned contract with The Quartermaster General was transferred to 

the Office of the Chief of Ordnance in a general shift of War Department responsibilities. The Ordnance-General Motors contract, signed 

29 December 1942, was effective as of the date of the letter of intent, 

which was modified during the year by twelve supplements, the latest, 

of 30 December 1942, extending the General Motors contract to 

30 June 1943.3 

The work which General Motors, as a civilian contractor under the 

jurisdiction of the Iranian Mission, was to do fell within the authority 

given General Wheeler in his Letter of Instructions to render aid, 

through assembly operations, to British, Russian, and other friendly 

forces in his area. By early 1942 the British were already operating an 

assembly plant at Rafadiyah for their own military services. The 

Iranian District engineer furnished some technical advice and assistance at this plant and, when the American construction projects in 

Iraq were abandoned, this technical aid to truck assembly continued 

at Rafadiyah. A second British assembly plant, at Bushire, was busied 

chiefly in assembling American lend-lease vehicles from India assigned 

to the UKCC to enable it to carry out its motor transport mission.4 

Both plants were capable of assembling vehicles for Soviet account as 

well as their own when need arose; but together they were inadequate 

• Unless otherwise noted, statements concerning General Motors operations are based upon: 

(1) Chart, Truck Assembly in Iran, seen at head office, General Motors Overseas Corporation (GMOC), New York. (2) General Motors Overseas Operations, The War Effort of 

the Overseas Division (1944). (3) Statistical Tables, Exhibits "A" and "C," filed at head 

office, GMOC, giving production figures for Andimeshk, 1942 and 1943, and Khorramshahr, 

1943. (4) Intervs with A. S. Clark, General Staff, Foreign Affairs, and Henry M. Halsted, 

Jr., Regional Dir, Far East, GMOC, 25 Oct 44; and with L. C. Meyer, Head of Boxing 

and Inspection Dept, GMOC, 28 Nov 47. (5) Pamphlet, Packing Slip Summary: Equipment for TUP Mobile Assembly Unit, prepared by General Motors Overseas Operations. 

(6) Pamphlet, Methods of Packing ... for Overseas Operations, prepared by General 

Motors Overseas Operations and submitted to QMG, 5 Feb 42. (7) File, General Motors: 

Confidential Correspondence, Miscellaneous General Motors Quartermaster Contracts, 

NYODF. (8) Ltr, Bruce Harmon to author, 6 Jan 50. • (1) The contract was DA-W-398-QM-250, which became W-613-0RD-2930, for a fixed fee of $2,500 per month. 160 Genl Motors Overseas Corp Contract, SL 8982. 

(2) General shift authorized by WD Cir 245, 25 Jul 42. (3) Report on Overseas Assembly 

Plants, by Minna Grossman, 25 Ju145. Hist Sec, OCofOrd. • Request for American vehicles for UKCC submitted to Gen Wheeler by CinC, India, 

23 Oct 41. Iran 5/13, NADEF. 
142 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

to carry the expanded load of vehicles called for by the First (Moscow) 

Protocol. In addition to assembly operations, the British moved completed trucks, with and without cargo, in early 1942, over three high wa y 

routes to the Soviet delivery point at Tabriz. 

When Generals Wavell and Wheeler discussed American aid projects at New Delhi in November 1941, they agreed on establishment 

of American truck assembly plants at Karachi and at the head of the 

Persian Gulf, but they did not agree on the allocation of assembled 

vehicles as between the British and the Russians or upon the routes over 

which assembled trucks would be delivered. The extent of the American task and the sites of its plants required further exploration. Wheeler 

submitted two proposals to the War Department: that a small TUP 

plant be installed somewhere in the Persian Gulf area, and that a plant 

big enough to serve the entire Middle East be installed at Karachi. It 

was at this time that large ordnance plans for Karachi were being 

hatched. The War Department, which had earlier hesitated to accept 

a British suggestion to create large American installations in India, 

forthwith made the counterproposal that it would be more efficient to 

enlarge the existent General Motors plant at Bombay, capable already 

of delivering 4,000 vehicles a month, and that a Beta Pack assembly 

plant now en route for Karachi could then be diverted to Basra. General Wheeler, however, adhered to his recommendation of Karachi, 

because of the advantages of shortened communications, port facilities, 

elimination of the transshipment Bombay would require, and better 

climatic conditions. In November Folspen, the American engineer constructor, was directed to erect an assembly plant in the AhwazAndimeshk region. 

In the course of three-cornered conversations held in December in 

Tehran among the Russians, the Tenth Army, and 'Vheeler, it developed that the Russians were strongly opposed to Karachi as an 

assembly point for their vehicles. They pointed out the difficulties of 

delivering trucks overland from there up the east Iranian border to 

Meshed and thence into the USSR. They preferred that major motor 

vehicle deliveries be effected not via the Persian Gulf but via the northern Russian ports, more accessible to the battle lines of Europe. Russian 

needs via the Persian Gulf were therefore estimated at only 2,000 vehicles per month, a figure confirmed to Wheeler by Washington after 

conferences there among Generals Sidney Spalding and Moore and 

British Army representatives.1i The Russians therefore were pleased 

• (1) Msg ARMINDIA Q (Ops) VVY /802/Q, GHQ, India, to War Office, Iraq, 

14 Jan 42. NA 2051 (Iran DO-I), NADEF. (2) Rad AMSIR 10, 21 Jan 42. MID 

400.32951-21-42 (1-6-42). 
MOTOR VEHICLE ASSEMBLY AND DELIVERY 143 

when Wheeler's decision to locate a Beta Pack assembly plant at Andimeshk was approved on 8 January 1942 by the Commander-in-Chief, 

India. Also pleased was the British director of transportation for Iran, 

because of Andimeshk's accessibility to the Iranian State Railway. The 

selection of Andimeshk was opposed by Kenneth Harker, representative of UKCC, and by a General Motors representative, who wrote of 

the site: 

Never were the factors of climate and human comfort more completely subordinated to military expediency .... The area is infested with malaria, sand 

fly fever, typhoid, and dysentery. The water supply TUns through open ditches, 

and powdery clouds of dust are a constant plague to men and machines alike. 6 

In February General Wheeler advised Washington that General 

Motors should operate two TUP plants at Andimeshk to assemble 2,000 

motor vehicles per month for the Russians; an assembly plant at Umm 

Qasr for 3,000 vehicles monthly for the British in Iran and Iraq; a 

plant at Karachi to assemble a similar number for delivery to the 

British; a service and repair station at Andimeshk to handle maintenance of 300 vehicles a month for the British Army and UKCC; a 

checkup station at Tehran for final check on trucks delivered there to 

the Russians before Andimeshk assembly was put into operation; a 

checkup station at Kazvin for final check on trucks delivered there to 

the Russians after being driven by Russian drivers from the assembly 

lines at Andimeshk; and body-building and engine-reconditioning 

plants at Umm Qasr and Karachi. 1 It was not long before this extensive 

program was whittled down, first, by the reduction of Karachi operations stemming from the reduced ordnance program; second, by the 

virtual American withdrawal from Iraq; and third, by the shift in 

American priorities from British to Russian aid. The Wheeler recommendation had proposed 6,000 monthly assemblies by American plants 

for British delivery and 2,000 for Soviet delivery. By the end of April 

1942 it was reported that the Andimeshk plant was designed to process 

2,000 trucks monthly for the Russians and 1,000 for the British. In 

actual practice, after work began at Andimeshk, its production was 

devoted almost entirely to vehicles for the USSR.s 

The contract with General Motors provided that the company 

would be responsible for personnel, engineering and equipment specifications, procurement of equipment and tools, and management and 

"The War Effort cited n. 2(2). 

'Rad AMSIR BAG 12, Gen Wheeler to Gen Moore, 14 Feb 42. Folder, MT RepairUmm Qasr, SLX-l1,737. • Col Shingler, Rpt to American Aid Subcommittee, Cairo, sub: Status of Projects as of 

April30, 1942. 334.8 American Aid Subcommittee, SL 9011. 
144 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

operation of plants; and that the Army would be responsible for 

priorities, shipment of plant equipment and truck material, construction of plant buildings, living quarters, and railway sidings, and the 

delivery of truck material for assembly at the site of the work. Certain 

of these U.S. Army responsibilities were assumed by the British, 

especially construction (housing, roads, utilities) and moving the boxed 

vehicles from shipside to Andimeshk. The British assumed all costs of 

installing equipment at the plant and agreed to make certain local arrangements concerned with labor, power, and water, as well as to 

provide all fuels and lubricants used for assembled trucks destined for 

the USSR. This last arrangement was interpreted by the Americans as 

requiring the British to replace oils and greases used at the checkup 

stations where vehicles were handed over to the Russians if the Russians 

refused to do SO.9 The British commenced construction at Andimeshk in 

February upon a concrete foundation laid by Folspen. Superstructure 

was then erected by the British under a subcontract from the American 

Army. Plans and supervision were furnished by General Motors. 

Neither of the two Beta Pack plants to be installed in the Andimeshk 

buildings when completed was as yet available. One was en route from 

the United States to Karachi; the other, borrowed by General ''''heeler 

from the British base at Port Sudan, was scheduled to reach Andimeshk 

in late March, thus determining the earliest date at which Andimeshk 

assembly operations could start. The Americans undertook to furnish 

2,000 vehicles per month, to deliver the two plants complete with cranes 

and tools, and to assemble and hand over the vehicles to Russian drivers 

at the point of assembly. 

The last-named point, the means by which assembled trucks were 

to be driven from Andimeshk to Soviet receiving points in the north, 

went against local British policy. The Russians insisted upon driving the 

trucks north themselves, and the Americans proposed keeping at Andimeshk a rotating group of about 450 Soviet personnel for this purpose. 

A British report to the War Office in January noted the Russian demand and added, "Shortage of drivers ... may make this desirable 

provided political factor permits." 10 Just as they had opposed the quartering of Soviet military personnel near the Abadan aircraft assembly 

plant, so the British regarded the presence of numerous Russians at 

Andimeshk and at checkup stations and traffic posts along the delivery 

routes as undesirable infiltration of the British zone of Iran. The prob-

• Memo 206/77/Q-l and 206/15/77/Q-l, Hq, Tenth Army, 12 Feb 42, sub: Development of American Installations at Andimeshk .. 004.04 AlOe, SL 8976. ,. Msg cited n. 5 (1). 
MOTOR VEHICLE ASSEMBLY AND DELIVERY 145 

lern was settled at Andimeshk by yielding to the Soviet-American 

wishes; but it was to arise again elsewhere.l1 

While construction at Andimeshk proceeded and the TUP plants 

were being waited for, a January message from Washington that 2,484-

trucks for the USSR were at sea heading for the Persian Gulf made 

it necessary to plan for their assembly elsewhere than at Andimeshk.12 

It was decided to take advantage of the UKCC assembly plant at 

Bushire. The Iranian Mission entered into a contract whereby UKCC 

technicians and native laborers were to operate under the nominal direction of a single American officer. It was arranged that the assembled 

trucks were to be driven to Tehran by Iranian native drivers. At Tehran 

after rigorous inspection at a service and repair station run by a private 

local concern, also under contract to the Iranian Mission, the vehicles, 

if acceptable to the Russians, were to be transferred to Soviet control. 

Still driven by their UKCC-hired native drivers, they were to proceed 

to Tabriz for physical surrender to the Soviet authorities. The distance 

from Bushire to Tabriz was 1,179 miles over the worst of roads through 

hazardous desert and mountain country alive with armed bandits. To 

the damage inflicted by the execrable driving of the Persian drivers 

would be added the toll taken by the terrain and losses from pilferage 

or hostile attack. The Tehran contractor therefore would have his 

hands full before the Russians took over the trucks. 

Problems and Performance 

Between 2 February, when the first shipment of cased trucks 

reached Bushire, and 18 March, when the temporary arrangement with 

the UKCC ceased, 1,263 trucks destined for the USSR were assembled 

at Bushire under contract with the Iranian Mission.13 The arrangement 

was only a stopgap one; but it relieved the pressure of accumulating 

unassembled trucks for Russia. The cost was high: a bill of $275,000 

from UKCC for assembly and delivery overland to Tabriz, plus all costs 

for repair and servicing at the private contractor's establishment at 

Tehran. When the bad news reached Washington, an admonition went 

forth to Colonel Shingler to persuade the British to reimburse UKCC 

and collect from the Russians. This suggestion failed to observe three 

n Folder, MT Assembly-Details of Transport, passim, SL X-ll,737. 

"Rad cited n. 5 (2). 11 (1) Ltr, Col Shingler to CG, SOS, 10 Apr 42, sub: Status of U.S. Mil Iranian Mission. 

PGF 70. (2) Ltr, Col Shingler to Dir, Intn Div, SOS, Washington, 3 Jul 42 (cited hereafter as Shingler Ltr), says Bushire work began 3 Feb 42. AG 400.3295 Russia, Hq AMET. 

Another copy .004.04 Beta Pack Assembly Plants, SL 8976. 
146 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

realities: First, UKCC, a wholly state-subsidized entity, enjoyed two 

personalities--one as an official body, the other as a business enterprise, 

making it unlikely that the British Government would reimburse 

UKCC. Second, UKCC was under a contract to the American mission, 

which, however it may have been entered into, had to be honored. 

Third, the Russians were even then difficult to collect from. The bill 

stood at $275,000, and, although this sum was not so bad as the $600,-

000 erroneously reported as a fact in a later Federal Bureau of Investigation report, it was enough to exhaust the Quartermaster's allotment 

for 1942-43 of a quarter of a million dollars for assembling Soviet 

trucks. There are no comparable cost figures for later American truck 

assembly as the figures recorded for the Army-operated plant at Khorramshahr for February 1944 (about $28 per truck) and for February 

1945 (about $17) represent chiefly payron costs exclusive of U.S. 

military wages. But even if these partial figures were doubled, tripled, 

or quadrupled, they would still fall far below the UKCC's charge of 

nearly $218 per truck which, to be sure, allowed for the 1,1 79-mile 

drive overland to Tabriz, with Uncle Sam paying for the checkup at 

Tehran en route. The UKCC bill for Bushire assembly was an introduction to the Middle East for the Iranian Mission.H 

While work at Bushire was nearing completion the mission sent to 

Bombay for two General Motors specialists who were to get assembly 

operations at Andimeshk started in the open air as soon as the borrowed 

Beta Pack plant should arrive from Port Sudan and without waiting 

for completion of the plant buildings being erected by the British from 

General Motors plans and specifications. One aspect of the employment of General Motors as a contractor was that a minimum number 

of their American technicians, most of them from their staff in India, 

could organize assembly operations using a ma~imum number of locally 

obtained foremen and laborers. On 14 March the two General Motors 

men arrived. On 26 March, just after the arrival of the Port Sudan 

plant, production at Andimeshk was actually under way. The rate, 

because the native workmen were green and the plant was exposed to 

sun and sand, was only about 25 vehicles a day. Colonel Shingler reported in early April the completion of 160 trucks and the accumulation 

" (1) Memo for Intn Div, 2 May 42. Defense Aid Papers, Russia, Trucks, Drawer 3, 

Cabinet 67, Intn Div, ASF CCF. (2) Rads AMSIR WASH 146 and 147 to Col Shingler, 

2 May 42. AG 400.329'5 (8-9--41) Sec 4. (3) Rad AMSIR, from Basra, 30 Mar 42. Same 

file. (4) FBI Rpt, 27 Feb 44. MID 451.2, 24 Feb 44 (25 Jan 43). (5) Rad AMSIR 232, 

30 May 42. Filed as in (2). (6) Hist Rpt, Plants Br, Opns Div, Hq, PGC, 6 Mar 45, 

Inel 4, Table, Truck Assembly Time and Cost per Truck Produced at TAP II, Khorramshahr, 

Period from Jul 43 through 31 Jan 45. PGF 125-Z. (7) Hist Rpt, TAP II, for Feb 45, 

9 Mar 45. PGF 23-Z. 
MOTOR VEHICLE ASSEMBLY AND DELIVERY 147 

of 850 cased vehicles awaiting assembly. By the end of April, 322 cargo 

trucks had been assembled.15 

So pressing was the Soviet need for trucks that sixty mechanics were 

brought down from Tehran to speed the work. On 25 April the second 

TUP plant-which had been shipped to Karachi, later located on the 

docks at Bombay, and forwarded to Iran-reached Andimeshk and 

added its production capacity to that of the plant from Port Sudan. 

Throughout March and April cranes and tools were borrowed from 

the Army or obtained from India, while construction of the main building, rail sidings, yard paving, living quarters, and utilities continued. 

On 6 May the still uncompleted main building was occupied, and in 

that month power-plant equipment borrowed from the Army was installed. By the end of June, after three full months of work, 3,509 

assembled cargo trucks had been turned out and sent on their way to 

the USSR. 

When April shipping information indicated arrival at Persian Gulf 

ports by the end of May of 4,130 cased trucks for the USSR, it was 

obvious that facilities at Andimeshk, designed for the 2,000 trucks per 

month stipulated the previous December by the Russians, would be 

swamped. Once again the UKCC plant at Bushire seemed the solution; 

but Bushire, the UKCC, the Soviets, and the British had by this time 

become entangled in a series of mutual objections which might have 

resulted in a stalemate, war or no war, except for American intervention. Russian objections to the UKCC were founded on the experiences 

of February and March which encouraged the Russians to suspect the 

company of profiteering and attempting to obtain a transportation 

monopoly in Iran and which indicated the inefficiency of overland delivery from Bushire to Tabriz via Tehran. In early February when the 

Russians announced their intention of sending a party to Bushire to 

reconnoiter the road, assist in traffic control of the convoys, and study 

the performance of the vehicles, the British, who did not want to see 

Russians operating so far south in Iran, objected. The American Minister at Tehran, Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr., treated with both sides and the 

Russians sent some drivers and armed guards to Bushire. Later, when 

Shingler proposed turning again to Bushire, the question was reopened 

and once again was settled through American good offices. To overcome the refusal of the Russian Ambassador at Tehran to accept any 

more trucks driven by UKCC drivers, the Americans proposed inspection by Iranian Mission officers throughout the process of assembly and 

,. (1) Ltr cited n. 13 (1) gives date of beginning work as 27 Mar 42. General Motors 

records say 26 Mar 42. (2) Table 8. 
148 THt; PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

delivery. With some compromising all round, it was arranged to assemble several shiploads of Russian-bound trucks at Bushire. A member 

of General Greely's mission, then observing from Tehran, reported in 

April, "There seems to be no difficulty in turning over trucks to the 

Russians at the point of assembly as it has worked out satisfactorily at 

Andimeshk." 16 

But there were difficulties, among them those arising from the 

necessarily increased American supervision of UKCC operations at 

Bushire. The single American officer was replaced in August by an 

officer and a small detachment of an ordnance medium automotive 

maintenance company. Even after the immediate emergency of AprilMay had passed, Bushire was continued as a supplementary assembly 

plant, since the rigors of the German submarine campaign had all but 

closed the north Russian ports and the flow of trucks via the Persian 

Gulf was expected to increase. 

American supervisory personnel remained at Bushire well over a 

year, introducing several innovations which increased production. In 

all, 6,628 vehicles were assembled there for the Russians in this 

Iranian-worked, British-operated, and American-supervised plant.'T 

At Andimeshk performance from the beginning of operations late 

in March produced an erratic-looking curve on the chart throughout 

the rest of 1942. (Table 9 and Chart 4, Appendixes A and B) After 

slowness natural to the beginning of a new project, June assemblies 

reached 2,241 units, leaving at the end of the month 566 unassembled 

vehicles. During that period, while concentrating on Soviet-bound 

vehicles, the Andimeshk plant assembled 115 Studebaker tank trucks 

consigned, by Soviet permission, to the British because they were needed 

to supply gasoline to truck convoys in the area. The early output w~s 

achieved with small numbers of personnel and inadequate plant equipment which, as late as the end of 1942, constituted only 35 percent of 

specifications. By the end of July the staff at Andimeshk numbered 2 

officers, 10 enlisted men, 10 General Motors executives, 150 skilled and 

semiskilled native workmen, and between 350 and 400 unskilled 

natives. The reduction in assemblies, precipitate after August, reflected 

a reduced flow of arrivals, not a diminished capacity to handle the 

work. To the end of June, Andimeshk assemblies of 3,509 units for the 

USSR contrasted with arrivals at Bushire of 2,268 units of which the 

10 (1) Special Rpt to Home Office, by Col John B. Luscombe, QM Off, USSR Mission, 

atchd to Weekly Progress Rpt 10, 21 Apr 42. 319.1 USSR, Intn Div, ASF NCF. (2) Folder 

cited n. 11. 

"Table 7. 
MOTOR VEHICLE ASSEMBLY AND DELIVERY 149 

only available information merely indicates that nearly all had been 

delivered to the Russians.1s 

Whether because of the contrast between performance at the two 

plants or because of continuing Soviet hostility to UKCC assembly of 

Soviet-bound trucks at Bushire, Kenneth Harker of UKCC journeyed 

to Moscow and presented to General Faymonville a comprehensive and 

unfavorable estimate of American operations at Andimeshk and a 

request that he be sent to Washington to reveal the state of affairs at 

Andimeshk. The correspondence indicates that Harker's views were 

not shared by Grigori M. Polyansky, assistant commercial representative attached to the USSR Embassy at Tehran. He stated Harker was 

off by 180 degrees and his ejaculation, "God protect us from Bushire assembly!" was forwarded by Faymonville to Shingler via the American 

Legation in Tehran. Harker did not go to Washington. Investigation 

revealed that the Soviets had accepted 95 percent of trucks assembled 

at Andimeshk and Bushire. The episode closed with a statement by 

Shingler to Faymonville that the British, Russians, and Americans enjoyed "most cordial" relations, that "in British-Soviet dealings this 

mission functions as go-between," and that "improvement in mutual 

understanding will continue." It is not possible to state how far the 

British and Russians would have gone along with Shingler's statement 

of the American role or with his optimism. They were not newcomers 

to Iran.19 

Although new arrivals of crated vehicles were to fall off after June, 

the visit of Molotov to Washington preliminary to the signing of the 

Second Protocol raised the Persian Gulf quota of trucks for Russia by 

50 percent. On 3 June Harry Hopkins authorized General Burns to 

promise Molotov 3,000 American trucks per month!O Plans were therefore developed for erection of a second TAP, also to be operated by 

General IV[otors. A site was selected at Khorramshahr about two miles 

from the docks and adjacent to the new railway branch line and the 

highway being built to Ahwaz. General Motors delivered plant and 

building blueprints to the U.S. Army on 20 July, and the British started 

construction early in August. Provision was made for housing 15 General Motors and 7 U.S. Army executives, 48 skilled and 102 semiskilled 

,. (1) Shingler Ltr. (2) For strength figures, Memo, by Defense Aid Dir, Iran-Iraq 

Serv Comd, 27 Jul 43. 323.61 Establishment of Military Districts, Binder 1, SL 9008. ,. (1) Alternative explanations suggested by Col Shingler in Rad AMSIR 361 to Washington, 17 Jun 42. 330.14 Criticisms and Complaints 1942, SL 9008. (2) Rad, Gen Faymonville to Col Shingler, copies for Gens Wheeler and Maxwell, 5 Jun 42. Same file. (3) Rad, 

Maj. John G. Ondrick, U.S. MA, Tehran, to Col Shingler, 17 Jun 42. Same file. (4) Rad 

5-309. Col Shingler to Amembassy, Moscow, for Faymonville, 28 June 42. Same file. 

" Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 576. 
150 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

laborers, 30 Soviet officers, 250 Soviet soldier-drivers, and 378 native 

unskilled workmen. The plant was scheduled for completion by 

30 September.21 

Such was not to be the case, for construction delays ensued. Although the railway sidings were completed in October and the main 

building was under roof, employee housing was only just begun. Moreover, only 60 percent of necessary TUP assembly equipment had arrived from the United States; but this fortunately included two new 

plants. One of these was sent to Andimeshk to replace the British plant 

borrowed from Port Sudan. The other was retained for use at Khorramshahr. In December, as the arrival of increased truck shipments 

from America grew imminent, General Motors expressed its concern 

over delays in construction at Khorramshahr.22 In consequence the 

Iranian District engineer supplemented the British construction forces. 

Work was far enough advanced by 26 January 1943 for assembly to 

begin. Aided by sufficient arrivals of plant equipment by 30 June to 

bring plant to 89 percent of full requirements, production at Khorramshahr rose steadily. At Andimeshk, 97 percent of necessary plant 

equipment reached the site and was installed by the end of March 

1943, making it possible to handle the rising flow of incoming vehicles. 

In June Andimeshk assembled 4,066 vehicles, all for the USSR, while 

at Khorramshahr 3,116 vehicles, 459 of them for the U.S. Army, the 

rest for the USSR, rolled off the lines. The total, 7,182 vehicles, contrasts with the 2,241 turned out at Andimeshk alone a year before.23 

June marked the final month of TAP operation by the civilian contractor. Effective 1 July 1943 General Motors became the fourth (and 

last) of the civilian contractors employed on U.S. Army projects in 

the Persian Corridor to be terminated, as General Connolly's new organization took over the TAP's and thus completed militarization of all 

projects. In exchanges which preceded the termination of the contract, 

General Motors had rejected a proposal that it carryon under some 

such scheme of divided responsibility as had been accepted by the engineer constructor, Folspen. In the company's view it could not separate 

operation and management responsibilities. It urged assignment of 

sufficient Army personnel before 30 June to provide time for training. 

The whole enterprise was growing and could not be handed over to 

untried management overnight. From the start a few Army personnel 

:n (1) Memo, 6 Sep 42. DE File C-3, Conferences, NADEF. (2) Ltr. General Motors 

Resident Deputy Regional Dir for Indian and Persian Gulf Areas to CG, PGSC, 14 Dec 42. 

DE File 0-1, Operations, NADEF. 

'" Ltr cited n. 21 (2). 

"Table 9. 
MOTOR VEHICLE ASSEMBLY AND DELIVERY 151 

were at both Andimeshk and Khorramshahr, and in the summer of 

1942 a handful of military personnel and about 70 contractor employees 

were at the Tabriz-Tehran checkup stations.24 

In August, when construction began on the new assembly plant at 

Khorramshahr, General Motors requested military personnel, to work 

at the site. Some 22 soldiers of the 3,474th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company were put on the job and remained after 

January to work on the assembly lines. In April 1943 the contractor 

requested soldier assistance to speed unloading of cased vehicles at 

Khorramshahr. Two officers and 90 men of the 506th Ordnance 

Medium Automotive Maintenance Company were assigned. Up to ten 

days previous to the last day of the contract these were all the military 

at the two TAP's, when the company expressed to General Connolly 

its concern that "practically no military personnel" were available to 

take over the plants.25 On 26 June, four days before termination, the 

3,467th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company 

reached Iran and was immediately assigned to Andimeshk. At about 

the same time the 3,455th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company went to the TAP at Khorramshahr. The Army carried 

on from there.26 

Mention has already been made of problems connected with delivery of assembled vehicles and of stations established in the north for 

final checkup before physical surrender to the USSR. The process of 

delivery of assembled vehicles into Soviet hands began at the end of 

the assembly lines where both Soviet and American inspectors stood 

watch. After passing this first inspection, the trucks proceeded to parking areas to await drivers. They were then loaded with cargo and 

started north in convoys over the long overland highway route, stopping 

at road camps originally set up by the UKCC which were made available to the convoys by the British. At the end of the journey the trucks 

again went through checkup, reconditioning, and inspection at northern checkup stations run by the Americans, and were finally turned 

over to the USSR. At each stage of this process difficulties multiplied. 

In the first place, Russian inspection requirements were rigorous. 

In the words of Colonel Shingler, "Russian insistence upon perfection 

in each truck may be explained by the fact that the Soviet 'accepting' 

a truck is personally liable if any defect is found upon arrival in Russia. 

Endless time has been spent on inconsequential details. If uncorrected, 

however, the Soviets simply refuse to touch the vehicles in question . 

.. (1) File cited n. 2(7) passim. (2) Memo cited n. 18 (2). 

so Rad, Sven Dithmer to Gen Connolly, 20 Jun 43. PGF 125. 

"" For transition see Ch. XIV below. 
152 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

U.S. personnel have, therefore, been instructed to comply with every 

reasonable Russian demand." 27 

N ext, there was not always sufficient co-ordination of planning to 

move trucks which had passed inspection, a notable instance occurring 

when, for a period in June 1942, 1,000 trucks stood at Andimeshk 

awaiting drivers. The Soviet colony there totaled about seventy-five 

officers in permanent residence as inspectors, guards, and checkers, 

while as many as 150 soldier-drivers sometimes arrived at once.28 Pilferage and damage to vehicles took place from time to time in the car 

parks, and a disastrous fire at Khorramshahr on 24 May 1943 destroyed 

some hundreds of vehicles awaiting assembly.20 

The checkup stations were a vital link in the chain of delivery. First 

planned for was a station at Kazvin, but the Soviets requested its location at Tabriz, inside their zone, and 300 miles nearer the Soviet border. 

Before the Tabriz station was established, however, provision had to 

be made for the trucks being driven up from Bushire in early 1942. Accordingly, the Iranian Mission, under advice from USSR representatives at Tehran, contracted for the services of a group of civilians 

employed by the Soviet Transportation Commission. This station provided 1 ,OOO-mile lubrication, tightening, and minor repairs. so 

Establishment and operation of a checkup station had been stipulated in the General Motors contract; but as the two General Motors 

technicians sent to Tabriz to undertake the task were killed in a plane 

crash en route the Iranian lvlission advertised for a local subcontractor. 

Colonel Shingler reported in July as follows: 

In negotiating informal contracts at Tehran and Tabriz the Soviets refused to 

permit our acceptance of the low bidder on the plea that the individuals were 

Nazis. Instead the Russians "required" employment of a particl'Jar Czech firm. 

It now develops the firm is headed by officials of the USSR Transportation Directorate and is a government subsidized concern. Even so, every nut and bolt required 

in servicing and repair operations is charged against the U.S. Mission.at 

He added, "In conference with even the highest local officials of the 

Soviet Trade Commission, the thought is constantly expressed that the 

manufacturer must make good all damages, defects, or shortages, and 

the Soviets will contribute nothing to assist. This is applicable to trucks 

arriving at Tabriz after a 740-mile trip under a load with Russian 

drivers." 

2T Shingler Ltr. 

"" Ibid. 

"" Rpt cited n. 14 (4). The number given is 350 crated chassis units and 100 crated cabs 

burned in the open desert. Monthly Hist Rpt, Khorramshahr Port and Station, May 43, 

PGF 16-E, puts the total damaged or destroyed at about 250 . .. Memo, Mente for Shingler, 31 Mar 42. AG 095 UKCC, Hq PGC. 11 Shingler Ltr. 
MOTOR VEHICLE ASSEMBLY AND DELIVERY 153 

The first contract was for 400 trucks to be serviced at about 25 U.S. 

cents each, the mission to supply oil, grease, and parts. At the signing 

of the second contract, the local firm raised its price to 67 cents. Against 

this increase the mission was helpless to produce cost figures in favor 

of the lower rate, for though it had reason to believe the labor cost per 

truck was about 22 cents, it had never placed a representative on the 

spot to check the company's costs or records. At the signing of the 

second contract the mission assigned an officer and four enlisted men 

to assist in operation. Colonel Shingler's report of this unhappy 

situation concludes: 

In spite of the obstinate Russian demands and the delicate relationships existing between Soviet, British, and Persian interests, the Mission has thus far been 

able to maintain the most cordial relations. The cost and effort required to effect 

truck deliveries in spite of all handicaps appears warranted and the time appears 

inauspicious to carry on heated discussions over "responsibilities." 32 

At the expiration of the second contract, the Tabriz station was 

moved in August 1942 to Tehran and was placed under U.S. ordnance 

mechanics with the .aid of locally hired labor. In the following February 1943, upon Soviet request, an American officer and twenty-five 

enlisted men removed the station to Tabriz, but after eleven days, once 

again at Soviet request, they returned to Tehran. 

Labor problems during the contractor period met with a variety 

of solutions. Over wage rates and working conditions at the UKCC 

plant at Bushire, the purely supervisory Americans exercised no control. 

They could only note the high degree of absenteeism which marked the 

working force in the early months of 1942 and an underlying spirit of 

hostility toward the Allied cause. As for wages, they noted that natives 

earned up to four U.S. cents per day while skilled mechanics on the 

assembly lines achieved up to a maximum of ten U.S. cents per day. 

American suggestions of bonus systems, both as incentive pay for increased production and as an amelioration of rates which in American 

eyes were uneconomic in the long run, proved difficult to bring to 

adoption. The British administration had with great thoroughness set 

up tables of wage scales, and American attempts to circumvent them, 

which were not infrequent, were invariably met by British protests that 

severe damage to the social structure of Iran would ensue from the payment of exaggerated rates. Such complaints, entirely legitimate from 

the British point of view, came to a head at a joint Anglo-American 

meeting in the British labor office on 15 June 1942 at which time the 

Americans yielded to the British request that they discharge all natives 

12 Ibid. 
154 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

and artisans and rehire them through the British deputy assistant 

director of labor. This was what the Americans had undertaken 

originally to do, and the only point which can be raised in defense of 

their departure from the book was that increasing wages helped them 

get on with their urgent war tasks. After this agreement Colonel 

Shingler reported to Washington that wages were still a disturbing 

factor in a difficult labor pattern and that in his view they were too 

low.33 

During 1942 the economy of Iran was affected by the stresses set 

up through the presence of British, Soviet, and American forces and 

their activities. Prices were inflated. Near-famine conditions obtained, 

in certain localities exaggerated by Soviet refusal to allow wheat from 

Azerbaijan to be brought to the south. In attempting under these conditions to attract labor vigorous enough to work, the Americans decided 

to supplement the fixed wage scales with food. A number of plans which 

enabled workmen to obtain tea, rice, and sugar succeeded one another, 

and in this respect American initiative obtained British support, as expressed by Maj. Gen. A. R. Selby in midsummer when he said he "felt 

the two governments should take a hand in the food situation and feed 

the workmen on some reasonable basis." 34 A similarly helpful flexibility 

was demonstrated by the British in the case of a number of skilled native 

mechanics when the American-supervised checkup station was moved 

from Tabriz to Tehran in August 1942. It was found that the rates paid 

in Tabriz were higher than those allowed for Tehran; but the 

British authorities acceded to the American desire to pay the higher 

wages in order to retain the good workmen. The permission stipulated, 

however, that employees hired in future must come under the regular 

scales, thus automatically providing a source of possible friction between groups of mechanics doing the same work on the same job but at 

different rates. 

Of the many adjustments required to keep things going smoothly, 

one deserves to be recorded, not for its intrinsic importance, but for its 

value as an illustration. Early in 1942 the Russians officially protested 

to Colonel Shingler that the UKCC was advertising for sale, at something like one hundred dollars a thousand board feet, lumber derived 

from assembly operations. The Russians claimed that the lumber was 

salvaged from the packing cases in which trucks for the USSR were 

shipped. They further claimed that, since the cost of the trucks included the cost of packing, the lumber belonged to them and they 

.. (1) Memo of 15 Jun 42 Mtg. DE File C-3, Conferences, NADEF. (2) Shingler Ltr . .. Quoted Rpt by Maj C. M. Hearn, Chief, Opns Sec, Iranian Engr Dist, to Iranian 

Dist Engr, 22 Aug 42. DE File R-2, Reports, NADEF. 
MOTOR VEHICLE ASSEMBLY AND DELIVERY ISS 

should at least control its disposition. In an effort to settle the matter 

it was eventually necessary for Shingler, accompanied by Minister 

Dreyfus, to call upon Soviet Ambassador Smirnov. The meeting, conducted in German, concluded in an arrangement whereby American 

agencies were allowed to take whatever materials were necessary to 

the accomplishment of the American mission, the British were allowed 

a certain percentage of material for their trouble in handling the salvage, and the Russians would be entitled to carry away such quantities 

as \vould not result in displacing available cargo normally carried in 

the trucks upon leaving the assembly plant. Later in the year-when 

the American comman'd was hard pressed to meet construction deadlines for installations to accommodate the expected arrival of the first 

movement of service troops and was forced to every sort of improvisation-it was suggested that the agreement on packing-case lumber be 

reopened to provide for construction needs. Tentative conversations 

having shown that the Russians were prepared to refer the matter to 

their ambassador, Shingler advised that "we rock along under existing 

arrangements, taking only as much lumber as can be withdrawn 

amicably." Thus was avoided a renewal of the small tempest which 

drastic shortages, a trying climate, and the natural rivalries and amourpropre of Allies had brewed. 35 

The truck assembly program was among the earliest of the tasks 

undertaken by the American command in the Persian Corridor. Operations began at Andimeshk even before the move from Iraq to Iran was 

completed. The contractor phase continued some eight months after 

the arrival of General Connolly in the field. During the period of General Motors operation, 20,081 vehicles were assembled at Andimeshk, 

9,670 at Khorramshahr. M Of the total of 29,751 at the two plants, 

29,069 vehicles, or 98 percent, were for the USSR. On 1 July 1943 the 

Army threw its resources into the task of handling the greatly increased 

flow of vehicles that was to come during nearly two more years of work . 

.. (1) Handwritten note, Col Shingler to Col Osborne, 14 Nov 42. DE File 0-1, 

Operations, NADEF. (2) Notes supplied the author by General Shingler, 16 May 1950. ,. Army figures. For General Motors figures see Table 7, n. b. 
CHAPTER IX 

Strengthening Iran 

On a day in l\1ay 1942 President Roosevelt sat in the White House 

with his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, the Soviet Ambassador, 

Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, 

and Harry Hopkins. The First (Moscow) Protocol was about to expire, 

and this was one of several meetings which produced the Second 

(Washington) Protocol. Harry Hopkins has left notes of an incident 

overshadowed by the main business of the meeting but not without 

significance: 

"The President had two or three memoranda on his desk which I had never 

heard of before, which were obviously given him by the Department of State, in 

which the Department was offering their good offices in alleged difficulties between 

the Russians and the Iranians on the one hand and the Russians and Turks on the 

other. I gathered Molotov was not much impressed. I at any rate so imagined and 

in front of the President he raised the point that they thought they knew a good 

deal more about their relations with Iran and Turkey than we did. I confess I 

did not see in what way our good offices were to be executed." 1 

It would be misleading to blow up this little picture to the proportions of a mural painting entitled Historic Turning Point in IranoAmerican Relations. It was no such thing; but it was a moment to 

remember, an example of that subtlety in diplomacy of which Roosevelt could show himself a master. What he was truly driving at, why 

Molotov bridled-these are questions anybody may answer in his fashion. Interpretation of the scene starts with a concrete fact, known to 

the men there present. On 10 March Iran had been declared eligible 

for lend-lease aid. The three Americans at the 'White House knew that 

action to implement that declaration was currently being formulated; 

the two Russians, even if not specifically informed, were certainly aware 

that this must be the case. But none of this was mentioned or alluded to. 

Instead, in the midst of discussion of ponderables like munitions for the 

USSR, the President casually revealed the memoranda on his desk 

offering American good offices in alleged difficulties between the Rus1 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 559. 
STRENGTHENING IRAN 157 

sians and the Iranians. This delicate hint, this calculated irrelevancy, 

in the context of lend-lease for Russia, may well have been Roosevelt's 

way of putting his guests on notice that the welfare of Iran was of interest to the United States. Not the memoranda on the desk, but the major 

unspoken fact of lend-lease for Iran, gave substance to the President's 

casual gesture. Without words, the gesture could have meant that from 

now on American good offices would be expressed by deeds, not words; 

that Iran was to be helped to help itself. Molotov's acerbity would suggest that he got t!1e point. 

Before World WaT II 

The situation in which Iran found itself in 1942, with foreign troops 

within its borders, had occurred before, and the United States had 

helped before. But in 1942 the Anglo-Soviet occupation and the conditions in effect by virtue of the Tri-Partite Treaty provided a more favorable milieu than previously for an American effort to help Iran help 

itself. Although American attempts to provide some sort of balance 

wheel in Iran date only from 1911, and therefore form the shortest 

chapter of the long book of Iran's relations with the West, they furnished a background of experience in problems still very much alive in 

1942. Roosevelt was not initiating new policy when he indicated that 

day at the White House his interest in Iran's survival as an independent 

state. American aid to Iran in World War II established no new 

precedent; but because of the special circumstances arising out of the 

war, it was more effective than before. 

The first gesture of American aid to Iran was not an official act of 

the American Government. It occurred when the American economist, 

W. Morgan Shuster, arrived in Iran late in 1911 to accept an invitation, delivered through the United States Government, to reorganize 

Iranian finances. 2 Shuster set to work on the assumption that as an 

employee of the government of Iran he was responsible to it alone; but 

he reckoned without the views of czarist Russia and imperial Britain. 

These nations, by the Convention of 1907, had virtually partitioned 

Iran into Russian and British spheres. Their watchful concern to preserve these precluded any effective development of the country as a 

whole. This strengthened the centrifugal forces which traditionally 

enabled tribal and provincial elements in Iran to defy authority at the 

capital, and tended to drain strength away from the national govern-

• The following account of the American civilian missions derives from George V. Allen, 

"American Advisers in Persia," Department of State Bulletin, XI (23 Jul 44) 88-93; and 

Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, pp. 263-73. 
158 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

ment. Shuster believed that possession and control by the central government of a strong and incorruptible rural police force or gendarmerie 

'would further the maintenance of order, the collection of taxes, and 

the equitable distribution of the grain harvests. As a prerequisite to a 

governmental financial house cleaning, he proposed establishment of a 

gendarmerie free to operate throughout Iran, regardless of British or 

Russian spheres. To head and train it he nominated a British officer of 

long experience in the country and ready familiarity with its language 

and customs. But this strengthening of central authority in Iran was not, 

in 1911-12, congenial to either British or Russian policy. Sir Edward 

Grey, Foreign Minister, opposed in the House of Commons the principle of permi.tting an English officer to operate in the Russian zone as 

setting an uncomfortable precedent for the British zone. At Tehran the 

Russian Ambassador confronted the Iranian Government with a demand that it expel Shuster within forty-eight hours. Czarist troops 

crossed over into northern Iran and a regiment of Cossacks appeared 

at Tehran. Shuster departed. 3 

In World War I, Iranian neutrality was violated when British, Russian, and Turkish troops fought on Iranian soil. At the end of hostilities 

the British remained in the north as well as the south, while Bolshevik 

forces occupied positions in the northern provinces. During the early 

months of 1919, Lord Curzon, overwhelming opposition from many elements of English opinion, carried to an advanced state negotiations 

with the Iranian Government for an Anglo-Persian treaty. Under its 

terms a loan of two million pounds sterling at 7 percent, secured by 

customs receipts, was to be used for public works, including construction of a raihvay in which there would be a large British interest. Administrative reforms under British guidance, with appropriate powers 

and controls, completed a program which aroused strong opposition in 

Iran because of its one-sidedness. Its supporters were those who had 

negotiated the treaty and those who stood to benefit from the expenditures on public improvements. Those in opposition, troubled alike by 

the treaty and the occupation of their land by foreign troops, endeavored to obtain through President Wilson a hearing for their cause 

at Versailles. 

This effort having proved vain, the new Soviet Government in 

June 1919 capitalized upon the resultant disillusionment with the West 

bv making known through its representative at Tehran its willingness 

t~ conclude a treaty of friendship with Iran on highly favorable terms, 

• Shuster's eight months' effort and his views upon the situation are presclVcd in his book, 

The Strangling of Persia (New York: Century Company, 1912). 
STRENGTHENING IRAN 159 

including cancellation of debts and renunciation of valuable Russian 

concessions. The offer was not publicized by the Iranian Government 

and on 9 August the Anglo-Persian treaty was signed. Newspapers 

favorable to the government which had negotiated the treaty made 

much of Iran's being deceived in its reliance upon the Wilsonian principle of self-determination, and the Iranian Prime Minister in a public 

statement asserted that the United States had refused aid to Iran. 

Thereupon, in a message of 4 September, Secretary of State Lansing 

authorized the American Minister at Tehran, John L. Caldwell, to 

"Deny to both Persian officials and anyone else interested that America has 

refused aid to Persia. You may also inform them that the United States has often 

showed its interest in the welfare of Persia and that the American Commission in 

Paris endeavored earnestly, several times, to secure an audience at the Peace Conference for the Persian Commission, but the American Commission was surprised 

that it did not receive more support in this matter. However, the announcement 

of the recent Anglo-Persian treaty probably explains why such a hearing could not 

be obtained and it also appears that the Persian Government at Tehran did not 

give strong support to the efforts of the Commission. The American Government 

learned of the recent Anglo-Persian Agreement with surprise, for it seems to 

indicate that Persia does not desire American cooperation and aid in the future, 

even though the Persian delegates in Paris strongly and openly sought American 

support." ~ 

Caldwell vainly sought to obtain publication of the American 

denial in Tehran newspapers. He then resorted to the unconventional 

device of printing it in leaflets which were circulated on the streets and 

in the bazaars. The truth thus made known heartened the opponents 

of the Anglo-Persian agreement and assisted its rejection by the Majlis 

early in 1921. With the collapse of Lord Curzon's treaty came the withdrawal from Iran of the British advisory mission headed by ArmitageSmith and James M. Balfour whose business it had been, under the 

treaty's terms, to diagnose administrative deficiencies and suggest cures. 

The setback to British influence was accompanied by the signature at 

"Moscow on 26 February 1921 of a Soviet-Iranian treaty incorporating 

terms offered the Iranians in 1919 and granting the USSR the right 

of armed intervention in Iran in the event that a third power should 

attempt to use Iran as a base for military action against the USSR. 

One hundred days later Col. Reza Khan, Minister of War and coming 

strong man of Iran, forced the resignation of the Prime Minister and a 

• (1) From The Pageant of Persia, pp. 340-41, by Henry Filmer, copyri.ght 19~6, used by 

special pennission of the publIshers, The Bobbs-MerrIlI Company, Inc., IndIanapolIs. (2) See 

also J. M. Balfour Recent Happenings in Persia (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, Ltl, 1922), pp. 123-25; Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, p. 74; 

Ch. 1, pp. 12-13, above; and R&A 1206, Conflicts and Agr.eements of Interest of ~he Un}ted 

Nations in the Near East, 10 Jan 44, Research and AnalYSIS Br, Office of Strategic ServIces, 

p.26. 
160 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

reorganization of the Iranian cabinet in which Reza Khan remained 

as War Minister. 

With a treaty of friendship with the USSR and with British influence eclipsed, the new Irani~n Government now sought technical 

advice and help in administrative reform from a quarter which would 

render it without demanding a quid pro quo. The choice fell upon the 

United States. By Iranian invitation Dr. Arthur C. Millspaugh, Economic Adviser to the Secretary of State, became Director General of 

Iranian Finances. With a small staff of assistants he served from 1922 

to 1927. 

During this period the Iranian Minister at Washington wrote the 

Secretary of State on 21 February 1924: 

" .•. the Persian Government and people have always recognized the 

altruism and impartiality which distinguish the American Government and people. 

They particularly appreciate the concern of the United States for fair play, for 

the respect of the independence of the smaller nations and for the maintenance 

of the economic open door. 

"It was because of their implicit faith in the lofty ideals and trusted friendship 

of America that my Government, over a year ago, confided the reorganization of 

their finances to American advisers and have consistently courted the technical 

and financial cooperation of this country in the industrial and economic development of Persia." 6 

The confidence there expressed was reflected in the support which 

Millspaugh received, soon after his arrival, from Reza Khan. Shuster's 

plans were revived and a gendarmerie was organized to preserve internal order, collect taxes, and suppress fraud and corruption, particularly in distribution of the harvests. But early enthusiasm languished, 

and as Reza rose in the government (he became Prime Minister in 

1923 and crowned himself Shah-in-Shah in 1926) his dictatorial 

methods and growing nationalistic spirit came into increasing conflict 

with a foreign mission which had been given extensive powers over 

domestic policies. Reza Shah Pahlevi was determined to devote what 

Millspaugh considered a disproportionate share of the national budget 

to support the Army. Over the resultant deadlock of opinion the two 

parted company and the Americans left for home in 1927. 

The immediate consequence of Millspaugh's departure was that 

Reza Shah Pahlevi turned to Germany to supply a growing roster of 

technical and administrative advisers. If the United States possessed 

through Millspaugh's mission the opportunity to supersede the influence of other countries by means of its friendship, this opportunity 

passed with the influx of the Germans. On they came, first under the 

• Allen's article cited n. 2. 
STRENGTHENING IRAN 161 

Weimar Republic, then under Hitler, advising in education, lending 

technical skill, building docks, roads, and parts of the railway, adorning 

the new station at Tehran with the swastika (symbol of Aryan 

brotherhood), lecturing, giving parties, organizing Boy Scouts, and 

generally spreading the Germanic gospel as Kaiser Wilhelm had done 

in the nineties, when he opened wide his arms to his brothers in the 

Arab lands and simultaneously revealed to the world his plans for the 

Berlin-to-Baghdad railway. By the time the British and Russians entered 

Iran in 1941 some two thousand Germans had to be run to ground and 

taken into charge or under observation. The departure of the first 

Millspaugh mission, then, poses one of those unanswerable historical 

conundrums: What would have happened if American interest, in 

spite of discouragements and difficulties, had been continuously 

maintained in Iran? (I 

Of the many problems left unsolved at Millspaugh's going, the 

Gendarmerie, denied adequate funds and subordinated in the favor of 

the Shah to the Army, was only one. The size of the Army was another. 

On the credit side must be reckoned the Iranian State Railway which 

proved such an Allied asset in World War II. It has been said that the 

financial strengthening of Iran achieved by Millspaugh made it possible for the Shah to build the railroad.7 

Inception of the American Advisory Missions 

In the fourteen years between the departure of the Millspaugh 

mission from Iran in 1927 and the arrival of Soviet and British troops 

upon Iranian soil in 1941, the general internal position of the country 

had fluctuated both politically and economically. The ISR and other 

ambitious public works stood as monuments to the driving will of Reza 

Shah. But such representative democratic institutions as existed were 

sadly weakened by the long dictatorship; a little band of large landowners vied for court favor; the tribes remained active; while the people of Iran, modernized by royal decree to the extent of wearing European clothing, continued in the ancient ways of poverty and disease. 

The Anglo-Soviet occupation not only threw out Reza Shah, but perforce, for the duration of the war, detached from what there was of central authority in Iran most of the usual prerogatives of national sovereignty. Iran was sorely in need of two things: the will to help itself by 

rigorous self-discipline and internal reform; and the willingness to fol-

• For German penetration to 194-1 see Lenczowski, Ru.ssia and the West in Iran, pp. 

151-52, 160-62. T Allen's article cited n. 2. 
162 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

low the disinterested advice of a friend. So once again the United 

States, already present as Britain's helper in the Persian Corridor, was 

appealed to. The ISR had become an official lend-lease project almost 

six months before Iran itself was declared eligible for lend-lease aid in 

March 1942. When that declaration came, the new government of Iran 

was ready to direct American attention to pressing Iranian needs. As 

American policy toward Iran, still groping in the dark in 1942, gradually clarified, it was recognized that many kinds of aid, whether 

rendered under lend-lease or othenvise, nevertheless, by strengthening 

Iran, fulfilled the purposes of lend-lease, which were to assist all who 

were banded together against the Axis. The development of trust-

\yorthy security forces and the improvement of the economy of Iran 

were constructive ends, not only from this point of view, but also in relation to the l\1iddle East situation in general, where weakness was prone 

to attract predatory strength and where disorder and political uncertainty operated against any interest, including the American, that was 

arrayed against the Axis. American policy gradually formed itself 

about the discovery that Iran was everybody's interest because a weak 

Iran invited disorder which would involve all alike. 

Iran's request for help and American willingness to give it were, 

therefore, not the fruits of sentimentality or of after-dinner oratory. 

Wallace Murray expressed the American position as being based upon 

"our desire to bolster the somewhat shaky position of the present 

Iranian Government by providing it with concrete evidence of the 

willingness of the United States to provide all possible assistance." 8 

Within the generalization were the specific needs of Iran (1) to bolster 

its Army and Gendarmerie and (2) to obtain direct access to the 

fountainhead of lend-lease supply. 

In the first case, the Tri-Partite Treaty of alliance had limited the 

war assistance of the Iranian forces "to the maintenance of internal 

security on Iranian territory." This restriction effectively barred Iran 

from entering the war except as approved by Britain and the USSR.9 

But it did permit the co-operation of Iran in the maintenance of law 

and order along the Allied supply line through the Corridor. It was 

therefore as much to the advantage of the occupying powers that Iran 

should perform this service as it was an advantage to Iran to possess 

• Ltr, Wallace Murray, Adviser on Political Relations, Dept State, to Gen Eisenhower, 

OPD, 29 Apr 42. OPD 210.68 Iran 3. The letter records that the Foreign Office, London, 

approved the principle of "Anglo-United States co-operation in Persian questions." 

• Iran broke off relations with Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, and Romania on 16 September 

1941, after the occupation, but before the date of the treaty. It broke off relations with Vichy 

France on 5 February 1942; and declared war on Germany 9 September 1943 and on 

Japan 1 March 1945, retroactive one day. 
STRENGTHENING IRAN 163 

efficient military forces. In the second case, because the chief agency in 

rendering lend-lease aid for military uses was the United States War 

Department, acting, in early 1942, through the Iranian Mission, Iran 

required a military contact to supplement the usual diplomatic 

channels. 

On 1 April 1942 the Assistant Secretary of State wrote the Secretary of War that Iran desired an American officer to serve as Intendant 

General and reorganize the finance and army supply divisions of the 

Iranian War Department. The Department of State, it was added, 

approved the proposal as offering an opportunity to improve relations 

with Iran and thereby to aid the cause of the United Nations in the 

Middle East. The Department of State felt that the United States was 

favorably situated to undertake the task suggested "because both Great 

Britain and the Soviet Union are handicapped in their relations with 

Iran by the inevitable dislike and distrust of the Iranians for the powers 

which are in occupation of their country." 10 This was the first of steps 

which were to produce, after some experimentation, an American military mission to advise the Iranian Army. In further correspondence, in 

which the Department of State inquired whether the War Department, 

on the invitation of Iran, would make available Col. H. Norman 

Schwarzkopf, graduate of West Point in 1917 and at one time head 

of the New Jersey State Police, "to take charge of the reorganization 

of the Iranian national police force." War Department willingness was 

pledged, thus opening the way to organization of a second American 

military mission, one to advise the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie.l1 

The second category of Iranian requests, those for assistance in the 

economic field, came later in the year. Dizzy with the problems arising 

out of the Allied occupation, the new Iranian Government of Shah 

Mohammed Reza Pahlevi, having returned to constitutionalism, asked 

the Department of State to recommend Americans for administrative 

and advisory posts. As a result, Dr. Millspaugh, invited by Iran, returned there as Administrator General of Finances on 29 January 1943. 

He accepted the invitation only after the Majlis on 12 November 1942 

approved a contract embodying his conditions. By a further law of 

4 May 1943 the Majlis empowered Millspaugh to establish or work 

toward rigid governmental regulation of grain collection, prices, transport, and distribution; and to recommend enactment of a high, graduated income tax to spread the tax burden more fairly and to combat 

inflation and other war-born evils. The Majlis also authorized employ-

,. Ltr, Adolf A. Berle, Jr., to Henry L. Stimson, 1 Apr 42. AG 210.68 (4-1-42) (1). 

11 Ltrs, Berle to Stimson, 8 Apr 42; Stimson to Berle, 16 Apr 42; Berle to Stimson, 

24 Apr 42. Abstracts PGF 261. 
164 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

ment of up to sixty American specialists and gave Millspaugh power 

to direct the government's entire financial program, to draw up the 

budget, to supervise the operations of the Finance Ministry, to control 

the inspection department, and to supervise the Americans and 

Iranians who represented the Ministry of Finance in the provincial 

capitals. 

The ramifications of Millspaugh's second economic mission to Iran 

extended to collection of the harvests and supplying bread for urban 

centers; control of the public domains and administration of the estates 

of the former Shah ceded to the government on his abdication; stabilization of prices; and regulation of the purchase, distribution, and 

control of goods. In this area, the Road Transport Department controlled movement of all kinds of goods over Iranian highways and was 

at one time aided by some fifty British and American Army officers 

lent by their governments. Another office, the Transport Priorities 

Office, determined priorities for all civilian goods moved by road, rail, 

or water. All of these controls were necessarily subordinate to the 

over-all controls over movements and priorities exercised under the 

Tri-Partite Treaty by the occupying powers. 

Besides the members of the Millspaugh mission, who never exceeded 

thirty-five, other Americans served in various administrative and advisory capacities. One reorganized the police of Tehran and other cities. 

Another became in 1944 adviser to the Ministry of Public Health and 

attacked the increasing spread of typhus in the country. Still other experts supervised the importation of pharmaceutical supplies, and advised on soil erosion and irrigation, petroleum problems, and agricultural education. The account of their work lies beyond the limits of 

this volume. It is understandable that Millspaugh's mission, in view 

of its extensive powers and responsibilities, should eventually have run 

into trouble and, as in the earlier attempts by Shuster and Millspaugh 

himself, should have come prematurely to the end of its labors. Millspaugh resigned in February 1945, and, with the exception of a few 

who remained until 1948 under direct personal contract to the Iranian 

Government, most of his staff were gone by autumn 1945. Their departure was unmourned by many Iranians. It would be difficult to say 

who learned the least by the experience, the Iranians or the Americans.12 

1J Mohammed Reza Shah is directly quoted in an interview published in The New York 

Times, September 27, 1950, as saying, "The war completely disrupted our life. One of the 

worst of our experiences was Dr. Millspaugh, who has tremendous responsibility for our 

bankruptcy and lack of discipline, created by the occupation of our country." U.S. Ambassador Allen's contrary view regarding bankruptcy was alluded to above, page 161. MIllspaugh's accounts of his missions are in his books, The American Task in Persia (New York: 
STRENGTHENING IRAN 165 

In 1942, within a month after the Department of State informed 

the War Department that Iran had requested appointment of an 

American officer to serve as Intendant General of the Iranian Army, 

the dissolution of the USSR Mission on 2 May offered the opportunity 

of appointing General Greely, its former chief, to the position. General 

Greely had been in Iraq and Iran since the previous January, had come 

to know men prominent in the Iranian Government and the British 

and Soviet forces, and was familiar with the lend-lease program. On 

10 April Somervell informed Greely that the Iranian Government desired a United States officer to take charge of the finance and army 

supply divisions of the Iranian War Ministry. But Greely notified Washington that he was coming home and was told by The Adjutant General 

on 16 May to stand by for further assignment. That his name was under 

consideration for the Intendant Generalcy is indicated by a message 

of the same date to the State Department from U. S. Minister Dreyfus 

at Tehran concerning the appointment. "General Greely," it ran, "has 

conducted himself very well in Tehran .... However, before he is 

designated, it would, I feel, be well to establish that he has technical 

training, administrative ability, and energy required for this difficult 

and important position." 13 

When word of what was in the wind reached Greely a few days 

later, he promptly informed the War Department that, if ordered to 

remain in Iran to organize a mission to its Army, he proposed to assume 

command, as ranking American officer, of all U.S. military personnel 

and activities in Iran. As promptly came the reply that he would do no 

such thing.14 The proposal, if accepted, would have combined under 

single authority the entire American effort in Iran-both the program 

of aid to Britain and the USSR, being conducted by Colonel Shingler 

as chief of the Iranian Mission, and the new program of strengthening 

Iran, still being approached by Washington in gingerly fashion. Washington was not prepared at this time to unify these programs in one 

step. The American position in Iran, as a nonsignatory of the TriPartite Treaty, and as an auxiliary of one of the occupying powers, 

Century Company, 1925) and Americans in Persia. See also Elgin Groseclose, Introduction 

to Iran (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 181-84; and Millspaugh's letter 

to The New York Times, October 10, 1950. l3 (1) Tab "A," Summary of the Record Relative to General Greely's Mission in Iran, 

atchd to Memo for CofS, signed Brig Gen St. Clair Streett, Actg ACofS, OPD, 17 Aug 42. 

OPD Exec 10, Item 56, OPD Hist Sec Coli, OCMH. (2) Rad, Greely to WD, 13 May 42. 

AG 210.31 (5-13-42) (14). (3) Rad, TAG to Greely, 16 May 42. Same file. (4) Rad 

162, Dreyfus to Hull, 16 May 42. Dept State 891. 20/134. 

" (1) Rad AMSIR 2, Greely to WD, 20 May 42. Summary of Cables, Russian Mission 

File, OPD, Middle East, Abstract PGF 261. (2) Rad 17, WD to Greely, 22 May 42. Same 

file. 
166 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

made inadvisable the taking of large strides. Washington preferred to 

keep in step with its Allies. 

Secretary Stimson, therefore, having ascertained that the British 

approved appointment of an American officer as requested by Iran, 

wrote Secretary Hull on 20 May that without the consent of the Congress General Greely could not accept appointment to a foreign army, 

but that he might serve as an adviser. There was a further and more 

emphatic caveat from Dreyfus to Hull; but the War Department's decision was communicated to Greely in a series of messages. Greely was 

to become an advisory Intendant General to the Iranian Army; he was 

not to accept emoluments or office from a foreign government; he 

would investigate and report to Washington as to how best to meet the 

wishes of Iran; and he was to be guided by Minister Dreyfus who would 

be instructed by the Department of State.15 

From the outset of the arrangement thus informally entered into, 

it was apparent that Greely's conception of his function was not in 

conformity with that of the State Department, whose political responsibility made its voice dominant. On two fundamental questions, the 

handling of lend-lease allocations to Iran and the direction to be taken 

by American foreign policy in Iran, Greely took positions which, no 

matter how well justified in his own view by future events, resulted in 

an impasse.16 . 

In the matter of lend-lease, allocations for Iran 'were still under discussion at Washington which reported that their determination would 

take some time.17 Urgent as Iranian needs were, they had to be fitted 

into the program of aid to Britain and the USSR. Decisions as to how 

to strengthen Iran were, under the circumstances, primarily political 

decisions, and it was therefore a nice question as to how far General 

Greeley's function as adviser on army finance and supply entitled him 

to go in determining what Iran should receive. The American War 

Department implemented lend-lease policy, it did not make it. In 

Greely's view, however, his job was to get as much help as possible to 

Iran, although he acknowledged that the Iranian idea of his resources, 

"'(1) Ltr, Stimson to Hull, 20 May 42. AG 210.68 (4-1-42)(1). (2) Rad 165, 

Dreyfus to Hull, 22 May 42. Dept State 891.20/138. (3) Memo, Greely for CofS, 7 Sep 42, 

sub: Rpt on Duty as Adviser, Iranian Army, 19 May-4 Sep 42 (cited hereafter as Greely 

Rpt). Case 45, Sec 1 OPD 210.684 Iran. (4) Rad, WD to Greely, 24 May 42. Cited 

Greely Rpt. (5) Rad AMRUS 19, TAG to Greely, 17 Jun 42. AG 210.684 (4-1-42). 

(6) Rad, Marshall to Greely, 23 Jun 42. AG 210.31 (5-13-42) (14). 10 The basic documents on the Greely incumbency are: (1) Greely Rpt. (2) Memo, 

WD Summary, Maj Gen Thomas T. Handy, ACofS, OPD, for CofS, 1 Oct 42. Abstract 

PGF 261. (3) State Dept Summary by Wallace Murray, 3 Sep 42, inclosed in Ltr, Sumner 

Welles to Lt Gen Joseph T. McNarney, DCofS, 23 Sep 42. Dept State 891.20/175 PS/MEL. 11 Rad AMSIR 354, Somervell to Shingler, 8 Jul 42. AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 4. 
STRENGTHENING IRAN 167 

gained from the equipment and manpower at his disposal while he was 

head of the USSR Mission, was exaggerated. 

This is a fine country [he wrote] with a virile people, and more could be done 

with it than MacArthur did with the Philippines, but it would be a long pull, and 

depend entirely on the course of the war. I know a lot of people from the Shah 

down, and they seem to like me. But it would be a mistake to detail me just as a 

gesture. They expect help rather than advice. They have had help from American 

missions and schools, and it would be a pity to spoil our reputation by giving them 

a Major General without anything to back him Up.1S 

The Department of State had given instructions through Minister 

Dreyfus that in economic and political matters General Greely was to 

be guided by Dreyfus, remaining independent in technical military matters. Under this division of responsibility, not, to be sure, very exactly 

defined, Greely felt that the minister was withholding from him information necessary to his function. He informed General Marshall to 

that effect, and told Dreyfus: 

Frankly . . . in a total war I considered that everything was subordinate to 

the military effort. On this account I would take no direct action in either sphere 

which called for his supervision, but [would] merely advise the Iranian military 

authorities. I added that since he refused me his confidence I could not trust him to 

be of assistance to me in my work and that for this reason I intended to have as 

little as possible to do with him.19 

The result was a kind of deadlock of which Greely's efforts to secure 

two hundred motor trucks for the Iranian Army is illustrative. As his 

report makes clear, that Army was woefully lacking in motor transport 

and forced to obtain trucks virtually at haphazard from the UKCC 

which held at the time almost a monopoly of usable vehicles. But 

Greely's cabled request to the War Department for the trucks turned 

up soon after on Dreyfus' desk at Tehran via a wire from the State 

Department asking Dreyfus' opinion of General Greely's request. 20 

Further steps taken in the field of supply moved the situation into 

the field of foreign policy and brought matters to a quick decision. In 

a message to General Marshall on 14 July, General Greely observed 

that the British and Russians were hamstringing Iranian communications, and that, starting with a few trucks, Greely could reorganize the 

Iranian Army into an efficient force. 21 American supplies, then, were 

incidental to putting Iran into a position to enter the war as an active 

,. Ltr, Greely to Somervell, 30 May 42. Abstract PGF 261-

" Greely Rpt, 20 and 27 Jun 42. Marshall replied on 27 June that Dreyfus was being 

instructed to inform Greely fully on all matters concerning him and that Greely was to do 

the same for Dreyfus. 20 Greely Rpt, 2 and 10 Ju142 . ., Greely Rpt, 14 Ju142. 
168 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

belligerent.22 The message to Marshall, as Greely records in his report, 

had the approval of the Shah, who shortly afterward proposed to General Greely that the United States invite the Iranian Minister of War, 

Gen. Amanollah Jahanbani, to Washington with a view to committing 

Iran as an ally.23 At this point matters moved with rapidity, for the 

proposal, if acted upon, would involve the United States in a question 

already settled by the Tri-Partite Treaty. Greely was ordered on 26 

July to return to Washington to confer with the Chief of Staff.24 But 

the next day Greely wired the War Department to take steps, through 

diplomatic channels, to invite the War Minister to 'Washington, adding, "Hurry because I leave within a week." 23 On 28 July Minister 

Dreyfus reported to the Secretary of State General Greely's effort to 

"commit the country as an ally," and added, "Greely's activities have 

now departed from realm of harmless interference and entered field of 

international politics." 26 Greely left Tehran for Cairo on 2 August and 

arrived at Washington on 11 August. 21 

General Greely's report ascribes the outcome of his efforts to the 

position taken by the Department of State in 1942 that American aid 

to Iran should be of a limited nature in that area of British responsibility. He prophesied that, unless American policy should change to 

greater responsibility for Iran as an ally, "any pretence of military 

assistance to Iran from the United States will remain only a futile 

gesture." Although for a time after 1943 the tide flowed toward the 

shore glimpsed by General Greely, his mission failed in 1942, not because all of his ideas were wrong, but because he was not the agency 

for the formulation of policy. His impatience in the face of what appeared to him to be indecision and fence-walking in time of national 

emergency disregarded the principle of due consultation with, and 

specific approval by, those whose business it was to view the war in 

global perspective. What Greely proposed to do in 1942 was judged by 

.. Ltr, Stimson to Welles, 1 Sep 42. Russian Mission File, Africa-Middle East Sec, OPD. 

"'Summary cited n. 16(3), citing Greely's authority . 

.. Greely Rpt. Memo cited n. 16 (2) says 24 July . 

.. Rad, Greely to War Dept, 27 Jul 42. Dept State 891.20/164 PS/FPJ . 

.. Rad 243, Dreyfus to Hull, 28 Jul 42. Dept State 891.20/159 (Sec 1-2) . 

... (1) Greely Rpt and Memo cited n. 16(2). Greely's report states that he was relieved 

of his assignment without further discussion. He was, however, considered by the War Department for return to Iran, as indicated by a memorandum of a conversation, 22 August, 

between the Messrs. Murray and John D. Jernegan of the Department of State and Brig. 

Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, in which the State Department expressed willingness, if the 

War Department found it impossible to send another officer in his place, to agree to Greely's 

return provided "He should be carefully and precisely instructed as to the limits of his 

functions." Dept State 891.20/168 PS/FP. (2) Greely's recall from Iran was discussed 

at the War Department as early as 14 July, when the Assistant Chief of Staff, G--l, suggested assigning Lt. Gen. George H. Brett as Commanding General, USAFIME, and sending 

General Maxwell to replace Greely. Memo, Col Douglas V. Johnson for Gen Handy, 14 

Jul 42. Russian Mission File, Africa-Middle East Sec, OPD. 
STRENGTHENING IRAN 169 

the policy-makers to be premature and impracticable under the 

co.-operative conditions in existence in the Persian Corridor. Therefore, 

General Greely had to go, and events had to unroll more slowly. 

The Ridley and Schwarzkopf Appointments 

In the middle of August, Colonel Schwarzkopf, who had been mentioned the previous spring as an adviser to the Iranian Government on 

the reorganization of the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie, departed for 

Iran with Lt. Col. Philip T. Boone and Capt. William Preston. They 

arrived at Tehran on 29 August where they reported to Minister 

Dreyfus, under whose direction they were to serve as long as their relation with the Iranian Government remained that of advisers. A bill was 

pending in Congress to authorize U.S. Army officers to act as officials 

of a foreign government whose defense was considered essential to the 

defense of the United States. Until that bill became law, Colonel 

Schwarzkopf and his staff were to remain under Dreyfus' direction 

ra ther than under the orders of the War Department.28 

Meanwhile the relentless advance of Axis forces toward the critical 

Middle East objectives of Suez and the Caucasus passes leading to the 

Iraqi and Iranian oil fields urgently focused attention upon the need 

to step up all plans for strengthening the Allied hand in the Persian 

Corridor. The British surrender of Tobruk on 21 June with the loss of 

25,000 troops opened the way to Rommel's sweep toward Alexandria. 

When exhaustion of men and supplies stopped him soon afterward at 

El Alamein, he had taken toll of 80,000 British men and over a thousand 

British tanks. It was the lowest depth to which British fortunes sank in 

Egypt in that trying year. Along the Black Sea coast, after taking 

Sevastopol on 2 July and retaking Rostov on 25 July, the Germans on 

8 August occupied the Maikop oil fields and advanced to capture, on 

11 September, Novorossiysk, the seaport at the Black Sea anchor of the 

Caucasus range. To the north, massive German drives toward Stalingrad began from two directions on 19 and 22 July. In August, then, 

with the great tests of El Alamein and Stalingrad ominously impending, the Allied position in Iraq and Iran was anything but secure. It 

was necessary to plan for the \",orst at a time when there was slight hope 

of anything better. Hidden in the future was the British counteroffensive, which, beginning at EI Alamein on 23 October, would tum back 

.. (1) Schwarzkopfs service dated officially from 7 August 1942. Memo, Seey War for 

President, 9 Ju1 46. Abstract PGF 261. (2) Dept State VII-4-C, Iran-Foreign AdvisersU.S. Gendarmerie Mission, Div of Near Eastern Affairs. (3) Ltr, Berle to Dreyfus, 19 Aug 42. 

Abstract PGF 261. 
170 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

the Axis forever from Suez. Hidden also was the frightful carnage at 

Stalingrad which, commencing on 31 August, would leave the ruined 

city free of the last Nazi by 2 February 1943 and the Caucasus invasion 

of Iraq and Iran a set of abandoned plans on the desks of the German 

General Staff. 

In August the British informed Iran that, should the Germans 

reach Astrakhan on the Caspian delta of the Volga below Stalingrad, 

Tehran would probably be bombed. The Iranian Government, aware 

of the rising restlessness of the people, applied to the Allies to declare 

Tehran an open city.29 In Washington conferees of the State and \Var 

Departments agreed to face the possibility that within three or four 

months, possibly less, a large part of the Middle East, specifically Iran, 

Iraq, and Palestine, would be under enemy occupation. It was further 

agreed that every effort should be made to save the Persian Corridor 

supply route, as an alternative to Murmansk and Archangel and as 

providing access to the Caucasus for military action and a base for air 

operations against the Balkans and German-occupied southern Russia. 

Moreover, it was agreed that the dispatch of American Army officers 

to advise the Iranian Army was desirable to frustrate the possibility of 

German political agents taking over Iran without a battle. so 

How to carryon the commitment to the Iranian Army represented 

by the appointment of General Greely was the question. Iran indicated 

that a large mission of two or three hundred American officers would 

be welcome, and the British concurred.31 Secretary Hull cabled Dreyfus 

at Tehran that the Department of State felt that an American military 

mission "would be most helpful in strengthening our position in Iran 

at the present time and in building a firm foundation for future relations." The message pointed out that efficient American administration 

would exert a favorable influence and counteract pro-Axis feeling. 

It would also place us in a position to observe and control any movement within 

the [Iranian] Army tending toward its use as a fifth column in the event of 

threatened Axis invasion. We further feel that an American group in key positions 

in the Army would be of great assistance to the various American advisers, in 

particular to the financial mission [under Dr. MilIspaugh).S2 

,. Iran's appeal was addressed to the British; Soviet and American military authorities 

were appealed to by Iran, but the United States refused to take a position, having no treaty 

ties with Iran. General Handy ruled that the War Department would follow the British 

lead on the question since Iran was within the British sphere of strategic operations. The 

Combined Chiefs of Staff were so informed. Dept State Memo of conversation between 

Jernegan and Col John E. Upston, Chief, Africa-Middle East Sec, OPD, 15 Aug 42. 

200.H 42 (IM-L-5) Iran-Iraq, Vol. I, OPD • .. (1) Memo of conversation between Jernegan and Col Truman Smith, 13 Aug 42, 

referred to Gen Handy. Russian Mission File, Africa-Middle East Sec, OPD. (2) Memo, 

22 Aug 42, cited n. 27(1) . ., Memo cited n. 16(2) . 

.. Rad 220, Hull to Dreyfus, 18 Aug 42. Dept State 891.20/165. 
STRENGTHENING IRAN 171 

On 21 August the Department of State proposed to the War Department that it undertake a military mission to Iran with responsibilities 

greater than those assigned to General Greely, but less comprehensive 

than those which Greely had envisaged. To this proposal Secretary 

Stimson replied that the War Department was unwilling to undertake 

enlarged responsibilities toward the Iranian Army, but that it would 

continue to allow U. S. Army officers to advise in key positions. Stimson 

noted that General Greely's purpose to organize an Iranian army to 

fight with the Allies ran counter to the Anglo-Iranian-Soviet treaty 

which limited the use of Iran's forces to internal security functions. 

Reports showed, Stimson wrote, that the Iranian Army was too disorganized to render effective service as a combat force even after 

resupply, reorganization, and long training.s3 

In accordance with this decision the War Department, conscious 

that its "future commitments in Iran will be based very largely on his 

[the appointee's] reports and recommendations," proceeded with 

great care in the selection of an officer for the advisory post. 54 The 

nomination went to Maj. Gen. Clarence S. Ridley, an engineer officer 

who had served (1936-1940) as Governor of the Panama Canal Zone, 

who had also headed the Puerto Rico Hurricane Relief Commission, 

and who was at the time of his nomination in command of the 6th 

Motorized Division. The Letter of Instructions and a supplementary 

letter issued to General Ridley fixed two responsibilities: to investigate 

and report on the desirability of a large military mission, and to advise 

the Iranian Government on service of supply matters affecting its Army. 

"You will not, however," the letter cautioned, in view of what had gone 

before, "directly or by inference, commit the United States to any 

action whatsoever without specific authority from the War Department." The supplementary letter added that Ridley might advise the 

Iranian Government directly on supply matters, but that on questions 

relating to the use of the Iranian Army as a combat force, he must refer 

to the 'Var Department. "Consult freely with Mr. Dreyfus, although 

it is understood that you will in no way be acting under his direction and 

control." Ridley was exempt from the command of the commanding 

generals of USAFIME and the Persian Gulf Service Command and 

he and Colonel Schwarzkopf were to be independent of one another.s~ 

IS Ltr cited n. 22. M Ltr, Stimson to Welles, 3 Sep 42. Dept State 891.20/175-1/2 PS/DAB . 

.. (1) Ltr of Instructions, Gen Handy, ACofS, OPD, to Gen Ridley, 24 Sep 42; Ltr, 

Handy to Ridley, 7 Oct 42, sub: Interpretation of Instructions. Abstracts PGF 261. These 

letters, not rescinded when the Ridley mission later entered into contractual relationship 

with the Iranian Government, merely became inoperative. (2) Ltr, TAG to CG, USAFIME, 

7 Oct 42, sub: Transportation and Administrative Facilities. PGF 261. (3) A letter, 
172 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

After conferring at the State and War Departments and with Gen~ 

eral Greely, Field Marshal Sir John Dill, and the Iranian Minister at 

Washington, General Ridley, accompanied by Col. Fernand G. Dumont and Capt. Robert S. Conly, Jr., arrived in Iran on 30 October.a6 

In proceeding to carry out that part of his instructions which called 

for a report on the advisability of a large American training mission, 

Ridley soon encountered the political pitfalls and diplomatic difficulties 

with which the country abounded. The Prime Minister had taken over 

the portfolio of the Minister of War and appeared to be jockeying with 

the Shah for control of the Army. The post of Intendant General involved the giving of advice for the reorganization and administration 

of the Army's finance, quartermaster, engineer, sanitary, veterinary, 

recruiting, military justice, transport, and remount departments. But 

soon after Ridley's arrival the Shah expanded his views of what he 

wanted Ridley to do, and proposed that Ridley take over reorganization of the entire Army and accept the rank of lieutenant general as 

Aide to the Shah. The Minister of vVar countered with an alternative 

proposal that Ridley become Assistant Minister of War.a

! 

Inasmuch as the United States Congress had recently enacted legislation authorizing the President to detail officers and enlisted men of 

the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps to assist such governments as the 

President "deems it in the interest of national defense to assist," during 

the period of war or a declared national emergency, there was no legal 

bar to acceptance of either proposal. 3S After reviewing the arguments 

for sending a large military mission, General Ridley recommended that 

he be allowed to accept the proposal of the Minister of War that he 

become Assistant War Minister, and he suggested that an American 

quartermaster colonel be given the post of Intendant General.39 This 

recommendation was disapproved in the 'Var Department in January 

1943,.° It was felt that the direct responsibility which General Ridley 

would owe to the Iranian Government would involve the United States 

in the question of security of the Persian Corridor line of communications, which was assigned by the Tri-Partite Treaty to the joint care 

of Iran, Great Britain, and the USSR. The question of sending a fullscale American military mission to reorganize the Iranian Army as a 

Welles to Dreyfus, undated, enclosing a copy of Ridley's Letter of Instructions, stated that 

Ridley was "not to be regarded as acting under your direction." Abstract PGF 261. 

"(I) Grt'e\y Rpt. (2) Memo citt'd n. 16(2). D7 Ltr, Ridley to Chief, OPD, 10 Dec 42. Mission Rpt File, Hq, U.S. Military Mission 

with the Iranian Anny, War Office, Tehran. I! Public Law 722, 1 Oct 42, amending 44 Stat 565, 19 May 26 • •• Ltr cited n. 37 . 

.. OPD Memo, Jan 43. Case 53, Sec II, OPD 210.684 Iran. 
STRENGTHENING IRAN 173 

whole was finally answered in the negative the following October when 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that the separate Ridley and Schwarzkopf missions were sufficient.H The program to strengthen Iran by 

supplying expert military and economic advice and administrative 

assistance continued, therefore, according to the basic pattern laid 

down in 1942.42 

., JCS 557, 30 Oct 43, sub: Mil Mission to Persia; and JCS 557/1, 2 Nov 43. Case 67, 

Sec II, OPD 210.684 Iran . .. The account of the Anny and Gendarmerie Missions is continued in Ch. XXI below. 

PART TWO 

THE PERSIAN GULF COMMAND 

CHAPTER X 

New Job, New Tools: The SOS 

Plan 

The Midsummer CrisisJ 1942 

The radical change in American responsibilities in the Persian 

Corridor which was decided upon in September 1942 was a change of 

method and pace, not of direction. The direction continued, as before, 

toward the objective of aiding the British in their efforts in the area, 

particularly their efforts to deliver supplies to the Soviet Union. But 

the old method of doing this-with the American task primarily in construction and in the operation of assembly plants, while the British, in 

addition to their other obligations, controlled and operated transport 

facilities-was superseded by the new American job. Henceforth, to 

speed the movement of supplies to the USSR, the primary American 

concern was to be in transport. 

Although the accelerating imbalance between tonnages arriving at 

Persian Gulf ports and tonnages carried inland to Soviet receiving 

points was a vital factor in determining the change of method and pace, 

the decision to change was not a local one. It was not even a purely 

War Department decision. By midsummer of 1942 three broad lines 

of policy and action in the conduct of the war intersected to mark a 

point of crisis. The solution proposed to meet that crisis, in so far as 

Persian Corridor operations were concerned, was the so-called SOS 

Plan, giving the United States greatly increased responsibilities in the 

aid-to-Russia program. Dictated first by the military situation in the 
176 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

Middle East, second by considerations of high policy toward the Soviet 

Union, and third by the crisis in Persian Corridor logistics, the decision 

was taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in accordance with principles agreed upon between the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom 

and the President of the United States. In listing the three factors in 

the decision no precedence is implied, for they were closely interrelated 

and not distinct phenomena. The lines of the war, of which these were 

but three, crossed and recrossed, tangled and knotted. These three happened to culminate in crisis at approximately the same time. 

One of the factors influencing the American decision that summer 

to strengthen Iran was the ominous military situation in the Middle 

East at midyear: the surge of Axis forces toward critical objectives, 

from the west through Egypt and from the north around the Black 

Sea. It had other repercussions upon Persian Corridor planning; for 

simultaneously with the prospect that Axis forces would overrun the 

area, seize the oil of Iraq and Iran, and cut off the Russian supply line, 

the success of Axis submarines and aircraft in the Arctic was reducing 

almost to impotence the effort to supply Russia by the Murmansk route. 

With both northern and southern supply routes threatened with extinction, and with the threatened loss of the Middle East, the question of 

the degree to which Russian supply routes were to be defended became 

entangled with the question of military defense of the Middle East; 

and this had to be balanced against global policy. In the process, old 

plans and policies gave way to new. 

In January the Combined Chiefs of Staff accepted a tentative plan 

for an Allied invasion of northwest Africa known as GYMNAST, but this 

plan was shelved in March. In April Operation BOLERO was conceived 

for the assembly or build-up in England of American forces for an 

ultimate cross-Channel attack. During the spring General Marshall 

and Harry Hopkins had reached tentative agreement in London with 

the British on plans for SLEDGEHAMMER, a cross-Channel landing and 

diversion operation for 1942, and a full-scale cross-Channel operation 

for 1943, called ROUNDUP. It was soon felt in the United States, however, that the British preferred postponing an assault upon the Continent until after 1942, and that they were interested in GYMNAST, whose 

adoption would render difficult any adequate build-up for a crossChannel attack timed for the spring of 1943. Prime Minister Churchill 

therefore went to Hyde Park late in June for discussions which moved 

on to the White House. There, on Sunday morning, 21 June, President 

Roosevelt handed Churchill a slip of paper bearing news of the fall of 

Tobruk. The crisis thus precipitated by the retreat of the British to 

Egypt and the expectation of a junction of Germans and Japanese in 
NEW JOB, NEW TOOLS: THE SOS PLAN 177 

the Indian Ocean, strengthened Churchill's argument to postpone 

Channel plans in favor of GYMNAST. Churchill having returned a 

few days later to London, Roosevelt went back to Hyde Park whence 

he dispatched a telegram on 30 June to General Marshall on the 

increasingly serious situation in the Middle East. Marshall's replies of 

30 June and 2 July were straightfonvardly pessimistic.1 

Axis success in Egypt and southern Russia was paralleled by the 

terrific losses inflicted by German submarines, surface craft, and aircraft upon Allied shipping on the perilous route to Murmansk. Thanks 

to the help the perpetual daylight in Arctic waters afforded Axis sea 

hunters during April, May, and June, of 522,000 tons which left United 

States ports, only 300,000 tons got through to Murmansk. From London 

on 13 July Averell Harriman, in a message to Hopkins, directly related 

the Murmansk sea toll to the need to step up shipments via the Persian 

Gulf route. He recommended that all planes and trucks beyond the 

capacity of the Alaska-Siberia route to the USSR be shipped to the 

Persian Gulf and that, to take care of this additional tonnage, the 

Iranian State Railway be operated by the United States. A memorandum of two days later from General Marshall and Admiral Ernest 

J. King for Hopkins agreed that convoys to the Persian Gulf would 

suffer less damage than those to Murmansk and indicated that steps 

were being taken to increase the tonnage to the Gulf and to develop 

increased inland clearance capacity. At the same time Churchill gave 

Roosevelt his opinion that sinkings in the Atlantic in the preceding 

seven days were at a rate unexampled in this war or the last. On the 

Murmansk route twenty-two out of thirty-three ships in a recent convoy 

had been sunk. The next day the Prime Minister sent the President 

a copy of a cable which he proposed to send to Stalin, reviewing the 

difficulties besetting the north Russia route and suggesting the suspension of further convoys during the rest of the summer. The President 

by cable of the same date (15 July) reluctantly approved the proposal 

and, connecting Murmansk and the Persian Gulf route, as Harriman 

had done, asked Churchill to consider whether American railroad 

men should run the line from the Gulf north to help take care of the 

new tonnage going to the Gulf instead of to Murmansk. Churchill's 

reaction was instantly favorable and he sent off to Harry Hopkins a 

draft acceptance of the railway proposal with certain important strings 

attached to it. Churchill's formal acceptance of the American offer 

followed after a month, as will appear later in the narrative. Whether 

• See Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, Ch. XXV, and Winston S. Churchill, Th6 Hinge 

of Fate (Boston: Houghton MiBlin Company, 1950), p. 382. 
178 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

or not Hopkins discussed the Churchill draft with the President it is 

impossible to judge from available documents! 

At all events, by 15 July four questions of vital policy, each of which 

would affect future action in the Persian Corridor, demanded answers. 

First was the defense of the disintegrating military position in Egypt 

and the approaches to the Caucasus. Second was the virtual elimination 

of the Murmansk supply route to Russia. Third was the need to build 

up the Persian Gulf route as an alternative to Murmansk. And fourth, 

most important of all in its long-range implications, was the choice 

between continuing plans for a cross-Channel invasion in 1942 and 

reviving plans for an invasion of North Africa. Postponement of an 

assault upon the Continent of Europe, a second-front operation urgently 

desired by the Russians to offset German pressure on the Eastern Front, 

would, in conjunction with the drastic reduction of tonnages reaching 

the USSR via Murmansk, cause a most unfavorable impression among 

the Russians. Yet the situation in Egypt provided strong argument for 

an operation in Morocco and Algeria. The crux of the problem, then, 

was how to maintain a balance between the urgent needs of the British 

and of the Russians. 

At the White House on the night of 15 July, Roosevelt, who had 

decided to send Hopkins, Marshall, and King to London to arrange 

definitive strategy for the rest of the year, told Hopkins that at London 

a determined effort should be made to obtain agreement that, if 

SLEDGEHAMMER could not be mounted in 1942, then another theater 

must be chosen "where our ground and sea forces can operate against 

the German ground forces in 1942." 3 Two theaters suggested themselves, North Africa and the Middle East, and in either one operations 

would entail a substantial reduction in BOLERO, and consequent disappointment of Soviet hopes for an early invasion across the English 

Channel. 

The next day Hopkins, Marshall, and King left for London taking 

with them a detailed memorandum of Presidential instruction of which 

the eighth section dealt in nine subsections with the problems of the 

, (1) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 544, 600. (2) Rad ALUSNA, London to 

OpNav, 13122 CCR, 887-A Limit~d, Harriman to Hopkins, 13 Jul 42. Russia File (5) 

WDCSA. (3) Memo, Marshall and King for Hopkins, 15 Jul 42. Same file. (4) MS Index 

to the Hopkins Papers, Vol. I, Bk. V, Aid to Russia, pp. 14-16, Item 62. (5) The Murmansk 

convoys were not wholly suspended. A September statement indicates their relation to Persian 

Gulf planning: "If our shipping losses continue at the present excessive rate along th~ 

Northern Russian route, it may become necessary to use the Persian Gulf route entirely." 

CCS 109/1, Rpt, CSP for CCS, approved 22 Sep 42, sub: Development of Persian Trans 

Facilities. 323.361 General Connolly's Letter of Instructions, SL 9008. (6) Page 16 of 

Item 62 cited in (4). The Index entry carries the erroneous date 18 June for 18 July. 

I Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 602. 
NEW JOB, NEW TOOLS: THE SOS PLAN 179 

Middle East. Summarizing the "effect of losing the Middle East," the 

memorandum stated: 

"You will determine the best methods of holding the Middle East. These 

methods include definitely either or both of the following: 

"(a) Sending aid [air?] and ground forces to the Persian Gulf, to Syria and 

to Egypt. 

"(b) A new operation in Morocco and Algiers intended to drive in against the 

backdoor of Rommel's armies. . . .". 

The London talks, having moved toward the second of Roosevelt's proposed courses, took up GYMNAST and prepared it for action. Renamed 

TORCH at a meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 25 July, it was 

subsequently carried out in the North African landings the following 

November. 6 Roosevelt's approval in July of the revival of GYMNAST 

was accompanied by his insistence that a European operation would 

not necessarily be postponed beyond 1943. 

His first proposal, to send troops to the Persian Gulf, Syria, and 

Egypt, met a different fate from his second. Sending troops was not 

a new proposal. On 25 March Roosevelt had asked the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff and the Secretary of War their views on the dispatch of American combat troops to northwest Africa, Libya, and Syria, and had been 

informed by General Marshall on 2 April that it was believed American 

strength should be directed toward a cross-Channel assault and not 

toward the Mediterranean.6 The July decision reversed that policy; 

but while it offered <;:ountermeasures of great potential effectiveness in 

the Mediterranean and Atlantic areas, it supplied no immediate solution to the problem of relieving German pressure against the Soviet 

Union. As unpublished papers reveal,7 during July and August Roosevelt explored the possibility of an American air force to operate with 

the Russians in the Caucasus. He was encouraged in his design by 

Churchill's word that Stalin had once said he would welcome such a 

force; and Churchill, partly as a means of luring Turkey into the war 

on the Allied side, was eager to send Allied forces to the Soviet front. 

The Russians, however, refused the offer of air aid in the Caucasus, 

tentatively in August, then, as the battle of Stalingrad began, flatly in 

October.8 

• Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 604--05. 

'Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, p. 31 and n. 106. 

"Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, p. 15. 7 See: (1) MS Index to the Hopkins Papers, Vol. I, Bk. V, Aid to Russia, passim. 

(2) Prime Minister to President, Most Secret and Personal Msg 216, 2 Dee 42; and Msgs, 

Churehill to Roosevelt, Roosevelt to Churchill, and Roosevelt to Stalin, 30 Aug-9 Oct 42. 

OPD Exec 10, Item 63-a, OPD Hist Sec Call, OCMH. • Research Draft MS, by Edwin M. Snell, 2 Apr 48, sub: The USSR in the U.S.-British 

Plans and Operations in 1942, p. 34. OCMH. 
180 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

There was only one possible means left of directly strengthening 

the Soviet hand in 1942, and that was to increase shipping to the Persian 

Gulf. This the Combined Chiefs of Staff authorized in August. New 

shipping priorities gave Russian-aid supplies going by way of the Persian Gulf the same general priorities as TORCH, while BOLERO and the 

Murmansk route dropped to lower positions in the scale.9 

Ways and Means 

The rearrangement of shipping priorities marked a last step in the 

process of developing and promulgating the policy of increasing aid to 

Russia via the Persian Corridor. Still to come was planning, the equation merging policy with performance. Up to the crisis of midsummer 

1942 there had been no dearth of planning, first, for the initiation of 

Corridor tasks, and second, for means to prevent the choking of the 

supply pipeline. In the first case, the critical operation entrusted to the 

Americans was construction of such installations as docks, warehouses, 

and highways. In the second, the most troublesome phenomenon of the 

year was the problem of inland clearance. Successful movement required the provision of adequate ports, the establishment of efficient 

methods of ship discharge, cargo storage, and transfer to trucks and 

railway, the provision of overland highway routes, and the organization 

of trucking and railway services to carry the goods north as fast as they 

were landed. By midyear none of these goals had been attained. The 

threat of backlogs of Soviet-destined goods began to become an unmanageable reality. The new planning to take care of the increased 

load decreed by the July decisions therefore overtook and absorbed 

the improvisations by which the British and their American auxiliaries 

had been attempting hitherto to keep up with the job. 

The Harriman suggestion in July that American operation of the 

railway would improve inland clearance revived talk along that line 

which ran back as far as Lord Beaverbrook's proposal of November 

1941. In May 1942 General Somervell urged establishment of an 

American trucking organization as a means of ameliorating a worsening transport situation. Concern over inefficient port operations developed early in vVashington and was not lessened by the January 

observations of William C. Bullitt, personal representative of the President. \Vashington was unsparing in its pressure on the Iranian Mission 

to improve cargo handling at the ports, but it is difficult to see how 

vVashington expected that mission, whose transport activities were 

• See P&P Records for August 1942. P&O, WDGS. 
advisory only, to bring about effective changes in methods. There is at 

least one early British suggestion that the Americans “control” the 

ports of Khorramshahr and Bandar Shahpur, and that, to bring about 

better co-ordination, there should be American representation on 

British movements control committees and on the War Transport 

Executive Committee which was responsible to London. Though some 

representation was subsequently arranged, the Americans had no 

power to act either through the committees upon which they sat or 

through their own military mission; and the committees upon which 

they sat derived from sources of distinct authority as far apart as 

London and Basra.10

Although at midyear new British dock construction was behind 

schedule, theoretical port capacity at Basra had been considerably 

increased above prewar level; but actual discharge there fell below the 

previous year’s average. Nevertheless, Basra was at the time the most 

active Persian Gulf port; but less than a quarter of its cargo discharge 

was destined for the USSR. The rest was for the British Tenth Army.11

In Washington, Harry Hopkins received analyses of the Basra problem 

and in May a suggestion from General Burns, formerly assistant to 

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., of lend-lease and then executive officer of 

the Munitions Assignments Board, Combined Chiefs of Staff, that a 

three-man survey group tackle Persian Gulf problems in co-operation 

with the other nations concerned. In June Burns suggested to Hopkins 

that Burns’ assistant, General Sidney Spalding, head a group to go to 

Iraq and Iran to determine means of improving the situation.12 Other 

suggestions sent in from the field sought to centralize authority and 

responsibility for port operations. One, from the War Shipping Administration’s agent at Basra, requested increased American authority over 

local port agents when unloading American ships.13 Another, from 

the U.S. naval observer at Basra, noting that no agency was solely 

responsible for deliveries to the USSR, recommended establishment of 

an Anglo-American board at Basra to function in this capacity only, 

and suggested as a suitable head Bosworth Monck, a Basra representative of the Ministry of War Transport, London, who had previously 

10 (1) For early railway proposals see Ch. XVII below. (2) Rad 177, Somervell to 

AMSIR, 9 May 42. AG 400.3295 (8–9–41) Sec 5. (3) See Memo, ACofS, WPD, incorporating a draft cable to AMSIR, Gen Eisenhower to TAG, 28 Mar 42. AG 400.3295 

(8–9–41) Sec 4. (4) Rad Q/669, Gen Iraq [GOC, British forces in Iraq] to ARMINDIA, 

8 Jan 42. Shipping Data, SL X–11,737. 11 HOTI, Pt. IV, History of the Ports, by Ogden C. Reed, pp. 1–2. PGF. 

12 (1) Memo, John J. McCloy for Hopkins, 23 May 42, and Memo, Burns for Hopkins, 

26 May 42. MS Index to the Hopkins Papers, Vol. II, Bk. VII, Lend-Lease Aid to Russia 

(1942), p. 3, Item 24. (2) Memo, Burns for Hopkins, 18 Jun 42. Same entry, Item 26. 

Spalding to WD, 30 JuI 42. Abstract PGF 236. 13 Rad, Eugene Seaholm to WSA, 30 Jun 42, repeated in and indorsed by Rad, Gen 

NEW JOB, NEW TOOLS: THE SOS PLAN 181 

advisory only, to bring about effective changes in methods. There is at 

least one early British suggestion that the Americans "control" the 

ports of Khorramshahr and Bandar Shahpur, and that, to bring about 

better co-ordination, there should be American representation on 

British movements control committees and on the War Transport 

Executive Committee which was responsible to London. Though some 

representation was subsequently arranged, the Americans had no 

power to act either through the committees upon which they sat or 

through their own military mission; and the committees upon which 

they sat derived from sources of distinct authority as far apart as 

London and Basra.1o 

Although at midyear new British dock construction was behind 

schedule, theoretical port capacity at Basra had been considerably 

increased above prewar level; but actual discharge there fell below the 

previous year's average. Nevertheless, Basra was at the time the most 

active Persian Gulf port; but less than a quarter of its cargo discharge 

was destined for the USSR. The rest was for the British Tenth Armv.ll 

In Washington, Harry Hopkins received analyses of the Basra probl~m 

and in Maya suggestion from General Burns, formerly assistant to 

Edward R. Stcttinius, J r., of lend-lease and then executive officer of 

the Munitions Assignments Board, Combined Chiefs of Staff, that a 

three-man survey group tackle Persian Gulf problems in co-operation 

with the other nations concerned. In June Burns suggested to Hopkins 

that Burns' assistant, General Sidney Spalding, head a group to go to 

Iraq and Iran to detcrmine means of improving the situation.12 Other 

suggestions sent in from the field sought to centralize authority and 

responsibility for port operations. One, from the War Shipping Administration's agent at Basra, requested increased American authority over 

local port agents when unloading American ships.13 Another, from 

the U.S. naval observer at Basra, noting that no agency was solely 

responsible for deliveries to the USSR, recommended establishment of 

an Anglo-American board at Basra to function in this capacity only, 

and suggested as a suitable head Bosworth Monck, a Basra represcntative of the Ministry of War Transport, London, who had previously 

10 (1) For early railway proposals see Ch. XVII below. (2) Rad 177, Somervell to 

AMSIR, 9 May 42. AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 5. (3) See Memo, ACofS, WPD, incorporating a draft cable to AMSIR, Gen Eisenhower to TAG, 28 Mar 42. AG 400.3295 

(8-9-41) Sec 4. (4) Rad Q/669, Gen Iraq [GOC, British forces in Iraq] to ARMINDIA, 

8 Jan 42. Shipping Data, SL X-11,737. 11 HOTI, Pt. IV, History of the Ports, by Ogden C. Reed, pp. 1-2. PGF. . " (1) Memo, John J. McCloy for Hopkins, 23 May 42, and Memo, Burns for HopkinS, 

26 May 42. MS Index to the Hopkins Papers, Vol. II, Bk. VII, Lend-Lease Aid to Russia 

(1942), p. 3, Item 24. (2) Memo, Burns for Hopkins, 18 Jun 42. Same entry, Item 26. 11 Rad, Eugene Seaholm to WSA, 30 Jun 42, repeated in and indorsed by Rad, Gen 

Spalding to WD, 30 Jul42. Abstract PGF 236. 
182 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

developed the port of Murmansk and who was thoroughly familiar 

with Russian needs.14 

Ivlost of these suggestions aimed at tightening administrative controls in order to increase performance; but there was the equally serious 

problem of the lag in construction. Without dock and highway facilities 

movement on a large scale was impossible. Both British and American 

dock construction at Basra, Bandar Shahpur, and Khorramshahr was 

far behind schedule at the middle of 1942, as was the American highway between Khorramshahr and Andimeshk. In fact, because of the 

shift in priorities and the move of the American constructor from Iraq 

to Iran, completed only in June, the American projects for Iran were 

barely begun. No adequate force of skilled Americans reached the site 

of work until September, and no sufficient quantity of construction 

equipment, especially for highway building, until October. 'Var Department plans to militarize and expand the activities carried on under 

civilian contract owed their inception as much to the unsatisfactory 

progress of construction as to the unsuitability of maintaining civilians 

in a theater of war. But at midyear these plans were still in the talking 

stage. 

The events of June and July, culminating in the high-level decisions 

affecting Persian Corridor operations, launched a period of intense 

activity.15 General Sidney Spalding was sent from Washington; Prime 

,. Ltr, Lt Comdr Derwood W. Lockard to OpNav, via Dir, Naval Intelligence, 1 Aug 42. 

PGF 242. 

,. Much of the material in this section draws upon: (1) Analysis, Persian Gulf 

Capacities for Period 10 Oct-IO Nov 42 (August Shipments ex-USA), Result of Conf, 

29 Jul 42, Gens Spalding and Fayrnonville, Col Shingler, Comdr Lockard, Bosworth Monck; 

Memo, ACofS, Opns, for CofS, Hq, PGC, 12 Nov 44, giving estimated British tonnages 

for Russian-aid cargoes during 1942. PGF 122. (2) Rad, Spalding to Washington, 30 .lui 42, 

copy; Rad, Lock, Basra, to RepMinShip New York. repeat Shipminder London, 30 Jul 42, 

copy; Rpt, Lt Col Alden K. Sibley to CG, USAFIME, through CG, SOS, USAFIME, 

18 Aug 43, sub: A Brief Assessment of Two Years' Activities of U.S. Army Forces in the 

Middle East, II Sep 41-11 Sep 43. PGF 236. (3) Rpt Serial 138-42. Lockard, Basra, to 

Intelligence Div, OpNav, 1 Aug 42, atchd to Ltr cited n. 14. (4) Rads 135, Churchill 

to Roosevelt, 22 Aug 42, Harriman to Roosevelt, 23 Aug 42, AMSME 857, Maxwell to WD, 

22 Aug 42, all being Incl I, Summary of Basic Correspondence, of Plan for Operation of 

Certain Iranian Communications Facilities between Persian Gulf Ports and Tehran by U.S. 

Army Forces, 3 Sep 42 (the SOS Plan); Summary of Present and Projected Shipping 

Capacities, and Target Estimates Persian Gulf Supply Routes as of 22 Aug 42, prepared 

by Col Shingler in conference with British officials, both atchd to Inc! III, Ports, Facilities, 

Capacities, and Inland Distribution, of SOS Plan. Copy PGF 235. (5) Documents dated 

13-17 Aug 42 on Harriman-Maxwell trip to Moscow. OPD-99-H-42 (FIME-L). 

(6) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 627. (7) History: United States Military Iranian 

Mission, 20 Mar 43, prepared for Col Don G. Shingler, Chief of Mission, by 1st Lt Victor 

E. Dietze, Hist Off, pp. 32, 34. PGF 242. (8) Min of Stf Mtg attended by Gens Wilson, 

Maxwell, and Spalding, Cairo, 24 Aug 42. AG 334.8 Hq AMET. (9) Rads, U.S. MA, 

Tehran, to G-2, Washington, 17, 18 Jul 42, quoted in Memo, Maj Gen George V. Strong 

for CG, SOS, 24 Aug 42; Memo, Gen Somervell for Gen Lutes, 29 Aug 42; Memo, 

Gen Spalding for Gen Somervell, 4 Sep 42, sub: Target Estimate of Persian Gulf Supply 

Routes. Atchd to SOS Plan, Copy Conti Div, ASF, Sp Coli, HRS DRB AGO. This last file 

contains originals and copies of planning papers which have supplied incidental information. 
NEW JOB, NEW TOOLS: THE SOS PLAN 183 

Minister Churchill himself went from London to Cairo and Tehran, 

as did Averell Harriman. Harriman and General Maxwell went to 

Moscow to consult Stalin on Soviet needs, and Harriman, after stopping 

off in Cairo on the way back to report to Churchill, proceeded to 

Washington. General Faymonville came down from Moscow. The 

signals offices at Cairo, Basra, Baghdad, and Tehran dispatched thousands of words of estimates, surveys, and recommendations. And all the 

while time was passing, and there was no time to lose. 

When General Spalding reached Basra in the last days of July it 

was known that some twenty-eight ships, most of them from the United 

States, bearing 125,000 long tons of cargo for the USSR were scheduled 

to reach Persian Gulf ports beginning in October; and that some 7,000 

additional tons from India, East Africa, and elsewhere were also coming. The immediate problem, therefore, was to devise measures for 

clearing 132,000 long tons of incoming Russian-aid materiel. In addition was the even graver problem of meeting a new target. By the July 

decisions, 200,000 long tons a month of Russian-aid deliveries was the 

new goal. It was double the figure originally set and at midyear so 

hopelessly far from attainment. In all of 1942, including the latter 

months when Soviet deliveries considerably bettered the record of the 

early months, the total lift for the USSR through the Persian Corridor 

attained only about 350,000 long tons. The new target therefore set 

a goal almost seven times as great as that actually achieved in all 1942 ; 

and it was set when the prospects for its accomplishment were at their 

dimmest. It was two and one third times the estimated August inland 

clearance capacity. It disposed of any thought of surrendering to the 

crisis by reducing Soviet tonnages, for it affirmed that, no matter what 

the difficulties, Russian aid would be increased.'s With the sights drastically raised, it was up to the planners to devise ways and means to 

meet the new goals. 

The preparation of recommendations for handling the cargoes soon 

expected and those to come in the new program required stocktaking of 

three sorts. First, present methods had to be reviewed, their deficiencies 

analyzed, and their improvement determined. Second, present and 

projected facilities had to be surveyed: docks and dock equipment, 

railway rolling stock, highway routes, labor, and construction equipment. On the basis of data developed from these two kinds of inquiry, 

the third step, preparation of capacity estimates for port discharge and 

1. According to Commander Lockard, W. H. Lock, Director of the Ministry of War 

Transport at Basra, who had gone to Washington to discuss port problems, was believed to 

have considered recommending a decrease in Soviet loads for Persian Gulf ports. Ltr 

cited n. 14. 
184 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

inland clearance, could be taken. Many individuals and agencies shared 

in the arduous business of fact finding. Lt. Comdr. Derwood W. Lockard's probing analysis of the immediate need as well as the ultimate 

proved reliable and suggestive, although his estimates were nearly all 

increased as planning went on. American fact hunters were almost 

wholly dependent upon British sources for their information and, as 

there were many different British sources, estimates rarely agreed even 

upon vital points. Much information was channeled through Colonel 

Shingler's transportation officer, :Maj. Erme B. Myott, to Shingler who, 

after consultation with local American, British, and Soviet authorities, 

prepared numerous comprehensive and detailed estimates for General 

Spalding. These became the basis of studies carried on by the G-4 staff 

at USAFIME headquarters, Cairo, which in turn were used in drawing up General Maxwell's recommendations to Washington after he 

and Spalding had conferred with Churchill, Harriman, General Wilson, Commander-in-Chief, PAl Force, and the top British Middle East 

transport and quartermaster men, Maj. Gen. Sir Donald J. McMullen 

and General Riddell-'¥ebster respectively. 

What to do with the incoming cargoes which were just over the 

horizon was Spalding's first order of business. Some decision had to be 

reached, and reached promptly, in order that the necessary shipping 

arrangements could be made at New York and other American ports. 

A conference at Basra on 29 July, participated in by Spalding, Faymonville, Shingler, Lockard, and Monck, concluded that, in the period 10 

October to 10 November, when the 132,000 long tons would hit the 

Persian Gulf ports, inland clearance by road and rail-after deducting 

tonnages for the British military forces, the Iranian civilian economy, 

and the Polish refugees being cared for by the British military-could 

accommodate only 111,500 long tons for the USSR. Other figures, based 

upon data not used at that meeting or providing solutions different from 

those reached on 29 July, appear in messages and estimates which went 

from Spalding to \Vashington and from the Ministry of War Transport, 

Basra, to its officials at New York \vho had to load and route ships with 

due regard to the capacities of the various Gulf ports to receive certain 

kinds of cargoes. The significant general conclusion of the conference 

on the immediate problem was that as of 1 August there was an estimated gap of 54,000 long tons monthly between the capacity of the 

ports of Basra, Bandar Shahpur, Khorramshahr, Ahwaz (lighter port 

on the Karun River) , and Bushire to receive all cargoes and the smaller 

capacity of existent rail and road facilities to carryall kinds of tonnages 

inland. It was obvious that substantial backlogs would accumulate at 

the ports until inland clearance could be brought into balance with 
NEW JOB, NEW TOOLS: THE SOS PLAN 185 

port capacities. The cargoes arriving in October-November would 

have to be processed under existing conditions and methods subject 

to whatever improvements were immediately possible to make; but 

General Spalding advised Washington that wharf cranes, diesel engines 

for the railway, road-making equipment, and military port operating 

personnel additional to that already requested by Colonel Shingler for 

the militarization and expansion of the civilian contract operations 

were urgently required. 

The general problem of the new quota called attention first to 

existing organization and procedure. Some Americans whom Spalding 

consulted complained that, as Commander Lockard put it, plans to 

increase Russian loads "frequently have had only lip service paid 

them." This criticism was directed at the British who were at midyear 

solely responsible for transport matters. Whether accurate or not as a 

statement of fact, the criticism did not do full justice to the other responsibilities borne by the British forces in the Corridor. Indeed, when 

General Spalding told General ·Wilson at Cairo that "there has been 

no serious backing of the Persian supply route" by the British and 

American forces, Wilson in reply referred to a letter in which 

Churchill had once pointed out to Roosevelt that it would be difficult 

for the British to supply Russia and at the same time maintain British 

forces in a suitable state of readiness to repel invasion. 

The tug of war between priorities for British and Soviet needs had 

resulted in numerous frustrations and alterations of plans, a striking 

example of which was furnished by the shift of the American tasks from 

the port construction at Umm Qasr and other Iraqi projects. It is easy 

to understand, long after the fact, that such difficulties were inherent in 

a co-operative rather than a combined operation; but the feeling was 

strong at the conferences held by Spalding that they might have been 

largely avoided if the British had not divided responsibility for their 

Russian-aid operations among at least five agencies. Within the area 

controlled by Tenth Army, transport facilities were created and 

operated by separate transport directorates for Iran and Iraq; the 

Ministry of War Transport and UKCC, independent agencies each 

reporting to London, shared in both policy and operation; and the 

busiest Persian Gulf port, at Basra, was nominally under the control of 

the Iraqi Government. Lockard's recommendations for improvement 

struck at the basic weakness of divided responsibility. Although Tenth 

Army, by virtue of the directive given in 1941 to Quinan, was responsible in general for the Russian-aid delivery program, no single agency 

responsible to Tenth Army had the matter in hand. Lockard noted that 

on 20 September the Quartermaster General, Tenth Army, would be-
186 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

come Inspector General, Communications for Iraq and Iran, and that 

he would be advised by directors of transportation and movements 

control whose functions, contrary to those of their parallels at GHQ, 

Middle East Forces, Cairo, were, as of 1 August, for local reasons, not 

clearly enough defined to prevent friction and overlap. The Lockard 

report recommended establishment of a permanent committee to suggest improvements in efficiency and to be presided over by a representative of the Ministry of War Transport. The other members would 

be an officer of Tenth Army and an American officer qualified as a 

transport expert. The committee would be responsible to Tenth Army, 

but would have the right to appeal to higher authority any movement 

ordered by Tenth Army detrimental to Russian aid. It was further 

recommended that the committee was to be solely concerned with 

Russian-aid movements and must have power to allocate priorities in 

both ship and land movements. 

While improvement of methods and centralization of authority 

were vital parts of any scheme to increase performance, benefits resulting from them would be conditioned by the tools available for the job. 

Tonnage estimates therefore depended on the condition of ports, railway, and highways, and on the speed with which the disparity between 

port discharge and inland clearance could be wiped out. Up to midsummer of 1942, Basra, both as the sea gate of the British line of communications and as the best equipped port on the Gulf, had been discharging more cargo than Khorramshahr, Bandar Shahpur, and Bushire together. But until the port area of Basra was connected that 

summer to the ISR by the branch line to Cheybassi, Russian-aid goods, 

which approximated one fourth of Basra ship discharge, had to go overland by truck, and this threw a disproportionately heavy burden upon 

th.e UKCC and British Army motor transport services using the Khanaqin Lift and other highway routes north from Basra. On the other hand, 

Bandar Shahpur, where new dock construction at midsummer was far 

behind schedule, discharged much less tonnage than was cleared inland 

by rail. Bushire landed small tonnages and sent them inland over one 

of the worst roads in Iran. At midsummer Khorramshahr's discharge 

capacity was only half that of Basra's. Like Basra's, it was largely dependent, for clearance to Soviet receiving points, on road transport, for 

the new rail extension to Ahwaz, though completed in June, was not 

yet useful for heavy work. As Khorramshahr's docks were finished and 

put into service and as the new rail line gained capacity, that port would 

rise, as it eventually did, to top position. But the planners in August 

had to forecast as well as they could the rate of improvement in facilities 

and to provide a shift in loads from port to port as the relative pros-
NEW JOB, NEW TOOLS: THE 50S PLAN 187 

pective capacities of ports to discharge and to clear inland altered. It 

was apparent that, until Basra's rail connection with the ISR could 

haul large tonnages, truck haulage out of Basra would have to be 

stepped up; and until the new highway out of Khorramshahr was ready, 

other highway routes would have to be utilized. The only hope of holding the accumulation of backlogs to manageable proportions was therefore to build up motor transport wherever possible during the remainder of 1942. Thereafter, if all went according to plan, motor 

transport would become secondary to the railway. 

The procurement of enough trucks and drivers was a pressing 

problem, for there was no time to bring them from the United States. 

Lockard estimated that the UKCC had assembled-and as of 1 August 

was operating-1,300 lend-lease trucks and around 1,000 Iranian 

trucks on contract. There were perhaps 3,000 nonmilitary trucks in 

Iran, many of them laid up for lack of tires; but it was felt that UKCC 

could put tires on 1,000 of them from its stock of 16,000 tires, and thus 

add an estimated 7,000 tons to road capacity. The Lockard report 

recommended the drastic step of requisitioning all remaining nonmilitary trucks in Iran, and the equally drastic step of suggesting to the 

Russians that their trucks, which were driven north loaded, be sent 

over the route twice before delivery. Colonel Shingler's tonnage estimates, which went forward to Cairo and Washington, forecast that up 

to 1 .January 1943 more than half of total inland clearance would be 

accomplished by truck, and that after that date more than half would 

move by rail. His figures showed an imbalance between ship discharge 

and inland clearance up to 1 December 1942, but optimistically (as the 

event proved) expected new construction, new methods, and increased 

manpower to even the score after that date. Procurement of trucks was 

essential to attainment of his goals. 

The Shingler estimates were predicated upon the use of every 

known trucking route in the frantic search for maximum delivery, 

although in his view it was preferable to use those which were most 

convenient and quickly capable of development, expanding as a last 

resort to less desirable routes. His figures thus included calculations for 

use of highways in eastern Iran, including the Zahidan-Meshed route 

used for a time by UKCC and under improvement by a UKCC contractor. This route had been opposed by the Russians in January 1942 

as delivering cargoes too far from their battle lines; and, since it terminated at Ashkhabad, inside the border of the Turkmen Soviet Republic, 

it would almost certainly continue to be opposed by the Soviets as requiring admission within their borders of American and British military 

personnel. As a minor feeder to these routes Shingler included the use 
188 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

of Karachi for discharge of not more than 30,000 long tons monthly. 

Two highway routes originating in Iraq were also included in the 

Shingler estimates.l1 

The total discharge capacity of ports/8 which was estimated at 

189,000 long tons as of 1 August, rose in the Shingler tables to 252,000 

for November, and 399,500 tons for June 1943, with the possibility of 

advancing the last figure to February. The last two figures, if attained, 

would be sufficient to accommodate both the new target of 200,000 

long tons monthly for the USSR and mounting tonnages for British and 

American military needs, Iranian civilian economy, and the Polish 

refugees. The totals given included estimates that the ISR could haul 

78,000 long tons north of Andimeshk in November, 90,000 in December, and 180,000 by June 1943, or 6,000 tons a day in contrast to its 

1941 rate of 200.19 

Concurrently with the assembly of these figures the process of 

relating them to available and prospective operational plans was going 

on. Churchill, Harriman, Maxwell, and Spalding concluded their various consultations at Moscow, Tehran, and Basra and reassembled at 

Cairo. There, just before Churchill's departure for London, Harriman 

repeated to him the suggestion that American service troops expand 

and operate Persian Gulf ports and the ISR. The fact gathering had 

now to be turned to account in devising methods of operation. The 

British and Americans who conferred together at Cairo had before 

them the suggestions of the past nine months. These were of three 

kinds: increased manpower; increased centralization of authority and 

responsibility within the British administration; and American operation of rail, port, and motor transport facilities. The first was being 

partly met by the War Department's militarization of civilian contract 

activities, service troops for which were proposed for shipment in the 

latter part of 1942. This program, conceived months before the midsummer crisis brought the SOS Plan into existence, was, while retaining its individuality up to a late hour, ultimately to be merged in troop 

estimates and dispositions for the SOS Plan. Centralizing within the 

"Notes supplied the author by General Shingler, 16 May 1950. 

"Basra (Margil and Tanuma), Ahwaz, Khorramshahr, Bandar Shahpur, Bushire, and 

Karachi. to The Summary of Present and Projected Shipping Capacities, cited note 15 (4), which 

eliminated the Basra-area port of Margil, estimated September capacity of Bushire, Bandar 

Shahpur, and Khorramshahr at between 99,000 and 129,000 long tons and rail clearance 

at 60,000. The same document estimated ultimate attainable target capacity for those ports 

plus the lighter basin later called Cheybassi at 261,000 long tons, with rail clearance of 

180,000 tons and road clearance (not estimated for September) at 61,500 tons. Both estimates left a considerable gap which meant accumulation of backlogs; but the document 

noted that water and road routes in the Tigris valley, not included in the estimates, could be 

developed or utiliz!'d to close the gap. 
NEW JOB, NEW TOOLS: THE SOS PLAN 189 

American command responsibility for transport solved part of the old 

problem of divided British responsibilities. But there was still to be 

solved the intricate question of the relation of American to British 

responsibili ties. 

On 22 August General Maxwell sent to Washington the broad outlines of an American plan. This superseded a tentative plan sent to 

London a few days earlier by General Spalding. Maxwell's proposals 

embodied the conclusions of the conferees at Cairo and was concurred 

in by GHQ, Middle East Forces, subject to approval of a final general 

plan. Maxwell stated the purpose of the plan as twofold: to assist in 

increasing the flow of supplies to the USSR; and to provide the British 

forces in the Corridor with their necessary requirements. A basic target 

figure of 251,000 long tons monthly was established, of which 180,000 

would be carried by the ISR north of Andimeshk. Inasmuch as this 

figure \vas for the ports of Khorramshahr, Bushire, Bandar Shahpur, 

and Tanuma only, it represented a decision to concentrate American 

activity at those ports, whereas the Shingler figure of 252,000 long tons 

monthly had included other ports. The basic American target therefore 

did not include the additional tonnage that could be handled at Basra 

by the British. It was further proposed that the American Army operate 

the ISR from Tehran to the Gulf, and that an American truck forwarding organization be set up to supplement the UKCC. In addition to units already planned for the militarization program, Maxwell 

proposed a total troop strength for the plan of 8,048 officers and men. 

He noted that Negro troops would be "acceptable" for port and truck 

units.20 

The Maxwell message had this to say on the problem of authority 

and responsibility: 

The allocation of traffic in this area would be made by the British military 

authorities, even though the actual operations would be under control of the U.S. 

Army Forces in the Middle East. All action would be under a general policy to be 

established by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which would take into consideration 

.. (1) Spalding discussed the employment of American Negro troops with Ministry of 

War Transport officials at Basra and the matter was referred to London. In recommending 

their use in a message of 30 July 1942 Spalding noted that the British had not specifically 

approved the idea. A condition of British approval of the importation of American Negro 

troops into Iran and Iraq was that they would be kept apart from the natives. Some Americans thought this was out of fear of the consequences of the disparity in rates of pay. 

Maxwell envisaged use of Negro troops in supervisory capacities. The SOS planners in 

Washington in September decided to refer the problem to General Connolly as commanding 

~eneral, leavin~ him to dispose his troops as he saw fit. Memos of Sep dates in SOS Plan 

file cited n. 15 (9). (2) The estimated strength figure was made up of 3 port battalions 

and a headquarters, totaling 2,667; 2 railway operating battalions and 1 engineer battalion 

totaling 2,363; and 3,018 for 2 truck regiments. Estimates of equipment called for 75 

locomotives and 1,200 "wagons" of 20-ton capacity for the railway; and 7,200 trucks of 

an average capacity of 7 tons for the motor transport service. 
190 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

all the principles which govern the amount of cargo which is agreed to be forwarded to the USSR. Inasmuch as the traffic is subject to emergency military 

demands, and because the facilities are within the British theater of operations, it 

is felt that the allocation of the traffic should rest with the British military 

authorities. 

Two more messages served to transfer the planning to Washington. 

From London on 22 August Prime Minister Churchill sent his answer 

to President Roosevelt's proposal of the previous month: 

I have delayed my reply until I could study the Trans-Persian situation on the 

spot. This I have now done both at Tehran and here, and have conferred with 

Averell [Harriman], General Maxwell, General Spalding and their railway experts. 

The traffic on the Trans-Persian Railway is expected to reach three thousand tons 

a day for all purposes by [the] end of the year. We are all convinced that it ought 

to be raised to six thousand tons. Only in this way can we ensure an expanding 

flow of supplies to Russia while building up the military forces which we must 

move into Northern Persia to meet a possible German advance. 

To reach the higher figure, it will be necessary to increase largely the railway 

personnel and to provide additional quantities of rolling stock and technical equipment. Furthermore, the target will only be attained in reasonable time if enthusiasm 

and energy are devoted to the task and a high priority accorded to its requirements. 

I therefore welcome and accept your most helpful proposal contained in your 

telegram, that the railway should be taken over, developed and operated by the 

United States Army; with the railroad should be included the ports of Khorramshahr and Bandar Shahpur. Your people would thus undertake the great task of 

opening up the Persian Corridor, which will carry primarily your supplies to 

Russia. All our people here agree on the benefits which would follow your approval 

of this suggestion. \Ve should be unable to find the resources without your help 

and our burden in the Middle East would be eased by the release for use elsewhere 

of the British units now operating the railway. The railway and ports would be 

managed entirely by your people, though the allocation of traffic would have to be 

retained in the hands of the British military authorities for whom the railway is 

an essential channel of communication for operational purposes. I see no obstacle 

in this to harmonious working. 

The change-over would have to be carefully planned to avoid any temporary 

reduction of effort, but I think it should start as soon as possible. Averell is cabling 

you detailed suggestions.21 

Harriman sent a message to the President on 23 August. He strongly 

reinforced Churchill's cable by stating that the British did not possess 

the resources or personnel to carry out the expanded program even if 

the United States should supply the equipment. Furthermore, Harriman warned, "Unless the United States Army undertakes the task, 

71 Churchill's draft acceptance of 18 July 1942 (Item 62 cited note 2(4» sent to Harry 

Hopkins read: 

I welcome and accept your most helpful proposal contained in your telegram that the 

Railways should be taken over, developed and operated by the U.S. Army; with the railroads 

should be included certain Persian ports-though the allocation of traffic would have to be 

retained in the hands of the British military authorities for whom the railway is an essential 

channel of communication for operational purposes. 
NEW JOB, NEW TOOLS: THE SOS PLAN 191 

the flow of supplies to Russia will dry up as the requirements of the 

British forces in the theater increase." He added that the importance 

of developing the ISR could not be overemphasized and that "the 

condition in the Prime Minister's cable of the British retaining control 

of traffic to be moved is reasonable, offers no practical difficulty, and 

should be accepted." The message went on to recommend that the task 

be undertaken, and that a top-caliber railroad man of a western railroad be drafted and commissioned in the Army with the rank of 

brigadier general. He should be "vigorous and young, not much over 

fifty, with experience on mountain and desert operations, [and] ability 

to handle relations with different nationalities." With a party of twenty 

to twenty-five key men he should proceed at once by air to Iran to 

arrange with the British on the spot for the gradual taking over of the 

ISR south of Tehran. Noting that the turnaround of ships in the ports 

"is deplorably slow," Harriman recommended early dispatch of port 

battalions, including the transfer to Khorramshahr of one "now in 

Karachi which has not been allowed to function due to labor union 

restrictions." Karachi, an auxiliary port in Shingler's estimates, was 

thus eliminated by Harriman. Although Churchill's message had not 

touched on motor transport, Maxwell's proposal had included a trucking service while urging top priority for port and rail plans. Harriman 

noted, "The British are also asking for help with trucks and personnel 

to increase the road transports," and added, "This is an important 

proposal but of second priority to the railroad and ports." 

On 25 August, the President directed General Marshall to prepare 

a plan for operation of certain Iranian communications by U.S. Army 

forces. This signal set in motion three more stages in the process of 

increasing aid to the USSR. First, a plan had to be evolved; next, it 

had to be considered and approved; and finally, it had to be mounted. 

It was now 'Washington's turn, for the first time in the war, to train its 

biggest planning guns upon a major Middle East project. 

The Chief of Staff passed the President's directive to Operations 

Division which referred the whole business of planning to General 

Somervell's Services of Supply. The preparation of a detailed plan was 

assigned to the Strategic Logistics Division, SOS, Col. Dabney O. 

Elliott, Director, with over-all responsibility centered in General Lutes, 

Somervell's Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations.22 On 29 August 

Somervell wrote Lutes that the plan was to be so complete that the 

signature of the President would set it into motion, down to the last 

detail. "This is the first opportunity," Somervell said, "that the SOS 

" Detailed plans were presented him by the Corps of Engineers on 29 August, and by the 

Signal and Medical Corps on 30 August. 
192 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

has had to tum in a report of this kind, and I wish it to be the best we 

can do." By 3 September the plan was completed by the Strategic 

Logistics Division, SOS. On the next day it was passed to General 

Somervell and by him to Operations Division and the Chief of Staff, 

equipped with a draft letter for the Chief of Staff to send to the President, submitting the plan to him, and a draft cable for the President to 

send the Prime Minister, stating, "I have approved a plan to put 

[Churchill's] proposal into effect." 

But the plan was to take a different course. It was not, after all, 

a purely American plan, and so the President's approval would not 

have set it in motion. It was a plan for fitting increased American responsibilities within the already existing framework of British responsibilities and authority. From the office of the Chief of Staff the completed 

plan went, therefore, on 9 September to the U.S. Joint Staff Planners. 

Having received their approval it went on to the Anglo-American Combined Staff Planners on 11 September, who debated it, amended it, 

and recommended its approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This 

was granted on 22 September by CCS 109/1 and the plan was returned 

to the U.S. War Department for action. On 25 September Maj. Gen. 

Thomas T. Handy, Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, transmitted CCS 

109/1 to the Commanding General, SOS, for his information and 

action. It was just one month from the date of the President's directive, 

just two months from the day the Combined Chiefs' naming of TORCH 

made inevitable increased aid to Russia through the Persian Corridor. 

The SOS Plan 

The Plan for Operation of Certain Iranian Communication Facilities between Persian Gulf Ports and Tehran by U.S. Anny Forces, 

running to nineteen typewritten pages with ten inclosures, consisted of 

basic correspondence, estimates, appreciations of terrain and facilities, 

maps, organization charts and tables, and drafts of letters of instruction, 

activation orders, and movement orders.23 Its provisions may be summarized under the general headings of logistics and administration. 

Logistic Recommendations 

Target Estimates. The plan assumed no carry-over of backlog tonnages from the period of special stress between August 1942 and June 

"The basic documents for this and the following sections are: (1) SOS Plan copy 

cited n. 15(4). (2) SOS Plan copy cited n. 15(9). (3) CCS 109/1, cited n. 2(5), and 

Tab "A", draft telg to General Officer Commanding.in-Chief, PAl FOTce. (4) Another 

copy of CCS 109/1, with American and British drafts atchd. Registered Documents Room, 

OPD. 
NEW JOB, NEW TOOLS: THE 50S PLAN 193 

1943. On that basis it adopted the Maxwell-Shingler figure of 6,000 

long tons per day (or 180,000 long tons monthly) for ultimate rail 

carriage of all cargoes north of Andimeshk. Its target for the ports of 

Khorramshahr, Bandar Shahpur, Bushire, and Tanuma increased the 

Maxwell-Shingler figure to 8,700 tons daily, or 261,000 monthly, for 

all cargoes. It looked forward to ultimate road capacity by truck of 

172,000 long tons monthly, a figure greatly in excess of those previously 

set. The expanded highway estimate, if attained, would leave ample 

leeway for increased port performance which would otherwise overtax 

the railway. 

Facilities, Manpower, and Equipment. The Maxwell recommendation that the four ports just named should be American operated was 

followed, as was the provision for three port battalions (including one 

to be transferred from Karachi to Khorramshahr, as suggested by Harriman). The Maxwell estimate of 3,121 men for the ports was likewise 

accepted. Concise information on port equipment was not available to 

the Washington planners, who noted that ample stocks were on hand 

at the New York Port of Embarkation and could be shipped out with 

the port battalions. 

The composition of railway units was restated by the plan, although 

it followed the Maxwell strength figure of 2,722 officers and men. The 

units were to be one engineer railway grand division, one engineer battalion (railway shop), two engineer battalions (operation), and one 

engineer transportation company (less one platoon). The plan provided for 75 locomotives and 2,200 freight cars of 20-ton capacity, 

which included the 1,200 cars in the Maxwell estimate and 1,000 cars 

already ordered under lend-lease. To accomplish delivery the plan 

contemplated diverting to Iran 1,200 cars at Karachi destined for Iraq, 

but noted that this would be subject to procurement in the United 

States of adequate brake equipment for them for the mountains of 

Iran. 

Three highway routes were listed in the plan in addition to that 

running north from Khorramshahr, a part of which was under construction by the engineer civilian constructor. The three others were: 

Khorramshahr-Ahwaz-Hamadan-Kazvin, Bushire-Shiraz-Tehran, 

and some portions of the route through Iraq via Khanaqin used by the 

UKCC and British military motor transport. The plan anticipated that 

truck deliveries would also be made at Tabriz and Pahlevi, both inside 

the Soviet zone of Iran. Like the Maxwell estimate, the SOS Plan expected to use native drivers to supplement American soldier drivers in 

the motor transport service; but the native role was somewhat di-
194 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

minished, while the military strength was increased to 5,291 officers 

and men for the trucks. In addition, the SOS Plan provided a large 

reserve of military personnel for highway maintenance, not to be 

shipped "unless experience dictates the need for them." This reserve 

comprised two engineer regiments, one engineer maintenance company, and three engineer dump truck companies. In addition an engineer headquarters (corps) was set up in the plan to supervise road 

maintenance and to go overseas "in the primary shipments." 

The problem of estimating and providing trucks in suitable 

quantities and sizes illustrates the complexity of logistic planning. To 

begin with, the width and surfacing of highways to be used were determined by the potential traffic they would be called upon to bear. 

The traffic tonnage was conditioned by many factors, of which the 

chief one was the determination at highest levels of Soviet needs and 

the next in importance was the capacity of the ports to receive and 

discharge tonnage. Once upon the highway, tonnage was susceptible to 

a variety of treatments, these in turn conditioned by such diverse factors 

as terrain, climate, and the human element en route. During the days 

of intensive planning it was determined that the use of small trucks 

(under 3-ton capacity) was wholly out of the question because not only 

were there not enough drivers to man the larger number of trucks thus 

required to move a given tonnage but the larger number of trucks would 

call for an excessive number of maintenance crews and service stations. 

Moreover, more trucks per ton of haulage meant larger and less manageable convoys. And if these factors were not themselves controlling 

in the decision against small trucks, the hot and waterless terrain would, 

as always, have had the last word. It was the experience of the British 

in Iran that because of the dust trucks could not proceed safely closer 

than three hundred yards apart, double that if there were two lines of 

traffic. This was a problem in visibility, not in the comfort of the drivers. 

With such spacing in dusty areas the advantage lay with fewer and 

bigger trucks. In actual operation, photographs show that American 

convoys, depending on highway surface conditions, traveled from 

fifty feet to three hundred yards apart.24 

The Maxwell estimate called for 7,200 trucks of 7-ton average 

carrying capacity. The SOS Plan noted that some 1,100 trucks could 

be found immediately, some of them, of lO-ton capacity, to be repossessed from a lot ordered by the British under lend-lease, and others, 

of unknown size, at Karachi "belonging to the Chinese." But, unfortu-

.. British estimate of distance in Ltr, British Off in charge of highway construction by the 

contractor, Kampsax, to Gen Spaulding, 31 Jul 42, sub: Road Carrying Capacity. Conti 

Div, ASF, Sp Coll, HRS DRB AGO. 
NEW JOB, NEW TOOLS: THE 50S PLAN 195 

nately for the intention of the earlier planners, the remainder, stated 

the plan, would have to come from the stocks of 2Y2-ton trucks with 

trailers presently available or in production in the United States. 

The plan included in its strength estimates a total of 822 officers 

and men for command headquarters, and 7,405 officers and men for 

miscellaneous services. The Signal Corps, for example, estimated that 

1,181 officers and men would be required to establish communications 

between the command and Basra, Asmara, and Karachi; and within 

the command along the railway and highway routes. There would be 

need also to provide hospitalization for 10 percent of total troop 

strength; units and equipment for water purification, shoe and textile 

repairs, laundry, and sterilization; and limited ordnance supply and 

repair equipment, all at a 120-day supply level. 

Overseas Movement and Future Supply of the Operation. Arranging for overseas movement was dependent upon settlement of a whole 

series of priority questions. First came priorities within the project 

itself, and these were basically determined by the plan's acceptance of 

the primacy of rail and ports operations. But then everything to go 

abroad had to be fitted into a prearranged spot on a ship; and the availability of ships was interlocked with the general conduct of the war 

and with the priority given to the Persian Gulf movement with relation 

to the many other movements competing for shipping at the same time. 

Nearly 40 percent of total planned strength was to be diverted from 

BOLERO.25 The Combined Staff Planners, commenting on planned diversions of shipping, noted that forty-four cargo ship sailings diverted 

to the Persian Gulf would cost BOLERO, because of the shorter distance 

to England and quicker turnaround, a total of 110 sailings. In arranging personnel shipments, rail operating troops came first, followed by 

port and truck troops. These three groups, with accompanying housekeeping and general service and maintenance personnel, came to some 

18,000 men. The planning indicated the following analysis: 

Troops in area 26 __________ ._______________________ 338 

Port Battalion from Karachi_______________________ 889 

Available in area _____________________________ 1,227 

,. 8,969 out of 23,876. so Consisting of Hq 1616 (PGSC), 128 officers, 8 enlisted men __________________ 136 

Part of 833d Signal Service Company__________________________ 36 

Company A, 84th QM Bn (LM} ___ .. _________________________ 166 

Total_________________________________________________ 338 

There was also a 50-bed station hospital staffed by 54 civilians who would have to be 

replaced. Inel VII, Troop Movements to Persian Gulf Serv Comd, SOS Plan copy cited 

n. 15(4). 
196 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

Maxwell estimates_____________________________________ 8,365 

SOS Plan-___________________________________________ 9, 769 

Total from U.S. _____________________________________ 18, 134 

Plus total available in area___________________________ 1,227 

Tot~ __________ --____________________________ 19,361 

Deferred (highway maintenance and service troops) __ 4,515 

Aggregate strength _________________________ 23,876 

A basic plan for movement overseas was presented on 30 August 

by the Transportation Corps. It calculated shipping for a total of 

471,000 ship tons of cargo including provision for 16,159 vehicles. It 

was estimated that with shipping withdrawn from BOLERO and the 

Murmansk route, 50 percent of personnel could sail the first month of 

the movement, and that, beginning 1 October, cargo could be shipped 

at the rate of ten ships a month through January 1943. The Transportation Corps calculations counted on getting the initial echelon with its 

proportionate share of equipment out to Iran and at 'work there by the 

end of December 1942, completing the whole movement by late February or early March.27 

The 808 Plan provided for carriage of 475,000 ship tons, but otherwise closely followed the estimate of the Transportation Corps. After 

some fifty-one vessels had carried the movement to Iran, it was estimated that two vessels a month of 8,000-ton cargo capacity each would 

be required to keep the force supplied. Although every effort would be 

made to get as many parts of the new task under way at once through 

simultaneous shipment of men and materials, the basic priority of shipments would be in the following order: 

( 1) The forward echelon of headquarters. 

(2) Railway and port operating personnel. 

(3) Equipment and supplies for operation of railway and ports. 

(4) Personnel and equipment for motor transport operations. 

(5) Miscellaneous service and other units to make the command 

self -sustaining. 

Administrative Recommendations 

In administrative matters the 80S planners confined themselves to 

general recommendations, inasmuch as the organization of the American command and its operation within the framework of British powers 

"Memo, Maj Gen C. P. Gross, CoITrans, for Somervell, 30 Aug 42, sub: Trans Serv 

for Persian Gulf. SPTSA/370.S-A. 
NEW JOB, NEW TOOLS: THE SOS PLAN 197 

and responsibilities were matters respectively for determination by the 

American commanding general in the field and for mutual agreement 

between British and American field commanders, subject to the direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It was recommended, therefore, 

that the Persian Gulf Service Command should be reorganized to continue existing American activities in construction and assembly and to 

carry out the new commitments. The organizational structure suggested was a simple one: a PGSC headquarters and three subheadquarters for ports, railway, and motor transport services to which the 

operating units of those services would report. Hospital, depot, and miscellaneous service units were also provided for. The Commanding 

General, PGSC, was to have wide discretion to deal directly on transport matters and allocations of traffic with representatives of Great 

Britain, the USSR, Iran, and Iraq "in conformity with policies established by the Commanding General, USAFIME," and was to be empowered to communicate directly with the War Department "except 

for military operational activities." 28 The SOS Plan thus envisaged a 

semiautonomous American organization nominally under the jurisdiction of USAFIME at Cairo but able to act promptly on vital local 

questions. "The importance of the Iranian supply routes," stated the 

plan, "renders it essential that the British and United States commanders have authority to take the necessary steps on the ground to remove 

any administrative or other hindrances to the smooth operation of this 

channel of supply at maximum capacity." 

As had been recommended by Churchill, Harriman, Maxwell, and 

Spalding, the Americans were to operate transport services while the 

British were to continue to control traffic. The plan did not elaborate 

details for the working out of arrangements. In one field of activity in 

which Anglo-American co-operation would be required it did, however, venture a comment. It was noted that unrest in Iran might at any 

time give rise to acts of sabotage, especially against the railway, whose 

many tunnels and bridges made it peculiarly vulnerable. Enemy successes in North Africa and the Caucasus would increase the danger 

from this source, and to counter the danger British forces in Iran, according to information as of 15 May available to the planners, numbered only 15,000. The SOS Plan assigned only one military police 

battalion and one military police company to the American forces, and 

their functions would be confined to routine interior guard and police 

duties at ports and other American-controlled installations. In view of 

these scant means of enforcing security, the plan observed that Ameri-

.. From Incl V-a, 50S Plan copy cited n. 15 (4). 
198 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

can railway units would have to be trained to defend themselves against 

marauders. "It is assumed," said the plan, "that since Iran is within 

the British area of responsibility, the necessary security of these supply 

routes and critical installations will be provided by the British." 

The Plan Approved 

The directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff was the law and the 

prophets for the Anglo-American effort in the Persian Corridor. In 

the logistic field it accepted the recommendations of the SOS Plan in 

all but a few minor details. The Combined Chiefs added the barge port 

of Ahwaz on the Karun River to the list of installations to be operated 

by the American Army; and they adopted the recommendations of a 

combined military transportation committee for the overseas movement of the American forces which modified SOS Plan recommendations for shipping. The Combined Chiefs noted that no difficulty would 

be anticipated in effecting the first and second priority personnel shipments through early November; and that after that it would be necessary before arranging for further troopships to await word from the 

field as to how much native labor could be used on American projects, 

and whether economies in troop shipments could be achieved in this 

manner. In order not to overtax the still limited facilities at Persian 

Gulf ports, the Combined Chiefs reduced the monthly cargo ship sailing estimates for the movement from ten to five, and noted that as late 

as~December the ports could handle not more than 34,000 long tons 

monthly for the overseas movement without reducing cargo handling 

for the 'uSSR, British military needs, and requirements of the Iranian 

civilian economy. As it developed, even this figure proved optimistic. 

The main business of the Combined Chiefs was to establish policy 

for co-ordinated Anglo-American operations, and more than half their 

paper was devoted to the definition of the respective responsibilities of 

the British and American armies. Three assumptions were stated as 

basic: "This area lies within the sphere of British strategic responsibility, which will require careful co-ordination regarding control, allocation, and priority of supplies" ; to carry out its increased responsibilities in the Persian Corridor, the United States would have to divert personnel, equipment, and ships from planned use in other theaters; and 

the new plan would increase the strategic dispersion of United States 

military resources by throwing new forces into an area "definitely 

threatened by the German drive into the Caucasus." The second and 

third of these basic assumptions underlay the forceful statement which 
NEW JOB, NEW TOOLS: THE SOS PLAN 199 

was set as the first condition attaching to acceptance of the plan. The 

first assumption governed the remaining conditions. 

The relevant passages from CCS 109/1 follow: 

9 (a) (1) That the primary objective of the U.S. forces in this area will be to 

insure the uninterrupted and increased flow of all supplies into Soviet Russia. 

Over and above the minimum requirements for British forces consistent with their 

combat mission, and essential civilian needs, Russian supplies must have highest 

priority. 

(2) That the necessary military protection be furnished by the British to insure 

adequate security of the railroads, roads, and harbor facilities against the threat 

of sabotage and Axis air, ground, and sea operations. The Commanding General, 

Persian Gulf Service Command, must be familiarized with the British plan in 

order that he may integrate his available local defensive means with those of the 

British. 

(3) That the control of these railroads, road routes, and ports be exercised by 

the British General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Persia/Iraq Command 

as follows: 

a. The Commanding General, U.S. Persian Gulf Service Command, will 

develop, operate, and maintain the port facilities at Bandar Shahpur, Khorramshahr, Tanuma, Ahwaz, and Bushire. He will assist in maintaining roads leading 

from these ports to the general vicinity of Tehran and will operate and control 

U.S. motor transport moving on such roads. He will develop, operate, and maintain the railroads leading from those ports to Tehran. 

b. Priority of traffic and allocation of freight will be controlled by the British 

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Persia/Iraq Command. Inasmuch 

as the primary objective of the U.S. participation in the operation of lines of 

communications from the Persian Gulf area to Tehran is to increase and insure the 

uninterrupted flow of supplies to Russia, it is definitely understood that the British 

control of priorities and allocations must not be permitted to militate against the 

attainment of such objective, subject always to the military requirements for preparing to meet a threat to the vital Persian Gulf oil areas. Should the British 

Commander in Chief make any decision which in the opinion of the Commanding 

General, U.S. Persian Gulf Service Command, would unnecessarily prejudice 

the flow of supplies to Russia, the latter will immediately report the circumstances 

through the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in 

Washington. 

c. U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf Service Command will be, for all administrative purposes, under the direction of the CG/USAFIME. 

d. During any period of active or imminent British military operations in the 

area, the Commanding General, U.S. Persian Gulf Service Command, will conform to such decision, but if he does not agree will immediately report such disagreement, through the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff, to the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff in Washington, who will give a decision on the matter. 

e. An uninterrupted and increasing flow of vital supplies over these routes to 

accomplish the primary objective (supplies to Russia) is contingent upon complete 

cooperation bctween U.S. and British Commanders in the area. In the event that 

problems arise which cannot be mutually solved, each Commander will communicate (the British Commander, if desired, through the War Office) with his respec-
200 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

tive Chiefs of Staff, who will in tum present the matter for the decision of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington. 

Unfinished Business 

It was inevitable that both the SOS Plan and the directive of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff would be modified when put to the test of 

actual experience in the field. The one was a forecast which on the 

whole proved remarkably accurate; the other was a working compromise whose ambiguities in certain important matters had to be clarified 

as the experiment in co-operation developed. Both papers left to the 

future a legacy of unfinished business not apparent in the summaries 

of their contents; and both embodied rejection or acceptance of varying points of view. Differences of opinion and ambiguities in policy 

were among the many obstacles besetting the Persian Corridor delivery 

program. It would require an Olympian omniscience to say that the job 

would have gone faster if this or that had been learned earlier; or to 

go even farther and say that all the main pitfalls were clearly foreseeable by September 1942 and therefore wholly avoidable. Such a sweeping statement would be false. Some of the unfinished business, broadly 

considered, was avoidable. Nearly all of it, if considered from such a 

single and limited point of view as the primacy of the logistic commitment to the USSR, was avoidable also. The entire operation under the 

SOS Plan, which had its origin in a tangle of global events and policies, 

was never free of their implications and influences, and cannot, therefore, be fairly judged by any limited criteria. This must be borne in 

mind in considering differences in point of view as expressed in the SOS 

planning period.29 

A striking instance of delay in reconciling differences of opinion on 

a matter of major policy was transport operation by the Americans. 

\\Then it was first suggested, the United States was not a belligerent, 

and for many months after Pearl Harbor the debate for and against 

American operation proceeded not as between the Americans on one 

.. A minority opinion about the 50S Plan as a whole was voiced by General Greely 

when asked his views by the Strategic Logistics Division, SOS. He felt, as did others in the 

War Department earlier in 1942, that U.S. service troops should not be used to support 

the operations of non-American forces. Therefore, he recommended that the midsummer 

crisis of 1942 should be met by the dispatch of U.S. combat troops to Egypt before any 

service troops should go to Iran. Such troops, if sent to Iran, should be limited to the task 

of moving supplies to the USSR, and only in such types and quantities as required for the 

Caucasus campaign. Greely recommended that Shingler be asked to estimate needs for such 

limited aid to Russia and that "he should be protected in his recommendations." Greely 

also thought that Iranian and Iraqi troops should be used to defend the oil fields. Memo, 

Dir, Strategic Logistics Div, SOS, for Gen Lutes, transmitting information from intervs with 

Gens Aurand and Greely and Col Hauser, 30 Aug 42. ContI Div, ASF, Sp ColI, HRS 

DRB AGO. 
NEW JOB, NEW TOOLS: THE SOS PLAN 201 

side and the British on the other, but as between disputants in each 

camp, whose arguments canceled each other out. It is an extreme simplification to say that American operation of the ISR came a year after 

it should have because a perverse and obstinate group of British Army 

men in the field delighted in keeping the railway to themselves and 

refused to extend themselves too strenuously in aid to Russia; and yet 

there were Americans who believed just that. A psychiatrist might trace 

the roots of their belief to the auxiliary status of the American forces in 

the area of British responsibility~ and to their consequent feeling that, 

somehow, they were being put upon and were at a disadvantage which 

in some fashion represented a British success in extended Anglo-American maneuvers. But the auxiliary status went, as it were, with the job. 

'Vhen the British first asked American help in 1941, it was the only 

way help could be furnished. No evidence has been found that President Roosevelt demanded any quid pro quo whatever when the Iranian 

Mission was organized, or that at any time thereafter it ever occurred 

to him to do so. Although resultant conditions for members of the 

United States Army may have been, and indeed in many an instance 

were, personally galling, nothing illustrates more convincingly the disinterestedness of the American task as a whole than the continued 

auxiliary position of the United States forces in the Corridor. The position, while admirable, was not an easy one for the U.S. Army. 

There was, for example, the basic assumption of the SOS Plan as 

restated and approved by the Combined Chiefs: American operation, 

British control of movements and allocations. Churchill had written 

Roosevelt, "I see no obstacle in this to harmonious working" ; Harriman 

had called it reasonable, and had told the President it offered "no practical difficulty." The Maxwell proposal had accepted it as a matter of 

course; but then the Maxwell cable of 22 August had posited a dual 

mission for the American command: to provide British forces with 

their requirements and to supply the USSR. It is significant, however, 

that CCS 109/1 stated that the sole justification for U.S. Army activity 

under the SOS Plan was aid to Russia. There is no mention of aid to 

the British line of communications, Basra to Baghdad. Between the 

dates of the Maxwell recommendation and the directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff the Combined Staff Planners had threshed out the 

problem of allocations. For American operation under over.:all British 

control of movements was not just a question of division of authority. 

Control of traffic carried with it the implementation of policy, and 

would reflect basic decisions as to the priorities to be given to British 

and Soviet needs. It was an old and a sore point and had plagued the 

Americans since their first arrival in the field. 
202 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

British control of movements and allocations wore three aspects. 

First, this control was essential to the exercise of British responsibility 

for the military security of the area. On this ground alone the American 

planners had no thought of challenging it. Second, British control, if 

not subject to fixed policy with regard to the primacy of Russian aid, 

might conceivably result in diminution of that program. This aspect 

worried the Americans among the Combined Staff Planners, and they 

succeeded after considerable exchange of ideas in achieving in CCS 

109/1 the statement given above as paragraph 9 (a) (1), including the 

word minimum, which was not present in all preliminary drafts.so 

This statement, taken with that in paragraph 9 (a) (3) b, marked a 

meeting of minds and the establishment of unmistakably clear policy 

regarding priorities in Corridor movements. But American operation 

of transport within the over-all control of movements by the British 

offered still a third difficulty on the purely administrative level. Time 

and again the U.S. Anny had, whether deliberately or inadvertently, 

experimented with this sort of divided responsibility in its relations 

with its own civilian contractors. There was evidence that, at least on 

that level, divided operational and managerial responsibility could not 

be efficiently administered. Because this third aspect of the control 

problem was tied in with the other two, the opinions of those who 

believed divided responsibilities to have been the bane of Persian Corridor activities in 1942 and equally undesirable as a feature of the SOS 

Plan were overridden in favor of the optimistic hopes of Churchill and 

Harriman.s1 This was the biggest piece of unfinished business left by 

the SOS Plan and the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive; but by 1 

May 1943, as the story of subsequent operations will show, effective 

control of movements passed to the Americans. There is no doubt that 

Stalingrad and El Alamein had a lot to do with British willingness to 

delegate the controls they exercised under the Tri-Partite Treaty to the 

Americans, for the diminishing threat of Axis invasion enabled them 

to relax a full state of readiness to repel invaders. But the change, which 

was the only fundamental alteration in the SOS Plan under pressure 

of field conditions, was equally attributable to the inefficiency of di-

.. This word is omitted from the draft telegram recommended by the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff to be sent as basic instructions to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, PAl 

Force (cited n. 23(3)). Paragraph 2 (a) of that draft includes the sentence, "Therefore, 

after meeting the requirements for British forces and essential civilian needs, Russian supplies 

must have highest priority." This is considerably less rigid than CCS 109(l itself and is 

illustrative of the devices by which the Combined Chiefs attained harmony and agreement. 

81 General Greely's former chief of staff of the USSR Mission, Colonel Hauser, when 

consulted by the Strategic Logistics Division, SOS, voiced "the definite opinion that a U.S. 

organization subject to British control of traffic will not be successfuL" Memo cited n. 29. 
NEW JOB, NEW TOOLS: THE SOS PLAN 203 

vided responsibility and to the mutual confidence in which the AngloAmerican partners held one another. 

In September 1942 the turning back of Axis pressures against the 

Middle East was not even a plausible hope; hence the Combined Chiefs' 

proviso that, although British control of priorities and allocations must 

not militate against the flow of supplies to Russia, such control would 

be "subject always to the military requirements for preparing to meet 

a threat to the vital Persian Gulf oil areas." This proviso indicates how 

closely interwoven were the issues of movement control and security, 

for both of which the Combined Staff Planners assigned responsibility 

to the British. But whereas movement control ultimately became 

effectively American, security was in practice enforced by both annies. 

There were two categories of security to be covered by the planning: 

the over-all military security of the area, a problem which diminished 

as Axis threats disappeared in 1943; and the local security of ports, 

docks, storage areas and warehouses, property in transit, vehicles, men 

and equipment, telegraph systems, oil and gasoline refueling stations, 

rail and highway bridges, tunnels, and rights of way-a complex 

agglomeration of liabilities, from the security point of view, which had 

to be taken care of bv both the British and the Americans. In this second 

category of security' responsibilities it was never a practical possibility 

to draw a distinct dividing line between British and American jurisdiction. Both the SOS Plan and CCS 109/1, therefore, confined themselves 

to a statement of basic and comprehensive British responsibility for all 

kinds of security. The draft telegram prepared by the Combined Chiefs 

for the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, PAl Force, was broadly 

expressed. "You will be responsible," it said (paragraph 2 (d)), for 

providing the necessary military protection "to insure adequate security 

of the railroads, roads and harbor facilities against sabotage and Axis 

air, ground and sea operations." The instruction continued: "You will 

also insure that such defense means as are available to the Commanding 

General, U.S. Persian Gulf Service Command, are co-ordinated with 

yours, without interfering in any way with any arrangements made by 

him for the local protection of his forces." The wording should be compared to the language of CCS 109/1 (paragraph 9 (2) ). 

Both versions provide for the protection of day-to-day logistic 

operations, as well as for the contingent duty of repelling invasion. The 

two texts perhaps reveal a secret of the success of the Combined Chiefs 

in directing a great wartime coalition: they were not unnecessarily 

dogmatic, nor were they tiresomely consistent in details. Theirs was 

the task of making a shoe that would fit in all weathers and outlast, if 
204 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

necessary, a succession of wearers. The problem here was one of command relationships. In the discussions of the Combined Staff Planners 

the American members respected the paramountcy of British responsibility for security under treaty obligations. Moreover, the SOS Plan 

provided, as has been noted, only the most meager American military 

police forces for the most routine of interior guard duties, and the 

planned American force was for service, not combat. The American 

planners, however, did feel it desirable that the British commander in 

the field should acquaint his American opposite with his security plans, 

and this stipulation was incorporated in CCS 109/1 (paragraph 9 (2) ). 

On the other hand, the draft instructions for the British commander 

(paragraph 2 (d)) laid upon him no obligation to communicate his 

plans for security to the American commander. The draft instructions 

were wholly silent on this question, with the result that the British commander was free to proceed either in accordance with the directive 

paper or with his specific instructions, both of which emanated from the 

same supreme source of authority. This was a piece of unsettled business which, unlike other ambiguities, caused no future trouble since 

there was no invasion and therefore no necessity to put any American 

soldiers in the area under British command.52 Nor was there any time 

during the rest of the war when either the British or the American 

commander used the machinery of the directive to appeal disputes to 

the supreme authority of the Combined Chiefs. Once again cooperation worked. 

Although the SOS Plan and CCS 109/1 left a few important questions to the future, the biggest of these problems, control of movements, 

was promptly solved by straightforward adjustment in the field. The 

closely related questions of security responsibility and command relationships, while never precisely defined, were answered from day to day 

by a working compromise between a unification of forces, which the 

.. (1) While the Combined Staff Planners were meeting, Colonel Shingler was holding 

infonnal conversations with his British opposite numbers in the field about many problems 

that would arise when large numbers of American troops would come. It was unofficially 

agreed that "some form of Anglo-U.S. unified command" was called for to deal with the 

co-ordination of Iranian native manpower to prevent uneconomic and inefficient competition 

for services, inequalities in pay rates, and similar disparities between un-co-ordinated British 

and American agencies. It was also unofficially agreed that, after the disposition of the new 

American service troops, "Administrative command should be British where such machinery 

exists at present, and American in any future station where American units only will be 

functioning." British Summary of "Talk with Col. Shingler, U. S. P. G. S. C. on 13 September 

42." PGF 131. (2) Shingler held similar talks in April 1942 to prepare for the then expected 

arrival of troops in August under the militarization program; and Maxwell in October 

reached informal agreements in Cairo as to relationships between American and British 

forces. Neither of these tentative explorations was connected with the implementation of 

the SOS Plan. 
NEW JOB, NEW TOOLS: THE SOS PLAN 205 

Americans did not desire, and a separation of forces, which no one 

desired.sa 

Some further recommendations of the SOS Plan and CCS 109/1, 

which chiefly concerned internal affairs of the American command and 

which were altered after a period of trial and error, require comment. 

Two of these were in the logistic field, two of them in the administrative. The SOS Plan, perhaps influenced by the interim proposals put 

forward in July and August to deal with the immediate problem of 

backlogs, recommended several highway routes for the use of American motor transport. As soon as construction permitted, American 

trucking was assigned to the road between Khorramshahr and Kazvin. 

To Churchill's suggestion that the Americans operate the ports of 

Khorramshahr and Bandar Shahpur, the plan added Bushire and 

Tanuma, suggested by Maxwell. The directive added Ahwaz. By decisions reached in the field only Khorramshahr and Bandar Shahpur 

were taken over by the American command, although the lighterage 

basin near Tanuma, which was later designated Cheybassi, was taken 

over in addition and operated between July 1943 and October 1944. 

Bushire was eliminated as a port for American expansion and operation early in 1943, and Ahwaz, as a busy center of British Inland Water 

Transport activity, handled too little Soviet cargo to justify its inclusion in the American program. H 

Although the SOS Plan recommended wide powers for the American commanding general to deal locally with representatives of the 

other nations concerned with supply and although it permitted him to 

communicate directly with the War Department, it left him subject 

to the commanding general of USAFIME. This decision represented a 

rejection of opinion within the War Department which advocated separation of the American command in Iran from USAFIME.s5 But the 

separation did not take place until 10 December 1943, following the 

declaration of Tehran respecting the sovereignty of Iran. 

A similar ambiguity in administrative controls concerned the intentions of the SOS planners as to the administrative relationship between 

•• Security as an administrative problem is discussed in Chapter XI and as an operating 

problem in Chapters XVI, XVII and XVIII below . .. Maj. George L. Morton inspected Bushire in November 1942 and reported to Col. 

Donald P. Booth that improvements in discharge and clearance there without an increase 

in ship arrivals would be pointless. A subcommittee of the War Transport Executive Committee considered Bushire in January 1943 and concluded that the port's shallow offshore 

roadstead, the execrable highway inland, the distance of the port from Tehran, and the lack 

of truck able cargoes for inland carriage by vehicles assembled at the UKCC plant made 

improvement of Bushire less desirable than expenditure of equal effort at more promising 

locations. Pages 4-5 of history tited n. 11. .. See Memo cited n. 29. 
206 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR Al'l"D AID TO RUSSIA 

the American command and the representative of the War Shipping 

Administration. A draft Letter of Instructions for the Commanding 

General, USAFIME, stated that in port matters under the jurisdiction 

of the 'War Shipping Administration, the Commanding General, 

PGSC, "will be assisted by their local representative, who will operate 

under his supervision." 36 This established one of those situations where 

"control" and "supervision" overlap, sometimes with unfortunate consequences. Although the draft just quoted never became a binding 

statement of policy, it suggests that the planners were willing to take a 

chance on the consequences of leaving certain areas of port management divided between the American command in the field and the 

civilian War Shipping Administration.87 

Implementing the Plan 

While the SOS Plan was still in the mill the War Department on 

14 September ordered Brig. Gen. Donald H. Connolly from Headquarters, Army Air Forces, to Headquarters, Services of Supply, to prepare 

to take over command of the new American force for the Persian Corridor. Connolly was an engineer graduate of West Point (1910) and 

had served several assignments as district engineer on rivers and harbors projects. On detached service in 1934 he had, as Administrator 

of the Los Angeles Civil "Vorks Administration, come to know Harry 

Hopkins. In 1935-39 he served as Administrator of the Works Progress 

Administration at Los Angeles. In 1940 he was Corps Engineer of the 

Ninth Army Corps; from 1940 to 1942, Administrator of Civil Aeronautics, Department of Commerce, directing construction of many 

airports; he served also as a member of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics; and in 1942 he went to Headquarters, Army 

Air Forces, \Vashington. The SOS planners had made numerous recommendations for key personnel for the new Amercian command, but 

only one was put into force. Their recommendation that Shingler be 

made chief of staff was effective briefly until Connolly's personal choice, 

Col. Stanley L. Scott, arrived at Basra to relieve Shingler. Scott, like 

Connolly, was an engineer graduate of West Point (1916) and was 

brought by Connolly to Washington from a position as Division Engineer of the Southwest Division. As Chief of Staff of Headquarters 1616, 

the name the newborn organization for Iran took from its office space 

in the Munitions Building in Washington, it was to be his job to direct 

"Inel V-b, SOS Plan copy cited n. 15(4). . . 31 The relations between WSA and the Amcncan command are touched upon m Chapter 

XVIII below. 
NEW JOB, NEW TOOLS: THE SOS PLAN 207 

the mounting of the SOS Plan. A wide range of assignments had pre~ 

ceded this one, including a term as district engineer at Honolulu when 

he was head of the Public Works Administration for the Territory of 

Hawaii (1931-34), service in the Office of the Chief of Engineers, instruction at West Point and Fort Belvoir, and district and division 

engineer posts from 1938 to 1942 in which he was in charge of con~ 

struction programs for rivers and harbors, dams, locks, and airfields 

exceeding a billion dollars in value. His new task involved the selection 

of some forty key personnel who were flown to the field during October, 

November, and December ahead of the first shipment of troops. Colonel 

Scott also assigned final priorities of men and materials for shipment. 

Working within the broad outlines of the SOS Plan which had recommended the form of three operating services, he was to devise a pattern 

of organization for the reorganized PGSC.3S 

On 1 October Connolly was issued a Letter of Instructions as the 

commanding general of the PGSC. Leaving Scott in Washington to see 

to the mounting of the new undertaking, Connolly reached Basra on 

20 October. Colonel Shingler, who had continued field command of 

PGSC, now became Connolly's acting chief of staff and served until 

Scott, who was chief of staff of the headquarters at Washington, arrived 

at Basra on 20 November and relieved him. On 25 October Connolly 

was promoted to major general. S9 

Planning for the overseas shipment of Movement 1616 and its successors occupied General Connolly during the brief period of his stay 

in Washington, and Colonel Scott until his departure in November. 

On 2 October the President sent a memorandum to the Secretary of 

War and other cabinet and administration officials in which he informed them of the circumstances which had made it imperative to 

increase aid to the USSR via the Persian Gulf in order to meet the 

quotas set under the Second (Washington) Protocol for the period 1 

July 1942 to 1 July 1943. He urged "that the project for the operation 

and enlargement of the transportation facilities of the Persian Corridor 

IS (1) Intervs with Scott, Pentagon, 7,8 Jan 48, and Connolly, Pentagon, 18 Aug 50; 

biographical information in PGF and AGO; and WD SO 249, 14 Sep 42. (2) GO 6, 

Hq, PGSC, USAFIME, 20 Nov 42, in accordance with Ltr Orders TAG, 15 Oct 42. 

(3) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 83,85, 100 . 

.. (1) Scott became a brigadier general 28 October 1942. (2) By GO 13, Hq, PGSC, 

21 December 1942, Shingler became District Commander, Basra District, serving until 3 

March 1943. He served as Director, Motor Transport Service, from 13 March to 22 

September 1943, and was promoted to brigadier general on 18 March 1943. He departed 

for the United States on 4 September 1943. An inquiry from Wheeler to Connolly in January 

1943 as to whether Connolly would release Shingler for service with Wheeler in CBI drew 

the reply that Shingler's work was "very important" to the command and that Shingler was willing to remain with PGSC. Rad TIGAR TTA 63, Wheeler to Connolly, 3 Jan 43, 

and abstract of reply. PGF 262. 
208 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

be given sufficient priority and support in the form of men, equipment 

and ships to insure its early and effective accomplishment." 40 

On 5 and 6 October Colonel Scott presented General Somervell 

with two memoranda based upon the estimates of the SOS Plan and 

subsequent estimates which had been sent in by Maxwell and Shingler. 

These papers listed troops, supplies, and equipment needed, divided 

into five priorities. The first embraced troops and supplies for 10,000 

men's subsistence, including a 150-day supply for water purification 

equipment, refrigerants, and cleaning and laundry supplies. The second category was port unloading equipment. The third was locomotives, with diesels ahead of steam engines. The fourth included small 

trucks, pumps, machinery, and construction equipment. The fifth was 

larger trucks. Other papers reveal the multiplicity of items necessary for 

the expedition: quartermaster materials for truck repair and maintenance; ordnance, engineer, and signals materials; and for the railway 

such details as grinding wheels, steam gauges, and tubular water glasses 

for boilers. The variety "vas endless.41 

The groupings listed indicated relative importance of the several 

items in point of their arrival in the field. Their shipment was fitted into 

over-all shipping priorities. In arranging these Colonel Scott and General Connolly altered the order previously accepted. General1vfax\vell 

had recommended equally high priorities for the railway and the ports. 

and Harriman had likewise subordinated personnel and equipment 

for trucking to the other services. The SOS Plan had adhered to these 

recommendations but had stipulated that, if simultaneous shipment for 

ports and railway could not always be accomplished, personnel and 

equipment for the railway should take precedence. Priorities for Move:-

ment 1616 placed the ports first, followed in order by the railway and 

the motor transport requirements, though it did not follow that everything for the ports had to be shipped before anything for the railway. 

Items were fed into the pipeline, however, in that general order, and 

as much went forward together as shipping space permitted. After he 

had been in Iran for about six weeks, Connolly told Somervell that this 

was "my biggest mistake," for he had supposed that the physical task 

of unloading .ships at the ports was the bottleneck. Upon arrival, however, he learned that the rate of unloading ships, under existing condi-

'0 (I) All Washington functions completed, Rear Echelon, Headquarters 1616, ASF, was dissolved 22 March 1943. Home Office Rpt to Hq, PGSC, 23 Mar 43. 336.01 International 

Agreements, SL 9012. (2) Memo, President for Secy War et aI., 2 Oct 42.092.2 Tripartite 

Pact, SL 9012. <1 Memos, Scott for Somervell, 5, 6 Oct 42, sub: Movement of Troops, Equipment, and 

Supplies to PGSC. Abstracts PGF 262. 
NEW JOB, NEW TOOLS: THE SOS PLAN 209 

tions, was determined by the ability to move cargoes inland. "If I had 

known the above before leaving Washington, I would have arranged 

my priorities of men and equipment differently," he wrote. 42 

In view of the agreement among those who conferred in July and 

August with General Spalding that immediate provision of greatly 

increased truckage was urgent, some explanation is required of the relatively low priority which the SOS Plan assigned to men and equipment 

for a motor transport senrice. The explanation is a simple one: the 

SOS Plan aimed not at a temporary need, but at long-Fange requirements. Properly developed, the railway would obviously handle the 

lion's share of inland clearance, with motor haulage supplementing it. 

The conferees were faced with an immediate problem whose solution 

was sought locally because there was no time to wait for an SOS Plan 

to be developed and mounted. The intenral between midsummer and 

the early months of 1943, when the Americans took over their new 

assignments, saw little diminution of the critical transport crisis, so 

that in time the problem, which had been a British one, was merged in 

the new American effort. The trucks and motor transport personnel 

which were shipped out for the SOS Plan from October onward 

eventually did their part in bringing backlogs under control. 

Meanwhile, until he was relieved by Connolly Colonel Shingler 

attempted, with what incomplete information Washington supplied 

him, to fit the plans for the militarization of civilian contract activities 

into the new plans for reinforcing and expanding the American task. 

To a memorandum addressed to Spalding on 12 September Shingler 

attached "compilations showing U.S. Army Senrice units deemed 

necessary to support the Special Units assigned or planned for operation 

of facilities in the Persian Gulf Area." 43 A list of equipment for road 

work was carried by Colonel Lieber, who departed the next day for 

Washington. Shingler's memorandum reported a somewhat cool response to efforts he had been making to discuss the proposed American 

commitments in the field of transport with'British military authorities. 

It furnished a footnote to Churchill's assertion to the President that 

the changeover of certain operations from British to American hands 

would have to be carefully planned to avoid "any temporary reduction 

of effort." Shingler wrote, "Apparently word of our prospective participation had spread since several British underlings appear to be 

'resting on their oars' awaiting our appearance. Port conditions are 

.. (1) Interv with Scott cited n. 38(1). (2) Ltr, Gen Connolly to Gen Sornervell, 

1 Dec 42. OCoITrans, Hist Br-Overseas Cornd, Pentagon . •• Memo, Shingler for Spalding, 12 Sep 42. PGF 259. 
210 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

particularly disturbed .... It is obvious to all that we are of necessity 

concerning ourselves with conditions over which we have neither the 

authority nor the physical means to improve now." The root difficulty 

during the period of transition which was beginning was that until 

Connolly arrived in the field with a new mission in transport, Shingler's 

responsibilities remained the old ones in construction and assembly, 

and his efforts in transport would continue to be purely advisory. His 

message to Spalding would indicate that he was not informed how far 

the SOS Plan had progressed, and his planning was therefore along 

the old lines of the militarization program. 

The merging of that program with the new undertaking came very 

late in the day and without any formal abandonment of the militarization program. As has been told, estimated troop strength under the 

SOS Plan included the Shingler-Maxwell estimates for personnel, plus 

the strength previously earmarked for militarization, plus supplementary estimates. Until General Connolly's assumption of command 

on 20 October, it would appear that planning in the field was for an 

expanded militarization program with added responsibilities. This conception of the situation underlies a letter from Shingler to Louis Dreyfus, American Minister at Tehran, on 18 September, only a few days 

before the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the SOS Plan and issued 

their directive. The letter discussed the procurement of Iranian drivers 

up to the number of 6,000 for the fleet of 7,200 trucks "to be operated 

by this headquarters" in moving tonnage to northern Iran and beyond. 

It noted that, while "a certain percentage of drivers" would be provided by the U.S. Army, "It is quite essential that a major portion 

of the truck drivers be civilians, and secured in Iran." Dreyfus was requested to make inquiries of the Iranian Government's attitude in the 

matter and was told that in view of present British intentions to recruit 

a smaller number of native drivers "primarily for military" haulage, 

it was Shingler's hope that Americans would not be excluded "through 

treaty provisions or other considerations" from utilizing native manpower. An initial group of 2,000 would be required by November.H It 

can be inferred from this letter that Washington, in its intense preoccupation with preparation of the SOS Plan, had not fully informed 

Shingler that the plan would provide over 5,000 American soldier 

drivers for the truck fleet, and that Shingler was thus proceeding, in 

accordance with the situation as it existed during the midsummer conferences with Spalding, to make provision for a solution of the trucking 

problem that was dependent primarily upon native drivers. It was well 

.. Ltr, Shingler to Dreyfus, 18 Sep 42. PGF 259. 
NEW JOB, NEW TOOLS: THE SOS PLAN 211 

that he did, for the American trucking service ultimately found it necessary to use several thousand native drivers.~5 

Thus, while the plan itself was getting off to a very good start in 

'Vashington, its eventual implementation in the field was headed for 

many months of difficult transition. Once put into action, the plan 

gradually brought order out of confusion. How long this toilsome 

process took is apparent in the statistical tables in this book. By the 

middle of 1943 there was evidence enough that the new tools would 

do the job . 

.. (1) See Ch. XVI, p. 323, below. (2) An indication of how closely guarded from those 

in the field were Washington's plans is furnished by a personal letter written before Connolly's 

arrival by Philip C. Kidd, civilian representative of lend-lease in Iran. Kidd wrote that it was not known what relation Connolly's new command would bear to USAFIME, or whether 

Shingler would be reassigned or would continue as administrative head of the command 

while Connolly would "run the railroad." Abstract PGF 262. (3) Spalding reported on his 

return to Washington that both Maxwell and Shingler felt the need of a liaison officer in 

Washington familiar with specific area problems. Although Somervell proposed to Maxwell 

an arrangement to meet the need, nothing significant developed. Ltr, Somervell to Maxwell, 

22 Sep 42. AG 210.31 (9-22-42) (40). 
CHAPTER XI 

Blueprint for the Machine 

This is a chapter about paper-that indispensable commodity without which modern war could scarcely be sustained. Those who do the 

paper work, generally held in contempt by the men of action, carry 

a heavy burden of importance and responsibility. So all-encompassing 

is the paper side of war that it is sometimes hard to tell where the 

paper-shuffler leaves off and the man of action begins. Sometimes they 

are one and the same person, embodying inseparable functions of command. And all their papers-the orders and counterorders, the designations and redesignations-and all their charts with those ubiquitous, 

those mystical, little boxes connected, straight or zig-zag, but connected, 

somehow, by lines of authority, make up the blueprint for the machine 

that goes by the name of administration. 

Theoretically, organic structure, like Jefferson's idea of government, 

is best when at a minimum essential to efficient operation; worst when 

bud proliferates to leaf, and leaf to branch, until a jungle dimness obscures the light. This tendency to overexpansion, common to all types 

of organization, civil or military, is especially marked under field conditions of great urgency, when extravagant use of manpower may be 

justified by the results obtained. It is only one of several obstacles to a 

simple description of the paper side of the American task in the Persian 

Corridor. If two heads are observed growing-upon a stalk where one is 

normal, the botanist, torn between his admiration of nature's little 

prank and his curiosity concerning the soil that produced such luxuriance, stuffs his notebook with exceptions and monstrosities and forgets 

the species for the sport. It is thus also with the too literal chronicler 

of the paper side of war. 

Organization provides the machinery for carrying out duties by attaining objectives. In this sense, function, which is the definition of 

objectives, is inseparable from organic structure, which is the form of 

function, and from operation, which is the expression of function. Only 

a static function amidst static conditions could produce an administrative machine that would keep still long enough to be photographed. 
BLUEPRINT FOR THE MACHINE 213 

But static is hardly the word for the American operation in the Persian 

Corridor. Yet some kind of picture must be secured. It must be caught 

from the spate of organization charts and manuals which issued from 

the various headquarters. These documents are exercises in theory. 

They seek a generalized solution for specific problems. They represent 

an agreed way of doing tasks whose common elements are thought 

susceptible to a common treatment. But, although they are the revered 

icons of the paper shufflers, they are not inviolable. In instances where 

their theoretically inflexible generalizations clash with ever changing 

fact, they prove themselves surprisingly flexible. Though they decree, 

for example, that administrative subareas shall control all building 

construction within their respective borders, they permit an exception 

where a certain subarea is equipped to perform this function not only 

for itself, but for its neighbor, who is thereby relieved of that responsibility. This is flexibility for the sake of efficiency; but too many departures from the charts produce overlapping and duplication. Efficiency suffers, and more change is required to correct the situation. And 

so ad infinitum. 

The administrative evolution of the American command in the 

Persian Corridor was marked not only by this kind of change. There 

\vere also shifts to accommodate new functions, and shifts to improve 

procedures for carrying out old functions. And there were shifts, alas, 

whose motivation, if ever significant, seems somewhat less than that in 

retrospect. For it must be conceded that there are some paper shuffiers 

who shuffle purely out of habit. Charts and manuals, then, do not ,tell the 

whole story. That must be left to some future devotee of the mysteries 

of administration. 

The Structure of American Headquarters 1 

When General Connolly assumed command of the PGSC on his 

arrival at Basra, 20 October 1942, the strength at his disposal com1 Unless otherwise indicated, the first two sections derive from the following sources. These provide materials for more detailed study than is possible in this book: (1) Chart 1. 

(2) Organization Charts for PGSC and PGC: (a) As recommended in SOS Plan, sec. 

III, par. 9, and Ind V, PGF 235; (b) Tentative, approved 30 Nov 42, 323.61 Establishment of Military Districts, Binder 2, SL 9008; (c) Mar and Jul 43, in Organization Manuals 

of those dates, PGF 240; (d) 7 Nov 43, 384, Special Questionnaire from Gen Somcrvell, 

SL 9016, another copy PGF 240; (e) Oct 44, PGF 240; (f) Proposed, 12 Dec 44, 323.361 

Powers and Duties, SL 9008; (g) 1 Feb 45, filed as in (e); (h) Mar 45, PGF 240; (i) Basra 

Dist and Ports Serv, 2 Jan 43, PGF 240. (3) Organization Manuals for the Comd, for 

43 and 44, PGF 240; and for certain stf divs and operating servs, PGF 122. (4) The 

separate files of each general staff division and headquarters for each operating service, 

district service command, camp, post, and station, formerly at St. Louis, now filed at the 

Kansas City Records Center. (5) Rosters to February 1943, and records of unit activations, 

arrivals, and assignments to 20 July 1944. PGF 245 and 259. (6) Files of General and 
214 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

prised some 400 officers and men of the Services of Supply and the Air 

Forces and just under 1,000 American civilians. In eight months' time 

PGSC strength would approach its maximum of nearly 30,000 service 

troops, with only a handful of civilian technicians remaining after completion of militarization of the contractor projects. (Table 12 and 

Chart 2, Appendixes A and B) In a little more than two months' time, 

the first echelon, numbering some 5,000, would land at Khorramshahr 

to take over the new American responsibilities. By the first week in 

January 1943, PGSC headquarters-temporarily carrying on at Marine House, Ashar, where almost from the first the Iranian Mission 

and its successors had been established-would move to Tehran to 

interim offices on Shah Reza Avenue. On 18 July the nerve center of 

the American command would be permanently established at Camp 

Amirabad, the great new community it was to build for itself on the 

outskirts of Tehran, complete with fine hospital, brick barracks, shops, 

offices, warehouses, and recreational facilities, where, one day in December, the President of the United States was to surprise and delight 

the men by a visit and a warmly appreciative little speech.z 

The prospective sevenfold increase in strength between October 

1942 and the following midyear indicates that the new command, 

which continued the name given its predecessor under Colonel Shingler 

in August 1942, was to pass through no ordinary reorganization. The 

snake was not shedding its skin for a new one; it was to become, and 

that in a space of months, a brand new snake of which all that was to 

remain of its former state was its name. As the increase in size mirrors 

the increase in function, so the change in the location of headquarters, 

from the sea end of the British line of communications to the capital 

city in the Russian line of communications, reflects the change in 

function. That change was the Combined Chiefs' directive to the new 

Special Orders, located as in (4). (7) Detailed Studies in HOTI: (a) Pt. I, Chs. 1-5, 

Administration, by George B. Zeigler and (Ch. 5 only) Wallace P. Rusterholtz, with Annex, 

Analysis of the PGC Districts, by Victor H. Pentlarge, Jr.; (b) Pt. I, Ch. 6, History of 

the Office of Technical Information, Pt. I, Chs. 9, sec. 1, a,l1d 10, History of the Supply and 

Fiscal Divisions, and Pt. III, History of Construction, by Pentlarge; (c) History of Civilian 

Personnel Branch Activities, Administraton Division, by Col Richard W. Cooper; (d) Pt. I, 

Ch. 8, sees. 1, 3, 4, and 5, History of the Control, Movements, Documentation, and Plants 

Branches, Operations Division, and Pt. I, Ch. 11, History of the Foreign Claims Commission, 

Administration Division, by Laurence P. Corbett. PGF. • History: United States Military Iranian Mission, 20 Mar 43, prepared for Col Don G. 

Shingler, Chief of Mission, by 1st Lt Victor E. Dietze, Hist Off, pp. 55, 65-66. PGF 242. 

(2) Monthly Rpt of Activities of PGSC, Oct 42, to CG, PGSC, 5 Nov 42. PGF 259. 

(3) Memo, Hq, PGSC, 15 Jan 43, sub: Rpt of S-2 Activities Aboard Transport 441. 

PGF 242. (4) GO 3, Hq, PGSC, 20 Oct 42. (5) Memo, Hq, PGSC, 6 Jul 43, sub: 

Movement of GHQ Equipment and Personnel to Amirabad. PGF 259. (6) Troop shipments were planned for five shiploads to sail between October 1942 and March 1943. 

Memo, Lt Col N. M. Martin for Connolly, 21 Dec 42. PGF 225. (7) GO 43, Hq, PGSC, 

14 Jul43. 
BLUEPRINT FOR THE MACHINE 215 

command to insure an ever increasing flow of supplies to the USSR. 

At the same time, by order of the U.S. Chief of Staff, the PGSC was to 

continue the projects undertaken by the Iranian Mission. To accomplish these missions-the one primary, the other secondary-General 

Connolly's Letter of Instructions authorized him to effect such 

reorganiza tion of the PGSC as might be necessary.3 

Between 20 October 1942 and the arrival, exactly one month later, 

of General Scott, who immediately became chief of staff, relieving 

Colonel Shingler, temporarily acting chief of staff, no important 

changes were made in organizational structure. Before Connolly's arrival the Shingler organization had consisted of a general staff of three 

for performance of S-I, 2, 3, and 4 duties at headquarters, a special 

staff of eighteen to supervise operations, and three territorial area commanders with headquarters at Basra, Ahwaz, and Tehran. There was 

also the separate organization of the Iranian District engineer at Ahwaz. 

The Shingler structure had been adequate for the direction of the old 

organization's limited operations in construction and assembly; but it 

required revamping to accommodate the new operational responsibilities in transport provided in the SOS Plan. In accordance with that 

plan's priorities for projected railway and port operations, Col. Paul F. 

Yount had reached Basra on 5 October to begin preliminary arrangements for taking over the ISR from the British. Some 1,200 officers and 

men for the Military Railway Service (MRS) landed at Khorramshahr 

on 11 and 12 December, and that organization's field career began 

formally on 17 December. Col. Donald P. Booth and five officers of his 

staff reached Basra on 1 November, followed in December by 940 officers and men of the port organization that was to serve under him. 

The advance echelon of the Motor Transport Service (MTS) arrived 

in December. In preparation for the commencement of work, seven 

general staff divisions and five operating services were set up on 25 

November under the commanding general. As the preliminary planning in \Vashington had anticipated no need for territorial administrative subareas, the area commands established on 1 September by 

Colonel Shingler were left undisturbed pending further study. By 

recommendation on 26 November of Colonel Booth, Director of Ports, 

new instructions were issued to area commanders in view of the need to 

distinguish between their functions and those of the new operating 

services being set up alongside them. Area functions were defined as 

I (1) Rad AMSME 1787, Marshall to Connolly, through CG, USAFIME, 13 Nov 42. 

323.35 Hq PGSC (1 Jan-3l Jul 43), SL 9008. Abstract, 14 Nov 42, PGF 259. (2) Gen 

Connolly's Ltr of Instructions, 1 Oct 42. 322.361 General Connolly's Letter of Instructions 

with Amendments, SL 9008. 
216 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

"administrative control of all U.S. Army activities" in the respective 

areas: supply, housing, security, transportation, and procurement, but 

not storage or construction. Appointments to directive positions were 

made on 25 November for general staff divisions for administration, 

personnel, intelligence, plans and training, operation and supply, control, and movements; and to the following operating services: Railway, 

Ports, Motor Transport, Construction, and Signal Communication. A 

tentative organization chart, approved 30 November, shows also, as 

reporting to the commanding general through the chief of staff, but 

independent of the general staff divisions, an inspector general and a 

public relations branch.4 

This was the first blueprint for the machine that was to move so 

many millions of tons of goods to the USSR, and it was to be modified 

repeatedly. 'Vhile there was a tendency to consolidate general staff 

functions by a reduction of divisions in that category, executive and 

advisorv offices tended to cluster about the chief of staff and the commandin:g general as certain new problems and responsibilities in dealing 

with other Allies in the Corridor cropped up and could not be assigned 

elsewhere. The functions of the seven general staff divisions are indicated by their titles; but there was some overlapping among them. Although the Personnel Division was charged with formulating general 

policy relating to the employment of civilian personnel by the operating 

services, the Control Division formulated labor relations policy also. 

Similarly, although there was a Construction Service-charged with 

designing and building authorized new projects and major modifications to existing installations including all roads, rail trackage, port 

structures, and utilities-nevertheless, the Railway Service was to construct such modifications to its facilities as were authorized and practicable for them to do with their own forces, and this same charge was 

laid upon the Ports Service. Maintenance and motor vehicle repair 

responsibilities were similarly divided among MTS, areas, and the Op-

• (1) GO 11, Hq, PGSC, 17 Dec 42. (2) GO 7, Hq, PGSC, 25 Nov 42. (3) Interv, Gen 

Booth with Victor Pentlarge, Pentagon, 11 Apr 46. (4) Memo, Booth for Scott, 26 Nov 42. 

326.61 Establishment of Military Districts, Binder 2, SL 9008. (5) By General Order 7, con- finning General Order 2 and General Order 3, Headquarters 1616-A, \Vashington, the 

following were appointed directors of the divisions and services indicated, effective on arrival 

in the command: Col. Arthur C. Purvis, Administration; Lt. Col. George B. Buell, Jr., 

Personnel; Col. Robert H. Givens, Jr., Intelligence; Lt. Col. Byron E. Bushnell, Plans and 

Training; Colonel Graham, Operations and Supply; Colonel Martin, Control; Maj. Victor 

E. Maston, Movements; Colonel Yount, Railway Service; Colonel Booth, Ports Service; 

Col. Mark V. Brunson, Motor Transport Service; Colonel Osborne, Construction Service; 

and Lt. Col. Samuel M. Thomas, Signal Communication Service. Subordinate appointments to four services and two divisions were made by Special Order 80, Headquarters, 

PGSC, 25 November 1942. 
BLUEPRINT FOR THE MACHINE 217 

erations and Supply Division. As time went on, some of these overlaps 

were eliminated in subsequent reorganizations. 

The basic plan of command organization was a line and staff one. 

The line organization consisted of the operating services, the areas or 

districts, and exempted establishments, all directly responsible to GHQ. 

On them fell responsibility for the execution of the primary mission of 

the command. The operating services were concerned with direct field 

operation of ports, railway, motor transport, and signals activities. The 

areas or districts operated posts, camps, and stations located within 

their boundaries and, in addition, were charged with specific operational duties assigned by GHQ. Direct operational responsibility for assembly plants, for instance, belonged in theory to the districts, although 

general staff responsibilities sometimes overlapped. Exempted establishments were those installations which came under direct control of 

GHQ. The staff existed to advise the commanding general in the fields 

of their respective functions, to develop plans, formulate policies, and 

establish procedures. They supervised operational activities assigned 

them and sometimes through their field agencies directly controlled 

these operations. Soon after adoption of the first plan of organization 

in November, directors of general staff divisions, operating services, and 

territorial districts were called upon to submit to GHQ detailed plans 

and charts for their organizations.G A brief review of some of the many 

reorganizations in administrative structure which followed will indicate in a broad fashion how changing function was reflected in the 

machinery. 

An early reorganization of January 1943 can be regarded as mainly 

experimental, for it not only continued the dispersal of general staff 

functions among many divisions, but, by assigning the director of ports 

to general staff status, it departed from the basic principle which distinguished planning and direction of policy from operations. A reshuffle 

in March moved intelligence out of the general staff to an association 

with the Office of the Chief of Staff. The same happened to the Control 

Division which in June was redesignated the Executive Office of the 

Chief of Staff.6 A new Office of Technical Information was attached 

to the commanding general. It absorbed the previous Public Information Office, and included in addition an office for analyses to be made 

for the commanding general as contrasted to the logistical analyses 

entrusted to the former Control Division. The Office of Technical 

Information also included a Historical Section and sections for activi-

• GO 11 cited n. 4- (1). • GO 36, Hq, PGSC, 15 Jun4-3. 
218 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

ties involving interpreters and military correspondents. In anticipation 

of the reduction of its role as an operating service, as construction of 

facilities caught up with the program, the Construction Service was 

abolished and its planning functions absorbed within a new Operations 

Division, which, destined to become the most important of the general 

staff divisions in the conduct of the primary mission of the command, 

absorbed also the former Plans and Training, and Movements Divisions. The Personnel Division went into Administration, leaving only 

three general staff divisions for Administration, Operations, and Supply. There were now three operating services, MRS, MTS, and the 

Signal Service. Ports Service was amalgamated with Basra District, 

which, with Ahwaz and Tehran Districts, made up the active territorial 

subareas. 

The July chart, besides reflecting the redesignation of the previous 

May whereby the districts became Gulf, Desert, and Mountain, showed 

a number of new offices clustered about the Offices of the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff. These now comprised the Offices 

of the Inspector General and the Provost Marshal, the Executive Office 

of the Chief of Staff, and the Office of Technical Information. The 

Operations Division contained the following branches: Control 

(moved back from the Executive Office), Executive, Movements, 

Plants (responsible for assembly and container plant operations), and 

Construction. In a later reorganization, Executive Branch was replaced 

by Documentation Branch. The names of these branches give an idea 

of the general functions exercised by Operations Division as the clearinghouse and mainspring of all of the complicated co-ordination necessary to the carrying of supplies overland to the USSR. The workings of 

the process are shmvn in some detail later in this book where operation of the ports and the railway is discussed, and that aspect of administration is explained which shows what it meant to take a crate of 

canned fish from a ship lying in the Karun River and hand it over to 

the Soviet representatives where and when they wanted or needed it 

for the particular war needs wired to them from their commanders and 

supply experts responsible for provisioning the Eastern Front. Ship discharge, overland routing, and delivery were operational phases of the 

logistical process which affected the "ultimate consumer," the USSR, 

very closely; but these were in turn conditioned by the total flow of tonnages to and through the Corridor. 

The flow to the Corridor was determined by allocations under the 

several Russian protocols. The rate of arrivals was subject to shipping 

and to the capacity of Corridor facilities at ports and for inland clearance. Calculations were based upon the collection and correct interpre-
BLUEPRINT FOR THE MACHINE 219 

tation and prompt dissemination of statistics affecting capacities and 

operations. The Control Branch was responsible for the calculations 

which regulated an even flow of traffic and sought to utilize all available equipment. For this purpose it maintained close liaison with the 

British, the Russians, the ports, and all the forwarding agencies. 7 A 

meeting was held bimonthly to determine the capacities of the ports, 

assembly plants, and transportation agencies. This meeting studied 

current operational activities, including the motive power and rolling 

stock of the railway; car utilization and turnaround; the effect of nonRussian-aid requirements on MRS, MTS, and UKCC; the number of 

trucks and aircraft that could be assembled; and the number of ships 

that could be berthed and discharged in a month's time. Then Washington was advised of the capacity so that the proper number of ships 

could be allocated. Those who attended the capacity meetings were the 

regional director, War Shipping Administration, a representative of 

the British Ministry of War Transport, and representatives of UKCC, 

British Movements, Baghdad, and British Movements, Tehran; and, 

for the U.S. Army, the assistant chief of staff for Operations, and representatives of Movements, Plant, and Control Branches, Operations 

Division, as well as of MRS, MTS, and the Office of the Petroleum 

Adviser. 

Following the capacity meeting, a joint target meeting was held 

for the purpose of determining the maximum cargo that could be 

moved within the limits of the capacity of the Corridor. The arrival of 

ships and the available cargo in storage areas (backlog) had to be considered because these factors would affect the size of the target. If ships 

scheduled to arrive in a certain month were delayed, the target would 

be greater if there was a sufficient backlog available for forwarding 

than if the storage areas were nearly empty. In addition to the representatives of British and American agencies who attended the capacity 

meetings, the USSR had the following representatives at the target 

meetings: the chief of the Soviet Transportation Commission, the chief 

of Iransovtrans, and two other Soviet transport experts. Each agency 

presented a report at these meetings. 

The MRS furnished information on total capacity of the railroad 

already determined at the capacity meeting, along with estimates of 

the number of days' turnaround for freight cars in the USSR zone, 

monthly bulk fuel requirements for railway operations, and internal 

requirements for the Iranian civilian economy. The MTS reported its 

capacity as determined at the capacity meeting. The petroleum adviser 

, The following material on capacity and target meetings is paraphrased from the Control 

Pranch History cited note 1 (7d). 
220 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

acted in a supervisory capacity concerning the requirements and commitments of the U.S. Army, the USSR, the local civilian economy, 

and various transport agencies, for petroleum products. The assistant 

chief of staff for Operations was chairman of the meeting and exercised 

staff responsibility for the whole program. His Control Branch was 

responsible for co-ordinating, analyzing, and assembling all information pertaining to the target figure. His Movements Branch analyzed 

all traffic operations through the Corridor. His Plants Branch furnished 

information on the number of trucks and aircraft arriving, and being 

assembled, and the amount of cargo the assembled motor vehicles 

could carry north. The British representatives were responsible for esti. 

mating the tonnage of petroleum and wheat products to be moved and 

for indicating how they should be transported to their destinations. In 

addition, they supplied information on total Iranian civil and British 

military needs. The Soviet representatives 8 were responsible for accepting all USSR cargo moving through the Corridor, and for forwarding 

it into the USSR. In the process of establishing the monthly target, their 

requests and suggestions were fundamental to the task. Much lengthy 

discussion at these meetings was bypassed by previous exchange of information by letter. Informal meetings were also customary between 

Movements and Control Branches, the MRS, MTS, and British Army 

Movements. 

The procedure just outlined may be taken as the average; it does 

not necessarily represent the way things were literally done at any given 

period. It was a device made as simple and efficient as the cumbersome 

circumstances permitted; but it took a lot of paper, and a lot of desks 

and filing cabinets to make it work. The general outlines assumed by 

Operations Division in the March 1943 reorganization, when it drew 

together many functions hitherto scattered, were refined and modified 

in succeeding reorganizations; but the machine itself proved to have 

attained workable form very early in the history of the command. 

A reorganization of November 1943 produced quite a shuffle. The 

provost marshal went from the level of the commanding general's group 

of offices to the general staff level, and was replaced at the commanding 

general's level by the petroleum adviser. Fiscal matters were separated 

from the Administration Division and made into a Fiscal Division of 

the general staff. On the operating level, Ports Service reappeared on 

• From 1 November 1942 the Russians maintained at Tehran a representative of the 

Peoples' Commissariats of Internal and Foreign Affairs under whom Iransovtrans functioned. 

This official was initially Engineer Colonel Zorin, whose deputy for the south of Iran was Lt. Col. Michail F. Lengnik. These officers were the supreme authorities on the Soviet side 

for the transportation of goods to the USSR. Ltr, Zorin to Hq, PGSC, 31 Oct 42. AG 400, 

HqPGC. 
BLUEPRINT FOR THE MACHINE 221 

the charts with the three other services (MRS, MTS, Signal) but was 

connected through dual command to Gulf District. It was generally 

felt 9 that by the middle of 1944 the structure of the command had 

evolved into a smooth-running machine, and the absence of that sort of 

acute administrative jitters which gave birth to the word snafu was 

marked. The chart of the October 1944 reorganization therefore crystallizes the blueprint for the machine whose performance in moving 

supplies to Russia reached its peak in that year. Only the Offices of the 

Inspector Genenl and of Technical Information remained directly attached to the commanding general; a special staff was created to include the Offices of the Executive Officer, the Petroleum Adviser, the 

Provost Marshal, and the Headquarters Commandant; and, as indication of the prominence now given to the increasing activities of the Air 

Transport Command in the area, the special staff included an air officer. The general staff divisions remained at four; but the Fiscal Division 

had grmvll as the complex functions of finance had grown. It now consisted of a big headquarters office at Tehran, and thirteen field 

branches. Operations Division, with its five branches (Control, Movements, Plants, Documentation, and Construction), now possessed 

eleven field offices. 

The reorganization of December 1944 reflects the passing of the 

peak work load for the command and the beginning of reduction of 

the administrative machine, especially in the territorial areas. Of these, 

only the Mountain District, now called Tehran Area, remained. Gulf 

affairs were absorbed partly by Ports Service, partly by assumption of 

functions by Operations Division. Administrative services, formerly 

handled in rather complicated fashion for MRS by the several territorial areas through which the rail line passed, were now assigned to 

the single MRS directorate to carryon under more unified control. 

Desert District had disappeared to be replaced by a more restricted 

Andimeshk Area. This tendency to eliminate the full headquarters apparatus for the territorial areas and to amalgamate their functions with 

those of local posts continued in the February 1945 reorganization, 

which shows Mountain District affairs handled by Amirabad Post, and 

Desert District affairs by Andimeshk Post, no longer regarded as an 

area. 

The March chart is unchanged from February, save for the appearance on the special staff of a liquidation commissioner, a reflection of 

the vast task that lay ahead when the job would be done and installations and equipment to the value of tens of millions of dollars would 

I Interv cited n. 4(3). 
222 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

have to be disposed of. After March 1945, the process of contraction 

continued as military strength was reduced and projects were finished 

or abandoned. 

In a memorandum for staff divisions and directors of operating 

services at the time of the December 1944 reorganization, the chief of 

staff, then General Booth, noted that the new plan "has been predicated 

upon the assumption that the elimination of Districts would effect an 

appreciable saving in overhead personnel." 10 This was not the first 

allusion to be made to the overmanning of the administrative side in 

the building of the machine. A report made by the Plans and Training 

Branch, Operations Division, as early as May 1943, developed the estimate that, according to planned disposition of personnel, present and 

to come, "Out of a total of 1,522 officers slated for duty in the PGSC, 

44.5% are to be engaged in administrative, staff and supply duties, 

while 55.5% are to be actually engaged in the 'Aid-to-Russia' program. 

Considering all personnel, officers and enlisted men, 36.3% are to be 

engaged in administrative, staff and supply duties, while 63.7% will be 

engaged in the primary mission of the command." 11 Although this report recommended economy in future administrative planning for utilization of manpmver, economy was not always achieved; and in the 

over-all structure of the command, perhaps the feature most vulnerable 

to overmanning was that of the administrative territorial subareas. 

The Districts 

When Colonel Shingler set up his geographical subareas in September 1942, the chief motive was to provide American opposite numbers 

for the British officials with whom the Americans had to deal in matters of local procurement and local maintenance of their projects. 

Because of the small size of the American command and the limited 

nature of American responsibilities for construction and assembly 

operations, these local transactions were vital to the welfare of the 

projects and required the elimination of any delay in obtaining decisions such as had taken place when varieties of local requests from 

un-co-ordinated field agencies had to be processed. The areas provided 

the needed co-ordination. The new American command, however, was 

designed to be self-sufficient, and was big enough to maintain local 

offices able to take care of its local needs without the intervention of 

established British agencies, many of which, with the enlargement of 

to Memo, Booth for aU Stf Divs and Dirs of Servs, 12 Dec 44, sub: Reorganization 

of the PGC. PGF 240. Another copy 323.361 Powers and Duties, SL 9008. H Memo, Capt Robert M. Wilbur, Chief, Plans Sec, Plans and Training Br, for Col 

Osborne, ACofS, Opns, 20 May 43, sub: Troop Disposition in PGSC. PGF 240. 
BLUEPRINT FOR THE MACHINE 

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223 

THE DISTRICTS 

1942-1945 

-- O.STftIG T 80U~D.q £5 

" 

The area of Gulf District included all of Iraq and the south shore of the Gulf. 

The district was previously known as Southwestern Area and as Basra District. Its 

headquarters was moved from Basra to Khorramshahr in May 1943. 

Desert District was first called Central Area, then Ahwaz Service District. Its 

headquarters was moved from Ahwaz to Andimeshk in November 1943. 

Mountain District, whose headquarters was always at Tehran, was organized 

first as Northern Area, then redesignated Tehran District. 

Zahidan was to have been the headquarters of an Eastern Area which was 

never activated. 

the American force, had reduced their own numbers. During the planning period in Washington for the new command it had been expected 

that the pattern of the U.S. corps area, or service command, would be 

followed and that the several field operating services would be responsible for their own field maintenance. After his arrival in the field, 

however, General Connolly realized that the diverse sorts of personnel 

(stevedores, truck drivers, railroad men, signals technicians, construc-
224 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

tion men) and their far-flung activities called for a uniform administrative and supply system for their maintenance. Accordingly, after a brief 

period in which the old Shingler areas were left undisturbed, their 

duties were modified in November, and in December they were redesignated and reorganized.12 The function of the new districts was 

defined as follows by General Order 11 : 

Districts are organized for the purpose of decentralizing administration, housekeeping, and construction functions within designated geographical areas. The 

District Headquarters are sub-headquarters of the Central Headquarters, Persian 

Gulf Service Command, and, as such, report directly to the Commanding General. 

The District Commanders do not exercise command over the units assigned to 

Services and Divisions. They will, however, exercise control over general administration, housekeeping, hospitalization, housing, and general supply for all 

establishments within their jurisdiction. Their responsibilities will also include 

internal security, labor relations, local procurement of supplies and services as 

authorized by the Commanding General, all operating under general policies 

promulgated by the parent staff division of General Headquarters. . . . 

Services are operating units with definite responsibilities. The districts are 

organized to facilitate the operations of the services; they have no control over 

the employment of units not specifically assigned to them. The District functions 

best when it renders greatest service to the units operating in its territory. 

That was the theory: the district commander, as deputy of the 

commanding general in his own area, co-ordinated the activities of the 

several operating agencies within his area, applying to this duty the 

general policies laid down by the general staff divisions. Although the 

district commander had no control over the targets and schedules of 

the operating services, he was empowered to settle any disputes among 

them which might arise within his district, and to reconcile conflicting 

requisitions which might pass through his headquarters. At no time in 

the history of the districts did the operating services feel it necessary 

to appeal to the commanding general the decision of a district commander .13 Beyond maintaining, training, and disciplining the troops 

within their areas, providing local security, and co-ordinating operations, the district commanders came in time to exercise important 

operating responsibilities of their own. In this respect the general theory 

of the sub commands was stretched rather far. 

The instructions given district commanders in November 1942 had 

exempted them from responsibility for construction, which was to be 

performed throughout the command by one of the then existing operating services, the Construction Service. The Construction Service was 

abolished in the reorganization of March 1943 and its purely planning, 

" By GO's 11 and 13, Hq, PGSC, 17 and 21 Dec 42. 

" Statement by General Booth cited by Victor Pentlarge in Annex cited note 1 (7 a). 
BLUEPRINT FOR THE MACHINE 225 

standard-setting, and policy functions transferred to Operations Division of the general staff at Tehran. Even before this, General Order 11 

had in December 1942 foreshadowed the coming decentralization of 

construction responsibilities by assigning to the Ahwaz District, in 

which lay the headquarters of the Iranian District engineer, all construction duties for building at the ports, which lay in Basra District. 

In May, the districts were made responsible for all new construction 

within their boundaries authorized by GHQ.14 The other important 

direct operating responsibility laid upon these nominally administrative agencies was that for the running of the aircraft, motor vehicle, 

barge, and container plants. As the Construction Branch, Operations 

Division, formulated policy and exercised general supervision over construction within the several districts, so at first the Supply Division, and 

later Plants Branch, Operations Division, acted in behalf of these other 

projects. 

One factor in the manning of the district headquarters organizations makes it difficult to determine the extent of their drain on the 

available pool of manpower in a command whose primary duty was 

movement of supplies. With their separate staff sections and organization charts patterned after GHQ, the districts constituted a sort of 

superimposition, administratively, of Pelion upon Ossa. The difficulty 

arises from the fact that a considerable proportion of the headquarters 

staffs of most of the districts were manned by officers and men who 

belonged to operating services at work in the area. It has been estimated 

that 350 persons staffed the three district headquarters at their maximum, and of these many were also performing operational work at the 

same time.15 Yet it must be realized that any headquarters with a full 

staff has more work for some members than for others, and that some 

duties of a headquarters nature are nominal. Furthermore, a headquarters must provide for its own maintenance, and this can mushroom into 

a variety of service units which must be provisioned, housed, paid, and 

accounted for-with the usual paper work and clatter of typewriters. 

At the start, the district organizations were necessary to handle tasks 

impossible for the operating services to perform for themselves, and to 

,. (1) GO 30, Hq, PGSC, 15 May 43. Subsequent changes in the powers and duties of 

the districts may be traced in: GO's, Hq, PGSC, 31, 16 May 43,3', 18 Jun 43, 42, 8 Jul 43, 

and 51, 25 Aug 43; also GO's, Hq, PGC, 1, 5 Jan 44, and 51, and Memo, Col Graham, 

Actg CofS, for CO's of Gulf, Desert, and Mountain Dists, 6 Jan 44, sub: Reorganization 

of Districts, Posts, Camps, and Stations. PGF 240. See also the Pentlarge Annex, cited no~ 

l(7a), which incorporates interviews with Colonel Martin, 11 April 1946, and Generals 

Shingler, 22 April 1946, Booth, 11 April 1946, and Scott, 22 March 1946. (2) The evolution 

of administration of construction is treated in Chapter XII below. 

". Pentlarge, after interview with Colonel Martin, formerly executive officer to the chid 

of staff, cited note 14 (1). 
226 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

provide uniformity of standards and economies in administration. As 

time went on, however, the larger posts within the districts became 

familiar with the work of the districts and therefore could, theoretically, 

have supplanted the district organizations. This process occurred in a 

few instances even before the contraction in command organization set 

in; but its general application was delayed beyond the time, stated to 

have been any time after July 1944, when it could, theoretically, have 

occurred. Posts did not wholly supplant the district organizations until 

January 1945.16 Perhaps the outstanding example of overstaffing of this 

sort was the Mountain District headquarters, located at Camp Amira~ 

bad right next door to GHQ itself. Its function was the administration 

of the immediate vicinity of GHQ, and yet there was GHQ, and there 

also was the headquarters staff of Camp Amirabad. In January 1945 

this anomaly was righted by the abolition of Mountain District. 

The question whether the virtues of the district system outweighed 

its defects would require, for answer, detailed examination of a mass 

of evidence. 'Vhen it is considered that the districts provided decentral~ 

ized administration for widely disparate operations extending over an 

area as large as Texas and California combined, and that structural 

organization necessarily reflects the complexity of the function it is 

designed to execute, the conclusion is unavoidable that, although the 

districts were expensive in terms of manpower, they contributed to the 

accomplishment of the American mission. The whole matter of the administrative machine cannot justly be judged as one would measure the 

time studies of a long-established chain-store system whose operations 

have been streamlined by efficiency experts. 

Evolution of the Persian Gulf Command 

The rearrangements in the internal structure of the command, 

which were required to accomplish its increased functions, were accompanied by a readjustment of its administrative and command relationships to headquarters of USAFIME at Cairo. Of the three chief pieces 

of unfinished business left by the SOS Plan and the directive of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff, that of the independence of the new American command in the Persian Corridor was the thorniest. The other two 

dangling compromises of September 1942-the control of movements 

(whether to be British, as hitherto, or American) and security for operations--ciepended in no small measure for their resolution upon the 

" Interv cited n. 4 (3). 
BLUEPRINT FOR THE MACHINE 227 

ability of the American command at Tehran to act authoritatively and 

promptly without recourse to echelons imposed between itself and 

Washington. 

When the PGSC was so designated in August 1942, as a part of 

the unification of the U.S. Middle East theater, it was directly under 

the commanding general of USAFIME, General Maxwell. This was 

still its status when Connolly supplanted Shingler on 20 October. But 

when General Andrews relieved General Maxwell on 4 November 1942 

and Maxwell became Commanding General, SOS, USAFIME, the 

PGSC dropped one rung further down the ladder of command and 

found itself designated as one of the service commands of USAFIME 

along with the Eritrea, Delta, and Levant service commands, with none 

of whose tasks or problems it had anything in common whatsoever, 

either qualitatively or quantitatively. The subsequent ascent up the 

ladder toward independent command lasted just over one year, during 

which time, although there was a steady drift toward Tehran's autonomy, command responsibility for the increasingly complex job in Iran 

rested in Cairo, more than a thousand miles away. 

General Connolly's Letter of Instructions of 1 October 1942 had 

placed him under the "administrative supervision" of the commanding 

general of USAFIME and this phrase was subject to varying interpretations by Maxwell and Connolly. When General Marshall issued 

his Letter of Instructions of 24 October to General Andrews it was 

explained that "administrative supervision" meant "command" and 

Andrews was instructed to exercise all the prerogatives of a commander 

over PGSC.17 This tightening of the grip of Cairo was followed, after 

the early November changes at CSAFIME headquarters, by General 

Maxwell's calling for "a multiplicity of detailed reports" from PGSC 

and issuing "a lot of instructions, the gist of which was that nearly 

everything had to be approved in Cairo before action could be taken." 

As General Connolly put it, "\Ve were tied hand and foot as far as 

getting anything done was concerned." 16 Although the mission of 

PGSC was now very different from the earlier mission under Colonel 

Shingler, administrative procedures suffered as they had earlier when 

it sometimes took as long as three weeks for PGSC to get a reply from 

Cairo on pending matters.'9 In the important field of direct negotiations 

between the American command and the British there was a seeming 

11 Ltr of Instructions, Marshall to Andrews, 24 Oct 42. OPD 384 ME (10-24-42). 

10 Ltr, Connolly to Somervell, 20 Dec 42. Abstract PGF 262. 

" Interv with Lt Col Philip C. Kidd, G-5 AMET, at Cairo, 6 Jul 45, citing Shingler's 

authority for the statement. 
228 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

contradiction between Connolly's instructions and the views held by 

Maxwell in Cairo. Connolly's instructions permitted him to deal directly with the British, Iranians, and Russians on all matters not requiring diplomatic channels, provided Cairo was informed and provided 

this information was furnished in accordance with instructions emanating from Cairo. Difference in interpretation of the Washington instructions in this respect was resolved when Maxwell informed Connolly on 

14 November that by agreement between American and British headquarters at Cairo, liaison between PGSC and PAl Force would henceforth be made directly between Connolly and General Wilson.20 But 

the larger question of command relationship remained for solution. 

On 12 December General Andrews, accompanied by his staff, went 

to Basra on the first official visit to the Corridor on strictly theater business made by a commander of USAFIME since the unification of the 

previous June.21 As a result of conferences between Andrews and Connolly, agreement was reached to relieve PGSC from assignment to SOS, 

USAFIME, and to put it directly under the commanding generaL 

Connolly wrote Andrews, after the latter's return to Cairo, "The proposed change will in my opinion clear up the confusion which now exists 

and will greatly facilitate the operations of this command .... Your 

trip over here has had a marked influence on morale, indicating to the 

personnel that you consider the work they are doing to be important to 

the war effort." To General Somervell, Connolly wrote, "Our relations 

with Cairo have been cleared up." 22 It would have been perhaps more 

accurate to have said that they had been clarified; for although General 

Andrews' proposed action was to begin a new period of greater autonomy, it did not bring independence. 

The first step toward autonomy was formalized by the issuance on 

20 January 1943 of a clarifying directive to Connolly from Cairo. It 

provided that he could henceforth requisition directly upon the War 

Department; it delegated to him authority to represent the Commanding General, USAFIME, in negotiations with the British, Irani, and 

Iraqi representatives, with final authority reposing in Connolly for all 

matters not requiring diplomatic channels; and it empowered him to 

procure personnel beyond that already authorized to go through 

USAFIME, as well as to submit recommendations for promotions. 

Connolly was authorized to undertake any construction necessary to 

•• Ltr, Maxwell to Connolly, 14 Nov 42. PGF 259. 21 General Maxwell had passed through in August 1942 with Averell Harriman en route to 

Moscow. 

'" (1) Ltr, Connolly to Andrews, 20 Dec 42. Abstract PCF 262. (2) Ltr cited n. 18. 
BLUEPRINT FOR THE MACHINE 229 

accomplish his mission but to obtain approval from Cairo for all other 

construction.2B 

Beyond this point the further evolution of PGSC toward independence of command became involved with the twin questions of 

intelligence activities and security responsibilities. Here the basic point 

at issue was whether the carrying on of routine intelligence activities by 

the American command was consistent with its primary mission of 

delivering supplies to the USSR. It had been assumed in the planning 

period at Washington that, as Averell Harriman put it to the Strategic 

Planning Division, SOS, the new command ought to possess "a good 

G-2 in the headquarters [to] keep in touch with the military situation 

and also with the sabotage situation." 24 Accordingly a supplementary 

Letter of Instructions had been issued to General Connolly on 21 October 1942 by Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, 0-2, War Department, 

placing under Connolly's command all War Department intelligence 

personnel in Iran and Iraq and on the southern shores of the Persian 

Gulf and the Gulf of Oman; their selection, location, transfer, and administration to be determined by the War Department. 25 

On 26 March 1943 General Connolly sent the following message 

to General Marshall: 

Supplemental letter of instructions ... charges this command with responsibility for War Department intelligence for this theater. Experience has shown that 

this is not compatible with my primary mission and Russians very suspicious of our 

G-2 activities since they see no need for such activities in furthering our mission. 

This suspicion of our motives is hampering our obtaining the operational data we 

must have in order to carry out efficiently our primary mission. As our operations 

increase in volume it will become of even greater importance that the Russians 

have confidence in our sincerity of purpose. Under decision of the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff, British have full responsibility for security our operations south of 

the vicinity of Tehran inclusive, which necessarily includes colIection of necessary 

intelligence. If the situation ever develops that we do any operating north of the 

vicinity of Tehran 26 Russians will have full responsibility for security. Thus the 

PGSC as such has no need for military inteIIigence.27 

13 (1) Directive, CG, USAFIME, to Connolly, 20 Jan 43, sub: Operation of PGSC. 

PGF 240. (2) GO 6, Hq, USAFIME, 20 Jan 42. (3) These orders were issued in the name of General Brereton who was Commanding General, USAFIME, from 31 January to 5 

September 1943. GO 8, Hq, USAFIME, 31 Jan 43; WD GO 59, 5 Sep 43. General Andrews 

left Cairo on 30 January to go to England to take over from General Eisenhower command 

of U.S. forces in the European Theater of Operations. Andrews was killed in an air crash 

in Iceland 3 May 1943. (4) General Maxwell was relieved by General Crawford on 1 B March 

1943. 1st Ind, Ltr G-2, 18 Mar 43. AG 350.05 (3-14-43) Hq AMET . .. Memo, Col Elliott for Somervell, 4 Sep 42. SOS Plan, Copy Conti Div, ASF, Sp 

Coli, HRS DRB AGO. ,. Strong to Connolly, Supplement to Ltr of Instructions: Mil Intelligence Instructions, 

21 Oct 42. MID 904 (10-21-42), OPD Registered Documents Room . •• It never did . .. Rad AGWAR 689 TN-2640, Connolly to Marshall, 26 Mar 43. 384 Conduct of War, 

SL 9016. Another copy AG 371.2 (2 Apr 42-1 Nov 44) Hq AMET. 
230 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

Operations Division, Washington, promptly revoked the supplementary Letter of Instructions, and effective 1 May the Intelligence 

Division of General Connolly's general staff was dissolved, and all military intelligence functions of the American command abolished save 

only map procurement and distribution, and censorship. These functions were assigned to the provost marshal. As a part of this sweeping 

gesture of friendly compliance with Russian desires, all intelligence 

offices in the various district headquarters were likewise abolished.2$ 

Although this decisive action removed from Connolly responsibility for intelligence activities while his command remained subordinate to Cairo, the feeling in Washington that such responsibility 

properly belonged to an independent theater commander again made 

the question an issue in the negotiations to separate Tehran from Cairo, 

for Connolly remained unwilling, even as a theater commander, to 

worry the Russians by sponsoring an intelligence division. When Maj. 

Gen. W. D. Styer, Chief of Staff, ASF, passed through Tehran in 

June en route to the China-Burrna-India theater, he and General 

Connolly discussed the status of PGSC and the efficiencies that might 

be obtained through independence of Cairo. As a result of Styer's 

report to \"1 ashington of this discussion, General Marshall informed 

Connolly that "it is believed administrative delays due to distance from 

Cairo can be reduced considerably by delegation to your headquarters 

of further powers to which the Commanding General, USAFIME 

may be agreeable." What followed was a delegation of power to Connolly to make contracts; to return officers and enlisted men to the zone 

of the interior; to reclassify, promote, and appoint officers; and to 

exercise the power to review conferred on theater commanders by War 

Department Circular 21 of 15 January 1943.29 But Washington still 

believed that if PGSC were established as an independent theater, it 

should possess an intelligence division. At a conference at Cairo later 

in the summer Connolly is reported to have said that "any highpowered G-2 activities under his jurisdiction would interfere with his 

sa (1) Rad, Gen Handy to Gen Connolly, 3 Apr 43. OPD 617 Persia (3-26-43). 

(2) GO 26, Hq, PGSC, 30 Apr 43. (3) General Wedemeyer, reporting to General Marshall on a visit to the PCSC very early in 1943, said: "Connolly is accomplishing difficult objectives 

without fanfare. Good judgment, hard work, and tact all mark his approach to solution 

of problems involving other nationals. He definitely has their respect and may be expected 

to gain increasingly their co-operation." Rad, Wedemeyer to Marshall, signed Brig. Gen. 

Clayton L. Bissell, from New Delhi to AGWAR, 2 Feb 43. CM-IN 1102 (3 Feb 43) . 

.. (1) Rad AMPSC 989, Marshall to Connolly, 28 Jun 43. 384 Conduct of War, SL 9016. 

(2) Rad, Connolly to Brereton, 1 Jul 43. Same file. (3) Rad AMSME 748-P, Brereton 

to Connolly, 18 Jul 43. Same file. (4) Rad AMSME 649-P, Brereton to Connolly, 29 Jun 43. 

PCF 248. (5) Rad AMPSC 1175, Marshall to Brereton, 28 Jul 43. 323.361 Powers and 

Duties (General), SL 9008. 
BLUEPRINT FOR THE MACHINE 231 

primary mission, that is, the supply of equipment to the Russians." so 

Washington decided to leave the question of independent command in 

abeyance inasmuch as Brereton, who had succeeded Andrews, was 

shortly to be relieved as Commanding General, USAFIME.31 

The new USAFIME commander, Maj. Gen. Ralph Royce, took 

over on 10 September. As a result of correspondence and personal consultation between Royce and Connolly over the following months, and 

of consultations with high officials from Washington who came to 

Tehran for the three-power conference held there from 28 November 

to 1 December, a new Letter of Instructions was issued by General 

Marshall to General Connolly under date of 10 December 1943.32 

Effective that date, the new Persian Gulf Command (PGC) became 

directly responsible to the War Department through OPD. The mission of the command was broadly worded. It was "to further the 

objective of the United States in the prosecution of the war." Primary 

was the continuance of the task imposed by CCS 109/1. In addition, 

the Commanding General, PGC, was to co-ordinate American activities under his command with those of other United Nations; to direct 

and control representation of the War Department in dealings with 

friendly governments in all matters not requiring diplomatic channels; 

to carryon supply activities, and all Army Air Forces activities except 

the Air Transport Command; and to exercise the usual powers and 

perform the usual administrative duties of a theater commander. 

Although the whole area of Saudi Arabia was reserved to USAFIME, 

it was provided that the Commanding General, USAFIME, might 

delegate to the Commanding General, PGC, construction activities by 

the U.S. Army "in the eastern part of that country," as well as the 

representation of the War Department in negotiations or other actions 

pertaining to the development or production of petroleum products 

by U.S. interests in eastern Saudi Arabia. 33 In continued deference to 

the wishes of the Russians, only such intelligence activity was authorized as was necessary to the security of the new command and this was 

carried on as a part of the routine work of the provost marshal. The 

.. Ltr, Brig Gen Gilbert X. Cheves (who relieved Crawford as CG, SOS, USAFIME, on 25 Jun) to Gen Styer, 21 Aug 43. SP 323.31 (7-26-43) (1) Opns Br, AGO. 

"Rad AMPSC 1379, Marshall to Brereton and Connolly, 1 Sep 43. PGF 248. n (I) Ltr of Instructions, Marshall to Connolly, 10 Dec 43. PGF 248. Other copies 

323.361 General Connolly's Letter of Instructions with Amendments, SL 900B, and SP 

323.31 (7-26-43) (1) Opns Br, AGO. (2) Memo, Marshall, 10 Dec 43, sub: Establishment 

of PGC. 323.361 Powers and Duties (General), SL 900B. This file also contains radios, 

memoranda, and drafts of proposed instructions drawn up by Connolly and Royce for forwarding to the Chief of Staff, Washington . .. Both were delegated by letter, Brig. Gen. Benjamin F. Giles (who relieved Royce at 

Cairo on 10 March 1944) to Connolly, 13 June 1944. Abstract PGF 262. 
232 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

PGC did not set up a G-2 division, and General Connolly exercised 

intelligence responsibility only for such investigations as pertained to 

the safety of American operations in moving supplies to the Soviet 

receiving points. 

With the command relationship to Cairo thus settled, PCC settled 

dmvn to devote its energies directly, and without the administrative 

complexities inherent in the earlier command structure, to its primary 

mission. The year 1944, which produced peak deliveries to the USSR, 

saw also the rounding out of the administrative machine. On 24 

December General Connolly was relieved as Commanding General, 

PGC, in order to become deputy commissioner of the Army-Navy 

Liquidation Commission at Washington. He was to return to the Corridor a year later to serve briefly as director of Foreign Liquidation. 

Succeeding Connolly as commanding general was General Booth, 

an engineer graduate of West Point (1926) who, like Connolly and 

Scott, had seen service in district engineer work in the United States, 

particularly at Rock Island, Illinois, and at Seattle. He came to the 

command of PGC via the posts of Ports Service director, commander 

of Basra District, director of Operations Division, and chief of staff.34 

Following General Booth as chief of staff was Col. Samuel M. Thomas, 

who had come into the Corps of Engineers through the Officers' Reserve Corps, and whose specialized training included courses at the 

Army Signal Corps School and the Command and General Staff School. 

He served as director of the Signal Service from his arrival in the Corridor late in 1942 to his assignment as chief of staff in January 1945. 

When Thomas, then a brigadier general, was ordered to the United 

States in July 1945 he was succeeded as chief of staff by Col. Gustav 

A. M. Anderson. Anderson had served in the command as director of 

the MTS, commanding officer of the Mountain District until its inactivation, and assistant chief of staff for Administration. \'\Then General 

Booth was ordered to the United States in August 1945, Colonel Anderson became Commanding Officer, PGC, and saw the American effort 

in the Persian Corridor through to the end. His chief of staff was Lt. Col. 

Edwin B. Woodworth.a5 

Of Booth relieved Scott as chief of staff on 29 February 1944. Abstract PGF 262 . .. (1) Connolly served briefly as Commanding General, USAFIME, from 5 September 

1943 to 10 September 1943, when Royce relieved him. WD GO 59, 5 Sep 43, and GO 23, Hq, 

USAFIME, 10 Sep 43. (2) GO 89, Hq, PCC, 24 Dec 44. (3) Key Personnel. PGF 246. 

(4) GO 78, Hq, PGC, 15 Jul 45. (5) Rad, CO, PGC, to CG's, USFET [and] AMET, 15 

Aug 45, abstract PGF 262, and GO 93, Hq, PGC, 15 Aug 45. The wind-up of the command 

is told in Ch. XIX below. 
BLUEPRINT FOR THE MACHINE 233 

Division of Responsibility With the British 

To the extent that structural organization provides the means for 

executing function, the structure of the American command and its 

status with regard to USAFIME headquarters at Cairo were both subject to the status of American responsibilities relative to the controlling 

British powers and duties. The SOS Plan provided a definition of 

American functions and a suggested skeletal organization. The directive of the Combined Chiefs defined the continuing duties of the British 

under the Tri-Partite Treaty. It was left to the British and American 

commanders in the field to work out the problem of fitting the new 

American command and its functions into the framework of these 

British responsibilities. 

Accordingly, during the early months in which the newly arrived 

American service troops were taking over certain British functions 

assigned by CCS 109/1, British and American headquarters were 

studying the problem. It was soon apparent that the central aspect of 

the problem of meshing the activity of the tWb commands was control 

of movements. This was the governor of the machine, the means by 

which the whole process of discharge of cargo at the ports, allocation 

of traffic, and inland clearance was regulated. At a meeting held at 

Tehran on 7 April 1943 a joint agreement for the control of move~ 

ments in Iran was signed, to become effective when PGSC was ready to 

take over movements responsibility. On 21 April, PGSC notified PAl 

Force that the American command would be ready to take over on 1 

May; and from that date Movements Branch, Operations Division, 

assumed responsibility for contr01s to be exercised within the over-all 

responsibility of the British.3s This aspect of the agreement, whereby 

one party retained the last word while delegating actual authority to 

the other party, marks the highest and most difficult achievement in 

the Persian Corridor experiment in co-operation. Only a high degree 

of tolerance between the partners in so complex an intermeshing of 

prerogatives could have assured the successful operation of the agreed 

plan. 

The joint agreement began by restating British responsibility for 

.. (1) Joint Agreement between Persia and Iraq Forces and the Persian Gulf Service 

Command for the Control of Movements in Persia, 7 Apr 43. 323.361 General Connolly's 

Letter of Instructions with Amendments, SL 9008. Another copy 092.2 Treaties and Agreements, SL 8978. Appendixes A and B cover the constitution and functions of the monthly 

capacity and target meetings; Appendix C deals with priorities; and Appendix D covers the 

respective responsibilities of the PAl Force and PGSC Movements staffs. (2) Hist Rpt, 

Movements Dr, Opns Div, Hq, PGSC, 115 May 43, p. 4. PGF 126-D. (3) Rad AGWAR 

2894, Connolly to Marshall for Spalding info Harriman, 1 Nov 43 (summarizing AngloAmerican responsibilities). 384 Conduct of War, SL 9016. 
234 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

internal security; for providing all possible assistance to insure the 

maximum of aid to Russia; and for the control of priorities of traffic in 

Iran. The American responsibility for delivery of maximum tonnage 

to the USSR was also restated. Under the first point, internal security, 

British responsibility entailed provision "of such garrisons in Persia as 

may be considered necessary; the maintenance of the food and fuel 

requirements of the civilian population; and of the requirements of 

essential industries." British logistical responsibility, under the second 

point, was defined as embracing the discharge of goods at Iraqi ports 

and their carriage over the line of communications through Iraq; the 

provision of port lighterage and inland water transport on the Karun 

River; the provision of military or UKCC motor transport over the 

Khanaqin Lift; and undertaking the improvement and maintenance 

of road communications with such American assistance as might be 

decided upon jointly between the parties t~ the agreement. Under the 

third point, over-all British responsibility for priorities was to be exercised through the machinery of the monthly target and capacity meetings which were held under American chairmanship; and priorities 

for movement of British military and essential civil traffic would be requested by British Movements of the American command which would 

take the necessary action. The movement of American personnel, 

military freight, and aid-to-Russia tonnages was to be under American 

control. In the event that local agreement could not be reached between 

British and American representatives to accommodate demands for 

movement of British categories of traffic within the current capacities 

determined for aid-to-Russia tonnages, the matter was to be referred 

to GHQ, PAl Force. If a decision were rendered on that or any other 

matter by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, PAl Force, 

contrary to CCS 109/1, the Commanding General, PGSC, was 

authorized by his Letter of Instructions-in conformity with the terms 

of the Combined Chiefs' directive and instructions to General Wilson 

of PAl Force-to report the matter immediately through the U.S. 

Joint Chiefs to the Combined Chiefs. No such appeal was made at 

any time. 

The agreement assigned to the Americans authority over movements hitherto exercised by the British, except for movements required 

for British military personnel and stores, and essential civilian needs 

including oil. As the Americans were primarily concerned with aid-toRussia movements, the arrangement left them effective control of the 

lion's share of inland clearance over their own line of communications 

from the Gulf to Soviet receiving points in the north, and it gave them 

also the right of fitting British requirements into the larger pattern, 
BLUEPRINT FOR THE MACHINE 235 

subject to appeal to British headquarters. Short of a grant of absolute 

authority, impossible to give an auxiliary force not an occupying power 

in Iran, this arrangement accomplished .the necessary centralization 

of the chief means of traffic movement the lack of which had hitherto 

plagued the aid-to-Russia program in the Corridor. 

The joint agreement left the control of inland water transport in 

British hands, including the allocation of barges and lighters; but 

monthly capacity of barge lift was determined at the monthly capacity 

meeting at which the American voice was strong. Allocation of incoming shipping as between ports in Iran and Iraq likewise remained 

with the Basra Transport Executive Committee, on which sat representatives of the British Ministry of War Transport, GHQ, PAl Force, 

the War Shipping Administration, the PGSC, and the USSR. At 

American-operated ports, British Movements was to be responsible 

only for arrangements connected with embarkation and disembarkation of British military and Polish personnel. At British-operated ports, 

the British were responsible for all documentation and handling of 

stores, including those for American and USSR account. On the ISR 

the British Movements staff was similarly responsible only for arranging with the American staff for movement of British and Polish personnel and stores, for essential civilian traffic, and for the necessary 

documentation for those movements. In motor transport, the American 

command was responsible for the co-ordination of its own truck fleets 

with those of UKCC and ultimately exercised complete control over 

all traffic on American highway routes, while British control prevailed in all respects over the uses to which British highway routes were 

to be put. The American command, in consultation with British Movements, was made responsible for obtaining disposal instructions and 

priorities from the Soviet authorities for all cargo destined for the 

USSR, and the Americans were to notify British 110vements Control 

at Tehran of the instructions regarding Soviet cargo handled by the 

British through British-operated ports. 

The joint agreement was essentially a division of responsibility 

according to function. Each party retained authority for its internal 

necessities, and each received authority for those of its duties which 

may be called external: in the British case, for its obligations as an 

occupying power toward the Iranian civil population; in the American 

case, for the movement of goods to Russia, which constituted the bulk 

of all movements in the region. Yet within the broadly defined and 

cleafly distinguishable areas of responsibility, it is plain that the functioning of transport required, at almost every step, a close collaboration 

and a delicate balancing of prerogatives. In the process the wheels of 
236 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

the Anglo-American machine developed some friction. The Americans, 

for instance, chafed at British controls over inland water transport. 

But on the whole the control of movements remained the outstanding 

instance of successful co-operation. 

The joint agreement, while affirming British responsibility for internal security, was not concerned in detail with that problem, beyond 

stating that the American command was responsible for guarding 

American traffic and for notifying British Movements Control when 

guards would be required for Soviet cargo. "The responsibility for 

providing required guards rests on British Movements." That was the 

theory, which, stated another way, provided that American security 

responsibility was confined to American installations other than those 

classified as direct aid-to-Russia installations, and to protection of 

cargoes solely for American military requirements. All other security 

responsibility was in the hands of the British. As defined by them this 

covered 

"The ports of Khorramshahr and Bandar-Gulf [Ban dar Shahpur], American 

Aid-to-Russia plant at Abadan, the rail line of communications to Teheran, barge 

traffic on the Karun and Shatt-al-Arab rivers, vehicle traffic on the Khorramshahr-Kazvin road route, also all installations on those routes used by the 

Americans for Aid-to-Russia traffic." 31 

This was, in effect, a sweeping British assumption of security control 

over virtually the entire American effort in the Persian Corridor. Theoretically, the arrangement was of advantage to the American command 

inasmuch as it relieved it of the necessity to provide large numbers of 

investigative and police personnel. Practically, because the British were 

physically unable to provide equivalent necessary police protection for 

the activities and installations included in their field of responsibility, 

the burden was divided, and that part of it which was borne by the 

American command was exercised by virtue of the security authority 

possessed by the British. The American provost marshal, Lt. Col. 

George P. Hill, Jr., estimated that to carry out their security obligations properly, the British would have needed to double their military 

strength in all categories of troops.3S But after Stalingrad the British 

removed the Tenth Army from the area and reduced military strength 

as much as possible. In view of the ever present problems of pilferage. 

theft, banditry, and the threat of sabotage to the railway and other in-

" Report of Military Police Activities, PGC, United States Army, p. 11. PGF 130. This 

document of 132 pages and Appendix of 39 Items furnishes a thorough study of the American 

security problem . .. Memo, Lt Col George P. Hill, Jr., for Provost Marshal General, Washington, 30 Apr 44, 

sub: Provost Marshal Activities, PGC. Item 1, App., Rpt cited n. 37. 
BLUEPRINT FOR THE MACHINE 237 

stallations, the Americans were forced into providing security measures 

of their own while relying at the same time upon the British. In general 

practice, British security forces were used for protection against tribal 

disturbances, banditry, and sabotage; American, for local guard duties. 

But even this division of labor was not so clear-cut as it sounds, for in 

practice it was not possible to draw a sharp distinction in the face of a 

situation calling for immediate action. In consequence-unlike the division of responsibility for movements control, which was reasonably distinct and where lines of responsibility and command were clear-security problems were a source of constant, if usually minor, irritation 

between the British and American forces. Because of the primary responsibility of the British in security matters American representatives 

were in a subordinate position at security conferences with British, 

Russian, and Iranian authorities. British officials made the final decisions in shaping policy, determining procedures, and defining the 

limits of responsibility. 

In this connection the provost marshal records: 

The British once refused to furnish guards for an oil storage tank along the 

railroad on the grounds that the oil was not intended for Russian consumption, 

although this storage constituted the principal source of gasoline supply for the 

Southern Division of our Motor Transport Sexvice. Upon practically all occasions where questions of policy were discussed it became necessary for PGC to take 

the firmest possible stand to insure that the British did not use the loophole of 

definition to evade their full responsibility.59 

Colonel Hill gives a further illustration of the embarrassments inherent 

in the American position: 

Too often U.S. requests for action have been treated with maddening delay 

and perfunctoriness. To give a specific example: An American truck was fired 

upon in the Gulf District by ruffians of a nomad tribe. The District Provost 

Marshal went out to investigate the incident and himself was fired upon. Military 

Police followed the camel tracks of the offenders to the entrance of their village, 

then reported the incident immediately to British security personnel. The British 

wasted three days consulting with their consul and conferring with one official 

and another over the question who should take action, British or Iranian authorities. By the time the issue was decided the nomads had trekked on beyond possibility of apprehension. It was a different story a few days later when another group 

of nomads fired upon a British colonel. An entire company of Punjabs raced to 

the scene and quickly captured the guilty parties. 

These incidents, typical of the sort of difficulty that arose because of 

the anomalous position the Americans held as nonoccupying-power 

nationals in Iran, illustrate that at its worst the vague division of reIII Page 12 of Rpt cited n. 37. 
238 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

sponsibility left the Americans unprotected, whereas at its best, the 

security situation functioned only through close and sympathetic cooperation by the Americans with the British but without command 

responsibility or control. The arrangement, unavoidable so long as the 

Combined Chiefs' directive imposed entire responsibility in PAl Force, 

was unfortunate, for it both failed to provide entirely satisfactory 

security for the American operations and created considerable ill 

feeling in the ranks. In the words of the provost marshal, "Anglophobia 

became a common disease of the American provost personnel." 

Although this situation was a fly in the ointment of generally satisfactory Anglo-American relations in the Corridor, it never endangered 

the effectiveness of operations in the area. If it had, the policy would 

have required review by the Combined Chiefs. The British proved 

entirely able to cope with the defense of the area, as was shown by their 

arrest in August 1943 of the celebrated German agent, Franz Mayer, 

chief of German intelligence in Iran, along with thirty-one of his accomplices who were employed on the ISR. And the combined efforts 

of British, American, Soviet, and Iranian authorities succeeded in 

reducing looting and attacks upon trains and truck convoys to a minimum. It was only in its minor aspects that the situation proved more 

annoying than dangerous. 

Because of its adverse (if minor) effect upon the Anglo-American 

partnership, it may be wondered why the policy-makers, even if they 

failed to heed American warnings in the planning period and went 

ahead with the Combined Chief's plan, did not bring about some modification which, while not called for through any distinct peril to the 

operations, would have eliminated a fruitful source of friction. For they 

were well and truly warned. In June 1942' Colonel Shingler, whose 

responsibilities, it will be recalled, were limited to construction and assembly projects for the British in the aid-to-Russia program, asked 

Washington for a military police unit for control of American soldiers, 

seamen, and civilians and for protection of U.S. equipment and assembly plants. Even at that time he noted that British protective measures were "insufficient and sabotage [presented] serious problems." 4t 

During the planning period immediately preceding adoption of the 

SOS Plan, General Strong presented a memorandum to General Somervell citing cables received from the American military attache at 

Tehran to the effect that British interest in the security of the ISR was 

very considerably less than the military attache thought it ought to be. 

One of these messages contained the statement, "I feel that in order 

.. Rad 349, Shingler to AMSIR Wash, 15 Jun 42. PGF 236. 
BL UEPRINT FOR THE MACHINE 

to carry out our great program of shipping supplies through Iran 

we must transcend the political policies of British rule in Iran." 41 

239 

Shingler did not get his MP's, and when the SOS Plan tables of 

organization were drawn up, they provided for one military police 

battalion and one military police company. After Connolly's arrival in 

the field, with the outcome of battle at Stalingrad still perilously uncertain, and a deterioration of economic, social, and political conditions 

in Iran, he, too, requested Washington to increase the number of MP 

units authorized or the new command.42 On 11 December the 727th 

MP Battalion arrived with the first shipload of service troops. It was 

followed on 7 August 1943 by the 788th MP Battalion. As of 30 April 

1944 the eight companies of these two battalions, scattered in small detachments among seventeen locations in the command, were the only 

MP personnel under Connolly's command, and they were not of the 

first quality.43 To assist them in their local duties, other men were drawn 

from operations and hastily trained. It was clearly Washington policy, 

in view of the British responsibility for security matters, to limit American power in the Corridor to act in the same matters. And as time went 

on and certain annoyances developed, no one was willing to disturb the 

status quo. Security is an essential and inalienable function of military 

command, and military command in the Corridor south of Tehran, in 

all aspects which relied upon control of security measures, was British. 

Even if it had been possible, under the Tri-Partite Treaty, for the British to designate areas over which they would delegate military authority 

to the American command, that delegation would have caused the 

right of the Americans to be present at all to be challenged by the other 

signatories to the treaty.44 Subordination in security matters was a part 

of the price the Americans paid to serve the Allied cause in the Persian 

Corridor. 

41 Memo, Strong for SomervelJ, 24 Aug 42, citing cables of 17 and 18 Jul 43. SOS 

Plan, Copy ContI Div, ASF, Sp Coli, HRS DRB AGO. 

"Rad, Connolly to Scott, 7 Nov 42. PGF 259. 

"Rpt cited n. 37 and Memo cited n. 38. The provost marshal states in these documents 

that the 727th MP Battalion contained "castoffs of infantry and other arms and services ... " 

and 15 percent limited service men; and that although the quality sent him in the 788th 

MP Battalion was better, 50 percent of the officers of both battalions "were not qualified to 

perform the duties of their grades." .. As a matter of fact the question was raised anyhow by the Russians and Iranians. See 

Ch. XX below. 
CHAPTER XII 

The Machine at Work 

A Bird's-Eye View 

The machine conceived by the SOS planners and tentatively 

designed by General Connolly's advance field group was a multipurpose 

one. Not only did it have to take over and expand the assembly and 

construction projects already in existence, it had also to assume the 

transport responsibilities assigned by directive of the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff as the new command's primary mission. It had to be versatile 

enough to meet demands upon it as widely disparate as the conduct of 

negotiations with foreign representatives and the provision of water 

in the desert; as varied as the operation of a railroad and the operation 

of a small station for changing truck tires high in a snowy mountain 

pass. The arrival of the first service troops in December 1942 set the 

machine in motion, a machine composed of men: American soldiers, 

the American civilians who remained during the transition from the 

contractor system to militarization, and, finally, the civilian army of 

natives whose labor and good will were indispensable to the success of 

the aid-to-Russia program.1 

The first large troop shipment came to Khorramshahr after a 

voyage which began at New York on 1 November on the West Point 

and was continued, from Bombay, on British ships of smaller draft, 

the Rhona, the Lancashire, and the Dilwara.2 By the middle of 1943 the 

military strength of the command approached the maximum assigned 

strength of nearly 30,000 officers and men reached in early 1944. The 

year 1943 brought the highest number of native employees on American projects, approximately 42,000 men and women-Iranians, Iraqi, 

Polish refugees, and a sprinkling of other nationalities and races. In 

'For plans for work assignments, see Orders for Processing Shipment 1616 at Khorramshahr. 323.61 Establishment of Military Districts, Binder 2, SL 9008. Port troops were at work unloading ships under British control the day after their landing. Dir of Ports, 

Monthly Rpt of Opns to 28 Feb, 1 Mar 43. PGF 26-A. • For an account of the voyages of the West Point and other ships which brought the new American command to Iran, see HOTI, Pt. V, History of the 3d Military Railway Service, 

by 1st Lt Francis J. Lewis, pp. 32-48. PGF. 
THE MACHINE AT WORK 241 

addition an average of 15,000 Iranian civilians was employed directly 

by the ISR during the period of American operation. Railway employees at the height of operations in 1944 reached 30,000. Although 

exact figures for native employment are not available, it was estimated 

that during the busiest months of 1943 and 1944 the combined AngloAmerican operations in the Persian Corridor used about 100,000 

natives. Because of the greater mechanization of American projects, 

the higher proportion of these workers was employed by the British.s 

Table 13 gives an idea of the scope and variety of the tasks undertaken by the American command. Taken with Chart 2 it helps indicate 

the shifting emphases that fell now upon one sort of task, now upon 

another. The two provide a kind of bird's-eye view of the operation as 

a whole. They show, for instance, that military strength was brought 

to its peak quite early in the game, as all units allocated by the SOS 

Plan, with subsequent accretions, were thrown promptly into the field 

to serve as the machine's basic force. The operating services set up 

under the plan each generated its own pattern. The American command took over the port of Khorramshahr on 7 January 1943, and 

the top month of ports operations came in July 1944. The Motor 

Transport Service began active operations in March 1943 and closed 

on 1 December 1944. The Military Railway Service took over the 

southern sector of the ISR from the British on 1 April 1943 and handed 

the line back on 25 June 1945. Peak strength in native labor, reached 

in November 1943, some months after the peak in military strength, 

preceded by eight months the highest month for ports traffic attained 

in July 1944. This reflects the heavy expenditure of manpower required 

to prepare the facilities-highways, docks, warehouses, camps, posts, 

stations, and other installations-prerequisite to the flow of maximum 

traffic through the Corridor to USSR receiving points. The mission of 

the command was declared accomplished on 1 June 1945. Assembly 

operations proceeded throughout most of the period in a curve which 

reached its maximum in 1944 and then tapered off. The picture as a 

whole is one of a region extending from Khorramshahr to Kazvin-a 

• (1) Peak assigned U.S. military strength came in February 1944 with 29,691 officers 

and men. In addition to the assigned strength, attached military personnel sexved in the 

command area, most of these-sometimes reaching 2,000 in the later period-being personnel of the Air Transport Command. (2) An estimate in February 1943 that combined 

Anglo-American native laborers numbered 125,000 is supplemented by a statement at a. meeting in that month that 81,000 natives were then being provided food rations and that 

a maximum limit of 100,000 was agreed between the British and Americans for native food 

rations. Memo, Maj Richard W. Cooper, Chief, Labor Relations Br, to CG, PGSC, 2 Feb 43, 

sub: Policy on Feeding Native Laborers; Memo, Maj H. R. Eichenberg, Dist QM, Tehran 

Dist, 16 Feb 43, sub: Summary of History of Native Feeding, PGSC, Aug-Nov 42; and 

Min of Mtg, U.S. Army, British Army, and, USSR, 16 Feb 43, sub: Native Feeding. 

PGF 234. 
242 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

distance almost exactly that which separates New York from Detroit 

by road-dotted from end to end by American installations serving a 

dozen principal activities, each keyed to its own tempo, but interdependent and co-ordinated by a central purpose and design. 

The distribution of the machine's working parts-its military personnel and civilian labor forces-among the several tasks illustrates 

the complexity of planning and co-ordination. During the peak of 

operations, from February to September 1944, for example, 17 percent 

of the military strength of the American command was assigned to 

operation of the MTS; 14 percent to the MRS; 3 percent to signals 

work; and the balance of 66 percent to working the ports, assembly 

plants, and depots, to construction and maintenance, and to the overhead and housekeeping activities necessary to the existence of the 

command itself.4 Earlier and later periods show variations in distribution of military strength by tasks. The sampling of trends in civilian 

employment by tasks furnishes another means of measuring the shifting 

of emphasis from one type of work to another, though not an infallible 

one, because its yardstick excludes the military personnel who performed all the work of the Signal Service and much of the highway 

construction program. 

But the trends can be generalized. Table 13 correctly suggests, for 

instance, the conclusion that the greatest activity at the beginning of 

General Connolly's regime was in construction other than highways, 

and that the construction peak was reached early. Highway construction and maintenance, also an important early activity, rounded its 

rising curve later than other types of construction and then declined. 

In the earliest period sampled, the very high civilian employment 

figure for ordnance activity reflects the initial arrival and disposition 

of heavy machinery and equipment which was a nonrecurrent task. 

The service and supply item grows larger as the command's logistical 

performance rises, but continues to increase in the final period sampled 

when military strength was matched, almost man for man, by native 

laborers, three fifths of whom, at that time, were occupied in service 

and supply activities. Port operations employed civilians in a curve 

which parallels the development of port capacity to handle the increasing loads shipped into the Corridor. Employment at depots, other 

than ordnance, roughly parallels the curve of port operations, but 

the civilian employee total reached its peak earlier, and tapered off 

• (1) HOTI, Pt. I, Chs. 1-5, Administration, by George B. Zeigler and (Ch. 5 only) 

Wallace P. Rusterholtz, with Annex by Victor H. Pentlarge, Jr., p. 84. PGF. (2) Ltr, 

CO, PGSC, to House Subcommittee on WD Appropriations, 5 Oct 45. AMET 314.7 Military Histories, SL 8997. 
THE MACHINE AT WORK 243 

sooner than that for the ports themselves, reflecting the intensive efforts 

required to prepare and put into operation a storage and warehouse 

plant which would be capable thereafter of handling maximum loads 

as called upon, and which was geared, after the initial preparations, 

to operate maximum loads with a decreasing labor force. Interpretation of the figures for the railway and motor transport services requires 

the more detailed information furnished in the later chapters devoted 

to their work. The civilian railway figures are not significant, showing 

only those employees who for special reasons were directly employed by 

the U.S. Army; and the :MTS figures indicate only that the American 

trucking system, to which the SOS Plan assigned a relatively lower 

priority than to the other two chief operating services, depended upon 

a large supply of native labor to keep it roIling during the comparatively brief period of its most intensive activity. 

As the story of the command's chief activities proceeds, the routine 

\vork, which cannot be dealt with in detail, must not be forgotten. 

Construction, signal communications, assembly, and the operation of 

ports, railway, and truck convoys, were to be the main business of the 

Americans for three years to come. But without the steady performance of more humdrum assignments common to military establishments, though beset in the Persian Corridor by their own peculiar problems, the accomplishment of the primary mission would have been impossible. There were the quartermaster troops and their native helpers, 

who ran great depots at Khorramshahr and Ahwaz, operated bakeries, 

laundries, ice-cream plants, and refrigerated warehouses; they conducted salvage and repair, took care of supply of troops and installations, and maintained cemeteries. There were also the men of ordnance 

with their depot at Andimeshk and their far-flung activities; the medical, dental, and hospital. personnel; the military police; and those in 

charge of water supply-all shared in the common task, the primary 

mission of getting supplies through to the USSR. 5 

Certain personnel problems applied to the command as a whole. 

Because of the extraordinary demands upon the available labor supply 

imposed by war-born activities, it was essential that Iranian, British, 

Soviet, and American authorities should agree upon general wage rates 

and principles of hiring. Otherwise competition for labor would seriously derange the economy and frustrate the activities of the four nations in the area. Basic American policy was established in December 

1942 and was generally adhered to throughout the remaining period of 

'Documented details of these tasks are in the indexed Persian Gulf Files (PGF) and 

are summarized in an unused draft chapter, "Supporting Services," filed with the manuscript 

of this book in OCMH. 
244 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

operations. Labor policies set by the British deputy assistant director of 

labor and enforced by local British labor officers were accepted by the 

Americans. No one could be hired away from any Allied war organization, including the ISR, the UKCC, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, 

or Soviet or British military organizations, nor could any person be 

hired who resigned from these groups with the intent of joining American enterprises. Rates of pay were to be, in general, those set by the 

British authorities.s To maintain amicable relations with the government of Iran it was later determined that American agencies would 

not hire persons employed by the Iranian Government, unless applicants furnished a release or a leave of absence signed by competent 

Iranian authority.r While it cannot be said that these general policies 

prevented dislocations in the labor market or some raids by one group 

upon the labor supply of another (instances occurred on the part of 

all four national groups), the policy was more honored in the observance 

than in the breach. 

The Iranian economy was nevertheless unfortunately and inevitably upset 'during the war years. Inflation and scarcity of commodities, 

particularly in the summer of 1942, produced food riots at Ahwaz and 

Andimeshk resulting in some deaths. Joint Anglo-American action in 

September instituted a daily ration of flour, tea, and sugar, charged 

for at the rate of two rials 8 against daily wages. The rioting stopped, 

absenteeism diminished, and productivity on war work, especially highway construction, increased, because of the encouragement to steadier 

employment and the increased vigor of the workers. After the new 

American command had established itself, the British authorities raised 

the question of reducing food rations for native workmen, on the 

ground that the required tonnage threw too great a burden upon the 

transportation system. During early 1943 the Americans experienced 

some difficulty in obtaining tea and sugar for native rations from local 

British sources. The Americans were not in favor of reducing the rations and pointed out that 80 percent of the required amount would 

be used within a 1 50-mile radius of the ports, and that 600 tons monthly 

would suffice. It was preferable in the American view to feed the natives 

entirely than to dispense with their labor and have to rely on increased 

American and British military manpower, whose rations would have 

to be imported. 

By the Tri-Partite Treaty Great Britain and the Soviet Union undertook to cause a minimum of disturbance to Iranian economic life. 

• Memo, Gen Scott, 1 Dec 42, sub: Labor Policy. AG 230.05, Hq PGC. T Civ Pers Cir 2, Hq, PGSC, 20 Jan 43. Abstract PGF 261. • By WD Cir 130 (Jul43), the rial was valued at $0,03125. 
THE MACHINE AT WORK 245 

They pledged their best endeavors to safeguard Iran's economic existence. At a conference on 16 February 1943, attended by American, 

British, and Soviet representatives, it was agreed that responsibility for 

the civil population belonged to the Iranian Government but that when 

food was otherwise unobtainable the Allied war agencies should provide 

rations for workmen according to the American-suggested scale. The 

British were to be responsible for the supply of sugar and tea from British military stocks, and of wheat, to be procured through the Middle 

East Supply Center and drawn through British military stocks. By this 

agreement a serious impediment to the successful conclusion of operations in the Corridor was averted.9 

In the south smoldering antagonism between workmen of Arab and 

Persian stock was a fairly constant problem. At some installations there 

was little or no friction; at others the situation required careful handling. In the summer, when the Persians migrated to the north, the 

proportion of Arab laborers tended to increase. The passage of Iraqi 

nationals across the border to the Iranian ports sometimes produced 

difficulties when British security authorities considered border controls 

inadequate. Matters came to a head in the latter part of 1943 with an 

American protest against British closing of the border to all but specialized technical people from Iraq. Measures of control were jointly 

devised which led to confirmation by PAl Force on 5 July 1944 of an 

agreement for frontier control in the Basra-Khorramshahr area.IO 

The employment of American Negro units in Iran did not receive 

the unmixed blessing of the British authorities, who feared that unless 

Negro troops were isolated from the natives the differential in rates of 

pay would cause trouble. They also pointed out that because some 

Arabs and Persians had been slave dealers it would not be tactful to 

place American Negroes in supervisory capacities in the Persian Corridor. It was American policy that Negroes should serve in the armed 

forces in numbers proportionate to the population ratio, and it was 

understood that they would serve under General Connolly and be used 

at his discretion. The original troop disposition plans made in Washington called for three Negro port battalions and two engineer dump 

truck companies, and the first troop shipment on the West Point in~ 

cluded the 435th Engineer Dump Truck Company and Company B 

of the 611th Quartermaster Bakery Battalion les one platoon. During 

the life of the American command Negro troops served in port opera-

"Documents cited n. 3(2). 10 (1) Hist Rpt, Hq, Abadan Air Base, PCC, Oct 44. PCF 2-V. (2) Ltr, Hq, PAl 

Force, to Hq, PCC, 5 Jul 44; and Ltrs, U.S. Provost Marshal to CO's of PCC Dists, 8 and 

18 Aug 44.010.8 Traffic Regulations, SL 8976. 
246 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

tions, highway and airfield construction, maintenance, and motor pools. 

In general, they were assigned to Gulf District, but units also worked 

in the Desert and Mountain Districts, some being stationed at Tehran 

and Hamadan. The 352d Engineer Regiment, whose band was the 

pride of the command, received a wide variety of assignments. Its units 

were stationed in many parts of the Corridor in 1944 before departure 

on 9 November for another theater. 

At no time very numerous, Negro troops at the end of February 

1945 constituted a little over 10 percent of the strength of the PGC, 

which was in proportion to their percentage in the Army as a whole. 

In July 1944 the PGC proposed to supplant its Negro units by importing Italian prisoners of war. Whatever the long-range pressures which 

may have motivated the proposal, it offered a solution for the relief of 

two Negro port battalions whose reduced efficiency after long service 

at the docks was of immediate concern to GHQ. Washington rejected 

the proposal as violating the principle that each theater commander 

must maintain a certain percentage of Negroes in proportion to all 

troops. The status of American troops in the Persian Corridor was not 

a matter of formal international understanding, and the American 

position, as an auxiliary force, was sometimes difficult. It is not surprising that, within this general pattern, the special problems arising from 

the presence of Negro troops in Iran were also difficult.ll 

The Army Takes Over Construction 

The construction program carried on by the Iranian District 

engineer in 1942 suffered more vicissitudes than any other part of the 

task assigned to the Iranian Mission and its successors throughout 

that year of confusion. Handicapped by the late start resulting from the 

shift to Iran from Iraq in the spring and dogged by drastic shortages 

of men and materials which were not overcome until October, just as 

the new regime of General Connolly was taking over, the 1942 opera11 (1) Rad, Connolly to Scott, 7 Nov 42. PGF 259. (2) An article on a Negro bakery 

outfit in Iran appeared in Yank, May 21, 1943; GO 4, Hq 1616-A, SOS, 16 Oct 42; 

History: United States Military Iranian Mission, 20 Mar 43, prepared for Col Don G. 

Shingler, Chief of Mission, by 1st Lt Victor E, Dietze, Hist Off, PGF 242; Memo, Plans 

Div, Hq, SOS, 9 Sep 42, SPOPP 370.5 (9-8-42). (3) Hist Rpt, Engrg Br, Opns Div, 

15 Feb 44-1 Jun 45, PGF 127-1-D; for an account of the 352d Engineer Regiment's service 

and that of the 435th Engineer Dump Truek Company, see HOTI, Pt. III, History of 

Construction, by Victor H. Pentiarge, Jr., pp. 34-45, PGF, where the work of other engineer 

units is also recorded. (4) Strength of the Army, prepared for War Department General 

Staff by Machine Records Branch, Offiee of Adjutant General, under direction of Statistics 

Branch, GS, 1 Mar 45. (5) Rad WAR 70749 to Connolly, 26 Jul 44. 291.2 Negro, SL 

8992. (6) Ltr, Maj Gen John E. Hull to Gen Handy, 24 Jul 44. Paper 991, Bk. 21, File 9, 

OPD Executive Office File. 
THE MACHINE AT WORK 247 

tions nevertheless brought to five the number of berths at Khorramshahr, produced a temporary road in partly usable shape from there 

to Andimeshk, and completed twenty bridges and the buildings contemplated in the first planning. But the new construction fell far short of 

what had been planned to meet traffic requirements even before the 

increased aid-to-Russia commitment. The amount of work which remained to be done to reach SOS Plan requirements therefore assumed 

almost staggering proportions. Every link in the chain of supply operations from Khorramshahr to Kazvin had to be strengthened and new 

facilities provided, not only for the work of the three chief operating 

services, but for the accommodation of the service troops of the new 

command. After the grievous troubles of 1942 the provision of adequate manpower and equipment-coupled with a plan of operations 

no longer, after Stalingrad, subject to overriding tactical prioritiesthrew construction into high gear. By the end of 1943 few major 

construction projects remained to be completed.12 

In construction affairs the transition to the Army's militarized 

program was complicated by the necessity of meshing the new machine 

with the old Iranian District engineer organization while providing 

continuity and simultaneously launching new undertakings. All this 

had to be done at top speed because port, rail, and motor convoy 

operations could not attain maximum efficiency until facilities were 

provided. 

The administrative machinery which was evolved to carry construction operations through the period of transition and onward into 

the activity of 1943 was more complex on paper than in action. When 

General Connolly's principal engineer officer, Colonel Osborne, arrived in the field in early November 1942, construction was still in the 

hands of the Iranian District engineer's office at Ahwaz. Colonel 

Osborne brought with him a small group of six officers and fourteen 

enlisted men called the Engineer Headquarters (Corps) 1616. They 

had been organized the previous September at the Engineer Organization Center, Camp Claiborne, Louisiana, and were trained to conduct 

engineer headquarters activities in the field. In accordance with the 

"(I) Hist Rpt, Cons Br, Opns Div, IS Aug-IS Dec 43. PGF 127-K. (2) Except as 

otherwise noted, authority for the rest of this section is derived from History cited note II (3), 

includin" the section on the Construction Service; Hist Rpts, Cons Div, Cons Br, Opns Div, 

and Engrg Br, Opns Div, 15 Feb 43-1 lun 45, PGF 127; Completion Rpt, Aid-to-Russia 

Highway, prepared bv Engrg Br, Opns Div, Hq, PGC, PGF 127.; Semimo~thly and Monthly 

Rpts of Civilian Employees, 15 Apr 43-31 luI 45, PGF 151; HISt Rpts, ClV Pers Br, Admm 

Div, same period, PGF 151; HOTI, Pt. I, Ch. 7, History of Civilian Personnel Branch 

Activities, Administration Division, Hq, PGC, by Col Richard W. Cooper, PGF; and Memo, 

Opns Di\" Jun 45, for House Mil Affairs Committee, sub: PGC Installations and Facilities, 

319.25 Compilations and Gathering Data, SL 9008. 
248 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

functional plan adopted for the command, construction activities, 

being among the most pressing duties to be performed at the outset, 

were to be carried on by an operating service. When in November five 

operating services were set up, Colonel Osborne became the first 

director of the Construction Service, which, like its parallel services, 

derived its powers and duties from the commanding general. 

Organization of the Construction Service did not immediately result in the extinction of the Iranian District engineer, whose powers 

and duties stemmed from the Chief of Engineers, Washington, through 

the North Atlantic Division engineer, New York. For more than a year 

the Iranian District engineer and the commanding officers of the Iranian Mission and its successors had worked out a modus operandi in spite 

of the theoretical overlapping of their powers and duties. It was necessary to eliminate even theoretical overlapping before the new command got up to its neck in operating responsibilities. Colonel Osborneserving in the triple capacities of General Connolly's chief engineer 

officer in charge of construction, Iranian District engineer, and commanding officer of the Engineer Headq uarters (Corps) 1616-personified the unification of overlapping responsibilities. But although the 

establishment in November of the Construction Service combined personnel of the district engineer's staff and of the Engineer Headquarters 

(Corps) 1616 with the personnel of the new operating service, the 

organizations whose roots extended beyond the Persian Corridor continued to survive. Even before Osborne recommended to Connolly the 

abolition of the Iranian Engineer District, steps were being taken in 

Washington, in view of the militarization of civilian contract activities, 

to simplify procurement and supply for engineer work by turning over 

the duties and property of the two engineer districts in the Middle East 

command to theater services of supply. But the wheels moved slowly, 

and the Iranian Engineer District did not disappear from view until 

1 May 1943. The Engineer Headquarters (Corps) 1616 remained a 

headquarters within the construction machinery until 20 February 

1944.13 

Through the device of combining overlapping functions in a single 

person, construction policy and operations were effectively controlled 

13 (1) Memo, Gen Styer, CofS, SOS, for CofEngrs, 28 Oct 42, sub: Amalgamation of Dist 

Engr Offices with Serv Comds and/or SOS in the USAFIME. PGF 239. (2) Rad AMSME 

1869, Somervell to Maxwell, 18 Nov 42; and Rad 256-Z, Maxwell to Connolly, 4 Dec 42. 

PGF 239. (3) Ltr, NAD Engr to CofEngrs, 8 Apr 43. NA 323 (NAD) 4, NADEF. (4) GO 

11, OCofEngrs, ASF, WD, 17 Apr 43. Same file. (5) Rad, Gen Robins, Actg CofEngrs, 

to Connolly, 1 May 43. 384 Conduct of War with Relation to Commands, SL 9016. 

(6) Ltr, TAG to CofEngrs, 24 Sep 42. AG 370.5 Shipment 1616, Hq PGC. (7) GO 8, 

Hq, PGC, 20 Feb 44. 
THE MACHINE AT WORK 249 

by command headquarters from the start. Like Pooh-Bah, the Lord 

High Everything Else in The Mikado, the director of construction 

could do in that capacity what he might not do as Iranian District 

engineer. A further step toward administrative simplification was the 

early decentralization of operational responsibility, when the geographical subareas were provided with engineer officers and charged 

with construction duties for their areas. In the Ahwaz Area, long the 

headquarters of the Iranian District engineer, the Ahwaz District engineer and the Iranian District engineer were the same person. An exception to the rule which made each geographical district responsible 

for its own construction, the Ahwaz District performed construction 

tasks also for Gulf District until 1 June 1943, when, by a process of 

biological division, a Gulf District engineer office was established with 

personnel from Ahwaz. That the job was not all blueprints and desk 

conferences was grimly emphasized only a few days later. Prospecting 

an uncertain desert track between Ahwaz and Tanuma to determine 

the route of a new road, the Gulf District engineer and his companion 

lost their way and perished under the blazing sun. Search parties found 

their bodies on 12 J une.14 In a context of administrative arrangements 

it is too easy to forget the land that had to be subdued to the purposes 

of the war and the men who subdued it. 

Colonel Osborne served only briefly as the first Director, Construction Service, for in November he went on to head the new Operations 

and Supply Division, being succeeded in construction by Colonel 

McGlone, who, like himself and all who headed construction work 

thereafter, had previously served as an Iranian District engineer. But 

the success of delegating responsibility to the territorial districts soon 

dictated the abolition of the Construction Service in the interests of 

simplification of administrative machinery. The headquarters reorganization of l\1arch 1943, therefore, eliminated the Construction Service, 

but established within a reorganized and newly named Operations 

Division a Construction Branch, whose chief, Colonel McGlone, reported to the division's director, Colonel Osborne. While actual construction was carried on by decentralized district engineers, plans and 

policies were set at GHQ by Construction Branch. This arrangement 

continued for the life of the command, although the branch was 

redesignated Engineering Branch in March 1945.15 

"Hist Rpt, Cons Br, 15 May-IS Jun 43, PGF 127-F, names Maj E. D. Park, but omits 

to name the sergeant who shared his fate. 

" (1) Colonel McGlone and Colonel Cape, his executive officer, both served as Chief, 

Construction Branch, Operations Division. (2) SO 47, Hq, PGSC, 16 Mar 43; SO 89, Hq, 

PGSC, 8 May 43; GO 38, Hq, PGC, 28 Feb 45; SO 68, Hq, PGC, 15 Mar 45. 
250 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

The construction program proceeded in three waves of priority 

determined by need and growing troop strength and materials. First 

priority went to roads, docks, assembly plants, and storage buildings, 

in a continuation and extension of the work already under way in late 

1942. Hospitals, mess halls, barracks, and latrines received second 

priority; while administration buildings, service clubs, and miscellaneous structures came last. As a general policy, work was performed 

by U.S. Army service troops and native labor; but some projects, including over one hundred buildings erected at Hamadan and road 

construction north of Andimeshk, employed local contractors. Because 

of the local availability of mud bricks, kiln bricks, and stone in a country 

where lumber was scarce, the Persian Corridor was one of the few 

overseas areas where permanent or semipermanent construction was 

used. Among many problems arising from climate and local conditions 

was roofing for buildings in the south. After unsuccessful experiments 

with tar paper over boards taken from truck packing cases, a sand 

asphalt compound was developed which stood up well under the sun. 

Electrical and plumbing fixtures came largely from the United States. 

As the American tasks were being transferred from Iraq to Iran, 

Colonel Shingler in April 1942 directed the Iranian District engineer 

to complete a temporary road and a permanent two-way highway between Khorramshahr and Andimeshk and a branch road across to 

Tanuma-Cheybassi by 1 December.1G Because of uncertain security 

conditions to the north of Andimeshk, it was decided in Washington 

in October not to attempt road construction in that region with civilian 

constructors. With only the temporary road completed but not wholly 

surfaced beween Khorramshahr and Andimeshk by December and the 

branch westward to Tanuma-Cheybassi as yet unattempted, it was 

decided to concentrate highway building upon the permanent road to 

Andimeshk and, in conjunction with the British, using military forces 

and native labor, to convert the existing rough road from Andimeshk 

to Kazvin to a highway suitable for heavy truck convoys.17 

The branch road from Khorramshahr to Tanuma was built by 

U.S. engineer troops between July and December 1943. It was extended five and a half miles upstream from Tanuma to Coal Island by 

British contractors with U.S. engineer help. The longer link was maintained by the American command until mid-November 1944, the 

,. Ltr, Shingler to Lieber, 18 Apr 42. PGF 127. 

1T A British request to the Americans to build a road from Andimeshk to Baghdad was 

disapproved as not contributing to the accomplishment of the PGSC's primary mission. 

Colonel Osborne recommended that such aid to the British be deferred until completion of the 

projected aid-to-Russia highways. Ltr [no d., but after 1 Oct 42], Osborne to Scott; and 

Ltr, PGSC to PAl Force, 24 Dec 42. DE File D-I, Operations, NADEF. 
THE MACHINE AT WORK 251 

shorter until April of that year. After taking over the KhorramshahrAndimeshk highway from the engineer constructor and repairing the 

serious damage caused by the floods of March 1943, the new command 

completed the permanent road that year. From Khorramshahr to 

fifteen miles south of Ahwaz a bitumen surface was laid on an embankment of compacted earth. North to fifteen miles beyond Ahwaz a 

sandstone base on earth embankment was used with bitumen surface. 

Beyond, to Andimeshk, the base layer was gravel. The cost of 173 miles 

of road was $28,896,000. 18 

Before 1942 the British and Iranians had worked on the old road 

between Andimeshk and Kazvin; but when the U.S. engineers began 

work on it in June 1943, it was unpaved or badly paved at intervals. 

This long stretch of road was jointly constructed and maintained by 

an Anglo-American agreement reached in August 1943 and revised in 

April 1944.19 The United States built or rebuilt 252 miles; the British, 

with American aid, 178 miles; and the British alone, 30 miles. Because 

of large British contributions of labor and materials, their share of the 

cost was $9,832,000 as against the American share of $5,936,000. The 

road was improved by straightening curves, relocating some stretches, 

cutting away hills, and replacing the surface. Although convoys used it 

during construction, by the coming of first snow most of the length was 

paved or surfaced with gravel which was replaced by paving in 1944. 

Upon an earth embankment was laid a gravel base, surfaced with 

bitumen. 

Maintenance of highways, as agreed between the British and 

American commands, was an American responsibility for the Khorramshahr-Andimeshk road until 1 December 1944, and was shared 

between Andimeshk and Kazvin until June 1945; but winter maintenance policy, separately agreed upon in July 1943, handed over to the 

Americans entire responsibility for flood, slide, and snow control from 

Khorramshahr all the way to Kazvin. For the greater part of 1943, 

while the northern part of the road was under construction, this responsibility threw a severe burden upon American engineer troops and 

heavy equipment, for at the beginning of the year about half the route 

north of Andimeshk was unsurfaced and was being maintained by 

native labor with picks and shovels. By throwing everything into maintenance, by watering, blading, and adding gravel, the road surface was 

" This and subsequent breakdown costs are derived from the sources used for Table 14, 

where estimated costs of constructing American fixed installations in the Persian Corridor 

have been consolidated under general headings and classifications. 19 Joint Directive on Aid·to-Russia Road Construction, Policy, Procedure, and Co-operation, on the Route Andimeshk-Malayer-Hamadan-Kazvin, signed 9 Aug 43. 092.2 Treaties 

and Agreements, SL 8978. 
252 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

sufficiently improved to speed up travel time for the motor convoys, 

and this resulted in reducing maintenance time and labor hitherto 

expended on the vehicles. By the end of 1943 not more than fifty miles 

of road remained unpaved between Andimeshk and Kazvin. 

A detailed inventory of other construction throughout the command would produce a bewildering jumble of items, large and small. 

Dock construction was, fortunately for incoming cargoes, soonest completed. The sixth new berth at Khorramshahr-which, with the old 

concrete berth there before the war, provided seven berths-was completed late in May 1943. Sentab Jetty, described in the later chapter 

on port operations, had been extended from a pygmy a little over 400 

feet long by 50 feet wide to a giant over 3,000 feet long, widened, by 

April 1944, to over 100 feet, and served by access trestles and a maze 

of approach railway tracks. New water lines for fire protection and an 

elaborate system of lighting for night operations made the jetty capable 

of handling the heavy stream of cargo which tested its design and efficiency successfully in 1944. The jetty at Failiyah Creek at Khorramshahr was completed in May 1943, and by August of that year the 

decking laid at Bandar Shahpur on the new British contractor-built 

jetty was in service. 

At Amirabad, on the rising ground between Tehran and the mountains where the Iranian Government had planned a five-year construction program for a cantonment, permission to use the site was granted 

to the American command, and work began early in December 1942 

on the extensive headquarters camp. It was occupied in July 1943. At 

Andimeshk, which was developed into an important rail-to-road transshipping station, base ordnance workshops were established and camps 

for some 3,100 officers and men of ordnance, MTS, and MRS units. 

By the end of 1943, thirty-six posts, camps, and stations, to house and 

serve nearly 30,000 troops, had been completed at a cost of $19,633,900. 

By the end of 1944, airstrips and runways had been constructed, resurfaced, or extended at Andimeshk, Ahwaz, and Abadan; and the British 

had been furnished blueprints for modifications and extensions to Royal 

Air Force fields used by the Americans at Sharja in Trucial Oman, 

Bahrein, Landing Ground H3 in western Iraq, and at Habbaniya. At 

the Soviet-controlled airfield at Tehran, Qaleh Morgeh, jointly occupied by Russians and Americans, temporary construction, the only sort 

allowed by the Russians, was accomplished. In 1945 little construction 

work remained to be done except such desirable flourishes as swimming 

pools and the installation of air-conditioning apparatus. 

The cost estimates in Table 14 furnish a reliable index to the scope 
THE MACHINE AT WORK 253 

and distribution of the construction program by large categories; but, 

because they do not include such items as the expense of maintaining 

the military establishment which did the constructing, they fall short 

of expressing the full expenditure of treasure which went into the facilities essential to deliver supplies to the USSR. The table does not 

show individual projects, like that at Khurramabad where installations 

exceeded one million dollars; or Amirabad, which came to more than 

two and a quarter millions; or Ahwaz, to over two millions. It does not 

itemize the nearly ten millions of dollars which went into the port of 

Khorramshahr, in which the British interest came to one third; or the 

nearly four millions required to put Bandar Shahpur into shape, less 

than one quarter of that amount being American interest. Of the total 

consolidated cost estimate, approaching one hundred million dollars, 

more than half was required to create the aid-to-Russia highways used 

by American truck convoys, and by far the greater part of that amount 

was borne by the American taxpayer. But more than one third of the 

estimated cost of constructing American fixed installations fell to the 

British share in the experiment in co-operation. 

Signal Communications 

Of the five operating services established in November 1942, the 

Signal Service, originally called the Signal Communication Service, 

was the smallest, its military strength at the peak of signals activity in 

July 1944 numbering about 1,000 officers and men including a headquarters staff at Tehran of about 150. Its first director, Colonel Thomas, 

served from his arrival in the field in November 1942 until he became 

Chief of Staff, PGC, in January 1945, when he was succeeded by Lt. 

Col. George H. Combel. 20 The Signal Service was dissolved on 14 

August 1945, being replaced by Signal Branch, Operations Division. 21 

Administratively the Signal Service was a command-wide operating service which derived its powers and responsibilities from the commanding general. It exercised direct control over all signal installations 

.. Relieved 15 June 1945 by Major Sherwen. Rpt, Ex Off to CofS, to CofS, 22 Jun 45. 

PGF 251-C. 

:n (I) For technical details of signals operations see Communications in the Persian Gulf 

Command, edited by Capt Sidney L. Jackson, Historical Section, OCSigO. October 1944, 

filed as Pt. I, Ch. 8, sec. 2 of HOTI, PGF; and Pentlarge's A Supplement to Communications 

in the PGC Apr 46, filed as above. (2) The basic sources for this section are the Historical 

Reports of the Signal Service, 15 May 43-15 Aug 45, PGF 133, and especially those for 

10 Aug 44, 14 Jul 45, and 15 Aug 45. Also GO 34, Hq, PGSC, 31 May 43 (defining signal 

functions) ; Interv with Col Thomas, 1 Dec 44; Ltr, Gen Thomas to Col A. F. Clark, Jr., 

22 Apr 46, PGF 133; and A Brief Description of the Development. and Present Oper:,~ions 

of the Persian Gulf Command, prepared 31 Aug 44 for the Superintendent, U.S. MIlItary 

Academy, and transmitted by Ltr, 24 Oct 44, Historical Report 1944, SL 8997. 
254 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

and facilities in the command, equally for construction, operation, 2nd 

maintenance. It could call upon the district commanders for unit 

supplies and help in other housekeeping matters in which districts acted 

as service organizations. At the outset local responsibility was exercised 

through subordinate signal headquarters within each of the command's 

territorial districts; but after a period of trial this arrangement was 

found to handicap the development and operation of continuous lines 

along the railway by subjecting them to the separate local authority 

of the district signal officers across whose territories the railway com" 

munications ran. Effective 1 June 1943, therefore, four signal sectors 

independent of the district organizations were set up. Three of these 

sectors corresponded in territory to the districts, and maintained headquarters at Basra, Ahwaz, and Tehran. They were not concerned with 

railway communications, but rather with local wire and radio installations within camps and stations. The fourth sector, with its head" 

quarters at Tehran, was responsible for what eventually became, in 

effect, a long"lines system for the whole command, extending from 

Khorramshahr, Bandar Shahpur, and Tanuma-Cheybassi to Tehran, 

paralleling the railway, and operating as a single unit of communication. Auxiliary functions of the Signal Service included the installation 

of beacons for aircraft, train and road dispatch systems, and facilities 

for the Iranian Government. 

At the time of the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran civil communications were rudimentary. Two circuits ran from the Gulf to Tehran, 

and these were supplemented by British improvements during 1942. 

With the arrival in December of the 833d Signal Service Company the 

Americans began to establish radio communication between major 

posts in the command. Construction of wire facilities started with the 

arrival in March 1943 of the 95th Signal Battalion, but proceeded 

slowly because their equipment, shipped separately, arrived months 

after they did. Meanwhile they borrowed what they could from the 

British, mostly for local telephone systems, and relied upon radio for 

intra command communication. When the 231st Signal Operation 

Company reached the field in the middle of 1943, the 95th Signal 

Battalion was freed for additional construction and for maintenance of 

wire lines already strung. By early 1944 major signal construction was 

completed. At peak command operations that year, the Signal Service 

operated 11 fixed radio stations, 15 teletype stations, and 17 telephone 

switchboards with a capacity of 40 or more lines. About 500 miles of 

pole line had been erected, over 8,000 miles of wire strung, and 12,000 

miles of wire maintained. In maintenance there was a division of labor 

with the British, who were responsible for all wire along the highway 
THE MACHINE AT WORK 255 

route. The American command maintained all wire along the railway 

line. Because of their overriding responsibility for security in the 

Corridor, the British were charged with protection of all long lines 

between American camps, American security responsibility being confined, in theory, to local lines within the boundaries of U.S. installations; but in practice, American troops aided in guarding lines 

wherever there was greatest incidence of thieving or threat of sabotage. 

Throughout the history of the command signal operations were 

hampered by wire thefts. It was the practice of marauders to cut long 

lengths of copper wire, for which they showed a marked preference, 

from the poles and then to escape before security patrols or automatic 

alarm systems could act effectively. Some of the copper so lifted would 

turn up in the bazaars as trinkets or coat hangers. It has been estimated 

that about 250 miles of copper wire was stolen. 22 The disruption of 

service through wire thefts was a disturbing factor in telephone and 

teletype operations, and contributed to the decision to keep the radio 

system intact after the completion of the faster and more efficient wire 

systems rendered radio a less desirable means of communication. The 

ma jor dependence of the command upon wire systems is indicated by 

the monthly total of five million groups transmitted by teletype at the 

peak of operations, contrasted to half a million groups per month by 

radio. In addition, toll calls by telephone approximated 25,000 per 

month. 

When time came to contract communications in keeping with the 

general reduction in command activities, wire installations were among 

the first to be discontinued. Arrangements were concluded late in February 1945 to give over to the British the lines between Bandar Shah pur 

and Ahwaz for maintenance and the signal office at Bandar Shahpur 

for operation. Late in July all wire teletype equipment was removed 

from service; but Khorramshahr-Tehran and Khorramshahr-Abadan 

radio teletype circuits remained, as did the telephone lines. By the end 

of September the signals men were no longer operating long distance 

telephone lines, and had turned them over to the British for disposal. 

Thereafter only local switchboards were maintained and operated by 

the Americans. In October Operations Division, Headquarters, PGSC, 

was notified that the British had sold the combined Anglo-American 

telecommunications system to the Iranian Government for approximately a million dollars, of which the American share was approximatelv $310,000, amounting to 17 percent of the cost of construction, 

including materials and labor. Almost to the end of the command's 

.. Ltr cited n. 21 (2). 
256 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

existence radio served for communications, both within the command's 

territory and between PGSC and the Africa-Middle East Theater in 

Cairo, but for the last few days PAl Force furnished the Americans 

what communications service they required.:! 

The bare and brief recital of facts leaves to be read between the 

lines the achievement of the men of the Signal Corps who, starting 

almost from scratch, created a network of instant and reliable communication without which the work of moving supplies to the USSR 

would have been severely handicapped. Not the least of their triumphs 

was the picturesque feat of stringing more than forty miles of open 

wire through railway tunnels 7,000 feet aloft in forbidding mountains, 

while trains laden with .the materials of war rolled by at 30-minute 

intervals. Man for man, the contribution of the Signal Service to the 

success of the command's mission was no less significant than that of 

the larger numbers at the docks, in the storage yards, repair shops, and 

assembly plants, or pushing north by truck and train. 

The Command and Air Activities 

Official American air transport to and through the Persian Gulf 

area was accomplished by the Air Transport Command (ATC). Its 

operations were subject to its own determination but there was an administrative relationship between ATC and the theater command.24 

From 8 February 1943, all weather, airway communications, and 

ATC units or detachments operating in the PGSC were attached to that 

headquarters for administrative supervision. This meant that the command held housekeeping responsibility for ATC installations including the following services: base censorship; third, fourth, and fifth 

echelon repair for vehicles; hospitalization; laundry; military police; 

supply other than Air Corps technical; postal; bakery; post exchange; 

runway maintenance; salvage; repair and disposition; utilities; and 

burial.2S 

Iranian airfields used by ATC were located at Abadan, Tehran, 

and Kazvin. Airfields used by ATC outside Iran were at Basra, Sharja, 

Bahrein, Habbaniya, and Landing Ground H3. In June 1943 ATC 

units at Basra moved to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company airfield at 

.. (1) Rpt, Ex Off to CofS, to CofS, 1 Mar 45. PGF 251-C. (2) Rpt, Sig Serv to CofS, 

27 Jun 45 and 1 Aug 45. PGF 251-B. (3) Rpts, Opns Div to CofS, 3 and 18 Oct 45. 

PGF 251-B . .. In addition to the airfields operated or used by ATC, the headquarters flight of the 

American command occasionally used airstrips at Ahwaz, Andimeshk, Khurramabad, 

Sultanabad, and Hamadan . .. (1) HOTI, Pt. II, Ch. I, The Abadan Aircraft Assembly Plant (and Air Base), by 

Wallace P. Rusterholtz, p. 2. PGF. (2) Hist Rpt, Ports Serv, Feb 45, p. 1. PGF 26-Z. 
THE MACHINE AT WORK 257 

Abadan because the Margil airport at Basra was too small.26 Under 

agreement with the British the Abadan field was operated by the ATC. 

Operational personnel and air operations were under the direct control 

of the ATC. 

Abadan Air Base was used extensively, particularly as a stop on 

the route from Cairo to Karachi. Aircraft assembled for the USSR at 

the Abadan plant were flown away from the Abadan Air Base. The 

number of landings ranged from approximately 500 to 1,500 per 

month. During October 1944, one of the field's busiest months, 1,649 

landings were made there. In order to provide for the large numbers 

of transients passing through and for A TC personnel assigned to 

Abadan, the command, in 1944, undertook some major construction. 

The housing area was enlarged from a 200-man camp to a 2,900-man 

camp. Mess halls, recreational facilities, and air conditioning were installed and utility systems were completely revised. Besides construction, PGC's housekeeping services at Abadan were expanded according to the planned increase in operations. For instance, during the 

month of October 1944, 1,373 PGC military personnel were attached 

to Abadan to provide necessary services. In addition, 1,100 native 

employees served the A TC in aircraft and post maintenance and in 

improving the runways.21 

At the RAF fields at Sharja, Bahrein, Habbaniya, and Landing 

Ground H3, the A TC was at first assigned landing rights only but later 

was allowed to conduct its own operations under British over-all control. PGC was responsible for conducting negotiations between the 

RAF and A TC. ATC provided information regarding required facilities at the fields which PGC relayed to the RAF. Actual construction 

was the rtsponsibility of the British, but a PGC officer was stationed at 

each field to act as liaison between the constructing agency and PGC.28 

Extensive ATC operations at Bahrein began in the summer of 1944. 

From February to May 1944, the ATC units at Bahrein were detachments from those at Abadan. PGC provided housekeeping services for 

ATC personnel operating at Bahrein. ATC required some extensive 

construction at Bahrein for which PGC supplied some materials and 

co-ordinated requests with the British. 

The first A TC operations at Habbaniya in October 1943 were few; 

but by April 1944 ATC required housing for 250 operating personnel 

and 250 transients. These ATC troops were under the administrative 

,. History cited n. 25 (1). 

,., (1) Rpt cited n. 10 ( 1 ). (2) Page 10 of Rpt cited n. 11 (3). (3) Station List, Hq, PGC, 

as of Oct 44. PGF 230-V. 

• Page 4- of Rpt cited n. 11 (3). 
258 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

jurisdiction of PGC. In October 1944 80 PGC troops were at 

Habbaniya carrying out the PGC mission there.29 

ATC operations at Sharja began early in 1944. In June 1944 a 

request to provide quarters for 115 officers and 185 enlisted men was 

handled through the PGC. A complete camp, including living quart(~rs, operations building, water facilities, recreation building, and warehouse, had to be constructed at Sharja. In October 1944, 116 PGC 

personnel were assigned there. PGC responsibility for ATC operations 

at Landing Ground H3 was the same as that for other British-controlled 

fields. In October 1944 nine PGC military personnel were at Landing 

Ground H3.30 

The Qaleh Morgeh airport at Tehran was under USSR control, 

but the ATC was allowed to use the field. PGC provided facilities and 

administrative services for the ATC there. Repairs were made on an 

existing hangar utilized by U.S. personnel. A temporary terminal 

building was built, runway lights were installed, and other improvements were made at the field. As late as November 1944 General Connolly expected that he might have to build an airfield at Tehran.s1 

Studies made for an all-American airfield with two runways and all 

navigation and maintenance equipment went no further, as joint 

Soviet-American use of the Qaleh Morgeh airport continued to the 

end. The Soviet-controlled airfield at Kazvin was used by ATC for 

emergencies only. No U.S. personnel were stationed there. 

Logistical Support of FRANTIC Mission 

This survey of command activities as a whole will conclude with 

mention of two of its undertakings in support of other theaters of operation. The first of these tasks was to contribute, though briefly, to the 

war in the European theater. The other was in aid of China-BurmaIndia. 

On 1 November 1943, a U.S. military mission to the USSR, headed 

by Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, was organized. Deane's mission achieved 

many things in the Soviet Union. Most pertinent to this history was 

the successful negotiation of Soviet permission to establish airfields in 

the Soviet Union from which shuttle bombing of German territory 

could be accomplished. Soviet approval for the project was given on 

2 February 1944, whereupon the Eastern Command, code-named 

to (1) Historv of the North African Div, ATe, 1 Mar 45-30 Sep 45, p. 497, Archives 

of the Air Hist Office, File 313 A (Mar 45-Sep 45). (2) Station List cited n. 27 (3). ao (1) Page 516 of History cited n. 29(1). (2) Rpt cited n. 10(1), ., Ltr, Connolly to Giles, 16 Nov 44. AG 686 Dhahran, Hq AMET. 
THE MACHINE AT WORK 259 

FRANTIC Mission, was established to carry out the shuttle-bombing 

operations. Late in February General Connolly was notified that he 

would be responsible for supplying FRANTIC Mission and that all air 

shipments required in the establishment of FRANTIC would be routed 

through the Persian Corridor. 32 

By the end of March agreement with the Soviets was reached that 

U.S. personnel would arrive at FRANTIC bases via Tehran where 

Connolly would secure group visas for them from the Soviet Embassy.s3 

Construction of airstrips with steel mats and necessary buildings 

on the sites agreed upon at Poltava, Mirgorod, and Piryatin in the 

Ukraine, was begun in the spring of 1944. These bases were completed 

in May and the first shuttle-flight landings were made in June 1944 by 

seventy-three Fortresses which had left Italy and bombed a German 

airdrome at Debrecen, Hungary.34 

The PGC acted as the services of supply or base section to the 

Eastern Command. Items for issue to FRANTIC Mission were requisitioned by PGC and transported through PGC to the bases. Three 

types of transport were used in the Persian Gulf area: motor, rail, and 

air. PGC co-ordinated emergency shipments by air and sorted and 

transshipped necessary items. 

In addition to requisitioning supplies, providing motor vehicles and 

rail cars, and co-ordinating air shipments, PGC arranged for uniform 

billing and marking to insure prompt delivery to the Eastern Command; stored supplies for which transportation was not immediately 

available; and co-ordinated with the Soviets in Tehran the proper 

clearance of personnel and cargo. Shipments were routed through 

Tehran and Tabriz, and Moscow and Poltava were advised when 

supplies left both points. 

Though the first echelon for FRANTIC Mission entered the USSR 

from the PGC on 25 February 1944, major personnel shipments were 

not begun until 22 April. These went overland from Cairo to Hamadan 

under British auspices. From Hamadan, MTS transported them to 

Tabriz, at which point the Soviets provided for the remaining portion 

of the trip. All records testify to the comfort and efficiency of the 

accommodations provided by the Soviets over that part of the men's 

journey which lay within their borders. Altogether 1,276 persons were 

shipped through the PGC to the Eastern Command.3s 

n Memo, Col N. M. Martin for Lt Col Augustus H. Martin, 7 Jun 44, sub: Establishment of the Eastern Comd, USSTAF. PGF 237. 33 Deane, The Strange Alliance, p. 112. 

" Deane, The Strange Alliance, pp. 118-21. .. (l) Memo cited n. 32. (2) Memo, 1st Lt William G. Lerchen, Jr., for Ex Off to 

CofS, Hq, PGC, 21 Jul 44, sub: Status of Eastern Comd Project. PGF 237. 
260 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

Aside from supplying the shuttle bases in the USSR, PGC gave 

technical assistance, established a replacement pool, and assumed 

medical responsibility for FRANTIC Mission. 

During July 1944 PGC was concerned with plans for the staging 

and transportation to Poltava of the 427th Night Fighter Squadron, 

but this project, called Mission 16, was abandoned in August.36 

The shuttle bases served eighteen missions in the early summer of 

1944; but two developments shortened the life of FRANTIC. First, the 

Germans promptly harried Poltava, beginning on 22 June, only twenty 

days after the first landings there by American shuttle bombers. Then 

later, as the fighting front receded westward, the usefulness of the 

bases diminished. On 24 September the withdrawal of Eastern Command personnel was ordered. Four days later, General Deane notified 

PGC that two trains would leave Poltava on 2 and 9 October, respectively, carrying 40 officers and 360 enlisted men each. Some personnel were to be evacuated by air and 200 were to remain at Poltava 

for the winter. PGC was responsible for the evacuation of all supplies 

and personnel and, throughout the winter, continued to send suppli~s 

to the winter detachment remaining at Poltava. The last U.S. soldier 

left the Ukraine in April 1945.3T 

The total logistical support given FRANTIC Mission by the PGC is 

difficult to estimate on the basis of available statistics. The MRS transported 8,513 long tons of Eastern Command cargo north of Andimeshk 

from June through September 1944.88 To this figure must be added the 

amount of cargo evacuated from the Eastern Command by MRS as 

well as the contribution of the MTS which carried personnel and cargo 

to Tabriz and 'which also evacuated supplies from Tabriz during 

September and October. 

The Command and Project LUX 

In the fall of 1944 an urgent need for 500 cargo trucks developed 

in the China-Eurma-India theater. Some forward air bases had been 

lost or were about to be lost so that supplies could no longer be flown 

to the front. Trucks were needed to transport goods along the ever 

lengthening supply lines. The most logical source for these was the 

Persian Gulf Command which was assembling trucks for the Soviets, 

whose requirements by late 1944 were beginning to decline. The diffi-

•• Extracts, Rpts, Ex Off to CofS. PGF 251-A, B . .., (1) Deane, The Strange Alliance, p. 124. (2) Rpt, Eastern Command, based on un- dated Memos by Col Martin, Ex Off to coes. PGF 237 . .. Table 5. 
THE MACHINE AT WORK 261 

culty lay in getting the trucks from the PGC to China. All of China's 

ports were in the hands of the enemy and the Burma Road was still 

closed. The one open route was from Iran through Turkestan Soviet 

Socialist Republic and Sinkiang Province in China to Kunming. (Map 

I-inside back cover) This route was peppered with obstacles. I t wound 

through some of the most difficult terrain in the world-plateau, desert, 

and mountain. None of it was well mapped, the climate was known 

to be extremely cold, and the territory was inhabited by hostile 

nomads. 39 

On 4 October 1944, a cable signed by General Marshall was dispatched to General Connolly stating that 500 trucks were to be transferred from PGC to CBI. The cable stipulated that PGC personnel 

would convoy the trucks and that PGC and CBI would decide whether 

personnel would be retained by CBI after their arrival. MTS trucks 

or Soviet vehicles were to be us.ed. 

Planning for the operation was delegated to Headquarters, MTS, 

until 31 October 1944, when the project was officially entitled Lux 

and a separate headquarters for it was established within the PGC. 

Liaison officers from CBI were attached to the new organization. 

The total convoy strength, as planned, was to be 1,100 including 

two quartermaster trucking battalions, one maintenance company, and 

engineer, signals, and medical detachments. PGC and CBI disagreed 

as to plans for the disposal of convoy personnel upon completion of the 

mission. CBI wished to retain the drivers as there were no surplus 

trained drivers in that theater. PGC maintained that it could not continue its operations at full tilt with a deduction of 1,100 men. Shrinkage 

in MTS operations by November enabled the War Department to 

settle the matter by allocating Lux convoy personnel to CBI. Disagreement also arose over troops, CBI insisting that only white troops be 

used in China, while PGC urged that the proportion of Negroes be the 

same as existed in the command. PGC was overruled on this point, also, 

and convoy personnel included no Negro troops. 

The Lux convoy route as mapped out was estimated at 8,000 miles. 

From Ashkhabad in Turkestan SSR for 3,000 miles to Sary-Uzek, the 

convoy was to be transported by the Trans-Turkestan Railway. The 

remaining 5,000 miles were to be covered by truck convoy. The ad-

.. (1) The sources for this section are Hist Rpt by Lt Col Charles E. Stilson, Ex Off 

of Movement 59003, 29 Dec 44, PGF 164; other Hist Rpts and photographs, Oct-Dec 44, 

same file; six unnumbered folders on Project Lux (Movement 59003), AG Files, Hq PGC; 

and HOTI, Pt. VII, Ch. 3, History of Project Lux, by Victor H. Pentlarge, Jr., PGF. 

(2) A fuller treatment of Lux appears in Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, The 

U.S. Army and the China-Burma-India Theaters: Vol. II, Command Problems, 1943-1944, 

a volume now in preparation in this series. 
262 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

vance party was scheduled to leave Ahwaz on 30 November 1944 with 

eleven serials following. It was calculated that the whole movement 

would take about three months. 

The Soviets agreed to release to Project Lux 493 trucks already 

assigned to them. They further offered to transport the whole convoy 

over about one third of its journey, through Turkestan, and to render 

substantial assistance in the way of food, communications, and gasoline. Final plans assigned the convoy 500 vehicles: 423 2Y2-ton 6 x 4 

Studebaker trucks, each with a 1-ton trailer; 50 winch-equipped 6 x 6 

cargo trucks; 20 weapons carriers; 3 command cars; and 4 ambulances. 

Provision was also made for the amounts of gasoline, food, and water 

to be carried, allowance being made for possible restocking along the 

route; arctic clothing and other equipment were duly planned for, as 

were communication facilities for the convoy. Lt. John Clark, a CBI 

expert on North China who was flown to Tehran as adviser to Lux, 

felt that if the convoy displayed insignia and properly identified itself, 

it would pass unscathed through certain parts of Kansu Province where, 

since mid-July, intermittent mining and raiding had been occurring. 

On the other hand, information transmitted by the Soviet Foreign 

Office through the American Embassy at Moscow indicated disturbance 

along the convoy route in Sinkiang so severe as to make postponement 

of the movement of trucks to China, in Soviet opinion, highly desirable. 

Confirmation came shortly afterward from Maj. Gen. Albert C. \Yedemeyer, Commanding General, U.S. Forces, China theater, that disturbances around the city of I-ning were increasing. General Deane 

radioed from Moscow that the Soviet Government would not now undertake to assist the agreed movement through Turkestan, and General 

Connolly decided to hold up the convoy at Ahwaz. 

On 30 November, the day the convoy was to have set out, the War 

Department advised that final decision on the convoy's departure would 

come from Washington. On 7 December General Wedemeyer notified 

the War Department that conditions in Sinkiang were growing worse 

and indefinite postponement of Project Lux would be justified. Two 

days later, General Marshall cabled Connolly that the War Department wished to move Lux convoy by water to Calcutta and from there 

overland to China as soon as the Burma Road could be used. Connolly 

replied that more rapid delivery could be made by sending the convoy 

to Zahidan and thence by rail to Karachi and across India. General 

Wedemeyer thought that time thus saved would not justify wear and 

tear on the trucks. 

The original route and all alternatives except General Marshall's 

were abandoned, and it was finally decided to move the convoy in ac-
THE MACHINE AT WORK 263 

cordance with the Chief of Staff's cable. New plans were therefore 

developed in the PGC to crate and ship Lux cargo vehicles to Calcutta 

for later reassembly; to leave behind trailers and special vehicles not 

needed for the new route; and to ship a few other vehicles already 

assembled. Its planning function ended, the organization at PGC headquarters which had been responsible for Project Lux since 31 October 

was inactivated on 17 December. The operation proceeded to Calcutta 

by three ships, the first of which left the Persian Gulf on 24 December 

1944, and the moyement of all echelons of Lux from the Persian Gulf 

to Kunming was completed on 12 March 1945. The route, covering 

1,775 miles, used ships to Calcutta, rail to Assam, and the Burma Road 

beyond Assam. No part of the original cargo was lost in transit. Thus, 

after a good deal of planning and a great heave of performance, PGC 

discharged this service to CBI without interfering with its primary 

mission. 
CHAPTER XIII 

The Air Corps Takes Over 

Aircraft Assembly 

The assembly of aircraft for the USSR under the several protocol 

agreements, by which the United States in conjunction with the United 

Kingdom and the Dominion of Canada promised material aid to the 

Soviet Union, was one of the tasks assigned to the Iranian Mission and 

continued by its successors. In accordance with the pattern of the 1941 

planning period, operating responsibility for aircraft assembly at 

Abadan was at first exercised by the Douglas Aircraft Company under 

contract to the U.S. Army Air Corps. During the period of Douglas 

operation, ending on 31 March 1943, about seventy-five planes on an 

average were delivered monthly to Soviet pilots who flew them off 

to the battle lines. During the period of Air Corps operation, from 

1 April 1943 through 31 January 1945, when the Abadan aircraft 

assembly plant was disbanded, deliveries to the Russians averaged 

182.9 aircraft monthly. The flow of aircraft from the United States to 

the USSR was greatest during the period of the Third (London) Protocol, 1 July 1943 through 30 June 1944, when 5,735 planes were delivered by the United States to the Russians at Fairbanks, Alaska, the 

north Russian ports of Archangel and Murmansk, and via the Persian 

Gulf. In this year, 2,902 aircraft were delivered by the U.S. Army in 

the Persian Corridor. During the peak year of American shipments of 

aircraft to the USSR, Abadan, therefore, accounted for half of all the 

aircraft delivered, in contrast to its one third share of the total made 

available by all routes for the entire period of lend-lease deliveries.1 

The Pressure of the Protocols 

The ability of the American command to raise the average monthly 

output of assembled planes by almost 150 percent and to handle half 

1 (1) Table 10. (2) Report on War Aid Furnished by the United States to the USSR, 

Foreign Economic Sec, Office of Foreign Liquidation, Dept State, 28 Nov 45. (3) See also 

Chart 3. 
THE AIR CORPS TAKES OVER AIRCRAFT ASSEMBLY 265 

the total world-wide deliveries during the peak year can be ascribed to 

the increase in manpower and resources which followed militarization 

of the project in April 1943. But this increase was not always commensurate with the flow of incoming aircraft. Throughout the life of 

the assembly task, the struggle against the backlog remained, as during 

the period of contractor operation, the chief problem to be surmounted. 

In ordinary assembly operations where the quantity of materials may 

vary it is customary to maintain a fairly constant backlog to provide 

continuity of production. But assembly of aircraft for the USSR was 

not an ordinary operation. Provision of the maximum number of planes 

for use against the enemy made the reduction of backlog to zero the 

desirable but unattainable ideal. Furthermore, the accumulation on 

the ground of serviceable aircraft was a constant invitation to enemy 

bombing raids. The fact that no such raids took place did not cancel 

out the wisdom of providing against their possible occurrence. The 

battle of the backlog may seem merely of statistical significance, a humdrum matter of figures which ought to balance: so many arrivals, so 

many assemblies, so many deliveries. (Tables 10 and II, Appendix A) 

It was actually anything but humdrum. Creatures of the unexpected 

and the unpredictable, the figures measure success or failure in the 

effort to meet inexorable protocol demands. 

There was, in the first place, the highly variable rate of arrivals 

which never could be systematically co-ordinated with the supply of 

manpO\,,-er. One reads, for example, the message sent in April 1943 

from General Sidney Spalding in Washington to Averell Harriman 

at London. The Prime Minister had just forwarded to Harry Hopkins 

a proposal for the British to ship 285 aircraft due from them under the 

protocols to the USSR via Abadan. The Abadan plant was then in the 

throes of transition from civilian to military operation; but Washington approved, stating, "This number of airplanes may temporarily 

overload erection facilities and result in some delay in delivery to 

Russia. Army Air Force agrees to strengthen Abadan as much as possible to facilitate erection of the 285 airplanes." 2 It was up to Abadan 

after that, whether or not the strengthening was achieved in time or 

ever. 

Then there was the weather, that unappreciated hobgoblin of the 

Persian Corridor. As of 1 April, when the Air Corps took over Douglas's 

Ce.dar Project, what a report calls "unusual weather conditions" had 

for some time prevented the take-off of completed planes from Abadan 

with the result that 107 of them waited at the field to be flown away. 

'Rad, Gen Sidney Spalding to Harriman, 23 Apr 43, cited MS Index to the Hopkins 

Papers, Vol. II, Bk. VII, Lend-Lease Aid to Russia (1942-43), p. 5, Item 48. 
266 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

This kind of situation offered continuing obstacles to the smooth flow of 

the assembly and delivery process. To cite a further example of the 

unpredictable, on 1 April, among the 192 aircraft on hand which were 

either not yet assembled or not yet put into serviceable condition were 

16 P-40's immobilized because their belly fuel tanks had been borrowed 

by the Russians to enable them to fly out Spitfires delivered to them at 

Abadan by the RAF without auxiliary tanks. These were among a lot 

of 50 Spitfires being delivered to the USSR by the RAF in return for 

40 Bostons lent by the Russians to the British the previous summer 

during the crisis in the fighting in Egypt. Not a week passed without its 

quota of similar problems requiring special adjustment and solution in 

a hurry. They must be read between the lines of the humdrum story.s 

Manpower, Procedures, and Production 

On 1 April 1943 Colonel Porter, commanding officer of Abadan 

Air Base and of headquarters, 82d Air Depot Group, had at his disposal436 officers and men of the Air Forces, of whom 334 were members of the 17th Depot Repair Squadron which had been on detached 

service with the 82d Air Depot Group since January, learning from 

the Douglas civilians the special points of assembly at Abadan. There 

were also 165 Soviet operatives and 54 native laborers; but of the 193 

Douglas civilians at the site on that date, only 125 stayed to the end of 

the month. Of these only 55 were of the former Cedar Project, the rest 

being borrowed from the Douglas Project 19 at Gura, Eritrea. Some 

civilians, their contracts concluded, were returned to the United States. 

Although this working force delivered 214 aircraft to the USSR in 

April, a peak figure to that date, the backlog at the end of the month 

was 235. Progress in one direction was vitiated by backsliding in the 

other. It was a time for strengthening manpower. But just at this point, 

on 2 May, the 17th Depot Repair Squadron departed to join the Ninth 

Air Force in North Africa, leaving Colonel Porter with a serious manpower shortage. An appeal to General Connolly for the loan of 36 

enlisted men for thirty days was refused on the grounds of personnel 

shortage in the command generally; but the visit to Abadan on 16 May 

of Maj. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Air 

Forces, resulted in a requisition being made on Washington to ship 65 

men. It did not help the immediate situation that in April the 18th 

Depot Repair Squadron of 10 officers and 338 enlisted men had been 

shipped from the United States to replace the 17th. The 18th did not 

• Ltr, Capt A. B. Swank, Conti Div, Hq, POSC, to CoES, PGSC, 18 Apr 43, sub: 

Status of Aircraft Deliveries at Abadan. PGF 2. 
THE AIR CORPS TAKES OVER AIRCRAFT ASSEMBLY 267 

arrive until 12 July, by which time the backlog had risen to 550. Meanwhile deliveries dropped in May to 152, in June to 96. The backlog 

exceeded 200. With some Douglas civilians borrowed from Gura to 

make a total of 185 for June, and with 140 officers and men of the 82d 

Air Depot Group, Colonel Porter faced the rising backlog with only 

slightly over half the Americans, military and civilian, that were at 

Abadan three months earlier. June also brought word from Patterson 

Field, Ohio, that nearly 300 aircraft would reach Abadan in July 

for processing. To intensify the crisis, the number that arrived exceeded 

490. \Vith its working force cut in half, Abadan faced its biggest work 

load. Patterson Field advised Colonel Porter to inform the British at 

Basra that the RAF representatives in Washington had been told that 

the RAF in Iraq could expect to be called upon to help out at Abadan. 

This appears something like the "strengthening" mentioned in Washington in April in connection with the extra shipment arranged between 

Churchill and Harry Hopkins. Colonel Porter, 12,000 miles nearer 

reality than \Vashington, replied that the RAF was itself undermanned 

and could not supply the help it had offered on an earlier occasion. 4 

The arrival of the 18th Depot Repair Squadron on 12 July would 

ease matters somewhat after the new men had learned their jobs; but 

meanwhile Abadan buzzed with a hornet's nest of administrative complications. Command and responsibility at the assembly plant were not 

clearly defined during the contractor period, nor were they any clearer 

in early July 1943. The plant came under the Commanding General, 

PGSC. Immediate administrative supervision over its activities was 

delegated by him to the commanding officer of the geographical subarea of the PGSC, Basra District. But PGSC came under USAFIME 

at Cairo, and Abadan was subject in technical matters not only to 

USAFIME's air officer, but to Air Corps authority in the United 

States. On 13 July Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, commanding general 

of USAFIME, protested to General Arnold by message to \Vashington 

that certain orders had gone direct from America to Abadan, as a 

• (1) Ltr, Col Porter to Douglas Comp::my, 26 Apr 43, quoted Harold Courlander, Paul 

L. Hoefier, and others, History of Project 19, Abadan Ch., pp. 65-87. Drawer 101, Douglas 

Files. (2) Backlog and arrival figures from tables compiled by Hist Br, OTI, Hg, PGC. 

PGF 245. See also tables, PGF 2, 125. (3) Rad 148, Col Porter, signed Connolly, to Patterson 

Field, Ohio, relayed to Washington AGWAR 1664, 30 Jun 43. PGF 2. (4) Rad AMPSC 

340, Gen Marshall to Gens Brereton and Connolly, 4 Mar 43. PGF 2. (5) Hist Rpt, Abadan 

Air BasC", for Kov 41 through ~ov 43,1 Jul 44. PGF 2-K. (6) Ltr, Col Porter to Col Harry 

S. Bishop, CO, Project 19, Gura, 26 Jun 43. Drawer 211, Status Reports-Project 19 and 

Combined, Douglas Files. (7) HOTI, Pt. II, Ch. 1, The Abadan Aircraft Assembly Plant 

(and Air Base), by Wallace P. Rusterholtz, p. 5. PGF. (8) HOTI, Pt. I, Ch. 8, sec. 3, 

History of Movements Branch, Operations Division, Hg, PGC, prepared by ~10'Tments 

Branch, Operations Division, with Supplement by Laurence P. Corbett, and statistical appendix, Complete Summary of Port and Transportation Agencies Performance of PGC Operations 

through 3] May 1945,5 July 1945, p. 62. PGF. 
268 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

result of which "there is a great deal of confusion." 5 Brereton insisted 

that responsibility for aircraft assembly at Abadan must rest with the 

Commanding General, PGSC. Arnold's reply admitted that direct orders had been sent "in the interest of expediting this important project 

and thereby assisting your headquarters," adding, "One cannot overstress the importance of the accomplishment of the mission of this 

establishment for which you are fully responsible," that is, the Commanding General, USAFIME, not the Commanding General, PGSC.s 

On 14 July, as a sequel to Colonel Porter's attempts to obtain 

personnel from Gura, the RAF, and the American command, General 

Brereton noted, in a message to Porter, the existence of "confusion 

concerning requests for assistance," and that Porter had been receiving 

"functional instructions" direct from the Air Service Command, Patterson Field, Ohio. Brereton added, "Responsibilities and administration of Abadan are a responsibility of CG, PGSC, with direct communication to Air Service Command, Patterson Field on technical matters 

only." 7 On 29 July, Headquarters, PGSC, set forth a clarification, 

authorized by Washington and Cairo. The Abadan aircraft assembly 

plant and all related activities on Abadan Island were placed under 

the "jurisdiction and control of the Commanding General, PGSC, 

except that direct communication with Patterson Field, Ohio, has been 

authorized for technical matters only." The Commanding Officer, Gulf 

District (Basra District was thus redesignated in May), PGSC, was 

"responsible for supervising and co-ordinating the activities of the 

Abadan Aircraft Assembly Plant," and was to handle administrative. 

operational, and supply matters on behalf of the commanding general 

in the same manner as other assembly plant operations within the 

command. The Operations Division, Headquarters, PGSC, was made 

responsible for "general supervision and documentation," and for establishing monthly production targets in consultation with the commanding officers of the plant and of Gulf District. On 24 August the functions 

of Operations Division respecting Abadan were assigned to its Plants 

Branch.s Thus a local modus operandi was established within the framework of the PGSC, itself within the framework of USAFIME, while 

the Air Corps at Patterson Field kept its finger upon the technical 

aspects. 

While this was going on, the plant raised production in July to 

• Rad AMSMEAF 1627, Cen Brereton to Cen Arnold, 13 Jul 43. AC 600.12, Hq AMET. • Rad, Cen Arnold to Cen Brereton, 15 Jul 43. AC 600.12, Hq AMET. T Rad AMPSC, AMSMEAF P-28, Cen Brereton to Col Porter, 14 luI 43. PCF 2. • (1) CO 45, Hq, PCSC, 29 lui 43. (2) Rad, Cen Scott to Col Donald P. Booth, 

24 Aug 43. AC 635 Abadan Aircraft Assembly Plant, Hq PCC. (3) Hist Rpt, Plants Be, 

Opns Div, Hq, PCC, for Aug 43. PCF 125-H. 
THE AIR CORPS TAKES OVER AIRCRAFT ASSEMBLY 269 

141; but this was highly unsatisfactory to the Russians. On 28 July 

General Arnold notified General Brereton at Cairo that "Russian officials in vVashington" were requesting "immediate action ... to assure assembly of 300 aircraft per month." 9 The Russians complained 

that assembly was inadequate, and that insufficiently protected planes 

lying about in crates at Basra and Margil invited local sabotage. It developed that there had been confusion at these landing ports as to the 

responsibility for the safety of cargoes of U.S. aircraft consigned to 

the British but to be diverted to the USSR. The Americans assumed the 

responsibility. 

In August, although new arrivals of aircraft had fallen to 275 and 

deliveries had risen to 204, the backlog exceeded 600. It was now General Connolly's turn to appeal for additional help. In early September 

he informed General Brereton that he would require 19 officers and 

270 enlisted men to meet the new monthly quota of 300 aircraft.1o He 

did not get them immediately; but Abadan did come in promptly for 

a visit from Maj. Gen. Ralph Royce whp had just succeeded Brereton 

as commanding general of USAFIME. Washington had inquired why 

the rate of delivery at Abadan had declined during August. Royce replied that he would report to General Arnold after personal investigation. He radioed on 26 September that Abadan was "a very disorganized installation," with insufficient officers, men, and equipment to 

complete its mission.ll Colonel Porter, who had borne the burden and 

heat of the day for the past nineteen months, had been returned to the 

United States on 11 September. He was followed by four successive 

commanding officers in three months, after whom two more served out 

the time that remained until the plant was closed down in January 

1945.12 Continuity of operations for a time, therefore, largely depended 

upon the Douglas civilians, who were veterans of longest service, upon 

the military force, and upon the supervisory functions exercised by 

Plants Branch, Operations Division. 

The full force of the increased deliveries under the London Protocol nmv began to reach the Persian Gulf. In September, in spite of the 

• Rad AMSME 5991, Gen Arnold to Gen Brereton, 28 Ju143. AG 323.3 Abadan, Hq PGC. 

,. Rads, Gen Connolly to Gen Brereton, 7 and 14 Sep 43. AG 600.12 Abadan, Hq AMET. 

u (1) Rad 6758, to Gen Royce, 12 Sep 43. Notebook North African Mission, Vol. II, 

Africa ME Office, OPD. (2) Rad AMSME 8162, Gen Royce to Gens Marshall and Arnold, 

26 Sep 43. AG 400.3295 Russia, Hq AMET. 

12 After Colonel Porter the commanding officers were: Lt. Col. Richard J. Kirkpatrick 

(11 Sep-29 Oct 43); Lt. Col. Cedric B. Davis (29 Oct-4 Nov 43); Col. James L. Jackson 

(4 Nov-3 Dec 43) ; Col. Phillip A. Roll (3-9 Dec 43) ; Colonel Davis (9 Dec 43-30 Aug 44) ; 

Lt. Col. Chester E. McCarty from 30 Aug 44. (1) GO 8, Hq, Abadan Air Base, 30 Aug 44. 

Hist Rpts, Abadan Air Base, (2) Dec 43, PGF 2-L; (3) for Nov 41 through Nov 43, 1 Jul 44, 

PGF2-K. 
270 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

succession of commanding officers at Abadan, deliveries reached 253 

aircraft. But the backlog rose ominously to 670. On 1 October 1943 additional Air Corps personnel reached the site, 100 of them earmarked 

to move on to India as soon as the state of the backlog permitted. With 

this extra force at work, October deliveries of 395 aircraft struck the 

maximum attained at any time during the life of the project; but the 

inflow of new planes provided an unwelcome reservoir of 829 awaiting 

assembly on 10 October. This was also a peak figure, and a challenge 

to the approximately 500 military personnel and 69 Douglas civilians 

at the plane' By their efforts the figure receded to 607 at the end of 

the month, and fell below 100 by the end of January 1944. Although 

it was to rise again by mid-July to 155, the tide turned in October 194·3 

and the battle of the backlog was finally won. 

In Table 10 can be read the story of deliveries to the USSR during 

the rest of 1943 and the year 1944. Progress during 1944 was such that 

on 19 July General Marshall informed General Connolly that, as soon 

as aircraft on hand and en route were delivered to the Russians, the 

War Department planned to disband the plant. After one or two postponements that time came on 1 February 1945, when operational responsibility for remaining work at the plant was assigned, upon its 

disbandment, to the Air Transport Command. Ninety-one officers and 

men were transferred to the ATC and 244 shipped to the United 

States.a 

Abadan Air Base 

The falling off of shipments of incoming aircraft which occurred 

after the end of the London Protocol period in June 1944 initiated the 

declining curve of assemblies at Abadan; but meantime there had been 

steadily increasing activity at the Abadan Air Base, to which the ATC 

had moved from Basra in June 1943 when the field at Margil proved too 

small for its expanding mission. On 12 August 1944, with assembly operations at Abadan entering their last lap, came official recognition that 

the function of Abadan Air Base had shifted from assembly to air operations. On that date the 82d Air Depot Group and the 18th Depot 

Repair Squadron were disbanded, and their personnel and equipment 

transferred to Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Abadan Air 

Base, with an aggregate strength of 26 officers and 502 enlisted men, 

"The contracts of the civilians expired in December 1943 and they returned to the United 

States with a commendation from General Royce dated 10 October 1943. Drawer 69, 

Termination of Project 19, Douglas Files. H (I) Rad 67209, Gen Marshall to Gen Connolly, 19 Jul 44. AG 635 Abadan Aircraft 

Assembly Plant, Hq PCC. (2) GO 22, Hq, PGC, 31 Jan 45. (3) Hist Rpt, Abadan Air 

Base, for Jan 45. PGF 2-Y. 
THE AIR CORPS TAKES OVER AIRCRAFT ASSEMBLY 271 

plus 100 enlisted men attached additionally as Air Corps unassigned."G 

The commander of the base was responsible for remaining assembly operations, while Plants Branch, Operations Division, handled production 

schedules, processed requisitions, and, with the Gulf District commander, supplied advisory staff functions chiefly relating to over-all production and target obligations. But in all other respects Abadan had become a busy airfield, with its transient planes and passengers and all 

the elaborate installations required to serve them. By the time the 

ATC took over completely on 1 February 1945, Abadan was mightily 

transformed from the relatively unimproved space three miles north of 

the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company refinery to which the first American 

workers came early in 1942. 

That is why, in July 1944, there was a considerable to-do over the 

report that the AIOC contemplated buying the land on which the 

Americans had lavished their peculiar talents for doing things on the 

grand scale. "vVithout notifying us," General Connolly radioed to 

Washington, 

Aloe ... has applied to the Iranian Government on this transaction. We have 

requested the American Embassy to initiate necessary action to stop the purchase 

of this land until Washington has advised us on the situation. This transaction 

vitally hampers our possibilities for disposition of our enormous investment or for 

our postwar rights to mediate in operation of airfields.'6 

American rights to occupy the land next the refinery were informal, not 

to say tenuous. The Douglas Aircraft Company came in by virtue of a 

purely verbal agreement, there being "no lease or any other form of 

written agreement" between them and AIOC, or between AIOC and 

the United States Governmcnt.17 United States operation of the Abadan 

assembly plant had of course been a matter of Anglo-American understanding in Washington in January 1942, but the legality of land 

occupancy had not been established by formal document.'8 Much later, 

after the ATC had moved to Abadan and had undertaken its program 

to expand facilities there for regular flights, the Commanding General, 

USAFIME, received on 27 January 1944 from headquarters of the 

RAF, Middle East, a statement of British willingness to prepare airfields for ATC use which contained no reference to terms, tenure, or 

lG (1) GO 53, Hq, PGC, 12 Aug 44. (2) Hist Rpt, Abadan Air Base, for Aug 44. 

PGF 2-T. 

16 Rad, Gen Connolly to Gens Somervell, Arnold, and Maj Gen Thomas T. Handy, 1 Jul 44. 

095 AIOC, SL 8979. 17 1st Ind, 28 Dec 43, to Ltr, Chief, Cons Br, OPD, PGC, to CO, Gulf I'ist, PGC, 

22 Dec 43. 095 Douglas Aircraft Company, SL 8979. 

18 Rad AMSIR 10, to Gen Wheeler, 21 Jan 42, on agreement at Washington between 

Gens Sidney Spalding and Moore and British RAF representatives. MID 400.3295 1-21-42 

(1-6-42). 
272 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

leases. This paper has been described as "the only documentary form of 

agreement ... covering U.S. Army use of the subject field." 10 The matter became engulfed in the infinite maw of official files on both sides of 

the Atlantic. The United States remained in occupancy of Abadan 

until the end of its operations in Iran in 1945, and its property rights in 

buildings and installations there were duly adjusted as a part of the 

postwar settlements with the United Kingdom and the government of 

Iran. 

In a story which has necessarily concentrated, as did the sweating 

men who made their contribution at Abadan, upon the assembly and 

delivery of thousands of aircraft for Russia, the human factor has been 

submerged under the facts of human achievement. It was a job by men 

for men, even though there were times when, as the Russians felt, the 

machine, not the man, was irreplaceable and of prime importance. But 

there were other times when men counted as men: such highlights as 

the visit of the Shah to the plant in February 1944, and the good-will 

party also held that month for forty Soviet officers headed by Maj. 

Gen. Ivan I. Obrazkov, commandant of the Soviet air detachment at 

Abadan.20 On that night, the oratory, heard over the clinking of glasses, 

made much of the co-operation of the United States and the Soviet 

Union in providing craft for Soviet fighters. The echoes of that evening's celebration have long since faded in the clangor and hissing of 

the near-by refinery. But the fact of that co-operation and its fruits is 

something time cannot alter. 

Tucked away in the files is a mimeographed sheet handed to the 

men of the 18th Depot Repair Squadron as they arrived in July 1943.21 

It cannot now be read as they read it in the burning heat of unfamiliar 

Abadan but it will serve as a reminder of the human factor: 

This depot is an International Settlement. You will work with American 

Soldiers, highly skilled American civilian technicians, a detachment of the USSR 

Air Corps ... RAF, Iranians, Iraqi, Arabians, and Indians. Such success in our 

work as we have had has been built on the cooperation and mutual understanding 

among these groups. It is essential that this "good will" be maintained and we 

count on you to maintain it. Due to the heat, our meal and work schedule is as 

follows: 

3:30 early morning coffee; 3:55 muster at hangars; 4:00-7:30 first work 

period; 7: 30-8: 00 second breakfast; 8: 00-12 : 00 second work period; 12: 30 lunch; 

13:30 bus leaves mess hall for swimming (Sats thru Thurs); 17:45 dinner; 20:00 

movies (Sunday, Tuesday, Thursday). 

]·3d Ind, by AGO, Washington, 9 Jun 45, to Ltr, ACofS, Opns, Hq, PGC, to CG, 

U.S. AAF, Washington, 6 Apr 45. 092 Agreement Concerning Use of Abadan Air Field, 

SL 8978. The RAF letter was titled Development of North African Air Route to India. 20 Hist Rpt, Abadan Air Base, for Feb 44. PGF 2-N. 21 Signed by Colonel Porter. PGF 2. 
THE AIR CORPS TAKES OVER AIRCRAFT ASSEMBLY 273 

If you find this camp a bit rough at first remember that many of us have been 

here for over a year and raised what we have from the open desert. You will join in 

completing the new PX and other construction needed, so that we can all enjoy 

a more comfortable camp. You will be able to make your own barracks more 

comfortable during your free periods in the afternoons and evenings. Lumber is 

available . 

. . . Every additional aircraft that we can send North now, may save hundreds 

of American lives next year. Working together we can top our best production 

records. 

LET'S GO!! 
CHAPTER XIV 

The Army Takes Over the 

TAP)s 

General Connolly's primary mission, movement of supplies through 

the Persian Corridor to Soviet receiving points, did not preclude his 

continuing unfinished tasks in British or Russian aid undertaken by 

predecessor American commands. Assembly of partly knocked-down 

vehicles at some point in their journey to destination was unfinished 

business of this sort; but it was also a part of the transportation process. 

After the Army took over the truck assembly plants on 1 July 1943, 

there was no change in the pattern of assembly and delivery set during 

the contractor period. The vehicles were processed as before, and 

driven away, as before, by Soviet drivers over the road to Khurramabad and Malayer, east to Sultanabad, and north to Tehran. There 

were changes, though, in quantity and tempo. More trucks by far 

arrived from overseas than during the earlier period, and there were 

more Americans, more natives, and more machines to deal with them. 

'Vorking 59 percent of the period of truck assembly operation, the 

Army assembled for all purposes 82 percent of the vehicles. Because 

there was so much more to do, it was done faster. The figures measure 

increased work load and increased capacity. They do not imply less 

efficiency for the contractor period.1 

Plant 

In July 1943 four TAP's with which the American command was 

concerned were in service. TAP I at Andimeshk and TAP II at 

'Khorramshahr were American staffed and operated. TAP III at 

1 (1) A Brief Description of the Development and Present Operations of the Persian Gulf 

Command, prepared 31 Aug 44 for the Superintendent, U.S. Military Academy, and transmitted by Ltr, 24 Oct 44. Historical Report 1944, SL 8997. (2) This chapter makes extensive use of HOTI, Pt. II, Chs. 3-5, U.S. Truck Assembly Plants, by Laurence P. Corbett. 

PGF. (3) Tables 7, 8, 9, and Charts 4, 5. 
THE ARMY TAKES OVER THE TAP'S 275 

Bushire, run by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation with 

some American supervision and advice, ceased work in which there 

was American interest that month. At TAP IV, the British-operated 

plant at Rafadiyah, an American officer was stationed for purposes 

of liaison, collection of statistical data, comparison of methods, target, 

and output, and exchange of information. TAP IV's production 

affected that of the plants at Andimeshk and Khorramshahr-as when 

in August and September 1944 a stoppage at Rafadiyah, caused by 

change-over from Studebakers to Chevrolets, produced a production 

deficit which had to be made up by TAP's I and II to meet theater 

targets. In October 1944 TAP IV was closed down and TAP's I and II 

assumed the entire truck assembly load for the Persian Gulf. 

Under the structural organization of the American command, 

Plants Branch, Operations Division, was responsible for the direction, 

co-ordination, and operation of the TAP's. In this capacity, Plants 

Branch functioned like any headquarters staff agency. It computed 

and reported plant capacities, co-ordinated operations so that supply 

and output would be in balance and in accordance with headquarters 

policy, and established a statistical reporting system to serve the needs 

of over-all control and co-ordination of all agencies in the logistical 

process. Responsibility for administration, supply, training, security, 

and operation of the plants was decentralized and handed over to the 

local district commanders set up in December 1942 for the Gulf, 

Desert, and Mountain Districts. Between May and August 1943, the 

district commanders for the Gulf and Desert Districts, in their capacities as deputies of the commanding general, set up procedures for 

operating the TAP's under technical instructions and directives proceeding from GHQ. Officers were assigned in charge of the plant. 

They transmitted statistical information to Plants Branch. At 

Khorramshahr a Plants Branch suboffice was established by the Gulf 

District commander to provide more direct controP 

At Khorramshahr were detachments of the 347 4th and the S06th 

Ordnance Medium Automotive ~1aintenance Companies, as well as 

the 3455th Ordnance ~1edium Automotive Maintenance Company; 

.at Andimeshk, the 3467th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company.3 The group at Khorramshahr had to contend with 

an initial hospitalization of 20 percent of its strength on account of 

the heat, as well as a heavy labor turnover among the native workmen. 

, (1) Hist Rpt, Plants Br, Opns Div, Hq, PGSC, 22 Jul 43. PGF 125-F. (2) See also 

SO 68, Hq, PGC, 15 Mar 45. (3) HOTI, Pt. I, Ch. 8, sec. 5, History of the Plants Branch, 

Operations Division, Hq, PGC, by Laurence P. Corbett. PGF. • In January 1944 the 3556th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company was assigned to TAP II and the detachments of the 506th and 3474th were reassigned. 
276 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

At Andimeshk the newly arrived service troops went to work only 

four days after reaching Iran. A report treats with some bitterness 

of conditions at the take-over. The chief complaint was that General 

Motors, in striving to attain record production in its last month, had 

neglected the important duty of keeping the flow of incoming cased 

vehicles going, so that when the Army assumed responsibility on 1 July 

it found 280 freight cars of cased trucks standing unloaded in the 

yards. Furthermore, a drastic shortage of nuts, bolts, and spare parts 

meant that July production would have to wait for local manufacture 

of some parts and requisitioning of others. Finally, it was charged that 

the Army had to cope with claims by native laborers for pay increases 

and leaves of absence promised them by General Motors. The report 

stated that the Army had instituted three shifts a day and hoped by 

ironing out difficulties to get production on both assembly lines up to 

between sixty and a hundred trucks a day.4 

It is not remarkable that the first month of operation under Army 

management failed to reach target levels. August brought a greater 

familiarity with the job and TAP I produced 923 vehicles above its 

target of 2,500 while TAP II bettered its target of 3,500 by 261. All 

hands received the commendation of General Connolly for fine August 

performance. 

Problems connected with adapting American factory techniques 

to local conditions, problems growing out of ever present wearing out 

or shortages of tools and parts, production problems arising from necessary change-overs from time to time from Chevrolets to Fords to 

Studebakers to Mack trucks to Eren gun carriers to jeeps, very difficult problems relating to batteries, and, above all, the eternal problem 

of the weather, ranging from half a foot of mud and water underfoot 

to unendurable heat overhead-these were routine at Andimeshk and 

Khorramshahr. With the essential pattern of assembly already established before it assumed operating responsibility, the Army settled 

down to routine production, improvement of methods, and the introduction of refinements in efficiency. Since the voluminous records of 

the activities were not kept according to a uniform plan, they provide 

no basis for statistical comparisons of periods. Some figures for TAP 

II indicate, however, the decided improvement in efficiency of 

operations in general at that plant. Tables for Febmary 1945 show 

total assemblies 155 percent greater than for February] 944, accomplished with an average daily employee roster only 68 percent of the 

• Diary Report and Information on Condition of TAP I, Andimeshk, on Termination of 

General Motors Contract, by Capt Jack C. Schoo, Ord Sec, Opns, Plants Br, TAP I, 6 Jul43. 

PGF 70. 
THE ARMY TAKES OVER THE TAP'S 277 

earlier date. Man~hours worked per vehicle were more than halved, 

and the labor cost per assembly, exclusive of the pay of military personnel, was reduced in the year to 58 percent of similarly computed 

costs in the earlier month.:; 

Problems 

The Army's performance represents the routine solution of many 

problems, four in particular. These were fitting truck assembly to the 

over-all logistical process within the theater, native labor, Russian 

checkup stations, and the question of damage and sabotage. 

The assembly in Iran of vehicles manufactured in the United 

States, to be delivered by highway or rail or both, was so closely related to other links in the logistic chain as to require, for its smooth 

functioning, the most detailed co-ordination. Ideally, the port would 

be forewarned of the arrival of crated vehicles and thus be prepared 

to off-load cargoes promptly; ideally, rolling stock would be at hand at 

the ports to convey the crates to the assembly plants where their arrival, 

known in advance, would be met by sufficient forces to unload, uncrate, denail, stack, store, or move them to the assembly line. All this 

meant planning at each step, from shipside in the United States onward, in accordance with totals and allocations agreed at the highest 

levels. As the logistic chain grew in length and distance from the 

United States, these broad strategic allocations narrowed and were 

transmitted into monthly, weekly, and daily plant targets, feverishly 

worked for by assembly-line crews. In the end those strategic quotas, 

set in \Vashington, 1\10scow, and London, were met by the sweating 

soldier-workman and his native helpers. 

Then, at the line's end, after an ideally smooth passage facilitated 

by a pleni tude of tools and parts and accessories, the finished vehicle, 

having come up to manufacturers' specifications and having survived 

rigorous American and Soviet inspections, passed on in the logistic 

chain, northward toward the Soviet Union. Failure of any link, even 

lack of accurate statistical data, would be reflected immediately in 

operations. At the TAP's, daily tallies, accounting, and record-keeping 

were corrected bv monthly inventories. It for instance, a chalked tall v 

written by a checker on a ~ase being unloaded at the docks were rubbed 

off by contact \vith another case, a discrepancy in tallies would get into 

the records all along the line until caught by monthly inventory totals. 

'Computed from: (1) Hist Rpt, Plants Br, Opns Div, Hq, PGC, 6 Mar 45, Inc! 4, 

Table, Truck Assembly Time and Cost per Truck Produced at TAP II, Khorramshahr, 

Period from .lui 43 through 31 Jan 45. PGF 125-Z. (2) Hist Rpt, TAP II, for Feb 45, 

9 Mar 45. PGF 23-Z. 
278 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

The even flow of vehicles was interrupted seriously when a cargo ship 

ran aground off port in the Persian Gulf in 1944. The results were a 

seven-day stoppage in September at TAP I, a monthly target missed, 

and insistent calls from the Soviets for the trucks they had planned for. 

The mechanism which regulated the machine was supplied by the 

Control and Plants Branches at headquarters in Tehran. By May 1943 

Control Branch was responsible for conducting monthly capacity arid 

joint target meetings while Plants Branch was charged with collecting 

from the assembly plants statistics for use at those meetings, a development which coincided with the taking over by the PGSC from the 

Bri tish of cargo movements con trol for the Corridor. 

At the monthly joint target meetings, Plants Branch furnished an 

analysis of the USSR and PGSC cargo manifests, giving a detailed list, 

by make and model, of vehicles to arrive between the twenty-first of 

the current month and the twenty-first of the ensuing month, with a 

5-percent allowance for damaged or short-shipped vehicles. In computing the targets, district commanders submitted recommendations 

indicating the minimum and maximum production estimates for the 

coming month. In addition, a plant inventory was submitted estimating 

the production for the remaining part of the month so that the approximate number of vehicles on hand for the next month's assembly 

could be determined. Plants Branch maintained liaison with the Russians concerning truck assembly and with Control Branch concerning 

berthing schedules, arrival dates, and future scheduled arrivals of vessels carrying cased vehicles. After final agreement with the Soviets the 

monthly quota was fixed and all data forwarded to the district commander and to the commanding officers of the TAP's.5 

Generally speaking, the native labor problem diminished as time 

went by and experience increased. When the TAP's came under Army 

operation the Andimeshk plant employed about 1,700 workmen; Khorramshahr, about 2,200. These natives worked as foremen, group leaders, mechanics, truck conditioners, material handlers, unloaders, and 

crane operators. Being unskilled, they had to be taught as they worked, 

to the detriment of efficient operations. Initial turnover was as high as 

twenty to thirty daily separations for absenteeism, malingering, inaptitude, or resignation. During the winter of 1943-44 there was some 

suffering by natives, who shivered in inadequate clothing on the night 

shifts. ,,york schedules varied: sometimes there were two shifts of 8 

hours; sometimes, a lO-hour day shift and a 9-hour night shift; and 

in March 1944 the night shift was dropped. 7 

6 Opns Div, PCC, Manual for Dec 44. 7 Rpt cited n. 2(1). 
THE ARMY TAKES OVER THE TAP'S 279 

From then on, due to an increase in the local labor supply which 

enabled better men to be selected, a greater stability in labor conditions 

brought plant operations nearer to the techniques familiar in the 

United States. Improvement in native housing and messing, or rationing for those not housed at the site, plus introduction, in August 1943, 

of a wage incentive system rewarding production above a standard 

minimum, brought improvement in plant capacity. Workmen's compensation, however, introduced by General Motors, was modified by 

the Army, and the worker who had received pay for job-incurred injuries and pay while hospitalized now found his wage stopped when 

he entered the hospital. Furthermore, after recovery he had to file a 

claim and only after it was approved did he receive his lost wages. In 

most cases this worked a hardship upon natives who lived from hand to 

mouth and had no accumulated reserves to call upon in time of need. 

Traditionally suspicious of one another as well as of foreigners, the 

native workmen found American timecard systems used for pay-off 

difficult to cope with. Identity badges were forged, timecards stolen 

or sold, and the paymaster's life generally made miserable. Countermeasures and new devices were employed to ensure, in so far as possible, 

honest and fair pay-offs. Theft, both petty and large scale, posed problems of discipline and these were not always fairly solved-the Iranian 

police frequently releasing suspects arrested on American complaint, 

and the Americans, on their part, sometimes carrying search of native 

quarters to lengths of severity not countenanced in the States.s 

Production figures, however, testify to the establishment of generally 

smooth relations with an efficient labor force. 9 The brightest aspect of 

the labor picture was the adaptability of the native workmen to American assembly-line industrial techniques, and here, as time went on, 

the patience of Americans as teachers was rewarded by the eager 

willingness of the learners. Greater progress in this respect was made 

after the Army took over and could mingle large numbers of American 

soldier-instructors through the lines. The TAP's distinguished themselves by their ability to take mutually distrustful racial groups, 

ignorant, slow-moving, underfed laborers, camel drivers, and desert 

nomads, and make of many of them skilled factory hands and even 

supervisors. It may be that American machines do not, after all, require 

supermen to operate them, and that sociologists and statesmen have 

• (1) Hist Rpt, TAP II, for Sep 43. PGF 23-1. (2) Hist Rpt, TAP II, for Scp 44. 

PGF 23-U. (3) Report of Military Police Activities, PGC, United States Anny, Pt. II, 

sec. III, and Pt. III, sec. II. PGF 130 . • HOTI, Pt. I, Ch. 7, History of Civilian Personnel Branch Activities, Administration 

Division, Hq, PGC, by Col Richard W. Cooper, p. 19. PGF. 
280 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

something startling to learn from the speed with which Khorramshahr 

scaled, if not the heights, at least the foothills of Detroit.10 

When the Army took over truck assembly, Plants Branch assumed 

responsibility for the checkup station at Tehran, operated by an ordnance medium automotive maintenance company detachment and 

some two hundred and twenty native workmen, as well as a small 

checkup station established, at Russian suggestion, at Khurramabad on 

the highway north of Andimeshk. The Khurramabad station, manned 

by a handful of American soldiers, was from time to time the object of 

Soviet criticism. A demand that the Americans change the oil of Soviet 

vehicles there "vas refused after a thorough test of the condition of oil 

in vehicles after arrival at Tehran, which showed an oil change en route 

unnecessary. The Soviets moved in some Red Army men, but further 

complaints were registered against the condition of vehicles serviced 

there. After an inspection trip by Soviet and American officers these 

complaints were admitted to be groundless. Next, in June 1944, the 

Soviets requested expansion of the station, but after thorough study 

of the proposal by the Americans it was refused. Meanwhile, the Russians assigned 6 officers and 40 men to Khurramabad and began to 

service their own vehicles. In September 1944, 10 American soldiers 

were removed, leaving 4 until January 1945 when the Soviets took over 

full control of the station. 

At the big 'Tehran checkup station rigid inspection, lubrication, 

tightening, and maintenance were the final operations of the Americans 

before handing over the vehicles to the Soviets. In spite of the very large 

numbers of vehicles which passed through the routine, Russian complaints against the quality of the work were numerous and could be met 

only by willingness to correct defects. It was suggested, after a complaint 

of April 1944, that the Soviets set up an inspection system outside the 

American plant in order to eliminate the interference with American 

operations by Russian inspectors in the plant. In April 1945 the Russians took over the Tehran checkup station. 

Among the most serious problems was that of damage to parts and 

vehicles. Often defective packing in the United States or rough unloading at the ports resulted in damage which showed up in poor performance of assembled trucks. Not only did many crates arrive in damaged 

,D (I) The article by Nels Anderson, "Give Us More American Education," Survey 

Graphic, January 1946, pages 13ff., tallies with the detailed labor records kept by the Army, as well as with the testimony of civilian foremen and service troops who worked with native 

workers in the truck assembly plants. (2) General Scott, Chief of Staff, PGC, in an address 

at Khorramshahr on 26 January 1944, marking the end of the first year's operations at 

TAP II, thanked "the officers and men of the PGC, the Russian troops, and the Iranian 

workmen" equally for their contribution to the war in their truck assembly work. PGF 244. 
THE ARMY TAKES OVER THE TAP'S 281 

condition, but boxes would slide off trucks into the highway to be 

descended upon by eager natives who, before the military police could 

arrive, would carry off parts, tear away the crating lumber, and expose 

equipment to sun and dust. 

Beginning in June 1943 a rising tide of complaints from the Soviets 

called attention to persistent breakdown of Studebakers, Fords, and 

Chevrolets assembled at Andimeshk and Khorramshahr, breakdowns 

not attributable to the rough overland journey northward after assembly or to the sometimes reckless operation by native drivers. From 

G-2 at USAFIME headquarters, Cairo, went a report of the situation 

with a request to the Federal Bureau of Investigation to conduct a 

study of factories in the United States to determine whether sabotage 

was taking place there or in Iran. Investigation which followed at the 

Studebaker Hercules plant at Canton, Ohio, and at the assembly point 

at South Bend, Indiana, revealed some defective materials going into 

pistons, but no sabotage, and a report in May 1944 tossed the ball 

back to the Persian Gulf with the suggestion that if there was sabotage 

it must be occurring in Iran. The upshot of all this was that the Army 

tightened up processing of waybills and improved handling methods 

from the docks to keep damage of cased vehicles to a minimum. All 

material was recorded as to condition at arrival, and widespread 

breakdowns of delivered vehicles declined.ll 

The End of Operations 

By November 1944 the American plants at Andimeshk and Khorramshahr were the only TAP's left operating. As the Eastern Front 

had receded westward farther and farther from the Persian Gulf line 

of communication, and as the Mediterranean was again open for Allied 

shipping, plans went forward in high places to develop a supply route 

to the USSR through the Black Sea. On 28 November it was recommended by the Munitions Assignments Board at Washington that either 

TAP I or TAP II be turned over to the USSR to be re-established for 

use in assembling trucks to be shipped to Russia via the Black Sea 

route.12 Meanwhile, on 19 November the War Department had instructed the Persian Gulf Command that plant operations were to be 

adjusted to permit the prompt dismantling of TAP I for shipment to 

the USSR, and orders to dismantle the Andimeshk plant came through 

on 7 December on the heels of the authorization by the Munitions 

Assignments Committee (Ground) on 30 November to transfer one 

11 See under 9 Jun and 18 Nov 43, and 22 May 44. MID 451.2 (22 May 44) (25 Jun 43). 12 Memo, 28 Nov 44. AG 400.3295, Hq Amet. 
282 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

plant to the Soviets. A formal communication was sent to Col. Leonid 

I. Zorin, Deputy Chief of Iransovtrans, and on 10 December a Russian 

Acceptance Committee arrived at Andimeshk. The entire plant, stacking yard, and salvage area were divided into smaller sections with a 

Russian officer, an American officer, and an interpreter assigned to 

each group. While this was going on native workmen were discharged 

in daily batches. December output of 550 vehicles brought to 79,370 

Andimeshk's assembly for all consignees. By 17 January 1945 the entire 

TAP had been dismantled and shipped by rail to the Soviet Union. 

It was a considerable consignment, carried in 115 freight cars, two of 

them special low-bed cars for hauling the bulky cranes in the equipment through the narrow tunnels of the railway. The men of the 

3467th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company, who 

had been at Andimeshk since June 1943, completed cleanup of records 

and were relieved on 4 February 1945. After that Khorramshahr 

carried on alone. 

I t is a curious thing how trucks kept pouring toward the Persian 

Gulf even at this late date, with the Russian front nearly two thousand 

miles from Tehran. But the long pipeline from the United States kept 

filling in the west and discharging in the Persian Gulf, and upon 

TAP II fell the task of keeping things moving as before. Personnel 

came down from Andimeshk, two shifts were worked, and in January 

the TAP produced 5,582 trucks. 

Matters were drawing to an end, however, for in February the 

two main assembly lines at TAP II were authorized for transfer to 

the USSR and actually stopped work in mid-March, leaving only the 

Mack line to carryon until 20 April, when it, too, was dismantled. 

By 24 April the entire plant had been dismantled and moved toward 

Russia in 146 rail cars plus another 114 cars carrying cased vehicles 

and salvage. Two ordnance units remained behind amidst what must 

have seemed to them, after former activity, the desolation of the desert. 

There were also three large cranes awaiting low-bed cars to get them 

through the tunnels on their journey north. When the 3556th and 

3455th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Companies were 

relieved before 1 May the American truck assembly mission in the 

Persian Corridor was completed. 

From March 1942 through April 1945 the four TAP's in Iraq 

and Iran assembled 191,075 units for all consignees. Of this total the 

two American plants turned out 88 percent, or 168,021 units.13 During 

the fifteen months of the contractor period, Andimeshk and Khorramshahr produced 29,751 units, 98 percent of which were for the USSR. 

" Exclusive of the 599 vehicles noted Tables 8, 9, n. c. 
THE ARMY TAKES OVER THE TAP'S 283 

The Army, in its twenty-two months of operation assembled 137,671 

units. Of these 96 percent went to the Russians, reflecting the increased 

amount of work done in the later period for consignees other than the 

Russians, notably the U. S. Army. In comparing the performances of 

the two periods it must be borne in mind that, by the time the Army 

took over, the assembly buildings except for Khorramshahr were 

virtually complete. Adequate machinery and equipment had been 

installed. Military manpower was sufficient and could be shifted to 

meet sudden demands, as the labor force of the contractor could not. 

Moreover, the heaviest flow of vehicles coincided roughly with the 

development of capacity. 

In this respect the truck assembly program was fortunate. Unlike 

the aircraft assembly operation, it did not have to struggle for most 

of its existence to meet targets while sometimes hopelessly handicapped 

by shortages of manpower, materials, and equipment. Then, too, in 

contrast with the experience at the ports, truck assembly did not 

develop capacity significantly in excess of the load it was actually 

called upon to bear. The variables and uncertainties which beset so 

many other activities of the American command afflicted the TAP's 

to a lesser degree. Whether by design or by fortuitous circumstance, 

production proceeded, except for the early 1942 period, as the statistical tables show, according to a reasonable rising and falling curve. 

When demand accelerated, capacity was ready; when the progress of 

the war removed the demand, no time was lost in closing out the 

project. How the King of Hearts would have applauded the TAP's 

for following his advice to Alice: "Begin at the beginning, and go on 

till you come to the end: then stop." 
CHAPTER XV 

Oil for the War 

No matter how well fed, equipped, or officered, without oil and 

gasoline the modern army is a helpless monster, mired and marked for 

destruction. It has been calculated that bctween 40 and 50 percent of 

the total supply tonnage of a combat division's daily consumption is 

petroleum.1 Because of variables in the equation, there are no accurate 

criteria for estimating the ratio of oil used in the noncombat activities 

of an army to the total tonnages required to carryon such activities. 

Oil, the lifeblood of mechanized warfare, must flow by the oceanful. 

To meet their world-wide requirements for petroleum products, 

the British and Americans virtually pooled their oil resources. The 

Soviet Union, possessor of large supplies within its own borders, characteristically remained aloof from the joint arrangements of the western 

Allies, refusing even to exchange information on oil. 2 Russia was not, 

however, entirely self-sufficicnt, for during the period of lend-lease the 

United States shipped to it 2,113,449 long tons of petroleum products.s 

Because the Persian Corridor runs through one of the world's principal 

oil-producing areas, only certain types of lubricants of American origin 

passed through it to the USSR. The great bulk of American lend-lease 

petroleum went by other routes. The responsibilities of the American 

command in the Persian Corridor for petroleum shipments to Russia 

were therefore relatively minor, both as compared with total American 

petroleum shipments to Russia and as compared with the total of other 

.cargo tonnages delivered via the Corridor. 

The varied responsibilities and activities of the several national 

army forces within the Persian Corridor and in Iraq, not to mention the 

civilian economies, called for large quantities of oil. As the American 

1 (1) Hist Rpt, Office of Petroleum Adviser, Opns Div, Hq, PGC, Mar 43-Jul 45. 

PGF 8-E. (2) Rear Adm. Andrew F. Carter, one-time executive of the Army-Navy Petroleum Board, told an audience at the National War College on 6 February 1947 that the 

British calculated petroleum as 69.9 percent of total movement; the Americans, as 50 percent. 

'Herbert Feis, Seen from E. A. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1947), p. 136. • To this figure should be added 621,826 short tons (555,202 long tons) shipped from 

the United States to the United Kingdom to replace petroleum shipped from the Abadan 

refinery to the USSR, charged as British reciprocal aid to the United States. Tables I, 

n. g, and 2, n. g. 
OIL FOR THE WAR 285 

command increased its responsibilities in the field of inland transport, 

it extended its participation in the movement of oil through the area, 

and in addition to serving its own housekeeping needs, assisted in supplying the other army forces as well as the civilian economies. But that 

was not the limit of American responsibility for POL.4 From the period 

of early planning in 1941 for extensive pipeline construction, the complex business of distribution of oil for the war was a part of the general 

logistical problem the United States, by its presence in the Persian 

Corridor, undertook to help solve. The problem also included efforts, 

shared by the Americans, to increase Middle East refinery capacity, 

and American operation of plants for the manufacture of oil drums and 

jerrycans.5 

Early Pipeline Projects 

The usefulness of pipelines in reducing the burden of transporting 

oil by ship, rail, and truck early suggested an ambitious program of 

pipeline construction in Iran and Iraq. In broad outline, the program, 

which first involved construction of the lines for the British by the 

American engineer contractor using lend-lease materials, later provided for construction by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company using British 

labor and lend-lease materials. In due course, after the Americans had 

made known their position that their assistance would be limited to 

pipelines required by military necessity, and that they would insist on 

a voice in postwar disposition of installations using lend-lease materials, 

the program was radically scaled down. 

According to a memorandum prepared by the British Purchasing 

Commission in September 1941, the pipeline project had been discussed and its "need . . . carefully considered and agreed by the Joint 

Anglo-American Mission to Russia," the Harriman-Beaverbrook mission, whose labors resulted in the First (Moscow) Protocol. 6 The 

British pressed the matter and on 25 October Brigadier W. E. R. Blood, 

of their Staff Mission in Washington, presented to General Wheeler, 

newly appointed chief of the U.S. Military Iranian Mission, a memorandum which stated that the project's objective was to end the traffic 

bottleneck in the Bandar Shahpur-Andimeshk area. The paper proposed constructing a pipeline to parallel the existing AIOC line from 

• A British term adopted by the Americans for its brevity. It stands, loosely, for petrol 

(gasoline, benzine, kerosene), oil (raw oil, fuel oils, and all petroleum derivatives except 

petrol and lubricants), and lubricants (grease). POL means petroleum and any or all of its 

products. • A rectangular can of four to five gallons' capacity and varying design, especially as to 

cap, lip, or spout, indispensable, because of its portability, for refueling in areas unsuitable 

:or mobile tankers. A German innovation in World War I, hence, jcrrycarz, generic term 

for all variants, British or American. • Memo, prepared by British Purchasing Commission, 25 Sep 41. Iran 28/17, NADEF. 
286 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

Abadan to Ahwaz, two lines from Ahwaz to Andimeshk, and lines from 

there to Dorud or Azna and to Hamadan. Estimated capacity of the 

completed installations would be 2,000 long tons per day.7 This plan 

would facilitate the movement of crude petroleum from the chief oil 

fields in the neighborhood of Ahwaz to the refinery at Abadan and 

would also provide for the transportation of refined petroleum products 

well north of Andimeshk to Dorud or Azna on the railway to Tehran, 

or even farther north and west to Ramadan in the direction from which 

any Axis incursion through the Caucasus would come. 

By the end of November, General Wheeler had left the United 

States and set up his headquarters at Baghdad, leaving behind at the 

home office of the Iranian Mission in Washington Captain Yount to 

handle the pipeline matter as part of the engineer program being prepared in consultation with Folspen, engineer constructor. It is possible 

that Wheeler's feeling that he could not include pipelines among the 

American projects discussed with Wavell at New Delhi that month 

arose from his knowledge that pipelines were being handled at Washington. The laying of 600 miles of pipe in Iran, using American materials, was one of the projects included in the \Vashington task list of 

24 November, although pipeline was absent from Wheeler's list of 

projects issued at the same time. During that month, the British Ministry of Supply pressed the Lend-Lease Administration so strongly to 

hurry the procurement and shipment of pipeline material that it was 

arranged that the Office of the Chief of Engineers, \Var Department, 

would report frequently on the status of pipeline procurement to General George Spalding of the erstwhile Division of Defense Aid Reports, 

Office for Emergency Management, who would pass on the reports to 

the Lend-Lease Administrator, Mr. Stettinius, who would in turn 

reassure the British.s The early plans contemplated connecting the proposed pipeline system with six container plants in order that manufactured drums and jerrycans could be filled at the plants themselves. 

Specific pipeline routes were placed under study and the engineer constructor alerted to undertake the construction of the lines and twelve 

pumping stations, using "materials furnished through Lend-Lease on a 

British requisition." The first requisition for 600 miles of 6-inch pipe 

(later increased to 760 miles) was nearly all shipped from the United 

States by January 1942 and it was expected that by Mayall necessary 

pipe and couplings would reach Iran.9 

T Memo, Brig W. E. R. Blood for Cen Wheeler, 25 Oct 41. Iran 5/13, NADEF. 

"Documents dated 28 Oct and 24 Noy 41. 679 Pipe Line, Oil, Iran, Intn Div, ASF NCF. • Memo for Cen Aurand, 23 May 42, sub: Pipelines in Iran and Iraq. 679 Pipe Line, 

Oil, Iran, Intn Diy, ASF NCF. 
OIL FOR THE WAR 287 

On the date of Captain Yount's report on construction needs, 

which was prepared at Washington, General Wheeler informed General Moore, Deputy Chief of Staff for Supply, War Department, that 

negotiations were under way in the field for the pipeline construction 

to be done by the AIOC. "Unless otherwise directed," said the message, "contractor need not be prepared for this work." 10 

Although this was an indication of the direction in which matters 

were moving, it was not final, and planning continued in the United 

States. Like everything else, planning for pipeline construction involved a great deal of detail, and, like everything else, much of this 

detail required solution in high places rather than in the field. For 

instance, a difference over joints had developed in the field between 

Colonel Gillies, commanding the Basra subheadquarters office of the 

Iranian Mission, and the local British representative. The British 

wanted welded joints; Colonel Gillies recommended dresser joints. 

The matter was referred to Washington where Brigadier Blood and a 

representative of the Office of the Chief of Engineers decided that, 

although it was general practice for the Americans in constructing a 

pipeline system for the British to follow British wishes, dresser joints 

would be used, subject to the approval of the Commander-in-Chief, 

India.ll 

On 24 December 1941 a preliminary report on the Iranian pipeline project was submitted to the recently appointed District Engineer 

for the Iranian Engineer District, Colonel Lieber.12 The report dealt 

with the following six proposed pipeline routes together with necessary pumping stations and communications: 

(1) Ahwaz-Dizful-Hamadan 320 miles refined prod-

(2) Ahwaz-Dizful 

(3) Abadan-Basra 

(4) Baghdad-Khanaqin 

(5) Kirkuk-Mosul 

100 miles 

35 miles 

110 miles 

100 miles 

ucts 

fuel oil 

refined products and fuel 

oil 

refined products and fuel 

oil 

refined products 

"Rad Wheeler to Moore, 24 Nov 41. DE File D-2, Directives, NADEF. II Me~o for file by Maj T. T. Molnar, Supply Sec, Defense Aid Unit, OCofEngrs, 

4 Dec 41, concerni~g meeting held 2 Dec 41. 381 (Middle East) O&T Sec Files, Folio 1, 

Serials 1-175, OCofEngrs. 12 A Preliminary Report on Iranian Pipeline Project, 24 Dec 41. Iran 45/1, NADEF. 
288 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

(6) Kirkuk-Baiji 66 miles refined products and fuel 

oil 

This very considerable network, when added to existing oil lines in 

the area, would provide the British oil fields in Iraq and Iran with 

alternative connections with Mediterranean outlets, and would also 

establish an integrated oil transport system extending from the Persian 

Gulf far into the northern interior. In a memorandum prepared in 

January in the home office of the Iranian Mission in Washington, 

supposed Axis strategy against the oil fields, the Suez Canal, and the 

Persian Corridor supply line was examined with relation to possible 

routes of enemy attack upon these regions. The pipeline program was 

presented as directly meeting or preparing "for an enemy drive southward and from between the Caspian and Black Seas." Nevertheless, 

it was observed that without detailed study of transportation conditions 

in the field it was impossible to estimate the amount of relief the proposed pipelines would afford existing highway and rail transpores 

By early January the negotiations referred to by General 'Vheeler 

in November resulted in the War Department's proposing to furnish 

materials, which were then actually en route to Iran, while the AIOC 

would construct the lines with British labor. The proposed routes were 

reduced to five, namely numbers 1, 2, 3, and 6 as listed above, and 

either 4 or 5.14 

At this time a meeting was held in the Division of Near Eastern 

Affairs, Department of State, to consider the postwar implications of 

the pipeline project and to determine what agreement the State 

Department should endeavor to reach with the British Foreign Office 

regarding ownership and use of the proposed pipelines in the postwar 

period. Prior to the meeting the Department of State had informed 

the ,,y ar Department that, although it did not wish to delay matters 

or to cast doubt upon the War Department's judgment of the military 

value of the projects, the State Department was concerned with protecting American oil interests "in the future developments in this area 

and preventing a repetition of the events of the period immediately 

subsequent to the first World vVar." 16 

11 Memo, signed by Maj H. Case Willcox, 7 Jan 42. 679 Pipe Line, Oil, Iran, Intn Div, 

ASFNCF. ,. Memo of conversation, State Dept, 12 Jan 42, sub: Postwar Economic Implications of 

Plans of the WD to Furnish Wheeler Mission with Lend-Lease Materials for Cons of Mil 

Pipelines in Iran and Iraq. 679 Pipe Line, Oil, Iran, Intn Div, ASF NCF. 

'" Memo, Capt Yount for Gen Moore, 13 Jan 42. 679 Pipe Line, Oil, Iran, Intn Div, 

ASF NCF. The account of the meeting, except as otherwise noted, is based upon this memo- randum and that cited note 14. Present at the meeting were Wallace Murray, Chief of the 

Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Paul Alling, his Assistant Chief, Max Thornburg, and 
OIL FOR THE WAR 289 

At the meeting Wallace Murray, Chief of the Division of Near 

Eastern Affairs of the Department of State, and later Ambassador to 

Iran, presented an account of the exclusion of American interests from 

the development of the Iraqi oil fields following failure of the United 

States to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. He told how the Colby-Curzon 

correspondence of 1920-28 led to the British Government's allowing 

American interests a 23.75-percent share in the Iraq Petroleum Company in 1928, and he sketched the history of the D'Arcy concession of 

1901 granted to the AIOC and renewed with some limitation in 1933. 

In view of the predictions of experts that American domestic oil supplies 

were not inexhaustible, the State Department, taking a long-range 

view of American requirements, wished to ensure that American 

interests in Iran would not be put at a disadvantage by the proposed 

pipeline construction in Iraq, where American participation in the oil 

company was a minority one, and in Iran, where the AIOC enjoyed, 

save for the five northern provinces, exclusive rights to exploit oil 

resources. It was thought that an arrangement protecting the interests 

of all concerned, American a3 well as British and Iranian, might 

"relieve Iran from possible British postwar pressure to make the lines 

available exclusively to the AIOC." 16 The lack of lend-lease agreements with Iraq and Iran at the time of the meeting complicated the 

postwar disposition of any pipelines which might be built on their 

territory with American materials. 

Consideration was therefore directed to whether the proposed 

routes were for strictly strategic use or based primarily upon future 

commercial requirements; to the effect of the lines upon postwar distribution of refined products and upon development of new oil fields; 

to the question whether their construction would operate to bar American participation in future oil developments in this area; and finally 

to the question of how to agree to safeguard American interests without 

jeopardizing military necessity. 

It was concluded that the State Department would explore the 

matter with the Foreign Office; that ownership would remain in abeyance during the war; that after the war it was desirable that ownership 

and disposition of the lines be settled by agreement among the United 

States, Iran, and the United Kingdom; that pipelines be regarded 

Mr. Parker, for the State Department, and General Moore, Maj. A. N. Wood, Captain Yount 

(the latter two from the Home Office of the Iranian Mission), Philip Young of the LendLease Administration, Fred H. Kay, Vice President, Standard-Vacuum Oil Company, R. C. 

Stoner, Vice President, Standard Oil Company of California, F. A. Davies, President, 

California-Arabian Oil Company (later Arabian-American Oil Company, i. e., Aramco), and 

C. E. Olmstead, Vice President, Texas Company. 

" Memo cited n. 9. 
290 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

as in the same category as other material assistance from the United 

States carried out under the terms of lend-lease, such as port development, railway rolling stock, and highway improvement; and, finally, 

that no delay in the project be interposed by the United States. 

General Moore advised that the British be notified that they could 

not dispose of lend-lease projects without American permission, and 

that General Wheeler be formally directed to examine all lend-lease 

proposals "from the standpoint of military necessity." There is no 

record that such instructions were formally delivered to Wheeler, 

but Captain Yount, who proceeded to Baghdad shortly after the meeting, informed Wheeler fully as to its deliberations and conclusions. 17 

The protection of American postwar interest in the proposed lines, 

the question involved in General Moore's first suggestion, was promptly 

undertaken by the State Department and record of their action transmitted on 30 January to the home office of the Iranian Mission "with 

reference to the meeting concerning a proposal to construct pipelines 

in Iran." The method followed by the State Department was to instruct 

U.S. ambassadors at London, Kuybyshev, and Tehran to protest 

against the provisions of Article IV of the draft treaty then being 

negotiated by Britain, the USSR, and Iran to formalize the situation 

resulting from the invasion and occupation of Iran by British and 

Soviet forces in the preceding year as a counterstroke against Nazi 

forces working for the control of Iran. Article IV read: 

A special agreement shall be concluded between the Allied governments [the 

United Kingdom and USSR] and the Imperial Iranian Government defining the 

conditions of any transfers to the Imperial Iranian Government after the war of 

buildings and other improvements effected by the Allied Powers on Iranian territory. These agreements shall also settle the immunities to be enjoyed by the 

Allied forces in Iran. 

The instructions forwarded to the American ambassadors cited this 

article as appearing "to envisage subsequent negotiations restricted to 

Great Britain, Soviet Russia, and Iran, involving the disposition of 

property which would apparently include American lend-lease material and affecting the long-range interests of the United States in 

Iran." The ambassadors were instructed therefore to request assurance 

from the United Kingdom and the USSR that no such negotiations as 

were referred to by Article IV should be undertaken "before this Government has been consulted and has given its consent to any provisions 

at present affecting, or which may in the future affect American property, rights or interests in Iran." 18 

n Memo, Gen Yount for author, 24 Dec 48. 1. Document and incls dated 26 Jan 42. 679 Pipe Line, Oil, Iran, Intn Div, ASF NCF. 
OIL FOR THE WAR 291 

The upshot was that the only construction under the original program was the short line from Abadan to Basra listed as route 3 above. 

Pipe was supplied under lend-lease for construction by the British. The 

installation was estimated to carry 192,000 gallons a day. Although 

Folspen was relieved of responsibility for construction, as foreshadowed 

in November by General Wheeler, the American engineer constructor 

was nevertheless requested by the British to provide some welding 

equipment and welding supervisors and some technical supervision. 

Thus the early plans for an elaborate Iran-Iraq pipeline network of 

more than 700 miles were modified down to 35 miles. The episode furnishes an instructive military footnote to the larger story of Middle 

East oil which lies beyond the limits of the present history.lg 

Increase of Middle East Refinery Capacity-Bahrein 

Although oil existed in plehty in Iraq and Iran, and there were 

Allied-controlled refineries at Haifa, Bahrein, and Abadan, the exigencies of the war situation in the Middle East in 1941 and 1942 tended to 

limit the use to which these vital Allied war assets could be put in 

behalf of the war effort. As Dr. Herbert Feis has written, "The dangers 

of German destruction or conquest of Middle Eastern oil fields and refineries, the virtual closing of the Mediterranean to tanker transport, 

and the length of the sea haul from the Persian Gulf to western Europe 

combined to confine the usefulness of Middle Eastern oil mainly to 

nearby military operations and safely accessible points until 1943-4." 

American interest in increasing Middle East refinery capacity was expressed late in 1941 by the U.S. Army Air Forces. In November arrangements were made by the appropriate governmental agencies to 

expedite shipment of needed machinery and equipment to Abadan for 

increase of its output. Early in the new year, 1942, the Office of the 

Petroleum Co-ordinator (which in December 1942 became the Petroleum Administration for War) asked the Bahrein Petroleum Company (BAPCO) to submit proposals for the addition to their refinery 

of 100-octane gasoline facilities. At the same time the co-ordinator, 

Harold Ickes, proposed a general program to increase Middle East 

,. (l)Interv with Ambassador Murray, Tehran, 30 Ju145. ,(2) Memo cited n. 9, quoting 

Rad, Col Shingler to Washington, 16 May 42: "All pipeline projects in Iran-Iraq have been 

canceled" with the exception of sections of routes 1 and 2 given in the list in the text. These 

sections would run only from Ahwaz to Andimeshk and were designed for 70,000 gallons and 

150,000 gallons per day, respectively. According to Ambassador Murray even this reduction 

of the original program was abandoned. (3) Memo cited n. 9. Ltr, Edmund A. Prentis, 

Folspen, to Missions Br, Intn Div, SOS, Washington, 18 Jun 42, indicates that Folspen was then working on plans for anchorages for a 6-inch dresser-coupled oil line. 679 Pipe Line, 

Oil, Iran, Intn Div, ASF NCF. (4) Rpt on Trans-Iranian Railway, by Capt Yount,S Jan 42. 

WPD 4596 to -15 Iran (Persia) HRS DRB AGO. 
292 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

refinery capacity which was deferred on the advice of military officials 

pending clarification of the war situation in that area. Further shipments to Abadan of machinery and equipment were expedited in May 

and July 1942 and in May and June certificates of priority for materials 

for the general expansion of the refinery at Haifa were issued. In 1943 

agreement was reached to undertake the Bahrein plant expansion. In 

the same year the construction of the Arabian American Company's 

refinery at Ras Tannura, Saudi Arabia, was begun. By the end of the 

war all this activity had provided an increase of 43 percent in total 

Middle East refinery capacity, that at Abadan amounting to more than 

100 percent.20 

In the case of the refineries at Abadan and Haifa, American aid 

was limited to expediting allocation and shipment of machinery and 

equipment. The Bahrein and Ras Tannura construction was facilitated 

on the urgent recommendation of the Army-Navy Petroleum Boardestablished in 1942, later (1943) an agency of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff-in order that its output might serve American military and 

naval needs in the Pacific war. Only in the case of Bahrein were United 

States Government funds employed or did the War Department, 

through its commanding generals at Cairo and Tehran, assume even 

indirect responsibility. 

This responsibility for operations at the Bahrein refinery was indirect because there was no contractual relationship regarding the 

refinery between the \'\Tar Department and BAPCO. 21 It would be more 

accurate, therefore, to say that, instead of responsibility, the War Department exercised a paramount interest in the progress of the high20 (1) Feis, Seen from E. A., p. 100 and n. 4, p. 171. See also Thirteenth Report to 

Congress on Lend-Lease Operations for the Period Ended November 30,1943 (Washington: 

Government Printing Office, 1944), Ch. 7, "Lend-Lc-ase Petrolt>um in the War," pp. 39-45. 

(2) Interv with Admiral Carter, National War College, 6 Feb 47. (3) Interv with Dr. John 

W. Frey, Historian, Petroleum Administration for War, Interior Dept, 13 Jan 47. (4) Preliminary Report of Observations on Bahrein Island, 27 Jun 44, by Maj Gus R. Bartds, 

Deputy Provost Marshal, PGC, to CG, PGC (cited hereafter as Bartels Rpt). Seen by the 

author at office of Bahrein Petroleum Company, Awali, Bahrein Island, Jul 45. (5) A History 

of the Petroleum Administration for War, 1941-1945, prepared under the direction and 

editorship of John W. Frey and H. Chandler Ide (Washington: Government Printing Office, 

1946), p. 265. (6) Interv cited n. 20(3). 21 (1) But see Container Plants at Abadan and Bahrein, below. (2) See also under date 

of 29 Mar 44. AG 095 Bahrein Oil Co, Hq AMET. (3) The only other direct connection 

occurred oyer the sale to the company of surplus heavy construction equipment. On 2 September 1943 the company requested USAFIME to sell it such equipment in accordance with 

Army policy designed to save shipping. After discussion between USAFIME headquarters 

and the War Department it was decided on 29 April 1944 to supply BAPCO from the Persian 

Gulf. History of ACofS, G-4, AMET, par. 16. Hq AMET. The material was transferred, 

the transaction being legalized on 31 July 1944 by a contract signed between the Persian 

Gulf Command and BAPCO for the sale (with right to repurchase) of $120,927.39 worth 

of machinery, equipment, and supplies under existing law, authority, and declarations. which 

indicated that the national defense and the war effort would be promoted by speeding construction of aviation gasoline facilities. See Contract W-7358-PGC-1. AG File, Hq PGC. 
OIL FOR THE WAR 293 

octane aviation gasoline expansion program and that this interest found 

expression in assumption of jurisdiction over American employees of 

the companies on Bahrein Island. To understand the resulting situation, 

never clearly defined, it will be necessary to review certain aspects of 

the refinery project although construction and operation of the refinery 

were the direct responsibility of BAPCO and outside the jurisdiction of 

War Department agencies. 

The oil concession held by BAPCO, a Canadian subsidiary of 

Standard Oil Company of California, was first granted by the Sheik 

of Bahrein, through the good offices of the Department of State, to 

another American company. After BAPCO took over, it started work 

on the island in 1931, bringing in the first oil strike the next year. The 

first crude was shipped out in 1934. A refinery, built in 1936, was 

enlarged in 1937 and 1940. The high-octane plant additions begun in 

1943 were undertaken under a contract with the Defense Supplies 

Corporation, a subsidiary of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 

Defense Supplies Corporation putting up 75 percent of the cost in 

return for taking the entire high-octane output as agents for the U.S. 

Army and Navy. The first shipment of lOO-octane gasoline from the 

new plant occurred in July 1945. New plant construction was carried 

on for BAPCO by a subcontractor, Compania Constructora BechtelMcCone (BMC), a Venezuelan corporation. 22 

Three factors in the eventual exercise of interest by the War 

Department require notice: first, the political situation at Bahrein 

Island; second, certain proposals made during the contract negotiations; and third, early difficulties in operations which threatened the 

success of the undertaking and brought about the exercise of the War 

Department's interest. 

The Sheikdom of Bahrein is a British protectorate, British rights 

on the island having existed from about 1820. Pursuant to an agreement between the British Government and the Sheik Isa in 1909 and a 

Bahrein Order in Council of 1913, the British political agent on the 

island conducted on behalf of the Sheik all foreign relations and exercised on behalf of the Sheik exclusive jurisdiction over all non-Bahreini 

on the island. During the period under review (1943-45) the British 

political agent was endowed with sweeping power to deport any 

American or British subject, without reference to the Sheik, for 

"intrigue" or "conduct prejudicial to good order and disturbance of 

22 (1) Feis, Seen from E. A., p. 103 and n. 7. (2) Interv with Ward Anderson, General 

Mgr, BAPCO, Awali, Bahrein Island, 11 Aug 45. (3) Interv cited n. 20 (2). The Defense 

Supplies Corporation later modified the contract and had to pay damages for reducing the 

specified quantity. The New York Times, March 17, 1947. 
294 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

the peace," or for offenses, misdemeanors, or felonies. 23 Furthermore, 

although the BAPCO concession was granted by the Sheik, it was 

under the jurisdiction of the British Government which could control 

or pre-empt it. A challenge to British interest in Bahrein was offered 

in November 1927 when the government of Iran claimed sovereignty 

over the island; but this was met by notice served by the British of 

their intention to protect Bahrein against all other claimants. In 

1943-45 there was no United States consul or other American political 

representative on the island, a proposal by the State Department to 

send a consul having been protested by the British.2~ 

Partly because of this political background, BAPCO, when asked 

by the Office of the Petroleum Co-ordinator in January 1942 to submit 

proposals for construction of 100-octane gasoline facilities, complied 

in March with the suggestions that the plant be owned by the United 

States Government; security be provided by military police (American); the United States Government assist in recruiting, deferring 

from the draft, and transporting civilian employees; necessary priorities and shipping space be assured; and in the event of enemy attack 

the United States Government evacuate the construction forces. 25 

Because of the reluctance of the Army to proceed with a general 

program of Middle East refinery expansion until the war situation had 

become clarified, the BAPCO reply was held for some time under 

advisement until in December the Army-Navy Petroleum Board, on 

behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, authorized the Petroleum Administrator for War to inform BAPCO that the project at Bahrein was 

urgently desired. Accordingly, BAPCO submitted new proposals in 

January 1943 looking to completion of the plant by the middle of 1944. 

Long consideration of the contract with the Defense Supplies Corporation ensued, and construction personnel did not reach the island in 

substantial numbers until early 1944. The target date was consequently 

advanced to March 1945, and, as has been stated, the first shipment of 

high-octane gasoline was not made until July 1945.26 

It is important to note, for its effect upon future developments, that 

under the contract finally agreed upon the United States accepted only 

BAPCO's third and fourth proposals and that no responsibility was 

assumed by the United States for security of plant or for jurisdiction 

over civilian personnel. 

23 Bartels R pt. 

" (1 )See under date of 6 Jul 44. AG 250.401 Court Martial Jurisdiction, Hq PGC. 

(2) Bartels Rpt. (3) Interv cited n. 22(2). ,. Bartels R pt. 

"" (1) Interv cited n. 20 (2). (2) This "costly" delay is listed in the Bartels Report among 

eight factors in deterioration of contractor-personnel morale which aroused the War Department's interest. 
OIL FOR THE WAR 295 

After the commencement of construction numerous difficulties 

arose which tended to delay the project and to foster poor morale 

among the civilian construction workers for BMC, the BAPCO subcontractor. Among these difficulties was a marked underestimate of 

personnel needs, placing undue burdens upon an insufficient force at 

the beginning. There were also delays in delivery of men and materials, 

abnormally slow discharge of cargoes by the local British lighterage 

firm (Gray Mackenzie & Co., Ltd.) when they did arrive, shortage of 

materials, equipment, and motor transport, and shortage of native unskilled labor because of the numbers required by the Royal Air Force 

in its construction of airport facilities on another part of the island for 

the Air Transport Command. There was also an average weekly wage 

differential of one hundred and fifty dollars to the disadvantage of 

the BMC employees at Bahrein as compared to wages paid by the 

M. W. Kellogg Company to Americans on its refinery project at 

Abadan.21 All of this contributed to an abnormally high labor turnover 

which was both costly and inefficient and which reflected an increasing 

spirit of unrest among the American employees at the refinery whose 

numbers rose from twenty-five in December 1943 to over 1,000 in 

1944-45 for both BAPCO and BMC.211 

Unrest culminated on the night of 17-18 June 1944 in "the incident at the gate," in which two Americans, attempting to enter the 

refinery without passes, resisted the local Bahreini police.29 It was 

understood by the contractors that under local law and the conditions 

of their concession their employees properly came under local police 

jurisdiction. The incident at the gate merely dramatized and focused 

attention upon the refusal of a malicious element among the employees 

to recognize that jurisdiction. Apprised of the resultant impasse and the 

threat it implied to the success of the Bahrein aviation gasoline project, 

General Connolly promptly dispatched his deputy provost marshal to 

Bahrein to investigate. This action, justified by the general responsibilityof Connolly for maintenance of War Department interests, rested 

" Bartels R pt. ,. The normal complement of the BAPCO refinery before commencement of the aviation 

gasoline program was about 150 Europeans and 1,500 natives. Between 19 May 1943, when 

the high-octane plant project was begun, and the close of business on 12 August 1945 (when 

figures were prepared), 91 percent of European employees processed had been terminated. 

That is, out of 1,104 men processed for the payroll and shipped to Bahrein Island, only 

-iOl remained. Resignations, discharges, and 30-day terminations accounted for 33.5 percent 

of the total employment roster, while 48 percent remained at the plant to the end of their 

contracts. Average turnover approximated one third of total enrollment. Personnel figures 

prepared and information furnished by Walter Hillman, Personnel Manager for BMC at 

the refinery; Mr. Hanson; and J utiUg Fifer, Manager of the BAPCO refinery. ,. Bartels Rpt. 
296 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

upon a presumption of specific jurisdiction rather than upon any clearly 

defined jurisdiction. 

The Army authorities possessed the right to apply the Articles of 

War to War Department civilian employees under their jurisdiction. 

At Bahrein, however, neither contractor nor employees operated under 

War Department contract. The question of Army jurisdiction over 

Bahrein's refinery had come up in November 1943 when General Royce, 

then commanding general of USAFIME, cabled General Somervell 

that he had heard that responsibility for it was to be assigned to the 

Persian Gulf Service Command, then still a part of the USAFIME 

command. To General Royce's suggestion that jurisdiction be assigned 

USAFIME, Somervell replied that, although the jurisdiction was 

automatically USAFIME's under the command setup, it was desirable 

that "any army responsibility be relegated to CG PGSC as it is believed 

that his technical staff is especially qualified to handle this." 30 Under 

other circumstances the Judge Advocate General later, on 13 May 

1944, advised the Commanding General, USAFIME, not to courtmartial American civilian employees of BAPCO while they remained 

within the limits of the Middle East theater as it was doubtful whether 

such procedure would be sustained if tested by habeas corpus or other 

civil proceeding. 31 The lack of clearly defined jurisdiction as between 

USAFIME and the American command in the Persian Gulf over the 

Bahrein project further complicated the problem of controlling the 

transfer of ex-employees of BAPCO and BMC to the payrolls of 

USAFIME civilian contractors, a factor in the high Bahrein labor 

turnover which General Connolly labored more than a year to eradicate 

by agreed controls and arrangements with Brig. Gen. Benjamin F. 

Giles, who became Commanding General, USAFIME, in March 

1944.32 Some weeks previous to the incident at the gate, General Connolly had informed the American charge d'affaires at Tehran that the 

80 Rad AMSME 9141, Royce to Somervell, 6 Nov 43, and atchd papers. AG 095 Bahrein 

Oil Co., Hq AMET. 

"JAG to CG, USAFIME, 13 May 44. AG 095 Bahrein Pet. Co., Hq AMET. 

82 See Rad PX-147B9, Connolly to Giles, 2 Jun 44. AG 095 Bahrein Pet. Co., Hq AMET. 

The radio warned that both USAFIME and its contractors were hiring ex-Bahrein employees, 

causing unrest and high turnover in "this high priority work." Connolly requested Giles to 

check with him to assure that job applicants have a release from PGC regardless of "what 

appears to be a bona fide release from our contractors." Both the phrase "our contractors" 

and the reference to release by the military indicate a de facto assumption of jurisdiction. 

Giles replied, agreeing to check and pointing out that an agreement to clear with the oil 

company and PGC had existed since the previous 17 February. Rad, Giles to Connolly, 

6 Jun 44. Same file. But a message from Royce to PGC, dated 23 February, after the 

agreement cited by Giles, promised to hire no more men without oil company clearance, thus 

suggesting that the agreement did not always govern. Rad, Royce to PGC, 23 Feb 44. 

Same file. 
OIL FOR THE WAR 297 

Persian Gulf Command could not control the American civilians at 

Bahrein because they were not employees of the War Department or 

of a War Department contractor. S3 

Such was the situation when General Connolly met the fact of 

civilian resistance to local authority by the dispatch of his deputy 

provost marshal. This officer reported under date of 27 June 1944 

that the British political agent claimed exclusive jurisdiction over the 

American civilians but promised to appoint Americans as his agents 

in any trials resulting from lawbreaking. The American recommended 

the assignment to Bahrein of an American commanding officer to be 

responsible to the Director of Ports and Gulf District, PGC, and the 

assignment of twelve American military policemen and two Counter 

Intelligence Corps agents.34 

General Connolly forthwith notified BAPCO on 5 July that neither 

the 'Var Department nor the Department of State recognized local 

British jurisdiction over American civilians and that any deputizing 

should be done by the Sheik and not by the British political agent. 

\Vhen BAPCO replied that because of the local conditions already 

explained this was impossible, Connolly referred the matter to General 

Somervell with a request to the Department of State to handle the 

situation. A prompt reply advised Connolly to let the status quo stand, 

nor were matters clarified by a radio from Somervell on 16 July stating 

that the Provost Marshal General had ruled that the PGC was not 

responsible for jurisdiction over the American civilians, but that the 

Commanding General, PGC, might remove or exclude undesirables 

upon notification of the U.S. consul. As there was no U.S. consul at 

Bahrein, the consul forty miles across the water at Dhahran handled 

necessary consular duties. as 

Thus matters stood through the rest of 1944 and 1945 while the 

aviation gasoline project was brought to completion, the bulk of 

American civilians withdrawn, and the PGC itself ultimately deactivated. With the arrival of ATC troops at the airfield at Muharraq, 

at the other end of Bahrein from the refinery at Awali, the presence of 

American military personnel with a direct administrative link to the 

PGC contributed to the security of the refinery without disturbing the 

established local jurisdiction of the British political agent. 

OJ Ltr, Gen Connolly to Richard Ford, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy, Tehran, 25 Apr 

44. AG 201 Dreyfus, L. G., Jr., 1944, Hq PGC. M Bartels Rpt. 35 Communications of 5, 6, 8, 10, and 16 Jul 44. AG 250.401 Court-Martial Jurisdiction, 

HqPGC. 
298 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

Container Plants at Abadan and Bahrein 

The rather minor responsibilities of the U.S. Army for establishment and operation of plants for the manufacture of jerrycans and oil 

drums in the area of the Persian Gulf fell within the framework of a 

program for the whole Middle East initiated at Cairo. Rommel's 

successful push into Egypt in May 1941 literally blew the extensive 

British stockpile of jerrycans sky-high. These indispensable containers 

are difficult to destroy; but when some three million of them are hit by 

shellfire and blast, it is scarcely practicable, under fire, to run about 

the desert and pick them up again. They are a total loss. For the next 

year the British attempted to resupply themselves. Increasing needs, 

not only of the British Army and Royal Air Force but of the American 

Air Forces, led to discussion at Cairo for reproducing drums and cans 

in requisite quantities. By September 1942 General Maxwell was planning for factories at Haifa, Cairo, Alexandria, Tanta, Abadan, and 

Tehran. He requested General Marshall to send six complete plants 

by mid-October. On 24 October Maxwell asked General Somervell to 

give the plants top priority because of their urgent need. On 2 January 

1943 Maxwell asked Somervell for ten additional plants.sa 

The ultimate program was on a smaller scale. On 17 Maya contract was approved between the Ordnance Department and the Overseas Steel Container Corporation, a subsidiary of the U.S. Steel 

Corporation, for management, operation, and maintenance of plants 

for the production of steel drums, pails, and jerrycans in North Africa 

and the Middle East. By Anglo-American agreement in June 

USAFIME was responsible for five container plants as part of a coordinated group to receive quotas established by the War Office, 

London, and allocated by the Deputy Director of Works, Middle East 

Forces, Cairo. In August it was settled that after installation by the 

Corps of Engineers operation of the plants would be by the Overseas 

Steel Container Corporation under ordnance supervision. 37 

Meanwhile arrangements were made for establishment within this 

general program of a container factory at Abadan. In an exchange of 

views on the subject in April 1943 between American headquarters at 

Cairo and Tehran, General Connolly stated that, although the pro-

.. (1) Ltr, Maxwell to Marshall, 21 Sep 42. Cited G--5 File 457, Hq AMET. (2) Rad 

AMSME 2095, Maxwell to Somervell, 24 Oct 42. AG 463.7 (13 Jun 42-30 Apr 43), Hq 

AMET. (3) Rad AMSME 3618, Maxwell to Soroervell, 2 Jan 4:1. G-5 File 457, Hq AMET. 

" (1) Contract, 17 May 43, was for estimated cost of $5,105,356, at a fixed fee of $299,400. 

160 Contract Overseas Steel Container Corporation, SL 8982. (2) Ltr, Gen Giles to GHQ, 

MEF, 24 Jun 43, citing Ltr, Gen Crawford to Lt Gen Sir Wilfred Lindsell, 5 Jun 43, and 

reply, 13 Jun 43. G-5 File, Can and Drum No. I, Hq AMET. (3) Ltr, Ord Off, USAFIME, 

to CG, SOS, USAFIME, 24 Aug 43. Same file. 
OIL FOR THE WAR 299 

posal to set up a plant at Abadan was one for determination at Washington, it was the view of both the American and British commands 

in his area that no need for such a plant existed. General Crawford, 

commanding Services of Supply, USAFIME, replied that the matter 

had been studied from a theater point of view and agreement with 

the British had been reached. s8 Plans, therefore, went ahead, the British 

constructing the necessary buildings at Abadan for three American 

plants--one for jerrycans, one for 36-imperial-gallon drums, and a 

third for U.S. 55-gallon drums. There was a temporary crisis in 

August, after the buildings were erected and the plants were arriving 

for installation, when there was a sudden decision to ship everything 

to Bahrein Island, but this was rescinded in a few days.39 The Abadan 

factory was to be operated by the Overseas Steel Container Corporation as long as required to train British personnel. It was agreed that 

in return for supplying the materials for cans and drums, the British 

would take the full output during 1943. No agreement as to costs or 

distribution of output was reached. It was assumed that the British, 

who required containers for their campaigns in Southeast Asia, would 

assign production where most needed. 

It is not clear from the record whether the plants at Abadan were 

ever American operated, although Americans, acting under the responsibility of the Commanding General, PGSC, instructed the Indian 

Army labor battalion, which worked the plants, in their operation and 

lent a hand later on from time to time when their knowledge of the 

machinery was required to surmount difficulties or to get things started 

again after breakdowns. 

Since the output was to be wholly allocated to British uses, it was 

recommended early in September, before operations began, that the 

plants be turned over to the British. In October Washington relieved 

General Connolly of his responsibility for the container plants at Abadan, the Overseas Steel Container Corporation faded from the picture, 

and the British took over responsibility for operation, while title to 

the plants was held by the Commanding General, SOS, USAFIME. 

The Abadan plants appear to have begun operation late in 1943 and, 

except for the jerrycan plant, to have continued into 1945:° 

•• Rad TN 3099, Gen Connolly to Gen Brereton, 5 Apr 43; and reply, Gen Crawford 

to Gen Connolly, 10 Apr 43. AG 600.12 Abadan, Hq AMET. ,. Penciled notation on copy of Rad AGWAR 2227, 27 Aug 43. AG 635 Drum Assembly 

Plant, Hq PGC. ,. (1) Memo, Ord Off, SOS, USAFIME, for CG, USAFIME, via G-4, 8 Sep 43. 

AG 635 Drum Assembly Plant, Hq PGC. (2) Rad AMPSC 1599, to Gen Connolly, 7 Oct 43. 

Same file. (3) Memo, Overseas Contracts See, Field Serv Div, OCofOrd, 9 Oct 43. 

Same file. (4) Ltr, cors, PGC. to CG, ASF, 20 May 45. AG 635 Pertinent CorrespondenceDrum Plants--Contl Br, Opns Div, Hq PGC. 
300 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

Meanwhile General Connolly, who still found no necessity for the 

plants and believed that neither the British nor the Americans would 

use any large production from them, accepted the decision of higher 

authority to proceed anyhow and in September 1943 suggested locating 

one or two 55-gallon drum plants at Bahrein Island. This would provide, in case of loss or damage at the Abadan plant, an alternative 

plant seven or eight days nearer the CBI theater than those in the 

Mediterranean area. The recommendation was shortly followed by 

conclusion of a contract with BAPeO to establish and operate at their 

works two 55-gallon plants!l The War Department was to furnish the 

necessary manufacturing machinery, some of which was shipped to 

Bahrein from Mombasa, to reimburse the contractor for half the cost 

of the necessary buildings and to offer him the first opportunity to 

purchase the machinery at the termination of the contract. In turn the 

contractor was to manufacture drums at a fixed price per completed 

drum in quantities ordered by the government and to furnish all labor 

and materials not specified in the contract. Since the government controlled the rate of production, the contractor was to be paid a stated 

monthly sum for all fixed charges not affected by the rate of production. 

Administratively the Bahrein plant's connection with General Connolly's headquarters was through Plants Branch, Operations Division, 

which co-ordinated operations through the commanding officer of the 

Gulf District. The Plants Branch also acted as liaison agent with the 

Petroleum Adviser, Operations Division, and reported monthly the 

number of drums necessary to produce. It also maintained close contact with the Assistant Chief of Staff for Supply on matters pertaining 

to materials and equipment. As a statistics office, Plants Branch obtained weekly and monthly production reports and retained copies of 

receipts for plant equipment and materials used by the contractor. 

The Bahrein plants went into production on a two-line basis on 

1 August 1944 and almost immediately shut down because of lessened 

demand for 55-gallon drums and stood by for instructions from the 

Army-Navy Petroleum Board. By November, when authority was 

received from Washington to devote total output to British requirements in Southeast Asia, operations were on a three-shift basis. Total 

production of drums to the year's end was 41,307 accepted units. 

Because of increased labor force, better contractor supervision, and the 

41 Rad AGWAR 2444,20 Sep 43. AG 635 Drum Assembly Plant, Hq PGC. The contract, 

W-7366-0rd-l, was signed between 9 October and 21 November 1943, according to memo- randum cited note 40(3). There was also a contract, W-7366-QM-8260, with BAPCO. 
OIL FOR THE WAR 301 

arrival of needed' equipment, production for the month of February 

1945 reached 41,691, rising in April to 48,949. 42 

Meanwhile, in March certain complications arose as to continued 

operation of the plant. A general policy had been evolved in Washington to sell all American drum plants in areas where the United States 

had no supply responsibility, and BAPCO had evinced an interest in 

buying the two drum plants, War Department owned, at their refinery. 

Responsibility for over-all policy regarding the plant now rested with 

the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, and the Army-Navy 

Petroleum Board, who advised Headquarters, PGC, that production 

was to continue as long as required to meet operational demands for 

containers. Although a stock pile of some 76,000 drums had accumulated at Bahrein and supplies on hand there were sufficient for six 

months' production at the monthly quota of 40,000 units demanded 

by the British, Abadan production, owing to shortages of steel and 

supplies there, had fallen off drastically and might fall farther. The 

Bahrein plant was thus useful in supplementing Abadan production; 

but in the opinion of Headquarters, PGC, it seemed, even in these 

circumstances, to be producing more than conditions warranted. 

Accordingly, authority was requested from the Army-Navy Petroleum 

Board to reduce production to a one-line, two-shift basis at a minimum 

target of 40,000 per month until the British could demonstrate their 

ability to move out the accumulated stock pile. Permission was granted, 

effective 1 May, and the authorities at PAl Force were so informed. 43 

Up to 1 May Bahrein's cumulative production amounted to 188,346 

accepted drums. During that month, however, with a return to the 

one-line, two-shift plan of operation, and because of breakdowns of 

machinery which, in spite of appeals to AIOC, Middle East Forces, 

Africa-Middle East Theater, and India, could not be replaced, the 

monthly total fell to 23,665 accepted units, but rose again sharply 

next month. 44 

The American decision to reduce production had been met with 

British demands for an increase. At first the Americans countered with 

the suggestion that, since the Bahrein and Abadan output was solely 

destined for British uses in Southeast Asia, the Abadan plants be moved 

to India and their production taken up by the plants at Bahrein and 

.. Hist Rpts, Plants Br, Opns Div, Hq, PGC: (1) 4 Oct 44. PGF 125-U. (2) 15 Jan 45. 

PGF 125-X. (3) Table 14. 

" (l) Hist Rpt, Plants Br, Opns Div, Hq, PGC, 2 May 45. PGF 125-B. (2) Extract, 

21 Mar 45, Rpts, Ex Off to CofS, PGC. PGF 251-A, 251-B. (3) Rad WARX 60174, 29 Mar 

45, referred to in Rpt cited in (1). See also Extracts, 23, 30 Mar 45, Rpts, Ex Off to CofS, 

PGC. PGF 251-A, 251-B. Responsibility for filling the drums rested with BAPCO and PAl 

Force, the War Department's interest being solely in maximum production . .. Table 15. 
302 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

those in the Africa-Middle East Theater. Before this went any further 

the progress of the Japanese war determined Washington that continued operation of American-sponsored drum plants in the Persian 

Gulf Command was inconsistent with a policy of troop withdrawal and 

redeployment, and in June PGC was advised that the British Army 

Staff in Washington had been notified to that effect!5 

In accordance with this decision the Director, Readjustment Division, Army Service Forces, declared surplus Abadan plants 166-A, 

187-A, and 127-B, along with the Bahrein plant, effective 1 August 

1945, and terminated the Bahrein contract as of 31 July. Plants Branch, 

Operations Division, PGC, prepared schedules of equipment for the 

Supply Division, Headquarters, PGC, to process prior to turning over 

to the Army-Navy Liquidation Commission for disposal. It was later 

discovered that, because of provisions in the Bahrein contract, that 

plant could not be declared surplus, and the Jersey City Quartermaster 

Depot was designated by the War Department to negotiate with 

BAPCO for sale. <6 

Supply of POL Within the Command 

Inherent in its primary mission as a supply line was the responsibility of the Persian Gulf CQInmand and its predecessors for the movement 

of POL.<7 Within the area of the command, of course, lay not only a 

large part of the civilian population of Iran with its normal petroleum 

demands, but also those organizations, principally military, of Iranian, 

British, Soviet, and American nationality, which required petroleum 

products in large quantities, both to fill the normal housekeeping requirements for maintenance of military establishments and forces and 

for the operation of shipping, ports, highway convoys, railways, and 

industrial enterprises such as motor vehicle and aircraft assembly 

plants. 

The top authority over production and distribution of petroleum 

products in the area was the Baghdad Petroleum Advisory Committee, 

" (l) Extract 25 Apr 45, Rpts, Ex Off to CofS, PCC. PCF 251-A, 251-B. (2) Ltr 

cited n. 40(4). (3) Rad WAR X 280146Z, Jun 45. AC 635 Pertinent CorrespondenceDrum Plants-Conti Br, Opns Div, Hq PCC. '6 Hist Rpt, Plants Br, Opns Div, Hq, PCC, 10 Aug 45. PCF 125-F . 

.. Unless otherwise noted, authority for facts and statistics in this and the next section 

rests upon: (I) HOTI, Pt. I, Ch. 8, sec. 3, History of Movements Branch, Operations 

Division, Hq, PCC, prepared by Movements Branch, Operations Division, with Supplement 

by Laurence P. Corbett, and statistical appendix, Complete Summary of Port and Transportation Agencies Performance of PCC Operations through 31 May 1945, 5 July 1945. 

PCF. Certain figures given in the text are the result of new computations based upon statistics 

in the Supplement. (2) Memo, Maj Lester S. Thompson, Petroleum Adviser to CofS, Hq, 

PCC for CC, PCC, 28 Jan 44; sub: Relating to the Procurement, Storage, and Distribution 

of Petroleum Products. PCF 8-T. (3) Rpt cited n. I ( I ). 
OIL FOR THE WAR 303 

upon which a representative of the American command served with 

representatives of the AIOC and affiliated companies, PAl Force, the 

RAF, and the Petroleum Division of the British Ministry of Fuel and 

Power, London.48 The findings and recommendations of the committee's monthly meetings were submitted to the ministry in London, and 

through it to the U.S. Army-Navy Petroleum Board at Washington. 

Production and distribution were interpreted as covering oversight of 

responsibility and accountability for consumption, and, of course, all 

plans for distribution including highway, barge, rail, and pipeline 

transport, and the construction, location, and operation of container 

and filling plants. In the practical application of these responsibilities 

within the area, final decisions and allocation of responsibility for carrying them out were arranged by mutual agreement between the British 

and American local commands. This allocation shifted during the 

period of American activity in Iran, from rather incidental responsibility on the part of the Americans for their own early projects in 1942, 

to the fullest measure of responsibility in 1944-45, the period in which 

the American command virtually took over all Persian Corridor transport direction and control. During the period 1941-45 many agencies 

carried petroleum products within the area-agencies both civilian, 

like the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation and the AIOC, 

and military, like PAl Force, the RAF, and Soviet military organizations. American statistics cover petroleum hauled by Americanoperated transport agencies, but do not necessarily cover all petroleum 

hauled, non-American records being unavailable. 

The complexity of the task of petroleum distribution can be gauged 

by a listing of the consumers within the area. Within the jurisdiction 

of the successive American commands, of which the Persian Gulf 

Command was the last, the largest consumers of fuel oil, which originated in Iran, and of lubricants, which came from the United States, 

'Were the Military Railway Service, which operated the railway, and 

the Motor Transport Service, which operated the convoys of trucks. 

The ISR had its own purchasing contract with the AIOC, but 

American petroleum statistics include, nevertheless, not only the fuel 

thus purchased to run the railway, but also the petroleum products 

carried over the railway for Soviet account under the several protocols 

and for all other purposes. Other requirements for petroleum products 

within the American command included that for operation of posts, 

camps, and stations; aviation gasoline (in addition to that carried north 

for Soviet account) for the American Air Forces and ATC; afld POL 

.. State Dept Rpt, British Controls in Iraq, by Richard E. Gnade, 25 Feb 44. Mid 330 

Great Britain, 3 Apr 44 (12 Mar 43). 
304 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

for the Eastern Command, briefly located inside Soviet territory in the 

shuttle-bombing program which was supplied through the Persian 

Corridor. There were also needs connected with the testing and flying 

of USSR aircraft assembled in the Corridor. 

Other consumption i'n the area, for which at one time or another 

the transport facilities operated by the American forces hauled petro~ 

leum products, included Soviet air force and armies, PAl Force, Soviet 

military transport, the newly assembled Soviet trucks, newly assembled 

UKCC trucks, and the Iranian Army, Gendarmerie, military transport, and civilian needs. It is notable that in 1943-44 nearly twice as 

much fuel was delivered for Iranian domestic and civilian commercial 

use as ever before, and that the amount was further increased the 

following year in the face of all other demands that were being met 

within the Corridor. This was the result of increased oil production 

and refining as well as of vastly increased transportation facilities. 

Although during the Allied occupation Iran experienced inflation and 

a period of food shortage, the presence of foreign forces was accom~ 

panied by increased domestic civilian consumption of petroleum 

products. In spite of the increased civilian consumption, American 

officials stated that there was no basis for the complaint of two Soviet 

officials in August 1943 that the "private motorist in Persia" was 

getting gasoline needed by the Soviets for the battles of Orel and 

Kharkov.49 Over-all Soviet petroleum requests were fully met. 

After General Connolly'S arrival in the field in October 1942, a 

Movement Division of the Persian Gulf Service Command was set 

up in Basra. Since the previous July an American movements representative had performed liaison there between the small American detachment and the British forces and continued in general liaison work 

including the co-ordination of information relating to the first largescale arrival of American troops in December 1942. The new Movement Division was officially activated on 5 January 1943 at Khorramshahr, with three branches, including a Transportation Branch from 

which, by a reorganization of 1.5 March 1943, developed the Oil Section, Movements Branch, Operations Division. The Americans took 

over from the British on 1 May 1943 the control of USSR cargoes. The 

setting up of a separate Oil Section, as distinct from a Transportation 

Section within IVlovements Branch, emphasized the need for an office 

to deal with control and distribution of tank cars. Although after January 1945 AIOC became responsible for maintaining full storage by 

means of an agreed allotment of tank cars, PGC still had to account for 

co Notes of Mtg held at Soviet Transportation Directorate, Tehran, 18 Aug 43. AG 337, 

HqPGC. 
OIL FOR THE WAR 305 

operating delays in transit. Therefore, the Oil Section continued actively until May 1945 when it was incorporated into the Inland Traffic 

Section. 

To represent the command on the Baghdad Petroleum Advisory 

Committee, to act as technical adviser on all petroleum matters, and 

to co-ordinate petroleum activities within the theater, the Office of 

PetroleUUl Adviser was established in March 1943 and the adviser attached as special assistant to the chief of staff. On 23 December 194,1 

the office was transferred to Operations Division and was dissolved on 

1 August 1945. 50 The petroleum products obtained by the American 

forces from the AIOC were supplied on reciprocal aid by requisitions 

made upon PAl Force. 

The movement of a basic commodity like petroleum must be accurately traced and exactly measured if it is to be statistically evaluated 

with relation to other types of cargoes. In the Persian Corridor the 

numerous agencies, with their different record-keeping systems, make 

a valid statistical analysis of petroleum movement performed by the 

U.S. Army impossible. Totals, unrelated to other figures, are difficult 

to comprehend and not significant in themselves; but they furnish the 

only materials for evaluation. 

American Army operation up to 31 March 1945 consumed 537,804 

long tons of petroleum, exclusive of lubricants. The ISR, whose cargoes 

were proportionately the greatest in the Corridor and are reliable as 

indicators of movement, carried 4,638,095 long tons north of Andimeshk from August 1942 through May 1945. Of this total, 2,934,443 

long tons, including petroleum, were destined for the USSR. One 

source states that of that Soviet-destined tonnage carried by the ISR, 

653,659 long tons of petroleum were delivered at Tehran. 51 The Soviet 

share of total cargoes hauled north of Andimeshk by rail during thi<; 

period was 63 percent; 40 percent of total rail tonnage was petroleum, 

more than one third of which was for Russia. The total rail cargo 

hauled north of Andimeshk in this period and not destined for the 

USSR was 1,155,041 long tons, more than half of it oil. The railway 

itself received 258,695 long tons in bulk oil; 553,014 long tons were for 

the Iranian civilian economy; and the balance was for American, 

British, and Russian military and civilian agencies in the area. 

The figures indicate that getting oil to many different consumers 

was no small task. Getting oil to the USSR, the high-priority consumer 

D. GO 85, Hq, PGC, 30 Ju145. 01 This figure is from History cited n. 47(1). The Report on War Aid Furnished by the 

United States to the USSR, Foreign Economic Section, Office of Foreign Liquidation, 

Department of State 28 November 1945, gives the figure 555,202 long tons of Abadan 

petroleum products delivered to the USSR. The difference was petroleum imported into Iran. 
306 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

of the Persian Corridor for whose supply the American command primarily existed, was a special problem, additional to the general problem of oil transport. 

Gasoline for Russia 

In the spring of 1943 it was apparent that the exigencies of the 

struggle on the Eastern Front would soon require the Soviets to call for 

greatly increased supplies of aviation gasoline from the Western 

Powers. On 12 Maya message went from General Somervell to General 

Connolly requesting advice as to the feasibility of sending bulk shipments of aviation fuel via the Persian Corridor.52 The Aviation Gasoline 

Program, world-wide in scope, was based, in the Persian Corridor area, 

upon an agreement reached in following months whereby the AIOC 

made available for Russian delivery amounts of high-octane aviation 

gasoline to be delivered by the American-operated transport agencies. 

The gasoline was. supplied on reverse lend-lease, subject to delivery in 

the United Kingdom of equivalent amounts of petroleum from Western 

Hemisphere sources to compensate the United Kingdom for AlOC 

products normally intended for their uses. The Persian Gulf part in the 

program came into effect as of 1 July 1943 under the Third (London) 

Protocol and continued through the Fourth (Ottawa) Protocol, which 

was effective through 12 May 1945. Over half a million long tons thus 

went to the USSR from the Abadan refinery. 

Preliminary estimates in May 1943 were for haulage of 5,000 long 

tons per month. To superimpose the new burden upon the already increasing transport demands in the Corridor required not only new and 

complex arrangements for railway tank cars, highway haulage, shipping-including tankers and barges-storage facilities, and container 

filling, but development of new transport means such as pipelines, and 

a high degree of co-ordination of all these factors. As arrangements developed, capacity estimates by July 1943 had increased to 10,000 long 

tons per month and were projected at that level through June 1944. 

By November 1943, however, it was possible to raise the target to 25,000 

long tons per month, and in the following July the target was stepped 

up to 37,000, of which 23,000 were to be carried in railway tank cars 

and 14,000 in drums. The figure of 37,000 long tons per month continued to April 1945, dropped in May to 25,000, and on 1 June] 945 

the program was terminated.53 

.. Rad, Somervell to Connolly, 12 May 43, AG 337, Hq, PGC, quoted HOTI, Pt. VII, 

Ch. 7, Information on Gasoline to Russia, by Ogden C. Reed. PGF . .. During 1944 planning included commitments for FRANTIC, the U.S. Army Eastern 

Command shuttle-bombing mission located in the USSR. A large proportion of the tonnage 

hauled over the ISR during June, July, August, and September 1944 for that mission consisted 
OIL FOR THE WAR 307 

The steady increase in USSR bulk petroleum products (highoctane gasoline and alkylate), carried from September 1943 on into 

1945, was accomplished without affecting the distribution of petroleum 

for other uses within the Corridor. This achievement was made possible 

through a number of factors. The fleet of tank cars available in July 

1943 for USSR petroleum was only forty cars. By March 1945, 400 

tank cars transported 32,855 long tons of high-octane gasoline. The 

tank car turnaround period of fifteen days in 1943 dropped to half that 

in 1945. Economies and efficiencies all down the line contributed; but 

the most significant factor was the erection of new installations, called 

Petroleum Base 4 (P-4) and Petroleum Base 7 (P-7) near 

Khorramshahr. 

Although by the summer of 1943 the AIOC in conjunction with 

PAl Force had already established a number of fuel bases for reception, 

storage and distribution of petroleum, the increased requirements 

called for additional facilities. A site two miles north of Khorramshahr 

adjacent to the PGSC's Ports Service Motor Pool was selected and in 

August 1943 construction of P-4 was begun. Leveling of the area and 

laying the concrete floor was accomplished by American Khorramshahr 

Post engineers while above-ground facilities were constructed by the 

British Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers. The AIOC installed pipelines and distribution points and on 25 November 1943 

rail tank cars began to move north out of P-4. 

P-4 thus became the terminus of pipelines from the Abadan refinery. At this base fuel was distributed to tank cars by use of small 

pressure pumps. The installation also filled drums for truck haulage. 

In addition it served as a transportation clearing yard for rail and 

truck movements to the Soviet receiving points on the Caspian Sea. 

The drumming of gasoline, with which American troops were particularly concerned in this co-operative Anglo-American undertaking, 

did not commence until :May 1944. Responsibility was divided among 

numerous agencies. AIOC supplied the gasoline; U.S. Khorramshahr 

Port Transportation along with British Movement Control arranged 

for transport scheduling; the 6th British Petrol Staff and the 153d 

(la ter 154th) Indian Depot (Indian Army Service Force) filled tank 

cars and tested, washed, and filled drums; while American personnel 

from Khorramshahr port handled the loading and unloading of drums 

of aviation gasoline. The tonnages hauled by rail north of Andimeshk for FRANTIC were: 

1,230 long tons, June; 6,547, July; 678, August; and 58, September. A radio from Connolly 

to Somervell indicates that the American command was prepared to haul 12,000 long tons for 

FRANTIC in August. The reduction and eventual conclusion of that mission made this unnecessary. Rad 28 Jul 44, AG 337, Hq PGC, quoted History cited n. 52. 
308 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

and the spotting of rail cars and trucks. Russian inspection officers 

completed the P-4 team. 

P-4 had been in operation something over a year when acute need 

for further facilities set the Americans to construction of the near-by 

sister installation, P-7, designed to serve for 100-octane fuel, while 

P-4 would handle 70-octane. Construction was quickly accomplished; 

but by January 1945, P-7 became a storage area and P-4 handled all 

100-octane gasoline. At the end of April the U.S. Army withdrew, 

handing over to PAl Force, although the American Port Transportation Office continued to assist in movement matters. During the period 

of its operation P-4 cased and shipped over 275,000,000 gallons of 70-

and 1 OO-octane fuel to Soviet receiving points. The base averaged 1,200 

tank cars or over 9,000,000 gallons of gasoline monthly by rail 

and approximately 2,500,000 gallons in drums monthly.~4 

Of Hist Rpt, Ports Serv, Apr 45. PGF 26-B. 
CHAPTER XVI 

Truck Transport 

Construction, assembly, and petroleum operations were vital but 

secondary parts of the American mission. By directive of the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff the primary mission was transport. An American trucking service, first proposed in May 1942 by General Somervell, was regarded by the SOS planners as supplementary to existing British trucking organizations.1 It therefore received a priority lower than that 

accorded to the American organizations for ports and railway. This 

was not because the planners failed to recognize urgent trucking requirements. The crisis of midsummer 1942 had demonstrated that, 

until rail capacity in the Corridor could be vastly improved, the only 

hope of dealing with mounting backlogs of cargo at the ports was to 

strengthen the existing British motor transport system, as operated by 

the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation and British military 

trucking units. The assignment of third priority status to an American 

trucking organization resulted rather from the long-term view that, 

since there was no possibility of organizing and shipping a fully functioning American trucking outfit to the Corridor in time to affect the immediate problem that faced the planners in August 1942, it was best to 

encourage such local assistance to UKCC as was possible while organizing and putting into the field an American motor transport service. 

American trucks would strengthen the British services. Unlike the 

American port and rail services, the Motor Transport Service was not 

to supplant any existing British activity. 

In a country of desert and mountain, ill supplied with highways, 

relatively waterless, and subject to extremes of climate, transport by 

road was less efficient by all measurements than bulk transport by rail. 

Furthermore, granting adequate capacity both by road and rail, there 

would always be cargoes that were not truckable; and granting maximum rail development, the need for truck operations would correspondingly decrease. Planning for a motor transport service was thus 

subject to greater contradictions and more uncertainties than was 

t Rad 177, Somervell to AMSIR, 9 May 42. AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 5. 
310 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

planning for rail expansion. A trucking organization, even as a temporary expedient, required highways adequate to heavy usage. To this 

contradiction between permanent highways and temporary planned 

use were added the basic uncertainties existing at the time the SOS 

Plan was being evolved. The SOS planners' estimates, which depended 

on important unknowns such as the routes to be used and the extent to 

which an American motor transport service was to supplement UKCC 

operations, were subject to further variables inherent in the nature of 

truckable cargoes. Estimates relying upon a steady flow of tonnages 

were at best tentative. 

In its provision for trucking the SOS Plan therefore confined itself 

to a statement of general intentions. Its estimate of required personnel 

proved accurate enough: 5,291 men for road operations plus an additional 4,515 for highway and vehicle maintenance. Estimates of required vehicles and anticipated targets, on the other hand, were not 

achieved. The hope of the planners to supply 7,200 trucks of 7-ton 

average capacity was not realized, and all calculations based upon the 

use of larger trucks were overturned when the :Motor Transport Service 

found it would have to use whatever vehicles it could get. In the matter 

of target estimates, the SOS planners were in no position to indicate 

what proportion of the 172,000 tons of ultimate monthly road capacity 

it expected the MTS to handle and what proportion was for British 

agencies, nor could the plan indicate precisely what part of the total 

it expected to be USSR tonnage. With only the vaguest of maps, MTS 

launched itself upon a road wrapped in mists and marked by unexpected turnings. 

The Preliminaries 

Planning, early organization and procurement, overseas shipment, 

and early operations were all carried forward under the necessity of 

adjusting the concepts of the SOS Plan to field realities. On 9 October 1942, shortly after approval of the SOS Plan, Headquarters 

and Headquarters Company, MTS, was formally activated at Camp 

Lee, Virginia, with Col. Mark V. Brunson as director. He was assisted 

by two Regular Army officers and three experienced truck fleet operators and maintenance experts commissioned from civilian life.2 

'Unless othe:cwise noted, this chapter draws upon: (1) Historical Outline of Motor 

Transport Service 1616-D, U.S. Army, PGC, PGF 13 I-B. (2) Monthly Hist Rpts, MTS, 

1 Mar 43 through 31 Oct 44, with atchd Accident Rpts. PGF 131. (3) Monthly Rpts of 

Opns, MTS, for Mar, Jun, Jul, Aug 43. PGF 131. (4) History of the Motor Transport 

Sen·icc [unsigned and undated but late 194-41. PGF 1'l1-W. (5) HOTI, Pt. VI, History 

of the Motor Transport Service, by Wallace P. Rustcrholtz. PGF. (6) Plan for the Operation 

of the Motor Transport Service, PGSC, by Col Brunson, 15 Jan 43. PGF 131. (7) Functions 
TRUCK TRANSPORT 311 

Personnel estimates called for two truck regiments totaling 3,270 

officers and men. This somewhat greater than standard strength 

allowed for unpredictable operating situations. A minimum of two 

automotive maintenance battalions--one medium and one heavywas provided for, with a considerable assortment of engineer troops 

for highway construction and maintenance and for construction of 

sheds, shops, camps, and other necessary facilities. Recruitment was 

marked in its first stages by haste and confusion; however, it was 

distinguished by the effort to obtain from the rank:, of experienced 

trucking men both top experts and the great body of drivers, mechanics, 

and dispatchers upon whose skill and fortitude hung the ability to throw 

an organization together in short order. The quartermaster authorities, 

to whom Headquarters 1616 delegated the trucking problem early in 

October, appealed to the American Trucking Associations, Inc., at 

Washington for advice and assistance in speedily assembling adequate 

numbers of experienced men. In five days the organization, through 

telegrams to 350 regional members of its Special War Committee who 

in tum vigorously stimulated enlistments locally through handbills 

and radio, brought in to the Army from the ranks of the civilian 

trucking world 5,377 applications for enlisted grades and 263 officer 

candidates. The response exceeded expectations and was due, in part, 

to the fact that word got around that the new recruits would be eligible for advanced grades and would be exempt from many features 

of Army training. 'When this impression was corrected-as it was 

promptly-enthusiasm somewhat diminished. Evidence conflicts as 

to how many men were actually inducted from among the applicants solicited; but the 516th Quartermaster Truck Regiment 

was largely staffed by officers who had been fleet maintenance 

men, traffic experts, and specialists in fuel distribution and cargo 

handling, and manned by experienced dispatchers, drivers, and mechanics. The other regiment called for by the SOS Plan, the 517th, 

suffered from the reaction which set in among truckmen after the 

confusion over promises had been cleared up. Its strength was largely 

composed of assignments and transfers from other troop units in the 

Army and not of men with specific trucking skills and experience.s 

of MTS and Troop Units Assigned Thereto. PGF 122. (8) For data on perfonnance and 

civilian personnel see Tables 4, 6, 13 and Charts 2, 6. I The recruiting campaign was conducted in consultation with Army officials. Colonel 

Brunson and others conferred at the American Trucking Associations' headquarters in Washington and worked closely with the association; there were no written instructions or commitments. The present account draws upon Interv with John Lawrence, Mgr, American 

Trucking Associations, 16 Mar 50. Hist Rpt, 2d Bn, 516th QM Truck Regt, Nov 42, 

PGF 52-2-J; and pages 2-3, Outline cited n. 2(1). 
312 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

Step by step the organization took shape. In November Colonel 

Brunson and three officer assistants arrived by air at Basra to investigate routes and sources of fuel supply; to accept some two hundred 

trucks turned over by UKCC and the British Army at Bushire and 

Tehran; and to plan for establishment of MTS relay stations along the 

highway from Khorramshahr northward, for schools to train native 

drivers and mechanics, and for fleet operations. On 17 December 

the MTS was established as an operating service of the American 

command. 4 When command headquarters moved early in January 

1943 to Tehran, MTS moved its headquarters there, too. In December 

1942 the 429th Engineer Dump Truck Company and a First Provisional Truck Company, composed of men drawn from other PGSC 

units in the field, were assigned to MTS. Their first duty was to accept 

and assemble the trucks received from the British, and to drive administrative vehicles for the three territorial districts of the command. 

In January 1943 a school for training native civilian driver-interpreterinstructors was opened at Tehran. It turned out some seventy instructors and paved the way for the opening in February of a school at 

Andimeshk to train native drivers. The start of this enterprise was 

delayed until the arrival from the United States of Headquarters and 

Headquarters Company, MTS, from which its staff of instructors was 

drawn supplemented by graduates of the interpreter school. The 

roster of MTS was further strengthened in February by the arrival of 

the 3d Battalion of the 26th Truck Regiment, a Negro outfit destined 

to join the 517th Truck Regiment when it should complete its training and arrive in the field. In anticipation of the commencement of 

trucking operations, the 3430th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company, an early arrival, was assigned in February to establish and man relay, service, and repair stations along the route from 

Khorramshahr to Kazvin. 

The assembly of men and equipment, the laying out of service 

stations, and the gathering of data were among the preliminaries that 

had to be accomplished before regular American trucking service could 

begin. There were also problems related to the route itself which 

pressed for early solution. Because of the concentration of American 

activity at the port of Khorramshahr and the impossibility of manning, 

fueling, and provisioning more than one route, the highway north from 

there provided the inevitable route for the MTS. But no part of the 

highway to Kazvin, in December 1942, was fit for heavy and continuous traffic. The sector from Andimeshk south by the year's end was 

• GO 11, Hq, PGSC, 17 Dec 42. 
TRUCK TRANSPORT 313 

provided with a temporary roadway. Bridges and some road construction had been accomplished on the permanent road; but, thanks 

to the floods of March 1943 which washed away much of what had 

been built up to that time, construction of the permanent all-weather, 

two-lane highway from Khorramshahr to Andimeshk occupied the 

greater part of 1943. As for the northern sector, where the problem 

was the improvement of an existing road, the American engineer 

troops did not begin work until June. They progressed so well, along 

with companion British forces, that by the end of the year barely fifty 

miles remained unprovided with a hard surface. 

The route from Khorramshahr to Andimeshk crosses a low, sandy 

plain, varying in elevation from 10 feet at Khorramshahr to 70 feet at 

Ahwaz and 500 feet at Andimeshk-windy, hot, and dry, swept in 

summer by dust storms and in winter by heavy rains. (Map 4) The 

Karun River and the Ab-i-Diz, roughly paralleling the road, run close 

enough to provide the flood hazard which proved so damaging just 

as MTS was going into action. Beyond Andimeshk the terrain is characterized by deep gorges and rugged mountains. Some of the ascents 

are abrupt and steep, occasionally rising as sharply as grades of 10 to 

12 percent (roads in the Uni~ed States seldom exceed 10 percent). 

A notable example of this is the Avej Pass (elevation 7,776 feet), the 

highest point along the MTS route. Heavy snowdrifts and bitter cold 

in winter, with temperatures dropping as low as 25 0 F., below zero, 

proved hazardous features of this 5-mile climbing section of the road. 

Along this route, UKCC, which had been hauling Russian-aid, 

British military, and other cargoes since late 1941, had established a 

chain of repair and rest stations at Ahwaz, Andimeshk, Khurramabad, 

Ramadan, and Kazvin, with a northernmost terminus at Tabriz, capital 

of the province of Azerbaijan, well within the Soviet zone. Plans for a 

supplementary American trucking service over the same route had 

assumed the farthest destination. The SOS Plan had stated, "Truck 

convoys will pass over these routes to Tabriz, Pahlevi, and other delivery 

points to the Russians," and Colonel Brunson's January 1943 plan for 

operations listed Tabriz as the destination of first priority, with Chalus 

and Pahlevi, on the Caspian, following-all of them inside the Soviet 

zone. This understanding was confirmed in conference on 16 January 

with the Soviet liaison officer for lend-lease shipments, Colonel Zorin.5 

Developments in February threw into doubt the several termini 

for American operations. The Soviets refused to issue passes to Ameri-

• Memo, Col Ward, Deputy Dir, MTS, PGSC, for CG, PGSC, 16 Jan 43, sub: Conf 

with Col Zorin. PGF 131. 
"" \ Co.,p Kromer 

• 

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TRUCK TRANSPORT 315 

can soldier-drivers and workers and notified General Connolly that 

special application and arrangements would have to be made for sites 

for American camps near Tabriz, Zenjan, and the Caspian ports. Such 

applications, promptly made, went unanswered. Suspecting that the 

difficulty may have arisen from a conflict of overlapping Soviet jurisdictions, Connolly appealed to General Faymonville at Moscow for 

help and warned that if the destinations planned for were not available, 

~1TS cargo would have to be dumped at Kazvin, on the border of the 

Soviet zone, to be carried forward from there by the Soviet forces. On 

19 February, no change having taken place in the situation, General 

Connolly wrote to Gen. Anatoli N. Korolyev, Chief of the Soviet 

Transportation Department in Iran, that all movement orders to 

American troops beyond the zonal border had been revoked. By 1 

March Kazvin was agreed upon as the delivery point for MTS cargoes 

and, despite a change of mind by the Soviets within a week, when they 

again suggested that the Americans deliver cargo to the Caspian ports 

and Tabriz, Connolly held his ground and so reported to the American 

Embassy, Moscow, and to General MarshalL Although the Soviets 

made a specific request in June for delivery of cargo at Pahlevi, Kazvin 

remained the American terminus with the exception of a brief period 

between September and November 1944 when special MTS convoys, 

equipped with their own radio communications, went through to 

Tabriz. The situation recalls the similar uncertainty of Soviet policy 

in the matter of the terminal checkup stations which were a part of the 

system for delivering assembled motor vehicles.6 

Meanwhile in January an understanding was reached with the 

British on the gradual meshing of the new . .<\merican trucking operation 

with the existing services of UKCC. At a meeting attended by General 

Connolly for PGSC, General Selby of GHQ, PAl Force, and R. H. 

Evans, Managing Director of UKCC, it was agreed that by 1 March 

a small American fleet could be assembled and manned to begin trucking as far south as the condition of the road permitted and to continue 

to whatever northern terminus was being used at that date. Pending 

the time when sufficient men and vehicles would permit full-scale MTS 

operations, the Americans would act as unpaid contractors for the 

UKCC fleet and UKCC would make no demand upon the USSR for 

• (1) Ltr, Gen Scott, CofS, PGSC, to Col Zorin, 5 Feb 43. PGF 131. (2) Rad TN 1162, 

Connolly to Faymonville, 16 Feb 43. PGF 131. (3) Ltr, Connolly to Korolyev, 19 Feb 43. 

PGF 131. (4) Rad TN 2054, Connolly to Standley for Faymonville, 12 Mar 43. PGF 131. 

(5) Rad TN 2056, Connolly to Marshall, 12 Mar 43. AG 400.3295 Russia, Hq AMET. 

(6) Ltr. Connolly to Korolyev, 4 Aug 43. PGF 131. 
316 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

payment for carrying goods by MTS trucks.1 The MTS would use 

UKCC and British military staging camp facilities and services along 

the road and was to be responsible for guarding its vehicles and for 

supervising their loading and unloading, while UKCC would arrange 

for loading and unloading and would perform all accounting. It was 

further agreed that when MTS went into full-scale operation on its 

own, UKCC would transfer its facilities at Andimeshk and appropriate 

adjustments in traffic control of the highway would be made. From 

then onward, during a period of anticipated rising tonnage, UKCC 

would serve as an unpaid contractor to MTS. This last provision did 

not become effective. Concerning lend-lease vehicles, parts, equipment, 

and supplies there was some disagreement. The Americans proposed 

that as these had been allocated to the British for transporting Russianaid cargo and since that function was being assumed by the Americans 

all such equipment as was in storage, en route, or on order should be 

consigned to PGSC for proper allocation, General Selby disagreed, 

stating that he understood allocations would be made by the British 

in consultation with the Americans. The maturing of MTS as an 

operating agency of PGSC eventually eliminated occasion for 

disagreement on this point.s 

The Trucks Start Rolling 

Although there was a small amount of loading activity in late February, MTS operations began officially on 1 March when some 400 

trucks started moving Russian-aid cargo out of Andimeshk. The road 

south of there was not yet usable for regular service. Inasmuch as the 

516th Truck Regiment did not reach the field until May, the 517th 

until July, and other increments of strength and equipment until November, early operations were on a small scale. Available MTS manpower was supplemented by drawing upon other PGSC units; and as 

MTS strength, before May, was heavier in mechanics and maintenance 

men than in drivers, these categories were called upon for duty in both 

capacities. The small fleet of trucks grew by fall to about 2,500 vehicles, 

reaching by September 1944 a total somewhat in excess of 6,000. 

Smaller than the fleet projected in the SOS Plan, the total nevertheless 

7 The size of the UKCC fleet was estimated by Lockard, as of 1 August 1942, as 1,300 

lend-lease trucks directly operated by UKCC and about 1,000 Iranian trucks operated on contract. The U.S. military attache at Tehran reported on 5 December 1942 that UKCC 

was then operating dircctly some 1,330 trucks. Rpt 32, 5 Dec 42, MID 523.091 Iran 12-5--42 

(11-23--42). How many of these vehicles were in service over the usable portions of the 

Khorramshahr-Kazvin-Tabriz highway it is impossible to state. 

"Min of UKCC Conf held at U.S. Hq, 9:30 A.M., 20 Jan 43. AG 334.8, Hq AMET. 

Another copy PGF 131. 
TRUCK TRANSPORT 317 

proved adequate for the shorter route actually used in MTS operations. 

The first trucks out of Andimeshk drove as a closed convoy to 

Kazvin, arriving on 4 March. They were followed by daily departures; 

but the month's score in Russian-aid cargo came to only 3,570 long 

tons. (Table 6, Appendix A) Whether the score was high depended on 

how much truckable cargo was available and what MTS capacity was 

at the time-both being unknown quantities. Perhaps it should have 

been higher; in any case, March conspired to demonstrate in one compact lesson man) of the problems that would have to be solved before 

MTS could make a significant contribution to inland clearance. The 

weather was unusually severe and Avej Pass was closed to traffic for 

one week of the month. It was to be months before systematic road 

improvement and maintenance north of Andimeshk started and the 

road was therefore a hazard in itself; for the rest of the early story, the 

word inadequate covers the numbers of men available for driving, 

maintenance, loading, and unloading and characterizes supply and 

security measures taken against pilferage of cargo. 

General Connolly was not satisfied with the share of the inland 

clearance burden being borne by MTS and felt that tighter organization, improved operating methods, and more vigorous command could 

make better headway against the many handicaps so apparent in early 

March. It had been expected that, until the railway attained maximum capacity, trucking would playa large part in taking cargoes 

away from the ports, and, as the figures show, MTS tonnages through 

March 1943 were small. Accordingly, Connolly suddenly asked Colonel 

Shingler to take over MTS on ] 3 March. Shingler was tested by long 

experience in the area. He had come out in 1941 with Wheeler, succeeded to the command of the Iranian Mission on Wheeler's departure 

for India, and had served as commanding officer of the successor 

organizations until Connolly's appointment late in 1942. He then acted 

as chief of staff until General Scott's arrival in November. Next month 

Connolly put Shingler in command of Basra District, with jurisdiction 

over the critical early operations at the ports. Experience qualified 

Shingler as a number one trouble shooter. The task he assumed was 

both delicate and critical, for MTS was largely staffed with professional truckers from civilian life and military transportation experts. 

His most important contribution to increased MTS performance was 

the prompt introduction of the block system of dispatching vehicles, 

noticed later. He also instituted changes in truck servicing at transfer 

points and devised more expeditious methods of loading and unloading. The immediate result was doubled tonnage for April, and a score 

for September, the last month of Shingler's service, nearly seven times 
318 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

that of March. Methods of trucking developed by him in the Persian 

Corridor were effectively used in Europe in 1944 in connection with 

the Red Ball Express.9 

The administrative organization of MTS early assumed the basic 

form which, despite minor changes, was to continue to the end. The 

effort to distinguish functions as administrative and operational 

resulted at the start in an arrangement whereby serving under the 

director were an executive officer in charge of Administration and 

Supply Divisions and a manager in charge of Operations and Maintenance Divisions. This continued until Col. Glenn R. Ward, who had 

been manager, was elevated to the post of director and combined in 

himself both the administrative and operational functions of command. 

A fifth staff division, called Training, appeared in the March 1943 

organization chart. It was charged with training both military and 

civilian drivers. The November 1943 chart shows this function, as 

regards military training, transferred to the Administration Division. 

A new division, for civilian personnel, handled all matters pertaining 

to the recruiting, training, pay, and administration of native employees. 

At MTS headquarters at Tehran branches for investigation, traffic 

control, accident prevention, and statistical analysis and compilation 

(a function different from documentation, which was performed 

within the Operations Division of MTS) were in November 1943 

directly tributary to the office of the MTS executive. Later they were 

absorbed into the staff divisions.lO 

Provision was made in the earliest organization plans for field 

stations along the highway. These were to furnish necessary services, 

and as time went on they took on similar characteristics and functions, 

each being provided with a refueling point, grease pits, tool room, 

battery recharging unit, storage rooms, open sheds with bays for 

second and third echelon maintenance and repair, and accommodations to feed and house the drivers. Some of these functions were of a 

housekeeping nature and were exercised by the district commanders of 

the three territorial districts. Others, especially such as were uniquely 

applicable to a motor transport service (the provision, for example, 

of fuel oil, lubricants, and gasoline), became the specific responsibility 

of MTS. Field services were consolidated in time by the division of the 

• (1) Interv with Gen Connolly, Pentagon, 18 Aug 50. (2) Notes supplied the author 

by General Shingler, 16 May 1950. (3) Shingler was succeeded on 22 September 1943 by 

Col. Glenn R. Ward, who joined MTS under Colonel Brunson at activation. He was relieved 

on 27 October by Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Sweet, who served until MTS was disbanded on 

1 December 1944. Between September and November 1944, in Sweet's absence in the United 

States, Colonel Anderson served as director. Ltr, Gen Sweet to author, 12 Jul 50. 

10 Organization Manual for Mar 43; Charts for Mar, Nov 43, Oct 44. PGF 240. 
TRUCK TRANSPORT 319 

highway route into two sectors designated as the Northern Divisionfrom Kazvin south to Khurramabad; and the Southern Divisionfrom Khurramabad to Khorramshahr. In October 1943, after the 

arrival of nearly all troops assigned to MTS, a rearrangement of stations brought all units of the 516th Truck Regiment into the Northern 

Division and placed all units of the 517th in the Southern Division. 

The respective division commanders, who were the regimental commanders, were responsible to the director of MTS for operation, maintenance, traffic control, cargo handling, supply, administration, discipline, and housekeeping in their divisions. The Northern Division 

functioned through main field stations at Khurramabad, Hamadan, 

and Kazvin, and minor stations at Buruj~rd and Avej; the Southern 

Division maintained principal stations at Khorramshahr, Ahwaz, and 

Andimeshk, and a minor station at Jelogir. A separate office for an 

11TS port officer was at Khorramshahr.ll 

On the administrative side MTS developed, as an expression of 

its special operating function, not only a semi autonomy in supply which 

distinguished it from the other operating services of the command but 

also virtual autonomy (always within the limits governed by paramount British responsibilities) in security and related matters. After 

MTS began its regular trucking operations but before it was clear just 

what would be its eventual responsibilities in control of the highway 

route, its director proposed that all the military police in the command 

be assigned to MTS for use in traffic regulation. Half of the military 

police in the command, constituting Band D Companies of the 727th 

Military Police Battalion, were assigned to MTS and were placed 

under a command so all-embracing that the provost marshal was later 

forced to take steps to prevent use of MP's as truck drivers at times 

when MTS manpower was inadequate and desperate measures were 

called for to meet assigned targets.12 The duties of MP's thus placed 

under MTS command were defined and their activities regulated by 

MTS. 

Security, in the sense in which the word had meaning for MTS 

operations, covered several important aspects of the motor transport 

11 In April 1943 the Third Provisional Truck Company was diverted from duty with the 

MTS to haul U.S. Anny cargoes from Khorramshahr to Ahwaz and Andimeshk (Table 6, 

n. d). Because it took over from port transportation officers incidental haulage difficult to 

co-ordinate with their main functions, and because it did not operate within regular MTS 

schedules, this company served, from 14 May 1943 to 27 September 1944, under jurisdiction 

of Movements Branch, Operations Division, suboffices at Khorramshahr and Ahwaz. Memo, 

Maj Gordon D. Cornell, Ex Off, Office of Port Comdr, Khorramshahr, 24 Apr 43. PGF 26-A. 

,. Report of Military Police Activities, PGC, United States Anny, p. 121. PGF 130. 

Section VIII of this report, especially those portions (pp. 108-22) dealing with traffic control 

for MTS and with convoy problems, with exhibits and appendixes, is a valuable and detailed 

source of information. 
320 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

mission. Fundamentally, it included the execution and enforcement of 

regulations established for the dispatch and movement of MTS vehicles; and, while there was no American responsibility for over-all 

security, MTS, by Anglo-American agreement, had to look out for 

its own property and the safety of its own troops and employees. The 

MP's, who were spread out from eleven police stations up and down the 

line of traffic-Company B within the Southern Division; Company 

D, the Northern-had therefore not only to keep traffic moving but 

to check individual trucks and drivers, to enforce rules for speed, disstance, stopping, and starting, to prevent and to investigate accidents, 

to deal with pilferage, and to detect illegal haulage of cargo and 

passengers. 

Full American control of the highway came slowly, following 

American responsibility for road maintenance and the steps by which 

UKCC reduced its own activity over the route. In fact, except for developments in operational procedures such as loading and unloading 

and highway and vehicle maintenance, nearly all the mileposts in the 

MTS story mark decisions and policies which can be related to the primary problem of traffic control-the dispatch and movement of trucks. 

Two methods of dispatching MTS trucks were used. For the first 

four weeks they proceeded in normal military convoy units; but, as 

the shortage of trucks was greater than the shortage of drivers, this 

method, which entailed taking trucks through to destination with one 

driver, left trucks standing idle while drivers were resting. A secondary 

disadvantage arose from the climatic changes through which the route 

passed. A driver starting at the desert end in thin clothing met with snow 

and freezing weather north of Andimeshk and either proceeded with 

inadequate protection or had to stop to change, thus delaying the run. 

On 28 March Colonel Shingler introduced the block system. The 

route was divided into four blocks with an MTS camp at the end of 

each-at Andimeshk, Khurramabad, Ramadan, and Kazvin-the 

four blocks requiring respectively 8, 12, 12, and 8 hours' running time. 

Under the block system drivers operated out of home stations, taking 

their trucks to the next station where they handed them over to the 

driver on the next block. After a rest period of a day or overnight, the 

drivers drove empty southbound trucks back to their home stations. 

Vehicles could thus be operated night and day, with time out only for 

servicing and maintenance. At the terminals of the route, schedules 

permitted time for thorough overhaul before redispatch of vehicles. 

Raving served during the heaviest period of hauling activity, the block 

system was replaced on 28 August 1944 by the convoy system. In 

effectiveness there was little to choose between the two methods, given 
TRUCK TRANSPORT 321 

the same number and type of trucks and equal resources in manpower. 

With limited equipment but ample personnel, on the one hand, the 

block system, permitting round-the-clock operation, was the more expeditious. On the other hand, the normal military convoy system 

required less elaborate station operations and smaller maintenance 

plants manned with fewer service men and, since the driver was responsible for his truck and cargo the full length of the trip, checking of 

cargoes at transfer points and need for precautions against pilferage 

were reduced. 

The control of traffic passed through several phases. For some time 

Gulf and Desert District commanders were responsible for the control 

of MTS convoys south of Andimeshk, but exercised no responsibility 

for the other users of the road-Iranian civil and military vehicles, 

Russian soldiers driving trucks north from the Khorramshahr Truck 

Assembly Plant, and British vehicles under the control of the British 

Army, UKCC, and AIOC. In July, UKCC, having previously transferred its large rail-to-truck transfer installation at Andimeshk to 

MTS,13 rerouted its heaviest traffic westward to the Khanaqin Lift, 

thus relieving the Khorramshahr-Andimeshk leg of the highway of a 

considerable burden .as well as the section between Andimeshk and 

Ramadan. But at Ramadan the British trucks from Khanaqin and 

Kermanshah rejoined the American route and proceeded thence to 

Kazvin and beyond. Especially during the rest of 1943, when the whole 

length of the route from Khorramshahr to Kazvin was still under constru<;:tion and repair, congestion continued. American traffic beyond 

Andimeshk had for some time been regulated by the MP's assigned 

to MTS; but, although an international Highway Traffic Committee 

met periodically to consult on traffic problems, no unified controlsave that nominally provided by British security authorities-existed. 

Congestion was not the only road hazard nor the only cause for 

delays and difficulties. Truck drivers were not experienced in military 

traffic procedures and had to be trained while operations continued. 

Military police were at the start inadequately trained. There were reports in April 1943 that some American drivers held to the center of 

the road to prevent others from passing; that Russian convoys were 

disregarding one-way traffic control and going through to the confusion of others; and that Russian vehicles parked in the middle of the 

road for repairs and rest. Many of the Soviet convoy trucks were driven 

by soldiers recuperating from battle wounds, assigned to the Persian 

,. As compensation the sum of 2,356,752 rials (over $70,000) was charged by UKCC to the 

British Army which in turn debited the amount to PGSC as reciprocal aid. Rad, Hq, PGSC, 

to Hq, PAl Force, 1 Jun 43. AG 095 UKCC, Hq PGC. 
322 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

Corridor for a kind of holiday and making the trip for the first and only 

time over unfamiliar terrain. Native drivers of UKCC, MTS, and 

Iranian vehicles posed numerous problems. To centralize control it was 

therefore agreed that MTS should regulate traffic using the highway 

between Khorramshahr and Takistan, twenty miles south of Kazvincivil and military, American, British, Iranian, and Soviet.a 

The first fruit of the new responsibility was the introduction in 

September 1943 of a system of time bands to minimize congestion 

and to give necessary priority to MTS convoys, which in that month 

began a quick rise in delivered tonnage that was to attain in December the highest all-cargo and the second highest Russian-aid total 

achieved in the life of the service. Each hauling agency using the road 

was allotted specific hours of the day (time bands) during which its 

trucks were assured .operating priority on certain sectors of the road. 

Outside the proper bands, the movement of as many as ten vehicles 

in any 24-hour period was permitted without restriction. MTS received 

two 5-hour bands per day in each direction when it had priority. 

Within each of the four time bands-two north and two south each 

day-MTS trucks moved in serials containing from twenty-five to 

thirty-four trucks each. Midway stations were established in all blocks 

where trucks were fueled, the oil checked, and the drivers given rest 

and food. In the southern area water stops were set up along the way. 

After eight to twelve hours of driving time trucks stopped for checkup 

and relief drivers took over. 

Operations and Obstacles 

The equitable sharing of the road among many users was an 

important accomplishment. It proved easier to bring about than the 

solution of such problems as training native drivers, reducing the rate 

of accidents, preventing pilferage, establishing communications, overcoming shortages in men and machines, and maintaining personnel 

and equipment in good working order. 

The provost marshal of the command has stated that the program 

for training native drivers "reflects great credit" upon the MTS/5 

The condition of driver shortages was chronic with the MTS until well 

past the middle of 1943, and in times of special stress there were never 

enough military drivers to meet emergency increases in tonnages. To 

deal with the problem, mechanics, clerks, and even MP's were summoned to duty from time to time; men with only four hours' rest were 

"Cir 73, Hq, PGSC, 13 Aug 43. 

" Page 111 of Rpt cited n. 12. 
TRUCK TRANSPORT 323 

sent back to the road; and men unfamiliar with the road or, for that 

matter, with driving great trucks or responding to convoy signals were 

pressed into service. The number of soldiers was limited; and therefore, 

very early, a systematic program was undertaken for training natives. 

The shift in :March from the convoy to the block system called for 

increased overhead and station personnel months before the scheduled 

arrival of the first truck regiment from the United States could 

supply them. 

A drive to recruit 3,500 natives as mechanics and drivers, begun 

in January 1943, was supplemented in that month by establishment of 

the school at Tehran to train driver-interpreters. Its seventy graduates 

furnished a pool of instructors for the three drivers' schools, the first 

of them opened at Andimeshk in February, followed by others at 

Ramadan and Kazvin. A supplementary diesel school held for specially 

selected drivers in December 1943 produced 800 qualified drivers. 

When it is realized that the pupils in these schools had most of them 

never ridden in a motor vehicle, that their instruction originated in 

English, that the American instructors did not understand and could 

not correct what their native interpreters said to the pupils, the difficulty of turning out skilled drivers and mechanics can be appreciated. 

Then, too, although there was plain bad driving among all nationalities 

using the road, the natives supplied a fancy variety of their own: 

Moslem fatalism which accepted the crash that followed rounding 

a sharp curve on the wrong side of the road as the will of Allah; or 

the instinct that met the discovery at the top of a steep hill that the 

brakes had ceased to function by leaping from the cab and letting the 

burdened truck careen to its destruction and the endangerment of all 

else on the road. There were also the handicaps imposed by widespread 

opium addiction. The reports are in agreement that after training the 

skill and competence of the native drivers for MTS were of high 

quality, a tribute to their intelligence and spirit as well as to their 

instruction.18 

The drivers' schools enrolled by the end of July 1944 approximately 

16,566 natives and graduated 7,546.17 Yet maximum native driver employment, reached in February 1944, was only 3,155. The relatively 

,. (I) The first truck drivers' schools were established in 1942 by Folspen. (2) For documentation on native driver problems see The MTS Native Drivers' Schools, by George B. 

Zeigler, 1 Sep 44, PGF 131; Memo, :Maj Dishman for Col Shingler, 25 Aug 42, PGF 259; 

Memo, Brunson for Cooper, 16 Jan 43, sub: Employment of Qualified Truck Drivers, PGF 

131; Ltr, Lt Vincent P. Donahue to Maj Clarence D. McGowen, 16 Apr 43, sub: Employment of Native Drivers by Russia, PGF 131; and Rad TN 3890, Shingler to Cooper, 22 Apr 43, 

PGF 131. (3) Connolly, in notes for the author, states British estimated native driver addiction 

at 75 percent; Shingler, at 65 percent. 

" The figure includes the diesel course at Andimeshk. 
324 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

small numbers of graduates and the small total of surviving drivers 

in service require interpretation. The figures reflect not only the winnowing process of training but other factors in the general employment 

situation. Particularly during the early days of the training program 

it was widely felt by the Americans in charge that irresistible temptation was offered the natives both during and after training to leave 

MTS. It was said, for example, that drivers working for the Soviet 

services were not forbidden when piloting deadheading vehicles to 

pick up passengers and cargo on the side and to pocket the resultant 

baksheesh. This made working for the Soviet agencies more attractive, 

inasmuch as the highest wage paid MTS drivers in the early months 

was 1,800 rials per month, as contrasted to reported scales paid by the 

Russians and UKCC ranging from 2,500 to 5,000 rials per month. 

The student wage at the MTS schools of 20 rials a month, plus shelter 

and a food ration not widely appreciated, tempted students to leave the 

schools and seek employment elsewhere. 

MTS raised the student wage to a range between 450 and 750 rials 

per month; but at a conference held in May 1943 by representatives of 

11TS, AlOe, UKCC, and the British and Soviet Armies, the Soviets 

declined to standardize wage scales. Agreement was reached, however, 

on more stringent inspections of cargoes to prevent the carrying of unauthorized passengers and loads, and the suggestion was advanced 

that a system of controlling the movement of drivers from one agency 

to another be instituted. These measures did not prevent the dissipation 

of MTS-trained native drivers into other Allied services.'s 

The course of the civilian-driver training program as well as the 

accumulation of experience by MTS personnel can be traced in the 

fluctuating rate of accidents per million truck miles. During April 1943 

the rate was computed at 24.9 with nine deaths, eight of them civilian. 

Overworking of drivers to attain targets; excessive speeding which 

reflected insufficient MP strength to patrol the roads, as well as inadequate road signs at that early date; heavy dust conditions in the south; 

and the poor condition of the highway were contributing factors. 

During the period from July to November the number of civilian 

(native) drivers rose above seven hundred and the urgency of target 

requirements made it necessary to place most of them on the road 

straight from their training courses without enough supervised road 

experience. The accident rate rose in November to 103 per million 

truck miles. An intensive safety campaign was inaugurated in December, accompanied by incentives such as certificates granted civilians 

18 Memo, Capt Charles E. Berman for Col Edward F. Brown, 14 May 43. MTS 319 

Hq PGC. 
TRUCK TRANSPORT 325 

for 10,000 miles of accident-free driving and \Var Department awards 

for soldiers. Trips to Cairo and the Holy Land rewarded the soldiers 

with the best records, and a white elephant emblem was presented each 

month to trucking companies with the worst records. The decline in 

accidents which followed reached its lowest rate, 6.7 per million truck 

miles, in October 1944. In general, soldier-driver accidents during 1944 

were caused by mechanical defects, speeding, and driving at improper 

intervals, while the highest percentage of native-driver accidents resulted from loss of control of the vehicle, driving at improper intervals, 

driving in the wrong lane, and speeding. 

The hard-pressed ~fP's on patrol were never free from security 

problems, of which the block system of operation posed that of checking cargoes at the points where one driver handed over to the next. It 

was usually impossible to make a thorough check until the end of the 

line was reached. By that time native bandits and pilferers had done 

their work, aided by sharp turns and steep inclines in the road which 

forced drivers to slow down, permitting the thieves to drop from overhanging banks in the mountainous sections upon the slowly moving 

trucks, slit tarpaulins, and throw off items like tires, ammunition, sugar, 

flour, beans, and cloth. Sometimes pilferage was accomplished by native 

drivers who succeeded in making their way out of a serial to points off 

the road where they unloaded. At night cargo was sometimes hurled 

from the trucks to waiting confederates. Native huts in which to store 

the plunder sprang up along the route, but these were all eventually 

burned. In December 1943 continued losses of cargo and equipment 

led to the assignment of special investigators. Cargo was checked thoroughly at each station before drivers were released, loads were sealed, 

and the system of waybilling at points of origin was improved; but loss 

through pilferage was never eliminated. 

The dependence of traffic and security controls upon signal communications was early recognized. By December 1942 radio stations at 

Khorramshahr, Ahwaz, and Andimeshk were available for MTS uses 

and by April 1943 additional stations at Khurramabad, Hamadan, and 

Kazvin, the last named being a mobile set, were in service. In May 

1943 the MTS requested the Signal Service to plan, install, and operate 

a radio system for its own use so that communication would be available 

from one division point to another. Two nets were set up with a maximum of one relay from anyone point to another along the entire supply 

line. Small semifixed stations, installed at intervals between the larger 

fixed stations, served in emergencies for sudden calls for wreckers and 

ambulances and for security purposes. In addition, telephone service 

between Tehran and Kazvin was established. After the completion of 
326 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

the teletype network for the command in January and February 1944, 

the lessening need for radio warranted the removal of the stations at 

Khorramshahr, Ahwaz, and Andimeshk. Eventually radio service was 

entirely supplanted by teletype and telephone. 

Maintenance of vehicles was a never ceasing problem. At the beginning of operations, when parts and servicing apparatus were in 

drastically short supply, maintenance difficulties were aggravated by 

lack of buildings and lighting for the bulk of the work, which had to 

be done at night. Then, as the end of 1943 saw the virtual completion 

of the building program and as the shortage of parts gave way to better 

supply, the growth of the fleet, coupled with the increase-through the 

aging of vehicles in constant and hard use-of the rate of obsolescence, 

meant that the work of the indispensable mechanics and repair men 

was never done. In February 1944 the number of deadlined vehicles 

for which no parts were available was mounting despite every effort to 

improvise, repair, manufacture, and reuse parts. Deadlined trucks were 

systematically cannibalized to keep as many others in service as possible. 

At the same time truck companies in the north reported being handicapped by lack of proper winter equipment such as skid chains of the 

right sizes, antifreeze, and windshield wipers and curtains.1v By the 

end of July roughly 10 percent of the fleet was deadlined--over six 

hundred trucks; but the reduction of the number to ninety-seven by the 

end of October illustrates the extremes of crisis to which maintenance 

was subjected by the uncertainties and vagaries of truck operations in 

the Corridor as well as the ability of the untiring maintenance troops to 

meet the crises. 

Of the trucks in the MTS fleet, certain types of Internationals, 

Studebakers, and Mack diesels, none of them specifically designed for 

the peculiar conditions of Corridor operation, bore the chief burden 

of the load. It was reported that, all factors considered, the Studebaker 

6 x 4 tractor with 7-ton trailer and the 2Y2-ton cargo trucks gave good 

service. 20 It was stated that these vehicles could cover 50,000 miles 

before repair became uneconomical. Generally, the basic chassis developed only a few serious faults: the cabs, fenders, hoods, dust skirts, 

and other sheet metal parts failed rapidly, and other failures occurred 

on hood side panels, hood tops, transmission cover plates, radiator cores, 

storage battery supports, fan belts, and distributor caps. Studebaker 

I-ton trailer mortality was high, largely as a result of abuse when 

t. Initial Hist Rpt, 3923d QM Truck Co, Hamadan, 15 Feb 44. PGF 20B-M. 

20 Ltr, Myott to Ward, 23 Oct 43, sub: Suitability of Trucks in Operation. Cited p. 79 of 

History cited n. 2 (5). 
TRUCK TRANSPORT 327 

operated empty. Tarpaulins required frequent repair. The Mack diesel 

10-ton 6 x 4 cargo trucks were considered well adapted to MTS needs. 

They were good for 100,000 miles before repairs became uneconomical. 

Parts consumption was low and failures infrequent, but their bodies 

were too small and were structurally weak. Mack weaknesses were in 

the radiator, cowl, starter switches, series parallel switches, flexible fuel 

lines, fuses, and air cleaners. Most diesel road failures were caused by 

clogged fuel lines. On the basis of experience in MTS, it was felt that 

the ideal truck would have been a 6 x 4 tractor-trailer diesel with air 

brakes and a 150-horsepower engine, ten forward speeds, a maximum 

speed of forty-five miles per hour, power to carry its net load of fifteen 

tons up 15-percent grades, and stamina enough to operate 100,000 

miles over mountainous roads. The trailer would have had a dual axle 

with air brakes and a van type of body 28 feet long, 7 feet high, and B 

feet wide. But there was no time, in setting up the MTS, to design and 

produce the perfect truck for the job. It was a supplementary service 

with a limited life to live and it made the best of available equipment. 

It was not only the trucks that took a beating on the highways of 

Iran. Morbidity studies of the Army personnel of MTS reveal one 

ailment peculiar to them. Until the entire route was hard surfaced, 

driving was an ordeal regardless of the weather. Mile after mile of 

washboard roads took toll of men as well as vehicles. As an anonymous 

military scribe put it, vibration "shook the trucks to pieces . . . and 

pounded the men's kidneys to jelly." 21 A medical survey in late 1944 

of low-back injuries throughout the command during the previous 

twenty months laid special emphasis on the extent of such complaints 

among the truck drivers. It was found that of the 466 cases in the command requiring hospitalization one third of the whole were truck 

drivers who constituted only one tenth of the strength of the command. 

Rough roads, hard, uncomfortable seats, lack of drivers' belts as supports (these were not included in the Tables of Equipment of truck 

companies sent into the field), long hours of driving without sufficient 

rest, army cots which sagged, failure of drivers to seek proper massage 

and heat for tired back muscles, neglect in reporting for medical care 

until symptoms were severe, and vehicle accidents were listed as the 

causes. In other respects, the health of the men did not differ from the 

average in the command.22 

"History, 395lst QM Truck Co. PGF 187-N . .. Rpt, Study of Low-Back Injury Cases Admitted to Hospitals, PGC, by Maj Thomas S. 

Cotton, Nov 44. Ci ted p. t 05 of History cited n. 2 (5). 
328 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

The Score 

According to plan, as soon as the ISR demonstrated its ability to 

serve adequately as the sole agency for inland clearance of Russianaid cargoes, the MTS would be dispensed with. '''' ashington's decision 

in November 1944 to close out MTS promptly served notice that, in 

Washington's view, regardless of the remaining course of the war, the 

railway would be adequate for all demands to come. MTS ceased 

operations on 30 November 1944. 

Comparison of the tonnage accomplishments of the railway and 

MTS will show clearly why road transport was the first to go and 

why it went when it did. (Tables 5 and 6, Appendix A) Through 

1943 MTS haulage of Russian-aid cargoes steadily mounted. In 

May the condition of the highway was such that it was possible to 

begin loading both at the Russian Dump at Khorramshahr and at 

dockside. Rail-to-truck loadings continued as a regular procedure at 

Andimeshk until August, after which time loadings there were resorted 

to only when there was a shortage of truckable cargo at Khorramshahr. 

How desperately the organization worked to meet the targets set for 

it at Tehran has been shown by references already made to overworked and inexperienced men being pressed into service as drivers. 

The July delivery of 17,068 long tons of Russian-aid cargo exceeded 

by 14 percent the target for that month, the highest set up to that time. 

Month after month the target continued to be met or exceeded. It was 

not until January 1944, in a month when truckable cargo at the port 

proved less than expected by the target makers and when driving 

through swirling clouds of snow in the treacherous twistings of the 

mountain highway slowed progress, that, for the first time, MTS failed 

to reach its target. January's score of 32,385 long tons of Russian-aid 

cargo fell under expectations by 5 percent. In February the target was 

slashed drastically and MTS exceeded it by 4 percent. With an interlude of high demand for movement in March, cargoes again fell steeply 

in April and May to rise in July to the peak for Soviet deliveries. That 

was the feverish month when the whole command, being challenged 

by maximum pressures of tonnages, not only rose to them but exceeded 

them all along the line. After July MTS' share of tonnage was reduced, 

first gradually, then precipitately, while the railway was pressed to 

achieve its peak Russian-aid haulage in September. In that month, 

while the trucks were hauling 8,187 tons for delivery to the USSR, 

the railway carried 170,100. 

When MTS shut up shop and added up its performance, the total 

of all cargoes carried came to 618,946 long tons. Two thirds of this, 
TRUCK TRANSPORT 329 

or 408,460 long tollS, were carried for the Russians. The total, while 

small relative to command totals, was no drop in the bucket. To accommodate what the men of MTS and their native co-workers delivered 

to Soviet receiving points would have required a line of standard U.S. 

Army 2Y2-ton 6 x 6 cargo trucks standing bumper to bumper all the 

way from Baltimore to Chicago. 

As was the case with nearly everything the American Army undertook to do in the Persian Corridor, the establishment of a truck service 

under the conditions met by MTS was without exact precedent or 

parallel. There is therefore nothing by which to measure MTS achievement. Even UKCC, being an agency of government endowed with the 

privileges and characteristics of a private corporation (including those 

of charging for certain services) is not strictly comparable to MTS. 

Moreover, since UKCC operated trucking services over many routes 

in Iran and Iraq from late 1941 until long after MTS' dissolution, and 

since available performance figures do not break down UKCC's totals 

into time periods or by routes served, there is no common denominator.23 

The record of MTS must stand, then, on its own, as a supplementary part of the total Anglo-American program, which in its brief span 

of activity shouldered something like one tenth of the total American 

share of Russian-aid deliveries. If the progress of the war and operating 

conditions in the Persian Corridor had only proceeded in accordance 

with sound and logical business principles, it could be concluded that 

the effort, the expense of spirit, treasure, and skill that went into the 

organization and operation of MTS were not, bookkeeping-wise, commensurate with the proportionate results attained. But a realistic 

appraisal must conclude that, in spite of its slow start-conditioned 

by the state of the highway and by the priority which assigned to the 

railway and ports the paramount considerations of time, manpower, 

and equipment-MTS was on hand to deliver the goods at a time 

when, if there had been no American trucks, cargoes would have 

"Under date of 27 May 1945, UKCC informed Headquarters, PCC, that, while UKCC 

"deprecate comparison between the achievement figures of the different Allied agencies carrying goods in Aid to Russia, the ton/kilometres operated by the United Kingdom Commercial 

Corporation from the commencement to September 30th 1944 amounted to a total of 

795,138,536." AC 095 UKCC, Hq PCC. Reduced to ton-kilometers, MTS' Russian-aid haulage totaled 418,058,810 for its shorter single route and shorter period of operation. If the 

estimate of tonnages carried by British motor agencies given in Table 4 is taken as consisting 

chiefly of UKCC performance, it would appear that UKCC and MTS hauled very nearly 

the same total tonnages in Russian-aid cargoes over their own routes; but it must be borne 

in mind that the UKCC figure may, on the one hand, include some tonnages credited also 

to MTS because of the dose association of the services early in 1943, and may, on the other 

hand, not include some haulage by UKCC over Iraqi routes for which information is not 

available. The slight difference between metric tons (UKCC) and long tons (MTS) must 

also be considered. 
330 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

accumulated unmanageably at the ports. As a reserve supply line in 

case of sabotage on the railway it was indispensable. Its effort must 

be judged not by its cost in men and equipment, not by its relative 

contribution to the total logistic achievement, but by the fact that 

MTS manned the breach when no other means were available to meet 

a pressing urgency. 
CHAPTER XVII 

The Railway 

The Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran in 1941 would have been less 

essential to Allied war purposes had the Iranian State Railway not 

existed. For unwittingly Reza Shah Pahlevi, who opened the $140,-

000,000 line on 26 August 1939 after more than seven years of construction, had forged in the ISR a powerful weapon against the very 

Germans whose accepted friendship hastened the wartime occupation 

and his abdication. As a ready-made link between Western Hemisphere 

sources of supply and the Soviet battle lines, the railway hauled three 

out of every five tons of supplies delivered through the Corridor to 

Soviet receiving points by combined British and American effort. 

Virtually all of those three tons were delivered to the Russians during 

the period of American operation. The figures are 5,149,376 long tons, 

2,989,079 long tons, and 2,737,677 long tons.1 

The railway operation was impressive; but the totals do not make 

real its sheer mass of steel, manpower, and planning. Other figures 

indicate the extraordinary rate of increase. Before the Anglo-Soviet 

occupation the railway could haul 200 tons a day. During the period 

of all-British operation for which figures are available the daily average 

haul of Russian-aid freight was 66110ng tons. The daily average haul 

in the peak month of British operation (September 1942) was 790 

long tons of Russian-aid cargoes. In the period of interim AngloAmerican operation (January through March 1943) the daily average 

of Russian-aid cargo hauled climbed to 921 long tons. The daily average for the whole period of American operation (Apri11943 through 

?vlay 1945) was 3,397 long tons of Russian-aid freight. Nor was this 

the full measure of the capacity to which the ISR was brought. In 

the last five months of British operation, August through December 

1942, the daily average of all freight hauled was approximately 1,530 

long tons, a notable improvement over the capacity inherited by the 

British in 1941. For the whole period of American operation this figure 

1 (1) Tables 4 and 5 and Chart 7 for all tonnages unless otherwise noted. (2) Railway 

Gazette (London) 74 (1941) 634 (6 Jun 41) and The Middle East, 1948 (London: Europa 

Publications, Ltd., 1948), p. 132, for costs. Other sources estimate costs as high as $200,000,000. 
332 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

rose to 5,336, an average which reflects not only the limited accomplishments at the beginning, but also the peak performance of 1944. 

The daily average for that year was 6,489 long tons, and for July, 

the top month of 1944, 7,520.2 

A comparable increase in capacity, achieved in peacetime by a 

well-equipped modern railway under the blessings of a management 

beholden to none but its own judgment, would be hard to find in the 

annals of railroading. Yet the performance wrung from the ISR between 1941 and 1945 was marked up on the record in the face of the 

usual Persian Corridor headaches: a kitchenful of cooks stirring the 

broth to the loud accompaniment of arguments on precedence, proper 

handling of the ladle, the ingredients, and determination of the appropriate rental owed to the owner of the pot and of the cook or cooks 

liable for its payment. 

For this reason the tangle of agreements and arrangements, not to 

speak of tensions, that existed among the authorities is as important 

a part of the railway story as the record of day-to-day operations. 

Neither aspect of the story sufficiently explains the secret of the prodigies of performance that, among them, the Americans, the British, the 

Iranians, and the Russians extracted from the ISR. Certainly the 

prodigal expenditure of American material resources in expansion of 

rolling stock and improvement of maintenance of way, operating facilities, and methods greased the wheels; while on the other side multiple 

authority and differing national aims and temperaments operated as a 

brake. From the moment of the Anglo-Soviet occupation the ISR was 

destined to carry the main burden of Russian-aid traffic. When, after 

a year of British operation, the Combined Chiefs turned the job over 

to the United States Army and coolly raised the target to 6,000 long 

tons daily for all cargoes, the grim fact was that, from then on, the 

ISR would have to live up to expectations, would have to carry loads 

undreamed of. It is perhaps because of this necessity that all other 

factors appear as secondary explanations of the ultimate feat. The 

necessity itself provided the key to the result. The ability of the railway 

to carry so much of the burden of Russian-aid tonnage was essential to 

the success of the supply program. The railway had to succeed. 

And it did, but not without dust and heat: the dust of minutes 

and memoranda; the heat of the day's work on the line and in the 

yards. The peculiar nature of the railway operation, involving as it 

did complicated adjustments at the diplomatic as well as the military 

• British experts, after more than a year's experience with the ISR, believed that a theoretical maximum daily capacity of 5,200 long tons was actually as remote as infinity. Memo 

Gen Yount for author, 24 Dec 48. 
THE RAILWAY 333 

level, overshadowed all merely operational problems. These ad justments, whether they concerned military command, or whether they involved national pride or prerogatives, in essence were adjustments of 

authority. 

One should not give a man a job to do without clothing him with 

the requisite power and discretion to do it. Normally there is no separation between authority and responsibility. But the four-power partnership in the Corridor posed abnormal conditions which affected the 

railway task no less than other parts of the supply program. In September 1942 the Combined Chiefs, as told in Chapter X, gave to the 

Americans responsibility for transport operations while leaving undisturbed the primary British authority over security and movements. 

In the interest of efficient operation it became necessary for the commanders in the field to effect, by delegation of authority and other 

adjustments, as close an identity of authority and responsibility as the 

abnormal Corridor situation permitted. How this was done for the 

transport task as a whole (trucks, ports, railway) was told in Chapter 

XI. The effort to harness authority and responsibility into one team 

is a main thread in the story of the railway. 

Authority and Responsibility 

The basic charter under which all wartime activity on the ISR was 

carried on was the Tri-Partite Treaty; but as a guide to railway matters 

its grants of authority to the British and Soviet Armies were general. 

It did not specify how their control of Iranian communications would 

apply to the specific business of running the railway. Moreover, as the 

treaty was not signed until January 1942 and as the railway problem 

pressed for action if not for solution from the moment of occupation 

the previous August, there was no time for dispassionate consideration 

of ways and means. The British and Soviets proceeded, under the preliminary terms accepted by Iran in September 1941, to exercise control 

of communications within their respective zones. It cannot be said 

that this was a deliberately chosen policy, although the separate assumption of operating and supervisory responsibility for a railway thus 

arbitrarily divided into two segments at Tehran established a precedent 

which had the full force of chosen policy, and which, as time went on, 

proved the fixed and never altered basic operating plan for the railroad. 

In the remaining months of 1941 this basic decision-which-was-notdecided was taken, as it were, by default. 

The alternatives, as they appeared from time to time in the endless 

discussions among the Corridor partners, were two: operation of the 
334 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

line as a whole from Gulf to Caspian by a single responsible authority 

with power to take decisions; or a division of the line at Tehran with 

co-ordination to be provided by a joint operating commission representing Iran, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. The first, the logical 

solution, failed of adoption whenever it was proposed because it was 

incompatible with the basic Corridor situation-a partnership of 

expediency without unified local command. The second was a compromise whose experimental execution dwindled into early oblivion. 

From the beginning the United States was drawn into both alternatives as well as the de facto Anglo-Soviet arrangement. Churchill's 

appeal a few days after the occupation for American locomotives, 

rolling stock, and technical advice bulked large in the War Department's decision to establish the Iranian Mission, the selection as its 

first chief of General 'Wheeler, a railroad expert, his choice as civilian 

contractor of Foley Brothers, Inc., an engineering firm experienced in 

railroad construction and, above all, the designation of the ISR as an 

approved lend-lease project months before the designation of Iran as 

a nation eligible for lend-lease aid. "When in September 1941 the lendlease authorities were unable to find a suitable top railroad man to 

advise Harry Hopkins on the equipment needed to meet the ChurchillBeaverbrook requests, the matter of strengthening the ISR was handed 

over to the \Var Department and by it referred to General \\!heeler and 

his new Iranian Mission. The commissioning of John A. Gillies, General 

Manager of the Santa Fe Railway, as a lieutenant colonel and his 

dispatch to Iran in October to investigate and report followed. 3 

The United States thus assumed from the beginning responsibilities 

in the railway task without receiving authority for their execution. It 

undertook to supply equipment and technical advice to be used at the 

discretion of the Anglo-Soviet Armies whose authority was not only 

split-each in its zone of Iran-but was in turn derived from the 

Iranian Government as owner of the ISR. It was some time before the 

ambiguities of the situation resolved themselves into a series of understandings, some definite, some no more definite than an absence of 

objection by one party to the actions of another. In September 1941 the 

Soviet Ambassador at Tehran proposed that each occupying power 

operate the rail lines within its respective zone of occupation. There was 

no formal agreement to that effect, but separate operations proceeded 

as if there were. The British commissioned Sir Godfrey Rhodes, General Manager of the Kenya and Uganda Railways and Harbors, a 

brigadier and flew him early in October to Tehran to become director 

• (1) Memo, Hopkins for Stettinius, 19 Sep 41, transmitting Msg, ChurchilJ to Hopkins; 

(2) Ltr, Wheeler to Stettinius, 28 Oct 41. WPD 4596 to -15 Iran (Persia) HRS DRB AGO. 
THE RAILWAY 335 

of transportation; but when the Russians established a Soviet railway 

headquarters at Tehran it was reported to Washington that the British 

in Iran viewed the act with some dismay and feared that divided 

operating control would make for reduced railway capacity and would 

cause complications with the Iranian railway administration.4 

Before the end of 1941 both alternatives to divided operating 

control appeared on the scene. The suggestion was made for a joint 

operating commission; and, early in November, Lord Beaverbrook expressed the hope that the United States would operate the ISR. The 

reactions to the latter differed. General Wheeler reported that informal 

conversations with the Iranian Prime Minister, the Iranian Foreign 

Minister, and the Soviet Ambassador at Tehran indicated a favorable 

attitude, but that the British transportation directorate in Iran was 

opposed. On the other hand, the British War Office in London, in a 

message in January 1942 requesting India's views, noted that operation 

of the railroad by Americans as allies was a different proposition from 

operation by Americans as nonbelligerents, the American status at the 

time of the Beaverbrook proposal. London requested Indian headquarters to consider the matter from the point of view of (1) the use 

that could be made elsewhere of British personnel released by American 

operation, and (2) the psychological effect on the British forces in Iran 

who were developing the railway of having it handed over to Americans. When India referred the proposal to Baghdad for an opinion, the 

response was favorable to American operation of the ISR. Baghdad 

said, "Psychological effect on our transportation personnel should not 

be taken into account. Operation Persian Railway by Americans extremely desirable every point of view. We should discard all stipulations 

and give Americans complete control." 5 

This opinion might have carried more weight in British councils 

had it been advanced as a matter of general principle; but the Baghdad 

message, by asserting that British transportation personnel in Iran 

replaced by Americans would be "invaluable for employment in Iraq," 

showed that its advocacy of i\merican operation was colored by the 

pressing need of the British forces in Iraq for increased strength, and 

was not necessarily a considered opinion as to the best way of solving 

the railway problem in Iran. 

At Washington caution marked discussions between the State and 

vVar Departments, and pessimism a memorandum by War Plans Divi-

• Rad, Wheeler to Moore, 15 Jan 42. WPD 4596 to -15 Iran (Persia) HRS DRB AGO. 

• (1) Rad, Wheeler to Moore, 21 Dec 41; (2) Rad, War Office, London, to GHQ, India, 

and British Army Stf, Washington, 3 Jan 42. WPD 4596 to -15 Iran (Persia) HRS DRB AGO. 

(3) Rad Q/669, Gen Iraq [GOe British forces in Iraq] to ARMINDIA, 8 Jan 42. Shipping 

Data, SL X-ll,737. 
336 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

sion which, while accurately assessing present difficulties, can hardly 

be blamed for not achieving equal accuracy regarding the future. 

Noting that the "Southern area served by the railroad is unhealthful," 

the paper went on to state: 

u.s. civilian or military personnel, not acclimated, would not be efficient 

or effective .... Bad living conditions, shortage of water, unsatisfactory legal 

status and difficult working conditions make it questionable if competent U.S. 

Civilian railroad technicians could be retained . ... Should U.S. Railroad units 

operate Trans-Iranian Railroad, the next logical step would be for U.S. Quartermaster lVlits to operate the docks and U.S. Quartermaster truck companies to 

do the trucking. This could only be justified if it were contemplated that u.s. 

combat troops were later going to operate in this area. Since this is not the current 

plan, U.S. Army service troops should not be provided for this duty.6 

Both American chiefs of missions in the Middle East saw the logic 

behind the proposed American operation. General Maxwell told his 

staff at Cairo that, to obtain maximum efficiency uncomplicated by 

rivalries over controls, the ultimate objective was American operation. 

General Wheeler, after conference at New Delhi with the Acting 

Commander-in-Chief, India, and his staff, reported that he shared 

British apprehension over divided (Anglo-Soviet) control of the ISR. 

He urged American operation by an American staff, or, as an alternative, a variant of the proposal for a joint supervisory committee which 

would entrust supervision to a small American headquarters staff, an 

arrangement which would require a high degree of co-operation by 

the British, Soviet, and Iranian authorities. Along the lines expressed 

by the WPD memorandum, Wheeler stated that the United States 

should come in only if the ISR were to be used for delivery of large 

quantities of supplies for the USSR, or for maintaining large British 

or American forces in northern Iran against Axis invasion. If these 

were not to be the proposed uses of the railroad, then he recommended 

that the British and Russians should work out their problems alone. 

Wheeler advised caution in making big plans because he had been told 

by the Soviet Ambassador that Moscow demanded only 2,000 motor 

trucks per month and 100 aircraft to be delivered by the Persian Gulf 

route, and this did not place too heavy a strain upon the railroad's 

capacities. Nevertheless, he concluded, because it might be necessary 

for British and American troops to operate in northern Iran and the 

Caucasus against Axis forces, some state of readiness of the railroad 

should be provided. He therefore recommended that if it should be 

• (1) Memo of conversations between State and War Depts [Jan 42], sub: Political Factors 

Involved in Provision of Trans Facilities in Iran; (2) Memo, Lt Col Clayton L. Bissell for 

Col Handy, WPD, 5 Jan 42, sub: Trans-Iranian Railroad; (3) See also Draft of Memo, Jan 42, 

prepared in WPD for submission as recommendation to CofS, unused. WPD 4596 to -15 Iran 

(Persia) HRS DRB AGO. 
THE RAILWAY 337 

considered politically expedient to attempt to harmonize all interests, 

the United States should offer to Britain and Russia to provide American management with a small headquarters staff. 7 

N either the Wheeler suggestion, designed to fit into the Corridor 

situation so long as no extraordinary demands were to be made of the 

railroad, nor the Beaverbrook suggestion, which would have required 

a radical alteration in the basic Corridor situation, attracted sufficient 

strength to come into effect. In both British and American camps, 

arguments pro and con canceled one another out. But early in 1942, 

acting by request of the Tri-Partite powers, the United States designated Colonel Gillies to act as "mediator" on a joint board of representatives of Iran, Great Britain, and the USSR. Gillies served until 

his death in line of duty on. 28 February 1942. No successor was 

appointed.s 

Early in 1942 a detailed document was negotiated upon a foundation of Iranian proposals modified and extended by British and 

Soviet suggestions. Entitled "Regarding the Affairs of the Ministry of 

Ways and Communications," it was designed to establish a contractual 

relationship to govern British operation of the ISR. As the agreement 

was never approved by top authorities, the British proceeded under 

a simpler plan which they submitted to Iran but not to the USSR. 

Meanwhile the Russians had been going their separate way in their 

zone." 

Thus matters rocked along until mounting tonnages and global 

pressures produced the crisis of midsummer 1942, one of whose resolutions, as told in Chapter X, was the assignment of the operation of 

the British sector of the ISR to the U.S. Army. It is recorded that when 

all the preliminaries were over and Averell Harriman at Cairo told 

Prime Minister Churchill that the U.S. Army was ready to undertake 

the assignment, some British officers once again expressed alarm at 

putting control of an essential line of empire communications into 

foreign (i. e., American) hands; whereat Churchill dismissed the objection with the words, "And in what better hands could it be?" 10 

• (1) Min, Stf Mtg at Cairo, 17 Jan 42. Maxwell Papers. (2) Rad cited n. 4. 

• Memo, Col John E. Hull for ACofS, WPD, 17 Mar 42, sub: American Opn of TransIranian Railroad. WPD 4596 to -15 Iran (Persia) HRS DRB AGO. 

• (1) Copy with atchd papers in 336.01 International Agreements, SL 9012. (2) Ltr, Col 

John B. Stetson, Jr., Fiscal Adviser to CG, PGSC, 19 Jul 43. Same file. 10 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 627. This was while Churchill was en route horne 

from conferences with Stalin at Moscow in which Harriman took part. Churchill records in 

his memoirs (The Hinge 0/ Fate, p. 474) that on 11 August on the way to Moscow he and 

Harriman attended with "various high British and American railway authorities" a long 

conference in the garden of the British Legation at which "it was decided that the United 

States should take over the whole Trans-Persian railway from the Gulf to the Caspian." If 

matters reached that point at that time, the decision was soon reviewed and limited. It is a 

moot point how close the United States carne, at various times, to being given that logical, but, 
338 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

American control, however, was at that time not contemplated, 

since the Combined Chiefs' directive studiously avoided any modification of British authority over movements and security. Operation 

and control were to be in different hands. American responsibilities 

had been enormously enlarged, but once again it was responsibility 

without authority, an anomaly from every point of view and one 

whose adverse effects upon operations called for the prompt attention 

and vigorous negotiation which General Connolly gave to the problem 

as soon as he arrived. If there had been in anybody's mind the thought 

that the new American command was to be integrated with the British, 

or subordinated to it, it soon become clear that the meshing of the two 

forces would be much subtler than that. Connolly wrote candidly in 

December 1942 to Somervell: 

... we are setting up our show on the Pershing pattern. This naturally does 

not, and cannot be expected to, arouse any great degree of enthusiasm on the 

part of our British cousins. They have been dominating the situation south of 

Tehran and competing with the Russians in Tehran. It is understandable that 

they want to keep a grip on all facilities and resources both for use during the war 

and for aftervyard. Up to date our arguments with them on labor, covered storage. 

supplies, etc., have been on a very friendly and cooperative basis. The idea i, 

gradually percolating that this is a part of the U.S. Arn1y-not part of the British 

ArmyY 

'When, a few days after this letter was written, the first five thousand 

American service troops reached Khorramshahr, the relation between 

the American and British forces appeared to the Russians and Iranians 

to call for explanation. As is told hereafter in Chapter XX, they inquired whether the Americans, coming to Iran at British invitation. 

were to be considered as a part of the British command, and whether, 

if they were not, their presence prejudiced Iranian sovereignty and the 

rights enjoyed by the signatories to the Tri-Partite Treaty. The prolonged diplomatic exchange which followed provided the background 

against which negotiations to reconcile operational responsibility and 

authority were carried on. "The next big argument," General Connolly 

wrote in the letter just quoted, "is going to be over control of the railroad." Its culmination was the "Joint Agreement between Persia and 

Iraq Forces and the Persian Gulf Service Command for the Control 

of Movements in Persia," signed 7 April 1943.12 

in view of the Soviet's exclusion of others from the northern zone, unlikely, solution to the 

railway problem. In the opinion of an American in close touch with Iranian affairs, the 

Russians would in time have accepted American operation of an undivided line, Gulf to 

Caspian, but were alienated from the necesary confidence by their distaste for General 

Connolly's firmness. This footnote to history, communicated to the author, is recorded not 

as fact but as opinion from a significant source. 

11 Ltr, Connolly to Somerveil, 1 Dec 42. OCoITrans, Hist Br-Overseas Comd, Pentagon. 

12 See Ch. XI above, pp. 233-36 and n. 36. 
THE RAILWAY 339 

By this agreement, which gave the American command effective 

control over movements, the gap which separated responsibility and 

authority was considerably narrowed and operational problems proportionately simplified. In the course of the negotiations the old question of a unified rather than divided operation of the railway line again 

made its appearance when the American Ambassador at Moscow, Admiral William H. Standley, informed the Department of State that he 

possessed information that Iran wished the United States to take over 

not only the British sector but the Soviet sector as well. The information, 

while indicative of a trend in Iranian thinking and maneuvering, was, 

as General Connolly advised Washington, not accurate as to official 

Iranian policy. The question was settled, at least for the time being, 

by the decision of the Departments of State and War that, even should 

the offer to entrust to the U.S. Army operation of the ISR from Gulf 

to Caspian be forthcoming, it would be declined.1s 

The agreement on movements control made it possible for an independent American command to work, by means of delegated authority, 

with rather than under the British command. Since control of movements was essential to the carrying out of American operational responsibility, the agreement with the British proved, as Connolly reported after seven months' trial, "extremely satisfactory." 14 Yet it was 

little more than a detailed working arrangement in the all-important 

field of allocations, priorities, and movements. Efforts were therefore 

made to supplement it with other agreements defining the status of 

the American command in the Corridor, and, more specifically, the 

degree to which British responsibilities regarding the ISR were assumed by the U.S. Army when it took over operation of the British 

sector of the line. Although the negotiations to these ends were inconclusive they illustrate further some problems inherent in a situation 

which by its nature precluded either unified command or the exact 

definition of responsibilities. 

The Power of the Purse 

As the Combined Chiefs' directive said nothing about railway finances, the power of the purse figured prominently in the effort of the 

American command to control effectively the operations it had undertaken. The basic and thorny question focused UpOl} British obligations 

11 (1) Rad 215, Standley to Dept State, 26 Feb 43. Case 7, OPD 617 Iran, Sp Coli, HRS 

DRB AGO. (2) Min, Mtg of Representatives of Depts State and War, 1 Mar 43. Same file. 

14 Rad AGWAR 2894, Connolly to Marshall for Spalding, info Harriman, 1 Nov 43. 384 

Conduct of War, SL 9016. 
340 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

to the ISR. By agreement with the Iranian Government, the British 

had guaranteed to it an annual net sum, or profit, equivalent to that 

earned by the I SR between 21 !vfarch 1940 and 20 March 1941. The 

net revenue to Iran was accordingly fixed at 103 million rials per annum (equivalent to $3,218,750). British Army freight was to receive a 

50-percent concession in rates to be agreed, and transit freight, which 

meant goods destined for the USSR, would receive a 20-percent concession for all over 500,000 tons monthly. Capital expenditures beyond 

normal expansion were to be borne by the Ally, British or Soviet, making 

the demand for them; and the Allies contracted not to interfere more 

than necessary with Iranian civilian needs.15 

The guaranteed annual net profit was to be calculated after a 

balancing of receipts and expenditures, with war-caused expenditures 

to be excluded from the ISR's operating budget. The crux of the 

financing- problem was freight charges. At the beginning of the plan 

the UKCC was to pay freight charges incurred for the USSR, the 

funds coming from the \Var Office, London, while the British Army 

drew upon '\Tar Office funds paid out by PAl 'Force in Baghdad for 

their O\\ln charges. After September 1943 the British Army paid all 

charges except those for Iranian civil goods and uSSR internal movements. In April 1944 this method was dropped and the British resorted 

to cash advances on the tenth of each month to cover the difference 

between ISR civil earnings and the amount needed for current operating expenses, such as wag-es. Very substantial payments, totaling 

$14,782,727 as of 1 June 1945, were made by the ISR for stores of 

British, U.S. lend-lease, and U.S. Army non-lend-lease origin.16 

'\Then the American command took over operations from the 

British in 1943, along with the rolling stock came a complex of bookkeeping between the British Army and the Iranian railway directorate: 

cash advances, expenditures, book credits, and adjustments-all involved in the general financial arrangements under which British 

operations were conducted. Exchanges of views as to American 

financial responsibilities were promptly begun and continued until 

the lend-lease settlement with Great Britain in March 1946. Throughout, British pressure was doggedly exerted to prevail upon the united 

States to assume, as of 1 April 1943, "sole responsibility for making 

" (1) Documents citcd n. 9. (2) Rpt on Financial Responsibility for the Iranian State Ry, 

18 Jun 45, forwarded under covering Ltr, Gen Booth to Gen Marshall, 21 Jun 45, OPD 617 

Iran. Sp Call, HRS DRB AGO. ,. (1) Rad AGWAR 1515, Connolly to Marshall, Somervell, and Rear Adm Andrew F. 

Carter, 14 Jun 43. 120 Funds, Disbursements, Laws, Regulations, SL 8979. (2) Rpt cited 

n.15(2). 
THE RAILWAY 341 

advances or meeting bills in the first instance" on the ISR.17 The British 

felt moreover that this liability should be supplemented by American 

agreement to pay the cost of all British as well as American internal 

traffic after 1 April in return for the British paying for their own and 

American traffic before that date. The United States would thus find 

itself saddled with liability for everybody's expenses plus the guarantee 

to Iran, and all this in addition to the ever mounting costs of maintaining and operating the American command in the Persian Corridor, 

which was already a heavy contribution toward the joint war effort 

in that area. 

But the cardinal consideration from the point of view of the American command was not the cost involved in accepting the British 

proposal, for cost was not reckoned in the American effort to bring aid 

to Russia. Acceptance of the British financial liabilities toward the 

ISR would mean that American money would go directly into American operations instead of being siphoned into them via lend-lease to 

Britain. It was felt in the American command that taking over the 

British financial responsibility would increase American operational 

efficiency and authority by reducing the number of voices to be consulted over policy. The power of the purse gave the British ultimate 

control over operational matters whose cost (in American dollars) they 

could approve or disapprove when it was chargeable to the British 

share in lend-lease. In short, the Americans reasoned, if the money ,,,,,ere 

to be spent anyhow, it was simpler for it to pass directly from American 

hands to the ISR instead of from Washington to Tehran via London.'s 

The American command therefore proceeded for some time to negotiate with the British upon the basis of the Americans taking over the 

British working agreement with the ISR. This involved not only an 

American guarantee of a minimum annual sum to Iran, as proposed 

by General Connolly on 21 July 1943, but American assumption of all 

costs, including USSR transit freight, which exceeded ISR revenues. 

Tentative agreement was reached along these lines, to be effective 

on 1 August. But on 19 July the Americans informed Brigadier Rhodes 

that there would be a delay. As it turned out the delay proved 

permanent.19 

The crux of the opposition which Washington soon expressed was 

the Combined Chiefs' directive (CCS 109/1). This provided only 

n'British Army Stf, Washington, to OPD, 22 Sep 43. Case 8, OPD 617 Iran, Sp Coll, HRS 

DRB AGO. 

" Interv with Gen Connolly, Pentagon, 18 Aug 50. lO (1) Stetson to Rhodes, 19 Jul 43.336.01 International Agreements, SL 9012. (2) For 

Connolly's proposal see Case 8, OPD 617 Iran, Sp Coli, HRS DRB AGO. 
342 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

that the U.S. Army should serve in the place of the British Army in 

certain undertakings in the Persian Corridor. It did not alter basic 

British responsibilities or mention finance. Since financial matters lay 

at the heart of control, General Marshall advised General Connolly 

that any alteration of the financial arrangements existing at the 

assumption of American operational responsibility would require the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff to reopen "the entire question of responsibility for and control of the transport routes." 20 General Connolly was 

therefore committed to continuing negotiations in the financial field 

within the prescribed limits of the status quo as of the date of CCS 

109/1, as modified by the working agreement over movements signed 

with the British in April 1943. And there were the other arrangements 

to be made to define American relations with the Corridor partners. 

Respecting these negotiations, opinion at Washington was divided as 

to whether they should proceed at the military level or the diplomatic 

level, and whether unilateral agreements or a general pact would be 

desirable. In time all talks merged with the negotiations over final 

settlement when the Americans, their mission over, returned the ISR 

to the British. 

Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohammad Sa'ed directed 

a stream of inquiries, expostulations, and expressions of indignation at 

United States Minister Dreyfus, who in due course transmitted some 

of them to General Connolly. In April 1943 Mr. Sa'ed wanted to know 

whether the new working agreement between the Americans and the 

British had been consented to by the Russians; in May he deplored 

the chaos resulting from ill-defined operational control of the ISR; 

in July he demanded a direct Iranian-American agreement; in August 

he complained that the American railway director, Colonel Yount, 

without negotiation had presented to the railway administration for 

signature an operating agreement; and he ventured to point out that 

no matter how eager the government of Iran was to co-operate in 

friendship with its Allies, the ISR was the property of Iran and nothing, 

no action, should take place save under "the stipulations of a general 

agreement to be signed by the Governments of Iran and the United 

States." 21 

Mr. Sa'ed was reassured: that the United States was merely sub-

"Rad, Marshall to Connolly, 5 Aug 43. OPD 617 Iran, Sp Coli, HRS DRB AGO. A suggestion to cut the Gordian knot of authority by reviving, for the last time, the proposal for 

all-American operation from Gulf to Caspian appeared at this time. Memo, Stetson for OPD, 

4 Aug 43. Same file. 

21 Ltrs 410 and 1113, Mohamed Sa'ed to Dreyfus, 28 Apr, 15 Jun 43, 336.01 IntcrnationJI 

Agreements, SL 9012; Ltrs 1548 and 2118, Sa'ed to Dreyfus, 11 Jul, 12 Aug 43, 092.2 Treaties 

and Agreements, SL 8978. The replies referred to, as well as texts of tentative agret'mcnts, 

will be found in these two files under the dates cited in the text. 
THE RAILWAY 343 

stituting for Great Britain in the matter of the railway, and that, as 

the British had informed the government of Iran, nothing had affected 

British obligations under the Tri-Partite Treaty; that, instead of chaos, 

General Connolly was able to report ( 21 June) improving tonnages 

for the USSR and for the Iranian civilian economy as well and harmonious relations between Colonel Yount and Hossain Nafisi, DirectorGeneral of the ISR, and to explain (23 August) that the administrative agreement referred to in one of the diplomatic communications 

\\-'as actually a bulletin on personnel procedure, adopted after long 

conferences, and in agreement, with Nafisi; and finally, that Nafisi had 

been informed on 3 August that the working agreement with the 

British "will be subordinate to the final covenant between the U.S. 

Army and the ISR." 

The files abound in drafts and counterdrafts for such a covenant, 

and the summer of 1943 witnessed simultaneous discussions of three 

sorts: between the Americans and the British, on the military level, to 

determine financial obligations; between the Americans and the Iranians, on the political level, to discuss a bilateral railway agreement 

(perhaps as a part of a larger agreement as to American status in 

Iran); and four-power discussions toward a railway agreement.22 

\Vhile Connolly was thus attempting to be, like "Mr. Cerberus, three 

gentlemen at once," in Mrs. Malaprop's phrase, the War Department 

in August 1943 reached a conclusion and advised him as follows: 

First, the Anglo-Iranian arrangements were so complex the United 

States could not hope to do them justice if the British should withdraw 

altogether in the matter of the railway. Second, since the United 

States was not a party to the Tri-Partite Treaty, it was inappropriate 

for it to join in a four-power railway agreement. Third, Connolly 

should negotiate an operating contract with the ISR, obtaining therefor the concurrence of the governments of the United Kingdom, 

USSR, and Iran. Fourth, the British should continue, as in 1941-1942, 

to bear the ultimate financial responsibility.23 

To some extent the \Var Department's policy decisions were helpful, for they cleared the air with regard to what financial liabilities the 

United States would assume. Thenceforth, General Connolly and his 

fiscal adviser, Col. John B. Stetson, Jr., could be as adamant in their 

assertion that the U.S. Army was agent only, and not financially liable, 

as were the British in insisting that as of 1 April 1943 a new deal in 

finances ought to take place. General Connolly may have been reluctt Rad IDOl, Dreyfus to Dept State, 16 Oct 43. Case 8, OPD 617 Iran, Sp ColI, HRS 

DRB AGO . .. Memo, 27 Aug 43, and atchd papers. OPD 123 (5 Aug 43). 
tant to proceed with the delicate palavers prerequisite to an operating 

contract signed with the ISR and blessed by Britain and the USSR, 

for, as already noted, he was satisfied with the working agreement with 

PAI Force. Meanwhile, it appears that the British desired settlement 

of railway matters at the political level, and Minister Dreyfus concurred.24 It must be supposed that the British took this position, not 

because they were dissatisfied with the successful movements agreement which had been worked out at the military level, but because 

of the financial stand now being taken by the Americans. The view of 

the Department of State was therefore communicated by Dreyfus to 

Stetson at American military headquarters, through quotation of a 

telegram from the Acting Secretary of State to Dreyfus, as follows: 

If it is necessary to conclude an agreement on a political level covering the 

operation of the trans-Iranian Railway, you are authorized to initiate and negotiate 

such an agreement satisfactory to the American military authorities. While War 

Department orally concurs in this, it nevertheless has expressed a preference for 

an agreement by the military authorities concerned. 

To this Stetson replied in part as follows: 

Understand, of course, that it was the view of PGSC to negotiate this agreement 

on the military level and not on the political level. The War Department, however, 

refused to PGSC authority to make any financial commitments binding the United 

States with respect the railroad. 

In view of this decision, I informed the British that the entire financial responsibility was theirs, and that we as operators of the railroad are acting for them 

in the position of agent. They have elected, therefore, to make the agreement with 

respect to the railroad on the diplomatic level.25 

Actually the situation was not essentially changed. The British 

maintained their financial convictions, but in March 1944 the War 

Department indicated that it would be willing to credit the cost of 

U.S. Army freight by entering it on the books as reverse lend-lease, 

provided the British paid it in the first instance.26

But when on 31 May 1945 representatives of the British and 

American Armies sat down together to discuss the return of the ISR 

to the British, it was found not only that the British still expected the 

Americans to pay for everything after 1 April 1943 but that the British 

proposed stopping their interim payments to the ISR after 30 June 

1945 and that they would regard any subsequent breakdown as a joint 

Allied responsibility.27 

24 Rad cited n. 22. 25 (1) Ltr, Dreyfus to Col Stetson, 2 Nov 43. 092.2 Treaties and Agreements, SL 8978. 

43. Same file. 

(2) Ltr, Col Stetson to Richard Ford, Chargé d’Affaires, American Legation, Tehran, 6 Nov 

OPD 617 Iran, Sp Coll, HRS DRB AGO. 

26 Memo, John J. McCloy, Budget Div, OCofS, prepared for OPD, 14 Mar 44. Case 10, 

27 Rpt cited n. 15(2). 
THE RAILWAY 345 

Up to 1 July 1945 the cash advanced by the British to the ISR 

was more than twenty million dollars less than the ISR claimed the 

British owed for payment of USSR transit freight charges. If the ISR 

would agree to a reduction of the rates, as proposed but never settled, 

to three tenths of a rial per ton kilometer, then the British had overpaid 

by more than three and one half million dollars. As such overpayment 

did not cover costs of delivered stores and all operating expenses, there 

was a considerable gap to be made up to reach the guarantee of one 

hundred and three million rials net annual income. These matters 

were adjusted on paper by discovering and agreeing upon a freight 

rate that would even matters up pretty much as they were. So much 

for the British obligation to the ISR. After 1 July 1945 the British 

proposed that the United States, the USSR, and themselves pay the 

ISR separately for bills incurred; but the Americans pointed out that 

unless the British gave the ISR sufficient funds to settle its accounts 

with the United States for heavy purchases of supplies, stores, and 

equipment, against which account the United States had withheld 

payments to the ISR for command internal freight charges, then the 

United States, while paying off the ISR account, might not be paid in 

return.28 

In view of the difficulties which beset a financial settlement limited 

to the railway, the American command felt that the total effort of the 

United States Army in the Persian Corridor was relevant. Such a factor 

as American improvement and maintenance of highways over and 

above its obligations under the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive 

should offset British claims for compensation for freight charges on 

the railway/9 Since the question appeared incapable of solution in 

the field, it passed to higher authority and was ultimately swallowed 

up in the over-all lend-lease settlement between the British and American Governments. In this final settlement a notation appears that a 

British claim for compensation from the United States for twenty-five 

million dollars for USSR transit freight carried over the ISR was 

disallowed by the United States.so 

There is a bright side to the tedious record of all these negotiations 

in which the Americans, for the sake of efficient operations, strove to 

attain as close an identity between responsibility and authority as the 

Corridor situation permitted. If that situation could have been altered 

"Ibid. 

lIfI (1) Intervs with Col Stetson, Tehran, 3-4 Aug 45. (2) Correspondence by Col Stetson 

in 323.361 and 550.3, SL 9008. 30 The New York Times, March 28, 1946. This "final" settlement was followed by a supplementary settlement covering disposition of, and method of payment for, all wartime installations 

in the Middle East, signed at Washington on 12 July 1948. The New York Times, July 13, 1948. 
346 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

by negotiation to provide unified operation of the ISR from Gulf to 

Caspian or even to invest the American command with primary authority as well as responsibility, the operational problem would have 

been noticeably eased and the results achieved even more striking than 

those summarized at the beginning of this chapter. But it is a commentary upon Anglo-American temperaments that, during the years 

when American and British officialdom strove in paper after paper 

and talk after talk to determine who could properly do what and who 

should pay for what, their colleagues were running the trains, doing 

the job, delivering the goods to the Russians. Nevertheless, as that part 

of the story now unfolds, the murmur of innumerable conferences and 

the rustle of carbon copies will still be heard above the clang of freight 

cars in the assembly yards and the deep-throated whistle of the diesels 

echoing in the high mountains of Iran. 

The Americans Take Over 

The railway itself is a notable engineering accomplishment.s1 Its 

single-track, standard-gauge main line extends 865 miles from the 

southern terminus of Bandar Shahpur, a tidewater port at the northern 

end of the Persian Gulf, to Bandar Shah on the southeastern shore of 

the Caspian Sea. (See Map 4.) Within its span many phases of engineering and railroad construction are combined in somewhat unusual 

concentration. 

Soon after completion of the main line, construction began on two 

branches. In 1939 the railway extended a branch northwest from 

Tehran toward Tabriz; in 1941 this line had passed Zenjan and was 

carried on to Mianeh in 1942, a total distance of 272 miles. Some work 

was done west of Mianeh, but the plans based on the former Shah's 

insistence upon driving the line from there straight through, rather 

than around large hill masses, proved too costly and the project withered. The other branch, running eastward from Garmsar through Samnan to Shahrud for a distance of 196 miles, was placed in service in 

1940. In 1942 the British, purely as a military measure, constructed two 

more branches. One 77 miles in length, extended from Ahwaz to Khorramshahr; the other was a 27 -mile extension from this line to Cheybassi, lighterage port up-river from Tanuma and opposite Margil, in 

the port area of Basra . 

.. The description of the railway derives from (1) HOTI, Pt. V, History of the 3d Military 

Railway Service, by 1st Lt Francis J. Lewis (cited hereafter as HOTI-V), pp. 3-5, PGF; and 

(2) MA Rpt 222 from Tehran, 14 Jan 44, MID 617 Iran, 14 Jan 44 (29 Dec 41). 
THE RAILWAY 347 

From Bandar Shahpur the line runs northward for 69 miles, across 

marshland and the Khuzistan Desert, to Ahwaz, crossing a 3,512-foot 

bridge over the Karun River at that point. Following the course of the 

Ab-i-Diz River, the railroad continues northwest for 87 miles across 

the desert to Andimeshk in the Zagros foothills, where it embarks on 

the first of two of the most dramatic railroad sections in the world. 

The Zagros Mountains are forbiddingly devoid of vegetation, their 

lonely, rocky fa~ades utterly bleak, the ravines between the profusion 

of their peaks sheer and desolate. North of Andimeshk as far as Dorud, 

130 miles distant, the railroad hugs the course of the Ab-i-Diz, crossing 

it many times in that section, high in the mountains. The railroad 

plunges through tunnel after tunnel-135 of them in one stretch of 

165 miles-and permits glimpses of breathtaking sweep as it emerges 

time after time to skirt the brinks of deep and precipitous canyons. 

The first American soldiers traveling north to their station in Tehran, 

in January 1943, found no comfort in the fact that the locomotives 

hauling them over the single-track railroad were without headlights 

in this succession of tunnels. There are many bridges and there are 

miles of retaining walls of massive design and galleried sheds to protect 

the track from snow and landslides. North of Dorud the line ascends 

to an altitude of 7,272 feet and, emerging upon a high plateau, reaches 

Sultanabad, 91 miles away, and Qum, 87 miles beyond Sultanabad. 

From there it is 111 miles to the capital city, Tehran. 

From Tehran, the main line turns abruptly southeast for 71 miles 

to Garmsar, skirting the high welll of the Elburz Mountains. At Garmsar, the line veers northeast again, entering a lofty pass in the Elburz 

and climbing to a height of 6,927 feet. In this 65-mile section the railroad performs veritable gymnastics, with spiraled switchbacks, tunnels 

which burrow through the rock in sweeping curves, and, at one point, 

a corkscrew climb in which four elevations of track lift the railway 

with a grade of one in 36. One hundred and fifty-three miles from the 

summit in the Elburz lies Bandar Shah, which is 85 feet below sea level. 

Beginning at Tehran, the Soviet sector of the ISR comprised 757 

miles of line running east from the capital to Bandar Shah and Shahrud, and west to Mianeh. The British sector extended for 680 miles 

of main and branch line southward from Tehran, through the mountains and across the desert to the Gulf. Over this route the first American railroad troops rode to Tehran on a train drawn by a little prewar 

Ferrostaal locomotive with copper firebox and brightly trimmed 

wheels. Their journey was enlivened when, in the wilds of the Zagros 

Mountains, they had to get out and push the train up the more difficult 

grades. That ludicrous first experience was to fade into the incredible 
348 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

past as the great diesels from beyond the Atlantic took over the rails 

in Iran and the trains lengthened and the tonnages grew. 

One year before, while the newly arrived British were working to 

increase the prewar capacity of the ISR from its 200-ton daily level, 

General Wheeler had estimated that, using existing inadequate equipment, American operation might raise capacity for all types of cargo 

to 600 tons daily, capable of increase to 1,800 tons by the addition of 

American rolling stock. The British had set themselves a goal of 2,000 

tons daily to be reached by April 1942.32 

With a military operating and supervisory staff which reached a 

maximum of 120 officers and 3,900 engineer (sapper) troops and 

using the existing ISR civilian administrative and operating staff, the 

British Army had brought the railway in the last five months of 1942 

to a daily average for all cargoes of some 1,500 tons. To do so they 

had doubled the trackage in the yards at Andimeshk, Ahwaz, and 

Tehran, and had constructed over one hundred miles of new line. 

They doubled the area of the erecting shops at Tehran and put up 

new sheds, storehouses, workshops, and offices in various localities, as 

well as new wire installations for telephone and telegraph up and down 

the line. They doubled rolling stock, including motive power. Their 

achievement was not to be underrated; but it fell far short of the 

6,000-ton target now set by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.sa 

General Connolly soon found that the inability of the railway to 

take away landed cargoes from the ports was the key problem to be 

solved in the new transport task facing him. The prospect was hardly 

pleasing. He wrote in December: 

My biggest mistake in estimating the situation before leaving Washington was 

in thinking that the ports were the bottleneck. I find that at present the rate of 

removing cargo from shipside determines the rate of unloading ships. There is no 

storage at the docks. There are not sufficient trucks and railroad rolling stock available, and what they do have they do not operate efficiently. If I had known the 

above before leaving Washington, I would have arranged my priorities of men and 

equipment differently.34 

As told in Chapter X, rail operating units which had received top 

priority for overseas shipment in early SOS planning shared equal 

priorities with port and trucking troops in the revised arrangements. 

IZ (1) Rad cited n. 5 ( 1 ). (2) Review and estimates of tonnage situation at end of 1941 in 

Report on Trans-Iranian Railway, by Capt. Paul F. Yount, 5 January 1942, and in British 

and American naval intelligence studies attached thereto or cited therein. WPD 4596 to -15 

Iran (Persia) HRS DRB AGO. 33 (1) PAl Force History, II, 203, 8-10,13. (2) Ltrs, Lt Col A. E. M. Walter, Asst Dir 

Trans, British Army Stf, to: Brig Gen T. H. Dillon, 19 Sep 42, sub: Locomotives and RoBing 

Stock-Persia; and Brig Gen Sidney P. Spalding, 25 Sep 42, sub: Rpt on Car Position on the 

ISR. OCofTrans, Hist Br-Overseas Comd. Pentagon . 

.. Ltr cited n. 11. 
THE RAILWAY 349 

Next after troop shipments came port unloading equipment, with 

diesels in third place. The transition from British to American operation of the railway was therefore prolonged over several months during 

which the American railway troops were arriving, learning their jobs, 

and gradually taking over the line. 

To command them General Connolly had selected Colonel Yount 

who had come to the area in 1941 as a transportation expert with 

General Wheeler's Iranian Mission and had then gone with Wheeler 

to India. Recalled from India, Yount reached Basra on 5 October 1942, 

where, with a sIIlall forward echelon which arrived later from the 

United States, he established a temporary railway headquarters. In 

December, with its headquarters now moved to Ahwaz, the Military 

Railway Service was established as one of the operating services of 

the American command. 35 

A survey tour of the line conducted by Colonel Yount and conferences with Iranian, Soviet, and British officials laid the groundwork 

for the gradual process of take-over. This took place as fast as trained 

troops became available. The first outfit to arrive was the 711 th Engineer Railway Operating Battalion. Unlike other units which were 

sponsored by American railways and later incorporated into the MRS, 

the 711 th was all Army. Activated in June 1941, it was ready for work 

when it reached Khorramshahr in December 1942. Starting on 1 January 1943 by taking over from the British operation of the line from that 

port to Ahwaz, by the 16th it was running the trains from Dorud to 

both Khorramshahr and Bandar Shahpur.36 

To provide headquarters staff personnel for administration of the 

MRS, the 702d Railway Grand Division arrived in January. Recently 

activated in October 1942, this group was sponsored by the Union 

Pacific Railroad and was largely staffed by ex-civilian railroaders with 

a minimum of military training and indoctrination. On 9 February, 

with his headquarters moved from Ahwaz to Tehran, Colonel Yount 

formally assumed command as director and general manager of MRS 

and of the 702d Railway Grand Division. An organization chart for 

March shows a staff division of functions, into sections for Administration, Transportation, Water, Equipment, Engineering, and Supply, 

with operating functions centralized in two railway divisions-the 

.. (I) Rad, Gen Somervell to Gen Wheeler, 9 Sep 42, Hq, ASF, Theaters of Opns, PGe 

(12) 1942-1943, HRS DRB AGO. (2) GO 11, Hq, PGSe, 17 Dec 42. 

'"The account of organizational matters is based upon: (I) HOTI-V, pp. 27-48. This 

entire study of 153 pages is valuable for its detailed field-level story of the whole railway operation. (2) Mil History, 711 th Engr Ry Operatin~ Bn, MRS, PGSe. Feb 43. PGF 45-A. (3) Mil 

History, Hq, MRS, PGSC, Mar, May 43, PGF 132-B, D. (4) Mil History, 762d Ry Diesel 

Shop Bn, MRS, 10 May, 7 Jun 43, PGF 60-D, E. (5) Organization Manuals filed under dates 

cited. PGF 240. (6) Mil History, Hq, 3d MRS, PGC, 1-31 Dec 44. PGF 132-X. 
350 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

Northern, extending from Tehran to Dorud; and the Southern, from 

there to the ports. The operating battalions derived their authority 

directly from the director. Among the more important accomplishments of this headquarters group, during the period of joint BritishAmerican operations, was the taking over by its Equipment Section 

in February of responsibility for all railway rolling stock and equipment. The Transportation Section, as a preliminary to the assumption 

of full American operating responsibilities, found it necessary to prepare a book of rules-the railroad man's bible-which would establish 

uniform procedures based upon explicit instructions. The ISR possessed 

no automatic signals, no interlocking or multiple tracks, and few grade 

crossings. Existing ISR rules had to be co-ordinated with such American methods as could be modified to local conditions. After protracted 

discussion with Soviet and Iranian railway people, a standard book 

of rules was promulgated by common consent on 1 April. 

Meanwhile other operating units were arriving from the United 

States. In January the 730th Engineer Railway Operating Battalion, 

sponsored by the Pennsylvania Railroad, joined the 711 th, which was 

already in charge of the Southern Division. By the end of March, the 

730th was ready to operate the Northern Division. A few days previously, the 754th Railway Shop Battalion, just arrived, took over the 

ISR's principal locomotive and car repair shops at Tehran. 

These four organizations, the administrative unit, two operating 

battalions, and the shop battalion, totaled 3,067 officers and men, 

a number slightly greater than the strength allotted to the American 

railway service by the first estimates under the SOS Plan. Revised 

Tables of Organization provided for an additional shop battalion to 

handle the American diesel engines which were to take over the 

heaviest work from the steam locomotives. 87 Accordingly, the 762d 

Railway Diesel Shop Battalion added 632 officers and men to available 

manpower upon its arrival in March. During April and the first week 

of May it took over the shops at Ahwaz, consisting of back shop, the 

freight car assembly shops, and the powerhouse. 

By that time the MRS was already running the railway from Tehran 

to the Gulf. As of 1 April 1943 "responsibility for control of operations 

and maintenance of the Iranian State Railway between Tehran and 

Persian Gulf Ports formerly exercised by the Transportation Directorate (Persia) of PAl Force" devolved upon the MRS. On 1 May, when 

the Anglo-American agreement for control of movements came into 

'7 (l) Ch. X, p. 193, above. (2) Memo, CofS for Opns, SOS, for G-3, 20 Sep 42; Memo, 

ACofS, OPD, for G-3, 21 Sep 42. OPD 617 Iran, Sp Coll, HRS DRB AGO. 
THE RAILWAY 351 

effect, railway movements, including allocation, scheduling of trains, 

and distribution of rolling stock passed also to the Americans.ss 

At the beginning of May there were about 3,700 officers and men of 

the MRS working on the railroad. Their numbers and the types of 

units assigned had been determined at the 'War Department. The resulting Tables of Organization, compiled far from the scene of activity, 

were not entirely adapted to field conditions. In War Department 

theory an operating battalion was to have jurisdiction over a stretch 

of 60 to 120 miles of single-track railway, including one terminal. A 

railway grand division would direct two operating battalions and one 

shop battalion, or a maximum of 240 miles of single-track line and two 

terminals. In actual practice the 702d Railway Grand Division was 

supervising two operating. battalions and two shop battalions, spread 

over 677 miles, as well as eight terminals; the 711 th Railway Operating 

Battalion operated 388 miles, and the 730th, 289 miles. An attack upon 

the problem of thinly spread manpower was made when on 1 May the 

MRS activated the 1 st Provisional Railway Operating Battalion, later 

designated the 791st Railway Operating Battalion. Men for the new 

outfit were dra\vn from those battalions already in the area plus personnel from other units in the command with prewar railroad experi· 

ence. The new unit was assigned the 221-mile stretch of mountainous 

country between Andimeshk and Sultanabad. Since this rearrangement 

left the 711 th with 258 miles and the 730th with 198, the theoretical 

limit of 120 miles was still far from attained. At the same time the two 

railway divisions were divided into three: the Northern, from Tehran 

to Sultanabad; the Central, from Sultanabad to Andimeshk; and the 

Southern, from there to the ports. 

The conclusion of these arrangements in May 1943 gave the MRS 

organization a form which remained essentially unaltered throughout 

its existence. This structural stability was important to the success of 

the railway task. MRS strength rose slightly after this date, but at its 

peak of about 4,000 it was almost identical with the maximum strength 

of the British military railroaders who preceded it. 

One administrative change did occur, but this was largely a matter 

of redesignation to make practice conform to theory. The 702d Railway 

Grand Division, the administrative dynamo which powered the organization of MRS, was intended by the \Var Department to be comparable to a civilian railway regional headquarters; but it found itself 

actually serving as a military railway service headquarters to which 

.. (1) GO 3, Hq. MRS. 31 Mar 43. (2) Hist Rpt, Movements Br, Opns Div, Hq, PGSC, 

16 May 43, p. 4. PGF 126-D. 
352 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

grand divisions were intended by the Tables of Organization to be subordinate. Although the MRS had been designated by PGSC as a military railway service, it was not so recognized by the War Department, 

whose Military Railway Service, up to November 1942 an organization 

within the Corps of Engineers, was that month transferred to the new 

Transportation Corps and assigned the duty of operating and maintaining all military railways in theaters of operation.~9 

By the summer of 1943 the headquarters staff of about one hundred, including forty-three officers, was hard put to it to supervise the 

activities of 4,000 men in five battalions, and of approximately 15,000 

ISR native employees. The Tables of Organization made up at Washington did not recognize the comprehensive functions of the staff under 

actual conditions. They provided, for example, eighteen stationmasters 

with the rank of captain, but these were not needed because ISR employees filled those positions. On the other hand the T /0 made no 

provision for specialists in labor relations and left heavily undermanned 

the administrative control of supply and accounting. In the latter field, 

particularly, it was necessary to keep accurate financial records 

against the day of final reckoning with the British and Iranians. Accordingly, on 20 July Colonel Yount requested that the War Department authorize establishment of an approved Headquarters, MRS, to 

replace the 702d Railway Grand Division. General Connolly, in forwarding his recommendation, asked also for officers to fill important 

functional gaps. After a delay of many months, during which time the 

MRS reached the first of its two great peaks in tonnage performance, 

approval came through from Washington, and on 10 April 1944 Headquarters, 3d :t-..1RS, PGC, was activated.40 

Colonel Yount remained only a few weeks longer, for in May he 

was ordered to the CBI theater to face fresh railway problems. His 

long period of service had seen not only establishment of a pattern of 

organizational structure and procedure which withstood time and 

vicissitude but also the achievement, through increasing efficiency, of 

tonnages to which, to put it mildly, the ISR was not previously 

3D (1) Situation Report on Railway Troop Units, by Chief, Mil Ry Br, to CofTrans, 19 Nov 

42, SPTOR 320.2, as of 15 ;.l'ov 42, when they were transferred from Corps of Engineers 

pursuant to WD GO 60, 5 ~ov 42. (2) Brig Gen Andrew F. McIntyre, "How the Army Has 

Learned to Railroad," Railway Age 117 (1944) 849-51 (2 Dec 44) . 

.. (1) Rpt of Labor Sec, Hq, 3d MRS, PGC, by Maj Henry Dawes, ISR Liaison and Labor 

Off, to Col Richard W. Cooper, Civ Pers Off, PGC, 12 Jan 45. PGF 132. (2) GO 23, Hq, 

PGC, 10 Apr 44. (3) U.S. Army Transportation in the Persian Corridor, 1941-1945, Monograph 25, Hist Unit, OCofTrans, ASF, Feb 46, by H. H. Dunham, pp. 172-73 (cited hereafter as Dunham). (4) No exact figure for Iranian employees of the ISR exists. The number 

was, moreover, variable. General Yount stated to the author that 15,000 was a reliable average 

figure for the whole period of operations. Of these, 8,000 were employed in the southern sector; 

7,000, including all headquarters ISR office workers, in the Tehran area. 
THE RAILWAY 353 

accustomed. He was succeeded as director by CoL Frank S. Besson, Jr., 

who served until May 1945 when as a brigadier general he left Iran 

for a ne\v assignment. Under Colonel Besson the MRS met the test 

of the peak loads of the latter part of 1944. Besson's two successors, 

Col. Aubrey 1vL Bruce and Lt. CoL L. D. Curtis, carried on to the end 

of operations. 

MRS organization charts show, in the latter period, little change 

from the beginnings. In November 1943 the headquarters staff had five 

instead of six sections, that for Water being eliminated, and the Supply 

Section being redesignated Stores and Purchase. Five instead of four 

operating battalions came under the director's command. The chart 

for October 1944 shows no change from the preceding year. That for 

March 1945 indicates a distinction between staff functions, still administered through five sections, now called Administration, Operations, Transportation, Equipment, and Stores, and line functions. The 

last, with line of command extending back to the director's office, consisted of the running of trains-functioning through the Northern, 

Central, and Southern Divisions-operation of the six railroad camps 

scattered along the line, and maintenance operations at the shops at 

Tehran and Ahwaz. 

Men at Work 

'Vhen General Connolly observed in December 1942 that moving 

cargo inland was at that time a tougher problem than unloading ships, 

he was indicating that until port and rail capacities could be brought 

into balance the logistic pipeline would tend to choke up altogether 

or feed its transit tonnage spasmodically. Rail and port performance, 

though they must be recorded as distinct enterprises, are nevertheless 

to be considered as intimately affecting one another. In evaluating the 

ups and dO\vns of tonnages hauled by the ISR it is obvious that maximum rail haulage was possible only when maximum cargoes were 

available at the ports. Table 3 and Charts 8, 9, and 10 help to tell the 

rail story. 'When the statistical record shows rising ship discharge accompanied by rising rail tonnage, it reveals ability of the railroad to 

keep pace with demand. On the other hand, low rail tonnages may 

indicate either inability of the railroad to carry cargoes away from the 

ports, or, as was the more usual case after the apprentice period, 

diminution of incoming cargoes. 

Although the entire transport operation was affected by administrative and policy controls at the highest levels, their primary point of 

contact at the operating level was at the ports. Here was the first test 

of co-ordinating various functions which touched so closely that, 
354 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

without clear-cut definition of what belonged to ports operation and 

what to rail, confusion was inevitable. The two services, Ports and 

MRS, took over their new responsibilities in alternating steps. On 

1 January 1943 MRS began to operate trains out of Khorramshahr. 

On the seventh, port operation of Khorramshahr by Americans began, 

although British units remained to help. By 18 January MRS was 

running all the trains from Khorramshahr and Bandar Shah pur to 

Dorud; and in mid-February American units assumed interim operation of the port of Bandar Shahpur, with continuing British help. 

On 1 April both ports and railroad commenced all-American operation, and on 1 :May began effective American control of movements in 

the British zone. But even before the first American assumption of 

operating responsibilities, Colonel Booth for Ports and Colonel Yount 

for 1v1RS had, in December 1942, agreed on a division of labor at dockside, where their jurisdictions met and were likely to become operationally entangled. The ports organization would control the rail yards 

including car loading, and storage operations, \vhile 1v1RS would control switching engines, and would maintain technical supervision over 

rolling stock in the rail yards. 41 

Car switching at the ports was a crucial part of the process of making 

up trains and speeding removal of landed cargoes inland. This was 

particularly so at Bandar Shahpur, where the only means of inland 

clearance from the island was by raiL By February 1943 nearly 20 

percent of the total available strength of the 711 th Railway Operating 

Battalion were switching cars at the two ports. Charts 9 and 10 show 

that at both ports, but especially at Khorramshahr, ship discharge 

outran rail clearance during the early months of 1943. To obtain closer 

co-ordination of rail and port functions Booth and Yount agreed in' 

May to put all railway terminal operations at Khorramshahr under port 

operating command. This settlement left the railway free for its single 

task of running trains and placed all strictly port functions under port 

control. By simplifying the MRS task, it contributed in no small measure to the stability of that organization's functional pattern and soon 

bore fruit in rising efficiency. 

The Americans were active in many other ways during those early 

months of 1943. Locomotives were assigned to districts according to 

power requirements; American and Iranian personnel made studies of 

track construction, sidings, tunnels, and bridges, and improved trackage at Ahwaz and Khorramshahr to expedite car handling. Distribution of air-brake equipment and hand brakes in trains was standardized, Studies were begun for improvement of water facilities, for 

(1 Ch. XVIII, pp. 381, 387-88, below. 
THE RAILWAY 355 

the installation of diesel fuel oil storage tanks, and for storing "dead" 

engines at Tehran. New engine sheds at Ahwaz were projected. Damage to the communications system by thieves, electrical and snow 

storms, and the March floods was inspected and repairs begun. All 

along the line from January through March there was intense activity 

as the date neared for complete American take-over. American soldiers 

observed British and Iranian operations to familiarize themselves with 

procedure, the nature of available equipment, and the railway line 

itself. American mechanics studied at the British shops in Tehran the 

peculiarities of the locomotives they were to inherit. Tests were made 

of air sanders on British locomotives, and of hand brakes on American 

flatcars and tank cars. As fast as they arrived the new diesels were 

erected. The first diesel-hauled train moved from Ahwaz to Andimeshk 

in March. In another month all freight trains and mixed trains from 

ports to Andimeshk were powered by these 126-ton, 1,000-horsepower 

engines. 

The heavy March rains that flooded the newly built road out of 

Khorramshahr also caused a serious traffic delay on the railroad. 

Several thousand feet of track and one bridge were washed out on the 

Khorramshahr-Ahwaz line, suspending train movements for ten days 

except for one train each way on alternate days. Track gangs worked 

in driving rain to prevent spreading of the damage. Though Soviet 

haulage fell off in March as a result of the floods and of several accidents, the total of all cargoes showed a slight increase over February.42 

In spite of such troubles, the interim period of joint Anglo-American operations achieved in March two encouraging records. On the 

third the 711 th Battalion moved 6,402 long tons up to Andimeshk in. 

seven trains, eclipsing any previous single day's record in ISR history. 

Thus, even before the Americans came into full control of operations, 

it was demonstrated that the ISR could be made to meet and to exceed 

the new target set for it by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. On 29 

l\1arch a speed record was set when a special diesel-powered passenger 

train bearing Her Majesty Taj-ol-Moluk, the Queen Mother of Iran, 

covered the eighty-seven miles between Ahwaz and Andimeshk in two 

hours and thirty-eight minutes. 

The setting of targets was a matter of concern to all operating 

authorities. One American consideration during the negotiations which 

led to American assumption of movements control was the feeling that 

if targets could be more accurately estimated than hitherto there 

would be less chance of disappointing the Russians. It was desirable 

.., The account of operational matters, except where otherwise noted, is based upon 

HOTI-V; and Hist Rpts, Hq, MRS. and 3d MRS, for periods given. PGF 132. 
356 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

to reduce complaints by reducing the errors of optimism. The policies 

and methods by which tonnage targets for the railway were established were determined during the first half of 1943. Each monthly 

target for MRS was set after the capacity of the railroad had been 

determined, the potential capacity being based on the number of cars 

and locomotives available in serviceable condition. A preliminary 

monthly target meeting was then held by American and British representatives to estimate the amount of essential internal tonnage-American and British military freight and Iranian civil freight-which could 

be moved in the following month. The internal tonnage thus determined was then deducted from the potential capacity, itself a species 

of over-all target. The difference was the Russian-aid target or estimated cargo tonnage for delivery to the Russians at Tehran. 

Although Table 5 shows rising Russian-aid haulage for each of 

the months of April through July 1943, the target was not always 

reached. Tonnage for April, for example, fell short by 10 percent, but 

nevertheless represented the most the Russians had got in anyone 

month up to that time. August, when tonnages fell off sharply, was the 

last month during the period of MRS operations in Iran in which 

performance fell below the target level. And thereby hangs a tale in 

which the Russians figure prominently.43 

The division of labor in May 1943 between the Ports Service and 

MRS made for closer co-ordination of loading at the ports. The 

trouble lay not only in some confusion resulting from divided responsibility for what was determined to be a strictly port function but also 

in a problem much more difficult to control, namely, the availability 

of cars for loading. Here the necessity existed for more efficient use of 

cars within MRS; but the availability of cars was even more importantly related to Soviet operations north of Tehran. If the Soviet 

railway organization could not take away loads as fast as they were 

delivered, or if they did not return empty cars from their zone to the 

MRS with sufficient regularity, congestion was bound to occur in the 

south. It was clear from the first that MRS had to provide adequate 

numbers of cars at the ports. To that end, beginning in March 1943, 

adjustments were made to facilitate car turnaround from the Soviet 

zone. Delays north of Tehran arose in the first instance from heavy 

rains and snowstorms which cut off train movements for a day or two 

at a time. At a meeting of Soviet and American representatives in 

March the Americans agreed to assign cars temporarily to the Russians 

., Opns Directive Consecutive 1, Hq, Opns Div, PGSC, signed by Col Theodore M. 

Osborne, ACofS, Opns, 30 Mar 43, sub: Target for April. PGF 26-A. First of a series of 

monthly target papers. 
THE RAILWAY 357 

to haul track ballasting material to repair and strengthen damaged 

portions of their line. The Americans also agreed to furnish locomotives when needed to assist the Russians' train movement. In all, 

seventy-six American locomotives were so lent during 1943. It was 

further agreed that as fast as the MRS could repair worn-out or 

damaged locomotives belonging to the ISR they would be delivered for 

use by the Russians. Eventually MRS repaired nearly all locomotives 

and cars used by MRS and the Russians.44 

The provision of emergency aid to the Soviet railroaders was the 

first task of the March meeting; but agreement as to car allocations up 

and down the ISR from Caspian to Gulf was equally important if 

traffic \vas to move smoothly. The Americans proposed allocations for 

different sectors, for different types of cars-such as ballast and service 

cars and oil tankers-and for different kinds of cargoes. But the Russians would not commit themselves. They expressed general satisfaction with the assignments proposed but needed time for analysis. They 

questioned the necessity for the allotment of cars provided between the 

ports and Tehran to meet Iranian civilian, and British and American 

military, needs, suggesting that these be reduced in favor of Russianaid traffic. And they blandly pointed out the fact that no formal operating agreement existed. The Anglo-American discussions as to authority ,vere still going on and feelers were being actively put out in 

the direction of both bilateral agreements and a general four-power 

agreement. Under the circumstances the Russians would not recognize 

American authority to allocate cars, and they were unimpressed by 

the Americans' suggestion that, since the only business in hand was 

to speerl aid-to-Russia traffic, it was best to make all necessary arrangements for operating whether or not the formal paper agreements had 

yet been concluded. 

The next month, after the movements agreement with the British 

was signed. the Americans tried again. At a meeting in Colonel Yount's 

office on 19 April further car allocation proposals were made to the 

Russians, who countered with a request for increasing the target for 

tonnages to be carried north of Andimeshk. The Americans replied that 

the present target was based upon a 22-day car turnaround between the 

ports and destinations in the Soviet zone and that, since the turnaround 

.. The account of car turnaround and r('lations with the Russians is based upon: (1) Interv 

with Gen Connolly, Pentagon, 18 Aug 50. (2) Dunham, pp. 155-59. (3) HOTI-V, pp. 

111-13. (4) Ltr, Yount to Col J. A. Appleton, 28 Apr 43, cited Dunham, p. 155. (5) HOTI, 

Pt. r, Ch. 8, Sec. 3, History of Movements Branch, Operations Division, Hq, PGC, prepared 

by Movements Branch, Operations Division, with Supplement by Laurence P. Corbett, and 

statistical appendix, Complete Summary of Port and Transportation Agencies Performance 

of PGC Operations through 31 May 1945,5 July 1945, pp. 5, 27. PG}<'. 
358 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

was currently greater than that, the target figure would have to stand. 

Although Russian-aid freight hauled by the Americans increased 

steadily from April through July, it was necessary to bolster the Soviet 

sector of the ISR by constant loans of locomotives and air-braked cars, 

essential for train operation in the mountainous country north of 

Tehran. MRS, by careful planning, gradually raised the percentage 

of air-braked cars available for Soviet-operated trains from fifteen to 

forty. To reduce the job of reclassification in the Tehran yards otherwise needed to provide these air-braked cars, MRS began to make 

"blocked" trains at Andimeshk composed of cars with a common 

through destination. 

Even with such help, the Soviet trainmen continued to falter in 

the race to carry away from Tehran what the :rvfRS brought to them. 

In July 1943 tank cars for high-octane gasoline were making a 30-day 

turnaround between Khorramshahr and Bandar Shah on the Caspian, 

and this was twice as long as American calculations provided for. During July and August such a congestion of traffic occurred in the Soviet 

zone between Tehran and Bandar Shah as to choke the yards at Tehran 

with loaded cars waiting to go on and to leave the Gulf ports almost 

void of empty cars for loading at shipside. The pipeline, clogged at its 

northern end, was unable to take in cargo at the south, and an embargo 

resulted. From 8 to 13 August the Americans at the Gulf ports stopped 

loading cars for Bandar Shah to give the Russians time to catch up. 

Russian haulage fell off from July to August by 12,000 long tons. 

The summer crisis forced General Connolly to inform General 

Korolyev, Chief of the Soviet Transportation Department in Iran, that 

it might be necessary to go even further, and to stop all shipments into 

Iran if the Russians could not tighten their operations procedures 

enough to put Soviet and MRS haulage into balance. As a result the 

Russians promised to make improvemcnts, and kept their promises; 

but at the end of the year Tehran saw a new transportation chief for 

the Russians, Maj. Gen. Ivan V. Kargin. 

Except for a hesitation in November, Russian-aid tonnages carried 

by MRS to Tehran rose steadily for the rest of 1943; but not without 

periods of serious congestion when it was necessary to store loads at 

stations south of Tehran because of Soviet inability to accept anything 

more at the capital. The vigorous efforts of MRS management 

gradually improved car turnaround. A backlog of 906 cars of USSRbound cargo at Andimeshk early in September was reduced in three 

weeks to 281 loads by shifting extra enlisted men of the 762d Battalion 

to detached service at the Andimeshk yards to speed the work. Even 

more spectacular improvement was achieved in the matter of the tank 
THE RAILWAY 359 

cars whose Gulf to Caspian turnaround in July had been thirty days. 

By increasing the loading facilities at the Gulf end and the unloading 

facilities at the Caspian, by improving train schedules, by blocking 

such cars into special trains rather than mixing them with other types 

of car, by giving priority to all Soviet-destined gasoline, and by time 

saving resulting from improved communications, the average tank car 

turnaround fell in 1944 to ten days and in 1945 to eight. 

The banner year, the year in which the ingenuity and resourcefulness of l\1RS management and the hard work of its men paid off in tons, 

was 1944. That is not to say that 1944 was all plain sailing. Persistent 

attack on the problem of car turnaround continued, the outstanding 

innovation being the blocking of trains at the ports instead of at Andimeshk, thus reducing switching time at Ahwaz and Andimeshk and 

causing a speed-up in the total running time of given cargoes. 

Three accidents, two on the Soviet sector of the ISR, interrupted 

the flow of traffic but failed to dent the statistical record. In February 

trains ",'ere backed up for a time while track, tom up by an accident, 

was repaired; and in Maya washout on the line east of Tehran stopped 

operations for two days. In the second case, MRS rushed forty-two men 

to the scene and repaired the damage, and the Russians who, under the 

circumstances, offered no objections to the penetration of their zone by 

the Americans, came through with official commendations. On the 

American part of the line the summer saw the destruction by fire in the 

mountains southwest of Sultanabad of a train of twenty-five cars, most 

of them carrying high-octane gasoline to the Russians.4s 

On 28 July the delivery of the one-and-a-half millionth ton to the 

Russians called for a celebration. A 48-car train which stopped for 

flourishes at all the main stations along the northbound route was the 

center of culminating ceremonies at Tehran on that date. Fanfare, 

speeches, and a souvenir pamphlet took their due places in history 

and, as the American soldier railroaders handed over the trainload of 

tanks and war materiel to their Soviet opposites, one of them gave a 

cigarette to the burly Russian girl who was fireman on the northbound 

engine. Cameras clicked. There were cheers!a The American command 

eventually overcame the objections of the British and Soviet commands 

to public announcement of the extent of American aid-to-Russia 

'" (l) Mil History, Hq, 3d MRS, PCC, 1-29 Frb 44, 1-31 Aug PCF 132-N, T. (2) 

Memo, Col Curtis, Ex Off, Hq, 3d MRS for CC, PCC, for CafS, PCC, May 45, sub: Aid 

and Favors to Russians. PCF 132. (3) Rpt of Ry Opns, Hq, 3d MRS, PCC, Sep 44, p. 2. 

PCF 132-U . •• (1) Mil History, Hq, 3d MRS, 1-31 Ju144, and 1-31 Aug 44, PCF 132-8, T. (2) PCC 

pamphlet, Souvenir of an Accomplishment, 15 Sep 44. 
360 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

operations in the Corridor. In the United States the public in time came 

to know something of the American achievement. 

While internal traffic maintained a fairly steady level through 

1944, Russian-aid tonnages fluctuated with the rates of ship discharge. 

The charts show that Khorramshahr experienced two sharp recessions 

in cargo arrivals, Bandar Shahpur three, while both ports were equally 

affected by the sudden and precipitate upsurge in midsummer. At 

Khorramshahr the MRS kept ahead of the game in handling Sovietbound tonnages except for the peak month of landings, July; that 

month produced the railroad's all-time top for total cargoes, but it did 

not achieve its highest Russian-aid haulage until September. Similarly, at Bandar Shahpur there was only the briefest period at year's 

end when MRS fell temporarily behind landings. The year proved that 

MRS could absorb everything that was thrown at it and come back 

for more. 

Problems and Solutions 

Many of the most pressing problems which confronted the MRS 

arose from activities not directly connected with the running of trains. 

Upon their solution the success of operations hung no less than upon 

such matters as car allocations. There were questions of security and 

safety, of public relations and personnel administration. There were 

maintenance and repair and the development of adequate communications facilities; and there were matters of procedure and practice 

in the fields of purchasing, procurement, and accounting. 

Security and Safety 

The 702d Railway Grand Division, which was later merged into 

the 3d MRS headquarters, found itself plunged into many unfamiliar 

and unexpected responsibilities. Among these was security of train 

operations against sabotage, banditry, and pilferage. The SOS Plan 

provided only two military police battalions for the American command on the presumption that security was a British obligation. When 

it became clear that railroad security required supplementary American surveillance, MRS established at its headquarters in February 

1943 a Security Section to work under the American provost marshal's 

office and in collaboration with British and Soviet field security forces 

in Iran.u 

Scattered up and down the line these attempted to curtail pilferage. Small tools, sugar, tires, arms, and ammunition were particularly 

<7 At one time General Connolly arranged with General Wilson of PAl Force for the 

U.S. command to assume full responsibility for railway security, but Washington vetoed the 

idea. Interv with Gen Connolly, Pentagon, 18 Aug 50. 
THE RAILWAY 361 

vulnerable to theft. Copper wire and brass were welcomed on the black 

market, as were all manner of American post exchange supplies and 

lend-lease materials intended for Russia. Some Americans trafficked 

in items that found their way into the black market and when possible 

they were apprehended and court-martialed. 48 

In spite of the posting of guards along the railway, by the end of 

1943 pilferage of cargo had reached alarming proportions and monthly 

conferences were held to discuss solutions for the problem. As a result, 

in January 1944 Russian guards were placed on trains from Andimeshk 

to Tehran. Only those persons, exclusive of American and Iranian 

crews, possessing temporary passes were permitted by Russian guards 

to ride freight trains. Furthermore, self-locking American car seals 

were installed on cars to minimize car pilferage. 

To curtail pilferage among Iranian laborers in the shops and camps 

and to prevent entry of natives who were not ISR or MRS employees, 

systems of button and card identification were instituted. Too many of 

the natives employed by the railway could not resist the temptation 

to purloin whatever could be concealed beneath their garments and 

it became necessary to search their persons before permitting their exit 

from their posts. Natives found guilty of thefts were turned over to the 

Iranian Gendarmerie for prosecution. 

As new measures to alleviate a current situation became effective, 

fresh problems arose. The overlapping of British and American responsibilities had been handled for a year on a day-to-day basis of mutual 

convenience. Some Americans felt some British lacking in a proper 

realization of the importance of policing the line adequately; but in 

this respect American complaints of British indifference or worse diminished as American responsibilities and experience in the field 

increased. The American command, in a circular published in February 1944, recognized the working responsibility of MRS for protection 

of command supplies in transit.49 

Two months later, looting of northbound trains was resumed on 

the line south of Andimeshk. Indian guard detachments were reinforced and, as the raiding parties suffered numerous fatalities, pilferage 

declined once more. Particular emphasis was placed on guarding com-

.. (1) Report of Military Police Activities, PGC, United States Army, pp. 62-63. PGF 

130. (2) HOTI·V, pp. 96-100 . 

•• In mid-1942 the American military attache at Tehran was much concerned over British 

laxity in security matters on the railway. Col. H. Norman Schwarzkopf also reported unfavorable impressions he received on an inspection trip and these were relayed to Washington in 

October. But after an agitated attache report in March 1943 of inadequate British railway 

police arrangements, the files Rrow cooler on this subject. (1) MID 617 Iran 12-5-42 

(12-29-41) and 8-24-42 (12-29-41). (2) Cir 15, Hq, PGC, 7 Feb 44, as amended by Cir 37, 

27 Mar 44. 
362 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

mand cargo and in April, for the first time in MRS operation, there 

was a report of no pilferage of that class of cargo along the railway. 

Three months later, at a joint conference held on 7 August 1944, the 

Russians were able to report that pilferage was currently at the lowest 

point since supplies started moving over the ISR to Russia. Nevertheless, during August 1944 it was reported that the Desert and Mountain 

Districts recovered $23,317.16 worth of pilfered command and Russian-aid goods.50 

Security measures in Iran extended beyond precautions against 

pilferage and black market activities. Nazi interest in Iran for purposes 

of securing access to Iran's oil fields and India was undeniable. A proGerman attitude was prevalent in many quarters and there was an 

undercurrent of resentment toward Allied intrusion in Iran. The arrest 

because of active Axis sympathy, in August 1943, of fifty ISR employees attested to these facts. Those arrested included chiefs of many 

ISR departments. On the Sultanabad division of the ISR so thorough 

a purge was made that no one in authority remained to administer 

the division which employed 3,000 men. Papers found in the possession 

of many of the accused proved that they were members of an Axis spy 

ring which had definite plans for sabotaging the ISR. Their arrests 

coincided with that of the chief of German intelligence in Iran, Franz 

Mayer, whose main interest was in disrupting Allied aid to Russia by 

brigandage directed against the railroad and highway routes. 51 

A safety program was established concurrently with the security 

program, but it suffered an indifferent existence until the :r-,/IRS had 

operated for many months in Iran. One of the earliest safety measures-the issuance of a book of rules-was prompted by an accident 

which occurred at the outset of MRS operations. The trains which 

moved the men of the 711 th Battalion to their various posts were 

manned by enlisted members of that battalion, in company with 

Iranian crews and under British control. On 24 December 1942 a 

group of U.S. Army men left Khorramshahr for Andimeshk. The 

derailment of a boxcar in Khorramshahr yard delayed the train's 

scheduled departure that evening and the train actually left Khorramshahr shortly after midnight. Early Christmas morning, when 

the passengers were asleep, the train crashed head on into a southbound 

freight train. Both trains were running without lights. One soldier was 

killed and fifteen were injured and, though none of the crew was held 

50 Rpts of Ry Opns, Hq, 3d MRS, PGe: (l) May 44, p. 8. PGF 132-2-Q. (2) Apr 44, 

p. 7. PGF 132-1-Q. (3) Aug 44, p. 7. PGF 132-1-T. (4) Page 66 of Rpt cited n. 48(1) . 

., (1) Rpt cited n. 40 (1). (2) Mil History, Hq, MRS, PGSe, 1 Aug-31 Aug. PGF 

132-H. (3) HOTI-V, p. 122-23. (4) Page 55 of Rpt cited n. 48(1). 
THE RAILWAY 363 

responsible for this first wreck, preventive measures were immediately 

taken. 52 

Following the accident regulations were tightened. One American 

conductor and, when possible, one American engineer were to be on 

each train, the latter to supervise the work of the Iranian engineer. 

The conductor was to be in charge of the train, supervise the work of 

the Iranian crew, and assume responsibility for the safe movement 

of the train. Before departure from each station the conductor was to 

notify the American dispatcher at the next station and also check with 

the Iranian conductor to make certain of clearance. 

An intensive study was made of the operating conditions in the 

Tehran yards where delivery was made to the Russians of cargo destined for the Soviet front. Standard procedure provided that the "consist" of each train leaving Andimeshk be teletyped to Tehran. This was 

a kind of manifest which showed the number of each car in the train, 

its contents, and its destination. The yardmaster in Tehran, informed 

in advance of the arrival of each train, assigned a track. On the train's 

arrival in the yards each car was inspected for mechanical defects and 

the condition of its seals, proper reports were rendered, and any defective cars were segregated for repair. Thereafter the train was split 

up; cars destined for Bandar Shah were placed on one track, those 

for Shahrud on another, and those for Mianeh on still another. Cars 

containing civil Iranian freight billed to Tehran also were placed on 

a different track, to be moved later to proper destination-the customs 

yard, the Tehran Silo, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the Goods 

Shed, or the Russian Dump. After trains were separated for movement 

west or east of Tehran, all cars were again checked as on arrival, especially those loaded with explosives or in flammables. All air brakes 

were rechecked. The increase in the number of cars equipped with air 

brakes from 12.5 percent to 70 percent in two years of American operation was an important factor in the safety record established on the 

ISR, as was the rigid mechanical inspection of each train at each 

termina1. 53 

In 1944 a comprehensive safety program was inaugurated; posters 

were produced monthly for distribution at all installations under MRS 

jurisdiction and safety was made part of the training program. Awards 

in the form of certificates were given those whose records showed that, 

for six or twelve months, they had observed safety ruleS.54 During the 

winter of 1944--45 train schedules were revised to restrict operations to 

"HOTI-V, p. 52. 

'" HOTI-V, pp. 60-61. ,. HOTI-V, pp. 100-101. 
364 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

daylight hours. It was hoped in this way to decrease hazards along the 

tunnel sector between Andimeshk and Dorud. 

Public Relations 

Americans have learned slowly and with bewilderment to defend 

themselves against charges flung at them by those whom they have attempted to help. It always proves puzzling to learn how readily the 

beneficiary perceives in a disinterested action some Machiavellian 

design. Iran was no exception, and those clements in the community 

that chose to blame their country's war-born difficulties upon the 

Americans easily fitted the railway into their patterns. The ISR was 

mercilessly attacked in Tehran newspapers for losses of shipments and 

alleged grafL and two successive ministers of roads were reported to 

believe conditions as bad as some papers alleged. The Americans, as 

mentors of the ISR, came in for blame. Students of American soldierinstructors in English classes-instituted by the Labor Section of MRS 

and attended by Iranian Army officers, businessmen, and employees of 

the railroad and of other government agencies-when asked their 

opinions of the ISR seldom spoke well of it. Most of them had no idea 

what the ISR was doing. And perhaps the most unfortunate circumstance of all was that no one in Iran seemed aware that, under American operation, the railroad in 1944 was transporting twice as much 

Iranian civilian tonnage as had been hauled before 1943. There was 

even a general expectation that the Allies would pay Iran heavy damages for disrupting its internal economy by appropriating the ISR 

for the purposes of the war. After the war, "Prince" Mozaffer Firouz, 

when he was briefly serving as Iranian Ambassador at Moscow, 

claimed, in a bold sallv into statistics, that half a billion dollars' worth 

of unspecified damage'had been done to the ISR during the war." 

Elements in the Iranian Government itself, unhappy over the cooperation given by Hossain Nafisi, civilian director-general, sought his 

dismissal. After obtaining the prior approval of the British and Soviet 

Embassies, General Connolly authorized the director of the MRS on 

18 October 1944 to issue a memorandum which stated that neither 

the American nor the Soviet transportation authorities recognized any 

change in Nafisi's status, and this stand was vigorously backed three 

days later by the commander of PAl Force. 56 

"Washington Post, March 29, 1947. Anticipating need for accounting of stewardship, 

General Connolly engaged the Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation of Boston to 

study the question. Their Report on Capital Improvements to the Property of the lSR during 

the Period of Allied Use of Its Facilities was submitted to him under date of 28 February 1945. ,. (1) lntcrv with Gen Connolly, Pentagon, 22 Aug 50. (2) Memo by Dir, 3d MRS, 18 

Oct 44. AG 323.361, SL 9008. (3) Ltr, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, PAlC, to 

HBM Embassy, Tehran, 21 Oet 44. Same file. 
THE RAILWAY 365 

Though the immediate issue of administrative procedure and 

authority was thus settled, by the end of 1944 the Iranian press had 

grown so voluble against American management that on Colonel 

Besson's initiative special efforts were launched to inform the public. 

Press tours of line and installations had been held from 1943 on. One 

was arranged in December 1944, followed in May 1945 by another arranged for the Shah, the Queen, members of the Majlis, and other government officials. On this latter occasion the presentation by the Shah 

to Mr. Nafisi of the Iranian Medal of Merit marked the distance 

traveled toward public enlightenment. 57 

Personnel Administration 

MRS operated through its own military personnel and the existing 

staff of the ISR, a total force averaging some 19,000 persons. The 

standardization implicit in Tables of Organization posed numerous 

problems. Some positions these established were found unnecessary, as 

in the case of the stationmasters already cited. One instance of snafu 

occurred in which several Pullman porters arrived to join a railway 

operating battalion. 

Hurried recruitment and training of professional railroaders 

showed up significant differences between a good railroad man and a 

good military railroad man. An Army officer is responsible for his men, 

day and night, and under all circumstances. Officers commissioned 

directly from successful professional experience in railroad operation 

brought with them no such special competence. The consequent assignment of some men to positions for which they were not qualified, and 

the lack of men for specific needs led, for a while, to acute dissatisfaction throughout the organization. In time, as men were trained and 

commissioned in the field, and as rotation and new assignment altered 

conditions, the situation was improved.58 

The problems which went along with MRS dependence upon 

Iranian labor were varied. The war had upset the Iranian economy 

and a crop failure had induced widespread hunger. Wages had not 

kept pace with prices, which had skyrocketed 800 percent in three years. 

Bread riots were rife in Tehran. Furthermore, bound by its instructions 

to comply with Iranian laws and regulations, the MRS inherited conditions under which the vague and inadequately codified regulations of 

the ISR had long encouraged administrative looseness. The MRS 

" PGF 132 passim, especially Ltr, Col Besson to CG, PGC, 27 Nov 44, and atchd papers. IS (1) HOTI-V, p. 58. (2) Ltr, Col L. D. Curtis, former Ex Off and later CO, 3d MRS, 

to author, 4 Jun 48. (3) Intervs cited ns. 18, 56 (1). 
366 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

Labor Section undertook to introduce a western consistency not 

altogether welcome to the eastern mind. 59 

The first serious labor problem was presented in March 1943 by the 

floods which damaged some· nine miles of line on the desert below 

Ahwaz. Not a single laborer could be procured to work on the washedout section because of the competition for Iranian labor among various 

American Army services in the area and because at the time the ISR 

could employ none to work in that locality. The Army was then extending to native labor, in addition to regular wages, a daily allowance of 

1\'\'0 rials with which to purchase a ration of tea, sugar, and flour. The 

MRS determined to extend the same privilege to ISR employees south 

of Ahwaz, and when a large group of natives had been convinced of the 

availability of food in that section a trainload of them was dispatched 

to the scene. Later, railroad labor was accorded the same ration as 

skilled labor in Ahwaz, and an average of 4,500 employees per month 

received that ration. 

There were early labor troubles at Tehran. In April 1943 native 

train and engine crews began absenting themselves from duty because 

food was too hard to get on the lines out of Tehran. Since regular train 

service had to be maintained to move the freight destined for Russia, 

conferences were held with the American adviser to the Iranian Ministry of Foods.60 A contract resulted whereby the ISR would distribute 

government-rationed bread to its employees in Tehran. A rationing 

system was developed, ration cards were distributed, two Army trucks 

were secured for transportation, and five stores were opened in the 

Tehran yards on 12 April 1943, when 7,000 of the flat, native loaves 

of bread were sold. Within a few weeks, sales on peak days reached 

12,500 loaves. The Americans somehow contrived to fulfill their promise of daily bread sales; when the supply threatened to be exhausted, 

the bakery was pressed to speed its production, and distribution continued. It became necessary to provide Americans to maintain order 

at the stores to ensure first-come, first-served treatment. The Labor 

Section was proud that no employee who applied was denied bread. 

'Within the ISR, the Food Department, which was charged with the 

responsibility of buying food for resale to native employees, required 

westernization. In January 1943, for instance, dried beans mixed with 

pebbles were being sold to the natives. Wheat contained so much 

foreign matter that its consumers suffered severe headaches and digestive ills. The MRS took control, placed an American officer in charge, 

""The account of labor matters is based upon (1) Rpt cited n. 40(1). (2) HOTI-V, pp. 

101-08,119-20,144-45. Sec also Table 13 . 

.. Joseph P. Sheridan. 
THE RAILWAY 367 

and improved the situation. By June 1943 monthly sales of all food had 

reached 500 tons. 

In April 1943 there also occurred a wage crisis which was attributed 

to inequities in government regulations and to indifference among ISR 

officials. Approximately one third of the skilled and semiskilled roundhouse employees at SuItanabad had quit in one month. The MRS 

studied the situation and found that wages of some employees with 

seniority were extremely low and that new employees were being hired 

to do the same work for more pay. There were no accurate lists of 

employees and no personnel data. Falsification and guesses existed in 

the ISR lists. The names of Armenians and Turks were omitted; friends 

were tabulated at higher wages than those to which their duties 

entitled them. Eventually, personnel lists were revised and reclassification and wage adjustments accomplished, so that a measure of seniority 

and equity was accomplished In the wage conditions of ISR personnel. 

During the summer of 1943 it had become apparent that the ISR 

was effecting discharges adverse to the interests of the MRS. Political 

in essence, this situation entailed lengthy controversies with the ISR 

and with the Ministry of Roads. The MRS finally developed a system 

of transferring to its payrolls any employee whom the ISR elected to 

discharge but whom the MRS considered necessary to keep. 

In December 1943 strikes threatened the ISR and the success of 

MRS's mission. There were various causes, one of which stemmed from 

the ISR's failure to make the so-called "high cost of living allowance" 

authorized for all government employees. Actually, a technicality 

which had required action by the Council of Ministers was responsible 

for the ISR's failure. Agitators spread rumors to the effect that ISR 

had refused to make the payment, and many of the employees, easily 

inflamed against any form of real or imagined tyranny, were quickly 

aroused. The MRS counteracted the threat by guaranteeing that the 

bonus would be paid. The first monthly installment was made in 

December and ISR labor was quieted. Other trouble developed because 

a few enginemen failed to receive wage increases and because of irregularities in the distribution of free uniforms. It was soon learned that 

ISR men were being formed into organized unions. The Railway 

\Vorkers' Union, however, professed to be opposed to strikes, and 

various intercepted communications sent by it to its local committees 

were found to demand that there be no union interference with the 

movement of war goods to Russia. Occasional meetings were held 

between 1IRS personnel and union leaders and a number of the union's 

recommendations were acted upon. It was reported that very few 

unreasonable requests were presented. 
368 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

Twice in 1944 the strikes threatened in 1943 occurred. In March, 

government employees at the Tehran Silo struck for higher wages and 

obtained a wage increase for unloading laborers who were railway 

employees. In August 1944, 500 unloading natives in the Goods Shed 

in Tehran went on strike. The reason was that ISR employees under 

Russian supervision had been granted a wage increase of ten rials per 

day. Since labor working under Russian supervision represented about 

3 percent of all such labor employed in the Goods Shed, it was finally 

determined that the daily wage would remain at thirty rials. An increase in the wage for that class of employee would have resulted in 

increases for 10,000 on the ISR payrolls, and else\vhere there was 

adequate labor willing to work for 30 rials daily. 

American supervision of the Iranian labor force on the railroad 

provided an interesting experiment in the introduction of western 

ideas. The willingness and adaptability of the ISR civilian administrative staff were important factors in the experiment's success. A minor 

illustration points to the small revolution in ideas which accompanied 

the war effort on the ISR. Although in the offices of the chief of police 

and chief of secretariat Moslem custom still forbade approval of the 

employment of women, by January 1945, 150 women were working 

in the offices of the ISR. 

Maintenance and Repair 

Maintenance of way and rolling stock, as well as continued operation on an increasing tonnage scale, required as routine measures steady 

improvement to physical plant. New trackage installed included passing sidings, freight and sorting yards, and rail-to-truck transfer tracks 

at Andimeshk and Tehran. Engine sheds were built at Ahwaz, warehouses at several points, and sand houses were spaced from Andimeshk 

north to provide adequate supplies of screened sand in the mountains. 

Tanks for storage of water and others for diesel fuel oil were placed 

where needed. Perhaps the strangest work of all was the virtually new 

construction required through the mountains where the light rails, laid 

to carry only the mild and infrequent little trainloads of prewar times, 

"crept" under the weight of war tonnages. Reballasting and elaborate 

rail anchorage solved this serious problem.s1 

Water facilities on the ISR became one of the first problems for 

the IvIRS. In Iran, water comes from wells, springs, and streams, but 

there is little water reserve because there is little moisture. Therc is a 

great diminution of water supply in the hot autumn months, before 

the wet season replenishes it, and consideration had to be givcn to the 

" (1) HOTI-V, p. 67. (2) United States Army Dispatch, PCC, AUgUSI 1,1945. 
THE RAILWAY 369 

need for uninterrupted water supply. At one point water was pumped 

hventy-five miles to the place of consumption from a river which has 

been known to rise as much as thirty feet jn one night during the rainy 

season. Existing ISR water facilities were improved by installation of 

additional pumps, settling basins, and storage tanks. To utilize every 

possible agency by which to increase water supply, the MRS in four 

places tapped the ancient Persian qanat system of distributing water 

underground by gravity. The ISR then contracted with village owners 

for the use of this water. 62 

It is easy to understand why diesel locomotives were assembled in 

Iran as rapidly as they arrived. After two years of service, the diesels 

used only t'wenty gallons of water per trip from the Gulf to Tehran. 

They did not have to draw upon the various water stations along the 

line. Moreover, their slight exhaust created none of the distress suffered 

by the men on steam trains in the long unventilated tunnels. By 1 July 

1943, 57 of these diesels had been erected and put into service on the 

line. Ninety-one American mikado locomotives, as \veU as 8 reconditioned Hong Kong engines, were in use. In addition, there were the 240 

locomotives already operating in March; 143 locomotives of the 2-8-0 

class furnished by Great Britain, and 57 Ferrostaals of the 2-8-0 and 

2-10-0 classes and 40 steam locomotives of miscellaneous types which 

belonged to the ISR. The coming of the diesels dramatized the face 

lifting of the line, and the augmented numbers of locomotives contrasted with the 110 steam engines, mostly unserviceable, which the 

Bri tish took over in 1941.63 Of non passenger cars, the British found 

1,998, divided among 924 boxcars, 457 low-side gondolas, 87 freight 

cars, 295 tank cars, 170 ballast cars and 65 rail cars. Of the total, far 

too many lacked brakes of any sort, and such hand brakes as \vere in 

use were inadequate for heavy loads on steep grades. In their first year 

the British imported 891 additional cars and 1,990 were shipped in 

from the United States, to bring the total to 4,779 freight cars, still a 

number considered altogether insufficient to handle the Russian-aid 

target. By 1 May 1943 there were 5,088 cars of all classes on the line, 

most of them hand braked and all having screw couplings. As of midJune 1945, after 2,906 cars had been brought to Iran by the 1vlRS, the 

total of ''lorking cars was 7,994. Sixty-five percent of the new arrivals 

., (1) L. M. Winsor, "Irrigation in Iran," United Stales Army Dispatch, PCC, M'lTch 

20 and 27, 1944. (2) For a description of the qanat, see Donald N. Wilber, Iran: Past and 

Present (Princeton, 1\. J.: Princeton University Press, 1948), pp. 121-23 . • , Equipment figures from: (1) Dunham, pp. 36-37. (2) HOTI-V, p. 69. (3) 3d Military 

Railway Service Equipment Section Records, cited HOTI-V, p. 69. (4) For the period of 

British operation, Dunham draws upon British reports and the Stone and Webster Report 

cited note 55. The two sources do not tally, but their differences are minor, and irrelevant 

to present purposes. 
370 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

were air braked, and, with the diesels, they bore the brunt of the heavy 

war traffic. 

One very important aspect of MRS operations was the business of 

the 762d and 754th Shop Battalions. Responsible for the repair of a 

great variety of locomotives and cars of British, German, and American 

origin and, at the same time, faced in early 1943 with a critical shortage 

of locomotive and car parts, the shop battalions did a remarkable job. 

Many mechanical items were not procurable in Iran and those which 

could be found were exorbitantly costly. It became obvious, therefore, 

that parts would have to be manufactured by the men in order to 

repair equipment and keep it serviceable. Both foreign and obsolete 

tools had to be used until American tools arrived. 

Methods of tool and parts manufacture were crude. For instance, 

there was an acute need for quantities of brake shoes. They could 

not be procured in Iran, nor was the ISR, which before the war had 

ordered them from the German manufacturers of its equipment, 

equipped to manufacture its own. The 754th Battalion established a 

foundry at the Tehran shops. Molds for the brake shoes were fashioned 

in the hard earth, which was the floor of the foundry, and the molten 

iron poured in. Although the process was primitive, production by 

native workers under American soldier supervision was substantial. 

In the month of August 1944, 2,450 brake shoes were manufactured. 

The total for two years of operation was somewhere near 50,000. 

No less useful, though of less heroic proportions, was the foundry's 

contribution to the art of dentistry. The 19th Station Hospital at 

Tehran needed castings for a great number of dentures for command 

personnel and the 754th was requested to furnish them, which it did, 

all in the day's work.6

' 

One of the first tasks of the 762d Battalion was the erection of 

diesels and rail cars as they arrived in Persian Gulf ports. Tools to be 

used for this purpose had to be devised from the scant material at 

hand and methods had to be improvised, but the battalion carried out 

the demands made upon it. By the end of 1943, 2,210 cars and the 

fifty-seven 1,000-horsepower diesel locomotives previously mentioned 

had been assembled. 65 A total of 1,076 freight cars had been equipped 

with heavy couplings and friction draft gear. The month of December 

1943 saw virtual completion of the programs for car erection and 

installation of air brakes. During 1943, 854 cars were equipped with 

.. (1) Mil History, 754th Ry Shop Bn, 3d MRS, 12 Sep 44. PCF 102-T. (2) HOTI-V, 

p.75 . 

.. Rpt of Ry Opns, Hq, MRS, PCC, Dec 43. rCF 132-1-L. For repair figures for June 

! 943 and D~cf'mh"r ! 944, see PCF 132-F and PCF J32-J-X. 
THE RAILWAY 371 

air brakes. Mikado-type locomotives were modified by installing improved sanders with enlarged boxes. The slipping of locomotives on 

grades was thus reduced to a minimum and more rapid turnaround 

resulted. The use of grease rather than oil lubrication for rod bearings 

reduced the incidence of overheated bearings and consequent engine 

deterioration. The increase in demand made upon the shop battalions 

is best illustrated by a comparison of the number of cars repaired 

during certain specific months. In June 1943, 144 cars were repaired; 

in December of the same year 2,704 cars were repaired; the number 

increased to 6,985 cars repaired during the month of December 1944. 

A further contribution of the shop battalions was their supervision 

and training of ISR employees in modern methods of locomotive and 

car repair and modification. The assembly line replaced the Iranian 

system of bunching workers to repair a single locomotive or car. Schools 

were set up to teach natives the reconditioning and salvaging of usable 

spare parts. They also taught the repair, improvisation, and maintenance of machine-tool equipment. There was some difficulty at first 

since those who made drawings for modification had to work in millimeters, inches, kilograms, British and American tons-and in four languages. The language difficulty was partly overcome by publication 

of a booklet on locomotive parts printed in English, French, Russian, 

and Persian. Copies of the booklet were distributed to all points on 

the ISR. In its many schools for ISR employees, MRS was conspicuously successful in developing large numbers of skilled workers.56 

The dependence of the shop battalions upon an uncertain flow of 

supplies, whether from the local market or from the United States, 

called for ingenuity in improvising in frequent periods of dearth. In 

April 1943 the Stores Section of the ISR was transferred to the jurisdiction of the MRS to cut dovm stealing by substituting disciplined 

supervision. This was part of a general arrangement with Millspaugh 

whereby MRS kept an eye on ISR finances. Americans had previously 

been assigned to familiarize themselves with Iranian and British stocks 

and a small British cadre was retained temporarily to advise. The ISR 

system of classification of supplies was cumbersome and impractical; 

their three types of supplies were subdivided into fifty or more. MRS 

simplified the classification system and set up records which would 

indicate what supplies were available. 

Acute shortages existed in small tools, spare parts for locomotives, 

freight car wheels, and axles. Arrivals of railroad supplies from the 

United States between May and August 1943 alleviated the situation 

". (1) Memo, Col Curtis, for CG, PGC, for CofS, 31 May 45, sub: Aid and Favors to 

Iranians, pp. 4-5. PGF 132. (2) HOTI-V, p. 70. 
372 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

to a considerable degree, but the shortage of freight car wheels and 

axles created a serious problem again in June 1944. Shipments finally 

arrived in July and August and these parts were installed immediately 

on cars which had been held up for some time for lack of them. Shortages in specific items continued to exist so that by February 1945,6,266 

items had been on requisition for twelve months.67 

Railway Communications 

Communications facilities directly required in railway operations 

were regarded by the American command as a part of its signals responsibilities. Although the Americans had engaged in both construction and operation of signals facilities on a small scale before 1943, 

British signal troops, for lack of American, had operated, maintained, 

or, through their control of the ISR, had supervised railway communications facilities even after the MRS took over the line. In March 1943, 

after the arrival in the field of the 95th Signal Battalion, the Signal 

Communication Service of the American command was directed to 

operate and maintain such signals facilities as were required by the 

MRS. From 31 May responsibility fell upon that service for wire circuits and railway signals installations, whether Iranian, British, or 

American, along the line from Tehran south to Khorramshahr, Tanuma, and Bandar Shahpur. The service therefore organized a Railway 

Sector to parallel the regional sectors already set up to cover administrative requirements within the command districts. The Railway Sector 

handled not only MRS business, but also provided a through service for 

administrative traffie common to the command districts.6B 

The year 1943 saw the most substantial addition to railway signals 

facilities. 'Vires in railway operational use in late 1942 had consisted 

of a galvanized iron ground return circuit. This was reserved for ISR 

use, but British signal units operated o\'er it a net of teletype machines 

with printers at Tehran, Dorud, and Andimeshk, and a physical relay 

at Dorud. The circuit provided both a telegraph line and a block-toblock telephone service for train control. There was also a copper dispatch circuit, under British control, reserved for ISR operations. Both 

these circuits were carried on steel poles. 

In the spring, as American responsibilities for railway communications increased, selective ringing equipment was installed on the 

er Rpt of Ry Opns, Hq, 3d MRS, PCC, Feb 45, p. 7. PCF 132-1-Z . .. The account of railway signals is based upon: (I) Communications in the Persian Culf 

Command, editpd by Capt Sidney L. Jackson, Hist Sec, OCSigO, October 1944, pp. 5. 12, 

13, 16, 18,21. Filed as HOTI, Pt. I, Ch. 8, See. 2. PCF. (2) Hist Rpt, Sig Serv, 16 Aug15 Dec 43. PCF 133-K. (3) Ltr, Brig Cen Samuel M. Thomas to Col A. F. Clark, Jr., 

22 Apr 46. PCF 133. 
THE RAILWAY 373 

dispatch circuit. Additional voice lines were constructed to carry Persian-language railway traffic and by year's end two grounded telegraph 

circuits, with drops at intermediate stations, pro'Vided additional facilities for train dispatching. Two complete circuits, built through the 

tunnel sector from Andimeshk to Dorud, were extended to Tehran. 

'Whereas in early 1943 the teletype taken over from the British constituted virtually all the teletype then in use by American agencies in 

the command, the end of the year found teletype, thanks to increased 

,,,,,ire facilities, carrying the burden of communication within the 

command. 

The theft of wire by tribesmen or roving independents with an eye 

for quick profits became critical. Arrangements were concluded in 

May 1943 for patrol of railway wire lines by Indian infantry under 

British command. A supplementary force of Iranian gendarmes was 

assigned to help patrol the wires, but even this was not sufficient to 

curb thefts. In the spring of 1944 the situation became so critical that 

arrangements were made to have units of the Iranian Army help guard 

certain sections of the line. Thefts continued in spite of increased 

precautions and, though the extent of impairment to MRS operations 

as a whole does not show in available records, theft of raihvay wire 

must have composed a substantial portion of the total of 219,033 feet 

of army wire reported stolen in the period from 1 October 1943 to 

30 September 1944,69 Installation of electrical shock devices to discourage thieves failed when the natives began to use ropes to break 

the wire. Next tried, and more effective, was the "tattle-tale" system 

which gave instant warning of interrupted circuits. 

Local Procurement 

The Purchasing Section established in the MRS effected many 

improvements in local procurement methods employed by the ISR. 

Some time-consuming routines which grew out of the formality of 

Iranian business practice were eliminated, and a purchase order form 

was introduced that cut down the number of weeks required to handle 

documents. Commodity price charts were made and price trends of 

important commodities reported weekly; these records were used as 

guides in awarding large orders and preventing overpayment. Several 

ISR employees were arrested for thieving. 

Procedure in procuring railway maintenance supplies was a problem early in 1944. At that time the 'Var Department suggested that 

such supplies be procured from American lend-lease goods delivered 

to the Iranian Government. That is, the Iranian Government would 

.. Page 78 of Rpt cited n. 48 (1). 
374 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

request needed supplies through American lend-lease; then they would 

be made available to the MRS for use on the railway. The command 

had already established a steady, dependable source for railway maintenance supplies which involved passing requisitions through Army channels in the United States. The cost of the supplies was in turn paid by the 

ISR. This repayment procedure was already quite complicated since 

it involved dealing with both ISR officials and the British Army. 

General Connolly protested the new War Department proposal, insisting that to change the procedure of procuring supplies and to require 

the Army to procure them via lend-lease to the Iranian Government 

would threaten the success of his mission. He added that the officials 

in Washington could not realize the consequences of introducing 

Iranian politics and local customs of trade, barter, and ethics into procurement. Connolly described his efforts to obtain railroad ties locally 

as the equivalent of a nightmare. First, there was the railroad, which 

of course was government owned; then, there was the Iranian Minister 

of Communications, under whom the railroad nominally operated; 

and finally, there was the Minister of Agriculture, from whom permits 

to cut lumber were obtained. The effort to purchase the ties had begun 

in September 1943; no deliveries had been made by February 1944, 

largely because certain individuals in each of the three agencies were 

interested in obtaining what were called their perquisites. The delay 

caused the procurement officer of the command to buy ties on the open 

market, turn them over to the railroad, and request reimbursement. 

Had it not been for the red tape involved, American lend-lease could 

have been used to supply the ISR. General Connolly's plea, "Without 

the railroad the mission of the PGC fails," was heeded and he was 

allowed to continue procuring railway maintenance supplies from his 

normal source in the United States, the Charleston Port of 

Embarkation. 70 

Accounting 

Examination of the ISR accounts revealed practices which struck 

the Americans as both unfamiliar and unconventional. As no reconciliation of bank statements with the railway'S books had been made 

in two years, the ISR's true bank balance was unknown. Deposits were 

taken to the bank about once every three months. The monthly summarized cash statement consumed twenty days in preparation; errors 

were numerous; the accounts were about a year in arrears." 

,. Rad AGWAR 688, Gen Connolly to Gens Marshall and Somervell, 19 Feb 44. OPD 

617 Iran, Sp Coli, HRS DRB AGO. 

'" (1) Memacitedn.66(1). (2) HOTI-V,pp.114-16. 
THE RAILWAY 375 

This situation was of concern to those in MRS who had to keep 

the record straight. Four railroad accounting officers were therefore 

requisitioned from the United States and accountants transferred from 

headquarters. To remedy chaotic accounting for materials and supplies, the MRS Accounting Section in August 1943 introduced centralized material accounting at Tehran. It also introduced a new 

timekeeping system in the ISR Traction Department by which 

employees were paid only for time worked. 

An innovation which paid off in increased efficiency was the introduction of American waybills for freight carried over the ISR system, 

Tehran and south. These ensured trustworthy delivery records for 

goods and provided for accurate accounting of both cargoes and cars. 

Delivery was expedited and pilferage reduced by eliminating the possibility of cars containing valuable merchandise going astray. In anticipation of final accounting, a project undertook to abstract all waybills 

prepared at ISR stations since the beginning of the movement of Allied 

traffic. 

Banking procedures were improved by reconciliation of ISR books 

(in both the Bookkeeping Department and the Cash Office) with the 

Bank Melli statements. Deposits were made three times a week and, 

through better methods, the time required for the preparation of the 

monthly summarized cash statement was reduced from twenty to five 

days per month and its accuracy increased. Likewise, the system of 

clearing cashiers, which had formerly taken two to three months, was 

reduced to five days. 

The Last Months 

The third year of American operation opened with rather large 

tonnages; but February and the succeeding three months saw the reduction of Russian-aid cargoes to minor proportions. After March 1945 

petroleum products furnished the principal freight. Shop operations 

decreased proportionately with freight curtailment, though car and 

engine repair continued until American operations ceased. Effective 

10 April the monthly aid-to-Russia target for the MRS was reduced 

to 60,000 long tons of dry cargo and 40,000 long tons of POL. In 

addition, internal cargo was lowered to 50,000 long tons.72 

On 25 May the commanding general of the PGC was authorized 

to announce that, as of 1 June 1945, the mission of his command would 

be accomplished. That meant an early end to MRS. After some weeks 

T'J (1) Mil History, Hq, 3d MRS, 1-31 Jan, 1-31 Mar 45. PGF 132-Y, 132-1-A. (2) Ltr, 

Ex Off to CofS, PGC, to Dir and Gen Mgr, MRS, 10 Apr 45, sub: Reduction in MRS Target. 

Secret and Security Room, ORB, RAC, Cabinet 18, Drawer 1, Folder 4, SL PGSC. 
376 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

of special training of railway personnel, chiefly Iranian, the physical 

return of control to Headquarters, PAl Force, Baghdad, was accomplished as of 25 June. The British lost little time after receiving the 

railway from the MRS in handing it over to the Iranian Government. 

From the time of handover, all northbound freight for the USSR 

and PGC was carried under Iranian operation. On 15 July the 3d 

Military Railway Service was discontinued. Its remaining dutiesdirection of details of handover and disposal of locomotives and rolling 

stock-were assigned to a new Military Railway Division of the general 

staff at headquarters.73 

Numerous documents covering the transfer both of the railway as 

a whole and of constituent parts and embodying detailed exhibits of 

fixed assets were duly signed. These documents reflected the complicated nature of the financial problems involved in American operation 

and return to British control. The instruments of transfer stated that 

the United States, having received the railway properties from the British on 1 April 1943, returned them plus additions (regardless of the 

nation or agency making them or paying for them). They further 

stated that the British agreed that improvements made by them were 

returned by the United States in good order; that improvements made 

by the U.S. Army were received on a temporary loan with permission 

to transfer them to Iran on a care, use, and maintenance basis until 

final disposal; and that handover of operational responsibilities in no 

way prejudiced the rights of the U.S. Government relative to fixed 

assets or equipment "and that final settlement therefor will be made 

as agreed upon by the parties hereto in the future." 74 

Additions to the capital structure of the ISR subsequent to 1 April 

1943 fell 'into three categories: those financed through the ISR's own 

capital budget, those financed by the British through the medium of 

MRS work orders, and those financed by the United States by means 

of construction directives issued by the command. The first of these 

categories comprised projects required by the normal expansion of the 

railway. The others were projects essential to furtherance of the Allied 

war effort. 75 Instances arose where it was difficult to draw the line. In 

many, improvements needed to carry cargoes to the Russians remained 

with the ISR. 

" (1) Rpt of Ex Off to CofS, PGC, 25 Jun 45. PGF 251-C. (2) Ltr, ACofS for Opns, 

Hq, PGC, to Hq, Persia and Iraq Command, 27 Jun 45.323.31, SL 9008. (3) GO 75, Hq, 

PGC, 15 Jul 45. ,. (1) Ltr, Hq, 3d MRS, to CG, PGC, 26 Jun 45. 092.2 U.S. Army, British Army, and 

Iranian State Railroad Agreements Covering Transfer of Railroad, SL 8978. Ltr covers 

agreements and exhibits referred to. (2) Rpt cited n. 55. 

" PGC Real Property Record, Mil Ry Serv, PGC-K, Pt. B, Vol. 1, Insert., Iranian State 

Railway. Drawer 2, Cabinet 2477, SL AMET 60. 
THE RAILWAY 377 

The railway had responded well to the demands the war laid upon 

it; and, while fulfilling the Anglo-American commitment to the USSR, 

it did not fail as the essential artery of Iran's economy. In the year 

before the occupation the ISR had carried 460,000 passengers and 

205,000,000 ton miles of freight. In 1943, under MRS operation, it 

carried, wholly additional to its work for the Allies, 710,000 Iranian 

passengers and 625,000,000 ton miles of Iranian civil freighee 

During the last months of MRS operations effort was made to bring 

the ISR and its equipment to the highest possible pitch of fitness for 

postwar use. Concern for the Iranian economy after the war was not 

lacking in the consultations which preceded the handover. The Secretary of State notified Ambassador Wallace Murray at Tehran in June 

] 945 that the British desired that the railway be left capable of handling 50,000 long tons a month. Murray replied that, with its own 

property and what he understood the American command planned to 

leave behind, capacity would exceed 87,000 long tons per month. By 

letter of 11 July the Acting Secretary of State reminded the Secretary 

of vVar of the commitment on economic assistance subscribed to by 

the United States in the Declaration of Tehran. Action subsequently 

taken provided the ISR with rolling stock sufficient to accommodate 

50,000 long tons per month.l1 

Many factors were responsible for the success of the American railway operation. Among them the availability in ample supply of the 

finest equipment and rolling stock, as used by ingenious and resourceful 

men who gained valuable experience on the spot, must rank foremost. 

Improvement in operative and administrative methods, the help extended to the Russians in tightening car turnaround, and, by no means 

least, the success achieved in winning the indispensable support of 

native workmen through patient instruction and fair labor administration-these, too, rate high. But when all is added up, the sum spells 

an intangible: a rugged will to see the job through. 

If a single thread can be discerned running through the com plica ted 

story, it is the determination to achieve efficient operations at almost 

any cost of effort and treasure. Handicapped throughout by the indeterminate status of the American force in Iran, the Americans sought 

consistently to cut through knotty questions of financial and command 

authority and responsibility. In several instances efforts made in the 

TO (1) Memo cited n. 66 (1). (2) Table 5. 

" (l) Rad 288, Seey State to Wallace Murray, 8 Jun 45; and Rad 390, Murray to Secy 

State, 12 Jun 45. Case 15, OPD 617 Iran, Sp Coll, HRS DRB AGO. (2) Ltr, Aetg Seey 

State to Seey War, 11 Jul 45. Case 18, same file. 
378 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

field to obtain or to assert a larger degree of direct control over their 

operations than seemed intended by the Combined Chiefs' directive 

were restrained by Washington. Notable among these were Connolly's 

arrangement with Wilson to assume entire responsibility for railway 

security; his willingness to take on additional financial burdens in order 

to simplify operating controls; and his readiness to carry the whole 

railway burden from Gulf to Caspian. 

On the other hand, when the long-drawn-out negotiations over 

status and prerogatives proved fruitless, General Connolly, though he 

joined with Iranians, British, and Russians in conversations to clarify 

these matters, preferred, so far as the railway was concerned, to rock 

along with no more exact definition of his powers than was contained 

in the April 1943 movements agreement with the British. Though cooperation rather than unified command was the hard way, the results 

proved that it was enough. 
CHAPTER XVIII 

Port Operations 

In the scheme of transport the sea gates to the Corridor were basic. 

Into their maw would pour more than four million long tons of 

Russian-aid and other incoming cargoes handled by the American 

Army at Khorramshahr, Bandar Shahpur, and Cheybassi. 

In the planning stage the ports seemed the key to the smooth flow 

of tonnage and the planners concentrated their procurement of men 

and equipment and their priorities upon this vital spot in the logistical 

pipeline. The test of actual operation revealed the interdependence 

of numerous factors of which the functioning of the ports was but one 

item. Performance at the ports was affected by factors which spanned 

the whole range that lies between ship discharge on the most fundamental operating level and administrative controls proceeding from 

the highest levels of strategic planning. Ship discharge was conditioned 

by the adequacy of ships' gear as well as of cranes, fork lifts, and similar 

equipment at dockside. Adequacy of berthing space and labor supply 

also influenced performance. The handling of landed cargoes determined in its way the rate of discharge, for inadequate dock, warehouse, 

and open storage space, and insufficient intraport transport, such as 

railway, trucks, barges, lighters, and tugs, caused the piling up of goods 

and diminished the capacity to unload shipping. These factors in tum 

affected the rate of inland clearance via rail and highway, as they were 

equally affected by the efficiency of inland clearance. Administrative 

controls, likewise, by determining the flow of shipping to the ports, the 

berthing of ships, and the allocation of movements and priorities 

(British, American, and Soviet), bore down heavily upon the ports. 

If all these factors were in perfect and harmonious balance, then 

the Ports Service could function at top efficiency in its critical spot 

in the supply pipeline; but such perfection does not happen. Nobody 

expected that it could happen in Iran where four different nations 

theoretically concerned themselves with each tum of a ship's winch; 

where the spilling of dried beans from an ill-packed consignment 

burned up the wires (and the bureaucrats) halfway round the world; 
380 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

and where a deficiency in Soviet shipping at Caspian ports caused the 

backing up of supplies in the pipeline all the way to North America. 

Direction of the American-operated ports was consequently the most 

complex of the subordinate posts in the American command. It was 

a tough assignment, and it fell to Colonel Booth. After a year as director 

of ports/ Colonel Booth's comprehensive schooling in manifold troubles 

qualified him for transfer to headquarters at Tehran. There he served 

first as assistant chief of staff for operations, next as chief of staff, and 

finally, then a brigadier general, as commanding general. The Ports 

Service became for the American command not only a school of experience, but a touchstone of the command's ability to solve problems, 

surmount difficulties, and deliver the goods. 

Evolution of American Responsibility 

The SOS Plan contemplated American operation of certain POftS 

within the framework of the British communications responsibilities 

that were stipulated by the Tri-Partite Treaty. This meant that 

American operations were to be subject to British control of traffic. 

Managerial respo~sibility and discretion were thus, in the plan, restricted to the operational level, and a simple operating organization 

was proposed, to consist of a port headquarters and a subordinate 

working force of port battalions.2 Details and modifications were to 

be worked out in the field as experience dictated. 

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 9th Port of Embarkation-which had been activated in the United States on 14 July 1942 

and during the next three months organized, trained, and equippedwas selected to provide the administrative port troops for the Persian 

Gulf assignment and d~vided into three echelons for shipment. The 

advance party, headed by 9th Port's commanding officer, Colonel 

Booth, and consisting of five key officers, reached Basra on 1 N 0-

vember. 8 The first troops came ashore at Khorramshahr on 11 and 12 

December. They were the 378th Port Battalion of 940 officers and men 

(white) and some personnel of the 9th Port. They were followed on 

27 January 1943 by the 380th Port Battalion of 19 white officers and 

927 Negro troops along with the rest of 9th Port, to be augmented still 

later by the 482d Port Battalion (white officers, Negro troops), the 

385th (white), and finally by a new 380th. These were the troops to 

1 The title Director of Ports will be uniformly used in this chapter although it actually 

varied from time to time. The Ports Service was similarly called by several names. 

• Plan for Operation of Certain Iranian Communication Facilities between Persian Gulf 

Ports and Tehran by U.S. Army Forces, 3 Sep 42, Sec. III, par. 9, and Inc! V. Copy PGF 235. 

3 Hist Rpt, 9th Port, Mollile, Supplement, 19 Jul 42-1 Mar 43. PGF 12-B. 
PORT OPERATIONS 381 

do the job; but from the beginning there were complications. The Brit· 

ish were everywhere in charge, and there was nothing automatic about 

taking over from them, especially as much of Colonel Booth's attention 

was occupied after his arrival in assisting in the final determination of 

what ports should be taken over as well as how. By early January Khorramshahr and Bandar Shahpur, the two ports served by the ISR, had 

been settled upon, as originally proposed by Prime Minister Churchill, 

for American operation.4 

Between the arrival of the first port troops, in December, and] 

May 1943, the Americans passed from the condition of voluntary helpers to the status of fully responsible operatives. At Khorramshahr the 

men went to work on 13 December, the day after they landed, working 

as volunteers under the direction of the British. On 7 January the port 

was formally transferred to American operational control, but some 

British forces remained, at American request, throughout that month 

to help with .the transition. In a letter to GHQ, PAl Force, the American commanding general requested also that the British continue "to 

handle Movement control until the necessary American personnel arrive and are trained to properly man the jobs." 5 The request reveals 

that already the American command had determined that one of the 

necessary modifications in the field of the generalizations of the SOS 

Plan would be to end the division of responsibilities for operational 

control and control of traffic, by the plan allocated respectively to the 

Americans and the British, and to unite them in American hands. This 

very important step followed soon. The interim period, with the Ameri· 

cans in charge and the British still helping, ended on 1 April when 

American operational control of the ports became fully effective. On 

1 May, although under the Tri-Partite Treaty the British still exercised 

final authority over communications and movements in the Corridor, 

the American command became the determining agency in movements 

control, setting targets, and allocating traffic. At the port of Bandar 

Shahpur the same evolution took place. American troops first reached 

there on 2 February 1943 where they learned their jobs as volunteers 

under British direction. As of midnight of 17-18 February, the port 

was transferred to the Americans, who carried on with some British 

assistance until 1 April when American control of operations became 

complete. 

• (1) The lighterage basin at Cheybassi was added six months later. (2) Ltr, Gen Connolly, 

CG, PGSC, to GHQ, PAl Force, Baghdad, 9 Jan 43, sub: Preliminary Plan for Taking over the Operation of Certain Port, Railway, and Motor Transport Facilities in the Persian 

Corridor. PGF 26-A. 

• Ltr cited n. 4(2). 
The interim period was not propitious for the setting of records. 

Indeed, whether during the phase of British responsibility with American help, or that which followed) of American responsibility with 

British help, both Armies shared the difficulties of mutual accommodations to one another's methods and temperaments under circumstances unfavorable for efficient results. With storage areas at 

Khorramshahr and Bandar Shahpur congested, inland clearance very 

slow and, in January 1943, sixteen out of twenty-eight cargo ships in 

the area lying idle for lack of accommodations at ports, and with 

165,000 long tons of cargo undischarged and no prospect of relief in 

sight, some Americans were inclined to think ill of British operations.6

Too many ships arrived without cargo gear. When they arrived at 

Bandar Shahpur during the period when unloading equipment at 

dockside was nonexistent, things went badly ; and when lighterage 

capacity dwindled to three 100-ton lighters, throwing the chief burden 

for discharge upon the docks, matters were not improved. Some 

Americans complained that, though they were on duty fifteen hours a 

day, they stood around for many hours waiting for freight cars which 

existed) they felt, in plenty, but which were not available at dockside 

because of the derelictions of British Movements Control. The Americans were indignant when the British authorities in charge of allocations of berthing space put ships with Russian-aid cargoes to anchor in 

the channel and docked ships carrying British military supplies.7

There was merit in such complaints and in others buried in the files; 

but it was not always realized that throughout 1942 the commander of 

the British forces was responsible not only for maintaining communications from Basra to Baghdad and from Khorramshahr to Tehran, for 

improving ports, highways, and railways to accommodate ever increasing Russian-aid tonnage, and for moving that tonnage to Soviet receiving points. He carried also the supreme responsibility of maintaining 

up to ten divisions of troops against the strong possibility of enemy 

attack through the Caucasus or through Anatolia, a threat which was 

not relieved until after Stalingrad. If British operation of the various 

Gulf ports in 1942 was not a marvel of efficiency and was hopelessly 

inadequate to handle the mounting flood of Russian-aid shipping 

6 General Summary Report of the Program of the War Shipping Administration for the 

Delivery of Russian-Aid to the Persian Gulf Ports and the Relations of the War Shipping 

Administration with Other Agencies, Public and Private, for the Period Ending December 

1944, by Nels Anderson, ME Representative for Recruitment and Manning, WSA, p. 67; 

and covering Ltr, to H. Chase Stone, Asst Deputy Administrator for Recruitment and Manning, WSA, Washington, 15 Dec 44. PGF 257. 

'U.S. Army Transportation in the Persian Corridor, 1941–1945, Monograph 25, Hist 

Unit, OCofTrans, ASF, Feb 46, by H. H. Dunham, pp. 26, 27, 30 (cited hereafter as 

Dunham). 

382 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

The interim period was not propitious for the setting of records. 

Indeed, whether during the phase of British responsibility with American help, or that which followed, of American responsibility with 

British help, both Armies shared the difficulties of mutual accommodations to one another's methods and temperaments under circumstances unfavorable for efficient results. With storage areas at 

Khorramshahr and Bandar Shahpur congested, inland clearance very 

slow and, in January 1943, sixteen out of twenty-eight cargo ships III 

the area lying idle for lack of accommodations at ports, and with 

165,000 long tons of cargo undischarged and no prospect of relief in 

sight, some Americans were inclined to think ill of British operations.8 

Too many ships arrived without cargo gear. \-\Then they arrived at 

Bandar Shahpur during the period when unloading equipment at 

dockside was nonexistent, things went badly; and when lighterage 

capacity dwindled to three lOO-ton lighters, throwing the chief burden 

for discharge upon the docks, matters were not improved. Some 

Americans complained that, though they were on duty fifteen hours a 

day, they stood around for many hours waiting for freight cars which 

existed, they felt, in plenty, but which were not available at dockside 

because of the derelictions of British Movements Control. The Americans were indignant when the British authorities in charge of allocations of berthing space put ships with Russian-aid cargoes to anchor in 

the channel and docked ships carrying British military supplies. 7 

There was merit in such complaints and in others buried in the files; 

but it was not always realized that throughout 1942 the commander of 

the British forces was responsible not only for maintaining communications from Basra to Baghdad and from Khorramshahr to Tehran, for 

improving ports, highways, and railways to accommodate ever increasing Russian-aid tonnage, and for moving that tonnage to Soviet receiving points. He carried also the supreme responsibility of maintaining 

up to ten divisions of troops against the strong possibility of enemy 

attack through the Caucasus or through Anatolia, a threat which was 

not relieved until after Stalingrad. If British operation of the various 

Gulf ports in 1942 was not a marvel of efficiency and was hopelessly 

inadequate to handle the mounting flood of Russian-aid shipping 

'General Summary Report of the Program of the War Shipping Administration for the 

Delivery of Russian-Aid to the Persian Gulf Ports and the Relations of the War Shipping 

Administration with Other Agencies, Public and Private, for the Period Ending Dec"mber 

1944, by Nels Anderson, ME Representative for Recruitment and Manning, WSA, p. 67; 

and covering Ltr, to H. Chase Stone, Asst Deputy Administrator for Recruitment and Manning, WSA, Washington, 15 Dec 44. PGF 257. 7 U.S. Army Transportation in the Persian Corridor, 1941-1945, Monograph 25, Hist 

Unit, OCofTrans, ASF, Feb 46, by H. H. Dunham, pp. 26, 27, 30 (cited hereafter as 

Dunham). 
PORT OPERATIONS 383 

toward the end of the year, steady progress was nevertheless made in 

the provision of additional docking space at Khorramshahr and Bandar 

Shahpur, and in other extensive construction, some of it delegated to 

the American Army. The additional facilities, as they came into use, 

increased port performance and encouraged the British to urge upon 

the Americans at the turn of the year a lO-berth building program to 

provide a 3D-percent reserve port capacity over and above estimated 

road and rail clearance capacity. Colonel Booth advised the American 

command that improvement of existing facilities and methods would 

be preferable to additional construction.s Differing opinions and policies were inevitable in the interim period and if some of the newly 

come Americans were irked by the creaking British machinery, they 

nevertheless learned how to get along with it, for it was all there was 

to work with. 

The central British agency for shipping was the War Transport 

Executive Committee,9 directly responsible to the Ministry of 'Var 

Transport in London. Established in the Basra port area on 23 October 

1941, its authority embraced Iraq, Iran, and all territories bordering 

on the Persian Gulf. It was the central clearinghouse and final authority 

for movements information, berthing and allocation of ships, arrivals 

and departures, loading and unloading priorities, port operations, and 

co-ordination with inland clearance. Its daily meetings were attended 

by representatives of the British director of transportation at Tehran, 

PAl Force Movements and Transportation officers, the Royal Navy, 

whose Sea Transport officer contracted for labor through the firm of 

Gray Mackenzie & Co., Ltd. (which had handled British shipping interests locally since 1851), and the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, which was responsible for documentation of Russian-aid cargoes. The Royal Air Force and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company were 

also represented. 'Vith all these interests were co-ordinated the civilian 

requirements of Iraqi and Irani trade. In addition the existent Basra 

Port Directorate and the Khorramshahr Port Committee, set up in 

May 1942 to co-ordinate interests at that port, arranged matters concerning dredging, channel markers, removal of sunken obstructions, 

and piloting. The British Army's Inland 'Vater Transport organization provided river and interport barge service, and lighterage and tug 

services. As an instrument of the Ministry of War Transport, the powerful \Var Transport Executive Committee's policies and acts were sub-

• (1) Ltr, GHQ, PAl Force, to Hq, PGSC, 1 Jan 43, sub: Movements and Trans. Gulf 

Dist (Gulf District Hq Files, PGC, now filed at the Kansas City Records Center, AGO, 

Kansas City, Mo.) 563.52. (2) Ltr, Col Booth to CofS, PGSC, 17 Feb 43. Same file . 

• W. H. Lock, Chairman. 
384 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

ject to British cabinet policy and, as an agency in a theater of war, 

its authority and acts were subject to the overriding priority of British 

military and naval operational requirements. Matters which could 

not be settled in committee had to be referred to London for 

determina tion.10 

In the early days of the committee in 1941-1942, the United States 

Military Iranian Mission had no shipping responsibilities whatever 

and no interest in shipping except to see to it that supplies and equipment required by its civilian contractors were expeditiously unloaded. 

To keep an eye on American shipping in the Persian Gulf, a U.S. 

naval observer was stationed at Basra in October 1941 and a regional 

director for the War Shipping Administration (WSA) was appointed 

on 1 November 1941." Both these men sat with the War Transport 

Executive Committee, being joined in July 1942 by a representative of 

the U.S. Army.12 After the arrival of 9th Port personnel, signifying 

that the new SOS Plan, with its increased responsibilities and tasks 

for the United States, was operative, the American port commander 

for Khorramshahr attended the committee's meetings for the first time 

on 11 January 1943 as a representative of the U.S. Army, being succeeded later by a representative of Movements Branch, Operations 

Division, Headquarters, PGSc.13 

The interim period came to a close on 1 May 1943 when the American command assumed, in effect, control of 110vements. In so far as 

American operations through the Corridor were concerned, the recommendations of the American members of the War Transport Executive 

Committee increasingly influenced policy and action. Delays caused by 

reference of disputed matters to London were virtually eliminated. In 

fact American controls over the berthing of ships were extended in 

certain instances even beyond the American-operated ports by an 

Anglo-American agreement of 10 September 1943; 14 and when an 

American served as chairman of the 'Var Transport Executive Committee, though no new powers were added, a fitting symbol of the 

American share in the common task was made visible. 

10 British Rpt, Persian Gulf Ports and Inland Transport Facilities and Organizations: 

Report on a Visit to Iraq and Persia, October 5th-November 2d, by R. S. Mactier, Basra, 

1 Nov 41. PGF 26-A. 11 Lt Comdr Derwood W. Lockard and Eugene Seaholm. 12 Maj Erme B. Myott. 13 (1) Maj James W. Rattray and Maj Elmer E. Anderson. (2) Rpt cited n. 6. (3) State 

Dept Rpt, British Controls in Iraq, by Richard E. Gnade, 25 Feb 44. MID 330 Great Britain, 

3 Apr 44 (12 Mar 43) . " Min of Allied Mtg, Hq, PGSC, 10 Sep 43, quoted HOTI, Pt. IV, History of the Ports, 

by Ogden C. Reed, p. 135. PGF. 
PORT OPERATIONS 385 

The American Organization and Its Functions 

Just as port operation developed ramifications unforeseen by the 

SOS planners, so port administration eventually required a more elaborate organization than that suggested in the SOS Plan; but at the start 

it resembled the SOS suggestion for a simple administrative headquarters and a subordinate working force. Colonel Booth, designated Director of Ports Service,'5 was already in command of the small group 

of administrative personnel comprised in Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 9th Port of Embarkation, and these mainly staffed 

the new Ports Service headquarters which he established at Khorramshahr. His working force of port battalions would operate and 

maintain port facilities and execute construction jobs which, at the 

beginning, were restricted to the modification of existing installations. 

After the arrival of the first large shipment of American port battalions 

and administrative troops, Ports Service headquarters was removed on 

21 December to Basra, where it was in direct contact not only with the 

vVar Transport Executive Committee, but with Headquarters, Basra 

District, PGSC.16 This administrative subarea of the American command inherited from its predecessor headquarters certain functions 

connected with ports and shipping which had evolved in pre-SOS 

days when there had been no direct American responsibility for port 

operations or shipping. Colonel Shingler, the commanding officer of 

Basra District, found himself charged with responsibility for construction activities at ports as well as with liaison with the British agencies 

and the WSA in such matters as the collection of shipping information. 

There was thus at the outset an area of responsibility for shipping 

and port matters which was occupied in part by both Colonel Shingler 

and Colonel Booth, each of whose commands stemmed, in the PGSC 

organization, directly from General Connolly. Possibility existed for a 

conflict of authority as well as of duties. Moreover the district, as an 

administrative subarea of the PGSC, exercised wide responsibilities 

for both administrative and operational activities. Among these, the 

office of director of ports was placed under the commander of Basra 

District, and the ports of Khorramshahr and Bandar Shahpur were 

administratively responsible to him, though their troops and administrative officers and men, as members of the port battalions and of 9th 

Port, came under the director of ports. Of such is the Kingdom of 

to Col Booth was designated Director as of 1 Nov by GO 7, Hq, PGSC, 25 Nov 42. 10 PGSC Headquarters were then also at Basra, but moved to Tehran in January 1943. 

For removal of Ports Serv Hq to Basra, see SO 1, Hq, Basra Dist, 22 Dec 42. PGF 13. 
386 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

Snafu, never happier than when founded upon strict obedience to 

logic and the principle of historical survival. 

The situation was soon righted when on 3 March 1943 Colonel 

Booth assumed command of Basra District. He immediately consolidated his three commands into one organization.17 Ninth Port remained 

the source of trained shipping personnel in the administration of district and ports activities. The Ports Service was predominantly operational, while the district became predominantly administrative. The 

organizations of the port commanders at Khorramshahr, Bandar 

Shahpur, and Cheybassi (when in July the American command began 

operations there) were brought under unified command and direction, 

and Ports Service became, in effect, an autonomous operating service.18 

With the consolidation of the ports and district headquarters, manpower economies were reflected in the reduction of officers from 46 

to 35, and of enlisted men in the headquarters detachment from 195 

to 179. Those released from administrative assignment became available for operations. 

On 16 May 1943 Basra District was redesignated Gulf District, and 

the combined District and Ports Service headquarters continued at 

Basra until its removal late in September to Ahwaz.19 The ensuing year 

brought only minor readjustments in the organization chart; but the 

passing of peak operations made possible a progressive contraction in 

the organization. First, operational direction of Khorramshahr and 

Bandar Shah pur was taken over late in 1944 by the Ahwaz office of the 

Port Operations Branch, Operations Division. The next step in contraction followed on 24 February 1945 when Gulf District was abolished and Ports Service moved to Khorramshahr, effecting a reduction 

in the Ports Service organization from six to two staff divisions for 

service and operations. This arrangement continued until 10 October 

17 Hist Rpt, 9th Port, Mobile, Mar-Apr 43, p. 1. PGF 12-C, D. 

" (1) At Khorramshahr, after brief periods in which Major Rattray and Lt. Col. John S. 

Willley served as commanders, Col. Bernard A. Johnson bore for eighteen months the brunt 

of the early and difficult days of adjustment as welI as the strains and satisfactions .Jf the 

period in 1944 of highest efficiency and peak performance. At Bandar Shahpur Maj. Harry C. 

Dodenhoff served from 2 February 1943 to November 1944, from the very beginning nearly 

to the date of returning the port to the British. He was succeeded by Lt. Col. Gordon D. 

Cornell of 9th Port. Colonel Booth was succeeded as Director of Ports and Commanding 

Officer, Gulf District, on 17 November 1943 by Col. Theodore M. Osborne, who, on 31 

October 1944, as a brigadier general, was succeeded by Colonel Johnson. Informal Hist Rpt, 

Mil Pers Br, Adm Div, PGC, 19 Dec 44. PGF 150-W. (2) When Gulf District was abolished 

on 24 February 1945, Colonel Dodenhoff became Commanding Officer, 9th Port, and 

Director, Ports Service. Hist Rpt, Ports Serv, Feb 45. PGF 26-Z. (3) Colonel Dodenhoff was 

succeeded on 23 May 1945 by Col. Louis T. Vickers. Hist Rpt, Ports Serv, May 45. PGY 

26-C-1. 19 Movement Orders 2, Hq, Dir of Ports and Gulf Dist, PGSC, 28 Sep 43. PGF 13. Move 

completed 10 October 1943. GO 57, Hq, PGSC, 21 Sep 43. Same file. 
PORT OPERATIONS 387 

when Ports Service was terminated. The next day all of its remaining 

functions were assumed by Transportation Branch, Operations Division. In its thirty-four months of existence, Ports Service had come 

full circle, from Khorramshahr through periods at Basra and Ahwaz 

and back to Khorramshahr again, expanding and contracting with 

the job to be accomplished.20 

The scope of port operation required collaborative effort or, at 

the least, efficient liaison, with other organizations-American, British, Soviet, and Iranian. In the early days when growing pains were 

continuous and violent, Colonel Booth had written: 

The Ports Service is charged with more duties and responsibilities in this theater 

than landing cargo. Landing the cargo is the easiest phase of our operation and is 

the phase in which we are best equipped with experts. Storage, documentation, 

guard, rail and truck loading operations and operation of internal use motor trucks 

are duties and responsibilities that Ports Service is now charged with.21 

He might have added that the ports organization usually found itself 

in the middle of the logistical mill, ground by upper and nether stones. 

Those who were primarily interested in speeding ships' turnaround 

joined with those interested in speeding the turnaround of railway 

cars to urge the ports organization to do something about their complaints. As a result functions were often redefined and reallocated to 

tighten performance, simplify procedure, or increase efficiency. 

The shift of certain Gulf District responsibilities in 1944 to the 

Ahwaz office of one of the command's general staff divisions diminished Gulf District powers. A transfer of responsibility in the contrary 

direction occurred when certain functions passed in January 1944 from 

Movements Branch, Operations Division, to newly established port 

transportation officers within the ports organization. This took place 

as part of a reorganization, promulgated by Gulf District, assigning 

to the Army Transport Service of the combined ports organization 

responsibility for the movement, loading, and discharging of ships, and 

to the port transportation officers the movement of freight and passengers to and from the ports and the procurement and allocation of all 

transportation facilities for the ports. In addition they were to perform 

all documentation and maintain current records on all freight stored 

.. (1) CO 36, Hq, PCC, 24 Feb 45. (2) PGC Headquarters had moved fro.m Tehran to 

Khorralmhahr on 15 Sentember 1945. The command in October became a servlce command 

of the Africa-Middle E~st Theater. CO 111, Hq, PCSC, 10 Oct 45. (3) Final Hi~t Rpt, 

Ports Sen', for I Srp-IO Oct 45,22 Oct 45. PGF 2fi-G-1. 

21 ~.lcmo, Hq, Office Dir of Ports and CO, Basra Dist, for Off in Charge, Opns, Basra 

Dist, 15 Apr 43. PGF 26-A. The director of ports was also responsible for training and 

proces<in,,; arriving troops and handlinr: departing troops. 
388 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

or in transit at their ports.22 These duties were partly operational and 

partly executive or of a staff nature; yet, in the sudden rush of developments, they had come to be exercised by Movements Branch, which, 

as a general staff office outside the ports organization, was less suited 

to perform the operational functions than an office within the ports 

structure. Hence the change. 

Yet Movements Branch had earlier been brought into the picture 

in an effort to improve the situation at the start of operations. On 

11 March 1943 Colonel Booth appealed to General Connolly for closer 

co-ordination with the Military Railway Service in the matter of speeding the turnaround of freight cars at the ports. By an agreement of 

29 December 1942 between Colonel Booth and Colonel Yount, Director of MRS, port commanders were to control yards and storage, tally 

and load cars, and prepare and distribute shipping tickets for each car, 

while the MRS would operate switch engines and have technical supervision of rolling stock in yards and on the main lines. But loading was 

subject to priorities, and these were arranged through Movements 

Branch of Operations Division, the staff division responsible for the 

supervision and control of matters relating to the whole lend-lease 

activity of the theater. In consequence of Colonel Booth's appeal, 

branch offices of Movements Branch were established on 17 March 

1943 to facilitate the processes of documentation and administrative 

direction. With this help the ports organization at Khorramshahr in 

particular was urged to speed loading. Stress was laid on the fact that 

the Russians had in only seventeen days reduced from 1,330 to 728 

the number of freight cars held in their zone north of Tehran. The 

port commander at Khorramshahr was therefore told that of the 500 

cars standing in his yards, 250 must be dispatched by the end of May. 

A further tightening of organizational structure occurred when on 

29 May railway terminal operations at Khorramshahr passed from 

MRS to the port commander.23 

Through its representative at Basra who sat with the War Transport Executive Committee, Movements Branch provided liaison between the American and British operating agencies, obtaining from the 

.. (1) HOTI, Pt. I, Ch. 8, Sec. 3, History of Movements Branch, Operations Division, 

Hq, PGC, prepared by Movements Branch, Operations Division, with Supplement by 

Laurence P. Corbett, and statistical appendix, Complete Summary of Port and Transportation Agencies Performance of PGC Operations through 31 May 1945, 5 July 1945. PGF. 

(2) Ltr, Col Osborne, Dir of Ports and Gulf Dist, to CG, PGC, for ACofS, Opns Div, 18 

Dec 43, sub: Establishment of Port Trans Offs. PGF 26-A . .. (1) Dir of Ports Instruction Bull 1,29 Dec 42. Gulf Dist 563.52. (2) History cited 

n. 22 (1 ). (3) Rads, Col Booth to Col WilBey, 19, 26 May 43. Gulf Dist 453.0 (4) Page 62 

of History cited n. 14. (5) Loading of trucks at the ports was done by Motor Transport 

Service personnel. Dir of Ports Instruction Bull 2. 29 Dec 42. Gulf Dist 563.52. 
PORT OPERATIONS 389 

British all available shipping information for transmittal to Ports Service and to GHQ at Tehran. In the early period the WSA representative received directly from arriving ships stowage plans and manifests 

which he distributed to port agencies. After July 1943 ships' papers 

were received in advance of ship arrivals, thus greatly speeding the processes requiring manifest and stowage information; but in the course of 

time the function of the WSA became largely advisory, supplying 

Movements Branch with shipping forecasts and information, and 

technical advice on loading, safety, and routing.24 

Two other offices within Operations Division were closely involved 

with shipping and port matters. Control Branch, which was responsible for advising the commanding general on target estimates, received recommendations on port capacities from the Gulf District 

organization. While the Movements Branch officer at Basra maintained liaison with the British agencies, the Ocean Traffic Section of 

Movements Branch at Tehran was the agency for co-ordinating Soviet 

movement and priority requirements. Established on 1 February 1943 

as the Traffic Control Section, its primary function was to perform 

liaison between the American and Soviet headquarters in obtaining 

disposal instructions for all cargoes destined for the USSR.25 The chief 

Soviet agencies involved were the Soviet Transportation Directorate 

and Iransovtrans. The latter's office in Tehran was divided into suboffices for processing such disparate items as tanks, food, clothing, and 

engineer equipment. The Ocean Traffic Section had to screen the often 

conflicting demands of these separate offices. In general, cargoes for 

Bandar Shah on the Caspian Sea were appropriate for their destinations in the central Russian manufacturing area. Those headed for 

Dzhul'fa along the motor truck routes were chiefly commodities such 

as food, clothing, ammunition, spare parts, and similar items destined 

for immediate use on the battle front. 

The process by which Soviet requirements were translated into 

American action was unavoidably cumbersome. It began with the 

manifests of incoming ships. At the outset these came through the 

British, then through the WSA, often at the last minute and in so few 

copies as to be almost useless. Later these came in advance by courier; 

finally via the Movements Branch office in Basra. Copies of the manifests were then forwarded to Tehran and translated into Russian. 

The Ocean Traffic Section began the process of breaking them down 

into categories, and the various offices of the Soviet agencies got to 

24 Memo, ACofS Opns for CG, 8 Jan 45, sub: Relations between WSA and PGC. Historical Data on PGC Furnished Mead Committee, SL 8997 . .. History cited n. 22 (1). 
390 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

work making up their requirements in accordance with their latest 

orders from the battle front and their latest information as to Soviet 

ability to receive cargoes at the transfer points and carry them on to 

Soviet destinations. In the end each item of a ship's manifest was 

listed according to destination. The detail was enormous and exacting 

and intensified by the unremitting pressure for speed. Thousands of 

commodities were sorted out on paper in this way at Tehran and 

designated for eleven different destinations. Then the lists were sent 

to the ports for action; but at the ports, especially in the first year, 

the local Soviet representative was likely to make last-minute adjustments, usually dictated by alterations in front-line requirements. Any 

such change would affect co-ordinated loading plans for northbound 

trucks and trains and slow the flow of tonnage, so that the very act 

of accommodating American operations to Soviet requirements was 

likely to bring a protest from the Soviets against American delays. 

The Russians were implacable in their demands for speed and quantity, and where there were so many protests and suggestions, many 

were bound to be justified. This was especially true in the early months, 

and Colonel Booth called upon his port commanders in March 1943 

to improve the loading of freight cars, after Soviet complaints of incompatible cargoes such as sugar and iron wire in one car, or improper 

stowage of airplane engines, leading to damage in shipment, or overloading of cars. Betterment followed automatically when an increase 

in available rolling stock improved the selectivity of freight cars ,md 

therefore the efficiency with which a trainload of hundreds of different kinds of items could be made Up.26 

Sometimes Russian suggestions were less to the point than those 

concerning loading. At a conference on 8 May 1943 with Lt. Col. 

Harry C. Dodenhoff, the port commander at Bandar Shahpur, the 

Soviet representatives suggested night shifts at the docks, although 

floodlighting had not yet been installed. And sometimes a congenital 

cautiousness in the Slav nature compromised American actions designed directly for Soviet benefit. Such an instance, occurring in January 1943, though originating at the shipping level ultimately occupied 

the time and attention not only of the highest War Shipping and Maritime Commission officials in Washington, but of the Commanding 

General, PGSC, and the Russian Ambassador at Tehran. Because of 

the large number of ships at anchor at the head of the Gulf awaiting 

discharge, General Connolly, in accordance with WSA's instructions 

to clear the Shatt al Arab, diverted a limited tonnage of relatively 

"Rad, Gen Booth to Port Comdrs at Khorramshahr and Bandar Shahpur, 31 Mar 43. 

Gulf Dist 453.0. 
peRT OPERATIONS 391 

low priority to Karachi, where the ships could be more promptly unloaded and returned to America for fresh cargoes for the USSR. But 

the local Soviet authority, in the words of General Connolly's reports 

to 'Washington and the United States lend-lease representative at 

Moscow, 

. . . resisted each, every and all diversions and no concrete recommendations 

could be obtained from him. He was informed that if he did not act in the matter 

that I would be forced to fix priorities .... It is obvious here that Soviets prefer 

holding excess cargo in ships idling in ports .... Russians apparently consider 

that their recommendation on low priority cargo would be sanctioning diversion to 

Karachi, which they oppose. 

The dispatch adds, in connection with Soviet implications that the 

American effort in their behalf is not all it might be, "Needless to say 

we are vitally interested in increasing flow of supplies to USSR. That 

is our only reason for being here." The "Var Department backed Connolly and the diversion relieved the shipping glut in the Gulf.21 

Sometimes Soviet ideas were tried out with no very encouraging results. An instance is an attempt to improve the dispatching of cargoes 

from Bandar Shahpur by rail. In November 1944 an agreement between Iransovtrans and the American command provided, first, for 

shipment of commodities by individual order numbers in carloat:i lots, 

and, second, for holding for complete discharge and segregation before 

dispatch certain items specified by headquarters at Tehran on disposal 

instructions. 23 The immediate result of the agreement was that, at the 

close of the month of November, the Storage and Transit Area at 

Bandar Shah pur was glutted with cargo which, instead of being loaded 

at shipside directly for its northern (Soviet) destination, had to be 

sent to the dump and sorted. Fortunately the last ton of Russian-aid 

cargo was cleared from Bandar Shahpur on 31 December. The new 

instructions did not prevail long enough to bring to serious proportions 

the accumulation of backlog they seemed destined to create. Their 

promulgation is a further monument to the American effort to oblige 

the Soviet Ally . 

. Because of their inflexibility and literalness, the Soviet representatives were never easy to please; but the record shows that, after the 

early months, Soviet-American procedures settled down to a working 

basis. If they had not done so, the total tonnages would tell a different 

story. 

2' (1) Rad, Gen Connolly to Gen Sidney Spalding, repeated to Admiral William H. 

Standley, U.S. Ambassador at Moscow, for Gen Faymonville, 16 Jan 43. PGF 26-A. (2) 

Interv with Gen Connolly, Pentagon, 18 Aug 50. 

2' Hist Rpt, Bandar Shahpur Port, Nov 44. PGF 9-W. 
392 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

The Ports and Their Problems 

Even a sampling of ports relations with other agencies shows that 

getting the cargoes off the ships was, as Colonel Booth had said, the 

least of his "\Torries, though one of his biggest jobs. Problems and operations were synonymous. The physical ports were a problem. The 

troops who disembarked at Khorramshahr in December 1942 had 

sailed some seventy miles up theShatt al Arab River. Sentab Jetty, 

the port's chief installation, was situated on the east bank of the Shatt 

half a mile upstream from its confluence with the Karun River. Along 

these two rivers, bordered by groves of date palms, and in the flat desert 

spaces enclosed by them, busy construction activity betokened the 

efforts, begun by the British in the previous year, to transform a sleepy 

native village and its single concrete berth, connected with the interior only by a desert road fit for camels, to a vital port of entry for 

millions of tons of war material destined for the USSR. In December 

1942 a rail branch and an incompleted modem highway stretched 

inland from the docks to Ahwaz, eighty miles away. By the following 

:May new construction gave Sentab Jetty seven berths connected with 

the shore by six trestle approaches for railway tracks and trucks. It 

stretched 3,251 feet parallel to the shore. Its width had been doubled 

and it was paved level from end to end to allow trucks to drive over 

the three railway tracks which extended its full length. It was floodlighted for night operations. (ill ap 5-inside back cover) 

By May the fearful summer had set in, with the thermometer regularly climbing above 100° F., and afternoon shade temperatures ranging between 110° and 125°. After May and continuing to October 

sun temperatures would exceed 1400 accentuated by spells of high 

humidity and severe periodical dust storms. Only October ~nd November provided pleasant weather. When the first troops came ashore in 

December the nights were cold, the days often lashed by torrential 

rains, and this was to continue into March, followed by heat and 

drought. It was a miserable environment which the troops entered 

after forty-one days at sea and, though much construction had preceded their arrival, housing was lacking so that they had tents pitched 

for them in a muddy flooded area about a mile inland from the jetty. 

Six months later the main camp of adequate mud-brick barracks being 

erected on the same site for Khorramshahr's permanent troops was 

only half completed. \\Then the camp was finished in August, a serious 

drag on efficient operations was ended by the improvement in housing.29 

.. (1) Ltr, Lt Col B. E. Bushnell, to CO, Gulf Dist, PGSC, 7 Jun 43, sub: Inspection of 

Motor Transport and Cons Equipment, Khorramshahr, Iran, p. 2. PGF 26-A. (2) By way 
RUSSIAN DUMP 

SENT AB JETTY 

TAP II 

CUSTOMS JETTY 

AERIAL PHOTO OF KHORRAMSHAHR 
SAR BANDAR KHOR ZA NGI WHARF lJ . S. CAMP JETIY 

AERIAL PHOTO OF BANDAR SHAHPUR 
PORT OPERATIONS 393 

Besides Sentab Jetty there were three other dockage installations 

at the port of Khorramshahr. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company wharf 

at Abadan handled heavy cargoes like locomotives from shipside to 

barges. The barges proceeded to about a mile above the jetty where 

Failiyah Creek entered the Shatt al Arab River. Just within the creek, 

on its east bank, a wooden bulkhead was extended bv additional construction. By March 1943 a lighterage wharf 1,500 'feet long and 10 

feet wide, connected with the adjacent railway system by three tracks 

and served by a lOO-ton electric derrick and a 5-ton crawler crane, was 

ready to unload barge cargoes for placement upon railway cars. The 

leveling of ground along the tracks provided ample open storage space. 

Two small lighterage wharves completed the dockage facilities 

used by the U.S. Army. At the junction of the Karun and Shatt Rivers, 

the Customs Jetty, enlarged by the British in 1942 and 1943 and provided with rail approaches, was mainly used for commercial lighterage; but the U.S. Army was authorized to use it when there were 

available facilities. About three miles up the Karun River, on its west 

bank, was Khumba \Vharf, extended and improved in 1943 by port of 

Khorramshahr engineers, and used mainly for landing crated trucks 

and unloading barges containing engineering supplies. 

The chief storage area at the port was called the Russian Dump, 

formally known as the Transit Storage Area. This was a 32-acre tract 

situated next to the railway yards about a mile inland from Sentab 

Jetty. Provided with railway tracks running parallel with storage sections, and with 1,800 feet of gantry-crane track, this area furnished 

space for temporary storage of overflow Soviet cargo. Here Russian-aid 

cargo was segregated, checked, loaded, and dispatched northward 

by rail or truck. 

In the early days when much American equipment was arriving, 

destined for the Ahwaz General Depot 77 miles north, it had been 

stored in an area adjacent to the Russian Dump where pilferage was 

prevalent. The construction of three open-sided warehouses provided 

shelter for receiving and sorting American materiel. As the cargoes 

passed through to Ahwaz, subsequent arrivals were stored at Customs 

Jetty warehouses for Khorramshahr subdepot use. so 

The officers and men of the 378th Port Battalion and of 9th Port, 

who arrived at Bandar Shahpur on 2 February 1943 as an advance 

of contrast, the men at the British Ordnance Base at Shu'aiba were still under canvas nearly 

two years after their arrival, and their officers remained in tents for another year. PAl 

Force History, II, 40. 

'" (1) Rpt, Port Facilities at Port of Khorramshahr, prepared by Opns Div, Hq, PGC, 

for U.S. MA, Tehran. PGF, 26-A. (2) Maps of Khorramshahr. Hq Port and Gulf Dist 

File, SL 8973. 
394 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

echelon of the Army Transport Service to take over the port from the 

British sixteen days later, had already come ashore at one Persian Gulf 

port and had found it no paradise. They did not know, when they 

approached the low, miasmal shore of Bandar Shahpur, what life there 

was like; but they may have suspected, as they looked about them, that 

whatever was climatically bad at Khorramshahr would be worse at 

Bandar Shahpur, whatever was climatically good at Khorramshahr 

could be no better at the primitive island port fifty-four miles to the 

east. Lying on an island in the Khor Musa, an inlet at the head of the 

Persian Gulf about forty-three miles from the Gulf itself, Bandar 

Shahpur was built as the sea terminus of the ISR. There was no town, 

only a native village of conical straw mats lashed to ballie poles,31 

sprawling over 70 percent of the port site. There was no landward communication save the single-track railway which, carried on 900 feet of 

trestle from the single jetty, reached the island, stretched across it on 

raised ground through the classification yards to the north side, and 

then spanned the mud flats of the Khor Musa to the mainland over a 

6-mile embankment. Isolated, treeless, and dismal, Bandar Shahpur, 

too, was no paradise; but in 1942 under British operation it had received 

half the Russian-aid cargo arriving at Persian Gulf ports, and it was 

to bear its fair share in 1943 and 1944. 

The first American group were housed in mud huts used by the 

Royal Air Force. The second, arriving soon after, pitched their tents 

knee-deep in mud, and fought off flood conditions that were inevitable 

on a low, flat island unprotected save by primitive dikes. Life was not 

sweetened by the proximity of the native laborers' camp, infested with 

vermin and strewn with refuse; but by the end of the first month, 

February, nearly all the natives had been moved to Sar Bandar where, 

at a location six miles away on the mainland, just west of the railroad, 

a camp was contrived for them which, at the peak of operations, accommodated some 4,000 persons. 

Beginning in March 1943 wooden sidewalks were laid, drainage 

installed, and lighting wired in the enlisted men's washrooms. By May 

barracks were started. By December much needful construction, including two tidal gates to control the flooding of the mud flats, had 

been finished. It was right that at Bandar Shahpur, where the men's 

living conditions at the first had been even worse than at Khorramshahr, 

improvement was prompter. 

The port installations were relatively simple. The old jetty, extending far into the water because of the shallow shore line, was of 

" Roughhewn poles used in Iran for structural framework. 
PORT OPERATIONS 395 

wooden piles. Its two berths totaled 800 feet in length and the jetty was 

40 feet wide, bearing three lines of railroad track. During the months 

of June to August, the new jetty, which had been under construction 

for over a year by the British firm of Braithwaite, Burns, and Jessop 

under contract to the British Army, was put into use, adding three 

berths. Seventy-seven feet wide, its steel-piled length, curving 1,680 

feet in the opposite direction to that of the old jetty, completed a flattened Y -shaped structure. Its tail was the 900-foot trestle carrying the 

single rail track to shore. At these jetties ships tied up and discharged 

their cargoes by the use of ship's gear directly to the rail cars, while 

some cargo was manhandled to cars and some was transferred overside 

to lighters. 

At the beginning, the only usable lighterage wharf was the Bazaar 

Wharf, unhappily located on a creek which was dry at low tide. This 

was abandoned after American engineers, working from March to 

October, had enlarged and reconstructed Khor Zangi, an old wharf 

on the mainland two miles north of the island. With two rail spurs 

to the main line, and three powerful cranes in concrete foundations, 

the enlarged wharf, 660 feet by 20 feet, situated on deep water, was 

able to discharge loads directly from lighters to the railway cars on 

which they proceeded north. Small buildings for offices, storeroom and 

gear stowage, supplied with utilities, completed the equipment of 

Khor Zangi Wharf. 

Open storage was provided on the island between the railroad 

tracks, and at Sar Bandar, where the Americans installed three portal 

cranes, in unlimited area on the flat ground. Three corrugated iron 

warehouses and some smaller structures on the raised ground of the 

railway yards furnished covered storage. Fresh water, particularly 

in quantities for provisioning ships, had come originally in tank cars 

by rail from Ahwaz; but the Americans improved that, too, by increasing the capacity of an existing pipeline which brought water forty 

miles from an inland creek. 32 

The difficulties posed by the physical condition of the ports themselves gave way in time before the steady improvements made in facilities and equipment. Even the heat, for which early planning had made 

allowance in expectation of a 20-percent reduction in ship discharge 

during the worst months, failed to produce the expected seasonal 

slumps. In fact, although at Bandar Shahpur during a measured five 

weeks' period in the first summer, there was "ten to twenty times as 

.. (1) Rpt, Port Facilities at Port of Bandar Shahpur, prepared by Opns Div, Hq, PGC, 

for U.S. MA, Tehran. PCF 26-A. (2) Hist Rpt, Bandar Shahpur Port, Dec 43. PGF 9-L. 

(3) Map, Annex 7-C of Rpt cited n. 47 below. 
396 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

much heat exhaustion and heat stroke" as at Khorramshahr, both ports 

managed to attain maximum discharge in July of 1944.33 To be sure this 

performance reflected the matured organization and techniques gained 

in more than a year of operations, as well as the virtual completion 

of construction and improved inland clearance; but the human factor 

was basically and doggedly there, too. When General Styer, Chief of 

Staff, Army Service Forces, visited the command in July 1943, he 

reported to General Somervell, as an instance of troop morale at Bandar Shahpur, that when it appeared that the port might not meet its 

May target, port troops had asked if they might increase their working 

time to two 12-hour shifts.s. 

A distinctly human problem caused some trouble in the first months 

of port operations when it was discovered that pilferage was by no 

means confined to the native workers at the docks and storage areas. 

Some of the American port battalion troops found post exchange and 

canned subsistence items irresistible, and opinion surveys revealed that 

they reasoned, somewhat imperfectly, that since these, and other items 

of lend-lease cargoes, had been paid for by the American taxpayer, 

they were entitled to help themselves. 35 Such reasoning, while hardly 

to be condoned, is not wholly incomprehensible in a world in which 

travelers have long indulged, with the tacit consent of society, in the 

purloining of hotel silver, linen, crockery, and even the pictures on the 

walls; but when pilferage extended to war materiel, no excuse could 

be allowed. Moreover, the Russians put in a prompt complaint, to 

both ,British and Americans, and action followed. "It is a paradox," 

wrote Colonel Booth to the Khorramshahr port commander, "that we 

should work hard, collect and ship goods 15,000 miles and then not 

protect them to the best of our ability." He then empowered the port 

commander "to stop pilferage on the part of natives by the use of 

weapons, and under regulations, to deal with any of our own troops 

caught pilfering." 36 

Several steps were taken which shortly proved effective: additional guards were stationed at the sorting sheds, at holds of ships when 

they were open, and at each ramp leading to the Sentab Jetty; a fence 

.. Memo, IG, PGSC, for CG, PGSC, 3 Sep 43. PGF 26-A . 

.. Rad AGWAR 1801, Gen Styer to Gen Somervell, 15 Jul 43. PGF 26-A. This was no 

isolated case either for the Ports Service or for the other agencies in the command. There 

were numerous instances of the sort over the years, but this one emerges from anonymity 

because it was lucky enough to come to the attention of the high command . 

.. Report of Military Police Activities, PGC, United States Army, p. 62. PGF 130. 

S. (I) Ltr, Iransovtrans (Mr. Krasnov) to U.S. and British Movements Conti, 4 Mar 43. 

Gulf Dist 400.6. The Russians stated that they shot those caught pilfering. (2) Ltr, Col 

Booth to Port Comdr, 9 Mar 43. PGF 13. 
PORT OPERATIONS 397 

was built around the sorting shed area; boxes broken on arrival or in 

handling were isolated, put under guard, and sent to be recoopered. 

Although the matter of pilferage consumed most of the month of 

March, it was by no means either the sole or the chief problem to 

concern Colonel Booth as Director of Ports Service and Commander 

of Gulf District. Indeed, the colonel learned, as did the King in Hamlet, 

that 

\Vhen sorrows come, they come not single spies, 

But in battalions. . . . 

The investigation of pilferage, coupled by the 9th Port's inspector 

general with the problem of security at Khorramshahr, also served to 

throw into high relief many defects in the machincry.37 The pilfcrage 

,vas but a symptom, a part of the larger problems of othcer competence 

and assignment, ethcient use of enlisted men, employment and supervision of native labor. These factors spread in widening circles, to 

include such larger considerations as cargo handling, packing and 

storage, dock equipment, and, inevitably, the meeting of targets, the 

need for speed, always more speed, with the Russians clamoring for 

goods, and authorities all the way back to vVashington bearing down 

with increasing pressure to reduce the number of ships, loaded or half 

loaded, lying idle in the outer anehorages, waiting to be discharged 

and to return home for a new cargo. On 27 February a message went 

to General Connolly from General Somervell: 

All plans for your Command arc being attacked by reason of ship delays. Everything must be done to eliminate this .... Desire that all-out effort be made to 

unload and release ships which have been delayed in turnaround at PG ports. Even 

if it means rehandling of cargo, this effort must be made. A similar effurt must be 

made to move this cargo into USSR.as 

Called upon for a report, Colonel Booth stated to General Connolly 

on 1 March that daily average ship discharge for Khorramshahr had 

risen from 958 long tons in November, two months before American 

port troops went into action, to 2,234 long tons in February.39 But this 

improved performance fell well under the 100,000 long tons per month 

designated by Washington planners for shipment to the Persian Gulf 

ports. Among the several factors working against further improvement 

were manpower and equipment. Manpower consisted of two classes 

"Rpt, Investigation of Pilferage and Security at the Port of Khorramshahr, by Maj 

Cornell and Capt Joseph W. Kuns In. d.]; and, passim, Gulf Dist 400.6. 

"Rad AMPSC 309, Gen Somervell to Gen Connolly, 27 Feb 43. PGF 26-A . • 0 Ltr, Col Booth to Gen Connolly, 1 Mar 43, sub: Monthly Rpt of Port Opns, Khorramshahr, Period to 28 Feb 43. PGF 26-A. Tonnages discharged or landed, unless otherwise 

indicated, will be found in Table 3. 
398 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

of supervisors and two classes of working forces. Supervisors responsible for operations were officers from 9th Port. Since nearly all experienced stevedore officers were 9th Port men, their limited numbers 

\vere spread thin, one being assigned to each ship. The second class 

of supervisors were the port battalion officers, who were responsible for 

command of troops at the ship and saw to it that troops performed 

according to the requirements of 9th Port operation officers. This group 

were described by the Army Transport Service officer in charge of dock 

operations at Khorramshahr as "young officers recently from OCS and 

splendid fellows and willing to learn, but I don't know one instance 

of them having previous shipping experience." 40 In addition to this 

severe handicap to efficient performance, port battalion officers, too, 

were spread thin because of the necessity of using port battalion personnel in other than stevedore duties. Consequently, too few supervisors were available at the docks. The solution, Colonel Booth wrote 

on 3 March, was better distribution of enlisted men; but even as late 

as 15 April Colonel Booth was forced to admit, with regard to supervisory personnel, "I see no way to avoid using the white Port Battalions 

on supervision. The Ninth Port is not large enough to take the entire 

duty." A request for more 9th Port officers, directed to Washington as 

early as February, had produced no officers as late as 10 August.n 

The working forces consisted of U.S. Army troops and of native 

laborers. The first port battalion to reach Khorramshahr, the 378th, 

had received training in stowage methods, materials handling, winch 

operation, and cargo knotting and lashing. Among them were some 

experienced stevedores, winch operators, and shipping clerks; but in 

the judgment of a responsible 9th Port official, it "was not a well 

trained organization upon arrival" and "received practically all of 

its technical training after debarking at Khorramshahr." 42 The 380th 

Port Battalion, which arrived in January, had, in the language of its 

chronicler, been "hurriedly trained." Both groups had to learn on the 

job and both job and cargo tended to suffer in the process as relatively 

green men became crane operators, cargo checkers, warehouse foremen, transportation clerks, pump tenders, and even guards, truck 

drivers, blacksmiths, towmotor operators, and malaria control 

technicians. 43 

•• Testimony of Maj. Walter D. Brennan quoted Rpt cited n. 37. His remarks concerned 

the 378th Port Battalion only. 

" Ltr, Col Booth to Maj Brennan, 3 ?>.far 43, quoted pp. 41-42 of History cited n. 14. 

(2) Memo cited n. 21. (3) Rpt on Port Opns at Khorramshahr, by Maj Anderson, for Dir 

of Ports, 10 Aug 43. OCofTrans, Hist Er-Overseas Comd, Pentagon. 

42 R pt ci tcd n. 41 ('3 ). 

" (1) Hist Rpt, 380th Port En, 2 Jul 43. PGF 24-E. (2) Hist Rpt, 378th Port Bn, 

31 Jul 42-31 Jul 43. PGF 19-E. 
PORT OPERATIONS 399 

To compensate for shortage of port personnel, increased use was 

made of the second class of worker, the native laborer. Recruited, paid, 

and regulated by the Gulf District labor relations officer, native labor 

at Khorramshahr was hired directly by the labor officer and collectively 

through local labor contractors, who received a fixed rate per ton, 

the rates being adjusted from time to time as experience dictated. At 

Bandar Shahpur all labor was hired directly. At both ports the natives, 

almost wholly inexperienced, learned as they worked. Under such conditions cargo damage was inevitable; but the American soldier supervisor-instructors produced among their thousands of native workers 

not only stevedores and longshoremen but also operators of such 

machinery as winches. This was achieved with a minimum of friction. 

To the ports operation as a whole the contribution of native labor was 

indispensable. H 

In the matter of certain equipment the early story was also one of 

shortages, ironically the result of reliance in Washington upon a report 

from the field during the early planning in July 1942 that there was a 

sufficiency of cranes and gear. But in January 1943 power machinery 

for unloading and loading railway cars at the Russian Dump at 

Khorramshahr consisted of two small gantry cranes so that much of 

the cargo, including steel rails badly needed by the Soviet forces, had 

to be loaded by hand. A month later, two additional3-ton portal cranes 

and one 5-ton crawler crane were in operation, and during March and 

April four more portal cranes, ordered after Colonel Booth's arrival 

in the field in November, arrived and were erected. In January, at the 

height of the shortage, British PAl Force recommended joint pooling 

of Anglo-American crane facilities, suggesting that the British director 

of Ordnance Services be empowered to register and allocate all cranes, 

including those to arrive in future. The suggestion was declined by 

the American command, co-ordination of cranes was effected through 

the "Var Transport Executive Committee, and by August there was a 

sufficiency of cranes, but still a shortage of rigging and gear.45 

Lighters and barges come under the heading of equipment factors 

affecting port operations. Lighters were used from berth to berth in 

the same port and barges in ferrying discharged cargoes from one port 

to another. Their supply and allocation tied in very closely with port 

performance. After 1 May 1943 control over barges, lighters, and tugs, 

exercised by the British Inland 'Vater Transport (HIT), was the only 

H( 1) Chs. 3,4,5 of History cited n. 14. (2) HOTI, History of Civilian Personnel Branch 

Activities, Administration Division, Hq, PGC, by Col Richard W. Cooper. PGF . .. (1) Rpt cited n. 43(2). (2) Memo, Deputy QMG, GHQ, PAl Force, for Hq, PGSC, 

27 Jan 43, sub: Persian Ports. PGF 26-A. . 
400 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

element in port operations still in British hands. With the increase 

in the number of barges resulting from the American barge assembly 

operation at Kuwait, the problem of their use in time boiled down to 

allocations. The Americans were not satisfied with the service IWT 

gave them. There were instances of delays in ship discharge caused 

by late arrival of barges in spite of ample advance notification to the 

IWT; and there were instances in which more lighters were assigned 

to a ship than \\'ere required. In April, having consistently received 

inadequate lighterage allocations from the IWT to whom application 

was made at the daily berthing committee meetings at Margil (Basra 

port), Colonel Booth requested the Operations Division at Tehran 

headquarters to apply to PAl Force headquarters at Baghdad to 

approve an estimate of requirements for adequate barge and lighterage tonnage for Khorramshahr and Bandar Shahpur. In July, after 

months of somewhat desultory discussion and correspondence between 

the top headquarters, the British, while refusing to grant the Americans control of lighterage operations, obtained concurrence at Tehran 

to an allocation considerably smaller than that first proposed by 

Colonel Booth. Thus matters rocked along thenceforth.'6 

As if to top off the difficulties of the early months, torrential raim 

in March washed out large sections of the newly built highway and 

damaged the rail line so that inland clearance by rail and road between 

Khorramshahr and Ahwaz was severely restricted. Tonnage piled up 

at the Russian Dump at Khorramshahr and damage to stored cargo 

resulted. 

In the midst of all this, representatives of the Washington headquarters of the Transportation Corps, on a world tour of inspection, 

arrived on 15 March for a stay of some nine weeks.47 It was hardly a 

propitious moment for visitors. The seventh (and last) berth at Sentab 

Jetty was still under construction; the command was still shy at least 

ten thousand American troops; and the visitors from Washington early 

discovered what was already all too well known in the command-that 

more cargo was being shipped in these early months than could be 

•• (1) Memo, Col Osborne for Col Booth, 28 Apr 43, sub: Lighterage Facilities; and 

1st Ind, Col Booth to Col Osborne, 6 Jun 43. PGF 26-A. (2) Ltr, Col Booth to Col Osborne, 

29 Jul 43. PGF 26-A. 

"Report on Transportation at Persian Gulf Ports, by Lt Col Benjamin C. Allin and 

Capt Robert G. Stone [no d.]. OCofTrans, Hist Br-Overseas Comd, Pentagon. Supplemented 

by: Ltr, Col Allin and Capt Stone to CG, PGSC, 22 Apr 43, sub: Report on Port Study, 

Persian Gulf Ports; and Memo, Col Allin for Maj Gen C. P. Gross, CofTrans, 10 Jul 43, 

sub: Operating Conditions at Persian Gulf Ports. PGF 26-A. Colonel Allin and Captain 

Stone were traveling under letter orders dated 11 March 1943. No copy exists in the files of 

the Office of the Chief of Transportation, Historical Branch-Overseas Command, but 

Dunham (page 115) indicates their instructions covered survey and recommendation on port 

discharge (equipment, method) and clearance, but not inland clearance by road and rail. 
PORT OPERATIONS 401 

unloaded and that more cargo was being unloaded than could be transported to the USSR. They were also no less disturbed than was the 

command, from General Connolly down, over the length of days ships 

spent at port in the process of discharge!S And so they settled down to 

study the ports. 

The diagnosis, embodied in papers which for convenience will be 

called the Allin reports, covered most of the ailments which had been 

worrying the director of ports from the beginning. It was summarized 

almost too simply: "Two definite bottlenecks exist in the Persian line 

of communication, namely, interior clearance and port clearance.') 

To that no one could have taken the slightest exception, nor to the 

visitors' "opinion that the interior clearance from the ports to Russian 

delivery is the major bottleneck." That had been General Connolly's 

diagnosis of the previous December. To a number of conditions in port 

operations the Transportation Corps specialists called attention with 

helpful results. As a consequence of their diagnosis of Sentab Jetty, 

that key installation was widened by new construction which began 

in March. Unloaded cargo could then be temporarily stored at shipside, thus speeding discharge without waiting for removal of cargoes 

from the dock. The efforts of the Ports Service to recooper damaged 

crates and boxes both at the ships before unloading and at the storage 

areas received the blessing of the Allin reports, and were accelerated 

by them. 

Recognizing factors beyond the control of the command in the 

field, the reports recommended improvements in dunnage and ship 

stowage, and in the system of supplying manifests, along with other 

changes in procedure which had to be effected in the United States. 

These were to prove helpful; but the command was seriously disturbed 

at the recommendation which went forward to Washington to effect 

"a moratorium or suspension of shipments to the extent of one-half 

month's program, namely, 100,000 cargo tons .... " 49 Of this more 

will be said later; but the suggestion echoed General Somervell's 

February warning that plans for General Connolly's command were 

under attack because of ship delays. 

The Allin reports also dealt with problems of personnel. They noted 

a low state of morale, "evidence of friction among officers," "a dis-

.. The Allin reports say the delays (as of mid-April) ran up to 52 days for a single ship. 

The report cited note 41 (3) gives the following "average number of days elapsed since ship 

arrived in Gulf until discharge completed": March, 50; April, 51 ; May, 45; June, 40; July 26. 

" Prior to receipt of the Allin recommendation in Washington, the home office of PGSC 

had prepared a report for General Connolly indicating that a maximum of 200,000 long tons 

per month of shipments was under discussion. Rpt of Activities 7-29 Mar 43, Proposed Opns, 

27 Mar 43.336.01 International Agreements, SL 9012. 
402 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

tinct feeling that the officers have been passed over in the matter of 

promotions," and insufficient recreation and rest camp facilities for 

the men. This last matter was remedied before midyear by planning 

and new construction which had been impossible at the beginning. 

Exception was also taken in the reports to the transfer to other duties 

of the first Khorramshahr port commander, it being asserted that he 

was a trained shipping man and that his place was taken by a nonshipping man who was a "previous acquaintance of the Commanding 

Officer of the Basra District." On this matter the position of the commanding officer of the district and director of ports was that although 

the first man was a shipping man he was not a successful administrator; 50 and it is a matter of record that the second Khorramshahr 

port director served in that capacity only some two months, being relieved by the director of ports, like his predecessor, for "failure to 

produce." 51 General Styer reported to General Somervell the "gratifying results" being obtained by their successor, Col. Bernard A. Johnson.5e To assist in port operations, the Allin reports of April urged the 

assignment to the theater of "an officer skilled in stevedoring," an 

assignment which had been asked of Washington by the command in 

that very month, when Maj. Emery C. Creager of the Los Angeles 

Port of Embarkation was requested by name. When by the following 

July Washington had done nothing about it, Lt. Col. Benjamin C. 

Allin renewed his request directly to General Gross, and Major Creager 

was ordered to Iran 17 July.53 He was followed shortly by Col. Hans 

Ottzenn, Superintendent of the Water Division, New York Port 

of Embarkation, detailed by the Transportation Corps on the orders 

of General Somervell and with the concurrence of General Connolly 

to visit Khorramshahr and inspect stevedoring operations with a view 

to correcting any observable deficiencies. On 5 August Colonel Ottzenn 

informed General Connolly that he was unable to make recommendations for improvement in port operations "other than those which 

upon investigation I find are already planned .... " At the same time 

Colonel Ottzenn urged the War Department to see that the vVSA did 

not reduce shipping to the Persian Gulf as urged by Colonel Allin's 

reports. The command's monthly capacity figures, he felt, accurately 

reflected current ability to handle cargoes and use Corridor facilities 

00 Rpt cited n. 41 (3). 

" Rad cited n. 34. 

" Ibid. 

" (1) Dunham, p. 121 and n. 87. (2) As of 1 August 1944 Lt. Col. Emery C. Creager 

was Operations Officer, Water Division, Ports Service. List of Personnel Assignments as of 

1 Aug 44. PCF 26-A. 
PORT OPERATIONS 403 

to capacity, which would be wasted and partly idle if ship arrivals 

were diminished.54 

The allotment of total shipping to Persian Gulf ports was a matter 

of top war policy. While General Connolly strove to develop maximum 

capacity to handle what higher authority shipped to him for the USSR 

and while the USSR strove continuously to obtain ever increasing tonnages, 'V'ashington had to apportion shipping within the total requirements of a global war. An instance of the Russian pressure was passed 

on to General Connolly from the American lend-lease representative 

in Moscow in June 1943. During the discussions over the Third Protocol tonnages-those to be supplied the USSR from July 1943 through 

June 1944-the Soviets, aware of Washington talk of reducing Persian 

Gulf shipments, complained that General Connolly's capacity was not 

being fully used and urged increased rather than decreased shipments. 

On the other hand, Washington's effort to balance its global program 

was reflected when, in March 1944, the War Department indicated 

that after April tonnage should drop to 160,000-180,000 long tons, 

and not again exceed 200,000 long tons. Furthermore, the command 

in the field was cautioned to clear with Washington before agreeing 

to Soviet requests for increased commitments. The word was to cooperate with the Soviet "within the scope of our present commitments." 55 

Matters had obviously improved since the early months of 1943; 

but there was to be one more report which upon reaching Washington 

caused elaborate repercussions. The Allin reports had contained the 

following reference to relations between the command and the WSA: 

Effort should be made to secure the co-operation of the officer personnel with 

representatives of the War Shipping Administration. Of all the theaters we visited, 

this is the sole exception where the assistance of the War Shipping Administration 

representatives has not been received and made use of. It is our opinion that in this 

theater the lack of co-operation is the fault of the Army and not the War Shipping 

Administration. 

It will be recalled that before the coming into effect in late 1942 of 

the SOS Plan the indirect shipping interests of the United States in 

the Persian Gulf had been looked after by the U.S. Naval Observer, 

.. (1) Rpt, Col Hans Ottzenn to Gen Connolly (through Dir of Ports), 5 Aug 43. Hq, 

ASF, Theaters of Opns, PGC (13) 1942-1944, HRS DRB AGO. General Connolly forwarded 

this report to General Somervell under covering letter of 11 August 1943. (2) Rad, Col 

Ottzenn to Gen Gross, 5 Aug 43. Same file . 

.. (1) Rad, Gen Faymonville to Gen Connolly signed Standley, 12 Jun 43. 400.3295 

Lend-Lease Russia, SL 9021. (2) Memo, Col N. M. Martin to CG, PGC, 26 Mar 44, 

reporting on conferences in Washington and transmitting OPD instructions. 322 War Dept 

Conference on Theater Administration 1944, No.1 Organization, SL 8961. 
404 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

Basra, and by the regional director of WSA, Mr. Seaholm. In the early 

days of the new regime under the SOS Plan, as the American command 

gradually assumed more and more direct responsibility for shipping as 

a part of its logistic mission in the Corridor, WSA, as has already been 

stated, had performed certain functions at the ports in liaison with the 

War Transport Executive Committee. But as the American command's 

organization expanded to handle increasing responsibilities, Movements and other regulatory offices were establi::,hed to operate, for efficiency's sake, within the chain of military command. Inevitably WSA's 

functions became increasingly advisory. 

Under date of 20 June 1943, and in Mr. Seaholm's absence in the 

United States, Oscar A. J. Henricksen, assistant regional director, addressed a letter to the Director, Foreign Service Division, WSA, Washington. 56 Although it was a personal letter transmitting personal 

impressions, its author stressed its official importance. He wrote: 

Mac, these are harsh words but they are the truth and if anybody ever sat down 

and wrote about the actual conditions out here and they were published in the 

United States, all I have to say is that somebody better get out from under. There 

have been numerous representatives of the Army investigating the conditions at 

Khorramshahr, but as to the actual report turned in, no one knows. 51 In this connection I wish to state that I take personal responsibility for everything mentioned 

in this letter, let the chips fall where they may. 

The 'VSA on 3 July passed the letter on to General Burns, Executive, 

Munitions Assignments Board, Combined Chiefs of Staff, who for-

''Yarded it to General Somervell, who sent it to General Connolly with 

a letter containing the following passage: 

I ('"nelose copies of correspondence that reflect upon the discipline of port troops 

and the efficiency of the operations of your port organization at Khorramshahr. 

There have been other reports of a similar nature indicating a lower state of discipline, a poorer relationship with WSA authorities, and less efficiency of technical 

stevedoring operations than obtains in any similar location in the world. 58 

•• (1) Ltr, Oscar A. J. Henricksen to W. S. McPherson, 20 Jun 43. PGF 26-A. Another 

copy Hq, ASF, Theaters of Opns, PGC (13) 1942-1944. HRS DRB AGO. Other documents 

referred to in the text following and filed in the latter file are: (2) Ltr, Gen Somervell to 

Gen Connolly, 10 Ju143. (3) Rad SPTTT 7, Gen Gross to Gen Styer, 10 Ju143. (4) Rad 

cited n. 34. (5) Memo, Gen Styer for Gen Somervell, 24 Jul 43, sub: Rpt on Investigation 

of Complaint Made by WSA Representative at Basra re Handling of Shipping by PGSC. 

(6) Rpt and Rad cited n. 54. (7) Ltr cited n. 54 (1). 

" An apparent reference to Colonel Allin and Captain Stone. The reports were known to 

General Connolly, the Chief of Transportation, Washington, and the Commanding General, 

ASF, Washington, to whom the full versions were submitted, and to the following officers 

of the command in the field to whom Colonel Allin communicated his full views in a personal 

conference on 22 April: the executive officer of Basra District, Colonels Osborne, R. C. L. 

Graham, A. C. Purvis, Maj. J. V. Story, and Capt. A. B. Swank. No representative of WSA was present at this meeting . .. An apparent reference to the Allin reports. 
PORT OPERATIONS 405 

General Somervell announced his intention of sending Colonel Ottzenn 

to investigate, and of assigning "a competent officer to take charge of 

your stevedoring operations without delay." This was gratifying, in 

view of the theater's previous application for a stevedoring expert. 

General Somervell went on to speak of Henricksen's allegation that 

personal favoritism instead of shipping competence determined appointment of the Khorramshahr port commander, a charge likewise 

made in the Allin reports, and concluded, "I appreciate that this action 

is taken 59 without knowledge of the full story, but the unfavorable reports coming in and the low performance in unloading requires vigorous response by all of us." Through his chief of transportation, General 

Gross, General Somervell also requested his chief of staff) General 

Styer, who was in the CBI theater, to proceed to Khorramshahr "to 

look into complaint made by WSA representative." 

Arriving at Basra early on the morning of 15 July, General Styer 

was met by General Connolly and Henricksen (among others) and 

they proceeded with military staff members to Khorramshahr where 

a conference was followed by a tour of the docks. GO Before leaving for 

Cairo en route home next day, General Styer reported by radio to 

General Somervell, supplementing this message with a full written 

report dated 24 July. Henricksen explained to General Styer that 

his letter described conditions as of 31 May, that "he did not claim 

Army port operations inefficiently handled, but complained that in 

unloading of ships more attention was paid to meeting target than to 

care of cargo and wear and tear on ships' gear," that he "did not state 

that competent shipping personnel is not used," a statement attributed 

to him by the radios out of Washington, and, finally, that "considerable improvement" had occurred since 31 May and that he believed 

"that targets will be met unless there is a serious exodus of labor during 

the date picking season." 

The considerable time lag between the period covered by the WSA 

complaint and the visit of General Styer had brought about improvements. Thus the recooperage carried out aboard ship on badly packed 

cargoes, a procedure begun at the time of the Allin reports, now rendered less likely such spillage and waste as when Henricksen saw it 

"snow sugar and hail beans, and this is not a joke, as 1 have seen beans 

an inch deep on the dock which were later shoveled overboard." But 

the burning of drums of vegetable shortening, also reported by Henricksen, proved on investigation to have been an instance of a ship-

.91. e., dispatch of Colonel Ottzenn. 

eo At the conference and on the tour were Connolly and Styer, Booth, Osborne, and 

Johnson, Brennan and Hill (assistant to Brennan), and Henricksen and French of WSA. 
406 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

ment spoiled in transit and destroyed with Soviet concurrence after 

condemnation by the U.S. Army veterinarian.61 Unskilled native labor 

and inexperienced Army supervision were responsible along with defective packing for cargo losses and damage; but General Styer was disinclined to regard all of the instances complained of as indicative of 

fundamentally unsound conditions. He wrote, "Another instance 

pointed out by Mr. Henricksen concerned the capsizing of a barge 

loaded with some vehicles. He felt that this could have been prevented 

with proper supervision. This 1S not a daily occurrence. I have seen 

similar accidents happen in New York harbor with highly skilled 

crews." Likewise General Styer found that the complaint that port 

crews were undisciplined in their relations with ships' officers and 

crews was founded upon "only two instances," and that "Mr. Henricksen's statements about these were so general that I could get no 

more specific impression than that Mr. Henricksen thought they 

should accept suggestions from the ships' officers and crews in all cases 

and should not have talked back in the cases cited." 

General Styer concluded his report with tentative figures of target 

estimates and actual discharge. They showed that during the interim 

period to 1 May discharge did not come up to target but that in the 

third month (July) of full American responsibility the target was 

exceeded. "General Connolly," he wrote, "has a difficult job well in 

hand. In my opinion he now has it organized and built up with necessary facilities to the point where he will successfully accomplish his 

mission." 

General Connolly did not forward his accounting to General SomerveIl until after the arrival of Colonel Ottzenn. Colonel Ottzenn's 

favorable impression of conditions and steps being taken has already 

been noted. He too recorded that Mr. Henricksen was satisfied with 

present operations, and added figures to indicate the manpower handicap suffered at Khorramshahr. In contrast to the 5.4 Army Transport 

Service officers available for supervision of each ship at the New York 

Port of Embarkation, only 1.9 officers were available at Khorramshahr. 

General Connolly's letter of 11 August to General Somervell summarized the difficulties and concluded as follows: 

Considering the heat and other difficulties of the area, morale is high. Performance is the best standard for judging morale. You may be interested to know 

that the rate of movement of USSR supplies through the Corridor as set up for 

August is about five times the rate existing prior to the arrival of the PGSC, and 

the rate actually attained in July was four times that rate. The August rate (for 

Russian tonnage alone, and disregarding British, Iranian and PGSC cargo) is 

61 Rpt cited n. 41 (3). 
PORT OPERATIONS 407 

eleven times the maximum rate at which supplies moved over the Burma Road 

during its peak month. This should be sufficient evidence to any fair-minded person 

that the Command is not only efficient but has good morale.B2 

Tabulation of port discharge tonnages from July 1943 to the end 

of operations amply justifies the confidence of General Connolly, 

General Styer, and Colonel Ottzenn that, as General Styer put it, the 

command was "over the hump and will meet or exceed future forecasts if ships and cargo are furnished." The WSA did not institute a 

moratorium on shipping, and by the last month of 1943 total port 

discharge reached a tonnage which was only exceeded during one 

month in the busy year of 1944. In February 1944 the deputy representative of the British Ministry of War Transport for Abadan 

reported: 

One thing is quickly apparent to the observer, all junior officers have become 

exceedingly proficient at the work and there is a fine team spirit--quite apart 

from the keen competition between individual groups to turn out the best results 

each day.Bs 

The following December the WSA stated: 

With the U.S. Military, WSA has very cordial relations, due largely to the 

quality of the officers we have worked with and also to the fact that among them 

and the enlisted personnel are many men who have had previous experience with 

stevedoring, railroading, trucking, etc.54 

Performance ell 

The most pressing objective of the ports organization was to get 

ships unloaded and returned to sea. Ship discharge was the first link 

in the logistical chain, prerequisite to all others. During the period 

from the end of October 1942, months before the arrival of the American port troops, to 22 January 1943, "average turnaround time" according to WSA calculations was 55 days. In the first five months of 

1943, the period of greatest ship congestion at Persian Gulf ports, 

including the American-operated ports, the WSA noted: 

., What the general meant by "rate of movement" is obscure. The CBI Section, OCMH, 

states that between 11,000 and 20,000 long tons were hauled over the Burma Road in its peak 

month of December 1941. The general therefore does not seem to have meant long tons 

accepted in August by the USSR at their receiving points, as 157,388 long tons of all cargo 

(USSR, British, Iranian, American) were discharged at Khorramshahr and Bandar Shahpur 

in August 1943. 63 (1) Rpt, by R. Player, Feb 44. Gulf Dist 323.361. (2) Competition betwee.n port companies and battalions at berths was intensified by use of numbered flags accordmg to berth 

tonnage performance. It was rumored that wagers amounting to as much as $4,000 were 

made by various crew members. Hist Rpt, 9th Port, Mobile, Jun 43. PGF 12-F. 

54 Covering ltr cited n. 6. 

'" Charts 8, 9, 10, 11 and Table 3. 
408 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

59 vessels in the area remained 40 days or more. 

46 vessels in the area remained 50 days or more. 

33 vessels in the area remained 60 days or more. 

22 vessels in the area remained 70 days or more. 

9 vessels in the area remained 80 days or more. 

5 vessels in the area remained 90 days or more. 

Of the last group, one horrible example remained 124 days in port 

"before getting rid of her load"; but it is noted that she was "held up 

on priorities and for other reasons." G6 The note is a further reminder 

that port operation was not simply a matter of removing cargo from 

ships' holds. High turnaround time was not necessarily a reflection 

upon the stevedores, though of course speedy turnaround was impossible if operations were inefficient. Not only could turnaround 

figures produce a possibly misleading impression when scrutinized at 

a distance of ten thousand miles from Khorramshahr and Bandar 

Shahpur. Failure of discharge totals to come up to target estimates 

could also mislead if the estimates were not accurate. The Allin reports 

had observed that in the early months these estimates seemed sometimes impossibly high and unrelated to the realities, and in both April 

and May estimates were modified. 67 In time the mechanisms for producing accurate estimates improved, and the passing of the target in 

July 1943 marked not only this improvement but improvement in 

techniques of port operation as well. A 'V SA report shows that ship 

turnaround time fell steadily from an average of 51 days for April 

1943 to 18 in December, and dropped during 1944 to 8.2 in 

September.GS 

Improvement in the rate of discharge was a formidable factor in 

bringing operations in October 1943 to a current basis; but in that 

month some berths were vacant for several days because of a temporary 

diminution in shipping. This allowed clearance of all cargo from the 

Russian Dump. More ships arrived in November and December, and 

in the latter month Khorramshahr discharged over 155,000 long tons. 

On 21 December the American port troops at Khorramshahr unloaded 

7,041 long tons from seven ships. Two days later the Ministry of War 

Transport sent congratulations and dispatched men to study the 

til Pages 15, 19 of Rpt cited n. 6. lIT (1) Opus Directive Consecutive 1, Hq, Opus Div, PGSC, signed by Col Osborne, ACofS, 

Opns, 30 Mar 43, sub: Target for April. PGF 26-A. (2) Ltr, Port Opns Br, Gulf Dist, to 

CG, PGSO, 13 May 43, sub: Study of Port Perfonnance. PGF 26-A. (3) Ltr, CofS, PGSO, 

to CO, Gulf Dist, 31 May 43, sub: Estimated Ship Clearances. PGF 26-A . .. Page 20 of Rpt cited n. 6. The figures are ascribed to American command sources but 

do not tally with them in every instance. 
PORT OPERATIONS 409 

methods used. The record was exceeded on 13 February 1944 when 

7,693 long tons were likewise discharged from seven ships at Khorramshahr. On 8 March 2,458 long tons were unloaded from a single 

ship in 24 hours at Khorramshahr, and on 15 May Bandar Shahpur 

set a record not to be surpassed by discharging 4,475 long tons from 

a single ship in 24 hours. 69 

It should be realized that these figures, while correct as absolute 

measurements of achievement on a given ship at a given time, are no 

more indicative of relative efficiency than are the more abstract figures 

of average turnaround time or average tons per ship day. Because of 

the differences in ships, cargoes, and other variable factors, neither 

absolute daily discharge tonnages per ship nor abstract averages are 

reliable indexes of efficiency, as they are not based upon comparable 

factors. The number as well as the competence of labor gangs, the 

weather, and the nature of cargoes are too diverse to combine into 

comparable averages, and this is true in spite of the fact that operating 

officers found such averages, though abstract, to be useful day-to-day 

guides in estimating performance. For instance, the ship from which 

the record cargo was discharged at Bandar Shahpur carried a cargo 

of sugar in bags and possessed eight hatches instead of the usual five 

of Liberty ships. An unusual concentration of ships' gear, deck cranes, 

locomotive cranes on the dock, and the availability of an abnormally 

large working force all contributed to the record performance.7o An 

equally large labor party, using equal quantities of equipment in 

exactly similar weather, might, while working with equal skill and 

diligence, take twice as long to unload a ship whose cargo was diversified and cumbersome. Records should therefore be analyzed in the 

light of the considerations stated. Under the far from standard conditions in effect at Persian Gulf ports no statistically reliable means of 

recording comparable discharge tonnages existed. Total tonnages remain the best index of performance and efficiency. 

During the first six months of 1944 available shipping fluctuated 

and monthly discharge totals failed to reach the level attained in December 1943. While totals fell off somewhat, the abstract tons per 

ship day figures increased. Subject to the reservations in the foregoing 

analysis, the rising tons per ship day figures indicated that, in general, 

increased efficiency had less cargo to work on. During this period the 

Chief of Transportation, Army Service Forces, officially recognized 

increased efficiency in a letter stating that among U.S. Army overseas 

.. Pages 22,70,71 of Rpt cited n. 6. ,. Hist Rpt, Gulf Dist, May 44. PGF 13-Q. 
410 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

ports, Khorramshahr had placed second for discharge improvement, 

fifth for gross discharge, and tenth in turnaround. 71 

In July 1944, with 2,956 port troops on the job,72 Khorramshahr 

attained its peak performance by discharging 192,761 long tons of 

cargo, a comfortable improvement over the 41,421 long tons of the 

first month of American port operation there in January 1943. Sentab's 

seven berths and four anchorages were used almost to capacity, two 

berths being empty for a day. The port handled 34 ships that month30 carrying cargo for the USSR, 3 carrying U.S. Army cargo, and 1 

carrying both kinds. During July, 28 ships completed their discharge 

and sailed away. The installation for lighterage of heavy cargoes at 

Failiyah Creek took care of 70,069 long tons in July 1944 in contrast 

to 35,000 in April 1943 and its estimated capacity of only 9,000 in 

January 1943.73 

After July 1944 Khorramshahr operated below its capacity. In 

August, when the discharge total dropped to 124,004 long tons, there 

were fifty-seven empty berth days and a general relaxation of pressure.H 

The coming into use at the end of 1944 of the shorter Russian supply 

route through the Dardanelles was reflected in the decline of the 

Persian Gulf route. 

American operations at the Customs Jetty and at Khumba Wharf 

were discontinued in August, and thereafter Sentab Jetty's berths were 

often vacant. By March 1945 the primary functions of Failiyah Creek 

were the receipt and clearance of alkylate and cumene in drums for 

forwarding by rail to the USSR.76 In early March the remaining 

Soviet-bound cargo at the Russian Dump, including sheet steel, pipe, 

rails, oleomargarine, canned meat, and galvanized wire, was dispatched by rail and Soviet trucks. By the middle of the month the dump 

was terminated as an active installation. 

In March 1945 discharge at Khorramshahr had dropped to 30,216 

long tons. In effect, the port had completed its Russian-aid mission 

and turned its efforts to outgoing cargoes amounting that month to 

about half of the incoming total. In May the same proportions held 

good for Sen tab Jetty, while Failiyah Creek was busy barging outgoing 

T1 Ltr, covering period 1-15 Apr, CoITrans, ASF, 25 Apr 44, quoted Hist Rpt, Gulf 

Dist, Apr 44. PGF 13-P. 

1. Of these troops 1,800 were white, with 327 of them attached to headquarters companies; and 1,156 were Negro, with 34 of them attached to headquarters companies. Station 

List Hq, PGC, as of 31 Ju144, Sec. 3. PGF 230-S. 

i, (1) The operations during July 1944 at Sentab Jetty, Failiyah Creek, the Russian 

Dump, Customs Jetty, and Khumba Wharf are described in detail in Hist Rpt, Khorramshahr 

Port, Jul 44, PGF 16-S; and Hist Rpt, Gulf Dist, Jul 44, PGF 13-S. (2) Ltr, Col Booth to 

Mat Daniel P. Caulkins, 13 Jan 43. Gulf Dist 823.361. • Hist Rpt, Khorramshahr Port, Aug 44, p. 2. PGF 16-T. 

" Hist Rpt, Ports Serv, Mar 45. PGF 26-A-1. 
PORT OPERATIONS 411 

American locomotives. It was returned to the British on 24 June. The 

mission of Khorramshahr as a Russian-aid port was formally declared 

terminated as of 1 June 1945.16 During the months that followed the 

port's main job was evacuation of American equipment and troops. 

After hitting its stride in the latter half of 1943, Bander Shahpur's 

developed capacity was consistently underused. Strengthened by new 

construction, extensive use of lighterage, the sweat and grunts of port 

troops and native laborers, and mounting efficiency in the loading and 

dispatching of rall cars, the port was able to handle more tonnage than 

came to it in ships' bottoms. With discharge in December 1943 in 

excess of 71,000 long tons, the military strength at the port was 1,676.11 

But ships consigned to the port diminished in numbers until in April 

1944 only twenty-five out of a possible 150 berthing days were used, 

and no ships were docked between the eighth and twenty-first days 

of that month. The command, finding itself in the position of a restaurant keeper who does not know how much patronage to plan for, 

reduced the military strength of the port to 1,247 in July.78 But shipping 

rose and discharge reached its peak of 95,156 long tons in spite of the 

reduced military manpower. By the following November, with 1,508 

port troops, discharge had fallen to about one third proved capacity.'19 

December 1944 was the last month of Russian-aid operations at 

Bandar Shahpur, and the next month the Americans discharged 1,199 

long tons of British cargo before they climbed aboard boxcars for 

Ahwaz and Khorramshahr and new assignments. By the end of January the process of handing over to the British was virtually completed. 

A handful of American soldiers stayed on at Bandar Shahpur most of 

the year performing guard and caretaking duties.eo 

At Khorramshahr the Shatt al Arab River turns and for some 

twenty miles runs westward to Basra. Eight miles west of Khorramshahr the international boundary separates Iran from Iraq. By the 

terms of the Anglo-Iraqi arrangements of early 1941, the relatively 

well equipped little Iraqi port 81 was controlled by the British. It was 

the sea entrance to the British line of communication which extended 

to Baghdad, and, like Baghdad, with its Habbaniya military airport, 

Basra had its Shu'aiba military airport, both of them manned and controlled by the British under their treaty rights. Basra was, operationally 

,. Page 1 of Rpt cited n. 18 (3). 

" Rpt cited n. 32 (2). 

,. Of these troops 555 were white, 183 of them attached to headquarters companies; 692 were Negro, 18 of them attached to headquarters companies. Station List cited n. 72. 

'" Rpt cited n. 28. 

IORpt cited n. 20(3). 

II In 1941 its capacity was ahout 3,000 long tons a day. 
412 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

speaking, British. It was essential to the supply of the Tenth Army, 

and the gateway to the sea for the whole of PAl Force. Russian-aid 

activity at the port was therefore additional to the essential business of 

supplying the British Army. 

In the midst of this British area the SOS planners had proposed 

to assign to the American command responsibility for the operation 

of a lighterage basin known as Cheybassi. Cheybassi was not even a 

native village, though there were a few huts there in the palm grove 

along the river. In fact, as a port it was not even known as Cheybassi 

until the local name was officially adopted to distinguish the American 

operations there from the British depot activities about two miles 

downstream at Tanuma, whose name had been used for the whole 

region on the north (or east) side of the Shatt. 82 But although included 

in the SOS calculations for American operations, Cheybassi remained 

in British hands until 1 July 1943, landing lightered British military 

stores intended for the Tanuma Depot and an occasional consignment 

for the USSR. In all of 1942 no Russian-aid tonnage passed through 

Chevbassi. 

By early June 1943 it was apparent that the American Ports 

Service, having settled down to its tasks at Khorramshahr and Bandar 

Shahpur, was ready to take over Cheybassi. Colonel Booth so recommended on 2 June; an Anglo-American agreement ratified his recommendation on 23 June and set the date for taking over as 1 July. 

Cheybassi was designated a United States port with the same status 

as Khorramshahr and Bandar Shahpur. On 28 June 17 enlisted men 

and 6 officers arrived to take over, and by the end of July the station 

had reached a strength of 10 officers and 110 enlisted men of whom 

8 were from 9th Port and 75 from the 378th Port Battalion which had 

also started things off at Khorramshahr and Bandar Shahpur. Port 

troops filled supervisory and technical jobs. Native labor supplied by 

civilian contractors were stevedores, while directly hired natives were 

used for such station operations as intraport railway, utilities, and antimalarial work. As of 30 September 1943 there were 736 native laborers 

at Cheybassi.83 

8' The name was given to Cheybassi by Cir 53, Hq, PGSC, 20 JuI 43, as recommended by 

Ltr, Dir of Ports and Gulf Dist to CG, PGSC, for ACofS Opns, 1 JuI 43, citing recommendation in Min of Basra Port Committee, Mtg 416,24 Mar 43. PGF 26-A. 8l (1) Rad, Col Booth to Brig Gen Stanley L. Scott, CofS, PGSC, 2 Jun 43. PGF 162. 

(2) Min of Allied Mtg, 23 Jun 43. Gulf Dist 323.361. (3) Effective 6 Dec 43, Cheybassi 

became a subpart under the Port Comdr, Khorramshahr. GO 27, Hq, Dir of Ports and 

Gulf Dist, 5 Dee 43. PGF 26-A. (4) Hist Rpt, Cheybassi Port, JuI 43. PGF 162-G. (5) For 

Cheybassi see also Rpt, Port Facilities at Port of Cheybassi, prepared by Opns Div, Hq, PGC, 

for U.S. MA, Tehran, PGF 26-A; Hist Rpts, Gulf Dist, 1944, PGF 13; Ten-Day Rpts and 

Rpts of Cheybassi Port Opns, 1943, Gulf Dist 323.361. (6) The Port Comdr was Capt W. H. 

Besselman. 
PORT OPERATIONS 413 

The facilities, though modest, were more than adequate to take 

care of the traffic. There was the basin itself, jutting into the north 

bank of the Shau, flanked by wharves. There were a concrete runway 

into the water for use by amphibious vehicles, and raised concrete 

platforms for loading direct to rail cars. There were two 3-ton portal 

cranes and a 50-ton floating crane. Cargo came from ships in the stream 

or lying at the docks at Basra's port of Margil across the river from 

Cheybassi. Access was provided by rail and road. A meter-gauge rail 

line connected Cheybassi and Margil over a remarkable vehicular 

bridge whose center span sank into the river instead of rising to make 

way for ships. At Cheybassi's transfer yard this meter-gauge line met 

the standard-gauge, single-track spur of the ISR which the British had 

constructed in 1942, and this spur, like the ISR south of Tehran, was 

American operated.84 Access roads connected Cheybassi with Tanuma 

and Khorramshahr on its side of the Shatt, and with the Basra dock 

and business areas of Margil and Ashar on the opposite bank. In 

August the Cheybassi operating troops occupied new barracks built 

a mile and a half inland on the desert to avoid the mosquitoes which 

plagued the river bank. 

From the start, operations at Cheybassi differed from those at the 

other American ports. For one thing, there was much less variety in 

cargoes handled, Cheybassi's function being primarily to handle heavy 

cargoes like tanks which could not be trucked from the Basra area over 

the British highway route to Tabriz and which were therefore lightered 

to Cheybassi and put directly aboard ISR flatcars for the journey to 

Tehran. For a time petroleum products and alkylate in bulk tins and 

drums from the Abadan refinery were lightered to Cheybassi for transshipment to the USSR. In addition there was at all times an agreed 

American obligation to provide unloading at Cheybassi on twenty-four 

hours' notice for British military stores up to 200 long tons per day. 

Though the total never exceeded 2,500 long tons in a given month the 

proportion of British stores to USSR cargoes handled varied. Russianaid cargoes ranged through the period of American operation at 

Cheybassi from 50 percent to 90 percent of the total at a given time. 

In a second respect Cheybassi differed from Khorramshahr and 

Bandar Shahpur, for Cheybassi was, as it were, an American enclave in 

British country. Even its tonnages derived from British tonnages, for 

nearly every ton that was landed at Cheybassi by the Americans had 

already been discharged elsewhere under British operation. Relations 

were bound to be close, and co-operation was cordial and efficient. By 

.. In February 1945 it reverted to ISR operation. 
414 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

the Anglo-American agreement of June 1943, the American port commander operated the Cheybassi lighterage basin, adjacent docks and 

open storage areas, camp, and ISR railway spur. In return the British 

retained control over movements and security, maintained the wharves, 

and operated light and power services, while their IWT supplied lighters and tugboats along with a daily statement to the American commander as to lighter cargoes destined for his port. There is no record of 

difficulties arising over allocation of lighters such as occurred at the 

Iranian ports. It is a fair assumption that these things were more 

smoothly managed not only because the American and British forces 

were actually engaged at Cheybassi in joint work but because the 

American staff there was in direct and personal touch with the IWT. 

In one respect Cheybassi was similar to the other American ports, 

for all three developed more capacity than was used. Cheybassi, though, 

had not the comfort of reaching its full potentiality, if only once or 

twice. The SOS planners in 1942 had estimated a monthly tonnage of 

30,000 for the port. In August 1943 there were landed 19,731 long tons, 

being followed in December by a performance of 19,840 long tons. In 

the following eight months landings ranged between 12,000 and 19,000 

long tons; but the December figure was the peak, far below estimates. 

As in the case of the other ports, the organization was ready but the 

business went elsewhere, as the European war receded westward.8S 

Because Margil, the port of Basra, had been eliminated by Allied 

planning as a Russian-aid port and because the petroleum and alkyl ate 

shipments from Abadan had been diverted to Failiyah Creek, it was 

decided that Cheybassi was no longer required. With landings at the 

vanishing point in September, the port in effect returned to British 

control. Official transfer took place on 5 October 1944.116 In fifteen 

months of American operation total landings were 235,000 long tons. 

Four ports in the Persian Gulf area, although operated by the British, received Russian-aid cargo in which the American command had 

a direct interest. Bushire, the ancient seaport of Iran some 200 miles 

down the east coast of the Gulf beyond Khorramshahr, had been 

marked in the SOS Plan for American operation but was eliminated 

early in 1943. Until July it received consignments of crated motor 

vehides from the United States which were assembled at Bushire for 

delivery overland to the USSR. After July no Russian-aid cargoes 

passed through Bushire. Because of its possession of suitable dock facili-

., Hist Rpts, Gulf Dist, Aug 43-Aug 44. PGF I3-H, L, P, Q, R, S, T . 

.. (1) Hist Rpt, Gulf Dist, Oct 44. PGF 13-V. (2) Rad, Gen Booth to Brig Rhodes, info 

Col Osborne, 18 Aug 44. PGF 26-A. 
PORT OPERATIONS 415 

ties, the wharves on the island of Abadan in the Karon River just below 

Khorramshahr landed a substantial portion of the crated aircraft 

shipped from the United States for assembly at Abadan and delivery 

to the USSR Most of these aircraft were discharged first at Khorramshahr and barged to the British-operated docks at Abadan. At Ahwaz, 

seventy-seven miles up the Karun River, the British operated a barge 

terminal where, in the beginning, minor quantities of U.S. Army cargo 

and some Russian-aid cargo were landed from barges. The experiment 

of hauling U.S. Army cargoes by barge from Khorramshahr to Ahwaz 

was dropped by the end of April 1943.81 Because the American mission 

was primarily to speed the flow of supplies to the Soviet Union and 

because only 10 percent of the Ahwaz tonnage was destined for the 

USSR, Ports Service recommended that the American command 

should not take over Ahwaz operations from the British. Soon afterward 

both American and Russian-aid cargoes were diverted elsewhere. 

At Margil, the dock area on the Basra side of the Shatt al Arab 

River opposite Cheybassi (Basra is some two miles inland), Russianaid cargoes arrived in considerable quantities during 1943 and 1944, 

and American port officers were therefore stationed at Basra to coordinate movements with the British. Between June 1943 and November 1944 these cargoes totaled 446,430 long tons.S8 The lion's share 

of the total was discharged at Margil and trucked overland to Tabriz 

via the British-operated Khanaqin Lift. The balance was carried 

across the Shatt by lighter to Cheybassi and thence by the Americanoperated ISR to Tehran. Concentration of Soviet-bound freight in the 

latter half of 1944 at the American ports and abandonment of the 

Khanaqin trucking route reduced Margil's Russian-aid tonnage to a 

trickle in September 1944, and to nothing at all after November. 

After the inactivation of Ports Service in October 1945 and the 

taking over of its functions by Transportation Branch of Operations 

Division, close-out and evacuation loomed ahead, posing fresh problems. Indeed, for the ports men, who had to carry on until the last 

anchor was weighed, headaches were not to cease until the shore faded 

astern over the shimmering horizon of the Persian GUlf.89 

The return to the British in June 1945 of the lighterage terminal 

at Failiyah Creek left only Sentab Jetty among dock facilities under 

.f Command policy as announced by Col Osborne, ACofS, Opns, at meeting at office of 

Port Comdr, Khorramshahr, 23 Apr 43. Memo, signed by Maj Cornell, Ex Off, Office of the 

Port Comdr, Khorramshahr, 24 Apr 43. PGF 26-A. .. Page 46 of History cited n. 22 (1) . .. Colonel Ottzenn, who had returned to the United States after temporary duty in the 

Persian Gulf, came back in early December to assist in close-out and evacuation. Top Secret 

Book IV, p. 551, European Sec, QPD. 
416 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

American control, and even there the British firm of Gray Mackenzie 

& Co., Ltd., took over the handling of British shipping. 90 There remained only the formidable task of preparing to ship out men and 

equipment when the time should come. As of 30 November there 

were still 4,263 91 American troops in Iran and mountains of supplies 

and equipment. 

At that time, in response to a request from the War Department 

for shipping estimates, the command replied that its port troops, augmented by a civilian contractor, could outload ten Liberty ships and 

one locomotive carrier up to date of departure. After 1 January 1946 

the contractor, the American Iraqi Shipping Company,9Z could carry 

on. The ships were dispatched, all but the locomotive carrier; but the 

estimate proved altogether too optimistic, for it was reported to Washington on 15 December that by 27 December, the date upon which 

port operations would cease, Army port battalions would have loaded 

one ship with organizational equipment for the United States and one 

and one-half ships with United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration rolling stock for China, leaving cargoes for eight and onehalf ships and one locomotive carrier to be loaded by the contractor 

after departure of troops. This amounted to 70,000 weight tons of 

railway rolling stock, 20 locomotives, and 270 trucks. The contractor 

worked on through January and February and the last ship left for 

China on 24 February 1946. 

Meanwhile, about 1,000 troops left by air and small cargo ships, 

and the Iranian Army on 26 December assumed security responsibility 

for Khorramshahr and began taking over control of the port. Beginning 

on that day the remaining troops began to board the transport General 

Richardson. On 30 December the transport sailed, and the American 

job at the Persian Gulf ports was history.93 

OORpt cited n. 20(3). 11 Strength of the Army, prepared for War Department General Staff by Machine Records 

Branch, Office of Adjutant General, under Direction of Statistics Branch, GS, 1 Dec 45, p. 6. 

See also Table 12 and Chart 2 . ., A subsidiary of American Eastern Corporation whose Basra representative was Mr. 

Seaholm, formerly with WSA. 

"The following Rads have been drawn upon: WARX 85023, WARCOS to CG, AMET, 

24 Nov 45; PX 32580, CO, PGSC, to WARCOS, 25 Nov 45; Ocean Traffic Br, Water Div, 

CofTrans, to CO, PGSC, 6 Dec 45; PX 32640, Hq, PGSC, to WD, 8 Dec 45; DTG 121117Z, 

Hq, PGSC, to WD, 12 Dec 45; PX 32700, CO, PGSC, to WD, 15 Dec 45; BD 200, CO, 

Abadan Field, to WD, 25 Feb 46. Ocean Traffic Br, Water Div, OCofTrans. 
CHAPTER XIX 

Target Zero 

Before the last man crossed the gangplank of the General Richardson many men had consumed many reams of paper for more than a 

year planning for that inevitable moment. On 12 May 1945, four days 

after V-E Day, the War Department designated the Persian Gulf 

Command an inactive theater. This action was one of a series of steps 

which included the disbandment of the Motor Transport Service on 

1 December 1944, the closing of the port of Bandar Shahpur for 

Russian-aid purposes that month, the ending of aircraft and motor 

vehicle assembly early in 1945, the relinquishment of the railway in 

June, and a progressive contraction in function, structure, and personnel paralleling the falling off of incoming shipments. Later in May 

General Marshall notified PGC that its mission would be declared 

accomplished on 1 June. On that date the target would become zero.l 

The Chief of Staff's message also indicated that operation and 

maintenance of transport agencies would revert to the British by 1 July, 

an aim not fully achieved by that date. Circumstances altered cases in 

the ending of things, even as in their early planning. Indeed, the nonexistent powers of divination and infallible judgment were no less 

prerequisite to a perfect ending than to a flawless beginning. Of the 

two, divination would perhaps have been the handier in planning to 

close out the PGC. 

To dismantle and dispose of its installations and provide for its 

men was the job to be done. But how? where? when? It would have 

been convenient to know when the war in Europe would end. Some 

thought they knew, but their calculations were badly jolted by the 

Battle of the Bulge in December. It would have helped, also, to know 

how fast and how fully to bring into use the Black Sea shipping route 

to Russia after the Mediterranean was cleared of the Axis. It would 

have been invaluable to know what to do about the continuing war 

1 (1) Rpts, Ex Off to CofS, to CofS, PGC, for May 45. PGF 251-C. (2) Rad WARCOS, 

24 May 45. 323.361 General Connolly's Letter of Instructions with Amendments, SL 9008. 

(3) HOTI, Pt. VII, Ch. 1, The Closing of the Command, by Victor H. Pentiarge, Jr. PGF. 
418 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

against Japan; whether, for instance, to move the PGC apparatus, 

lock, stock, and barrel, off to the Far East, as General Connolly once 

proposed. Men planned as they could for what they could foresee; 

but the Japanese signature, affixed aboard the Missouri on 1 September 

1945, set them to planning anew. With the sailing of the General 

Richardson evacuation of the command's troops was completed. On 

the last morning of 1945, as Khorramshahr stirred, a note, long heard, 

was silent. No bugle sounded reveille. The Americans had gone. 

The Process of Contraction 

The progress of the war in Europe in the summer of 1944 not only 

aroused hope, too soon proved vain, of an early German surrender, 

but, by removing the Eastern Front farther and farther from the 

Persian Gulf supply line and by dearing the Mediterranean Sea, made 

it feasible to plan for a shorter sea route to the USSR by way of the 

Black Sea. The strategic necessity for further large-scale shipments 

through the Persian Corridor was diminished. Beginning in September 

the Army Service Forces (ASF) at Washington prepared a series of 

studies to determine the future of the PGC.2 The purpose of the studies 

was to reconcile existing Persian Corridor supply obligations with current developments. The supply obligations to the USSR were established by the several protocols, of which the Fourth (Ottawa) Protocol, 

though not formally signed until 17 April 1945, was planned for the 

period between 1 July 1944 and 30 June 1945. Two sets of plans for 

reduced operations were required, both subject to change in view of 

the highly fluid conditions. By the first set, the ASF at Washington 

had to determine how long and to what extent to continue Corridor 

operations; by the second set, the PGC had to plan, within targets fixed 

by \Vashington, how to reduce its operations. Only one point was 

wholly clear when the planning began in September and that was that 

PGC was scheduled for progressive reduction. It was so notified on 

15 September 1944, and ordered to prepare plans accordingly. The 

ensuing plans, code-named KARO, will be noticed later.3 

An ASF study of 15 January 1945 notes the following tonnages allocated under the Fourth Protocol to be shipped from the Western 

Hemisphere to USSR receiving points: 

, (1) A study prepared by Theater Br, Planning Div, Office of Dir of Plans and .O~ns, 

ASF,5 Sep 44. Conti Div, ASF, Sp Coll, HRS DRB AGO. (2) A study, 15 Jan 45, revlewlOg one of 24 Oct 44. 384 Conduct of War with Relation to Commands, SL 9016. I Rpts, Ex Off to CofS, to CofS, PGC, 13 Dec 44 and 1 Jan 45. PGF 251-C. 
TARGET ZERO 419 

Via the Far East route _____________ ~ __ 3, 719,497 long tons 

Via north Russian ports _______________ 2, 032, 754 long tons 

Via Persian Gulf and Black SeL________ 870,416 long tons 

TotaL__________________________ 6, 622, 667 long tons 

It had already been decided that PGC would be closed out as soon as 

the Black Sea route and a contemplated route through the Baltic could 

assume its undelivered tonnages, and in accordance with this basic 

policy the PGC had been notified on 11 November 1944 that the MTS 

would be discontinued forthwith. This was the first major reduction 

in the command's operating machinery. By the date of the January 

study only 287,273 long tons remained to be shipped under the Fourth 

Protocol allocations from the Western Hemisphere via the Persian Gulf 

route and the Black Sea route to whose ports the first ships came that 

month. Spread over the remaining life of the Ottawa Protocol, that 

total, to which must be added petroleum products transported through 

the Corridor from Abadan, fell far below the developed port and inland 

clearance capacity of the Anglo-American forces. In view of this fact, 

it was incumbent upon the planners to consider whether the PGC could 

not be shut down altogether rather than continued at much less than 

its capacity. The problem was colored by two unknowns: the duration 

of the war in Europe and the peculiar circumstances governing the use 

of the Pacific route to eastern Siberian ports. This route was affected by 

uncertainty as to Japan's attitude toward it. By means of the Siberian 

shipments, the United States, at war with Japan, was reinforcing the 

USSR, ally of the United States and enemy of Japan's ally, Germany. 

But, because the USSR was neutral in the war between Japan and the 

United States, Japan did not blockade shipments to Soviet ports. To 

obviate interception of American vessels at sea bound for Soviet ports, 

some one hundred and twenty-five American ships in this service were 

transferred under lend-lease to Soviet control. The fear that this somewhat unreal contrivance might be exploded whenever it suited Japan's 

convenience overhung the operation from its inception. 

Two conditions were therefore posited in the ASF study: (1) Could 

the PGC be shut down if Japan closed the Pacific route and thus threw 

the entire burden of shipment under the Fourth Protocol upon the 

remaining routes? (2) Could the PGC be closed out if the Pacific route 

remained usable? In the first case it was decided that the PGC must 

operate until the Black Sea route, whose estimated capacity for February was set at only 40,000 long tons per month, could reach 269,000 

long tons per month, or, in the event of the defeat of Germany, the 
420 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

Black Sea route and the Baltic together could handle that amount. It 

should be noted that this plan envisaged supplying the USSR after the 

defeat of Germany. What actually happened was that on 12 May, after 

the capitulation of Germany, the Fourth Protocol ceased to be operative 

and was replaced by other arrangements for continuing supply to the 

USSR. 

It was concluded in the January study that, if the Pacific route 

should remain open, all PGC activities could be discontinued by April 

except those required to ensure the movement of petroleum products, 

and these, it was suggested, might well be taken over by the British. 

The paper therefore recommended stopping motor vehicle assembly 

operations at the Khorramshahr plant by 1 April, by which time it was 

estimated that unassembled vehicles on hand in January, plus those to 

be delivered through March, would be disposed of with the aid of the 

British plant at Rafadiyah. 

The ASF transmitted its study to the Operations Division on 16 

January with recommendations to accept and, in case the decision was 

to discontinue PGC, to arrange with the British to continue petroleum 

deliveries from Abadan to the Soviet Union. On 24 January OPD notified the ASF that PGC would have to be continued as assurance against 

the closure of the Pacific route, at least until deliveries via the Corridor, 

added to those that could be achieved via the Baltic and Black Seas, 

reached 269,000 long tons monthly. But any excess above that figure 

was to be subtracted from the PGC target and the PGC's operations 

and strength reduced accordingly. The Commanding General, ASF, 

was instructed that when in his opinion PGC could be eliminated he 

was to recommend its closing to the general staff.' 

On 3 February General Scott, formerly Chief of Staff, PGC, and 

now Director of the Planning Division, ASF, wrote to General Booth 

that planning for the PGC in the field would be affected by the imminent removal of the Khorramshahr assembly plant for shipment to the 

Soviet Union and by the limit of the capabilities of the Black Sea ports. 

From then until the surrender of Germany in May, PGC planning 

strove to provide for progressive reduction of operations within a flexible range of diminishing targets. The reduction of the target to zero 

by 1 June, and Washington's desire that transport operations be handed 

over by 1 July, put subsequent planning on a less uncertain basis. 

Henceforth not slowdown, but close-out, was the goal; the only uncertain element was the time limit to be applied. 5 

• (1) Ltr, Gen Styer to OPD, 16 Jan 45. Filed as in n. 2(2). (2) Ltr, Gen Hull to CG, 

ASF, 24 Jan 45. Same file. • Ltr, Scott to Booth, 3 Feb 45. Filed as in n. 2 (2). 
TARGET ZERO 421 

By the time word came that the command's mission was accomplished and its target zero, reduction plans (KARO Plans A and C) had 

been approved and put to work. Plan A, effective 5 January 1945, was 

adjusted to a monthly capacity of 194,000 long tons. Though nearly 

100,000 tons under the 1944 peak load, the Plan A figure exceeded 

anything actually attained in 1945. The precipitate drop in tonnages 

which came with the new year was not even faintly suspected in the 

year-end planning. (Chart 8, Appendix B) KARO Plan C, prepared 

in readiness for lowered targets, became effective in April after receipt 

of a War Department message drastically reducing monthly POL requirements to 40,000 long tons and shaving dry cargo down to a mere 

10,000 long tons monthly. Staff and operating agencies were busy applying the pattern of Plan C to their own jurisdictions-the plan called 

for a reduction of command troop strength to about S,OOO-when the 

message of 24 May arrived slashing target all the way down to zero. 

The subsequent KARO Plan E, adopted in .Tune, concentrated therefore 

on evacuation and redeployment; but it did not go into effect until the 

PGC had been structurally absorbed into the American command at 

Cairo.6 

This development was sparked by a War Department message in 

July to Cairo and Tehran that PGC might be reincorporated into 

AMET (USAFIME was redesignated the Africa-Middle East Theater 

on 1 March). General Giles of AMET dispatched a plane load of 

officers to Tehran to study the problems involved in consolidation.7 

A report for the Chief of Staff, PGC, presented by Operations Division, 

reviewed the effect of consolidation upon the organization and work 

of that division. While the tasks of the petroleum adviser, and the 

Control, Documentation, and Plants Branches could be closed out, 

and air services improved, the duties of Movements and Engineering 

Branches, it was concluded, would be hampered by subordination 

of PGC to AMET. In the case of Movements Branch, direct relations 

with WSA at Khorramshahr and with Washington and the local 

British command in obtaining shipping space for personnel and supplies would be subjected to additional channels of command with 

resultant delay and loss of efficiency. The work of the Engineering 

Branch in preparing construction cost data and final property records 

would be embarrassed by the necessity of adjusting to AMET's dif-

• Rpts, Ex Off to CofS, to CofS, 10, 24 Jan, 22 Mar, 25 Apr, 8, 14,22 Jun, and 5 Ju! 45. 

PGF 25l-C. T Rad WARX 36990, WARCOS to Cairo and Tehran, 23 Jul 45, and Rad, 

COMGENAMET to Booth, 24 Ju145. Filed as in n. 2(2). 
422 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

ferent procedures and rules as to fixed assets, agreements with the 

British, and declarations of surpluses.s 

On 3 August the War Department ordered consolidation of PGC 

under AMET, effective on 1 October. The conditions were to be agreed 

upon in accordance with the recommendations to be made by PGC. 

General Booth was ordered back to the United States as of 15 August, 

and was succeeded by Colonel Anderson. A further message late in 

August confined the responsibilities of the headquarters at Cairo and 

Tehran to support of the Air Transport Command, general supervision 

of remaining lend-lease activities, disposal of salvage, excess, and surplus properties, and the reduction of strength commensurate with these 

duties. 9 

Conferences and correspondence carried on by the authorities of 

PGC and AMET, in spite of producing the somewhat less than precise 

statement that PGC was to "continue operating more or less independently" of Cairo, settled the general basis of the approaching consolidation.IO V-J Day clarified, though it could not exactly fix, the time 

element, hitherto wholly uncertain, and left only administrative details 

to be agreed upon. PGC stipulated that it must continue to handle all 

movement matters as before, through direct communication with WSA, 

the British Ministry of War Transport, the British Army, and Washington, and must process its own excess personnel. PGC conceded that 

AMETwas to have the last word in awards and promotions, except that 

promotions of enlisted personnel would remain the prerogative of the 

PGC. The terms of consolidation agreed between Cairo and Tehran 

were embodied in AMET's general order establishing a Persian Gulf 

Service Command as a subcommand of AMET and a Letter of 

Instructions later issued by General Giles to Colonel Anderson. These 

documents brought the American command in the Corridor one step 

nearer to the final dissolution which was officially recorded as effective 

31 December 1945.11 

• Memo, ACofS for Opns, for CofS, 25 Jul 45, sub: Consolidation of PGC with AMET. 

Filed as in n. 2(2) . 

• (1) Rad W ARX 43729, W ARCOS to Cairo and Tehran, 3 Aug 45. Filed as in n. 2 (2). 

(2) Rad WARX 55388, WARCOS to Cairo, Liberia, and Tehran, 27 Aug 45. Same file. 

,. Memo, CofS, PGC, for all Stf Divs, 7 Sep 45, sub: Confs with Hq, AMET, Regarding 

Consolidation on 1 October. Filed as in n. 2(2). Another copy 323.361 Powers and Duties, 

SL 9008. 

II (1) GO 83, Hq, AMET, 21 Sep 45. Filed as in n. 2(2). Ltr of Instructions, Giles 

to Anderson, 25 Oct 45. 323.361 General Connolly's Letter of Instructions, SL 9008. (3) As 

of 15 September 1945, the last roster of the several headquart,'rs of PGC showed at Tehran, 

in addition to Colonel Anderson and Colonel Woodworth as commanding officer and chief 

of staff respectively, a staff judge advocate, a chief surgeon, an inspector general, and directors 

of fiscal, administration, operations, supply, and military railway divisions. Only two other 

important headquarters existed in the dwindling command. At Khorramshahr, Col. Louis T. 

Vickers was commanding officer; at Amirabad Post, Maj. Winsor L. Finney, Jr., was com-
TARGET ZERO 423 

Within the command itself the process of contraction, begun with 

the first KARO plan, became a long-drawn-out sequence of detailed 

actions, confusing and even disconnected if itemized, but coherent 

when viewed in perspective as a whole. 12 The underlying pattern of 

the process was the gradual shift of functions from agencies to which 

they had been delegated back to the source of command authority and 

responsibility, the commanding general and his general staff. After the 

disbandment of the MTS at the end of 1944, the next part of the 

machinery to go was the scheme of territorial districts whose functions 

were absorbed by other agencies. The Mountain District disappeared 

in January 1945, its functions being taken over by Amirabad Post; 

Desert District folded its tents soon after, as Andimeshk Post took 

over; and in February Gulf District handed over to Ports Service at 

Khorramshahr. 

The next step, which came in June, brought further consolidation 

of structure to reflect concentration of function. Amirabad Post took 

over housekeeping, administration, and supervision for all installations 

north of Andimeshk; Ports Service for all south of Andimeshk. 

Andimeshk itself continued those duties for the post and for what remained of the installations at that once important rail-to-truck transfer 

point which had embraced not only Camp Kramer, MTS Camp 

Number 4, and the great ordnance depot, but also the headquarters 

of Desert District and the Southern Division of MTS. After 25 June 

the Iranian Government, having taken over the operation of the ISR 

from the British, ran the trains south of Tehran, while MRS personnel 

assembled and prepared rolling stock for outward passage. Nearly 

3,500 freight cars were knocked down at Ahwaz and fifty-seven diesel 

locomotives formerly used by the MRS were shipped out of the command before September. 

By 1 July only Amirabad and Khorramshahr remained as important 

American posts. The road camps dotting the long route of the truck 

convoys were, with five exceptions, all closed and put under security 

guard early in 1945. The exceptions were lent for short periods to 

British or Soviet agencies. In October Iranian forces of the Army or 

Gendarmerie assumed guard responsibility for the closed road camps. 

manding officer. See Ltr, CO, PGSC, for House Subcommittee on WD Appropriations, 

5 Oct 45, sub: Rpt Concerning the PGC. AMET 314.7 Military Histories, PGSC, SL 8997. 

(4) Rad, Giles to WARCOS, 10 Jan-46. CM-IN 2277, Organization Directory File, AGO. II The chief steps are recorded in: (1) Memo, Booth for all Stf Divs and Dirs of Servs, 

12 Dec 44, sub: Reorganization of the PGC. PGF 240. Another copy 323.361 Powers and 

Duties, SL 9008. (2) Ltr, CofS to Dir, 3d MRS, sub: Transfer of Jurisdiction to MkS Camps. 

Latter file. (3) Rpt, CO, PGC, to CofS, 30 Sep 45, sub: Final Rpt from PGC. PGF 259. 

(4) GO's, Hq, PGC, 1945: 11,12 Jan; 16, 18 Jan; 19,20 Jan; 22, 31 Jan; 36, 24 Feb; 65, 

21 Jun; 78, 15 Jul; 92,14 Aug; 93,15 Aug; and (Rq, PGSC) 111,10 Oct 45. 
424 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

On 11 October the remaining functions of Ports Service were assumed 

by Transportation Branch, Operations Division, as Ports Service was 

disbanded. 

With the command's last transport responsibilities focused at Khorramshahr and its other duties concentrated on evacuation and liquidation of property, the continuance of GHQ far to the north at 

Tehran, while the outward tide flowed southward, came seriously into 

question as early as July. In a message to General Marshall, then at 

the Potsdam Conference, General Booth stated that he would like to 

keep headquarters at Tehran until 1 November. He estimated that 

between 700 and 800 men would be required there to man ATC 

operations, headquarters, the liquidation office, and maintenance and 

security activities. He added that, if necessary, headquarters could be 

moved to Khorramshahr earlier, leaving liaison and liquidation groups 

at Amirabad, but that this would be done "at considerable handicap 

in efficiency and some delay in program." 13 

On 15 September GHQ was removed from Tehran to Khorramshahr, leaving within the city limits of Tehran the few officers and 

men of the U.S. Military Missions to the Iranian Army and Gendarmerie, and at Amirabad 53 officers and 402 men, a contingent which 

fell by 30 October to 51 officers and 286 men. Of this total, 254 were 

engaged in maintenance and security activities, while the rest were 

divided between liquidation duties and weather and communications 

units necessary to continuance of the movements of ATC and Headquarters Flight.14 

At the time of the move the duration of the Americans' stay at 

Amirabad was uncertain. It was understood that the British expected 

to leave fewer than 60 soldiers at Tehran after 15 October and to 

evacuate to Iraq shortly after that all of their 18,000 troops then in Iran. 

The Russians evacuated Qaleh Morgeh airport at Tehran on 18 September and were expected to remove all their troops from Tehran soon 

after that.15 The Americans planned to stay on at Amirabad as long as 

liquidation and ATC activities continued, and, if the camp were turned 

back to the Iranian Government before these activities ceased, to transfer remaining personnel to the American Embassy compound. But 

events moved more swiftly than anticipated, for Amirabad was taken 

over by the Iranian Army on 9 December. Remaining American personnel-with the exception of a handful of Airways and Air Communi-

"Rad P-31256, Booth to Marshall, 26 Ju145. Filed as in n. 2(2). 

"(I) Rad P-32135, COPERGULF to WARCOS, 18 Sep 45. Filed as in n. 2(2). (2). 

Rpt, Hq, PGSC, to AMET, 30 Oct 45. 323.361 AMET Powers and Duties, SL 9008. 1.0 (1) Rad cited n. 14(1). (2) Rad PX-32139, COPERGULF for WARCOS, info 

COMGENAMET and CONAFD ATC, 19 Sep 45. Filed as in n. 2 (2). 
TARGET ZERO 425 

cations Service, weather, and liquidation people-were ordered out of 

Tehran on the 15th, and the handful followed on the 25th.16 

That left only Khorramshahr. The camp there was taken over by 

the Iranian Army on 26 December, and from the next day outloading 

operations at the port were handled by the American-Iraqi Shipping 

Company assisted by 20 enlisted men discharged from service, working 

as civilians. An American civil airline, Transcontinental and Western 

Airways, accepted a contract to take over flights from ATC, aided by 

150 discharged A TC personnel turned civilians and 15 technicians 

similarly discharged from the Airways and Air Communications Service and Army Air Forces Weather Service.17 

Evacuation and Redeployment 

Although the plans for evacuation were on a somewhat more leisurely scale than those which were actually carried into effect, the 

reason was not a reluctance on the part of the Americans to leave Iran.18 

They were willing enough to go when the job was done. The question 

was, when could the job be considered done? Up to a late date some 

American planners reckoned on the terminal date for Allied evacuation, set by the Tri-Partite Treaty as six months from the cessation of 

hostilities between the Allies and Germany or Germany's associates. 

That date, which was later to figure in portentous international discussions because of the failure of the Russians to honor it, was 2 March 

1946. Others, recognizing that the United States was not a signatory 

to the treaty and desiring to give Iran no possible grounds for resenting 

an overstay of its welcome to the Americans, determined that regardless of British and Russian evacuation plans the Americans should not 

stand upon the order of their going, but go. As early as 25 July a message 

,. (1) Rad, Sasser (Tehran) to Anderson (Khorramshahr), 10 Dec 45. Filed as in n. 

2(2). (2) Rad, PGSC to War, signed Connolly, 17 Dec 45. CM-IN 4728, Organization 

Directory File, AGO. 

"Rad cited n. 16(2). 18 This section draws upon: (1) Rad WARX 76255, WAR COS to Cairo, info PGSC, 

16 Oct 45. Filed as in n. 2(2). (2) Rad, Marshall to Booth, 25 Jul 45. Filed as in n. 2(2). 

(3) Facts on File, V (May 30-June 5, 1945), No. 241, 175. (4) The New York Times, 

May 31, November 27, 1945. (5) Rad cited n. 13. (6) Rad WARX 65046, WARCOS to 

Tehran and Cairo, 15 Sep 45. Filed as in n. 2 (2). (7) AGO Ltr, 29 Nov 45, AGPO-A-N200.4 (28 Nov 45). (8) The last outgoing shipment included some 2,000 replacement troops 

whose arrival on 20 November 1945 the Department of State had attempted to forestall 

because of the possible adverse impression upon Iranian opinion of so late a reinforcement; 

but the ship which brought the new troops took away 1,170 men on 24 November. Rpts, 

Opns Div to CofS, PGSC, for Nov 45, PGF 251-B; and Rad cited in (1). (9) For redeployment accounts and estimates see: (a) Memo, Hq, PGC, for members of House Mil Affairs 

Committee, 25 Jun 45, sub: Redeployment of Troops from PGC. 319.25 Compilations and 

Gathering Data, SL 9008. (b) Rad cited n. 13. (c) Ltr, 25 Jul 45, sub: Estimated Strength 

of PGC Installations by Month, Aug through Nov 45. Secret and Security Room, ORB, 

RAC, Folder 23, Drawer 4, Cabinet 18, SL PGSC. 
426 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

from Potsdam to Tehran warned, "There may be a decision to withdraw from Iran within sixty days the greater part or all U.S. forces 

except for essential ATC units." The message added that the Russians 

and British had agreed to withdraw from Tehran "in the near future, 

and PGC should be withdrawn from Tehran immediately except for 

the minimum essential to operations conducted in the area." General 

Booth was requested to submit alternative plans for withdrawal of all 

nonessential forces within sixty and a hundred and twenty days. The 

question of Allied withdrawal from Iran had been raised by the government of Iran soon after the end of the war in Europe when, on 

30 May, it formally requested the three powers to restore a normal 

situation in Iran by removing their forces. General Booth reported to 

Potsdam on 26 July that the U.S. Ambassador at Tehran had informed 

him that, despite the Iranian Government's formal request for withdrawal, the Iranian Foreign Office continually urged the retention of 

American forces in Iran and reiterated its confidence in American 

intention to keep faith with the Declaration of Tehran regarding 

Iranian sovereignty. Later, as field plans indicated to Washington the 

time estimated to close out all commitments in orderly fashion, the 

War Department advised both Cairo and Tehran, "Political considerations make it important that U. S. not be subject to criticism for lagging 

in Tehran evacuation." 

On 2 October a conference of Allied foreign ministers at London 

ended after legalistic wrangling over a date for troop withdrawal had 

produced no agreement. On 24 November the United States delivered 

a note to the Soviet Union proposing 1 January 1946 for departure of 

all Allied troops from the country. Disorders had broken out in October 

in the province of Azerbaijan which culminated on 12 December in 

the declaration of an autonomous republic by a national assembly convened at Tabriz. The American note and a parallel suggestion by the 

British were rejected by the USSR, which pointed out that its treaty 

of 1921 with Iran permitted the right to introduce troops into the 

territory of Iran. President Truman nevertheless desired to speed 

evacuation of Allied forces and thus contribute to a settlement of the 

difficulties in Azerbaijan. Word was passed that American troops 

should leave the country by 31 December. Secretary of War Patterson 

dispatched General Connolly to Iran to see that this was done. 

The reduction of troop strength from the peak figure of midsummer 

1944 to the 4,000 who sailed away on the General Richardson proceeded over a period of more than a year in accordance with estimates 

which necessarily altered as controlling factors decreed. The plans 

which were made and unmade are of less significance than the fact 
TARGET ZERO 427 

of reduction. (Table 12 and Chart 2, Appendixes A and B) By V-E 

Day command strength had been reduced by approximately 16,000 

troops, who had been redeployed to other theaters. By the end of July 

command strength was down to 40 percent of its peak. Estimates made 

at that time of probable strength at the end of the year came very close 

to the actual fact. As fast as functions ceased, the men thereby released 

were shipped out of the command. The departure of the last man two 

months before the treaty date of 2 March 1946 was in accordance with 

the spirit in which they had come: to do a j<;>b, and then be off. 

Liquidation of Property 

No aspect of the history of World War II is open to greater misunderstanding than the disposal of property no longer deemed necessary to be held for the government. It is a subject virtually impossible 

to explore in limited space with hope of reaching the ultimate truth. 

For good or ill, the disposal of unwanted property after the war became 

so entangled in red tape as to be incapable of being reduced, at least 

on the theater level, to brief and reliable form. The problem was world 

wide, and this fact in itself made confusion worse confounded as field 

representatives of the military services, the Department of State, and 

the Foreign Economic Administration came into contact, at home and 

abroad, with representatives of the myriad agencies of government 

which had things to dispose of. In general, an article not required locally was declared "excess" to authorities next higher, and so on up 

to the top of the command, who could then certify the property as 

"excess" to the command. It was then available to be shipped elsewhere if it could be used elsewhere, or if not, a multiplicity of higher 

authorities were empowered to declare it "surplus." This made the 

property eligible for disposal. But there were numerous categories, and 

there was much hairsplitting and sharp definition, which resulted in 

complicating the process of disposal. Most of these were safeguards. 

Aircraft and items peculiar to aircraft, for instance, were to be disposed 

of through the Foreign Economic Administration; airfields could not 

be declared "surplus" without the approval of the Department of 

State; contracts for disposal were subject to final approval by various 

agencies. 

No reasonable person expects that, when wars are finished, their 

costs can be accurately estimated, or that materials built for war and 

not used can be exactly accounted for or usefully returned to the 

civilian economy. Who can say what was the cost of the Battle of 

Waterloo? Who, then, could cast up a balance sheet for the American 
428 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

operations in the Persian Corridor? No one will ever know what it 

cost, though the British and Americans poured a hundred million 

dollars into construction of fixed installations, though the books show 

that more than forty millions of dollars were paid to American soldiers 

from 1 January 1943 to 30 June 1945.19 1£ it is impossible to determine 

costs, then it is equally impossible to determine losses, and, because 

the entire expense was a part of the war effort, losses can with equal 

logic be set down as part of the price of getting some millions of tons 

of war supplies through to the USSR in time to be useful against the 

Germans. Misunderstanding of war property disposal results from 

supposing that the United States had been running a shop, keeping 

an orderly inventory, and accounting to stockholders for the use made 

of their investment in the shop. But shopkeeping and waging war are 

not comparable. Nevertheless the end of war imposes the obligation 

not to waste what is still usable. The difficulty is to interpret action 

taken in any given area, where, for instance, local authorities may 

have made what they regarded as the most eminently satisfactory disposal arrangements only to have them upset by higher authority; or 

where local authorities, sensing improper conditions attaching to local 

offers to buy, may have been required by higher authority, applying 

world-wide policies, to go ahead anyhow. 

In the Persian Corridor, the disposal of property no longer needed 

by the United States or impracticable to ship home was a job of complexity and delicacy-complex because of the variety of properties 

to be disposed of, delicate because a visitor who during the course of 

his visit has built some elaborate and expensive gadgets into his host's 

house is not in an advantageous bargaining position in offering to 

sell them to the host (who did not ask for them in the first place and 

had Ii ttle or no use for some of them in the second). The first command agency established to deal with the matter \\Oas the Property 

Disposal Branch of the Fiscal Division. 20 It was at about this time that 

General Connolly, relieved as Commanding General, PGC. was returned to 'Washington to become deputy commissioner of the joint 

Army-Kavy Liquidation Commission established to co-ordinate and 

consolidate disposal of properties. The Property Disposal Branch, 

which came under the direction of Colonel Stetson, Director of the 

Fiscal Division, was charged with "formulating policies, supervising 

disposal operations and maintaining necessary liaison with other 

19 HOTI, Pt. I, Ch. 10, History of the Fiscal Division, Hq, PCC, by Victor H. Pentlargc. 

Jr. PCFo 

20 CO 84, Hq, PCC, 15 Dec 44. 
TARGET ZERO 429 

agencies in matters pertaining to the disposition of fixed and movable 

property made surplus through the reduction of operations within this 

command." 21 Establishment of the Property Disposal Branch followed 

a War Department request to the theater to examine the possibility of 

disposing property to the Iranian Government. It formalized the concern, already shown in the command, that the British and American 

forces would pursue parallel policies toward the Iranian Government 

in the matter of property disposal and that in the settlement of property 

matters between them, especially in cases of joint Anglo-American 

ownership or joint capital investment, common principles of cost and 

other accounting could be agreed upon.22 

As the job grew greater, both actually and prospectively, the Property Disposal Branch was detached from the Fiscal Division on 23 February 1945 and set up directly under the chief of staff as the PGC 

Liquidation Commission, with Colonel Stetson at its head. The command had already been notified by 'Washington that, by one of those 

shifts of policy and realignments of responsibilities and redefinitions of 

categories which kept property disposal activities round the world in 

a turmoil for years, the responsibility of the Foreign Economic Administration for disposal of surplus Army and Navy properties, except 

aircraft and items peculiar to aircraft, would be taken over by the 

Army-Navy Liquidation Commission.23 Until April the PGC Liquidation Commission continued to gather data, co-ordinate local policies, 

and act as the bargaining agency in dealings with possible local purchasers. But in April the War Department authorized the liquidation 

commissioner to act for the Army-Navy Liquidation Commission, and 

the PGC commission was therefore dissolved and replaced by a field 

office of the Army-Navy commission, headed by Colonel Stetson. 24 This 

office was to dispose of surplus property other than salvage, which 

remained the responsibility of the PGC. In December 1945, when General Connolly came on from vVashington to speed the close-out, he 

brought along a group of experts, including Col. Hans Ottzenn of the 

Transportation Corps, Lt. Col. James W. Totten of OPD, and representatives of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the Air Forces, and Transcontinental and 'Western Airways.25 

Surpluses fell roughly into three categories, each calling for different 

methods of settlement or disposal. The largest of these included fixed 

installations, real estate, and leases. From the outset of American 

21 History cited n. 19. 

22 Ltr, Booth to Brig Jackson, PAl Force, 3 Nov 44. Abstract PGF 251-C. 

"Rpts, Ex Off to CofS, to CofS, 14 Jan 45. PGF 251-C. 

" GO 49, Hq, PGC, 24 Apr 45. 

" (1) Rpts, Ex Off to CofS, to CofS, 11 Apr 45. PGF 251-C. History cited n. 1 (3). 
430 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

operations the British had handled the acquisition of real estate for the 

United States and were reimbursed through the machinery of reverse 

lend-lease or reciprocal aid. Toward the end of 1943 the British had 

desired to terminate these leases and leave to the American command 

their renegotiation directly with the Iranian Government or the individual owners of the properties affected. 26 But early in 1944 the American command requested PAl Force that, in view of the fact that the 

United States enjoyed no treaty arrangements with Iran governing the 

presence of American forces in the country, the British should "continue 

to hold under present arrangements and in their name, all Iranian 

Government property now used by the U.S. Army." PGC would continue, "as in the past, to reimburse the British Government for expense 

incurred in its behalf." This was agreed to by the British command on 

15 February.27 In consequence, after the declaration of completion of 

the American command's mission, its Engineering Branch became the 

agency whereby leases were terminated, troops allocated for caretaking 

and stand-by maintenance, and reports prepared relating to fixed 

assets, costs, and inventories. The British handled the conclusion of 

arrangements by which the United States had occupied buildings on 

Iranian land or buildings or land used rent free (as was the site of 

Amirabad, for example) under grants made to the British within the 

terms of the Tri-Partite Treaty.28 

A second category of surpluses, and one most difficult to settle to 

everyone's satisfaction, was that of equipment held under lend-lease. It 

was not always possible to reach agreement as to adjustments of property rights or values within this category and, in the case of motor 

vehicles originally obtained from the United States under lend-lease 

by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, some heat was generated before a solution was reached. During the first half of 1945 a 

tug of war took place over possession of the fleet of trucks operated by 

UKCC. At one time it was to revert to the Foreign Economic Administration, at another to the British Army, and in March 1945 the 'War 

Department gave firm instructions that 567 vehicles were to be repossessed by the United States. A report sent to Washington from the 

American command in July stated that more than 2,900 Americanmade vehicles of all types were lend-leased to UKCC which used them 

in its operations in western Iran between 25 April 1942 and 30 September 1944. It is impossible to discover from the files how many of 

"Hist Rpt, Cons Br, Opns Div, 15 Dec 43~15 Feb 44. PGF 127~M. 

Z1 (1) Ltr, Col McGlone to Persian Area Hirings Office, 4 Feb 44. AG 601.53, Hq PGC. 

(2) Ltr, GHQ, PAl Force to Hq, PGC, 15 Feb 44. Abstract 251~C. 

os Corrcspondenc" durin" May 1945 b"tween British and American headquarters. 323.361 

Powers and Duties, SL 900B. 
TARGET ZERO 431 

these vehicles were physically returned to the keeping of the U.S. 

Army and how many were credited to U. S. account under lend-lease 

bookkeeping. The impression is that not many returned to physical 

possession of the Americans. 29 In matters less troublesome than motor 

vehicles proved to be, the British and Americans got together on agreed 

tables of costs for fixed installations in which there was joint interest 

and these were figured in the final lend-lease settlement reached after 

the war on a global basis. 

The third category of surpluses consisted of all property, fixed or 

movable, in which the United States enjoyed an incontestably sole 

interest and which had been declared by all the requisite authorities 

as eligible for sale or disposal overseas. Negotiations with the Iranian 

authorities were channeled through Colonel Stetson and Wallace Murray, United States Ambassador at Tehran, and resulted in on-the-spot 

agreements which, by early November, covered nearly everything in 

this category that was disposable. Plans were modified when Iranian 

matters were mingled with global Anglo-American lend-lease settlements and the results were not always pleasing to some who had 

reached advantageous local settlements. 30 

From the point of view of a shopkeeper's report to stockholders, 

the return received for property disposed of in Iran was highly disappointing. Fixed installations, camps, and buildings which had cost 

thirty million dollars went for less than three millions. The highway, 

which was the largest single expense and which could not be rolled up 

and taken away if not sold, was not sold. Its cost was written off to 

the service it performed in aiding Russia. The Iranian Government 

paid over ten million dollars for equipment used by the MRS on the 

ISR. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 

paid about six million dollars for movable property valued at about 

eight millions-boxcars, flatcars, and gondolas, oil-burning locomotives, and about two hundred motor vehicles, all shipped to China. A 

syndicate of Iranian merchants contracted to pay two and a half million 

dollars and a sum in rials approximating another four and a half 

millions for other property. All told, fixed and movable property 

roughly costing over $62,000,000 was disposed of for about $26,-

000,000.31 

I t is doubtful whether, under the circumstances, a much better 

bargain could have been struck. Soon after the end of the war numerous 

.. See documents, especially dated 27 May and 11 July 1945. AC 095 (UKCC), Hq PCC. 

80 (1) Memo,5 Nov 45. 092 (Iranian), SL 8978. (2) Rpt cited n. 12 (3). (3) Intervs with 

Col Stetson, Tehran, 3, 4 Aug 45. 

" History cited n. 1 (3). 
432 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

stories circulated freely in the United States of waste and callousness 

in the disposal of government property in faraway places. Food was 

left to rot upon inaccessible islands; property in short supply in one 

part of the world went begging in another; and returned soldiers vividly 

described frantic villagers held back forcibly from piles of blazing 

army blankets which could be neither sold because of one set of regulations nor given away to shivering natives because of others. In the 

Persian Corridor no such incidents took place; and although there 

were heavy bookkeeping losses, there was no well-established instance 

of wanton waste. 

Comparative Score 

In the world-wide effort to deliver war supplies to Soviet Russia, 

how does the record of the Persian Corridor compare with that of 

the other routes from the Western Hemisphere? There were five 

routes: the Soviet Arctic, the Black Sea, the north Russian, the Persian 

Gulf, and the Soviet Far East. 

The least important route, tonnage wise, was that which led from 

American Pacific ports to Siberian ports on the Arctic Ocean. Because 

the Arctic ports were ice free only during the summer months, sailings 

were restricted to those periods. The main military significance of the 

route was that aviation fuel was transported over it for an air ferry 

route across Siberia which, because of Soviet opposition, never materialized. Total tonnage was 452,393 long tons. 32 

Next in tonnage accomplishment was the Black Sea route, the 

last to be inaugurated. It was made possible by clearing the Axis from 

the Mediterranean and the Black Sea ports of Odessa, Constanta, and 

Novorossiysk. In 1944 the Andimeshk truck assembly plant and a 

number of PGC portal cranes were transferred to the USSR for installation at these ports. First ships arrived in January 1945. During 

the five months of operation of the route 680,723 long tons were 

delivered. 

British convoys first sailed to the north Russian port of Murmansk 

in August 1941. Archangel served as an alternative port. This was the 

shortest route from American ports to the USSR, 4,500 miles, and 

required twenty-one days' running time and five weeks' convoy time. 

Inland clearance distance by rail from the ports to the battle front 

and industrial centers was satisfactorily short. During the last three 

months of 1941 and the first four months of 1942 the rate of shipments 

12 Table 1 and Chart 12. 
TARGET ZERO 433 

to north Russian ports was greater than by any other route then in 

use from the 'Yestern Hemisphere to Soviet ports; but the increasing 

severity of Axis attacks upon shipping in northern waters reduced its 

use drastically until July 1944, by which time an improvement in its 

safety reopened it to year-round activity. It did not again become a 

main artery of Soviet supply, for by that time it had been rivaled by 

the Soviet Far East and Persian Gulf routes. Its total of 3,964,231 long 

tons was nearly equal to that of the Persian Gulf. 

Longest in mileage and ship round-trip time, the Persian Gulf route 

was nevertheless desirable because of its relative safety, its all-year usefulness, and its accessibility to Soviet territory if other routes should be 

denied. The difficulties of providing and operating adequate port and 

inland clearance facilities were substantial handicaps in operation of 

the Gulf route; but so long as other routes were threatened either by 

military denial or, in the case of the Far Eastern route, by a sudden 

change in Japan's attitude toward its use, the Persian Gulf remained 

a necessity. In receiving 4,159,117 long tons of Soviet-aid cargo from 

the Western Hemisphere, the Gulf was excelled only by the Far 

Eastern route. 

Almost half, or 47 percent, of Russian-aid supplies from the Western Hemisphere reached the Soviet Union via a sea lane which 

extended from American Pacific ports around to the north of Honshu 

to eastern Siberian ports. The total tonnage via this route came to 

8,243,397 long tons; but, because of the peculiar situation by which 

Japan winked at the traffic to her ally's enemy, only supplies classified 

as nonmilitary were carried. 

The significance of the Persian Gulf route is measured by its tonnage 

accomplishment and its fulfillment of strategic necessity. Its handicaps 

were less serious than those which at one time or another afflicted the 

other routes; its advantages more solid and continuous. Development 

of the Persian Gulf line of communications to the USSR was clearly 

basic to global planning. 

Operations closed, as they opened, at the ports. Khorramshahr, 

entrance for aid-to-Russia cargoes, served also as exit for the men and 

machines who had worked them. The tide of traffic turned about. 

Soldiers and baggage, once again packed aboard ship, headed for the 

open sea-the high-point men for home, the others for new assignment 

in Africa or Europe. Behind them, the once clamant wharves, the now 

empty storage yards, the roads no longer writhing with traffic, the hot 

shining rails, stilled after grinding and shrilling day and night under 

the weight of the long trains-these commenced imperceptibly to settle 
434 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

back into the decay that comes so naturally to the region.s8 In a few 

years it would be as though the Americans had never worked at 

Khorramshahr, as if all that effort were a desert mirage. 

Only one thing will convert that effort into a mirage: neglect of its 

memory. It was real enough, for its own time, and for the future. This 

is the record of its reality. 

II Iran's postwar seven-year plan for economic improvement included development of 

Khorramshahr. The New York Times, September 24,1950. 
PART THREE 

IRAN: THE FOURTH PARTNER 

CHAPTER XX 

The U.S. Army and Aid to Iran 

Through the months that stretched between the day British and 

Soviet troops entered Iran in 1941 and the day the last Russian soldier 

departed into his own country in 1946, it would have been a remote 

and cloistered Iranian indeed who could have remained unaware of 

the Allied armies or unaffected by their activities. The tenseness, the 

urgency, the unsleeping bustle and unresting energy that it took to 

transport supplies by the millions of tons across desert and mountain 

could not fail to affect a population so suddenly exposed to them. In 

the role of fourth partner in the Corridor operations, thrust upon Iran 

by the exigencies of war, that nation perforce faced a situation beyond 

its control. Although its sovereignty was reaffirmed by the Tri-Partite 

Treaty, the normal exercise of sovereignty was so circumscribed by the 

demands of the war as to be virtually suspended for the duration. As 

the essentially passive partner, Iran contributed in proportion to its 

acquiescence in Allied purposes. 

The difficulty of Iran's position cannot be overemphasized. In this 

book the focus is upon the Allied operations. Iran is seen only through 

the small end of the telescope, diminutive and incidental. The thousands of Iranian workmen who manned Allied projects do not appear 

as part of an economic inflation accelerated by the expenditure of vast 

sums of Allied money. Rations of tea, bread, and sugar figure in the 

story as parts of an Allied labor problem; food riots, for instance, are 

briefly glimpsed. Miles-long motor convoys roll through Iranian towns 

toward Russia; but no notice is taken that their route is marked with 

traffic signs in two foreign languages, or patrolled by foreign military 
436 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

police who do their best to provide safety but who cannot always prevent the deaths of heedless peasants, like distracted chickens, under the 

rolling wheels. Encampments rise to house the foreign troops, often on 

land leased or granted by the government of Iran. The story does not 

emphasize that these are exclusively administered by the foreign powers 

concerned; nor is the muffled booming heard that marked, day after 

day, the detonation of antipersonnel mines set off by native prowlers 

'lttempting the barriers enclosing the foreigners' stores of goods and 

food. Pilferage and banditry, menaces to the movement of supplies 

through lonely country, appear frequently enough in the story; but the 

search and seizure, the entering of native huts by foreign troops-so 

often rewarded by recovery of plunder not hauled 12,000 miles to be 

bootlegged in the Iranian bazaars-are not the story's main concern. 

Yet these acts and their implications bulked large in the Iranians' 

lives. Their economy was distorted, their amour-propre disturbed. The 

period of the occupation-which-was-officially-not-an-occupation, despite the protection of the occupying powers, exacerbated the essential 

fact of Iran's existence: weakness-internal weakness, both economic 

and political-and helplessness in external affairs. During this period 

the United States turned up on the spot as auxiliary of one of the occupying forces. As a nonoccupying power, the United States was less 

encumbered than Britain or the USSR in helping Iran to help itself and 

proceeded, upon Iranian invitation, to do so through the second Millspaugh economic mission and the military advisory missions arranged 

for in 1942. But as the American service forces, come to Iran to move 

Russian-aid supplies, expanded until they were the most numerous of 

the Allied forces in the Corridor, the feelings of the populace, already 

disposed to resent the ancient rivals, Britain and Russia, became more 

and more susceptible to the manipulations of those who chose to point 

to the Americans, and the swarm of American troops, as the source of 

Iran's wartime discomfiture.~ This delicate situation and the growing 

feeling in American quarters that not only the success of Allied operations in the Corridor but considerations of longer range and wider scope 

called for further strengthening of Iran are subordinated in this book 

to the U.S. Army's story. As American policy evolved after 1942 certain 

responsibilities were assigned to the Vvar Department which made the 

U.S. Army an instrument for aiding Iran to combat its internal and 

1 General Booth, Commanding General, PGC, replying to a letter from Ambassador 

Leland B. Morris who called his attention to charges of this sort in the Iranian press, pointed 

out the high employment resulting from Army operations, the avoidance of competitive 

bidding for items in short supply in the local market, the high degree of self-sufficiency of 

the American forces, and cash payment for goods in plentiful supply. Ltr, Booth to Morris, 

25 Feb 45. Abstract PGF 261. 
THE U. S. ARMY AND AID TO IRAN 437 

external weaknesses. General Connolly's directive was broadened to 

enable him to give Iran assistance of an economic nature, additional to 

his primary mission in aid of the Soviet Union; and the military advisory 

missions, despite obstacles and discouragements, were continued 

throughout the war and after as tokens of American concern for 

Iranian independence. 

The Question of Status 2 

So long as the American representation in the Corridor consisted 

of not more than a few hundred officers and men of the U.S. Army 

and the civilians engaged in construction and assembly projects, no 

question arose as to the legal status of the Americans in Iran. Their 

auxiliary character and small numbers, as well as the fact that their 

tasks, of a technical and advisory nature, were nominated by the British, 

made it possible to consider them as if they were in effect subcontractors 

to the British forces. When, however, the first 5,000 service troops came 

ashore at Khorramshahr without any previous notification to the government of Iran,a inquiries were promptly directed by Iran to the 

American Minister at Tehran, Louis Dreyfus, and to the Soviet Union 

as to certain questions raised by the presence on Iranian soil of large 

numbers of American soldiers. The United States was informed that 

the arrival of its troops was regarded as an infringement of Iranian 

sovereignty and was pressed to regularize their status by adhering to 

the Tri-Partite Treaty as a means of securing formal permission for 

their presence and of defining the conditions under which they were to 

remain. An inquiry which Iran put on 12 December 1942 to the Soviet 

Government was not without its ironic aspects, considering that the 

Americans had come to Iran in order to facilitate the movement of 

supplies to the USSR. Doubtless it bespoke Iran's reluctance to offend 

the powerful neighbor then in occupation of its northern provinces. 

Iran wished to know whether the Soviet Union objected to United 

States participation in the operations of the Allied forces in the 

Corridor. 

, (1) Memo by Gen Connolly, atchd Ltr, Connolly to Dreyfus, 19 Jul 43.336.01 International Agreements, SL 9012. (2) Note, Charge d'Affaires, USSR Embassy, Washington, 

to Secy State, handed to Loy Henderson, 27 Jul 43. Div of Near Eastern Affairs, Dept State 

711.91/106 PSjFP. (3) U.S. Note to USSR, 16 Jun 43. Same file. (4) Memo, Dept State 

for WD, 5 Aug 43. OPD 336 Russia (24). • R&A 1206, Conflicts and Agreements of Interest of the United Nations in the Near 

East, Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Br, 10 Jan 44, p. 31. A request 

to the Iranian Prime Minister in October 1942 by Colonel Shingler for extraterritorial rights 

for American troops (which was refused) did not constitute formal notice of American plans. 

Interv with Gen Connolly, Pentagon, 18 Aug 50. 
438 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

Iran's inquiries to the United States and to the USSR set off a train 

of notes, telegrams, drafts, and counterdrafts that stretched on, in 

the leisurely fashion of diplomacy, into 1945. The correspondence between the foreign offices of Iran and the United States came to exactly 

nothing; that between the United States and the USSR produced the 

gestures the situation called for. Although the two exchanges were related to one another they can best be considered separately. Before the 

Soviet Government could acquiesce in the presence of American troops 

in Iran it desired to satisfy itself that American participation in Corridor operations did not infringe or diminish any rights enjoyed by the 

Soviet Union under the Tri-Partite Treaty. In response to a Soviet 

inquiry as to American intentions, Minister Dreyfus informed Andrei 

Smirnov, Soviet Ambassador at Tehran, that U.S. military units were 

in Iran only to support the British military forces which still exercised 

"full control over transport lines in the south of Iran," and "bore responsibility for their safety." This explanation failed to satisfy the 

USSR. A note was dispatched from the Soviet Embassy at Washington 

to the Secretary of State on 11 May 43 drawing his attention to "a certain lack of clarity" in the Dreyfus memorandum. The Russians cited 

the fact that, in the negotiations which were proceeding between the 

United States and Iran to regularize the presence of American troops 

in Iran, the Americans had presented a draft agreement under which 

Iran would grant to the United States the same rights over communications as were enjoyed under the Tri-Partite Treaty by the British and 

the Russians" 

The United States tried again, explaining to the USSR on 16 June 

1943 that American troops went to Iran at British request; that their 

task "under general British guidance" was to maintain control over 

transport facilities in Iran in order to increase deliveries of supplies 

to the USSR; and that they were not in Iran to support the British 

"in any military sense." The Soviet reply of 27 July asserted that general British guidance indicated that the American forces were "part of 

the British Iranian-Iraq military district." It stated that the USSR 

would inform Iran that there was no Soviet objection to the presence 

of American troops in Iran providing no Soviet rights were altered 

thereby. In consultations between the State and \Var Departments 

which followed receipt of this note the Department of State took the 

position that any attempt to set the Russians right on the details of the 

'Note, Charge d'Affaires, USSR Embassy, Washington, to Seey State, 11 May 43, 

referring to Memo, Dreyfus for Smirnov, 3 Apr 43. Div of Near Eastern Affairs, Dept State 

711.91/99 PS/HWL. 
THE U. S. ARMY AND AID TO IRAN 439 

co-operative working arrangements in force between the British and 

Americans in Iran would be "quibbling" and might delay formal Soviet 

acquiescence. In the Vvar Department an OPD paper suggested that 

it would be useful to point out in any future correspondence with the 

USSR that "military control of the area within which our troops are 

operating is exercised by the British. American troops form an independent command, located within, but not a part of the 'British IranIraq military district.' " OPD suggested that the Russians should address their inquiries about security matters to the British, whose 

responsibilities in that field were exclusively exercised by them under 

direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. As to general policy and 

American responsibility for transport, the OPD paper stated: 

Decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff do not indicate that the British are 

responsible for the question of general policy concerning the operation of supply 

routes, or that they retain general responsibility for the dispatch of supplies to the 

Soviet Union by the Persian Route. On the other hand, while the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff do not specifically assign responsibility for general policy, they do assign 

definitely responsibility for the dispatch of supplies to Russia to the United States.5 

There the matter rested. Fortunately for the success of the Russian-aid 

program, no hint of that fastidious regard for the legal niceties at the 

diplomatic level, which kept the Russian notes flowing for more than 

half of 1943, seeped down to the level of operations to dilute the full 

strength there of Russian zeal for American supplies. Nor did it affect 

the regularity and vehemence with which Soviet officials pressed the 

American command to exert ever greater effort and to provide more 

and more tonnage for the Russians. 

,.vhile the USSR was satisfying itself that the American forces were 

not in Iran to disturb Soviet rights under the Tri-Partite Treaty, the 

government of Iran launched into a long exchange of views with the 

government of the United States. The discussions covered two kinds of 

proposed agreement to regularize the presence of American troops in 

Iran and fell into two distinct phases. The first phase, initiated by Iran, 

passed into the second following the signing by the three Allied Powers 

of the Declaration of Tehran. One of the two agreements discussed 

covered the whole subject of American status in Iran. The other was 

restricted to exemption of U.S. Army personnel from the criminal 

jurisdiction of Iranian courts. Ideas shifted from time to time as to 

whether there should be separate agreements, one master agreement, 

, Memo by Col Johnson, 13 Aug 43. OPD 210.684 Iran (13 Aug 43) . 
440 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

or a series of similar but separate bilateral agreements between Iran 

and each of the three powers in the Corridor. 6 

Having been requested in December by General Andrews, Commanding General, USAFIME, to secure for the Americans a status 

regarding their forces similar to that of the British and Russians, Minister Dreyfus on 18 January 1943 presented to the Iranian Foreign 

Minister the views of the United States on an agreement to exempt 

American troops from Iranian criminal jurisdiction.7 After many 

months during which no agreement was reached, General Connolly on 

19 July suggested to Dreyfus the incorporation, in the pending general 

agreement on status, of provisions to include in a legal immunities 

section civilians accompanying the U.S. forces. He further proposed 

that the exemption to be granted to soldiers and civilians be extended 

to civil as well as criminal matters. In December Connolly wrote Dreyfus that, in order to obtain uniformity of treatment, "It would be much 

more practical if the matter of criminal jurisdiction could be worked 

out jointly with the other Allied Forces in Iran." Connolly expressed 

the view that, until the question of the status of American troops on 

Iranian soil was determined, the subsidiary question of criminal jurisdiction over American troops should not be pursued. Accordingly, he 

requested Dreyfus to withdraw his note to the Iranian Foreign Minister 

of 18 January 1943. Early in January 1944 General Marshall expressed to General Connolly his doubt of the efficacy of an agreement 

which included the other Allied nations. To this Connolly replied that 

talks between Dreyfus and the Iranian Foreign Minister had ceased, 

and that British, American, and Soviet authorities would first agree 

upon uniform terms regarding criminal jurisdiction of their troops 

• (1) Interv with Col Milford F. Henkel, JAG, PGC, Amirabad, 3 Aug 45, for this and 

other background material in this section. (2) Documents alluded to or drawn upon for this 

section include: (a) Those primarily relating to court jurisdiction over troops: Ltr, Gen 

Andrews to Dreyfus, 16 Dec 42, Folder American Diplomats in M/E, CG/USAFIME, AG 

File, Hq AMET; Note 341, Dreyfus to Iranian Foreign Minister, 18 Jan 43, Treaty File, 

JAG File, Hq PGC; Ltr, Connolly to Dreyfus, 6 Dec 43, Treaty File, JAG File, Hq PGC, 

another copy 092.2 Treaties and Agreements, SL 8978; Ltr, CofS, PGSC, to Dreyfus, 

30 Mar 43, 336 Foreign, International Affairs and Relations, SL 9012; Rad AMPSC 2189, 

Marshall to Connolly, 10 Jan 44, Rad AGWAR 156, Connolly to Marshall, 12 Jan 44, 092.2 

International Treaties and Agreements, SL 8978. (b) Correspondence and drafts: U.S. 

proposed drafts, undated, but earliest proposal for an executive agreement, first revision 

of 24 Feb 43, second revision of 25 Aug 43, Cases 55, 64, Sec II, OPD 210.684 Iran; new draft treaty submitted to Secy State, 21 Apr 44, Treaty File, JAG File, Hq PGC. (c) Correspondence on a comprehensive treaty or agreement: Ltrs, Dreyfus to Connolly, 7, 18 Jun 43, 

Connolly's reply, 19 Jun 43, 336.01 International Agreements, SL 9012; Rad AMSPC 1041, 

Marshall to Connolly, 7 Jul 43, 336.01 International Agreements, SL 9012; Memo and Ltr 

cited n. 2 (1). T It may not have been known to General Andrews that no separate formal understandings existed between the two Allied forces and Iran on exemptions and legal jurisdiction of 

their troops. These were tried by their own military courts under the general provisions of 

international law. 
THE U. S. ARMY AND AID TO IRAN 441 

and would then seek to obtain bilateral agreements with Iran in conformity with those terms. Whatever conversations followed, no formal 

agreement on the subject was reached between Iran and the United 

States. 

As has been stated, Iran early pressed the United States to regularize the presence of its troops on Iranian soil by adhering to the 

Tri-Partite Treaty. The Department of State preferred to proceed 

upon the basis of an executive agreement rather than a treaty and 

early submitted a draft which included the grant to the U.S. forces of 

the right to "use, maintain, guard and control" any of the means of 

communication within Iran, including railways, roads, rivers, airdromes, ports, pipelines, and telephone, telegraph, and wireless installations wherever advantageous for the prosecution of the war effort. 

Article V of the draft stipulated that when an act by U.S. forces affected the Tri-Partite Treaty nothing should be undertaken until "after 

consultation and agreement with the appropriate Iranian, British and 

Soviet authorities." 

To Dreyfus' request for comment on an Iranian counterdraft, Connolly replied in June 1943 that "the concessions to be made by the 

United States ... are so far-reaching" as to require careful study. 

In .T uly Connolly furnished his comments to Dreyfus, a copy of which, 

at Marshall's request, was forwarded to Washington by courier. Connolly noted that, in spite of "our indeterminate legal position," operations were being satisfactorily carried on with a minimum of misunderstanding with the three other partners. On the asumption that "our 

interest in this area is of temporary duration," and noting that the 

Iranian counterdraft went beyond provisions of the Tri-Partite Treaty, 

he advised that no concessions should be made greater than those applying to Britain and the USSR in that treaty. Connolly suggested that 

agreements by the United States with the British and the Russians 

should precede an agreement with Iran, and inquired whether the 

proposed grant to the American forces of rights over communications 

had received the prior consent of the signatories to the Tri-Partite 

Treaty. Certain proposed provisions seemed to Connolly inadvisable. 

One, obligating the United States to defend Iran from aggression, he 

deemed unwise on the grounds that this obligation was undertaken by 

the British and Russians and that the American troops constituted a 

noncombatant force. Another he questioned required the American 

command to consult the Iranian Government before fixing the location 

of troops or installations. Connolly counseled the inclusion of a clause 

similar to provisions of the Tri-Partite Treaty governing the transfer, 

after the war, to Iran by the Allied forces of buildings and other im-
442 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

provements. A new American draft of 25 August affirmed American 

respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Iran and promised 

the withdrawal of the armed forces of the United States from Iran "not 

later than six months" after the end of hostilities, or earlier if a peace 

treaty should be concluded earlier. But, although exchange of views 

between the War and State Departments and between the two governments continued, no agreement was reached. 

What was lacking was a formula to reconcile the independent command status of the American forces with the auxiliary nature of their 

functions. From the auxiliary angle there were obstacles to the Americans' assuming obligations and privileges equivalent to those belonging 

to the signatories to the Tri-Partite Treaty; but from the angle of independent command there was no inconsistency in a direct Irano-American understanding. Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, who was in Iran 

during 1943 as the President's ambassador-at-Iarge, felt that the slow 

progress toward a treaty-to recognize "the presence of American troops 

as an American operation" was chargeable to sabotage by what he 

regarded as "imperialist" sympathizers in the Department of State. 

He so informed the President. 8 General Hurley believed that the moral 

advantages of an understanding with Iran outweighed the difficulties 

encountered in attempting to equalize the status of United States troops 

in Iran with that of the British and Soviet forces. As General Connolly's 

comments to Minister Dreyfus show, the commander of the American 

forces, having primary regard to the smooth functioning of the American tasks in the Corridor, preferred the existing working arrangement. 

Although the negotiations took the normal course of diplomatic 

maneuvering, they suggest that agreement at any time in 1943 would 

have been premature. For one thing, as Connolly pointed out, American 

operations and relations were proceeding satisfactorily without any 

agreement; but the main factor was that long-range American policy 

toward Iran had not crystallized. Connolly had observed in July that 

his views were based upon the assumption of temporary American 

interest in the area, an interest limited to the time necessary to complete the Russian supply mission. General Hurley wished to see Iran's 

hand strengthened and believed direct treaty relations with the United 

States governing the presence of American troops in Iran would 

contribute to that end. He felt that opposition to a treaty implied a 

desire to leave the position of the British and Russians in Iran unaltered. 

• Ltr, Hurley to Roosevelt, 21 Dec 43. Copy furnished by General Hurley. The President 

requested Hurley's permission to delete Hurley's views on the contradictions between 

imperialism and the Atlantic Charter from this letter before circulating it. Interv with 

Gen Hurley, Washington, 30 Mar 50. 
THE U. S. ARMY AND AID TO IRAN 443 

But the Department of State was also moving toward the objective 

of redressing the balance in Iran. Under date of 23 January 1943 the 

Secretary of State approved a policy memorandum for the guidance 

of his officers which, noting that the British had "recently" proposed 

that the Allies declare themselves as having power to modify the 

Iranian cabinet at will, stated that "nowhere else in the Middle East 

is there to be found so clear-cut a conflict of interests between two of 

the United Nations, so ancient a tradition of rivalry," as that existing 

in Iran between the USSR and Great Britain. Referring to the advisory 

missions to the Iranian Army and Gendarmerie, the memorandum 

observed that by such means the United States could build up Iran 

"to the point at which it will stand in need of neither British nor Russian 

assistance to maintain order in its own house." Since keeping the peace 

was as important as winning the war, the United States should support 

the peace in Iran with goods, advice, and services." Here was the early 

formulation of a long-range policy \vhich sought the salvation of Iran 

not by offering it an alliance against other powers but by encouraging 

it to look out for itself. This was the principle upon which were based 

the tasks of technical advice and material aid which were subsequently 

assigned to the War Department. Consistent with it were the recommendations forwarded to President Roosevelt by General Hurley the 

following May that Iran be assured that the United States insists that 

the principles of the Atlantic Charter apply to Iran, that Iran be permitted to join the United Nations in a declaration of war against the 

Axis, and that the American Legation be raised to the status of an 

embassy.1o 

When the leaders of the Allied Powers gathered at Tehran on 

28 November 1943, it was made knmVl1 through Prime Minister Ali 

Soheyli that the government of Iran desired an Allied declaration 

respecting its sovereignty. Welcoming this Iranian initiative, President 

Roosevelt saw in such a declaration an opportunity to lay at rest the 

problem of the legal status of American troops. His signature, affixed 

to the Declaration of Tehran on 1 December, provided the same moral 

support by the United States of Iran's integrity as would the signature 

• (I) Memo, American Policy in Iran, by Div of Near Eastern Affairs, prepared by 

John D. Jernegan, approved by Secy State, 23 Jan 43. Case 57, Sec II, OPD 210.684 Iran. 

(2) Commenting on this paper Minister Dreyfus on 14 April 1943 noted that the Iranians 

themselves were an obstacle to the achievement of American aims on their behalf because 

of corruption, selfishness, antiforeignism and lack of social consciousness, but that there 

was a basic "germ of goodness in them which should be protected and nourished." Memo 

atchd to memo ci ted in (1). 10 Ltr, Hurley to Roosevelt, 13 May 43. Copy furnished by General Hurley. The first 

suggestion was made implicit in the Declaration of Tehran; the second was made effective 

in September 1943 with Iran's declaration of war on Germany; the third was implemented 

when the U.S. Legation became an embassy on 9 February 1944. 
444 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

on a treaty regulating the status of American troops; and this American 

assurance was given without stirring up complications with the TriPartite powers. The text of the declaration follows: 11 

Dec. 1, 1943 

DECLARATION OF THE THREE POWERS REGARDING IRAN 

The President of the United States, the Premier of the U.S.S.R., and the 

Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and 

with the Prime Minister of Iran, desire to declare the mutual agreement of their 

three Governments regarding their relations with Iran. 

The Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom recognize the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war 

against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union. 

The Three Governments realize that the war has caused special economic 

difficulties for Iran, and they are agreed that they will continue to make available 

to the Government of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having 

regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their world-wide military operations and to the world-wide shortage of transport, raw materials, and supplies for 

civilian consumption. 

With respect to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States, the 

U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran 

that any economic problems confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should 

receive full consideration, along with those of other members of the United Nations, 

by conferences or international agencies held or created to deal with international 

economic matters. 

The Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance 

of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon 

the participation of Iran, together with all other peace-loving nations, in the 

establishment of international peace, security and prosperity after the war, in 

accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have subscribed. 

(Signed) WINSTON S. CHURCHILL 

J. STALIN 

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 

The declaration accomplished a number of useful purposes, not 

the least of which was the recognition by the signatories of the need 

to strengthen Iran's economy. It also introduced the second phase in 

the attempt to define the status of American troops in Iran. The dec1aration having reassured Iran as to the powers' respect for its sovereignty, that government thenceforth showed a lessened interest in 

U The text given here is from the photostatic copy of the draft of 30 November 1943 

taken from White House files. Supplied by the Department of State. See Frontispiece. 
THE U. S. ARMY AND AID TO IRAN 445 

reaching an accord with the United States on a matter in which Iran 

had once felt its sovereignty infringed. On the other hand, the United 

States, having obtained a three-power declaration of friendly intentions toward Iran, felt less inhibited in seeking an agreement with Iran 

on troop status. But the passage of time was to fit such an agreement 

into a larger design of international relations. 

On 2 December, the day after the signature of the declaration, 

President Roosevelt, about to depart from the Tehran airport, outlined 

to General Hurley "a tentative basis for American policy in Iran which 

might be used as a pattern for our relations with all less favored associate nations." 12 He requested Hurley to send him a report on steps 

required to strengthen the Iranian economy as a means of stabilizing 

the country. In response Hurley advanced suggestions for assisting Iran 

to develop its resources for the benefit of its people and called for the 

furnishing of American advisers to be paid by Iran and to operate 

under provisions of Iranian law. By applying the principles of the Atlantic Charter, Hurley urged, Iran could be encouraged to develop 

a "pattern of self-government and free enterprise." In transmitting 

Hurley's letter to .the Secretary of State, Roosevelt wrote: "I was rather 

thrilled with the idea of using Iran as an example of what we could do 

by an unselfish American policy." 13 The larger design was beginning 

to take shape.a 

It was sketched out some time later in an informal policy paper 

forwarded to the American Embassy at Tehran by the Under Secretary 

of State. 

The President and the Department [Stettinius said] have considered Iran as 

something of a testing ground for the Atlantic Charter and for the good faith of 

the United Nations .... There are important reasons why our present heightened interests in Iran should be extended into the postwar period. . . . America's 

10 Ltr cited n. 8. 

U Memo, Roosevelt for Hull, 12 Jan 44. Case 28, Sec I-A, OPD 384 Middle East, HRS 

DRB AGO. Roosevelt wrote Hurley in the same sense on 25 March 1944. Copy furnished by 

General Hurley. The President's letters were noncommittal on Hurley's specific proposals. 

1& While in Tehran the President and Harry Hopkins had consulted with Dr. Millspaugh about assistance to Iran. In a letter to Hopkins, written at Hopkins' request, 

Millspaugh outlined a 20-year program of American aid in accordance with "the proposition 

that you and the President apparently had in mind," namely, "that Iran, because of its 

situation, its problems, and its friendly feeling toward the United States, is (or can be made) 

something in the nature of a clinic-an experiment station-for the President's post-war 

policies-his aim to develop and stabilize backward areas; that the present American effort 

in Iran is actually a means of implementing those policies, a means of helping nations to help 

themselves, with negligible cost and risk to the United States; and that a similar effort might 

well be made in other regions." Ltr, Millspaugh to Hopkins, 11 Jan 44. Copy furnished by 

Grace Murphy, secretary to Robert E. Sherwood. At Hopkins' request Connolly also drew 

up a detailed commentary on U.S. relations with Iran, "American Foreign Policy Toward 

Iran," forwarded by letter, Connolly to Hopkins, 26 February 1944. Copies of both furnished 

by Mr. Sherwood. 
446 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

position in Iran is not intended to lapse again in any way to that of relative unimportance. . . . The impression snould be avoided at all costs that we intend to 

stand at the side of Iran as a political buffer to restrain our Allies, the British and 

Russians, with regard to Iran. 

Instead, there was to be an active policy of strengthening Iran and 

of protecting American interest against any discrimination. "Every 

effort will be made to obtain British and Russian collaboration. At the 

same time no implication of the use of armed force to maintain Iran's 

independence will be given." 1~ An Iran sufficiently strong and healthy 

to discourage foreign intervention was the objective. To this international consideration was added the protection and furtherance of 

American interests in sharing Iran's commerce and resources, not overlooking Iran's strategic location on the international air routes. 

Meanwhile, during the spring preceding the dispatch of this policy 

statement, a new American draft agreement on the status of troops had 

been prepared which fared no better than its predecessors. Very late 

in the day Iran proposed to legalize, by unilateral declaration of the 

Majlis, the presence of American troops; but this proved objectionable 

as opening the way to the imposition by Iran of duties upon articles 

imported for the personal use of the American forces and to possible 

denial of the right of the Americans to sell or dispose of fixed or movable 

properties in Iran at the end of the war. A unilateral declaration by the 

Iranian Majlis would deprive the Americans of a chance to negotiate 

such questions.16 

In the end no treaty or agreement was signed, nor were efforts of 

the Americans in the summer of 1944 to persuade the Russians and 

British to work out a joint agreement with Iran on the presence of 

Allied troops, immunities, and exemptions successful. The American 

command went about its business with nothing more substantial than 

a gentleman's agreement; but this proved, because of good faith on 

both sides, to be substantial enough. It was fortified by the American 

assumption that, though there was no written understanding, the 

American status was fixed by the status of the British. Furthermore, it 

was assumed that the existence of leases and business contracts, including the written agreement by which the United States occupied, rent 

free, Iranian government land at Amirabad, furnished adequate sanctions and implied Iranian consent to the unilaterally asserted American 

position. Beginning with American declaration of exclusive jurisdiction 

over its area at Khorramshahr as a military district, the Americans' 

"Rad 462, Stettinius to American Embassy, Tehran, 31 Jul 44. State Dept Cable Book, 

Near East, Iran. 

,. See Ltr, U.S. Ambassador to Iran Morris to Gen Booth, 27 Jan 45, and Booth's reply, 

8 Feb 45. 092.2 (Iran.-American) Re: Presence of U.S. Troops in Iran, SL 8978. 
THE U. S. ARMY AND AID TO IRAN 447 

assumption of jurisdiction over their own people was extended in ever 

widening circles. American troops who committed criminal offenses 

were tried by American authorities under the general provisions of 

international law. American military jurisdiction over American civilians attached to War Department agencies was continuously exercised. 

The order of the War Shipping Administration in 1942, placing merchant seamen under military jurisdiction while in port, not only 

strengthened the power of the American command to keep cargoes 

moving despite labor agitation or mutiny but emphasized the authority 

and responsibility of the Americans for their own people in Iran. The 

Iranian Government did not question the right of the American command to set up its own postal system, nor did it present any bills for 

customs duties or claims for taxes. IT In the end, although there was no 

formal understanding as to the removal of American military personnel, this, too, \vas carried out informally and well in advance of the 

date promised by the British and Russians in the Tri-Partite Treaty. 

In the thorny matter of status the experiment in co-operation was once 

again vindicated. 

Broadening the Directive 

The services which the U.S. Army was able to render to the Iranian 

economy during the war period, while useful and numerous, were not 

in themselves either so vast or so significant as to justify more than 

passing mention in a general account of the U.S. Army in the Persian 

Corridor. Of many acts of temporary or purely local assistance no more 

record was kept than is kept by a neighbor who lends the good wife 

next door half a pound of sugar, or her man a lawn mower. Other services of which record survives were performed only after an amount of 

high-level consultation and policy-weighing altogether disproportionate to their material worth. The events which led to the broadening of 

General Connolly's directive to include the rendering of economic 

assistance to Iran are therefore more important than the consequences 

of the broadening itself. These events must be considered as one aspect 

of a regional, not a local, program. Although tensions both local and 

personal were generated before Connolly's directive was altered to 

authorize economic assistance, the determination of policy, while a 

matter of concern to the Departments of both State and vVar, was ultimately guided by the President in accordance with regional purposes 

and policies jointly promulgated by the British and American Governments. This much is said lest the case of the twenty-seven men, which 

" Interv cited n. 6 (1). 
448 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

will appear in the following pages, should appear to be overstressed. 

The assignment of soldiers under General Connolly's command to perform certain services of a strictly nonmilitary nature for the government of Iran illustrates the larger problems and policies involved. It 

is these, and not the actual assignment of the twenty-seven men, which 

are important. 

The material needs of Iran during the war years became the concern of those two Allies, the British and the Americans, who recognized 

the relevance of Iran's economic plight to the success of the war effort. 

It ,vas also relevant to the general regional problem of the economy 

of the Middle East as a whole. With the usual genius of the human race 

for doing things the hard way, responsibility for aiding Iran became 

the concern not of an all-\vise and all-powerful authority but of a multiplicity of agencies-British and American, civilian and military, severally and in combination. On the British side an early step in channeling 

economic matters through a central authority was the establishment at 

Cairo of an Intendant-General to co-ordinate all supply and transport 

problems in the Middle East. In April 1941 the Intendant~General set 

up the Middle East Supply Center (MESC) as a clearinghouse for 

civilian supply for the entire region. The Intendant-Generalcy gave wa y 

to the office of Minister of State, to which Richard Casey was appointed. With his subsequent membership in the British War Cabinet, 

the line of administrative authority for 1\1ESC ran through him straight 

to the Ministry of War Transport at London. The connection with 

London reflected MESC's primary object: efficient regulation and 

control-as a war measure---Df shipping and commerce among the 

states of the Middle East. The purposes which motivated such controls 

were military: to eliminate nonessential shipping and trade; and to 

avoid the political and military hazards which would arise from populations made discontented or hostile by hunger, unemployment, and 

other end products of disorganized economies. It has been stated of 

MESC that its object was primarily military, its methods economic, 

and its accomplishments often political,18 

The dispatch of the North African and Iranian Missions to the 

Middle East in 1941 to render lend-lease aid to the British and other 

friendly forces brought the United States into the picture; while the 

lS (1) Page 13 of document cited n. 3. (2) For the early hlstory of MESC, see Department 

of State Bulletin VIII (1943) 76 (16 Jan 43). (3) For accounts of its organization and 

work, see Foreign Economic Administration publication ME-7, The Middle East Supply 

Center, by Special Areas Br, Middle East Div, May 44; Frederick Winant, "The Combined 

Middle East Supply Program," Department of State Bulletin X (1944) 199 (26 Feb 44); 

Winant, with John P. Dawson, "The Middle East Supply Program," Foreign Commerce 

Weekly XV (1944) 3 (1 Apr 44); and John A. Calhoun, "Iran in 1943," p. 8, Foreign 

Commerce Weekly XV (1944) 3 (l Apr 44). 
THE U. S. ARMY AND AID TO IRAN 449 

entrance of the United States into the war put lend-lease at the service 

of civilian as well as military needs. The adherence of the United States, 

upon British invitation, to the MESC followed in the spring of 1942; 

but the participation of the United States in a comprehensive economic 

program for the Middle East was complicated by the fact that the 

Americans, so newly come upon the scene, possessed no single economic 

authority similar to that exercised by Minister of State Casey. Economic, political-diplomatic, and military agencies-all with legitimate 

interests in economic matters-included the War Department, with its 

responsibility for military allocations under lend-lease, and its implementing missions, later merged into USAFIME; the Department of 

State, with primary responsibility for political matters through its 

ministers at Cairo, Tehran, and the other Middle Eastern capitals; the 

Lend-Lease Administration and the Board of Economic Warfare, later 

merged into the Foreign Economic Administration, whose policies and 

functions were closely integrated with those of the State Department; 

the Navy; the Treasury; and the \Var Shipping Administration. In 

Iran there were also the Anglo-American Combined Supplies Committee at Tehran, the Millspaugh economic mission, and the military 

missions to the Iranian Army and Gendarmerie. 

The administration of lend-lease matters had from the beginnings 

in March 1941 provided for the agencies concerned, American and 

foreign, a nightmare of procedural complexities. Lend-lease entered 

the Middle East through War Department agencies; but even from the 

beginning, when the War Department's primacy in determination of 

quotas and allocations for military purposes was strongest, it was apparent that lend-lease involved problems not primarily military. Of these 

the most touchy ones were determination of the ultimate receiver of 

particular lend-lease goods and services; the definition of the end use 

to which these were to be put; the attempt to see to it that no substitutions were made either in end user or in end use; and, most difficult 

problem of all, the procedure of allocation which involved not only the 

method of setting quotas but the determination of who should set them. 

War Department agencies in the Middle East were inclined to test 

every question that arose in the crucible of immediate war purposes 

and military objectives and programs. Lend-lease and the Department 

of State extended the testing area to that embraced by the larger 

regional purposes of MESC: the maintenance of the civilian economy. 

Within all three groups were some who accepted and others who 

strongly resisted the power, which carried over from early lend-lease 

conditions, by which the British, who were the chief beneficiaries, could, 

in effect, dole out American aid from the British quota, or, by virtue of 
450 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

established British controls in the Middle East, could insist on the 

British right to determine quotas for the region. The desire of certain 

Middle Eastern nations to deal directly with the United States and not 

through the British emphasized even more deeply that lend-lease wore 

many aspects and required for its functioning the balancing of many 

in terests. 19 

Accordingly, when the United States adhered to MESC both the 

State and War Departments were represented in it.20 But when Frederick Winant, State Department liaison officer for the Lend-Lease 

Administration, was soon after authorized "to represent the office of 

Lend-Lease Administration in the Near East Area served by the 

MESC," the multiplicity of interests involved may be noted in the wording of his formal instructions. "In so doing," wrote Stettinius, then LendLease Administrator, "you will consult with this office in connection 

with policy matters and will act in close collaboration with the local U.S. 

Army, Navy, and State Department authorities, and the local representatives of other U.S. agencies wherever their interests may be 

involved." 21 In connection with Winant's appointment, and the accompanying appointment of Philip C. Kidd to Iran, the War Department in 

August 1942 notified General Maxwell-by then, as Commanding General, USAFIME, the head of the successors to the original American 

lend-lease missions-that Winant and Kidd would act as lend-lease advisers to Maxwell and Shingler, but that all lend-lease requests would re1t Although General Hurley, protesting that "the least we should demand is that we be 

permitted to do our own giving," advised President Roosevelt as late as December 1943 that 

distribution of United States lend-lease goods in the Middle East ought to be by American 

agencies, and although the President replied 25 March 1944, "You are right that the distribution of Lend-Lease supplies throughout the Middle East should be taken over by our own people and I have let the Secretary of State know my views in this regard," such steps as 

were taken amounted only to modification and regulation of the basic conditions. To the end, 

lend-lease distribution in the Middle East was never wholly under American control. 

Ltr cited n. 8, and reply, President to Hurley, 25 Mar 44. Copy furnished by General Hurley. 2. General Maxwell, Commanding General, North African Mission, for the War Department, and J. E. Jacobs, Counselor of Legation, for the American Minister, on behalf of the 

Department of State, were at the first MESC session (11-14 May 1942) attended by Americans. Press Release, Maxwel! Papers. The question of lend-lease representation at Cairo 

can be traced through the Hopkins Papers, especially Memorandum, Stettinius for Hopkins, 

9 October 1941, suggesting attaching a lend-lease representative "to each of the missions 

in Egypt and Iran," MS Index to Hopkins Papers, Volume II, Book VII, Middle East 

Politics and Requirements, Item 11 (2); Radio, Hopkins to Alexander C. Kirk, American 

Minister at Cairo, Lt. Col. Edwin W. Piburn, pre-mission lend-lease advance agent in Egypt, 

and General Maxwell, 8 December 1941, indicating relationship of Piburn as temporary 

lend-lease representative to the North African Mission, Volume II, Part VII, Lend-Lease 

Operations in Middle East (6), 1 tern 57; and Ltr, Asst Secy State Dean Acheson to 

Stettinius, 6 Mar 42, and Memo, Thomas McCabe, Lend-Lease Administration, for Hopkins, 

7 Mar 42, sub: Lend-Lease Administration Representative in the Middle East, Vol. II, Pt. 

VII Item 75. 

I'Ltr, Stettinius to Winant, 9 Jun 42. Seen at Office of Historian of Foreign Economic 

Administration. 
THE U. S. ARMY AND AID TO IRAN 451 

quire Maxwell's approva1.22 Such instructions could have reduced the 

collaboration of Winant to compliance, or Maxwell's approval to a formality. To avoid such a dilemma called not only for the good will and 

co-operation of Maxwell and 'Winant, which both gave, but often for 

the even more difficult reconciliation of points of view toward lend· 

lease that did not always coincide because of the differing approaches 

of ,\-Var and State. 23 

Some months later, in January 1943, the Lend-Lease Administrator 

advised the Assistant Secretary of War that, in view of the fact that 

Winant was the ranking representative over all other lend-lease representatives in the Middle East, the Lend-Lease Administration desired 

to revoke all authority previously conferred on Maxwell as a representative of lend-lease. In reply the War Department, declining the 

proposal, pointed out that both \Vinant and Maxwell had been designated lend-lease representatives, and concluded: 

In the absence of a definite relationship between your representative and the 

CG of American forces in the area, such as has been established for instance in 

Australia and in North Africa, the War Department must be of the view that 

the proposal to relieve General Maxwell of his Lend-Lease activities is not in the 

best interest of our war effort.24 

The return to the United States in mid-1943 of both Winant and 

Kidd temporarily unbalanced the joint responsibility of State and 

War Department agencies in the administration of Middle Eastern 

lend-lease affairs and exposed the need for a centralized American economic authority, primarily to participate in the work of MESC, and 

also to co-ordinate lend-lease activities:5 All agencies concerned with 

economic matters in the Middle East except the military were subsequently combined into an American economic mission, and James M. 

Landis, Dean of the Harvard Law School and Director of the wartime 

Office of Civilian Defense, was made its director and named principal 

American civilian representative to the MESC. In defining his duties 

and appointing him to the personal rank of minister, the Secretary of 

.. Rad 1491, Somervell to AMSEG, 16 Aug 42. OPD Cable Book, North African Mission, 

Vol. III. 

"Intervs with Winant, Washington, 27 Jul 44 and 26 Apr 45; and with Ma}.."Well, 

Washington, 12 Mar 46. Background for this chapter was also obtained through: Interv 

cited n. 8; Interv with Col Kidd, G-5 AMET, Cairo, 6 Jul 45; Interv with Dreyfus, Washington, 14 Apr 49; Intervs with James M. Landis, Cambridge, 8 May 45 and 22 Mar 46; 

and Interv with Gordon P. Merriam, Chief, Near East Div, at Dept State, 6 Apr 45. 

,. Ltr, Stettinius to McCloy, 2 Jan 43; and Ltr, McCloy to Stettinius, 11 Jan 43. AG 

400.3295 (1-9-43) (1). 

'" Kidd felt that as civilian lend-lease representative for Iran he had incurred the displeasure of Minister of State Casey by opposing British efforts, through MESC, to establish 

quotas for all of Iran, including the Soviet zone, without consulting the Russians. Upon 

his return to Washington he was commissioned by the Army and sent back to the Middle East 

to become 1-1axwell's director of lend-lease affairs at American command headquarters, Cairo. 
452 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

State stipulated that all matters involving political considerations 

would require consultation under the guidance of the American chief 

of mission in each country concerned.26 One result, besides the benefits 

of centralization of American economic authority, was that administrative responsibility for the MESC now devolved for the British upon 

the Minister of State (later the Minister Resident) and the Ministr)' 

of War Transport and for the Americans upon the American Economic 

Mission in the Middle East and Mr. Landis. Joint Anglo-American 

committees at Cairo, London, and Washington co-ordinated questions 

of policy where civilian and military interests required it. American 

influence in the MESC grew steadily stronger henceforth. 27 

Another result of the Landis appointment was the stimulus it 

afforded to the program of American economic aid for Iran; but before 

the Army was brought formally into the program two more mountains, 

in addition to those already mentioned in connection with the Middle 

East program as a whole, had to be moved. The name of the one was 

Procedure; of the other, Policy. Under the first heading came such 

considerations as the submission of requisitions for lend-lease articles 

for Iran's needs. Such requests came from a variety of Iranian governmental sources and were made to various American agencies. It was 

necessary also to determine a final authority in the field for screening 

requests, after which ultimate decisions rested with higher authority in 

Washington acting in conformity with over-all plans and policies for 

the region. The mountain Procedure therefore closely adjoined the 

mountain Policy; for the fact that the Persian Gulf Service Command 

(and its successor, the PGC) was on the spot with seemingly inexhaustible stocks of vehicles, equipment, and goods of all sorts made it 

the object of requests to divert its resources to Iranian needs. But these 

requests could not be granted without impeding the command's 

primary mission of aid to Russia. Without questioning Iran's need 

Connolly was convinced of his inability under his instructions to respond 

favorably to a fraction of the demands for help. He was nevertheless 

dra\Vll into the program of economic aid. 

At the turn of the year 1942-43, a serious food shortage, which 

resulted from seizure of grain and livestock by USSR occupation forces 

in their zone of Iran, was intensified by local hoarding and profiteering. 

The situation produced an agreement, signed on 4 December 1942 by 

American, British, and Iranian authorities, by which the Americans 

and the British undertook to make up food deficiencies by importation 

.. Ltr, Hull to Landis, 17 Sep 43. Original seen at Dean Landis' office in Cambridge . ., Casey wrote Landis, 28 December 1943, in praise of "your work and the spirit which 

has animated it here in the Middle East, and perhaps together we have no need to be 

ashamed of our record here in this respect." Letter seen at Landis' office. 
THE U. S. ARMY AND AID TO IRAN 453 

of 30,000 tons of wheat and 24,000 tons of barley during the ensuing 

year. During 1943 the PGSC unloaded and delivered to Iranian customhouses civilian goods arriving at the ports and arranged for the 

movement of imported grain within the Corridor, thus taking an active 

part in solution of an emergency situation. Other actions by the Soviet 

authorities in their zone created deficiencies in the Iranian economy 

of an emergency nature. The output of the Iranian state munitions 

factory was diverted to the USSR, as was that of Iranian canning 

factories, copper mines, and military shoe factory. As lend-lease imports 

to fill these and other needs increased, the PGSC Gulf District established in August 1943 at Khorramshahr a storage dump and camp for 

guards for Iranian military supplies.28 

The requisition procedure met with some differences in interpretation. In June 1943 the War and State Departments and the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff decided that henceforth all independent Near Eastern 

countries, among them Iran, might request lend-lease aid directly 

from the United States and need not put their requests through the 

British; but no understanding was reached between War and State as 

to how the governments were to submit their applications. It "might 

be possible," a mesage from Washington stated in September, for the 

commanding general of PGSC to receive applications and pass them 

to Washington with his recommendations. Requests made through 

other American agencies, such as the American Minister or the American missions to the Iranian Army and Gendarmerie, would go to Washington, whence they would be submitted by the War Department to 

Connolly for comment.29 

The policy and procedure to effect it were embodied in a paper 

adopted by the Munitions Assignments Board in Washington in September 1943. "In accordance with its announced policy," the paper 

read, "the United States Government will receive requests direct for 

munitions of war from all governments eligible for Lend-Lease 

aid .... " 30 Applications were to go to the Munitions Assignments 

Board at Washington, which would then obtain the views of the military commanders in the area involved, inform United Kingdom rep-

.. (1) In the winter of 1941-42, 93,000 tons of wheat had been imported by the British, 

some of it from American sources. Groseclose, Introduction to Iran, pp. 175, 181, 185-86. 

(2) Rad AGWAR 705, Connolly to Marshall, 23 Feb 44. Case 28, Sec I-A, OPD 384 Middle 

East, HRS DRB AGO. (3) See File 400.3295 Lend-Lease, Iran, SL 9021; and Ltr, Connolly 

to Ridley, 3 Aug 43, 451.2 Trucks for Iranian Anny, SL 9028. The dump was moved in 

December to Andimeshk. Connolly loaded and delivered stores to the dump; Ridley unloaded 

them there. 

,. Rad AMPSC 902, Marshall to Brereton and Connolly, 15 Jun 43; Rad AMPSC 1545, 

Marshall to Connolly, info Royce, 27 Sep 43. 400.3295 Lend-Lease, Iran, SL 902l. .. Excepted governments were Turkey and members of the British Empire and Commonwealth. MBW 69/1, 13 Sep 43. MBW, Bk. IV, ASF Intn Div Files, HRS DRB AGO. 
454 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

resentatives, and receive and examine their views. This was the American position. The British position recognized "the right of any nation 

to apply for munitions direct to Washington, London, or any Dominion" ; considered that when the claimant nation "is situated within 

an area of British strategic or security responsibilty" its requests, 

"whenever possible," should have prior approval of the British commander-in-chief of that area before being considered at Washington; 

and requested that "whenever possible" no commitments be made by 

the Munitions Assignments Board at Washington until the views of 

the British Chiefs of Staff had been obtained.31 

The two approaches to aiding the independent countries of the 

Middle East led, toward the end of 1943, to a challenge by the British :12 

of the procedure being followed by General Ridley and Colonel 

Schwarzkopf in making direct requisition to Washington for lend-lease 

articles needed by the Iranian Army or Gendarmerie. Although the 

American lists had received the approval of the British military attache 

at Tehran, the British position was that, since Iran was in an area of 

British strategic and security responsibility, the War Office at London 

was concerned in such matters as the size, equipment, and training of 

the Iranian forces. The British suggested that these matters should be 

handled by agreement between the chief of the American military 

mission concerned and the Commander-in-Chief, PAl Force. General 

Ridley took the position that his contract with Iran expressly forbade 

him to tender any advice based upon other considerations than the good 

of the Iranian Army, and that the proposed arrangement, if carried 

out, would render Ridley's position political and thus forfeit the confidence of the Iranian authorities and jeopardize the purpose of his 

mission. Ridlev noted that if the Americans and the British were to 

plan to "speak 'with one voice," as the British commander of PAl Force 

had urged, such agreement would have to be negotiated at the diplomatic level. This view was upheld at the War Department the following April 1944, and what began as a procedural matter ended in the 

realm of policy with American insistence on the Iranian Government's 

right to determine its own policies and to effectuate them by direct 

appeal to the fountainhead of lend-Iease.aa 

11 Inc! HB," 19 Jul 43, atchd to MBW 69/1, cited n. 30. 

12 Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready of the British Army Staff, Washington, on behalf of Lt. Gen. 

Arthur H. Smith, Commander-in-Chief, PAl Force. For radios, memoranda, minutes, cor- respondence, and reports bearing on the protest and its sequel, see Mission Report File, 

U.S. Military Mission with the Iranian Army, War Office, Tehran, 17 January, 27 March, 

10 and 13 April 1944. 13 Supplies and equipment purchased in the United States under lend-lease for ultimate use by the Iranian Gendarmerie were transferred to the Iranian Ministry of the Interior 

through the facilities of the PGSC and PGC. Colonel Schwarzkopf's Gendarmerie Mission 
THE U. S. ARMY AND AID TO IRAN 455 

'While this weaning of Iran from British tutelage was being attempted through Anglo-American adjustments, the question of General Connolly's authority to render economic aid to Iran was being 

threshed out within the American official family. Two factors put Connolly in a pivotal position: the possession by his command of articles 

suitable for use in aid of Iran; and the fact that Washington asked 

for his views on requests for aid which came via the American Legation 

and the Millspaugh, Ridley, and Schwarzkopf missions. Many of the 

demands on Iran's behalf were clearly for nonmilitary purposes, like 

a request for the loan of equipment to dig irrigation ditches and wells. 

This type of assistance, strongly supported by Minister Dreyfus and 

the President's ambassador-at-Iarge, General Hurley, was usually 

denied by Connolly as lying outside his primary mission.54 

In the matter of building up the Iranian Gendarmerie with American supplies, Colonel Schwarzkopf experienced difficulty in converting 

General Connolly (and the War Department) to the project. Requests 

for supplies, approved by the Department of State, by the British military attache at Tehran, and by Philip Kidd, civilian head of lend-lease 

in Iran, often foundered upon the rock of War Department nonconcurrence.a

• It was the view of the Department of State that the requested equipment was essential to civil well-being in Iran, in accordance with the general purposes of MESC, which had their roots, as 

has been noted, in military necessity. Moreover, mid-1943 found 

conditions in Iran, in the opinion of the commanding general of 

USAFIME, highly alarming. General Brereton reported to Washington in August, as follows: "Employees are likely to revolt against the 

Iranian Government. The British can discover no group upon which 

to found plans for internal security. It is asserted that confidence in 

American advisers is decreasing and a state of chaos developing." ZQ 

Whether or not Connolly shared Brereton's alarm, he did not abandon 

his basic assumption that the strengthening of Iran's economy lay beyond his primary mission to aid Russia. In exasperation Minister 

facilitated receipting and invoicing, and payments were arranged between the Foreign 

Economic Administration and the Iranian Ministry of Finance. Cases 81, 100, Sec IV, 

OPD 210.684 Iran. 

3i (1) See correspondence between Connolly and Dreyfus, 13 July-4 November 1943. 

092 International Affairs and Relations, SL 8978. (2) Memo of conversation, John McCloy, 

Wallace Murray, and George Allen, 29 Jan 44, sub: Broadening Directives of Gcn Connolly. 

Div of Communications and Records, Dept State 861.24/1773 PS/RGB. 

'" Not until 11 June 1945, through an amendment to Schwarzkopf's Letter of Instructions 

following a strong recommendation by the Department of State of 5 June 1945, did the 

War Department put the Iranian Gendarmerie on the same footing as the Iranian Army in 

supply matters. See Memo and amended Ltr of Instructions to Schwarzkopf. Case 100, 

Sec IV, OPD 210.684 Iran. oo Rad AMSME 7615, Gen Brereton to Gen Strong, G-2, 26 Aug 43. 371.2 (Apr 42-1 

Nov44) HqAMET. 
456 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

Dreyfus in a message to Secretary Hull denounced this attitude and 

castigated Connolly and his fiscal director, Colonel Stetson, for what 

he saw as their indifference to Iranian problems. 37 

But to Connolly the Iranian problem wore one aspect, and to Dreyfus another. In the two men the differing approaches of the War and 

State Departments to the problem of Iran were personified and brought 

face to face. As spokesmen for their departments' policies, they clashed, 

as the policies each was bound to pursue clashed. Even after the assignment of Minister Dreyfus to another post, following the Tehran Conference, removed the mounting personal tension between Dreyfus and 

Connolly, the War and State Departments still lacked a harmonious 

meshing of their differing means for attaining the same general ends on 

behalf of the Iranian problem. 

The appointment of Landis in September to be American director 

of economic operations in the Middle East helped to weight the scales 

in favor of the views of the State Department. In a diagnosis of Iran's 

troubles, prepared in November for Harry Hopkins to take to the 

Tehran Conference, Landis ranked foremost the lack of food. He 

found other consumer goods in sufficient supply, but the means of distribution (transport) disrupted. Iran's third fundamental lack was 

system, or what Americans liked to call know-how. 3s Despite the encouragement to administrative reform supplied by the Millspaugh 

economic mission the machinery of Iran's economy was still dangerously inefficient. 

The story now reaches the case of the twenty-seven men.39 As a 

means of attacking Iran's three lacks, Landis requested Connolly to 

furnish seventeen officers and ten men to assist in solving problems connected with the transport of cereal and sugar beets for civilian needs 

and fuel and oil for the Iranian transport system. The request was 

referred to Washington to the headquarters of the Army Service Forces, 

whence General Somervell on 6 December 1943 directed an inquiry to 

Harry Hopkins at Cairo to ascertain from the President (who was in 

Egypt on his way home from the Tehran Conference) whether he desired the Army to furnish that sort of assistance to a State Department 

"Rad 837, Dreyfus to Hull, 13 Aug 43. Dept of State, VII--4--C, Iran-Foreign Advisers-U.S. Gendarmerie Mission, Div of Near Eastern Affairs. as Memo on Consumer Goods in Iran, undated, forwarded under cover of Ltr, Landis 

to Hopkins, 26 Nov 43. Copy from Hopkins Papers supplied by Robert E. Sherwood . .. (1) Rad, Somervell to Hopkins, 6 Dec 43; and Memo, Somervell for Handy, 7 Dec 43. 

Hqs, ASF, Theaters of Opns, PGC (13) 1942-44, HRS DRB AGO. (2) Memo, Handy, 

ACofS, OPD, for CofS, 12 Feb 44, sub: Assistance to Iran by PGC. Case 28, Sec I-A, 

OPD 384 Middle East, HRS DRB AGO. This file contains all documents alluded to in text 

except where otherwise noted. (3) Rads, 17, 20, 22, 24 Feb 44, and Ltr, 31 Mar 44, by 

Marshall, Royce, Kirk, and Connolly. 334 Minister Landis Mission. SL 9011. 
THE U. S. ARMY AND AID TO IRAN 457 

mission. Somervell stressed the view that the Army would not consider 

such assistance a precedent for the future. An affirmative answer having 

been received the next day, Somervell ordered Connolly to furnish the 

desired Army personnel. 

The President's approval was followed by two moves to assure 

that the Army's assistance could be relied upon in other cases than that 

of the twenty-seven men. Wallace Murray, Director of the Office of 

N ear Eastern and African Affairs of the Department of State, requested 

the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, to broaden Connolly's 

instructions to authorize the furnishing of equipment and forces in aid 

of Iran; and Landis, at Hopkins' suggestion, sought for and obtained 

from the President a letter containing the following passage: 

Your work, under the directives you have received from the Department of 

State and the Foreign Economic Administration, is primarily concerned with the 

conduct of economic activities relating to the war. In that work you will, of course, 

put first the strengthening in every way of the warm and co-operative relations with 

our Allies, upon which our success in the war, and thereafter, so largely depend. 

On occasion you may require the assistance of other branches of the United States 

Government, now active in the Middle East, to make your endeavors in the economic field effective. Within this area of operations you are authorized to show this 

letter to such officials of the United States in order that the aid they may reasonably 

give you may be forthcoming within the limits of their staffs and in so far as is 

consistent with political and military policies.40 

The Murray proposal was examined by the State and War Departments for several weeks, General Connolly's views were obtained, and 

War made clear to State its concern to safeguard its primary mission 

lest its resources be dissipated. War urged that Connolly's aim should 

be to help Iran help itself and not have "the American Army do the 

work which Iran needs done." Granting Connolly the authority requested by State was not to be interpreted as sponsoring activities in 

finance, agriculture, and health. The War Department cautioned 

against rendering aid in such a way as to arouse misunderstanding in 

Iran, instancing a case in which the British, using trucks with British 

Army markings, assisted in collecting the Iranian harvest, only to incur 

the suspicion of the Iranian public that they were diverting the harvest 

to their own uses. Acting in accordance with Connolly's recommendation, the War Department on 12 February 1944 amended Connolly's 

Letter of Instructions by granting him discretionary authority to render 

for short periods such aid as had been requested by the Department of 

.. (1) Ltr, Roosevelt to Landis, 6 Mar 44. Copy supplied by Mr. Landis. (2) Copy of 

Landis' proposed draft showing changes from the final text supplied from the Hopkins 

Papers by Mr. Sherwood along with a letter, Landis to Hopkins, 3 February 1944, and 

memorandum, Hopkins for President, 11 February 1944. 
458 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

State. The kinds of aid covered included furnishing technical advice 

and lending equipment and personnel, providing no interference with 

Connolly's primary mission ensued. Connolly later asked that, to avoid 

inviting a flood of requests \'\'hose denial might lead to ill feeling, public 

announcement of the new directive be withheld.41 

In accordance with his broadened authority, Connolly made the 

twenty-seven men available to Landis who recommended their assignment to the Iranian Road Transport Department, under the direction 

of Floyd F. Shields, transport adviser in the Millspaugh mission. Plam 

were made to use them in a thoroughgoing reorganization of Iranian 

road transport calculated to require a year's time. Applauded by the 

Department of State, this assignment of American Army personnel 

was regarded within the War Department as based upon an erroneous 

concept of aid to Iran. An OPD memorandum suggested that the 

Iranians, instead of training their own people, hoped to keep the 

twenty-seven men indefinitely. The Chief of Staff on 31 March notified 

the Department of State that they should be replaced by Iranian 

civilian or military personnel by 26 August 1944, and for this reason 

Connolly's recommendation that they be detached from the PGC and 

organized as a special mission was not approved. The request was mad~ 

without knowledge of Marshall's intention to put a time limit on the 

men's availability!2 

The difference in attitude between State and '\Tar was not now 

over the desirability of the Army's lending aid in the economic program 

but over extent and method. In the determination of these the Armv's 

voice in military lend-lease and in the apportionment of its person~cl 

and equipment was fairly matched by the Department of State's voice 

at the diplomatic level. A stalemate was avoided by the day-to-day 

balancing of the two prerogatives and responsibilities and by a further 

refinement of the procedures by which requests for aid were screened. 

On 23 February 1944 Connolly reported to :Marshall on the extent of 

aid already rendered or planned for and gave his estimate of the 

probable sources of further requests!3 In addition to citing the services 

rendered in 1943 in handling grain importations for the civilian economy, Connolly stated that he was considering using empty 1\1otor 

Transport Service trucks on the southward return run to haul 1,500 

tons of Iranian Government-owned wheat from Hamadan to Dorud. 

Further assistance in transport had been furnished through the supply 

URad cited n. 28(2) . 

., (I) Ltr, ~furray to McCloy, Asst Secy War, 26 Feb 44. Case 28, Sec I-A, OPD 38'} 

Middle East, HRS DRB AGO. (2) OPD I':ote for Record, 26 Feb 44. Same file. (3) Inter\' 

with Gen Connolly, Pentagon, 22 Aug 50 . .. Rad cited n. 28 (2). 
THE U. S. ARMY AND AID TO IRAN 459 

in 1943 on memorandum receipt of 200 motor vehicles for an indefinite 

period and the assembly by Connolly's plants of 360 trucks shipped to 

the Ridley mission under lend-Iease. 44 Most requests for assistance, Connolly reported, had come from the Millspaugh mission and it was anticipated that this source and the Shah, rather than the Ridley and 

Schwarzkopf missions, would provide most future requests. Contacts 

were being maintained with Millspaugh, Ridley, Schwarzkopf, the 

American Embassy at Tehran, and L. Stephen Timmerman, American 

adviser to the civilian police. 

In reply to this report the War Department sent Connolly a long 

message on the procedures being adopted for handling the diverse 

requests for aid expected to follow the broadening of the directive. By 

direction of the Department of State the American Embassy was to 

screen all requests. Although Connolly's operations had priority over 

those of the U.S. missions to the Iranian Army and Gendarmerie, 

Connolly was to give these agencies all possible help, in such a way as 

to reflect credit upon them as instruments of the American policy of 

aiding Iran. General Ridley's opinion was to be sought in cases where 

projects could be carried out in whole or in part by the Iranian Army or 

Gendarmerie, but Connolly was to have the last word on participation 

by PGC. The message closed with a declaration of policy. "We do not 

want American soldiers to undertake any work that can be done by 

Iranian civilians or soldiers. Assignment of American troops to execute 

any requests would be the best way of meeting the situation, but this 

method would not be in conformance with the principle of aiding the 

Iranians to aid themselves, and would deter the development of Iranian 

abilities." 45 

Projects and requisitions for Iran approved by Connolly were 

nevertheless subject to overriding diplomatic policy and, in the case of 

the road transport project including the twenty-seven men, to the vicissitudes of Iranian politics. The President's policy of aiding the Iranians 

to help themselves required a corollary insistence that aid be entrusted 

only to competent agencies, capable of putting it to effective use. In 

accordance with this principle the American Embassy at Tehran 

approved lend-lease supply of military goods for the Iranian Army and 

Gendarmerie because the Ridley and Schwarzkopf missions were able 

to direct their use effectively. On the other hand, by the end of June 

.. On Connolly's inability to furnish Millspaugh transport vehicles because he was "not 

authorized to comply with requests for articles of civilian end use at any time," see Ltrs, 

Millspaugh to Connolly, 4 Apr 44, and Connolly to Millspaugh, 17 Apr 44. 451.1 Passenger 

Automobiles, SL 9028. 

"Rad AMPSC 2614, War Dept to Connolly, 1 lfar 44. :123.361 Powers and Duties, 

SL 9008. 
460 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

1944, the 1\.1illspaugh mission had encountered such severe opposition 

to its operations as to evoke a threat from the Iranian Prime Minister 

and Majlis to repeal the sweeping economic powers of its director as 

Administrator General of Finance. Moreover, the issuance of orders to 

return the twenty-seven American officers and men to active status 

with the PGC had rendered the tenure of office of Floyd Shields, to 

whose direction they were assigned, so precarious that the American 

Embassy directed the suspension of delivery of road transport vehicles, 

tires, and spares "until it is clear that their use will be controlled by a 

reliable organization." In a matter of days the threat passed and the 

embassy asked Connolly to release the articles. This proved, however, 

only the lull before the storm, for by the following January 1945 official 

announcement was made of the withdrawal of all economic power from 

Millspaugh.46 

The departure of the Millspaugh mission left only the 'War Department agencies-the Persian Gulf Command and the military advisory 

missions-to implement the President's policy toward Iran as formulated by the Department of State . 

.. (1) Ltr, Richard Ford, Charge d' Af1aires ad interim, to Connolly, 30 Jun 44. 334 Minister Landis Mission, SL 9011. (2) Ltr, Ford to Connolly, 3 Jul 44. Same file. (3) Rad, 

Col Thomas E. Mahoney, Ridley's QM, to OPD, 11 Jan 45. 334 U.S. Military Mission with 

the Iranian Army, SL 9011. 
CHAPTER XXI 

The Military Advisory Missions 

For the United States-a newcomer to Middle Eastern affairs, invited to the Persian Corridor to undertake a war-born enterprise in 

aid of its British and Soviet Allies-the strengthening of Iran developed 

aspects and problems only dimly foreseen when, in March 1942, Iran 

was declared eligible for lend-lease aid. The program to strengthen 

Iran had two objectives: first, to ensure immediately local conditio~s 

under which the Russian-aid program could succeed; second, eventually to enable Iran to be master in its own house. The two objectives, 

which might have been complementary, were often rendered mutually 

contradictory by the peculiar circumstance of Iran's situation during 

the war years, while at the same time the ability of the United States 

to render effective aid to Iran was complicated by American regard 

for the rights enjoyed under the Tri-Partite Treaty by the occupying 

powers. American efforts in Iran's behalf were therefore cautious, perhaps even haphazard. Some of the reasons have been explored in Chapters IX and XX. Only slowly did it become apparent that the political, 

economic, and military health of Iran, essential to the success of Russian-aid operations, was a matter of life or death for Iran itself; that, 

in fact, the second objective overshadowed the first; that the problem 

of Iran was monolithic.1 

Although this realization was reflected in the clarification and 

firming of American policy respecting Iran which occurred after the 

Tehran Conference, one basic consideration precluded adoption of 

comprehensive measures for shoring up Iran's weakness. This was the 

matter of controls. The imposition upon a sovereign state of all-embracing controls sufficient to ensure needed reforms in its government, 

economy, and military establishment would inevitably substitute a 

semicolonial status for the independence which those reforms were 

1 Background for this chapter was obtained through interviews with: Gen Ridley, Pentagon, 

19 Dec 44, War Office, Tehran, 24 Jul 45, and Pentagon, 7 Feb 47; Col Schwarzkopf, Tehran, 

3 Aug 45; Col Boone, Tehran, 30 Jul 45; Col Mahoney and Maj Conly, Tehran, on several 

occasions in Jul and Aug 45; Col Charles G. Dodge of G-3 and Lt Col Victor B. Shemwell, 

Pentagon, 10 May 50; Louis Dreyfus, Washington, 14 Apr 49; and Wallace Murray, Tehran, 

30 Ju145. 
462 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

designed to buttress. Reform may be assisted from without but it must 

be adopted and supported from within. In the case of the Millspaugh 

economic mission, for example, the comprehensive powers granted to 

Millspaugh by Iran ultimately proved unworkable under existing circumstances. Thus ended that phase of American economic aid. American assistance to Iran's military establishment, on the other hand, did 

not, during the war and the five years following V-J Day, involve such 

sweeping grants of authority to foreign advisers. Partly for this reason 

the American advisory missions to the Iranian Army and Gendarmerie 

survived into the postwar period as evidence of American support of 

the sovereignty of Iran. The full story of the missions and the evaluation 

of their work must remain for the historian of the future unhampered 

by closeness to the event and considerations of international policy. 

The value set upon the missions in the early postwar period was evidenced when President Truman told the Congress on 1 June 1950, 

"That Iran remains an independent country in spite of continuous 

Soviet pressure is due in part to the strong support of the United States." 

The Contracts 

The security forces of Iran consisted of local police under centralized control from Tehran; the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie, 

under the Minister of Interior, which served as a national constabulary 

for internal security; and the Army, formally under the Minister of 

"Yar, but whose control was subject to fluctuations as such state officers 

as the Shah, the Chief of Staff, the \Var Minister, or the Prime Minister 

gained temporary ascendancy over it. During the greater part of its 

existence the Gendarmerie had been the poor relation of the Army, 

subsisting on the scraps that fell from the budget table and generally 

unhonored. In accepting Iran's invitation to provide technical advice 

for the Gendarmerie and reorganization of the supply services of the 

Army, the 'Cnited States had declined the alternative suggestion that 

it establish a large mission to train and reorganize the Iranian Army as 

a whole. Even the less ambitious alternative which was undertaken 

bristled with difficulties inherent in two organizations seething with 

political complications. General Ridley, therefore, in undertaking to 

reorganize the Iranian Army supply services, accepted neither an 

offered post under the Shah nor one under the "Yar Minister. Colonel 

Schwarzkopf began his service as head of the Gendarmerie :rvIission 

under the direction of the American Minister at Tehran, Louis Dreyfus. 

Early in 1943, after Schwarzkopf had spent some months sizing up 

the situation and formulating recommendations in an informal capac-
THE MILITARY ADVISORY MISSIONS 463 

ity, negotiations were begun for a contract between the United States 

and Iran to formalize his status. While these were in the preliminary 

stages, the talks were widened, upon the recommendations of General 

Ridley and General Hurley, to include a contract for the Army Mission. 

It was thought that a contractual relationship would provide the 

authority necessary to enforce reforms and achieve results. After prolonged exchange of views behveen the governments and among officials 

of the Departments of State and vVar, agreed terms, having been 

authorized by an act of the Iranian MajIis on 21 October 1943, were 

signed at Tehran by Minister Dreyfus and Mohammad Sa'ed, Iranian 

Foreign Minister: that for the Army Mission on 3 November, effective 

as of 22 March 1943, and that for the Gendarmerie Mission on 27 

November, effective as of 2 October 1942.2 

General Ridley, who was continuously under War Department 

control, had been provided in September 1942 with a Letter of Instructions. The authorization of the missions by the Iranian Majlis enabled 

Colonel Schwarzkopf to receive analogous status and he was therefore 

given a Letter of Instructions, relieved from his assignment to the 

American Minister, and returned to the supervision of the War Department.a The letter defined Schwarzkopf's primary mission as the improvement of the efficiency of the Gendarmerie, "thus facilitating 

Russian supply." It exempted the Gendarmerie Mission from the command of the commanding generals of USAFIME and PGSC, and 

made it also independent of the Army Mission, but enjoined it to e.o-operate with those agencies. A provision which never came into force 

was that if "the British, who are responsible for the security of the communications in southern Iran," should employ the Gendarmerie to 

maintain that security, then Colonel Schwarzkopf, in his capacity as an 

officer of the Gendarmerie, would come under British command. The 

letter also cautioned Schwarzkopf against becoming involved in matters of a purely diplomatic nature, a caution also carried in Ridley's 

Letter of Instructions, arising from the experience of his predecessor, 

General Greely. 

The contracts for the Army and Gendarmerie Missions provided in 

• (1) Copies of the Army contract in Case 59, Sec II, and Case 71, Sec III-A, OPD 

210.684 Iran, HRS DRB AGO. These files contain also drafts, memoranda, and other papers 

relating to the negotiations. (2) Copies of the Gendarmerie contract in VII-4-C, IranForeign Advisers-U.S. Gendarmerie Mission, Div of Near Eastern Affairs, Dept State, 

and in MID 370.093 Iran 6 Jan 44 (26 Oct 42). Also published in Department of State 

Executive Agreements Series 361, Publication 2084. • (1) Memo for Dir, OPD, 21 Oct 43, sub: Clarification of Status of the Schwarzkopf 

Mission. Case 67, Sec II, OPD 210.684 Iran, HRS DRB AGO. (2) Ltr of Instructions, 

Gen McNarney, DCofS, to Col Schwarzkopf, 23 Oct 43. Same file. (3) Rad 574, Dept State 

to Dreyfus, 11 Nov 43. VII-4-C, Iran-Foreign Advisers-U.S. Gendarmerie Mission, Div 

of ~ear Eastern Affairs, Dept State. 
464 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

detail for functional and administrative matters. The American officermembers of the missions were to serve in the Iranian Ministries of War 

and Interior respectively, through their chiefs of mission, and were to 

outrank all Iranian officers of their rank. The government of Iran was 

to bear the expenses of the missions, including salaries for the American 

members of the missions in addition to their American Army salaries. 

Appointment of American members to the missions was to receive 

Iranian as well as American approval. The chief of the Army Mission 

was to be appointed Military Adviser by the Iranian War Minister 

through an Imperial General Order and to receive broad powers, including access to "any and all records, correspondence and plans relating to the administration of the Army needed by him," as well as 

the power to investigate, summon, and question "any member of the 

Army" in "matters which in his opinion will assist him" in his duties. 

He was also empowered to recommend to the Shah removals, promotions, and demotions of Iranian Army officers. Under the Gendarmerie 

contract, the Minister of Interior was to appoint the chief of the mission 

as his adviser in charge of Gendarmerie affairs, a provision which 

carried with it the attributes of command. 

Two stipulations common to the contracts, though somewhat differently worded in each, safeguarded the sovereign integrity of Iran: 

American members of the missions were perpetually bound not to 

divulge any secret or confidential matters of which they would become 

cognizant; and the government of Iran was empowered to cancel the 

contracts of any individual members of the missions who were duly 

and competently proved to be guilty of interference in the political 

affairs of the country or of violation of the laws of the land. A third 

provision, common to both contracts, stipulated that Iran would not 

employ any foreign personnel in or for the Army or Gendarmerie during 

the life of the contracts without approval of the respective missions. 

The Work of the Missions 

In the first months of his duty, in the fall of 1942, Colonel Schwarzkopf visited the Gendarmerie posts to familiarize himself with problems, including that of employing Gendarmerie personnel in the patrolling and guarding of the railway. He reported his findings to the Minister of Interior and presented to the Prime Minister a plan for the 

reorganization of the Gendarmerie.4 By August 1944 he had estab-

• (1) Rpt, Schwarzkopf to Minister of Interior, 31 Oct 42. VII-4-C, Iran-Foreign 

Advisers-U.S. Gendarmerie Mission, Div of Near Eastern Affairs, Dept State. (2) Rpt to 

Prime Minister, 22 Feb 43. Same file. 
THE MILITARY ADVISORY MISSIONS 465 

lished training schools for sergeants, motorcycle riders, and truck 

drivers, and had planned six others. He had arranged to obtain from 

the United States a radio engineer to install over the next two years 

a communications system for the dispersed posts. This was a modest 

installment of his plan, but he had found the work of his mission beset 

with conditions of intrigue and inefficiency marked by a succession of 

eleven ministers of interior during the two years after his arriva1. 5 In 

1945, faced with the possibility that the United States would withdraw 

the mission, Iranian officials indicated acceptance of nine demands 

embodying longfelt needs for the Gendarmerie. These included a status 

independent of Army interference, a separate and adequate budget, 

pensions, establishment of an elite corps, genuine government support 

of the mission's efforts, and elimination of graft, red tape, and delay 

in accomplishing reforms.6 Although the spirit was willing to translate 

these demands into action, the flesh proved weak, and at the end of the 

war period many of the reforms were yet to be accomplished. 

The achievements of the mission up to that time were nevertheless 

far from negligible, the most striking being the improvement of the 

condition of the ranks and the creation among them of an esprit de corps 

which became notably apparent in the political crisis of 1946 following 

departure of the Allied forces from Iran. Starting with human material 

handicapped by illiteracy and opium addiction, Colonel Schwarzkopf 

was in time able to report progress against ills long associated with 

abuse of office. The Gendarmerie rank and file moved steadily toward 

a better sense of discipline and a respect for businesslike, honest, and 

efficient procedures.1 

The Army Mission was no less plagued than was the Gendarmerie 

Mission by a lack of continuity in War Ministers and Chiefs of Staff, 

by budgetary inadequacies, and a host of problems, political and 

human, that sprang from Iran's essential weakness. Change and improvement in the Gendarmerie had been impeded by the organization's 

,virtual friendlessness, its status as poor relation of the powerfully 

intrenched Army; but the privileged position of the Army was an 

equally effective impediment to its change and improvement. 

General Ridley's job was to improve the efficiency of the Army 

without becoming involved in Iranian political matters. Swimming was 

• Ltr, Schwarzkopf to U.S. Ambassador, Tehran, 16 Aug 44. VII-4-C, Iran-Foreign 

Advisers-U.S. Gendarmerie Mission, Div of Near Eastern Affairs, Dept State. Another 

copy Case 71, Sec III-A, OPD 210.684 Iran, HRS DRB AGO. • (1) Ltr, Schwarzkopf to Col Alfred D. Starbird, OPD, 18 Aug 45. Case 103, Sec IV, 

OPD 210.684 Iran, HRS DRB AGO. (2) Rads 756 and 775, Murray to Dept State, 

24 and 27 Sep 45. VII-4-C, Iran-Foreign Advisers-U.S. Gendarmerie Mission, Div of 

Near Eastern Affairs, Dept State. 

'Rpt by Schwarzkopf, undated. MID 370.093 Iran 6 Jan 44 (26 Oct 42). 
466 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

permitted, provided he hung his clothes on a hickory limb but did not 

go near the water. In reviewing his mission's accomplishment to the 

end of the war period, Ridley recalled his early diagnosis of the Army's 

situation in 1942, an analysis which had much in common with Minister 

Landis' economic prescription the next year for food, adequate transport, and an efficient system of doing things. Ridley found upon his 

arrival that the inflation had rendered officer salaries, and the budget 

generally, inadequate; that of serious equipment shortages, those in 

transport were drastic; that the organization and functioning of the 

supply and auxiliary departments were unsatisfactory; but that for all 

tasks likely to be imposed upon the Army during the war period, 1942 

tactical methods and training were in general sufficient. In a report 

submitted in 1942, at the request of the Shah, to the Minister of War, 

Ridley specified four necessities as basic to Army'reorganization: limiting total strength to 88,000; retaining only the best officers; providing a 

reasonable scale of pay; and providing adequate motor transport.8 

Though promptly approved by the Shah and published to the Army, 

few of these recommendations had been carried out five months later; 

but reports from December 1943 forward reveal considerable positive 

accomplishment along the recommended lines, reflecting changes of 

personnel in the government of Iran which provided high-level support 

for reform. 

Much attention was devoted to reorganization of the supply and 

auxiliary branches of the Army-those to which, except by specific 

Iranian request, Ridley's mission was to confine its attentions. After 

something more than a year of operation the mission had set up a depot 

system of supply with centralized responsibility for procurement, distribution, and troop payment. The new depot system supplanted one in 

which, with the exception of clothing and individual soldier equipment 

"(1) Memo, Work and Accomplishment of the American Military Mission with the 

Iranian Army, enclosed with Progress Rpt, Ridley to OPD, 11 Sep 45. Case 82 (4), Sec IV, 

OPD 210.684 Iran, HRS DRB AGO. (2) Rpt, Ridley to Minister of War, 6 Dec 42, sub: 

Basis of Reorganization of the Army. Case 53, Sec II, same file. (3) Other reports offering 

basic survey and review: Preliminary Rpt, Ridley to Chief, OPD, 10 Dec 42, Case 53, Sec II, 

same file; Review forwarded under Ltr, Ridley to U.S. Ambassador, Tehran, 26 Mar 44, 

Mission Rpts File, Mission Hq, War Office, Tehran; Rpt, The Military Mission with the 

Iranian Army: An Estimate of Its Accomplishments and Its Future Value, forwarded under 

Ltr, Ridley to OPD, 31 May 44, Case 71, Sec Ill-A, OPD 210.684 Iran, HRS DRB AGO. 

(4) Detailed accounts of the mission, drawn upon in this chapter, are the following letters 

and progress reports from Ridley to OPD: 17 Mar, 8 May 43, Mission Rpts File, Mission Hq, 

War Office, Tehran; I4 Jun 43, Case 76, Sec 11, OPD 319.1 Middle East, HRS DRB AGO; 

24 Jul, 11 Sep, 23 Nov 43, Cases 87, 92, and 107, respectively, Sec III-A, same file; 30 

Dec 43, Case 71, Sec II, same file, another copy Case 71, Sec III-A, OPD 210.684 Iran, 

HRS DRB AGO; 15 Feb 44, same file; 7 May, 9 Aug 44, Cases 77, 80, respectively, Sec III, same file; 30 Oct 44, Case 82, Sec IV, same file; 8 Nov 44, Mission Rpts File, Mission Hq, 

War Office, Tehran; 21 Mar, 1 Jun 45, Cases 82, 82 (3), respectively, Sec IV, OPD 210.684 

Iran. HRS DRB AGO. 
centrally procured and distributed, everything, including troop payment, had been locally administered through each regiment. Too much 

opportunity was offered for inefficiency, irregularities, graft, and injustice. The revised system substituted, along with centralization, adequate 

financial accounting, standardization of procurement, and reorganization of the Offices of the Quartermaster General and the Chief of 

Finance. A factory to produce shoes and clothing was established and 

from time to time training schools in administration, engineering, 

medicine, finance, and quartermaster problems were operated. In 

1943–44 the entire Army was inoculated against typhus with vaccine 

from the United States, the first time such a step had ever been taken. 

Malaria control was instituted experimentally at an Army post under 

technical instruction supplied by the Persian Gulf Command. 

Ridley reported in May 1944 no progress in administrative reform 

in two fields-recruitment and the administration of justice-where 

“the inherent conditions are such that there is no hope of improvement 

under any further plans the Mission can devise.” He took no hand in 

the unsavory recruiting department of the Army, where exemption of 

those who could buy themselves off, Faking medical examinations, and 

enlistment of unfit persons were among “widespread practices that 

seem impossible to correct until the whole law-enforcement policy 

and moral sense of the country are radically revised.’’ The Justice 

Department of the Army also seemed to Ridley to offer no hope of 

accomplishing results. 

By the middle of 1944 an impasse in the Majlis over the size of the 

Army threatened to cut off budget appropriations. In this question 

Ridley, who had recommended an army of from eighty-eight to ninety 

thousand, found himself on middle ground between the Shah, who 

desired an army of 108,000, and Dr. Millspaugh, whose budgetary appropriations, in Ridley’s belief, would have had the effect of cutting 

the Army in half by reducing its field force to only 30,000, a figure only 

slightly larger than that of the Gendarmerie when Schwarzkopf took 

over. Millspaugh stated that he felt a large army would be unnecessary 

in Iran if the tribes were justly treated and the Gendarmerie made 

adequate to police the country. In fact, subject to those two rather 

fundamental if’s, Millspaugh preferred no army at all.’ The head of 

the American economic mission insisted upon a budget which would 

take from the Army and give to agricultural and social projects. Ridley’s figure was strongly supported by the British Ambassador as providing an army sufficient for Iran’s defense and security. Millspaugh’s 

figure prevailed while his financial powers survived; but his insistence 

See Millspaugh, Americans in Persia, especially pp. 104–05, 114–15. 
468 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

upon a small army hastened his downfall, after which a strength basis 

was reached somewhere between the figures supported by Ridley and 

the Shah.lo 

Lack of motor transport for the Army was no less serious than 

Schwarzkopf had found it to be for the Gendarmerie, or Landis for the 

Iranian economy as a whole. General Greely in July 1942 had informed 

General Marshall that, starting with a few trucks, he could reorganize 

the Army into an efficient force. Ridley found the Army "practically 

immobile," with almost no vehicles, equipment, or drivers. By the end 

of May 1944 he was able to report the establishment of a motor transport organization with regular operating schedules; the institution of 

repair and maintenance shops at Tehran, Isfahan, and Kermanshah; 

the arrival from the United States of 600 trucks procured on lend-lease 

requisition from the War Department; the establishment of schools 

for training drivers and mechanics; and the reorganization of the 

Army's Transport Department-all of which was noted as "an outstanding accomplishment of the :Mission, of great value to the Iranian 

Army." But only a year later Ridley reported that the program in 

transport had "suffered greatly" through frequent changes in the head 

of the Transport Department.ll Any accomplishment represented not 

only achievement of parts of the plan for the Army but also a victory, 

if only temporary, over internal conditions. 

Priorities and Policy 

There were also important external conditions which affected the 

program of strengthening Iran, and specifically its Army and Gendarmerie. Some of these, incidentally involving the two missions as 

parts of the general program and as agencies affected by lend-lease 

procedures followed by the American and British commands in the 

Corridor, have been touched upon in the previous chapter. But the 

question of lend-lease supplies for the Iranian Army and Gendarmerie 

required also the determination of the respective importance of the 

two missions as instruments of a developing policy toward Iran. In this 

matter, although the Department of State moved well ahead of the 

War Department, it eventually succeeded in persuading the War 

,. Rad 881, Richard Ford, U.S. Charge d'Affaires ad interim at Tehran, to Dept State, 

14 Mar 44. VII-4-B, Iran-Foreign Advisers-U.S. Military Mission, 1942, Near East Div, 

Dept State. 

11 (1) Rpt, Estimate of Accomplishments, cited n. 8 (3). (2) Progress Rpt, 1 Jun 45, 

cited n. 8(4). (3) From the United States carne 200 Studebaker 5-ton and 400 Ford ly,-ton 

trucks, some of which were assembled by Iranian Army personnel under Ridley's supervision 

at PGC plants. 
THE MILITARY ADVISORY MISSIONS 469 

Department to place Iran's military lend-lease needs on a par with 

those of other beneficiary countries. Meanwhile, until June 1945, when 

the War Department took its last step in that direction, caution marked 

its attitude, and slowness and tediousness the provision of supplies for 

the Iranian Army and Gendarmerie. The result was often embarrassment for Ridley and Schwarzkopf and mingled feelings on the part of 

the Iranians, puzzled to reconcile American protestations of friendship 

with the modest fruits which came trickling from the cornucopia of 

lend-lease. And this situation was bound to continue so long as the War 

Department entertained doubts as to the effective use by the Iranian 

services of American grants-in-aid. 

Even before he left Washington General Ridley was alert to the 

psychological aspects of gift bearing. He expressed his apprehension 

lest the Iranians, denied their request for a large training mission and 

disappointed in their hopes of obtaining bountiful supplies for their 

Army, might react unfavorably to Ridley'S mission. He urged the War 

Department to encourage the Iranians by promptly delivering to the 

Iranian Army some two hundred much-needed trucks asked for by 

General Greely and already in Iran, though on lend-lease consignment 

to the British and Russians.12 Trucks were eventually provided; but in 

July 1943 Connolly was still having to explain to Ridley that the Russian-aid program could not be interrupted at the truck assembly plants 

even to accommodate the relatively small number of vehicles he asked 

for. In August, as the TAP's adjusted their schedules, General Scott 

notified Ridley that he could sandwich some fifty Iranian Army assembliesinto the Russian-aid assemblies every twelve days.13 

July brought encouraging word that 400 trucks allotted by lendlease for use in the Iranian harvest were at sea; but Ridley reported that 

he had heard nothing about other items on a heavy list of requisitions 

which, after checking with the British military attache, the American 

Embassy, and the Millspaugh mission, he had sent to 'Vashington the 

previous March. The news from Vvashington about the list was interesting. The list (with the exception of items, like Palm Beach cloth, 

not carried in the regular U.S. Army procurement program) had been 

approved by the 'Var Department and sent on to the l\1unitions Assignments Board, which had the last word. OPD heard that 100,000 pairs 

of shoes had been dispatched overseas (a further requisition was disapproved). But in July the Deputy Chief of Staff ruled that the Army 

... Memo, Ridley for Handy, 13 Oct 42. Case 47, Sec I, OPD 210.684 Iran, HRS DRB 

AGO. 1.3 (1) Ltr, Scott to Ridley, 13 Jul 43. 334 Maj Gen Ridley's Mission to Iranian Government, SL 9011. (2) Ltr, Scott to Ridley, 2 Aug 43. 451.2 Trucks (for Iranian Army). SL 

9028. 
470 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

Service Forces might not recommend filling any requisitions beyond 

those on Ridley's initial March list unless the articles requested were 

clearly surplus and not needed in the American war effort.a 

If Ridley experienced troubles in obtaining items he felt needful for 

the Army, Schwarzkopf found the going even tougher in behalf of the 

friendless Gendarmerie. Soon after Minister Dreyfus-exasperated by 

Connolly's inability to find, within his interpretation of his instructions, 

the means of assisting in the missions' programs-had protested to Secretary of State Hull, Colonel Schwarzkopf went to Washington and 

personally outlined the problem to harried officials there to whom Iran 

was a vague spot on the map and the problem of preserving its sovereignty through grants of trucks and shoes not at all a realistic one. But 

when, in October 1943, Sch\varzkopf's Letter of Instructions was issued 

to him by the Deputy Chief of Staff it embodied the same principle 

that had been established the previous July for Ridley's requisitions: 

If it appears that supplies or equipment not available in Iran are needed, you 

may make recommendations to the War Department giving full reasons for the 

need, being careful to give no undue hopes or expectations to the Iranian Government. No U.S. supplies will be provided unless they are clearly surplus and not 

needed in the war effort. 

\Vithin these limitations supplies went forward under lend-lease for 

the Army and Gendarmerie Missions. By August 1944 Schwarzkopf 

could report that, of 1,200 motor vehicles ordered for the Gendarmerie, 

297 were in Iran and 450 more had been approved in \Vashington. He 

had also obtained, among miscellaneous items, 23,000 pairs of shoes 

and 150,000 yards of woolen cloth which was made into uniforms at 

the rate of 300 a day, in time to smarten up the Gendarmerie for a 

review on the Shah's birthday in November. By the end of 1944 the 

Gendarmerie had received lend-lease supplies to the value of $962,-

981.02, and the Army to the value of $2,382,474.17. In view of the fact 

that the annual cost to the Iranian Government of the Army Mission 

alone was estimated at more than $123,000, the lend-lease grants were 

not exactly reckless. Caution was still the word.l5 

" Memo, OPD, 9 Feb 45, referring to Gen McNamey's ruling of 15 Jul 43. Case 100, 

Sec IV, OPD 210.684 Iran, HRS DRB AGO. See also Rad WAR 50023, Somervell to 

Booth, for Ridley from Shingler (then at Munitions Assignments Board), 9 Mar 45. 334 

U.S. Military Mission with the Iranian Army, SL 9011. ).II (I) Ltr cited n. 5. (2) Ltr, Schwarzkopf to Col Frederic H. Chaffee, OPD, 2 Oct 44. 

Case 71, Sec III-A, OPD 210.684 Iran, HRS DRB AGO. This says 25,000 pairs of shoes. 

(3) Ltr, Supply Div, GHQ, PGC, to Harold B. Hoskins, Chief Representative, Foreign 

Economic Administration, Tehran, 2 Jan 45. 400.3296 (Iranian), SL 9020. No later figure 

is available for the Gendarmerie, but on the analogy of the Army Mission, which reported as of 11 September 1945 "more than $2,600,000 worth of equipment and supplies," it is 

likely that the additional year added little to the 1944 total. (4) Rpt, Estimate of Accomplishments, cited n. 8 (3). 
THE MILITARY ADVISORY MISSIONS 471 

Too much so to please the Department of State. For some time the 

'Var Department, discouraged by the obstacles within Iran to the reform programs of its advisory missions, had been considering withdrawing them. The Department of State, on the other hand, preferred 

them to continue, and coupled with the question of their continuance 

the matter of supply. On 25 October 1944 Stettinius, then Acting 

Secretary of State, wrote as follows to the Secretary of War: 

A primary consideration in this government's stated policy toward Iran is a 

desire to strengthen that country so that it may maintain internal security to avoid 

dissensions and weaknesses which breed foreign intervention and aggression. A 

most practical way to implement this policy is to strengthen Iran's security forces. 1G 

In December, after General Ridley had journeyed to Washington and 

had conferred with officials of the \Var and State Departments, the 

Secretary of State wrote as follows to the Secretary of \Var: 

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary 

of War and has the honor to refer to Mr. Stcttinius' letter of October 25, 1944, 

setting forth the urgent political reasons for the continuance of the American Military Mission to the Iranian Army. 

At a meeting held at the State Department on December 18, 1944, between 

officials of the War and State Departments and attended by Major General Ridley, 

the political and other reasons for the continuance of the military mission beyond 

the date already set for its termination, March 1, 1945, were reviewed. General 

Ridley made it clear that the mission could not attain the objective desired by the 

Department of State in consonance with the United States policy toward that 

country, unless high priority could be given by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the 

shipment to Iran of certain essential military supplies. 

The Department desires to urge that high priority be given to the shipment of 

these military supplies for the Iranian Army. It is realized that the War Department 

is being pressed to supply arms not only for urgent war needs but also for the use 

of postwar armies. It is considered, however, that the Iranian case differs in several 

essential re5pects from that of many other countries. American policy in Iran is 

based specifically on the Declaration on Iran, signed at Tehran on December 1, 

1943, by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin. This 

Declaration recognized the sacrifices made by Iran in the interests of the war effort 

and pledged Allied assistance to Iran both during and after the war. A prominent 

implementation of this policy has been the American adviser program, under which 

this military mission has so successfully carried out its duties. Protection and advancement of our interests in Iran require that we give the military mission the tools 

with which to work. Furnishing the Iranian Army with essential supplies is in line 

with the Department's basic policy toward Iran, which envisages strengthening the 

Iranian security forces to the point where they can maintain order after the withdrawal of Allied forces. The United States can contribute substantially to world 

security by assisting to create a strong Iran, free from internal weakness which 

to Ltr, Stettinius to Stimson, 25 Oct 44. Case 71, Sec III-A, OPD 210.684 Iran, HRS 

DRB AGO. 
472 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

invites foreign intervention or aggression. To carry out this policy requires strong 

and well-equipped security forces. 

Iran is perhaps the most prominent area of the world where inter-Allied friction 

might arise. Such friction would grow out of the chaos and disorder in Iran which 

would result from a weak Iranian Army. It is in our interests to prevent this from 

happening. 

For these reasons it is urgently recommended that the American military mission 

to the Iranian Army be continued for an indefinite period beyond March 1, 1945, 

and that a sufficiently high priority rating be given to General Ridley's request for 

military supplies to enable him to continue his mission in Iran with reasonable 

assurance of success,l1 

To the formulations of American policy toward Iran since January 

1943 this statement was a forceful addition. The Secretary of War soon 

after, citing the "cogent reasons" in the Secretary of State's letter, and 

recognizing "that the protection and advancement of our interests in 

Iran will require the s~rengthening of the Iranian security forces so 

that order may be maintained in this area, where world security might 

be threatened, after the withdrawal of Allied troops," consented to 

"present to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their consideration the request 

for a priority for these military supplies." 18 An OPD memorandum 

which followed in February recommended that "Iran be placed in the 

same category as other United Nations," because of "the changed 

United States policy toward Iran"; but there had been no change. 

That the fuller formulation of policy struck the War Department as a 

new policy may possibly throw a small beam of light on its reluctance 

hitherto to back the missions' programs with adequate material encouragement. Even when it finally moved, the War Department first 

placed only the Iranian Army on a par with the armies of the other 

United Nations. It took a further appeal from the Department of State, 

pointing out that the Gendarmerie was "of equivalent importance with 

the Iranian Army," to bring about in June the amendment of Schwarzkopf's Letter of Instructions which recognized that fact in so far as 

supply under lend-lease was concerned.19 

But the improvement in priorities came too late to prevent the 

psychological repercussions that accompanied shortages and prolonged 

"Ltr, Secy State to Secy War, 21 Dec 44. ME 891.20 Mission/II-2844, Near East Div, 

Dept State; quoted in Intn Div, ASF, Lend-Lease Documentary Supplement, Vol. VIII, 

1 Aug-31 Dec 44. 

" Ltr, Stimson to Secy State, 27 Dec 44. Intn Div, ASF, Lend-Lease Documentary 

Supplement, Vol. VIII, 1 Aug-31 Dec 44. See also Rad 24, Stettinius to AMEMBASSY, 

Tehran, 17 Jan 45. VII--4-B, Foreign Advisers-U.S. Military Mission 1942, Near East 

Div, Dept State. 11 (1) Memo and Rad cited n. 14. (2) Ltr, Harold B. Minor, Actg Chief, Div of Near 

Eastern Affairs, Dept State, to Col Dan Gilmer, OPD. 5 Jun 45; Memo, OPD for CG, 

ASF,8 Jun 45, sub: Equipment for the Iranian Gendannerie; Ltr, DCofS to Schwarzkopf, 

14 Jun 45, deleting par. 4-a of Ltr of Instructions. Case 100, Sec IV, OPD 210.684 Iran, 

HRS DRB AGO. 
THE MILITARY ADVISORY MISSIONS 473 

delays in the arrival of items ordered more than two years previously.20 

And much hard feeling was engendered in Iran by the consequences of 

the sudden stoppage of lend-lease after V-J Day.21 The programs of 

the advisory missions thus had little opportunity to benefit from the 

liberalization of priorities before V-J Day cut off their source of supplies. But by that time Iran's mounting crisis was forcing new American 

decisions in the making of which supply was the least of worries. 

The Question of Continuing the Missions 

With the crisis over Azerbaijan in 1946, Iran dramatically fulfilled 

President Roosevelt's expectation that it might serve as a testing ground 

for the Atlantic Charter and the good faith of the United Nations. 

The two American military missions were still in the service of the 

Iranian Government. They were not there because the War Department felt the Iranian Government had given them adequate support 

at all times, or because of continuing military necessity for them. That 

the two missions survived several strong impulses of the War Department to abolish them was due to political factors which outweighed 

the military in the question of continuance, just as it had done when 

the two missions were originally established. 

The contract of the Army Mission (not signed until November 

1943, but effective as of March 1943) provided that the mission would 

continue through the war or period of war emergency; that it could be 

extended thereafter by mutual agreement; and that it could be terminated at any time by either party on three months' notice. The Gendarmerie Mission's contract (not signed until November 1943, but 

effective as of October 1942) provided for a two-year term, with extension thereafter by agreement. General Ridley cautioned in March 1943 

that improving the efficiency of the Iranian Army "to make it an effective security agency to facilitate Russian supply" was likely to prove a 

long task. By July he reported pessimistically that low Army morale, 

outlying tribes in constant revolt, and a weak and corrupt central 

'" Progress Rpt, 1 lun 45, cited n. 8 (4). :zt (1) Materials for the Iranian Army, already landed, were thrown into the custody of 

PGC by the stoppage of lend-lease. Included were quantities of cloth for uniforms and 

Army feeling ran high because the Gendarmerie had already received cloth. The difficulty 

was solved, somewhat awkwardly, by having PGC declare the cloth surplus and sell it to 

Iran through the Army-Navy Liquidation Commission. Progress Rpt cited n. 8(1). (2) The 

President's similar action after V-E Day, which contributed to the rapid deterioration in 

Soviet-American relations, was later regretted by him. Interview with the President by Arthur 

Krock, The New York Times, February 15, 1950. Stalin told Hopkins at Moscow on 27 May 

1945 that it made it impossible for the Russians to "make a suitable expression of gratitude to 

the United States for the Lend-Lease assistance during the war .... " Sherwood, Roosevelt 

and Hopkins, p. 888. 
474 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

government posed heavy obstacles to a thoroughgoing reorganization. 

The situation, he said, was "worse than it has ever been since my 

arrival here." Noting that "a strong man, backed by the highest authority, could possibly change all this in a year," Ridley nevertheless felt 

that there were two criteria for continuing the mission: reasonable 

expectation of progress in reform and support of the mission by the high 

command. Providing that the obstructions which came from lower 

levels did not reduce the effectiveness of the mission's work "to the point 

of futility," Ridley was willing to go ahead. It is noteworthy that this 

view was expressed months before the negotiations, then pending, 

culmina ted in the signing of the contracts for the two missions. 

In December it was decided to increase the authorized strength of 

the Army Mission by nine officers as a compromise between the War 

Department's desire not to increase the mission at all and Iran's desire 

to add thirty officers.22 In the following spring of 1944, after some 

months of operation under the contract, Ridley again raised the question of continuance of his mission. On 31 May he stated that "all practicable major plans and investigations that can now be foreseen will 

have been completed and put into operation under guidance of the 

Mission by November 1, 1944," and suggested, if agreeable to the 

Iranians, withdrawal of the mission after that date. The recommendation was based upon such considerations as the removal of the threat of 

German invasion, Iran's declaration of war against the Axis, and the 

presence of British and Soviet troops in Iran which, together with the 

Iranian Army in its present state of training and equipment, would 

provide, he felt, adequate power to deal with problems of internal 

security. The War Department notified the Department of State that 

in its opi~ion "There exists no military necessity for this mission," but 

requested the views of State.23 The Department of State consulted the 

Iranian Government and reported that the Iranians wished the mission 

to continue indefinitely. State and War agreed upon a compromise 

which would positively end the mission on 1 March 1945.24 When this 

decision was made known to the Iranians, the Shah and the Minister 

of War urged extension of the closing date to 1 November 1945 or, 

preferably, to 1 March 1946. State feared that "the withdrawal of 

the Mission at this time when the Iranian Army is about to meet its 

II Progress Rpt, 30 Dec 43, cited n. 8 (4). The maximum actual (not authorized) strength 

of the Army Mission during the war period was about twenty-five officers and men; of the 

Gendarmerie Mission, about twenty-two officers and men. :13 Ltr, Secy War to Secy State, 23 Jun 44. Case 71, Sec III-A, OPD 210.684 Iran, 

HRS DRB AGO . .. Ltr, Hull to Stimson, 14 Aug 44, and reply, Robert A. Lovett, Actg Secy War to Secy 

State, 18 Aug 44. Case 71, Sec III-A, OPD 210.684 Iran, HRS DRB AGO. 
THE MILITARY ADVISORY MISSIONS 475 

crucial test in view of the imminent withdrawal of foreign armies from 

the country might have unfortunate political and psychological repercussions." Ridley suggested on 8 November 1945 that, in view of 

the fact that his mission was not the sole key to Iran's troubles and if it 

was retained after 1 March 1945, its strength be reduced by the nine 

officers added previously at Iranian request. The question was settled 

after the conferences in Washington which Ridley attended in December. The mission was to continue indefinitely after 1 March 1945 

subject to the contractual right to terminate it at three months' notice.2D 

In the summer of 1944 Iran expressed a desire to continue the 

Gendarmerie Mission for one year to 2 October 1945. Colonel Schwarzkopf told the American Ambassador at Tehran that plans for reorganization of the Gendarmerie were then complete and that if the mission 

were to carryon further it should do so only to create a really effective 

security organization, and that this decision should be taken not as 

a temporary expedient but "only if the interest of America is deep and 

lasting in Iran." A thoroughgoing reorganization might take from five 

to ten years. "In the post-war period," Schwarzkopf wrote, "security 

in Iran bears importance directly comparable to American interests 

in Iran." 28 The same question had been raised a year earlier by General Connolly in connection with the broadening of his directive to 

permit him to give economic assistance to Iran. It was now answered 

for the Gendarmerie Mission by the decision, taken in August, to renew 

the contract for one year. This step, anticipating by some months the 

decision not to terminate the Army Mission, gave additional reality 

to the increasingly forceful expressions of State Department policy 

toward Iran which were issued during 1944. 

In due course the question of fl. second renewal of the Gendarmerie 

Mission contract arose with the passage by the Iranian Council of 

Ministers of a decree authorizing its extension for one more year, or 

until 2 October 1946. As many seemingly insurmountable local obstacles had raised doubts as to the wisdom of continuing the mission 

and as during the negotiations the Iranians showed reluctance to commit themselves to American demands for reform, the Acting Secretary 

of State, Dean Acheson, instructed Ambassador Murray that, if the 

desired assurances were not given and, after trial, transformed into 

effective action satisfactory to him and to Colonel Schwarzkopf, Murray was authorized to terminate the mission. Acheson added that the 

• (I) Ltr cited n. 16. The letter praised Ridley's work as contributing to good international relations. (2) Ltr cited n. 18. (3) Progress Rpt, 21 Mar 45, cited n. 8 (4). • (1) Ltr cited n. 5. (2) Rad 610, U.S. Ambassador to Oept State, 18 Aug 44. Case 71, 

Sec III-A, OPO 210.684 Iran, HRS ORB AGO. (3) Note for record, 17 Oct. 44. Case 78, 

Sec III, OPO 210.684 Iran, HRS ORB AGO. 
476 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

department regretted the necessity of such a course of action at the 

time, but that it would be "futile and undignified" to continue with 

"little hope of positive accomplishment or reflection of credit" on the 

United States. The suggestion of futility echoed that made in July 1943 

by General Ridley and underlined the difficulty of helping the Iranians 

to help themselves through a purely advisory program. The assurances 

were duly offered and the mission's contract renewed for one year.2T 

At about the same time it was decided once more not to abandon 

(he Army Mission. Ridley had reopened the question on 1 June 1945 

and added in a July report that it was now a question whether the 

Iranian Army, without American guidance, could preserve order in 

the country. In his progress report of 11 September he touched once 

again upon the question of continuing the mission: 

Enclosed is a statement on the work of the Mission to date. Perusal of this statement will show that the primary work of the Mission under the contract is practically finished. Future work will consist only in helping them, so far as they will 

permit, in routine administration and operation under the plans already made for 

them. Due to lack of money, and to the inherent lack of business and administrative 

ability, laziness, dishonesty, or general low quality of a large part of the personnel 

available for the work, the execution of the plans is generally mediocre, and in spots 

unsatisfactory and discouraging although there are some bright spots. 

From a technical viewpoint I see little value in keeping the Mission here. However the Iranian Minister of War has told me that he wants the Mission to remain in 

some form, and I understand that our own State Department also wants it to remain 

as a matter of public policy. 

The decision, in which the War Department concurred, was that the 

mission would be terminated at the end of the war or a period of declared national emergency unless renewed by further agreement.28 In 

December the Department of State publicly declared that "existing 

arrangements do not project the functions of the missions [Army and 

Gendarmerie] into the normal peace-time era." 29 

But, as the normal peacetime era was slow in returning to the world, 

both missions were extended from time to time by mutual agreement. 

At the end of 1950 they were still on the job at Tehran after some 

.., (1) Rad 553, Ambassador Murray to Dept State, 28 Jul 45. VII--4-C, Iran-Foreign 

Advisers-U.S. Gendarmerie Mission, Div of Near Eastern Affairs, Dept State. (2) Rad 

756 cited in n. 6(2). (3) Rad 558, Acheson to Murray, 26 Sep 45. VII--4-C, Iran-Foreign 

Advisers-U.S. Gendarmerie Mission, Div of Near Eastern Affairs, Dept State. Acheson's 

message had the concurrence of the War Department on the recommendation of General 

Connolly, then at OPD. (4) Rad 775 cited n. 6(2). (5) Ltr, Schwarzkopf to Starbird, 

OPD,2 Oct 45, VII--4-C, Iran-Foreign Advisers-U.S. Gendarmerie Mission, Div of Near 

Eastern Affairs, Dept State . .. Dispatch 99, Dept State to U.S. Embassy, Tehran, 21 Sep 45, Mission Rpts File, 

Mission Hq, War Office, Tehran. • Ltr, Dept State to Representative Karl E. Mundt, 7 Dec 45. VII--4-C, Iran-Foreign 

Advisers-U.S. Gendarmerie Mission, Div of Near Eastern Affairs, Dept State. 
THE MILITARY ADVISORY MISSIONS 477 

changes in personnel and contractual provisions. 3D Both were capable 

of extension a year at a time by an exchange of notes. A new Army 

Mission contract, signed at Tehran on 6 October 1947 by Ambassador 

George V. Allen and Mahmud J am, Iranian Minister of War, replaced 

the 1943 contract. 31 In 1948 a revision prohibited the chief of the mission from giving Iran any advice on tactical or strategic plans or operations against an enemy of Iran. Under the original contract and 

Ridley's Letter of Instructions, such advice was permitted, if sought by 

Iran, and given after consultation with the War Department. In 1948 

also the Gendarmerie Mission contract was amended to supplant the 

command functions of the chief of the mission by advisory functions 

only. 

In 1949 an experimental redistribution of Gendarmerie strength 

was made by the Iranian Government with a view to reaching a policy 

decision on the ultimate duties of the Gendarmerie and its relationship 

to the Army. The desire in certain quarters of Iranian officialdom to 

subordinate the Gendarmerie to the Army or even to extinguish the 

Gendarmerie altogether was a hot potato of Iranian politics sedulously 

avoided by American advisers. Yet the poor-relation status of the 

Gendarmerie doubtless influenced thinking at certain desks in the 

American \Var Department where it was feared to take sides even 

indirectly in the controversy by making supplies available. This opinion 

may have been a factor in the delay until June 1945 in putting the 

Gendarmerie's supply through lend-lease on a basis comparable to that 

of the Army. For its part, the Department of State's championship of 

the equal importance of the Gendarmerie and the Army merely recognized that conditions during the Allied occupation placed the internal 

security functions of the two forces on the same basis for the duration 

of the war; and this position was maintained without prejUdice to the 

relative merits of the internal squabble over the two services in Iran. 

Although the War Department acceded to the Department of State's 

predominant voice in setting policy on supply and the continuation of 

the missions, there were those in the War Department who persisted, 

even after V-J Day, in viewing the Gendarmerie Mission as of less importance than the Army Mission in the whole program of strengthening 

Iran. 

II In 1946 Ridley was succeeded by Maj. Gen. Robert W. Grow who was replaced a 

year later by Maj. Gen. Vernon Evans. In 1948 Schwarzkopf was succeeded by Col. James R. 

Pierce. In the five postwar yean the strength of the Gendarmerie Mission remained about the 

same, that is, under twenty officers and men, while the Army Mission was increased by some twenty enlisted men in 1949 to perform service and maintenance of the articles made available to Iran from U.S. surplus stocks after the war. n The 1947 contract was published in the Department of State's Treaties and Other 

International Acts, Series 1666; reprinted in Treaties and International Acts, Series 1924. 
478 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

Illustration may be furnished, as a postscript to the story of the 

missions, by reference to the decoration and promotion which came to 

Colonel Schwarzkopf after the end of the war. On 19 November ]944 

General Connolly recommended to The Adjutant General a Legion 

of Merit for Schwarzkopf; but the reason he gave, that Schwarzkopf 

had co-operated with the PGC by furnishing gendarmes to accompany 

raiding parties of military police "to confiscate and repossess stolen 

United States property," was not considered by a decorations board 

which met on 5 December 1944 as indicating exceptionally meritorious 

conduct in the performance of outstanding service.32 The next year, 

by a letter to The Adjutant General, Col. Alfred D. Starbird, Chief, 

European Section, Theater Group, OPD, recommended Schwarzkopf 

for the Distinguished Service Medal; but this, too, was disapproved 

by an awards board on 13 November. It considered the Gendarmerie 

Mission "much lower in degree of importance and responsibility" than 

the Army Mission. It should be noted that General Booth and General 

Ridley had both received the Distinguished Service Medal, and that 

in the previous June the War Department had liberalized its supply 

policy for the Gendarmerie on assurances that the Department of State 

considered the two Iranian services as of equal importance. The awards 

board forthwith recommended Schwarzkopf for a Legion of Merit, 

noting his "great responsibility" for the 21,000 officers and men of the 

Gendarmerie. 

This decision was protested by Lt. Gen. John E. Hull, Assistant 

Chief of Staff, OPD, who went with his written protest of 28 November 

directly to General Handy, Deputy Chief of Staff. He obtained a setting aside of the Legion of Merit award and approval of a Distinguished 

Service Medal by explaining that Schwarzkopf's position was independent of any other command; that he exercised command; and that 

"under his careful direction the Gendarmerie, while being completely 

modernized, performed the potentially dangerous task of maintaining 

order in Iran in spite of the presence of many dissatisfied elements 

there, and without arousing the antagonism of the British or the R ussians in a country which still is a center of international friction." The 

medal was approved on 4 December by a board which thriftily adopted 

the citation already proposed by them for the Legion of Merit. 33 

Away back in February 1943 Minister Dreyfus had recommended 

Schwarzkopf's promotion to brigadier general both as a reward for 

good work and as an aid to his mission's work in a country where the 

prestige value of rank was high. General Connolly also recommended 

IS Abstracts of documents quoted are in PGF 261. II Award published in GO 119, WD, 17 Dec 45. Medal presented at Tehran, 20 Jan 46. 
THE MILITARY ADVISORY MISSIONS 479 

promotion. For more than three years Schwarzkopf remained a colonel. 

Then in June 1946, Ambassador Allen, whose arrival at Tehran in 

April marked new emphasis on American support for Iran, sent a 

message to the Secretary of State, coupling a recommendation for 

Schwarzkopf's promotion with the role then being played by the 

Gendarmerie. He said, in part: 

There persists, in spite of Soviet troop withdrawal, real danger of Iran becoming newest puppet of Soviet Union. Overthrow of government by leftist elements 

is easily possible, amI without effective security forces, the numerous Soviet stooges 

and ruthless adventurers now in Iran could easily make it successful. There would 

probably result a totalitarian state dominated entirely by Moscow. International 

rivalry would be immediately intensified on the Persian Gulf, with several vital 

matters at stake, for example, entire Middle East oil resources. Iranian Gendarmerie 

constitutes important deterrent to governmental overthrow. This organization, by 

its promptness last month in establishing security in Caspian area as Soviet troops 

evacuated, deserves large degree of credit in preventing rebellion there similar to 

Azerbaijan uprising. 34 

The recommendation was communicated by Acting Secretary of 

State Acheson to Robert Patterson, Secretary of War. Acheson reminded Patterson that for three years the Department of State had 

"communicated to the War Department its approval of the work being 

done by Colonel Schwarzkopf, and has expressed its hope that the head 

of the Mission could be given general officer status." Ambassador Allen 

had pointed out that Schwarzkopf was handicapped in his contacts by 

being a colonel. Acheson concluded that, "since the events taking place 

in Iran are of very real significance in the general context of our foreign 

relations, and since the Gendarmerie Mission is playing a major role 

in these events, the Department hopes that the War Department will 

find it possible to comply with Ambassador Allen's suggestion." 3S 

Because of an inflexible policy of reducing the number of general 

officers, the first reaction in the War Department was to refuse the promotion, and a letter to that effect was drafted for the signature of the 

Secretary of War. But OPD's successor, Plans and Operations Division, 

recommended to the Chief of Staff, General Eisenhower, that an exception be made. The Secretary of War then asked the President to nominate Schwarzkopf to the Senate to be brigadier general, temporary 

grade. The nomination was made forthwith and duly approved by the 

Senate.3S 

K Rad 799, AIIen to Secy State, 4 Jun 46. Abstract PCF 261. .. Ltr, Acheson to Patterson, 21 Jun 46. Abstract PCF 261. .. Published in SO 158, WD, 18 Jul 46, with rank from 12 Jul 46. See also Memo, Ei~"nhower for Secy War, 9 Jul 46; and Memo, Secy War for President, 9 Jul 46. Abstracts 

PCF 261. 
480 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

In a sense, this tardy recognition of the value of the Gendarmerie 

Mission marked a further step in the evolution of American policy as 

expressed through the two advisory missions. Ridley and Schwarzkopf 

had struggled against heavy odds in Iran to achieve aims limited by the 

caution of both War and State. Those departments had sought to 

evaluate their effectiveness: War, from the point of view of technical 

accomplishment, first in aiding the supply task in the Corridor, later 

in providing a measure of internal security in a disorganized state; 

State, from the point of view of the moral and political force which 

the missions could exert simply by existing, no matter how technically 

frustrated or futile. But, even as the conviction became intensified that 

the missions were instruments not only for the prosecution of a local 

objective but also of wider foreign policy, their technical helplessness 

as purely advisory agencies continued to constrict their effectiveness 

as moral or political factors. It was a dilemma whose resolution the 

war years delayed. After 1945, developments offered hints of how the 

dilemma could be resolved; but they had not resolved it by the end of 

1950. 

They did answer one question, posed in the first chapter of this 

book: Had America come to the madhouse of Middle Eastern politics 

as visitor, doctor, or inmate? In undertaking to strengthen Iran the 

United States became a doctor, one who may only prescribe and hope 

for the best. 
Appendix A TABLE 1-CARGO SHIPPED FROM THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE TO THE USSR BY ROUTE OF DELIVERY, 22JUNE 1941-20 SEPTEMBER 1945· 

[Long Tons] 

Persian Gulf Soviet Far East North Russia Black Sea Soviet Arctic 

Year and Month b All Per· Per· Per· Per· Per· Routes 

Tons cent Tons cent Tons cent Tons cent Tons cent 

of of of of of 

Total Total Total Total Total 

-- --

Total. ...••••....•. 17,499,861 4,159,117 23.8 8,243,397 47.1 3,964,231 22.7 680,723 3.9 452,393 2.5 

1941 ••••••.......••... 360,778 13,502 3.7 193,299 53.6 153,977 42.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 

June .................... 2,988 0 0.0 2,988 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 O.C 

July .•..••.••••.•.•...... 27,567 0 0.0 27,567 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 O.C 

August ................... 97,483 0 0.0 93,113 95.5 4,370 4.5 0 0.0 0 O.C 

September .......••.•.... 38,161 0 0.0 27,629 72.4 10,532 27.6 0 0.0 0 O.C 

October ............. ' .... 65,513 0 0.0 17,161 26.2 48,352 73.8 0 0.0 0 O.C 

November ............... 57,604 2,972 5.2 13,559 23.5 41,073 71.3 0 0.0 0 O.C 

December ............... 71,462 10,530 14.7 11,282 15.8 49,650 69.5 0 0.0 0 0.( 

1942 .................. 2,453,097 705,259 28.8 734,020 29.9 949,711 38.7 0 0.0 64,107 2.l 

January .................. 88,597 34 (0) 26,047 29.4 62,516 70.6 0 0.0 0 0.( 

February ••••..•••••••••. 92,670 5,282 5.7 22,206 24.0 65,182 70.3 0 0.0 0 0.( 

March ................... 213,999 17,754 8.3 25,555 11.9 170,690 79.8 0 0.0 0 0.( 

April •••••••••••..•.•••.• 441,968 21,173 4.8 38,441 8.7 382,354 86.5 0 0.0 0 0.( 

See footnotes at end of table. 
TABLE I-CARGO SHIPPED FROM THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE TO THE USSR BY ROUTE OF DELIVERY, 22 JUNE 1941-20 SEPTEMBER 

1945 a-Continued 

Persian Gulf Soviet Far East North Russia Black Sea Soviet Arctic 

Year Dnd Month b All 

Route, Per· Per· Per· Per· Per· 

Ton, cent Ton, cent Ton, cent Ton, cent Tons cent 

of of of of of 

Total Total Toral Toral Total 

May ...••...............• 194,747 86,978 44.7 33,035 17.0 74,734 38.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 

June .....•.............. 193,695 91,012 47.0 30,288 15.6 54,720 28.3 0 0.0 17,675 9.1 

July ••................... 183,362 62,492 34.1 63,313 34.5 13,351 7.3 0 0.0 44,206 24.1 

August .................• 215,453 65,598 30.4 78,616 36.5 69,013 32.0 0 0.0 2,226 1.1 

September ............... 179,430 72,057 40.2 79,604 44.4 27,769 15.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 

October ....•...........• 229,331 121,272 52.9 108,059 47.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 

November ..............• 176,911 70,430 39.8 106,481 60.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 

December .•....•.•.•..•. 242,934 91,177 37.5 122,375 50.4 29,382 12.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 

1943 .•.•••.•...••.•••• 4,794,545 1,606,979 33.5 2,388,577 49.8 681,043 14.2 0 0.0 117,946 2.5 

January ....•............• 258,055 86,836 33.7 97,671 37.8 73,548 28.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 

February ................ 342,055 40,071 11.8 129,004 37.7 172,980 50.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 

March ................... 263,209 131,277 49.9 122,646 46.6 9,286 3.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 

April. ................... 337,572 143,808 42.6 193,764 57.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 

May ..................... 349,259 121,002 34.6 216,380 62.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 11,877 3.4 

June .................... 275,622 28,786 10.4 230,183 83.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 16,653 6.1 

July ...................... 336,094 126,184 37.5 152,215 45.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 57,695 17.2 

August .................. 469,961 177,153 37.7 261,087 55.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 31,721 6.7 

September ............... 511,365 197,886 38.7 313,479 61.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 

October ................. 439,655 192,744 43.8 180,872 41.1 66,039 15.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 

November ............... 568,620 194,775 34.2 228,964 40.3 144,881 25.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 

December ....•.......•.• 643,078 166,457 25.9 262,312 40.8 214,309 33.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 

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1944 ••••••••....••.•• , 6,217,622 1,788,864 28.8 2,848,181 45.8 

January .••••••.••••••••.. 599,239 201,713 33.7 176,170 29.4 

February ................ 341,158 114,161 33.5 100,017 29.3 

March ................... 351,751 150,500 42.8 91,299 26.0 

April ••...•.............. 408,870 274,791 67.2 134,079 32.8 

May ..........•....•..... 553,376 289,070 52.2 264,306 47.8 

June ...........•...•••.. 522,556 187,349 35.9 307,224 58.8 

July ...................... 624,578 127,393 20.4 275,761 44.2 

August •................. 561,533 36,437 6.5 308,614 55.0 

September .....•..•...... 579,860 87.861 15.2 298,208 51.4 

October ................. 545,414 156,228 28.6 309,441 56.8 

November ............... 564,628 95,864 17.0 313,916 55.6 

December •.............• 564,659 67,497 12.0 269,146 47.7 

1945 .................. 3,673,819 44,513 1.2 2,079,320 56.6 

January .................. 405,762 31,454 7.8 194,914 48.0 

February ........••.•••.. 450,588 4,497 1.0 181,741 40.3 

March .•................. 487,030 4,409 0.9 161,786 33.2 

April. ................... 540,278 1,232 0.2 193,709 35.9 

May •••••................ 768,295 2,921 0.4 518,212 67.4 

June •••••..•.........••• 329,191 0 0.0 275,018 83.5 

July ...................... 408,554 0 0.0 313,360 76.7 

August ..........••....•• 234,606 0 0.0 200,369 85.4 

September ................ 49,515 0 0.0 40,211 81.2 

1,452,775 23.4 0 

221,356 36.9 0 

126,980 37.2 0 

109,952 31.2 0 

0 0.0 0 

0 0.0 0 

0 0.0 0 

155,760 24.9 0 

185,562 33.0 0 

190,556 32.9 0 

79,745 14.6 0 

154,848 27.4 0 

228,016 40.3 0 

726,725 19.8 680,723 

118,869 29.3 60,525 

153,278 34.0 111,072 

148,731 30.5 172,104 

167,180 30.9 178,157 

138,667 18.1 108,495 

0 0.0 21,638 

0 0.0 1,268 

0 0.0 18,160 

0 0.0 9,304 

0.0 127,802 

0.0 0 

0.0 0 

0.0 0 

0.0 0 

0.0 0 

0.0 27,983 

0.0 65,664 

0.0 30,920 

0.0 3,235 

0.0 0 

0.0 0 

0.0 0 

18.5 142,538 

14.9 0 

24.7 0 

35.4 0 

33.0 0 

14.1 0 

6.6 32,535 

0.3 93,926 

7.7 16,077 

18.8 0 

2. 

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O. 

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O. 

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• Represents total shipments from the Western Hemisphere, principally 

leand.lease supplies, including goods for Canadian and British accounts. 

Includes approximately 488,000 tons lost en route, principally in 1942. 

Does not include some 555,000 long tons of petroleum products orIgi· 

nating at BriIish relineries in Abadan, Iran, replaced by allocations from 

U.S. supplies for British use. Does nOt include Quantities of supplies 

originally shipped to U.S. Army Air Force Eastern Command shuttle 

bases in the Ukraine or supplies shipped for U.S. Army usc in the Persian 

Corridor. 

b Represents date of departure from Western Hemisphere port •• 

• Less than 0.05 percent. 

S'llree: U.S. Stare Department, work sheets used in compiling Report 

on War Aid Furnished by the United States to tbe USSR, November 28, 

1945. 

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TABLE 2-CARGO SHIPPED PROM THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE TO PERSIAN GULP PORTS POR THE USSR, BY TYPE, NOVEMBER 1941-MAY 1945· 

NumYear and ber of Total 

Month b Ves- Shipments Air· 

sels e All Types craft 

Total. . 646 4,159,117 4,073,978 39,645 

1941. •.... 12 13,502 11,327 377 

Nov ••..•.... 1 2,972 1,398 34 

Dec .••••....• 11 10,530 9,929 343 

1942 •..... 140 705,259 685,500 11,207 

Jan ••.••..••• 1 34 34 34 

Feb .•........ 14 5,282 5,282 1,185 

Mar ..••.•.••. 12 17,754 15,264 1,437 

Apr •......... 6 21,173 21,173 85 

May •........ 13 86,978 85,050 639 

Jun .......... 13 91,012 87,362 960 

Jul. •......... 15 62,492 61,772 517 

Aug ......... 16 65,598 63,734 1,444 

Sep .......... 10 72,057 69,619 550 

Oct .•........ 15 121,272 117,927 2,517 

Nov ......... 10 70,430 69,179 842 

Dec .•........ 15 91,177 89,104 997 

1943 ...... 241 1,606,979 1,563,600 16,713 

Jan •......... 16 86,836 77,646 378 

Feb .......... 7 40,071 37,429 256 

Mar ..••••••• 20 131,277 128,533 1,885 

Apr .......... 21 143,808 140,591 2,267 

May ••....... 19 121,002 119,038 1,925 

Jun ••.•••.••• 7 28,786 28,786 25 

Jul. .......... 21 126,184 123,801 2,594 

[Long Tons] 

United States Shipments 

Combat Other Guns and 

Vehi· Trucks· Vehi- Ammuni .. Food 

eles des I!I tion t 

70,407 873,846 70,178 144,361 995,368 

0 10,138 0 0 0 

0 851 0 0 0 

0 9,287 0 0 0 

20,045 143,927 0 44,214 84,108 

0 0 0 0 0 

0 2,253 0 0 1,517 

0 8,493 0 4 4,335 

0 9,474 0 1 3,077 

1,625 10,624 0 714 12,362 

2,618 12,975 0 785 10,522 

2,780 4,154 0 1,494 3,333 

2,406 5,247 0 4,188 2,301 

3,180 13,752 0 5,614 7,622 

4,008 26,078 0 15,918 11,761 

1,181 25,839 0 6,110 5,865 

2,247 25,038 0 9,386 21,413 

10,523 308,526 41,447 36,222 423,660 

463 18,811 2,007 7,627 17,741 

8 8,639 1,009 1,819 8,111 

43 31,771 1,713 3,342 39,707 

656 29,785 4,200 0 38,697 

222 26,119 2,655 0 28,639 

(I) 6,404 0 105 10,141 

217 23,975 2,000 3,103 33,789 

Metals Petroleum and Metal Prod- Products ucts I' 

1,248,517 45,068 

443 39 

443 0 

0 39 

339,889 1,566 

0 0 

0 0 

663 0 

8,373 0 

52,493 0 

50,185 0 

43,795 0 

43,366 0 

36,038 0 

52,732 464 

27,195 146 

25,049 956 

412,946 26,449 

22,960 46 

13,139 96 

32,177 (I) 

38,874 1,615 

34,014 3,769 

9,889 802 

33,040 4,895 

Other b 

586,588 

330 

70 

260 

40,544 

0 

327 

332 

163 

6,593 

9,317 

5,699 

4,782 

2,863 

4,449 

2,001 

4,018 

287,114 

7,613 

4,352 

17,895 

24,497 

21,695 

1,420 

20,188 

Britist 

and 

Cana· 

dian 

Ship. 

ment! 

--

85,13 

2,17 

1,57 

60 

19,75 

2,49 

1,92 

3,65 

72 

1,86 

2,43 

3,34 

1,25 

2,07 

43,37 

9,19 

2,64 

2,74 

3,21 

1,96 

2,38 

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.... 

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Aug •••....... 26 177,153 167,442 2,110 654 19,801 

Sep .•........ 29 197,886 196,436 2,862 4,074 38,534 

Oct ••........ 28 192,744 188,530 796 1,973 40,244 

Nov ......... 26 194,715 189,410 823 440 34,560 

Dec .......... 21 166,457 165,958 792 1,773 29,883 

1944 ....... 240 1,788,864 1,770,282 11,348 39,839 394,829 

Jan •..•...... 26 201,713 200,530 1,174 3,541 34,689 

Feb .•........ 16 114,161 113,872 1,175 3,751 16,631 

Mar ..•...... 22 150,500 150,243 2,403 1,899 27,962 

Apr ••........ 35 274,791 273,462 2,034 7,551 49,897 

May •........ 36 289,070 288,465 2,501 6,683 61,179 

Jun .......... 26 187,349 186,218 1,151 4,035 50,840 

Jul ........... 20 127,393 123,340 859 5,810 25,698 

Aug ......... 5 36,437 36,437 50 782 15,781 

Sep .......... 11 87,861 87,637 0 1,906 26,942 

Oct •......... 21 156,228 150,202 1 3,074 37,796 

Nov ......... 13 95,864 93,901 0 807 26,684 

Dec .......... 9 67,497 65,975 0 0 20,730 

1945 ...... 13 44,513 43,269 0 0 16,426 

Jan .•........ 6 31,454 30,667 0 0 11,923 

Feb •........• 2 4,497 4,497 0 0 2,670 

Mar ••....... 2 4,409 3,952 0 0 1,400 

Apr .......... 1 1,232 1,232 0 0 0 

May •.••..•.. 2 2,921 2,921 0 0 433 

3,405 3,850 40,508 

4,600 4,423 38,158 

6,016 5,660 43,998 

6,677 3,814 61,803 

7,165 2,479 62,368 

28,479 63,418 478,591 

8,193 4,131 79,195 

3,295 3,997 40,762 

2,981 4,152 62,750 

5,818 4,640 76,529 

2,606 15,118 64,374 

1,443 5,302 32,432 

1,124 4,756 30,131 

328 0 3,862 

666 5,507 15,463 

634 9,673 40,645 

947 5,103 17,559 

444 1,039 14,889 

252 507 9,009 

87 507 5,940 

130 0 552 

0 0 203 

0 0 971 

35 0 1,343 

I Includes explosives. 

43,662 7,607 

52,885 6,632 

53,476 580 

42,676 407 

36,154 0 

482,661 14,226 

35,767 238 

22,535 759 

26,134 688 

58,452 2,710 

90,415 742 

66,043 3,029 

31,422 1,507 

13,953 49 

32,849 817 

46,003 1,326 

34,994 1,443 

24,094 918 

12,578 2,788 

10,496 695 

1,071 0 

256 2,093 

0 0 

755 0 

45,845 

44,268 

35,787 

38,210 

25,344 

256,891 

33,602 

20,967 

21,274 

65,831 

44,847 

21,943 

22,033 

1,632 

3,487 

11,050 

6,364 

3,861 

1,709 

1,019 

74 

0 

261 

355 

9,71 

1,45 

4,21 

5,36 

49 

18,58 

1,18 

28 

25 

1,32 

60 

1,13 

4,05 

(i) 

22 

6,02 

1,96 

1,52 

1,24 

78 

45 

o 

4 

9 

9 

6 

o 

• Represents total Quantltles shipped from Western Hemisphere ports 

during the months indicated. Includes Quantities lost or diverted en route. 

Does not include Quantities originally shipped to U.S. Army Air Force Eastern 

Command shuttle bases in the Ukraine or supplies shipped for U.S. Army 

use in the Persian Corridor. 

I Does not include some 555,000 tons of petroleum products, originating 

at British refineries in Abadan, Iran, and replaced by allocation from U.S. 

supplies for British use. 

b Represents date of departure from Western Hemisphere ports. 

• Includes 105 vessels whose cargo included a minor portion consigned to 

USSR. 

d Includes jeeps and trailers. 

• Consists chiefly of motorcycles and tractors. 

b Includes communication and railroad equipment, textiles, rubber prod~ 

ucts, and other miscellaneous materials and products. 

I Less than 0.5 ton. 

Source: U.S. State Department, work sheets used in compiling Report on 

War Aid Furnished by the United States to the USSR, November 28, 1945. 

~ '"d 

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(JI 
486 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

TABLE 3-CARGO DISCHARGED AT AMERICAN-OPERATED PORTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF, JANUARY 

1943-MAY 1945 • 

[Long Tons] 

Consignee 

Total Year and Month Discharged USSR Other 

TotaL .•........ 3,900,815 (b) (b) 

1943 ........•...... 1,673,568 (b) (b) 

January ......•........ 67,238 (b) (b) 

February ...........•. '1 88,339 (b) (b) 

March ......••.•...•.. 110,958 (b) (b) 

April •.•.•.•.......•.. 117,621 117,621 

May ° •..•...•.•........ 111,372 106,109 5,263 

June ...•.•.•....••.... 120,930 113,759 7,171 

July ••••••...•••••.... 152,684 138,226 14,458 

August .•.•.•••••.•.••. 157,388 111,408 45,980 

September .......... ; . 143,838 95,480 48,358 

October ......••.•.... 154,034 139,689 14,345 

November ••.•.•.....• 222,224 203,949 18,275 

December •.•.....•.... 226,942 213,051 13,891 

1944 ••..••..•••.•.. 2,005,727 1,884,845 120,882 

January ..•...•.....•.. 208,854 195,863 12,991 

February ...•.......••. 147,009 147,009 

March ° •....••••.••..•• 213,534 204,400 9,134 

ApriL .•.•.••..••..•.• 71,358 60,048 11,310 

May •..•.•••.•.•...••• 185,896 185,896 ° June •.••...•••••.••••• 203,548 193,620 9,928 

July •••.••••.•...••••• 287,917 273,575 14,342 

August .••.••••••.••••• 183,817 177,503 6,314 

September •••••.•••••• 129,416 114,474 14,942 

Octoher .•••.••••••••• 74,468 59,009 15,459 

November ••.•.•.••••• 143,747 132,869 10,878 

December .......... '" 156,163 140,579 15,584 

See footnotes at end of table. 

I Port of Discharge 

Khorram· 

shahr 

2,804,918 

1,190,483 

41,421 

63,113 

81,437 

90,976 

80,111 

86,852 

108,259 

111,107 

110,803 

109,199 

151,719 

155,486 

1,394,114 

136,756 

105,011 

136,573 

50,519 

122,115 

140,296 

192,761 

124,004 

92,220 

68,370 

105,202 

120,287 

Bandar 

Shahpur 

1,095,897 

483,085 

25,817 

25,22 6 

29,521 

26,64 

31,26 

34,07 

44,42 

46,28 

33,03 

44,83 

70,50 

71,45 

611,61 

72,09 

41,99 

76,96 

20,83 

63,78 

63,25 

95,15 

59.81 

37,19 

6,09 

38.54 

35,87 

5 

1 

8 

5 

1 

5 

5 

5 

6 

3 

8 

8 

1 

9 

1 

2 

6 

3 

6 

8 

5 

6 
APPENDIX A 487 

TABLE 3-CARGO DISCHARGED AT AMERICAN-OPERATED PORTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF, JANUARY 

1943-MAY 1945 a-Continued 

Consignee Port of Discharge 

Year and Month Total 

Discharged Khorram- Bandar USSR Other shahr Shah pur 

1945 .•............. 221,520 198,824 22,696 220,321 1,199 

January ......•.•••.•.• 98,618 95,577 3,041 97,419 1,199 

February ....•.•...•••. 71,869 65,122 6,747 71,869 0 

March .......••..••••• 30,216 30,216 0 30,216 0 

April ..........•.•••.• 8,141 247 7,894 8,141 0 

May ..•...........•..• 12,676 7,662 5,014 12,676 0 

a Does not include 234.992 long tons landed at Cheybassi. Iran. which were initially discharged elsewhere. 

Monthly landings at Cheybassi during the period of American operation were as follows: 

1943 

Jul 16.700 Oct 17.051 

Aug 19.731 Nov 17.935 

Sep 17.111 Dec 19.840 

~ Data not available. 

Jan 17,058 

Feb 11.769 

Mar 12.211 

1944 

Apr 15.941 

May 13.446 

Jun 18.602 

Jul 17.237 

Aug 18.554 

Scp 1,806 

Source: Headquarters. Persian Gulf Command, U.S. Army, Office of the ACofS for Operations. Movements 

Branch. Complete Summary of Port and Transportation Agencies Performance of PGC Operation. ThrouJ:h 

3' May 1945, 5 July 1945, p. 6, supplemented by monthly reports of operations at respective ports. 
488 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

TABLE 4-SUPPLlES DELIVERED TO THE USSR THROUGH THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR, BY TYPE OF 

TRANSPORT, 1942-1945 a 

[Long Tons] 

I 

Assembled 

Year Motor I A bl d British and Month Total Railway Trucks and Transport 55.em e Agencies b Cargo Service AIrcraft 

TotaL ••.•. 5,149,376 2,989,079 1,235,088 408,460 36,018 480,731 

1942 .....•.... 353,114 165,655 70,415 0 4,940 112,104 

1943 .....•...• 1,793,932 894,767 479,591 189,736 19,728 210,110 

January .....•••.. 51,285 e 23,981 6,672 0 d 842 19,790 

February ......... 68,808 • 33,585 18,871 135 d 516 15,701 

March .........•• 75,605 ·28,181 27,988 3,570 d 948 14,918 

April. .•.....•... 101,155 44,590 29,284 8,768 d 1,727 16,786 

May ............. 127,572 54,835 41,549 11,002 d 1,200 18,986 

June ............. 147,193 67,729 48,487 11,252 d 758 18,967 

July .•...•....... 178,742 84,414 58,830 17,068 d 1,116 17,314 

August. •.•.•.... 164,422 72,421 49,188 21,103 d 1,558 20,152 

September ....... 199,293 102,261 55,556 23,335 d 1,863 16,278 

October ......... 217,252 121,947 47,065 26,389 3,264 18,587 

Novemher ....... 214,587 120,098 41,244 32,729 3,456 17,060 

December ..•.... 248,018 140,725 54,857 34,385 2,480 15,571 

1944 .......... 2,555,172 1,594,781 571,800 218,724 11,350 158,517 

January .......... 257,531 146,685 56,726 32,385 1,002 20,733 

February ......•.. 205,305 121,129 53,097 10,365 1,203 19,511 

March ........... 225,735 125,726 52,632 29,443 1,101 16,833 

ApriL ........... 144,569 78,966 34,983 12,641 1,594 16,385 

May ............. 193,332 113,583 44,301 13,616 1,687 20,145 

June ............. 253,068 140,664 57,050 31,745 1,665 21,944 

July ..•.....•.... 282,097 164,834 61,728 36,727 1,166 17,642 

August •....•..•. 275,137 164,253 62,036 32,794 768 15,286 

September ....••. 238,136 170,100 49,461 8,187 754 9,634 

October ....•.•.. 145,395 109,698 30,002 5,196 95 404 

November ....... 151,894 112,218 33,736 5,625 315 0 

December .....•• 182,973 146,925 36,048 I 0 0 0 

See footnotes at end of table. 
APPENDIX A 489 

TABLE 4-SUPPLIES DELIVERED TO THE USSR THROUGH THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR, BY TYPE OF 

TRANSPORT, 1942-1945 ·-Continued 

Assembled Motor Assembled British Year and .Month Total Railway Trucks and Transport Aircraft Agencies b Cargo Service 

1945 .•........ 447,158 333,876 113,282 0 (0) Co) 

January .......... 142,309 105,706 36,603 0 0 0 

February ......... 137,630 86,902 50,728 0 (0) Co) 

March ........... 84,583 63,656 20,927 0 0 0 

April. ........... 51,333 46,309 5,024 0 0 0 

May ............. 31,303 31,303 0 0 (0) Ce) 

• Figures shown include some data for British operations. The total of 5,149,376 long tons delivered 

includes 165,655 tons delivered by the British during their operation of the Iranian State Railway in 1942 and 

480,731 tons delivered by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation and other British agencies through. 

out the entire period. The remaining 4,502,990 tons were delivered chiefly by the U.S. Army but include 

unknown British tonnages in 1942 figures for assembled trucks and aircraft, as well as the British share of rail 

deliveries during the period of joint operation Uanuary-March 1943); which reduce the U.S. share to 4,417,243. 

See Ch. I, n. 4. 

b Represents tonnages carried by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation and British military agen· 

cies, chiefly via the Khanaqin Lift. Data are unofficial and may be incomplete; official British data are not 

available. 

• Railway operated jointly by U.S. and British agencies. 

d Partly estimated. The 10,528 tons reported for the period January-September 1943 was prorated by 

month, based on quantities, types, and weights of planes delivered each month (basic weight of planes delivered 

to the American command by air and cased weight of planes delivered by water). 

• Data not available for B aircraft delivered to USSR in 1945 (see Tables 10 and 11). 

Source: Headquarters, Persian Gulf Command, U.S. Army, Office of the ACofS for Operations, Movements 

Branch, Complete Summary of Port and Transportation Agencies Performance of PGC Operations Through 

31 May 1945, 5 July 1945, p. 2. 
TABLE 5-FREIGHT HAULED BY RAIL NORTH OF ANDIMESHK, IRAN, AUGUST 1942-MAY 1945· 

[Long Tons] 

u.s. Internal Traffic 

USSR Army 

Year and Month Total Eastern Supplies Com- Total Civil Oil- mand Supplies b 

. - 4,701,244 • 2,989,079 8,513 1,703,652 271,460 1,155,041 

• 293,042 • 165,655 0 127,387 17,878 80,793 

35,770 12,440 0 23,330 0 13,880 

48,022 23,807 0 24,215 3,148 16,307 

50,987 23,074 0 27,913 3,850 20,028 

46,466 20,450 0 26,016 5,081 15,278 

48,648 22,735 0 25,913 5,799 15,300 

1,419,105 894,767 0 524,338 65,110 364,375 

52,285 23,981 0 28,304 3,975 18,925 

64,204 33,585 0 30,619 4,723 18,983 

65,522 28,181 0 37,341 5,568 25,123 

87,784 44,590 0 43,194 6,568 27,609 

98,353 54,835 0 43,518 7,532 31,597 

108,779 67,729 0 41,050 3,103 31,949 

J 119,480 84,414 0 35,066 3,700 22,061 

111,251 72,421 0 38,830 3,820 26,290 

150,751 102,261 0 48,490 5,670 32,235 

175,818 121,947 0 53,871 4,534 37,808 

185,623 120,098 0 65,525 9,547 46,148 

199,255 140,725 0 58,530 6,370 45,647 

Other d 

277,151 

28,716 

9,450 

4,760 

4,035 

5,657 

4,814 

94,853 

5,404 

6,913 

6,650 

9,017 

4,389 

5,998 

9,305 

8,720 

10,585 

11,529 

9,830 

6,513 

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1944 .............................. 1 2,375,116 I 1,594,781 8,513 771,822 124,068 533,963 113,791 > '"t:l 

'"t:l 

January •..•.•..•.••.•...........•••. '1 222,866 146,685 0 76,181 9,212 54,270 I 12,699 ~ 

February •..••........................ 189,882 121,129 0 68,753 10,943 51,496 6,314 Z 

ti March •••..•.....••.•.......•........ 191,490 125,726 0 65,764 9,465 49,223 7,076 ~ 

ApriL ..•..•....•...•.....•...•.•.•.. 145,718 78,966 0 66,752 10,205 47,9 11 8,636 ~ 

May ••........................•...... 174,935 113,583 0 61,352 13,914 39,961 7,477 > 

June •.............................•.. 205,342 140,664 1,230 63,448 8,211 43,047 12,190 

July ••.•.••.•••••......•.••..•.•••..•• 233,132 164,834 6,547 61,751 6,701 45,175 9,875 

August ..•.••. , .•.............••.••.•• 225,817 164,253 678 60,886 8,864 42,671 9,351 

September •.••...............•••••••• 225,527 170,100 58 55,369 7,826 40,599 6,944 

October ••••.............••...•.••••• 175,739 109,698 0 66,041 14,297 40,652 11,092 

November ••....•...•....•..••.•.•••• 172,235 112,218 0 60,017 10,520 37,240 12,257 

December .•...•••.•.•.•.•..•.•••..•.. 212,433 146,925 0 65,508 13,910 41,7 18 9,880 

1945 (five months) ................. 613,981 333,876 0 280,105 64,404 175,910 39,791 

January ............•.••.•.•..••••.••• 182,286 105,706 0 76,580 18,243 49,339 8,998 

February ..•....................••••.• 149,671 86,902 0 62,769 14,824 40,668 7,277 

March •.•.....•.•.............•...... 111,529 63,656 0 47,873 7,761 30,301 9,811 

ApriL •••••••••..•.•....•.•.••.••.... 99,979 46,309 0 53,670 14,716 30,349 8,605 

May ••.••.•..••.•.•.•.......••••••..• 70,516 31,303 0 39,213 8,860 25,253 5,100 

• Represents tonnages delivered during the months indicated. Does not Co .• United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, and Polish interests • 

include passenger hauls. • Includes 63.149 tons of USSR supplies delivered by rail before AUl:ust 

b Includes Persian civilian supplies and wheat from Sultanabad, Iran. 1942. 

Does not include oil. SQllrce: Headquarters. Persian Gulf Command, U.S. Army. Office of the 

• Inchtdes packed petroleum products and civilian and railway bulk oil. ACofS for Operations. Movements Branch, Complete Summary of Port and 

d Includes supplies for transportation stores; U.S .. British, and Russian Transportation Agencies Performance of PGC Operations Throul:h ~ 1 

military requirements in Iran; and local requirements of Anglo·Iranian Oil May 1945, 5 July 1945, pp. 18-21. 

.... 

~ 
TABLE 6-FREIGHT HAULED IN THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR BY THE MOTOR TRANSPORT SERVICE, 1943-1944 

Freight Hauled' (Long Tons) 

USSR Supplies U. S. Army Supplies 

Year and Month Truck-miles 

Operated b Lend-lease Other 

Total Motor Scrap Total Transport Lumber' North South 

Tons Percent SerVIce of Andi- of Andi- of Total meshk meshk d 

Total •••.•..••••.... 99,967,863 618,946 408,460 66.0 2,953 207,533 18,385 81,227 107,92 

1943 •.•...•.........•.. 47,502,608 301,764 189,736 62.9 0 112,028 11,761 38,339 61,92 

January ••••.••••••.••.••.. 0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0 0 

February .................. 0 • 174 • 135 77.6 0 39 0 0 • 3 

March ••.••••••••..•••.... 1,034,224 6,290 3,570 56.7 0 2,720 510 137 2,07 

April. .................... 2,274,495 12,376 8,768 70.8 0 3,608 494 270 2,84 

May ••...•..••...•..•..... 2,801,692 17,492 11,002 62.9 0 6,490 956 745 4,78 

June ••.•...•.•.•..•••••••• 3,496,628 29,085 11,252 38.7 0 17,833 864 3,551 13,41 

July •••••.•.•••.•••••••••.. 4,383,105 27,837 17,068 61.3 0 10,769 1,229 3,080 6,46 

August .••.••..•••..•...... 5,671,808 32,332 21,103 65.3 0 11,229 1,752 3,025 6,45 

September ..••••••.•••••.. 5,766,699 40,479 23,335 57.6 0 17,144 1,494 9,429 6,22 

October ................... 6,642,036 40,264 26,389 65.5 0 13,875 2,121 4,717 7,03 

November ..•..•...•••••. , 7,404,425 43,292 32,729 75.6 0 10,563 1,480 2,662 6,42 

December ..•••••••.••.••.. 8,027,496 52,143 34,385 65.9 0 17,758 861 10,723 6,17 

1944 ................ , ,. 52,465,255 317,182 218,724 69.0 2,953 95,505 6,624 42,888 45,99 

January ••••.•••••..••••••• 7,397,820 42,679 32,385 75.9 0 10,294 622 4,297 5,37 

February .•.••••..•.••••.•. 3,116,032 I 18,725 10,365 55.4 138 8,222 474 3,589 4,15 

March •.••.•.••...•••.•••• 6,222,164 38,657 29,443 76.2 65 9,149 619 I 5,209 3,32 

1 

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)ril. .................... 

ay ••••••.•••••••••.•.••• 

ne ...•.•................ 

Iy ••••••••••••••••••••••• 

19U5t. ••••••••••••••••••• 

ptember ..•............. 

:tober ................•.. 

nember •............... 

!cember ................. 

3,545,846 

3,297,439 

6,646,864 

7,718,592 

6,921,251 

2,285,933 

2,836,959 

2,476,355 

0 

29,784 12,641 

22,579 13,616 

37,113 31,745 

42,197 36,727 

39,624 32,794 

15,649 8,187 

15,168 5,196 

15,007 5,625 

0 0 

• Represents supplies delivered during the months indicated. Does 

not include 95,023 tons of gravel hauled during the period September 

1943-July 1944 for use in MTS construction of hard standing areas. 

b Represents total miles operated, loaded and empty, except that mileage 

of maintenance and deadhead vehicles and vehicles engaged in gravel haul 

is not included. 

• Represents packing-case lumber delivered to USSR. 

42.4 831 16,312 298 5,050 10,964 

60.3 0 8,963 327 4,372 4,264 

85.5 0 5,368 827 2,496 2,045 

87.0 0 5,470 603 2,165 2,702 

82.8 0 6,830 537 2,366 3,927 

52.3 858 6,604 1,095 2,549 2,960 

34.3 1,061 8,911 329 5,538 3,044 

37.5 0 9,382 893 5,257 3,232 

0.0 0 0 0 0 0 

d Consists chiefly of tonnages hauled by the Third Provisional Truck 

Company, operating separately from the main MTS lIeet. 

• Represents freight loaded 28 February and reported as February tonnage, although actually it did not leave Andimeshk until 1 March. (Motor 

Transport Service, Historical Report, 1-31 March 1943, P. 2, PGF 131-C). 

Source: Persian Gulf Command, Motor Transport Service. Monthly 

Statistical Report of Operations for November 1944. 

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TABLE 7-NuMBER OF VEHICLES AsSEMBLED AT TRUCK AsSEMBLY PLANTS IN THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR, MARCH 1942-ApRIL 1945 

All Plants Andi· Andi. Khorram· Rafa· Tehran Bu,hire meshk Assembled for meshk b .hahr b (TAP III) diyah Ordnance Checkup 

Total Carp;o Other' (TAP I) (TAP II) (TAP IV) Depot Station 

Trucks 

Total ........... '191,075 172,842 18,233 79,961 88,060 • 6,865 ·16,161 24 4 

USSR ............•.... 184,112 166,760 17,352 78,627 83,218 6,628 15,611 24 4 

U.S. Army ............ 6,364 5,664 700 

Iran .................. c 390 366 24 

British Army .......... ·199 42 157 

UKCC ................ 010 10 0 

• Consists chiefly of jeeps and weapons carriers. 

b TAP I (Truck Assembly Plant I) was operated by General Motors 

Overseas Corporation from 26 March 1942 through 30 June 1943. 

Records of GMOC show a total output of 20,380 vehicles during this 

period, compared with 20.081 indicated by U.S. Army records for the 

same period. TAP II was operated by General Motors Overseas Corpora. 

tion from 26 January 1943 through 30 June 1943. Records of GMOC 

show a total output of 9.690 vehicles during this period. compared with 

9.670 indicated by U.S. Army records for the same period. The General 

Motors count includes vehicles still being processed on the last date of 

743 4,834 237 550 0 0 

382 8 Co) Cc) 0 0 

199 0 C') Cc) 0 0 

10 0 Co) Co) 0 0 

contractor operations. U.S. Army figures are based on delivery of 

completed vehicles. 

• Does not include assemblies at the British.operated plants at Bushire 

and Rafadiyah for British or Iranian use. These antedated and also 

paralleled USSR assembly operations at these plants. 

Source: Headquarters. Persian Gulf Command. U.S. Army. Office of the 

ACofS for Operations. Movements Branch. Complete Summary of Port 

and Transportation Agencies Performance of PGC Operations Through 

31 May 1945. 5 July 1945. P. 24. 

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APPENDIX A 495 

TABLE 8-MONTHLY OUTPUT OF AsSEMBLED VEIllCLES AT TRUCK ASSEMBLY PLANT II, 

KHORRAMSHAHR, IRAN, 26 JANUARY 1943-19 APRIL 1945 

USSR Vehicles U. S. Army Vehicles 

All Year and Month Vehicles 

Total Cargo Other Total Cargo Other 

Trucks Vehicles Trucks Vehicles 

Total· ......... 88,052 83,218 81,579 1,639 4,834 4,679 155 

1943 ...•••.••••.•.• 31,938 28,014 26,479 1,535 3,924 3,884 40 

January ...•.•.•...... 33 33 33 0 0 0 0 

February ..••.....•.•• 798 798 549 249 0 0 0 

March ••...•.•.••.••• 1,309 1,309 887 422 0 0 0 

ApriL ....•.•.•.....• 2,261 2,261 1,587 674 0 0 0 

May •••.•..•.•..•••.• 2,153 2,135 2,112 23 18 18 0 

June .....••.•.•...... 3,116 2,657 2,655 2 459 459 0 

July .................. 3,117 2,672 2,632 40 445 445 0 

August ........•.•...• 3,761 2,856 2,819 37 905 887 18 

September •••••••.•.• 4,032 3,299 3,290 9 733 721 12 

October .............. 3,761 3,079 3,079 0 682 677 5 

November ............ 3,185 2,724 2,719 5 461 456 5 

December ............ 4,412 4,191 4,117 74 221 221 0 

1944 .......••...... 41,434 40,636 40,532 104 798 775 23 

January .......•.•.•.• 3,857 3,676 3,654 22 181 179 2 

February ............. 3,935 3,820 3,803 17 115 115 0 

March .....•.••••• '" 3,359 3,328 3,302 26 31 31 0 

ApriL ..•••••.....•.. 2,396 2,326 2,325 1 70 70 0 

May •.........••••... 3,400 3,371 3,371 0 29 29 0 

June ......•..•..•...• 3,655 3,597 3,597 0 58 50 8 

July .................. 3,916 3,842 3,842 0 74 73 1 

August ...•...••...••• 3,861 3,770 3,762 8 91 91 0 

September •.......•..• 3,055 3,055 3,025 30 0 0 0 

October .......•.•.•.• 2,147 2,094 2,094 0 53 53 0 

November .••.••.•... 3,102 3,078 3,(J78 0 24 23 1 

December ............ 4,751 4,679 4,679 0 72 61 11 

1945 •....•.•.••..• 14,680 14,568 14,568 0 112 20 92 

January •............. 5,582 5,578 5,578 0 4 0 4 

February ....•........ 6,113 6,061 6,061 0 52 11 41 

March •........•.•..• 2,430 2,374 2,374 0 56 9 47 

April •••.•.••.•.•.••• 555 555 555 0 0 0 0 

~ Does not include 8 cargo trucks assembled for rhe Iranian Government. 

SOILrce: Headquarters, Persian Gulf Command. U.S. Army, Office of the ACofS for Operations, Movements 

Braoch, Complete Summary of Port and Transportation Agencies Performance of PGC Operations Through 

31 May 1945. 5 July 1945, pp. 25ff. 
496 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

TABLE 9-MONTHLY OUTPUT OF AsSEMBLED VEHICLES AT TRUCK ASSEMBLY PLANT I, 

ANDIMESHK, IRAN, MARCH 1942-DECEMBER 1944 

USSR Vehicles 

All Year and Month Vehicles I Total Cargo 

Trucks 

Total",., .....• 79,370 78,627 63,173 

1942 .•.••..•.•••.• 8,816 8,816 8,239 

April b ............... 322 322 322 

May ...•....•.•.•.... 946 946 946 

June ..••••..•.....••. 2,241 2,241 2,241 

July ....••.•••......•. 1,024 1,024 999 

August ...•.•......... 1,171 1,171 1,070 

September ..•........ 598 598 432 

October ..•..•........ 640 640 584 

November .......•... 726 726 660 

December ............ 844 844 718 

Undistributed c ....... 304 304 267 

1943 ............... 33,661 33,148 24,532 

January ...••.•....... 1,165 1,151 916 

February .....•..•.•.. 1,097 1,018 652 

March ..•.•....•..... 1,449 1,421 964 

ApriL ........•...... 1,617 1,548 975 

May •••.••...•.•..... 1,871 1,856 1,762 

June ..•.....•.•...... 4,066 4,066 3,093 

July .................. 2,704 2,701 2,015 

August ............... 3,423 3,396 2,616 

September ....•.•.... 3,478 3,478 3,015 

October .............. 2,807 2,668 2,006 

November ••........• 3,914 3,867 3,401 

December •....•.•.... 6,070 5,978 3,117 

1944 ............... 36,893 36,663 30,402 

January ••.••.••....•. 5,116 5,062 3,205 

February ..•.•..•..... 3,632 3,604 3,454 

March ••••..•...•.... 2,667 2,638 2,613 

April. ••.•........... 1 2,525 2,518 2,352 

May .••.••........... 1,828 1,826 1,812 

June ..•.•.••...•.•.•• 3,525 3,525 3,130 

I 

July .................. 4,407 4,407 3,537 

August ..•.........•.• 4,673 4,663 3,644 

See footnotes at end of table. 

Other 

Vehicles 

15,454 

577 

0 

0 

0 

25 

101 

166 

56 

66 

126 

37 

8,616 

235 

366 

457 

573 

94 

973 

686 

780 

463 

662 

466 

2,861 

6,261 

1,857 

150 

25 

166 

14 

395 

870 

1,019 

U. S. Army Vehicles 

Total Cargo 

Trucks 

743 198 

0 0 

0 0 

0 0 

0 0 

0 0 

0 0 

0 0 

0 0 

0 0 

0 0 

0 0 

513 191 

14 0 

79 79 

28 28 

69 69 

15 15 

0 0 

3 0 

27 0 

0 0 

139 0 

47 0 

92 0 

230 7 

54 4 

28 0 

29 0 

7 1 

2 0 

0 0 

0 0 

10 0 

Other 

Vehicle~ 

545 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

322 

14 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

3 

27 

0 

13 9 

47 

92 

223 

50 

28 

2 

1 

9 

6 

2 

o 

o 

o 
APPENDIX A 497 

TABLE 9-MONTHLY OUTPUT OF ASSEMBLED VEffiCLES AT TRUCK ASSEMBLY PLANT I, 

ANDIMESHK, IRAN, MARCH 1942-DECEMBER 1944-Continued 

USSR Vehicle. U. S. Army Vehicles 

All Year and Month Vehicles 

Total Cargo Other Total Cargo Other 

Trucks Vehicles Truck. Vehicles 

September ............ 3,843 3,789 2,057 1,732 54 0 54 

October .............. 1,548 1,516 1,483 33 32 0 32 

November ............ 2,579 2,565 2,565 0 14 2 12 

December .......•..•. 550 550 550 0 0 0 0 

• Does not include 591 vehicles assembled for other agendes,distributed as follows: Iranian Government, 366 

cargo trucks and 16 other vehicles; British, 42 cargo trucks and 157 other vehicles; United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, 10 cargo trucks. Monthly distribution for the!ile assemblies is not available. 

b Includes the first few vehicles assembled at the beginning of operations during the last week in March . 

• Represents additional vehicles accepted by USSR during 1942 but not included in convoy lisls on which 

other figurts were based. The months in which these acceptances took place are not known. 

Source: Headquarters Persian Gulf Command. U.S. Army, Ollice of the ACofS for Operations, Movements 

Branch Complete Summary of Port and Transportation Agencies Performance of PGC Operations Througb 

31 May 1945, 5 July 1945. pp. 25ff. 
TABLE 10-MONTHLY DELIVERIES OF AIRCRAFT TO THE USSR 

BY U.S. ARMY IN THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR, 1942-1945· 

[Number of Planes) 

Month 1942 1943 1944 1945 

Total. ........• 742 2,446 1,678 8 

January.,., .......... 0 102 172 0 

February ............. 1 67 133 1 

March ............... 5 114 170 0 

April. ................ 33 214 270 0 

May .................. 81 152 158 7 

June ....•.......•.... 128 96 301 0 

July ........•......... 111 141 170 0 

August ........•.•.•.. 51 204 101 0 

September ............ 56 253 90 0 

October .............. 68 395 55 0 

November ......•..•.. 110 393 37 0 

December ............ 98 315 21 0 

• Includes data for 995 aircraft flown to Abadan, Iran, as well as for 

3,879 cased aircraft shipped to Abadan by water and assembled for the 

USSR. Does not include data for aircraft turned Over to the USSR 

unassembled. 

Source: Headquarters, Air Materiel Command, Special One·Time 

Report of Deliveries of AAF Aircraft to the USSR, AUilust 1947. 

TABLE 11-AIRCRAFT DELIVERED TO THE USSR BY U.S. ARMY 

IN THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR, BY TYPE, 1942-1945' 

[Number of Planes) 

Type Total 1942 1943 1944 1945 

--

All types ..... 4,874 742 2,446 1,678 8 

A-20, Bomber 

(Light)b ••..••• 1,269 468 491 309 1 

DB-7, Bomber 

(Light)c ........ 151 150 1 0 0 

D-25, Bomber 

(Med.)d ........ 124 103 21 0 0 

P-39, Fighter .... 2,030 2 1,159 866 3 

P-40, Fighter •... 1,091 19 755 317 0 

P-47, Fighter •... 188 0 0 184 4 

AT-6, Trainer •.. 21 0 19 2 0 

• Does not include data for aircraft turned over to the USSR unassembled. 

b Includes 871 A-20's flown to Abadan. Iran • 

• British designation for A-20 light (fighter) bomber. 

d All B-25's were Bown to Abadan, Iran. Later redesignated as light 

bomber. 

SOllrce: Headquarters, Air Materiel Command, Special One·Time 

Report of Deliveries of AAF Aircraft to the USSR, August 1947. 

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TABLE 12-ASSIGNED STRENGTH OF U.S. ARMY FORCES IN THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR,' 1943-1945 

1943 

Month 

Total Officers b Enlisted 

Men 

January •.•.•.•••••.•.•.•.•.•.. 10,949 723 10,226 

February •.....•.....•.•••.••.. 12,868 808 12,060 

March ...•.•.•.•.•.•.•......•• 18,509 1,132 17,377 

April •...•.••..•••.•.•.•.•...• 18,513 1,167 17,346 

May •.••••..•••...•••••.•..•.• 23,208 1,409 21,799 

June .••.••...•......•.•.•••••• 25,423 1,703 23,720 

July .......•...••••..•...•..•.• 27,320 1,748 25,572 

August. ....•..........•..•..•• 28,584 1,811 26,773 

September .•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.... 28,218 1,812 26,406 

October .•..•..••••.•.••..•.•.• 29,545 1,839 27,706 

November .................... 29,589 1,846 27,743 

December ••..•••••.•...•.•.•.• 28,757 1,836 26,921 

• Represents assigned strength as of the last day nf each mnnth. Attached strength in the area is nnt included, but generally was less than 

2,000 and consisted primarily of ATC personnel. Prior to 1943. U.S. 

Army personnel in the Persian Corridor amounted nnly to a few hundred 

until the first major force arrived in December 1942~ raising total assigned 

strength to 451 officers and 5.456 enlisted men by the end of that month. 

b Includes warrant officers, nurses, dietitians, and physical therapists. 

, Data not reported. The total shnwn was taken frnm PGSC Report 

1944 1945 

Total Officers b Enlisted Total Officers b Enlisted 

Men Men 

29,445 1,824 27,621 26,082 1,740 24,342 

29,691 1,851 27,840 20,883 1,427 19,456 

29,286 1,956 27,330 18,893 1,229 17,664 

29,300 1,806 27,494 15,793 1,112 14,681 

28,853 1,803 27,050 16,063 1,097 14,966 

28,493 1,756 26,737 13,547 931 12,616 

28,296 1,767 26,529 9,173 667 8,506 

28,168 1,732 26,436 6,922 566 6,356 

27,739 1,698 26,041 • 5,740 • 453 • 5,287 

27,710 1,786 25,924 5,787 443 5,344 

26,301 1,693 24,608 4,263 324 3,939 

26,647 1,718 24,929 ( d) (d) ( d) 

to War Department Budget Officer fnr Honse Snbcommittee on War 

Department Appropriations, 5 October 1945, P. 1. Data for officers and 

enlisted men estimated. 

,"" d Final evacuation of command troops occurred 30 December 1945. 

Source: War Department General Staif, Office of the Adjutant General, 

Machine Records Brauch, Streugth of the Army STM-30, for respective 

mouths. 

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500 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

TABLE 13-DlSTRIDUTION OF U.S. ARMY CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES IN THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR, 

1943-1945 

[SELECTED DATES] 

1943 1944 1945 

--- Nationality and Type of Work 

30 April 31 Decem- 31 August 31 Decem- 31 July ber ber 

---

TotaL •..••.•.•••.•••...•.•.•••.• 24,285 41,099 35,126 16,460 6,145 

American ...•.•.•..••....••...•....•• a 317 37 4 0 0 

Native .••...•••.•.•.•..••.....•...•.• 23,968 40,682 34,640 15,949 5,850 

Polish .•..••.••••••.....•..•.•...•... 0 380 482 511 295 

Assembly Plants, Aircraft .••...•...•.... (b) 994 0143 13 0 

Assembly Plants, Truck •.••.•...•....••. (b) 5,448 4,308 2,056 (d) 

Construction, Highway' •.••.••..•••••.. 796 1,771 1,029 48 54 

Construction, Other •..•..•...•••..•••.. 14,758 8,039 3,763 1,696 178 

Depots (excludes Ordnance) .•..•.....•. 1,346 3,309 1,909 1,564 1,529 

Hospitals ....••...••...•..•..••..••.•.. 197 419 703 421 64 

Motor Transport Service •..............• 578 8,722 8,126 224 (I) 

Ordnance .............................. 3,044 1,293 1,156 1,118 377 

Ports .......•.•.....•••..••.•.•.•...... 2,055 6,463 7,373 3,879 647 

Railway· ••..•••.•.•............••.•••. 839 549 465 348 50 

Service and Supply h •••••••••••••••••••• 672 4,092 6,151 5,093 3,246 

• Engaged in road and building construction and in projects for the district engineers, Tehran District. 

b Data nOI available; excluded from total. 

• After 19 July 1944 aircraft assembly was restricted to planes then on hand or en route. 

d Operations ceased in April 1945. 

e Includes maintenance workers. 

I Operations of convoys ended 1 December 1944. 

I Does not include civilians directly employed by the ISR, numbering some 30,000 at the peak in 1944. 

b Includes maintenance of buildings and utilities; supply of posts, areas, and operating services; operation of 

motor pools and laundries; and employees such as clerks, stenographers, houseboys, janitors. and waitresses. 

Source: Semimonthly and monthly reports of civilian employees, 15 April 1943-31 July 1945 (adjusted) 

PGF 151. 
TABLE 14-EsTIMATED COSTS OF CONSTRUCTING FIXED INSTALLATIONS IN THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR, 1943-1945' 

V ni ted States British b 

Type of Construction Total 

Total I Construction Lend·lease • Total Construction Reciprocal Aid d 

Total •............ $98,233,000 $61,828,000 $61,103,000 $725,000 $36,405,000 $31,698,000 $4,707,000 

Ports e ••••••••••••• 14,838,000 7,391,000 7,122,000 269,000 7,447,000 5,250,000 2,197,000 

Military Railway 

Service ............ 2,184,000 2,033,000 2,033,000 0 151,000 92,000 59,000 

Motor Transport 

Service ........... 4,619,000 4,334,000 4,334,000 0 285,000 0 285,000 

Aid-to-Russia Highways .............. 54,157,000 35,038,000 35,006,000 32,000 19,119,000 18,862,000 257,000 

Signal Service ....... 5,977,000 1,848,000 1,847,000 1,000 4,129,000 3,806,000 323,000 

Petroleum Operations ............. '1 841,000 368,000 0 368,000 473,000 473,000 0 

Other r •••••••••••••• 15,617,000 10,816,000 10,761,000 55,000 4,801,000 3,215,000 1,586,000 

I 

• Represents total cumulative costs from the beginning of operations 

through 31 December 1944. 

• Comprises installations at Bandar Shahpur, Khorramshahr <including 

Russian Dump), and Cheybassi. 

b Costs shown apply only to those installatio:1s used by or available to 

the V.S. Army, including installations in which the V.S. Army had no 

financial interest. British costs coaverted to V.S. dollars at the 1945 

exchange rate of $4.035 to the pound. 

o Represents value of U.S. contributions to British construction. 

d Represents value of British contributions to U.S. construction. 

f Includes such installations as posts, camps, and stations other than 

those for MRS; depots; airfields; assembly plants; hospitals; checkup 

stations. 

Source: Joint Report on Construction CostDJta <as of 1 December 1944) 

adopted by British and American Agencies at Surplus Property Disposal 

Meeting, Tehran, 14 March 1945, PGF 127. 

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502 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

TABLE IS-DRUM PRODUCTION AT BAHREIN, 1944-1945 

Month 

TotaL ••••••••••....••.. 

1944 •.••.•.••.•.•••...•.•.. 

July ••....•.••••••.••••.••.•••. 

August ...••..•.•.•.••....••••• 

September •••••..•.••••.•...•• 

October .•..•.••.••.•.••••••... 

November •••••••••••..•..••.. 

December .••••.•.•••••.•.•.••. 

Quantity 

318,886 

41,307 

54 

4,511 

310 

889 

15,724 

19,819 

Month 

1945 .••.••••••••••••••••••.. 

January •••.•••••••.•••.•••••.. 

February ••••.•..••••••••••••.. 

March ••••..••••.•••••.••••••. 

April •••.....••.•••••.•••..••. 

May ••••••••.•...•...••••••••. 

June •..•.••.••••...••••.•••.•• 

July •••••••.•..•••••••••••••••• 

Quantity 

277,579 

25,620 

41,691 

30,779 

48,949 

23,665 

42,698 

64,177 

Source: Persian Gulf Command, PlanlS Branch, Operations Division, Historical Repon for period 1 Ma, 

1945-10 August 1945, Inclosure I. 
Appendix B 

CHART 2-MANPOWER IN U. S. ARMY OPERATIONS IN THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR, 

1941-1945 THOUSAND 

50 rl -~-H-O-U-SA-N-D----------------- t 

40 ~ l-------J~~, NLA;J~~ __ I /, 

I ,/ " r 6 f-------------------"-...;-J / ,'" I \ I , 

I ~~ \ 

30 I " ---- --~ 3 1-------:0----'--'---'-'-'--1-1 I 

20 0' , 

10 II ',," 

ON 0 

1941 

US CIVILIANS " ... " 

M J 

J 

1942 

1942 

J 

1943 

J 

1944 

J 

1945 

o 

Source: Table 12: PGSC and PGC Semimonthly and Monthly Reports of Civilian Employees, Aprll 

l{l43-July 1945; History of U. S. Military Iranian Mission, 20 March 1943, by 1st Lt. Victor E. 

DIetze. 
504 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

CHART 3-AmCRAFT DELIVERED TO THE USSR AT ABADAN, IRAN, 1942-1945 

4001---------------,--------------~~------------------,_----_, 

300r---------------r-------------~~*T--------~~-----------··----1 

200r-----·----------+-----ft-----+~ 

I 

100 1--1 ---fi~--.. --J~~-.--t-'ffl77\_'_'1'~ 

J 

1942 

J 

1943 

*Represents aircraft flown in : no assembly necessary. 

Source: Table 10. 

J 

1944 

CHART 4-VEHICLES ASSEMBLED AT TRUCK ASSEMBLY PLANT 1, ANDIMESHK, 

IRAN, 1942-1944 

THOUSAND VEHICLES ASSEMBLED DISTRIBUTION PERCENT 

8 pp~~~~~~~~~ 100 

6 I-----~r---------~---------- 75 

2 

1942 1943 1944 1942 1943 1944 

Source: Table 9. 
APPENDIX B 505 

CHART 5-VEHICLES ASSEMBLED AT TRUCK ASSEMBLY PLANT II, 

KHORRAMSHAHR, IRAN, 1943-1945 

THOUSAND VEHICLES ASSEMBLED DISTRIBUTION PERCENT 

8 ~!f77?2C:;;;~~~~~01100 

6 75 

4 

2 

~~~J~~~~~~~~J~~~~~~O 

1943 1944 

Source: Table 8. 

CHART 6-FREIGHT HAULED IN THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR BY THE MOTOR 

TRANSPORT SERVICE, 1943-1944 

THOUSAND LONG TONS 60 -----------------------------------------------------------

40 

20 

M A M J J A 

1943 

Source: Table :I. 

o D M A M J J A o N 

1944 
506 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

CHART 7-FREIGHT HAULED NORTH OF ANDIMESHK, IRAN, ON IRANIAN STATE 

RAILWAY, AUGUST 1942-MAY 1945 

THOUSAND LONG TONS 

250 ~-------------------,---------------------,--------, 

200~---~--------------------~~.------r----~~-'~--------1 

150~----~----------------r---~------~---r----,,----r-~~----

\ I , 

\ I , \.-' \ 100~-----+------__ ~----~----T---~~~----------~~~--~-

1942 

8ource: Table II. 

/ 

DEC 

"- -~-.- .-"-. 

EASTERN 

COMMAND 

~ ..... MAR JUN 

1944 

, 

\ ",', \ 

/ - . , , ,. 

, 

SEP DEC MAR MAY 

1945 

CHART 8-CARGO DISCHARGED AT AMERICAN-OPERATED PORTS IN THE PERSIAN 

GULF, JANUARY 1943-MAY 1945 

THOUSAND LONG TONS 

300,----------------------,------------------------,----------

100 

O~~~ JAN MAR JUN SEP DEC 

1943 

8ource: Table 3. 

MAR JUN 

1944 

SEP DEC MAR MAY 

1945 
APPENDIX B 507 

CHART 9-DISCHARGE AND INLAND CLEARANCE OPERATIONS AT KHORRAMSHAHR, 

IRAN, AUGUST 1942-MAY 1945 

THOUSAND LONG TONS 

200,------,------------------,-------------------,----------

, 

\ 

\ , 

150r------+------------------~~~------~+_~--~\\.+/--~--------­ DISCHARGED -

100~----~--------T7~~----~----~~----~--~~~l------

50r-----+T~--~----------_+----~L-----------~--~~· \ 

SEP DEC "MAR JUN 

1942 1945 

Source: Table 3, supplemented by Historical Reports, Headquarters, Director ot Ports and Gnlt 

District, PGC, for respective months. 

CHART 10-DISCHARGE AND INLAND CLEARANCE OPERATIONS AT BAN DAR 

SHAHPUR, IRAN, AUGUST 1942-JANUARY 1945 

THOUSAND LONG TONS 

100,------.---------------------,---------------------,----, 

75~----_+--------------------~~--~----_P~------_+----~ 

25 , oJ 

0 

AUG DEC MAR JUN SEP 

1942 1943 

Source: Table 3, supplemented by Historical Reports, Headquarters, Director of Ports and Gult 

District, PGC, for respective months. (Clearances tor January-April 1944 interpolated; complete 

data not available.) 
508 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

CHART ll-USSR CARGO LANDED AT CHEYBASSI, IRAQ, JULY 1943-

SEPTEMBER 1944 THOUSAND LONG TONS 

20-----=~------------~._----------------------------------

10 

Source: Study of Port Operations-CheybasBI, Ports Branch Headquarters, PGC, for respective 

months. 

CHART 12-CARGO SHIPPED TO THE USSR FROM THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, 

BY ROUTE, 22 JUNE 1941-20 SEPTEMBER 1945 

MILLION LONG TONS 

8 --------------------------------------------------------------

6 -----------------------------F~~~-----------

4-------------------------------~~~__;~~~----------------

2 

1941 

·Sovlet Arctic and Black Sea Routes. 

Source: Table 1. 
ACofS 

AG 

AGO 

AIOC 

AMET 

ASF 

ASFCCF 

ASFNCF 

ATC 

BAPCO 

BMC 

Bn 

Br 

Bull 

CBI 

CCS 

Cedar 

CG 

CinC 

Cir 

Civ 

CO 

Co 

CofEngrs 

CofOrd 

CofS 

CofTrans 

ColI 

Comd 

Comdr 

Conf 

Cons 

ContI 

CSP 

DCofS 

Dir 

Glossary 

Assistant Chief of Staff 

Adjutant general 

Adjutant General's Office 

Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 

Africa-Middle East Theater 

Army Service Forces 

Army Service Forces, Current Classified Files 

Army Service Forces, Noncurrent Classified Files 

Air Transport Command 

Bahrein Petroleum Company 

Compania Constructora Bechtel-McCone 

Battalion 

Branch 

Bulletin 

China-Burma-India theater 

Combined Chiefs of Staff 

Civilian Emergency Defense Aid to Russia 

Commanding General 

Commander-in-Chief 

Circular 

Civilian 

Commanding Officer 

Company 

Chief of Engineers 

Chief of Ordnance 

Chief of Staff 

Chief of Transportation 

Collections 

Command 

Commander 

Conference 

Construction 

Control 

Combined Staff Planners 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

Director 
510 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

Dist 

Div 

Douglas Files 

Engr 

Engrg 

Folspen 

G-l 

G-2 

G-3 

G-4 

GMOC 

GO 

GOe 

GS 

Gulf Dist 

HOTI 

HqAMET 

HqPGC 

HRSDRBAGO 

IG 

ISR 

IWT 

JA 

JCS 

MA 

Maxwell Papers 

ME 

MEF 

District 

Division 

Foreign Projects File, Storage Files, Douglas Aircraft Company, Santa Monica, California 

Engineer 

Engineering 

Foley Bros., Spencer, White and Prentis 

Personnel section of divisional or higher staff 

Intelligence section 

Operations section 

Supply section 

General Motors Overseas Corporation 

General Order 

General Officer Commanding 

General Staff 

Gulf District Headquarters Files, Persian Gulf 

Command, now filed at the Kansas City Records 

Center, Adjutant General's Office, Kansas City, 

Mo. 

History of the Persian Gulf Command, prepared 

by Historical Section, Office of Technical Information, Headquarters, Persian Gulf Command 

AG decimal files seen at Headquarters, AfricaMiddle East Theater, Cairo, now filed at the 

Kansas City Records Center 

AG decimal files seen at Headquarters, Persian 

Gulf Command, Tehran, now filed at the Kansas 

City Records Center 

Historical Records Section, Departmental Records Branch, Adjutant General's Office 

Inspector general 

Iranian State Railv,:ay 

Inland Water Transport 

Judge advocate 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Military Attache 

Personal files lent by General Maxwell to the 

Middle East Section of the Office of the Chief of 

Military History and returned to him upon his 

retirement from the Army 

Middle East 

Middle East Files; Middle East Forces 
GLOSSARY 

MESC 

MID 

Min 

MisBr 

MISMIDWD 

MRS 

Mtg 

MTS 

NAD 

NADEF 

NYODF 

OCofEngrs 

OCMH 

OCofOrd 

OCSigO 

OCofTrans 

OPD 

OpNav 

OTI 

PAl Force 

Pers 

PGC 

PGF 

PGSC 

QMG 

RAF 

Regt 

S-1 

S-2 

S-3 

S-4 

Serv 

SL 

Middle East Supply Center 

Military Intelligence Division 

Minutes 

Missions Branch 

511 

Military Intelligence Service, Military InteIli· 

gence Division, War Department 

Military Railway Service 

Meeting 

Motor Transport Service 

North Atlantic Division 

North Atlantic Division Engineer Files, New 

York 

New York Ordnance District Files, New York 

Office of the Chief of Engineers 

Office of the Chief of Military History 

Office of the Chief of Ordnance 

Office of the Chief Signal Officer 

Office of the Chief of Transportation 

Operations Division, War Department General 

Staff 

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 

Office of Technical Information 

Persia and Iraq Force 

Personnel 

Persian Gulf Command 

Historical Files, Office of Technical Information, 

Headquarters, Persian Gulf Command, now at 

Office of the Chief of Military History 

Persian Gulf Service Command 

Quartermaster General 

Royal Air Force 

Regiment 

Personnel section of regimental or lower staff 

Intelligence section 

Operations section 

Supply section 

Service 

Material formerly filed in Persian Gulf Service 

Command boxes at St. Louis, now filed at the 

Kansas City Records Center 
512 

SLAMET 

SOS 

SO 

SWP Office 

TAG 

TAP 

TUP 

UKCC 

USAFIME 

WDGS 

White Office 

WPD 

WSA 

THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND AID TO RUSSIA 

AG decimal files from Headquarters, MricaMiddle East Theater, formerly filed in drawers 

and cabinets at St. Louis, now filed at the Kansas 

City Records Center 

Services of Supply 

Special Order 

Head Office, Spencer, White and Prentis, New 

York 

The Adjutant General 

Truck assembly plant 

Twin-unit pack 

United Kingdom Commercial Corporation 

U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East 

War Department General Staff 

Head Office, J. G. White Engineering Corporation, New York 

War Plans Division, War Department General 

Staff 

War Shipping Administration 
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD "WAR II 

The following volumes have been published or are in press: 

The War Department 

Chief 0/ Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations 

Washington Command Post: The Operations Division 

Strategic Planningfor Coalition Warfare,' 1941--1942 

Strategil' Planningfor Coalition nllrfare: 1943-1944 

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943 

Global Logistirs and Strategy: 1943-1945 

The A.rmJ and Economic 1'v1obilization 

11le A.rmJ and Industrial Alanpower 

The Armv Ground Forces 

The 'Olganizalior1 of Ground Combat Troops 

The Procurement and Training oj Ground Combat Troops 

The Armv Service Forces 

The ~Olganizatior1 and Role of the Army Servire Forces 

The Western Hemisphere 

The Framework of Hemisphere Defense 

Guarding the United States and Its Outposts 

The War in the Pacific 

The fall oj the Philippines 

Guadalcanal: The First OjJensiVf' 

Victory in Papua 

CARTWHEEL' The Reduction oj Rabaul 

Seizure of the Gilberts and Alar'Shalls 

Campaign in the Marianas 

The Approach to the Philit1Jines 

Lryte: The Return to the Philippines 

Triumph in the Philippines 

Okinawa: The Last Battle 

Strategy and Command: The First Two Yew'S 

The Mediterranean Theater of Operations 

Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the tlbt 

Sicily and the Surrender of Italy 

Salero to Cassino 

Cassino to the A.lps 

The European Theater of Operations 

Cross-Channel A.ttack 

Breakout and Pursuit 

The Lorraine Campaign 

The Siegfried Line Campaign 

The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge 

The Last OJJensive 
The SlIpmne Comll/and 

Logistical ,)'upport of the Armies, viiI 1011 I' 1 

Logisliml Support of the A 1'111 iI'S, VOIIIIllI' Jl 

The :\1iddle East Theater 

The Pl'I'sian Corridor and Aid to Russia 

The China-Surma-India Theater 

Stilwell's Alilsioll to Chillo 

51tilwell's COlllmalld PI'Ob/ellls 

Tillie Runs Ollt in eRI 

The Technical Services 

Thl' Chl'll/lml Wwfarl' Sl'rl'ice: Orgallizingfor War 

The Chemiral W(lIIarl' Snvice: From Lo/Joratol)' to Field 

The Chell/lml W(]IIare 5l'nllce: Chl'lniea/.I ill Combat 

The COIPS of l~nginl'ers: Troops I1wl Equipmen/ 

The cO/ps of r."ngi7lfl'l's: Thl' War Against .lapan 

Thl' CO/ps of Enginl'en: Thp War Against Germany 

The CO/Pol of Engineers: iHilitary Constructioll in /he UniLed 51lales 

The Alpdiml Departlllellt: Hospitalization ({lid E,I(l.l'Iwtion; Zone of Illterior 

The MI'(Iiml Deportment: ivIeditlll Senlice III the Meditnrrlllean alld Aiinor 

ThNltl'ls 

The AIl'diwl Departmmt: Medical Sen lire in thl' 1~/lmpNin TliNlter of Operatiolls 

The iHedico{ Depo rtment: AIedical ,)'er-I'ice in the War AgaimlJapan 

nil' Ordnance Depar/Illellt: Planning iV/lmitiorisfor War 

The Ordnonce Department: Pl'Ocurl'lllent alld SutJply 

Thl' Ordll(lll((, Depar/ment: 011 Beachhead and Battleji'Ont 

The Quarterll/(Jstn Corps: Organization, Supply, and Sn1lices, Volume 1 

The Qllartermaster Cmps: Organiwtion, SujJply, and Sel1li(fs, Volume 1J 

The QII(1rLI'rI/l(Jster Cmps: Operations ilZ thl' vwn Against japan 

The QU(1rtl'l'lI/(/ster COIPS: OjJeratiolls in thl' War Against Germany 

The Signal COIPS: 7/11' FlIll'Igl'lll)' 

The Signal C0I1)s: The Test 

The Signal COIPS: The Outcome 

Tlip 7iwl.ljJortlltioll CorjJs: Responsibilities. Organization, and Operations 

The Trrlll.lj)Ortatioli COl ps: Ivlovements, 7}-oining, and Supply 

The 7rwlsjJortatio/l CO/ps: Operations O,leneas 

Special Studies 

Chronology: 1941-1945 

Alifilar, RelatiorlS Between the United States (Jnd Callada: 1939-1945 

Rearllllng the French 

T/un Rattles: Arnm1ille, A/tuzzo, and Schmidt 

The Women's .-Inn)' Corps 

Civil Affairs: Soldiers BpcOIne Governors 

Buying Airrraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces 

Thp Employment of Negro Ii'Oops 

iHal//wt/an." The U.S. Army and the Atomic Bomb 

Pictorial Record 

The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas 

The War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas 

The War Against japan 
Index 

Abadan: 10,83. See also Abadan Air Base; 

Aircraft assembly j Anglo-Iranian Oil 

Company; Container plants. 

docks: 84 

inland clearance: 84 

Russian-aid cargoes: 415 

Abadan Air Base. See also Aircraft assembly. 

agreement on use: 55n, 128, 271-72, 272n 

ATC operations: 270-71 

commanding officers: 266, 269n 

good-will party: 272 

installations: 256-57, 271 

land occupancy: 271-72 

Shah's visit: 272 

strength: 270-71 

Acheson, Dean: 475,476,479 

Adler, Brig. Gen. Elmer E.: 54, 71, 125n, 

131, 132, 133 

Africa-Middle East Theater: 256, 301, 302, 

421-22 

Agra: 46 

Agreements. See Treaties and agreements. 

Agwileon: 103, 117 

Ahern, Jack A.: 137 

Ahwaz: 48,61,92, 142, 253,393 

civilian employee conduct: 117-18 

food riots: 244 

highway construction: 83, 84, 250 

location: 83 

port: 415 

precipitation: 109 

rail connections: 33, 83, 346, 347 

Russian-aid cargoes barged to: 415 

Ahwaz District: 215,218,222,225,249,254. 

See also Andimeshk Post; Central Area; 

Desert District; Persian Gulf Service 

Command. 

Ahwaz General Depot: 393 

Air Corps: 40,42,43,54, 58n, 94, 125, 126, 

132, 133, 136, 256n, 267-68. See also 

Air Forces; Aircraft assembly; Cedar 

Project; Douglas Aircraft Company. 

Air Depot Group, 82d; 137,266,267,270 

Air Forces: 66,91,92, 214, 231, 265, 266, 

291, 303, 425,429. See also Air Corps. 

Air Section, Iran-Iraq Service Command: 

90-91 

Air Transport Command (ATC): 221, 231, 

241n, 252, 256-58,270, 271, 295, 297, 

298, 303, 422, 424, 425, 426 

Aircraft, reconditioned for Soviet use: 131. 

See also Aircraft assembly. 

Aircraft assembly: 39,54,84,101,125. See 

also Cedar Project; Royal Air Force. 

backlogs: 265-66,269,270 

close of operations: 270, 417 

command problem: 267-68 

commanding officers: 269n 

incoming aircraft, flow: 265 

production: 264,266,267,268-69,270 

Soviet pressure: 269 

strength problem: 266-67,269,270 

Aircraft delivery: 84, 124-25, 129, 264 

Airfields: 8, 9, 35, 252, 256-53 

Allen, George V.: 157n, 160, 160n, 161n, 

164n,455n,477,479 

Allin, Lt. Col. Benjamin C.: 

reports, port operations: 400-403, 404n. 

405,403 

Alling, Paul: 288n 

Allison, Capt. John: 129 

American Aid Subcommittee: 38,86, 125 

American-British relations. See An g I ().. 

American relations. 

American Eastern Corporation: 416n 

American Embassy, Tehran. See American 

Legation, Tehran. 

American-Iranian relations. See IranianAmerican relations. 

American Iraqi Shipping Company: 416, 

425 

American Legation, Baghdad: 8, 9 

American Legation, Tehran: 443, 443n, 445, 

455, 459. See also Allen, George V.; 

Caldwell, John L.; Dreyfus, Louis G. 

Jr.; Morris, Leland B.; Murray, Wallace. 
516 INDEX 

American-Soviet relations. See So vie tAmerican relations. 

American Special Observer Group: 14, 20, 

22, 124. See also Chaney, Maj. Gen. 

James E. 

American Trucking Associations, Inc.: 311, 

311n 

Amirabad Post: 221, 423. See also Mountain District; Northern Area; Tehran 

District; Persian Gulf Service Command. 

Amtorg: 66 

Andaman Islands: 105 

Anderson, Maj. Elmer E.: 384n, 398n 

Anderson, Col. Gustav A. M.: 232, 318n, 

422 

Anderson, Nels: 106n, 280n, 382n 

Anderson, Ward: 293n 

Andimeshk: 98. See also Motor vehicle 

assembly and delivery. 

food riots: 244 

highway construction: 83,84,250,251 

installations: 252 

motor veI.icle repair, service: 143 

train-to-truck transfer: 35, 252, 321, 368, 

423 

Andimeshk Area: 221. See also Ahwaz District; Central Area; Desert District; 

Persian Gulf Service Command. 

Andimeshk Post: 221,423 

Andrews, Lt. Gen. Frank M.: 136,227,228, 

229n, 231, 440 

Anglo-American Combined Staff Planners: 

192,195,201,202,203,204 

Anglo-American Combined Supplies Committee: 449 

Anglo-American relations. See also Combined Chiefs of Staff; Multilateral relations: SOS Plan; Treaties and agreements. 

command relationships: 95, 95n, 98, 98n, 

99,204n 

construction responsibilities: 57-59, 126, 

133, 251, 299 

co-ordination between Allied services, lack 

of: 105 

economic assistance, Middle East: 448-50, 

452-54 

Anglo-American relations-Continued 

emergency military operations plans: 91, 

199,203-04 

financial arrangements: 58, 59, 113, 114, 

340-42 

food rationing: 244-45 

global strategy: 176-30 

land occupancy: 271-72,429-30 

lend-lease quotas: 449-50, 450n, 451n, 454 

local labor: 153-54, 204n, 243-44 

local procurement: 59,92-93,113-15 

motor transport: 315-16 

planning based on British needs: 31 

POL: 284, 298-99 

port operations: 382-84 

priorities, British and Soviet: 35-36, 185, 

202, 203 

property disposal: 429,430 

responsibilities, controls, division of: 32, 

99, 180-92, 201-05, 251 

security: 237-39 

unification, U.S. missions: 85-89 

U.S. aid, nature and scope: 13-18,94-96, 

180-92 

Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC): 10, 

105, 123, 125, 133, 134, 244, 301, 303, 

321,324,363,383 

airfields: 256 

docks: 84,393 

labor contractors: 103-04 

land tenure arrangements: 271 

machinery, equipment shipments: 291-92 

oil rights: 289 

POL financial arrangements: 305, 306 

POL storage and distribution: 304,307-08 

reported plan for purchase of Abadan Air 

Base: 271 

Anglo-Iranian relations: 4, 6, 7, 158. See 

also Multilateral relations. 

Anglo-Persian Treaty, 1919: 12 

Anglo-Russian occupation, Iran: 10-12, 

13,14,435-36 

Anglo-Russian rivalry: 3, 6, 12-13, 28, 

157-60,443 

financial arrangements, ISR: 346 

Tri-Partite Treaty: 11, 28, 162, 164, 171, 

172, 202, 244-45, 290, 333, 380, 381. 

425, 430, 435 
INDEX 517 

Anglo-Iraqi relations: 4,7,9 

Basra port control: 54, 185,383 

British occupation, Iraq: 8-9 

communications control: 8, 13 

mandate: 7 

treaty of alliance, 1930: 8 

Anglo-Russian relations: 73. See also Multilateral relations; Tri-Partite Treaty. 

aircraft diversions: 74, 128,266,269 

American co-ordination: 76, 147, 149 

assembly operations: 74,128,147,149 

inspections: 74 

ISR control: 333-39 

packing-case lumber dispute: 154-55 

rivalry in Iran: 3, 6, 12-13, 28, 157-60, 

443 

Soviet personnel in British zone: 130-31, 

144--45, 147 

Appleton, Col. J. A.: 357n 

Arabian-American Oil Company: 289n, 292 

Aridity, affecting steam locomotive use: 15, 

368-69 

Army-Navy Liquidation Commission: 232, 

302, 428, 429 

Army-Navy Petroleum Board: 292,294,300, 

301, 303 

Arnold, Gen. Henry H.: 131,132,267-69 

Articles of War: 118, 296 

Assembly operations. See Aircraft assembly; 

Barge assembly; Military Railway Service; Motor vehicle assembly and delivery. 

Atlantic Charter: 442n, 444, 445, 445n 

Auchinleck, Gen. Sir Claude ]. E.: 9, 17, 18 

Aurand, Brig. Gen. Henry S.: 16n, 22n, 64n, 

75, 76n, 80, 86, 88, 97 

Avej Pass: 314,317,319 

Aviation Gasoline Program: 306 

Axis. See also Germany. 

attack on Soviet Union: 4, 9-10, 14, 19, 

20,25 

influence in Middle East: 8-9,10,160,161 

lend-lease as defense against: 4 

threat to Middle East: 3,4,5,8,9-10, 12, 

13, 14, 19, 20, 169-70, 176, 197, 198, 

291, 382 

Azerbaijan disorders: 28,426,473 

Baghdad Petroleum Advisory Committee: 

302-03,305 

Bahrein, Sheikdom: 293-94 

Bahrein Petroleum Company (BAPCO) 

container plants: 300-302 

expansion, production facilities: 291-95, 

297 

jurisdiction over civilian employees: 294, 

295-97 

purchase, PGC construction equipment: 

292n 

Baird, Col. Willet J.: 72n, 76n 

Balfour, J. M.: 159, 159n 

Balfour-Arnold agreement: 22 

Bandar Shahpur: 33, 35, 62, 84, 186, 379, 

381, 390, 393, 399. See also Ports; 

Ports Service. 

costs: 253 

dock construction: 252, 395 

geography: 394 

inland clearance: 186,347,354,394 

installations, facilities: 394-95 

living conditions: 394 

port commanders: 386n 

port performance: 411 

U.S. control proposed: 180-81,190 

Bank Melli: 375 

Barge assembly: 84, 109-12, 123 

Bartels, Maj. Gus R.: 292n, 294n, 295n, 297n 

Basra: 35, 92, 111 

British communications, importance: 411-

12 

highway construction: 83 

inland clearance: 35, 186-87, 415 

port administration: 54, 185, 383 

port f acili ti es: 33 

Russian-aid cargoes: 415 

Basra District: 215,218,222,225,254,267, 

268, 385, 386, 402. See also Gulf District; Persian Gulf Service Command. 

Basra Port Directorate: 54, 383 

Basra Transport Executive Committee: 235 

Batt, William L.: 23 

Bazaar Wharf: 395 

Beaverbrook, Lord: 15, 23, 37, 180, 334,335 

Bechtel-McCone, Compania Constructora 

(BMC): 293,295,296 
518 INDEX 

Beck, Walter: 135n 

Beresford, Maj. Gen. G. de la P.: 130 

Berle, Adolf A., Jr.: 163n, 169 

Berman, Capt. Charles E.: 324n 

Besselman, Capt. W. H.: 412n 

Besson, Brig. Gen. Frank S., Jr.: 353,365 

Beta Pack: 140 

bin Salmon, Haji Ahmed: 110 

Bishop, Col. Harry S.: 267n 

Bissell, Brig. Gen. Clayton L.: 230n, 336n 

Blood, Capt. Lawson T.: 105n 

Blood, Brig. W. E. R.: 285,287 

Board of Economic Warfare: 449 

BOLERO: 99, 176, 178, 180, 195 

Boone,Col. PhilipT.: 169,461n 

Booth, Brig. Gen. Donald P.: 205n, 216n, 

222, 224n, 225n, 387, 390, 392, 420, 

426. See also Allin, Lt. Col. Benjamin 

C.; Persian Gulf Command; Ports 

Service. 

arrival Basra: 215,380 

biographical note: 232, 232n, 380 

co-ordination Ports Service, MRS: 354, 

388 

Distinguished Service Medal: 478 

named Commanding General, Persian Gulf 

Command: 232 

named Director of Ports: 380, 385 

port operations problems: 396-400 

ports to be American operated: 381, 412 

Ports Service, command channels: 385 

Ports Service, organization: 385,386 

redefinition area functions: 215 

relations, commanding officer, Basra District: 385 

responsibilities: 385, 386 

return to United States: 232,422 

ship discharge, early increase: 397 

triple command: 386 

view on additional port construction: 383 

view, presence of Americans in Iran: 436n 

view, headquarters removal from Tehran: 

424 

Bracken, Brendan: 24n 

Braithwaite, Burns, and Jessop: 395 

Brennan, Maj. Walter D.: 398n,405n 

Brereton, Maj. Gen. Lewis H.: 137, 229n, 

231,267-68,269,455 

Brett, Lt. Gen. George H.: 54,168n 

Brewer, Sam Pope: 117n 

Bridge construction: 107-08, 123,247 

British Chief Engineer, Iraq: 34 

British command relationships: 37, 39n, 

44-45,88 

British Foreign Office: 288, 289 

British Inland Water Transport (IWT): 32, 

109,110,111,383,399-400,414 

British Intendant General: 38,448 

British Joint Planning Staff: 13 

British Joint Planning Staff for Middle East: 

86,87 

British Joint Staff Mission: 62, 85, 95 

British Middle East Forces: 39n, 86, 88, 90, 

95,131,186,189,298,301 

British Military Police: 118 

British Minister of State, Cairo: 37, 86, 88, 

448, 449, 452 

British Ministry of Fuel and Power: 303 

British Ministry of Supply: 286 

British Ministry of War Transport: 181,184, 

185, 186, 219, 235, 383-84, 407,408, 

422, 448, 452 

British Petrol Staff, 6th: 307 

British political agent, Bahrein: 293-94, 297 

British Purchasing Commission: 140,285 

British relations. See Anglo relations. 

British Supply Council: 15, 21, 37, 95 

British Tenth Army: 14,54,61,98,99, lOS, 

106, 109, 134, 142, 181,236, 412. Se~ 

also Persia and Iraq Force. 

administration, Soviet-aid operations: 

185-86 

militarized operations arrangements: 98-

99 

priorities, U.S. highway construction: 83 

British War Office: 15,44,58, 140, 144, 298, 

335, 340, 454 

British War Transport Executive Committee: 

181, 383-84, 385, 388, 399, 404 

Brock, Brig. Gen. R. C.: 31 n 

Brooke, Gen. Sir Alan: 31n 

Brown, Col. Edward F.: 324n 

Brownsville Shipbuilding Corporation: 112n 

Bruce, Col. Aubrey M.: 353 

Brunson, Col. Mark V.: 216n, 310, 312, 314 

Buell, Lt. Col. George B., Jr.: 216n 
INDEX 519 

Bullitt, William C.: 20n, 54, 73, 86, 94, 95, 

98,180 

Burns, Maj. Gen. James H.: 15n, 16n, 22, 

23,37,45, 81n, 149,181,404 

Bushire 

inland clearance: 33,34-35,84,186,205, 

205n 

motor vehicle assembly: 84,141,145,147, 

148, 149,274-75 

port facilities: 33, 84, 205, 205n 

Russian-aid cargoes: 414 

Bushnell, Lt. Col. Byron E.: 216n 

Byrnes, James F.: 28n 

Caldwell, John L.: 159 

Calhoun, John A.: 448n 

California-Arabian Oil Company: 289n 

Camp Amirabad: 214, 226, 252, 253, 424, 

430 

Camp Kramer: 423 

Canada: 264 

Capacity meetings: 219,278 

Cape, Lt. Col. Enos B.: 107n, 121n, 249n 

Carter, Rear Adm. Andrew F.: 284n, 292n, 

294n,340n 

Case of the twenty-seven men: 447-48,456-

57, 458, 459, 460 

Casey, Richard G.: 88, 448,449,451 n 

Caulkins, Maj. Daniel P.: 410n 

Cedar Project: 265. See also Aircraft 

assembly. 

administrative status: 126-27, 132-33 

backlogs: 127,128,130,131,135,136 

B-25 processing: 129 

British responsibilities: 128 

commanding officer: 132 

construction: 126,128,133-34 

contractor's responsibilities: 125-26, 127, 

134 

cost: 1 S8 

cost estimates: 126, 126n 

incoming aircraft, flow: 135 

jurisdiction, civilian employees: 134 

militarization: 136-37,266 

production: 138, 264 

production target: 127 

site: 54-55,125 

Cedar Project-Continued 

Soviet acceptances: 131,135-36 

Soviet inspections: 131 

Soviet mechanics: 130-31 

strength: 127-28, 134 

technical supervision: 126, 132 

Central Area: 92,222. See also Ahwaz District; Andimeshk Post; Desert District; 

Persian Gulf Service Command. 

Chaffee, Col. Frederic H.: 470n 

Chaney, Maj. Gen. James E.: 14, 16, 17,20. 

See also American Special Observer 

Group. 

Chaney Misoion. See American Special 

Observer Group. 

Chemical Warfare Service: 50 

Cheves, Brig. Gen. Gilbert X.: 231 n 

Cheybassi: 33, 186, 188n, 250, 346, 379, 

38In, 412-414 

Chilson, E. N.: 49n 

China-Burma-India Theater: 63, 64, 207n, 

230,260-63 

Churchill, Winston S.: 192, 265, 267 

agrees to proposed American operation 

ISR: 177, 190, 337 

caution, careful planning needed: 209 

conferences with Roosevelt, June 1942: 

176-77 

Hinge of Fate: 177n, 337n 

interest, sending Allied forces to Soviet 

front: 179 

optimism, American operations under British controls: 20 I, 202 

planning of increased Russian-aid shipments via Persian Gulf: 183,184,188, 

190,197 

pledge of assistance to Soviet Union: 20, 

22 

presses North African invasion precedence 

over cross-Channel operations: 176-77 

proposes American develo~ment, operation, Khorramshahr, Bandar Shahpur: 

190,381 

seeks U.S. assistance equipping ISR: 15, 

334 

view on shipping losses: 177 

City 0/ Dalhart: 57,59 
520 INDEX 

Civilian contractors 

Air Corps contract: 125-38. See also 

Cedar Project. 

British use: 33-34, 42 

difficulties of system: 42,43, 51-52 

Engineer contract; 47-48, 52-53, 119, 

121-23. See also Barge assembly; 

Construction. 

evacuation: 416, 425 

local contractors: 145,152-53,250 

manpower: 85, 103 

militarization: 42,43,52-53,61, 62n, 93-

100, 118-21, 136-38, 150, 182, 188,210 

motor vehicle checkup: 152-53 

Ordnance contract: 49-50,51-52, 52n, 

53, 94, 141, 150-51, 298. S 1111 also Container plants j Motor vehicle assembly 

and delivery. 

overlapping responsibilities; 49-51, 126 

Quartermaster contract: 51, 141 

reasons for use; 42, 94, 95, 96 

status of civilian employees; 42,51-52,94. 

See also Civilian employees. 

UKCC contract: 145-46, 147-48 

Civilian employees: 266, 270 

control: 30, 96, 118, 126-27, 134, 293, 

293-94, 294, 295-97,446-47 

discipline: 112, 117-18, 126-27, 134,296 

health: 112, 117, 121 

militarization: 99-100,119-20,122,266 

morale: 134, 295 

status: 42,51-52,94,96,112,118,126-27, 

134 

Clabaugh, Lt. Col. S. F.: 52n 

Clark, Col. A. F., Jr.: 253n, 372n 

Clark, A. S.: 14ln 

Clark, Lt. John: 262 

Claterbos, Col. Louis J.: 88n 

Climate: 105, 106, 143, 314, 392, 394, 395 

Coakley, Robert W.: 23n 

Colby, Bainbridge: 289 

Combel, Lt. Col. H.: 253 

Combined Chiefs of Staff 

Directive CCS 109/1: 99, 119 

command relationships: 205-06, 226 

control of movements: 202':"03, 204 

exeerpts: 199-200 

modifications, 50S Plan: 198 

Combined Chiefs of Staff-Continued 

Directive CCS 109/I-Continued 

omission, financial directive, ISR operation: 341-42 

primacy, Soviet aid: 199,201,202 

security responsibility: 203-04 

instructions, Commanding General, PAl 

Force: 203-04 

strategic planning: 175-80 

Communications control 

Iranian: 11, 32 

Iraqi: 13 

Conly, Maj. Robert S., Jr.: 172,461n 

Connolly, Maj. Gen. Donald H.: 6n, 83, 85, 

93,119, 120, 121, 207n, 210, 213, 230n. 

239, 240, 242, 246, 258, 261, 262, 266, 

26~ 271, 274, 276,304, 306,31~ 323n, 

342-43,353, 360n, 364n, 378, 385, 388, 

397,401,402,403,404,418,475,478. 

See also Persian Gulf Command; Persian Gulf Service Command. 

biographical note: 206,232, 232n 

civilian employee problems: 295-97 

command relationships: 227-31 

command reorganizations: 215-24 

container plant responsibilities: 298-99, 

300 

firmness with Soviets: 315, 33~n, 358, 390-

91 

Iranian problems, alleged indifference to: 

456 

ISR financial arrangements: 341-44 

Letter ofInstructions: 207,215,227,231 

movements control negotiations: 338-39 

named to eommand, PGSC: 28,206, 207 

port problems: 405-07 

promotion: 207 

public relations: 364 

relations, U.S. Minister, Tehran: 456 

relief and subsequent assignments: 232, 

232n, 426, 428, 429 

responsibility for economic aid to Iran: 

437, 447-48, 452, 453, 455, 456-60, 

469,470 

shipping priorities: 208 

staff appointments: 206,317,349,402,405 

status of U.S. troops in Iran: 343,440-42 
INDEX 521 

Connolly, Maj. Gen. Donald H.-Continued 

view, Anglo-American command relationships: 338 

view, PGSC intelligence activities: 229, 

230-32 

view, ports bottleneck: 208-09, 348 

view, railway procurement procedures: 374 

Yount request for MRS Hq forwarded: 

352 

Consortium Kampsax: 34, 194n 

Construction: 40,48, 181, 182,250 

Abadan Air Base: 257, 271 

aircraft assembly plants: 125-26, 128, 133-

34 

airstrips, runways: 133, 252 

area (district) responsibilities: 224-25, 

249 

bridges: 107-08, 123, 247 

British operations: 33,34,57,59,83-84, 

101, 128, 133-34, 144, 145, 146, 147, 

149-50, 181, 251, 383 

British responsibilities: 57-58, 126, 128, 

133, 144 

buildings: 57,58,59,62, 62n, 82, 84,101, 

109,111, 123, 133, 134,247,250,252, 

257 

cost estimates: 123,252-53 

costs: 44, 123, 251, 252, 253 

early handicaps: 101-09,246 

equipment, supplies, shortages: 102-03, 

104-05 

financial arrangements: 58,59, 144,251 

highway: 15, 34, 48, 57, 60, 82, 83, 84, 

101, 103, 104, 107-09, 123, 247, 250, 

251,314 

in Iraq: 57-60 

local materials: 105,250 

manpower shortages: 102, 103 

militarized administration: 247-49 

militarized program: 250 

motor vehicle assembly plants: 144, 145, 

147,149-50 

POL container plants: 299 

port: 33, 48, 57, 59, 60, 82, 83, 84, 101, 

104--05, 106-07, 107n, 123, 182, 247, 

252, 383, 393, 394--95 

proposed for India: 55, 62-63, 142 

Construction-Continued 

railway: 33,47,57,60,83,101,368 

strength: 85, 104 

Container plants: 298-302 

Convention of 1907: 12,157 

Cooper, Col. Richard W.: 214n, 241n, 247n, 

279n, 352n, 399n 

Corbett, Laurence P.: liOn, 214n, 269n, 

274n, 275n, 302n, 357n, 388n 

Cornell, Lt. Col. Gordon D.: 319n, 386n, 

397n 

Cost estimates 

Cedar Project: 126, 126n 

construction, Engineer contract: 123 

container production: 298n 

Costs 

Bandar Shahpur: 253 

barge assembly: 110 

Cedar Project: 138 

construction, Engineer contract: 123 

construction, highway: 251 

construction, ISR: 331, 331n 

construction of posts, camps, stations: 252, 

253 

property sold as surplus: 431 

Iraqi projects: 44 

Khorramshahr port installations: 253 

lend-lease supplies, Iranian Army, Gendarmerie: 470, 470n 

motor vehicle assembly: 141n, 145-46 

motor vehicle checkup: 153 

Persian Corridor operations: 428 

personnel transport delays: 103 

rail-to-truck transfer installation, Andimeshk: 321 

telecommunications system: 255 

u.S. Military Mission to Iranian Army: 

470 

Cotton, Maj. Thomas S.: 327n 

Council of Peop!cs' Commissars: 66 

Counter Intelligence Corps: 297 

Courlander, Harold: 126n, 267n 

Courts-martial: 88,118,296,361 

Cover, Carl: 133n, 138n 

Crain, Brig. Gen. James K.: 52 

Crawford, D. M.: 49n 

Crawford, Maj. Gen. Robert W.: 75, 229n, 

231n, 299 
522 INDEX 

Creager, Lt. Col. Emery C.: 402,402n 

Criminal jurisdiction: 118, 296, 439, 440, 

446-47 

Curtis, Col. L. D.: 353, 359n, 365n, 371n 

Curzon, Lord: 158,159,289 

Customs Jetty: 393,410 

d'Alblac, Air Vice Marshal Sir John H.: 71 

D' Arcy concession of 1901: 289 

Davies, F. A.: 289n 

Davies, Joseph E.: 22 

Davis, Lt. Col. Cedric B.: 269n 

Dawes, Maj. Henry: 352n 

Dawson, John P.: 448n 

Deane, Maj. Gen. John R.: 262 

FRANTIC Mission: 26n, 258-60 

Strange Alliance: 26n, 259n, 260n 

Declaration of Tehran ~ 377, 426, 439, 443-

45,471 

text: 444 

Defense Aid Division, War Department: 16, 

16n 

Defense Supplies Corporation: 293, 294 

deGuingand, Maj. Gen. Sir Francis: IOn 

Delivery, meaning of term: 69 

Denture castings: 370 

Depot Repair Squadron, 17th: 266 

Depot Repair Squadron, 18th: 266,267,270, 

272-73 

Desert District: 218,221,222,246,275,321, 

362, 423. See also Ahwaz District; 

Andimeshk Post; Central Area: Persian 

Gulf Service Command. 

Diesel locomotives : 355, 369 

Dietze, Lt. Victor E.: 55n, 119n, 182n, 214n, 

246n 

Dill, Field Marshal Sir John: 172 

Dillon, Brig. Gen. T. H.: 348n 

Dilwara: 240 

Directives 

Combined Chiefs of Staff, CCS 109/1. 

See Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

Middle East: 16-18, 19,28,30,31,32,42, 

58,66, 113, 124, 140 

War Department (militarization): 43,61, 

96,9~ 101, 119, 136 

Dishman, Maj. Addison V.: 73n, 323n 

Dithmer, Sven: 151n 

Division of Defense Aid Reports: 15, 15n, 

22,25,37,286 

Dock construction. See Construction, port. 

Dodenhoff, Col. Harry C.: 386n, 390 

Dodge, Col. Charles G.: 461n 

Donahue, Lt. Vincent P.: 323n 

Douglas Aircraft Company: 85,91,271 

Cedar Project: 125-38,264,265,266 

Project 19: 125,134,266 

Dougovito, Capt. Carl J.: 77,79 

Dreyfus, Louis G., Jr.: 147, 155, 165, 166, 

167,168,169,170,171,210,342,344, 

437,438,440,441,442, 443n, 455, 456, 

462,463,470,478 

DuBois, Arthur W.: 56n, 115n, 116, 116n 

Dulles, Foster Rhea: 20n 

Dumont, Col. Fernand G.: 172 

Dunham, H. H.: 352n, 357n, 369n, 382n, 

400n,402n 

Dunn, Gano: 52 

Eastern Area: 92, 222 

Eastern Command. See FRANTIC Mission. 

Eden, Anthony: 37 

Eichenberg, Maj. H. R.: 241n 

Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D.: 75, 181n, 

229n, 479 

Elliott, Col. Dabney 0.: 191 

Elliott, WO (jg) Henry G.: 14n, 125n 

Engineers, Chief: 40,41,45, 90, 102, 121, 

248,286 

Engineers, Corps: 40,41,42,49,50,52,97, 

120, 121, 191n, 298, 352. See also 

Barge assembly; Civilian contractors; 

Construction; Iranian District engineer. 

Engineer Dump Truck Companies 

429th: 312 

435th: 245 

Engineer Headquarters (Corps) 1616: 247, 

248 

Engineer Railway Operating Battalion, 

730th: 350, 351 

Engineer Regiment, 352d: 246 

Evans, R. H.: 315 

Evans, Maj. Gen. Vernon: 477n 

Failiyah Creek: 252,393,410,414,415 

Falmouth, H.M.S.: 8 
INDEX 523 

Faymonville, Brig. Gen. Philip R.: 22, 22n, 

23, 25, 38, 65, 66, 67, 73, 74, 77, 79, 

83, 130, 131, 149,183, 184,315 

Federal Bureau of Investigation: 146,281 

Feis, Herbert: 284n, 291, 292n, 293n 

Fellers, Col. Bonner F.: 95n 

Fennemore, George M.: 21n 

Ferrell, Bc-n W.: lIOn 

Fifer, Julius: 295n 

Filmer, Henry: 159n 

Financial arrangements. See also Costs. 

Anglo-American. See also reverse lendlease (below). 

construction: 58-59,112-13 

ISR operation: 340-46, ::76 

Middle East fmancial agreement: 113-

14,114n 

MTS-UKCC: 315-16 

motor vehicle assembly operations: 144 

real estate acquisition: 271-72, 429-30 

Anglo-Iranian, ISR operation: 340 

disposition, surplus lend-lease equipment: 

430-31 

lend-lease supplies for USSR: 24-25 

Middle East Directive: 58 

POL supplied U.S. forces: 305 

POL supplied USSR: 306 

property disposal settlements: 431 

reVCi'se lend-lease: 113-14, 305, 306, 

321n, 430 

U.S. advisory missions in Iran: 464 

Finney, Maj. Winsor L., Jr.: 422 

Firouz, Mozaffer: 364 

First (Moscow) Protocol. See Russian-aid 

Protocols. 

Foley Brothers, Inc.: 47, 334. See also 

Folspen. 

Foleyabad: 107 

Folspen: 47,52,56,60,61,83,85,90,101-

12, 117-23, 142, 144, 286, 291, 323n. 

See also Civilian contractors; Construction. 

Fonda, Capt. Garrett: 88n 

Ford, Richard: 297n, 344n 

Foreign Economic Administration: 427, 429, 

430,449,457 

Fourth (Ottawa) Protocol. See Russian-aid 

Protocols. 

FRANTIC Mission: 26n, 258-60, 304, 306n 

Frey, John W.: 292n 

Gasoline. See POL. 

Gausmann, R. W.: 49n, 50n 

Gendarmerie Mission. See U.S. Military 

Mission to Iranian Gendarmerie. 

General Motors Corporation: 51, 73, 140-

55, 276 

General Richardson: 416, 417, 418, 426 

Germany. See also Axis. 

agents; 8,9,10,116,161,170,238,362 

influence: 11,12, 13 

prewar penetration: 160-61 

Gerow, Brig. Gen. Leonard T.: 39n,86n 

Giboney, David F.: 109n, 115n 

Giles, Maj. Gen. Benjamin F.: 231n, 296, 

296n, 421, 422 

Gillies, Lt. Col. John A.: 47, 55, 74, 287, 

334, 337 

Gilmer, Col. Dan: 472n 

Givens, Col. Robert H., Jr.: 216n 

Gluck, Lt. Col. Edward: 49n, 50n 

Gnade, Richard E.: IOn, 303n, 384n 

Goods Shed: 363, 368 

Graham, Brig. Gen. Roy C. L.: 117n, 216n, 

404n 

Granville: 60, 106 

Gray Mackenzie & Co., Ltd.: 295, 383, 416 

Greely, Maj. Gen. John N.: 25n, 81n, 89, 

128, 132, 168n, 170, 171, 172, 200n, 

463, 468, 469. See also U.S. Military 

Mission to the USSR. 

action on Soviet complaints: 73-75 

adviser to Iranian Army: 165-69 

command, USSR Mission: 26,39-40,65-

81 

policy counter State Department: 166-69 

proposals, wider command: 75-76, 165 

USSR entry negotiations: 69-71, 72, 77-

79 

Greely Mission. See U.S. Military Mission 

to USSR. 

Grey, Sir Edward: 158 

Gromyko, Andrei A.: 71n 

Groseclose, Elgin: 165n, 453n 

Gross, Maj. Gen. C. P.: 196n, 400n, 402 

GrossmAn, Minna: 141n 
524 INDEX 

Groves, Capt. H. G.: 48n, 107n 

Grow, Maj. Gen. Robert W.: 477n 

Gulf District: 218, 222, 237, 246, 249, 268, 

271, 275, 297, 300, 321, 386, 386n, 

387-88, 389, 397, 399, 423. See also 

Basra District; Ports Service. 

GYMNAST: 176, 177, 179 

Haifa refinery: 292 

Haining, Gen. Sir Robert H.: 38 

Hale, Lt. Col. O. J.: 31n 

Halsted, Henry M., Jr.: 141n 

Handy, Maj. Gen. Thomas T.: 170n, 192, 

478 

Harker, Kenneth: 143, 149 

Harmon, Bruce: 141n 

Harriman, W. Averell: 14, 15, 16n, 37, 183, 

184, 197,208,229,265,337, 337n 

optimism, American ope~ation, British control: 201,202 

Special Mission for War Supplies to USSR: 

22-23 

view, necessity increase Gulf shipments: 

177 

view, U.S. operation, ISR: 180, 188, 190-

91 

view, U.S. operation, ports: 188, 190-91 

Harrison, Gordon, A.: 31 n, 179n 

Hauser, Col. John N.: 68, 74-75, 75, 89n, 

202n 

Headquarters 1616: 311 

Headquarters Company, MTS: 310,312 

Headquarters Company, 9th Port of Embarkation: 380, 385 

Hearn, Maj. C. M.: 115n, 154n 

Henderson, Loy W.: 71 n, 437n 

Henkel, Col. Milford F.: 440n 

Henricksen, Oscar A. ].: 404, 405, 406 

Heusinger, Generalleutnant Adolf: 31n 

Higgins Industries, Inc.: 112 

Highway 

construction: 15,34,48,57,60,82,83,84, 

101, 103, 104, 107-09, 123, 247, 250, 

251,314 

control: 235, 320-21 

maintenance: 251-52 

routes: 34-35,63,193,205,274,312-14 

Highway Traffic Committee: 321 

Hill, Lt. Col. A. ]. R.: 34 

Hill, Lt. Col. George P., Jr.: 236,237 

Hillman, Walter: 295n 

Hitler, Adolf: 5,9,14,19,20,21,161 

Hitler-Stalin Pact: 19, 20 

Hodges, Col. John N.: 97n 

Hoefler, Paul L.: 126n, 267n 

Hopkins, Harry L.: 15, 16n, 17, 21, 24n, 25, 

37,149,156,176,177,178,181,206, 

265, 267, 334, 445n, 456, 457, 473n 

Hoskins, Harold B.: 470n 

Hull, Cordell: 80,156,166,170,456,470 

Hull, Lt. Gen. John E.: 246n, 337n, 478 

Hurley, Maj. Gen. Patrick J.: 442, 443, 445, 

450n, 455, 463 

Hutchinson, Lt. Gen. Sir Balfour: 95n 

Icke, Capt. Earl L.: I11n 

Ickes, Harold: 291 

Ide, H. Chandler: 292n 

lilah, Prince Abdul: 8 

India 

inclusion in early plans: 45-46, 55, 62-

63, 82, 142, 143 

inland clearance from Karachi: 34 

Indian Army Service Force': 307 

Indian Depots 

153d: 307 

154th: 307 

Inland clearance. See also Iranian State 

Railway; Motor Transport Service. 

Baghdad: 35 

Bandar Shahpur: 35, 186, 347, 394 

Basra: 35, 186, 187, 415 

bottleneck: 107, 180, 184-85, 186, 187, 

208-09, 309, 348, 353 

Bushire: 33, 34-35, 84, 186, 205, 205n 

Cheybassi: 186,346,413 

Khorramshahr: 33, 186, 187, 392 

routes: 34-35 

Inland Water Transport (IWT): 32 

barge assembly for: 109-12 

British control: 235, 236 

control of barges, lighters, tugs: 399-400 

services to U.S. port operations: 383,414 

International air routes: 446 
INDEX 525 

Iran. See also Anglo-Iranian relations; 

Iranian-American relations; Multilateral 

relations; Soviet-Iranian relations; U.S. 

Military Mission to Iranian Army; 

U.S. Military Mission to Iranian Gendarmerie. 

Anglo-Soviet areas of control: 11 

Anglo-Soviet control, communications: 11 

Army-Gendarmerie relations: 161, 462, 

477 

Axis invasion threat: 10, 169-70 

Azerbaijan disorders: 28,426,473 

Declaration of the Three Fowers Regarding Iran. See Declaration of Tehran. 

declarations of war: 162n 

developments under Reza Shah: 13, 161 

evacuation: 11, 13, 425-27 

food shortages: 114,115, 154,244-45,304, 

365,452 

German agents: 10, 116, 161, 170, 238, 

362 

German penetration: 13, 160-61 

Greely, adviser to Iranian Army: 165-69 

inflation: 114, 115, 154, 244-45, 304, 365, 

435 

integrity and independence: II, 12, 13, 

435 

neutrality: 11, 12,26,158,162 

Persian-Arab antagonism: 245 

POL consumption: 304 

pro-German elements: 4, 10, 11, 12, 170, 

362 

security responsibilities: 26, 162, 373, 455 

tribal autonomy: 115 

tribal co-operation: 116-17 

tribal revolt, 1914: 12 

U.S. interest, indicated to Soviets: 156-57 

wartime disruption: 244-45, 364, 435-36 

Iran-Iraq Service Command: 119. See also 

Persian Gulf Command; Persian Gulf 

Service Command; U.S. Military Iranian Mission. 

command relationships: 89-90 

organizational structure: 90 

redesignated Persian Gulf Service Command: 91 

')5S9; I O~61-··· 35 

Iranian-American relations: 455. See also 

Multilateral relations; U.S. Military 

Mission to Iranian Army; U.S. Military 

Mission to Iranian Gendarmerie. 

American status in Iran: 338, 342-43, 

437-47 

development, U.S. assistance policy: 

442-60 

Greely, adviser to Iranian Army: 165-69 

Iranian resentment, wartime disruptions: 

436,436n 

rSR improvement: 377 

lend-lease: 26, 162-63,454,469-73 

Millspaugh economic mission, 1922-27: 

160-61 

Millspaugh economic mlSSlOn, 1943-45: 

163-64, 164n, 170, 436, 449, 456, 458, 

459,460,462,467-68 

objectives of U.S. aid: 162,461 

operational control, ISR: 342-43, 364-65 

prewar relations: 7, 12-13, 156-61 

Shuster financial mission: 157-58 

U.S. property disposal: 431 

U.S. withdrawal: 425-26 

Iranian-British relations: See Anglo-Iranian relations. 

Iranian District engineer: 45, 46, 101, 109, 

126, 133, 225, 250 

aid to British operations: 141,150 

appointment: 41 

area administration: 90, 92 

absorption of overlapping functions: 248-

49 

barge assembly: 109-12 

bridge construction: 107-.08, 247 

civilian contractors: 47 

command relationships: 40,41-42,89,93, 

120,247-49 

construction priorities: 56, 57-58 

construction site assignments: 48 

construction, Umm Qasr: 59,60 

deterioration, Folspen relations: 121-22 

difficulties, contractor system: 42 

discipline, civilian employees: 117-18 

financial, procurement responsibilities: 

41,112-14 

headquarters, Ahwaz: 61,83,90,215 

headquarters, Umm Qasr: 57n 
526 INDEX 

Iranian District engineer-Continued 

highway construction: 107, 108-09, 247, 

250 

incumbents: 121,121n 

militarization: 117 

pipeline projects report: 287-88 

port construction: 106-07, 247 

powers and duties: 40-41,93, 101, 112-

14,248-49 

procurement and payment procedures: 59 

relations, tribal leaders: 115-17 

security arrangements: 116 

separation from Engineer Dept., proposed: 

120 

shortage problems: 101-05,246 

staff organization: 90 

termination, contractor operations: 43, 

122-23 

Iranian Engineer District: 41, ~20, 248. 

See also Iranian District engineer. 

Iranian Mission. See U.S. Military Iranian 

Mission. 

Iranian-Soviet relations. See Soviet-Iranian 

relations. 

Iranian State Railway (ISR): 34, 55, 62, 

143, 16!, 187,215,241,244,328,350, 

368, 377. See also Military Railway 

Service. 

accounting: 374-75 

administrative weaknesses: 365, 366, 367 

alleged Allied damage: 364 

Anglo-American division of responsibili. 

ties: 235, 338, 339 

Anglo-American financial arrangements: 

340-46 

Anglo-Iranian financial arrangements: 

340 

Anglo-Soviet control: 333-35, 337, 347 

branch lines: 106, 186,346 

British expansion: 15, 33, 101, 106, 346, 

348 

British military operating strength: 348 

capacity estimates: 188, 188n, 189, 193, 

348 

capacity increase: 331-32,377 

civilian administrative staff: 368 

construction and cost: 331,331n 

flood damage: 355, 366 

Iranian State Railway-Continued 

Food Department: 366 

German agents: 238,362 

haulage, Iranian civilian: 364, 377 

haulage, Soviet-aid: 331,375 

main line route: 84, 346-47 

movements control: 338-39 

native employee strength: 352, 352n 

plans for U.S. aid: 15, 16, 37, 47, 162, 

334 

plans for U.S. operation: 177, 180, 186, 

189, 190-91, 200-201, 335-37, 348-49 

POL: 303, 305, 375 

press attacks on U.S. operation: 364-65 

Railway Workers' Union: 367 

return to Iranian control: 376 

sabotage: 197,362 

sea terminus: 33, 346 

security: 238-39, 362 

settlement for U.S. property: 431 

strategic importance: 331 

strikes: 367-68 

unified operation, proposals: 333-37, 339 

U.S. operation. See Military Railway 

Service. 

Iransovtrans: 219, 220n, 282, 389, 396n 

Iraq. See also Anglo-Iraqi relations. 

Anglophobe elements: 9 

British air bases: 8 

Bri tish rights and responsibilities: 8 

cost, U.S. projects: 44 

German agents: 8, 9 

Harriman visit to British bases: 14-

Iranian Mission activities: 45, 46, 47, 50, 

53, 55, 56-62 

pro-German elements: 4 

pro-German revolt: 8-9, 13 

threat, Axis invasion: 10-11 

Iraq Petroleum Company: 289 

Ireland, Philip W.: lIn 

!sa, Sheik of Bahrein: 293, 294 

Italian prisoners of war: 246 

Jackson, Col. James L.: 269n 

Jackson, Col. Sldney L.: 253n 

Jacobs, J. E.: 450n 

Jahanbani, Arnanollah: 168 

Jam, Mahmud: 477 
INDEX 527 

Jernegan, John D.: 168n, l70n, 44~n 

J errycans, definition: 285n 

Johnson, Col. Bernard A.: 386n, 402 

Johnson, C. D., LUll1b~r Company: 11211 

Johnson, Col. Douglas V.: 168n, 439n 

Johnson, Drake and Piper, Inc.: 51 n 

Joint Agreement between Prrsia and Iraq 

Forces and the Persian Gulf Servicc' 

Command for the Control of Movements 

in Persia: 233-36, 338-39 

Joint Anglo·American Mission to Russi,,: 

22-23, 285 

J udgc Advocate Gent'rnl: 296 

Kahuku: 104,105 

Kargin, Maj. Gen. Ivan V.: 358 

Karmilitsin, Ivan S.: 74 

KARO Plans: 418,421,423 

Kay, Fred H.: 289n 

Kellogg, M. W., Company: 295 

Khanaqin Lift: 35, 35n, 186, 321, 415 

Khor Zangi Wharf: 395 

Khorramshahr. See also Motor vehick :ISsembly and delivery; Ports Service. 

costs: 253 

discharge performance: 410 

expansion: 392 

geography: 83, 109, 392 

housing: 392 

inland clearance: 33, 186,187,392 

Iranian postwar development plans: 4 ~;1 n 

PGC headquarters: ::l87n, 424-25 

port capacity: 83,106,107,186,410 

port commanders: 386n 

port construction: 33, 62, 101, 106 .. 07, 

lOin, 247, 252, 392, 401 

port facilities: 252, 392-93 

storage facilities: 393 

U.S. control: 180-81,190,241,381 

U.S. jurisdiction: 446 

Khorramshahr Port Committee: 383 

Khumba Wharf: 39:',410 

Khurramabad: 253 

Khuzistan Province, Governor: 115 

Kidd, Lt. Col. Philip C.: 211n, 227n, 450, 

451, 4S1n, 455 

King, Admiral Ernest J.: 177, 178 

Kirk, Alexand~r C.: 450n 

Kirkpatrick, Lt. Col. Richard J.: 269n 

Knudsen, William S.: 23 

Korolyev, Anatoli N.: 315, 358 

Kortjohn, Eugene W.: 47n 

Krock, Arthur: 473n 

Kuns, Capt. Joseph W.: 397n 

Kuwait, barge assembly: 109-12 

Kuwait, Sheik: 110 

Kuwait Oil Company: 110 

Ladue, Col. Laurence K.: 76n,97n 

Lampson, Sir Miles: 37 

Lancashire: 240 

Land, Rear Adm. Emory S.: 36, 61 

Landing Ground H3: 252,256,257,258 

Landis, James M. 

appraisal, Iranian economic problems: 

456,468 

Army assistance: 456-58 

head, American Economic Mission in thc 

Middle East: 451-52 

Lansing, Robert: 13, 159 

Latham, Brig. H. B.: 39n 

Lawrence, John: 311n 

Lee, Brig. Gen. Raymond E.: 86n 

Leighton, R. M.: 23n 

Lcnczowski, George: 12n, 157n, 159n, 161n 

Lend-Lease Act: 4, 13, 30 

Lend-Lease Administration: 15n, 25, 38, 65, 

74,79,286,449,450,450n,451 

Lend-lease aid 

administrative complexities: 449-52 

to Great Britain: 13-14,65 

for ISR: 15, 16, 37, 162, 334, 373-74 

in Middle East: 4, 4-5, 13-14, 14-20, 

29,291-92,448-52,453-54 

for refinery expansion: 291-92 

in supplying Soviet Union: 3, 14-15, 

17, 18--20,21-23 

to Iran: 26-27, 156, 162, 163, 166,448, 

450, 452-54, 454n, 455, 458, 459, 461, 

468-73,477 

10 Soviet Union: 65-66, 473n. See also 

Russian-aid Protocols. 

via aid to Britain: 14-15, 17, 18-20, 

21-23,31 

aircraft: 125 

B~lfour-Arnold agreenH'nt: 22 
528 INDEX 

Lend-lease aid-Continued 

to Soviet Union-Continued 

financial aspects: 24 

Master Agreement: 24 

motor vehicles: 139 

POL: 284,284n 

priority: 36 

property rights: 25, 131 

protocol tonnage commitments: 23 

significance: 4-5 

total supply tonnage: 4 

U.S. Lend-Lease Mission to USSR: 25, 

65 

ternilnation: 473,473n 

Lengnik, Lt. Col. Michail F.: 220n 

Lerchen, Lt. Col. William G., Jr.: 259n 

Lewis, Lt. Francis J.: 240n, 346n 

Lieber, CoL Albert C., Jr.: 36n, 42n, 47, 57n, 

59n, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 109, 110, 

113, 115, 117, 117n, 118, 209, 287. 

See also Iranian District engineer. 

named Iranian District engineer: 41 

report on British construction: 59 

return to l..:nited States: 121 

successors: 121 n 

Lindsell, Lt. Gen. Sir Wilfred: 298n 

Litvinov, Maxim M.: 69,70, 71, 156 

Lock, W. H.: 106n, 183n, 383n 

Lockard, Lt. Comdr. Denvood W.: 182n, 

183n, 184, 185, 186, 187, 316, 384n 

London Protocol. See Russian-aid Protocols. 

Lovett, Robert A.: 474n 

Lubricants. See POL. 

Lupton, George: 137 

Luscombe, Col. John B.: Han 

Lutes, Maj. Gen. LeRoy: 99, 191 

Lyons Construction Company: 112n 

Lyttleton, Sir Oliver: 37 

MacArthur, Gen. Douglas: 167 

McCabe, Thomas B.: 79n, 450n 

McCarty, Lt. Col. Chester E.: 269n 

McCloy, John J: 22, 70n, 181n, 344n,455n, 

458n 

McGlone, Lt. Co!. R. G.: 107n, 121n, 122n, 

249 

McGowen, Maj. Clarence D.: 323n 

McIntyre, Brig. Gen. Andrew F.: 352n 

McMullen, Maj. Gen. Sir Donald J.: 1£14 

McNarney, Lt. Gen. Joseph T.: 166n 

McPherson, W. S.: 404n 

Macready, Lt. Gen. G. N.: 454n 

Mactier, R. S.: 57n, 384n 

Magruder, Brig. Gen. John: 66 

Mahoney, Col. Thomas E.: 461n 

Majlis: 159, 163, 365, 446,460,463 

Margil: 33, 33n, 129, 163,413,414,415 

Marshall, Gen. George C.: 63, 78, 86, 87, 88, 

95,96,167,168,176,177,178,179, 

191,227,229,230,231,261,262,270, 

29B, 315, 342, 417, 440, 458 

Martin, Lt. Col. Augustus H.: 259n 

Martin, Col. N. M.: 216n, 225n, 2flOn 

Maston, Maj. Victor E.: 216n 

.!\-faxwell, Maj. Gen. Russell L.: 45,66, 71, 

89n, 94, 95, 97,119, 168n, 204n, 229n. 

See also U.S. Military North Afri(',m 

Mission; U.S. Army Forces in Middle 

East. 

control, lran·-Iraq area, proposed: 76, 76n, 

85,89 

discipline, civilian employees: 117-18 

independence, British command channels: 

87 

Hl('mbcrship, Middle East Supply Council: 

87, 450n 

named chief, North African Mission: 17 

named Commanding General, SOS, 

USAFIME: 227 

named Commanding General, 'GSAFIME; 

39,89 

planning, increased Corridor shipments; 

183, 184, 188, 189-90, 191, 193, 194, 

197,201,208 

relations, Iranian Mission and succ.essors: 

:18-39, 86, 87-92, 125, 130-31, 133, 

136, 227, 228, 298 

relations, lend-lease r('pn.'s('ntatives: 450-

51 

request, troops for supply services: 95 

view, American operation, ISR: 336 

views, militarization measures: 120-21 

Maxwell Mission. See U.S. Military North 

African Mission. 

Mayer, Fmnz: 238,462 

Medical Corps: 191 n 
INDEX 529 

Meng, Lt. Col. Carl L.: .121 n 

Merriam, C~rdon P.: 451n 

Meyer, L. C.: 141n 

Middle East Air Service Command: 133 

Middle East Directive: 16-18, 19, 28, 30, 

31,32,42,58,66,113,124,140 

Middle East Supply Center: 448-52,455 

Middle East Supply Council: 87 

Middle East War Council: 38 

Miles, Col. Francis H., Jr.: 49, 51n, 53n, 76, 

76n 

Miles, Brig. Gen. Sherman: 25n 

Militarization 

Cedar Project: 136-37, 266 

civilian contractors: 42, 43, 52-53, 61, 

62n, 93-100, 118-21, 136-38, 150, 182, 

188,210 

civilian employees: 99-100, 119-20, 122, 

266 

construction: 247-49 

Iranian District engineer: 117 

Maxwell, Maj. Gen. Russell L., views on: 

120-21 

motor vehicle assembly and delivery: 

150-51,155 

Persian Culf Service Command: 209-11, 

247-49 

Shingler, Brig. Gen. Don C., problems of 

transition: 209-10 

SOS Plan: 188,210 

strength estimates: 97-98 

U.S. Military Iranian Mission: 43, 61-82, 

119 

War Department directive: 43,61,96,99, 

101, 119, 136 

Military discipline, civilians: 117-18,296 

Military police: 197, 238-39, 319-20, 321, 

325 

Military Police Battalions 

727th: 239, 239n, 319-20, 321, 325 

788th: 239, 239n 

Military Railway Service (MRS): 218,219, 

220, 241. See also Iranian State Railway. 

accidents: 359, 362 

accounting improvements: 374-75 

activation: 215 

Military Railway Service-Continued 

activation, 3d MRS, PCC: 352 

Anglo-American division of responsibilities: 235 

assembly of locomotives, cars: 370,423 

assistance to Soviet operations: 356-57, 

358, 359 

car allocations: 357-58,388 

car switching: 354 

car turnaround: 356-58, 388 

celebration: 359 

commanding officers: 349,352-53 

communications: 372-73 

construction: 368 

co-ordination, Ports Service: 353-54, 388 

equipment estimates: 193 

evacuation: 423 

food allowances, rationing: 366 

headquarters: 349, 352 

inactivation: 375-76,417 

labor problems: 366--68 

locomotives, rolling stock: 355,369-71 

operating divisions: 349, 351 

operating procedures, Tehran yards: 363 

operating units: 349, 350, 351 

organizational structure: 349-50, 353 

plant improvement: 368,376,377 

preparatory activities: 354-55 

procurement: 373-74 

public relations: 364-65 

repair p,arts manufacture: 370 

responsibilities: 350-51 

rules book: 350, 362 

safety program: 362-64 

security: 360-63,373 

shipping priority, Movement 1616: 208 

shortages, tools, spare parts: 371-72 

speed record: 355 

staffing problems: 351,352,365 

stores supervision: 371 

strength: 350,351,365 

strength estimates: 193 

target realization: 356 

target setting: 355-56 

targets: 332 

tonnage fluctuations: 353, 360 

train "blocking": 358, 359 

training ISR personnel: 371,375 
530 INDEX 

Military Railway Service-Continued 

wage reforms: 367 

water supply: 368-69 

Millspaugh, Arthur C.: 371 

American Task in Persia: 164n 

Americans in Persia: 115n, 165n, 467» 

economic mission, I ran, 1922-27: 160-61 

economic mission, Iran, 1943-45: 163-64, 

164n, 170,436,449,456,458,459,460, 

462, 467--68 

views on V.S. assistance to Iran: 445n 

MiJlstead, Norman H.: 91, 135n 

Minor, Harold B.: 10n,472n 

Mission 16: 260 

Missouri: 418 

Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlevi: 10, J.63, 

164n, 168, 172,272,365,466,467 

Molnar, Maj. T. T.: 287n 

Molotov, Vyacheslav M.: 23, BOn, 149, 156, 

157 

Monck, Bosworth: 181, 182n, 184 

Moore, Maj. Gen. Richard C.: 22n, 62, 70, 

72,76,142,287,290 

Morris, Leland B.: 436n, 446n 

Morton, Maj. George L.: 205n 

Moscow Protocol. See Russian-aid Protocols. 

Motor transport, British: 34,101, 141, 186, 

191, 314. See also United Kingdom 

Commercial Corporation. 

Motor Transport Service (MTS): 29, 215, 

216, 218, 219, 220, 23~ 241, 261, 

309-330 

accident control: 324-25 

activation: 310, 312 

Anglo-American division, responsibilities: 

235 

capacity estimates: IS8n, 193 

cargo inspections: 324, 325 

commanding officers: 310,317, 31Sn 

communications: 325-26 

co-ordination, UKCC: 315-16 

delivery terminus: 314-15 

divisions: 319 

driver morbidity: 327 

driver shortages: 322-23 

driver training: 312,318,322-24 

early operations, problems: 316-17 

Motor Transport Service-Continued 

field stations: 312, 3iG---19, 320,423 

fleet strength: 316 

headquarters: 312, 31S 

highway conditions: 312-14,321-22 

highway users: 321 

inactivation: 328,417,419 

military police: 319-20 

native employees: 243, 322-24 

native training: 312, 31S, 322-24 

operational improvements: 317-18 

organizational structure: 312,318-19 

performance: 32S-30 

plans for: 180,187,191,193-95,309-10 

priority: 196,208, 209, 243, 309-10 

recruitment: 311 

routes: 193, 205, 312-14 

security: 319-20,325 

Soviet convoys: 321-22 

strength estimates: 193-94,310,311 

supplementing rail capacity: 187, 208, 

209, 309-10, 317, 328 

time bands system: 322 

traffic control: 320-22 

truck estimates: 194-95,310 

vehicle maintenance: 326 

vehicle types, performance: 326--27 

wage scales, native drivers: 324 

Motor Transport Service, Headquarters 

Company: 310,312 

Motor vehicle assembly and delivery: 40, 48, 

54, 55, 73, S3, 101, 109 

Andimeshk operations: 146--47, 14S, 150, 

155, 274, 276, 281--82 

Andimeshk plant, strength: 148 

beneficiaries: 139--40 

British objections to Soviet personnel: 

144-45, 147 

British operations: 34, 35, 140, 141, 142, 

275 

British responsibilities: 144, 149 

checkup stations: 143, 151, 152-53,280 

construction: 144, 149-50 

contractor output: 155 

costs: 145-46, 276-77 

damage: 152, 280--81 

definition of terms: 140 

delivery: 144-45, 147, 151-52,274 
INDEX 531 

Motor vehicle assembly and delivery-Con. 

delivery routes: 34, 35, 274 

driver problems: 144-45 

financial arrangements: 144 

General Motors contract: 141, 143-44, 

150 

General Motors responsibilities: 143-44, 

149, 150-51, 152 

Khorramshahr operations: 149-50, 155, 

274,275, 276, 282 

labor problems: 15::'-54,278-79 

militarization: 150-51, 155 

output: 139, 155,276,282-83 

pmposed operations in India: 142 

repair and service stations: 84, 143 

Soviet inspections: 151-52, 280 

Soviet objcctio:1s: 147, 149, 154-55, 278, 

280, 281 

Soviet personnel: 144-45, 147, 152, 274, 

280 

Soviet quotas: 142, 149 

total, U.S. vehicles delivered USSR: 139 

UKCC contract operations: 145-46, 147-

48, 149 

U.S. Army operations: 274-83 

accounting, records: 277, 281 

adminislration: 275 

damage: 280-81 

favoring factors: 283 

investigation, U.S. plants: 281 

logistical co-ordination: 277-78 

native labor: 278-79 

operating units: 275 

output: 276, 282-83 

plants: '274-75 

plants shipped to USSR: 281-82 

routine problems: 276 

take-over difficulties: 276 

targets: 278 

Tehran checkup station: 280 

termination: 281-83,417 

U.S. Army responsibilities, contractor 

operations: 144 

Mountain District: 218,221,222,226,232, 

246,275,362,423. See also Amirabad 

Post: Northern Area; Persian Gulf 

Service Command; Tehran District. 

Movement 1616: 207,208 

Movements control: 11, 54, 199, 201-03, 

233-34, 338, 381 

Anglo-American joint agreement: 233-36 

Multilateral relations: 153. See also AngloAmerican relations; Anglo-Iranian relations; Anglo-Iraqi relations; AngloRussian relations; Iranian-American relations; Soviet-American relations; 

Soviet-Iranian relations; Soviet-J apanese relations. 

Declaration of Tehran: 377, 426, 439, 

443-45,471 

Iranian food problems: 244-45,452-53 

ISR control, operation: 333-39, 342-43 

local labor policy: 243-44, 324 

POL arrangements: 284 

property rights: 271-72, 290, 429, 430, 

431 

publicizing U.S. effort: 359 

U.S. intervention: 76, 130, 147-48, 149, 

154-55 

U.S. status: 4, 16, 19,26,28-29,82, 124, 

175-76, 192, 201, 202, 204, 233-37, 

333,338-39, 341-43,437-47 

Mundt, Karl E.: 476n 

Munitions Assignmcnts Board: 181, 281, 

404, 453, 454, 469 

Murphy, Grace: 445n 

Murray, Wallace: 162, 166n, 168n, 288n, 

289, 377, 377n, 431, 455n, 457, 461n, 

475 

Myott, Maj. Erme B.: 184, 326n, 384n 

Nafisi, Hossain: 3,43, 364, 365 

Native employees: 110, 210-11, 240, 243, 

250, 266, 279,412 

claims, pay increases, leave: 275 

competence: 104, 111, 145,278,279,323, 

325,399 

competition for: 204n, 243-44, 324, 366 

food allowances, ration issues: 103, 114-

15, 154, 241n, 244-45,279, 366,435 

hiring procedures: 103-04, 116, 243-44, 

399 

identity cards: 279,361 

laborcr's camp, Bandar Shahpur: 394 

opium addiction: 323, 323n 

Persian-Arab antagonism: 245 
532 INDEX 

Native employees-Continued 

pilferage: 279, 325, 361, 396 

prosecution: 361 

strength: 85,104,240-41, 241n, 323, 352, 

352n 

strikes: 367-68 

training: 279, 312, 322-24, 371, 376, 

398-99 

wages: 153-54,243-44,279,324,367 

women, employment of: 368 

Negro troops: 189, 189n, 245-46, 261, 312, 

380,410n 

Negro Units 

Engineer Dump Truck Company, 435th: 

245 

Engineer General Service Regiment, 352d: 

246 

Port Battalion, 380th: 380, 398 

Port Battalion, 482d: 380 

Quartermaster Bakery Battalion, 611 th: 

245 

Nelson, Donald: 36, 6 I 

Night Fighter Squadron, 427th: 260 

North African Mission. See U.S. Military 

North African Mission. 

North Atlantic Division engineer. See North 

Atlantic Engineer Division. 

North Atlantic Engineer Division: 41, 48n, 

52, 97, 112, 120, 121, 248. See also 

Iranian District engineer. 

Northern Area: 92, 222. See also Amirabad 

Post; Mountain District; Tehran District. 

Obrazkov, Maj. Gen. Ivan 1.: 131,272 

Office for Emergency Management: 15n, 286 

Office of Production Management: 23 

Oil. See POL. 

Oilfields: 8, 14. See also Pipelines; POL. 

Axis threat: 3, 4, 9, 10, 169, 176 

exclusion of American interests: 289 

Soviet: 10, 169 

Olejar, Paul D.: 50n 

Oliver, Lt. Col. Robert C.: 128n 

Olmstead, C. E.: 289n 

OMET: 50 

Ondrick, Maj. John G.: 149n 

Opium addiction: 323, 323n, 465 

Ordnance Department: 40, 42, 43, 49-53, 

66, 94, 97, 141, 298. See also Cedar 

Project. 

Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance 

Companies 

506th: 151,275, 275n 

3430th: 312 

3455th: 151,275,282 

3467th: 151,275,282 

3474th: 151,275, 275n 

3556th: 275n, 282 

Osborne, Brig. Gen. Theodore M.: 117n, 

120, 121n, 216n, 247-49, 250n, 386n, 

404n 

Oshima, Hiroshi: 31n 

Ottawa Protocol. See Russian-aid Protocols. 

Ottzenn, Col. Hans: 402, 402-03, 405, 406, 

407, 415n, 429 

Overseas Steel Container Corporation: 298, 

298n, 299 

Paaswell, George: 108 

Palatka Shipbuilding Company: 112n 

Park, Maj. E. D.: 249n 

Patterson, Robert P.: 47n, 96, 426, 479 

Pennsylvania Railroad Company: 350 

Pentlarge, Victor H., Jr.: 131n, 214n, 224n, 

225n, 242n, 246n, 253n, 261n, 417n, 

428n 

interviews: 42n, 93n, 108n, 216n, 225n 

Peoples' Commissariat of Foreign Affairs: 79, 

220n 

Peoples' Commissariat of Foreign Trade: 74 

Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs: 

220n 

Persia. See Iran 

Persia and Iraq (PAl) Force: 14, 256, 301, 

315, 340, 344, 350, 364, 376, 383, 399, 

400,412 

instructions, Combined Chiefs of Staff: 203 

interest, lend-lease supplies for Iran: 454 

land tenure arrangements: 430 

liaison, PGSC: 228 

movements control: 199, 201-03, 233-34, 

338, 381 

POL activities: 301, 303, 304, 305, 307, 

308 

security responsibilities: 203, 236-38, 245 
INDEX 533 

Persian Corridor. See Russian-aid supply 

routes. 

Persian Gulf Command (PGC). See also 

Aircraft assembly; Construction; Container plants i Military Railway Service; 

Motor Transport Service; Motor vehicle 

assembly and delivery; Persian Gulf 

Service Command; POL; Ports Service; 

Signal Service. 

activation: 231 

chiefs of staff: 232,232n 

commanding officers: 232 

contraction: 417,423-25 

economic assistance, Iran: 452, 453, 459-

60,466 

evolution of autonomy: 226-31 

headquarters: 252,424 

inactivation as theater: 417,421-22 

intelligence: 231 

jurisdiction, civilian employees: 295-97 

logistical support, FRANTIC Mission: 

259-60 

malaria control: 466 

peak streng th: 241 n 

Project Lux: 260-63 

public relations: 272,359-60,364-65 

redesignated Persian Gulf Service Command, AMET: 421-22 

reduced operations plans: 418-20 

responsibilities: 231-32 

services to ATC: 257-58 

Persian Gulf Service Command (PGSC). 

See also Aircraft assembly; Barge assembly; Construction; Container plants; 

Military Railway Service; Motor Transport Service; Motor vehicle assembly and 

delivery; Persian Gulf Command; POL; 

Ports Service; Signal Service. 

activation: 91 

Anglo-American co-ordination: 200-205, 

219,233-39,243-44, 251 

Anglo-American agreement, movements 

control: 233-36, 338-39 

area (district) functions: 92-93, 215-16, 

217,221,222-24,249,254,423 

area (district) organization: 92-93, 221, 

222, 224, 225, 226 

CCS 109/1: 198-99 

Persian Gulf Service Command--Continued 

chiefs of staff: 206,232, 232n 

close-out operations: 415-16,425-27 

commanding officers: 91,207,232 

evacuation estimates: 416 

general staff divisions, directors: 216 n 

general staff divisions, functions: 219-20 

headquarters: 214, 252,424 

headquarters organization: 93, 215-18, 

220-22, 422n 

intelligence: 229~31 

liaison: 92-93, 219, 227 ~28 

militarization: 209-11,247-49 

military police: 239,239n 

Movement 1616: 207-09 

movements control procedure: 219-20 

native employees: 241, 241n 

native employment, policy: 243-44 

Negro component: 245-46 

operating services, directors: 216n 

operating services, functions: 215-18. See 

also Military Railway Service; Motor 

Transport Service; Ports Service; Signal 

Service. 

operational trends: 241-43 

ordnance depot: 243 

property disposal administration: 428-29 

quartermaster activities: 243 

redesignated Persian Gulf Command: 231 

relations, War Shipping Administration: 

205-06,219,403-07 

reorganizations: 214-18,220-22 

responsibilities: 91-92, 118-19, 199, 214-

15,240,241-42,247,256 

security: 236-39 

services to Air Transport Command: 256 

SOS Plan: 195-98 

strength: 213-14,240-41, 241n 

strength distribution: 222, 242 

subordination to USAFIME: 91-92, 199, 

205,226-31 

Pessell, Brig. W. P.: 95n 

Petroleum. See POL. 

Petroleum Administration for War: 291,294 

Petroleum Adviser: 219,221,300,305 

Petroleum Bases (P-4, P-7): 307-08 

Petroleum Co-ordinator, Office: 291, 294 

Piburn, Lt. Col. Edwin W.: 4S0n 
534 INDEX 

Pierce, Col. James R.: 477n 

Pilferage: 116, 145, 152, 279, 325, 360-62, 

393,436 

Soviet penalty: 396n 

by troops: 361, 396 

wire: 255, 361, 373 

Pipelines: 8 

construction: 291 

early plans: 46, 47, 285-88 

property rights question: 289-90 

proposed routes: 287-88 

State Department views: 288-<39 

water: 57,395 

Player, R.: 407n 

POL: 4, 6, 7, 220. See also Container 

plants; Pipelines. 

American responsibilities: 284-85 

Anglo-American pooling: 284 

area consumers: 302,303-04,305 

definition of term: 285n 

effect, war situation: 291 

gasoline for USSR: 305-07, 432 

haulage statistics: 305 

Iranian civilian consumption: 304 

Motor TranspOTt Service: 318 

motor vehicle delivery: 144,153,280,304 

Petroleum Base installations: 307-08 

PGSC admini,tTation: 304-05 

production, distribution control: 302-03 

refinery capacity increase: 291-95 

Soviet requirements: 304 

storage: 304, 307-08 

tank cars, control, distribution: 304-05 

tank car strength: 307 

tank car turnaround: 307 

tr ilnsport: 303 

U.S. shipments to USSR: 284, 284n 

Polish refugees: 6, 240 

Polyansky, Crigori M.: 149 

Port, 9th: 380,384, 386, 393, 397, 398,412 

Port Battalions 

378th: 380,393,398, 398n, 412 

380th: 380, 398 

385th: 380 

482d: 380 

Port construction. See Construction, port. 

Ports: 73, 180. See also Bandar Shahpur; 

Cheybassi; Construction, port; Khorramshahr; Ports Service. 

American operated: 379 

Anglo-American division of responsibility: 

235,383-84 

British development: 33, 181 

British operations: 382-84, 414-15 

discharge capacity estimates: 184, 188, 

188n, 189, 193 

inland clearance problem: 184, 186-87, 

400 

plans for U.S. operations: 40, 180-82, 198, 

205,206 

shipping priority, Movement 1616: 208 

shipping priority, 50S Plan: 196 

Ports Service: 379, 423. See also Bandar 

Shahpur; Cheybassi; Construction, port; 

Khorrarnshahr; Ports. 

Bandar Shahpur, performance: 41 

Bandar Shahpur, strength: 411 

Bandar Shahpur, transfer to U.S. control: 

381 

cargo losses, damage: 405-06 

Cheybassi operations: 412-14 

Cheybassi, strength: 412 

Cheybassi, transfer to U.S. control: 386 

close-out: 415-16 

commanding officers: 386n 

co-ordination, Basra (Gulf) District: 385, 

386 

co-ordination, MRS: 353-54, 388 

equipment shortages: 399-400 

evacuation responsibilities: 411, 416 

evolution of responsibility: 380-84 

forwarding procedure, Soviet cargoes: 

389-90 

headquarters: 386 

Khorramshahr performance: 409-11 

Khorramshahr Port Committee: 383 

Khorramshahr, strength: 410 

Khorramshahr, transfer to U.S. control: 

381 

liaison: 383-84, 388-89 

lighterage: 399-400 

manpower problems: 397-99,406 

morale: 395-96,401-02,407 

native labor: 398, 399,406 
INDEX 535 

Ports Service-Continued 

organizational structure: 385-87 

personnel problems: 401-02 

pilferage: 393, 396-97 

port battalions: 380, 398 

port commanders: 386n 

railway terminal responsibilities: 388 

recooperage: 401, 405 

responsibilities: 381,387, 387n, 388 

ship discharge: 397,407,408-09 

ship turnaround: 397,401, 401n, 407-08 

Soviet relations: 390-91,403 

stevedoring: 402,405,406 

Styer's investigation: 405-06 

target estimates: 408 

termination: 386-87. 411, 415 

Transportation Corps inspection: 400-402 

variable factors influencing performance: 

409 

WSA relations: 403-07 

Porter, Col. Charles P.: 90, 132, 134, 137, 

266,267,269,272-73 

Prentis, Edmund A.: 47n, 57n, 103n, 291n 

Preston, Capt. William: 169 

Procurement 

Anglo-American arrangements: 59,92-93., 

103-04, 113-15,243-44 

Iranian District engineer's responsibilities: 

41,59,112-13,115 

labor: 59, 103-04, 110, 113-16, 243-44, 

399 

lend-lease supplies for Iran: 453-54, 455, 

469-73 

MRS: 373-74 

Project 19: 125,134,266 

Project Lux: 260-63 

Protocols. See Russian-aid protocols. 

Provost Marshal General: 297 

Purvis, Arthur B.: 21n 

Purvis, Col. Arthur C.: 216n,404n 

Qaleh Morgeh airport: 252,258,424 

Quartermaster Bakery Battalion, 611 th, 

Company B: 245 

Quartermaster Corps: 40, 42, 50, 51, 141, 

336 

Quartermaster Truck Regiments 

516th: 311,316,319 

517th: 311,312,316,319 

Queen of Iran: 365 

Quinan, Lt. Gen. Sir E. P.: 14, 18, 32, 33, 

185 

Railway. See Iranian State Railway; Military Railway Service. 

Railway construction. See Construction, 

railway. 

Railway Diesel Shop Battalion, 762d: 350, 

358,370 

Railway Grand Division, 702d: 349, 351, 

352,360 

Railway Operating Battalions 

1st Provisional: 351 

711th: 349,350,351,354,355,362 

730th Engineer: 350,351 

791st: 351 

Railway Shop Battalion, 754th: 350,370 

Railway Workers' Union: 367 

Ras Tannura: 292 

Ration issues: 103, 114-15, 154, 241n, 244-

45, 279, 366, 435 

Rattray, Maj. James W.: 384n, 386n 

Reciprocal aid. See Financial arrangements, 

reverse lend-lease. 

Reconstruction Finance Corporation: 293 

Red Ball Express: 31 S 

Reed, Ogden C.: 6n, 106n, 181n, 384n 

Reverse lend-lease. See Financial arrangements. 

Reza Khan. See Reza Shah Pahlevi 

Reza Shah Pahlevi: 10, 12, 13, 34, 115, 

159-60,160-61,331,346 

Rhodes, Brig. Sir Godfrey: 32-33,334 

Rhona: 240 

Riddell-Webster, Lt. Gen. Sir Thomas S.: 

88,184 

Ridley, Maj. Gen. Clarence S.: 27, 46~, 

475n. See also U.S. Military Mission to 

Iranian Army. 

appointment, adviser Iranian Army: 171 

biographical note: 171 

command relationships: 464 

decoration: 478 

diagnosis, Iranian Army problems: 466 
536 INDEX 

Ridley, Maj. Gen. Clarence S.-Continued 

difficulty obtaining lend-lease supplies: 

468-73 

Iranian Army transport improvement: 

468,469 

Iranian difficulties: 172,462,465,473-74 

lend-lease requisition procedures: 454,459 

powers and duties: 171, 172-73, 462, 464 

recommendation, Iranian Army strength: 

467-68 

relations with PGC: 459 

reorganization, Iranian Army supply services: 466--67 

staff: 172 

views, continuing Army Mission: 473-77 

Ridley Mission. See U.S. Military Mission 

to Iranian Army. 

Riggs, Maj. Thomas S.: 97n 

Road camps: 107, 151,423. See also Motor Transport Service, field stations. 

Roads. See Construction, highway; Highway, maintenance, routes. 

Robertson, Col. Walter M.: 68n 

Robins, Maj. Gen. Thomas M.: 41n, 42, 45, 

248n 

Roll, Col. Phillip A.: 269n 

Romanus, Charles F.: 261n 

Roosevelt, Franklin D.: 14, 15, 16, 22-23, 

24,61,67,95,177, 185, 190,201,214, 

447 

concern, speed Russian aid: 21,23,36,54, 

61,207-08 

conference, Churchill, June 1942: 176-77 

considers sending air force to Caucasus: 

179 

insistence, direct U.S. engagement German forces: 178 

interest, aiding Iran: 27, 156-57, 443-46, 

456-57,459,473 

Middle East Directive: 16, 17 

proposals, holding Middle East: 178-79 

view, lend-lease distribution: 450n 

Roosevelt, Kermit: 115n 

ROUNDUP: 176 

Routes. See Highway, routes; Russian-aid 

supply routes. 

Royal Air Farce (RAF): 71, 133,266,267, 

268, 271, 295, 298, 303, 383, 394 

aircraft assembly: 32,35,39,54,125,128-

29,130, 131, 134, 135 

airfields: 252, 257-58 

Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers: 

307 

Royal Engineers, Corps: 34 

Royce, Maj. Gen. Ralph: 231, 269, 296 

Rug .. , A. J.: 47n, 102n, 108n, 117n 

Russian Dump: 363,393,399,400,408,410 

Russian Revolution: 12 

Russian-aid protocols 

First (Moscow): 23, 24, 36,65, 124, 127, 

129, 142, 156, 285 

Second (Washington): 23, 129, 149, 156, 

207 

Third (London): 23, 264, 269, 270, 306, 

403 

Fourth (Ottawa): 23,306,418,419,420 

prescribed routes: 23,419 

Roosevelt's concern meet commitments: 36 

tonnages: 23, 419 

Russian-aid supply routes 

aircraft delivery: 124-25 

A.xis toll on shipping: 12, 36, 104, 176, 

177, 178, 433 

comparative adv~ntages: 432-33 

comparative tonnages: 432-33 

Japanese tolerance of Pacific route: 419-

20 

Persian Corridor: 15, 61 

Allied control: 11 

Axis threat: 3, 4, 5, 9-10, 13, 14, 20, 

169-70, 176, 197, 198, 291, 382 

comparative advantages: 433 

comparative tonnages: 432-33 

expansion dictated by global strategy: 

176-80 

German estimate of importance: 5 

reduced dependence on: 410, 417, 418, 

419,420 

shipping priority: 180 

Soviet-aid tonnage: 5-6, 331, 432 

tonnage target: 183 

total tonnage: 5-6 

plans, Fourth Protocol shipping: 418--20 

protocol tonnage commitments: 23,419 
INDEX 537 

Russian-aid supply routes-Continued 

shipping priorities: 180 

total Western Hemisphere tonnage: 4 

Russian-Iranian relations. See also SovietIranian relations. 

Anglo-Russian rivalry, Iran: 3, 6, 12-13, 

157-60 

treaty of friendship: 158-59, 159-60 

Russo-Finnish War, 1939-40: 19 

Rusterholtz, Wallace P.: 131n, 214n, 242n, 

256n, 267n, 310 

Sa'ed, Mohammed: 342,463 

Santa Fe Railway: 334 

Santelman, Lt. Walter W.: Illn 

Saudi Arabia: 231,292 

Schoo, Capt. Jack C.: 276n 

Schools: 312, 465. See also Training. 

Schwarzkopf, Brig. Gen. H. Norman: 27, 

361n, 461n. See also U.S. Military 

Mission to Iranian Gendarmerie. 

biographical note: 163 

command relationships: 171,463 

efforts and resul ts: 464-65 

Gendarmerie training schools: 464-65 

Iranian difficulties: 462, 465 

lend-lease requisition procedures: 454-59 

lend-lease supplies: 468,470-73 

named chief, mission to Iranian Gendarmerie: 163 

promotion and decoration: 478-80 

relations with PGC: 455,459 

responsibility to State Dept.: 169,462 

staff: 169 

view on mission's continuance: 475 

Schwarzkopf Mission. See U.S. Military 

Mission to Iranian Gendarmerie. 

Scott, Brig. Gen. Stanley L.: 117n, 225n, 232, 

280n, 420, 469 

biographical note: 206-07 

mounting SOS Plan: 207-08 

named chief of staff, PGSC: 206,215 

promotion: 207n 

Scott-Graff Company: 112n 

Seaholm, Eugene: 181 n, 384n, 404, 416n 

Second (Washington) Protocol. See Russian-aid Protocols. 

Security. See also Pilferage. 

Anglo-American co-ordination: 199, 203-

04,236-39,255,319-20,360-62 

Anglo-American friction: 237-39, 361 

British responsibilities: 14, 18, 31,54,98, 

185, 198, 199, 202, 203, 234, 239, 255 

forces insufficient: 116, 197, 204, 236-37, 

238-39, 319-20,360 

German agents apprehended: 238,462 

Iranian responsibilities: 26, 162,360,361, 

373,455 

Soviet co-operation: 360-62 

tribal co-operation: 116-17 

Selby, Maj. Gen. A. R.: 154,315,316 

Sells, Charles H.: 47n, 57n, 90, 103n, 104n, 

106n, 107n, 108n, 110, 115n, 117n, 

118n, 122, 122n 

Sentab Jetty: 252, 392, 393, 400, 401, 410, 

415 

Shah of Iran. See Mohammed Reza Shah 

Pahlcvi; Reza Shah Pahlevi. 

Shemwell, Lt. Col. Victor B.: 461n 

Sheridan, Joseph P.: 355n 

Sherwood, Robert E.: 21 n, 22n, 24n, 25n, 

81n, 130n, 149n, 156n, 177n, 178n, 

179n, 182n, 207n, 337n, 445n, 456n, 

457n, 473n 

Shields, Floyd F.: 458,460 

Shingler, Brig. Gen. Don G.: 42n, 45, 60, 62, 

62n, 76, 89n, 91, 98, 99, 104, 108n, 110, 

126, 129, 134, 145, 146, 147, 154, 165, 

185, 204n, 214, 215, 225n, 227. See 

also Basra District; Iran-Iraq Service 

Command; Motor Transport Service; 

Persian Gulf Service Command; U.S. 

Military Iranian Mission. 

area administration: 92-93,222-23 

assignments: 64,73,77,82,89,206,207, 

207n,317 

block system: 320-21 

capacity estimates: 184, 187-88, 189, 193 

discipline, civilian employees: 117-18 

highway construction program: 250 

Militarization, problems of transition: 

209-10 

MTS operations improvement: 317-18 

native drivers, suggests use of: 210-11 

PGSC organization: 215 
538 INDEX 

Shingler, Brig. Gen. Don G.-Continued 

port and shipping responsibilities: 385 

promotion: 20in 

protest, exclusion of Soviet mechanics from 

Abadan: 130 

relations, HQ, USAFIME: 8S-92 

request, extra-territorial rights: 437n 

request, military police: 238-39 

settlement, packing-case lumber dispute: 

154-55 

Soviet truck inspections, instructions on: 

151-52 

view on U.S. role in Corridor relations: 

149 

Ship turnaround: 191, 195,397,401, 401n, 

407-08 

Shipping losses: 12,36,104,176,177,178, 

433 

Shipping stringencies: 36, 53, 96, 99, 102, 

103, 104, 195 

Shipwrights' guild: 11 0 

Shortages 

equipment, supplies: 102, 104-05, 269, 

316-17,322,399-400 

manpower: 42,85,102,103,144,266-67, 

269,316,317,319,322-23,366,397-99, 

400 

security forces: 1l6, 197-98,204,236-37, 

238-39,317,319-20,360,373 

shipping: 36,53,96,99,102,104 

spare parts: 371-72 

tools: 371-72 

water supply: 15,368-59 

Shuster, W. Morgan: 157-58, 158n 

Shuwaikh: 110 

Sibley, Lt. Col. Alden K.: 182n 

Siboney: 56, 55n, 59 

Signal Battalion, 95th: 254, 372 

Signal Corps: 50, 191n, 195,232,256 

Signal Operation Company, 231st: 254 

Signal Service: 232, 242 

achievement: 256 

administration: 253-54 

contraction: 255-56 

directors: 253, 253n 

installations: 254, 325-26, 372-73 

maintenance: 254-55 

organization: 254 

Signal Service--Continued 

powers, duties: 253-54 

sale, telecommunications system: 255 

security: 255,273 

strength: 253 

wire thefts: 255,373 

Signal Service Company, 833d: 254 

Sims, Melvin: 76n, 97n 

SLEDGEHAMMER: 176, 178 

Smirnov, Andrei A.: 71,72,77,78,155,438 

Smith, Lt. Gen. Arthur H.: 454n 

Smith, Col. Truman: 170n 

Snell, Edwin M.: 179n 

Snow,BertN.: 136,136n,137 

Soheyli, Ali: 443 

Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon: 62,64, 75, 76, 

76n, 110, 120, 131, 165, 180, 191, 192, 

208, 228, 238, 296, 297, 298, 306, 309, 

338, 396, 397, 401, 402, 404, 405, 406, 

456,457 

SOS Plan 

administrative recommendations: 196-98 

communications: 195 

field modifications: 200-206 

key personnel: 206 

logistics: 192-96 

merging militarization process: 188,210 

military police: 197,204,360 

modification by Combined Chiefs: 198 

motor transport: 193-95, 196, 205, 209, 

243, 309-10, 314 

mounting: 206-09 

movements control: 197,201,204,380 

overseas movement: 195-96 

port operations: 193, 196,205, 380, 385, 

412 

powers, duties of commanding general, 

PGSC: 197,205 

preliminary analyses, estimates: 183-90 

preparation: 191-92 

priorities: 196,209, 243, 309, 348 

railway operation: 193, 196,348 

reorganization, PGSC: 197 

security: 197-98, 203, 360 

situation and discussions leading to: 

175-83, 184, 18S, 190-91 

strength estimates: 193,194,195,310 
INDEX 539 

SOS Plan-Continued 

tonnage estimates: 192-93,310 

WSA relationship: 205-06 

Southwestern Area: 92, 222. See also Basra 

District; Gulf District; Persian Gulf 

Service Command. 

Soviet-American relations. See also Multilateral relations. 

admission, U.S. Military Mission to USSR: 

39-40, 69-72, 77-81 

American status in Iran: 338,438-39 

assistance to Project Lux: 262 

Caspian port development: 45 

celebration, delivery of 1 Yo-millionth ton: 

359 

flight over Soviet territory: 124 

FRANTIC Mission: 258-60 

good-will party, Abadan: 272 

Karmilitsin credentials: 74 

lend-lease for Soviets impeded by U.S. 

public opinion: 19-20 

lend-lease termination: 473n 

loans for Soviet war supplies: 24 

motor transport termini: 314-15 

motor vehicle checkup: 152-53, 280 

port operations: 389-91 

primacy, Soviet-aid supply: 23, 35-36, 36, 

61,62,82,87,91,180, 199,201,202 

railway operations: 356-58 

Soviet exclusion of U.S. technicians: 66, 

70, 79 

Soviet inaction on visas: 66, 69-72, 77--81 

Soviet inspections: 74, 131, 151-52, 

280-81 

Soviet objections to U.S. intelligence activities: 229 

Soviet pressure for increased tonnages: 73, 

390,439 

Soviet refusal of air aid in Caucasus: 179 

Soviet-British relations. See Anglo-Russian 

relations. 

Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs: 78 

Soviet Commissar of Foreign Trade: 73 

Soviet Council of Peoples' Commissars: 66 

Soviet inspections: 74,131,151-52,280-81 

Soviet-Iranian relations. See also Multilateral relations; Tri-Partite Treaty. 

American status in Iran: 338,437-39 

Soviet-Iranian relations-Continued 

Anglo-Russian occupation, Iran: 10-12, 

13, 14,435-36 

evacuation of Iran: 425-26 

Soviet diversions, Iranian production: 

452,453 

treaty of friendship, 1921: 158-59, 160 

Soviet-Japanese relations: 419, 433 

Soviet Military Mission: 22 

Soviet Peoples' Commissariat of Foreign Affairs: 79, 220n 

Soviet Peoples' Commissariat of Foreign 

Trade: 74 

Soviet Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs: 220n 

Soviet personnel: 130,264,274,321-22 

British objections: 71, 130-31, 144 

strength: 131,150, 152,266 

Soviet Trade Commission: 152 

Soviet Transportation Commission: 152,219 

Soviet Transportation Department: 315, 358 

Soviet Transportation Directorate: 152, 389 

Soviet Union. See also Anglo-Soviet relations; Soviet-American relations; SovietIranian relations; Multilateral relations. 

Axis attack: 4,9,10,14,18,19,20,25 

Bri tish pledge aid: 20 

desire for second front: 178 

economic blockade by Allies: 20 

eligibility for lend-lease: 19,20, 24 

cntry into Anglo-American plans for U.S. 

aid to Britain in Middle East: 14-15 

lend-lease financial arrangements: 24 

POL pooling, nonparticipation in: 284 

refusal to standardize wage rates: 324 

total tonnage, lend-lease supplies: 4 

transport representatives: 220n 

U.S. aid initiated via aid to Britain: 18, 

19, 21-26 

U.S. loans for war supplies: 24 

U.S. plans for technical assistance: 65-66 

U.S. public opinion: 19-20 

U.S. State Department policy on aid: 21 

Spalding, Brig. Gen. George R.: 15, 15n, 37, 

40,45,286 

Spalding, Brig. Gen. Sidney P.: 15n, 45, 142, 

181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 188, 189, 197, 

209,265 
540 INDEX 

Special Mission for War Supplies to USSR: 

23, 25 

Spencer, White and Prentis, Inc.: 44n, 47. 

See also Folspen. 

Stalin, j\1:arshal Joseph V.: 21,23,24, 177, 

179, 183, 337n, 473n 

Standard Oil Company of California: 289n, 

293 

Standard-Vacuum Oil Company: 289n 

Standley, Admiral William H.: 23, 78, 79, 

339 

Starbird, Col. Alfred D.: 465n, 476n, 478 

State Department: 8, 21, 23, 70, 71, 293, 

297,427 

eo-ordination with War Department 

aid to Iran: 162, 163, 170~71, 443, 445~ 

46, 449~60, 468~77 

American status in Iran: 342-43, 437~ 

47 

Greely, adviser to Iranian Army: 165~69 

ISR operation: 335~36, 339, 342-44 

pipeline projects: 288~90 

U.S. Military Mission to USSR: 70~71, 

78~81 

prewar Iranian relations: 159, 160, 163 

Steinhardt, Laurence: 66 

Stetson, Col. John B., Jr.: 343, 344, 345n, 

428~31, 431n, 456 

Stettinius, Edward R., Jr.: 4n, 15n, 23n, 24n, 

36n,40, 74, 181,286,445~46,450,450n, 

471 

Stilson, Lt. Col. Charles E.: 261n 

Stilwell, Lt. Gen. Joseph W.: 63, 72 

Stimson, Henry L.: 80, 163, 166, 171 

Stone, H. Chase: 382n 

Stone, Capt. Robert G.: 400n,404n 

Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation: 

364n, 369n 

Stoner, R. C.: 289n 

Story, Maj. J. V.: 404n 

Stratemeyer, Maj. Gen. George E.: 266 

Streett, Brig. Gen. St. Clair: 165n 

Strength 

Abadan Air Base: 270~71 

aircraft assembly operations: 85, 127~28, 

134,266~67,269, 270 

barge assembly operations: 112 

British railway staff: 33 

Strength-Continued 

Engineer construction forces: 85, 104 

Inland Water Transport: 32 

Military Police: 239 

Millspaugh economic mission: 164 

motor vehicle assembly operations: 148, 

278 

MRS: 241,350,351,365 

Persian Gulf Command: 240-41,241n 

Persian Gulf Service Command: 240-41 

U.S. Military Iranian Mission: 56, 56n, 

85 

U.S. Military Mission to Iranian Anny: 

474, 474n, 477n 

U.S. Military Mission to Iranian Gendarmerie: 474,477n 

U.S.Military Mission to USSR: 68,69n 

Strength estimates 

Engineer construction: 102, 103 

militarization: 97~98 

Ordnance depot program: 52, 52n 

SOS Plan: 193~96 

Strong, Maj. Gen. George V.: 229,238 

Styer, Maj. Gen. W. D.: 230,396, 402, 405~ 

06,407 

Sunderland, Riley: 261n 

Swank, Capt. A. B.: 128n, 266n, 404n 

Sweet, Brig. Gen. Joseph B.: 318n 

Swenson, C. L.: 47n 

Syria: 4,9 

Taj-ol-Moluk, Queen Mother of Iran: 355 

Tanuma: 33, 83, 84, 412. See also Cheybassi. 

Tanuma Depot: 412 

TAP's. See Motor vehicle assembly and 

delivery. 

Target meetings: 219~20, 278, 356 

Taylor, E. P.: 15 

Technical assistance 

to British: 55,56,60,65,73,84 

planned for Soviets: 65~66, 67 

Soviet refusal: 66, 70, 79 

Tedder, Air Vice Marshal Sir Arthur W.: 

128n 

Tehran. See also Camp Arnirabad. 

Axis bombing anticipated: 170 

joint Anglo-Soviet occupation: 11 
INDEX 541 

Tehran-Continued 

motor vehicle inspection: 145 

processing B-25's: 129 

Tehran Conference: 231,443-44,456,461 

Tehran Declaration. See Declaration of 

Tehran. 

Tehran District: 215, 218, 221, 222, 254. 

See also Amirabad Post; Mountain District; Northern Area; Persian Gulf Service Command. 

Tehran Silo: 363,368 

Texas Company: 289n 

Texmar: 60, 106 

Third (London) Protocol. See Russian-aid 

Protocols. 

Thomas, Brig. Gen. Samuel M.: 216n, 232n, 

253, 253n 

Thompson, Maj. Lester S.: 302n 

Thornburg, Max: 288n 

Thurston, Walter: 77 

Timberman, Lt. Col. Thomas S.: 75n 

Timmerman, L. Stephen: 459 

TORCH: 179, 180, 192 

Totten, Lt. Col. James W.: 429 

Tracy, Lt. Co\. Maxwell W.: 115n 

Traffic control. See Motor Transport Service; Movements Control. 

Training 

aircraft assembly: 279 

container plant operation: 299 

Indian Army labor battalion: 299 

Iranian Gendarmerie: 464-65 

MRS, railway personnel: 376 

MRS, repair and modification: 371 

MTS, drivcr-interpreter-instructors: 312, 

322-24 

natives: 279, 312, 322-24, 371, 376, 

398-99 

operation, maintenance, U.S. equipment: 

49,55,65-66,67,79,87,91 

port battalions: 398 

port operations: 398-99 

Transcontinental and Western Airways: 425, 

429 

Transit Storage Area. See Russian Dump. 

Trans-Persian Railway: 190. See also Iranian State Railway. 

555951 0-61-36 

Transport 

Anglo-American agreement on movements 

control: 233-36 

British responsibility and control: 11, 14-

15, 18, 32-35, 54, 87, 101, 175, 185, 

192, 199, 233-36 

facilities: 32-35. See also Construction, 

highway, port, railway. 

overseas movement, U.S. forces: 99, 102, 

103, 104, 195-96,207-08 

U.S. assumption of responsibility: 28-29, 

32,175,192,199,233-36 

U.S. emphasis on Russian-aid supply: 23, 

61, 62, 82, 87, 91, 101, 175, 180, 199, 

201, 202 

U.S. participation, debate on: 200-201 

Transportation Corps: 196, 352, 400, 401, 

402,429 

Treaties and agreements 

Anglo-American Agreement Concerning 

Use of Abadan Air Field: 55n, 128, 

271-72, 272n 

Anglo-American (Balfour-Arnold) agreement on aviation aid: 22 

Anglo-American Joint Directive on Aidto-Russia Road Construction: 251,251n 

Anglo-American Middle East financial 

agreement: 113-14, 114n 

Anglo-Iraqi treaty of alliance, 1930: 8 

Anglo-Persian treaty, 1919: 12,158,159 

Convention of 1907: 12, 157 

D'Arcy concession of 1901: 289 

Declaration of Tehran: 377, 426, 439, 

443-45,471 

Hitler-Stalin pact: 19, 20 

Joint Agreement between Persia and Iraq 

Forces and the Persian Gulf Service 

Command for the Control of Movements 

in Persia: 233-36,338-39 

Soviet-Iranian treaty of friendship, 1921: 

13, 158-59, 160 

Tri-Partite Treaty. See Tri-Partite Treaty. 

Versailles Treaty: 289 

Tribes 

autonomy: 115 

bandits: 117, 145, 237 

co-operation: 112, 115-17 

defiance of central authority: 157 
542 INDEX 

Tribes-Continued 

German-encouraged revolt: 12 

Lurs guard ISR: 117n 

rifles, ammunition provided: 116 

Tri-Partite Treaty: 157,1651 168,333,430 

Anglo-Soviet responsibilities toward Iranian economy: 244-45 

communications control: II, 164,202,380, 

381 

evacuation: 11, 28, 425 

Iranian independence: 11, 435 

Iranian neutrality: 11, 162, 171 

security: 11, 162, 172 

U.S. adherence proposed by Iran: 437,441 

U.S. protests draft Article IV: 290 

U.S. status vis-a.-vis signatory powers: 338, 

437-39,441,461 

Troxler, Capt. Paul D.: 115n 

Truck Company, First Provisional: 312 

Truck Regiment, 26th, 3d Battalion: 312 

Trucks. See Motor Transport Service; Motor vehicle assembly and delivery. 

Trucks for Iran: 167,458-59, 468, 469, 470 

Truman, Harry S.: 426, 462, 473n 

TUP. See also Motor vehicle assembly and 

delivery. 

definition: 140 

Unification of U.S. missions in Middle East: 

85-92 

Union Pacific Railroad Company: 349 

United Kingdom Commercial Corporation 

(UKCC): 15, 139, 141, 143, 151, 154, 

167, 186, 187, 189, 244, 303, 304, 321 

Anglo-American motor transport co-ordination: 235,309,310,312,315-16,321 

convoy routes: 34-35 

dockside activities: 33, 383 

lend-lease trucks, disposition: 430-31 

motor vehicle assembly for Iranian Mission: 145-46, 147-48, 149, 275 

semiofficial status: 15, 33-34, 146, 185, 

219 

Soviet objections to assembly by: 147, 149 

trucking services: 34, 44, 314 

vehicle strength: 187, 316n 

wage rates: 153, 324 

United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration: 416,429,431 

Upston, Col. John E.: 170n 

U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East 

(USAFIME): 184,440,450,455 

activation: 39, 88-89 

Anglo-American plans leading to: 85-89 

command relationships: 89-90, 133, 205, 

226-28 

commanding generals: 227,231, 231n 

container plants: 298-99 

jurisdiction, civilian employees: 296 

redesignated Africa-Middle East Theater: 

421 

U.S. Lend-Lease Mission to USSR. See Faymonville, Brig. Gen. Philip R. 

U.S. Maritime Commission: 396 

u.S. Military Iranian Mission: 25, 26, 28, 

44,56,61, 72, 125,215,264,384. See 

also Cedar Project; Civilian contractors; 

Civilian employees; Construction; Iranian District engineer; Motor vehicle 

assembly and delivery. 

agencies affecting: 38-40 

Anglo-American plans, unification Middle 

East missions: 85-89 

auxiliary status: 53-54,82, 180 

Cedar Project responsibilities: 126, 132, 

133 

command relationships: 64,86,87,88 

commanding officers: 17, 64 

co-ordination, British construction responsibili ti es: 57-59 

establishment: 17 

headquarters: 29,47, 62n, 83 

Indian projects: 62-64, 82 

manpower problems: 85 

militarization: 43, 61-82, 119 

Ordnance program: 49-53 

pipeline project planning: 285-90 

proposals, changed command relationships: 

75-76,86 

redesignated Iran-Iraq Service Command, 

USAFIME: 89 

relations, Iranian District engineer: 40--42 

responsibilities: 17-18,30-31,80,334 

Soviet aid, indirect approach to: 20,53-54 

Soviet supply, first priority: 61-62,82 
INDEX 543 

U.S. Military Iranian Mission-Continued 

strength: 56, 56n, 85 

strengthening ISR: 334-

task nominations, plans: 37-3B, 44-47, 

55-56,84 

tcchnical assistance to British assembly; 

55,60, 73 

UKCC contract: 145--46 

USSR Mission, overlapping functions: 

68-70, 73-77 

U,S, Military Mission to Iranian Army: 27, 

462. 

annual cost to Iran: 470 

commanding officers: 477n 

contractual status: 463-64,473,4715-77 

establishment: 170-73 

functions: 171,462,477 

lend-lease requisition procedures: 454,459 

lend-lease supplies: 468-73 

question of continuing: 471, 472, 473-77 

relations with PGC: 459,470 

reorganization Iranian Army supply services: 466-67 

staff: 172 

strength: 474, 474n, 477n 

transport improvement: 468,469 

U.S. Military Mission to Iranian Gendarmerie: 27 

command relationships: 171,463,472 

commanding officers: 477n 

contractual status: 463-64,477 

efforts and achievements: 464-65 

establishment: 163,169 

Gendarmerie training schools: 464-65 

lend-lease requisition procedures: 454,459 

lend-lease supplies: 455, 46B, 470-73 

question of continuing: 471,473,475-77 

relations with PCC: 455,459 

responsibility to State Dept.: 169,462 

staff: 169 

strength: 474,477n 

U.S. Military North African Mission 

Anglo-American plans, unification Middle 

East missions: 85--89 

Cedar Project responsibilities: 125, 126, 

132-33 

commanding general: 17 

U.S. Military North African Mission-Con. 

establishment: 17 

headquarters: 38 

proposals for integrating Iranian Mission: 

76, 76n 

replaced by USAFIME: 88 

representation of Iranian Mission: 38-39 

responsibilities: 17-18 

U.S. Military Mission to the USSR: 25-26, 

56,65-81,128,132,165 

activities in Iran: 72-76 

early concept and purpose: 39,65-66, 67 

functions: 39, 67 

Hauser report: 74-75 

relations with Faymonville mission: 66-67, 

79 

relations with Iranian Mission: 39--40, 67, 

68-69,70,71-72,72-76,77 

relations with North African Mission: 71 

relations with U.S. Embassy, Moscow: 77, 

78, 79 

strength: 68, 69n 

termination: 80 

USSR entry difficulties: 39--40, 67-68, 

69-71, 7~77-78, 79 

U.S. Steel Corporation: 298 

USSR. See Soviet Union. 

USSR Mission. See U.S. Military Mission 

to the USSR. 

Van Valkenburg, Samuel: 8n 

Van Vlack, Lt, Col. H. G.: 115n, 116, 117 

Vickers, Col. Louis T.: 386n, 422n 

Villiers, Alan J.: liOn 

Vyshinsky, Andrei Y.: 66 

Wain house, Maj. David: 75n 

Walter, Lt. Col. A. E. M.: 348n 

War Department: 7, 13, 16, 17, 18,22, 23, 

29, 30, 38, 40, 41, 45, 50, 52, 62, 66, 

102, Ill, 118, 121, 124, 125, 141, 142, 

175, 197, 205, 206, 228, 231, 262, 281, 

288, 300, 301, 302, 334, 373, 391, 402, 

416,417,421,422,426,429,430. See 

also SOS Plan. 

control of overseas lend-lease misqions: 64n 
• 

544 INDEX 

War Department-Continued 

co-ordination with State Department 

aid to Iran: 162, 163, 170-71, 443, 

445-46, 449-60, 468-77 

American status in Iran: 342-43,437-47 

Greely, adviser to Iranian Army: 165-

69 

ISR operation: 335-36, 339, 342-44 

pipeline projects: 288-90 

U.S. Military Mission to USSR, 70-71, 

78-81 

interest in BAPCO expansion program: 

292-93, 295-97 

jurisdiction, civilian employees: 118, 293, 

296-97,446-47 

militarization directive: 43, 61, 96, 99, 

101,119,136 

views, unification missions in Middle East: 

86-92 

views, use of troops in Middle East: 94-95, 

179 

War Production Board: 36 

War Shipping Administration (WSA): 36, 

181, 219, 235, 384, 385, 389, 390, 447, 

449 

regional director: 384n 

relations, PGSC: 205-06, 389, 403-07, 

422 

ship turnaround reports: 407-08 

Ward, Col. Glenn R.: 318, 318n, 326n 

Ward, Maj. Gen. Orlando: 81n 

Washington list of proposed American projects: 45-47,386 

Washington Protocol. See Russian-aid 

Protocols. 

Water pipelines: 57, 395 

Wavell, Gen. Sir Archibald P.: 9, 17, 18, 

45,46,61,63,109,142,286 

Wedemeyer, Maj. Gen. Albert C.: 168n, 

230n,262 

Welles, Sumner: 21, 79, 166n 

Wemyss, Lt. Gen. H. C. B.: 62,85,86,96 

Wesson, Maj. Gen. Charles M.: 49n, 52 

West Point: 240,245 

Wheeler, Brig. Gen. Raymond A.: 28,29,37, 

53n,62n,66,71,72,82,83,95, 102, 105, 

207n, 291, 335. See also U.S. Military 

Iranian Mission. 

Wheeler, Brig. Gen. Raymond A.-Con. 

advance railway surveys: 47, 334 

agencies affecting planning, action: 38-40 

assembly plants sites, decisions: 54-55, 

125,142-43 

biographical note: 17, 47 

estimate, ISR capacity: 348 

Greely's proposals to supersede: 73, 75 

named chief, Iranian Mission: 17,334 

named Commanding General, SOS, CBI: 

63,72 

planning mission's tasks: 29-30, 45-48, 

55-56,61,84,109,142,285-90 

powers and duties: 18, 29-30, 38, 53-54, 

62-63,68-69,73,109,124,141 

promotion: 17n 

relations with British commands: 37,86-

87 

relations with Iranian District engineer: 

40-42 

relations with Soviets: 87 

report, Anglo-American construction, 

financial arrangements: 58 

representation by Maxwell: 39 

responsibility, Indian projects: 62-63 

successor: 64,76,77,82 

view, American operation, ISR': 336 

view, Anglo-Soviet relations: 76 

view, Basra port operations: 54 

view, need senior air officer: 131 

Wheeler Mission. See U.S. Military Iranian 

Mission. 

White, J. G., Engineering Corporation: 49, 

51,52,94,108 

White, Lazarus: 47n 

Wilber, Donald N.: 369n 

Wilbur, Capt. Robert M.: 222n 

Wilfley, Lt. Col. John S.: 386n 

Willcox, Maj. H. Case: 288n 

Wilson, Gen. Sir Henry Maitland: 9, 14, 

184, 185, 228, 234, 360n, 378 

Wilson, Woodrow: 12, 13, 158 

Winant, Frederick: 448n, 450-51 

Winsor, L. M.: 369n 

Women, employment of: 368 

Wood, Maj. A. N.: 289n 

Woodworth, Lt. Col. Edwin B.: 232, 422n 
INDEX 545 

Y Dung, Philip: 289 

Yount, Col. Paul F.: 215, 216n, 286, 287, 

289n, 290, 332n, 342, 343, 349, 352n, 

352-53, 354, 357-58, 388. See also 

Military Railway Service. 

Zabzab: 9Gn 

Zahidan District: 92, 222 

Zahidan-Meshed route: 34, 55, 187 

Zeigler, George B.: IS In, 214-n, 242n. 323n 

Zorin, Coi. Leonid I.: 129, 220n, 282, 314-

1:< U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 2000 0·458-459 QL 3 
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CHART 1-UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST 

IWAR DEPARTMENTI 

, 

I 

r-------------~~-------------~ 

l

US MILITARY NO AFRICAN MISSION 

(USMNAM) 21 Sep '41 -17 Jun '42 

(Cairo 22 No'll '41-) 

___ , I NO ATLANtiC DIV (CE) I : , ________ .l...- ____ --, :--------

~~~ __ ~I~~ ~~-~i~~~ 

I

NO AFRICAN ENGR DISTI I IRANIAN ENGR DIST i 

(Asmora) Jan '42- I 

r----..-- __ I-_~_...J 

~~~~~~:~~--~-. 

AREA OFFICE, ASMARAJ •• -... r'42~IIIAREA OFFICE, HELIOPOLIS AREA OFFICE, TEL-AVIV 

Red •• ig AS MARA SERV CMD ZMar'42 Jon-Mar 42 Redeilli! Jan-Mar 42 Red"'G 

Rodo'09 ERITREA SERV CMD '6 Apr'42 HELIOPOLIS SERV CMD 2"'.'42 PALESTINE SERV CMD 2""~2 

IWAR DEPARTMENTI 

, r- -- --.----- - -- -- - -- i t---1""- - 1----- L- -.-- -- -- f- - - - ---, 

USAF in CENTRAL AFRICA I I USAFinlheMIDDLE EAST _ _ _ ~ I NO ATLANTIC DIV (CE) I ~ 

1 US MILITARY IRANIAN MISSION 

(USMIM) 27 Sep'4I-24 Jun '42 

(BoQhdad 30 How 41-15 Nor '42) 

(Basra 15 Mar - 24 Jun '42) 

LEGEND 

--- E ... olutlon of CamIRand 

(Succe .. ion, ob.orbtlon, r.de"9notlon, .tc I 

- - - O .... roll Re.ponllbility 

---- Admlnl,trotlon and Supply 

- - - - - Coordination and LlOI,on 

- _._._._. Supply only 

(USAFICA) (Accra) 5 Jo' '42-1 I (USAFIME)(Cairo) ,7 Jo. 42- I I ~ 

I

r - .J I r - - - - i.....1- !-- - - ~ - - - - - ± - - -I- - - - -,--!I-;------i-----------,I 

,-----'----, I I' .r::. t- - - - - - .., 

I 

SOS USAFICA I I,USAF in LIBERIA (USAFIL) j NO AFRICAN SERV CMD NO AFRICAN ENGR DIS~ IIRANIAN ENGR DIST - - IRAN-IRAQ SERY CMD US MIDDLE EAST ARMY AIR FORCESJ 

(Acero) 14 Jut ~2- (Talk Forci 5889) 24 Jun - 15 Auo '42 1 I I (Bo&ro) 24 Jun -I~ /Lug 42 (USMEAAF) 28 Jun -12 No ... '42 

(Roberfs Field) Jun-Oec 42 (Cairo 24 Jun-I Jul _2) I I ReClulg PERSIAN GULF SERV ~ ____ R_lde.lg NINTH AAF 

(Gura,Erit I Jul-15Auo'42) t: : CMD (PGSC) 13 /Lug '42 

r - --L r- - t--r - - ---, 1 I r I t-- ~I~IO_H ______ _ 

.1 c---- ----I-~~----- ---1 r---: : ISOUTHWESTER-N-AR~ cENTRAt-.iREA JII NORTHE!N AREA I 

I

ERITREA AREA I lHELIOPOLIS AREAl I IPALESTINE AREAl I 'I (Basra)' 50.- 21 Doc 42 II (Ahwaz), 50.-21 00'42J BTehran) S •• -2100''42J 24 Jun-15 Au; '42 I 24 Jun-15 AU9 ~2J L 6 Jul-15 AUQ~2J I 

t--..:L 

II EASTERN AREA I IICZOhldanHNon-Operotlonol) I 

....ri ~ --=- ::-::---=-= ffi = --=-= b -=--1 ~ ~ - - - - ~ : r - - ---.J t-- ,.-- - ~Rf!!2!!.S -- I- - -- ~ -- -I"- --..:-1. IERITREA SERY CMDL 

I 15 Au; 42- I I

DEL TA SERV CMDI 

15 AU9 '42- J ILEVANT SERV CMlll 

L 15 Aug 42- J IICONSTRUCTION SERV II 20 Oc1 42-

PORT SERV 

20 Oct '42- MIL RAIL SERV I 20 Oct '42-

IIMOTOR TRANS SERVI l SIGNAL SERV 

I L 20 Oct '42- J 20 Oct '42-

-.- --~---

IWAR DEPARTMENTI , r- - -r I- - t-- - - -- -- L--- -- -r- -- - -- -~ -- -I- -, 

r-"'US='ALF=CI"'C.JA--; 

to 15 SIP '43 I 

NATO USA I 

4 Feb 43-

l USAFIME 

I 

- - - - - - - -, I NO ATLANTIC DIV (CE) I I : 1 1 r-.....J 

I 

I 

SOS USA FICA I 

to I~ SIP '43 

r.....J 

i 

I

SUB HQ (Dakar) I 

18 Dec '42- 27 Sep43 I 

r-t- -t--r--t---.L 

r=~...,1 I I 

I 

USAFIL liMED BASE SECTI SOS USAFIME I 

12 o.e '42-1 (See Charf ~) I (COIrO)4Nov'42-15S.P'4~ 

r;. t-::---=-=!-:- - Po ~ ---- ERITREA SERV CMDI IDELTA SERY CMDI 

- - r-- ----T' - - - - - -4- -- - - ~ - ~ - - ~ ....--++----t----t----t--t-----,J '..r::.t--------L--, ~~ NO AFRICAN ENGR DIST I I IRANIAN ENGR DIST -~ i Cloud 1 May 43 J Cloeed I May ~3 . ~ II'JI ~ ___ ~ __ ~,,~(ln~ ~Ie 

~_-=-:I_~":-::; - -- r- -- -- . ~I-""---"T'----=:-----' Iii-I 

j

NINTH AAF)j Tron, to ETO 

Oct '43 

I LEVANT SERV CMDJ I I LIBYAN SERV CMD ) I I: : ~r'---,-'-:Pc:!G"S'::-C--- 7 O.c '42 -31 May '43 I I I L (8asro to 3Jon'4]) 

L.--IJ'o-----'1'----'lI'-----~---1"--~--t--..... ""'- .. -_T .... ----.... I (Be."QhaZl 7 o.c '42-1 Mar 43) '--+--I ~ (Tenron 3 Jon '43) 

I (Tripoli' ".'-31 ".,431 I II r -~ -4 -f- - -t-t'- - t- r~ - - -~ -..:l 

, r----'~--_ J-l- -, II, BASRA DIST ~~ I AHWAZ DIST II, TEHRAN DIST _I l ZAHIDAN DISTJ 

I I

I TRIPOLlJ I,CYREP4AICA,11 2ID.C42-t6Moy~3 I 210'C42-16 Moy'43 21 Dec'4Z-16Moy43 (New,rActl'lored) 

SUB AREA sue AREA I GULF DISTI6" • DESERT DISTI6Mo,43- MT DIST 16 "'. 43-

I , ... '-3,1",,,43 '''.'-3,,,.,43 1 ,..-tr--L-r -- -,-1-- --- ~--~ 

l

TRIPOLI BASE, CMDLUBENGHAZI BASE CMDI CON S~RV I L ~'Ul!!!l<,U PORT SERV MRS MTS~ IS"-IG::-'-=S-=E-=R"'V'I 31 "'0),-25 Sep 43 rl 31 "'oy-21 No ... '43 J to I Mar 43 I' HmeHqJilOj.~T- L--'='-----=r-~ 

-

1 - IWAR DEPARTMENTI 

~------

~ 

--n:.--r-----I-------

IUSAFIMEj 

r ~---f---4-I-- ----I---f-i.--I-------------

I

WEST AF SERV CMD (WASC)I USAFIL MBS I ESC J 15 SIP '.3- I to 16 F.b 44 

r-..J 

I BASE SECT NO II 

21 S.p~3-3IJan~41 

l ose I to 16 F.b '44 J I LSC J LCloeed Jon ~4 

--~--- r----I-r- NATO USA I USAFI~E I 

to I Mar 45 

,--L~r-,- -r - - -1"-,7 - - - -t'T- - -fJ I WASC I I USAFIL II MBS:I IMIDDLE EAST SERV CMDI r----J to 28 Apr 45 t028F'b'45~ (MESC) 16 Feb '44 J 

___ I WAR DEPARTMENT I ::L __ 

__ IO~-_ 

...!:..!.O.2:!..!l __ , ~ I 

r---~p G~S::-:C::'--'---' 

to 10 o.c '43 

PERSIAN GULF CMD 

10 O.c '43-

I 

GULF DISTIl 

PORT S~R'."II 3 Mar 4]-

PGC 

I t-- - ~ ~E R~I S-T-J r-:-Mc::O-:-: 'U~N~TA:-:I7.N--::D"'IS::-:T:::--'t I to 29 Jon '45 to 22 JOn'45 I R.pl by Repl by Amirobod Polt 

Andim.,hk POlt 

rD-A-K-'-AR'--B-ASLE-C-MC':D"11 ~ L - - .....J 

3' Jo.'44-28 A., '45 I ERITREA BASE, CM~I 

L~ ~-I-: - -1---rr-- 16 F.b- 25 Dec 44 .J GULF DISTI 

PORT SERV I MRS I MTS I 

pd MRS 10 Apr 4+i Cloeed , Dec 441 

L SIG SERVJ 

to Z4 F.b '45 

IWAR DEPARTMENTI 

r------~--- ~I l

AFRICA-MIDDLE EAST THEATRE I 

(AMET) 1 Mor'45-31 May '46 

IO"-?lID,,'4~ 'il 

.--_""rL, -- r"1-- --Ii - -- - -: - WASC IINO AFRICAN SERV CMD II EBC II MESC J -_.i....- 1 - r --

~W~E~ST~A~F~R~IC~A~N~D~I~ST~(~W~A~D~)I --. - - - - - - --?" - - -;._---.~---'=:L.21-L-__,1 

DET US ARMY IN MIDOLE EASTjl1 PGC loIO'I~5 to I Jut '45 I UCO$Qblonco) I Mar ~5-20Mor4!J l25 Dec "44-28 Feb "~ L'O 20 Mar "46 (Casablanco) 15 May'46- I (DUSAME )(CompHucks'ep) 17 MO)'46-1 PGSC I Oct 4S-Closed 31 {)ec45 

i.. ___ , I ___ --I (Ktlorrom,l'Iahr IOct-) 

- t- - - - ... -""-,---,-_:_=_:'_-,-..1':"'.-'-::-::-=- r- - 1::1 

I 

AND'''ESH" POST IAMIRABAD POST I I 

DAKAR :SE,C~'~- - --- - 'tU-S~;I~ - - -~!: l ® 

28 Ap,-I J,I 45 r 128 Apr'45-1 •• Cl24 F.b 46~~ - I~M(I 4~ 

~ ____ -,--r_- ~ -r-- - - r:. - t-- - - ..::I - -r::c------::-::-:..=1~=:c_::_:= 

I 

SOUTHWESTERN TOWN CMD I rl SOUTHERN 1)IIWESTERN TOWN CENTER TOWN CMD lEASTERN TOWN CMDI .~ (Dakar) 15 NaY'4~-Mor '46 j ~ TOWN CMD (Accra) CMD (Oron) (AIQiers) Mar'45-Nor '46 (Tunis) Mor"45-Mor '46 I ~ 

~ I r':4.:J".' '46 "0,45-"."46 ~ 

DAKAR BASE CMD 

I Jul -15 No ... '45 

<D Oet 2d 510 Ser ... 8n r.mained at /L,mora otter 28 Feb '46 und.r dlr~ct control of Chllt Signal Officer, War Oe"t 

RESIDUAL TEAMS I 

L 

" 

IWAR DEPARTMENTI 

..r::.- ~- :::J ___ ~ ___ -, 

USFET I 

(See Chari 4b)J 

L..-.l 

l WAD I JUn'46-J 

o II conI 31 Oct 46 

r-________ J--J ______ ---, 

I 

DUSAME 1 Jun "46-0Iscon.' 10 Mar 47 

(Com" Huck.Sl.p 10 19 Jul 46) 

(Poyn. FI.ld 19 Jul-' O.c '46) 

(Cairo I Dec 46 -10 Mar '47) 

L - - -r------=-=--,:=:L-:-'::-::-L:-:: r:::--, RESIDUAL TEAMS I 

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I (All inoct by 10 March '47) I 

--r 

PORT SERVI 

10 I Ocl'45 J 

~IOct~5 tol0cl'45 I 

r-- -r - -r - - -

l 3d MRS 

Cloud 25 Jun'45 

--'---=1 

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Cloud 15 Aug ",5J 

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MAP 5