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******************************************************VICTORAYALAv. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION (AC 36739)
Lavine, Beach and Pellegrino, Js. Argued April 6—officially released September 8, 2015 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Tolland, Sferrazza, J.)
Steven B. Rasile, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).
Lisa Herskowitz, senior assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state’s attorney, andRebeccaA. Barry, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).Opinion BEACH, J. The petitioner, VictorAyala, appeals from the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for habeas corpus relief. On appeal, the petitioner claimsthatthehabeas courterredinnotfindingthathis trialcounselprovidedineffectiveassistancebyfailingto investigate andpresentthe testimony oftwo witnesses. We affirm the judgment of the habeas court.
The facts regarding the petitioner’s underlying conviction, as recited by this court on direct appeal, are
asfollows: ‘‘OnNovember4, 2007, the [petitioner] twice visited the apartment ofthe victim [Terry Weaver] and her husband [Christopher Weaver]. On the first occasion,the [petitioner] knockedonthedoorandthevictim allowed him to enter and search her residence for his girlfriend [Marilyn Lozada, also known as Chena]. Later that night, the [petitioner] returned to the [Weavers’] residence and, unbeknownstto [thevictim], waitedoutside, hidden from the view ofthe door’s peephole, until the victim opened the door to get some air. When she opened the door, the [petitioner] pushed his way into the apartment and stuck what she described as a black handgun into her stomach, threatened to kill her and inquired about the whereabouts of his girlfriend. The victim informed the [petitioner] that his girlfriend was not at her residence, at which time the [petitioner] pushed her and demanded that she sit on the couch. The [petitioner] then searched the residence for his girlfriend, and when he was unable to find her, he left the residence. ‘‘The victim then called the police to report the incident. Special weapons and tactical unit members responded to the call and searched the [Weavers’] residence. Local patrol officers also arrived on the scene and questioned the victim about the [petitioner]. She provided the officers with the [petitioner’s] name and his physical description. The victim also dictated and signedastatementforthepolice regardingthe incident. The police then searched the vicinity for the [petitioner]. After locating him, they conducted a one-onone identification [procedure] whereby the victim was asked to look at the [petitioner] and determine if he
was the person who committed the alleged crimes at herresidence. The victimpositively identifiedthe [petitioner] as the individual who had entered herresidence [in the early hours of] that morning. ‘‘The [petitioner] subsequently was arrested and charged in a six count information with burglary in the second degree with a firearm in violation of [General Statutes] § 53a-102a (a), burglary in the first degree in violation of [General Statutes] § 53a-101 (a) (3), kidnapping in the second degree with a firearm in violation of [General Statutes] § 53a-94a (a), threatening in the second degree in violation of [General Statutes] § 53a-62 (a) (1) and interfering with an officer in violation of [GeneralStatutes] § 53a-167a(a).Afterthe [petitioner’s] arrest, the victim and her husband signed statements recanting their allegations against the [petitioner]. When questioned at trial, however, they testified that they signed those statements due to pressure from the [petitioner’s] girlfriend and asserted that the victim’s initial statement to the police and her husband’s testimony at trial were the truthful account ofthe incident. After trial, the [petitioner] was convicted on all counts and was sentenced to a total effective term offourteen years of incarceration.’’ (Footnotes omitted.) State v. Ayala, 133 Conn. App. 514, 516–17, 36 A.3d 274, cert. denied, 304 Conn. 913, 40 A.3d 318 (2012). The petitioner’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. Id., 526.
The petitioner filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus on September 25, 2013. Following a trial, the habeas court issued a memorandum of decision denying the amended petition. The habeas court granted the petition for certification. This appeal followed. ‘‘Our review of the judgment of the habeas court is carefully circumscribed. The underlyinghistoricalfacts found by the habeas court may not be disturbed unless the findings were clearly erroneous.

. . . Whether the representation a [petitioner] received

. . . was constitutionally inadequate is a mixed question of law and fact.

. . . As such, that question requires plenary reviewbythis courtunfetteredbythe clearlyerroneous standard.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vivo v. Commissioner of Correction, 90 Conn. App. 167, 173, 876 A.2d 1216, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 925, 883 A.2d 1253 (2005). ‘‘To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a habeas petitioner must satisfy the twopronged test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Stricklandrequiresthatapetitionersatisfyboth
a performance prong and a prejudice prong.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santaniello v. Commissioner of Correction, 152 Conn. App. 583, 587–88, 99 A.3d 1195, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 937, 102 A.3d 1115 (2014). ‘‘The first component of the Strickland test, generallyreferredtoastheperformanceprong, requires that the petitioner show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

. . . In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court held that [j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a [petitioner] to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense, after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act
or omission of counsel was unreasonable.

. . . ‘‘Even if a petitioner shows that counsel’s perfor-mance was deficient, the second prong, or prejudice prong, requires that the petitioner show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Martinez v. Commissioner of Correction, 147 Conn. App. 307, 313–14, 82 A.3d 666 (2013), cert. denied, 311 Conn. 917, 85 A.3d 652 (2014). ‘‘In making [the prejudice] determination, a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality ofthe evidence before the judge or the jury.

. . . [A] verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affectedby errors than one with overwhelming record support.

. . . [T]he ultimate focus ofinquiry must be on the fundamental fairness ofthe proceeding whose result is being challenged.

. . . The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning ofthe adversarialprocessthatthe trial cannotbe relied onas havingproducedajustresult.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sanchezv. CommissionerofCorrection, 314Conn. 585, 606–607, 103 A.3d 954 (2014).
The petitioner claims that the habeas court erred in finding that he failed to demonstrate that he was prejudicedbyhiscounsel’sperformance. Hefirstargues here, as he didinthe habeas court, thathis trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to investigate and to present the testimony oftwo witnesses, the petitioner’s brother Fernando Ayala (Fernando), and Jesus Gonzalez. The petitionerassertedthatthesewitnesses couldhaveprovided to thejury evidence that he resided at the Weavers’ apartment.1 Thepetitionerarguesthathisresidency at the scene ofthe crime would have defeated the element of unlawful entry, common to both burglary counts.2 Additionally, the petitioner argues that the testimony of Gonzalez and Fernando could have served to discredit all of the Weavers’ testimony.
The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, argues that the habeas court correctly concluded that it was not reasonably probable that the testimony of Fernando and Gonzalez would have affected the outcome of the petitioner’s trial.3 The respondent argues that the testimony of Fernando and Gonzalez would have merely echoed Katherine Campbell’s testimony,4 and thejury would have found them less credible than Campbell because of kinship and criminal records.5
Additional facts are helpful to the resolution of this claim. The habeas court determined that at the time of the petitioner’s arrest, he was found by police in a stairwell of an apartment building on Cedar Street in Meriden, a few blocks from the Weavers’ apartment. He was wearing his coat inside out, and he held a bandana and a cap in his hand. When confronted by the police, the petitioner gave a false name and birth date,denied that he had been in the Weavers’ apartment building that night, and explained that he had been visiting a friend in the Cedar Street building, but could not rememberthe friend’s name or apartment number.6
At the underlying criminal trial, Terry Weaver testified that Lozada had been living in the apartment in exchange for crack cocaine. According to Weaver, the petitioner occasionally stayed in the apartment with Lozada, but he did not have a key, and Lozada had vacated the apartment a few days before the incident. Trial counsel presented one defense witness at the underlying criminal trial, Campbell, the petitioner’s friend. She testified at the criminal trial that she had either picked up or dropped off the petitioner in front ofthe Weavers’ apartment building three or four times, including once about one week before the incident, but that she never entered the building herself.
Fernando testified at the habeas trial: that he frequently stopped by the Weavers’ apartment to see the petitioner, sometimes unannounced; thatthe petitioner had a key that he used to enter the apartment;7 that the Weavers never seemed surprised to see them; that he and the petitioner would spend time in the petitioner’s bedroom; that he sometimes paid the petitioner’s rent to the Weavers, in either cash or drugs; andthatthe last timehehadpickedupthepetitionerfromtheapartment
was about one and one-half days before the incident. He also testified that, although the bed and sofa in the petitioner’s bedroom did not belong to the petitioner, he kept several of his possessions there, including a small television, a nightstand, clothing, and some personal items. Fernando picked up these possessions from the Weavers’ apartment a few months after the petitioner’s arrest. Gonzalez testified atthe habeas trial thathevisitedthepetitionerthreetimes atthe Weavers’ apartment, and stayed overnight once. The habeas court concluded that the petitioner had notmethis burdento proveprejudice underStrickland regardingthepotentialtestimonyofFernando and Gonzalez.8 The court concluded that the testimony of FernandoandGonzalezwouldhavebeenonly‘‘peripherally inconsistent’’ with that of the Weavers. The habeas court did not explicitly find the testimony ofFernando and Gonzalez credible.9
We agree with the habeas court that even ifthe testimony of Fernando and Gonzalez had been presented atthe petitioner’s criminaltrial, there was not areasonable probabilitythatthe result ofthe proceeding would have been different; our confidence in the outcome has not been undermined. The case against the petitioner
wasfairlystrong. Thestatepresentedtwoeyewitnesses, theWeavers, who knewthepetitioner, calledthepolice, positively identified him, and testified against him at trial. There was evidence that the petitioner had lied to the police and had attempted to disguise his appear-ance at the time of his arrest.
The petitioner’s putative witnesses would not have aidedhisdefensesignificantly. The differencesbetween the testimony of Fernando and Gonzalez at the habeas trial and the testimony of the Weavers and Campbell at the underlying criminal trial were minor and largely reconcilable. As the habeas court aptly stated, ‘‘Although the Weavers denied that the petitioner was givenakeytotheirapartment, thepetitionercouldhave received the key, or a copy, from Lozada. The visits by [Fernando and Gonzalez] to the apartment [are] compatible with the Weavers’ version that the petitioner occasionally stayed at the apartment with his girlfriend.’’ Casualpermissionto staywith Lozadais different from authority to enter and remain in the premises
as a matter of right, and whether the petitioner had
everpaidrentinsomefashionisnotdispositive. Neither of the putative witnesses would have established that the petitioner had the right to be on the premises at the time of the crime. Even if he had been a frequent guest, either of the Weavers or of Lozada, he was not there as a matter of right, and he could still be found guilty of burglary. See generally State v. Stagnitta, 74 Conn. App. 607, 612, 615, 813 A.2d 1033 (‘‘To enter unlawfully means to accomplish an entry by unlawful means, whiletoremainunlawfullymeansthattheinitial entering of the building

. . . was lawful but the presence therein became unlawful because the right, privilege orlicenseto remainwas extinguished. Wheneither ofthese situations is established, the threshold element of burglary is present.

. . . A license in real property is defined as a personal, revocable, and unassignable privilege, conferredeitherbywritingorparol, to do one
or more acts on land without possessing any interest therein.

. . . Generally, a license to enter premises is revocable at any time by the licensor.

. . . It is exercisable only within the scope of the consent given

. . . . The phrase, licensed or privileged, as used in General Statutes § 53a-100 [b] is meant as a unitary phrase, rather than as a reference to two separate concepts.’’ [Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.]), cert. denied, 263 Conn. 902, 819 A.2d 838 (2003). Furthermore, the Weavers were cross-examined at the underlying criminal trial regarding their extensive druguse, criminalactivity, andrecantationoftheiroriginal statements. The jury believed the Weavers’ testimony. Additional testimony regarding the petitioner’s residency, indirect in any event, would most likely not have swayed the jury to disbelieve the whole of the Weavers’ testimony. We conclude that there is not a reasonable probability that the testimony of Fernando and Gonzalez would have altered thejury’s verdict, and
our confidence in the verdict is not undermined. The habeas court did not err in concluding that the petitioner was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s per-formance.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The petitioner also argued in the habeas court that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and to present the testimony of his girlfriend, Lozada, who could also have testified about his residency. The habeas court found that trial counsel attempted to locate Lozadapersonally and through an investigator, and spoke to her on the telephone. Lozadawas not called as a witness at the habeas trial, and her whereabouts were unknown. The habeas court concluded that the petitioner had not met his burden to prove deficient performance or prejudice under Strickland regarding Lozada. The petitioner does not challenge these conclusions on appeal.

2 The petitioner was convicted of burglary in the second degree with a firearm in violation of § 53a-102a (a), and burglary in the first degree in violation of § 53a-101 (a) (3). Burglary in the second degree with a firearm incorporates the definition ofburglary in the second degree, which appears in General Statutes § 53a-102 (a) andprovides: ‘‘Apersonis guiltyofburglary in the second degree when such person enters or remains unlawfully in

a dwelling, while a person other than a participant in the crime is actually present in such dwelling, with intent to commit a crime therein.’’ (Emphasis added.) Section 53a-101 (a), definingburglary inthe first degree, states in relevant part: ‘‘A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree when

. . . (3) such person enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling at night with intent to commit a crime therein.’’ (Emphasis added.)

3 Thehabeascourtdidnotmakeanexpressfindingregardingperformance. Rather, the court focused on whether there was any prejudice, that is, whether the additional evidence would have mattered.

4 Campbell was, accordingto the habeas court, a ‘‘friend’’ ofthe petitioner who helped him with applications for assistance and ‘‘getting to appointments.’’

5 The respondent argues for affirmance on the alternative ground that neither Fernando nor Gonzalez testified at the habeas trial that he would have testified at the criminal trial. There was testimony at the habeas trial that Fernando was in a residential drug treatment program and Gonzalez

was incarcerated at the time ofthe petitioner’s criminal trial. Testimony at trialmayhave implicatedthemin drugtransactions, atatime whenprosecution was not barred by a statute of limitations. The habeas court made no findings in this regard, and we decline to address the argument.
6 The police asked the petitioner about a handgun, and the petitioner replied that it was a can opener. A search of the Cedar Street building led to the seizure ofapaint can opener. No gun was ever found. State v. Ayala, supra, 133 Conn. App. 516 n.2.

7 The habeas court found that the petitioner agreed with the testimony of Terry Weaver, that he did not have a key to the apartment.
8 The habeas court noted that even if the petitioner had been renting a
room from the Weavers on the evening of November 4, 2007, his entrance into the Weavers’ bedroom would not have been lawful. General Statutes § 53a-100 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The following definitions are applicable to this part: (1) ‘Building’

. . . . [w]here abuilding consists of separate units, such as, but not limited to separate apartments, offices or rented rooms, any unit not occupied by the actor is, in addition to being a part of such building, a separate building

. . . .’’ According to the Weavers, the petitioner had searched their bedroom in his search for Lozada, and there was no evidence that he was authorized to enter that room.
9 The habeas court also noted that it disbelieved the petitioner’s version ofevents, whichincludedthetwouneventfulvisitstotheWeavers’apartment the night of November 4, 2007, but the petitioner failed to explain why the Weavers would concoct their story, why he attempted to disguise his appearance immediately before his arrest, why he gave a false name and birth date, and why he lied to the police.