J-S05026-24

2024 PA Super 149

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMES DOUGLAS AKELEY 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1165 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 31, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Potter County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-53-SA-0000002-2023

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

OPINION BY KING, J.: FILED: JULY 19, 2024

Appellant, James Douglas Akeley, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered in the Potter County Court of Common Pleas, following his 

bench trial conviction for operating a vehicle with a suspended registration.

1

 

We reverse Appellant’s conviction and vacate the judgment of sentence. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On 

December 30, 2022, Officer Chip Scheller initiated a traffic stop of Appellant’s 

vehicle for having dark tinted windows. Appellant was driving a 2014 Subaru 

Legacy bearing the Pennsylvania registration number LJR 3959. When Officer 

Scheller ran the registration number, the system indicated that the vehicle’s 

registration was suspended. Upon further inquiry, Officer Scheller received 

documentation that Appellant’s vehicle registration was suspended for failure 

____________________________________________

1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1371(a). 
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to maintain insurance and the suspension was effective beginning on 

December 12, 2022. Appellant provided Officer Scheller with an identification 

card but did not produce proof of his registration. Officer Scheller could not 

recall whether Appellant provided proof of insurance. Officer Scheller issued

Appellant a citation for the tinted window and driving with a suspended 

registration. Appellant pled guilty on both counts at the Magisterial District 

Court. Appellant timely appealed his conviction for driving with a suspended 

registration to the Court of Common Pleas. 

The Court of Common Pleas conducted a bench trial on June 6, 2023. 

At trial, the Commonwealth presented testimony from Officer Scheller, who 

testified to the aforementioned facts. The Commonwealth further placed into 

evidence the vehicle record abstract from the Pennsylvania Department of 

Transportation (“PennDOT”). The document included a signed certification 

and attestation from the PennDOT custodian of records that the document was 

a full, true, and correct copy of the PennDOT record. The document further 

stated that Appellant was the owner of the vehicle with the tag number LJR 

3959 and the registration for this vehicle was suspended effective December 

12, 2022. The document did not indicate whether Appellant had been sent 

notice of his vehicle’s suspension. Officer Scheller also did not provide any 

additional testimony to indicate that Appellant had notice of the registration 

suspension prior to December 30, 2022, when Appellant was issued the 

citation. 
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On August 31, 2023, the court entered an order finding Appellant guilty 

of operating a vehicle with a suspended registration and imposed a fine of 

$200.00. Appellant filed a post-sentence motion on September 8, 2023, 

arguing, inter alia, that the Commonwealth failed to present any evidence that 

Appellant had notice that his registration was suspended. The court denied 

the post-sentence motion on September 15, 2023. Appellant filed a timely 

notice of appeal on September 26, 2023. On October 4, 2023, the court 

ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal, and Appellant complied on October 19, 2023. 

Appellant raises the following issues for our review: 

Assuming arguendo that PennDOT lawfully and legally 

suspended the registration of the Subaru, whether there 

was sufficient evidence to convict [Appellant] when there is 

no evidence that he had been notified of the suspension nor 

any evidence that he was in any manner aware, at the time 

of the traffic stop, that the registration of the Subaru had 

been suspended? 

Assuming arguendo that [Appellant] was provided advance 

due process notification of the suspension, whether the 

evidence was sufficient to find beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the registration was, in fact, otherwise lawfully and 

legally suspended? 

Assuming arguendo that the conviction was otherwise valid, 

whether there was sufficient evidence to find beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the conviction of [Appellant] was in 

compliance of his Due Process Rights under the 14th

Amendment of the United States Constitution and under 

Section 1, Section 9 and Section 11 of Article I of the

Pennsylvania Constitution since there is no evidence 

whatsoever that [Appellant] was ever notified by PennDOT, 

by the Pennsylvania State Police, by any insurance company 

or anyone else that the registration for the Subaru was 
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being considered for suspension? 

(Appellant’s Brief at 7-8) (reordered for purpose of disposition). 

In his first issue, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to 

present any evidence to establish that Appellant had notice that his 

registration was suspended. Appellant asserts that Section 1371(a) requires 

the Commonwealth to establish that Appellant knew his registration was 

suspended when he drove his vehicle. Appellant contends that the mere fact 

that Appellant is presumed to know the law should not negate the 

Commonwealth’s burden to establish notice. Appellant maintains that the only 

construction of Section 1371(a) which protects his due process rights requires

the Commonwealth to establish as an element of the offense that Appellant 

had notice that his registration was suspended. Appellant concludes that the 

Commonwealth’s failure to present any evidence of notice renders the 

evidence insufficient to sustain his conviction, and this Court should reverse 

the conviction and vacate the judgment of sentence. We agree. 

A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence “presents a pure question 

of law and, as such, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review 

is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Santiago, 294 A.3d 482, 485 (Pa.Super 

2023). The following principles govern our review of a sufficiency challenge:

As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency 

claims requires that we evaluate the record in the light most 

favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the 

benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 

evidence. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the 

verdict when it establishes each material element of the 
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crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused, 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the 

Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical 

certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be 

resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak 

and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of 

fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances. 

The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of 

wholly circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, [t]he fact that 

the evidence establishing a defendant’s participation in a 

crime is circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where 

the evidence coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn 

therefrom overcomes the presumption of innocence. 

Significantly, we may not substitute our judgment for that 

of the fact finder; thus, so long as the evidence adduced, 

accepted in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

demonstrates the respective elements of a defendant’s 

crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s 

convictions will be upheld. 

Commonwealth v. Sebolka, 205 A.3d 329, 336-37 (Pa.Super. 2019) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Franklin, 69 A.3d 719, 722-23 (Pa.Super. 

2013)). 

Section 1371 of the Motor Vehicle Code defines the offense of driving 

with a suspended registration as follows:

§ 1371. Operation following suspension of 

registration

(a) General rule.—No person shall operate and no owner 

shall permit to be operated upon any highway a vehicle the 

registration of which has been suspended.

(b) Penalty.—Any person violating this section is guilty of 

a summary offense and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced 

to pay a fine of not less than $100 nor more than $500. In 

the case of a motor carrier vehicle other than a trailer, the 

fine shall be double the registration fee for the maximum 

weight at which the vehicle could have been registered in 
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this Commonwealth.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1371. 

Although our courts have not yet considered whether notice is a required 

element of driving with a suspended registration, this Court has addressed 

whether notice is an element of driving with a suspended license. Notably, 

Section 1543 of the Motor Vehicle Code defines the offense of driving with a 

suspended license, in relevant part, as follows:

§ 1543. Driving while operating privilege is 

suspended or revoked

(a) Offense defined—Except as provided in subsection 

(b), any person who drives a motor vehicle on any highway 

or trafficway of this Commonwealth after the 

commencement of a suspension, revocation or cancellation 

of the operating privilege and before the operating privilege 

has been restored is guilty of a summary offense and shall, 

upon conviction or adjudication of delinquency, be 

sentenced to pay a fine of $200.

* * *

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(a). In defining the elements of this offense, this Court 

has consistently held that “[p]roof of actual notice of the suspension of an 

appellant’s operator’s license is necessary to establish an essential element of 

the crime of operating a motor vehicle while one’s operator’s license is 

suspended.” Commonwealth v. Baer, 682 A.2d 802, 805 (Pa.Super. 1996). 

To meet its burden, the Commonwealth must demonstrate actual notice, not 

merely constructive notice, through facts and circumstances to show that the 

defendant received knowledge of the suspension. Id. (citing
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Commonwealth v. Crockford, 660 A.2d 1326, 1330 n. 3 (Pa.Super. 1995)

(en banc), appeal denied, 543 Pa. 690, 670 A.2d 140 (1995)). 

This Court has explained that the rationale for requiring the 

Commonwealth to establish notice is “is not grounded in mens rea in terms of 

conduct but rather notice as a component of procedural due process.” 

Commonwealth v. Peralta, 311 A.3d 1, 8 (Pa.Super. 2024). The decision 

to drive while being aware of the restriction is what creates the liability for the 

offense. Id. at 8-9. “Notice is, therefore, a judicially created element, 

designed to protect a defendant’s due process rights.” Crockford, supra at 

1329. 

Additionally, in Peralta, this Court recently analyzed whether notice is 

a required element of the offense of driving without an ignition interlock 

system. Section 3808 of the Motor Vehicle Code defines that offense, in 

relevant part, as follows:

§ 3808. Illegally operating a motor vehicle not 

equipped with ignition interlock

(a)Offense defined.—

(1) An individual required to only drive, operate or be in 

actual physical control of the movement of a motor vehicle 

equipped with an ignition interlock system under any of the 

following who drives, operates or is in actual physical control 

of the movement of a motor vehicle within this 

Commonwealth without such a system commits a 

misdemeanor and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to 

pay a fine of not less than $300 and not more than $1,000 

and to imprisonment for not more than 90 days[.]

* * *
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75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3808(a)(1). The Peralta Court determined that the 

Commonwealth was required to establish that the defendant had notice that 

he could not operate his vehicle without an ignition interlock system to sustain 

a conviction under Section 3808. In its analysis, the Peralta Court found the 

case law establishing the notice requirement for Section 1543 (related to 

driving with a suspended or revoked license) to be applicable to Section 3808. 

The Court noted that for both offenses, the decision to drive while aware of 

the restriction imposed is what creates liability under the offense. As such, 

the Peralta Court concluded that notice was a necessary element of the 

offense in order to protect the defendant’s due process rights. 

Instantly, the Commonwealth argues that “[t]he express language of § 

1371(a) driving with a suspended registration makes no mention of notice or 

knowledge of a suspended registration.” (Commonwealth’s Brief at 8). While 

we agree with the Commonwealth that the statutory language does not specify 

a notice element, similar to Sections 1543 and 3808, the offense of driving 

with a suspended registration prohibits an individual from driving a vehicle

when a certain restriction has been imposed. Specifically, Section 1371 

prohibits an individual from operating a vehicle when its registration has been 

suspended. In accordance with our case law interpreting Sections 1543 and 

3808, we hold that liability is created for the offense of driving with a 

suspended registration when a registrant chooses to drive a vehicle with 

awareness that the vehicle’s registration is suspended. See Peralta, supra; 
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Baer, supra. See also Crockford, supra. Therefore, we conclude that 

notice that a vehicle’s registration has been suspended is a necessary element 

that the Commonwealth must prove to convict an individual of driving with a 

suspended registration. 

As such, we must examine whether the Commonwealth presented 

sufficient evidence of notice in this case. “Notice is a question of fact, and 

anything that proves knowledge or is legal evidence showing knowledge exists 

can be sufficient.” Crockford, supra at 1330. Actual notice “may take the 

form of a collection of facts and circumstances that allow the fact finder to 

infer that a defendant has knowledge of suspension.” Id. at 1330-31. “While 

[there is] no hard and fast rule as to the kinds of proof required to establish 

actual notice of suspension, ... evidence of mailing of notice coupled with some 

other, additional evidence of knowledge will suffice to establish actual notice 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 1329. 

Additionally, with respect to notice of a license suspension, our Supreme 

Court has stated: 

Factors that a finder of fact may consider in determining 

circumstantially or directly whether a defendant had actual 

notice of his or her suspension include, but are not limited 

to, evidence that the defendant was verbally or in writing

apprised of the license suspension during the trial or a plea, 

statements by the accused indicating knowledge that he or 

she was driving during the period in which his or her license 

had been suspended, evidence that PennDOT sent by mail 

the notice of the suspension to appellant’s current address, 

evidence that PennDOT’s notice of suspension was not 

returned as undeliverable, attempts by the accused to avoid 

detection or a citation, and any other conduct 
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demonstrating circumstantially or directly appellant’s 

knowledge of the suspension or awareness of guilt.

Commonwealth v. Zimmick, 539 Pa. 548, 555-56, 653 A.2d 1217, 1221 

(1995). 

Here, the record is devoid of any evidence regarding whether Appellant

received notice that the registration of his vehicle had been suspended prior 

to the date that he was pulled over and issued the citation. The 

Commonwealth did not present any documentation or testimony indicating 

that PennDOT mailed a notice of the registration suspension to Appellant’s 

residence. Officer Scheller did not testify that Appellant’s demeanor or 

statements during the traffic stop indicated that he was aware that his 

vehicle’s registration was suspended. The only evidence of record that 

supports an inference that Appellant had notice of the registration suspension 

was Officer Scheller’s testimony that Appellant did not present proof of 

registration during the traffic stop. Nevertheless, this fact alone, without more 

is insufficient to establish that Appellant had actual notice that his registration 

was suspended. See Zimmick, supra; Crockford, supra. Thus, the 

Commonwealth failed to present evidence to establish that Appellant had 

notice of the suspension of his vehicle’s registration, such that the 

Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence to sustain Appellant’s 

conviction under Section 1371. See Sebolka, supra. Accordingly, we 

reverse Appellant’s conviction for driving with a suspended registration and 
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vacate the judgment of sentence.2 

Judgment of sentence vacated. Jurisdiction is relinquished.

DATE: 7/19/2024

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2 Due to our disposition, we need not address Appellant’s remaining issues.