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FLIGHT TEST DEBRIEF NOTE Page 1 of 3

A/C S/N Flight No. Date

DHC – 6 / 400 434 – C-FDHT TC 5 / TC 6 / TC7

(VAL 4.3.041/42/43)

May 27 / 28

2015

Transport Canada Flight Test certification fight and ground testing of Viking Air Limited’s Phase 

2 avionic upgrade.

This formal Certification assessment consisted of three flights, at both forward heavy and light aft 

loadings. This activity was in addition to two previous visits to Viking Air during 2014, where 

Transport Canada participated in familiarization assessments during the development process. In total, 

seven assessment flights were flown by Transport Canada with approximately 20 hours of test. Debrief 

notes were also written during the familiarization assessment flights.

This Debrief Note summarises comments, operating anomalies, review of data requirements, major 

recommendations, possible certification items and certification items arising from the subject flight test 

evaluation. Written responses are required and all items, except comments, must be resolved prior to 

airworthiness approval.

The test flights summarised below were flown on May 27/28, 2015 from Victoria, BC.

TC5 (VAL 4.3.041) Handling Flight

Ground Test

• Certification standard controllers / switches

• FMS Changes

• Electronic Checklist

• GH 3900 Standby ESIS

• IOS from Phase I

• Nuisance messages

• AFCS Preflight Check (AFMS procedure)

• YD functionality – Taxi Ops

• Takeoff using TOGA bars

• Inner Loops stability checks

• Inner Loops accel/ deccel performance

• Vsw disconnect

• YD performance

• Mis trim engagements

• AP disengage forces

• Mis trim forces

• Simulated landing with AP On

• Overspeed Protection

• OEI performance

• Circuits - Familiarization
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FLIGHT TEST DEBRIEF NOTE Page 2 of 3

TC6 (VAL 4.3.042) AFCS Performance Flight

• Takeoff with FD TOGA options

• Ongoing FD mode assessment

• Control Wheel Steering

• Trim Master Switch

• GA mode AFCS disconnect

• GH 3900 ESIS

• GA pitch targets relative to 60% Ng

• Advisory VNAV descent with constraints

• RNAV arrival to ILS

• LNAV Baro VNAV approach

• LPV approach

• Flap 37 ILS – no hazard

• NDB approach

TC 7 (VAL 4.3.043) AFCS Miscellaneous Flight

• GA Pitch Targets – 60%

• Takeoff with FD TOGA options

• Ongoing FD mode assessment

• GH 3900 ESIS

• VNAV descent

• Back course Approaches

• VOR Approaches

• SVS / TAWS Assessment

• AFCS / FD Transfer awareness and Mode Changes

• FAA Displays

• High Altitude AFCS Performance

• LPV approaches with GPS sensor failures

Reference Summary Category

1 Landing with Autopilot On:

A simulated approach and landing was performed as part of the Transport 

Canada evaluation and it was determined that the tests were inconclusive. 

Transport Canada asks that Viking perform this test on an actual landing to 

demonstrate no hazard.

Certification

2 SPD Mode:

As noted during previous TC assessments, the SPD FD mode is really a 

flight level change mode.

During a simulated engine climb (with Ng greater than 60%), with SPD 

mode set to best single engine rate of climb, it was noted that the flight 

Comment
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FLIGHT TEST DEBRIEF NOTE Page 3 of 3

Reference Summary Category

director appeared not command a climb. This was later determined to be a 

possibly be the result of not setting the altitude selector to a higher altitude 

during the test maneuver. This functionality is traditionally associated with 

a flight level change mode.

The scenario tested, with an altitude selector inadvertently left at an MDA 

setting, is not an improbable scenario during a go-around following an 

engine failure.

Transport Canada is concerned that the intended function of the SPD mode 

is not conducive to a single engine climb in all cases.

It is not understood why the FGC panel does not label this mode as a 

FLCH mode to clearly indicate to the crew the complexity inherent in this 

FD mode.

3 Mode Change Awareness: 

As noted in previous TC assessments, the mode awareness during 

uncommanded FD mode changes is not strong.

There are a multitude of Apex system changes which can affect the current 

FD modes, any of which could result in a mode change without significant

pilot awareness.

Viking is encouraged to increase the attention getting qualities of the Apex 

system during uncommanded mode changes for this single pilot aircraft 

being flown by pilots of low experience.

Comment

4 Pitch Trim Inhibit:

The functionality of the pitch trim inhibit switch relative to autopilot 

disconnect was inconsistent and dependent upon whether or not a servo 

load was on the autopilot.

Comment

5 FAA Mandated Gauge Modification:

The green FAA gauges were judged to comply with 23.1549 during flight 

in American airspace.

Comment

Philip Lamont Don Stephen

Transport Canada Flight Test Transport Canada Flight Test