### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON Fe br ua ry 7, 200 6 S es sio n

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. MA RIO JOHN SON

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty

No. 03-04524-25 C hris Craft, Jud ge

No. W2005-01052-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Jun e 2, 2006

This is a direct a

ppeal f rom convictions on a jury verdic t of four counts of agg ravated robbery . See Te nn . Co de An n. § 39 -1 3- 40 2. Th e De fe nd a nt w a s se nte nc e d a s a Ra ng e I I , mu lti ple of

fe nd e r t o six teen y ear s for e ach c onviction to be serve d consec utively in part for

an ef fec tive thirty -two-y ear sentenc e. On a

ppeal, the Def

endant raises f

our issues: (1) the trial court e rre d in consolidating the Def endant’ s two indictments for a single trial; (2) the admission of hea rsay statements is plain err or; (3) the trial court e rre d in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser -included o ff en s e of ag g ravated assault; and (4) the trial cour t’s imposit ion of consec utive s en t ence s violated the De fenda nt’s constitutional rights pursua nt to Blake ly v. Washington, 542 U.S

. 296 (2004). We af firm the judgme nts of the trial court.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J.
, d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u r t, in w h ic h J ER R Y L. S MI TH and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.

L ance Chism, M emphis, Tennesse e, for the appe llant, Mario J ohnson.

Pa ul G. Sum me rs , Atto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Da vidH. F ind le y , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Willi am G ibb on s, Di str

ic t A tto rneyGen eral ; an d Al and a Dwy er, A ss is tan t D is tr ict At to rne y Ge nera l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

F AC TS

The c onvictions at issue in this case stem from two se p ar at e robberies, occ urring a we ek apart, of the same Chinese Restaura nt. The fac ts show that the Def endant, Mario Johnson, robbed the Pe kin g I nn re staur a nt in Me mph is at g un po int on bo th F e br ua ry 26 a nd Ma

rc h 5 of 20 03 . In b oth instances, the D efe ndant, along with one or more acc omplice(s), b o u n d an d gag g ed the sa me twoE ach i ndi ct ment i ncl uded t wo count s of ag gr ava t ed r o b b ery w i t h a l t er nat i ve el ement s for e ach of t he t wo 1

vi ct i m s; c o unt s o ne and thr ee o f each i nd i ct m ent charged aggravat ed rob b ery t hrough vi o l ence, and co unt s t wo and fo ur

o f ea c h ind ic tm e n t ch a rg e d a g g ra v a te d ro b b e ry u n d e r th e the o ry o f p u tti n g the vic tim in fe a r.

M s. Y o ngci C hen and M r. Y i ngb i n C hen subm i t t ed t hei r t est i m o ny at tr ia l th ro u gh an i nt erpret er, who 2

t r ans l at ed t hei r s t at ement s f r om t hei r na t i ve l ang uag e of Cant ones e i nt o Engl i s h. W e not e t he t r ans l at or w as s ubj ect ed
to vo ir d ire a n d fo u n d c o m p e te n t b y the trial c o u rt.

-2- re staur a nt e mpl oy e e s w ith du c t ta pe a ft e r r ob bing th em of pe rs on a l pr op e rt y a nda lso takin g c a sh fr om the sto re re g ist e r. Th e De fe nd a nt wa s ult imate ly arr e ste d, a nd in Ma y of 20 03 , a She lby Cou nty g rand jury

issued two separ ate indictments, one f or ea ch robbe ry , containing fo u r counts of ag g ravated robbe ry

eac h. 1

I n Nov e mbe r

o f 2 0 0 4
, a n e v i d e n t i ar y

h e ar i n g w a s c o n d u c t e d o n t h e S t a t e ’ s m o t i o n to consolidate the two indictments f or trial. The State arg ued that, bec ause ide ntitywas a n issue and beca use the two robbe ries evide nced a common scheme
, the t wo cases s hould be consolidate d for trial. The De fenda nt arg ued that, while some elements of both r obberie s wer e admittedly simil ar, the re wa s n o c omm on sc he me , a nd e ve n if the re wa s, c on so lid a tio n o f the tw o c a se s w ou ld u nf a ir ly prejudice the Def

endant. The trial court g rante d the S tate’s moti on to consolidate, and the Def endant

rec eived a

jury trial in J anuary

of 2005.

At trial, Ms. Yo n gci C h en testified that she wor ks at the Peking I nn restaur ant with her hu sb a nda ndfathe r- in- la w, a ndthat she wa s a vic tim of bo th r ob be ri e s p e rp e tr a te d b y the De fe nd a nt. 2 Ms. Che n e xpla ine d th a t on the e ve nin g of F e br ua ry 26
, 20 03 , s he re c e ive d a c a ll at app ro xima te ly 8:00 for a ta

ke-out orde r to be de livered to the Airport I nn. The tele phone number of the phone from wh ic h th e or de r w a s p la c e d w a s r e c or de d o n th e re staur a nt’ s c a lle r I D. Ms. Ch e n te sti fi e d th a t a “very short time” after the call was place d and her husband lef t to deliver the orde r, the re staurant

was robbed. Acc ording to Ms. Chen, two men enter ed the r estaurant and demande d money . Neither

a tte mpt e d to hid e the ir

ide nti ty , a ndMs. Che n r e c og nize d th e De fe nd a nt a s a fo rm e r p a tr on . M s. Chen explained that one man wa s armed w ith a knife a nd the other a “long g un.” She desc ribed the g unman as “ a tall g uy , much t aller than me. He’ s big and hi s hair is kind of curled up.” Ms. Chen identified the De fenda nt as the g unman.

Ms. Chen testified that the De fenda nt ordere d her to ope n the cash reg ister drawer, and she

c omp lie d. She fu rthe r s ta te d th a t bo th sh e a nd he r fathe r- in- la w we re pla c e d in fe ar. She c ou ld s ta te that her f ather -in-law w as in fea

r bec ause, w hile he did not spe ak Eng lish, he was plea ding w ith the two robber s in Cantonese not to hurt hi m o r h i s d aug hter-in- law. Ms. Chen testified that a fter obtaining mone y

fr o m t h e cash reg ister and taking her pur se, the latter of which c ontained her driver’ s license, the two robber s forc ed her and her fathe r-in-la w into a bac k closet and bound a nd g ag g ed them both with duct t ape. Ms. Chen spe cifica lly reque sted, to no avail, that the robbe rs leave her driver’s lice nse. As the two were leaving , the Def endant a g ain pointed the g un at them and

warned them not to move.-3-

After the two robbe rs l eft, the victims manag ed to fre e themselve s, and Ms. Chen depr essed the alarm button and called the police while her fathe r-in-la w rushed to the f ront door and obse rved the robbe rs flee in “an old ca r, kind of re ddish color.” Ms. Che n also stated that she thoug ht one of the robbe rs as we aring g loves, but she was not sure

. Approxim ately

a we ek later , on Marc h 5, 2003, the s ame thre e people wer e wor king in the
restaur ant when a nother call for a delivery order to the American I nn at t he same addre ss was plac ed at about the sa me time, 8:00 p.m. Additionally , the ca ller I D indicated that this f o o d o rd er was pla c e d f ro m th e sa me ph on e a s th e bo g us or de r d ir e c tly pr e c e din g the ro bb e ry

a we e k e arl ie r. Ms. Che n d id n ot f

ill thi s o rd e r, bu t he r h us ba ndwa s r e qu ir e d to le a ve the re staur a nt o n o the r d e liv e ri e s. A short time later, a

customer c ame in to pick up an or der and was followed by two other men, whom Ms. Che n rec og nized a s the robber s from the previous wee k. The Def endant pointed a

g un
a t Ms . Ch e n a ndhe r f

a the r- in- la w, a g a in p la c ing the m in fe ar. Ms. Che n w a s o nc e a g a in f or c e d to op e n th e c a sh re g ist e r. Du ri ng thi s second rob bery , th e De fe nd a nt’ s a c c omp lic e dis play e d M s. Che n’ s d ri ve rs lic e ns e , sto le n a we e k prior , a ndthr e a te ne d th a t sh e mus t c oo pe rate if sh e wa nte d it back. T he robbe rs stole cash from the reg ister and money from Ms. Che n’s son’s pig g y bank, which

wa s o n th e c ou nte r. Ag a in, the ro bb e rs fo rc e d both Ms. Che n an d he r f a the r- in- la w i nto the sa me closet and bound a nd g ag g ed them with duct tape befor e lea ving.

A short time a fter this sec ond robbery , the Def endant wa s develope d as a suspe ct. His picture

wa s in c lud e d in a

ph oto g ra phic li ne-u p a ndpr e se nte d to Ms. Che n a ndhe r f a the r- in- la w. B oth victims posit ively

identified the De fenda nt as one of the men i nvolved i n both robberie s. Ms. Chen

a lso te sti fi ed that he r f

a the r- in- la w h a d c a nc e r andwa s to o s ic k to c ome to c ou rt a ndte sti fy

in person.
Mr. Yingbin Chen testified t hat he wor ked at the Peking I nn with the two victims; hi s wife, Ms. Yong ci Chen, and his father, Mr. F u Chen, who owne d the re staurant. Normally , his father

c oo ke d th e fo od , his wif

e too k ord e rs a nd se rv e d as t he c a sh ie r, a ndhe de liv e re d th e take -o ut o rd e rs

. Mr. Chen testified that on the e vening of F ebrua ry 26, 2003, he took a delivery to the Airport I nn, but no one was at the specifie d addre ss to rece ive the food. When he returne d, he wa s informed the
restaur ant had be en robbe d. Be cause h e wa s m o re fl uent in Eng lish than his wife and father, Mr. Chen assisted the police in c ollecting the victims’ statements by serving as a translator. Mr. Chen further tes t i fi ed t h at on t he eve ning of Marc h 5, 2003, he wa s out making de liveries whe n he
returne d to find the restaur ant had been robbed once ag ain. Mr. Chen assisted the police in taking the victims’ statements a second time. Mr. Chen also testified tha t he witnessed his father look at

a photogr aphic line-up prese nted by the police and positively identify a suspec t, circle a photo and sign his na me. On cr oss-examination, Mr. Chen admitted he had no pe rsonal knowledg e of w ho committed either robbe ry

.

Offic er Ricky Davison of the Crime Response Unit, Memphis Pol ice De partment, testified that he wa s called to the Peking I nn restaur ant the eve ning of Fe bruary

26, 2 0 0 3
, an d took photogr aphs of the crime scene and collected evidence. He found a glove on the f loor in the closet wher e the victims reported they had bee n b ound and g ag g ed, and he discovere d and tag g ed asM s

. Shi ves t es t i f i ed on cr oss

- exa mi nat i on t hat t he car cont ai ned t hr ee peop l e. 3

-4- evidenc e “w added up duc t tape.” O ffice r B . G. W i n s t on of the Memphis Police De partment testified that he was assig ned to e x amine the crime scene at the Peking I nn restaur ant on Marc h 5, 2003, and he f

ound a roll of duc t tape, a w ad of used duct tape, and an e mpty cash r eg ister dra wer

. Serg eant Aa

ron Kant of the Memphis Police Depa rtment testified that he responde d to the Marc h 5, 2003 robbery

of the Peking I nn restaur ant and interviewe d a clerk fr om a hotel next to t he

re s t au ra n t , wh o s t at ed t h at s h e o b s er v ed a m ar o o n Bu i ck wi t h a l u ggage ra ckan d M i s s i s s i p p i t ags in the are a about the time of the robbery

. Offic er Kant also rec orded the incoming phone number, 313-6839, fr om the restaur ant ca ller I D after the victims informed him that it was the same number that called in a

bog us order

just prior to the robbery

a we ek ea

rlier. A f ew day s later, Of

fice r Ka nt

rec eived a tip from an informant stating that the Defenda nt was involved in the Peking I nn robberies and disclosing the location whe re the Def endant wa s stay ing at the time. Ba sed on this ti p, Offic er Kant found the Def

endant sitting in a

maroon ve hicle with Mississi ppi ta g s. Be cause the Def endant had existi ng war

rants for unrela ted cha

rg es, h e was immediately arr ested. On c ross-examination, Offic er K ant re veale d that the informant wa s the boy friend of the Def endant’ s sister, who had bee n
an i n i t i al s u s p ec ti n t h e ro b b er i es

. Of fi ce r Ka n t al s o s t at ed t h at t h e ma ro o n ca r w i t h M i s s i s s i p p i t ags in which the De fenda nt was discover ed wa s a F ord, and not a Buic k.

Ms. Brandi J ohnson, the Def endant’ s sister, testified that she worke d and lived at the Airport I nn during the time of the crimes at issue in this case

. Ms. Johnson e x plained that she wa s familiar with the Peking Inn restaur ant, which wa s only two or t hree minutes awa y from where she lived and

wo rk e d, a ndthat sh e wa s a re g ula r p a tr on of

the re staur a nt. She a lso te sti fi e d that du ri ng thi s ti me pe ri odsh e sa w h e r b ro the r, the De fe nd a nt, on a re g ula r b a sis , a ndthat he “ a lw a y s u se [sic] my phone.” Ms. Johnson admitt ed that she ow ned a c ell phone assig ned the number 315-6839, and tha t the police c onfiscate d this phone about the same time he r brother was a rre sted. Whil e s he had difficulty reme mbering at trial the e vents of the day s the robberies occ urre d, Ms. J ohnson conce ded that she made initial st atements to the police shortly afte r the robbe ries in which she reported that the Def endant vis i t ed her at 7:45 the evening of Mar ch 5, 2003, and bor rowe d her c ell phone for about a ha lf an hour. She also informed the police that the Def endant wa s stay ing at the Americ an I nn around the time of the robbe ries, which w as loca ted next door to the Peking Inn restaur ant.

Ms. L y d ia Sh iv e s , a n e mp lo y e e o f th e A me r ic a n I n n , te s ti f ie d th a t o n M ar c h 5
, 2 0 03, she noticed a “ burg undy

car ” with Mississi ppi tag s ou t s i d e t he hotel. At appr ox imately 7:30 that evening , she witnessed the car being driven a cross the stre et to a par king lot nea

r the Peking I nn restaur ant. Someone was picked up, and the vehicle then drove off. Ms. Shives a lso authenticate d 3
reg istration car ds from the Ame rica n I nn hotel, which ind i ca t ed t h at Mr. Ke vin J ohnson, the Def endant’ s brother, rente d a room from Fe bruary 22 to Ma rch 1, 2003. Ms. Shives f u rt her
te sti fi e d th a t sh e sa w the De fe nd a nt i n th is r oo m on ce whe n sh e wa s d oin g ho us e ke e pin g . M s. Shives identified the photog raph of the ca r in which the D efe ndant was a rre sted as a photo of

the

same c ar she observe d the nig ht of the Mar ch 5, 2003 robbe ry

.M r

. Fu j u n Che n , v i ct i m Y on g ci Che n ’ s f at h er

- i n

- l aw , i s al s o r ef er r ed t o a s M r

. Fu Che n i n ot h er por t i on s of 4

t h e r ec or d.

-5- Offic er Tom Warrick, a De tective with the Robber y Bu re au of the Memphis Pol ice Depa rtment, testified that during the course of his inve stigation he learned that both bog us food orde r calls pre ceding the two robbe ries we re m ade from the same cell phone ow ned by Ms. Bra ndi J ohnson. Whi le he wa s initi ally interested in Mr. Ma

rcus Morg an, Ms. J ohnson’s ex-boy friend, Mr

. Mo rg a n wa s eve ntu a lly ru le d out as a su sp e c t be c a us e his pic tur e wa s n ot i de nti fi e d b y the vic tim s
a ndhis a lib i f

or the tim e of

the ro bb e ri e s c he c ke d o ut. The Defe nd a nt w a s th e n d e ve lop e d a s a suspect af

ter talking t o M s. J ohnson and the victim’s identification of the Def endant in a photogr aphic line- up. Additionally , Det. W arrick testified that Mr. F ujun Chen identified the c ar 4 in which the De fenda nt was ar rested a s the ca

r he w itnessed drive of

f af ter the f irst robbery

.

After his moti on for a cquittal was de nied, the De fenda nt presente d proof throug h the testimonyof two wit nesses. Ms. Dorothy J ohnson, the Def

endant’ s g randmother , testified that on the evening of Fe bruary 26, 2003, the Defenda nt was at her housefrom ar ound 5:30 or 6:00 until t he

ne xt mornin g . Sh e te sti fi e d th a t she wa s sur e he wa s the re be c a us e sh e wa s a lig ht s le e pe r andwo uld have he ard the car

drive off. On cr oss-examination, Ms. J ohnson admitted that she was not sure of the da te , a s it

wa s tw o y e ars pr ior , a ndfu rthe r c on c e de d th a t sh e didno t st a ndby the wi nd ow a ll night long , watching the Def endant’ s car

.

Mr . K e vin John so n, the De fe nd a nt’ s br oth e r, te sti fi e d that on F e br ua ry 26
, 20 03
, he wa s w ith the Defenda nt from 5:30 or 6: 00 until he went to bed at his g randmother ’s house a round 8:00. When he a wo ke a t aro un d mi dn ig ht the De fe nd a nt wa s still the re , an d he a g a in sa w the De fe nd a nt at the ir g ra nd mothe r’ s h ou se the ne xt m or nin g

. On c ro ss- e xami natio n, Mr . Joh ns on a dmi tte d th a t he pa id for the D efe ndant t o stay the ni g ht at t he American I nn the s ame nig ht he testified they both spent the nig ht at their g randmother ’s hous e. He also admitted that he did not know wher e the De fenda nt

wa s b e tw e e n th e tim e he we nt to be d, aro un d eig ht or nin e that ni g ht, a ndwh e n h e wo ke up a g a in at midnight.

At the conc lusion of t h e t ri al
, t h e jury found the De fenda nt guilty as cha rg ed of a ll eight aggr av at ed ro b b er y

o ff en ce s

. T h e t ri al co u rt m er ged t h e f o u r c o u n t s o f a ggra v at ed ro b b er y t h ro u gh fea r into the fo u r co u n t s of ag g ravated robbe ry throug h violence. A fter a sentenc ing he aring , the Def endant was sentenc ed as a multipl e offe nder to sixteen y ear s for eac h of his f our aggr avated robbery convictions. The trial court ran counts one and three of eac h indictment concur rently , but mandated tha t t h e sentenc es fr om the two separ ate indictments be se rved c onsecutively for a n
e ff e c tiv e se nte nc e of

thi rt y -t wo y e ars

. Th e De fe nd a nt’ s mo tio n f or a ne w t ri a l w a s d e nie d, a ndthi s appea l followed.

AN AL YSI S On app e a l, the De fe nd a nt ar g ue s th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in c on so lid a tin g the ind ic tme nts a t tria l; that the t rial court’s admission of hearsay statements and its failure to instruct the j ury on the lesser-6-

included off

ense of ag g ravated assault both constitute plain err or; and the tria l court’s imposition of

consec utive sentenc es violated his constitutional rights to a jury trial.

I. Consolid ation I n his first issue on appea l, the Def endant c laims that the trial court a bused its discretion by g ranting the State’s motion to consolidate the two indictments f or trial. To support this assertion, the De fe nd a nt ar g ue s tha t the ro bb e ri e s fa il to evi nc e a c omm on sc he me or plan, a s th e tw o s e pa rate robberies wer e not so unique that they should be considered “sig nature ” crimes. The De fenda nt notes that in the first robbe ry , two men wer e re ported, while the victim testified that three me n wer e involved in the second r obbery . Additional differ ence s, such as the use of g loves and the hiding of a g un under a

jacke t attes t ed t o i n o n e robbery but not the other, prove s there w ere “just as many differ ence s” as ther e wer e simil arities in the two crimes, acc ording to the Def endant. F urthermor e, the De fe nd a nt argue s th a t a ny pr ob a tiv e va lue of

c on so lid a tin g the tw o r ob be ri e s f or ide nti ty purposes wa s outweig hed by th e pre judicial eff

ect, a nd that the trial court’s err or in consolidating the tw o in dic tme nts c a nn ot b e de e med harmles s. Th e Sta te arg ue s th a t th e tw o r ob be ri e s d id constitute a “sig nature ” cri m e an d t here fore consolidation was prope r, and in the a lternative, a ny
err or in consolidatio n was ha rmless considering the“over whelming ” proof in evidence that the De fe nd a nt w a s g uil ty

of bo th r ob be ri e s.

A tr ia l c ou rt ’s de c isi on c on c e rn ing c on so lid a tio n o f o ff e ns e s w ill be re vie we d f

or a n a bu se of discretion. See State v. Denton, 149 S.W .3d 1, 12 (Tenn. 2004); Spicer v. State, 12 S.W .3d 438, 44 2 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) . T hu s, a tr ia l c ou rt ’s de c isi on to c on so lid a te of fe nc e s will no t be re ve rs e d u nle ss the court “applied a n incorre ct leg al standar d, or re ache d a dec ision which is ag ainst logic or
rea soning tha t cause d an injustice to the party complaining .” Spicer , 12 S.W .3d at 443.

Consolidation of mul tiple offense s ag ainst a single defe ndant for a single trial is gove rned by Rules 8, 13, and 14 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Criminal Proce dure. D enton, 149 S.W.3d at 12. Rule 8 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that “[t]wo or more offe nses may be joi ne d in the sa me ind ic tme nt, pr e se ntm e nt, or inf orma tio n, wi th e a c h o ff

e ns e state d in a

sepa rate count or c ons o l i d ated pursuant to Rule 13 if the offe nses constitute parts of a common scheme or plan or if they

are of the same or similar cha rac ter.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 8(b). Rule 13 g ives the trial
court t h e o p t i on to consolidate two or more indictments for trial if the of fense s could have been joi ne d in a

sin g le ind ic tme nt p ur su a nt t o Rule 8( b)

. Se e Te nn . R. Cr im. P. 1 3( a ). Ad dit ion a lly , Ru le 14 pr ov ide s th a t w he re “ tw o o r m or e of fe ns e s h a ve be e n jo ine d o r c on so lid a te d f or tr ia l pu rs ua nt t o Rule 8(b), the de fenda nt shall have a rig ht to a sever ance of t he offenses unless the offense s are part of a c o mm o n s c h e me o r p la n a n d th e e v id e n c e o f o n e w o u ld b e a d mi s s ib le u p o n th e tria l o f the others.” T enn. R. Crim. P. 14(b)(1). Thus, acc ording to our supreme court, the combined eff ect of these rule s is to

allo w th e p r o s e c u ti o n , u n d e r Ru le 8 ( b )
, to c o n s o li d a te s im il ar c h ar g e s a g a inst one defe ndant into one indictment and to be hear d in one trial. Also, the prosecution can reque st the trial court to consolidate, pursuant to Rule 13, other indictments for trial if they constitute parts of the sa me “c ommon scheme or pla n” or a re the “s am e or-7-

simil ar” crimes a s others with which the defendant is charg ed. Howe ver, if the de fe nd a nt o bje c ts t o c on so lid a tio n o r m ov e s to se ve r the of fe ns e s fo r tr ia l, the n Ru le 14(b)( 1) place s the burden on the prosec ution to show that the offe nses ar e part of a common scheme or plan and the evidenc e of eac h crime would be admissible in the trial of the other . Spicer, 12 S.W.3d at 443. Thus, under Rule 14(b)( 1), in addition to showing th a t th e o f

f e n s e s ar e p ar t o f a c o mm o n s c h e me o r p lan , th e r e is a ls o a question of evidentiary

admissibili ty

that must be addre ssed.

Denton, 149 S.W.3d at 13.

B e c a us e of

the e vid e nti ary

c omp on e nt, fo r c on so lid a tio n to be pr op e r the tria l c ou rt mus t

c on c lud e that: (1 ) the e vid e nc e of e a c h off e ns e is re le va nt to some ma te ri a l issu e in the tr ia l of a ll the other of

fense s, see Te nn. R. Evid. 404(b)(2); and (2) the pr obative value of the e vidence of other offe nses is not outweig hed by the prejudicial eff ect that admission would have on the def endant, se e Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b)( 4), in addition to f inding a common scheme . See De nton, 149 S.W .3d at 13; Spicer, 12 S .W.3d at 445. According ly , evidenc e of othe r off enses that “ tends to show a def endant’ s char acte r or pr opensity ” is g ener ally not admissible. See Denton, 149 S.W.3d a t 1 3 (c i ting Te nn. R. Evid. 404(b)). How ever , rules excluding evidenc e of other offe nses will not bar evidenc e of othe r cri me s , w r o n g s o r a c ts w h e n it is o f f e r e d to p r o v e “ s o me o th e r is s u e r e le v a n t a t tria l.” State v. Mo or e , 6 S.W. 3d 23 5, 23 9 (T e nn

. 19 99 ). F or e xamp le
, e vid e nc e of oth e r c ri me s may

be a dmi ssi ble for purposes of demonstrating “motive, intent, ide ntity
, the absenc e of mistake or acc ident
, o r t he exis tence of a la

rg er c ontinuing plan.” Denton, 149 S.W.3d at 13.

I n this case, the trial court found the S tate met its burden of proving the two robbe ries we re p ar t o f a c o mm o n s c h e me

. T e n n e s s e e c a s e la w h a s r e c o g n iz e d th r e e s e p ar a te types of c ommon scheme evidenc e for

purposes of s ev er an ce or consolidation: (1) of fense s that reve al a distinctive desig n or ar e so sim i l ar as to constitute “sig nature ” crimes; (2) off enses that a

re pa rt of a la rg er, continuing pla n or conspira cy ; and (3) offense s that are all part of the same c riminal transac tion. See State v. Shirley , 6 S.W .3d 243, 248 (Tenn 1999)

. The rec ord reve als that at the Def endant’ s pre- trial consolidation motion hearing , the t rial court found t he two robberies constituted a “sig nature ” crime. Th e tr ia l c ou rt

no te d th a t th e “ of

fe ns e s h app e ne d a

we e k apa rt

. Th e y inv olv e d th e sa me ph on e c a ll, the sa me de liv e ry , the sa me du c t tap e , an d in one of fe ns e it is alle g e d tha t one of the pe rp e tr a tor s, the de fe nd a nt, sh ow e d to the vic tim pro ceeds fro m th e prior ro bb e ry wh ic h w ou ld b e e sse nti a l to show identity .”

Our supre me court has held that the test for finding “ signature” crimes is not mere ly whether

a de fe nd a n tc o m m i t t e d b o t h c r i m e s , b u tr a t h e r “ w h e t h e r

t h e r e w a s a

u n i q u e m e t h o d u s e d in

c omm itt ing the c ri me s. ” Mo or e , 6 S.W. 3da t 24 1. Th e “mo du s op erandi e mpl oy e d mu st b e so unique and distinctive as to be like a sig nature .” I d. at 240. Phrased another way , the “methods used in committi ng the offe nses must have such unusual particularities that reasona ble men can conclude that it would not li kely

be employ ed by

differ ent per sons.” Shirley , 6 S.W .3d at 248.-8-

We f indthe ro bb e ri e s a t is su e in thi s case we re so fa c tua lly un iqu e a nddis tin c tiv e a s to

cons t i t u t e a signature “ modus operandi.” The two robbe ries we re c ommitt ed at the sa me time of night a nd on the same day o f t h e we ek; a telephone ca ll from the same c ell phone pre cede d eac h robbery ; both tele phone ca lls placed a “bog us” orde r to be de livered to the sa me motel; the robber s
wa ite d u nti l th e de liv e ry

ma n w a s a way , e a c h ti me le a vin g on ly a sma ll, y ou ng wo ma n an d a n e lde rl y man in the re staurant; one r obber w as armed wi t h a “l o ng g un”on ea ch occ asion; eac h time the victims were bound and g ag g ed with duct tape and pl ac ed in t he same closet; and the me thod of

esca pe af ter e ach r obbery

was a n older mar oon car with Missi ssippi tags. Th e v ictims of eac h robbery we re t h e same. Under the se circ umstances, we are unable to conc lude that the trial c ourt abused its discre tion when it f ound the manner

in which both robber

ies wer e committed constituted a “sig nature ” crime.

Furthermore , we f

ind the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the evidenc e of one of

the robbe ries would be a dmissibl e upon the tria l of the other h ad they not been consolidated. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 14(b)( 1). The Tennessee Supreme Court has held that whe n consolidation is based on a “ signature” crime the ory , “usua l l y t h e onlyrea son to allow admission of oth e r o ff e ns e s is to e sta

bli sh the ide nti ty

of the defend a nt. ” De nto n, 14 9 S. W.3 d at 14 . I n th is

case , identity was an issue, and the evidenc e of a signature “ modus operandi” --a s well as evide nce of the robbe rs showing the victim pr ocee ds of the first robbery at the second- -is certainly rele vant for the pur

poses of proving identity . Additionally , the probative value of admitting the e vidence of the Def endant’ s common scheme w as not outweig hed by prejudicia l effe ct. Acc ording ly , we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in consol i d at i n g the Def endant’ s two indictments for trial. This issue is without merit.

II. Adm ission of H earsay Stat em ents I n h is s e c o n d is s u e o n ap p e a l, th e D e f e n d a n t c laim s th e a d mi s s io n o f M r

. F u ju n Chen’s he ars a y state me nts wa s p la in e rr or that th is Co urt sh ou ld r e c og nize a ndre me dy . T o s up po rt thi s
a sse rt ion , th e De fe nd a nt a rg ue s th a t th e Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f E vid e nc e pr oh ibi t th eh e ars a y state me nts of Mr. F ujun Chen’s i dentifica tion of t he De fenda nt and the g et-a way vehicle, w hich wer e pre sented at trial throug h t h e t es t i mony of his son and daug hter-in- law. The Def endant c oncede s that an ob je c tio n to the a lle g e d ina dmi ssi ble he ars a y wa s not ma de a t tria l or in the mot ion fo r a

ne w t ri a l, but n o n et h el es s arg ues that this particular err or is addre ssable by

this Court because it mee ts the require ments of a plain er ro r an al y s i s. The State ar g ues that the De fenda nt waived this issue by failing to timelyraise it be fore the trial court, or in the alternative, arg ues that the e vidence contained in the rec ord does not support plain er ror r eview.

Our supre me court has mandate d that when “ a party does not object to the admissibilit y of evidenc e, . . . the evidenc e becomes admiss ible notwithstanding any other Rul e of Evide nce to the
contra ry , and the jury may consider that evidenc e for its ‘natural probative eff ects a s if it were in law admissible.’” S tate v. Smit h, 24 S.W .3d 274, 280 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting State v. Har ring ton, 627 S.W .2d 345, 348 (Tenn. 1981) ). Ac cording ly , we f in d n o er ror was committed, and any consideration of whether

the hea rsay statements of Mr. Fu

j u n Chen submitted at trial could have-9-

been ina dmissibl e hea

rsay is waived for failure to object to the t estimony at trial or r aise the issue befor e the tria l court at a

motion for new tria l. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a ).

I n addition, we brie fly

note that the issue pre sented by the Def en d an t fails to meet the require ments nece ssary for a finding of pl ain er ror. Our supreme c ourt has re cently upheld the long established rule that “plain error review places on the defendant the bur den of pe rsuasion,” a nd that “[t] he substantive stand ar d s for plain e rror revie w ar e diffic ult to satisfy .” State v. Gomez, 163 S.W. 3d63 2, 64 6 ( Te nn . 2 00 5) . A n a pp e llate c ou rt

c a n r e ve rs e fo r p la in e rr or on ly if :
(a ) the re c or d .

. . c le arl y

e sta bli sh [es ] wh a t oc c ur

re d in the tr ia l c ou rt ; (b ) a c le ar a ndun e qu ivo c a l rule of la w [h a s] be e n b re a c he d; (c ) a su bs ta nti a l r ig ht o f the a c c us e d [ha s] be e n a dv e rs e ly a ff e c te d; (d) the a ccuse d did not waive the issue f or tac tical re asons; and (e) consideration of the err or is “nec essary to do substantial just ice.”

Smit h, 24 S.W .3d at 282 (quoti n g S tate v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626, 641-42 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)). F urthermor e, all five fac tors must be established, and this Court need not a ddress a ll five fac tors if any

one fa ctor indica tes that relief is not warra nted. Smith, 24 S .W.3d at 283.

I n th is c a se , th e De fe nd a nt h a s f a ile d to de mon str a te that “ c on sid e ratio n o f the e rr or is ‘nec essary

to do substantial just ice.’ ” I d. at 282. Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 801(c) define s hear say as “a statement, other tha n one made by the dec lara nt while testify ing at the trial or hearing, of fer ed i n e v i d e n c e t o p r o v e t h e t ru t h o f t h e m a t t e r

a s s e r t e d

. ” T h e D e f

e n d a n ti s c o rr e c tt h a tg e n e r a l l y, “[h] ear say

is not admissi ble except as provide d by these rule s or otherw ise by law.” T enn. R. Evid. 802. Even if we were to find the admis sion of t he hearsay statements was e rror , the over whelming proof of g uilt presented in this case would have r ender ed it harml es s er ro r, and theref ore, our
c on sid e ratio n o f this iss ue wo uldno t be ne c e ssa ry to do sub sta nti a l ju sti c e . We de c lin e to f ind“ pla in

err or.” This issue is without merit.

III Jur y in st r uc ti on o f le sse r -i nc lude d offe nse The De fenda nt also alleg es that the trial c ourt erred byfailing to instruct the jury on the

e le me nt s of ag g ra va te d a ssa ult , a le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e of a g g ra vate d r ob be ry . T o s up po rt thi s claim, the Def

endant arg ues that this Court has consistentlyheld that ag g ravated assault is a lesse rincluded off

ense of his indicted char g e of a g g ravated robbery
, and that our supreme court ha s stated that “[i] f a jury could convict, no matter how improbable, it is err or not to char g e that lesser -included offe nse.” State v. Richmond, 90 S.W .3d 648, 662 (Tenn. 2002). The State arg ues that this iss ue is waived be cause the Def endant f ailed to ask for this a dditional jury char g e in w riting as re quired by statut e , a ndin the a lte rn a tiv e , a rg ue s th a t th e omi ssi on of the jury c ha rg e , if e rr or , wa s h arm le ss
err or.

The De fenda nt did not raise the trial court’s failure to instruct the j ury on the lesser -included offe nse of a g g ravated assault in his motion for a new trial. Acc ording ly
, we c ould properly find that the De fe nd ant fai led t o p re se rv e d th is i ssu e fo r a pp e a l pu rs ua nt t o T e nn e sse e Rul e s o f A pp e llateT he r ecor d re vea l s t hat t he t r i al cour t r el i ed on t wo f act ors in d etermi ni ng t hat cons ecu t i ve s ent enc i ng was 5

war r ant ed i n t hi s cas e; t he D ef endan t ’ s cr i mi nal hi s t ory was ext ens i ve, and t he D ef endan t was a dan ger ous offender

. See T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 4 0 -3 5 -1 1 5 (b )( 2 ) a n d (4 ) (2 0 0 5 ).

-10- Pr oc e du re . Se e Te nn

. R. Ap p. P. 3( e ), a nd 36 (a ). Ho we ve r, in this c a se we are statut orily bo un d to find that the De fenda nt waived this issue by failing to submit a written reque st for the lesse r-include d jury ins truc tio n a t tria l. Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d sec tio n 40- 18 -1 10 , in pe rt ine nt p art , p ro vid e s:
(b) In the abse nce of

a written reque st from a pa rty specific ally i d en t i fy ing the pa rt ic ula r le sse r inc lud e d off

e ns e or of fe ns e s on whi c h a

jury ins truc tio n is so ug ht, the trial judg e may

char g e the jury

on any lesser included offe nse or off enses, but no party shall be entitled to any

such cha rg e. (c) Notwithstanding a ny

other provision of law to the contra ry , when the de fenda nt fails to reque st the instruction of a lesser included offense as require d by this section,

su c h in str uc tio n is wa iv ed. Abs ent a w ri tte n r e qu e st, the failu re of a tr ia l ju dg e to instruct the jury

on any lesser inc luded offe nse may not be presented as a g round for

re lie f e ith e r i n a

mot ion fo r a

ne w t ri a l or on app e a l.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-18-110( b), and (c)

. Our supreme court has rec ently conc l u d ed t hat “Te nnessee Code Annotated s ec t i o n 4 0 -18-110( c) doe s not violate a def endant’ s rig ht to trial by jury .” State v. Pag e, 184 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tenn. 2006). The ref ore, w e conc lude t h e issue wa s waived.

We briefly

consid er wh et her it is appropriate to re view the f ailure to c harg e the lesse r included off

ense of ag g ravated assault under t h e d o ct ri n e of plain er ror. As our

supreme c ourt

rec ently stated, “A n err or would have to [be] espec ially eg reg ious in nature , striking at the very heart of the fa irness of the judicia l pr ocee ding, to rise to the level of plain err or.” I d. Her e, as in Page , the Def endant ha s failed to show he did not waive this issue for tac tical re asons. There fore
, we de cline to find plain err or. The D efe ndant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

IV . Se nt e nc ing I n his final iss ue on appe al, the De fenda nt claims that his constitut ional rig hts to a trial by jury , under the Six th Amendment of the f eder al Co n s t i t u tion and Article I , Section 6 of the Tenne ssee Const itution, wer e im pug ned when the t rial court made determinations of fa ct that wer e
no t su bmi tte d to a

jury

. Th e De fe nd a nt c ite s to B lake ly v. Was hin g ton , 5 42 U. S. 29 6 (2 00 4) , in 5 wh ic h th e Sup re me Cou rt he ld tha t th e S ix th Am e nd me nt t o th e fe de ra l Co ns tituti on pe rm its a d ef en d an t ’s s en t en ce t o b e in cr ea s ed o n l y i f t h e en h an ce m en t fa ct o rs re l i ed u p o n b y t h e tr i al j u d ge
ar e b a s e d u p o n f

a c ts r e f le c te d in th e ju r y v e r d ic t, a d mi tt e d b y th e d e f e n d a n t, o r ar e b a s e d on the de fe nd a nt’ s p re vio us c ri min a l hi sto ry . H ow e ve r, the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt ha s r e c e ntl y considere d the impact of the Blakely ruling on Tenne ssee’ s sentencing scheme and has c oncluded that the Criminal Sentencing Reform Ac t of 1989, under w hich the De fenda nt in this ca s e was sentenc ed, does not violate a defe ndant’s constitutional rig hts. See Gomez, 163 S.W .3d at 661.W e a l s o not e t hat
, even b efore our su preme c our t ’ s r ece nt r ul i ng i n G om ez, t hi s Co ur t cons i s t ent l y found t hat 6

B l ak el y di d n ot af

fec t con s ec u t i v e s en t en ci n g det er mi n at i on s

. Se e St at e v

. Ros e M ar i e H er n an dez
, N o. M 2003- 01756- CC A- R3- CD
, 2004 W L 298 4 8 4 4
, a t * 4 ( T en n

. Cr i m. App.
, N as h v i l l e, D ec

. 16, 2004) ; St at e v

. Ear i ce Rober t s , N o. W 20 03

- 02 66 8- C C A

- R 3- C D
, 200 4 W L 27 15 31 6, at * 15 ( T enn

. C r i m. A pp

. , Jack s on, N ov. 23, 200 4); St at e v

. Lawr enc e W ar r en Pi er ce , N o. M 2003- 0 1 9 24- CC A- R3- CD
, 2004 W L 2533794, a t * 16 ( T en n

. Cr i m. App.
, N as h v i l l e, N ov

. 9, 2 0 0 4 ).

-11- The De fe n d an t acknowle dg es our supre me court’s ruling in Gomez. However , he nonetheless a

rg ues in his a

ppellate brief that “ Blakely should be rea d for the br oad proposition that any fac t finding tha t increa s es a d ef endant’ s sentence above the ‘statutory maxi mum’ should be found bey ond a reas o n ab l e doubt bya jury .” The Def endant a rg ues that the statutory

default of

c o n c u rr e n ts e n t e n c i n g e s t ab l i s h e s a “ s t a t u t o r y

m a x i m u m ” s e n t e n c e o f

t w e n t y y e ar s f o r a R a n g e II, multipl e off

ender convicted f

or a Class B fe l o n y , t h ere fore he now a sserts that the imposition of

consec utive sentenc ing, r es u lt in g in h is th irty -two-y ear

eff ective se ntence , violated his constitutional rig hts to a trial by jury

. Acc ording ly
, the Def endant first arg ues that, beca use Gom ez ad d re s sed standard e nhance ments and not co n s ecutive sentencing , it is not controlling of his case . I n the

a lte rn a tiv e , th e De fe nd a nt a rg ue s that Go me z wa s “ inc or re c tly de c ide d, ” a ndhe the re fo re raise s th is issue on appea l in order to pre serve it should Gomez be overturned.

We find Gomez is controlling of this issue, and ther efor e conse cutive sente ncing based on fac tors found by

the trial court, and not decide d by a jury
, is allowed under Tenne ssee’ s sentencing
act. See State v. Clare nce W. C arte r, No. M2004-00757-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 1307807, at *5 6 (Tenn. Crim. App., Na shville, J une 1, 2005). Mor eover , we a cknowledg e and r espec t the De fe nd a nt’ s d e sir e to p re se rv e thi s is su e fo r p os sib le fe de ra l r e vie w. Ho we ve r, th is Co urt i s ob vio us ly re qu ir e d to fo llo w our su pr e me c ou rt ’s de c isi on s. Ou r dut y , a s a n in te rm e diate app e llate court, is clea

r: “It is a controlling principle that infe rior courts must abide the order s, decr ees a nd prec edents of hig her c ourts. The slig htest deviation from thi s rig id rule would disrupt and de stroy the sanc tityof the judicial proc ess.” B arg er v. B rock, 5 3 5 S

. W

. 2 d 337, 341 (Tenn. 1976)

. Acc ording ly , pursuant to the Te nnessee Supreme Court’s Gome z ruling, the De fenda nt’s claim of a violation of his constitutional right to trial by jury due to the trial court’s imposition of consec utive
sentenc es is without merit.

CO NC LU SION Ba sed on t h e fo regoing rea soning a nd authorities, the judg ments of the trial c ourt are aff irmed.

___________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, J UDGE