### In the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

____________________ No. 18-3729

B RIAN K NUTSON , et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants ,

v.

V ILLAGE OF L AKEMOOR, Defendant-Appellee

.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:18-cv-01804 — Marvin E. Aspen, Judge

.

____________________

A RGUED A PRIL 17, 2019

— D ECIDED A UGUST 1, 2019

____________________

Before M ANION , S YKES, and B RENNAN , Circuit Judges

. M ANION , Circuit Judge . This class action suit challenges the red light camera program of the Village of Lakemoor, Illinois. The plainti ff s received violation notices from Lakemoor thatthey claim are invalid because the notices lack a proper municipal code citation. They also claim Lakemoor denied themdue process by limiting the defenses that can be asserted before a hearing o ffi cer to contest a violation. The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. We a ffi rm.2 No. 18-3729

I. Background Describing the plainti ff s’ claims requires reading several provisions of Lakemoor’s Munici pal Code of Ordinances (the “Code”) together. First, Chapter 1 of the Code outlines the Code’s numbering system: “Each section number of this code shall consist of two component parts separated by a period, the fi gure before the period refe rring to the chapter number and the fi gure after the period referring to the section within the chapter.” Lakemoor Mun. Code § 1.01(C). Chapter 41-1/2 1 of the Code covers tra ffi c violations. It incorporates by reference the I llinois Vehicle Code (IVC), andstates “[t]he section numbers used in the [IVC] shall be identical to those section numbers in the Lakemoor Vehicle Code. Therefore, an ordinance violation shall be cited as ‘Chapter 41-1/2,’ followed by the corresp onding IVC section number.” Id. § 41-1/2.01. In 2012, Lakemoor enacted an ordinance titled “AUTOMATED TRAFFIC LAW ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM,” and codi fi ed it as Section 14 of Chapter 41-1/2. Id. § 41-1/2.14. Section 14 authorizes a system of red light cameras located at certain intersec tions to detect and record red light violations. Id. It states “[i]t shall be a violation of this section for anyone to operate a vehicle in disregard of a tra ffi c control device or to turn right on a red light where it is posted ‘No Turn on Red,’” id. § 41-1/2.14(B), but it also incorporates by reference the IVC’s prohibition of the same conduct, id. § 41-1/2.14(C)(1), (C)(4) (citing IVC § 11-306).

1 This chapter is referred to as Chapter 41-1/2 because it falls between Chapters 41 and 42.No. 18-3729 3

When a red light camera captures a vehicle commi tt ing a red light violation, Section 14 requires a wri tt en violation notice to be issued to the registered owner of the vehicle. Id. § 41- 1/2.14(C)(4). Section 14 lists the information that the notice “shall include,” such as the na me and address of the registered owner of the vehicle, the location, date, and time of the violation, and, importantly for this appeal, “[t]he violation charged, with speci fi c reference to that section of the Village of Lakemoor Municipal Code of Ordinances allegedly violated.” Id. § 41-1/2.14(C)(4)(c). The violation notice constitutes prima facie evidence of a violation, which can be rebu tt ed by several enumerated defenses. Id. § 41-1/2.14(C)(6). A recipientof a violation notice may request adjudication before a hearing o ffi cer, where he may present only the defenses listed in Section 14(C)(6). The list of de fenses does not include challenges to the violation notice’s compliance with Section 14’s requirements. Id. In its entirety, Section 14 co mprises approximately 42 subsections and sub-subsections and takes up roughly four full pages. At the end of Section 14 is the following parenthetical: “(Ord. 12-O-03, passed 1-26-2012),” referencing the ordinance number as it was passed and its date of passage. Lakemoor’s online ordinance compilation incl udes a cross-reference chart that links Ord. No. 12-O-03 to Section 14. 2

2 See Village of Lakemoor, Illinois Code of Ordinances , A M

. L EGAL P UBL ’ G C ORP ., http://library.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/Illinois/lakemoor_il/vil lageoflakemoorillinoiscodeofordinance?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$ vid=amlegal:lakemoor_il (last visited Au g. 1, 2019). From this page, the entire municipal code is accessible through a navigation panel on the left side of the screen, arranged by chap ters and sections. At the very bottom4 No. 18-3729

Each plainti ff received at least one such notice of violation.Next to the label “Code Violation and Description,” the notices include simply the notation “12-O-03.” However, the notices also include photographs of the violation occurrence and state these photographs depict “a violation of a red light signal and/or law pertaining to ‘Right Turn on Red.’” The notices further provide a complete list of defenses and grounds for contesting the violation as well as instructions for contesting the violation by mail or in person. All but one of the named plainti ff s chose to pay the $100 fi ne for each violation, 3 and none requeste d a hearing. They then fi led suit in federal court, seeking to certify three classes:(1) all individuals who received a violation notice from Lakemoor, (2) those who paid the fi ne, and (3) those who have not paid the fi ne. The plainti ff s alleged Lakemoor deprived them of due process under color of state law and sought declaratory

of this navigation panel is a link labelled “REFERENCES TO ORDINANCES” within the expandable folder “PARALLELREFERENCES.” That page includes a chart of all ordinance numbers arranged in numerical order. For each ordinance number, the chart lists the date on which it was adopted and provid es a direct link to the code chapter(s) and section(s) included in th at ordinance. For Ordinance No. 12-O03, the provided link leads directly to Section 14, although we note the hyperlink text is mislabeled as “§ 4- 1/2.14”. Searching for “12-O-03” in the page’s search bar does not lead one to the proper chapter, section, or the ordinance cross-reference chart.

3 One outlier plaintiff, Heather Bendl, received multiple violation notices but did not voluntarily pay the a ttached fines. Her state income tax return was garnished for the amount due in February 2018, but she later received another violation notice in April 2018. The fine for that violation remained unpaid at the time of the filing of the amended complaint.No. 18-3729 5

judgment. They argued the violation notices were void ab initio because the notation “12-O-03” does not su ffi ce as a “speci fi c reference to that section of the [Code] allegedly violated.” Instead, reading Lakemoor Municipal Code §§ 1.01, 41-1/2.01, and 41-1/2.14(C)(4)(c) together, th ey contended the violation notices must contain a citation to Chapter 41-1/2 of the Code along with the section number of the IVC dealing with red light violations (IVC § 11-306( c)). Therefore, the plainti ff s asserted the proper citation is “Lakemoor Mun. Code § 41- 1/2.11-306(c).” They claimed Lakem oor deprived them of due process by not including a challenge to the notice’s validity as an available defense under Sect ion 14(C)(6). In addition to their due process claim, the plainti ff s asserted a state law unjust enrichment claim based on the same allegations. 4

The district court held the no tices were valid because Section 14 incorporates by reference IVC § 11-306(c) and “12-O03” is a parallel session law citation to Section 14 that satis fi es the “speci fi c reference” requirement. Moreover, the district

4 The plaintiffs also asserted a due process claim under the Illinois Constitution and a claim for injuncti ve relief as a separate count. The plaintiffs abandoned the state constitutional claim at the district court. With respect to injunctive relief, that is a remedy, not a cause of action, and thus should not be plea ded as a separate count. See Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Com’n , 463 U.S. 582, 595 (1983) (“Whether a litigant has a cause of action ‘is analytically distinct and prior to the question of what relief, if any, a litigant may be entitled to receive.”); CustomGuide v. CareerBuilder, LLC, 813 F. Supp. 2d 990, 1002 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“An injunction ‘is an equitable remedy, not a separate cause of ac tion.’”). The district court properly dismissed that count on that basis. Furthermore, because we hold the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for violation of due process or unjust enrichment, they are not entitled to injunctive relief.6 No. 18-3729

court held the plainti ff s were not deprived of due process by the limitation of defenses because the defense they sought to assert was not viable. The district court dismissed the case. The plainti ff s appeal.

II. Analysis The plainti ff s assert a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment and a state law unjust enrichment claim and seek declaratory judgment. 5 We review the district court’s dismissal de novo

. Tamayo v. Blagojevich , 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008). “We may a ffi rm a district court’s dismissal order on any basis supported by the record.” Craig v. Rich Tp. High Sch. Dist. 227, 736 F.3d 1110, 1118 (7th Cir. 2013).

A. Due Process Claim The plainti ff s do not invoke the “substantive” due process doctrine. Instead, their claim asserts only that they were not

a ff orded the minimum procedural protections guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. In analyzing a procedural du e process claim, we follow a two-step process. First, we determine if the plainti ff has beendeprived of a liberty or property interest. Second, we determine if the plainti ffwas provided constitutionally su ffi cient process. Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ. , 870 F.3d 562, 571 (7th Cir. 2017). Lakemoor does not dispute the plainti ff s have a protected property interest in the $100 they were fi ned for each red light violation. Thus, the only question is what—or how much—process was due for that deprivation.

5 We have supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.No. 18-3729 7

“The cornerstone of due proc ess is notice and the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningf ul time and in a meaningful manner.’” Id. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). In this case, the plainti ff s received both. They received a wri tt en notice of each violation, which included a description and photograph of the violation as well as the time, date, and location where it occurred. They also had an opportunity to contest the violation before a hearing o ffi cer, and the violation notices explained in detail how to request such a hearing. Despite this, the plainti ff s argue they were denied a meaningful opportunity for hearing because Section 14 limits the defenses they can raise before the hearing o ffi cer. The limited defenses do not include challe nging the violation notice as void for failure to comply with Section 14’s requirements. This argument is unavailing. The requirements of due proces s are not rigid; rather, due process “is fl exible and requires only ‘such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.’” Riano v. McDonald, 833 F.3d 830, 834 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Ringquist v. Hampton , 582 F.2d 1138, 1140 (7th Cir. 1978)). Less process is due where less is at stake. Van Harken v. City of Chicago , 103 F.3d 1346, 1353 (7th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, we consider threefactors when determining what process is due before the government e ff ects a deprivation: (1) the nature of the private interest at stake, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation through the procedures used, and (3) the governmental interest. Mathews , 424 U.S. at 334–35. First, the private interest at stake in this case—a $100 fi ne—is relatively small. See Van Harken , 103 F.3d at 1353 ( fi nding less process was due wher e maximum possible penalty for parking violation was “onl y $100”). We do not pretend a8 No. 18-3729

$100 fi ne is of no consequence. However, in the grand scheme of deprivations the government can e ff ect, including imprisonment or the seizure of highly valuable property, a $100 fi ne is among the less serious sort. Accordingly, this factor suggests less process was required here. Second, Lakemoor’s limitationof defenses does not present a risk of erroneous deprivation. Lakemoor allows alleged violators to contest the violation on various grounds that, iftrue, would refute or alleviate culpability. For example, Section 14 allows a recipient of a violation notice to assert, inter alia , the following arguments as defenses: the vehicle was owned by or leased to another individual at the time of the violation; the driver passed through the red light in order toyield to an emergency vehicle; the vehicle cannot be adequately identi fi ed in the photo; or the driver was already issued a citation for the same vi olation. Lakemoor Mun. Code § 41-1/2.14(C)(6). By contrast, the plainti ff s’ desired defense (namely, the violation notice did not contain a proper citationto the Code section allegedly violated) has no bearing on culpability. Preventing alleged violators from asserting this technicality as a defense does not pr esent a risk of erroneous deprivation. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of fi nding the process provided was constitutionally su ffi cient. Finally, limiting the universe of possible defenses furthers the government’s interest in administrative e ffi ciency. In Mathews , the Supreme Court noted as relevant the “ fi scal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 424 U.S. at 335; see also Cont’l Training Servs., Inc. v. Cavazos , 893 F.2d 877, 893 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating the “conservatio n of resources and administrative e ffi ciency” are “unquestionably” governmentalNo. 18-3729 9

interests). Requiring the hearing o ffi cer to entertain any defenses the alleged violator desire s to raise, even those with no bearing on culpability, would create a greater administrativeburden and cost for Lakemoor. This factor supports Lakemoor’s choice to limit the possible defenses to those that refute or alleviate culpability. We have previously held a plainti ff is not deprived of ameaningful opportunity to be heard simply because the defense he wishes to assert is not available to him at the provided hearing. Cochran v. Ill. State Toll Highway Auth. , 828 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir. 2016). In Cochran , the plainti ff received noticeof a toll violation and was entitled to request a hearing. However, because the toll violation was a strict liability o ff ense, the plainti ff was prevented from presenting a knowledge defense at the hearing. He argued that this limitation of his defenses rendered the opportunity for hearing meaningless, but wedisagreed. “Although the knowledge defense was not available, other defenses were. Thus, plainti ff was not precluded from presenting anydefense, and the hearing was not meaningless.” Id. Similarly, the fact that the plainti ff s in this case could not assert a defense based on the violation notice’s lack of a Code citation does not mean that the hearing—at which they couldhave raised several other defenses—would have been meaningless. The process that the plainti ff s received was constitutionally su ffi cient, and they have, therefore, failed to state a federal due process claim.

B. Unjust Enrichment Claim The plainti ff s’ unjust enrichment claim is based on the same underlying allegations as the due process claim. They10 No. 18-3729

assert Lakemoor has been unjustly enriched by receiving payment of fi nes to which it was not entitled. The plainti ff s argue the violation notices were void ab initio because they did not include a proper citation to “that section of the [Code] allegedly violated” as required by Section 14. See Lakemoor Mun. Code § 41-1/2.14(C)(4)(c). This argument fails because there is no indication that the “speci fi c reference” requirement was intended to be read as a mandatory provision rather than a directory one. “A mandatory provision and a directory provision are both couched in obligatory language, but they di ff er in thatnoncompliance with a mandatory provision vitiates the governmental action, whereas noncompliance with a directory provision has no such e ff ect.” In re M.I. , 2011 IL App (1st)100865, ¶ 47, 964 N.E.2d 72, 83. Under Illinois law, a procedural command in a statute is pr esumed to be directory rather than mandatory. People v. Geiler, 2016 IL 119095, ¶ 18, 57 N.E.3d 1221, 1224–25. That presumption can be overcomeonly if (1) the statute uses negative language to prohibit further action in the event of nonc ompliance, or (2) the statute is designed to protect a right that would generally be injured if the provision is read as directory. Id.Although Section 14 states a violation notice “shall include” a “speci fi c reference” to the Code section allegedly violated, we see no basis for overturning the presumption that this requirement is directory rather than mandatory. First, Section 14 contains no negative language prohibiting Lakemoor from taking further action in the event of noncompliance.No. 18-3729 11

Second, although the plainti ff s argue their right to be fully informed of an alleged violatio n would be injured by a directory reading, this is simply not the case. The plainti ff s su ff ered no failure of notice caused by the “12-O-03” notation. The notice of violation each plainti ffreceived includes multiple photographs of each plainti ff s’ registered vehicle in the act of entering an intersection on a red light, with the license plate visible, and describes the photogra phs as evidencing “a violation of a red light signal and/or law pertaining to ‘Right Turn on Red.’” Each notice also includes the time, date, and location ofthe violation. Further, each notice provides detailed information about the procedures for contesting the violation, the date by which the fi ne must be paid or the violation contested, and a full list of possible defenses derived from Section 14. Everything the plainti ff s needed to know to contest the violation was fully and clearly explained in the notice of violation itself. The plainti ff s were not prejudiced by the lack of a proper Code citation. Therefore, the presumption in favor of a directory reading has not been overcome. Because we hold the “speci fi c reference” provision is directory rather than mandatory, the plainti ff s’ argument the violation notices were void ab initio fails as a ma tt er of law, and their unjust enrichme nt claim falls with it.

III. Conclusion The plainti ff s have failed to state a claim either for violation of due process or unjust enrichment. The district courtproperly dismissed the case. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.