### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14

- 11259 Summary Calendar

BILLY R. SANFORD , Plaintiff

- Appellant

v.
TARRANT COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; OFFICER CLARK; JOHN PETER SMITH HOSPITAL , Defendant s
- Appellee s

Appeal s from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 4:14

- CV

- 822

Before DAVIS, JONES, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Billy R. Sanford, Texas prisoner # 0492400, filed a civil rights comp laint, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. He further alleged that Officer Clark
violated his constitutional rights by using excessive force. Sanford timely

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED January 6, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 14-11259 Document: 00513331921 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/06/2016No. 14

- 11259

2 appeals the district court’s dismissal of his complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), for failu re to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
A district cour t shall dismiss a prisoner’s in forma pauperis civil rights complaint if the court determines that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. § 1915A(b)(1). “A dismissal of a civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim is reviewed de novo , using the same standard applicable to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Rogers v. Boatright , 709 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 2013). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted when it does not contain “suffi cient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)

. Before this court , Sanford does not brief any claim against th e Tarrant County Sherif f’s Department. He does not challenge the district court’s determination that the Tarrant County Sheriff’s Department is not an entity capable of being sued. Ev en if we liberally construed Sanford’s complaint to allege a claim agai nst Tarrant County, Texas, Sanford does not challenge the district court’s determination that a governmental entity cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions of its employ ees under a theory of responde a t

sup erior. Further, Sanford does not challen ge the district court’s determination that he failed to allege that Tarrant County had executed a custom or policy that deprived Sanford of a constitution al right. Sanford has
thus abandoned any challenge to the district court’s decision dismissing his

ac tion against the Tarrant County Sheriff’s Department for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner , 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987)

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3 A review of Sanford’s medical records does not demo nstrate deliberate indifference on the part of John Peter Smith Hospital. As noted at the Spears 1 hearing, there is no evidence in the medical records that Sanford suffer ed a
concussion. At most, Sanford’s complaint that he received only ibuprofen for

pa in amounts to a mere disagreement with medical treatment, which does not
constitute a constitutional violation. See Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976) ; see also Norton v. Dimazana , 122 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1997)

. Sanford has failed to show that any employee of John Peter Smith Hospital ignored his complaints, refused treatment, “or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.” See Johnson
v. Treen , 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985) . Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing his action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678. As to Sanford’s excessive force claim, there is no indicati on that Officer Clark maliciously and sadistically used force to cause Sanford harm. See
Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). Sanford’s claim does not show that,
under the ci rcumstances, the officer used more force than was reasonably necessary to secure Sanford and maintain order. See id. at 6

- 7. Further, the record belies Sanford’s assertion that the defendants’ attorney admitted at the Spears hearing to tampering with evidence that would have support ed Sanford’s excessive force claim.
T he distr ict court did not err in dismissing Sanford’s § 1983 complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See § 1915A(b)(1); Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678. Additionally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sanford’s mo tion for appointment of counsel. See Cupit

1 Spears v. McCotter , 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985). Case: 14-11259 Document: 00513331921 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/06/2016No. 14

- 11259

4 v. Johnson , 835 F.2d 82, 86 (5th Cir. 1987). Sanford’s motions for appointment of counsel on appeal and entry of default judgment are denied. AFFIRMED; ALL OUTSTANDING MOTIONS DENIED. Case: 14-11259 Document: 00513331921 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/06/2016