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## Tm% ATTORNEY GENERAL
. OFTEXAS

March 6, 1974 The Honorable Mark W. White, Jr. Opinion No. H- 253 Secretary of State Office of the Secretary’of State **Austin,** Texas 78711 Dear Secretary White: Re: Does “at his (Governor’s) pleasure” constitute a term of office within the definition of i 2(3)(C) 7 Article 6252-9b (Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., ch. 421, 6. 1086), the Ethics Bill, in its 5t(3) defines “Appointed officer” to igclude, as Subsection C:

“an officer of a state agency who is appointed

for a term of office specified by the constitution **or a**  **statute** of **this state.** 
**. .**  **. ‘** **I** The Constitution and **statutes** “specify” a term of years for num**erous** officers of state agencies. For example, Article ,j,’ $49-b, Constitution of ,Texas; and Article 54212, Vernon’s Texas CiLl Statutes. For others, **no** term is given. See, Article 43.003, Vernon’s Texas Water Code and Article 6008-1, V. T. C. S. Finally, there are officers who are to be appointed to serve at the “will” or “pleasure” of the appointing officer. See, for example, Articles 4413(201) and 4413d-1, Vernon’s Texas Civil **Statutes.**

**Your** question is whether an appointment “at his (Governor’s) pleasure” consl,itutes a term of office so as to make such appointees “Appointed officers” under Article 6252-9b, w. ,Generally, the phrase “term of office” is used to mean the fixed period of time for which the office may be held. It is the period designated by the Constitution or laws as the time during which the office may be held rather than the time an individual holds the office. 67 C. J. S., Officers. $42, pp.

p. 1182The Honorable Mark W. White, Jr., page 2 (H-253)

t95-96~, .and cases cited. And see, for example, State v. Galusha, 104 N.W. 197 (Neb. 1905); Recall Bennett Committee v. Bennett, 249 P. 2d 479 **(Ore.** 1952); Mutlins v. Jones, 162S.W. 2d 761 (Ky. 1942); Smith v. Pettis County, 136S.W. 2d 282 (MO. 1940). A person holding office at the pleasure of the appointing officer do(!s not have a term of office. Arthur v. Hubbard, 70 A. 2,d925 ,(My. 1950); City of Gwensboro v. Hazel, 17S. W. 2d 1031 (Ky. 1929); Kraterr v, Commonwealth, 15S.W. 2d 473 (Ky. 1929); State ex rel. Gilbert v. Board of Commissioners of Sierra County, 222 P. 654 **(N.** M. 1924); Bayley v. Garrison, 214 P. 871 (Cal. 1923); State ex rel. Matlack v. Oklahoma City, 134 P. 58 (Okla. 1913); State ex rel. Rumbold v. Gordoni 142S. W. 315 (MO. 1911);Harrold v. Barnum, 96 P. 104’~(Cal.‘App. 1908); Ida County Savings Bank v. Seidensticker, 92 N.W. 862 (Iowa 1902); & re Batey, 52 N.Y.S. 871 (App. Div. 1898); Somers v. State, 58 N.W. 804 (S.D. 1894). In Spears v. Davis, 398 S.W. 2d 921 (Tex; 1966),’ where the question was whether two,state senators were disqualified from running for Attorney General by Article 3, $18, of the Texas Constitution, which forbida such a candidacy “during the term for which he may be elected, ” the Supreme Court said:

“In order to avoid confusion, a clear dietinction must be made between the phrase, ‘term of office’ and an individual’s tenure of office. The period of time designated as a term of office may not and often does not coincide with an individual’s tenure of office.
. . .” (398 S. W. 2d at 926) And see Hall v. Baum, 452 S.W.~ 2d 699 (Tex. 1970). We believe that by referring to the “term of office specified by the constitution or a **statute** of this state, ” the Legislature evidenced its intention to refer to a apbcific, designated period of time, following the line of authority set out abovei

p. 1183_ . - The Honorable **Mark** W. White, Jr., page 3 (H-253)
Therefore, it is **our** opinion that an officer of a state agency appointed
“at the **pleasure ”**  **or** “at the will” of the Governor or other appointing authority is not one appointed for a term of office specified by the Constitution **or** a **statute** of this state. SUMMARY Officers of state agencies appointed for a term of office, as contemplated by Article 6252-9b. 02,(3)(C), V. T. C. S., do not include those appointed at the “pleasure” or “will” of the appointing officer. Very truly yours,

JOHN L. HILL

General of Texas

DAVID M. KENDALL, Chairman Opinion Committee

p. 1184