NASA MANAGEMENT

CHALLENGES

Human Capital and

Other Critical Areas

Need to be Addressed

Statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Committee on Science, Subcommittee on Space

and Aeronautics, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT

Thursday

July 18, 2002

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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the major management challenges and program

risks facing the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Right now,

NASA is at a critical juncture. Clearly, since its inception, NASA has advanced space

exploration and scientific knowledge and accomplished unparalled feats of engineering.

But NASA is now facing difficulties, particularly in terms of maintaining a skilled

workforce, controlling costs, and providing effective oversight for important projects.

Such problems have been debilitating to important space missions. For example,

substantial space station cost growth, which NASA became aware of in early 2001, has

resulted in cutbacks in construction, the number of crew members, and scientific

research, and, in turn, raised concerns about the viability of the program and has

negatively impacted the agencyís credibility with the Congress.

Recognizing the need for change, NASAís new Administrator, Sean OíKeefe, has

recently articulated a new vision for NASAóone that is science-driven, not destination

driven. To put NASA on a better footing to fulfill this vision, the agency is taking on a

major transformation aimed at eliminating stovepipes, becoming more integrated and

results oriented, and reducing risks while working more economically, efficiently and

effectively. Although NASA is in the very early stages of this transformation, it is

already undertaking initiatives to reshape and strengthen its workforce, including

developing a strategic human capital plan and an agencywide workforce planning and

analysis system. This subcommittee is also considering legislation proposed by NASA
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that would provide the agency with an assortment of tools and authorities to facilitate its

efforts to recruit and retain skilled personnel and reshape its workforce.

The subcommittee asked that we discuss the four major management challenges we

identified at NASA in our latest Performance and Accountability Series report. These

include: (1) strengthening human capital; (2) controlling International Space Station

costs; (3) implementing a faster, better, cheaper approach to space exploration; and (4)

correcting weaknesses in contract management. First, however, it is very important to

recognize that NASAís efforts to address these challenges and undertake a transformation

represent a subset of a larger need to fundamentally transform the federal government in

light of recent trends and long-range fiscal challenges. In this context, I will discuss

some of the essential actions that need to be taken by NASA in order to assure that this

transformation will become a reality.

Successfully addressing each of the four challenges will be critical for NASA in making

sure that it is equipped to achieve its vision for the future. The first challenge--

strengthening human capitalówill require a concerted and sustained effort by NASAís

leadership to commit to change; develop a strategy that ensures the organization has the

appropriate mix of employees to meet future business needs; implement effective

approaches for acquiring, developing, and retaining talent; developing and retaining

talent; and create a results-oriented culture. The remaining challenges facing NASA--

controlling International Space Station costs, implementing a faster, better, cheaper

approach to space exploration, and correcting weaknesses in contract managementóare
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equally important to address. Without better oversight and management over its most

important programs and acquisitions, NASAís transformation stands to lose credibility

and support among its partners in industry, the international community, and academia as

well as the support of the Congress.

BACKGROUND

NASAís mission encompasses human exploration and development of space, the

advancement and communication of scientific knowledge, and research and development

of aeronautics and space technologies. Its activities span a broad range of complex and

technical endeavorsófrom investigating the composition, evaluation, and resources of

Mars; to working with its international partners to complete and operate the International

Space Station; to providing satellite and aircraft observations of Earth for scientific and

weather forecasting purposes; to developing new technologies designed to improve air

flight safety. In January 2001, we reported that, overall, NASA spends more than $12

billion annually for goods and services supporting these and other activities, mostly on

contracts with businesses and other organizations.1

Since 1990, we have periodically reported on government operations that we identified as

ìhigh riskî, because of their vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.

Since 1999, we have provided each new Congress with a series of reports entitled

Performance and Accountability Series: Major Management Challenges and Program

 

1

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: National

Aeronautics and Space Administration, GAO-01-258 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2001).
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Risks providing a perspective on performance and management challenges across the

federal government, and updated those operations and programs that we have identified

as ìhigh riskî.

Our reports have identified a number of major management challenges at NASA. In our

last report, 2 issued in January 2001, we identified four challenges that warrant increased

NASA attention, including one areaócontract managementóthat we continue to

categorize as high risk. These four challenges are still applicable today. We plan to issue

our next performance and accountability report in January 2003.

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF

MAKING A TRANSFORMATION

NASAís recognition that it needs to make a transformation to a more integrated and

results-oriented organization comes amid a period of profound transition for our

government. This transition is being driven by a number of key trends, including: global

interdependence; diverse, diffuse, and asymmetrical security threats; rapidly evolving

science and technology; dramatic shifts in the agency and composition of the population;

important quality of life issues; the changing nature of our economy; and evolving

government structures and concepts. These trends present a range of challenges that have

no boundaries. These trends also contribute to the huge, long-range fiscal and budget

challenge facing the United States.

 

2

 GAO-01-258.
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Given these trends and long-range fiscal challenge, the federal government needs to

engage in a comprehensive review, reassessment, and reprioritization of what the

government does, how it does business, and who does the governmentís business.

For their part, agencies like NASA must re-examine their policies, programs, and

operations as well as their human capital policies and practices. The status quo is simply

unacceptable. The long-range numbers do not add up. This re-examination will in turn

require federal agencies to transform their cultures and shift their overall orientation

from:

• Process to results

• Stovepipes to matrixes

• Hierarchical to flatter and more horizontal structures

• An inward focus to an external (citizen, customer, and stakeholder) focus

• Management control to employee empowerment

• Reactive behavior to proactive approaches

• Avoiding new technologies to embracing and leveraging them

• Hoarding knowledge to sharing knowledge

• Avoiding risk to managing risk

• Protecting turf to forming partnerships.

The nature and scope of the cultural transformation that needs to take place in many

agencies across the federal government will take years to accomplishóeasily outrunning
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the tenures of most political appointees. At the same time, our work over the years has

amply documented that many agencies suffer from a range of long-standing management

challenges and a lack of attention to basic stewardship responsibilities, requiring

concerted action and sustained top-level attention if they are to be addressed.

One option for addressing the issues agencies face is to create a Chief Operating Officer

(COO) position for selected departments and agencies that would provide sustained

management attention essential for addressing key stewardship responsibilities in an

integrated manner while helping to facilitate the transformation process within an agency.

The long-term responsibilities, professional and nonpartisan in nature, could include

strategic planning, organizational alignment, core values stewardship, human capital

strategy, performance management, communications and information technology

management, financial management, acquisition management, risk management,

knowledge management, matrix management, and change management. Ideally, the

COO position should be at the Deputy level, have a term appointment of 5 to 7 years, and

be subject to a performance contract.

I testified before the National Commission on Public Service, chaired by Paul Volcker,

earlier this week. During my testimony, I noted that agencies that are experiencing

particularly significant challenges in integrating disparate organizational cultures along

with agencies engaged in major transformation efforts, like NASA, may be especially

appropriate first phase candidates for a COO position.3

 

3

U.S. General Accounting Office, Managing for Results: Using Strategic Human Capital

Management to Drive Transformational Change, GAO-02-940T (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002).
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NASA is just beginning to undertake major efforts to transform itself. Mr. OíKeefe came

on board as the agencyís new Administrator in January 2002 and began articulating his

vision for NASAís future this April. Concurrently, NASA is undertaking human capital

and other management initiatives designed to foster better financial management,

information technology management, and budget and performance integration. In view

of these efforts, the Office of Management and Budget this week identified NASA as

leading the government in progressing toward the implementation of five

governmentwide change initiatives contained in the Presidentís Management Agenda.

These include: strategic human capital management; competitive sourcing; improved

financial performance; expanded electronic government; and budget and performance

integration. While NASAís progress is noteworthy, it is currently rated as a ìred lightî in

each of the five key areas in the Presidentís Management Agenda.
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STRENGTHENING HUMAN CAPITAL

The Challenge

Like many agencies, NASA is

facing substantial challenges in

attracting and retaining a highly

skilled workforce. Left unchecked,

reductions in the space shuttle

workforce would have jeopardized

NASAís ability to safely support the

shuttleís planned flight rate. NASA

is taking comprehensive steps to

address this problem, but the agency

needs to make sure that it can

sustain its commitment to

implementing a strategic approach

to marshaling, managing, and

maintaining human capital.

Attracting and retaining a workforce with science,

engineering, and technology skills is critical to keeping the

space shuttle safe and operational.

Leading public organizations here in the United States and abroad have found that

strategic human capital management must be at the centerpiece of any serious change

management initiative and efforts to transform the cultures of government agencies.

People are an agencyís most important organizational asset. They define its culture,

drive its performance, and embody its knowledge base.

In January 2001, we designated strategic human capital management as a

governmentwide high-risk area. As our January 2001 High-Risk Series and Performance

and Accountability Series reports make clear, serious human capital shortfalls are eroding

the ability of many agencies, and threatening the ability of others, to economically,

efficiently, and effectively perform their missions. Plainly, the problem is not federal
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employees. Rather, the problem is the lack of a consistent strategic approach to

marshaling, managing, and maintaining the human capital needed to maximize our

government performance and ensure its accountability. Our High-Risk report outlined

four pervasive human capital challenges now facing the federal government.

• Leadership, continuity, and succession planning

• Strategic human capital planning and organizational alignment

• Acquiring and developing staffs whose size, skills, and deployment meet agency

needs

• Creating results-oriented organizational cultures.

As we reported in January 2001, the shuttle workforce had declined significantly in

recent years to the point of reducing NASAís ability to safely support the program.

Many key areas were not sufficiently staffed by qualified workers, and the remaining

workforce showed signs of overwork and fatigue. To the agencyís credit, NASA has

recognized the need to revitalize the shuttleís workforce, discontinued its downsizing

plans for the shuttle program in December 1999 and initiated efforts to hire new staff. In

September 2001, we testified that NASA was hiring approximately 200 full-time

equivalent staff and it had focused more attention on human capital in its annual

performance plan by outlining an overall strategy to attract and retain a skilled

workforce. But even with these gains, there were still considerable challenges. For

example, NASAís new staff would require considerable training and the agency still

needed to deal with critical losses due to retirements in coming years.
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NASA believes that similar workforce problems affect the entire agency. The average

age of its workforce is over 45, and the agency is finding it particularly difficult to hire

people with engineering, science, and information technology skillsófields critical to

NASA missions. At this time, within the science and engineering workforce, the over-60

population outnumbers the under-30 population nearly 3 to 1. Currently, 15 percent of

NASAís science and engineering employees are eligible to retire; within 5 years, about

25 percent will be retirement eligible. At the same time, the pipeline of people with

science and engineering skills is shrinking. According to NASAís Inspector General, the

agency is also facing the loss of significant procurement expertise through the year 2007.

NASA is taking steps to address its workforce predicament. For example, it is

developing an agency-wide integrated workforce planning and analysis system as part of

its new financial management system. This system is expected to track the distribution of

NASAís workforce across programs, capture critical competencies and skills, determine

management and leadership depth, and facilitate gap analyses.

NASA has also developed a strategic human capital plan, which incorporates strategies,

tactical actions, and metrics to support human capital goals. The plan has been submitted

to the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of Personnel Management for

review. The plan is based on a planning model developed by the Office of Personnel

Management (OPM) as well as our own model, which we published in March 2002.4

 

4

 U.S. General Accounting Office, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO-02-

373SP (Washington, D.C.: March 2002).
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Our model is designed to help agency officials effectively lead and manage their people

and integrate human capital considerations into their daily decision-making and the

program results they seek to achieve. In doing so, the model highlights the importance of

a sustained commitment by agency leaders to maximize the value of their agencyís

human capital and to manage related risks. Consistent with OPMís and the Office of

Management and Budgetís views, our model of strategic human capital management

embodies an approach that is fact-based, focused on achieving strategic results, and

incorporates merit principles and other national goals.

Additionally, NASA has renewed attention to hiring applicants just out of college and

intends to pursue this even more aggressively in coming years. It is also undertaking a

number of initiatives and activities aimed at acquiring and retaining critical needed skills,

such as using the new Federal Career Intern Program to hire recent science and

engineering graduates, supplementing the workforce with nonpermanent civil servants

where it makes sense, and implementing a program to repay student loans to attract and

retain employees in critical positions.

This subcommittee is currently considering a series of legislative proposals developed by

NASA to provide it with further flexibilities and authorities for attracting and retaining a

skilled workforce. These include streamlining hiring procedures; making noncompetitive

conversions of term employees to permanent positions; offering larger recruitment,

relocation, and retention bonuses; expanding use of early retirement; and providing

authority for permanent and enhanced buyouts.
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Several of the NASA issues mirror aspects of other legislative proposals such as the

Federal Human Capital Act.5

 While we have not performed a detailed analysis of the

support behind NASAís legislative proposals, several points are worthy of consideration.

• First, before agencies embark on major changes to their human capital management

strategy, they must come to grips with developing a realistic picture of how they can

reconcile their wants, needs, and affordabilities. This will require difficult tradeoffs.

• Second, the addition of flexibilities and authorities alone will not solve an agencyís

workforce problems. Agencies need to undertake a wide array of initiatives to attract,

retain, and motivate a top quality workforce. These include such actions as

revitalizing recruiting and college relations efforts; conducting employee feedback

surveys to set priorities and assess progress; conducting employee preference surveys

so employees can be given the opportunity to work in areas that interest and energize

them consistent with overall institutional needs; inventorying the skills and

knowledge of existing employees; initiating professional development programs for

newly hired staff to help them transition and progress; implementing modern,

effective, and credible performance appraisal and management systems; redesigning

training programs to directly link them to core competencies; and implementing

employee-friendly benefits, such as day care centers, business casual dress, flextime,

and public transportation subsidies.
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• Third, agencies need to make the most of current flexibilities and authorities already

available. These flexibilities are identified by OPM in its guide, Human Resource

Flexibilities and Authorities in the Federal Government. They include such things as

the ability to use commercial recruiting firms to recruit for vacancies; customize merit

promotion plans and performance systems; increase basic pay to attract and retain

staff with unusually high or unique qualifications; and grant substantial cash incentive

awards. Agencies should develop a sound business case for using these flexibilities

by focusing on how a given flexibility will address human capital challenges and

ultimately improve agency results. In tandem with exercising these flexibilities,

agencies must learn to effectively balance its pay and incentive programs to

encourage both individual and team contributions to achieving results.

• Fourth, agencies need effective succession planning. NASAís workforce profile,

particularly for science and engineering workers, points to the need for this. Faced

with the same problems at GAO, we reinstated our Executive Candidate Development

Program, under which candidates are selected through a rigorous competitive process

and are prepared for assignments at the SES level. While the potential loss of

expertise through retirements will be substantial, this turnover also affords NASAís

Administrator the opportunity to change culture, skill mix, deployment locations, and

other agency attributes. NASA will, however, need to leverage technology and

 5

 We previously testified on this proposed legislation in March 2002. See U.S. General Accounting

Office, Managing for Results: Building on the Momentum for Strategic Human Capital Reform.

GAO-02-528T (Washington, D.C.: March 2002).
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enhance its training efforts to help make this transition and facilitate needed

knowledge sharing initiatives.

• Fifth, agencies must ensure that strategic human capital plans are results-oriented and

data driven. This includes developing appropriate information on the number and

location of employees and their key competencies and skills as well as data on the

profile of the workforce, performance goals and measures for human capital

approaches. Further, agencies must effectively use this data to develop strategies that

continually ensure they have the right mix of employees to meet its future needs. A

key to success in this area will be NASAís ability to implement its new financial

management system, since it will encompass the new workforce planning and

analysis system.

Instituting a results-oriented culture involves fostering a collaborative environment

where managers, teams, and employees are empowered to accomplish programmatic

goals. It also includes creating a performance management system that provides

candid and constructive information to individual employees, objective and factbased information to managers, and the information and documentation necessary to

deal with poor performers.

Modernizing agency performance appraisal and management systems and linking

them to strategic plans and desired outcomes should be a top priority. Leading

organizations use their performance management systems as a key tool for aligning
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institutions, unit, and employee performance; achieving results; accelerating change;

managing the organization on a day-to-day-basis; and facilitating communication

through the year so that discussions about individual and organizational performance

are integrated and ongoing. To be successful in doing this, the performance

management system must link pay and incentive programs to individual knowledge,

skills, and abilities and contributions to achieving organizational results.

• Lastly, it is critical for agencies to sustain commitment to embracing human capital

management. Agency leaders need to see people as vital assets to organizational

success and must invest in this valuable asset. Agencies can foster this thinking and

commitment in their future leaders through efforts such as succession planning and

executive development. In addition, agencies need to hold managers accountable for

effectively managing people and actively supporting these concepts. In NASAís

case, the importance of the Administratorís personal commitment to change the

workforce as well as the way the agency does business cannot be overstated. His

leadership and commitment is essential, but he will need help to be successful,

particularly from managers at NASA centers in order to overcome resistance to share

knowledge and new ideas.
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CONTROLLING SPACE STATION COSTS

The Challenge

Development costs for the International

Space Station have soared to the point

where NASA has had to make

substantial cutbacks in the program.

This has negatively impacted NASAís

credibility with Congress and raised

concern among international partners

and the scientific community about the

viability of the space station. NASA is

taking action to keep costs in check, but

its success in this area still faces

considerable challenges.

The International Space Station is characterized as one of the most challenging

engineering feats ever attempted. It also represents an important effort to foster

international cooperation in scientific research and space exploration. But NASA has

been facing considerable difficulties in controlling costs and maintaining the scheduling.

The cost to complete assembly has mushroomed by about $5 billion to the current

estimate of about $30 billion, and while assembly of the station was originally expected

to be completed in 2002, NASA now expects it to be done in 2006. As a result, NASA

has had to make substantial cutbacks in the program, which in turn, has raised concern

among NASAís international partners and the scientific community about the viability of

the space station. The future of the space station program hinges on NASAís ability to

stem cost growth and schedule delays and to reestablish its credibility with Congress,

NASAís international partners, and the scientific community.

Cost overruns have hampered efforts to build and

operate the International Space Station
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NASA has had difficulty predicting and controlling costs and scheduling for the space

station since its inception in 1984. In September 1997, we reported that the cost and

schedule performance of the space stationís prime contract, which showed signs of

deterioration in 1996, had continued to worsen steadily and that program financial

reserves for contingencies had deteriorated, principally because of program uncertainties

and cost overruns. In our January 2001 Performance and Accountability Series report,

we reported that the prime contract for the space station was initially expected to cost

over $5.2 billion, and the assembly of the station was expected to be completed in June

2002. But by October 2000, the prime contractorís cost had grown to about $9 billion, of

which $986 million was for cost overruns, and the station was not expected to be

complete until April 2006. NASAís Office of Inspector General (OIG) reported the

same cost overrun in a February 2000 audit report, and based on recommendations in that

report, NASA agreed to take several actions, including discussing the prime contractorís

cost performance at regularly scheduled meetings and preparing monthly reports to senior

management on the overrun status.

Our recent work shows that the reasons for continued cost growth include inadequate

definition of requirements, changes in program content, and schedule delays and

inadequate program oversight.6

 NASA has controls in place that should have alerted

management to the growing cost problem and the need for mitigation, but these were

largely ignored because of NASAís focus on fiscal year budget management rather than

on total program cost management.

 

6

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Space Station: Actions Underway to Manage Cost, but

Significant Challenges Remain, GAO-02-735 (Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2002).
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The estimated cost growth is having a profound effect on the utility of the space stationó

with substantial cutbacks in construction, the number of crewmembers, and scientific

research. As a part of the space station restructuring, further work and funding for the

habitation module and crew return vehicle have been deferred, thus requiring the on-orbit

crew to be reduced from 7 to 3 members. This will limit the crewmember hours that can

be devoted to research. Additionally, NASA has cut back on the number of facilities

available for research--from 27 to 20. This will eliminate some experiments, such as

those relating to biotechnology. NASAís international partners and the scientific

community are not satisfied with these and other reductions in capabilities and have

raised concerns about the viability of the space station science program.

NASA is instituting a number of management and cost estimating reforms. But there are

significant challenges to their successful implementation. First, NASA is now preparing

a life cycle cost estimate for the program. Completing this may be difficult because

NASAís financial management system has proven inadequate for tracking space station

costs. Second, NASA is undertaking several studies to see how research can be

maximized, but these will not be completed until September 2002, leaving NASA with a

small window of opportunity to incorporate their results into the 2004 budget. Third,

NASA has not yet reached an agreement with its international partners on an acceptable

on-orbit configuration, sharing of research facilities, and the sharing of cost. Thus, the

capacity and capabilities of the space station, the scope research that can be

accomplished, and the partnersí share of operating costs are unknown at this time.
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IMPLEMENTING A FASTER, BETTER, CHEAPER

APPROACH TO SPACE EXPLORATION

The Challenge

NASA has been following a faster-bettercheaper management philosophy to reduce

costs, become more efficient, and increase

scientific results by conducting more and

smaller missions in less time. While

NASA has had many successes, failures of

two Mars probes shows that there are limits

to this approach, particularly in terms of

NASAís ability to learn from past

mistakes. NASA has taken steps in recent

years to strengthen lessons learning within

the agency, but more needs to be done to

overcome cultural and organizational

impediments.

The Mars Sojourner Rover was built under the

faster-better-cheaper philosophy.

Since 1992, NASA has been following a faster-better-cheaper management philosophy to

reduce costs, become more efficient, and increase scientific results by conducting more

and smaller missions in less time. The faster-better-cheaper approach works by focusing

on building less expensive space probes much quicker than in the past. It is intended to

stimulate innovative development and application of technology, streamline policies and

practices, and energize and challenge a workforce to continue to safely and successfully

undertake bold new missions in an era of diminishing resources.

While the approach has been successfully used for numerous missions, the failures of two

missions to Mars brought increased scrutiny. The Mars Climate Orbiter, which was
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intended to observe Marsí seasonal climate and daily weather from a low orbit around the

planet, was lost on September 23, 1999. Then on December 3, 1999, the Mars Polar

Lander, a robotic spacecraft intended to land near the South Pole of Mars for a planned

90-day mission to study the planetís layered polar terrain, was also lost.

NASA-sponsored investigative boards found that opportunities to identify and resolve

problems were missed due to poor communications, budget pressures, and poor

management and engineering practices. Upper management officials were not aware of

the extent of the programsí problems.

In our January 2001 Performance and Accountability report, we reported that NASA still

faced significant challenges to creating highly reliable missions and fostering open

communications under the budget constraints of the agency's faster- better-cheaper space

exploration strategy. In addition, success required an integration of lessons learned from

failures on an agency-wide basis.

NASA now recognizes the importance of learning from the past to ensure future mission

success and uses several mechanisms to capture and disseminate lessons learned. In

January 2002, for example, we reported7

 that NASA had developed a Web-based lessons

learned database, and used training, program reviews and periodic revisions to agency

policies and guidelines to communicate lessons.

 

7

U.S. General Accounting Office, NASA: Better Mechanisms Needed for Sharing Lessons

Learned, GAO-02-195 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2002).
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However, we also found that these tools were limited in their effectiveness. NASA

program and project managers reported to us that they were unfamiliar with lessons

generated by other centers and programs and many stated that they were dissatisfied with

NASAís lessons learned processes and systems. For example, they were not using

NASAís lessons learned information system partly because it was time-consuming to do

so.

We also identified problems hampering knowledge sharing within NASA that certainly

reflect a need for a significant transformation within the agency. In particular, many

program and project managers told us that they believed senior management support was

lacking for sharing lessons learned. There were also significant cultural barriers to

knowledge sharingóbeyond the difficulties associated with a stovepiped environment.

For example, there were no agency-wide incentives for sharing knowledge; many

managers simply lacked time to take part in knowledge-sharing activities; and the sharing

of lessons learned was not highly valued across the board. Clearly, with the difficulties

the agency is facing in hiring highly skilled employees, leveraging the institutional

knowledge of its experienced workforce is critical.

We made several recommendations to address these underlying problems as well as

recommendations to improve NASAís current knowledge sharing mechanisms. NASA

generally agreed with our recommendations and plans to implement them.
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CORRECTING WEAKNESSES IN CONTRACT MANAGEMENT

The Challenge

Much of NASAís success depends on the

work of its contractorsóon which it spends

the greatest part of its funds. But for many

years, NASA has not been able to

effectively oversee contracts, principally

because it has lacked accurate and reliable

information on contract spending and it has

placed little emphasis on end results,

product performance, and cost control.

NASA has addressed many acquisitionrelated weaknesses, but key tasks remain,

including implementation of a new

integrated financial management system.

The initial effort to develop the Propulsion Module

for the International Space Station was unsuccessful

because NASA proceeded with the contractor's

proposal without following fundamental contract

management processes.

Since 1990, we have identified NASAís contract management function as an area at high

risk due to its ineffective systems and processes for overseeing contractor activities. Our

reports and testimonies since then, have demonstrated just how debilitating contract

management and oversight weaknesses can be to important space programs. Our July

2002 report on the International Space Station, for example, found that NASA did not

effectively control costs as well as technical and scheduling risks, provide adequate

oversight review, or effectively coordinate efforts with its partners.8 In other examples,

we found that NASA lacked effective systems and processes for overseeing contractor

activities and did not emphasize controlling costs. NASAís accounting systems were

designed prior to implementation of current federal cost accounting and financial systems

that require agencies to track and maintain data for estimating and controlling costs,

performance measurement, and making economic trade-off decisions.

 

8

 GAO-02-735.
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In recent years, NASA has made progress in addressing its contract management

challenges. In July 1998, for example, we reported that NASA was developing systems

to provide oversight and information needed to improve contract management and that it

had made progress evaluating its field centersí procurement activities on the basis of

international quality standards and its own procurement surveys. In January 1999, we

found that NASA was implementing its new system for measuring procurement-related

activities and had made progress in evaluating procurement functions in its field centers.

But much work remains to be done to strengthen contract oversight. A key task is

modernizing NASAís financial management systems. According to NASA, the agencyís

financial management environment is comprised of decentralized, nonintegrated systems

with policies, procedures, and practices that are unique to its field centers. For the most

part, data formats are not standardized, automated systems are not interfaced, and on-line

financial information is not readily available to program managers. Thus, it is difficult to

ensure contracts are being efficiently and effectively implemented and budgets are

executed as planned. In addition, NASA has pointed out that the cost to maintain these

systems has been high, since both data and software are replicated at each field center.

The inadequacy of NASAís financial management system has further impact. Without a

more effective financial management system, NASA will likely continue to have

difficulty providing relevant, reliable, timely financial dataóincluding cost

informationóthat can be used on a real-time basis by program managers to monitor
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costs, schedule, and performance. In March 2002, we testified9

 that NASA was unable to

provide us with detailed support for amounts obligated against cost limits established by

the fiscal year 2000 NASA Authorization Act. This was due, in large part, to NASAís

lack of a modern, integrated financial management system.

To its credit, NASA is working toward implementing an integrated financial management

system that it expects to be fully operational in fiscal year 2008 at an estimated cost of

$691 million. This is NASAís third attempt toward implementing a new integrated

financial management system. The first two efforts were abandoned after 12 years and

after spending a reported $180 million. NASAís current approach focuses on learning

from other organizationsí successes in implementing similar projects, as opposed to

revisiting its own failures. NASA has also abandoned the single product approach that

the two prior attempts had as their basic architecture. Instead, the project will be broken

down into implementable modules on the basis of the availability of proven software

products.

Given the high stakes involved, it is critical that NASAís leadership provide the

necessary direction, oversight, and sustained attention to ensure that this project is

successful. In this regard, NASAís Administrator comes to the position with a strong

management background and expertise in financial management. Based on our

discussions with the Administrator, he has made clear that he plans to make financial

management a top priority.

 

9

U.S. General Accounting Office, National Aeronautics and Space Administration: Leadership

and Systems Needed to Effect Financial Management Improvements, GAO-02-551T (Washington,
GAO-02-945T

25

The task ahead, however, is daunting. In a recent internal review, NASA found that the

total cost estimate for deployment of the core financial module at all NASA centers had

grown considerably beyond the cost initially contemplated. The review also revealed

interoperability and security vulnerabilities within the current information infrastructure.

To address these continuing problems, the Administrator appointed an executive to

provide leadership and accountability in the direction and operation of the new system.

He also recently decided that the near-term focus of the program should be to ensure a

successful and rapid deployment of the core financial moduleóthe backbone of the

systemóand that the schedule of the remaining modules should undergo further risks

assessments before moving forward.

While modernizing NASAís financial management system is central to producing

accurate and reliable financial information needed to support contract management

activities, technology alone will not solve NASAís contract management problems.

NASA must also ensure that the cost data collected and maintained in its financial

management system are sufficiently detailed to allow comparisons of actual costs to

estimates and thereby provide an early warning of cost overruns or other related

difficulties. As we reported in August 2001, NASAís management practices and business

processes do not always facilitate the development of this type of data. For example, we

reported that NASA does not track the actual costs of completed space station

components even though it often estimates the cost of these components for planning and

budgeting purposes. Also, in programs such as the space station, NASA needs to

 

D.C.: March 20, 2002).
GAO-02-945T

26

effectively implement new controls planned to strengthen technical and scheduling

reviews as well as risk analyses.

We are continuing to monitor NASAís progress in addressing contract management

weaknesses. In response to a May 24, 2002 bi-cameral, bi-partisan request from the

Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee and the House Science

Committee, we are currently assessing the extent to which NASAís management of the

financial management system acquisition is in accordance with effective system

acquisition practices and is designed to support NASAís decisionmaking needs and

external reporting requirements.

-- -- -- --

In closing, NASA has a long and proud history, and it does many things well. But, times

have changed, and NASA must change with the times in considering what it does and

how it does business. Moreover, the agency is facing management challenges, which if

not effectively addressed, stand to hurt NASAís credibility with the Congress and its

partners and hamper important space missions. I would like to commend Mr. OíKeefe

for recognizing the need to transform and making a personal commitment to the

transformation effort. The steps he is taking should lay a sound foundation for change.

This is reflected in OMBís recent characterization of NASA as leading the government in

its progress implementing the five governmentwide initiatives identified in the

Presidentís Management Agenda. Clearly, NASA is off to a strong start on what will be
GAO-02-945T

27

a long-term effort. The challenge ahead for NASA will be to maintain the momentum to

transform, to effectively use existing and new authorities to strategically manage its

people, and to quickly implement the tools needed to strengthen management and

oversight.

CONTACTS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Allen Li at (202) 512-

4841. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include, Jerry Herley,

Cristina Chaplain, Shirley Johnson, Charles Malphurs, and Sarah Marquis.

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