Safety Evaluation Report for

the General Electric-Hitachi Global 

Laser Enrichment LLC LaserBased Uranium Enrichment Plant 

in Wilmington, North Carolina

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

NUREG-2120
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Safety Evaluation Report for

the General Electric-Hitachi Global 

Laser Enrichment LLC LaserBased Uranium Enrichment Plant

in Wilmington, North Carolina

Manuscript Completed: January 2012

Date Published: February 2012

Docket No. 70-7016

General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

 

NUREG-2120

iii

ABSTRACT

The report documents the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff review and safety 

and safeguards evaluation of the General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC (the 

applicant) application for a license to construct a laser-based uranium enrichment facility and 

possess and use special nuclear material (SNM), source material, and byproduct material in a 

laser-based uranium enrichment facility. The applicant proposes that the laser-based uranium 

enrichment facility be located in Wilmington, North Carolina, at the site of General ElectricHitachi Global Nuclear Fuel – Americas nuclear fuel fabrication site. The facility will possess 

natural, depleted, and enriched uranium, and will enrich uranium up to a maximum of 8 weight 

percent uranium-235.

The objective of this review is to evaluate the potential adverse impacts of operation of the 

facility on worker and public health and safety under both normal operating and accident 

conditions. The review also considers physical protection of SNM and classified matter, 

material control and accounting of SNM, and the management organization, administrative 

programs, and financial qualifications provided to ensure safe design and operation of the 

facility.

In this safety evaluation report, the NRC staff concludes that the applicant=s descriptions, 

specifications, and analyses provide an adequate basis for safety and safeguards of facility 

operations and that operation of the facility does not pose an undue risk to worker and public 

health and safety.

Potential environmental impacts associated with the proposed facility and its reasonable 

alternatives will be addressed in a separate NRC document, the final environmental impact 

statement, which is expected to be issued in February 2012.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ABSTRACT............................................................................................................................... iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................................................................................v

TABLES .................................................................................................................................. xvi

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .........................................................................................................xvii

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS....................................................................... xxi

1.0 GENERAL INFORMATION..........................................................................................1-1

1.1 FACILITY AND PROCESS DESCRIPTION......................................................1-1

1.1.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS ........................................................1-1

1.1.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA...............1-1

1.1.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS .........................................................1-2

1.1.4 EVALUATION FINDINGS......................................................................1-4

1.2 INSTITUTIONAL INFORMATION.....................................................................1-4

1.2.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS ........................................................1-4

1.2.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA...............1-5

1.2.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS .........................................................1-5

1.2.3.1 Corporate Identity..................................................................1-5

1.2.3.2 Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence ..............................1-6

1.2.3.3 Financial Qualifications..........................................................1-6

1.2.3.4 Liability Insurance................................................................. 1-8

1.2.3.5 Type, Quantity, and Form of Licensed Material .....................1-9

1.2.3.6 Authorized Uses ..................................................................1-10

1.2.3.7 Special Exemptions or Special Authorizations .....................1-11

1.2.3.8 Security of Classified Matter................................................1-24

1.2.4 EVALUATION FINDINGS....................................................................1-25

1.3 SITE DESCRIPTION ......................................................................................1-30

1.3.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS ......................................................1-31

1.3.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA.............1-31

1.3.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS .......................................................1-31

1.3.3.1 Site Geography ...................................................................1-31

1.3.3.2 Demographics .....................................................................1-33

1.3.3.3 Meteorology.........................................................................1-34

1.3.3.4 Geology...............................................................................1-39

1.3.3.5 Hydrology ............................................................................1-44

1.3.4 EVALUATION FINDINGS....................................................................1-45
vi

1.4 REFERENCES ...............................................................................................1-45

2.0 ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION..................................................................2-1

2.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS ...................................................................2-1

2.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA .........................2-1

2.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS....................................................................2-1

2.3.1 ORGANIZATION...................................................................................2-1

2.3.2 ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND QUALIFICATIONS.......2-3

2.3.3 MANAGEMENT CONTROL ..................................................................2-7

2.3.4 TRANSITION FROM DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION TO 

OPERATIONS.....................................................................................2-10

2.4 EVALUATION FINDINGS...............................................................................2-11

2.5 REFERENCES ...............................................................................................2-11

3.0 INTEGRATED SAFETY ANALYSIS AND INTEGRATED SAFETY ANALYSIS

SUMMARY...................................................................................................................3-1

3.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS ...................................................................3-1

3.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA .........................3-3

3.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS....................................................................3-3

3.3.1 SAFETY PROGRAM AND ISA COMMITMENTS ..................................3-3

3.3.1.1 Process Safety Information....................................................3-4

3.3.1.2 ISA Commitments..................................................................3-5

3.3.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE SITE AND FACILITY......................................3-6

3.3.2.1 Description of the Site ...........................................................3-6

3.3.2.2 Description of the Facility.......................................................3-7

3.3.3 PROCESS DESCRIPTIONS .................................................................3-8

3.3.4 EXTERNAL HAZARDS .........................................................................3-8

3.3.4.1 High Wind and Tornado Hazards...........................................3-9

3.3.4.2 Hurricanes and Tsunami......................................................3-10

3.3.4.3 Extreme Rainfall ..................................................................3-11

3.3.4.4 Flooding ..............................................................................3-12

3.3.4.5 Snow ...................................................................................3-13

3.3.4.6 Nearby Highways ................................................................3-14

3.3.4.7 Railroads .............................................................................3-15

3.3.4.8 Nearby Industrial Facilities...................................................3-15

3.3.4.9 Air Transportation................................................................3-15

3.3.4.10 Geology and Seismic Events...............................................3-17

3.3.4.11 Slope Stability......................................................................3-21

3.3.4.12 Liquefaction.........................................................................3-21

3.3.4.13 Settlement and Soil-Bearing Capacity .................................3-22
vii

3.3.5 DESCRIPTION OF ISA TEAM QUALIFICATIONS AND ISA 

METHODS ..........................................................................................3-23

3.3.5.1 ISA Team Qualification........................................................3-23

3.3.5.2 ISA Methods........................................................................3-24

3.3.6 ISA REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS ...............................................3-25

3.3.6.1 Completeness .....................................................................3-25

3.3.6.2 Consequences ....................................................................3-26

3.3.6.3 Enabling Conditions.............................................................3-26

3.3.6.4 Conditional Events...............................................................3-27

3.3.6.5 Safety Controls....................................................................3-27

3.3.6.6 Overall Risk.........................................................................3-27

3.3.7 ISA APPROACH .................................................................................3-28

3.3.7.1 Define Nodes To Be Evaluated............................................3-28

3.3.7.2 Identify Hazards ..................................................................3-28

3.3.7.3 Identify Scenarios................................................................3-28

3.3.7.4 Determine Consequence Category......................................3-29

3.3.7.5 Determine Unmitigated Likelihood .......................................3-29

3.3.7.6 Determine Unmitigated Risk ................................................3-30

3.3.7.7 Perform Quantitative Risk Analysis......................................3-30

3.3.7.8 Develop IROFS and Likelihoods..........................................3-31

3.3.7.9 Management Measures.......................................................3-31

3.3.7.10 Update Lists and Risk Indices .............................................3-31

3.3.7.11 Defense-In-Depth ................................................................3-31

3.3.7.12 ISA Approach Summary Evaluation.....................................3-32

3.3.8 NUCLEAR CRITICALITY REVIEW......................................................3-32

3.3.8.1 Criticality Safety IROFS.......................................................3-32

3.3.8.2 Nuclear Criticality ISA Evaluation ........................................3-33

3.3.9 CHEMICAL PROCESS REVIEW ........................................................3-34

3.3.9.1 Chemical Process Descriptions ...........................................3-35

3.3.9.2 Chemical Hazards, Accident Sequences, and IROFS .........3-35

3.3.9.3 Chemical Consequence Analysis Approach ........................3-36

3.3.9.4 Chemical Consequence Limits ............................................3-36

3.3.10 FIRE PROTECTION REVIEW.............................................................3-37

3.3.11 RADIATION PROTECTION REVIEW..................................................3-38

3.3.12 IROFS STRUCTURES REVIEW .........................................................3-38

3.3.12.1 Structural Design Loads ......................................................3-39

3.3.12.2 Load Combinations..............................................................3-39

3.3.12.3 Structural Analysis Method ..................................................3-40

3.3.12.4 Structural Design Criteria, Bases, and Method ....................3-40

3.3.13 MANAGEMENT MEASURES..............................................................3-41

3.3.14 IDENTIFICATION OF IROFS ..............................................................3-42

3.3.15 LIST OF SOLE IROFS ........................................................................3-43

3.3.16 DEFINITIONS OF “CREDIBLE,” “UNLIKELY,” AND “HIGHLY 

UNLIKELY”..........................................................................................3-43

3.3.16.1 Credible...............................................................................3-43

3.3.16.2 Unlikely................................................................................3-44

3.3.16.3 Highly Unlikely.....................................................................3-44

3.3.17 DESCRIPTION OF THE VERTICAL SLICE REVIEW..........................3-44
viii

3.4 EVALUATION FINDINGS...............................................................................3-45

3.5 REFERENCES ...............................................................................................3-45

4.0 RADIATION PROTECTION .........................................................................................4-1

4.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS ...................................................................4-1

4.1.1 RADIATION PROTECTION PROGRAM ...............................................4-1

4.1.2 AS LOW AS IS REASONABLY ACHIEVABLE PROGRAM...................4-1

4.1.3 ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS .....................4-1

4.1.4 WRITTEN PROCEDURES....................................................................4-1

4.1.5 RADIATION PROTECTION TRAINING.................................................4-1

4.1.6 VENTILATION AND RESPIRATORY PROTECTION PROGRAMS ......4-1

4.1.7 RADIATION SURVEY AND MONITORING PROGRAMS .....................4-2

4.1.8 ADDITIONAL PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS........................................4-2

4.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA .........................4-2

4.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS....................................................................4-2

4.3.1 RP PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION .....................................................4-3

4.3.2 ALARA PROGRAM ...............................................................................4-4

4.3.3 ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS .....................4-7

4.3.4 WRITTEN PROCEDURES....................................................................4-8

4.3.5 TRAINING.............................................................................................4-9

4.3.6 VENTILATION AND RESPIRATORY PROTECTION PROGRAMS ....4-11

4.3.7 RADIATION SURVEY AND MONITORING PROGRAMS ...................4-15

4.3.8 ADDITIONAL PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS......................................4-21

4.3.9 EXEMPTIONS.....................................................................................4-22

4.4 EVALUATION FINDINGS...............................................................................4-23

4.5 REFERENCES ...............................................................................................4-23

5.0 NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY..............................................................................5-1

5.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS ...................................................................5-1

5.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA .........................5-2

5.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS....................................................................5-2

5.3.1 INDUSTRY STANDARDS.....................................................................5-2

5.3.2 ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION ...........................................5-4

5.3.3 MANAGEMENT OF THE NCS PROGRAM...........................................5-6

5.3.4 NCS MANAGEMENT MEASURES .......................................................5-8

5.3.4.1 Training .................................................................................5-9

5.3.4.2 Procedures..........................................................................5-10

5.3.4.3 Audits and Assessments .....................................................5-10
ix

5.3.5 NCS METHODS AND TECHNICAL PRACTICES ...............................5-12

5.3.5.1 NCS Methodologies.............................................................5-12

5.3.5.2 NCS Technical Practices.....................................................5-21

5.3.5.3 NCS Methods and Technical Practice Findings ...................5-28

5.3.6 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM.......................................5-29

5.3.6.1 Criticality Accident Alarm System Description......................5-29

5.3.6.2 CAAS in the ISA Summary ..................................................5-31

5.3.6.3 CAAS Exemption Request...................................................5-32

5.3.6.4 CAAS Findings ....................................................................5-33

5.3.7 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS .........................................................5-34

5.3.8 INTEGRATED SAFETY ANALYSIS ....................................................5-35

5.3.8.1 ISA Commitments................................................................5-35

5.3.8.2 ISA Summary Review..........................................................5-37

5.3.8.3 ISA Summary Review Conclusions .....................................5-39

5.3.9 FACILITY CHANGES AND CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT.........5-40

5.4 EVALUATION FINDINGS...............................................................................5-42

5.5 REFERENCES ...............................................................................................5-43

6.0 CHEMICAL PROCESS SAFETY .................................................................................6-1

6.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS ...................................................................6-1

6.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA .........................6-1

6.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS....................................................................6-1

6.3.1 PROCESS DESCRIPTION ...................................................................6-2

6.3.1.1 General Process Description .................................................6-2

6.3.1.2 Chemical Process Inventories ...............................................6-3

6.3.1.3 Chemical Safety Strategy ......................................................6-3

6.3.1.4 Hazardous Chemicals and Chemical Interactions..................6-4

6.3.1.5 Process Description Conclusion. ...........................................6-5

6.3.2 CHEMICAL ACCIDENT SEQUENCES .................................................6-5

6.3.2.1 Review of Selected Accident Sequences...............................6-6

6.3.2.2 Chemical Accident Sequences Conclusion............................6-6

6.3.3 CHEMICAL ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCES..........................................6-6

6.3.4 IROFS AND MANAGEMENT MEASURES............................................6-8

6.3.4.1 Chemical-Process IROFS......................................................6-8

6.3.4.2 Management Measures.........................................................6-9

6.3.4.3 IROFS and Management Measures Conclusion..................6-13

6.3.5 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT...........................................................6-14

6.3.6 BASELINE DESIGN CRITERIA...........................................................6-14

6.4 EVALUATION FINDINGS...............................................................................6-16

6.5 REFERENCES ...............................................................................................6-16
x

7.0 FIRE SAFETY..............................................................................................................7-1

7.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS ...................................................................7-1

7.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA .........................7-1

7.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS....................................................................7-1

7.3.1 FIRE SAFETY MANAGEMENT MEASURES........................................7-2

7.3.1.1 Fire Safety Management and Direction..................................7-2

7.3.1.2 Fire Protection Program.........................................................7-2

7.3.1.3 Fire Protection Quality Assurance Measures.........................7-3

7.3.1.4 Fire Safety Management Measures Conclusions...................7-4

7.3.2 FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS..................................................................7-4

7.3.3 FACILITY DESIGN................................................................................7-5

7.3.4 PROCESS FIRE SAFETY.....................................................................7-7

7.3.5 FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE.........................7-8

7.3.5.1 Fire Protection Systems.........................................................7-8

7.3.5.2 Emergency Response Capability...........................................7-9

7.3.5.3 Fire Protection and Emergency Response Conclusion ..........7-9

7.4 EVALUATION FINDINGS...............................................................................7-10

7.5 REFERENCES ...............................................................................................7-10

8.0 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT....................................................................................8-1

8.1 INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................8-1

8.2 EVALUATION FINDINGS.................................................................................8-1

8.3 REFERENCES .................................................................................................8-1

9.0 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ..............................................................................9-1

9.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS ...................................................................9-1

9.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA .........................9-2

9.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS....................................................................9-2

9.3.1 TRAINING AND QUALIFICATIONS ......................................................9-2

9.3.1.1 Personnel Training ................................................................9-3

9.3.1.2 Personnel Qualifications........................................................9-3

9.3.2 RADIATION SAFETY............................................................................9-5

9.3.2.1 As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable Goals for Air and 

Liquid Effluent Control ...........................................................9-5

9.3.2.2 Air Effluent Controls to Maintain Public Doses ALARA ..........9-7

9.3.2.3 Liquid Effluent Controls to Maintain Public Doses ALARA .....9-8

9.3.2.4 ALARA Reviews and Reports to Management ......................9-9

9.3.2.5 Waste Minimization .............................................................9-10
xi

9.3.3 EFFLUENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING..........................9-11

9.3.3.1 Air Effluent Monitoring .........................................................9-13

9.3.3.2 Liquid Effluent Monitoring ....................................................9-17

9.3.3.3 Environmental Monitoring....................................................9-19

9.3.4 ISA SUMMARY ...................................................................................9-23

9.4 EVALUATION FINDINGS...............................................................................9-24

9.5 REFERENCES ...............................................................................................9-24

10.0 DECOMMISSIONING.................................................................................................10-1

10.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS .................................................................10-1

10.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA .......................10-2

10.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS..................................................................10-2

10.3.1 CONCEPTUAL DECONTAMINATION AND DECOMMISSIONING 

PLAN...................................................................................................10-3

10.3.1.1 Decommissioning Strategy..................................................10-3

10.3.1.2 Decommissioning Steps ......................................................10-4

10.3.1.3 Management and Organization............................................10-5

10.3.1.4 Health and Safety................................................................10-6

10.3.1.5 Waste Management ............................................................10-6

10.3.1.6 Security and Nuclear Material Control .................................10-7

10.3.1.7 Recordkeeping ....................................................................10-7

10.3.1.8 Decontamination Process....................................................10-8

10.3.2 DECOMMISSIONING COSTS AND FINANCIAL ASSURANCE..........10-9

10.3.2.1 Decommissioning Costs ......................................................10-9

10.3.2.2 Financial Assurance for Decommissioning ........................10-13

10.4 EVALUATION FINDINGS.............................................................................10-17

10.5 REFERENCES .............................................................................................10-18

11.0 MANAGEMENT MEASURES ....................................................................................11-1

11.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS .................................................................11-1

11.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA .......................11-2

11.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS..................................................................11-3

11.3.1 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT....................................................11-3

11.3.1.1 CM Policy ............................................................................11-3

11.3.1.2 Design Requirements ..........................................................11-4

11.3.1.3 Document Control................................................................11-5

11.3.1.4 Change Control ...................................................................11-6

11.3.1.5 Assessments.......................................................................11-7
xii

11.3.2 MAINTENANCE ..................................................................................11-8

11.3.2.1 Surveillance and Monitoring ................................................11-8

11.3.2.2 Corrective Maintenance.......................................................11-9

11.3.2.3 Preventative Maintenance .................................................11-10

11.3.2.4 Functional Testing .............................................................11-11

11.3.3 TRAINING AND QUALIFICATIONS ..................................................11-11

11.3.3.1 Organization and Management of the Training Function ...11-12

11.3.3.2 Analysis and Identification of Functional Areas Requiring 

Training .............................................................................11-13

11.3.3.3 Job Specific Training Requirements ..................................11-16

11.3.3.4 Basis of Training and Objectives .......................................11-17

11.3.3.5 Organization of Instruction.................................................11-18

11.3.3.6 Evaluation of Trainee Accomplishment..............................11-18

11.3.3.7 On-the-Job Training...........................................................11-18

11.3.3.8 Evaluation of Training Effectiveness..................................11-19

11.3.3.9 Personnel Qualification......................................................11-20

11.3.3.10 Provisions for Continuing Assurance .................................11-20

11.3.4 PROCEDURES.................................................................................11-21

11.3.4.1 Use of Written Procedures.................................................11-21

11.3.4.2 Procedure Development Process ......................................11-24

11.3.4.3 Temporary Changes to Procedures...................................11-27

11.3.4.4 Temporary Procedures......................................................11-27

11.3.4.5 Periodic Reviews...............................................................11-28

11.3.4.6 Use and Control of Procedures..........................................11-28

11.3.4.7 Records.............................................................................11-29

11.3.4.8 Topics to be Covered in Procedures..................................11-29

11.3.5 AUDITS AND ASSESSMENTS.........................................................11-30

11.3.5.1 Activities to be Audited or Assessed..................................11-31

11.3.5.2 Scheduling of Audits and Assessments.............................11-32

11.3.5.3 Procedures for Audits and Assessments ...........................11-33

11.3.5.4 Qualifications and Responsibilities for Audits and 

Assessments.....................................................................11-33

11.3.6 INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS...........................................................11-34

11.3.6.1 Incident Identification, Categorization, and Notification......11-34

11.3.6.2 Conduct of Incident Investigations .....................................11-35

11.3.6.3 Written Followup Report ....................................................11-36

11.3.6.4 Corrective Actions .............................................................11-37

11.3.7 RECORDS MANAGEMENT..............................................................11-37

11.3.7.1 Records Management Program.........................................11-37

11.3.7.2 Record Retention...............................................................11-39

11.3.7.3 Organization and Administration........................................11-39

11.3.8 OTHER QA ELEMENTS ...................................................................11-40

11.3.9 DEFINITIONS ...................................................................................11-41

11.4 EVALUATION FINDINGS.............................................................................11-41

11.4.1 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT..................................................11-41

11.4.1.1 CM Policy ..........................................................................11-42

11.4.1.2 Design Requirements ........................................................11-42

11.4.1.3 Document Control..............................................................11-42
xiii

11.4.1.4 Change Control .................................................................11-42

11.4.1.5 Assessments.....................................................................11-42

11.4.2 MAINTENANCE ................................................................................11-42

11.4.3 TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION.....................................................11-43

11.4.4 PROCEDURES.................................................................................11-43

11.4.5 AUDITS AND ASSESSMENTS.........................................................11-43

11.4.6 INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS...........................................................11-44

11.4.7 RECORDS MANAGEMENT..............................................................11-44

11.4.8 OTHER QA ELEMENTS ...................................................................11-44

11.5 REFERENCES .............................................................................................11-45

11.0 APPENDIX A, QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM DESCRIPTION .................... 11.A-1

11.A.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS ............................................................. 11.A-1

11.A.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ................... 11.A-1

11.A.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS.............................................................. 11.A-1

11.A.3.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 11.A-1

11.A.3.2 ORGANIZATION ................................................................. 11.A-2

11.A.3.3 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM ................................... 11.A-3

11.A.3.3.1 Quality Levels ................................................... 11.A-4

11.A.3.3.2 Application of Management Measures .............. 11.A-5

11.A.3.3.3 QA Program Evaluation Summary .................... 11.A-7

11.A.3.4 DESIGN CONTROL............................................................. 11.A-8

11.A.3.5 PROCUREMENT CONTROL .............................................. 11.A-9

11.A.3.6 INSTRUCTIONS, PROCEDURES, AND DRAWINGS ....... 11.A-11

11.A.3.7 DOCUMENT CONTROL.................................................... 11.A-12

11.A.3.8 CONTROL OF PURCHASED ITEMS AND SERVICES..... 11.A-13

11.A.3.9 IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF MATERIALS, 

PARTS, AND COMPONENTS........................................... 11.A-14

11.A.3.10 CONTROL OF SPECIAL PROCESSES ............................ 11.A-15

11.A.3.11 INSPECTION..................................................................... 11.A-15

11.A.3.12 TEST CONTROL ............................................................... 11.A-16

11.A.3.13 CONTROL OF MEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMENT .... 11.A-17

11.A.3.14 HANDLING, STORAGE, AND SHIPPING.......................... 11.A-18

11.A.3.15 INSPECTION, CONTROL, TESTING, AND OPERATING 

STATUS ............................................................................ 11.A-19

11.A.3.16 CONTROL OF NONCONFORMING ITEMS ...................... 11.A-19

11.A.3.17 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS................................................... 11.A-20

11.A.3.18 QUALITY ASSURANCE RECORDS.................................. 11.A-21

11.A.3.19 AUDITS ............................................................................. 11.A-22

11.A.3.20 PROVISIONS FOR CHANGE............................................ 11.A-23

11.A.3.21 FIRE SUPPRESSION IROFS............................................ 11.A-24

11.A.3.21.1 Fire Suppression QA Controls ...................... 11.A-24

11.A.3.21.2 Summary of Fire Suppression QA Controls .. 11.A-37
xiv

11.A.4 EVALUATION FINDINGS.............................................................................11-37

11.A.5 REFERENCES .............................................................................................11-38

12.0 MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING.............................................................12-1

12.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................12-1

12.2 EVALUATION FINDINGS...............................................................................12-1

12.3 REFERENCES ...............................................................................................12-2

13.0 PHYSICAL SECURITY ..............................................................................................13-1

13.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................13-1

13.2 EVALUATION FINDINGS...............................................................................13-1

13.3 REFERENCES ...............................................................................................13-1

14.0 PHYSICAL SECURITY OF THE TRANSPORTATION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR 

MATERIAL OF LOW STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE..................................................14-1

14.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................14-1

14.2 EVALUATION FINDINGS...............................................................................14-1

14.3 REFERENCES ...............................................................................................14-1

15.0 HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING ..........................................................................15-1

15.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................15-1

15.2 EVLAUATION FINDINGS...............................................................................15-1

15.3 REFERENCES ...............................................................................................15-1

16.0 ELECTRICAL POWER AND INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS......16-1

16.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................16-1

16.2 EVALUATION FINDINGS...............................................................................16-1

16.3 REFERENCES ...............................................................................................16-2

17.0 SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT PREPARERS.......................................................17-1
xv

APPENDIX - ACCIDENT ANALYSIS ....................................................................................A-1

A.1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................A-1

A.2 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS SUMMARY ................................................................A-1
xvi

TABLES

Table 1.2-1 Applicant Corporate Financial Assets and Bond Rating..............1-8

Table 1.2-2 Proposed Possession Limits .......................................................1-10

Table 3.3-1 Unmitigated Consequence Categories........................................3-29

Table 3.3-2 Unmitigated Likelihood Categories .............................................3-30

Table 3.3-3 Unmitigated Risk Matrix ...............................................................3-30
xvii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On June 26, 2009, General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC (GLE) (the applicant) 

submitted, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), an application requesting a 

license, under Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Parts 30, 40, and 70, to possess 

and use byproduct, source, and special nuclear material (SNM) in a laser-based uranium 

enrichment facility. GLE proposes that the facility be located in Wilmington, North Carolina, and 

have a nominal capacity of 6 million separative work units (SWUs). (A SWU is a unit of 

enrichment that measures the effort required to separate isotopes of uranium.) The facility will 

possess natural, depleted, and enriched uranium, and will enrich uranium up to a maximum of 8 

weight percent uranium-235. The applicant also requested a facility clearance for classified 

information under 10 CFR Part 95.

The NRC staff conducted its safety review in accordance with NUREG-1520, AStandard Review 

Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility.@ The staff=s safeguards 

review involved reviews of the applicant=s Fundamental Nuclear Material Control Plan (FNMCP); 

the Physical Security Plan, the Nuclear Material Transportation Security Plan; and the Standard 

Practice Procedures Plan for the Protection of Classified Matter. The staff also reviewed the 

applicant=s Quality Assurance Program Description and Radiological Contingency and 

Emergency Plan. Where the applicant=s design or procedures should be supplemented, the 

NRC staff has identified license conditions to provide assurance of safe operation.

The applicant also submitted an Environmental Report, which was used to prepare, in a 

separate document, an Environmental Impact Statement for the facility.

A summary of NRC=s review and findings in each of the review areas is provided below:

General Information

The applicant provided an adequate description of the facility and processes so that the staff 

has an overall understanding of the relationships of the facility features as well as the function of 

each feature. Financial qualifications were properly explained and outlined in the application. 

The description of the site included important information about regional hydrology, geology, 

meteorology, the nearby population, and potential effects of natural phenomena at the facility.

Organization and Administration

The applicant adequately described the responsibilities and associated resources for the 

design, construction, and operation of the facility and its plans for managing the project. The 

plans and commitments described in the application provide reasonable assurance that an 

acceptable organization, administrative policies, and sufficient competent resources have been 

established or committed for the design, construction, and safe operation of the facility.

Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) and ISA Summary

The applicant provided sufficient information about the site, facility processes, hazards, and 

types of accident sequences. The information provided addressed each credible event, the 

potential radiological and chemical consequences of the event, and the likelihood of the event. 
xviii

For nuclear criticality safety (NCS) safe-by-design components, the applicant identified the 

hazards and demonstrated that the failure of those components would be highly unlikely. No 

mitigated event consequence exceeds the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. The 

applicant also provided adequate information about items relied on for safety (IROFS). License 

conditions have been added to the license to ensure that IROFS boundaries will be defined 

using the applicant=s IROFS boundary definition procedure and that the applicant will submit 

license amendment requests if digital instrumentation and controls are used in IROFS.

Radiation Protection

The applicant provided sufficient information to evaluate the Radiation Protection Program. The 

application adequately describes: (a) the qualification requirements; (b) written radiation 

protection procedures; (c) the radiation work permit (RWP) program; (d) the program for 

ensuring that worker and public doses are as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA); and (e) 

necessary training for all personnel who have access to radiologically restricted areas. The 

radiation survey and monitoring program is adequate to protect workers and members of the 

public who may be potentially exposed to radiation.

Nuclear Criticality Safety

The applicant provided adequate information to evaluate the NCS program. The applicant 

committed to having an adequate group of qualified staff to develop, implement, and maintain 

the NCS program in accordance with the facility organization and administration and 

management measures. The program meets the regulatory requirements.

Chemical Process Safety

The applicant adequately described and assessed accident consequences that could result 

from the handling, storage, or processing of licensed materials and that could have potentially 

significant chemical consequences and effects. The applicant performed hazard analyses that 

identified and evaluated those chemical process hazards and potential accidents and 

established safety controls that meet the regulatory requirements.

Fire Safety

The applicant committed to reasonable engineered and administrative controls to minimize the 

risk of fires and explosions. The IROFS and defense-in-depth protection discussed in the 

applicant=s ISA Summary, along with safety basis assumptions and the planned programmatic 

commitments in the license application meet safety requirements and provide reasonable 

assurance that the facility is protected against fire hazards.

Emergency Management

The applicant provided an adequate Radiological Contingency and Emergency Plan, for the 

facility, which meets the regulatory requirements. The applicant commits to maintaining and 

executing an Emergency Plan for responding to the radiological and chemical hazards resulting 

from potential release of radioactive or chemically hazardous materials incident to the 

processing of licensed material. The requirements of the Emergency Plan are implemented 

through approved written procedures.
xix

Environmental Protection

The applicant committed to adequate environmental protection measures, including: (1) 

environmental and effluent monitoring; and (2) effluent controls to maintain public doses ALARA 

as part of the radiation protection program. The applicant=s proposed controls are adequate to 

protect the environment and the health and safety of the public and comply with the regulatory 

requirements.

Decommissioning

The applicant provided a conceptual decommissioning plan, for the facility, that addresses: (a) 

contamination control; (b) control of worker exposures and waste volumes; (c) waste disposal; 

(d) the final radiation survey; (e) control of SNM; (f) control of classified matter; and (g) 

recordkeeping for decommissioning.

The applicant provided a decommissioning funding plan, for the facility, that demonstrates that 

adequate funding will be available for decommissioning and that decommissioning will not pose 

a threat to public health and safety or the environment. The applicant also submitted an 

exemption request to allow for incremental funding for depleted uranium disposition based on 

depleted uranium tails generation rates. The decommissioning funding plan and the 

incremental approach for funding depleted uranium disposition costs will provide adequate 

assurance for decommissioning funding because sufficient funding will be available to 

decommission the facility and disposition the inventory of depleted uranium onsite at any point 

in time. The applicant also provided proposed language for a surety bond, with a standby trust 

agreement. The surety bond and standby trust agreement will be executed before the applicant 

takes possession of licensed material. The applicant will update the site-specific cost estimate 

at least every 3 years, to reflect inflation and changes in site inventories and conditions that 

could affect the cost of decommissioning. A license condition has been added to the license to 

ensure that the applicant takes possession of no licensed material until the surety bond and 

standby trust agreement are executed and are acceptable to NRC. The decommissioning 

funding plan is acceptable because it provides sufficient funding to ensure decommissioning 

and decontamination of the facility can be accomplished even if the licensee is unable to meet 

its financial obligations.

Management Measures

The applicant provided information about management measures that will be applied to the 

project. The information describes: (a) the overall configuration management program and 

policy; (b) the maintenance program; (c) training; and (d) the process for the development, 

approval, and implementation of procedures. The applicant explained the audits and 

assessments program as well as incident investigations and records management system. The 

applicant committed to establishing and documenting surveillances, tests, and inspections to 

provide reasonable assurance of satisfactory performance of the IROFS. The proposed 

management measures are acceptable and meet the regulatory requirements in 10 CFR 

70.62(d).

Material Control and Accountability

The applicant provided information describing the FNMCP for the project. The FNMCP 

describes the programs to be used to control and account for SNM in the facility. The program 

meets the applicable regulatory requirements in Part 74.
xx

Physical Protection

The applicant provided information on the policies, methods, and procedures to be implemented 

to protect SNM of low strategic significance used and possessed at the facility. This information 

is acceptable and meets the requirements in Part 73.

The applicant also provided information on the protection of classified matter, including security 

controls and procedures, to ensure that classified matter is used, processed, stored, 

reproduced, transmitted, transported, and destroyed. This program is acceptable and in 

accordance with the regulatory requirements in 10 CFR Part 95 for a facility clearance.

Transportation Security

The applicant provided information in the Nuclear Material Transportation Security Plan on the 

policies, methods, and procedures to be implemented to protect SNM of low strategic 

significance in transit to and from the facility. This information is acceptable.

Human Factors Engineering

The applicant provided information in the Human Factors Engineering Program Plan describing 

its technical approach for considering human factors in the plant design and operations. This 

program is integrated into the integrated safety analysis process to ensure that IROFS will be 

reliable and available when needed. The approach is consistent with the recommendations in 

NUREG-0700, “Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines,” and NUREG-0711, 

“Human Factors Engineering Program Review Model,” and is acceptable.

Electrical and Instrumentation and Control Systems

The applicant provided information on its electrical and instrumentation and control systems as 

it applies to IROFS. For operation of IROFS, no electrical supplies are necessary as all 

engineered IROFS fail in a safe configuration on loss of electrical power. In addition, the 

applicant did not propose to use digital instrumentation and control systems. The NRC staff is 

imposing a license condition setting out the standards the applicant would be required to meet 

in the event that it applies digital instrumentation and control systems in the future. The 

information provided is acceptable.
xxi

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AC alternating current

ACI American Concrete Institute

ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System

AEC active engineered control

AEGL Acute Exposure Guideline Level

AICHE American Institute of Chemical Engineers

AIF Atomic Industrial Forum

AISC American Institute of Steel Construction

ALARA as low as is reasonably achievable

ALI annual limit on intake

ANI American Nuclear Insurers

ANS American Nuclear Society

ANSI American National Standards Institute

ANSI/ISA American National Standards Institute/International Society of

 Automation 

ANSS Advanced National Seismic System

AOA area of applicability

ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers

ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers

ASQ American Society for Quality

ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials

BDC baseline design criteria

bgs below ground surface

BLEVE boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion

BMS Building Management System

C Celsius

CAAS Criticality Accident Alarm System

CCS Central Control System

CEDE committed effective dose equivalent

CEO Chief Executive Officer

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

cfs cubic foot per second

cm centimeter

cm/hr centimeters per hour

CM configuration management

CPI Consumer Price Index

CSA criticality safety analysis

DAC derived air concentration

DBE design basis earthquake

DC direct current

DCE decommissioning cost estimate

DCS Distributed Control System
xxii

DFP decommissioning funding plan

DOE U.S. Department of Energy

DOS U.S. Department of State

DP decommissioning plan

DUF6 depleted uranium hexafluoride

EA Environmental Assessment

ECC Emergency Control Center

EDMS Electronic Document Management System

EHS environmental health and safety

EIS Environmental Impact Statement

EO emergency organization

EOC Emergency Operations Center

EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

EPCRA Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know

EPRI Electric Power Research Institute

ER Environmental Report

ERO Emergency response organization

ESCI Emergency Services Consulting International

F Fahrenheit

FHA fire hazards analysis

FHWA Federal Highway Administration

Flashes/km2

/yr flashes per square kilometer per year

Flashes/mi2

/yr flashes per square mile per year

FMRC Factory Mutual Research Corporation

FMS Financial Management Service

FNMC fundamental nuclear material control

FNMCP Fundamental Nuclear Material Control Plan

FOCI foreign ownership, control, or influence

FR Federal Register

FSME Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental

 Management

FSRC Facility Safety Review Committee

ft foot

ft/day foot per day

ft/s foot per second

g acceleration of gravity

gal gallon

GE General Electric Company

GEHNEA General Electric-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas

GET general employee training

GLE General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment

GNF-A Global Nuclear Fuels - Americas

gpm gallons per minute

HAZCOM hazard communication

HEGA high efficiency gas absorption

HEPA high efficiency particulate air

HF hydrogen fluoride
xxiii

HFE human factors engineering

Holdings GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Holdings

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

I&C instrumentation and controls

IBC International Building Code

IC initial condition

ICC International Code Council, Inc.

ICRP International Commission on Radiation Protection

IEEE Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineering

in inch

in/hr inches per hour

IROFS item relied on for safety

ISA integrated safety analysis

ISG Interim Staff Guidance

ISO International Organization for Standardization

keff effective neutron multiplication factor

kg kilogram

km kilometer

km2 square kilometer

km/hr kilometers per hour

kPa kiloPascal

KV kilovolt

LA license application

lb pound

LCS Local Control System

LEL lower explosive limit

LLRW low-level radioactive waste

lpm liters per minute

m meter

m/day meters per day

m/s meters per second

m3

/sec cubic meters per second

M&TE measuring and test equipment

MCA moderator controlled area

MC&A material control and accounting

MCES Monitored Central Exhaust System

MDC minimum detectable concentration

MEI maximally exposed individual

mg milligram

mg/kg milligram per kilogram

mi mile

mi2 square mile

MMI Modified Mercalli Intensity

MoS margin of subcriticality

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

MPF main processing facility
xxiv

mph miles per hour

mrem milliRem

mrem/yr milliRem per year

mSv milliSievert

mSv/yr milliSievert per year

MSDS Material Safety Data Sheet

MT metric ton

MW moment magnitude

MW megawatt

NAIC National Association of Insurance Commissioners

NAVFAC Naval Facilities Engineering Command

NCDEM North Carolina Division of Emergency Management

NCEER National Center for Earthquake Engineering Research

NCGS North Carolina Geologic Survey

NCS nuclear criticality safety

NDA nondestructive analysis

NEI Nuclear Energy Institute

NELAC National Environmental Laboratory Accreditation Conference

NESC National Electrical Safety Code

NEPA National Environmental Policy Act

NESHAPS National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants

NFPA National Fire Protection Association

NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

NMSS Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

NMTSP Nuclear Material Transportation Security Plan

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NPDES National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System

NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NRR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

NSIR Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response

NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program

OJT on-the-job training

OSHA U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration

P&ID piping and instrumentation diagram

PCS Process Control System

pfod probability of failure on demand

PFPE perfluorinated polyether

PGA peak ground acceleration

PHA process hazard analysis

PM preventive maintenance

PMF probable maximum flood

PMP probable maximum precipitation

PMT post-maintenance testing

PNC potential non-compliance

PPE personal protective equipment

psf pounds per square foot

PSP Physical Security Plan

PSM process safety management
xxv

QA quality assurance

QAPD Quality Assurance Program Description

QC quality control

QL quality level

QRA quantitative risk assessment

RASCAL Radiological Assessment System for Consequence Analysis

RCA radiological controlled area

RC&EP Radiological Contingency and Emergency Plan

RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

Rem roentgen equivalent man

RES Office of Regulatory Research

RLETS Radioactive Liquid Effluent Treatment System

RM records management

RP radiation protection

RSC Radiation safety Committee

Scf standard cubic feet

SER Safety Evaluation Report

SILEX Separation of Isotopes by Laser Excitation

SM Source Material

SNM Special Nuclear Material

SNM-LSS Special Nuclear Material - Low Strategic Significance

SPPP Standard Practice Procedures Plan

SSC structure, system, and component

Sv Sievert

SWC surge withstand capability

SWSB Solid Waste Storage Building

SWU separative work unit

Tc-99 technicium-99

TEDE total effective dose equivalent

Th-232 thorium-232

Treasury Department of the Treasury

TSP Transportation Security Plan

235U uranium-235

UDS Uranium Disposition Services

UF4 uranium tetrafluoride

UF6 uranium hexafluoride

UIR unusual incident report

UL Underwriters Laboratories

UCF unit cost factor

UO2F2 uranyl fluoride

UPS uninterruptible power supply

U.S. United States

USEC United States Enrichment Corporation

USGS U.S. Geological Survey

USL upper subcritical limit 
xxvi

WMP Waste Minimization Plan

wt weight

yr year
1-1

1.0 GENERAL INFORMATION

1.1 FACILITY AND PROCESS DESCRIPTION

The purpose of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s or Commission’s) review of 

the proposed General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE) laser-based uranium 

enrichment facility and process description is to determine whether the application includes an 

overview of the facility layout and a summary description of the proposed processes. A more 

detailed description of the facility and processes is contained in the “Integrated Safety Analysis 

(ISA) Summary” (GLE, 2011a).

1.1.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 

The regulations in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 30.33(a)(2), 10 

CFR 40.32(c), and 10 CFR 70.22(a)(2) and (7) require each application for a license to include 

information on the proposed activity and the equipment and facilities that will be used by the 

applicant to protect health and minimize danger to life and property. In addition, the regulations 

in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(1), (2), and (3) require each application to include a general description of 

the facility, with emphasis on those areas that could affect safety, including identification of the 

controlled area boundaries.

1.1.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 

The guidance applicable to NRC’s review of the facility and process description section of the 

License Application (LA) (GLE, 2011b) is contained in Chapter 1 of the “Standard Review Plan 

for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility,” NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). 

The chapter is applicable in its entirety. For information regarding exemption requests, see 

Section 1.2.3.6, “Special Exemptions or Special Authorizations,” of this chapter.

The acceptance criteria applicable to this review are contained in Section 1.1.4.3 of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002). The applicant’s general information will be found acceptable if it presents 

information at a level of detail that is appropriate for general familiarization and understanding of 

the proposed facility and processes. In addition, the general information needs to summarize 

the information presented in the ISA Summary showing the overall facility layout on scaled 

drawings, including the site geographical and facility structural features, and describing the 

relationship of specific facility features to the major processes the will be undertaken. The 

general information also needs to include the major chemical or mechanical processes involving 

licensed material described in a summary form based on information in the ISA Summary, 

including the building locations of major processes; brief descriptions of the process steps; the 

chemical forms of the licensed material; the maximum amounts of licensed material in various 

building locations; and the types, amounts, and discharge points of waste material discharged to 

the environment. The application also needs to provide a summary identification of the raw 

materials, by-products, wastes, and finished products from the facility. This information needs 

to include trace quantities of impurities or contaminants characterized by identity and 

concentration and describe any moderators or reflectors with special characteristics.
1-2

1.1.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 

In Section 1.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), the applicant provides a summary description of the 

proposed laser-based uranium enrichment plant and processes. This description includes 

discussion of the major chemical and mechanical processes to be used in the facility. The 

facility is proposing to use a laser-based enrichment process to enrich uranium from its natural 

isotopic concentration of about 0.7 weight percent uranium-235 (235U) up to 8 weight percent 

235U. The proposed plant will have a nominal enrichment capacity of 6 million Separative Work 

Units (SWUs). (A SWU is a measure of the effort required to perform isotopic separation.) The 

process uses uranium in the chemical form of uranium hexafluoride (UF6). UF6 used and 

produced in the facility will meet appropriate American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) 

material specifications. Gaseous UF6 passes through a laser, which excites the 235U atom, and 

separates that isotope from uranium-238. The technology is based on the classified Separation 

of Isotopes by Laser Excitation (SILEX) process developed by SILEX Systems Limited, an 

Australian company. The SILEX technology is being used by the applicant under the 

“Agreement for Cooperation between the United States of America and Australia Concerning 

Technology for the Separation of Isotopes of Uranium by Laser Excitation,” signed on October 

28, 1999 (DOS, 1999).

The proposed plant, if licensed, will be constructed in Wilmington, North Carolina, at an existing 

General Electric Company (GE) site. Currently, at the Wilmington site, GE fabricates 

commercial nuclear reactor fuel, services reactor control rod drive assemblies, fabricates 

nuclear reactor components, and builds aircraft engines. Section 1.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011b) 

presents a summary description of site features including geography, demographics, local 

transportation routes, land use, meteorology, hydrology, geology, and seismicity. 

The applicant is proposing to construct an Operations Building having a UF6 Cylinder Shipping 

and Receiving Area; a UF6 Feed and Vaporization Area; a Product Withdrawal Area; a Tails 

Withdrawal Area; a Cascade/Gas Handling Area; a Blending Area; a Sampling Area; a 

Radioactive Waste Area; a Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Equipment Area; a 

Decontamination/Maintenance Area; a Laboratory Area; and a Laser Area. The facility will also 

include UF6 cylinder storage pads for feed, product, and tails cylinders, administration buildings, 

and other support buildings needed for equipment storage and the facility infrastructure. The 

tails storage pad will have a capacity for 9,000 tails cylinders to accommodate ten years of full 

capacity operations. Because the tails storage pad will be limited to 9,000 cylinders, which is 

less than the total number of tails cylinders that could be generated over the 40-year operating 

period of the facility (approximately 33,000 cylinders), the following license condition will be 

added:

The licensee shall store no greater than 9,000 tails cylinders onsite. If the licensee 

wishes to store more than 9,000 tails cylinders onsite, it shall submit an amendment 

request describing its proposed storage expansion and the provisions to be used to 

ensure the protection of public and worker safety.

The LA (GLE, 2011b) provides additional information on each of the facility buildings proposed 

be constructed, including drawings for each of these areas.

The applicant is proposing to use a UF6 feed process that will heat feed cylinders to vaporize the 

UF6 and remove light gases present in the cylinder. Light gases will flow through cold traps 

to remove any UF6 and chemical traps to remove any residual hydrogen fluoride. The feed 

process will not heat UF6 to temperatures high enough to produce liquid UF6.
1-3

The purified UF6 will flow into the cascades where it is enriched. Following enrichment, the 

product and tails streams will be withdrawn by cooling and desublimation. Product cylinders are 

brought to the blending station for blending to produce the customer’s desired 235U assay. The 

withdrawal and blending processes will not result in liquid UF6.

Before shipment to customers, product cylinders will be sampled to ensure that customer 

specifications are met. To meet appropriate sampling requirements, the UF6 must be liquefied 

to produce homogeneous samples. Product cylinders will be heated in an autoclave using hot 

air. Following sampling, the cylinders will be cooled using cold air to solidify the UF6. The 

sampling station is the only area of the facility where liquid UF6 will be present.

The proposed facility is expected to possess natural, enriched, and depleted uranium. It is 

expected to handle, on an annual basis, approximately 900 nominal 12.5-metric ton (MT) (14-

ton) natural uranium feed cylinders.

Gaseous airborne effluents will be released from the proposed facility. Areas potentially 

contaminated with radioactive materials will be processed using high efficiency particulate air 

filters and high efficiency gas absorption filters. Gaseous effluents will be monitored to ensure 

that releases meet 10 CFR Part 20 and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency National 

Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants airborne release limits.

Liquid discharges include contaminated process effluents, cooling tower blowdown, and sanitary 

and stormwater discharges. Liquid effluents containing radioactive materials will be processed 

using precipitation and evaporation. Following treatment and monitoring to ensure that 10 CFR 

Part 20 requirements are met, these liquids will be released to onsite treatment facilities prior to 

discharging with other wastewaters generated at the Wilmington site to the site outfall. All 

discharges will meet 10 CFR Part 20 and National Pollution Discharge Elimination System liquid 

effluent requirements.

Solid wastes expected to be generated include non-hazardous municipal and industrial, Class A 

radioactive, and hazardous wastes. Non-hazardous municipal and industrial solid wastes will 

be disposed of at applicable approved municipal and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 

(RCRA) disposal facilities. Radioactive wastes will be disposed of at licensed low-level 

radioactive waste disposal facilities. Hazardous RCRA wastes will be properly treated and 

disposed of at permitted treatment and disposal facilities. Mixed low-level radioactive and 

chemically hazardous wastes are not expected to be generated at the facility. Depleted 

uranium tails will be stored onsite on the Tails Pad until they are transferred to another licensee 

for commercial use or they are designated for transfer to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) 

under Section 3113 of the USEC Privatization Act of 1996. The applicant is proposing a 9,000 

12.5-MT (14-ton) cylinder Tails Pad capacity limit of depleted uranium tails cylinders to 

accommodate ten years of tails generation.

As stated above, the applicant provided information at a level of detail that is appropriate for 

general familiarization and understanding of the proposed facility and processes. The 

application summarizes the facility information contained in the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) and 

includes descriptions of the overall facility layout on scaled drawings, including the site 

geographical features and facility structural features and transportation rights-of-way. The 

summary also describes the relationship of specific facility features to the major processes that 

will be ongoing at the facility. The major chemical and mechanical processes involving 

licensable material are described in summary form, based in part on information presented in 
1-4

the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a). This description includes: (a) reference to the building 

locations of major process components; (b) brief descriptions of the process steps; (c) the 

chemical forms of licensable material in process; and (d) the types, amounts, and discharge 

points of waste material discharged to the environment from the processes. The applicant 

presented a summary identification of the raw material, by-products, waste, and finished 

products of the facility. Expected levels of trace impurities or contaminants would not exceed 

the levels specified in ASTM C996, “Standard Specification for Uranium Hexafluoride Enriched 

to Less than 5 % 235U” (ASTM, 2004). The information the applicant provided meets the

acceptance criteria in Sections 1.1.4.3(1), (2), (3), and (4) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, 

therefore, acceptable.

1.1.4 EVALUATION FINDINGS 

The staff has reviewed the proposed general facility and process descriptions according to 

Section 1.1 of the Standard Review Plan. The applicant has adequately described: (1) the 

facility and processes so that the staff has an overall understanding of the relationships of the 

facility features; and (2) the function of each feature. Because the tails storage pad has a 

capacity for less than the total quantity of tails cylinders that could be generated over the 40-

year life of the facility, the following license condition will be added:

The licensee shall store no more than 9,000 tails cylinders onsite. If the licensee wishes 

to store more than 9,000 tails cylinders onsite, it shall submit an amendment request 

describing its proposed storage expansion and the provisions to be used to ensure the 

protection of public and worker safety.

The staff concludes that the applicant has met the requirements and acceptance criteria in 

Sections 1.1.4.3(1), (2), (3) and (4) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and general facility and 

process information is, therefore, acceptable.

1.2 INSTITUTIONAL INFORMATION 

The purpose of NRC’s review of the applicant’s institutional information is to establish whether 

the license application includes adequate information identifying the applicant, the applicant’s 

characteristics, and the proposed activity.

1.2.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 

The regulations in 10 CFR 30.32(a) and 10 CFR 40.31(a) require each application for a license 

to include: (a) information on the identity of the applicant; (b) name, chemical and physical 

form, and maximum amount of licensed material that will be possessed; and (c) purpose for 

which the licensed material will be used. The regulations in 10 CFR 70.22(a) require each 

application for a license to include: (a) information on the corporation applying for a license; (b) 

the location of the principal office; (c) the names and citizenship of the principal officers; (d) 

information concerning ownership and control; (e) the proposed site activities; (f) financial 

qualifications; and (g) the name, amount, and specifications of the licensed material to be used. 

The regulations in 10 CFR 70.23(a)(5) require that the applicant appears to be financially 

qualified to engage in the proposed activities in accordance with the regulations. The 

regulations in 10 CFR Part 95 contain provisions for obtaining a facility security clearance. The 

regulations in 10 CFR 140.13b require applicants for uranium enrichment facilities to provide 

and maintain liability insurance.
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1.2.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 

The acceptance criteria applicable to NRC’s review of the institutional information section of the 

application are contained in 10 CFR 30.32, 10 CFR 40.31, 10 CFR 70.23(a)(5), 10 CFR 

Part 95, 10 CFR 140.13b, and Section 1.2.4.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). Chapter 1 of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is applicable to the proposed uranium enrichment facility in its 

entirety. The applicant’s institutional information will be found acceptable if it provides a 

description of the identity of the applicant; whether the applicant is a corporation or other entity; 

the organization and principal offices of the applicant; the site location; the names and 

citizenship of the principal officers; information on control and ownership of the applicant, 

including foreign interests; and the presence and operations of any other company on the site to 

be licensed are described. The institutional information also needs to provide a description of 

the financial qualification of the applicant that demonstrates current and continued access to 

financial resources needed to engage in the proposed activities. The applicant needs to identify 

the radioactive materials to be possessed, including the maximum quantities, chemical and 

physical forms, and the specifications of the material. In addition, the applicant needs to provide 

a narrative description of the activities or processes to be used consistent with the description of 

the proposed uses in the ISA Summary. The applicant also needs to describe any special 

authorization and exemptions to be requested and how the applicant will protect classified 

information.

Section 1.2.3.6, “Special Exemptions or Special Authorization,” of this Safety Evaluation Report 

(SER), addresses exemptions and special authorizations.

1.2.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

1.2.3.1 Corporate Identity 

In Section 1.2.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), the applicant provided information on its corporate 

organization. The applicant is GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment, LLC. The applicant is a 

limited liability company chartered in the State of Delaware and is the only subsidiary of GEHitachi Nuclear Energy Americas, LLC (GEHNEA). GEHNEA is a Delaware limited liability 

company and a wholly-owned subsidiary of GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Holdings (Holdings). 

Holdings is a Delaware-chartered limited liability company and is a subsidiary of GENE Holding 

LLC, also a Delaware-chartered limited liability company. GENE Holding LLC is owned by GE, 

a United States corporation chartered in the State of New York, and minority owner Hitachi 

America, Ltd., which is wholly owned by Hitachi, Ltd., a Japanese corporation.

GLE has two minority owners, Cameco Enrichment Holdings, Ltd., a Delaware limited liability 

company, and GENE Holding LLC. Cameco Enrichment Holdings, Ltd., is wholly owned by 

Cameco US Holdings, Inc., a Nevada corporation, which is wholly owned by Cameco 

Corporation, a Canadian corporation. Cameco Enrichment Holdings, Ltd., has a 24 percent 

interest in GLE and GENE Holding LLC has a 13.5 percent interest in GLE.

Under the above ownership arrangement, GE maintains an indirect majority (51 percent

ownership and controlling interest), and no foreign entity has the ability to exercise control over 

GLE operations and management or has access to, or use rights in, GLE’s nonpublic 

enrichment technology, including classified information. GLE Governing Board resolutions and, 

as applicable, Governing Board member voting proxies are utilized to assure that only 

Governing Board members who are U.S. citizens with appropriate U.S. government clearances 

have access to, or exercise control over, activities affecting the protection of classified matter.
1-6

No other companies will be present or operating on the uranium enrichment plant property other 

than where the applicant has contracted such services. The principal location for business is 

Wilmington, North Carolina.

The applicant provided the name of the President of GLE, who is a citizen of the United States.

The above information meets the requirements in 10 CFR 70.22(a)(1) and the guidance in 

Section 1.2.4.3(1) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable because it 

includes the full name and address of the applicant; the address and full description of the 

location of the proposed facility; the States of incorporation of the applicant and its parents; the 

names and citizenship of the applicant’s principal officers; corporate information related to 

foreign control, ownership, and influence; primary owners and relationships to other component 

of the same ownership; and the presence and operations of any other company on the site.

1.2.3.2 Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence 

The applicant provided foreign ownership, control, or influence (FOCI) information in its Facility 

Clearance Submittal (GLE, 2011c). With respect to the FOCI determination for GLE and its 

parents, NRC staff received a letter from the DOE, dated May 19, 2010 (DOE, 2010), that a 

preliminary favorable FOCI determination rendered on May 17, 2010, has revealed that the 

degree and extent of FOCI over GLE and GEHNEA do not pose an undue risk to national 

security and there are no restrictions placed on GLE and GEHNEA for reasons of FOCI. The 

NRC accepts this finding by DOE based on an Interagency Agreement between NRC and DOE 

dated May 6, 2002 (DOE, 2002). NRC staff also reviewed amendments to the original FOCI

submittal to reflect personnel changes in the GLE and GLE parent organizations. These 

amendments were consistent with the DOE determination and are, therefore, acceptable.

1.2.3.3 Financial Qualifications 

The governing regulations for financial qualifications for this application are 10 CFR 70.22(a)(8) 

and 10 CFR 70.23(a)(5).

Section 70.22(a)(8) of 10 CFR states:

“Each application for a license shall contain...[p]roposed procedures to protect 

health and minimize danger to life or property...[w]here the nature of the proposed 

activities is such as to require consideration of the applicant’s financial 

qualifications to engage in the proposed activities in accordance with the 

regulations in this chapter, the Commission may request the applicant to submit 

information with respect to his financial qualifications.”

Section 70.23(a)(5) of 10 CFR states:

“Where the nature of the proposed activities is such as to require consideration by 

the Commission, that the applicant appears to be financially qualified to engage in 

the proposed activities in accordance with the regulations in this part;”

In addition, the staff took into consideration the Commission’s ruling in Louisiana Energy 

Services, L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-97-15, 46 NRC 294 (1997), which addressed 

an application by Louisiana Energy Services to construct and operate a uranium enrichment 
1-7

facility pursuant to 10 CFR Part 70. Among other things, the ruling held that “the NRC is not 

required as a matter of law to apply the strict financial qualification provisions of Part 50 to all 

Part 70 license applications.” The Commission concluded that “the general language of Part 70 

leaves the Commission free to review the reasonableness of an applicant’s financial plan in light 

of all relevant circumstances,” which might or might not lead to application of any or all of the 

criteria stated in Part 50.

1.2.3.3.1 Evaluation of Cost Estimate to Construct and Operate the Facility

In Section 1.2.2.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), the applicant provided an estimate of the total capital 

investment required to construct a 6 million SWU facility, excluding capital depreciation, UF6 

tails disposition, decommissioning, and any replacement equipment required during the life of 

the facility. The estimated cost considered the costs of NRC licensing, site preparation, design, 

construction, long lead time manufacturing, installation, and testing and start-up.

The applicant stated that the cost estimate is based on a phased construction approach that is 

expected to take approximately 8 years from the time the license is issued to reach the full 6 

million SWU capacity. The applicant plans to construct the proposed facility in 1 million SWU 

phases. After the first 1 million SWU phase is completed, additional 1 million SWU increments 

will be constructed at 1-year intervals. The applicant is expected to start production from the 

first phase approximately three years from issuance of the NRC license.

Based on the information provided, staff considers that the project cost estimate presented by 

the applicant provides a reasonable estimate of the financial resources needed to construct and 

operate the facility.

1.2.3.3.2 Evaluation of Financial Qualifications

In Section 1.2.2.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), the applicant made commitments that construction of 

the first phase would not commence before funding is fully committed. Of this full funding 

(equity and/or debt), the applicant will have in place: (1) minimum equity contributions of 30

percent of the estimated project cost of the first phase from the parents and affiliates of the 

partners; and (2) firm commitments ensuring funds for the remaining project costs (GLE, 

2011b). Construction of the subsequent incremental phases will have the same requirements

listed for the first phase, with the caveat that expected profits from Phase 1 sales may be used 

as a funding source as well. 

GLE has no reported income statements since its inception. As stated in Section 1.2.2.3 of the 

LA (GLE, 2011b), GLE is currently funded by three parent companies, General Electric, Hitachi, 

and Cameco. The parent organizations have contributed cash and notes to fund the project 

through the design validation stage of the program and stand committed to provide additional 

funding pending the successful validation of the design concept. As stated above, the applicant 

currently expects to fund a portion of the construction costs through additional equity 

contributions provided by the parent companies. The applicant identified sources of debt and 

equity for construction, however, the applicant does state that other funding options may be 

explored including, but not limited to, additional equity owners or long-term debt instruments. 

The applicant provided a summary of each parent company’s total assets for the year ending 

December 31, 2009. All three of the parent organizations are publicly traded and have a 

Standard & Poor’s credit rating of BBB+ or higher, as referenced in Table 1.2-1, below.
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Table 1.2-1

Applicant Corporate Financial Assets and Bond Rating

To ensure the applicant meets the financial qualifications requirements pursuant to 

10 CFR 70.23(a)(5), the staff is imposing the following license condition, which is consistent with 

the approach previously accepted by the staff in Section 1.2.3.3.2 of NUREG-1851, “Safety 

Evaluation Report for the American Centrifuge Plant in Piketon, Ohio” (NRC, 2006a):

Construction of each 1 million Separative Work Unit phase shall not commence before 

funding for that increment is available or committed. Prior to initiation of such phase, the 

licensee shall make available for NRC inspection, documentation of the budgeted costs, 

the source of funds available or committed, and changes to actual costs or funding of 

previous phases.

The NRC staff finds that, based on the financial information submitted in the application

describing the applicant’s current and continuing access to the financial resources necessary to 

engage in the proposed activity, there is reasonable assurance that applicant is financially 

qualified to build and operate the proposed uranium enrichment facility and meets the financial

qualification requirements for the proposed activities in accordance with 10 CFR 70.22(a)(8), 10 

CFR 70.23(a)(5), Commission direction in CLI-97-15, and the guidance in Section 1.2.4.3(2) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), subject to the above license condition.

1.2.3.4 Liability Insurance

Under 10 CFR 140.13b, a uranium enrichment facility is required to carry liability insurance to 

cover public claims arising from any occurrence, within the U.S. that causes, within or outside 

the U.S., bodily injury, sickness, disease, death, loss of, or damage to, property, or loss of use 

of property arising from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of 

chemicals containing licensed material. The coverage would also apply to chemicals produced 

from licensed material. The amount of liability insurance required may be furnished and 

maintained in the form of either an effective facility form policy of liability insurance from nuclear 

facility underwriters, such other type of liability insurance as the NRC may approve, or a

combination of the foregoing. As discussed in Section 1.2.2.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), the 

applicant is proposing to have and maintain up to $200 million of liability insurance to satisfy the 

10 CFR 140.13b requirements.

American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) currently provides $200 million in coverage for the GE fuel 

fabrication facility located at the GE site (GLE, 2011b). The applicant provided a Certificate of 

Insurance that identifies the proposed uranium enrichment site to be covered under the existing 

fuel fabrication facility policy (GLE, 2011b). ANI indicated that $200 million is the maximum limit 

of liability it will provide for the GE site because the fuel manufacturing operations create a 

Parent Company

Total Assets 

(US$ billion)

S&P Credit 

Rating

GE 782 AA+

Hitachi Ltd. 112 BBB+

Cameco Corp. 7.21 BBB+
1-9

legacy exposure that restricts how much insurance capacity ANI is willing to provide (ANI, 

2010).

NRC staff finds that the Certificate of Insurance meets the proof of liability insurance 

requirements in 10 CFR 140.13b to issue the license. In addition, the applicant’s commitment to 

provide and maintain nuclear liability insurance in an amount of up to $200 million prior to the 

receipt of licensed material and throughout operation of the facility is sufficient to fulfill NRC 

regulatory requirements in 10 CFR 140.13b. NRC staff finds that the $200 million amount of

liability insurance is acceptable because it is the maximum amount available from private 

sources. If however, the applicant chooses to provide liability insurance at a level less than 

$200 million prior to the issuance of the license, the following license condition is proposed:

The licensee shall provide proof of full liability insurance of $200 million, as required by

10 CFR 140.13b, at least 30 days prior to the planned date for obtaining licensed 

material. If the licensee is proposing to provide less than $200 million of liability 

insurance coverage, the licensee shall provide, to the NRC for review and approval, an 

evaluation supporting liability insurance coverage in amounts less than $200 million at 

least 120 days prior to the planned date for obtaining licensed material.

1.2.3.5 Type, Quantity, and Form of Licensed Material

Table 1-7 of the LA (GLE, 2011b) lists the type, quantity, and form of the licensed material 

proposed for possession. The applicant proposes to use and possess up to 2,600 MT (2,870 

tons) of special nuclear material containing up to 8 weight percent 235U and up to 140,000 MT 

(154,000 tons) of source material as depleted or natural uranium. The applicant also expects to 

use additional source and by-product material in calibration sources and will amend the LA 

when these calibration sources are selected. The quantities of Technicium-99 (Tc-99) and 

transuranics from residual contamination as a consequence of the historical feed of recycled 

uranium at other facilities are expected to have no significant radiological impact. The proposed 

possession limits are summarized in Table 1.2-2 below. 

The applicant is proposing to enrich up to 8 weight percent 235U. However, the applicant is not 

expected to generate enriched material above 5 weight percent 235U in the near future as 

current nuclear power plants do not need enrichments at assays above 5 weight percent. In 

addition, 2.5-ton (2.3-MT) cylinders used to transport enrichment material are not approved for 

use above 5 weight percent 235U. NRC staff reviewed the application on the basis of producing 

enrichment levels of up to 8 weight percent 235U. However, NRC staff is imposing the following 

license condition to ensure that uranium enriched to up to 8 weight percent can be transported 

safely in approved product cylinders:

The licensee shall provide a minimum 60-day notice to NRC before initial product 

withdrawal of licensed material exceeding 5 weight percent 235U enrichments. This 

notice shall identify the necessary equipment and operational changes to support 

customer product shipments at these assays.

The applicant included Tc-99 and transuranics in Table 1-7 of the LA (GLE, 2011b). These 

radionuclides may exist at the facility in the form of process contaminants and waste or material 

held in cylinders from previous recycled uranium. The applicant has committed to comply with 

the requirements of ASTM C787 (ASTM 2006), “Standard Specification for Uranium 

Hexafluoride for Enrichment,” or ASTM C996 (ASTM, 2004). These standards contain purity 

requirements for uranium enrichment feed and enriched product. NRC considered the 
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applicant’s commitments to ASTM C787 (ASTM, 2006) and ASTM C996 (ASTM, 2004) an 

acceptable means for ensuring that the Tc-99 and transuranic possession limits contained in 

Table 1-7 of the LA (GLE, 2011b) are not exceeded.

Table 1.2-2

Proposed Possession Limits

Source or Special Nuclear 

Material

Physical and Chemical Form Maximum Amount to be 

Possessed at Any One Time

Uranium (natural and 

depleted) and daughter 

products

Physical: Solid, Liquid, and 

Gas

Chemical: UF6, UF4, UO2F2, 

oxides and other compounds

140,000,000 kg (308,000,000 

lbs)

Uranium enriched in isotope 

235U up to 8 percent by weight 

and uranium daughter 

products

Physical: Solid, Liquid, and 

Gas

Chemical: UF6, UF4, UO2F2, 

oxides and other compounds

2,600,000 kg (5,720,000 lbs)

Tc-99, transuranic isotopes 

and other contamination

Any Amount that exists as 

contamination as a 

consequence of the historical 

feed of recycled uranium at 

other facilities

Note: Tc-99 - Technetium-99

UF4 - Uranium Tetrafluoride

UO2F2 - Uranyl Fluoride

As stated above, the applicant identified the elemental name, maximum quantity, and 

specifications, including the chemical and physical forms, of the licensed material that the 

applicant proposes to acquire, deliver, receive, possess, produce, use, transfer, or store. The 

applicant also identified the isotopic content and amount of enrichment by percent of the 

licensed material. The information provided by the applicant meets the regulatory requirements 

in 10 CFR 70.22(a)(4) and the guidance in Section 1.2.4.3(3) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and 

is, therefore, acceptable.

1.2.3.6 Authorized Uses

As discussed in Section 1.2.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), the application is for the issuance of 

licenses under 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70 that would be effective for a 40-year period. The 

applicant is proposing to use special nuclear material and source material in the enrichment of 

uranium. The uranium enrichment services would be sold to clients for the production of lowenriched uranium that would be ultimately used in the manufacture of fuel for commercial 

nuclear power plants. Enrichment services may also be provided to the U.S. government.
1-11

As discussed in Section 1.2.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), byproduct material would be used in 

instrument calibration sources and may be present as contamination as a consequence of the 

historical feed of recycled uranium at other enrichment facilities. Feed cylinders that have been 

previously used to transport or store recycled uranium must be decontaminated before being 

allowed on the facility site. In addition, natural UF6 supplied to the facility will meet ASTM C787 

(ASTM, 2006), and periodic audits of suppliers will be performed to ensure that these conditions 

are met. The applicant intends to identify specific byproduct calibration sources in future license 

amendment requests. As discussed in Section 1.2.6 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), the applicant also 

requested approval of a classified-matter facility clearance under 10 CFR Part 95.

As stated above, the applicant provided a summary, non-technical description for each activity 

or process in which the applicant proposed to acquire, deliver, receive, possess, produce, use, 

process, transfer, or store licensed material. The authorized uses of licensed material proposed 

for the facility are described and are consistent with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 

amended. The description is also consistent with more detailed process descriptions submitted 

as part of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), as reviewed under Chapter 3 of this SER. The 

information provided by the applicant meets the guidance in Section 1.2.4.3(4) of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002) and the regulatory requirements in 10 CFR 70.22(a)(4) and is, therefore, 

acceptable.

1.2.3.7 Special Exemptions or Special Authorizations

In Section 1.2.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), the applicant requested two special authorizations and 

five exemptions to the regulations.

1.2.3.7.1 Authorization to Use Branch Technical Position for Release of Materials for 

Unrestricted Use

In Section 1.2.5.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), the applicant requested a special authorization to use 

the guidelines for contamination and exposure rate limits developed by NRC for release of items 

for unrestricted use. The applicant requested to use “Guidelines for Decontamination of 

Facilities and Equipment Prior to Release for Unrestricted Use or Termination of Licenses for 

Byproduct, Source, or Special Nuclear Material” (NRC, 1993) for decontamination and survey of 

surfaces or premises and equipment prior to abandonment or release for unrestricted use. The 

use of the requested guidelines is consistent with the acceptance criteria in Section 4.4.7.3(12) 

of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and the special authorization request is, therefore, acceptable. 

The use of these guidelines is also discussed in Section 4.7.13 of the LA (GLE, 2011b) and 

Section 4.3.7 of this SER.

The following license condition will be added to the License:

The Licensee shall release materials, equipment, and facilities for unrestricted use in 

accordance with “Guidelines for Decontamination of Facilities and Equipment Prior to 

Release for Unrestricted Use or Termination of Licenses for Byproduct, Source, or 

Special Nuclear Material.”
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1.2.3.7.2 Authorization to Make Certain License Application Changes Without Prior NRC 

Approval

In Section 1.2.5.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), the applicant requested authorization to make 

changes to the license commitments that do not decrease the effectiveness of its commitments 

without prior approval of NRC. For changes that decrease the effectiveness of its commitments, 

the applicant committed to requesting license amendments and to not implement the changes 

until NRC approval is obtained. Changes that could be made without NRC prior approval are 

changes for which there is no degradation in the safety commitments in the license and for 

which the change, test, or activity does not conflict with any condition specifically stated in the 

license. Records of such changes would be maintained, including the technical justification and 

management approval, in dedicated records available to NRC inspectors. A report containing a 

description of each change and appropriate revised sections of the LA would be submitted to 

the NRC within three months of implementing these changes. Staff reviewed this authorization 

request and because this request is consistent with the change provisions in 10 CFR 70.72 for 

changes to the ISA Summary, the staff finds that the authorization request is acceptable. The 

following license condition will be added for this authorization:

The licensee shall not make changes to the License Application that decreases the 

effectiveness of safety commitments, without prior NRC approval. For those changes, 

the licensee shall submit to the NRC, for review and approval, an application to amend 

the license. Such changes shall not be implemented until approval is granted.

Upon documentation of completion of a change for a facility or process, the licensee 

may make changes in the facility or process as presented in the License Application, or 

conduct tests or activities not presented in the License Application, without prior NRC 

approval, subject to the following conditions:

1. There is no degradation in the safety commitments in the License; and

2. The change, test, or activity does not conflict with any condition specifically 

stated in the License.

Records of such changes shall be maintained, including technical justification and 

management approval, in dedicated records to enable NRC inspection upon request at 

the facility. A report containing a description of each such change, and appropriate 

revised sections to the License Application, shall be submitted to the NRC within three 

months of implementing the change.

1.2.3.7.3 Exemption to Use International Commission on Radiological Protection 

Publication No. 68

In Section 1.2.5.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), the applicant requested a special authorization to use 

the derived air concentration (DAC) and annual limit on intake (ALI) values based on dose 

coefficients published in International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) 

Publication No. 68, “Dose Coefficients for Intakes of Radionuclides by Workers” (ICRP, 1995a).

This is considered an exemption request from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20. The 

Commission by Staff Requirements Memorandum, dated April 21, 1999 (NRC, 1999a), 

authorized the staff to grant such requests on a case-by-case basis based on the staff 

Commission Paper, SECY-99-077 (NRC, 1999b).
1-13

As stated in SECY-99-077 (NRC, 1999b), one of the major changes incorporated in the revised 

Part 20 was the manner in which internal exposure to radioactive materials is regulated. Before 

the revision, NRC regulated internal exposures by limiting the amounts of radioactive materials 

that may be taken into the body over specified time periods. The revised Part 20 eliminated 

regulation based on intakes and, instead, regulated on the basis of the dose that resulted from 

those intakes. The internal dose from intake of radioactive material is referred to in Part 20 as 

the committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE). The change to regulation of dose instead of 

intake was prompted in part by similar changes in the recommendations provided by national 

and international bodies, and also by the desire to end the traditional treatment of internal and 

external doses as two distinct and separate entities. A consequence of the dose-based rule is 

that compliance would not necessarily be constrained by use of a specific set of parameters to 

calculate the dose. Part 20, in fact, allows certain adjustments to be made to the model 

parameters if specific information is available, such as adjustments when the particle size of 

airborne radioactive material is known, rather than using a default particle size. However, Part 

20 also specifies certain protection requirements in the rule in terms of the quantities tabulated 

in Appendix B, the ALI and the DAC, rather than in terms of dose. Thus, requirements such as 

posting of airborne radioactivity areas, monitoring for intakes of radioactive materials, 

establishment of bioassay programs, and use of respirators are explicitly tied to the measurable 

quantities, rather than to a dose. This approach was taken to assure that these criteria would 

be easy to implement, and not impose an undue calculation burden on a licensee.

As stated in SECY-99-077 (NRC, 1999b), the models used in Part 20 to regulate internal dose 

are those described in ICRP Publications 26 (ICRP, 1977) and 30 (ICRP, 1978), adopted by 

ICRP in 1977 and 1978, respectively. Much of the basic structure of these models was 

developed in 1966, although some of its components and parameters were altered somewhat 

between 1966 and their formal adoption by ICRP in 1978. In 1991, the final 10 CFR Part 20 

revision rule was published revising 10 CFR Part 20 to incorporate the revised ICRP guidance, 

and in 1991 ICRP published a major revision of its radiation protection recommendations in 

ICRP Publication 60 (ICRP, 1991). In the several years following this revision, ICRP published 

a series of reports in which it described the components of an extensively updated and revised 

internal dosimetry model. These reports include ICRP Publications 66 (ICRP, 1995b), 67 

(ICRP, 1994), 68 (ICRP, 1995a), 71 (ICRP, 1996a), 72 (ICRP, 1996b), and 78 (ICRP, 1999). 

Because internal dose calculations in 10 CFR Part 20 are currently based on ICRP Publications 

26 (ICRP, 1977) and 30 (ICRP, 1978), NRC licensees must obtain an exemption to be permitted 

to use the revised and updated internal dosimetry models. Although the dose per unit intake 

calculated using the new models does not differ by more than a factor of about two from the 

values in Part 20 for most radio nuclides, the differences are substantial for some, particularly 

for the isotopes of thorium, uranium, and some of the transuranic radionuclides. For example, 

for inhalation of insoluble thorium-232 (232Th), the CEDE per unit intake calculated using the 

revised ICRP lung model is a factor of about 15 times lower than that in Part 20.

The staff has concluded during it=s license review that the licensee=s Radiation Safety Program 

is sufficiently sophisticated by training and expertise to utilize the ICRP Model in a manner 

equivalent to those listed in 10 CFR 20.1201(d), i.e., doses less than NRC=s regulatory limit of 5 

rems. Therefore, the applicant’s request for an exemption under 10 CFR 20.2301 is acceptable, 

because it gives its workers equivalent radiological protection as required by 10 CFR Part 20.

Under 10 CFR 30.11, 10 CFR 40.14, and 10 CFR 70.17, the Commission may grant 

exemptions from the requirements of the regulations as it determines are authorized by law and 

will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security and are otherwise in the 

public interest. NRC staff evaluated the exemption request and determined that such 
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exemption is not prohibited by law. Staff also determined that, because the dose modeling 

approach proposed by the applicant will provide adequate dose modeling approach consistent 

with international guidance, the approach will not endanger life or property or the common 

defense and security. Because the dose modeling approach will reduce the applicant’s 

expenses by using more accurate dose estimates, the staff has determined that the proposed 

approach will be in the public interest by reducing unnecessary regulatory costs. Therefore, the 

staff grants the requested exemption as provided in Section 1.2.5.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011b). 

The following license condition will be included in the license to address the applicant’s 

commitments for dose modeling:

The Licensee is granted an exemption to the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix 

B, related to the use of dose coefficients for determining derived air concentrations and 

annual limit on intake values, and shall use, in accordance with approved procedures, 

the derived air concentration and annual limit on intake values based on dose 

coefficients published in International Commission of Radiological Protection Publication 

No. 68, “Dose Coefficients for Intakes of Radionuclides by Workers,” in lieu of the values 

in Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 20.

1.2.3.7.4 Exemption to Radioactive Material Labeling Requirements

In Section 1.2.5.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), the applicant requested an exemption to the 

radioactive material labeling requirements in 10 CFR 20.1904. Instead, the applicant commits 

to posting signs at all entrances into Radiologically Controlled Areas in which radioactive 

materials are processed, used, or stored with a sign stating, “Every container in this area may 

contain radioactive material.” The exemption is acceptable because review of the Radiation 

Protection Program and training demonstrates this provides adequate protection and security. 

Under 10 CFR 30.11, 10 CFR 40.14, and 10 CFR 70.17, the Commission may grant 

exemptions from the requirements of the regulations as it determines are authorized by law and 

will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security and are otherwise in the 

public interest. NRC staff evaluated the exemption request and determined that such 

exemption is not prohibited by law. Staff also determined that, because the posting approach 

proposed by the applicant will provide adequate posting to alert workers of the presence of 

radioactive material areas and to take precautions to avoid or minimize exposure, the approach 

will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security. Because the posting 

approach will reduce the applicant’s expenses from having to label every individual container of 

radioactive material, the staff has determined that the proposed approach will be in the public 

interest by reducing unnecessary regulatory costs. Therefore, the staff grants the requested 

exemption as provided in Section 1.2.5.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011b). The following license 

condition will be included in the license to address the applicant’s commitments for posting:

The Licensee is granted an exemption to the labeling requirements in 10 CFR 20.1904, 

and shall instead post areas within Radiological Controlled Areas in which radioactive 

materials are processed, used, or stored with a sign stating, “Every container in this area 

may contain radioactive material.”

1.2.3.7.5 Exemption to Decommissioning Financial Assurance Requirements

In Sections 1.2.5.3 and 10.2.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), the applicant requested an exemption to 

the decommissioning financial assurance requirements in 10 CFR 40.36(d) and 10 CFR 

70.25(e) to allow incremental funding of the required decommissioning funding plan. Under the 
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requirements in 10 CFR 70.25(a), an applicant for a license for a uranium enrichment facility 

must provide a decommissioning funding plan. Under the requirements 10 CFR 40.36(d) and 

10 CFR 70.25(e), a decommissioning funding plan must contain a certification that financial 

assurance for decommissioning has been obtained in the amount of the cost estimate for 

decommissioning. The applicant is requesting that it be granted an exemption to 10 CFR 40.36 

and 10 CFR 70.25 to provide incremental funding for decommissioning to reflect its expected 

depleted uranium tails generation rate. As discussed in Section 1.2.5.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), 

the applicant stated that it would initially provide full funding for the projected cost of facility 

decontamination and decommissioning at the time the applicant takes possession of licensed 

material assuming a 6-million SWU capacity. The applicant will also provide NRC with revised 

funding instruments for depleted uranium disposition on an annual, forward-looking basis. The 

applicant will also adjust other decommissioning costs periodically, and no less frequently than 

every three years as required by 10 CFR 40.36(d) and 10 CFR 70.25(e). NRC staff will review 

revisions to the cost estimate and the financial instrument, which are presented before the 

applicant takes possession of licensed material. NRC staff will also review all subsequent 

revisions to the cost estimate and financial instruments.

Under 10 CFR 40.14 and 10 CFR 70.17, the Commission may grant exemptions from the 

requirements of the regulations as it determines are authorized by law and will not endanger life 

or property or the common defense and security and are otherwise in the public interest. NRC 

staff evaluated the exemption request and determined that such exemption is not prohibited by 

law. Staff also determined that, because the incremental funding approach proposed by the 

applicant will provide funding for all the applicant’s decommissioning obligations at any point in 

time, the approach will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security. 

Because the incremental funding approach will reduce the applicant’s expenses from having to 

fund a 40-year decommissioning obligation when, in actuality, the decommissioning obligations 

prior to the end of the 40-year operating period are less, the staff has determined that the 

proposed approach will be in the public interest by reducing unnecessary regulatory costs. 

Therefore, the staff grants the requested exemption as provided in Section 1.2.5.3 of the LA 

(GLE, 2011b). The following license condition will be included in the license to address the 

applicant’s commitments for updating the decommissioning funding plan over time:

The Decommissioning Funding Plan shall be updated as follows:

a. The Licensee shall provide to NRC for review an updated Decommissioning 

Funding Plan at least six months prior to the planned date for obtaining licensed 

material, and subsequently, after resolution of any NRC comments, final 

executed copies of the financial assurance instruments shall be provided to NRC 

at least 21 days prior to receipt of licensed material. The amount of the financial 

assurance instrument shall be updated to current year dollars and include any 

applicable change to the decommissioning cost estimate.

b. In the first executed financial assurance instrument submitted prior to receipt of 

licensed material, the licensee shall provide full funding for decontamination and 

decommissioning of the full-size facility.

c. In the first executed financial assurance instrument submitted prior to receipt of 

licensed material, the licensee shall provide funding for the disposition of 

depleted uranium tails in an amount needed to disposition the first year of 

depleted uranium tails generation. The cost estimate shall include an update to 

the DOE depleted uranium disposition cost estimate. The total amount funded 
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for depleted uranium disposition shall be no less than the updated DOE cost 

estimate.

d. Subsequent updated decommissioning funding estimates and revised funding 

instruments for facility decommissioning shall be provided for review, at a 

minimum, every three years. Any proposed reduction in the funding estimate 

based on operational changes shall be submitted six months prior to the change.

e. Subsequent updated decommissioning cost estimates and revised funding 

instruments for depleted uranium disposition shall be provided for review 

annually on a forward-looking basis to reflect projections of depleted uranium 

byproduct generation. The cost estimate shall include an update to the DOE 

depleted uranium disposition cost estimate. The total amount funded for 

depleted uranium disposition shall be no less than the updated DOE cost 

estimate.

This license condition is discussed further in Section 10.3.2.2 of this SER.

1.2.3.7.6 Exemption to 10 CFR Part 21.3 Definitions

In Section 1.2.5.6 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), the applicant requested an exemption from NRC 

regulations to replace the definitions of “basic component,” “commercial grade item,” “critical 

characteristics,” “dedication,” and “dedicating entity” as they apply to facilities licensed pursuant 

to 10 CFR Part 70 with modified definitions.

The regulations in 10 CFR 21.3 define a “basic component” as it applies to uranium enrichment

and fuel fabrication facilities as follows:

“[A] structure, system, or component, or part thereof, that affects their safety function, 

that is directly procured by the licensee of a facility or activity subject to the regulations in 

this part and in which a defect or failure to comply with any applicable regulation in this 

chapter, order, or license issued by the Commission could create a substantial safety 

hazard.”

The applicant proposed revising the definition of “basic component” to link it to Items Relied on 

for Safety (IROFS) and to remove the direct procurement requirement, since some items may 

be procured at the subsupplier level. As revised, the definition of “basic component” proposed 

by the applicant would read as follows:

“Basic Component: A structure, system, or component (SSC), or part thereof, 

designated as an IROFS identified as QL-1 or QL-2, that affects the IROFS function, that 

is directly procured by the licensee of a facility or activity subject to the regulations in 10 

CFR 70 and in which a defect or failure to comply with any applicable regulation in 10 

CFR 70, order, or license issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission could 

create a substantial safety hazard (i.e., exceed the performance requirements of 10 CFR 

70.61). Basic Components include QL-1 and QL-2 identified IROFS-related design, 

analysis, inspection, testing, fabrication, replacement of parts, or consulting services that 

are associated with the component hardware, whether these services are performed by 

the component supplier or others.
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When applied to IROFS identified as QL-NFPA, a basic component is a SSC, or part 

thereof, that affects the safety function of the IROFS that is directly procured by the 

licensee or a facility or activity subject to the requirements of the National Fire Protection 

Association (NFPA) Code of Record, and in which a defect or failure to comply with 

requirements of the NFPA Code of Record could create a substantial safety hazard. 

Basic component includes QL-NFPA identified IROFS-related design, analysis, 

inspection, testing, fabrication, replacement of parts, or consulting services that are 

associated with the component hardware, whether these services are performed by the 

component supplier or others, to the extent required by the NFPA Code of Record.”

The regulations in 10 CFR 21.3 define a “commercial grade item” as it applies to uranium 

enrichment and fuel fabrication facilities as follows:

“[A]n item that is: (i) Not subject to design or specification requirements that are unique 

to those facilities or activities; (ii) Used in applications other than those facilities or 

activities; and (iii) To be ordered from the manufacturer/supplier on the basis of 

specifications set forth in the manufacturer's published product description (for example, 

a catalog).”

The applicant proposed revising the definition to enable the procurement and dedication of 

items or services with unique design or specification requirements that may not be common to 

other facilities or be able to be ordered from a catalog. The definition of commercial grade items 

as it applies to fire suppression IROFS is maintained consistent with the original definition in 10 

CFR 21.3 as it is expected that fire suppression IROFS will be available for direct purchase from 

established manufacturer specifications that comply with National Fire Protection Association 

(NFPA) codes and standards. As revised, the proposed definition of “commercial grade item” 

would read as follows: 

“Commercial-Grade Item: An SSC, or part thereof, that affects its QL-1 and/or QL-2 

identified IROFS function, which is not designed and manufactured as a Basic 

Component. Commercial-grade items do not include items where the design and 

manufacturing processes require in-process inspections and verifications to ensure that 

defect or failures to comply are identified and corrected (i.e., one or more critical 

characteristics of the item cannot be verified).

When applied to items identified as QL-NFPA (being items in facilities and activities 

licensed pursuant to 10 CFR 70), commercial grade item means an item that is (1) not 

subject to design or specification requirements that are unique to facilities or activities; 

(2) used in applications other than those facilities and activities; and (3) to be ordered 

from the manufacturer/supplier on the basis of specifications set forth in the 

manufacture[r]’s published product description.”

This modification is necessary in order for the applicant to be able to procure material, 

equipment, and services from entities that do not apply quality assurance programs that meet 

the requirements of the Quality Assurance Program Description (QAPD) (GLE, 2011d) and to 

allow commercial procurement of items that are not readily available as catalog items. The 

definitions do maintain the important distinction that is identified in 10 CFR 21.3 requiring that 

commercial grade items cannot be items where in process inspections or tests are required to 

verify one or more critical characteristics. Those items would be required to be purchased as 

basic components.
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The regulations in 10 CFR 21.3 do not provide a definition of “critical characteristics” as 

applicable to uranium enrichment and fuel fabrication facilities. The applicant proposed a 

definition for “critical characteristics” that is comparable to that established for Part 50 facilities, 

with the exception that it refers to the item’s IROFS function instead of its safety function. 

However, the link to safety is inherent in an item’s identification as an IROFS. As revised, the

proposed definition of “critical characteristics” would read as follows:

“Critical Characteristics: Those important to design, material, and performance 

characteristics of a commercial-grade item that, once verified, will provide reasonable 

assurance that the item will perform its intended QL-1 and/or QL-2 identified IROFS 

function.

When applied to items identified as QL-NFPA, critical characteristics are those important 

to design, material, and performance characteristics of a commercial grade item that will 

provide reasonable assurance that the item will perform its intended QL-NFPA identified 

IROFS function.”

The regulations in 10 CFR 21.3 define “dedication” as it applies to uranium enrichment and fuel 

fabrication facilities by stating that dedication occurs after receipt when that item is designated 

for use as a basic component. The applicant proposed revising the definition to provide more 

specific guidance with respect to the purpose of dedication and the measures taken in order to 

accomplish dedication. As revised, the proposed definition of “dedication” would read as 

follows:

“Dedication: An acceptance process undertaken to provide reasonable assurance that a 

commercial-grade item to be used as a Basic Component will perform its intended QL-1 

and/or QL-2 IROFS function and, in this respect, is deemed equivalent to an item 

designed and manufactured under QL-1 or QL-2 requirements in accordance with the 

GLE QAPD. This assurance is achieved by identifying the critical characteristics of the 

item and verifying their acceptability by inspections, tests, or analyses performed by the 

purchaser or third-party dedicating entity after delivery, supplemented as necessary by 

one or more of the following: commercial grade surveys, product inspections or witness 

at holdpoints at the manufacturer’s facility, and analysis of historical records for 

acceptable performance. In all cases, the dedication process must be conducted in 

accordance with the applicable provisions of the GLE QAPD. The process is considered 

complete when the item is designated for use as a basic component applicable to QL-1 

and/or QL-2 IROFS.

When applied to items identified as QL-NFPA (being items in facilities and activities 

licensed pursuant to 10 CFR 70), the dedication process is applied to commercial-grade 

items to be used as basic components to provide reasonable assurance that they will 

perform their intended QL-NFPA identified IROFS function and are deemed equivalent 

to an item designed and manufactured under QL-NFPA requirements in accordance with 

the GLE QAPD. This assurance is achieved by confirming that the commercial-grade 

item is manufactured to established, acceptable national codes or standards that include 

one or more independent product endorsement based on qualification testing or periodic 

testing of selected characteristics of the item except in cases where such listing/approval 

is not required by codes and standards. In all cases, the applicable provisions of the 

GLE QAPD will be used to conduct the dedication process. The process is considered 

complete when the commercial-grade item is designated as a basic component.” 
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The definition, as revised, is more comprehensive than the one identified in 10 CFR Part 21 and 

will foster the implementation of a dedication process by the applicant that identifies the critical 

characteristics of QL-1 and QL-2 IROFS and performs necessary measures to verify the 

acceptability of such characteristics. The dedication process for fire suppression IROFS will 

ensure that commercial grade items comply with NFPA codes and standards and QAPD (GLE, 

2011d) controls.

The regulations in 10 CFR 21.3 do not define “dedicating entity” as it applies to uranium 

enrichment and fuel fabrication facilities. The applicant proposed a definition that is comparable 

to that identified in 10 CFR Part 21 for Part 50 facilities. The proposed definition of dedication 

would read as follows:

“Dedicating Entity: The organization that performs the dedication process for QL-1 and 

QL-2 identified IROFS. Dedication may be performed by the manufacturer of the item, a 

third-party dedicating entity, or the licensee itself. The dedicating entity, pursuant to 10 

CFR 21.21(c), is responsible for identifying and evaluating deviations, reporting defects 

and failure to comply for the dedicated item, and maintaining auditable records of the 

dedication process. In cases where the Licensee applies the commercial-grade item 

procurement strategy and performs the dedication process, the licensee would assume 

full responsibility as the dedicating entity.

When applied to items identified as QL-NFPA (being items in facilities and activities 

licensed pursuant to 10 CFR 70), the dedicating entity is the licensee. The licensee, 

pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(c), is responsible for reporting defects and failure[s] to comply 

for the dedicated item, maintaining auditable records of the dedication process, and 

assumes full responsibility as the dedicating entity.” 

The staff finds that the proposed definitions for “basic component,” “commercial grade item,” 

“critical characteristics,” “dedication,” and “dedicating entity” as they apply to the applicant are 

acceptable for providing reasonable assurance that IROFS will be available and reliable to 

perform their safety functions. As provided in the LA (GLE, 2011b), the proposed definitions 

describe procurement, verification, and dedication measures that will be adequate to ensure 

that items purchased as basic components or dedicated will perform their IROFS function.

Under 10 CFR 30.11, 10 CFR 40.14, and 10 CFR 70.17, the Commission may grant 

exemptions from the requirements of the regulations as it determines are authorized by law and 

will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security and are otherwise in the 

public interest. NRC staff evaluated the exemption request and determined that such 

exemption is not prohibited by law. Staff also determined that, because the 10 CFR Part 21 

definitions proposed by the applicant provide definitions that will ensure that IROFS will be 

available and reliable to perform their safety functions when needed, the approach will not 

endanger life or property or the common defense and security. Because the proposed 10 CFR 

Part 21 definitions will reduce the applicant’s expenses in implementing its quality assurance 

program by enabling the applicant to procure equipment not readily available from vendors that 

have 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, quality assurance programs. For these cases, vendors may 

be unwilling to develop 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, quality assurance programs or pass back 

development costs of new quality assurance programs directly to the applicant. Therefore, the 

staff has determined that the proposed approach will be in the public interest by reducing 

unnecessary regulatory costs. Therefore, the staff grants the requested exemption as provided 

in Section 1.2.5.6 of the LA (GLE, 2011b). The following license condition will be included in the 

license to address the applicant’s proposed changes to the definitions in 10 CFR Part 21:
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The Licensee is granted an exemption from the definitions of “basic component,” 

“commercial grade item,” “critical characteristics,” “dedication,” and “dedicating entity” in 

10 CFR Part 21.3, as replaced by the following:

Basic Component: A structure, system, or component (SSC), or part thereof, designated 

as an IROFS identified as QL-1 or QL-2, that affects the IROFS function, that is directly 

procured by the licensee of a facility or activity subject to the regulations in 10 CFR 70 

and in which a defect or failure to comply with any applicable regulation in 10 CFR 70, 

order, or license issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission could create a 

substantial safety hazard (i.e., exceed the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61). 

Basic Components include QL-1 and QL-2 identified IROFS-related design, analysis, 

inspection, testing, fabrication, replacement of parts, or consulting services that are 

associated with the component hardware, whether these services are performed by the 

component supplier or others.

When applied to IROFS identified as QL-NFPA, a basic component is a SSC, or part 

thereof, that affects the safety function of the IROFS that is directly procured by the 

licensee or a facility or activity subject to the requirements of the National Fire Protection 

Association (NFPA) Code of Record, and in which a defect or failure to comply with 

requirements of the NFPA Code of Record could create a substantial safety hazard. 

Basic component includes QL-NFPA identified IROFS-related design, analysis, 

inspection, testing, fabrication, replacement of parts, or consulting services that are 

associated with the component hardware, whether these services are performed by the 

component supplier or others, to the extent required by the NFPA Code of Record.

Commercial-Grade Item: An SSC, or part thereof, that affects its QL-1 and/or QL-2 

identified IROFS function, which is not designed and manufactured as a Basic 

Component. Commercial-grade items do not include items where the design and 

manufacturing processes require in-process inspections and verifications to ensure that 

defect or failures to comply are identified and corrected (i.e., one or more critical 

characteristics of the item cannot be verified).

When applied to items identified as QL-NFPA (being items in facilities and activities 

licensed pursuant to 10 CFR 70), commercial grade item means an item that is (1) not 

subject to design or specification requirements that are unique to facilities or activities; 

(2) used in applications other than those facilities and activities; and (3) to be ordered 

from the manufacturer/supplier on the basis of specifications set forth in the 

manufacture[r]’s published product description.

Critical Characteristics: Those important to design, material, and performance 

characteristics of a commercial-grade item that, once verified, will provide reasonable 

assurance that the item will perform its intended QL-1 and/or QL-2 identified IROFS 

function.

When applied to items identified as QL-NFPA, critical characteristics are those important 

to design, material, and performance characteristics of a commercial grade item that will 

provide reasonable assurance that the item will perform its intended QL-NFPA identified 

IROFS function.
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Dedication: An acceptance process undertaken to provide reasonable assurance that a 

commercial-grade item to be used as a Basic Component will perform its intended QL-1 

and/or QL-2 IROFS function and, in this respect, is deemed equivalent to an item 

designed and manufactured under QL-1 or QL-2 requirements in accordance with the 

GLE QAPD. This assurance is achieved by identifying the critical characteristics of the 

item and verifying their acceptability by inspections, tests, or analyses performed by the 

purchaser or third-party dedicating entity after delivery, supplemented as necessary by 

one or more of the following: commercial grade surveys, product inspections or witness 

at holdpoints at the manufacturer’s facility, and analysis of historical records for 

acceptable performance. In all cases, the dedication process must be conducted in 

accordance with the applicable provisions of the GLE QAPD. The process is considered 

complete when the item is designated for use as a basic component applicable to QL-1 

and/or QL-2 IROFS.

When applied to items identified as QL-NFPA (being items in facilities and activities 

licensed pursuant to 10 CFR 70), the dedication process is applied to commercial-grade 

items to be used as basic components to provide reasonable assurance that they will 

perform their intended QL-NFPA identified IROFS function and are deemed equivalent 

to an item designed and manufactured under QL-NFPA requirements in accordance with 

the GLE QAPD. This assurance is achieved by confirming that the commercial-grade 

item is manufactured to established, acceptable national codes or standards that include 

one or more independent product endorsement based on qualification testing or periodic 

testing of selected characteristics of the item except in cases where such listing/approval 

is not required by codes and standards. In all cases, the applicable provisions of the 

GLE QAPD will be used to conduct the dedication process. The process is considered 

complete when the commercial-grade item is designated as a basic component.

Dedicating Entity: The organization that performs the dedication process for QL-1 and 

QL-2 identified IROFS. Dedication may be performed by the manufacturer of the item, a 

third-party dedicating entity, or the licensee itself. The dedicating entity, pursuant to 10 

CFR 21.21(c), is responsible for identifying and evaluating deviations, reporting defects 

and failure to comply for the dedicated item, and maintaining auditable records of the 

dedication process. In cases where the Licensee applies the commercial-grade item 

procurement strategy and performs the dedication process, the licensee would assume 

full responsibility as the dedicating entity.

When applied to items identified as QL-NFPA (being items in facilities and activities 

licensed pursuant to 10 CFR 70), the dedicating entity is the licensee. The licensee, 

pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(c), is responsible for reporting defects and failure[s] to comply 

for the dedicated item, maintaining auditable records of the dedication process, and 

assumes full responsibility as the dedicating entity. 

1.2.3.7.7 Exemption to Criticality Accident Alarm System Requirements

In Section 1.2.5.7 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), the applicant requested an exemption for the use of a 

Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) to cover the UF6 Cylinder Storage Pads, the Trailer 

Storage Area, and the UF6 Cylinder Staging Area. In Section 5.3.6.3 of this SER, the staff 

evaluated the request for an exemption to 10 CFR 70.24 for the UF6 Cylinder Storage Pads, 

Trailer Storage Area, and UF6 Cylinder Staging Area and the risk levels associated with granting 

the exemption. Based on this review, the staff finds that there is a low risk of a criticality
1-22

accident with product cylinders in these areas. In addition, the staff finds that the installation of 

a CAAS in these areas would not significantly reduce the risk to the workers or the public.

Under 10 CFR 70.17, the Commission may grant exemptions from the requirements of the 

regulations as it determines are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the 

common defense and security and are otherwise in the public interest. NRC staff evaluated the 

exemption request and determined that such exemption is not prohibited by law. Staff also 

determined that the installation of a CAAS in the UF6 Cylinder Storage Pads, the Trailer Storage 

Area, and the UF6 Cylinder Staging Area would not significantly reduce the risk to the workers or 

the public because there is a low risk of a criticality accident with product cylinders in these 

areas. Therefore, the approach will not endanger life or property or the common defense and 

security. Because the proposed approach will reduce the applicant’s expenses in implementing 

its nuclear criticality safety program, the staff has determined that the proposed approach will be 

in the public interest by reducing unnecessary regulatory costs. Therefore, the staff grants the 

requested exemption as provided in Section 1.2.5.7 of the LA (GLE, 2011b). The following 

license condition will be included in the license to address the applicant’s proposed changes to 

the CAAS program:

The Licensee is granted an exemption to the requirements in 10 CFR 70.24, 

which require the Licensee to maintain a criticality accident alarm system, for the 

UF6 Cylinder Storage Pads, the Trailer Storage Area, and the UF6 Cylinder 

Staging Area.

1.2.3.7.8 Exemption to Criticality Accident Alarm System ISA Requirements

The regulations in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(4) require that the ISA Summary contain information that 

demonstrates compliance with the criticality monitoring and alarm requirements of 10 CFR 

70.24. The ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) did not contain sufficient information regarding the 

CAAS, because the detailed CAAS designs have not been completed at this time. Because a 

criticality cannot occur if there is no fissionable material onsite, an operating CAAS is not 

needed until the applicant obtains licensed material. Therefore, the staff is granting an 

exemption to the requirements in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(4) and is imposing the following license 

condition to ensure that the regulatory requirement is met before the licensee obtains licensed 

material:

The Licensee is granted an exemption to the requirements in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(4) 

to require that the ISA Summary contain information that demonstrates 

compliance with the criticality monitoring and alarm requirements of 

10 CFR 70.24. At least 90 days prior to obtaining licensed material, the Licensee 

shall submit to the NRC for approval the Criticality Accident Alarm System design 

information to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 70.65(b)(4) for all areas for 

which the NRC has not granted an exemption to 10 CFR 70.24, and in which 

special nuclear material is handled, used, stored, or transported (including 

outdoor transport routes), and include this information in the ISA Summary.

Under 10 CFR 70.17, the Commission may grant exemptions from the requirements of the 

regulations as it determines are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the 

common defense and security and are otherwise in the public interest. NRC staff determined 

that such exemption is not prohibited by law. The applicant indicated that CAAS coverage will 

be necessary for the Operations Building (except the laser area, which does not contain SNM), 

classified storage area, and unclassified storage area. These areas plus those areas where an 
1-23

exemption to the CAAS requirements have been requested in Section 1.2.5.7 of the LA (GLE, 

2011b) covers the primary areas where fissile material is expected to be handled, used, or 

stored. Coverage of transport paths between these areas was not listed in the LA (GLE, 

2011b); however, coverage of these areas is expected and can be verified once the final CAAS 

system layout is determined. The staff determined that the applicant’s commitments regarding 

which areas will have criticality alarms, and with the above imposed license condition, are 

sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that CAAS coverage of the needed areas of the 

facility be provided. (There is no need to provide detector coverage in areas where the 

presence of special nuclear material is not credible, because criticality cannot occur without the 

presence of fissionable material.) Therefore, the approach will not endanger life or property or 

the common defense and security. Because the proposed approach will reduce the applicant’s 

expenses in implementing its nuclear criticality safety program, the staff has determined that the 

proposed approach will be in the public interest by reducing unnecessary regulatory costs. 

Therefore, the staff grants this exemption. 

1.2.3.7.9 Exemption to Material Control and Accounting Requirements

The regulations in 10 CFR 70.74.33(c)(5) require that a licensee establish, document, and 

maintain a detection program, independent of production, that provides high assurance of 

detecting:

i. Production of uranium enriched to 10 percent or more in the U235 isotope, to the extent 

that special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance could be produced within 

any 370 calendar day period;

ii. Production of uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U235 isotope; and

iii. Unauthorized production of uranium of low strategic significance.

In Section 9 of the Fundamental Nuclear Material Control Plan (FNMCP) (GLE, 2010a), the 

applicant described a program for precluding and detecting unauthorized production of enriched 

uranium, including monitoring of the enrichment within the process system and monitoring of 

material quantities against possession limits.

However, because the final facility design is not yet in-place, the applicant has not analyzed 

potentially credible diversion scenarios by which unauthorized enrichment activities can take 

place. The staff determined that the applicant needs to provide a detailed analysis of potentially 

credible diversion scenarios by which unauthorized enrichment activities and unauthorized 

production of enriched uranium could occur. In addition, the applicant needs to conduct a 

detailed analysis of the processes and determine, based on the credible diversion scenarios, 

the management measures that are best suited to satisfy the detection program goals. 

Therefore, NRC is granting an exemption to 10 CFR 74.33(c)(5) and is imposing the following 

license condition requiring the submittal of the detailed analyses for review and approval as 

follows:

“The Licensee is granted an exemption to the requirements in 10 CFR 74.33(c)(5) to 

require that a licensee establish, document, and maintain a materials control and 

accounting detection program, independent of production. To meet the requirements of 

10 CFR 74.33(c)(5) for establishing a detection program for unauthorized enrichment 

activities, the Licensee shall submit for review and approval 90 days prior to receipt of 

licensed material, a description of its detection program for unauthorized enrichment 

activities to include a detailed analysis of conceptual and credible diversion scenarios for 

unauthorized production of enriched uranium, and related management measures that 
1-24

provide high assurance of detecting unauthorized production of enriched uranium. NRC 

approval of the detection program, as required under 10 CFR 74.33(c)(5), is required 

prior to the Licensee’s receipt of licensed material.”

Under 10 CFR 70.17, the Commission may grant exemptions from the requirements of the 

regulations as it determines are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the 

common defense and security and are otherwise in the public interest. NRC staff determined 

that such exemption is not prohibited by law. The applicant indicated that because a final facility 

design is not yet in-place, it cannot provide a detailed analysis of potentially credible diversion 

scenarios by which unauthorized enrichment activities and unauthorized production of enriched 

uranium could occur. The staff determined that the applicant’s commitments in the FNMCP 

(GLE, 2010a) with the above imposed license condition are sufficient to provide reasonable 

assurance that the detection program required under 10 CFR 74.33(c)(5) can be established, 

documented, and maintained. Therefore, the approach will not endanger life or property or the 

common defense and security. Because the proposed approach will reduce the applicant’s 

expenses in implementing its material control and accounting program, the staff has determined 

that the proposed approach will be in the public interest by reducing unnecessary regulatory 

costs. Therefore, the staff grants this exemption. 

1.2.3.8 Security of Classified Matter

The purpose of this review is to verify that the applicant provided sufficient information to 

conclude that there is an adequate Standard Practice Procedures Plan (SPPP) for the 

protection of classified matter for the buildings and facilities associated with the proposed facility 

to be located in Wilmington, North Carolina, and a facility clearance can be issued.

The applicant submitted its “Standard Practice Procedures Plan (SPPP) for the Protection of 

Classified Matter for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility,” SPPP03, (GLE, 2010b) for the proposed facility with its LA (GLE, 2011b). SPPP-03 (GLE, 2010b) 

addresses the applicant’s proposed classified information security programs. SPPP-03 (GLE, 

2010b) outlines the facility’s proposed security procedures and controls to ensure that classified 

matter is used, processed, stored, reproduced, transmitted, transported, and destroyed in 

accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 95. In addition to SPPP-03 (GLE, 2010b), 

submitted with the LA (GLE, 2011b), the applicant also has an approved SPPP, “Standard 

Practice Procedures Plan for the Protection of Classified Matter Global Laser Enrichment 

Wilmington NC Facility,” SP-01, (GLE, 2011e) for existing applicant facilities. In the future, 

when detailed design of the commercial facility is available, the applicant may combine SP-01 

(GLE, 2011e) and SPPP-03 (GLE, 2010b) into a single SPPP. Such a consolidation of the 

plans would require NRC approval under the change process presented in Section 1.2 of 

SPPP-03 (GLE, 2010b). In the meantime, however, the applicant will maintain the two separate 

plans.

1.2.3.8.1 Regulatory Requirements 

The regulations in 10 CFR 70.22(m) require applicants to provide a full description of a security 

program to protect against theft, and to protect against unauthorized viewing of classified 

enrichment equipment, and unauthorized disclosure of classified matter in accordance with the 

requirements of 10 CFR Parts 25 and 95. The regulations in 10 CFR 95.15(b) address the 

application requirements for a SPPP.
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1.2.3.8.2 Regulatory Acceptance Criteria 

The applicant’s SPPP-03 (GLE, 2010b) was reviewed for compliance with the requirements of 

10 CFR Part 95, by using “Standard Practice Procedures Plan Standard Format and Content for 

the Protection of Classified Matter for NRC Licensees, Certificate Holder, or Other Activities as 

the Commission May Determine” (NRC, 2006b). In addition, the staff also used the 

recommendations in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 08-11, “Information Security Program 

Guidelines for Protection of Classified Material at Uranium Enrichment Facilities” (NEI, 2009).

1.2.3.8.3 Staff Review and Analysis 

The staff reviewed and evaluated information provided by the applicant in the facility’s proposed 

security procedures and controls to ensure that classified matter is used, processed, stored, 

reproduced, transmitted, transported, and destroyed in accordance with the requirements of 10 

CFR Part 95 and found it to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR Part 95. The applicant made 

commitments in SPPP-03 (GLE, 2010b) to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 95 by 

providing an acceptable SPPP that establishes controls to ensure that classified matter is used, 

processed, stored, reproduced, transmitted, transported, and destroyed only under conditions 

that will provide adequate protection and prevent access by unauthorized persons. SPPP-03 

(GLE, 2010b) is also consistent with the guidelines in NEI 08-11 (NEI, 2009). The FOCI review 

required by 10 CFR 95.17 is discussed in Section 1.2.3.2 of this SER. By meeting these 

requirements, the applicant complies with the requirements of 10 CFR 70.22(m). On the basis 

of these findings, the staff concludes that SPPP-03 (GLE, 2010b) is acceptable. Final approval 

for implementation of SPPP-03 (GLE, 2010b) will not occur until the commercial facility buildings 

and associated facilities are constructed and inspected to ensure compliance with commitments 

in SPPP-03 (GLE, 2010b) and the requirements in 10 CFR Part 95.

1.2.4 EVALUATION FINDINGS 

The staff reviewed the institutional information for the proposed uranium enrichment facility, 

according to Section 1.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The applicant has adequately 

described and documented the corporate identity, structure, and financial information, and is in 

compliance with those parts of 10 CFR 30.32, 10 CFR 40.31, 10 CFR 70.22, and 10 CFR 70.65 

related to institutional information.

The staff reviewed the information provided on financial qualifications. The NRC staff finds that, 

based on the financial information submitted in the application describing the applicant’s current 

and continuing access to the financial resources necessary to engage in the proposed activity, 

there is reasonable assurance that the applicant is financially qualified to build and operate the 

proposed uranium enrichment facility subject to the following license condition:

Construction of each 1 million Separative Work Unit phase shall not commence before 

funding for that increment is available or committed. Prior to initiation of such phase, the 

licensee shall make available for NRC inspection, documentation of the budgeted costs, 

the source of funds available or committed, and changes to actual costs or funding of 

previous phases.
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The staff reviewed the information provided by the applicant on liability insurance. This 

information meets the requirements of 10 CFR 140.13b. Because full liability insurance 

coverage is not currently in place, NRC staff is imposing the following license condition:

The licensee shall provide proof of full liability insurance as required by 

10 CFR 140.13b, at least 30 days prior to the planned date for obtaining licensed 

material. If the licensee is proposing to provide less than $200 million of liability 

insurance coverage, the licensee shall provide, to the NRC for review and approval, an 

evaluation supporting liability insurance coverage in amounts less than $200 million at 

least 120 days prior to the planned date for obtaining licensed material.

The staff reviewed the applicant’s request for possessing uranium enriched in 235U up to 8 

weight percent. If a license is issued and operations begin at the proposed facility, the applicant 

is not anticipated to initially produce uranium above 5 weight percent because no demand for 

enriched product above this amount is expected during the next several years. However, before 

operations to produce uranium above 5 weight percent in initiated, NRC staff is imposing the 

following license condition to ensure that appropriate programs are in-place to identify the 

necessary equipment and operational programs, including the availability of appropriate 

transportation containers:

The licensee shall provide a minimum 60-day notice to NRC before initial customer 

product withdrawal of licensed material exceeding 5 weight percent 235U enrichment. 

This notice shall identify the necessary equipment and operational changes to support 

customer product shipments for these assays.

In addition, in accordance with 10 CFR 30.32, 10 CFR 40.31, and 10 CFR 70.22(a)(2) and (4), 

the applicant has adequately described the types, forms, and quantities and proposed purpose 

and authorized uses of licensed materials to be permitted at the facility.

The applicant provided information on five exemption requests and two special authorizations. 

The exemption requests are related to ICRP Publication 68 (ICRP, 1995a) dose modeling 

recommendations, decommissioning funding, radioactive material labeling, Part 21.3 definitions, 

and CAAS requirements and all meet the requirements of 10 CFR 30.11, 10 CFR 40.14, and 10 

CFR 70.17, as applicable. The special authorizations relate to the use of NRC recommended 

guidelines of contamination and exposure rate levels for the release of items for unrestricted 

use and a process for changing licensee commitments in the LA without NRC approval for 

changes that do not decrease the effectiveness of the commitments. The special authorization 

requests are consistent with NRC policy and are acceptable. The following license conditions 

will be added for the above exemptions and authorizations:

1. The Licensee shall release materials, equipment, and facilities for unrestricted 

use in accordance with “Guidelines for Decontamination of Facilities and 

Equipment Prior to Release for Unrestricted Use or Termination of Licenses for 

Byproduct, Source, or Special Nuclear Material.”

2. The licensee shall not make changes to the License Application that decreases

the effectiveness of safety commitments, without prior NRC approval. For those 

changes, the licensee shall submit to the NRC, for review and approval, an 

application to amend the license. Such changes shall not be implemented until 

approval is granted.
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Upon documentation of completion of a change for a facility or process, the 

licensee may make changes in the facility or process as presented in the 

Licensee Application, or conduct tests or activities not presented in the License

Application, without prior NRC approval, subject to the following conditions:

a. There is no degradation in the safety commitments in the License 

Application; and 

b. The change, test, or activity does not conflict with any condition 

specifically stated in the License.

Records of such changes shall be maintained, including technical justification 

and management approval, in dedicated records to enable NRC inspection upon 

request at the facility. A report containing a description of each such change, 

and appropriate revised sections to the License, shall be submitted to the NRC 

within three months of implementing the change.

3. The Licensee is granted an exemption to the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20, 

Appendix B, related to the use of dose coefficients for determining derived air 

concentrations and annual limit on intake values, and shall use, in accordance 

with approved procedures, the derived air concentration and annual limit on 

intake values based on dose coefficients published in International Commission 

of Radiological Protection Publication No. 68, “Dose Coefficients for Intakes of 

Radionuclides by Workers,” in lieu of the values in Appendix B of 10 CFR 

Part 20.

4. The Licensee is granted an exemption to the labeling requirements in 

10 CFR 20.1904, and shall instead post areas within Radiological Controlled 

Areas in which radioactive materials are processed, used, or stored with a sign 

stating, “Every container in this area may contain radioactive material.”

5. The Decommissioning Funding Plan shall be updated as follows:

a. The Licensee shall provide to NRC for review an updated 

Decommissioning Funding Plan at least six months prior to the planned 

date for obtaining licensed material, and subsequently, after resolution of 

any NRC comments, final executed copies of the financial assurance 

instruments shall be provided to NRC at least 21 days prior to receipt of 

licensed material. The amount of the financial assurance instrument shall 

be updated to current year dollars and include any applicable change to 

the decommissioning cost estimate.

b. In the first executed financial assurance instrument submitted prior to 

receipt of licensed material, the licensee shall provide full funding for 

decontamination and decommissioning of the full-size facility.

c. In the first executed financial assurance instrument submitted prior to 

receipt of licensed material, the licensee shall provide funding for the 

disposition of depleted uranium tails in an amount needed to disposition 

the first year of depleted uranium tails generation. The cost estimate 

shall include an update to the DOE depleted uranium disposition cost 
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estimate. The total amount funded for depleted uranium disposition shall 

be no less than the updated DOE cost estimate.

d. Subsequent updated decommissioning funding estimates and revised 

funding instruments for facility decommissioning shall be provided for 

review, at a minimum, every three years. Any proposed reduction in the 

funding estimate based on operational changes shall be submitted six 

months prior to the change.

e. Subsequent updated decommissioning cost estimates and revised 

funding instruments for depleted uranium disposition shall be provided for 

review annually on a forward-looking basis to reflect projections of 

depleted uranium byproduct generation. The cost estimate shall include 

an update to the DOE depleted uranium disposition cost estimate. The 

total amount funded for depleted uranium disposition shall be no less than 

the updated DOE cost estimate.

6. The Licensee is granted an exemption from the definitions of “basic component,” 

“commercial grade item,” “critical characteristics,” “dedication,” and “dedicating 

entity” in 10 CFR Part 21.3, as replaced by the following:

Basic Component: A structure, system, or component (SSC), or part thereof, 

designated as an IROFS identified as QL-1 or QL-2, that affects the IROFS 

function, that is directly procured by the licensee of a facility or activity subject to 

the regulations in 10 CFR 70 and in which a defect or failure to comply with any 

applicable regulation in 10 CFR 70, order, or license issued by the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission could create a substantial safety hazard (i.e., exceed the 

performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61). Basic Components include QL-1 

and QL-2 identified IROFS-related design, analysis, inspection, testing, 

fabrication, replacement of parts, or consulting services that are associated with 

the component hardware, whether these services are performed by the 

component supplier or others.

When applied to IROFS identified as QL-NFPA, a basic component is a SSC, or 

part thereof, that affects the safety function of the IROFS that is directly procured 

by the licensee or a facility or activity subject to the requirements of the National 

Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Code of Record, and in which a defect or 

failure to comply with requirements of the NFPA Code of Record could create a 

substantial safety hazard. Basic component includes QL-NFPA identified IROFSrelated design, analysis, inspection, testing, fabrication, replacement of parts, or 

consulting services that are associated with the component hardware, whether 

these services are performed by the component supplier or others, to the extent 

required by the NFPA Code of Record.

Commercial-Grade Item: An SSC, or part thereof, that affects its QL-1 and/or 

QL-2 identified IROFS function, which is not designed and manufactured as a 

Basic Component. Commercial-grade items do not include items where the 

design and manufacturing processes require in-process inspections and 

verifications to ensure that defect or failures to comply are identified and 

corrected (i.e., one or more critical characteristics of the item cannot be verified).
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When applied to items identified as QL-NFPA (being items in facilities and 

activities licensed pursuant to 10 CFR 70), commercial grade item means an 

item that is (1) not subject to design or specification requirements that are unique 

to facilities or activities; (2) used in applications other than those facilities and 

activities; and (3) to be ordered from the manufacturer/supplier on the basis of 

specifications set forth in the manufacture[r]’s published product description.

Critical Characteristics: Those important to design, material, and performance 

characteristics of a commercial-grade item that, once verified, will provide 

reasonable assurance that the item will perform its intended QL-1 and/or QL-2 

identified IROFS function.

When applied to items identified as QL-NFPA, critical characteristics are those 

important to design, material, and performance characteristics of a commercial 

grade item that will provide reasonable assurance that the item will perform its 

intended QL-NFPA identified IROFS function.

Dedication: An acceptance process undertaken to provide reasonable 

assurance that a commercial-grade item to be used as a Basic Component will 

perform its intended QL-1 and/or QL-2 IROFS function and, in this respect, is 

deemed equivalent to an item designed and manufactured under QL-1 or QL-2 

requirements in accordance with the QAPD. This assurance is achieved by 

identifying the critical characteristics of the item and verifying their acceptability 

by inspections, tests, or analyses performed by the purchaser or third-party 

dedicating entity after delivery, supplemented as necessary by one or more of 

the following: commercial grade surveys, product inspections or witness at 

holdpoints at the manufacturer’s facility, and analysis of historical records for 

acceptable performance. In all cases, the dedication process must be conducted 

in accordance with the applicable provisions of the QAPD. The process is 

considered complete when the item is designated for use as a basic component 

applicable to QL-1 and/or QL-2 IROFS.

When applied to items identified as QL-NFPA (being items in facilities and 

activities licensed pursuant to 10 CFR 70), the dedication process is applied to 

commercial-grade items to be used as basic components to provide reasonable 

assurance that they will perform their intended QL-NFPA identified IROFS 

function and are deemed equivalent to an item designed and manufactured 

under QL-NFPA requirements in accordance with the QAPD. This assurance is 

achieved by confirming that the commercial-grade item is manufactured to 

established, acceptable national codes or standards that include one or more 

independent product endorsement based on qualification testing or periodic 

testing of selected characteristics of the item except in cases where such 

listing/approval is not required by codes and standards. In all cases, the 

applicable provisions of the QAPD will be used to conduct the dedication 

process. The process is considered complete when the commercial-grade item is 

designated as a basic component.

Dedicating Entity: The organization that performs the dedication process for QL1 and QL-2 identified IROFS. Dedication may be performed by the manufacturer 

of the item, a third-party dedicating entity, or the licensee itself. The dedicating 

entity, pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(c), is responsible for identifying and evaluating 
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deviations, reporting defects and failure to comply for the dedicated item, and 

maintaining auditable records of the dedication process. In cases where the 

Licensee applies the commercial-grade item procurement strategy and performs 

the dedication process, the licensee would assume full responsibility as the 

dedicating entity.

When applied to items identified as QL-NFPA (being items in facilities and 

activities licensed pursuant to 10 CFR 70), the dedicating entity is the licensee. 

The licensee, pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(c), is responsible for reporting defects 

and failure[s] to comply for the dedicated item, maintaining auditable records of 

the dedication process, and assumes full responsibility as the dedicating entity. 

7. The Licensee is granted an exemption to the requirements in 10 CFR 

70.24, which require the Licensee to maintain a criticality accident alarm 

system, for the UF6 Cylinder Storage Pads, the Trailer Storage Area, and 

the UF6 Cylinder Staging Area.

8. The Licensee is granted an exemption to the requirements in 

10 CFR 70.65(b)(4) to require that the ISA Summary contain information 

that demonstrates compliance with the criticality monitoring and alarm 

requirements of 10 CFR 70.24. At least 90 days prior to obtaining 

licensed material, the Licensee shall submit to the NRC for approval 

Criticality Accident Alarm System design information to demonstrate 

compliance with 10 CFR 70.65(b)(4) for all areas in which NRC has not 

granted an exemption to 10 CFR 70.24, and in which special nuclear 

material is handled, used, stored, or transported (including outdoor 

transport routes), and include this information in the ISA Summary.

9. “The licensee is granted an exemption to the requirements in 10 CFR 74.33(c)(5) 

to require that a licensee establish, document, and maintain a materials control 

and accounting detection program, independent of production. In order to meet 

the requirements of 10 CFR 74.33(c)(5) for establishing a detection program for 

unauthorized enrichment activities, the applicant shall submit for review and 

approval 90 days prior to receipt of licensed material, a description of its 

detection program for unauthorized enrichment activities to include a detailed 

analysis of conceptual and credible diversion scenarios for unauthorized 

production of enriched uranium, and related management measures that provide 

high assurance of detecting unauthorized production of enriched uranium. NRC 

approval of the detection program, as required under 10 CFR 74.33(c)(5), is 

required prior to the Licensee’s receipt of licensed material.”

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s SPPP for the protection of classified matter (GEH, 

2010c) and found it to satisfy the requirement of 10 CFR Part 95. The staff concludes that the 

applicant has met the requirements and acceptance criteria applicable to this section.

1.3 SITE DESCRIPTION 

The purpose of a site description review is to determine whether the information provided by an 

applicant adequately describes the geographic, demographic, meteorological, geologic, 

hydrologic, and seismologic characteristics of the site and the surrounding area. The site 
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description is a summary of the information that the applicant used in preparing the 

Environmental Report (ER), Emergency Plan, and ISA Summary.

1.3.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 

The regulations in 10 CFR 30.33, 10 CFR 40.32, 10 CFR 70.22(a), and 10 CFR 70.65(b)(1) 

require each application to include a general description of the site, with emphasis on those 

factors that could affect safety (i.e., nearby facilities, meteorology, and seismology).

1.3.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 

The acceptance criteria applicable to the NRC review of the site description section of the 

application are contained in Section 1.3.4.3 of NUREG–1520 (NRC, 2002). The applicant’s site 

description will be found acceptable if it describes the site geography, demographics, 

meteorology, hydrology, geology, and seismology in a manner that is consistent with the 

detailed information in the ISA Summary, the ER, and the emergency plan.

1.3.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 

1.3.3.1 Site Geography 

1.3.3.1.1 Location 

The site geography of the proposed site is described in Section 1.3.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011b) 

and Sections 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a).

The proposed site is in Wilmington, North Carolina, on about 40 hectares (100 acres) in the 

north-central sector of an existing 656-hectare (1621-acre) site owned by GE 9.6 kilometers 

(km) (6 miles (mi)) north of the City of Wilmington. The site is located west of North Carolina 

Highway 133, Castle Hayne Road, and north of Interstate 140, which borders the south side of 

the GE property. The Northeast Cape Fear River borders the GE property to the west. Figure 

1-2 in the LA (GLE, 2011b) shows the location of the proposed facility in relation to the City of 

Wilmington, the Northeast Cape Fear River, local communities, Wilmington International Airport, 

and Interstate Highways I-40 and I-140. Figure 1-3 in the LA (GLE, 2011b) depicts the GE 

property boundary and the proposed enrichment facility controlled area boundary.

Vehicular access to the site is from two entrances on Castle Hayne Road and the Interstate I-40 

interchange at Castle Hayne Road. There is no rail access to the site.

The proposed site is typical of coastal North Carolina, with gently rolling land with rivers, creeks, 

swamps, and marshlands. The site has an average elevation of 12.2 meters (m) (40 feet (ft)) 

above sea level. The site is partially developed and GE operates a nuclear fuel manufacturing 

facility, a nuclear components service center, and an aircraft engine manufacturing facility at the 

location. The area in the immediate vicinity of the GE property contains farms, single-family 

residences, and light commercial operations.

The nearest communities are Wrightsboro, located to the south of the proposed site, Skippers

Corner to the east, and Castle Hayne to the north. 
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1.3.3.1.2 Nearby Highways 

The applicant discusses nearby highways in Section 2.2.1 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a). 

Several highways and roads are either near or at the boundary of the GE site. The shortest 

distance from the proposed facility site is more than 3,200 m (10,500 ft) to Interstate Highway I40; more than 1,370 m (4,500 ft) to Interstate Highway I-140; more than 1,920 m (6,300 ft) to 

North Carolina Highway 133; and fewer than 457 m (1,500 ft) to a local road north of the site 

(GLE, 2011a).

1.3.3.1.3 Railroads

The applicant discusses nearby railroads in Section 2.2.2 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a). 

The CSX Corporation provides freight service to the region and the nearest railroad line is more 

than 1,610 m (5,280 ft) away from the proposed facility. There is no railroad access at the GE 

site.

1.3.3.1.4 Waterways

The applicant discusses nearby waterways in Section 2.2.3 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a). 

Several waterways that may maintain waterborne barges are near the proposed site. The 

proposed facility is 4,800 m (15,800 ft) from Cape Fear River; 1,600 m (5,400 ft) from Northeast 

Cape Fear River; and more than 8,000 m (26,400 ft) from the Intracoastal Waterway and Port of 

Wilmington (GLE, 2011a). The distance from the proposed facility is approximately 1,201 m 

(3,940 ft) for the west-south-west portion, 2,697 m (8,850 ft) for the north-northwest portion, and 

2,312 m (7,585 ft) for the north-northeast portion of the Northeast Cape Fear River.

1.3.3.1.5 Nearby Industrial Facilities

The applicant discusses nearby industrial facilities in Section 1.3.2.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011b) 

and Section 2.4 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a). The nearest facilities to the proposed 

facility include Global Nuclear Fuel–Americas, LLC (GNF-A) Fuel Manufacturing Operations 

Facility, the GE Aircraft Engines Operation, the GE Services Components Operation Facilities, 

the GE Fuel Components Operation Facility, and the Wilmington Field Service Center. These 

facilities are located on the GE site. Among these facilities, the GNF-A Fuel Manufacturing 

Operations Facility is the closest with a distance of more than 1,737 m (5,700 ft).

Other industrial facilities that are more than 8 kilometers (km) (5 miles (mi)) away and located 

on the western side of the Northeast Cape Fear River (GLE, 2011a; GLE, 2011b). These 

operations include the BASF Corporation, Elementis Chromium facilities, and the L.V. Sutton 

coal-fired power plant owned by Progress Energy.

The GE site is zoned for heavy industrial use and no agricultural activities take place on the site.

 

1.3.3.1.6 Nearby Air Transportation 

The applicant discusses nearby airports in Section 2.2.4 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a). 

There are 13 airports in the tri-county area (New Hanover, Pender, and Brunswick): one

primary commercial airport (New Hanover County Airport) and 12 small municipal airport

facilities (GLE, 2011a). Brunswick County has seven small airports including heliports. Pender 

County has four small airports. Besides the New Hanover County Airport (Wilmington 

International Airport), New Hanover County also has a small airport (Pilot Ridge) located 
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approximately 18.5 km (11.5 mi) from the proposed facility site. Among these airports, four are 

publicly owned (New Hanover County Airport in New Hanover County; Odell Williamson and 

Brunswick County in Brunswick County; and Henderson Field Airport in Pender County) and the 

remaining airports are private airports for private use only (GLE, 2011a). 

The airport nearest to the proposed facility site is the New Hanover County Airport, 

approximately 8 km (5 mi) away. The next nearest airport is the Sandy Run Acres Airport in 

Brunswick County, approximately 16 km (9.9 mi) away. Besides the Pilot Ridge Airport, three 

airports (Pettigrew Moore Aerodome and Stag Air Park in Pender County and Winnabow Airport 

in Brunswick County) are between 16 and 24 km (10 and 15 mi) from the proposed facility site. 

The remaining are more than 32 km (20 mi) away from the proposed site (GLE, 2011a). 

1.3.3.1.7 Site Geography Evaluation

NRC staff reviewed the information provided in the LA (GLE, 2011b) and the ISA Summary 

(GLE, 2011a) on site geography, which included information on the site location, major nearby 

highways, nearby bodies of water, and other significant features that may affect the accident 

analysis. The site geographical information meets the regulatory acceptance criteria in Sections 

1.3.4.3(1) and 1.3.4.3(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), and is, therefore, acceptable because 

the applicant provided a summary describing the site geography, including its location relative to 

prominent natural and man-made features (such as rivers, airports, commercial and 

manufacturing facilities). The summary also described the site boundary and controlled area 

boundary. The applicant’s descriptions are consistent with the more detailed information in the 

ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), the ER (GLE, 2008), and the Radiological Contingency and 

Emergency Plan (GLE, 2011f). Based on review of the information provided on the site location 

and geography, staff concludes that the data provided are accurate and from acceptable 

sources. 

1.3.3.2 Demographics 

Information about demographics is provided in Section 1.3.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011b).

1.3.3.2.1 Local Population and Land Use 

The proposed site is located in the northwest corner of New Hanover County, North Carolina. 

Approximately 3 km (2 mi) to the north is the Pender County boundary and approximately 3 km 

(2 mi) to the west is the Brunswick County boundary. Within 8 km (5 mi) of the proposed site, 

there are 12,997 residents of New Hanover County, 3,305 residents of Pender County, and 36 

residents of Brunswick County based on 2000 U.S. Census Bureau data. In the local 

communities nearest the proposed site, Wrightsboro has 4500 residents, Skippers Corner has 

about 1200 residents, and Castle Hayne has about 1100 residents.

Land use within 8 km (5 mi) of the proposed site consists of farming, residential neighborhoods, 

and light commercial activity. The GE property is zoned for heavy industry. Immediately north 

of the GE property, the land is zoned as rural agricultural and has a low-density residential area, 

farms, a timber management area, and a private hunting area. Immediately south of the GE 

property is Interstate Highway I-140 and further south is a residential neighborhood. 

Immediately east of the GE property is North Carolina Highway 133, an agricultural research 

station operated by North Carolina State University, residential neighborhoods, and a 

recreational area for GE employees. To the west of the GE property is the Northeast Cape Fear 

River. Commercial and recreational fishing occur on the Northeast Cape Fear River. 
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However, commercial fishing is more prevalent on the Cape Fear River south of the GE 

property and south of the point where the Northeast Cape Fear River joins it.

1.3.3.2.2 Local Public Services 

Fire fighting services are provided locally by New Hanover County and the Castle Hayne 

Volunteer Fire and Rescue (GLE, 2011b and 2011f). Police and law enforcement services are 

provided by the New Hanover Sheriff’s Department (GLE, 2011f).

Figure 1-6 in the LA (GLE, 2011b) depicts local schools and recreational areas in the vicinity of 

the GE property. Within 6.4 km (4 mi) of the proposed facility site there is one school. Two 

more schools are within 8 km (5 mi) of the site and there are 21 schools within 12.8 km (8 mi) of 

the proposed facility site. The Trask Middle School, within 8 km (5 mi) of the site, serves as a 

New Hanover County emergency shelter. The nearest hospital is about 10 km (6 mi) from the 

proposed facility site. There are four New Hanover County parks within the 8 km (5 mi) radius 

of the proposed site, but no Federal- or State-managed parks.

1.3.3.2.3 Site Demographics Evaluation

The staff reviewed the site demographic information presented by the applicant and finds that 

the applicant has adequately described and summarized general site demographical information 

related to local population, identification of population centers, schools, commercial facilities, 

land use, and water use. Population information is provided based on the latest census 

information. The applicant’s descriptions are consistent with the more detailed information in 

the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), the ER (GLE, 2008), and the Radiological Contingency and 

Emergency Plan (GLE, 2011f). The information is consistent with the guidance in Sections 

1.3.4.3(1), 1.3.4.3(2), and 1.3.4.3(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable.

1.3.3.3 Meteorology 

1.3.3.3.1 Tornado Hazard

Information about the tornadoes and design-basis tornado at the proposed facility is provided in 

Sections 1.3.3.6 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), Section 2.5.6 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), and 

Section 3.6.2.7.2 of the ER (GLE, 2008).

Based on 54 years of available published data, 15 tornadoes were recorded between 1950 and 

2004 in New Hanover County. The strongest tornado was rated F2 on the Fujita scale and 

occurred in the neighboring Brunswick County. No F4 and F5 tornadoes were recorded in North 

Carolina and all tornadoes occurred in the Wilmington area are either F1 or F0 tornadoes (GLE, 

2011a and GLE, 2011b).

Based on these historical tornado records, the applicant determined that an F2 tornado estimate 

with a 3-second gust speed equivalent of 179–217 kilometers per hour (km/hour) (111–135 

miles per hour (mph)) based on the Enhanced Fujita scale for the site would be conservative 

(GLE, 2011a and GLE, 2011b). This estimate is comparable with the 225 km/hr (140 mph) 

tornado wind speed with an annual probability of 10−5 provided in NUREG/CR–4461, “Tornado 

Climatology of the Contiguous United States, Revision 2” (NRC, 2007a), for the Wilmington 

area. The applicant also indicated that this wind speed is bounded by the wind speed identified 

for hurricanes.
1-35

The applicant further conducted an assessment of the probabilities of tornadoes affecting the 

proposed facility using the expected travel distance of an F5 tornado (NRC, 2007a) and the 

historical tornado information for the tri-county area (New Handover, Brunswick and Pender) 

(NOAA, 2010). The applicant concluded that the annual probability for a tornado with the 

intensity greater than F1 is near or less than 10−5.

The applicant further defined the tornado-generated missiles based on Regulatory Guide 1.76, 

“Design-Basis Tornado and Tornado Missiles for Nuclear Power Plants,” Revision 1 (NRC, 

2007b). These missiles include a schedule 40 steel pipe, automobile, and a solid steel sphere 

with dimensions, weights, and associated impact speeds.

Based on the review of the information concerning tornados and tornado-generated missiles, 

the information provided by the applicant meets the regulatory acceptance criteria in 

Sections 1.3.4.3(3) and (5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable because 

the applicant provided appropriate meteorological data and design basis information on 

tornados and tornado-generated missiles that is accurate and is from reliable sources. 

1.3.3.3.2 High Winds and Hurricanes 

In Section 1.3.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), Sections 2.5.5 and 2.5.7 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 

2011a), and Section 3.6 of the ER (GLE, 2008), the applicant discusses the site meteorology, 

high winds, and hurricanes. Prevailing winds at the proposed facility site are from north and 

southwest. The mean hourly wind has a mean high of 20.1 km/hr (12.5 mph) and a mean low of 

9.5 km/hr (5.9 mph). The highest wind gust recorded was approximately 138 km/hr (86 mph) 

measured at the New Hanover County airport (Wilmington International Airport) during 

Hurricane Fran in 1996 and Hurricane Floyd in 1999. Based on this information, the applicant 

concluded that straight winds are not a controlling parameter to determine the design basis wind 

speed for the proposed facility. The NRC staff agrees with the applicant’s conclusion because, 

as discussed in the following paragraphs, hurricane winds define the design basis wind speed.

In Section 2.5.5 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), the applicant indicated that the hurricane 

hazards could be from winds and flooding. The 50-year (1954–2004) historical data for the New 

Hanover County, where the proposed facility is located, three hurricanes were recorded; two of 

these (Hazel in 1954 and Fran in 1996) were Category 3 hurricanes and the remaining one was 

a Category 1 hurricane. Based on these historical data, the applicant determined that the 

maximum potential hurricane hazards from a Category 4 hurricane should be a bounding case. 

The Category 4 hurricane has a 3-sec gust wind speed of 253.5 km/hr (157.5 mph).

In Section 1.3.3.3.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011b) and Section 2.5.7 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 

2011a), the applicant discussed site flooding hazards. Flooding caused by hurricane to the 

proposed facility may be in the form of rainfall, high tides, and storm surge. Citing Regulatory 

Guide 1.59, “Design Basis Floods for Nuclear Power Plants,” Revision 2 (NRC, 1977), the 

applicant indicated that the maximum probable surge along the North Carolina coast can be as 

high as 6.7 m (21.9 ft). Because the proposed facility is located at an elevation of 7.6 m (25 ft)

above sea level and is 32 km (20 mi) upstream from the ocean (GLE, 2011a and GLE, 2011b), 

the storm surge from a hurricane is highly unlikely to reach the facility horizon. Therefore, the 

applicant concluded that the storm surge from a hurricane is not a safety concern.

Based on the review of the information concerning high winds and hurricanes, the information 

provided by the applicant meets the regulatory acceptance criteria in Section 1.3.4.3(3) and (5) 
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of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable because: (1) the information is 

accurate and is from reliable sources; and (2) the applicant provides design-basis information 

for severe high wind and hurricane conditions applicable to the site.

1.3.3.3.3 Temperature Extremes 

In Section 1.3.3.3.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), Section 2.5.7.2 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), 

and Section 3.6.2.6.1 of the ER (GLE, 2008), the applicant discussed temperature extremes 

applicable to the GE site. Based on National Weather Service temperature measurements at 

the Wilmington International Airport, the mean annual maximum and minimum temperatures are 

23.3°C (74.0°F) and 11.9°C (53.5°F), respectively. The maximum temperature recorded is 

40°C (104.0°F), and the minimum temperature recorded is -18°C (0.0°F). The applicant stated 

that the proposed facility would be located in a moderate climatologic environment due to its 

proximity to the Atlantic Ocean, and it will select construction materials appropriate for this 

moderate climatologic environment. Consequently, the applicant concluded that extreme 

temperatures of -18°C (0.0°F) and 40o

C (104.0oF) are not safety concerns for the facility.

Based on the review of the information concerning extreme temperatures, the information 

provided by the applicant meets the regulatory acceptance criteria in Sections 1.3.4.3(3) and (5) 

of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable because: (1) the information is 

accurate and is from reliable sources; and (2) the applicant provides design-basis information 

for severe temperature conditions applicable to the site. Based on the temperature data the 

applicant presented, the NRC staff agrees with the applicant assessment that the facility site is 

in a moderate climatologic environment and temperature extremes are not a concern to the 

proposed facility performance.

1.3.3.3.4 Extreme Precipitation 

In Section 1.3.3.3.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), Section 2.5.7 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), 

and Section 3.6.2.6.2 of the ER (GLE, 2008), the applicant discussed extreme precipitation. 

Based on the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) record from 1971 to 

2000 (NOAA, 2004), the applicant indicated that the highest 24-hour rainfall amount recorded at 

Wilmington International Airport was 34.0 cm (13.4 in) that was caused by Hurricane Floyd 

(GLE, 2011b). The extreme environmental rainfall is equivalent to the 24-hour all-season 

extreme local precipitation of 109 mm (4.3 in) estimated by NOAA. The applicant further 

indicated that Wilmington International Airport has a 1.0  103 annual exceedance probability of 

receiving precipitation at a rate of 40.77 centimeters per hour (cm/hr) (16.05 inches per hours 

(in/hr)) for a duration of 5 minutes.

The applicant estimated the probable maximum precipitation (PMP) for the site for 1, 6, 12, 24, 

48, and 72 hour duration (GLE, 2011b) using the guidelines in NOAA Hydrometeorological 

Reports 51 and 52 (NOAA, 1978 and NOAA, 1982).

Based on the review of the information concerning extreme precipitation, the information 

provided by the applicant meets the regulatory acceptance criteria in Sections 1.3.4.3(3) and (5) 

of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable because: (1) the information is 

accurate and is from reliable sources; and (2) the applicant provides design-basis information 

for extreme precipitation conditions applicable to the site.
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1.3.3.3.5 Snow 

Section 1.3.3.3.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011b) and Section 2.5.7.1 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) 

discuss regional snowfall. The largest snow accumulation recorded in the Wilmington, North 

Carolina, area was 38.9 cm (15.3 in) on December 22–24, 1989. The maximum amount of 

snowfall recorded in a 24-hour period was 33 cm (13 in). This amount of snowfall is equivalent 

to a ground snow load of approximately 0.8–1.1 kilopascals (kPa) (17–22 pounds per square 

foot (psf)). The applicant used the approach in American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) 7–

05, “Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures” (ASCE, 2006), to estimate the 

snowfall with an annual probability of 1.0 × 10−5. The estimated ground snow load for an event 

with an annual probability of 1 × 10−5 is approximately 0.8–1.2 kPa (17–25 psf). The applicant 

defined the design basis snow load to be 1.2 kPa (25 psf).

 

The applicant recognized that snow drift could occur where the roof elevations change. Using 

the guideline in ASCE 7–05 (ASCE, 2006), the applicant determined that the highest snow load 

caused by snow drift from roof at high elevation to some portions of the roofs at low elevation 

could add additional 4.1 kPa (85 psf). The applicant pointed out the snow drift load could cause 

roof decking to sag or fail. However, the applicant analyzed the potential effect of roof decking 

failure and determined that such failure would only occur at locations where licensed material or 

hazardous chemicals produced from licensed material were not present. Therefore, the 

applicant concluded that the roof decking failure would not cause any high or intermediate 

consequences.

Based on the review of the information concerning snowfalls, the information provided by the 

applicant meets the regulatory acceptance criteria in Sections 1.3.4.3(3) and (5) of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable because: (1) the information is accurate and is 

from reliable sources; and (2) the applicant provides design-basis information for severe snow 

conditions applicable to the site.

1.3.3.3.6 Lightning and Thunderstorms 

In Section 1.3.3.3.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), Section 2.5.7 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), 

and Section 3.6.2.7 of the ER (GLE, 2008), the applicant discusses thunderstorms. In Section 

1.3.3.3.5 in the LA (GLE, 2011b) and Section 3.6.2.7.1 of the ER (GLE, 2008), the applicant 

discusses the lightning hazard at the proposed facility site. The applicant indicated that 

thunderstorms occur about 33 percent of days during the June to August period and that rainfall 

during the summer months occurs primarily during these thunderstorms. The applicant also 

stated that thunderstorms can produce damaging straight-line winds with wind speeds greater 

than 91 km/hr (57 mph).

The lightning strike frequency in the region surrounding the facility site ranges from 4 to 8 

flashes/square kilometer/year (flashes/km2

/yr) (1.5 to 3.1 flashes/square mile/year 

(flashes/mi2

/year)) and approximately 0.2 to 0.4 flashes/km2/yr (0.08 to 0.15 flashes/mi2/yr) for

the proposed facility site. The facility site area is approximately 0.5 km2 (0.02 mi2

).

Based on the review of the information concerning lightning and thunderstorms, the information 

provided by the applicant meets the regulatory acceptance criteria in Sections 1.3.4.3(3) and (5) 

of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable because: (1) the information is 

accurate and is from reliable sources; and (2) the applicant provides design-basis information 

for severe lightning and thunderstorm conditions applicable to the site.
1-38

1.3.3.3.7 Floods

Section 1.3.3.3.8 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), Section 2.5.3 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), and 

Sections 3.4.3 and 3.6.2.7.4 of the ER (GLE, 2008) discuss potential flooding to the proposed 

facility site. The site is located more than 16 km (10 mi) inland from the Atlantic Ocean and its 

closest bodies of water include the Northeast Cape Fear River and its associated tributaries. 

The applicant indicated that the proposed facility is located above the 100-year and 500-year 

flood plains for the region.

The potential floods that could affect the proposed facility include flood from rainfall in the 

Northeast Cape Fear River and Cape Fear River (probable maximum flood (PMF)), flood from 

local PMP, seismically induced upstream dam failure, hurricane surge, and tsunamis. Flood 

hazards resulting from hurricane surge and tsunamis are evaluated in Sections 1.3.3.3.2 and 

1.3.3.3.8, respectively, of this SER.

The nearest river to the proposed facility site is the Northeast Cape Fear River. This river joins 

the Cape Fear River 9.7 km (6 mi) south of the site. The applicant calculated the PMF for the 

Northeast Cape Fear River using the method in American National Standards Institute/American 

Nuclear Society (ANSI/ANS) 2.8, “Determining Design Basis Flooding at Power Reactor Sites,”

(ANSI/ANS, 1992) to determine the PMF still water level from the discharge flows and 

determined that flooding of either river could potentially affect the proposed facility site. The 

applicant determined that the Northeast Cape Fear River has a discharge capability of 2,549–

14,442 cubic meters per second (m3

/sec) (90,000–510,000 cubic feet per second (cfs)) and a 

PMF discharge of 8,778 m3

/sec (310,000 cfs). However, the applicant indicated that the 

proposed facility site and the surrounding area is relatively flat with gently sloping surfaces at 

gradients less than 2 percent and with little relief. The applicant further stated that the proposed 

facility is located 7.6 m (25 ft) above sea level. This elevation is, in general, the highest level 

east of the Northeast Cape Fear River. The east side of the Northeast Cape Fear River extends 

all the way to the coast. The elevation west of the river is also at 7.6 m (25 ft) above sea level 

for some distance before the elevation gets higher further west. Because of this generally level 

terrain around the Northeast Cape Fear River, the rise of flood water above the 7.6 m (25 ft)

above sea level will be limited and will be a slow process due to the availability of large flat 

region to accommodate the flood water. The applicant indicated that it is difficult to determine 

the discharge when the water level reaches 7.6 m (25 ft) above sea level due to the wide 

variability of the cross sections of the Northeast Cape Fear River above that level. 

Nevertheless, the applicant estimated that, including coincident wind-wave effects, the design 

basis water level for the PMF is 8.5 m (28 ft) above sea level for the proposed facility site, which 

is 0.9 m (3 ft) above the proposed facility floor level. Because the water level rising due to a 

PMF will be a slow process, the applicant indicated that ample time is available to warn 

operations personnel and to execute a safe shutdown.

The applicant stated that the PMF from the Cape Fear River with a discharge of twice that from 

the Northeast Cape Fear River could also flood the site. However, the applicant concluded that 

the PMF level from the Cape Fear River would not be likely to be more than 7.6 m (25 ft) above 

sea level based on the same justification used for the Northeast Cape Fear River.

No upstream dams exist on the Northeast Cape Fear River. Several dams exist upstream on 

the Cape Fear River. These dams are 48 km (30 mi) or more from where the Northeast Cape 

Fear River joins the Cape Fear River. The applicant indicated that seismically induced dam 

failure could cause flooding of the proposed facility site; however, the applicant did not expect 

that such floods could result in a flooding level more than from PMF because of the general 
1-39

level terrain of the proposed facility site and the general area being an estuary. Also, based on 

the same reason, the applicant concluded that the local PMP-induced flooding should not be 

more severe than the PMF.

In Section 1.3.1.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), the applicant provided a commitment for safe 

shutdown of the facilities that handle licensed material before a flood event that could challenge 

these facilities. This commitment is appropriate for the protection of workers and public safety. 

This action would be implemented by procedure.

Based on the review of the information concerning site flooding, the information provided by the 

applicant meets the regulatory acceptance criteria in Sections 1.3.4.3(3) and (5) of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable because: (1) the information is accurate and is 

from reliable sources; and (2) the applicant provides design-basis information for severe flood 

conditions applicable to the site. In addition, the applicant provided a commitment for safe 

shutdown of the facilities that handle licensed material before a hurricane event that could 

challenge these facilities is appropriate for the protection of workers and public safety. 

1.3.3.3.8 Tsunami

Section 2.5.4 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) discusses the probable maximum tsunami at 

the proposed facility site. The applicant stated that the facility site is more than 16 km (10 mi) 

away from the coastline and at a high elevation (7.6 m (25 ft) above sea level) compared to the 

surrounding level terrain. The applicant further indicated that, using NUREG/CR–6966,

“Tsunami Hazard Assessment at Nuclear Power Plant Sites in the United States of America -

Final Report” (NRC, 2009) as guidance, the proposed facility site can be considered “inland.” 

Thus, the applicant determined that the tsunami hazard to the facility is a highly unlikely event. 

Additionally, the applicant concluded that tidal bores are also highly unlikely given the distance 

from the coastline, the quick dissipation as bores travel upstream, and the elevation of the 

proposed facility that is 7.6 m (25 ft) above mean sea level. 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s consideration of the tsunami hazard and finds 

acceptable the applicant’s justification and determination that tsunamis are unlikely events. 

Based on the review of the information concerning tsunamis, the information provided by the 

applicant meets the regulatory acceptance criteria in Section 1.3.4.3(3) and (5) of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable because: (1) the information is accurate and is from 

reliable sources; and (2) the applicant provides design-basis information for tsunami conditions 

applicable to the site.

1.3.3.4 Geology 

1.3.3.4.1 Seismic Hazard 

Seismic hazards are discussed in Section 1.3.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011b); Section 2.5.1 of the 

ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a); and Section 3.3 of the ER (GLE, 2008).

The staff’s review of the seismic hazard applicable to the safety and design of the proposed 

facility includes:

1. Tectonic Setting;

2. Historic Seismicity; and

3. Seismic Hazard Assessment
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The following areas concerning the seismic hazard applicable to the safety analysis and design 

of the proposed facility were reviewed:

1. Seismic source characterization; 

2. Ground motion attenuation;

3. Seismic hazard calculation;

4. Development of site-specific spectra; and

5. Surface faulting.

Geological and Tectonic Settings

Geologic and tectonic settings are discussed in Section 1.3.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), Section 

2.5.1 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), and Section 3.3 of the ER (GLE, 2008). The proposed 

facility is located on the Atlantic Coastal Plain physiographic province. This province is a broad, 

low-relief terrace that stretches from along the Atlantic seaboard from New England to the Gulf 

of Mexico. The site geology is comprised of a wedge of unconsolidated sands, silt, marl, and 

other clays interbedded with occasional limestone strata which rests atop crystalline basement 

rocks. As noted in the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), the Atlantic Coastal Plain is not tectonically 

active. Small to moderate magnitude earthquakes occur throughout the region with 

concentrations in the Appalachian Mountains west of the site and near Charleston, South 

Carolina. These clusters of earthquakes are considered by the applicant to be associated with 

relic structures from Appalachian tectonics dating back more than 250 million years ago and 

from aftershocks related to the 1886 Charleston, South Carolina Earthquake. There are no 

geologic features in the Wilmington, North Carolina, region that have been identified as being 

capable of producing significant earthquakes. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), 

“Documentation for the 2008 Update of the United States National Seismic Hazard Maps”

(USGS, 2008), has identified this area as Zone 1, with moment magnitudes (MW) less than 6.0 

and Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) values of VI or less. In the USGS document “Earthquakes 

in Virginia and Vicinity 1774-2004” (USGS, 2006), USGS describes MMI values of VI as 

moderate shaking that produces only slight damage to buildings and structures. 

Historic Seismicity

The area around Wilmington, North Carolina, is not seismically active (Powell, 1991). There are 

no known active fault zones or concentrations of significant historic seismicity in North Carolina. 

The nearest major seismic event was located approximately 240 km (150 mi) southwest of the 

proposed facility site, near Charleston, South Carolina. Charleston experienced a large 

earthquake in 1886, with maximum MMI value of X and an estimated magnitude of 7.3 (USGS, 

2008). Paleoseismic information indicates similar earthquakes shook the Charleston, South 

Carolina, region several times over the past several thousand years (USGS, 2008). A repeat of 

the Charleston earthquake is considered the most significant source of the seismic hazards for 

the southeast coast of the United States, including Wilmington, North Carolina (USGS, 2008). 

Estimates of repeat times for a Charleston earthquake range between 250 and 1,000 years 

(Talwani, 2001). 

Based on an evaluation of several regional earthquake catalogs (USGS, 2006), the applicant 

identified nearly 900 earthquakes within a 322 km (200 mi) of the site since 1698. Most of these 

are small with estimated moment magnitudes less than 2.0. The two largest recorded 

earthquakes in the region occurred on January 18, 1884, and on March 5, 1958. No substantial 

damage was reported from either earthquake. As described in “Seismic Hazard in North 
1-41

Carolina” (Powell, 1991), press reports indicate that houses shook and some people were rolled 

out of bed, suggesting that these two earthquakes had maximum MMI values of V.

Seismic Hazard Evaluation

In addition to the lack of significant historical earthquakes near the site, the applicant cites the 

2008 USGS National Seismic Hazard Maps (USGS, 2008) to conclude that the seismic hazards 

at the site are not significant to safety. Based on the USGS maps, the proposed facility site has 

a 2 percent probability in a 50-year period of exceeding a peak-ground acceleration of 0.11 g (g 

is the acceleration due to gravity). The 2 percent probability in a 50-year period is 

approximately equal to a return period of 2,500 years or an annual probability of 4 × 10−4. There 

is also a 2 percent probability in a 50-year period of exceeding a 1-second spectral acceleration 

of 0.08 g and a 2 percent probability in a 50-year period of exceeding a 0.2-second spectral 

acceleration of 0.24 g. The USGS map results are based on an assumed “firm rock” site 

conditions (Site Class B) with a shear wave velocity of 760 m/s (2,500 ft/s). 

The applicant developed seismic design criteria based on a deterministic analysis in accordance 

with guidance in NUREG–1520, Appendix D, (NRC, 2010) and the 2006 International Building 

Code (IBC) (ICC, 2006a), following the method for development of the safe shutdown 

earthquake described in 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A. In particular, the applicant used two 

earthquakes to develop the design basis ground motions; a repeat of the 1886 Charleston 

earthquake located 114 km (71 mi) from the site and a local magnitude 5.0 earthquake 20 km 

(12.5 mi) from the site. Based on this analysis, the applicant derived ground motions of 0.24 g 

for the 0.2-second spectral acceleration and 0.09 g for the 1-second spectral acceleration, 

assuming 5 percent damping. The applicant used the suite of ground motion attenuation 

models and the weighting scheme for those models as developed in the 2008 update of the 

United States National Seismic Hazard Maps (USGS, 2008). Because the USGS models 

assume Site Class B conditions, but soils at the site are Site Class C, the applicant used site 

amplification coefficients from the IBC (ICC, 2006) to derive design basis ground motions (5 

percent damping) of 0.29 g for the 0.2-second spectral acceleration and 0.15 g for the 1-second 

spectral acceleration.

The NRC staff reviewed the information provided in the LA (GLE, 2011b), including the ISA 

Summary (GLE, 2011a), and the ER (GLE, 2008). Based on the review of the information 

concerning site seismicity, the information provided by the applicant meets the regulatory 

acceptance criteria in Sections 1.3.4.3(4) and (5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, 

therefore, acceptable because: (1) the information is accurate and is from reliable sources; and 

(2) the applicant provides design-basis information for seismic conditions applicable to the site. 

While the applicant did not provide 250-year and 500-year earthquakes, it did provide 

information from the most recent USGS earthquake hazard data (USGS, 2008) and evaluate 

the most significant historical earthquake in accordance with recent NRC guidance in NUREG1520, Revision 1, Appendix D (NRC, 2010).

1.3.3.4.2 Slope Stability

Section 1.3.5.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011b) discusses other geologic information for the proposed 

facility site. The applicant indicated that the proposed facility site is relatively flat with gently 

sloping surfaces at gradients less than 2 percent and with little relief. The applicant concluded 

that landslides resulting from slope instability are not a safety concern to the proposed facility. 

The NRC staff visited the site and concur with the applicant that the proposed facility site does 
1-42

not have a slope instability concern and hazards associated with slope instability are not 

credible. 

The NRC staff reviewed the information provided in the LA (GLE, 2011b), including the ISA 

Summary (GLE, 2011a), and the ER (GLE, 2008). Based on the review of the information 

concerning site slope stability, the information provided by the applicant meets the regulatory 

acceptance criteria in Sections 1.3.4.3(4) and (5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, 

therefore, acceptable because: (1) the information is accurate and is from reliable sources; and 

(2) the applicant provides design-basis information for slope stability conditions applicable to the 

site.

 

1.3.3.4.3 Liquefaction

In Section 1.3.5.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011b) and Section G.5 of Appendix G of the ER (GLE, 

2008), the applicant discussed soil liquefaction potential at the proposed site. The applicant 

assessed liquefaction potential at the proposed facility site through geotechnical investigations 

using soil data from two borings (GLE, 2011b and GLE, 2008). The applicant indicated that the 

soils in the two borings represent the highest and lowest potential for liquefaction (GLE, 2008). 

The assessment compared the calculated cyclic stress ratio to the calculated cyclic resistance 

ratio. In general, when a cyclic stress ratio is greater than the cyclic resistance ratio, 

liquefaction is likely. The applicant determined the cyclic stress ratio using the peak horizontal 

ground acceleration of 0.139 g (corresponding to the design earthquake with a return period of 

2,500 year) based on the USGS maps included in the 2006 North Carolina Building Code (ICC, 

2006b). The assessment results suggest marginal risk of localized liquefactions at depths of 8 

and 12 m (25 and 40 ft) for soils in one boring, whereas the soils in the other boring do not have 

a liquefaction risk. The cyclic stress ratio for the soil at the depth of 8 m (25 ft) is approximately 

20 percent larger than the cyclic resistance ratio, and it is nearly the same for the soil at the 

depth of 12 m (40 ft). Based on this assessment, the applicant concluded that soil liquefaction 

potential is small at the proposed site for a peak horizontal ground acceleration of 0.139 g.

The applicant committed to conduct a more detailed evaluation during the final subsurface 

investigation using the guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.132, “Site Investigations for Foundations 

of Nuclear Power Plants,” Revision 2 (NRC, 2003a), to more accurately estimate the cyclic 

stress ratios and cyclic resistance ratios for the soils at the final structure location. This 

supports design consideration on liquefaction potential using the guidance in Regulatory 

Guide 1.198, “Procedures and Criteria for Assessing Seismic Soil Liquefaction at Nuclear Power 

Plant Sites” (NRC, 2003b). The applicant further committed to assess liquefaction potential and 

its effects on operational safety using a horizontal ground acceleration consistent with the 

ground motion with an annual probability of 1.0  105

. 

The NRC staff evaluated the liquefaction potential results the applicant presented in Tables G-7 

and G-8 in Appendix G of the ER (GLE, 2008) using the cyclic resistance ratio curves for 

various fines contents in the cyclic stress ratio-blow count diagram recommended by the

National Center for Earthquake Engineering Research, “Proceedings of the National Center for 

Earthquake Engineering Research Workshop on Evaluation of Liquefaction Resistance of Soils” 

(NCEER, 1997), and find the applicant’s assessment results are reasonable and acceptable.

The staff reviewed the liquefaction and geotechnical investigation information presented in the 

LA (GLE, 2011b) and the ER (GLE, 2008) and concurs with the applicant that the potential for 

liquefaction of soils at the site is unlikely to be a safety concern for the proposed facility. The 

applicant committed in Section 1.3.5.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011b) to perform additional 
1-43

geotechnical investigations at the site to confirm that liquefaction is not a safety concern for the

proposed facility. Additional site testing will be evaluated in accordance with NRC Regulatory 

Guide 1.198, (NRC, 2003b). 

The NRC staff reviewed the information provided in the LA (GLE, 2011b) and the ER (GLE, 

2008). Based on the review of the information concerning site liquefaction potential, the 

information provided by the applicant meets the regulatory acceptance criteria in Sections 

1.3.4.3(4) and (5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable because: (1) the 

information is accurate and is from reliable sources; (2) the approach the applicant plans to use 

to confirm its conclusion that liquefaction of the soils at the final structure location is not a safety 

concern is consistent with NRC guidance; and (3) the applicant provides design-basis 

information for site liquefaction potential conditions applicable to the site. Because the applicant 

committed to follow accepted guidelines for conducting more detailed liquefaction and 

geotechnical investigations, the staff considers this acceptable as results of these future 

investigations will be evaluated in the NRC’s inspections prior to the issuance of the approval for 

operations required under 10 CFR 40.41(g) and 70.32(k).

1.3.3.4.4 Settlement and Soil-Bearing Capacity

In Sections 1.3.5.1 and 1.3.5.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), the applicant discussed potential for 

different settlement. The applicant indicated that it will consider the potential for differential 

settlement across a foundation when preparing facility and roadway engineering designs. In 

addition, in Sections 3.3.4.3 and 3.3.5 of the ER (GLE, 2008), the applicant provided soil 

information and discussed the preliminary geophysical and geotechnical investigation results it 

used to assess feasibility of this proposed site for construction of the proposed facility. To 

support structural design, the applicant further committed to conduct a geotechnical 

investigation (GLE, 2011b). This investigation will be performed in accordance with established 

geotechnical methods.

To assess total and differential settlements for structural foundations, the applicant plans to use 

methods provided in U.S. Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) Design Manual 7 

(NAVFAC, 1986), “Foundation Engineering Handbook” (Fang, 1990), and “Foundation Analysis 

Design” (Bowles, 1995). 

For determining the allowable bearing pressure for shallow and deep foundations, the applicant 

will use the methods in NAVFAC Design Manual 7 (NAVFAC, 1986); “Foundation Engineering 

Handbook” (Fang, 1990); Foundation Analysis Design (Bowles, 1995); and Federal Highway 

Administration (FHWA) FHWA-IF-99-025, “Drilled Shafts: Construction Procedures and Design 

Methods” (FHWA, 1999). Using the methods in NAVFAC Design Manual 7 (NAVFAC, 1986), 

“Foundation Engineering Handbook” (Fang, 1990), and Foundation Analysis Design (Bowles, 

1995) to determine the allowable bearing pressure for shallow and deep foundations is 

acceptable because the NRC staff used these methods for licensing activities related to fuel 

cycle facilities. The NRC staff also finds that the method in FHWA-IF-99-025 (FHWA, 1999) for 

estimating the allowable bearing pressure is acceptable because it is recommended by a FHWA 

and the suggested approach is consistent with that in NAVFAC Design Manual 7 (NAVFAC, 

1986).

The NRC staff reviewed the settlement and soil bearing capacity information provided in the LA 

(GLE, 2011b) and the ER (GLE, 2008). Based on the review of the information concerning 

settlement and soil bearing capacity, the information provided by the applicant meets the 

regulatory acceptance criteria in Sections 1.3.4.3(4) and (5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and 
1-44

is, therefore, acceptable because: (1) the information is accurate and is from reliable sources; 

(2) the applicant provides design-basis information for site settlement and soil bearing capacity 

conditions applicable to the site; and (3) the approaches the applicant plans to use to obtain

design-basis information for site settlement and soil-bearing capacity to support final facility 

design are consistent with industry-accepted methods. Because the applicant committed to 

follow accepted guidelines for conducting more detailed settlement and soil bearing capacity 

investigations, the staff considers this acceptable as results of these future investigations will be 

evaluated in the NRC’s inspections prior to the issuance of the approval for operations required 

under 10 CFR 40.41(g) and 70.32(k).

1.3.3.5 Hydrology 

Site surface water and groundwater hydrology is discussed in Sections 1.3.4 of the LA (GLE, 

2011b) and 3.4 of the ER (GLE, 2008).

Surface water in the vicinity of the proposed site includes the Northeast Cape Fear River and 

several tributaries and creeks that flow into the Northeast Cape Fear River. The Northeast 

Cape Fear River is characterized as a blackwater river with relatively low-levels of dissolved 

oxygen and higher turbidity than the Cape Fear River. It is also characterized as swamp water 

due to its naturally low pH. The Northeast Cape Fear River is influenced by tidal action, but its 

salinity depends on local freshwater flow conditions that can vary with time and tidal exchange.

There are three freshwater streams on the site. Unnamed Tributaries No. 1 and No. 2 drain 

through the Swamp Forest community in the western part of the site to the Northeast Cape Fear 

River and one that drains into Prince George Creek on the north side of the GE site property. 

All three streams are capable of supporting wildlife from the Northeast Cape Fear River, 

however, the salinity and dissolved oxygen content may limit the suitability of the habitat for 

some species.

There are also three small ephemeral ponds. These ponds are located in the western part of 

the site and in the north-central sector. These ponds are capable of providing a water source to 

wildlife.

Groundwater systems in the vicinity of the Wilmington site consist of six regional aquifers. 

These systems include the Surficial Aquifer, the Castle Hayne Aquifer, the Peedee Aquifer, the 

Black Creek Aquifer, and the Upper and Lower Cape Fear Aquifers. All these aquifers are 

permeable water-yielding formations. Less permeable confining units separate the aquifers.

The Surficial Aquifer consists of stratified sedimentary deposits and is recharged directly by 

rainfall. The water table is located an average of 2.7 m (9 ft) below ground surface (bgs) with a 

range of 0 m (0 ft) to 6.1 m (20 ft) bgs. The hydraulic conductivity has been estimated to be 

39.5 meters per day (m/day) (130 feet per day (ft/day)). The Surficial Aquifer discharges into 

streams, drainage ditches, and swampy areas and it recharges the Peedee Aquifer, which is 

referred to as the principal aquifer. Due to yield limits, it is used primarily for domestic use only.

Industrial process and drinking water wells used for the Wilmington site operations are drilled 

into the Peedee Aquifer. The average withdrawal rate is about 3.8 million liters per day (1.0 

million gallons per day). Historical data do not exhibit a long-term downward trend in aquifer 

levels from this withdrawal rate and future uses are not expected to adversely affect the 

sustainable yield. The hydraulic conductivity for the Peedee Aquifer has been estimated to be 

11.5 m/day (38 ft/day).
1-45

The NRC staff reviewed the information provided in the LA (GLE, 2011b) and the ER (GLE, 

2008). Based on the review of the information concerning site hydrology, the information 

provided by the applicant meets the regulatory acceptance criteria in Sections 1.3.4.3(4) and (5) 

of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable because: (1) the information is 

accurate and is from reliable sources; and (2) the applicant provides design-basis information 

for hydrological conditions applicable to the site. In addition, the staff reviewed the applicant’s 

hydrological data in the LA (GLE, 2011b) and finds that it provides sufficient information to 

assess site flooding hazards and ground- and surface-water impacts, and is consistent with 

information in the ER (GLE, 2008).

1.3.4 EVALUATION FINDINGS 

The staff has reviewed the site description for the proposed uranium enrichment facility 

according to Section 1.3 of the Standard Review Plan. The applicant has adequately described 

and summarized general information pertaining to: (1) the site geography, including its location 

relative to prominent natural and man-made features such as mountains, rivers, airports, 

population centers, schools, and commercial and manufacturing facilities; (2) population 

information on the basis of the most current available census data to show population 

distribution as a function of distance from the facility; (3) meteorology, hydrology, and geology 

for the site; and (4) applicable design basis events. The reviewer verified that the site 

description is consistent with the information used as a basis for the ER, emergency 

management plan, and ISA Summary; and that it demonstrates compliance with regulatory 

requirements in 10 CFR 30.33, 10 CFR 40.32, 10 CFR 70.22, and 10 CFR 70.65(b)(1).

1.4 REFERENCES 

(ANI, 2010) American Nuclear Insurers (ANI). Letter from J. Hoffman to I. Dinitz, “Global Laser 

Enrichment Facility,” December 2, 2010. ML103570247

(ANSI/ANS, 1992) American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society 

(ANSI/ANS). ANSI/ANS 2.8, “Determining Design Basis Flooding at Power Reactor Sites,” 

1992.

(ASCE, 2006) American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE). ASCE 7-05, “Minimum Design 

Loads for Buildings and Other Structures,” 2006.

(ASTM, 2004) American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM). ASTM C996, “Standard 

Specification for Uranium Hexafluoride Enriched to Less than 5 % 235U,” 2004. 

(ASTM, 2006) American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM). ASTM C787, “Standard 

Specification for Uranium Hexafluoride for Enrichment,” 2006.

(Bowles, 1995) Bowles, J.E., “Foundation Analysis and Design,” Fifth Edition. 1995.

(DOE, 2002) U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Interagency Agreement Between the U.S. 

Department of Energy Oak Ridge Operations and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Concerning Foreign Ownership, Control, and Influence Determinations Associated with Certain 

NRC Licensees. May 6, 2002.
1-46

(DOE, 2010) U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Letter from P. Jackson/DOE to J.K. 

Everly/NRC, May 19, 2010.

(DOS, 1999) U.S and Australia Agreement of Cooperation. “Agreement for Cooperation 

Between the United States of America and Australia Concerning Technology for the Separation 

of Isotopes of Uranium by Laser Excitation,” signed on October 28, 1999.

(Fang, 1990) Fang, H.Y., “Foundation Engineering Handbook,” Second Edition. 1990.

(FHWA, 1999) U.S. Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). FHWA-IF-99-025, “Drilled 

Shafts: Construction Procedures and Design Methods.” August 1999.

(GLE, 2008) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “Environmental Report 

for the GLE Commercial Facility,” 2008.

(GLE, 2010a) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “Fundamental Nuclear 

Material Control Plan for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility,” 

Revision 2, 2010.

(GLE, 2010b) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “Standard Practice 

Procedures Plan (SPPP) for the Protection of Classified Matter for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser 

Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility,” SPPP-03, Revision 2, 2010.

(GLE, 2011a) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “Integrated Safety 

Analysis Summary for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility 

License Application,” Revision 4, 2011.

(GLE, 2011b) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “GE-Hitachi Global 

Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility License Application,” Revision 6, 2011.

(GLE, 2011c) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “GLE Commercial 

Facility License Application Facility Clearance Submittal,” Revision 11, 2011.

(GLE, 2011d) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “Quality Assurance 

Program Description for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility,” 

Revision 7, 2011.

(GLE, 2011e) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “Standard Practice 

Procedures Plan for the Protection of Classified Matter Global Laser Enrichment Wilmington, 

NC Facility,” SP-01, Revision 11, 2011.

(GLE, 2011f) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “Radiological 

Contingency and Emergency Plan,” Revision 3, 2011.

(ICC, 2006a) International Code Council, Inc. (ICC). “International Building Code,” 2006.

(ICC, 2006b) International Code Council, Inc. (ICC). “North Carolina State Building Code: 

Building Code,” 2006.

(ICRP, 1977) International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). Publication No. 26, 

“Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection,” 1977.
1-47

(ICRP, 1978) International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). Publication No. 30,

“Limits for Intakes of Radionuclides by Workers,” 1978.

(ICRP, 1991) International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). Publication No. 60,

“1990 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection,” 1991.

(ICRP, 1994) International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). Publication No. 67,

“Age-dependent Doses to Members of the Public from Intake of Radionuclides: Part 2 Ingestion 

Dose Coefficients,” 1994.

(ICRP, 1995a) International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). Publication No. 

68, “Dose Coefficients for Intakes of Radionuclides by Workers,” 1995.

(ICRP, 1995b) International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). Publication No. 

66, “Respiratory Tract Model for Radiological Protection,” 1995.

(ICRP, 1996a) International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). Publication No. 

71, “Age-dependent Doses to Members of the Public from Intake of Radionuclides: Part 4 

Ingestion Dose Coefficients,” 1996.

(ICRP, 1996b) International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). Publication No. 

72, “Age-dependent Doses to Members of the Public from Intake of Radionuclides: Part 5 

Compilation of Ingestion and Inhalation Dose Coefficients,” 1996.

(ICRP, 1999) International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). Publication No. 78,

“Individual Monitoring for Internal Exposure of Workers,” 1999.

(NAVFAC, 1986) U.S. Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC). Design Manual 7, 

“Naval Facilities Engineering Command Design Manual,” 1986.

(NCEER, 1997) National Center for Earthquake Engineering Research. “Proceedings of the 

National Center for Earthquake Engineering Research Workshop on Evaluation of Liquefaction 

Resistance of Soils.” NCEER–97–0022. State University of New York at Buffalo. 1997.

(NEI, 2009) Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI). NEI 08-11, “Information Security Program 

Guidelines for Protection of Classified Material at Uranium Enrichment Facilities,” 2009.

(NOAA, 1978) National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). “Application of 

Probable Maximum Precipitation Estimates – United States East of the 105th Meridian,” 

Hydrometeorological Report No. 51, 1978.

(NOAA, 1982) National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). “Application of 

Probable Maximum Precipitation Estimates – United States East of the 105th Meridian,” 

Hydrometeorological Report No. 52, 1982.

(NOAA, 2004) National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). “Climatography of 

the United States No. 20, 1971-2000,” 2004.

(NOAA, 2010) National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). “Severe Weather 

Database Files (1950-2010),” 2010.
1-48

(NRC, 1977) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 1.59, “Design 

Basis Floods for Nuclear Power Plants,” Revision 2, 1977.

(NRC, 1993) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Branch Technical Position, 

“Guidelines for Decontamination of Facilities and Equipment Prior to Release for Unrestricted 

Use or Termination of Licenses for Byproduct, Source, or Special Nuclear Material.” April 1993.

(NRC, 1999a) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Staff Requirements Memorandum, 

SECY-99-077, “To Request Commission Approval to Grant Exemptions from Portions of 10 

CFR Part 20,” April 21, 1999.

(NRC, 1999b) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Commission Paper, SECY-99-

077, “To Request Commission Approval to Grant Exemptions from Portions of 10 CFR Part 20,” 

March 12, 1999.

(NRC, 2002) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG–1520, “Standard Review 

Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility.” 2002.

(NRC, 2003a) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 1.132, “Site 

Investigations for Foundations of Nuclear Power Plants,” Revision 2, 2003.

(NRC, 2003b) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 1.198, 

“Procedures and Criteria for Assessing Seismic Soil Liquefaction at Nuclear Power Plant Sites.” 

2003.

(NRC, 2006a) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG-1851, “Safety Evaluation 

Report for the American Centrifuge Plant in Piketon, Ohio,” 2006.

(NRC, 2006b) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). “Standard Practice Procedures 

Plan Standard Format and Content for the Protection of Classified Matter for NRC Licensee, 

Certificate Holder, or Other Activities as the Commission May Determine.” June 2006. 

(NRC, 2007a) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG/CR-4461, “Tornado 

Climatology in the contiguous United States,” Revision 2, 2007.

(NRC, 2007b) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 1.76, “DesignBasis Tornado and Tornado Missiles for Nuclear Power Plants,” Revision 1, 2007.

(NRC, 2009) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG/CR-6966, “Tsunami 

Hazard Assessment at Nuclear Power Plant Sites in the United States of America - Final 

Report,” 2009.

(NRC, 2010) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG–1520, “Standard Review 

Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility,” Revision 1, 2010.

(Powell, 1991) “Seismic Hazard in North Carolina.” Report prepared for the North Carolina 

Division of Emergency Management. University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. 1991.

(Talwani, 2001) Talwani, P. and Schaeffer, W.T. “Recurrence Rates of Large Earthquakes in 

South Carolina Coastal Plain Based on Paleoliquefaction Data.” Journal of Geophysical 

Research. Vol. 106, pp. 6621-6642. 2001.
1-49

(USGS, 2006) U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). “Earthquakes in Virginia and Vicinity 1774-

2004.” 2006.

(USGS, 2008) U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). “Documentation for the 2008 Update of the 

United States National Seismic Hazard Maps.” 2008.

2-1

2.0 ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

The purpose of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) review of the applicant's 

organization and administration is to evaluate whether the application describes proposed 

management policies that provide reasonable assurance that the licensee plans, implements, 

and controls site activities in a manner that ensures the safety of workers, the public, and the 

environment. The review also ensures that the applicant has identified and provided adequate 

qualification descriptions for key management positions.

2.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 70.22(a)(6) requires that the applicant 

provide the technical qualifications, including the training and the experience of the applicant 

and members of the staff. In addition, the regulations in 10 CFR 30.33(a)(3), 10 CFR 40.32(b), 

and 10 CFR 70.23(a)(2) require that an applicant be qualified by reason of training and 

experience to use the licensed material for the purpose requested. Also, the regulations in 10 

CFR 30.33(a)(2), 10 CFR 40.32(c), and 10 CFR 70.23(a)(4) require that the applicant’s 

proposed equipment and facilities are adequate to protect health and minimize danger to life or 

property. In addition, the regulations in 10 CFR 70.62(d) require a management system and 

administrative procedures for Items Relied on for Safety (IROFS) to ensure their availability and 

reliability.

2.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 

The guidance applicable to NRC’s review of the organization and administration section of the 

license application (LA) (GLE, 2011a) is contained in Chapter 2 of the “Standard Review Plan 

for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility,” NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). 

Section 2.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), “Areas of Review,” includes areas of review for both 

new facility applications and applications for modifications to existing facilities. Similarly, 

Section 2.4.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), “Regulatory Acceptance Criteria,” lists acceptance 

criteria for both new facilities and existing facilities. The regulatory acceptance criteria for both 

new and existing facilities are applicable to the review of the LA (GLE, 2011a).

2.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 

2.3.1 ORGANIZATION

The regulations in 10 CFR 30.33(a)(3), 10 CFR 40.32(b), and 70.23(a)(2) require that an 

applicant be qualified by reason of training and experience to use the licensed material for the 

purpose requested. In addition, the regulations in 10 CFR 30.33(a)(2), 10 CFR 40.32(c), and 10 

CFR 70.23(a)(4) require that the applicant’s proposed equipment and facilities are adequate to 

protect health and minimize danger to life or property. Thus, the applicant must implement an 

organization and appropriate administrative elements to support these regulatory requirements. 

The acceptance criteria in Section 2.4.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) address the need to: (1) 

identify and functionally describe the specific organizational groups that are responsible for 
2-2

managing the design, construction, and operation of the facility; (2) organization chants; and (3) 

plans to commission the facility’s startup and operation, including the transition from the startup 

phase to operations, under the direct supervision of the applicant’s personnel responsible for 

safe operations.

In Section 2.1 of the applicant’s LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant describes the organizational 

commitments, relationships, responsibilities, and authorities for the overall management system 

to assure the protection of the health and safety of the workers and the public, protection of the 

environment, and to provide for the common defense and security. This section includes 

qualifications, functions, responsibilities, and authorities of the positions in the organizations 

assigned functions related to environmental protection, health, safety, safeguards, security, and 

quality assurance during all stages of the project from design through construction, start-up, and 

operation. In Section 2.1.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that the qualifications, 

responsibilities, and authorities are defined in position descriptions that will be accessible to 

affected personnel and NRC.

Figures 2-1 and 2-2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) depict the applicant’s organization from design and 

construction through start-up and operations. 

As described in Section 2.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the GLE President and Chief Executive 

Officer (CEO) provides the overall direction and management for facility design, construction, 

operations, and decommissioning. During the design and construction phases, the GLE 

President and CEO is responsible for ensuring that the facility meets the applicable regulatory 

requirements and for implementation of a quality assurance program (GLE. 2011a). During 

these phases, the Quality Assurance (QA) and Infrastructure Program Manager, the Operations 

Manager, the Engineering Manager, the Projects Manager, the Security Manager, and the 

Environmental Health and Safety (EHS) Manager report to the GLE President and CEO (GLE. 

2011a). Figure 2-1 in the LA (GLE. 2011a) shows these relationships.

During the operations phase, the Facility Manager has overall responsibility for facility 

operations and directs activities involving quality assurance; operations; engineering; projects; 

security; emergency preparedness; infrastructure programs; environmental, health, and safety; 

and the Facility Safety Review Committee (GLE. 2011a). The Facility Manager reports to the 

GLE President and CEO (GLE. 2011a). The organization structure for operations is shown in 

Figure 2-2 in the LA (GLE. 2011a).

The applicant plans to construct and operate the proposed facility in 1 million Separative Work 

Unit phases (GLE. 2011a). As the construction of the first phase is completed, the applicant will 

begin staffing its operations organization and transition to the operations team (GLE. 2011a). 

During the transition, the EHS Manager and the QA Manager will report directly to the GLE 

President and CEO for design and construction matters and to the Facility Manager for 

operations matters (GLE. 2011a). As construction is completed, systems will undergo 

acceptance testing and turnover to the operations organization in accordance with written 

policies and procedures (GLE. 2011a).

As stated above, the applicant identified and provided a description of the proposed project 

organization that would be responsible for managing the design, construction, and operation of 

the proposed facility. The applicant also provided organization charts. The proposed 

organization provides for essential functions, qualified managers with appropriate experience, 

and defined responsibilities and authorities for the organizations assigned to environmental 

protection, health, safety, safeguards, security, and quality assurance during all stages of the 
2-3

project from design through construction, start-up, and operation. The proposed organization, 

therefore, provides an acceptable management system for ensuring that the design, 

construction, and operation of the facility with effective lines of communication will meet NRC 

regulatory requirements. The information provided by the applicant meets the guidance in 

Section 2.4.3(1) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) for new facilities as the applicant has identified 

and functionally described the specific organizational groups responsible for operating the 

facility and managing the design, construction, and operation of the facility, and has provided 

organization charts. The information provided by the applicant also meets the guidance in 

Sections 2.4.3(1) and (7) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) for existing facilities as the applicant 

has identified and functionally described the specific organizational groups responsible for 

operating the facility and managing the development of design changes to the facility, and has 

provided organization charts. In addition, effective lines of communication and authority among 

the organizational units involved in the engineering, health, safety, environment, and operations 

functions of the facility are clearly defined in the applicant’s organization. The applicant’s 

organization structure is, therefore, acceptable.

2.3.2 ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND QUALIFICATIONS

The regulations in 10 CFR 70.22(a)(6) require that the applicant provide the technical 

qualifications, including the training and the experience of the applicant and members of the 

staff. The regulations in 10 CFR 30.33(a)(3), 10 CFR 40.32(b), and 70.23(a)(2) require that an 

applicant be qualified by reason of training and experience to use the licensed material for the 

purpose requested. Thus, the applicant must implement an organization and appropriate 

administrative elements to support these regulatory requirements. The acceptance criteria in 

Section 2.4.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) address the need to identify the responsibilities, 

qualifications, and authorities of the key personnel responsible for managing the design, 

construction, and operations of the proposed facility and for health, safety, and engineering 

responsibilities. In addition, these responsibilities need to be clearly defined in position 

descriptions that are accessible to affected staff and the NRC, upon request. Also, the EHS and 

QA organizations need to be independent of the operations organization allowing it to provide 

objective EHS audit, review, or control of facility activities. Lines of authority, communications, 

and authority need to be clearly drawn. The EHS Manager also needs to have stop work 

authority if operations appear unsafe and must approve the restart of shutdown operations.

 

In Section 2.2 of the applicant’s LA (GLE. 2011a), the applicant provided information concerning 

the minimum qualifications, function, and responsibilities for key staff positions and are 

summarized in the following paragraphs. Personnel responsible for managing the design, 

construction, and operation of the plant will be required to have the substantive breadth and 

level of experience to successfully execute their responsibilities (GLE. 2011a). Responsibilities, 

authorities, and group inter-relationships will be documented in approved, written position 

descriptions (GLE. 2011a). Individuals who do not meet the specified qualification requirements 

may not be eliminated from consideration if other work experience and abilities demonstrate 

competence to fulfill the position requirements (GLE. 2011a). Such situations will be considered 

on a case-by-case basis and will be approved and documented by the Facility Manager (GLE. 

2011a).

The responsibilities and minimum qualifications for key positions, as described in Section 2.2 of 

the LA (GLE. 2011a), are summarized in the following paragraphs:

The President and CEO is responsible for overall policy direction and management of project 

activities. This individual takes direction from General Electric-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas 
2-4

Fuel Cycle Senior Vice President. The qualifications for this position are, as a minimum, a 

bachelor’s degree (or equivalent) and five years of related experience.

The Facility Manager reports to the President and CEO and has overall responsibility for the 

safety and activities conducted at the proposed facility. The Facility Manager must have, as a 

minimum, a bachelor’s degree in an engineering or scientific area and four years of experience 

in nuclear facility operations. The Facility Manager must be knowledgeable of the safety 

program and has the authority to shutdown the facility or unsafe processes and must approve 

restart of any operation that this individual shuts down.

The QA Manager reports to the Facility Manager and is responsible for establishing, 

implementing, and maintaining the facility QA program. This position is independent from other 

management positions and has stop-work authority and the ability to contact the President and 

CEO on any QA matter. The QA Manager must have, as a minimum, a bachelor’s degree in an 

engineering or scientific area and four years of supervisory experience in implementing QA 

programs. The QA Manager must also have at least two years experience in a nuclear facility 

QA organization.

The Operations Manager reports to the Facility Manager and has the responsibility of directing 

the day-to-day operation of the facility. This includes such activities as ensuring the correct and 

safe operation of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) processes, proper handling of UF6, and the 

identification and mitigation of any off-normal operating conditions. The Operations Manager 

will have, as a minimum, a bachelor's degree (or equivalent) in an engineering or scientific field 

and 4 years of responsible nuclear experience.

The Engineering Manager reports to the Facility Manager and has the responsibility of providing 

engineering support to the facility. This includes technical support for facility modifications; 

engineering support for operations and maintenance; safe performance; and support for the 

preparation of operating and maintenance procedures. The Engineering Manager will have, as 

a minimum, a bachelor’s degree or equivalent in an engineering or scientific field and 5 years of 

responsible nuclear experience.

The Projects Manager reports to the GLE President and CEO and has the responsibility for 

implementing facility modifications and for providing engineering support to operations, 

maintenance, and equipment testing personnel. The Projects Manager also manages design 

and construction activities. The Projects Manager will have, as a minimum, a bachelor’s degree 

or equivalent in engineering or a scientific field, 5 years of nuclear experience, and 3 years of 

supervisory or management experience.

The Infrastructure Programs Manager reports to the Facility Manager and has the responsibility 

for business and administrative support, including document control, records management, 

training, and administrative functions. The Business Manager must have, as a minimum, a 

bachelor’s degree or equivalent in personnel management, business administration, or a related 

field, and three years of related experience at a nuclear facility.

The EHS Manager reports to the Facility Manager and has the overall responsibility for 

establishing and managing the material control and accounting, nuclear criticality safety, 

industrial safety, environmental protection, fire safety, and radiation protection programs. The 

EHS Manager is administratively independent of operations activities and other management 

positions at the facility, but has the authority to stop work on any process or facility in the event 
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that safety controls are not assured. The EHS Manager must be consulted on the restart of any 

plant function shutdown due to EHS issues. Changes to the facility or to activities of personnel 

that require prior NRC approval are reviewed and approved by the EHS Manager or designee. 

The EHS Manager will have, as a minimum, a bachelor's degree (or equivalent) in an 

engineering or scientific field and at least 5 years of management experience in regulated 

activities. The EHS Manager will also have experience in the administration of nuclear criticality 

safety, environmental, and industrial programs.

The Security and Emergency Preparedness Manager reports to the GLE President and CEO 

and has the responsibility for physical security of the facility site and ensuring that the facility 

remains prepared to react and respond to any emergency situation that may arise. This 

includes protection of classified information, maintaining and implementing the Emergency 

Preparedness Program, training of personnel to implement the program, evaluating program 

effectiveness, and coordinating and maintaining agreements with offsite emergency response 

organizations. The Security and Emergency Preparedness Manager is administratively 

independent of operations activities. The Emergency Preparedness Manager will have, as a 

minimum, a bachelor's degree (or equivalent) in a related field and at least 5 years of 

experience in related activities, or equivalent; or a high school diploma and 8 years of 

experience in related activities.

The Licensing Manager reports operationally to the Facility Manager and functionally to the 

General Electric-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas (GEHNEA) Regulatory Affairs General 

Manager. GEHNEA is the immediate parent of GLE. The GEHNEA Regulatory Affairs General 

Manager has the responsibility for providing leadership and strategic guidance to the GEHNEA 

subsidiaries, which include GLE. The Licensing Manager is responsible for coordinating facility 

activities to ensure that compliance is maintained with applicable NRC requirements and for 

ensuring abnormal events are reported to NRC in accordance with NRC regulations. The 

Licensing Manager will have a minimum of a bachelor’s degree and 5 years of related 

experience in implementing and supervising a nuclear licensing program.

The Environmental Protection Manager reports to the EHS Manager and has the responsibility 

for coordinating facility activities to ensure all local, State, and Federal environmental 

regulations are met. The Environmental Protection Manager is administratively independent of 

operations activities, but has the authority to stop work on any process or facility related to 

environmental protection. The Environmental Protection Manager must approve the restart of 

any plant function shutdown due to environmental protection issues. The Environmental 

Protection Manager will have, as a minimum, a bachelor's degree (or equivalent) in engineering 

or in a scientific field and at least two years of experience in regulatory activities, or equivalent; 

or a high school diploma and 8 years of experience in regulatory activities.

The Radiation Protection Manager reports to the EHS Manager and has the responsibility for 

maintaining and implementing the Radiation Protection Program. These duties include: 1) the 

training of personnel in radiation protection; 2) evaluation and documentation of radiation 

exposures of personnel; 3) evaluation of the integrity and reliability of radiological 

instrumentation; 4) support emergency planning activities; and 5) assessing the effectiveness of 

the Radiation Protection Program through audits. The Radiation Protection Manager is 

administratively independent of operations activities, but has the authority to stop work on any 

process or facility related to radiation protection. The Radiation Protection Manager must 

approve the restart of any plant function shutdown due to radiation protection issues. 
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The Radiation Protection Manager will have, as a minimum, a bachelor’s degree in an 

engineering or scientific field, and 3 years of responsible experience that includes assignments 

of responsibility in a radiation protection program, and experience in the understanding, 

application, and direction of radiation protection programs. 

The Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Manager reports to the EHS Manager and is responsible 

for establishing and maintaining the NCS Program. The NCS Manager supports operations by: 

1) providing assessments for the Integrated Safety Analysis and for configuration control; 2) 

assessing normal and credible abnormal conditions; 3) determining NCS limits for controlled 

parameters; 4) performing nuclear criticality analyses; 5) supporting emergency response 

activities; and 6) assessing the effectiveness of the NCS program. The NCS Manager is 

administratively independent of operations activities, but has the authority to stop work on any 

process or facility related to nuclear criticality. The NCS Manager must approve the restart of 

any plant function shutdown due to nuclear criticality issues. The NCS Manager will have, as a 

minimum, a bachelor’s degree (or equivalent) in an engineering or scientific field with at least 4 

years in assignments involving regulatory activities, and experience in the understanding, 

application, and direction of NCS programs.

The Fire Safety Manager reports to the EHS Manager and has the responsibility for 

implementing the facility fire safety program. The Fire Safety Manager is administratively 

independent of operations activities, but has the authority to stop work on any process or facility 

related to fire safety concerns. The Fire Safety Manager must approve the restart of any plant 

function shutdown due to fire safety issues. The duties of the Fire Safety Manager include 

complying with fire safety regulatory requirements, managing the facility fire brigade, fire safety 

training, performing fire safety inspections, and supporting the ISA and configuration 

management activities. The Fire Safety Manager must have, as a minimum, a bachelor’s 

degree (or equivalent) in an engineering or scientific field and 4 years of experience in fire 

safety assignments.

The Material Control and Accounting (MC&A) Manager reports to the EHS Manager and has the 

responsibility for implementation and control of the Fundamental Nuclear Material Control Plan. 

The MC&A Manager is administratively independent of operations activities, but has the 

authority to stop work on any process or facility related to MC&A activities. The MC&A Manager 

must approve the restart of any plant function shutdown due to MC&A issues. The MC&A 

Manager must have, as a minimum, a bachelor’s degree (or equivalent) in an engineering or 

scientific field and 5 years of experience in the management of a safeguards program for 

special nuclear material to include responsibilities for MC&A. No credit for academic training 

may be taken toward fulfilling this experience requirement.

The Industrial Safety Manager reports to the EHS Manager and has the responsibility for the 

implementation of facility industrial safety programs and procedures. This will include programs 

and procedures for training individuals in non-radiological safety, laser safety, non-radiological 

chemical safety, and facility fire protection. The Industrial Safety Manager is administratively 

independent of operations activities, but has the authority to stop work on any process or facility 

related to industrial safety issues. The Industrial Safety Manager must approve the restart of 

any plant function shutdown due to industrial safety issues. The Industrial Safety Manager will 

have, as a minimum, a bachelor's degree (or equivalent) in engineering or in a scientific field 

and two years in related assignments; or a high school diploma and 8 years of related 

experience.
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In Section 2.2.11 of the LA (GLE. 2011a), the applicant discusses the Facility Safety Review 

Committee, the Radiation Safety Committee, and the Chemical Review Committee functions.

The Facility Safety Review Committee provides independent input to the Facility Manager on 

safety considerations related to environmental protection, NCS, radiation protection, and 

industrial safety (GLE. 2011a). This committee performs an annual assessment of the As Low 

As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) program (GLE. 2011a). The Radiation Safety Committee 

reviews matters associated with occupational exposures and the ALARA program and makes 

recommendations to the Facility Manager on radiological safety trends and projects (GLE. 

2011a). The Radiation Safety Committee is further discussed in Section 4.2.4 of the LA (GLE. 

2011a) and Section 4.3.2 of this Safety Evaluation Report (SER). The Chemical Review 

Committee reviews requests for new chemicals and the health and safety risks of the chemical, 

including information on handling, storage, and disposal (GLE. 2011a). Section 6.2.1.1.1 of the 

LA (GLE. 2011a) and Section 6.3.1.3 of this SER provides additional information on the 

Chemical Review Committee.

The information provided above meets the acceptance criteria in Section 2.4.3(3) of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002) for new facilities and the acceptance criteria in Sections 2.4.3(2), (3), and (4) 

of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) for existing facilities. In the LA (GLE. 2011a), the applicant 

identified the responsibilities, qualifications, and authorities of the personnel responsible for 

managing the design, construction, and operations of the proposed facility. These personnel 

have substantive breadth and experience and will be in place and be appropriately available. In 

addition, the responsibilities, qualifications, and authorities for key supervisory and management 

positions with health, safety, and environmental responsibilities are clearly defined in written

position descriptions that will be available to all affected personnel and to the NRC, upon 

request. Also, the EHS and QA organizations are independent of the operations organization 

allowing them to provide objective EHS audit, review, or control of facility activities. Lines of 

authority, communications, and authority are clearly drawn. The EHS Manager also has stop 

work authority if operations appear unsafe and must approve the restart of shutdown 

operations. As described above, the applicant provided an organization having the essential 

management functions needed to ensure safe operation of the proposed facility and having the 

appropriate breath, independence, and level of experience necessary to effectively manage the 

facility design, construction, and operations. The organizational responsibilities and 

qualifications are, therefore, acceptable.

2.3.3 MANAGEMENT CONTROL

The regulations in 10 CFR 70.22(a)(6) require that the applicant provide the technical 

qualifications, including the training and the experience of the applicant and members of the 

staff. The regulations in 10 CFR 30.33(a)(3), 10 CFR 40.32(b), and 70.23(a)(2) require that an 

applicant be qualified by reason of training and experience to use the licensed material for the 

purpose requested. Thus, the applicant must implement an organization and appropriate 

administrative elements to support these regulatory requirements. The acceptance criteria in 

Section 2.4.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) address the need to provide clear, unambiguous 

management controls and lines of communication and authority within the organization for 

managing the design, construction, and operation of the facility. The proposed management 

controls also need to provide an acceptable management system for ensuring that the design, 

construction, and operation of the facility will meet NRC requirements. In addition, the applicant 

needs to perform EHS functions using approved, written procedures prepared in accordance 

with a formal document control program. The applicant also needs a corrective action program 

for staff to report unsafe conditions in the EHS area and needs to ensure that reported concerns 

will be promptly investigated, assessed, and resolved. The applicant also needs effective and 
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clearly defined lines of communications and authority among its organizational units involved in 

engineering, EHS, and operations. In addition, the applicant needs formal management 

measures to ensure the availability and reliability of IROFS and needs to have written 

agreements in-place with local agencies for responding to fires and site emergencies. The 

above management controls need to provide for configuration management, facility 

maintenance, training and job qualifications, development of formal procedures for facility 

activities, internal audits and assessments, incident investigations, an employee corrective 

action program, and a formal records management program. 

In Sections 2.1.2 and 2.3 of the LA (GLE. 2011a), the applicant describes the management 

measures and associated policies, administrative procedures, and management controls to 

ensure that the facility equipment, facilities and procedures, staff (including training and 

qualifications), and programs provide for the protection of the health and safety of workers and 

the public, protection of the environment, and for common defense and security.

Organizations having responsibility for environmental, health and safety, safeguards, security, 

and QA functions are independent from the operations organization providing separate and 

independent lines of communication (GLE. 2011a). Organizations having engineering, safety 

and health, environmental, security, safeguards, and operations responsibilities have clear and 

well-defined lines of communication and authority (GLE. 2011a). For example, the QA 

Manager, the Security Manager, and EHS Manager are independent from the Operations 

Manager and other organizations enabling them to provide independent input to the GLE 

President and CEO during design and construction and to the Facility Manager during 

operations (GLE. 2011a).

Activities that are essential for effective implementation of the environmental, safety, and health 

functions are documented in approved, written procedures, prepared in compliance with a 

document control program (GLE. 2011a). Facility staff receives training in these control 

functions, which are monitored through internal and independent audits and assessments (GLE. 

2011a).

The applicant implemented an employee concerns program to provide a mechanism for 

employees to raise issues or concerns related to the design, construction, or operation of the 

facility (GLE. 2011a). Employees have the right and obligation to initiate the stop-work process 

if they consider that safety or quality is being compromised (GLE. 2011a). The applicant 

committed to investigating and resolving employee concerns in an effective and timely manner 

(GLE. 2011a). For the construction and operating phases of the project, the applicant will 

implement a corrective action program as described in Section 17 in the applicant’s Quality 

Assurance Program Description (GLE, 2010b) and evaluated in Sections 11.3.5 and 11.A.3.17 

of this SER.

The applicant has a Configuration Management Program to define and maintain a technical 

baseline for facility Items Relied on for Safety (IROFS) and provide a formal process for making 

changes to that baseline (GLE. 2011a). All changes made to facility IROFS are made in 

accordance with the Configuration Management Program (GLE. 2011a). Section 11.3.1 of this 

SER evaluates the Configuration Management Program.

A maintenance program will be implemented during operations. This program will include 

planned and scheduled preventive maintenance, surveillance, and performance trending, to 

ensure that IROFS are available and reliable to perform their intended functions (GLE. 2011a).
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The applicant will implement a formal, planned training program that will include indoctrination 

training for all employees, addressing criticality, radiological, emergency response, and 

industrial safety (GLE. 2011a). The level of indoctrination training will depend on the specific 

jobs to be performed (GLE. 2011a). Continued or periodic retraining will be established, when 

applicable, to ensure employee proficiency (GLE. 2011a). Operator training will be conducted 

as part of the qualification requirements prior to performing safety-related activities and before 

startup following significant changes in safety controls (GLE. 2011a). Additional information on 

the applicant’s training program is provided in Section 11.3 of the LA (GLE. 2011a) and is 

evaluated in Section 11.3.3 of this SER.

The applicant will implement a QA Program that requires periodic audits of activities affecting 

quality, to ensure that these activities are being conducted in accordance with procedures and 

the QA Program requirements (GLE. 2011a). The audits will be identified, scheduled, and 

performed in accordance with a written plan (GLE. 2011a). The frequency of audits will depend 

on the safety significance, status, and work history of the activity (GLE. 2011a). The Facility 

Safety Review Committee and the QA organization will conduct operational reviews and 

program audits (GLE. 2011a). Further information on audits is provided in Section 11.5 of the 

LA (GLE. 2011a) and is evaluated in Section 11.3.5 of this SER. Incident investigations will be 

conducted following upset conditions to ensure that these conditions are understood, that 

proper corrective actions are taken, and that appropriate offsite agencies, including NRC are 

properly notified (GLE. 2011a). Incident investigations are also described in Section 11.6 of the 

LA (GLE. 2011a) and evaluated in Section 11.3.6 of the SER.

The applicant will implement a records management program to control the preparation and 

issuance of applicant documents (GLE. 2011a). This document control program will include a 

formal process for preparing, reviewing, approving, and issuing revisions to documents (GLE. 

2011a). Further evaluation of the records management program is provided in Section 11.3.7 of 

this SER.

The applicant will coordinate emergency actions with appropriate State and local offsite 

emergency agencies through written agreements (GLE, 2010c). Coordination with offsite 

emergency agencies is discussed in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 of the Radiological Contingency and 

Emergency Plan (GLE, 2010c). Further evaluation of emergency management is provided in 

Section 8.3.2 of this SER.

The information the applicant provided above meets the guidance in Section 2.4.3(2) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) for new facilities as the applicant has provided clear, unambiguous 

management controls and lines of communication and authority within the organization for 

managing the design and construction of the facility. The proposed management controls 

provide an acceptable management system for ensuring that the design, construction, and 

operation of the facility will meet NRC requirements. In addition, the information the applicant 

provided above meets the guidance in Sections 2.4.3(5), (6), (7), (8), and (9) of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002) for existing facilities as the EHS functions are performed using approved, written 

procedures prepared in accordance with a formal document control program. The applicant 

also has an employee concerns program for staff to report unsafe conditions in the EHS area 

and reported concerns will be promptly investigated, assessed, and resolved. The applicant 

also has effective and clearly defined lines of communications and authority among its 

organizational units involved in engineering, EHS, and operations. In addition, the applicant will 

establish formal management measures to ensure the availability and reliability of IROFS. The 

applicant has written agreements in-place with local agencies for responding to fires and site 

emergencies. The above management controls provide for configuration management, facility 
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maintenance, training and job qualifications, development of formal procedures for facility 

activities, internal audits and assessments, incident investigations, an employee corrective 

action program, and a formal records management program. These programs will provide the 

needed scope of control over facility activities to ensure that worker and public health and safety 

will be protected in accordance with the regulations cited in Section 2.1 of this SER. Therefore, 

the applicant’s management controls are acceptable.

2.3.4 TRANSITION FROM DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION TO OPERATIONS

The regulations in 10 CFR 30.33(a)(3), 10 CFR 40.32(b), and 10 CFR 70.23(a)(2) require that 

an applicant be qualified by reason of training and experience to use the licensed material for 

the purpose requested. Also, the regulations in 10 CFR 30.33(a)(2), 10 CFR 40.32(c), and 10 

CFR 70.23(a)(4) require that the applicant’s proposed equipment and facilities are adequate to 

protect health and minimize danger to life or property. In addition, the regulations in 10 CFR 

70.62(d) require a management system and administrative procedures for IROFS to ensure 

their availability and reliability. Acceptance criteria on the transition from construction to 

operations are addressed in Section 2.4.3(4) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). Under these 

criteria, an applicant for a new facility needs to describe specific plans to commission the 

facility’s startup and operation, including the transition from the startup phase to operations 

under the supervision of the applicant’s personnel responsible for safe operations. This 

information needs to be of sufficient detail for the staff to understand the applicant’s planned 

transitions and to ensure that the transitions will be orderly and effective without introducing 

unnecessary health and safety issues for the initial operation of the proposed facility. 

The applicant is responsible for the design, QA, construction, testing, initial start-up, operation, 

and decommissioning of the facility (GLE. 2011a).

Toward the end of construction, the focus of the organization will shift from design and 

construction to initial start-up and operation of the facility (GLE. 2011a). As the facility nears 

completion, the applicant will staff its operations organization to ensure a smooth transition from 

construction activities to operation activities (GLE. 2011a). 

As the construction of systems is completed, the systems will undergo acceptance testing as 

required by procedure, followed by turnover from the construction organization to the operations 

organization by means of a detailed transition plan (GLE. 2011a). The turnover will include the 

physical systems and corresponding design information and records (GLE. 2011a). After 

turnover, the operating organization will be responsible for system maintenance and 

configuration management (GLE. 2011a). The design basis for the facility is maintained during 

the transition from construction to operations through the configuration management system 

described in Section 11.1 of the LA (GLE. 2011a) and evaluated in Section 11.3.1 of this SER.

The information the applicant provided on the transition from construction to operations meets 

the guidance in Section 2.4.3(4) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) for new facilities as the applicant 

has described specific plans to commission the facility’s startup and operation, including the 

transition from the startup phase to operations under the supervision of the applicant’s 

personnel responsible for safe operations. This information is of sufficient detail for the staff to 

understand the applicant’s planned transitions and to ensure that the transitions will be orderly 

and effective without introducing unnecessary health and safety issues for the initial operation of 

the proposed facility. Therefore, the applicant’s transition plans are acceptable.
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2.4 EVALUATION FINDINGS 

The staff reviewed the organization and administration for the proposed facility in accordance 

with the acceptance criteria in Chapter 2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The staff reviewed the 

applicant’s organization, management position summaries and qualifications, and management 

controls. These organizational and administrative elements describe: (1) clear responsibilities 

and associated resources for the design, construction, and operation of the facility; and (2) its 

plans for managing and operating the project. The staff reviewed these plans and the 

management and organizational commitments and concludes that they provide reasonable 

assurance that an acceptable organization, administrative policies, and sufficient competent 

resources have been established or are committed, to satisfy the applicant's commitments for

the design, construction, and operation of the facility.

2.5 REFERENCES 

(GLE, 2011a) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “GE-Hitachi Global 

Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility License Application,” Revision 6. 2011.

(GLE. 2011b) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC (GLE). “Quality 

Assurance Program Description for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial 

Facility,” Revision 7, 2011.

(GLE, 2011c) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC (GLE). “Radiological 

Contingency and Emergency Plan (RC&EP) for Global Nuclear Fuel – Americas, LLC and GEHitachi Global Laser Enrichment, LLC at Wilmington, NC,” Revision 3, 2011.

(NRC, 2002) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG-1520, “Standard Review 

Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility.” 2002.

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3.0 INTEGRATED SAFETY ANALYSIS

AND INTEGRATED SAFETY ANALYSIS SUMMARY

The purpose of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) review of the applicant’s 

Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) and ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) is to evaluate whether the 

applicant meets the regulatory requirement specified in 10 CFR 70, Subpart H, “Additional 

Requirements for Certain Licensees Authorized to Possess a Critical Mass of Special Nuclear 

Material.” The review determined whether appropriate hazards and baseline design criteria 

(BDC) have been addressed. The review also determined whether acceptable Items Relied on 

for Safety (IROFS) including initial conditions (ICs), management measures, and likelihoods and 

consequences have been designated for high-risk accident sequences and whether, with 

IROFS, the performance requirement of 10 CFR 70.61 have been met. The review also 

determined whether programmatic commitments to maintain the ISA and ISA Summary (GLE, 

2011a) are acceptable.

In particular, the review as described in this chapter considered information provided by the

applicant that is related to:

• Commitments regarding the applicant’s safety program, including the ISA, pursuant to 

the requirements of 10 CFR 70.62; and

• The ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 70.62(c)(3)(ii) 

and 70.65.

3.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS

The following regulatory requirements are applicable to the ISA and ISA Summary (GLE, 

2011a) content:

• The regulations in 10 CFR 70.62 specify the requirements to establish and maintain a 

safety program, including performance of an ISA that demonstrates compliance with the 

performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61;

• The regulations in 10 CFR 70.62(c) specify requirements for conducting an ISA, 

including a demonstration that credible high-consequence and intermediateconsequence events meet the safety performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61;

• The regulations in 10 CFR 70.64 specify requirements for baseline design criteria and 

facility and system design and facility layout; and

• The regulations in 10 CFR 70.65(b) describe the contents of an ISA Summary.

The regulations in 10 CFR 70.62 require an applicant to establish and maintain a safety 

program that demonstrates compliance with the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. 

The safety program is required to contain: (1) process safety information; (2) an ISA; and (3) 
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management measures. The ISA must be conducted and maintained by the applicant and must 

identify the following, in accordance with 10 CFR 70.62(c):

• Radiological hazards related to possessing or processing licensed material at the facility;

• Chemical hazards of licensed material and hazardous chemicals produced from licensed 

material;

• Facility hazards that could affect the safety of licensed material and, thus, present an 

increased radiological risk;

• Potential accident sequences caused by process deviations or other events internal to 

the facility and credible external events, including natural phenomena;

• Consequence and likelihood of concurrence of each potential accident sequence 

identified and the methods used to determine the consequences and likelihoods; and

• Each IROFS identified pursuant to 10 CFR 70.61(e), the characteristics of its 

preventative, mitigative, or other safety function, and the assumptions and conditions 

under which the item is relied upon to support compliance with the performance 

requirements of 10 CFR 70.61.

The regulations in 10 CFR 70.61 provide that the ISA must evaluate compliance with the 

performance requirements. The requirements in 10 CFR 70.61(b) specify that the risk of each 

credible, high-consequence event must be limited such that the likelihood of occurrence is 

highly unlikely; and the requirements in 10 CFR 70.61(c) specify that the risk of each credible, 

intermediate-consequence event must be limited such that the likelihood of occurrence is 

unlikely.

The license application must include a description of the safety program under 10 CFR 

70.65(a). In addition, the applicant is required to submit to the NRC an ISA Summary. As 

outlined in 10 CFR 70.65(b), the ISA Summary is required to contain:

• A general description of the site with emphasis on those factors that could affect safety;

• A general description of the facility with emphasis on those areas that could affect 

safety, including an identification of the controlled area boundaries;

• A description of each process analyzed in the ISA in sufficient detail to understand the 

theory of operation; and, for each process, the hazards that were identified in the ISA 

pursuant to 10 CFR 70.62(c)(1)(i)-(iii) and a general description of the types of accident 

sequences;

• Information that demonstrates the licensee’s compliance with the performance 

requirements in 10 CFR 70.61, including a description of the management measures; 

the requirements for criticality monitoring and alarms in 10 CFR 70.24; and, if applicable, 

the requirements of 10 CFR 70.64;

• A description of the team, qualifications, and the methods used to perform the ISA;
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• A list briefly describing each IROFS identified pursuant to 10 CFR 70.61(e) in sufficient 

detail to understand their functions in relation to the performance requirements of 10 

CFR 70.61;

• A description of the proposed quantitative standards used to assess the consequences 

to an individual from acute chemical exposure to licensed material or chemicals 

produced from licensed materials that are onsite, or expected to be onsite, as described 

in 10 CFR 70.61(b)(4) and (c)(4);

• A description list that identifies all IROFS that are the sole item preventing or mitigating 

an accident sequence that exceeds the performance requirement of 10 CFR 70.61; and

• A description of the definitions of unlikely, highly unlikely, and credible, as used in the 

evaluations in the ISA.

3.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

The guidance applicable to the NRC’s review of the applicant’s ISA and ISA Summary (GLE, 

2011a) is contained in Chapter 3 of NUREG-1520, “Standard Review Plan for the Review of a 

License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility” (NRC, 2002). Chapter 3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002) addresses the review of the ISA and the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a). Sections 3.4.3.1 

and 3.4.3.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) address the acceptance criteria for this review and 

are applicable in their entirety.

Chapter 11, “Management Measures,” of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) was used in the staff’s 

review of the management measures applied for the IROFS evaluated in the ISA Summary 

(GLE, 2011a).

3.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

3.3.1 SAFETY PROGRAM AND ISA COMMITMENTS

This section contains the staff’s programmatic review of the applicant’s proposed safety 

program, the proposed ISA commitments, proposed ISA method, proposed BDC 

considerations, and proposed defense-in-depth items. The staff’s review of the sensitive 

information, including proprietary, export control, and security-related ISA information provided 

in the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) and License Application (LA) (GLE, 2011b) is found in the 

non-public version of this Safety Evaluation Report (SER). The staff’s review of other 

information in the ISA, as determined from onsite reviews, is provided in Section 3.3.17 of this 

SER.

The staff reviewed the applicant’s proposed safety program commitments identified in 

Section 3.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011b) to determine whether the three elements of process safety 

information, the ISA, and management measures demonstrate compliance with the 

requirements of 10 CFR 70.62; and that records will be established and maintained for 

documenting each discovery that an IROFS or management measure has failed or degraded 

such that it cannot perform its intended safety function. The applicant’s commitments regarding 

process safety information is discussed in Section 3.3.1.1 of this SER. The applicant’s ISA 
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commitments are discussed in Section 3.3.1.2 of this SER, and the applicant’s commitments 

regarding management measures are discussed in Section 3.3.12 of this SER.

3.3.1.1 Process Safety information

The acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.1(1)(a), (b), and (c) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state 

that the applicant needs to commit to compiling process safety information to be used to identify 

and understand that hazards associated with the processes.

In Section 3.1.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), the applicant stated that it compiled and maintains 

process information addressing:

• The hazards of materials used or produced in the process — including information on 

chemical and physical properties (e.g., toxicity, acute exposure limits, reactivity, and 

chemical and thermal stability) such as are included in Materials Safety Data Sheets 

meeting the requirements of 29 CFR 1910.1200(g);

• The description of the technology of the process — including block flow diagrams or 

simplified process flow diagrams, a brief outline of process chemistry, safe upper and 

lower limits for controlled parameters (e.g., temperature, pressure, flow, and 

concentration), and evaluation of the health and safety consequences of process 

deviations; and

• Equipment used in the process, which includes general information on topics such as 

the materials of construction, piping and instrumentation diagrams, ventilation, design 

codes and standards employed, material and energy balances, IROFS, electrical 

classification, and relief system design.

The process-safety information described above will be maintained up-to-date by the 

configuration management program described in Section 11.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011b). As 

discussed in Section 11.3.1 of this SER, the applicant uses its configuration management 

system to control documentation and review design changes.

The applicant also developed procedures and criteria for changing the ISA. These include 

implementation of a facility change mechanism that meets the requirements of 10 CFR 70.72. 

The development and implementation of procedures is described in Section 11.4 of the LA 

(GLE, 2011b) and is evaluated in Section 11.3.4 of this SER.

As described in Section 3.1.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), the applicant uses personnel with 

expertise in engineering, safety analysis, and enrichment process operations and experience 

(individually or collectively) in nuclear criticality safety, radiological safety, fire safety, chemical 

safety, operations and maintenance, and ISA methods to maintain the ISA. The ISA Team for 

the various processes consists of individuals who are knowledgeable in the ISA method(s) and 

the operation, hazards, and safety design criteria of the particular process. Training and 

qualifications of individuals responsible for maintaining the ISA are described in Chapter 1 of the 

ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a).

 
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Therefore, the staff concludes that the above-mentioned program elements:

1. Meet the acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.1(1)(a) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) 

because the applicant’s safety program contains commitments to compile and maintain 

an up-to-date database of process safety information and is, therefore, acceptable.

2. Meet the acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.1(1)(b) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) 

because the applicant’s safety program includes procedures and criteria for changing 

the ISA, along with a commitment to design and implement a facility change mechanism, 

and is, therefore, acceptable.

3. Meet the acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.1(1)(c) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) 

because the applicant’s safety program contains a commitment to engage personnel 

with appropriate experience and expertise in engineering and process operations to 

maintain the ISA, and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.3.1.2 ISA Commitments

The acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.1(2)(a) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state that the 

applicant needs to commit to conducting an ISA of appropriate complexity for each process, 

including radiological, chemical, facility hazards, potential accident sequences, consequences 

and likelihood for each sequence, and IROFS. The acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.1(2)(b) 

of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state that the applicant needs to commit to maintain the ISA and 

its supporting documentation so that it is accurate and up-to-date. The acceptance criteria in 

Section 3.4.3.1(2)(c) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state that the applicant needs to commit to 

train personnel in ISA methods. The acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.1(2)(d) of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002) state that the applicant needs to commit to evaluate proposed changes to the 

facility and its operations using ISA methods and to designate new or additional IROFS and 

appropriate management measures as required. The acceptance criteria in Section 

3.4.3.1(2)(e) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state that the applicant needs to commit to any 

IROFS unacceptable performance deficiencies identified through updates of the ISA. The 

acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.1(2)(f) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state that the applicant 

needs to commit to maintain written procedures onsite. The acceptance criteria in Section 

3.4.3.1(2)(g) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state that the applicant needs to commit to establish 

all IROFS and to maintain them so that they are available and reliable when needed.

In Section 3.1.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), the applicant identifies ISA program elements that 

were used to establish the ISA process and contains the applicant’s commitments to conduct an 

ISA of appropriate complexity for each process. Those elements include the performance of an 

ISA for each process that identifies the radiological hazards, chemical hazards that could 

increase radiological risk, chemical hazards from materials involved in processing licensed 

material, facility hazards that could increase radiological risk, potential accident sequences, 

consequences and likelihood of each accident sequence, and IROFS including the assumptions 

and conditions under which the program elements support compliance with the performance 

requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 (GLE, 2011b). The staff’s evaluation of the applicant’s methods 

and criteria for implementing the ISA method is contained in Sections 3.3.5.2 and 3.3.6 of this 

SER.

Section 3.1.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011b) contains a commitment to maintain the ISA and its 

supporting documentation so that it is accurate and up-to-date. Changes to the ISA Summary 
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will be submitted to the NRC, in accordance with 10 CFR 70.72 (GLE, 2011b). The ISA update 

process accounts for any changes made to the facility or its processes (GLE, 2011b). Changes 

will be made in accordance with approved site procedures, and will be reviewed to ensure that 

the technical basis for the change and impacts to the ISA or other safety programs are 

examined by the applicant’s engineering, safety, and operations staff prior to implementation 

(GLE, 2011b). This commitment meets the acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.1(2)(b) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable.

Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011b) contain commitments to train personnel in the 

facility’s ISA methods and use suitably qualified personnel to update and maintain the ISA and 

ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a). This commitment meets the acceptance criteria in Section 

3.4.3.1(2)(c) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable.

Section 3.1.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011b) contains a commitment to evaluate proposed changes to 

the facility or its operations by means of the ISA method and to designate new or additional 

IROFS and appropriate management measures. Proposed changes that result in a new type of 

accident sequence or increased risk (likelihood or consequence) as well as the adequacy of 

IROFS and their corresponding management measures are evaluated and revised promptly 

(GLE, 2011b). This commitment meets the acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.1(2)(d) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable.

Section 3.1.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011b) contains a commitment to address the unacceptable 

performance deficiencies of IROFS that are identified through updates to the ISA. This 

commitment meets the acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.1(2)(e) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002) and is, therefore, acceptable.

In Section 11.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), the applicant commits to maintain written procedures 

onsite. This commitment meets the acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.1(2)(f) of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable.

In Section 3.1.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), the applicant commits to establish all IROFS (if not 

already established) and to maintain them so that they are available and reliable when needed. 

This commitment meets the acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.1(2)(g) of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.3.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE SITE AND FACILITY

3.3.2.1 Description of the Site 

The regulations in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(1) require that the applicant describe the site with emphasis 

on those factors that could affect safety. In Chapter 2 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), the 

applicant described and summarized general information pertaining to: (1) the site location and 

geography, including its location relative to prominent natural and man-made features such as 

rivers, airports, highways, and population centers; (2) population data; (3) climate; (4) motor 

vehicle and air traffic; and (5) topography. In Chapter 2 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), the 

applicant included a discussion of external hazards, including both natural phenomena such as 

earthquakes, landslides, volcanoes, flooding, as well as man-made phenomena such as aircraft 

crashes. The reviewers verified that the site description was consistent with the information 

used as a basis for the ISA.
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The population in New Hanover County is in excess of 182,000 (GLE, 2011a). The three 

neighboring counties (Brunswick, New Hanover, and Pender) have a total population of 

approximately 326,000 (GLE, 2011a). The nearest residential areas are located a distance of 

approximately 1280 meters (m) (4,200 feet (ft)) from the proposed facility (GLE, 2011a). These 

figures are provided in the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) based on available census data, as 

stated in the criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(2)(a) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and therefore meet 

the acceptance criteria. During the ISA process, the applicant assessed worker doses within 

the restricted area (GLE, 2011a). The consequences to the public and the environment were 

assessed at the outer perimeter of the Wilmington site boundary nearest to the process of 

interest (GLE, 2011a). Figure 3-1 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) provides a map of the 

facility with each major process and support building identified and meets the acceptance 

criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(2)(a) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002).

The primary production activities are supported by a large number of support activities, 

including, but not limited to, materials storage, waste processing, analytical/physical testing, and 

facilities and equipment maintenance (GLE, 2011a). Chapter 4 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 

2011a) contains 17 subsections, which provide details of the evaluated hazards for each 

primary activity. 

The staff finds the information provided in Chapter 2 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) to be 

adequate for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 70.65(b)(1) and the acceptance criteria in 

Sections 3.4.3.2(1)(a) and (b) in NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), which states that the applicant 

needs to provide a description of the site geography, population, and characterization of natural 

phenomena, as they affect facility safety and the consequence or likelihood of accidents caused 

by external factors.

3.3.2.2 Description of the Facility

The regulations in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(2) require that the applicant submit a general description of 

the facility with emphasis on areas that could affect safety, including an identification of the 

controlled area boundary. To meet the acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(2) of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002), the applicant needs to identify and describe the facility location and distance 

from the site boundary, restricted area and controlled area boundaries, design information 

regarding the resistance of the facility to credible external events, and the location of site 

buildings. 

The proposed facility and site are described in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.1.2 of the ISA Summary 

(GLE, 2011a). The controlled area boundary (CAB) and the restricted area are described in 

Section 3.1 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a). The commercial facility site lies within the 657 

hectare (1,621-acre) Wilmington Site located in New Hanover County approximately 9.7 

kilometers (km) (6 miles (mi)) from Wilmington, NC (GLE, 2011a). The proposed facility is 

located on approximately 40.5 hectares (100 acres) within the Wilmington Site (GLE, 2011a). 

The facility consists of operations and administrative buildings including cylinder storage pads 

(GLE, 2011a). These buildings and facilities are located within the 40.5 hectare (100-acre) 

fenced area (GLE, 2011a). Figure 3-1 in Chapter 3 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) shows 

the layout of the facility. 

In Section 2.1.2 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), the applicant stated that the CAB is the 

area between the restricted area and the Wilmington site boundary, and is otherwise known as 

the Owner Controlled Area.
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The staff finds the descriptions of the facility, controlled area boundary, restricted area, and 

distances used in the consequence modeling adequate for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 

70.65(b)(2) and the acceptance criteria in Sections 3.4.3.2(1)(b) and 3.4.3.2(2) of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002).

3.3.3 PROCESS DESCRIPTIONS

The regulations in 10 CFR 70.62(b) require the applicant to maintain process safety information 

to enable the performance and maintenance of an ISA. This process safety information must 

include information pertaining to the hazards of the materials used or produced in the process, 

information pertaining to the technology of the process, and information pertaining to the 

equipment in the process. The regulations in 10 CFR 70.62(c)(1)(iv) require that the ISA 

identify potential accident sequences caused by process deviations or other events internal to 

the facility and credible external events, including natural phenomena.

The regulations in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(3) require the ISA Summary to include a description of each 

process (defined as a single reasonably simple integrated unit operation within an overall 

production line) analyzed in the ISA in sufficient detail to understand the theory of operation, 

and, for each process, the hazards that were identified in the ISA and a general description of 

the types of accident sequences. The acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(3) of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002) state that the applicant needs to provide a description of the analyzed processes, 

including basic process function, major components, and a discussion of operating ranges and 

variables. 

Chapter 4 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) provided a description of the activities and 

hazards for each key process system in the facility, including a general description of the 

building, the equipment function, overview of the operations, and hazards of each process step. 

Each process system within the facility is analyzed in a “node” or subsection of Chapter 4 of the 

ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a). A list of these chapters and process systems is included in

Chapter 4 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a). Each node includes the following information:

1. System description;

2. Hazard identification discussion;

3. Summary of accident sequences that resulted in a Risk Index (consequence x likelihood) 

greater than 4;

4. Summary of IROFS implemented to protect against the accident sequences;

5. Quantification of accident sequence; and

6. Likelihood calculation (event tree) for each scenario.

Each chapter (node) in the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) contains a description of the process, 

basic theory of operation, a discussion of the unit processes broken down to a level necessary 

to understand the hazards and initiating conditions, major components, and system interfaces. 

Included in the process information is a description of the temperatures, pressures, state (solid, 

liquid, or gas) of the licensed material. This information meets the acceptance criteria in Section 

3.4.3.2(3) in NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002).

3.3.4 EXTERNAL HAZARDS

Section 2.5 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) presents a discussion of external hazards, 

including natural phenomena such as earthquakes, landslides, volcanoes, flooding, and intense 
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precipitation, as well as man-made phenomena such as aircraft crashes. The acceptance 

criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(1)(c) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state that the applicant needs to 

provide a characterization of natural phenomena and other external events sufficient to assess 

their impact on facility safety, including a discussion of which events are incredible and the basis 

for that determination. 

3.3.4.1 High Wind and Tornado Hazards

The applicant provided historical data on tornadoes in the area near the site in Section 2.5.6 of 

the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a).

Fifteen tornadoes were recorded between 1950 and 2004 (54 years of data) in New Hanover 

County (GLE, 2008; GLE 2010; GLE, 2011b). Six of them occurred in 1998 and 1999 with an 

intensity of F1 or less on the Fujita scale. The strongest tornado (June 13, 1962) was rated F2 

and occurred in the western part of New Hanover County. No F4 and F5 tornadoes were 

recorded in North Carolina and all tornadoes occurred in the Wilmington area are either F1 or 

F0 tornadoes. 

Based on these historical tornado records, the applicant determined that an F2 tornado estimate 

with a 3-second gust speed equivalent of 179 – 217 kilometers/hour (km/hr) (111 – 135 miles 

per hour (mph)) in the Enhanced Fujita scale for the site would be conservative. This estimate 

is comparable with the 225 km/hr (140 mph) tornado wind speed with an annual probability of 

10−5 provided in NUREG/CR–4461, “Tornado Climatology of the Contiguous United States” 

(NRC, 2007a), for the Wilmington area. The applicant also indicated that this wind speed is 

bounded by the wind speed identified for hurricanes. The applicant further defined the tornadogenerated missiles based on Regulatory Guide 1.76, “Design-Basis Tornado and Tornado 

Missiles for Nuclear Power Plants” (NRC, 2007b). These missiles include a schedule 40 steel

pipe, automobile, and a solid steel sphere with dimensions, weights, and associated impact 

speeds.

The applicant further conducted an assessment of the probabilities of tornadoes impacting the 

proposed facility using the expected travel distance of an F5 tornado (NRC, 2007a) and the 

historical tornado information from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

(NOAA), “Severe Weather Database Files (1950-2010)” (NOAA, 2011), for the tri-county area 

(New Handover, Brunswick and Pender). The applicant concluded that the annual probability 

for a tornado with the intensity greater than F1 is near or less than 10−5.

The NRC staff reviewed the tornado hazard information the applicant provided and finds the 

tornado hazard probability the applicant estimated for the facility site to be acceptable because 

the applicant appropriately used the historical data from a reliable source (NOAA) to estimate 

tornado hazards for the proposed facility and the approach it used is consistent with the 

guidance in NUREG/CR-4461 (NRC, 2007a), which is guidance widely used in the nuclear 

industry for tornado estimation. The NRC staff further finds that the applicant appropriately 

defined the tornado-generated missiles using Regulatory Guide 1.76 (NRC, 2007b). 

Consequently, the NRC staff concludes, with reasonable assurance, that the regulatory 

requirements in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(1) regarding tornado hazards have been met. The 

acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(1)(c) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state that the 

applicant needs to provide a characterization of natural phenomena and other external events 

sufficient to assess their impact on facility safety, including a discussion of which events are 

incredible and the basis for that determination. The NRC staff concluded that the applicant’s 
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analysis of hazards from tornadoes met these acceptance criteria and was found to be 

acceptable. 

3.3.4.2 Hurricane and Tsunami

In Section 2.5.5 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) and in Section 1.3.3.3.7 of the LA (GLE, 

2011b), the applicant indicated that the hurricane hazards could be from winds and flooding. 

The 50-year (1954–2004) historical data for the New Hanover County, where the proposed 

facility is located, three hurricanes were recorded; two of these (Hazel in 1954 and Fran in 

1996) were Category 3 hurricanes and the remaining one was a Category 1 hurricane (Diane in 

1955) (GLE, 2011a).

The applicant stated that no hurricanes made landfall in the area of the proposed site with a 

wind speed in the Category 4 range. Based on these historical data, the applicant determined 

that the maximum potential hurricane hazards from a Category 4 hurricane should be a 

bounding case. This Category 4 hurricane has a 3-second gust wind speed of 253.5 km/hr 

(157.5 mph). By definition, the wind speed associated with a Category 4 hurricane is 210–249 

km/hr (131–155 mph) in Saffir-Simpson hurricane wind scale. The applicant stated that 

historically only six Category 4 and six Category 5 hurricanes were recorded with wind speeds 

greater than 253.5 km/hr (157.5 mph) at landfall. Landfall of these hurricanes took place either 

on the coast of the Gulf of Mexico or in southern Florida which are at least 805 km (500 mi) from 

the coast of North Carolina. Hurricane Hugo in 1989 made landfall north of Charleston, South 

Carolina with a 3-second gust wind speed of approximately 245 km/hr (152 mph) which is less 

than the 253.5 km/hr (157.5 mph) design basis wind speed the applicant defined. Category 4 

Hurricane Hazel in 1954 made landfall just south of the North/South Carolina border 

approximately 64 km (40 mi) from the proposed site with an estimated 3-second gust wind 

speed of 225 km/hr (140 mph). The applicant further indicated that, the wind speed of a 

hurricane will decrease once it makes landfall and is expected to continue to decrease as it 

travels further inland. Because the proposed site is 16 km (10 mi) inland, the expected wind 

speed at the proposed site will be smaller than that at the landfall area. Therefore, the applicant 

concludes that its selection of the design basis wind speed of 253.5 km/hr (157.5 mph) is 

justifiable.

 

Flooding caused by hurricane to the proposed facility may be in the form of rainfall, high tides, 

and storm surge. Citing Regulatory Guide 1.59, “Design Basis Floods for Nuclear Power 

Plants” (NRC, 1977), the applicant indicated that the maximum probable surge along the North 

Carolina coast can be as high as 6.7 m (21.9 ft). Because the proposed facility is located at an 

elevation of 7.6 m (25 ft) above sea level and is 32 km (20 mi) upstream from the ocean, the 

storm surge from a hurricane is highly unlikely to reach the facility horizon. Therefore, the 

applicant concluded that the storm surge from a hurricane is not a safety concern.

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s consideration of hurricane hazard and finds that the 

applicant’s selection of a Category 4 hurricane as the bounding case for the proposed facility 

site is acceptable because the applicant appropriately used the historical data to assess the 

hurricane hazard and the selection approach is meets the acceptance criteria in Section 

3.4.3.2(1)(c) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The NRC staff concludes, with reasonable 

assurance, that the regulatory requirements in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(1) regarding high wind and 

hurricane hazards have been met. The acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(1)(c) of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002) state that the applicant needs to provide a characterization of natural 

phenomena and other external events sufficient to assess their impact on facility safety, 
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including a discussion of which events are incredible and the basis for that determination. The 

NRC staff concluded that the applicant’s analysis of hazards from hurricanes met these criteria 

and was found to be acceptable. 

In Section 2.5.4 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), the applicant discussed the probable 

maximum tsunami at the proposed facility site. The applicant pointed out that the facility site is 

of sufficient distance (more than 16 km (10 mi)) away from the coastline and at a high elevation 

(7.6 m (25 ft) above sea level) compared to the surrounding level terrain. The applicant further 

indicated that, using NUREG/CR–6966, “Tsunami Hazard Assessment at Nuclear Power Plant 

Sites in the United States of America” (NRC, 2009), as guidance, the proposed facility site can 

be considered “inland.” Thus, the applicant determined that the tsunami hazard to the facility is 

a highly unlikely event. Additionally, the applicant concluded that tidal bores are also highly 

unlikely given the distance from the coastline, the quick dissipation as bores travel upstream, 

and the elevation of the proposed facility site that is 7.6 m (25 ft) above mean sea level. The 

NRC staff agree with the applicant that it is highly unlikely that a tsunami would affect the 

proposed facility resulting in consequences exceeding the performance criteria in 10 CFR 70.61 

and conclude, with reasonable assurance, that the regulatory requirements in 10 CFR

70.65(b)(1) regarding tsunami have been met. The acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(1)(c) 

of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) states that the applicant needs to provide a characterization of 

natural phenomena and other external events sufficient to assess their impact on facility safety, 

including a discussion of which events are incredible and the basis for that determination. The 

NRC staff concluded that the applicant’s analysis of hazards from tsunamis met these criteria 

and was found to be acceptable. 

3.3.4.3 Extreme Rainfall

Extreme precipitation is discussed in Section 1.3.3.3.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), in Section 2.5.7 

of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), and in Section 3.6.2.6.2 of the Environmental Report (ER) 

(GLE, 2008). Based on the NOAA record (1871–2009), the applicant indicated that the highest 

24-hour rainfall amount recorded at Wilmington International Airport was 34.0 centimeters (cm) 

(13.4 inches (in)) that was caused by Hurricane Floyd in September 1999 (NOAA, 2004a). 

According to the applicant, the extreme environmental rainfall is equivalent to the 24-hour allseason extreme local precipitation of 10.9 cm (4.3 in) estimated by NOAA (NOAA, 2006). The 

applicant further indicated that Wilmington International Airport has a 1.0 × 103 annual 

exceedance probability of receiving precipitation at a rate of 40.77 centimeters per hour (cm/hr) 

(16.05 inches per hour (in/hr)) for a duration of 5 minutes (NOAA, 2004b).

In Section 2.5.7 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), the applicant estimated the probable 

maximum precipitations (PMPs) for the site for 1, 6, 12, 24, 48, and 72 hour duration using the 

guidelines in NOAA Hydrometeorological Report Nos. 51 and 52 (NOAA, 1978; NOAA 1982). 

The applicant stated that to avoid ponding potential from the PMPs, the roofs of the facility 

structures will not have parapets. The potential effects of PMPs on flooding of the site are 

evaluated in Section 3.3.4.4 of this SER.

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s extreme precipitation information and finds that the 

structural roof design criterion the applicant proposed should be able to prevent roof ponding 

related hazards. Based on this finding, the NRC staff conclude that the applicant’s ISA 

adequately considered the extreme precipitation risk and the regulatory requirements in 

10 CFR 70.65(b)(1) have been met. The acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(1)(c) of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002) state that the applicant needs to provide a characterization of natural 
3-12

phenomena and other external events sufficient to assess their impact on facility safety, 

including a discussion of which events are incredible and the basis for that determination. The 

NRC staff concluded that the applicant’s analysis of hazards from extreme rainfall met these 

criteria and was found to be acceptable. 

3.3.4.4 Flooding

In Section 2.5.3 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) and in Sections 1.3.1.2 and 1.3.3.3.8 of the 

LA (GLE, 2011b), the applicant discussed flooding events. In Table 4.16-1 of the ISA Summary 

(GLE, 2011a), the applicant indicated that potential accident sequences induced by flooding 

hazards may have low consequences as defined in 10 CFR 70.61(c).

The proposed Wilmington, North Carolina, site is located more than 16 km (10 mi) inland from 

the Atlantic Ocean and its closest bodies of water include the Northeast Cape Fear River and its 

associated tributaries (GLE, 2011a). The applicant indicated that the proposed facility is located 

above the 100-year and 500-year flood plains for the region (GLE, 2011a). The potential floods 

that could affect the proposed facility include flood from rainfall in the Northeast Cape Fear 

River and Cape Fear River (probable maximum flood (PMF)), flood from local PMP, seismically 

induced upstream dam failure, hurricane surge, and tsunamis (GLE, 2011a). Flood hazards 

resulting from hurricane surge and tsunamis are evaluated in Section 3.3.4.2 of this SER (GLE, 

2011a).

The applicant indicated that nearest river to the proposed Wilmington, North Carolina, facility 

site is the Northeast Cape Fear River (GLE, 2011a). This river joins the Cape Fear Review 9.7 

km (6 mi) south of the site (GLE, 2011a). The applicant calculated the PMF for the Northeast 

Cape Fear River using the method in American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear 

Society (ANSI/ANS) ANSI/ANS-2.8, “Determining Design Basis Flooding at Power Reactor 

Sites” (ANSI/ANS, 1992), to determine the PMF still water level from the discharge flows and 

determined that flooding of either river could potentially affect the proposed facility site (GLE, 

2011a). The applicant determined that the Northeast Cape Fear River has a discharge 

capability of 2,549–14,442 cubic meters per second (m3

/sec) (90,000–510,000 cubic feet per 

second (cfs)) and a PMF discharge of 8,778 m3

/sec (310,000 cfs) (GLE, 2011a).

The applicant indicated that the proposed Wilmington, North Carolina, site and the surrounding 

area are relatively flat with gently sloping surfaces at gradients less than 2 percent and with little 

relief (GLE, 2011a). The applicant further stated that the proposed facility is located 7.6 m (25 

ft) above sea level. This elevation is, in general, the highest level east of the Northeast Cape 

Fear River (GLE, 2011a). The east side of the Northeast Cape Fear River extends all the way 

to the coast (GLE, 2011a). The elevation west of the river is also at 7.6 m (25 ft) above sea 

level for some distance before the elevation gets higher further west (GLE, 2011a). Because of 

this general level terrain around the Northeast Cape Fear River, the rise of flood level above the 

7.6 m (25 ft) above sea level for the main processing facility (MPF) of this river will be limited 

and will be a slow process due to the availability of large flat region to accommodate the flood 

water (GLE, 2011a). The applicant indicated that it is difficult to determine the discharge when 

the water level reaches 7.6 m (25 ft) above sea level due to the wide variability of the cross 

sections of the Northeast Cape Fear River above that level (GLE, 2011a). Nevertheless, the 

applicant estimated that, including coincident wind-wave effects, the design basis water level for 

the MPF is 8.5 m (28 ft) above sea level for the proposed facility site, which is 0.9 m (3 ft) above 

the proposed facility floor level (GLE, 2011a). Because the water level rising due to a PMF will 
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be a slow process, the applicant indicated that ample time is available to warn operations 

personnel and to execute a safe shutdown (GLE, 2011a). 

The applicant stated that the PMF from the Cape Fear River with a discharge of twice of that 

from the Northeast Cape Fear River could also flood the site (GLE, 2011a). However, the 

applicant concluded that the PMF level from the Cape Fear River would not be likely to be more 

than 7.6 m (25 ft) above sea level based on the same justification used for the Northeast Cape 

Fear River (GLE, 2011a). No upstream dams exist on the Northeast Cape Fear River. Several 

dams exist upstream on the Cape Fear River (GLE, 2011a). These dams are 48 km (30 mi) or 

more from where the Northeast Cape Fear River joins the Cape Fear River (GLE, 2011a). The 

applicant indicated that seismically induced dam failure could cause flooding of the proposed 

facility site; however, the applicant did not expect that such floods could result in a flooding level 

more that from PMF because of the general level terrain of the proposed facility site and the 

general area being an estuary (GLE, 2011a). Also, based on the same reason, the applicant 

concluded that the local PMP-induced flooding should not be more severe than the PMF (GLE, 

2011a).

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s discussion on flood hazards and find that the maximum 

flood level of 8.5 m (28 ft) above sea level the applicant estimated is acceptable because: (1) 

the applicant used industry-accepted guidance to calculate PMF; and (2) the NRC staff agrees 

with the applicant’s assessment that the relatively flat topography for the site at elevation 

greater than 7.6 m (25 ft) above sea level would limit the flood level from rising too much above 

7.6 m (25 ft). In addition, because of the relatively flat topography for the site at elevation 

greater than 7.6 m (25 ft) above sea level, the NRC staff’s analysis also concludes that the rise 

of flood water above 7.6 m (25 ft) will be a slow process and the applicant should have 

sufficient time to warn operations personnel and to execute a safe shutdown. Therefore, the 

NRC staff further concludes, with reasonable assurance, that the regulatory requirements 

in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(1) regarding flood hazards have been met. The acceptance criteria in 

Section 3.4.3.2(1)(c) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state that the applicant needs to provide a 

characterization of natural phenomena and other external events sufficient to assess their 

impact on facility safety, including a discussion of which events are incredible and the basis for 

that determination. The NRC staff concluded that the applicant’s analysis of hazards from 

flooding met these criteria and was found to be acceptable. 

3.3.4.5 Snow

In Section 2.5.7.1 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) and Section 1.3.3.3.2 of the LA (GLE, 

2011b), the applicant discusses extreme snowfall events. The largest snow accumulation 

recorded in the Wilmington, North Carolina, area was 38.9 cm (15.3 in) on December 22–24, 

1989 (GLE, 2011a). The maximum amount of snowfall recorded in a 24-hour period was 33 cm 

(13 in) on December 23, 1989 (GLE, 2011a). This amount of snowfall is equivalent to a ground 

snow load of approximately 0.8–1.1 kilopascals (kPa) (17–22 pounds per square foot (psf)) 

(GLE, 2011a). The applicant used the method in American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) 

ASCE 7–05, “Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures” (ASCE, 2006) to 

estimate the snowfall with an annual probability of 1.0 × 10−5 (GLE, 2011a). The estimated 

ground snow load for an event with an annual probability of 1 × 10−5 is approximately 0.8–1.2 

kPa (17–25 psf) (GLE, 2011a). The applicant defined the design basis snow load to be 1.2 kPa 

(25 psf) (GLE, 2011a). 
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The applicant recognized that snow drift at the proposed Wilmington, North Carolina, facility 

could occur where the roof elevations change (GLE, 2011a). Using the guidelines in ASCE 7–

05 (ASCE, 2006), the applicant determined that the highest snow load caused by snow drift 

from roof at high elevation to the same portions of the roofs at low elevation could add additional 

4.1 kPa (85 psf) (GLE, 2011a). The applicant pointed out the snow drift load could cause roof 

decking to sag or fail (GLE, 2011a). However, the applicant analyzed the potential effect of roof 

decking failure and determined that such failure would only occur at locations where licensed 

material or hazardous chemicals produced from licensed material were not present (GLE, 

2011a). Therefore, the applicant concluded that the roof decking failure would not cause any 

high or intermediate consequences (GLE, 2011a).

The NRC staff reviewed the information the applicant presented on snow hazards and find the 

applicant adequately characterize the snow hazards to the proposed facility because it: 

(1) adequately described the historical snow fall data; (2) estimated ground snow load use a 

method consistent with acceptable code; and (3) adequately assessed potential effects of roof 

decking failure caused by snow drift load. Consequently, the NRC staff concludes that the 

regulatory requirements in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(1) regarding snow hazards have been met. The 

acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(1)(c) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state that the 

applicant needs to provide a characterization of natural phenomena and other external events 

sufficient to assess their impact on facility safety, including a discussion of which events are 

incredible and the basis for that determination. The NRC staff concluded that the applicant’s 

analysis of hazards from snow met these criteria and was found to be acceptable.

3.3.4.6 Nearby Highways

In Section 2.2.1 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), Section 1.3.1.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), and 

Section 3.2.1 of the ER (GLE, 2008), the applicant discusses nearby transportation corridors. 

Several highways and roads are either near or at the boundary of the proposed facility site. The 

shortest distance from the proposed facility site is approximately 3,219 m (10,560 ft) to 

Interstate Highway I–40; approximately 1,372 m (4,500 ft) to Interstate Highway I–140; 

approximately 1,920 m (6,300 ft) to North Carolina Highway 133; and approximately 457 m 

(1,500 ft) to a local road north of the site (GLE, 2011a).

According to Regulatory Guide 1.91, “Evaluations of Explosions Postulated To Occur on 

Transportation Routes Near Nuclear Power Plants” (NRC, 1978), the distance from the 

transportation route to the structures, systems, and components that must be protected should 

be at least 505 m (1,657 ft) assuming a maximum probable hazardous solid cargo for a single 

highway truck to be 23,000 kilograms (kg) (50,000 pounds (lb)) of trinitrotoluene equivalent 

(TNT) (GLE, 2011a). Beyond this distance, the peak positive incident overpressure on the 

structures, systems, and components induced by the explosion of this solid cargo would be less 

than approximately 7 kPa (1 psi) below which no significant damage would be expected (GLE, 

2011a). This distance is also called the safety distance (GLE, 2011a). 

The NRC staff reviewed the road distances the applicant provided from the facility to the 

surrounding transportation routes and find that the only road with a distance less than the safety 

distance of 505 m (1,657 ft) is the local road north of the site. However, according to the 

applicant, this local road is not a transportation route, but a residential subdivision road, and it 

ends northwest of the proposed facility. Based on this understanding, the NRC staff conclude, 

with reasonable assurance, that the regulatory requirements in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(1) have been 

met. The acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(1)(a) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state that 
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the applicant needs to provide a characterization of external events sufficient to assess their 

impact on facility safety, including a discussion of which events are incredible and the basis for 

that determination. The NRC staff concluded that the applicant’s analysis of hazards from 

highway transportation accidents met these criteria and was found to be acceptable.

3.3.4.7 Railroads

In Section 2.2.2 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) and in Section 3.2.1.3 of the ER (GLE, 

2008), the applicant discusses nearby rail service. CSX Corporation provides freight service to 

the region.

The NRC staff concludes, with reasonable assurance, that the regulatory requirements in 

10 CFR 70.65(b)(1) regarding railroad boxcar explosion hazards have been met. The 

acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(1)(a) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state that the 

applicant needs to provide a characterization of external events sufficient to assess their impact 

on facility safety, including a discussion of which events are incredible and the basis for that 

determination. The NRC staff concluded that the applicant’s analysis of hazards from rail 

transportation accidents met these criteria and was found to be acceptable.

3.3.4.8 Nearby Industrial Facilities

In Section 2.4 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a); Sections 1.1.1, 1.3.2.4, and 1.3.2.5 of the LA 

(GLE, 2011b); and Section 3.1.6 in the ER (GLE, 2008), the applicant discusses nearby 

industrial facilities. The nearest facilities to the proposed facility include Global Nuclear Fuel–

Americas, LLC (GNF-A) Fuel Manufacturing Operations Facility, General Electric Aircraft 

Engines and Services Components Operation Facilities, Fuel Components Operation Facility. 

Among these facilities, the GNF-A Fuel Manufacturing Operations Facility is the closest with a 

distance of approximately 1,737 m (5,700 ft) (GLE, 2011a). The applicant concluded that this 

distance provides adequate protection to the proposed facility personnel from radiological and 

chemical releases from the most significant, credible accident sequences resulting from GNF-A 

operations (GLE, 2011a). The applicant further indicated that offsite industrial facilities that exist 

within 8 km (5 mi) of the proposed facility site include the BASF Corporation, Elementis 

Chromium facilities, and the L.V. Sutton coal-fired power plant (GLE, 2011a). These facilities 

are located on the west side of the Northeast Cape Fear River and would not pose a safety 

concern to the proposed facility (GLE, 2011a). Also, these industrial facilities do not own or 

produce nuclear material (GLE, 2011a).

Based on this review, the NRC staff conclude, with reasonable assurance, that the regulatory 

requirements in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(1) have been met because the applicant adequately 

considered and included relevant nearby facilities-related hazards in its ISA. The acceptance 

criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(1)(a) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state that the applicant needs to 

provide a characterization of external events sufficient to assess their impact on facility safety, 

including a discussion of which events are incredible and the basis for that determination. The 

NRC staff concluded that the applicant’s analysis of hazards from accidents at nearby industrial 

facilities met these criteria and was found to be acceptable. 

3.3.4.9 Air Transportation

In Section 2.2.4 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), Section 1.3.2.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), and 

Section 3.2.1.4 of the ER (GLE, 2008), the applicant discusses nearby airport facilities. There is 
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one primary commercial airport (New Hanover County Airport) and 12 small municipal airport 

facilities in the tri-county area (New Hanover, Pender, and Brunswick) (GLE, 2011a, Figure 2-3) 

(GLE, 2011a). Brunswick County has seven small airports including heliports. Pender County 

has four small airports (GLE, 2011a). Besides the New Hanover County airport (Wilmington 

International Airport), New Hanover County also has a small airport (Pilot Ridge) located 

approximately 18.5 km (11.5 mi) from the proposed facility site (GLE, 2011a). Among these 

airports, four are publicly owned (New Hanover County Airport in New Hanover County; Odell 

Williamson and Brunswick County in Brunswick County; and Henderson Field Airport in Pender 

County) and the remaining airports are private airports for private use only (GLE, 2011a).

The airport nearest to the proposed facility site is the New Hanover County Airport, 

approximately 8 km (5 mi) away (GLE, 2011a). The next nearest airport is the Sandy Run 

Acres Airport in Brunswick County, approximately 16 km (9.9 mi) away (GLE, 2011a). Besides 

the Pilot Ridge Airport, three airports (Pettigrew Moore Aerodome and Stag Air Park in Pender 

County and Winnabow Airport in Brunswick County) are between 16 and 24 km (10 and 15 mi) 

from the proposed facility site (GLE, 2011a). The remaining are more than 32 km (20 mi) away 

from the proposed site (GLE, 2011a). 

Except for the New Hanover County Airport, all the other airports are small with limited annual 

number of operations (GLE, 2011a). The applicant showed that the aircraft hazards associated 

with these airports need not be included in the assessment of aircraft crash hazard for the 

proposed facility using the guidelines provided in NUREG–0800, “Standard Review Plan for the 

Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition” (NRC, 2007c). The 

NRC staff also finds it acceptable for the applicant to exclude these airports in the aircraft 

hazard analysis for the proposed site because these airports are either for private use or are 

small operations with the annual number of operations much less than the threshold numbers 

for the corresponding airports as specified in NUREG–0800 (NRC, 2007c).

The applicant indicated that the proposed facility is located just off a direct flight path 6.4–8.0 km 

(4–5 mi) from the runways of the New Hanover County Airport (GLE, 2011a). The 

applicant determined that, due to the proximity of the proposed facility to the New Hanover

County Airport, the screening criteria outlined in NUREG–0800 (NRC, 2007c) are not met; 

therefore, estimation of aircraft crash probability was needed (GLE, 2011a). The NRC staff 

finds that it is appropriate for the applicant to assess aircraft crash hazard to the proposed 

facility. An aircraft crash hazard analysis is required because the annual number of operations 

(more than 83,000 from AirNav.com (2009) and more than 92,000 from Airport-Data.com 

(2009)) at the New Hanover County Airport greatly exceeds the operation threshold specified in 

NUREG–0800 (NRC, 2007c) (GLE, 2011a). The NUREG-0800-specified threshold of annual 

number of operations for a facility with a distance, D, approximately 8 km (5 mi) from the airport 

of interest is 500 × D2 (NRC, 2007c). In the case of New Hanover County Airport, the threshold 

for annual number of operations is approximately 12,500, which is less than the recorded 

operations of 83,000–92,000 (GLE, 2011a).

The applicant used the methods provided in U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Standard 

DOE–STD–3014, “Accident Analysis for Aircraft into Hazardous Facilities” (DOE, 2006) to 

estimate aircraft crash frequency at the New Hanover County Airport and NUREG–0800 (NRC, 

2007c) to gain additional insight into the aircraft potential to the proposed site (GLE, 2011a). 

The applicant included all aircraft types in the analyses (GLE, 2011a). For each method, the 

applicant considered three categories of flight operations data (GLE, 2011a). For Category 1 or 

Case 1, the applicant estimated the number of operations by selectively using the data from the 
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Federal Aviation Administration Air Traffic Activity Data System, AirNav information, and New 

Hanover County Airport operations records (GLE, 2011a). For Case 2, the applicant used the 

average of the 10-year (1999–2008) historical flight data. Case 3 included the 40-year historical 

flight data (GLE, 2011a). The applicant indicated that the 30-year operations data before 1999 

show a steady increase in numbers of operations (GLE, 2011a). The numbers of operations 

show a decreasing trend since 2007 (GLE, 2011a). The applicant further indicated that the 10-

year historical data (1999–2008) used for Case 2 represented the best operation estimate that 

bounds the current New Hanover County Airport operations and addresses potential future 

operation changes (GLE, 2011a). Consequently, the applicant used the probability estimates 

for Case 2 to assess potential aircraft crash hazards to the proposed facility (GLE, 2011a). The 

NRC staff finds that the applicant’s decision using the probability estimates for Case 2 to assess 

aircraft crash hazards at the site is acceptable because the data set used in Case 2 bounds the 

New Hanover County Airport operations. 

The applicant presented the aircraft crash frequencies obtained from these two methods for 

Case 2 in its ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a). The aircraft crash frequency for the proposed facility 

Operations Building obtained using DOE–STD–3014 (DOE, 2006) is 3.66 × 105

/yr and it is 

3.47 × 106

/yr using the approach in NUREG–0800 (NRC, 2007c). The applicant further fine 

tuned the calculation using the effective height of the proposed facility instead of assuming that 

the entire Operations Building has the same height as the taller part (35-percent of the 

Operations Building is taller than the rest of the building) and excluding crash of single engine 

aircraft (GLE, 2011a). The resulting aircraft crash probability is 1.06 × 105

/yr using the DOE–

STD–3014 (DOE, 2006) method and 1.06 × 106

/yr for the NUREG–0800 (NRC, 2007c) 

approach. The applicant contended that, with the additional inherent conservatism as 

discussed in ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), it is reasonable to conclude that the potential of 

having an aircraft crash to affect the proposed facility is highly unlikely.

The NRC staff reviewed the aircraft crash analysis information the applicant provided. Based 

on this review, the NRC staff finds that the applicant’s analysis results are acceptable because 

the applicant appropriately used: (1) the threshold guidelines specified in NUREG–0800 (NRC, 

2007c) to screen small airports in the region and holding patterns associated with the New 

Hanover County Airport from further consideration in the analysis; (2) the commonly accepted 

methods to estimate aircraft crash probability; and (3) reliable flight operations data from 

Federal Aviation Administration Air Traffic Activity Data System. Therefore, the NRC staff 

further concludes, with reasonable assurance, that the regulatory requirements in 10 CFR 

70.65(b)(1) regarding aircraft hazards have been met. The acceptance criteria in Section 

3.4.3.2(1)(a) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state that the applicant needs to provide a 

characterization of external events sufficient to assess their impact on facility safety, including a 

discussion of which events are incredible and the basis for that determination. The NRC staff 

concluded that the applicant’s analysis of hazards from air transportation accidents met these 

criteria and was found to be acceptable. 

3.3.4.10 Geology and Seismic Events 

The applicant provides information on seismic hazards in Section 2.5.1 of the ISA Summary 

(GLE, 2011a), Section 1.3.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), and Section 3.3 of the ER (GLE, 2008).

Staff review of the seismic hazard applicable to the safety and design of the proposed

facility included:
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• Tectonic setting;

• Historic seismicity; and

• Seismic hazard assessment.

3.3.4.10.1 Tectonic Settings

In Section 2.5 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), in Section 1.3.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), and 

Section 3.3 of the ER (GLE, 2008), the applicant discusses the tectonic setting of the proposed 

facility site. The proposed facility is located on the Atlantic Coastal Plain physiographic province 

(GLE, 2011a). This province is a broad, low-relief terrace that stretches from along the Atlantic 

seaboard from New England to the Gulf of Mexico (GLE, 2011a). The site geology is comprised 

of a wedge of unconsolidated sands, silt, marl, and other clays interbedded with occasional 

limestone strata, which rests atop crystalline basement rocks (GLE, 2011a). As noted in 

Section 2.5.1 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), the Atlantic Coastal Plain is not tectonically 

active. Small to moderate magnitude earthquakes occur throughout the region with 

concentrations in the Appalachian Mountains west of the site and near Charleston, South 

Carolina (GLE, 2011a). These clusters of earthquakes are considered by the applicant to be 

associated with relic structures from Appalachian tectonics dating back more than 250 million 

years ago and from aftershocks related to the 1886 Charleston, South Carolina, Earthquake 

(GLE, 2011a). There are no geologic features in the Wilmington, North Carolina, region that 

have been identified as being capable of producing significant earthquakes (GLE, 2011a). In 

the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) report, “Documentation for the 2008 Update of the United 

States National Seismic Hazard Maps” (USGS, 2008) USGS identified this area as Zone 1, with 

moment magnitudes (MW) less than 6.0 and Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) values of VI or 

less. In the USGS report, “Earthquakes in Virginia and Vicinity 1774-2004” (USGS, 2006), 

USGS describes MMI values of VI as moderate shaking which produces only slight damage to 

buildings and structures (GLE, 2011a). 

3.3.4.10.2 Historic Seismicity

In the North Carolina Division of Emergency Management (NCDEM) report, “Seismic Hazard in 

North Carolina” (NCDEM, 1991), NCDEM states that the area around Wilmington, North 

Carolina is not seismically active. There are no known active fault zones or concentrations of 

significant historic seismicity in North Carolina (GLE, 2011a). The nearest major seismic event 

was located approximately 240 km (150 mi) southwest of the proposed facility site, near 

Charleston, South Carolina (GLE, 2011a). Charleston experienced a large earthquake in 1886, 

with maximum MMI value of X and an estimated magnitude of between 6.6 and 7.3 (USGS, 

2008). Paleoseismic information indicates similar earthquakes shook the Charleston, South 

Carolina, region several times over the past several thousand years (USGS, 2008). A repeat of 

the Charleston earthquake is considered the most significant source to the seismic hazards for 

the southeast coast of the United States, including Wilmington, South Carolina (USGS, 2008). 

Estimates of repeat times for a Charleston Earthquake range between 250 and 1,000 years 

(Talwani, 2001). Based on an evaluation of several regional earthquake catalogs (USGS, 

2006), the applicant identified nearly 900 earthquakes within a 322 km (200 mi) of the site 

between 1698 and 2007 (GLE, 2011a). Most of these were small, with estimated moment 

magnitudes less than 2.0. The two largest recorded earthquakes in the region occurred on 

January 18, 1884, and again on March 5, 1958 (GLE, 2011a). No substantial damage was 

reported from either earthquake (GLE, 2011a). Press reports indicate that houses shook and 
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some people were rolled out of bed, suggesting that these two earthquakes had maximum 

modified MMI values of V (NCDEM, 1991).

The recent August 23, 2011 earthquake, with a magnitude of 5.8, occurred more than 480 km 

(300 mi) north of the Wilmington site near the town of Mineral, Virginia (GLE, 2011a). According 

to the USGS shake maps for this earthquake, little or no ground shaking was felt in Wilmington 

from this earthquake (GLE, 2011a). In Section 2.5.1.2 of the ISA summary (GLE, 2011a), the 

applicant noted that this earthquake occurred in an area of the Virginia Piedmont known as the 

Central Virginia Seismic zone and that a similar magnitude event occurred near there in 1897. 

The closest distance between the Central Virginia seismic zone and the proposed site is about 

130 km (80 mi) (GLE, 2011a). A repeat of the 1886 Charleston, SC earthquake, located at its 

closest point to the site remains as the most severe historical seismic event relative to the 

proposed site (GLE, 2011a).

3.3.4.10.3 Seismic Hazard Evaluation

In addition to the lack of significant historical earthquakes near the site, the applicant cites the 

2008 USGS National Seismic Hazard Maps (USGS, 2008) to conclude that the seismic hazards 

at the site are not significant to safety (GLE, 2011a). Based on the USGS maps, the facility site 

has a 2 percent probability in a 50-year period of exceeding a peak-ground acceleration (PGA) 

of 0.11 g (g is the acceleration due to gravity) (GLE, 2011a). The 2 percent probability in a 50-

year period is approximately equal to a return period of 2,500 years or an annual probability of 4 

× 10−4 (GLE, 2011a). There is also a 2 percent probability in a 50-year period of exceeding a 1-

second spectral acceleration of 0.08 g and a 2 percent probability in a 50-year period of 

exceeding a 0.2-second spectral acceleration of 0.24 g (GLE, 2011a). The USGS map results 

are based on an assumed “firm rock” site conditions (Site Class B) with a shear wave velocity of 

760 meters per second (m/s) (2,500 feet per second (ft/s)) (GLE, 2011a). 

Based on this analysis, the applicant derived In Table 1-8 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), 

the applicant defined “highly unlikely” for earthquakes as natural phenomena in terms of a 

performance goal. According to this definition, the seismic performance goal is a failure 

probability equal to 1 × 10-4

/yr (GLE, 2011a). The applicant states that this performance goal 

can be achieved by applying the additional design features of the ASCE 43–05, “Seismic 

Design Criteria for Structures, Systems, and Components in Nuclear Facilities” (ASCE, 2005) to 

the design of the building as an IROFS (GLE, 2011a).

As noted in the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), the applicant originally defined the design basis 

earthquake (DBE) for the proposed facility in terms of a deterministic earthquake ground motion 

as described in Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) FCSS-ISG-08, “Natural Phenomena Hazards,” 

(NRC, 2005). This approach follows the method for development of the safe shutdown 

earthquake described in 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A (GLE, 2011a). In particular, the 

applicant used two earthquakes to develop the design basis ground motions; a repeat of the 

1886 Charleston earthquake located 114 km [71 mi] from the site and a local magnitude 5.0 

earthquake 20 km (12.5 mi) from the site (GLE, 2011a). Based on this analysis, the applicant 

derived ground motions of 0.06 for the PGA, 0.14 g for the 2-second spectral acceleration and 

0.05 g for the 1-second spectral acceleration, assuming 5 percent damping (GLE, 2011a). The 

applicant used the suite of ground motion attenuation models and the weighting scheme for 

those modes as developed in the 2008 update of the United States National Seismic Hazard 

Maps (USGS, 2008). Because the USGS models assume Site Class B conditions, but soils at 

the site are Site Class C, the applicant used site amplification coefficients from the IBC (ICC, 
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2006) to derive design basis ground motions (5 percent damping) of 0.07 PGA, 0.17 g for the 2-

second spectral acceleration and 0.09 g for the 1-second spectral acceleration (GLE, 2011a). 

However, the applicant determined, based on a comparison of the deterministic DBE with the 

USGS 2008 probabilistic seismic hazard results, using USGS 2008 data, that the likelihood of 

the DBE is approximately 1 × 10-3

/year (GLE, 2011a). Thus, the applicant determined that the 

DBE falls short of the “Highly Unlikely” performance goal of 1 × 10-4

/year for seismic events 

(GLE, 2011a). Therefore, the applicant developed an approach that uses a combination of the 

4 × 10−4 probabilistic ground motions and the design features of the ASCE 43–05 (ASCE, 2005) 

to assure that they the 1 × 10−4/year performance goal is achieved (GLE, 2011a).

3.3.4.10.4 Staff Evaluation of Seismic Hazard Assessment

The NRC staff reviewed the information provided in the LA (GLE, 2011b), the ISA Summary 

(GLE, 2011a), and the ER (GLE, 2008). Based on this review the staff conclude that the 

applicant met the requirements of 10 CFR 70.64(a)(2). The NRC staff conclusion is based on 

the following rationale:

• The description of the tectonic setting is derived from the USGS report entitled, 

“Quaternary Fault and Fold Database of the United States” (USGS, 1998);

North Carolina Geologic Survey (NCGS) Bulletin 95, “Geology of Basement Rocks 

Beneath the North Carolina Coastal Plain” (NCGS, 1993); and the published geologic 

literature (e.g., Talwani, 2001). NRC staff evaluated this information and based on the 

staff’s expert judgment, the staff find that the applicant appropriately considered the 

tectonic setting in their evaluation of the potential seismic hazard at the site. 

• The summary of historical earthquakes was derived from an examination of reliable 

earthquake catalog information, including data published in “The Virginia Tech 

Seismological Observatory Historic/Instrumental Southeaster U.S. Earthquake Catalog” 

(VPI, 2008) and the Advanced National Seismic System (ANSS) of the USGS 

(http://earthquake.usgs.gov/monitoring/anss/). NRC evaluated the historical earthquake 

information in the application and compared the information to other sources of 

earthquake data, including USGS ANSS catalog. Based on this evaluation, the staff 

found that the applicant appropriately considered the relevant historical earthquake data 

in their evaluation of the potential seismic hazard at the site. 

• The design basis ground motions were derived from the 2,500-year return period ground 

motions from the USGS 2008 National Seismic Hazard map (USGS, 2008) and adjusted 

for site soil conditions using the site amplification coefficients from the IBC (ICC, 2006). 

Staff review finds that a design basis earthquake using the 2,500-year return period 

ground motions based on a probabilistic seismic hazard assessment is consistent with 

guidance in DOE-STD-1020, “Natural Phenomena Hazards Design And Evaluation 

Criteria For Department of Energy Facilities,” (DOE, 2002a) and ASCE 43–05 (ASCE, 

2005) and is, therefore, appropriate as the seismic design basis for the proposed facility.

• Current nuclear-grade design codes and standards (such as ASCE, 2005; DOE, 2002a; 

and DOE-STD-1023, “Natural Phenomena Hazard Assessment Criteria” (DOE 2002b)) 

suggest that structures, systems, and components (SSCs) designed and constructed 

following these codes and standards will maintain their safety functions well beyond their 

design level. For example, in Table C-3 of DOE-STD-1023 (DOE, 2002b), DOE 
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concludes that SSCs appropriately designed to 4 × 10−4 ground motions have sufficient 

design margins so that they will maintain their safety functions for seismic demands four 

times less likely, or the 1 × 10−4 probability of exceedence ground motions. This would 

suggest that the SSCs at the proposed facility that are designed using the 4 × 10−4 

design basis ground motions would maintain their safety functions even under seismic 

demands from the 1 × 10−4 ground motions. 

• The use of the guidance in FCSS-ISG-08 (NRC, 2005) is not appropriate in this case 

because the deterministic safe shutdown earthquake does not represent a level of 

hazard sufficient to address safety of the facility, given the potentially high consequence 

of radiological risks from the facility. The deterministic DBE is roughly equal to 1 x 10-3

probabilistic ground motions, and, thus, it is not sufficient to allow the target 1 x 10-4

performance goal to be achieved. 

Therefore, based on these aforementioned reasons, the seismic hazard assessment conducted 

by the applicant coupled with the proposed seismic design method will, with reasonable 

assurance, meet the 1 × 10−4 definition of “highly unlikely.” The acceptance criteria in Section 

3.4.3.2(1)(c) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state that the applicant needs to provide a 

characterization of natural phenomena and other external events sufficient to assess their 

impact on facility safety, including a discussion of which events are incredible and the basis for 

that determination. The NRC staff found that the information provided by the applicant meets 

the criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(1)(c) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.3.4.11 Slope Stability

Slope stability of the site is discussed in Section 1.3.5.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011b) and Section 

3.3.5 and 4.3.2 of the ER (GLE, 2008). The applicant indicated that the proposed facility site is 

relatively flat with gently sloping surfaces at gradients less than 2 percent and with little relief 

(GLE, 2011a). The applicant concluded that landslides resulting from slope instability are not a 

safety concern to the proposed facility (GLE, 2011a). The NRC staff visited the site previously 

on May 18–20, 2004, for an onsite review of the GNF-A Fuel Fabrication Facility and, based on 

this onsite observation, the NRC staff concur with the applicant that the proposed facility site is 

relatively flat with gently sloping surfaces and, therefore, does not have a slope instability 

concern and hazards associated with slope instability are not credible. Therefore, the NRC staff 

conclude, with reasonable assurance, that the regulatory requirements in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(1) 

have been met regarding to this topic. The acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(1)(c) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state that the applicant needs to provide a characterization of 

natural phenomena and other external events sufficient to assess their impact on facility safety, 

including a discussion of which events are incredible and the basis for that determination. The 

NRC staff concluded that the applicant’s analysis of hazards from seismic events met these 

criteria and was found to be acceptable.

3.3.4.12 Liquefaction

In Section 2.5.1.3 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), Section 1.3.5.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), 

and Sections 3.3.5 and 4.3.2 of the ER (GLE, 2008), the applicant discusses the potential for 

liquefaction. The applicant assessed liquefaction potential at the proposed facility site through 

geotechnical investigations using soil data from two borings (GLE, 2011a). The applicant 

indicated that the soils in the two borings represent the highest and lowest potential for 

liquefaction (GLE, 2011a). The assessment compared the calculated cyclic stress ratio to the 
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calculated cyclic resistance ratio (GLE, 2011a). In general, when a cyclic stress ratio is greater 

than the cyclic resistance ratio, liquefaction is likely (GLE, 2011a). The applicant determined 

the cyclic stress ratio using the peak horizontal ground acceleration of 0.139 g (corresponding to 

the design earthquake with a return period of 2,500 years) based on the USGS maps included 

in the 2006 North Carolina Building code (ICC, 2006). The assessment results suggest 

marginal risk of localized liquefactions at depths of 8 and 12 m (25 and 40 ft) for soils in one 

boring, whereas the soils in the other boring do not have a liquefaction risk (GLE, 2011a). The 

cyclic stress ratio for the soil at the depth of 8 m (25 ft) is approximately 20 percent larger than 

the cyclic resistance ratio, and it is nearly the same for the soil at the depth of 12 m (40 ft) (GLE, 

2011a). Based on this assessment, the applicant concluded that soil liquefaction potential is 

small at the proposed site for a peak horizontal ground acceleration of 0.139 g (GLE, 2011a). 

The applicant committed to conduct a more detailed evaluation during the final subsurface 

investigation using the guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.132, “Site Investigations for Foundations 

of Nuclear Power Plants” (NRC, 2003a) to more accurately estimate the cyclic stress ratios and 

cyclic resistance ratios for the soils at the final structure location (GLE, 2011a). This supports 

design consideration on liquefaction potential using the guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.198, 

“Procedures and Criteria for Assessing Seismic Soil Liquefaction at Nuclear Power Plant Sites” 

(NRC, 2003b). In Section 1.5.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), the applicant further committed to 

assess liquefaction potential and its effects on operational safety using a horizontal ground 

acceleration consistent with the ground motion guidance in the IBC (ICC, 2006).

The NRC staff evaluated the liquefaction potential results the applicant presented in Tables G–7 

and G–8 of the ER (GLE, 2008) using the cyclic resistance ratio curves for various fines 

contents in the cyclic stress ratio-blow count diagram recommend in the National Center for 

Earthquake Engineering Research (NCEER) report, “Earthquake-Induced Liquefaction Features 

in the Coastal South Carolina Region” (NCEER, 1987), and find the applicant’s assessment 

results are reasonable and acceptable. The NRC staff also conclude, with reasonable 

assurance, that the regulatory requirements in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(1) have been met regarding 

this topic because the applicant’s commitment to conduct a more detailed evaluation of 

liquefaction potential for the soils at the final structure location using NRC guidance to support 

design is appropriate and acceptable. The acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(1)(c) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state that the applicant needs to provide a characterization of 

natural phenomena and other external events sufficient to assess their impact on facility safety, 

including a discussion of which events are incredible and the basis for that determination. The 

NRC staff concluded that the applicant’s analysis of hazards from seismic events met these 

criteria and was found to be acceptable.

3.3.4.13 Settlement and Soil-Bearing Capacity

In Sections 1.3.5.1 and 1.3.5.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011b) and Sections 3.3.5 and 4.3.2 of the ER 

(GLE, 2008), the applicant discusses the potential for soil settlement. The applicant indicated 

that it would consider the potential for differential settlement across a foundation when preparing 

facility and roadway engineering designs (GLE, 2011a). In addition, the applicant provided soil 

information and discussed the geophysical and geotechnical investigation results it used to 

assess feasibility of this proposed site for construction of the proposed facility (GLE, 2011a). To 

support structural design, the applicant further committed to conduct a geotechnical 

investigation (GLE, 2011a). This investigation will be performed in accordance with Regulatory 

Guide 1.132 (NRC, 2003a). To assess total and differential settlements for structural 

foundations, the applicant plans to use methods provided in Naval Facilities Engineering 

Command (NAVFAC) Design Manual (DM) 7, “Naval Facilities Engineering Command Design 
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Manual” (NAVFAC, 1986), “Foundation Engineering Handbook” (Fang, 1990), and Foundation 

Analysis Design (Bowles, 1995). 

For determining the allowable bearing pressure for shallow and deep foundations, the applicant 

will use the methods in NAVFAC DM 7 (NAVFAC, 1986), Foundation Engineering Handbook 

(Fang, 1990), Foundation Analysis Design (Bowles, 1995), and Federal Highway Administration, 

(FHWA), FHWA-IF-99-025, “Drilled Shafts: Construction Procedures and Design Methods” 

(FHWA, 1999).

The NRC staff found that the applicant’s commitment of conducting a geotechnical investigation 

to support facility structural design is acceptable. The NRC staff conclude, with reasonable 

assurance, that the regulatory requirements in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(1) have been met because the 

guidelines the applicant proposes to use for the geotechnical investigation are acceptable NRC 

guidance and the methods the applicant proposes to use for settlement and allowable 

soil-bearing pressure determinations are industry-accepted methods as recommended in 

Regulatory Guide 1.132 (NRC, 2003a). The acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(1)(c) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) states that the applicant needs to provide a characterization of 

natural phenomena and other external events sufficient to assess their impact on facility safety, 

including a discussion of which events are incredible and the basis for that determination. The 

NRC staff concluded that the applicant’s analysis of hazards from seismic events met these 

criteria and was found to be acceptable.

3.3.5 DESCRIPTION OF ISA TEAM QUALIFICATIONS AND ISA METHODS

3.3.5.1 ISA Team Qualification

The regulations in 10 CFR 70.62(c)(2) require that, to assure the adequacy of the ISA, the 

analysis must be performed by a team with expertise in engineering and process operations. 

The team must include at least one person who has experience and knowledge specific to each 

process being evaluated, and persons who have experience in nuclear criticality safety, 

radiation safety, fire safety, and chemical process safety. One member of the team must be 

knowledgeable in the specific ISA method being used. In addition, the regulations in 10 CFR 

70.65(b)(5) require a description of the expertise of the ISA team members and their 

qualifications. The acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state 

that the applicant’s ISA team leader needs to have formal training in the chosen method(s), at 

least one member needs to have specific operating experience in the process under review, and 

the team needs to have representatives from a variety of design and safety disciplines. 

In Section 1.3 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), the applicant stated that separate ISA Teams 

applied the ISA approach to the unclassified as well as the classified portions of the design 

under the direction of the ISA Team Leader. Each team included members with experience in:

1. Nuclear criticality;

2. Radiological safety;

3. Fire protection;

4. Laser enrichment technology;

5. Chemical safety; and

6. Process/operations.
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The team leader is formally trained in ISA methods and may be an outside consultant. 

Table 1-11 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) provides a list of key ISA team members along 

with their experience and qualifications. 

The information provided by the applicant in Chapter 1 of the ISA Summary addresses the 

criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), for identification of a team leader 

trained in the chosen ISA methodologies, and the team of individuals with the range of 

experience and disciplines required for a thorough understanding of the processes which were 

evaluated. Based on the above information, the staff finds that the ISA team and their 

qualifications are acceptable for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 70.62(c)(2) and 10 CFR 

70.65(b)(5) and the acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) 

because the applicant’s ISA team leaders have formal training in the chosen method(s), at least 

one member has specific operating experience in the process under review, and the ISA team 

includes representatives from a variety of design and safety disciplines.

3.3.5.2 ISA Methods

The regulations in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(5) require a description of the methods used to perform the 

ISA. The acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state that the 

applicant’s ISA method needs to provide a list of hazards and potential interactions, needs to 

select one of the methods described in NUREG-1513, “Integrated Safety Analysis Guidance 

Document” (NRC, 2001), needs to evaluate consequences in a manner consistent with the 

approaches described in NUREG/CR-6410, “Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facility Accident Analysis 

Handbook” (NRC, 1998), and needs to evaluate likelihood in an acceptable manner, such as the 

one described in Appendix A of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The applicant’s conformance with 

those criteria is described below.

In Section 1.2.1 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), the applicant stated that each 

facility/process is divided down to “nodes,” which established the boundaries for the review that 

the ISA team could efficiently and accurately analyze using an appropriate hazard identification 

method such as those described in the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AICHE), 

“Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures” (AICHE 1992) including “What-If”/checklist 

analyses. The method uses an interdisciplinary team to identify hazards, construct accident 

scenarios, assess consequences, and select IROFS. The applicant considered all modes of 

operations, including startup, normal operation, shutdown and maintenance in addition to 

common cause incidents, common mode failures, system interactions, and process conditions 

that could lead to undesirable consequences which do not meet the 10 CFR 70.61 performance 

requirements.

The applicant used Process Hazards Analyses (PHAs), Fire Hazards Analyses (FHAs), or 

similar analyses to identify facility hazards and incorporate the results into the ISA. A PHA is a 

set of systematic assessments of the potential hazards associated with an industrial process, 

and provides information useful in analyzing potential causes and consequences of fires and 

releases of toxic of flammable chemicals. The methods for conducting a PHA include, but are 

not limited to “Layer Of Protection Analysis”, and “What-if/ Checklist” techniques. An FHA is a 

comprehensive evaluation of the causes of, impacts from, and consequences of a fire scenario.

The staff finds that the hazard analysis methods meet the acceptance criteria in Section 

3.4.3.2(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and are, therefore, acceptable. 
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The acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state that the 

applicant’s ISA method should be one of the methods described in NUREG-1513 (NRC, 2001). 

The applicant utilized a combination of “What-If”/checklist analyses followed by event tree 

analysis techniques in the development of event summary tables, and to identify the IROFS 

(GLE, 2011a). 

NUREG-1513, Appendix A, AFlowchart for Selecting a Hazards Analysis Technique” (NRC, 

2001), identifies the “What-If”/checklist technique as an acceptable approach. Therefore, the 

staff concludes that the process hazard analysis method used by the applicant is acceptable for 

the identification of potential radiological, chemical and facility hazards, and potential accident 

sequences caused by process deviations; or other events internal to the facility and credible 

external events, including natural phenomena that could lead to a loss of UF6 confinement or a 

criticality. Based on the above information, the staff finds that the methods used to perform the 

ISA meet the acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and are, 

therefore, acceptable. 

3.3.6 ISA REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS

The regulations in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(4) require that the ISA Summary contain information that 

demonstrates the applicant’s compliance with the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61, 

including a description of the management measures, the requirements for criticality monitoring 

and alarms in 10 CFR 70.24, and the requirements of 10 CFR 70.64. The regulations in 10 

CFR 70.61(b) require that the risk of each credible high consequence event be limited. 

Engineered controls, administrative controls, or both, shall be applied to the extent needed to 

reduce the likelihood of the event so that, upon implementation of such controls, the event is 

highly unlikely or its consequences are less severe than those in paragraphs (b)(1)-(4) of 10 

CFR 70.61. The regulations in 10 CFR 70.61(c) require that the risk of each credible 

intermediate consequence event be limited. Engineered controls, administrative controls, or 

both, shall be applied to the extent needed to reduce the likelihood of the event so that, upon 

implementation of such controls, the event is unlikely or its consequences are less severe than 

those in paragraphs (c)(1)-(4) of 10 CFR 70.61. The regulations in 10 CFR 70.61(d) require that 

the risk of nuclear criticality accidents be limited by assuring that under normal and credible 

abnormal conditions, all nuclear processes are subcritical including an approved margin of 

subcriticality for safety. Preventive controls (as opposed to mitigative controls) must be the 

primary means of protection against nuclear criticality accidents.

Section 3.4.3.2(4) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) recommends that the performance 

requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 have three elements: (1) completeness, (2) consequences, and 

(3) likelihood. Completeness refers to the fact that the ISA must address each credible event. 

Consequences refer to the magnitude of the chemical and radiological doses of the accident 

and are the basis upon which an accident is classified in 10 CFR 70.61 to be a high or 

intermediate consequence event. Likelihood refers to the fact that 10 CFR 70.61 requires that 

intermediate consequence events be unlikely and high consequence events be highly unlikely. 

The applicant’s approach to each of these elements is discussed below.

3.3.6.1 Completeness

In Chapter 4 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), the applicant evaluated materials that are 

radioactive, fissile, flammable, explosive, toxic, and reactive; and identified potentially 

hazardous conditions. Hazards were assessed individually for the potential impact on the 
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process systems (e.g., UF6 feed system) (GLE, 2011a). The FHA was consulted in order to 

place reasonable and conservative bounds on the fire scenarios (GLE, 2011a). External events 

evaluated included seismic, tornado, tornado missile and high wind, snow and ice, flooding, 

local precipitation, transportation and nearby facility accidents, aircraft, pipelines, highway, 

railroad, and flooding (GLE, 2011a). The facility assessment resulted in natural phenomena 

events being assessed against all structures without regard to location or design differences, 

and fires were assessed by process nodes and included all possible fire hazards within the area 

(GLE, 2011a). These assessments by the applicant are evaluated by the applicant’s ISA Team 

in the discipline-related chapters of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a). At the end of the 

discussion for each node, the applicant listed each accident sequence, likelihood and 

consequence category, applicable IROFS, and overall risk (GLE, 2011a). 

The staff reviewed the accident sequences and determined that the ISA addressed the criteria 

in Section 3.4.3.2(4) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) because the applicant correctly applied an 

appropriate accident identification method, the “What-If” method, as described in NUREG-1513 

(NRC, 2001) and effectively presented the information for each node using an appropriate 

description of the identified accidents. In addition, the information meets the acceptance criteria 

in 3.4.3.2(3) as discussed in Section 3.3.3 of this SER. The staff, therefore, has reasonable 

assurance that the ISA is complete.

3.3.6.2 Consequences

In Section 1.2.4 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), the applicant listed three different 

consequence severity rankings (low, intermediate, and high) based on the consequences 

resulting from exposure to chemical, fire, criticality, or radiological hazards. The applicant’s 

program estimates the possible “worst case” consequences using acceptable methods including 

the guidance in NUREG/CR-6410 (NRC, 1998).

The high and intermediate rankings correspond to those listed in 10 CFR 70.61(b) and (c) for 

high and intermediate consequence events, respectively. NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s 

criteria for determining whether an accident is classified in 10 CFR 70.61 to be a high or 

intermediate consequence event and has determined that the criteria are in conformance with 

10 CFR 70.61(b)(1)-(4) and (c)(1)-(4) and are acceptable. The staff considers the consequence 

determinations to be acceptable and in accordance with the guidance in NUREG/CR-6410 

(NRC, 1998). The staff finds that the methods used to evaluate consequences meet the 

acceptance criteria in Sections 3.4.3.2(4) and 3.4.3.2(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and are, 

therefore, acceptable.

3.3.6.3 Enabling Conditions

In Section 1.2.3 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), the applicant introduces a new term, 

“enabling events,” which do not cause the sequence, but must be present for the initiating event 

to proceed. 

Staff examined the contribution of the enabling events, and determined that for each sequence, 

the identified IROFS were sufficient to make the overall likelihood unlikely or highly unlikely, as 

appropriate, and, therefore, no enabling events were necessary to meet the performance 

requirements. The staff considers the likelihoods to have been derived using acceptable 

methods and to comply with acceptable definitions of “not unlikely,” “unlikely,” and “highly 
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unlikely”. The staff concludes that these descriptions meet the acceptance criteria provided in 

Section 3.4.3.2(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and are, therefore, acceptable.

3.3.6.4 Conditional Events

In Section 1.2.3 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), the applicant introduces a new term, 

“conditional events,” which are not considered IROFS, but affect the overall likelihood of the 

accident sequence.

Staff examined the contribution of the conditional events, and determined that for each 

sequence, the identified IROFS were sufficient to make the overall likelihood unlikely or highly 

unlikely, as appropriate, and therefore no conditional events were necessary to meet the 

performance requirements. The staff considers the likelihoods to have been derived using 

acceptable methods and to comply with acceptable definitions of “not unlikely,” “unlikely,” and 

“highly unlikely”. The staff concludes that these descriptions meet the acceptance criteria in 

Section 3.4.3.2(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and are, therefore, acceptable.

3.3.6.5 Safety Controls

In evaluating accident sequences, the applicant introduces a new term, “safety control,” which 

are not considered IROFS, but provide defense-in-depth, for additional safety margin in the 

preliminary design, and to reduce the reliance on certain IROFS (GLE, 2011a). In Section 1.2.8 

of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), the applicant stated that they define and clearly identify 

items that provide defense-in-depth.

Staff examined the safety controls, and determined that for each sequence, the identified 

IROFS were sufficient to make the overall likelihood unlikely or highly unlikely, as appropriate, 

and, therefore, no safeguards features were necessary to meet the performance requirements, 

which would otherwise require them to be designated as IROFS. The staff concludes that these 

descriptions meet the acceptance criteria provided in Section 3.4.3.2(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002) and are, therefore, acceptable.

3.3.6.6 Overall Risk

The overall risk category of each accident sequence is determined using the consequence 

category and likelihood (as determined above) for the sequence in the Risk Matrix (Table 1-9 in 

the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a)). 

In the applicant’s Risk Matrix, an accident sequence with an overall risk index (likelihood x 

consequence) greater than 4 does not meet the Part 70 performance requirements and the 

application of IROFS to mitigate the consequence or reduce the likelihood is required (GLE, 

2011a). 

The NRC staff has reviewed the applicant’s approach for assuring that intermediate 

consequence events are unlikely and high consequence events are highly unlikely and has 

determined that it is acceptable. The staff considers the ISA method to be complete by its use

of the appropriate accident identification methodology from NUREG-1513 (NRC, 2001) and 

considers the consequence determinations to be acceptable and in accordance with the 

guidance in NUREG/CR-6410 (NRC, 1998). The staff considers the likelihoods to have been 

derived using acceptable methods and to comply with acceptable definitions of “not unlikely,” 
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“unlikely,” and “highly unlikely.” The criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) 

state that the applicant’s ISA method needs to provide a list of hazards and potential 

interactions, needs to select one of the methods described in NUREG-1513 (NRC, 2001), and 

needs to evaluate consequences in a manner consistent with the approaches described in 

NUREG/CR-6410 (NRC, 1998). The staff concludes that the applicant’s ISA method conforms

with the acceptance criteria and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 70.65(b)(4). 

The acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(4) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state that the 

applicant’s ISA Summary needs to contain information that demonstrates compliance with the 

performance requirements in 10 CFR 70.61 for completeness, consequence, and likelihood. In 

addition, likelihood should be determined using an acceptable method, using acceptable 

definitions of “unlikely” and “highly unlikely.” The staff concludes that the applicant’s ISA 

method meets the acceptance criteria and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.3.7 ISA APPROACH 

The regulations in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(4) require that the applicant demonstrate compliance with 

the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 and the requirements of 10 CFR 70.64. The 

following is a description of the approach selected by the applicant. A discussion of compliance 

with the acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) follows.

In Section 3.2.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), the applicant commits to a semi-quantitative risk-index 

approach identical to the example in Appendix A of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). 

3.3.7.1 Define Nodes to be Evaluated

In Table 1-2 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), the applicant divided the process systems, 

subsystems, facilities, and operations into nodes to establish the boundaries of the process 

systems and subsystems which enter or exit the node. Chapter 4 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 

2011a) provided a description of the activities and hazards for each key process system in the 

facility, including a general description of the building, the equipment function, overview of the 

operations, and hazards of each process step. 

3.3.7.2 Identify Hazards

The applicant used What-if analysis and checklist methodology to identify the facility process 

areas which represent significant hazards to workers, members of the public, or the 

environment due to radiological or chemical characteristics of licensed materials (GLE, 2011a). 

The types of materials identified include those which are radioactive, fissile, flammable, 

explosive, toxic or reactive, consistent with the guidance provided in NUREG-1513 (NRC, 

2001). The staff found that the applicant’s hazard identification meets the acceptance criteria in 

Sections 3.4.3.2(4) and 3.4.3.2(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) to provide a list of hazards and 

for use of methods listed in NUREG-1513 (NRC, 2001), and is, therefore, acceptable. 

3.3.7.3 Identify Scenarios

As stated in Chapter 1 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), the hazard identification process 

used by the applicant documented credible accident scenarios or sequences, usually with single 

initiating events consisting of process deviations, human errors, internal facility events, and 
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credible external events (such as aircraft crashes). Hazards were assessed individually for the 

potential impact on the process systems (e.g., UF6 feed system (GLE, 2011a).

External events described in Section 2.5 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) included seismic, 

tornado, tornado missile and high wind, snow and ice, flooding, local precipitation, transportation 

and nearby facility accidents, aircraft, pipelines, and highways. Hazardous scenarios initiated 

by natural phenomena events were assessed for each process unit and described in Chapter 4 

of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a). The staff found that the applicant’s scenario identification 

meets the acceptance criteria in Sections 3.4.3.2(4) and 3.4.3.2(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002) to provide a list of hazards and for use of methods listed in NUREG-1513 (NRC, 2001), 

and is, therefore, acceptable. 

 

3.3.7.4 Determine Consequence Category

Each node described in chapter 4 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) lists the potential accident 

sequences that were identified that could have consequences that exceed the performance 

requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. Such sequences could be caused by external events, facility 

events external to the process being analyzed, deviations from normal operations, and other 

failures (GLE, 2011a). 

The following unmitigated consequence categories for workers, members of the public, as well 

as the environment are presented in Tables 1-3 and 1-4 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) and 

include the consequence definitions from 10 CFR 70.61 as well as Acute Exposure Guideline 

Level (AEGL) thresholds for chemical releases of uranium hexafluoride (UF6), soluble uranium, 

and hydrogen fluoride (HF):

Table 3.3-1

Unmitigated Consequence Categories

Unmitigated Consequence Categories

High 3

Intermediate 2

Low – no further action required 1

The staff found that the applicant’s quantitative standards meets the acceptance criteria in 

Sections 3.4.3.2(4) and 3.4.3.2(7) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) to provide a list of hazards and 

for use of methods listed in NUREG-1513 (NRC, 2001), and is, therefore, acceptable. 

3.3.7.5 Determine Unmitigated Likelihood

The unmitigated likelihood for each accident sequence is calculated by using the Initiating Event 

frequency and assumes that none of the identified IROFS are available to perform their 

intended function (GLE, 2011a).

Table 1-6 in the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) presents the categories of “Not Unlikely,” 

“Unlikely,” and “Highly Unlikely,” and Table 1-7 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) cross 

references the three likelihood categories with a probability of occurrence based on approximate 

order of magnitude ranges. 
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The following unmitigated likelihood categories are presented in Tables 1-6 and 1-7 of the ISA 

Summary (GLE, 2011a):

Table 3.3-2

Unmitigated Likelihood Categories

 Unmitigated Likelihood Categories

Not unlikely 3 more than 10-4 per event per year

Unlikely 2 between 10-4 and 10-5 per event per year

Highly unlikely 1 less than 10-5 per event per year

The staff found that the applicant’s likelihood definitions meets the acceptance criteria in 

Sections 3.4.3.2(4) and 3.4.3.2(9) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) to provide a list of hazards and 

for use of methods listed in NUREG-1513 (NRC, 2001), and is, therefore, acceptable. 

3.3.7.6 Determine Unmitigated Risk

In Chapter 1 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), the applicant describes the unmitigated risk 

assignment matrix, which presents the risk category as the product of unmitigated likelihood and 

consequence categories. The risk matrix and computed index values are shown in Table 1-9 of 

the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) with the likelihood categories across the top and the 

consequence categories along the left side. The risk matrix shows the combinations of 

likelihood and consequence that are unacceptable (GLE, 2011a). Sequences that fall into these 

combinations will be mitigated or prevented with IROFS (GLE, 2011a).

The staff found that the applicant’s determination of unmitigated risk meets the acceptance 

criteria in Sections 3.4.3.2(4) and 3.4.3.2(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) to provide a list of 

hazards and for use of methods listed in NUREG-1513 (NRC, 2001), and is, therefore, 

acceptable. 

Table 3.3-3

Unmitigated Risk Matrix

 Unmitigated Risk Matrix

 

 Severity

Likelihood Category 1

 Highly Unlikely

Likelihood Category 2

 Unlikely

Likelihood Category 3

 Not Unlikely

Consequence Category 3

 High

Acceptable Risk

 3

Unacceptable Risk

 6

Unacceptable Risk

 9

Consequence Category 2

 Intermediate

Acceptable Risk

 2

Acceptable Risk

 4

Unacceptable Risk

 6

Consequence Category 1

 Low

Acceptable Risk

 1

Acceptable Risk

 2

Acceptable Risk

 3

3.3.7.7 Perform Quantitative Risk Analysis

The analysis of each process in the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) documents the evaluation of 

each node being analyzed. The entire quantitative analysis includes a description of the 

accident sequence, initiating and contributing conditions, preventive and mitigating controls, as 

well as an event tree showing a detailed likelihood determination (GLE, 2011a). 
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The staff found that the applicant’s quantitative risk analysis meets the acceptance criteria in 

Sections 3.4.3.2(4) and 3.4.3.2(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) to provide a list of hazards and 

for use of methods listed in NUREG-1513 (NRC, 2001), and is, therefore, acceptable. 

3.3.7.8 Develop IROFS and Likelihoods

For each scenario, the applicant determines and documents the mitigated likelihood in a 

Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) report, which provides sufficient information about the 

process, accident, and undesirable consequences (GLE, 2011a). The mitigated likelihood (or 

mitigated consequence) with the IROFS, including sole IROFS, applied must meet the 

performance requirements in 10 CFR 70.61 that high-consequence accident sequences are 

highly unlikely and intermediate-consequence accident sequences are unlikely (GLE, 2011a).

The staff found that the applicant’s IROFS development meets the acceptance criteria in 

Sections 3.4.3.2(4), 3.4.3.2(5), 3.4.3.2.(6), and 3.4.3.2(8) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) to 

provide a list of hazards and for use of methods listed in NUREG-1513 (NRC, 2001), and is, 

therefore, acceptable. 

3.3.7.9 Management Measures

The evaluation in each node analysis includes a description of the management measures 

which are applied to each IROFS for each scenario (GLE, 2011a). Additional information on 

management measures is contained in Chapter 11 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a). The 

staff found that the applicant’s IROFS development meets the acceptance criteria in Section 

3.4.3.2(4) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) to provide a list of hazards and for use of methods 

listed in NUREG-1513 (NRC, 2001), and is, therefore, acceptable. 

 

3.3.7.10 Update Lists and Risk Indices

Following evaluation of the entire scenario, including identification of IROFS and determination 

of the mitigated likelihood and consequence, a table summarizing the scenario is updated to 

include: a unique accident identification number, initiating event, initiating event frequency, 

IROFS and reliability, likelihood index, likelihood category, a link to the consequence 

determination, consequence category, overall risk index, and comments or recommendations 

(GLE, 2011a). An example table 1-10 is provided in the methodology described in Chapter 1 of 

the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a). Completed tables are furnished at the end of each process 

node evaluation in Chapter 4 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a). The staff found that the 

applicant’s IROFS development meets the acceptance criteria in Sections 3.4.3.2(4), 3.4.3.2(5), 

3.4.3.2.(6), and 3.4.3.2(8) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) to provide a list of hazards and for use 

of methods listed in NUREG-1513 (NRC, 2001), and is, therefore, acceptable. 

3.3.7.11 Defense-In-Depth

In Appendix D of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), the applicant describes the use of defense-indepth principles, beginning with the preference for engineered controls instead of administrative 

controls described in 10 CFR 70.64. The applicant describes the use of safety controls in 

addition to IROFS and recognizes that they are not IROFS and are not credited barriers that 

prevent or mitigate the consequence described in the scenario (GLE, 2011a). Based on the 

above, the staff found that the applicant’s hazard identification meets the acceptance criteria in 
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Section 3.4.3.2(4) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) to utilize defense-in-depth principles and 

engineered over administrative controls where practical, and is, therefore, acceptable. 

3.3.7.12 ISA Approach Summary Evaluation

Based on the above, the staff found that the applicant’s ISA approach meets the criteria in 

Sections 3.4.3.2(4) through 3.4.3.2(9) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) to evaluate accident 

sequences, identify IROFS and applicable management measures, and is, therefore, 

acceptable. 

3.3.8 NUCLEAR CRITICALITY REVIEW

The requirements in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(3) specify that the ISA Summary must contain process 

information sufficient to understand the theory of operation, a detailed description of the 

hazards, and a description of the general types of accident sequences. The applicant’s ISA 

Summary (GLE, 2011a) contains information on process-dependent criticality controls and their 

safety function. The ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) also contains a criticality safety section for 

each process or facility analyzed, with supporting discussions, describing the criticality safety 

control parameters and associated parameter limits. With regard to criticality safety, compliance 

with the double-contingency principle and defense-in-depth principles are adhered to in 

supporting the evaluation of criticality-related events. The NRC staff reviewed the information in 

the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), regarding the applicant’s description of process information, 

hazards, and accident sequences. Based on its review, the NRC staff determined, with 

reasonable assurance, that the facility meets the requirements of 10 CFR 70.65(b)(3). Further 

information on the application of the ISA process to the evaluation of criticality hazards is 

provided in Section 5.3.8 of this SER. Further discussion on other aspects of the NCS program 

is provided in Chapter 5 of this SER.

The review criteria in Sections 3.4.3.2(4) and 5.4.3.4.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state that 

the applicant needs to identify criticality accident sequences, their consequences and likelihood.

3.3.8.1 Criticality Safety IROFS

Discussion of the nuclear criticality safety IROFS is found in the non-public version of this SER.

 

3.3.8.1.1 Criticality Safety IROFS Evaluation

The criteria in Section 5.4.3.4.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) require the applicant to meet the 

performance requirements in 10 CFR 70.61(d) to limit the risk of criticality accidents during 

normal and credible abnormal conditions. In addition, 10 CFR 70.61(d) states that preventive 

controls (compared to mitigating controls) must be the primary means of protection against 

criticality accidents. This is to be accomplished by identification of criticality sequences, 

determination of the likelihood of criticality sequences, and descriptions of IROFS for criticality 

sequences. The staff concludes that the licensee’s ISA and IROFS described above meet the 

acceptance criteria provided in Section 5.4.3.4.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and are 

therefore acceptable.
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3.3.8.2 Nuclear Criticality ISA Evaluation

The staff reviewed the list of IROFS and their safety functions for criticality safety accident 

sequences, the management measures supporting the IROFS, and the accident sequences 

presented in Chapter 4 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) that provide the basis for the 

determination of the IROFS. For each IROFS, a description of the control is provided. 

Based on the review of ISA documentation, the staff’s evaluation found that the list of IROFS for 

process-specific operations of the facility, provided in the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), are 

consistent with the controls identified by the applicant in its ISA process, and supports the 

assurance that the hazards described in the general types of accident sequences for criticality 

safety has been determined to be “highly unlikely.” This meets the acceptance criteria listed in 

Section 3.4.3.2(3) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) for criticality accident sequences.

The staff also reviewed information contained in the detailed ISA documentation, maintained 

onsite, for selected processes having criticality safety accident sequences. As part of this 

review, the staff reviewed criticality safety analyses (CSAs), as appropriate. The CSAs 

reviewed were complete and had a number of parametric studies to support the conclusions 

made and the listing of IROFS required. 

The requirement in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(4) specifies that the ISA Summary must contain 

information that demonstrates the applicant’s compliance with the requirements for criticality 

monitoring and alarms described in 10 CFR 70.24. In Section 5.3.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), the 

applicant stated that it will maintain a nuclear criticality accident alarm system (CAAS) in each 

area that exceeds the limits specified in 10 CFR 70.24. Therefore, the facility is required to 

have a CAAS with two detectors in each area, to detect an inadvertent criticality and to alert 

facility personnel that it occurred. Placement of the detectors is determined by applying the 

detection criteria in 10 CFR 70.24(a)(1). The NRC staff reviewed the information in the LA 

(GLE, 2011b) and the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) regarding the applicant’s commitment to the 

CAAS. As stated in Section 5.3.5.2 of this SER, the applicant has not yet incorporated a 

sufficient level of detail in the ISA Summary, because the design of the CAAS system is not 

complete. To satisfy the requirements in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(4), an applicant must provide 

information in the ISA Summary demonstrating compliance with 10 CFR 70.24. Because a 

criticality cannot occur if there is no fissionable material onsite, an operating CAAS is not 

needed until the applicant obtains licensed material. Therefore, the staff is granting an 

exemption to the requirements in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(4) and is imposing the following license 

condition to ensure that the regulatory requirement is met before the licensee obtains licensed 

material:

The Licensee is granted an exemption to the requirements in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(4) 

to require that the ISA Summary contain information that demonstrates 

compliance with the criticality monitoring and alarm requirements of 10 CFR 

70.24. At least 90 days prior to obtaining licensed material, the Licensee shall 

submit to the NRC for approval Criticality Accident Alarm System design 

information to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 70.65(b)(4) for all areas in 

which NRC has not granted an exemption to 10 CFR 70.24, and in which special 

nuclear material is handled, used, stored, or transported (including outdoor 

transport routes), and include this information in the ISA Summary.
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The staff reviewed the nuclear criticality safety information contained in the ISA Summary (GLE, 

2011a) and other supporting documentation using the acceptance criteria in Sections 

3.4.3.2(4)(c) and 5.4.3.4.6(1) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The staff concludes that the ISA 

Summary (GLE, 2011a) provides reasonable assurance that:

1. The applicant adequately documented the ISA results in the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) 

for nuclear criticality safety (NCS);

2. The applicant adequately identified credible accident sequences for NCS;

3. The applicant adequately identified engineered and administrative controls, IROFS, and 

management measures for NCS;

4. The applicant adequately applied engineered and administrative controls, IROFS, and 

management measures to ensure that credible criticality accident sequences are 

prevented and made highly unlikely; and

5. The applicant maintains a criticality accident alarm system in accordance with the 

requirements in 10 CFR 70.24 and, when incorporated into the ISA Summary (GLE, 

2011a), will be in compliance with 10 CFR 70.65(b)(4).

In accordance with the acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(6) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) 

the applicant provided a complete list of all IROFS, as well as a description of their essential 

details, expected function, conditions needed to reliably perform the function, and the effects of 

the failure of the IROFS. The staff concludes that these actions meet the acceptance criteria 

provided in Section 3.4.3.2(6) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and are, therefore, acceptable. 

The criteria in Section 5.4.3.4.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state that the applicant needs to 

meet the performance requirements in 10 CFR 70.61(d) to limit the risk of criticality accidents 

during normal and credible abnormal conditions. In addition, 10 CFR 70.61(d) states that 

preventive controls (compared to mitigating controls) must be the primary means of protection 

against criticality accidents. This is to be accomplished by identification of criticality sequences, 

determination of the likelihood of criticality sequences, and descriptions of IROFS for criticality 

sequences. The staff concludes that the licensee’s ISA and IROFS described above meet the 

acceptance criteria provided in Section 5.4.3.4.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and are, 

therefore, acceptable. 

3.3.9 CHEMICAL PROCESS REVIEW

The regulations in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(7) require that the ISA Summary include a description of the 

proposed quantitative standards used to assess the consequences to an individual from acute 

chemical exposure to licensed material or chemicals produced from licensed materials which 

are onsite, or expected to be onsite, as described in 10 CFR 70.61(b)(4) and (c)(4). The 

acceptance criteria are listed in Section 6.4.3.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and are described 

below and in additional discussion in Chapter 6 of this SER. 

The NRC’s regulatory authority over chemicals hazards is explained in the NRC memorandum, 

“Regulatory Authority Over Chemical Hazards at Fuel Cycle Facilities,” dated March 10, 2003 

(NRC, 2003c). In the ISA, the applicant identified and evaluated all chemical hazards and 

accident sequences that could result in consequences exceeding the 10 CFR 70.61
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performance requirements in accordance with this NRC memorandum. Chemical hazards that 

do not affect the radiological material are covered by the Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration Process Safety Management regulation 29 CFR 1910.119, and the 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Risk Management Program (RMP) regulations in 40 

CFR 68.

The applicant discusses the chemical and radiological hazards resulting from a release of 

licensed material in Section 4 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a). Detailed analyses are 

evaluated at each node of the process. 

The NRC staff chemical safety review of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) consisted of the 

evaluation of a selected sample of accidents sequences in the dry conversion process and the 

cylinder wash area. The chemical safety review included the evaluation of the following areas:

$ Chemical processes;

$ Chemical hazards;

$ Chemical accident sequences;

$ IROFS’ preventive and mitigative functions; and

$ Chemical consequences and standards.

3.3.9.1 Chemical Process Descriptions

During the site visit and vertical slice review discussed in Section 3.3.17 of this SER, NRC staff 

examined a number of supporting documents, including QRAs for liquid and vapor HF scenarios 

and Technical Reports in addition to the LA (GLE, 2011b) and the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a). 

In addition to the supporting documents, the NRC staff examined the applicant’s descriptions of 

the approach employed for adequately maintaining safety in normal operations, including the 

hierarchy of policies, procedures, and screening criteria the applicant employed to identify 

chemicals for further analysis in the hazard evaluation and to allow an understanding of the 

development of potential accident scenarios. Safety significant scenarios for loss of 

confinement and plug removal were examined, as well as the methods for determination and 

identification of conditional events, management measures, administrative, and defense-indepth controls.

3.3.9.2 Chemical Hazards, Accident Sequences, and IROFS

For each of the process systems (nodes) in Chapter 4 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), the 

staff concludes that the applicant has adequately identified credible chemical accident 

sequences, including appropriate accident likelihoods, based on the applicant’s use of a 

combination of approved hazards analysis methods (What-If/Checklist or QRA) to identify those 

sequences and the staff’s review of selected chemical accident sequences. For each process 

node in Chapter 4 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b), the applicant provides a description of 

potential interactions of chemicals and an evaluation of the risks (both consequence and 

likelihood) as well as a description of controls to minimize the risks. The acceptance criteria in 

Section 6.4.3.1(1) and 6.4.3.1(2) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state that the applicant needs to 

submit process descriptions of sufficient detail to allow an understanding of the chemical 

process hazards, and an adequate list of the consequences and likelihoods of identified 

accident sequences. The information provided by the applicant meets the accident sequence 

and likelihood acceptance criteria in Sections 6.4.3.1(1) and 6.4.3.1(2) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 
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2002) and is, therefore, acceptable. Additional discussion of the staff evaluation of chemical 

safety is provided in Chapter 6 of this SER. 

3.3.9.3 Chemical Consequence Analysis Approach

For each node evaluated in Chapter 4 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), the applicant 

estimated chemical consequences for the bounding accident scenarios based on potential 

exposure concentrations. These estimated chemical exposures were then compared to the 

chemical quantitative standards the applicant identified in accordance with 10 CFR 70.65(b)(7). 

Chemical exposure calculations considered variables such as quantity, location, physical 

properties of the hazardous chemical, atmospheric conditions, and time of exposure. In 

addition, different assessment models were used to estimate the exposure of a hazardous 

chemical after a release. 

The acceptance criteria in Sections 6.4.3.1(3), 6.4.3.1(4), and 6.4.3.1(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002) state that an applicant needs to use appropriate techniques and valid assumptions as 

well as approved source term and vapor dispersion models, in evaluation of identified accident 

sequences. The staff finds that the applicant has identified and used appropriate methods and 

valid assumptions in estimating the consequences from identified chemical accident sequences, 

and that the consequences have been conservatively estimated. The information provided by 

the applicant meets the guidance in Sections 6.4.3.1(3), 6.4.3.1(4), and 6.4.3.1(5) of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002) and is therefore acceptable. Additional discussion of the staff evaluation of 

chemical safety is provided in chapter 6 of this SER.

3.3.9.4 Chemical Consequence Limits

This section evaluates the proposed chemical quantitative standards used to assess the 

consequences to the worker, public, and environment from acute chemical exposure to licensed 

material or chemicals incident to the processing of licensed material. In accordance with 10 

CFR 70.65(b)(7), the applicant is required to propose chemical quantitative standards as a part 

of the ISA Summary.

In Section 4.1 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), the applicant described exposures to the 

reaction products from a UF6 leak: UO2F2, and HF.

In Tables 1-3 and 1-4 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), the applicant committed to AEGL-3 

and AEGL-2 exposures as chemical consequence standards for high and intermediate 

consequence events, respectively, to a worker. In addition, the applicant defined dermal 

exposure consequences for both workers and members of the public. The applicant defined 

contact with HF solution as an intermediate consequence for a worker. 

In Table 1-3 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), the applicant committed to a soluble uranium

intake limit of 75 milligrams (mg) (0.165 lb) for a high consequence to a worker, and 30 mg 

(0.066 lb) for a high consequence to a member of the public.

The NRC staff, based on the information in NUREG-1391, “Chemical Toxicity of Uranium 

Hexafluoride Compared to Acute Effects of Radiation” (NRC, 1991), determined that 30 mg 

(0.066 lb) of soluble uranium is in agreement with the definition of a high consequence event as 

defined in 10 CFR 70.61(b)(4)(i) that states: “an acute chemical exposure to an individual from 
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licensed material or hazardous chemicals produced from licensed material that: (i) could

endanger the life of the worker...” 

The threshold for permanent kidney damage is the derived limit based on a systemic burden per 

0.3 milligram uranium per kilogram (mg/kg) (0.0003 lb uranium/lb) body weight, which totals 21

mg (0.046 lb) for a 70 kg (154 lb) standard man, as referenced in Table 2 in NUREG-1391

(NRC, 1991). Using the improved model in International Commission for Radiological 

Protection (ICRP) Publication 66 (ICRP-66), “Human Respiratory Tract Model for Radiological 

Protection, (ICRP, 1995), the systemic burden of 21 mg (0.046 lb) would require an intake of 75

mg (0.165 lb) of soluble uranium. The NRC-industry soluble uranium working group has agreed 

that an intake of 75 mg (0.165 lb) is a suitable limit for a worker.

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s chemical consequence standards and determined that they 

are in conformance with 10 CFR 70.61(b)(4) and (c)(4), as required by 10 CFR 70.65(b)(7), and 

meet the acceptance criteria in Sections 3.4.3.2(7) and 6.4.3.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) 

and are, therefore, acceptable. 

3.3.10 FIRE PROTECTION REVIEW

FHAs are used in the ISA to evaluate credible fire scenarios as to their potential to result in 

high- or intermediate-consequence events from the release of licensed materials, release of 

Part 70-regulated chemicals, or initiation of a criticality event (GLE, 2011a).

Areas of the facility for which fire events were documented in the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) 

are the following:

• Cylinder Storage and Handling

• Feed and Vaporization

• Product Withdrawal

• Tails Withdrawal

• Blending System

• Sampling System

• Decontamination/Maintenance

• Laboratory Operations

Discussion of the fire protection IROFS is found in the non-public version of this SER.

The staff finds that the fire safety analysis is adequate to ensure the requirements of 10 CFR 

70.61(b)(1)-(b)(4) and 10 CFR 70.61(c)(1)-(c)(4) will not be exceeded. The acceptance criteria 

in Sections 7.4.3.3 and 7.4.3.4 of NUREG 1520 (NRC, 2002) state that an applicant needs to 

apply fire safety considerations in the design of the facility, including process fire safety by 

utilizing National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) NFPA 801, “Standard for Fire Protection 

for Facilities Handling Radioactive Materials” (NFPA, 2008), as a standard. The applicant’s 

commitment to NFPA 801 (NFPA, 2008) is in Sections 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011b). 

The acceptance criteria in Section 7.4.3.5 of NUREG 1520 (NRC, 2002) state that an applicant 

needs to identify the fire emergency response organizations and IROFS. The applicant’s 

commitments for emergency response organizations for fire protection are described in Sections 

7.6.1 and 7.6.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011b). The applicant’s commitment for identification of fire 

safety IROFS is described in Section 7.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011b). The staff found that the 

applicant’s commitments meet the acceptance criteria in Section 7.4.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 
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2002), and is, therefore, acceptable. Additional discussion of the staff evaluation of fire safety 

is provided in Chapter 7 of this SER.

3.3.11 RADIATION PROTECTION REVIEW

The staff reviewed the applicant’s treatment of onsite radiological hazards with respect to their 

potential to create intermediate or high consequence events relative to workers or the general 

public. At the applicant facility, the radiological hazards are associated with low-enriched 

uranium with a maximum of 8 wt percent 235U, which is greater than the enrichment of traditional 

commercial feed material for low-enriched nuclear fuel fabrication plants, but is intended to 

provide flexibility for blending of product cylinders (GLE, 2011b). 

The applicant performed a radiological safety analysis for each credible accident scenario (GLE, 

2011b). Credible radiological accidents that were of intermediate or high consequences were 

identified (GLE, 2011b). 

All credible radiological accidents were made unlikely or highly unlikely (GLE, 2011b). The staff 

reviewed a sample of the credible accident sequences and the associated IROFS for those 

sequences (GLE, 2011b). 

Radiological consequences limits are presented along with chemical consequences in Table 1-3 

of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a). The applicant’s radiological limits are the same as those 

specified in 10 CFR 70.61(b)(3). The staff finds that the radiological safety analysis is adequate 

to ensure the requirements of 10 CFR 70.61(b)(1)-(b)(3) and 10 CFR 70.61(c)(1)-(c)(3) will not 

be exceeded. The acceptance criteria in Section 4.4.6.3 of NUREG 1520 (NRC, 2002) state 

that an applicant needs to install ventilation and containment systems in the facility, when 

designated as IROFS. The applicant’s commitments regarding bi-weekly verification of flows 

and direction, as well as filtration of air from ventilation and containment systems, including the 

commitment for verification following modifications to systems are in Sections 4.6.1 of the LA 

(GLE, 2011b). The staff found that the applicant’s commitments meet the acceptance criteria in 

Section 4.4.6.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), and are, therefore, acceptable. Additional 

discussion of the staff evaluation of radiation protection is provided in Chapter 4 of this SER.

3.3.12 IROFS STRUCTURES REVIEW

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s proposed design for structures containing licensed 

material processes to ensure compliance with the performance requirements in 10 CFR 70.61 

and 10 CFR 70.64(a)(2), and 64(a)(4). Acceptance criteria in Sections 3.4.3.2(2)(c), 3.4.3.2(3), 

and 3.4.3.2(4) are applicable to this review. The acceptance criteria on Section 3.4.3.2(2)(c) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) states that the applicant should provide design information 

regarding the resistance of the facility to failures caused by credible external events, when those 

failures may produce consequences exceeding those identified in 10 CFR 70.61. The 

acceptance criteria in Sections 3.4.3.2(3) and 3.4.3.2(4) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state that 

the applicant should address hazards and accident sequences and information demonstrating 

compliance with the performance requirements in 10 CR 70.61.

Discussion of the IROFS structures is found in the non-public version of this SER.
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The NRC staff organized the review and evaluation of the applicant’s LA (GLE, 2011b), and ISA 

Summary (GLE, 2011a) on structural, foundation, and equipment support designs of IROFS

structures in Figure 4.16-1 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) into the following four sections. 

3.3.12.1 Structural Design Loads

The structural design load criteria are based on the environmental and geologic features of the 

proposed site as identified in Sections 1.3.3, 1.3.4, and 1.3.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), in Section 

2 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), and the data presented in the accepted consensus 

industry codes and standards. In accordance with 10 CFR 70.64(a), the IROFS structures, 

foundations, and equipment supports are required to comply with a baseline design criterion for 

natural phenomena and external hazards. This baseline design criterion in 10 CFR 70.64(a) 

requires that the design adequately protects against natural phenomena of the most severe 

documented historical events for the site. These design basis loads from natural phenomena 

and external hazards, among others, include seismic, winds, snow, and local intense 

precipitation defined in Section 2.5 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) and Merrick & Company 

calculation, “Design Analysis Calculation for Natural Phenomena Analysis of the GLE 

Commercial Facility” (Merrick, 2010). 

The NRC staff reviewed the loads the applicant proposed for the preliminary design of the 

proposed IROFS buildings as provided in applicant’s LA (GLE, 2011b), ISA Summary (GLE, 

2011a), and the Merrick & Company calculation (Merrick, 2010). The NRC staff find that the 

applicant’s design bases for natural phenomena and external hazards are acceptable because 

these design bases were determined based on the environmental and geologic features of the 

site using industry accepted codes, standards, and methods. The applicant proposed to convert 

the design bases to applied loads to the IROFS structures in accordance with procedures 

outlined in an industry-accepted standard such as ASCE 7–05 (ASCE, 2006). Based on this 

evaluation, the NRC staff concludes, with reasonable assurance, that the regulatory 

requirements in 10 CFR 70.64(a)(2) and 64(a)(4) have been met because the structural design 

loads the applicant considered are consistent with those characterized for the proposed site. 

The acceptance criterion in Section 3.4.3.2(2)(c) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state that the 

applicant needs to provide design information regarding the resistance of the facility to failures 

caused by credible external events, when those failures may produce consequences exceeding 

those identified in 10 CFR 70.61. The acceptance criteria in Sections 3.4.3.2(3) and 3.4.3.2(4) 

of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) address the evaluation of hazards and accident sequences to 

demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 70.61. The NRC staff concluded that the applicant’s 

information on IROFS structural design loads met these criteria and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.3.12.2 Load Combinations

All major loads encountered or postulated for the IROFS buildings are listed in Sections 2.5 and 

3.3.2 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) and evaluated as design loads in Section 3.3.12.1 of 

this SER. Design loads are considered by the applicant to act in various load combinations 

according to industry accepted codes and standards (e.g., Section B.2 of American Institute of 

Steel Construction (AISC) AISC N690, “Specification for Safety-Related Steel Structures for 

Nuclear Facilities,” (AISC, 2007) and ASCE 7-05 (ASCE, 2006)) as stated in ISA Summary 

(GLE, 2011a).

Based on this evaluation, the NRC staff finds, with reasonable assurance, that the regulatory 

requirements in 10 CFR 70.64(a)(2) and 64(a)(4) have been met because the load 
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combinations the applicant proposed for the IROFS buildings are consistent with industry 

accepted codes, standards, and methods for steel structures and components. The acceptance 

criterion in Section 3.4.3.2(2)(c) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state that the applicant needs to 

provide design information regarding the resistance of the facility to failures caused by credible 

external events, when those failures may produce consequences exceeding those identified in 

10 CFR 70.61. The acceptance criteria in Sections 3.4.3.2(3) and 3.4.3.2(4) of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002) address the evaluation of hazards and accident sequences to demonstrate 

compliance with 10 CFR 70.61. The NRC staff concluded that the applicant’s information on 

load combinations met these criteria and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.3.12.3 Structural Analysis Method

The applicant performed preliminary design analysis of selected IROFS building structures 

under selected design loads as described in the Merrick and Company calculation (Merrick, 

2010). The directions of application of seismic forces for the final design will be those which will 

produce the most critical load effects as delineated in Section 12.5 of ASCE 7–05 (ASCE, 

2006). The final seismic analysis will consist of one of the types permitted by Table 12.6-1 in 

ASCE 7–05 (ASCE, 2006), based on the structure’s seismic design category, structural system, 

dynamic properties, and regularity. The applicant proposed to use two out of three methods 

permitted by Table 12.6-1 in ASCE 7–05 (ASCE, 2006): (i) equivalent lateral force method and 

(ii) modal response spectrum analysis. In the preliminary seismic analysis (Merrick, 2010), the 

applicant used the equivalent lateral force method. The preliminary analysis revealed that the 

wind load instead of seismic load governs the design of IROFS buildings. In the final analysis, 

resulting element and member moments and forces from the load combinations accepted in the 

Load Combinations subsection above will be checked for whatever combination produces the 

most unfavorable effects for IROFS buildings, foundations, and other structural components. 

The NRC staff reviewed the structural analysis method the applicant proposed and the 

preliminary analysis the applicant conducted for the IROFS structures and foundations as 

provided in the LA (GLE, 2011b), the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), and the Merrick and 

Company calculation (Merrick, 2010). The NRC staff finds that the analysis method the 

applicant proposed and used in preliminary analysis is acceptable because this method is 

based on standard industry accepted procedures. The NRC staff also finds that the preliminary 

analysis is acceptable because the proposed analysis method is appropriately used. Therefore, 

the NRC staff finds, with reasonable assurance, that the regulatory requirements in 10 CFR 

70.64(a)(1), 64(a)(2), and 64(a)(4) have been met with regard to the structural analysis method. 

The acceptance criterion in Section 3.4.3.2(2)(c) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state that the 

applicant needs to provide design information regarding the resistance of the facility to failures 

caused by credible external events, when those failures may produce consequences exceeding 

those identified in 10 CFR 70.61. The acceptance criteria in Sections 3.4.3.2(3) and 3.4.3.2(4) 

of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) address the evaluation of hazards and accident sequences to 

demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 70.61. The NRC staff concluded that the applicant’s 

information on structural analysis methodology met these criteria and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.3.12.4 Structural Design Criteria, Bases, and Method

The IROFS structures and foundations are designed to meet the design features of ASCE 43-05 

(ASCE, 2005).
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The applicant developed structural and mechanical design load criteria based on the 

environmental and geologic features of the applicant’s site as identified in Sections 2.5 and 

3.3.2 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) and preliminary analysis by Merrick & Company 

(Merrick, 2010). The design criteria are based on the applicable baseline design criteria in 10 

CFR 70.64(a)(2), which require the design to adequately protect against natural phenomena of 

the most severe documented historical events for the site. As part of the ISA for external 

events, the IROFS structures were determined to withstand the design basis natural 

phenomena and external hazards defined in Sections 1.3.3, 1.3.4, and 1.3.5 of the LA and 

Section 2.5 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a). As required by 10 CFR 70.64(b), the baseline 

design criteria for the IROFS structures incorporate defense-in-depth and require engineered 

controls over administrative controls. The main physical design criteria are related to high 

straight wind and seismic loads and are further defined and delineated in the appropriate IBC 

(ICC, 2006) subsections and other consensus codes and standards.

As provided in Table 3-1 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), the applicant will design IROFS steel 

structures using the allowable design method in AISC N690 (AISC, 2007) and the IROFS 

concrete structures will be designed using the American Concrete Institute (ACI), ACI-349, 

“Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety-Related Concrete Structures (ACI 349-06) and 

Commentary” (ACI, 2007).

Based on this review, the NRC staff concludes, with reasonable assurance, that the regulatory 

requirements in 10 CFR 70.64(a)(2), 64(a)(4), and 70.64(b) have been met because the 

structural design criteria, bases, and method the applicant proposed for the IROFS structures 

are based on industry accepted codes, standards, and procedures. The acceptance criterion in 

Section 3.4.3.2(2)(c) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state that the applicant needs to provide 

design information regarding the resistance of the facility to failures caused by credible external 

events, when those failures may produce consequences exceeding those identified in 10 CFR 

70.61. The acceptance criteria in Sections 3.4.3.2(3), and 3.4.3.2(4) state that the applicant 

should address hazards and accident sequences and information demonstrating compliance 

with the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. The NRC staff concluded that the 

applicant’s structural design information met these criteria and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.3.13 MANAGEMENT MEASURES

The regulations in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(4) require that the ISA Summary contain information that 

demonstrates the applicant’s compliance with the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 

including a description of the management measures that are applied to IROFS for each 

accident sequence for which the consequences could exceed the performance requirements of 

10 CFR 70.61. The acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.1(3) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) 

state that the applicant needs to commit to establishing management measures to ensure the 

reliability and availability of the IROFS identified for each scenario. In addition, the acceptance 

criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(4)(b) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state that the applicant needs to 

provide a description of the management measures applied to IROFS needed to meet the 

performance requirements. 

The regulations in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(4) require that the ISA Summary contain information that 

demonstrates compliance with the performance requirements in 10 CFR 70,61, including a 

description of the management measures. The regulations in 10 CFR 70.62(d) require that 

each applicant establish management measures generally on a continuing basis, which are 

applied to IROFS, to ensure compliance with the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. 
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The degree to which management measures are applied to a particular engineered or 

administrative control or control system may be graded commensurate with the reduction of the 

risk attributable to that control or control system. Management measures ensure that 

engineered and administrative controls and control systems, identified as IROFS, are designed, 

implemented, and maintained, as necessary, to ensure they are available and reliable to 

perform their function when needed. Chapter 11 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) includes 

acceptance criteria for the following eight areas of management measures: (a) configuration 

management (CM); (b) maintenance; (c) training and qualifications; (d) procedures; (e) audits 

and assessments; (f) incident investigations; (g) records management; and (h) other quality 

assurance (QA) elements.

The purpose of the staff’s technical evaluation of the applicant’s management measures was to 

ascertain whether the applicant provided information regarding its management measures for 

IROFS.

Chapter 11 of the LA (GLE, 2011b) describes the management measures applied to IROFS, as 

well as other quality assurance elements. The NRC staff reviewed the above information and 

finds the applicant’s description of the management measures applied to IROFS and the 

applicant’s application and integration of other QA Elements acceptable. The applicant’s 

management measures are evaluated in Chapter 11 of this SER.

In Chapter 11 of this SER, the staff reviewed the applicant’s implementation process concerning 

its records management system in accordance with the acceptance criteria of Section 11.4 of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). Based on this review, the staff has concluded that the records 

management system used will be effective in collecting, verifying, protecting, and storing 

information about the facility and its design, operations, and maintenance. In addition, the 

records management system will provide an adequate means for retrieval of the information in a 

readable format for the designated lifetimes of data and information collected and designated as 

records. 

The staff reviewed and evaluated the adequacy of the applicant’s approach to records 

management. In Section 11.7.3.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), the applicant stated that it will 

maintain records of failures and how records of IROFS failures will be readily retrievable and 

available for NRC inspection. 

The staff has reviewed the above information and finds the applicant’s description of the 

management measures applied to IROFS to meet the acceptance criteria in Sections 3.4.3.1(3) 

and 3.4.3.2(4)(b) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), regarding establishing and describing 

management measures and is, therefore, acceptable. 

3.3.14 IDENTIFICATION OF IROFS

The regulations in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(6) require that the ISA Summary include a list briefly 

describing each IROFS which is identified pursuant to 10 CFR 70.61(e) in sufficient detail to 

understand their functions in relation to the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61.

The regulations in 10 CFR 70.61(e) require that each engineered or administrative control or 

control system necessary to comply with the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 be 

designated as an IROFS. The acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(6) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002) state that the applicant needs to provide a list of all IROFS and a description of their 
3-43

characteristics. The applicant furnished a list of IROFS in each node or subsection of Chapter 4 

of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a). A description of each IROFS, its function, and 

characteristics, is contained in description of each node. The information furnished by the 

applicant addresses the criteria in Section 3.4.3.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, 

therefore, acceptable. 

3.3.15 LIST OF SOLE IROFS

The regulations in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(8) require that the ISA Summary include a descriptive list 

that identifies all IROFS that are the sole item preventing or mitigating an accident sequence 

that exceeds the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. The acceptance criteria in 

Section 3.4.3.2(8) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state that the applicant needs to provide a 

descriptive list of all IROFS that are the sole item preventing or mitigating an accident 

sequence. 

Discussion of the proposed sole IROFS is found in the non-public version of this SER.

NRC staff determined that the applicant provided a descriptive list of sole IROFS that meets the 

requirements of 10 CFR 70.65(b)(8) and the acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(8) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.3.16 DEFINITIONS OF “CREDIBLE,” “UNLIKELY,” AND “HIGHLY UNLIKELY”

The regulations in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(9) require the ISA Summary contain a description of the 

definitions of “credible,” “unlikely,” and “highly unlikely” as used in the evaluations in the ISA. 

The acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(9) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) state that the 

applicant needs to provide definitions of “credible,” “unlikely,” and “highly unlikely” when used in 

the applicant’s method of assessing likelihoods. 

3.3.16.1 Credible

In Section 1.2.5.4 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), the applicant stated that an event or 

accident sequence is considered “credible” unless it is determined to be “not credible.” In 

Section 1.2.5.3 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), an event or accident sequence is considered 

“not credible” if:

1. It is an external event with a frequency of occurrence can be conservatively estimated to 

be once in a million years; or

2. Is a process deviation, for which there is a convincing argument, based on physical laws, 

that the event is not possible or the accident sequence is extremely unlikely; or

3. The accident sequence includes a process deviation that consists of many unlikely 

human actions or errors for which there is no motive, short of intent to cause harm, and 

has never occurred in any fuel cycle facility.

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s proposed definitions for credible and determined that they 

meet the acceptable sets of qualities listed in Section 3.4.3.2(9) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) 

and are acceptable to show compliance with 10 CFR 70.61 based on these commitments.
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3.3.16.2 Unlikely

In Section 1.2.5.2 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), the applicant stated that an event or 

accident is considered unlikely if its frequency is in the range between 10-4 and 10-5 per-event 

per-year. NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s proposed definition for unlikely and determined 

that it met the acceptable range listed in Section 3.4.3.2(9) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is 

acceptable to show compliance with 10 CFR 70.61 based on these commitments. 

3.3.16.3 Highly Unlikely

In Section 1.2.5.1 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), the applicant stated that an event or 

accident sequence is considered highly unlikely if it meets the guideline of 10-5 per-event peryear. NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s proposed definition for highly unlikely and determined 

that it met the acceptable range listed in Section 3.4.3.2(9) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is 

acceptable to show compliance with 10 CFR 70.61 based on these commitments. 

The staff reviewed the applicant’s proposed definitions of credible, unlikely, and highly unlikely 

and determined that they are reasonably clear and can reasonably be expected to consistently 

distinguish accidents that are highly unlikely from those that are merely unlikely based on the 

methodology discussed above. 

3.3.17 DESCRIPTION OF THE VERTICAL SLICE REVIEW

The staff performed an onsite review the week of October 12, 2009, using the acceptance 

criteria in Section 3.5.2.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002).

The applicant presented overviews of the ISA, including development of the accident 

sequences, IROFS, risk determination, organizational roles for maintenance of the ISA under 10 

CFR Part 70, demonstration of the ISA database, and management measures.

During the onsite review, the staff interviewed applicant personnel and examined ISA 

documentation, supporting information, and selected accident sequences. The reviews of the 

accident sequences included, but were not limited to, process hazards analysis information, 

IROFS descriptions, consequence and likelihood definitions and calculations, technical reports, 

What-If Checklists, detailed QRA documents, commitments to codes and standards for fire 

protection, criticality safety, instrumentation and controls, internal administrative procedures, as 

well as ISA Team members’ qualifications. The focus of the review was to ensure that the ISA 

method was consistent with that described in the LA (GLE, 2011b), and that it met the 

regulations. Interviews were held with the applicant’s ISA team, and subject matter experts 

from a variety of safety disciplines. Primary interview questions dealt with the preliminary 

design, as well as detailed questions regarding specific scenarios. The subsets of the ISA, 

which the NRC staff selected during the onsite review, were examined to ensure that a range of 

accidents were evaluated, based on consequences, likelihood, and IROFS. The NRC staff 

evaluated the underpinnings of the calculations, conclusions, and the design, using the 

guidance provided for new applications for enrichment facilities, as well as historical safety 

performance at other fuel cycle facilities. This selection process meets the acceptance criteria 

in Section 3.5.2.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable. 
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3.4 EVALUATION FINDINGS

Many hazards and potential accidents can result in unintended exposure of persons to radiation, 

radioactive materials, or toxic chemicals related to the processing of licensed nuclear material. 

The staff finds that the applicant has performed an ISA to identify and evaluate these hazards in 

the site and potential accidents as required by 10 CFR 70 Subpart H. The staff reviewed the 

ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a) and finds that it provides reasonable assurance that the applicant 

will maintain process safety information and an ISA, has identified IROFS, and established 

engineered and administrative controls to ensure compliance with the performance 

requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. Specifically, the staff finds that the ISA results, as documented 

in the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011a), provide reasonable assurance that the IROFS, management 

measures, and programmatic commitments will, if properly implemented, make all credible high 

consequence accidents highly unlikely and all credible intermediate consequence accidents 

unlikely.

3.5 REFERENCES

(ACI, 2007) American Concrete Institute (ACI). ACI 349, “Code Requirements for Nuclear 

Safety-Related Concrete Structures (ACI 349-06) and Commentary,” 2007.

(AICHE 1992) American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AICHE). “Guidelines for Hazard 

Evaluation Procedures,” 1992. 

(AISC, 2007) American Institute of Steel Construction, Inc. (AISC). AISC N690, “Specification 

for Safety-Related Steel Structures for Nuclear Facilities,” 2007.

(ANSI/ANS, 1992) American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society 

(ANSI/ANS). ANSI/ANS-2.8, “Determining Design Basis Flooding at Power Reactor Sites,” 

1992.

(ASCE, 2005) American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE). ASCE 43–05, “Seismic Design 

Criteria for Structures, Systems, and Components in Nuclear Facilities,” 2005. 

(ASCE, 2006) American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE). ASCE 7–05, “Minimum Design 

Loads for Buildings and Other Structures,” 2006.

(Bowles, 1995) Bowles, J.E., “Foundation Analysis and Design,” Fifth Edition. 1995.

(DOE, 2002a) U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). DOE-STD-1020, “Natural Phenomena 

Hazard Assessment Criteria,” 2002.

(DOE, 2002b) U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). DOE-STD-1023, “Natural Phenomena 

Hazard Assessment Criteria,” 2002.

(DOE, 2006) U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). DOE–STD–3014, “Accident Analysis for 

Aircraft into Hazardous Facilities,” 2006.

(Fang, 1990) Fang, H.Y., “Foundation Engineering Handbook,” Second Edition. 1990.
3-46

(FHWA, 1999) U.S. Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). FHWA-IF-99-025, “Drilled 

Shafts: Construction Procedures and Design Methods.” August 1999.

(GLE, 2008) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “Environmental Report 

for the GLE Commercial Facility,” 2008.

(GLE, 2010) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). Supporting Documents 

to the “Integrated Safety Analysis Summary for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC 

Commercial Facility,” Revision 1. 2010.

(GLE, 2011a) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “Integrated Safety 

Analysis Summary for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility,” 

Revision 4. 2011.

(GLE, 2011b) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “GE-Hitachi Global 

Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility License Application,” Revision 6. 2011.

(ICC, 2006) International Code Council, Inc. (ICC). “International Building Code,” 2006.

(ICRP, 1995) International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). ICRP Publication 

66, “Human Respiratory Tract Model for Radiological Protection,” 1995.

(Merrick, 2010) Merrick & Company (Merrick). Merrick & Company calculation, “Design 

Analysis Calculation for Natural Phenomena Analysis of the GLE Commercial Facility.” 

5001B1005-R0, 2010.

(NAVFAC, 1986) U.S. Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC). Design Manual 7, 

“Naval Facilities Engineering Command Design Manual,” 1986.

(NCDEM, 1991) North Carolina Division of Emergency Management (NCDEM). “Seismic 

Hazard in North Carolina,” 1991.

(NCEER, 1987) National Center for Earthquake Engineering Research (NCEER). “EarthquakeInduced Liquefaction Features in the Coastal South Carolina Region” in Proceedings from the 

Symposium on Seismic Hazards, Ground Motions, Soil-Liquefaction and Engineering Practice in 

Eastern North America, 1987.

(NCGS, 1993) North Carolina Geologic Survey (NCGS). “Geology of Basement Rocks Beneath 

the North Carolina Coastal Plain,” Bulletin 95, 1993.

(NFPA, 2008) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 801, “Standard for Fire 

Protection for Facilities Handling Radioactive Materials,” 2008.

(NOAA, 1978) National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). “Hydrometeorolgical 

Report No. 51, Probable Maximum Precipitation Estimates, United States East of 105th

Meridian,” 1978.

(NOAA, 1982) National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). “Hydrometeorolgical 

Report No. 52, Application of Probable Maximum Precipitation Estimates, United States East of 

105th Meridian,” 1982.
3-47

(NOAA, 2004a) National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). “Climatography of 

the United States No. 20 1971-2000,” 2004.

(NOAA, 2004b) National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). “Point Precipitation 

Frequency Estimates from NOAA Atlas 14, Volume 2, Version 3.0,” 2004.

(NOAA, 2006) National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). “NOAA Atlas 14 –

Precipitation-Frequency Atlas of the United States,” Volume 2, Version 3.0, Revised 2006.

(NOAA, 2011) National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). “Severe Weather 

Database Files (1950-2010).” < http://www.spc.noaa.gov/wcm/#data> (Accessed September 

2011).

(NRC, 1977) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 1.59, “Design 

Basis Floods for Nuclear Power Plants,” 1977.

(NRC, 1978) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 1.91, 

“Evaluations of Explosions Postulated To Occur on Transportation Routes Near Nuclear Power 

Plants,” 1978.

(NRC, 1991) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG-1391, “Chemical Toxicity 

of Uranium Hexafluoride Compared to Acute Effects of Radiation,” 1991. 

(NRC, 1998) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG/CR-6410, “Nuclear Fuel 

Cycle Facility Accident Analysis Handbook,” 1998. 

(NRC, 2001) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG-1513, “Integrated Safety 

Analysis Guidance Document,” 2001. 

(NRC, 2002) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG-1520, “Standard Review 

Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility.” 2002.

(NRC, 2003a) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 1.132, “Site 

Investigations for Foundations of Nuclear Power Plants,” 2003.

(NRC, 2003b) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 1.198, 

“Procedures and Criteria for Assessing Seismic Soil Liquefaction at Nuclear Power Plant Sites,” 

2003.

(NRC, 2003c) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Memorandum from R. Pierson to 

C. Paperiello, “Regulatory Authority Over Chemical Hazards at Fuel Cycle Facilities,” March 10, 

2003. ADAMS Accession Number ML030700317

(NRC, 2005). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) 

FCSS-ISG-08, “Natural Phenomena Hazards,” 2005.

(NRC, 2007a) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG/CR–4461, “Tornado 

Climatology of the Contiguous United States,” 2007.
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(NRC, 2007b) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 1.76, “DesignBasis Tornado and Tornado Missiles for Nuclear Power Plants,” 2007.

(NRC, 2007c) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG-0800, “Standard Review 

Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition,” 2007.

(NRC, 2009) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG/CR–6966, “Tsunami 

Hazard Assessment at Nuclear Power Plant Sites in the United States of America,” 2009.

(Talwani, 2001) Talwani, P. and W.T. Schaeffer. “Recurrence Rates of Large Earthquakes in 

South Carolina Coastal Plain Based on Paleoliquefaction Data.” Journal of Geophysical 

Research. Vol. 106. pp. 6,621–6,642. 2001.

(USGS, 1998) United States Geological Survey (USGS). “Quaternary Fault and Fold Database 

of the United States: Fault Number 2659, Georgetown Liquefaction Feature, in Quaternary 

Fault and Fold Database of the United States,” 1998.

(USGS, 2006) United States Geological Survey (USGS). “Earthquakes in Virginia and Vicinity 

1774–2004.” U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 2006-1017. 2006.

(USGS, 2008) United States Geological Survey (USGS). “Documentation for the 2008 Update 

of the United States National Seismic Hazard Maps.” U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 

2008-1128,” 2008.

(VPI, 2008) Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (VPI). “The Virginia Tech 

Seismological Observatory Historic/Instrumental Southeaster U.S. Earthquake Catalog,” 2008.
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4.0 RADIATION PROTECTION

The purpose of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) review of the applicant’s 

Radiation Protection (RP) Program is to evaluate whether the application provides adequate 

information to protect the radiological health and safety of workers and is in compliance with the 

associated regulatory requirements in 10 CFR Parts 19, 20, 30, 40, and 70. Public and 

environmental protection is discussed in Chapter 9 of this Safety Evaluation Report (SER).

4.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS

4.1.1 RADIATION PROTECTION PROGRAM

Regulations applicable to establishment of an RP program are presented in 10 CFR Part 20,

Subpart B, “Radiation Protection Programs.”

4.1.2 AS LOW AS IS REASONABLY ACHIEVABLE PROGRAM

Regulations applicable to the As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) program are 

presented in 10 CFR 20.1101, “Radiation Protection Programs.”

4.1.3 ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS

Regulations applicable to the organization and qualifications of the radiological protection staff 

are presented in 10 CFR 30.33(a)(3), 10 CFR 40.32(b), 10 CFR 70.22(a)(6), and 10 CFR 

70.23(a)(2).

4.1.4 WRITTEN PROCEDURES

The regulations applicable to RP procedures are presented in 10 CFR 40.32(c), 10 CFR 

70.22(a)(8), and 10 CFR 70.23(a)(4).

4.1.5 RADIATION PROTECTION TRAINING

The following regulations apply to the radiation safety training program:

• 10 CFR 19.12, "Instructions to Workers;" and

• 10 CFR 20.2110, "Form of Records.”

4.1.6 VENTILATION AND RESPIRATORY PROTECTION PROGRAMS

Regulations applicable to the ventilation and respiratory protection programs are presented in

10 CFR Part 20, Subpart H, “Respiratory Protection and Controls to Restrict Internal Exposure 

in Restricted Areas.”
4-2

4.1.7 RADIATION SURVEY AND MONITORING PROGRAMS

The following NRC regulations in 10 CFR Part 20 are applicable to radiation surveys and

monitoring programs:

• Subpart C, “Occupational Dose Limits;”

• Subpart F, “Surveys and Monitoring;”

• Subpart L, “Records;” and

• Subpart M, “Reports.”

4.1.8 ADDITIONAL PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS

The following regulations are applicable to the additional program requirements:

• 10 CFR Part 20, Subpart L, “Records;”

• 10 CFR Part 20, Subpart M, “Reports;”

• 10 CFR 70.61, “Performance Requirements;” and

• 10 CFR 70.74, “Additional Reporting Requirements.”

4.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

The guidance applicable to NRC’s review of the RP section of the License Application (LA) for 

the General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser LLC (GLE) Enrichment Facility (GLE, 2011a) is 

contained in Chapter 4 of the “Standard Review Plan for the Review of a License Application for 

a Fuel Cycle Facility,” NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). Chapter 4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is 

applicable in its entirety. The acceptance criteria applicable to this review are contained in 

Sections 4.4.1.3, 4.4.2.3, 4.4.3.3, 4.4.4.3, 4.4.5.3, 4.4.6.3, 4.4.7.3, and 4.4.8.3 of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002).

4.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

In Chapter 4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant describes its proposed RP program. The 

applicant states that the principles of the program will be in accordance with the ALARA 

principle, and that no individual will receive a radiation dose in excess of any regulatory limit 

(GLE, 2011a). The Facility Manager has overall responsibility for safety and activities 

conducted at the proposed facility (GLE, 2011a). The GLE President and Chief Executive 

Officer provides overall direction and management with the respect to design, construction, 

operation, and decommissioning activities (GLE, 2011a). This individual is responsible for 

ensuring the facility complies with all applicable regulatory requirements, ALARA principles, and 

establishing the basic policies of the Radiation Control Program (GLE, 2011a). The Facility 

Manager provides for safe and controlled operations and protection of the environment by 

delegating and assigning responsibility to qualified line management and area managers (GLE, 

2011a). The RP Manager (RPM) will be responsible for establishing and implementing the 

ALARA Program (GLE, 2011a). 
4-3

4.3.1 RP PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

The implementation of the RP program is addressed in Section 4.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). 

Additional information on responsibilities and qualifications for the RP program is found in 

Section 2.2.9.6 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). The following sections identify each acceptance 

criterion from Section 4.4.1.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and discuss the staff’s analysis as 

to whether the information provided by the applicant in the LA (GLE, 2011a) meets the 

acceptance criteria.

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.1.3(1) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to design and implement its RP program to meet the regulatory requirements 

in 10 CFR Part 20, Subpart B.

In Section 4.1.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states the facility will use 

approved, written procedures for the RP program, in accordance with 10 CFR Part 20 

Subpart B. Written procedures and engineering controls will be used to implement RP 

principles to comply with occupational dose limits and maintain constraints on 

atmospheric releases (GLE, 2011a). In Section 4.1.2 of the LA, the applicant states that 

it will follow the guidance of Regulatory Guide 8.10, “Operating Philosophy for 

Maintaining Occupational Radiation Exposures As Low As Reasonably Achievable” 

(NRC, 1977) and Regulatory Guide 8.2, “Guide for Administrative Practices in Radiation 

Monitoring” (NRC, 1973) to achieve occupational doses and doses to members of the 

public that are as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). Constraints on atmospheric 

releases will be established such that no member of the public would be expected to 

receive greater than 10 millirem per year (mrem/yr) total effective dose equivalent 

(TEDE) from exposure to the release (GLE, 2011a). Also, the RP program content and 

implementation would be reviewed at least annually (GLE, 2011a).

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.1.3(2) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to provide an outline of the RP Program structure and define the 

responsibilities of key program personnel

Information on responsibilities and qualifications of personnel in the RP program is found 

in Section 2.2.9.6 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). Section 2.2.7.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) 

states that the Environmental Health and Safety (EHS) Manager reports to the Facility 

Manager and has responsibility for directing activities to ensure that the proposed facility 

complies with appropriate rules, regulations, and codes, to include Nuclear Criticality 

Safety, RP, Material Control and Accounting, Security, Emergency Preparedness, 

Licensing, and Environmental Protection. The RP Manager (RPM) reports directly to the 

EHS Manager and will be responsible for annually reviewing the content and 

implementation of the RP Program (GLE, 2011a).

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.1.3(3) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to staff the RP program with suitably trained people, provide sufficient 

resources, and implement the program.

Section 4.1.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) states that the RP group will be staffed with trained 

individuals who will provide oversight and control of the technical aspects of the program 

elements that affect RP. Section 2.2.7.8 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) describes the level of 
4-4

training and experience required of the RPM and the senior RP staff. The applicant 

used American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society (ANSI/ANS) 

N3.1, “Selection, Qualification and Training of Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants,” 

(ANSI/ANS, 1999) and provisions contained in Sections 4.3.3, 4.4.5, and 4.5.3.2 of 

American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) E1168, “Standard Guide for 

Radiological Protection Training for Nuclear Facility Workers” (ASTM, 2008) to develop 

the qualifications of RP personnel (GLE, 2011a). 

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.1.3(4) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to commit to the independence of the radiation protection function from the 

facility’s operations.

Section 2.2.7.8 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) describes the RP function as independent of 

Operations, possessing authority to shutdown potentially unsafe operations. RPM 

responsibilities include maintaining RP Programs, procedures, and training; evaluating 

radiation exposures of employees, and providing guidance and direction for 

establishment and implementation of the RP Program (GLE, 2011a). Section 4.1.2.3 of 

the LA (GLE, 2011a) states the RPM has direct access to the Facility Manager for 

matters involving RP. 

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.1.3(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to review, at least annually, the content and implementation of the radiation 

protection program as required by 10 CFR 20.1101(c).

Section 4.1.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) commits to review, at least annually, the content 

and implementation of the RP program. Section 4.1.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) states it is 

the responsibility of the RPM and RP staff to perform audits of the program annually.

The staff reviewed the applicant’s RP program implementation against the acceptance criteria in

Sections 4.4.1.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and, based on its review, finds that the 

commitments in the LA (GLE, 2011a) satisfactorily address the acceptance criteria in Section 

4.4.1.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002).

4.3.2 ALARA PROGRAM

The implementation of the ALARA Program is addressed in Section 4.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). 

The staff reviewed the applicant’s ALARA program implementation against the acceptance 

criteria in Section 4.4.2.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The following sections identify each 

acceptance criterion from Section 4.4.2.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and discuss the staff’s 

analysis as to whether the information provided by the applicant in the LA (GLE, 2011a) meets 

the criteria.

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.2.3(1) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to establish a comprehensive, effective, and written ALARA program.

In Section 4.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant commits to an ALARA Program, 

which includes policies, goals and approved written policies and procedures. The 

applicant committed to design and implement the ALARA program consistently with 

Regulatory Guide 8.2 (NRC, 1973), Regulatory Guide 8.13, “Instructions Concerning 

Prenatal Radiation Exposure” (NRC, 1999a), Regulatory Guide 8.29, “Instructions 
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Concerning Risks From Occupational Radiation Exposure” (NRC, 1996), and Regulatory 

Guide 8.37, “ALARA Levels For Effluents From Materials Facilities” (NRC, 1993a). 

These regulatory guides provide guidance on acceptable radiation monitoring and 

control programs, occupational dose monitoring for pregnant women, information to be 

provided to workers that may receive occupational exposures, and establishing and 

maintaining programs for monitoring gaseous and liquid effluents to meet the ALARA 

requirements.

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.2.3(2) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to prepare policies and procedures to ensure occupational exposures are 

maintained ALARA, and that such exposures are consistent with the requirements of 10 

CFR 20.1101.

Section 4.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) states that approved, written policies and procedures 

govern the implementation of the ALARA program. In Section 4.2.3 of the LA (GLE, 

2011a), the applicant states that the principles of the program will be to maintain 

personnel radiation exposures less than the applicable regulatory limit and the release of 

radioactive effluents in accordance with the ALARA principle to ensure that no individual 

receives a radiation dose in excess of any regulatory limit. Approved written procedures 

dictate atmospheric releases will be monitored and measured (GLE, 2011a). Section 

4.2.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) states that doses to the public will be calculated to ensure 

compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1101(d).

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.2.3(3) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to outline specific ALARA program goals, establish an ALARA program 

organization and structure, and have written procedures for its implementation in the 

facility design and operations.

As previously stated, approved, written policies and procedures govern the 

implementation of the ALARA program (GLE, 2011a). In Section 2.0 of the LA (GLE, 

2011a), the applicant states that the Facility Manager has overall responsibility for 

establishing these principles and the RPM is responsible for establishing and 

implementing the ALARA program. Section 4.2.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) states that 

constraints on atmospheric releases will be in place to ensure no member of the public 

receives a Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) in excess of 10 millirem per year. In 

Section 4.2.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that radiation exposures will 

be monitored and the annual average concentration of radioactive material released in 

gaseous and liquid effluents at the boundary of the unrestricted area will be in 

compliance with 10 CFR 20.1302, “Compliance with Dose Limits for Individual Members 

of the Public,” and will not exceed the values in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, “Annual 

Limits on Intake (ALIs) and Derived Air Concentrations (DACs) of Radionuclides for 

Occupational Exposure; Effluent Concentrations; Concentrations for Release to 

Sewerage,” Table 2.

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.2.3(4) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to establish an ALARA Committee, or equivalent organization, with sufficient 

staff, resources, and clear responsibilities to ensure that the occupational radiation 

exposure dose limits specified in 10 CFR Part 20 are not exceeded under normal 

operations.
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The applicant states in Section 2.2.8.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), that it has established an 

independent advisory committee, the Facility Safety Review Committee (FSRC). The 

FSRC provides the Facility Manager with an independent overview of the safety of 

operations, and provides management with guidance relative to involvement in safety 

risks (GLE, 2011a). The committee provides professional advice and counsel on 

Environmental Protection, nuclear criticality safety (NCS), RP, and Industrial Safety 

issues affecting nuclear activities (GLE, 2011a). The FSRC is responsible for 

completing an annual ALARA review which considers RP training, contamination 

controls, environmental monitoring, and review of new procedures or technologies (GLE, 

2011a). The FSRC is responsible to the Facility Manager (GLE, 2011a). The 

committee's proceedings, findings and recommendations are reported in writing to the 

Facility Manager, appropriate line management, and appropriate area manager(s) 

responsible for operations (GLE, 2011a). Such reports shall be retained for a minimum 

of three years (GLE, 2011a). The committee shall hold a minimum of three meetings 

each calendar year with a maximum interval of 180 days between any two consecutive 

meetings (GLE, 2011a).

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.2.3(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to use the ALARA program as a mechanism to facilitate interaction between 

RP and operations personnel.

The ALARA Program is structured to be a means of promoting interaction between RP 

and Operations personnel. Section 4.2.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) states both RP and 

Operations personnel serve on the Radiation Safety Committee (RSC). RP personnel 

interact with Operations Personnel in the preparation of Radiation Work Permits (RWPs) 

for specific radiological hazards associated with the work environment. RP and 

Operations personnel also interact in the performance of safety audits (GLE, 2011a).

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.2.3(6) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to regularly review and revise, when appropriate, the ALARA program goals 

and objectives and to incorporate, when appropriate, new approaches, technologies, 

operating procedures or changes that could reduce potential radiation exposures at a 

reasonable cost.

In Section 4.2.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that it will establish an 

RSC, whose objective is to maintain occupational radiation exposures ALARA through 

improvements in operations and will advise the Facility Manager on RP concerns. The 

committee will meet monthly to maintain a continual awareness of the status of projects, 

performance measurement and trends, and the current radiological safety conditions of 

site activities (GLE, 2011a). The maximum interval between meetings shall not exceed 

60 days (GLE, 2011a). A written report of each RSC meeting will be forwarded to the 

appropriate line management, area managers, and the EHS Manager (GLE, 2011a). 

Records of the committee proceedings will be maintained for a minimum of three years 

(GLE, 2011a). The committee consists of managers or representatives from key 

functions with activities affecting radiological safety (GLE, 2011a). The RSC will monitor 

trends in occupational exposure and effluent releases, identify potential radiological 

safety hazards, review results of audits and proposed activities, and promote continued 

improvement in limiting employee radiological exposures (GLE, 2011a). 
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The staff reviewed the applicant’s ALARA program against the acceptance criteria in Section 

4.4.2.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and, based on its review, finds that the commitments in 

the LA (GLE, 2011a) satisfactorily address the acceptance criteria in Section 4.4.2.3 of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002).

4.3.3 ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS

The staff reviewed the applicant’s organization and personnel qualifications against the 

acceptance criteria in NUREG-1520, Section 4.4.3.3 (NRC, 2002). The following sections 

identify each acceptance criterion from NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and discuss the staff’s 

analysis as to whether the information provided by the applicant in the LA (GLE, 2011a) meets 

the criteria.

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.3.3(1) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to appoint suitably trained RP personnel and identify their authority and 

responsibilities.

Section 4.1.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) states the RP Program section will be staffed with 

adequately trained personnel to implement an effective program. Section 2.2.7.8 of the 

LA (GLE, 2011a) describes the education and experience requirements for the RPM and 

senior engineer. Sections 4.1.2 and 4.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) describe information 

regarding the structure of key personnel and the RP organization and staff qualifications. 

As stated in Section 4.3.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant stated that 

organizational requirements will be consistent with the guidance of Regulatory Guides 

8.2 (NRC, 1973) and 8.10 (NRC, 1977).

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.3.3(2) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to establish clear organizational relationships among the individual positions 

responsible for the radiation protection program and other line managers.

Section 2.2.7.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) describes that the EHS Manager reports to the 

Facility Manager and has responsibility for directing activities to ensure that the 

proposed facility complies with appropriate rules, regulations, and codes, to include 

Nuclear Criticality Safety, RP, Material Control and Accounting, Security, Emergency 

Preparedness, Licensing, and Environmental Protection. Section 2.2.7.8 of the LA 

(GLE, 2011a) describes the responsibilities of the RP function. The RPM reports directly 

to the EHS Manager and will be responsible for annually reviewing the content and 

implementation of the RP Program (GLE, 2011a). The RPM directs the RP program and 

will be responsible for the implementation of the RP program (GLE, 2011a). Section 

4.1.2.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) states the RPM has direct access to the Facility Manager 

for matters involving RP and is independent from the Operations and Technical Services 

Organizations (GLE, 2011a). 

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.3.3(3) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to appoint a suitably educated, experienced, and trained RP program director 

(typically referred to as the radiation safety officer) who: (1) has direct access to the 

facility manager; (2) is skilled in the interpretation of data and regulations pertinent to 

radiation protection; (3) is familiar with the operation of the facility and RP concerns of 
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the site; (4) is used as a resource in radiation safety management decisions and (5) will 

be responsible for establishing and implementing the radiation protection program.

In Section 2.2.7.8 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that the RPM will have, 

as a minimum, a bachelor’s degree in engineering or scientific field, as well as three 

years experience including assignments involving responsibilities in RP or the 

application and direction of RP programs. 

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.3.3(4) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is to assign 

responsibility to the radiation protection program staff for implementation of the radiation 

program functions. 

Section 4.1.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) assigns responsibilities to the RP Manager and 

staff in multiple areas, including the establishment and maintenance of the RP Program, 

development of RP Procedures, staffing of the RP Program, monitoring of exposures, 

source control, training, performance of audits, posting of spaces, and environmental 

monitoring. Section 4.3.1 specifies the technical qualification requirements for the RP 

Manager and RP personnel at the proposed facility.

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.3.3(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to describe the minimum training requirements and qualifications for the RP 

director and staff.

In Section 2.2.7.8 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant describes the responsibilities 

central to the RP function, to include the minimum educational requirements of the RPM 

and senior engineers in the RP group. Section 4.3.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) states the 

RP Training Program is consistent with the guidance of ANSI/ANS N3.1 (ANSI/ANS, 

1999) and American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) E1168, “Standard Guide 

for Radiological Protection for Nuclear Facility Workers” (ASTM, 2008). 

The staff reviewed the applicant’s organization and personnel qualifications against the 

acceptance criteria in Sections 4.4.3.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and, based on its review, 

finds that the commitments in the LA (GLE, 2011a) satisfactorily address the application 

acceptance criteria in Section 4.4.3.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002).

4.3.4 WRITTEN PROCEDURES

The staff reviewed the applicant’s written procedure commitments against the acceptance 

criteria in NUREG-1520, Section 4.4.4.3 (NRC, 2002). The following sections identify each 

acceptance criterion from NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and discuss the staff’s analysis as to 

whether the information provided by the applicant in the LA (GLE, 2011a) meets the criteria.

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.4.3(1) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to prepare written, approved RP procedures to carry out activities related to the 

RP program.

In Section 4.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant describes the commitment to 

maintain and prepare approved written RP procedures that will be prepared in 

accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 70.22(a)(8). Section 4.4.2 of the LA (GLE, 

2011a) states RP procedures will be prepared, reviewed, and approved to carry out 
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activities related to the RP program. They would also be used to ensure RP activities 

are conducted in a safe, effective, and consistent manner (GLE, 2011a). RP Procedures 

are distributed to affected managers and available to GLE employees and certain 

procedures require periodic review (GLE, 2011a).

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.4.3(2) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to specify how the radiation protection procedures will be prepared, authorized, 

approved, and distributed.

Section 4.4.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) states that routine work performed in Radiological 

Controlled Areas (RCAs) will be managed through the use of approved written 

procedures developed as described in Section 11.4 of the LA (GLE, 2010a). In Section 

4.4.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant describes specific commitments to 

preparation and maintenance of RP procedures, including the approval of RP 

procedures and the approval of any revisions to the procedures to be completed by the 

RPM. Section 4.4.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) states that the RPM or designee will 

approve any RWP prior to issue of the procedure. Section 4.4.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) 

states RP procedures are reviewed and revised, as necessary, to incorporate any facility 

or operational changes, or changes to the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA).

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.4.3(3) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to specify written, approved RWPs for activities involving licensed material that 

are not covered by written RP procedures.

Section 4.4.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) states that non-routine activities are administered

through an RWP system. The RWP system is described in approved written procedures 

(GLE, 2011a). RWPs are issued for unanticipated work or maintenance, and must be 

approved by the RPM or designee (GLE, 2011a). The RWP specifies necessary 

controls, personnel monitoring devices, and protective clothing (GLE, 2011a). RWPs 

have expiration dates and a copy of all RWPs must be retained for the life of the facility 

(GLE, 2011a). The applicant describes in Section 11.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), a 

management measures program in which procedures are prepared, reviewed, and 

approved. In Section 4.4.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant describes specific 

commitments to preparation and maintenance of RP procedures, including the approval 

of RP procedures and the approval of any revisions to the procedures to be completed 

by the RPM. 

The staff reviewed the applicant’s written procedure commitments against the acceptance 

criteria in Sections 4.4.4.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and, based on its review, finds that the 

commitments in the LA (GLE, 2011a) satisfactorily address the acceptance criteria in Section 

4.4.4.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002).

4.3.5 TRAINING

The staff reviewed the applicant’s training commitments against the acceptance criteria in 

NUREG-1520, Section 4.4.5.3 (NRC, 2002). The following sections identify each acceptance 

criterion from NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and discuss the staff’s analysis as to whether the 

information provided by the applicant in the LA (GLE, 2011a) meets the criteria.
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• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.5.3(1) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to design and implement an employee RP training program that complies with 

the requirements of 10 CFR Parts 19 and 20.

In Section 4.5.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant describes the training 

requirements for workers likely to receive an occupational dose in excess of 100 millirem 

in one year. The required level of RP training is based on the potential radiological 

health risks associated with an employee's work responsibilities (GLE, 2011a). This 

training program outlines the requirements of 10 CFR 19.12(a) and the workers’ 

responsibilities under the applicant’s RP program (GLE, 2011a). Training will be 

consistent with ASTM 1168 (ASTM, 2008).

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.5.3(2) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to provide training, to all personnel and visitors entering restricted areas, that is 

commensurate with the health risk to which they may be exposed, or provide trained 

escorts who have received the training.

In Section 4.5.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that it will require workers, 

contractors, and visitors who enter controlled areas of the facility to be trained to the 

appropriate level, commensurate with the hazards. Visitors are escorted by trained 

personnel (GLE, 2011a).

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.5.3(3) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to provide a level of training based on the potential radiological health risks 

associated with that employee’s work responsibilities.

Section 4.5.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) states that different training requirements will be 

established, suited to the need of the individual, and commensurate with the level of 

radiological risk. In Section 4.5.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant committed to 

provide a level of training based on the potential radiological health risks associated with 

the individual’s work responsibilities. 

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.5.3(4) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to incorporate, in the RP training program, the provisions in 10 CFR 19.12 and 

topics such as: correct handling of radioactive materials; minimization of exposures to 

radiation or radioactive materials; access and egress controls and escort procedures; 

radiation safety principles, policies, and procedures; monitoring for internal and external 

exposures; monitoring instruments; contamination control, including protective clothing 

and equipment; ALARA and exposure limits; radiation hazards and health risks; and, 

emergency response.

In Section 4.5.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant describes the training 

requirements for workers likely to receive an occupational dose in excess of 100 millirem 

in one year. The required level of RP training is based on the potential radiological 

health risks associated with an employee's work responsibilities (GLE, 2011a). This 

training program outlines the requirements of 10 CFR 19.12(a) and the workers’ 

responsibilities under the applicant’s RP program (GLE, 2011a). In accordance with the 

regulatory requirements, the workers will be:
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• Kept informed of the storage, transfer, or use of radioactive material;

• Instructed in health protection issues associated with exposure to radiation and 

radioactive material, precautions or procedures to minimize exposure, and the 

purpose and function of protective devices employed;

• Required to observe, to the extent within the worker's control, the applicable 

provisions of the NRC regulations and licenses for protection of personnel from 

exposure to radiation and radioactive material;

• Instructed of their responsibility to promptly report to management any condition 

that may lead to or cause a violation of NRC regulations and licenses, or result in 

unnecessary exposure to radiation and radioactive material;

• Instructed on the appropriate response to warnings made in the event of any 

unusual occurrence or malfunction that may involve exposure to radiation and 

radioactive material; and

• Advised of the various notifications and reports that a worker may request 

pursuant to 10 CFR 19.13, Notifications and Reports to Individuals (GLE, 2011a).

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.5.3(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to review the radiation protection training program at least every 3 years and 

conduct refresher training at least every 3 years that will accurately address changes in 

policies, procedures, requirements, and the facility ISA.

Section 4.5.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) states that the contents of the training program will 

be reviewed bi-annually and the review will address policies, procedures, requirements, 

and changes to the ISA. In addition, refresher training will be completed annually, not to 

exceed 15 months (GLE, 2011a). Section 4.5.6 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) states the 

majority of the training would be conducted via computer-based training and evaluation. 

There are classroom instructors, authorized by the facility, used as needed (GLE, 

2011a). Practical examination is also a part of the training, dependent upon work 

requirements and employee qualifications (GLE, 2011a). 

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.5.3(6) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to review and evaluate the effectiveness and adequacy of the training 

program’s curriculum and instructors.

Section 4.5.6 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) states that the content of the formal training 

program would be reviewed and updated at least every two years by the RP and NCS 

Managers, to ensure the program is current and up to date. 

The staff reviewed the applicant’s training commitments against the acceptance criteria in 

Sections 4.4.5.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and, based on its review, finds that the 

commitments in the LA (GLE, 2011a) satisfactorily address the acceptance criteria in Section 

4.4.5.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002).

4.3.6 VENTILATION AND RESPIRATORY PROTECTION PROGRAMS

The staff reviewed the applicant’s ventilation and respiratory protection program commitments 

against the acceptance criteria in NUREG-1520, Section 4.4.6.3 (NRC, 2002). The following 

sections identify each acceptance criterion from NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and discuss the 
4-12

staff’s analysis as to whether the information provided by the applicant in the LA (GLE, 2011a) 

meets the criteria.

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.6.3(1) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to install appropriately sized ventilation and containment systems in areas of 

the facility identified in the ISA Summary as having potential airborne concentrations of 

radionuclides that could exceed the occupational, DAC values specified in 10 CFR Part 

20, Appendix B, during normal operations.

In Section 4.6 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant describes the facility ventilation and 

respiratory protection programs. Design features of the ventilation systems are 

described in Section 3.3.2.4 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b). Section 4.6.1 of the LA 

(GLE, 2011a) commits to the use of several engineering controls, including ventilation 

and containment systems to ensure airborne exposures are kept below regulatory limits 

in accordance with Subpart H of 10 CFR Part 20. The Operations Building ventilation 

system has a closed Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) and Monitored 

Central Exhaust (MCES) system, providing airflow from areas of lesser potential 

contamination to areas of higher potential contamination (GLE, 2011a). Ventilations 

systems for potentially contaminated areas exhaust to the environment through the 

Operations Building stack (GLE, 2011a). Potentially contaminated air is exhausted 

through High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filters and High Efficiency Gas Absorber 

(HEGA) filter media to remove particulates and gaseous contaminants (GLE, 2011a). 

Potentially contaminated air is exhausted through HEPA filters that are 99.97 percent 

efficient for removal of 0.3 micron particles (GLE, 2011a). Hoods and other localized 

ventilation designs are utilized to minimize personnel exposure to airborne uranium and 

hydrogen fluoride (HF) and ensure exposures are meet administrative and regulatory 

limits (GLE, 2011a). Section 4.6.1.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) commits to ventilation 

systems adequate to ensure the DAC values of Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 20 are not 

exceeded.

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.6.3(2) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to describe management measures, including preventive and corrective 

maintenance and performance testing, to ensure that the ventilation and containment 

systems designated as IROFS operate when required, and are within their design 

specifications.

Section 4.6.1.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) states that ventilation systems that are IROFS 

are monitored on a regular basis, as a routine part of the operating process (GLE, 

2011a). Operations and maintenance are performed using approved written procedures 

as described in Section 11.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). The various programs that pertain 

to preventive and corrective maintenance are described in Section 11.2 of the LA (GLE, 

2011a). 

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.6.3(3) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to describe the design criteria for the ventilation and containment systems, 

including minimum flow velocity at openings in these systems, maximum differential 

pressure across filters and types of filters to be used. 

Section 4.6.1.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) states that all effluents released from potentially 

contaminated areas would be filtered to remove radioactive particulates before release. 
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Section 4.6.1.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) states that systems would contain HEPA and 

other prefilters, as needed. The ventilation systems will be designed to maintain the 

potentially contaminated areas at a slightly negative pressure relative to the 

uncontaminated areas, to ensure airflow direction is from areas of little or no 

contamination to areas of higher contamination (GLE, 2011a). Approved, written 

procedures will be used to specify filter inspection, testing, maintenance, and change-out 

(GLE, 2011a). Additional features of the ventilation systems are described in Table 4-1 

of the LA (GLE, 2011a). 

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.6.3(4) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to describe the frequency and types of tests to measure ventilation and 

containment system performance, the acceptance criteria, and actions to be taken when 

the acceptance criteria are not satisfied.

Section 3.4.9 of the ISA Summary (GLE 2011b) states that effluent air streams will be 

continuously monitored to assess uranium concentration and daily for gross alpha 

activity. Section 1.1.2.1.9 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) states the Monitored Central Exhaust 

System (MCES) is designed to remove both UF6 and HF. In Section 4.6.1.4 of the LA 

(GLE, 2011a), the applicant describes testing of ventilation and containment systems. 

Differential pressure across high efficiency particulate air filters in potentially 

contaminated exhaust systems would be monitored monthly or automatically (GLE, 

2011a). Automatic monitors would have alarm features (GLE, 2011a). Filters would be 

replaced when differential pressure exceeds the manufacturers’ ratings or if the filters fail 

to function properly (GLE, 2011a).

In Section 4.6.1.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), for local or hood use, the applicant commits 

to maintaining the average air velocity above 80 linear feet per minute (GLE, 2011a). 

Airflows and differential pressures will be checked monthly or after significant 

modifications to the ventilation system (GLE, 2011a). Table 4-1, “Specific Facilities and 

Capabilities,” of the LA (GLE, 2011a), indicates that high velocity local ventilation airflow 

will be maintained at an average of 200 linear feet per minute (GLE, 2011a). Potentially 

contaminated exhaust systems are monitored at least monthly and alarmed (GLE, 

2011a). 

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.6.3(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to establish a respiratory protection program that meets the requirements of 10 

CFR Part 20, Subpart H.

Section 4.6.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) discusses the establishment of the respiratory 

protection program, in accordance with 10 CFR 20, Subpart H. Engineering controls 

would be used to the maximum extent possible and, if the decision is made to permit the 

use of respiratory protection equipment to limit the intake of radioactive material, only 

National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) certified equipment would 

be used (GLE, 2011a). In Section 4.6.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states the 

design of the respiratory protection program would be consistent with Regulatory Guide 

8.15, “Acceptable Programs for Respiratory Protection,” (NRC 1999). 

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.6.3(6) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to prepare written procedures for the selection, fitting, issuance, maintenance, 
4-14

maintenance, testing, training of personnel, monitoring, and recordkeeping for individual 

respiratory protection equipment, and for specifying when such equipment is to be used.

Section 4.6.2.2.of the LA (GLE, 2011a) states that approved written procedures will be 

used to control respiratory equipment, including selection, fit testing, inventory, 

maintenance, recordkeeping, and cleaning. Section 4.6.2.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) 

describes the proper techniques for fitness testing and mask fit will be re-evaluated 

annually. In Section 4.6.2.2.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that the 

determination of medical fitness to use respiratory protection equipment is made by a 

physician. Individuals are evaluated periodically thereafter, at a frequency specified by a 

physician (GLE, 2011a). The applicant committed to develop written procedures for the 

respiratory protection program to address the following subjects:

• Monitoring, including air sampling and bioassays;

• Supervision and training of respirator users;

• Fit testing;

• Respirator selection;

• Breathing air quality;

• Inventory and control;

• Storage, issuance, maintenance, repair, testing, and quality assurance of 

respiratory protection equipment;

• Record keeping; and,

• Limitations on periods of respirator use and relief from respirator use.

In Section 4.6.2.2.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that testing of 

respiratory equipment will be in accordance with manufacturers’ instructions in 

accordance with the NIOSH specification for each respiratory device (GLE, 2011a). 

Section 4.6.2.2.6 states training in the proper use of respiratory equipment will be 

conducted by a qualified instructor (GLE, 2011a). Recordkeeping will comply with 10 

CFR Part 20, Subpart L, and the applicant’s records management procedures in Section 

11.7 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). 

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.6.3(7) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to revise the written procedures for use of individual respiratory protection 

equipment as applicable, when processing, facility, or equipment changes are made.

Section 4.6.2.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) states that respiratory protection procedures 

would be revised as necessary, in accordance with procedures identified in Section 

11.4.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). 

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.6.3(8) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to maintain records of the respiratory protection program, including training for 

respirator use, and maintenance.

Section 4.6.2.2.8 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) addresses recordkeeping, specifying 

approved, written procedures, consistent with 10 CFR Part 20 Subpart L. Records for 

the respiratory protection program (including training for respirator use and 

maintenance) would be maintained in accordance with the facility records management 

program as described in Section 11.7 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). Section 11.7 of the LA 

(GLE, 2011a) discusses control of records and maintenance of the master file. 
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The staff reviewed the applicant’s ventilation and respiratory protection program against the 

acceptance criteria in Sections 4.4.6.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and, based on its review, 

finds that the commitments in the LA (GLE, 2011a) satisfactorily address the acceptance criteria 

in Section 4.4.6.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002).

4.3.7 RADIATION SURVEY AND MONITORING PROGRAMS

The staff reviewed the applicant’s radiation survey and monitoring program commitments 

against the acceptance criteria in NUREG-1520, Section 4.4.7.3 (NRC, 2002). The following 

sections identify each acceptance criterion from NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and discuss the 

staff’s analysis as to whether the information provided by the applicant in the LA (GLE, 2011a) 

meets the criteria.

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.7.3(1) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to have radiation survey and monitoring programs consistent with the 

requirements of 10 CFR Part 20, Subpart F.

In Section 4.7 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant describes its radiation survey and 

monitoring programs, which are based on the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20, Subpart 

F, and implemented through approved, written procedures. Aspects of the program are 

airborne and surface contamination and personnel dosimetry (GLE, 2011a). In Section 

4.7 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), The applicant states that the radiation survey and 

monitoring program will be consistent with the guidance set forth in Regulatory Guide 8.2 

(NRC, 1973), Regulatory Guide 8.7, “Instructions for Recording and Reporting 

Occupational Radiation Dose Data” (NRC, 2005), and Regulatory Guide 8.9, 

“Acceptable Concepts, Models, Equations, and Assumptions for a Bioassay Program” 

(NRC, 1993h). 

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.7.3(2) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to prepare written procedures for the radiation survey and monitoring program 

that include an outline of the program objectives, sampling procedures, data analysis 

methods, types of equipment and instrumentation to be used, frequency of 

measurements, recordkeeping and reporting requirements, and actions to be taken 

when measurements exceed 10 CFR Part 20 occupational dose limits or administrative 

levels established by the applicant.

Section 4.7.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) states that written procedures will be developed 

and approved to identify survey and monitoring objectives, as well as procedures and 

methods of data analysis. Instrumentation to be used, as well as frequency of 

measurements, will be specified (GLE, 2011a). Recordkeeping and reporting 

requirements and actions to be taken for exceeding certain thresholds will be 

established (GLE, 2011a). Section 4.7 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) states that Regulatory 

Guide 8.7 will be used administratively for this program.

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.7.3(3) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to design and implement a personnel monitoring program for external 

occupational radiation exposures that outlines methods or procedures to:
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a. Identify the criteria for worker participation in the program;

b. Identify the types of radiation to the monitored;

c. Specify how exposures will be measured, assessed and recorded;

d. Identify the type and sensitivity of personal dosimeters to be used, when they will 

be used, and how the collected data will be processed and evaluated; and

e. Identify the facility’s administrative exposure levels or action levels at which 

actions are taken to investigate the cause of exposures exceeding these levels.

Section 4.7.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) states that approved written procedures will be 

used and personnel dosimeters are distributed to individuals based on their job 

functions, commensurate with the amount of time an individual spends working with or 

near radioactive materials. Personnel monitoring includes issuance of 

Thermoluminescent Dosimeters (TLDs) for personnel entering Radiologically Controlled 

Areas (RCAs) to measure external dose (GLE, 2011a). Dosimetry is National Voluntary 

Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) approved and will be sensitive to the 

appropriate type of radiation to be monitored and distribution commensurate with the job 

function (GLE, 2011a). Personnel dosimeters will be processed by a NVLAP accredited 

vendor. Action guides for external exposures are established in written procedures also 

(GLE, 2011a). Expedited processing for emergent circumstance is available (GLE, 

2011a). Section 4.2.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) describes that an administrative control 

limit of 80 percent of the limits of 10 CFR 20.1201 is imposed. Exceeding an 

administrative limit invokes an investigation by the RPM (GLE, 2011a). 

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.7.3(4) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to “design and implement a personnel monitoring program, for internal 

occupational radiation exposures, based on the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1201, 

20.1204, and 20.1502(b), that outlines methods or procedures to:

a. Identify the criteria for worker participation in the program;

b. Identify the type of sampling to be used, the frequency of collection and 

measurement, and the minimum detection levels;

c. Specify how worker intakes will be measured, assessed, and recorded;

d. Specify how the data will be processed, evaluated, and interpreted; and

e. Identify the facility’s administrative exposure levels or the levels at which actions 

are taken to investigate the causes of exposures exceeding these levels.

In Section 4.7.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that a personnel monitoring 

program for internal exposures is implemented under approved, written procedures. The 

applicant commits to monitoring internal occupational radiation exposures based on the 

requirements of 10 CFR 20.1201, 10 CFR 20.1204, 10 CFR 20.1502(b), and 10 CFR 

20.1704(i) (GLE, 2011a). This program includes a urinalysis program for personnel who 

work in areas where soluble airborne uranium intakes could result in exceeding 10 

percent of the limit established in 10 CFR 20.1201 (GLE, 2011a). An in vivo lung 

counting program is described in Section 4.7.4.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) and established 

for personnel working in areas where insoluble uranium compounds are processed and 

calls for baseline and termination counting. Action levels are established in approved, 

written procedures to prevent an individual from exceeding the occupational exposure 

limits specified in 10 CFR 20.1201 (GLE, 2011a). The guidance of Regulatory Guide 8.9 

(NRC, 1993h) is used (GLE, 2011a). Additionally, personnel who are assigned an intake 
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of 10 percent of the applicable Annual Limit on Intake (ALI) are monitored annually 

(GLE, 2011a).

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.7.3(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1202 for summation of external 

and internal occupational radiation exposures through the use of procedures such as 

those outlined in Regulatory Guide 8.7 or 8.34.

Section 4.7.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) addresses summation of external and internal 

occupational dose by procedure. Regulatory Guide 8.9 (NRC, 1993h) is the basis for 

programs used (GLE, 2011a). In addition, the guidance of Regulatory Guide 8.34, 

“Monitoring Criteria and methods to Calculate Occupational Radiation Doses” (NRC, 

1992a) is used in determination of internal doses (GLE, 2011a).

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.7.3(6) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to design and implement an air sampling program in areas of the facility 

identified as potential airborne radioactivity areas, to conduct air surveys, and to 

calibrate and maintain the airborne sampling equipment in accordance with the 

manufacturer’s recommendations.

In Section 4.7.6 of LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that an air sampling program 

will be established for the facility as another means of assessing potential airborne 

contamination in support of the internal monitoring program. Procedures will be 

established to direct the conduct of air surveys, and to calibrate and maintain airborne 

sampling equipment according to manufacturers' recommendations (GLE, 2011a). 

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.7.3(7) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to implement additional procedures, as may be required by 10 CFR Part 20 

and the ISA Summary, to control the concentration of airborne radioactive material (e.g., 

control of access, limitation of exposure times to licensed materials, and use of 

respiratory protection equipment).

Section 4.7.7 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) states that continuous air sampling will be 

conducted in areas where airborne concentrations can exceed 0.1 DAC averaged over 

40 hours (GLE, 2011a). Written procedures will guide the program and include 

investigation of any air sample exceeding 2.5 DAC over 8 hours (GLE, 2011a). 

Regulatory Guide 8.25, “Air Sampling in the Workplace” (NRC, 1992b) is cited as the 

basis of guidance for the air sampling program (GLE, 2011a). 

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.7.3(8) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to conduct a contamination survey program in areas of the facility identified in 

the ISA Summary most likely to be radiologically contaminated (the program must 

include the types and frequencies of surveys for various areas of the facility and the 

action levels and actions to be taken when contamination levels are exceeded).

In Section 4.7.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that the routine survey 

program will be established by approved written procedures to determine workplace 

radiological conditions, to determine effectiveness of contamination control measures, 

and to ensure identification and posting of radiological hazards. In Section 4.7.9 of the 

LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant stated that routine surveys will be carried out in areas 
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most likely to be contaminated as well as other operational areas. The procedures that 

would be developed to implement the programs would include an outline of the program 

objectives, sampling procedures, data analysis methods, types of equipment and 

instrumentation to be used, frequency of measurements, recordkeeping and reporting 

requirements, and actions to be taken when measurements exceed 10 CFR Part 20’s 

occupational dose limits or the administrative levels established by the applicant (GLE, 

2011a).

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.7.3(9) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to implement the facility’s corrective action program when the results of 

personnel monitoring or contamination surveys exceed the applicant’s administrative 

personnel contamination levels.

Section 4.7.10 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) describes the establishment of a Corrective 

Action Program for personnel contamination. Requirements are established for reducing 

the potential for the spread of contamination (GLE, 2011a). In Section 4.7.10 of the LA 

(GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that protective clothing and disposable Personal 

Protective Equipment (PPE) will be provided for persons entering RCAs where the 

potential for personnel contamination exists as determined by RP staff. Change rooms 

will be provided for personnel exiting these areas (GLE, 2011a). The applicant requires 

monitoring of personnel exiting RCAs (GLE, 2011a). Contamination identified above 

background levels requires decontamination and assistance from the RP function to 

oversee decontamination processes (GLE, 2011a). Protective clothing requirements are 

identified in the LA, Table 4-2, “Personnel Protective Clothing” (GLE, 2011a). RP 

assistance is directed for instances of facial contamination or difficult decontamination 

(GLE, 2011a).

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.7.3(10) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to implement the facility’s corrective action program when any incident results

in airborne occupational exposures to radiation exceeding the facility’s administrative 

limits, or the dose limits in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, or 10 CFR 70.61.

Section 11.8.16 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) describes the use of approved written 

procedures specify requirements for identification and classification of conditions 

adverse to quality, trending of significant conditions adverse to quality, criteria for 

determining trends, and follow-up action to be taken to verify implementation of 

corrective action. Significant conditions, their causes, and corrective actions are 

documented, reported to appropriate levels of management, and follow-up action is 

taken to verify implementation of corrective actions (GLE, 2011a).

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.7.3(11) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to use equipment and instrumentation with sufficient sensitivity for the type or 

types of radiation being measured and to calibrate and maintain equipment and 

instrumentation in accordance with manufacturers’ recommendations.

RP instrumentation uses and ranges are listed in the LA, Table 4.3, “Types and Uses of 

Available Instrumentation” (GLE, 2011a). The instruments will be sufficient in number 

and selected to measure the types and energies of radiation encountered in facility 

operations (GLE, 2011a). The applicant commits to calibrating instruments before initial 

use, after major maintenance, and on a routine basis (GLE, 2011a). Portable 
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instrumentation is calibrated in accordance with Institute of Electrical and Electronics 

Engineers (IEEE) IEEE N323, “American National Standard Radiation Protection 

Instrumentation Test and Calibration” (IEEE, 1978) and manufacturing recommendations 

before initial use, after major maintenance, and on a routine basis following the last 

calibration (GLE, 2011a).

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.7.3(12) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to establish policies to ensure equipment and materials removed from 

restricted areas to unrestricted areas are not contaminated above the specified release 

levels in NRC Branch Technical Position, “Guidelines for Decontamination of Facilities 

and Equipment Prior to Release for Unrestricted Use or Termination of Licenses for 

Byproduct, Source, or Special Nuclear Material,” (NRC, 1993b).

In Section 4.7.13 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that it will restrict the 

release of materials, equipment, and other items for unrestricted use if removable 

surface contamination levels equal or exceed those specified in NRC’s Branch Technical 

Position entitled, “Guidelines for Decontamination of Facilities and Equipment prior to 

Release for Unrestricted Use or Termination of Licenses for Byproduct, Source, or 

Special Nuclear Material” (NRC, 1993b). In Section 1.2.5.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the 

applicant requested a special authorization to use “Guidelines for Decontamination of 

Facilities and Equipment prior to Release for Unrestricted Use or Termination of 

Licenses for Byproduct, Source, or Special Nuclear Material” (NRC, 1993b). The 

evaluation of the special authorization is further discussed in Section 1.2.3.7.1 of this 

SER. For the reasons stated in Section 1.2.3.7.1 of this SER, the special authorization 

request is acceptable, and the special authorization is granted.

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.7.3(13) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to leak-test all sealed sources in accordance with the following NRC Branch 

Technical Positions: 1) “License Condition for Leak-Testing Sealed Byproduct Material 

Sources” (NRC, 1993c); 2) “License Condition for Leak-Testing Sealed Plutonium 

Sources” (NRC, 1993d); 3) “License Condition for Plutonium Alpha Sources” (NRC, 

1993e); 4) “License Condition for Leak-Testing Sealed Source Which Contains Alpha 

and/or Beta-Gamma Emitters” (NRC, 1993f); and 5) “License Condition for Leak-Testing 

Sealed Uranium Sources” (NRC, 1993g).

The storage and leak-testing of sealed sources is addressed in Section 4.7.14 of the LA 

(GLE, 2011a). As described in Section 4.7.14 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant 

committed to use Branch Technical Position, “License Condition for Leak-Testing 

Byproduct Material Sources” (NRC, 1993c) and Regulatory Guide 8.24 “Health Physics 

Surveys During Enriched Uranium-235 Processing and Fuel Fabrication” (NRC, 1979). 

In accordance with these guidance documents, the applicant will: 1) store sealed 

sources when not in use in a closed container designed to contain radioactive material; 

2) leak test sealed sources containing more than 100 microcuries (μCi) of beta or 

gamma emitting material or more than 10 Curies (Ci) of alpha emitting material, other 

than H3, with a half-life greater than 30 days and in any form other than gas, for leakage 

or contamination at intervals not to exceed 6 months (GLE, 2011a); and 3) test sealed 

plutonium alpha sources containing 0.1 Ci or more of plutonium when in use at least 

every 3 months (GLE, 2011a).
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• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.7.3(14) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to establish and implement an access control program that ensures that: (a) 

signs, labels, and other access controls are properly posted and operative; (b) restricted 

areas are established to prevent the spread of contamination and are identified with 

appropriate signs; and (c) step-off pads, change facilities, protective clothing facilities, 

and personnel-monitoring instruments are provided in sufficient quantities and locations.

In Section 4.7.15 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that access to RCAs is 

controlled from access points through change rooms. Postings are provided at routine 

access points to identify requirements, such as use of survey meters, protective clothing 

requirements, and decontamination methods (GLE, 2011a). Areas will be posted in 

accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 20, Subpart J, except as described in its 

exemption request discussed in Section 1.2.5.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) and below (GLE, 

2011a). The applicant will provide radiological control by controlling access to areas 

where radioactive material may be encountered, by requiring that each person who 

enters those areas or facilities receives the appropriate level of radiological worker 

training, and by requiring personnel monitoring before exiting established step-off pad 

areas (GLE, 2011a).

In Section 1.2.5.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant requested an exemption from 

the posting requirements of 10 CFR 20.1904(a). Instead, the applicant committed to 

posting signs at all entrances into RCAs in which radioactive materials are processed, 

used, or stored with a sign stating, “Every container in this area may contain radioactive 

material” (GLE, 2011a). The exemption is acceptable because review of the RP 

program and training demonstrates this provides adequate protection and security. This 

exemption is evaluated in Section 1.2.3.7.4 of this SER. For the reasons stated in 

Section 1.2.3.7.4 of this SER, the exemption request is acceptable, and the exemption is 

granted.

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.7.3(15) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to have a radiation reporting program consistent with the requirements of 10 

CFR Parts 19 and 20.

As described in Section 4.7.16 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant will establish a 

Radiation Reporting Program for routine occupational exposure, as well as for incident 

reporting requirements of 10 CFR 20, Subpart M. The applicant will submit personnel 

monitoring information to the Radiation Exposure Information and Reporting System 

(REIRS) based on the personnel exposure database, in compliance with the 

requirements of 10 CFR 20.2206 (GLE, 2011a). The guidance of Regulatory Guide 8.7 

(NRC, 2005) applies (GLE, 2011a). Additional program commitments applicable to 

records and reports: 10 CFR 20 Subpart L, “Records;” Subpart M, “Reports;” Section 

70.61, “Performance requirements,” and Section 70.74, “Additional Reporting 

Requirements” (GLE, 2011a) The facility would maintain complete records of the 

Radiation Protection Program for at least the life of the facility (GLE, 2011a).

As described in Section 4.7.16 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), by procedure, the applicant will 

report to the NRC, within the time specified in 10 CFR 20.2202 and 10 CFR 70.74, any 

event that results in an occupational exposure to radiation exceeding the dose limits in 

10 CFR Part 20. The facility would prepare and submit to the NRC an annual report of 

the results of individual monitoring, as required by 10 CFR 20.2206(b) (GLE, 2011a).
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The staff reviewed the applicant’s radiation survey and monitoring program against the 

acceptance criteria in Sections 4.4.7.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and, based on its review, 

finds that the commitments in the LA (GLE, 2011a) satisfactorily address the acceptance criteria 

in Section 4.4.7.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002).

4.3.8 ADDITIONAL PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS

The staff reviewed the applicant’s additional program commitments against the acceptance 

criteria in Section 4.4.8.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The following sections identify each 

acceptance criterion from NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and discuss the staff’s analysis as to 

whether the information provided by the applicant in the LA (GLE, 2011a) meets the criteria.

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.8.3(1) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to maintain records of the RP program (including program provisions, audits, 

and reviews of the program content and implementation), radiation survey results (air 

sampling, bioassays, external-exposure data from monitoring of individuals, internal 

intakes of radioactive material), and results of its corrective action program referrals, 

RWPs, and planned special exposures.

The applicant stated in Section 4.8.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) that the facility would 

maintain complete records of the RP Program in accordance with 10 CFR Part 20, 

Subpart M. This would specifically include: RP program provisions, audits, and reviews 

of the program content and implementation, radiation survey results (air sampling, 

bioassays, external-exposure data from monitoring of individuals, internal intakes of 

radioactive material), and results of corrective action program referrals, RWPs and 

planned special exposures (GLE, 2011a). This is described further in Section 11.7.2 of 

the LA (GLE, 2011a).

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.8.3(2) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to establish a program to report to the NRC, within the time specified in 10 CFR 

20.2202 and 10 CFR 70.74, any event that results in an occupational exposure to 

radiation exceeding the dose limits in 10 CFR Part 20.

As stated in Section 4.8.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant would develop 

procedures such that the facility would report to the NRC, within the time specified in 10 

CFR 20.2202, any event that results in an occupational exposure to radiation exceeding 

the dose limits in 10 CFR 20.

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.8.3(4) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to prepare and submit to the NRC an annual report required by 10 CFR 

20.2206(b).

Also in Section 4.8.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant commits to prepare and 

submit to the NRC an annual report of the results of individual monitoring, as required by 

10 CFR 20.2206(b).

• The acceptance criterion in Section 4.4.8.3(4) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the 

applicant to refer to the facility’s corrective action program any radiation incident that 

results in an occupational exposure that exceeds the dose limits in 10 CFR Part 20, 
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Appendix B, or is required to be reported per 10 CFR 70.74, and to report to the NRC 

both the corrective action taken (or planned) to protect against a recurrence and the 

proposed schedule to achieve compliance with the applicable license condition or 

conditions.

The applicant stated in Sections 4.8.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) that any radiation incident 

resulting in an exposure exceeding occupational dose limits will be evaluated within the 

Corrective Action Program. Planned corrective actions and a schedule to achieve 

compliance will be submitted to the NRC (GLE, 2011a).

The staff reviewed the applicant’s additional program commitments against the acceptance 

criteria in Sections 4.4.8.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and, based on its review, finds that the 

commitments in the LA (GLE, 2011a) satisfactorily address the acceptance criteria in Section 

4.4.8.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002).

4.3.9 EXEMPTIONS

1. In Section 1.2.5.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant requested exemption from the 

requirements of 10 CFR 20.1904(a) which requires that each container of licensed 

material bear a durable, clearly visible label bearing the radiation symbol and the words

“CAUTION, RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL” or “DANGER, RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL.” 

Instead, the applicant commits to posting signs at all entrances into Radiologically 

Controlled Areas (RCA) in which radioactive materials are processed, used, or stored 

with a sign stating, “Every container in this area may contain radioactive material” (GLE, 

2011a). The exemption is acceptable because review of the Radiation Protection 

Program and training demonstrates this provides adequate protection and security. The 

evaluation of this exemption request is further discussed in Sections 1.2.3.7.4 and 

4.3.7.14 of this SER.

2. In Section 1.2.5.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant requested an authorization to 

allow the use of DAC and ALI values based on dose coefficients published in the 

International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) Publication 68, “Dose 

Coefficients for Intakes of Radionuclides by Workers” (ICRP, 1995a). This is currently 

considered an exemption request from all requirements of 10 CFR 20 that refer to 

quantities in Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 20. However, the Commission by Staff 

Requirements Memorandum dated April 21, 1999 (NRC, 1999c), authorized the staff to 

grant such requests on a case-by-case basis. 

The models used in 10 CFR Part 20 to regulate internal dose are those described in 

ICRP Publications 26 (ICRP, 1977) and 30 (ICRP, 1978), adopted by ICRP in 1977 and 

1978, respectively. Much of the basic structure of these models was developed in 1966, 

although some of its components and parameters were altered somewhat between 1966 

and their formal adoption by ICRP in 1978. In 1991, the NRC published a final rule 

(Standards for Protection Against Radiation, 56 Fed. Reg. 23360 (May 21, 1991)) 

revising 10 CFR Part 20 to incorporate the revised ICRP guidance in ICRP Publications 

26 (ICRP, 1977) and 30 (ICRP, 1978). In 1991, ICRP published ICRP Publication 60 

(ICRP, 1991), a major revision of its radiation protection recommendations. In the 

several years following this revision, ICRP published a series of reports in which it 

described the components of an extensively updated and revised internal dosimetry 

model. These reports include ICRP Publications 66 (ICRP, 1995b), 67 (ICRP, 1994), 68 
4-23

(ICRP, 1995a), 71 (ICRP, 1996a), 72 (ICRP, 1996b), and 78 (ICRP, 1999). Because 

internal dose calculations in 10 CFR Part 20 are currently based on ICRP Publications 

26 and 30, NRC licensees must obtain an exemption to be permitted to use the revised 

and updated internal dosimetry models.

The staff concluded that use of the ICRP Model can be effective in limiting occupational 

doses to those listed in 10 CFR 20.1201(d), i.e, doses to less than NRC=s regulatory limit 

of 0.05 Sieverts (5 Rems). The applicant’s request for an exemption under 10 CFR 

20.2301 is acceptable, because it gives its workers equivalent radiological protection as 

required by 10 CFR Part 20. Thus, the exemption is authorized by law and will not result 

in undue hazard to life or property. The evaluation of this exemption is also discussed in 

greater detail in Section 1.2.3.7.3 of this SER.

4.4 EVALUATION FINDINGS

The applicant has established and will maintain an acceptable RP program that includes:

1. An effective documented program to ensure that occupational radiological exposures are

ALARA;

2. An organization with adequate qualification requirements for the RP personnel;

3. Approved, written RP procedures and RWPs for RP activities;

4. RP training for all personnel who have access to restricted areas;

5. A program that will control airborne concentrations of radioactive materials with 

engineering controls and respiratory protection;

6. A radiation survey and monitoring program that will include requirements for controlling 

radiological contamination within the facility and monitoring of external and internal 

radiation exposures; and

7. Other programs to maintain records, report to NRC in accordance with 10 CFR Parts 20 

and 70, and correct for upsets at the facility.

Based on the staff’s analysis of the LA, the staff concludes that the applicant’s RP program is 

adequate and meets the requirements of 10 CFR Parts 19, 20, 30, 40, and 70. Conformance to 

the LA (GLE, 2011a) and license conditions will ensure safe operation of the facility.

4.5 REFERENCES

(ANSI/ANS, 1999). American National Standard Institute/American Nuclear Society 

(ANSI/ANS) ANSI/ANS N3.1, "Selection, Qualification and Training of Personnel for Nuclear 

Power Plants." 1999.

(ASTM, 2008) American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM). ASTM E1168, “Standard 

Guide for Radiological Protection Training for Nuclear Facility Workers.” 2008.
4-24

(GLE, 2011a) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “GE-Hitachi Global 

Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility License Application,” Revision 6, 2011.

(GLE, 2011b) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “Integrated Safety 

Analysis Report for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility,” 

Revision 4, 2011.

(ICRP, 1977) International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). Publication No. 26, 

“Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection,” 1977.

(ICRP, 1978) International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). Publication No. 30,

“Limits for Intakes of Radionuclides by Workers,” 1978.

(ICRP, 1991) International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). Publication No. 60,

“1990 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection,” 1991.

(ICRP, 1994) International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). Publication No. 67,

“Age-dependent Doses to Members of the Public from Intake of Radionuclides: Part 2 Ingestion 

Dose Coefficients,” 1994.

(ICRP, 1995a) International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). Publication No. 

68, “Dose Coefficients for Intakes of Radionuclides by Workers,” 1995.

(ICRP, 1995b) International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). Publication No. 

66, “Respiratory Tract Model for Radiological Protection,” 1995.

(ICRP, 1996a) International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). Publication No. 

71, “Age-dependent Doses to Members of the Public from Intake of Radionuclides: Part 4 

Ingestion Dose Coefficients,” 1996.

(ICRP, 1996b) International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). Publication No.

72, “Age-dependent Doses to Members of the Public from Intake of Radionuclides: Part 5 

Compilation of Ingestion and Inhalation Dose Coefficients,” 1996.

(ICRP, 1999) International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). Publication No. 78,

“Individual Monitoring for Internal Exposure of Workers,” 1999.

(IEEE, 1978) Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). IEEE N323, “American 

National Standard Radiation Protection Instrumentation Test and Calibration,” May 1978.

(NRC, 1973) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 8.2, “Guide for 

Administrative Practices in Radiation Monitoring.” February 1973.

(NRC, 1977) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 8.10, “Operating 

Philosophy for Maintaining Occupational Exposures As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable.” 

May 1977.
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(NRC, 1979) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 8.24, “Health 

Physics Surveys During Enriched Uranium-235 Processing and Fuel Fabrication.” October 

1979.

(NRC, 1992a) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 8.34, 

“Monitoring Criteria and Methods to Calculate Occupational Radiation Dose.” July 1992.

(NRC, 1992b) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 8.25, “Air

Sampling in the Workplace.” June 1992.

(NRC, 1993a) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 8.37, “ALARA 

Levels For Effluents From Materials Facilities.” July 1993.

(NRC, 1993b) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Branch Technical Position,

“Guidelines for Decontamination of Facilities and Equipment prior to Release for Unrestricted

Use or Termination of Licenses for Byproduct, Source, or Special Nuclear Material.” April 1993.

(NRC, 1993c) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Branch Technical Position, 

“License Condition for Leak-Testing Byproduct Material Sources.” April 1993.

(NRC, 1993d) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Branch Technical Position, 

“License Condition for Leak-Testing Sealed Plutonium Sources,” April 1993.

(NRC, 1993e) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Branch Technical Position, 

“License Condition for Plutonium Alpha Sources,” April 1993.

(NRC, 1993f) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Branch Technical Position, 

“License Condition for Leak-Testing Sealed Source Which Contains Alpha and/or Beta-Gamma 

Emitters,” 1993.

(NRC, 1993g) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Branch Technical Position, 

“License Condition for Leak-Testing Sealed Uranium Sources,” April 1993. 

(NRC, 1993h) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 8.9, “Acceptable 

Concepts, Models, Equations, and Assumptions for a Bioassay Program.” July 1993.

(NRC, 1996) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 8.29, 

“Instructions Concerning Risks From Occupational Radiation Exposure.” February 1996.

(NRC, 1999a) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 8.13, 

“Instructions Concerning Prenatal Radiation Exposure.” June 1999.

(NRC, 1999b) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 8.15, 

“Acceptable Programs for Respiratory Protection.” October 1999.

(NRC, 1999c) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Staff Requirements Memorandum, 

SECY-99-077, “To Request Commission Approval to Grant Exemptions from Portions of 10 

CFR Part 20,” April 21, 1999.
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(NRC, 2002) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG-1520, “Standard Review

Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility.” March 2002.

(NRC, 2005) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 8.7, “Instructions 

for Recording and Reporting Occupational Radiation Dose Data.” November 2005.
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5.0 NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY

The purpose of this review is to determine whether the General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser 

Enrichment LLC’s (GLE’s or the applicant’s) nuclear criticality safety (NCS) program is adequate 

to support safe design, construction, and operation of the facility, as required by 10 CFR 

Part 70. The applicant’s NCS program is described in Chapter 5 of its License Application (LA) 

(GLE, 2011a). In addition, the purpose of this review is to determine whether the Integrated 

Safety Analysis (ISA) and ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) meet the regulatory requirement 

specified in 10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H, “Additional Requirement for Certain Licensees 

Authorized to Possess a Critical Mass of special Nuclear Material,” for NCS.

The NCS programmatic review determines whether: (1) the applicant provided for the 

appropriate management of the NCS program; (2) the applicant identified, and committed to, the 

responsibilities and authorities of individuals for developing and implementing the NCS program; 

(3) the facility management measures described in 10 CFR 70.62 have been committed to and 

will support implementing and maintaining the NCS program; and (4) an adequate NCS 

program is described, which includes identifying and committing to the NCS methods, and NCS 

technical practices used to ensure the safe operation of the facility, as required by 10 CFR 

Part 70. This review also included review of the applicant’s criticality code validation report 

(GLE, 2010) to determine whether its use of calculation methods provides assurance that 

processes will be subcritical under normal and credible abnormal conditions, as specified in 10 

CFR 70.61(d).

The NCS ISA review was performed to determine whether: (1) the ISA program is acceptable 

for NCS; (2) the ISA has been acceptably performed and will be maintained for NCS; and (3) 

the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) contains necessary information, such that the NCS accident 

sequences are “highly unlikely.”

5.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS

The review of applicant’s NCS program should verify that the information the applicant provided 

meets the requirements of 10 CFR 70.22 and 70.65, which, respectively, specify the general 

and additional content of an application. In addition, the NCS review verifies compliance with 

the following regulatory requirements:

10 CFR 70.24, which contains requirements for criticality alarm and associated emergency 

response; 

10 CFR 70.52 and Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 70, which contain event notification requirements

for criticality events;

10 CFR 70.61 (b), which requires that the risk of each credible high-consequence event must be 

limited by using engineered or administrative controls to reduce the likelihood of the event or to 

mitigate its consequences;10 CFR 70.61(d), which requires that the risk of nuclear criticality 

accidents must be limited by assuring that under normal and credible abnormal conditions, all 

nuclear processes are subcritical, including use of an approved margin of subcriticality for 
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safety, and which states that preventive controls and measures must be the primary means of 

protection against nuclear criticality events.

10 CFR 70.61(e), which requires that engineered or administrative controls necessary to comply 

with the performance requirements in 10 CFR 70.61 shall be designated as an item relied on for 

safety (IROFS), and that each IROFS will be available and reliable to perform its intended 

function when needed.

10 CFR 70.62, which requires establishment and maintenance of a safety program that 

demonstrates compliance with the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61; 

10 CFR 70.64(a)(9), which requires that the design of new and existing facilities must provide 

for criticality control including adherence to the double contingency principle; and

10 CFR 70.72, which contains requirements concerning configuration management and the 

change control process.

The NCS review of the applicant’s ISA program and ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) verifies if the 

information the applicant provided meets the requirements of 10 CFR 70.62 and 70.65 with 

respect to NCS. These regulations specify: (1) the requirements for establishing and 

maintaining a safety program (10 CFR 70.62), including an ISA program that addresses NCS; 

(2) requirements for conducting and maintaining an ISA (10 CFR 70.62(c)) for NCS; and (3) 

requirements for the contents of an ISA Summary (10 CFR 70.65(b)) for NCS.

5.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

The acceptance criteria for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) review of the 

applicant’s NCS program are outlined in Section 5.4 of the NUREG-1520, “Standard Review 

Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility” (NRC, 2002). Section 5.4 

of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) contains all the acceptance criteria for review of the applicant’s 

NCS Program, including organization and administration, management measures, and technical 

practices. This includes the commitment to use Regulatory Guide 3.71, “Nuclear Criticality 

Safety Standards for Fuels and Material Facilities,” Revision 2 (NRC, 2010), which endorsed the 

use of the American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society Series 8 (ANSI/ANS 

8) NCS standards with specified modifications. In addition, the acceptance criteria in Section 

3.4 of NUREG-1520, (NRC, 2002) are applicable to the NRC’s review of the applicant’s ISA 

program and ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b). Section 3.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) contains 

the acceptance criteria for the staff’s review of the applicant’s ISA and ISA Summary. In 

general, the staff used Revision 0 of NUREG-1520 to perform the review. Where staff deviated 

from this version of NUREG-1520, the reasons for the deviation are explained in the text. The 

applicability of specific acceptance criteria to this facility is also discussed in the applicable 

evaluation sections.

5.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

5.3.1 INDUSTRY STANDARDS

The review described in this section of the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) was based on 

Sections 5.4 and 5.4.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), which describe the use of industry 
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consensus standards related to the NCS Program. Section 5.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) 

describes criteria for the use of NRC-endorsed standards, in particular commitments to comply 

with the requirements (“shall” statements) in standards and the need for more specific 

commitments to describe how the applicant will comply with the standards. Section 5.4.2 

summarizes the standards that have been endorsed in Regulatory Guide 3.71 (NRC, 2010). 

Regulatory Guide 3.71 (NRC, 2010) endorses a number of ANSI/ANS-8 national standards in 

full or in part. NRC endorsement of these standards means that they provide procedures and 

methodology generally acceptable to NRC staff for the prevention and mitigation of nuclear 

criticality accidents.

In its LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant committed to following the requirements (as defined in 

Section C of RG 3.71 (NRC, 2010)) in the ANSI/ANS 8 standards listed below:

• ANSI/ANS 8.1, “Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Material 

Outside Reactors” (ANSI/ANS, 2007a) (see Sections 5.2.1 and 5.4.1.3 of the LA (GLE, 

2011a));

• ANSI/ANS 8.3, “Criticality Accident Alarm System,” as modified by NRC Regulatory 

Guide 3.71 (ANSI/ANS, 1997a) (see Section 5.3.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011a));

• ANSI/ANS 8.19, “Administrative Practices for Nuclear Criticality Safety” (ANSI/ANS, 

2005) (see Sections 5.2.1, 5.3.2, 5.3.3, and 5.3.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a));

• ANSI/ANS 8.20, “Nuclear Criticality Safety Training” (ANSI/ANS, 1991) (see Sections 

2.3.3.1 and 11.3.2.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a));

• ANSI/ANS 8.21, “Use of Fixed Neutron Absorbers in Nuclear Facilities Outside 

Reactors” (ANSI/ANS, 1995) (see Section 5.4.4.8 of the LA (GLE, 2011a));

• ANSI/ANS 8.22, “Nuclear Criticality Safety Training Based on Limiting and Controlling 

Moderators” (ANSI/ANS, 1997b) (see Section 5.4.4.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011a));

• ANSI/ANS 8.23, “Nuclear Criticality Accident Emergency Planning and Response” 

(ANSI/ANS, 1997c) (see Section 5.3.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011a));

• ANSI/ANS 8.24, “Validation of Neutron Transport Methods for Nuclear Criticality Safety 

Calculations,” (ANSI/ANS, 2007b) (see Section 5.4.1.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a)); and

• ANSI/ANS 8.26, “Criticality Safety Engineering Training and Qualification Program” 

(ANSI/ANS, 2007c) (see Section 5.3.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a)).

As stated in Section 5.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), the criteria for the use of NRC-endorsed 

standards, if an applicant performs activities to which a standard endorsed by an NRC 

Regulatory Guide applies notwithstanding a general commitment to a standard, an applicant 

should clarify its intended compliance with those requirements in the standard that are 

expressed only as general principles by more specific commitments and description in the 

license application. Additional commitments, beyond what these standards require, are 

specified in the above-referenced sections of the LA (GLE, 2011a) listed in the bullets above, as 

evaluated in subsequent sections of this chapter.
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The applicant’s commitments to the ANSI/ANS standards above are consistent with Section 

5.4.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), the summary of standards that have been endorsed by 

NRC. As discussed below, the other ANSI/ANS 8 standards endorsed in Regulatory Guide 3.71 

(NRC, 2010) are either not relevant to operations at the proposed facility or are adequately 

addressed by other commitments.

The following standards are not applicable to operations at the facility:

• ANSI/ANS 8.5, “Use of Borosilicate-Glass Raschig Rings as a Neutron Absorber in 

Solutions of Fissile Material” (ANSI/ANS, 1996);

• ANSI/ANS 8.6, “Safety in Conducting Subcritical Neutron-Multiplication Measurements 

In Situ” (ANSI/ANS, 1983a);

• ANSI/ANS 8.10, “Criteria for Nuclear Criticality Safety Controls in Operations with 

Shielding and Confinement” (ANSI/ANS, 1983b);

• ANSI/ANS 8.12, “Nuclear Criticality Control and Safety of Plutonium-Uranium Fuel 

Mixtures Outside Reactors” (ANSI/ANS, 1987a);

• ANSI/ANS 8.15, “Nuclear Criticality Control of Special Actinide Elements” (ANSI/ANS1981); and

• ANSI/ANS 8.17, “Criticality Safety Criteria for the Handling, Storage, and Transportation 

of LWR Fuel Outside Reactors” (ANSI/ANS, 1984).

In addition, ANSI/ANS 8.7, “Guide for Nuclear Criticality Safety in the Storage of Fissile 

Materials” (ANSI/ANS, 1975), may have some applicability to some operations at the facility. 

For example, this standard contains tables of mass limits for different storage configurations that 

have not been described for currently proposed activities, but could be applicable to future 

activities at the applicant’s facility. However, the applicant can derive its own limits by using 

calculational methods validated in accordance with its commitments to ANSI/ANS 8.1 

(ANSI/ANS, 1998) and ANSI/ANS 8.24 (ANSI/ANS, 2007a) rather than making use of the 

values in ANSI/ANS 8.7 (ANSI/ANS, 1975). Therefore, a commitment to ANSI/ANS 8.7 

(ANSI/ANS, 1975) is not necessary.

Section 5.4.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) also contains a reference to ANSI/ANS-8.9, 

“Nuclear Criticality Safety Criteria for Steel-Pipe Intersections Containing Aqueous Solutions of 

Fissile Materials” (ANSI/ANS, 1987b). However, this standard has been withdrawn by ANS and 

is, therefore, no longer endorsed by the NRC. Therefore, there is no need for the applicant to 

commit to its use.

5.3.2 ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

The review described in this section of the SER was based on Sections 5.4.3.2 (organization 

and administration of the NCS Program, including responsibilities and qualifications of key 

positions, training of key personnel, reporting of defective conditions, use of postings, and use 

of appropriate standards) and 5.4.3.1.4 (applicant outlines an NCS Program structure and 

defines the responsibilities and authorities of key program personnel) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002), which describes the organization and administration of the NCS Program, including the 
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use of staff with the requisite qualifications to implement the functions of the NCS Program. The 

acceptance criteria pertain to the roles and responsibilities, and education and experience levels 

required, by NCS staff, and the organization structure and independence from operations of the 

NCS organization.

In Sections 2.2.9.2 and 5.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant describes its proposed 

organization for the design and construction phase, the operations phase, and the transition 

phase of the facility. The NCS function is within the Environmental, Health, and Safety (EHS) 

function during all three phases (GLE, 2011a). The EHS Manager reports to the GLE President 

and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) during the design and construction and to the Facility 

Manager during operations (GLE, 2011a). During the transition from design and construction to 

operations, the EHS manager reports to the GLE President and CEO for design and 

construction matters and to the Facility Manager for operations matters (GLE, 2011a). In 

addition, there will be an NCS Manager having oversight over the NCS Program (GLE, 2011a). 

This addresses the acceptance criteria in the applicant meets the acceptance criteria in Section 

2.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) as they relate to NCS, including organizational positions, 

functional responsibilities, experience, and qualifications of personnel responsible for NCS; 

Section 5.4.3.2(6) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits to describe 

organizations positions, experience of personnel, qualifications of personnel, and functional 

responsibilities, and also outlines organizational relations between the individual positions, and 

Section 5.4.3.2(7) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits to designate an 

NCS program director who will be responsible for implementation of the NCS Program. 

As discussed in Section 5.3.1 of this SER, the applicant committed to ANSI/ANS 8.1 

(ANSI/ANS, 2007a) and ANSI/ANS 8.19 (ANSI/ANS, 2005) with regard to administrative 

practices (GLE, 2011a). This addresses the acceptance criteria in Section 5.4.3.2(2) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits to ANSI/ANS 8.1 (ANSI/ANS, 2007a) 

and ANSI/ANS 8.19 (ANSI/ANS, 2005), as they relate to organization and administration.

As stated in Section 5.2.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the EHS function is independent of 

Operations and has the authority to shutdown processes when safety cannot be assured. The 

NCS Manager reports to the EHS Manager (GLE, 2011a). This addresses the acceptance 

criteria in Section 5.4.3.2(3) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that NCS specialists should be 

independent of operations supervision. The NCS function also has the authority to shutdown 

potentially unsafe operations (GLE, 2011a). As stated in Section 5.2.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), 

the NCS Manager must approve the restart of any operation shutdown by the NCS function. 

This addresses the acceptance criteria in Section 5.4.3.2(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that 

the applicant commits to the policy that personnel report defective NCS conditions to the NCS 

function and perform actions only in accordance with written, approved procedures. Unless a 

specific procedure deals with the situation, personnel shall report defective NCS conditions to 

the NCS function and take no action until the NCS function has evaluated the situation and 

provided recovery procedures. 

As described in Section 2.2.9.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), at a minimum, the NCS Manager has a 

bachelor’s degree in an engineering or scientific field, four years experience with regulatory 

activities, and experience with NCS programs. This addresses the acceptance criteria in 

Section 5.4.3.2(1) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant meet the acceptance criteria 

in Section 2.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) as they relate to NCS regarding organizational 

positions, functional responsibilities, experience, and qualifications of personnel responsible for 

NCS.
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As described in Section 2.2.9.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), training and qualification of NCS 

engineers will be done in accordance with ANSI/ANS 8.26 (ANSI/ANS, 2007c). At a minimum, 

an NCS Engineer will have a bachelor’s degree in an engineering or scientific field and 

experience in the assigned safety function (GLE, 2011a). In addition to the requirements for an 

NCS Engineer, a Senior NCS Engineer must have at least three years of NCS experience. 

NCS Engineers and Senior NCS Engineers have the authority and responsibility to conduct 

activities assigned to the NCS function, with the exception that an NCS Engineer cannot 

perform independent verifications of NCS analyses (GLE, 2011a). This addresses the 

acceptance criteria of Section 5.4.3.2(1) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) for specifying 

organizational positions, function responsibilities, experience, and qualifications of personnel 

responsible for NCS. As stated in Section 5.3.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), in addition to 

specifying qualifications for these positions, NCS staff will be trained in accordance with an NCS 

Engineer Training and Qualification Program. This addresses the acceptance criteria of Section 

5.4.3.2(8) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits to staff the NCS Program 

with suitably trained personnel and to provide sufficient resources for its operation.

Responsibilities and authorities of the NCS Manager are described in Section 2.2.9.2 of the LA 

(GLE, 2011a). Other NCS personnel have the authority and responsibility to conduct activities 

assigned to the NCS function; these activities are as described throughout Chapter 5, but 

specifically as listed in Section 5.1.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). This addresses the acceptance 

criteria in Section 5.4.3.1(4) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant outlines an NCS 

Program structure and defines the responsibilities and authorities of key program personnel.

As described in Section 5.2.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant committed to have postings 

to summarize key NCS requirements and limits, and to label fissile material containers where 

practicable. This addresses the acceptance criteria in Section 5.4.3.2(4) of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits to provide NCS postings in areas, operations, work 

stations, and storage locations.

The staff reviewed the applicant’s organizational structure and finds that it is acceptable 

because the NCS function is independent from the production staff, NCS evaluations are 

performed by qualified reviewers, with independent review to ensure quality assurance, and the 

applicant’s administrative practices are consistent with the requirements in ANSI/ANS 8.19 

(ANSI/ANS, 2005). The staff finds that the applicant has adequately addressed the acceptance 

criteria in Sections 5.4.3.1(4) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits to outline 

an NCS Program structure and defines the responsibilities and authorities of key program 

personnel and 5.4.3.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the organization and administration of 

the NCS Program, including responsibilities and qualifications of key positions, training of key 

personnel, reporting of defective conditions, use of postings, and use of appropriate standards..

5.3.3 MANAGEMENT OF THE NCS PROGRAM

The review described in this section of the SER was based on Section 5.4.3.1 of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002), which describes the management of the NCS Program. The acceptance criteria 

in this section include general program policies, objectives, and roles and responsibilities 

appropriate to the NCS Program.

In Section 5.1.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant committed to develop, implement, and 

maintain an NCS Program to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 70. This addresses the 

acceptance criteria in Section 5.4.3.1(1) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant 

commits to develop, implement, and maintain an NCS Program to meet the regulatory 
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requirements of 10 CFR Part 70. In Section 5.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant 

discusses the management of the NCS program. The NCS Manager is responsible for the NCS 

program. As stated in Section 5.1.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the objectives of the NCS program 

include:

• Develop, implement, and maintain an NCS Program that meets 10 CFR Part 70;

• Preventing the occurrence of nuclear criticality accidents, including by establishing 

sufficient IROFS and defense-in-depth and demonstrating an adequate margin of safety;

• Protecting against the occurrence of nuclear criticality accident sequences identified in 

the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b);

• Establishing and maintaining NCS controlled parameters, procedures, postings, IROFS, 

subcritical limits, and operating limits for identified IROFS based upon current NCS 

determinations as stated in Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a);

• Conducting NCS evaluations to assure that under normal and credible abnormal 

conditions processes remain subcritical with an adequate margin of safety;

• Establishing and maintaining training in emergency procedures to respond to a criticality 

accident as stated in Section 5.1.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a); and

• Compliance with the regulatory requirements in 10 CFR 70.61, 70.64(a), 70.65(b), and 

70.72 as they relate to NCS.

This list of objectives addresses the acceptance criteria in Section 5.4.3.1(2) of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002) that the applicant states the NCS Program objectives, which should include those

objectives listed in Section 5.3.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002); Section 5.4.3.1(3) of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant establishes NCS safety parameters and procedures; 

Section 5.4.3.1(6) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits to use the NCS 

Program to establish and maintain NCS safety limits and operating limits for IROFS in nuclear 

processes and commits to maintain adequate management measures to ensure the availability 

and reliability of the IROFS; Section 5.4.3.1(7) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant 

commits to preparation of NCS postings, training, and emergency response training; Section 

5.4.3.4.1(10)(b) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that NCS safety limits, operating limits, and limits 

on controlled parameters will be derived from NCS determinations; and Section 5.4.3.4.4(1) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits to the use of NCS controls and controlled 

parameters to ensure that under normal and credible abnormal conditions, all nuclear processes 

are subcritical, including use of an approved margin of subcriticality for safety. The acceptance 

criteria in Section 5.4.3.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) describe the functions and objectives of 

the NCS Program with regard to establishing a program, parameters and controls, postings, 

training, and change control. The remaining acceptance criteria above relate to the setting of 

limits and assurance of subcriticality. Section 5.4.3.4.1(10)(c) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) 

contains the acceptance criterion that NCS safety limits, operating limits, and limits on controlled 

parameters will be based on the proper application of NCS methodology. Section 

5.4.3.4.1(10)(b) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) contains the acceptance criterion that NRC 

safety limits, operating limits, and limits on controlled parameters will be derived from NCS 

determinations. The specific commitments expressed in the fourth and fifth bullets in the above 
5-8

list, and more generally the commitments to NCS methods as described in Section 5.4.1 of the 

LA (GLE, 2011a), together adequately cover this criterion.

As stated in Section 5.1.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), NCS design criteria and reviews are 

applicable to: (1) new and existing processes, facilities, or equipment which involves fissile 

materials; and (2) any change in existing processes, facilities, or equipment which may have an 

impact on the established basis for NCS. These commitments address the acceptance criterion 

in Section 5.4.3.1(9) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits to use the NCS 

Program to evaluate modifications to operations, recommend process parameter changes 

necessary to maintain the safe operation of the facility, and select appropriate IROFS and 

management measures. In Section 5.1.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant committed to 

adhering to the NCS baseline design criteria, for new facilities and new processes at existing 

facilities requiring a license amendment under 10 CFR 70.72. These commitments address the 

acceptance criterion in Section 5.4.3.1(8) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant 

commits to adhere to the NCS baseline design criteria requirements in 10 CFR 70.64(a)(9) for 

new facilities and new processes at existing facilities that require a license amendment under 10 

CFR 70.72.

The applicant described its NCS methods and technical practices in Section 5.4 of the LA (GLE, 

2011a). This includes, among other provisions, control over the calculational method software 

and hardware configurations (GLE, 2011a). Because a commitment to configuration control of 

this hardware and software means that the configuration will not be improperly changed, a 

specific commitment to keep NCS methods and technical practices applicable to current 

configurations, as stated in the acceptance criterion in Section 5.4.3.1(5) of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits to keep NCS methodologies and technical practices 

applicable to the current configuration by means of the configuration management function), is 

unnecessary.

The staff reviewed the applicant’s management of the NCS program and finds that it is 

acceptable because the applicant has adequately addressed the acceptance criteria in Section 

5.4.3.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant maintain and develop an NCS Program 

that meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 70, including stating program objectives, 

establishing safety parameters and procedures, defining responsibilities and authorities of key 

personnel, keep NCS methodologies applicable to the current configuration, establish and 

maintain safety limits and operating limits for IROFS and maintain appropriate management 

measures, prepare NCS postings, training, and emergency procedure training, adhere to the 

baseline design criteria in 10 CFR 70.64(a), and evaluate modifications to operations, including 

selection of appropriate IROFS and management measures; Section 5.4.3.4.1(10)(b) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits to derive safety limits, operating limits, 

and limits on controlled parameters from NCS determinations; Section 5.4.3.4.1(10)(c) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits to base safety limits, operating limits, and 

limits on controlled parameters on the proper application of the NCS approach; and Section 

5.4.3.4.4(1) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits to the use of NCS controls 

and controlled parameters to ensure subcriticality under normal and credible abnormal 

conditions. The staff concludes that the applicant’s commitments to develop, implement, and 

maintain an NCS program meet the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR Part 70.

5.3.4 NCS MANAGEMENT MEASURES

The review described in this section of the SER was based on Section 5.4.3.3 of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002), which describes acceptance criteria pertaining to management measures such as 
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training, procedures, and audits and assessments, applied to both facility operations and the 

NCS Program.

5.3.4.1 Training

The review described in this section of the SER was based on Section 5.4.3.3(1) of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002), which describes training of facility personnel related to criticality safety and 

emergency response, including adherence to ANSI standard ANSI/ANS 8.19 (ANSI/ANS, 2005) 

and ANSI/ANS 8.20 (ANSI/ANS, 1991).

In Sections 5.3.1 and 11.3.2.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant discusses the proposed 

NCS training program. Section 5.3.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) addresses training and 

qualification of the NCS staff. Section 11.3.2.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) addresses NCS training 

for operators and other personnel having contact with fissile materials. In Section 2.3.3 of the 

LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant stated that training will be provided for all individuals at the 

proposed facility commensurate with their roles and responsibilities. Training and qualification 

requirements will be met prior to the full assumption of duties for safety significant positions and 

before assigned tasks are independently performed (GLE, 2011a). 

All personnel and contractors must participate in general employee training (GET) (GLE, 

2011a). Not all aspects of GET are required for all personnel (GLE, 2011a). However, nuclear 

safety training, which includes NCS, must be completed to have unescorted access to 

radiological controlled areas (GLE, 2011a). Those with unescorted access are retrained at least 

annually (GLE, 2011a). Exams will be used to verify the effectiveness of the training program 

(GLE, 2011a).

As stated in Section 11.3.2.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), NCS training will be conducted consistent 

with the requirements of ANSI/ANS 8.19 (ANSI/ANS, 2005) and ANSI/ANS 8.20 (ANSI/ANS, 

1991). This addresses the acceptance criteria of Section 5.4.3.3(1)(a) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002) that the applicant commits to the above standards as they relate to training. The 

applicant’s commitment to ANS-8.20 (ANSI/ANS, 1991) requires training on the appropriate 

response to a criticality accident alarm (GLE, 2011a). This addresses the acceptance criteria of 

Section 5.4.3.3(1)(b) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits to provide 

training to all personnel to recognize the criticality accident alarm system (CAAS) signal and 

evacuate promptly to a safe area.

As stated in Section 5.2.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), operations personnel will also be trained to 

perform actions only in accordance with written procedures. They will also be instructed to stop 

an operation if they encounter a condition not covered by procedure and report the condition to 

the NCS function (GLE, 2011a). This addresses the acceptance criteria of Section 5.4.3.3(1)(c) 

of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits to provide training regarding the policy 

that personnel shall report defective NCS conditions to the NCS function and perform actions 

only in accordance with written, approved procedures.

The staff has reviewed the applicant’s commitments regarding personnel training as they relate 

to NCS and finds them acceptable because the applicant has adequately addressed the 

acceptance criteria in Section 5.4.3.3(1) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that describes training of 

facility personnel related to NCS and emergency response.
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5.3.4.2 Procedures

The review described in this section of the SER was based on Section 5.4.3.3(2) of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002), which relates to facility procedures for prevention of criticality, including 

adherence to ANSI standard ANSI/ANS 8.19 (ANSI/ANS, 2005).

In Sections 5.2.3 and 5.3.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant discusses the use of 

procedures at the proposed facility.

As stated in Section 5.3.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant committed to ANSI/ANS 8.19 

(ANSI/ANS, 2005) as it relates to procedures. This addresses the acceptance criteria of 

Section 5.4.3.3(2)(a) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that states, in part, that the applicant 

commits to ANSI/ANS 8.19 (ANSI/ANS, 2005) as it relates to procedures. Fissile material 

operations are performed in accordance with approved written operating procedures (GLE, 

2011a). Procedures for handling enriched uranium must be reviewed and approved by the NCS 

function, which will assure that no single, inadvertent departure from a procedure could cause a 

criticality accident (GLE, 2011a). If a condition exists which is not covered by procedure, the 

operator will stop the operation and the NCS function will be performed. Restart of the 

operation cannot occur until the NCS function evaluates the situation and the necessary 

procedures are provided (GLE, 2011a). 

Section 5.4.3.3(2)(a) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) also states that an applicant should commit 

to the policy that no single, inadvertent departure from a procedure could cause an inadvertent 

criticality. The staff has determined that compliance with this acceptance criterion is adequately 

covered by the applicant’s commitment to follow the double contingency principle, as it relates 

to the use of administrative criticality controls.

The staff has reviewed the applicant’s commitments regarding procedures as they relate to 

NCS, which include the use of ANSI/ANS 8.19 (ANSI/ANS, 2005) and committing to a policy 

where no single, inadvertent departure from a procedure could cause an inadvertent criticality. 

The staff finds the applicant’s commitments acceptable because the applicant has adequately 

addressed the acceptance criteria in Section 5.4.3.3(2) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that 

relates to facility procedures for prevention of criticality.

5.3.4.3 Audits and Assessments

The review described in this section of the SER was based on Section 5.4.3.3(3) of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002), which relates to audits and assessments of facility operations and the NCS 

Program. This includes adherence to ANSI standard ANSI/ANS 8.19 (ANSI/ANS, 2005), which 

address commitments to periodic walkthroughs of all process areas and periodic audits of 

management measures.

In Sections 5.3.2 and 11.5.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant discusses the use of audits 

and assessments at the proposed facility. As stated in Section 5.3.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), 

the applicant commits to ANSI/ANS 8.19 (ANSI/ANS, 2005) as it relates to audits and 

assessments. This addresses the acceptance criteria of Section 5.4.3.3(3)(a) of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits to ANSI/ANS8.19 (ANSI/ANS, 2005) as it relates to 

audits and assessments.

As stated in Section 11.5.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), quarterly audits will be conducted by NCS 

personnel to determine that operations conform to NCS requirements. This addresses the 
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acceptance criteria in Section 5.4.3.3(3)(c) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant 

commits to conduct and document quarterly NCS audits such that all NCS aspects of 

management measures will be audited at least every two years. Audit results are reported in 

writing to the Facility Manager, EHS Manager, NCS Manager, area managers, and other 

management as appropriate. The EHS manager will review audit results to determine if other 

safety impacts exist (GLE, 2011a).

As stated in Section 11.5.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), weekly walkthroughs in accordance with 

written procedures will also be conducted. Findings will be submitted to the affected line or area 

manager for resolution (GLE, 2011a). This addresses the acceptance criteria of Section 

5.4.3.3(3)(b) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits to conduct and document 

weekly NCS walkthroughs of all operating process areas such that all areas will be reviewed at 

least every two weeks, and identified weaknesses should be referred to the facility corrective 

action function and promptly and effectively resolved. Given the limited size and extent of 

hands-on operation in the facility, review of all operating process areas every two weeks, as 

stated in the acceptance criterion, is not necessary. 

Assessments to verify the effective implementation of the NCS program, management 

measures, and other programs will be performed (GLE, 2011a). Personnel from the area being 

assessed may perform the assessment, provided that they do not have direct responsibility for 

the specific activity being assessed (GLE, 2011a). However, the applicant also commits to have 

NCS professionals, independent of NCS personnel, conduct an assessment of the NCS 

program every three years (GLE, 2011a). An assessment of each management measure will 

be conducted annually (GLE, 2011a). Results of assessments are documented and reported to 

the appropriate management (GLE, 2011a). This addresses acceptance criteria 5.4.3.3(3)(c) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits to conduct and document quarterly NCS 

audits such that all NCS aspects of management measures will be audited at least every two 

years.

Corrective actions needed to address audit and assessment results are documented and 

approved by management and tracked to completion by the EHS function (GLE, 2011a). The 

audit program described above and the commitment to corrective actions address the 

acceptance criteria of Section 5.4.3.4.7(1) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant 

commits to use the NCS Program to promptly detect and NCS deficiencies by means of 

operational inspections, audits, or investigations, and refer to the facility’s corrective action 

function any unacceptable performance deficiencies in IROFS, NCS functions, or management 

measures, so as to prevent recurrence.

Besides the information in Section 11.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that the 

system described above is designed to ensure comprehensive program oversight at least once 

every three years. The staff has reviewed the applicant’s commitments regarding audits and 

assessments as they relate to NCS and finds them acceptable because the applicant has 

adequately addressed the acceptance criteria in Section 5.4.3.3(3) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002) that address adherence to ANSI standard ANSI/ANS 8.19 (ANSI/ANS, 2005), 

commitments to periodic walkthroughs of all process areas, and periodic audits of management 

measures) and Section 5.4.3.4.7(1) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits to 

use the NCS Program to promptly detect and NCS deficiencies by means of operational 

inspections, audits, or investigations, and refer to the facility’s corrective action function any 

unacceptable performance deficiencies in IROFS, NCS functions, or management measures, so 

as to prevent recurrence.
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5.3.5 NCS METHODS AND TECHNICAL PRACTICES

The review described in this section of the SER was based on Section 5.4.3.4 of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002), which describes NCS methodologies and technical practices. Section 5.4.3.4.1 of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) pertains to an applicant’s evaluation approach, which include criteria 

for setting limits on NCS controlled parameters, the use and validation of calculational methods 

used to set these limits and demonstrate subcriticality, and the establishment of suitable 

margins of safety and subcriticality. Section 5.4.3.4.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) pertains to 

an applicant’s technical practices, which include criteria for complying with the double 

contingency principle, the selection of controls and controlled parameters, performing 

evaluations to demonstrate subcriticality under normal and credible abnormal conditions, and 

criteria for modeling and controlling each of the possible controlled parameters.

Section 5.4.3.4.7(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) contains the acceptance criterion that the 

applicant should commit to use NCS methods and technical practices to evaluate NCS accident 

sequences in operations and processes. The staff finds that the use of such methods and 

technical practices is only applicable to the evaluation of normal and credible abnormal 

configurations, which consist of static arrangements of fissionable and other material. These 

methods are used to demonstrate that such configurations are subcritical. They differ from 

accident sequences, which are not static configurations, but sequences of events. Accident 

sequences are evaluated by using ISA methods, rather than NCS methods and technical 

practices. Therefore, this acceptance criterion is not applicable to the evaluation of accident 

sequences.

5.3.5.1 NCS Methodologies

The review described in this section of the SER was based on Section 5.4.3.4.1 of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002), which describes NCS methodologies, which include, as described above, 

the use of calculational and other methods for assessment of subcriticality, and the means used 

to validate them.

Double Contingency Principle

In Sections 5.1.1, 5.1.3, and 5.3.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant discusses the 

implementation of the double contingency principle at the proposed facility. The applicant 

committed to the double contingency principle as follows:

“Process designs shall incorporate sufficient margins of safety to require at least two 

unlikely, independent, and concurrent changes in process conditions before a criticality 

accident is possible.” (GLE, 2011a)

Section 5.1.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) commits the applicant to the double contingency principle 

as identified in ANSI/ANS 8.1 (ANSI/ANS, 2007a). In addition to restating the principle, this 

section discusses the independence and concurrency, as well as the use of both single and 

dual-parameter control, consistent with the guidance in Section 5.4.3.4.4(7) of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002). Section 5.1.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) describes one purpose of criticality safety 

analyses (CSAs) as being demonstration of meeting the double contingency principle through 

the establishment of controls. Section 5.3.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) reiterates this role of the 

CSA. 
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At the proposed facility, the double contingency principle serves as the fundamental technical 

basis for design and operation of the facility with respect to NCS (GLE, 2011a). Adherence to 

the double contingency principle will be ensured for fissile material operations by either 

controlling at least two independent parameters or providing at least two controls on a single 

parameter (GLE, 2011a). Section 5.4.3.4.2(1) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) contains the 

acceptance criterion that the use of a single control to maintain the value of two or more 

controlled parameters should only constitute a single leg of double contingency. This will 

necessarily be covered by the applicant’s correct application of the double contingency 

principle, and so a specific commitment to this is not necessary. At the proposed facility, the 

applicant has chosen to use the double contingency principle to ensure that each process will 

be adequately subcritical under normal and credible abnormal conditions. As discussed in 

Interim Staff Guidance (ISG), FCSS-ISG-03, “Nuclear Criticality Safety Performance 

Requirements and Double Contingency Principle” (NRC, 2005), application of the double 

contingency principle is “one means of meeting the performance requirements of §70.61(d),” 

provided: (1) controls are established on controlled parameters, and those controls designated

as IROFS; (2) conditions resulting from occurrence of a single contingency are shown to be 

subcritical with an acceptable margin; and (3) controls are sufficiently reliable to ensure that 

changes in process conditions are ”unlikely.“ The staff finds that these three conditions are met. 

Although not all NCS controls will be designated as IROFS, in the “Glossary of Definitions” in 

the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant stated that any controls that are needed to meet 10 CFR 

70.61(d) will be IROFS (see Section 5.3.5.2 of this SER). The applicant’s methods and 

technical practices (Section 5.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) include evaluation of abnormal 

conditions and demonstration that they meet the appropriate keff limit, and that NCS controls will 

be appropriately maintained. The staff, therefore, concludes that this way of meeting the 

subcriticality requirement of 10 CFR 70.61(d) is acceptable. The applicant’s commitments with 

regard to double contingency address the acceptance criteria of Section 5.4.3.4.4(7) of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits to implement an NCS Program that ensures 

double contingency protection, when practicable. Specifically, the commitments discussed 

above in Section 5.1.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), as well as the commitment to ANSI/ANS 8.1 

(ANSI/ANS, 1998), address Section 5.4.3.4.4(7)(a) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that 

addresses specifying the preferred method of adherence to double contingency protection, 

which is two-parameter control (although single-parameter control is also acceptable)) and 

Section 5.4.3.4.4(7)(b) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) (b) that addresses defining ‘concurrency’ 

and the need for rapid detection and correction of control failures)). The applicant is not taking 

any exceptions to double contingency protection, and therefore, Section 5.4.3.4.4(7)(c) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), which addresses discussing what will be acceptable in cases of 

exceptions to double contingency protection, is not applicable.

Section 5.4.3.4.5(1) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) contains the acceptance criterion that the 

applicant should commit to the double contingency principle in determining NCS controls and 

IROFS in the design of new facilities and new processes at existing facilities that require a 

license amendment under 10 CFR 70.72. Section 5.4.3.4.5(2) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) 

contains the acceptance criterion that the applicant should commit to double contingency 

protection as discussed in Section 5.4.3.4.4(9) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) (should be 

5.4.3.4.4(7) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) as discussed in the previous paragraph). These 

criteria are duplicative of other criteria in NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), such as those discussed 

in the paragraphs above.
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Criticality Safety Analyses

In Sections 5.1.3 and 5.3.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant discusses the use of CSAs at 

the proposed facility. At the proposed facility, the terms “CSA” and “NCS evaluation” are 

synonymous (GLE, 2011a). The purpose of a CSA is to demonstrate compliance with the 

double contingency principle (GLE, 2011a). As discussed in the previous section of this SER, 

this ensures that the CSA will demonstrate that a specified process is subcritical under normal 

and credible abnormal conditions in accordance with 10 CFR 70.61(d) (GLE, 2011a).

Section 5.4.3.4.2(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) contains the acceptance criterion that the 

applicant should commit to perform an evaluation for all controlled parameters that show the 

parameter will be maintained during both normal and credible abnormal conditions. There is no 

specific commitment to performing such an evaluation in the LA (GLE, 2011a). However, a 

specific commitment is unnecessary because ensuring that operations are subcritical under 

normal and credible abnormal conditions, and compliance with the double contingency principle, 

is all that the regulations in 10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H require for criticality. Many abnormal 

conditions, in fact, will necessarily involve the failure of one or more controlled parameters, so 

this criterion cannot be met under all circumstances. Therefore, the staff determined that this 

criterion is not applicable.

CSAs document the safety basis for a fissile material process, establish limits for controlled 

parameters, and establish controls to maintain these limits (GLE, 2011a). In addition, the CSAs 

will also specify certain management measures and additional controls which provide defensein-depth (GLE, 2011a). CSAs are controlled elements of the ISA and are conducted in 

accordance with the requirements of ANSI/ANS 8.19 (ANSI/ANS, 2005) (GLE, 2011a). The 

CSAs will not assess risk or show that criticality accidents are highly unlikely as required by 10 

CFR 70.61(b), but will inform such assessments (GLE, 2011a).

The demonstration of compliance with the double contingency principle will be sufficiently 

conservative such that each process is ensured to be subcritical under normal and credible 

abnormal conditions (GLE, 2011a). Analysis of normal conditions will assume the NCS 

controlled parameters are at the optimum credible conditions (i.e., most reactive) that would be 

expected when the identified criticality controls are functioning properly (GLE, 2011a). Analysis 

of credible abnormal conditions will assume the NCS controlled parameters are at the optimum 

credible conditions for credible process upsets, including failures of NCS controls (GLE, 2011a). 

These commitments address the acceptance criteria of Section 5.4.3.4.1(10)(a) of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002) that NCS safety limits, operating limits, and limits on controlled parameters 

will be established by assuming credible optimum conditions unless specified controls are 

implemented to control the limit to a certain range of values. 

As discussed in Section 5.4.1.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), methods used at the proposed facility 

to demonstrate subcriticality of processes include hand calculations utilizing published 

experimental data, solid angle calculations, and Monte Carlo computer codes (GLE, 2011a). 

When computer codes are used, the CSA must demonstrate that the effective neutron 

multiplication factor (keff), plus three times the standard deviation, for the system does not 

exceed the established upper subcritical limit (USL) for credible process upsets (GLE, 2011a). 

Mathematically, this is written as:
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The USL conservatively accounts for the bias, bias uncertainty, and a margin of subcriticality 

(MoS), which are determined in the code validation process (see following SER section on code 

validation) (GLE, 2011a).1 

The applicant also analyzed the sensitivity of keff to key parameters by performing a set of 

parametric calculations (GLE, 2011a). The impact of varying these parameters is quantified and 

documented (GLE, 2011a). The variability and uncertainty in process conditions will also be 

taken into consideration when establishing safety and operating limits (GLE, 2011a). This 

information helps in selecting adequate NCS controls for a system (GLE, 2011a). This set of 

parametric calculations, along with the consideration of variability and uncertainty, address the 

acceptance criteria of Section 5.4.3.4.4(6) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant 

commits to perform parametric calculations to correlate the change in a value of a controlled 

parameter and its keff value.

The commitments in Section 5.4.1.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) to establish limits on controlled 

parameters and ensure subcriticality with an adequate margin address the acceptance criteria 

of Section 5.4.3.4.1(2) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that NCS limits on controls and controlled 

parameters will be established to ensure an adequate margin of subcriticality for safety; and

Section 5.4.3.4.1(10)(d) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that operating limits will be derived from 

NCS safety limits by taking into consideration changes in operating parameters to ensure 

processes will remain subcritical under both normal and credible abnormal conditions; Section 

5.4.3.4.1(10)(e) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that NCS operating limits will establish sufficient 

margins of safety for processes and take into consideration the variability and uncertainty in 

processes and NCS subcritical limits; and Section 5.4.3.4.1(10)(f) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) 

that NCS safety limits will establish sufficient margins of safety for processes and take into 

consideration the variability and uncertainty in processes and NCS operating limit. The

commitment to consider variability and uncertainty, as well as the applicant’s commitment to 

ANSI/ANS 8.1 (ANSI/ANS, 1998), and ANSI/ISA 67.04.01 (ANSI/ISA, 2006) regarding setpoint 

methods (see Section 16.3.2.3.3 of the non-public version of this SER), ensure that the intent of 

the acceptance criteria of Section 5.4.3.4.4(2) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the intent of 

which is that the applicant follows the policy stated in ANSI/ANS-8.1 ANSI/ANS, 2007a) that 

process specifications shall incorporate margins to protect against uncertainties in process 

variables and against a limit being accidentally exceeded is met. Staff has reasonable 

assurance based on the above commitments that when instrument setpoints for NCS limits are 

determined, they will include appropriate allowances for variability and uncertainty. Section 

5.4.3.4.4(3) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) also contains the acceptance criteria that the 

applicant commit to ANSI/ANS 8.7 (ANSI/ANS, 1975), 8.9 (ANSI/ANS, 1987b), 8.10 

(ANSI/ANS, 1983b), 8.12 (ANSI/ANS, 1987a), 8.15 (ANSI/ANS, 1981), and 8.17 (ANSI/ANS, 

1984) as they relate to subcriticality. The applicant’s commitments to applicable ANSI 

standards are discussed in Section 5.3.1 of this SER.

Computer Code Validation

In Sections 5.4.1.3 and 5.4.1.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant discusses the validation of 

NCS computer codes at the proposed facility. The applicant uses a proprietary Monte Carlo 

code called GEMER (GLE, 2010) to calculate keff (GLE, 2011a). The GEMER code (GLE, 2010) 

 

1 The margin of subcriticality (MoS) is the administrative margin in keff to provide added assurance of 

subcriticality after bias and bias uncertainty are taken into account. This SER will use the applicant’s 

terminology, which is identical to the quantity referred to as the minimum margin of subcriticality in FCSSISG-10 (NRC, 2006).
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has been used by Global Nuclear Fuel––Americas (GNF-A) for many years, and the GEMER 

code validation report (GLE, 2010) is shared by GNF-A and the applicant (GLE, 2011a). The 

staff reviewed portions of the GEMER validation report (GLE, 2010) to verify that the validation 

is consistent with the LA (GLE, 2011a) and relevant to facility operations. Those portions of the 

GEMER validation report reviewed are described in Appendix A to Chapter 5 of the non-public 

version of this SER. They consisted of those portions material to the staff’s determination of 

whether the Upper Subcritical Limit and area of applicability were acceptable and provided 

reasonable assurance that nuclear processes evaluated to be subcritical will indeed be 

subcritical. The applicant may use other computer codes for NCS calculations once properly 

validated. This description of methods to be used addresses the acceptance criteria of Section 

5.4.3.4.1(1) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that NCS determinations will be performed using 

acceptable methods.

The commitment to validate calculational methods addresses the acceptance criteria of Section 

5.4.3.4.1(3) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that methods used to develop NCS limits will be 

validated to ensure they are within acceptable ranges and the applicant used appropriate 

assumptions and computer codes and implicitly in Section 5.4.3.4.1(7)(d) of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits to use pertinent computer codes, assumptions, and 

techniques in its methodology. Computer code validation, including documentation, is 

consistent with the requirements of ANSI/ANS 8.24 (ANSI/ANS, 2007b) and Section 4.3 of 

ANSI/ANS 8.1 (ANSI/ANS, 2007a) (GLE, 2010). This addresses the acceptance criteria of 

Section 5.4.3.4.1(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits to ANSI/ANS 8.1 

(ANSI/ANS, 2007a) as it relates to methods. (The version of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) in use 

during this review contains references to ANSI/ANS 8.1 (ANSI/ANS. 1998), but not to ANS 8.24 

(ANSI/ANS, 2007a)). The applicant’s validation method considers parameters such as neutron 

energy spectra, degree of moderation, and geometric configuration of materials (GLE, 2010). 

The code validation process establishes the bias, bias uncertainty and MoS using wellcharacterized and adequately documented critical experiments (GLE, 2010). If a statistically 

significant trend exists between a selected parameter and the critical experiments, then the bias 

will be determined by regression analysis, otherwise the bias is constant (GLE, 2010). Under 

no circumstance will the applicant use a positive bias (GLE, 2010). The bias uncertainty is 

estimated using one of the four methods identified in Section 5.4.1.3.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a): 

(1) the Single-Sided Lower Confidence Band; (2) Single-Sided Lower Tolerance Band; (3) 

Single-Sided Lower Tolerance Limit; and (4) Non-Parametric Method. The choice of method 

depends on the statistical characteristics of the benchmark data (e.g., normality, presence of 

trends) (GLE, 2011a). Each of these methods ensures that the calculated keff for a critical 

system will lie above the calculated limit with a 95 percent level of confidence (GLE, 2011a). 

Each of these methods includes margin to account for uncertainty in the methodology, data, and 

bias, addressing the acceptance criteria in Section 5.4.3.4.4(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) 

that the applicant must provide adequate allowance for uncertainty in the methodology, data, 

and bias to ensure subcriticality.

Critical experiments used for validation are assessed for completeness and applicability to the 

applicant’s proposed processes, and come from multiple sources to minimize systematic errors 

(GLE, 2010). The applicant may reject data outliers only when based upon inconsistency of the 

data with known physical behavior (GLE, 2010). Experiments are selected to cover the range of 

parameters relevant to the normal and credible abnormal conditions for the modeled systems 

(GLE, 2010).

The parameter range of selected critical experiments defines the area of applicability (AOA) for 

the code (GLE, 2010). This description of an AOA addresses the acceptance criteria of Section 
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5.4.3.4.1(6)(2) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the calculation of keff is based on a set of 

variables whose values lie in a range for which the methodology used to determine keff has been 

validated and Section 5.4.3.4.1(10)(g) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that keff is calculated from a 

set of variables whose values lie in a range for which the validity of the NCS method has been 

demonstrated. Any extension to the AOA must be justified in the CSA (GLE, 2010). The AOA 

may be extrapolated beyond the experimental parameter range using an established 

mathematical method or sound engineering judgment (GLE, 2010). The mathematical 

approach uses a leverage statistic to determine when an extrapolation is sufficiently reliable 

(GLE, 2010).

The staff determined that the term “sound engineering judgment,” as used in the basis for 

extrapolating beyond the range of benchmark data, is rather vague. Use of an “established 

mathematical methodology” for extrapolation is consistent with Section 4.3.2 of ANSI/ANS-8.1 

(ANSI/ANS, 1998), which states that extrapolation should be performed “by making use of the 

trends in the bias” and that, if the extrapolation is large, the method should be “supplemented by 

other calculational methods.” These require a rigorous mathematical approach, but the 

meaning of “sound engineering judgment” is unclear. However, the staff review of the 

aforementioned validation reports did not identify any concerns with the extent of the defined 

AOA. The staff notes that the applicant has not committed to provide notification of changes to 

its validation reports to the NRC as discussed in Section 5.4.3.4.1(7) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002) that the applicant includes a reference to, and summary description of, a documented, 

reviewed, and approved validation report for each methodology that will be used to make an 

NCS determination, and whenever there are changes to the validation report, the change will be 

reported to NRC by letter. The staff considers the description of the validation method in the LA 

(GLE, 2011a) sufficiently detailed to ensure that it will not be changed without prior NRC review 

and approval. However, the staff does not have assurance that the AOA will not be 

inappropriately changed, due to the subjectivity of “sound engineering judgment” and lack of a 

commitment to provide notification of changes to the validation report. Therefore, the staff is 

proposing the following license condition:

The licensee shall not make changes to the validation report that decrease the 

effectiveness of commitments in Section 5.4.1.3 or 5.4.1.4 of the license application, or 

that degrade the approved margin of subcriticality for safety, without prior NRC approval. 

Prior NRC approval is required for changes that meet one or more of the following 

criteria: (1) result in an increase in the upper subcritical limit, (2) expand the area of 

applicability, (3) necessitate extrapolation beyond the area of applicability, (4) employ a 

statistical method less conservative than that described in Section 5.4.1.3.2 of the 

license application (including less conservative levels of confidence), or (5) use new 

codes or calculational methods, or (6) use any other non-conservative change to the 

validation method or results.

By requiring notification to the NRC and NRC approval, including justification of any extensions 

to the AOA, for any changes to the validation reports, the acceptance criteria of 

Section 5.4.3.4.1(6)(3) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), that trends in the bias are used to support 

any extension of the methodology to areas outside the area(s) of applicability, are rendered 

moot. 

The description of the validation method in the LA (GLE, 2011a) addresses the acceptance 

criteria of Section 5.4.3.4.1(7)(a)-(j) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that address validation code 

criteria. Specifically, the description of the method in Section 5.4.1.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) 

addresses Section 5.4.3.4.1(7)(a) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the summary of the 
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validation report contains a summary of the theory of the method that is sufficiently detailed and 

clear to allow understanding of the method. The AOA is not described in detail in the LA (GLE, 

2011a); however, it is described in the validation report (GLE, 2010), which on account of the 

notification requirement in the above license condition addresses the acceptance criteria in 

Section 5.4.3.4.1(7)(b) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the summary of the validation report 

contains a summary of the area(s) to which the validation report applies. Because the applicant 

cannot change the AOA without notification and approval, the acceptance criterion in Section 

5.4.3.4.1(7)(c) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the summary of the validation report contains 

a justification for applying the methodology outside the area(s) of applicability will also be met. 

The description of an acceptable validation method also implicitly addresses Section 

5.4.3.4.1(7)(d) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the summary of the validation report contains 

a commitment to use pertinent computer codes, assumptions, and techniques in the method 

and Section 5.4.3.4.1(7)(e) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the summary of the validation 

report contains a commitment to properly perform the mathematical operations in the method.

The bullets discussing the use of benchmark-quality experiments in Section 5.4.1.3 of the LA 

(GLE, 2011a) addresses the acceptance criteria of Section 5.4.3.4.1(7)(f) of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002) that the summary of the validation report contains a commitment to use data 

based upon reliable and reproducible experimental measurements. These include assessing 

benchmark applicability, ensuring that they span the full range of necessary parameters, use of 

multiple independent series to minimize systematic errors, use of appropriate code options, and 

treatment of outliers. The criterion that the benchmarks must encompass appropriate 

parameters spanning the range of normal and credible abnormal conditions addresses the 

acceptance criteria of Section 5.4.3.4.1(7)(g) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the summary of 

the validation report contains a commitment to use plant-specific benchmark experiments and 

data derived therefrom to validate the method. The commitments regarding the bias, bias 

uncertainty, and upper subcritical limit in Sections 5.4.1.3.1, 5.4.1.3.2, and 5.4.1.3.4 of the LA 

(GLE, 2011a) address the acceptance criteria of Section 5.4.3.4.1(7)(h) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002) that the summary of the validation report contains a commitment to determine the bias, 

uncertainty in the bias, uncertainty in the methodology, uncertainty in the data, uncertainty in the 

benchmark experiments, and margin of subcriticality for safety, when using the method. Lastly, 

the description of computer software and hardware configuration control in Section 5.4.1.5 of 

the LA (GLE, 2011a), including verification of the computer code system, addresses the 

acceptance criteria of Section 5.4.3.4.1(7)(i) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the summary of 

the validation report contains a commitment to use controlled software and hardware when 

using the method and Section 5.4.3.4.1(7)(i) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the summary of 

the validation report contains a commitment to use a verification process when using the 

method.

The acceptance criteria of Sections 5.4.3.4.1(7)(a)-(j) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) addressing 

validation code criteria pertain to the summary description of the validation report (GLE, 2010) in 

the LA (GLE, 2011a). Analogous acceptance criteria listed in Sections 5.4.3.4.1(8)(a)-(i) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), which address commitments to have a documented, reviewed, and 

approved validation for each method used to make NCS determinations, pertain to the

committed contents of the validation report itself. The contents of the validation report are 

delineated in Section 5.4.1.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). These commitments address the 

acceptance criteria in Section 5.4.3.4.1(8)(a) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the validation 

report should contain a description of the theory of the method that is sufficiently detailed and 

clear to allow understanding of the method and independent duplication of results; Section 

5.4.3.4.1(8)(b) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the validation report should contain a 

description of the area(s) of applicability that define the range of values for which valid results 

have been obtained for the parameters used in the method and also, in accordance with 
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ANSI/ANS 8.1(ANSI/ANS, 2007a) that any extrapolation beyond the area(s) of applicability 

should be supported by an established mathematical method; Section 5.4.3.4.1(8)(d) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the validation report should contain a description of the proper 

functioning of the mathematical operations in the method; Section 5.4.3.4.1(8)(e) of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002) that the validation report should contain a description of the data used in the 

methodology, showing that the data were based on reliable experimental measurements; 

Section 5.4.3.4.1(8)(f) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the validation report should contain a 

description of the plant-specific benchmark experiments and the data derived therefrom that 

were used for validating the method; Section 5.4.3.4.1(8)(g) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that 

the validation report should contain a description of the bias, uncertainty in the bias, uncertainty 

in the methodology, uncertainty in the data, uncertainty in the benchmark experiments, and 

margin of subcriticality for safety, as well as the basis for these items if used in the 

methodology. In addition, the use of positive bias is proscribed; and Section 5.4.3.4.1(8)(i) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the validation report should contain a description of the 

verification process and results. The remaining acceptance criteria in Section 5.4.3.4.1(8)(c) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the validation report should contain a description of the use of 

pertinent computer codes, assumptions, and techniques in the method and Section 

5.4.3.4.1(8)(h) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the validation report should contain a 

description of the software and hardware that will use the method are covered by the fact that 

the applicant is committed to perform and document a validation report that must be consistent 

with the summary description of the validation in the LA (GLE, 2011a). The applicant’s 

commitment to include the validation report in its configuration management system (Section 

5.4.1.4 and 5.4.1.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011a)) addresses the acceptance criteria in Section 

5.4.3.4.1(9) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits to incorporate each 

documented, reviewed, and approved validation report for a method, and the assumptions used, 

into the facility configuration management program.

The regulations in 10 CFR 70.61(d) contain the requirement that under normal and credible 

abnormal conditions, all nuclear processes must be subcritical, including use of an approved 

margin of subcriticality for safety. This “approved margin of subcriticality for safety” consists of 

the applicant’s MoS (identical to the administrative margin, or “minimum margin of subcriticality” 

in FCSS-ISG-10 (NRC, 2006)) together with the margin due to the applicant’s conservative 

technical practices as described in Section 5.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). This is consistent with 

the guidance in FCSS-ISG-10 (NRC, 2006) that assurance of subcriticality may be provided by 

specifying a margin in keff (MoS), or specifying conservative modeling practices, or both.

The applicant will apply an MoS of at least 0.03 for all criticality calculations, which has been the 

historical safety basis margin used at GNF-A (GLE, 2010). For AOAs in which the bias 

uncertainty exceeds 0.03 (e.g., AOA-6), an MoS of 0.05 will be employed (GLE, 2010). This 

distinction is reflected in Section 5.4.1.3.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), which states that a larger 

MoS will be used when the combination of bias and uncertainty exceeds 0.03. In addition, the 

applicant has also stated (GLE, 2011c) that AOA-1, covering low-enriched homogeneous 

systems, is the only one applicable to currently envisioned facility processes. AOA-2 concerns 

high-enriched uranium, which is not present in sufficient quantities to constitute a criticality 

concern. AOA-6 concerns heterogeneous fuel systems with boron. Neither of these types of 

material is expected at the facility in any significant quantities. Changing this would require the 

applicant to undergo the facility change process, and the staff considers such a significant 

change would require a license amendment. Therefore, the use of an MoS of 0.03 for 

calculations applicable to the proposed facility operations is acceptable to the staff.
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Section 5.4.3.4.4(4) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) contains the acceptance criterion that the 

applicant needs to commit to NRC pre-approval for any administrative margins (identical to the 

MoS). The staff determined that a specific commitment to this criterion is not necessary, 

because the MoS is being reviewed as part of the licensing review, as required by 10 CFR 

70.61(d). This addresses the acceptance criteria of Section 5.4.3.4.1(6)(1) of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002), which states that the is MoS intended to be large compared to the uncertainty in 

the calculated keff values. Acceptability of the MoS is justified by the use of critical experiments 

which closely match the applications at the proposed facility, conservative methods to derive the 

bias and bias uncertainty, and a consistent conservative set of modeling assumptions defined 

by internal procedures. The most important of these conservative assumptions is evaluating all 

nuclear processes at an enrichment of 8 weight (wt) percent uranium-235 (235U), whereas facility 

operations will be limited to no more than 5 wt percent 235U. The applicant indicated that there 

may be a need to increase the target enrichment in the future above 5 wt percent 235U (GLE, 

2011a). 

The staff finds that the conservative margin due to enrichment is a significant part of the 

technical basis for approval of the MoS and is also relied on in the validation review for justifying 

extending the area of applicability beyond experimental benchmark data (see Appendix A to 

Chapter 5 of the non-public version of this SER). Given this reliance on this conservative 

margin, the staff will impose the following license condition:

The licensee shall provide a minimum 60-day notice to NRC prior to initial customer 

product withdrawal of licensed material exceeding 5 weight percent 235U enrichment. 

This notice shall identify the necessary equipment and operational changes to support 

customer product shipment for these assays and shall provide the facility documents 

demonstrating compliance with all criticality safety regulatory requirements. The 

licensee may not implement the changes in enrichment until NRC approves the 

changes.

This 60-day notification period will allow NRC staff time to assess the proposed change, to 

determine the impact on the basis for the MoS and extensions of the area of applicability. The 

staff notes that this margin in enrichment is only applicable to normal operations; abnormal 

conditions that result in exceeding the target enrichment would erode the basis for the MoS. 

The staff considers a reduced margin under these limited circumstances to be acceptable, 

because of the very low likelihood that the target enrichment would be significantly exceeded. 

Enrichment would be monitored closely for production purposes, and experience at other 

enrichment facilities indicates that such evolutions occur very rarely.

As stated above, the applicant’s set of conservative modeling practices, as described in the 

technical practices part of its LA (GLE, 2011a), provide margin that supports the acceptability of 

the MoS. While the most important of these modeling practices (in terms of the margin 

produced in keff) is in terms of the bounding enrichment, it is the totality of the applicant’s 

technical practices that supports the finding of acceptability of the MoS. Therefore, in addition 

to the license condition regarding increasing product enrichment, the staff will impose the 

following license condition:

No changes shall be made, without prior NRC approval, to Section 5.4 of the License 

Application that would result in modifying the current values for criticality-based analysis 

in a less conservative direction, with regard to either validation or criticality evaluation of 

nuclear processes.
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Section 5.4.3.4.4(8) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) contains the acceptance criterion that the 

applicant should met the acceptance criteria in Section 3.4 of NUREG-1520 as they relate to 

subcriticality. The staff finds that this criterion is met by commitments to several other 

acceptance criteria in Section 5.4.3.4.4(1) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant 

commits to the use of NCS controls and controlled parameters to ensure that under normal and 

credible abnormal conditions, all nuclear processes are subcritical, including use of an approved 

margin of subcriticality for safety; Section 5.4.3.4.1(2) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that NCS 

limits on controls and controlled parameters will be established to ensure an adequate margin of 

subcriticality for safety; and Section 5.4.3.4.1(6) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant 

commits to the intent of the validation report statement in Regulatory Guide 3.71 (NRC, 2010), 

which states the applicant should demonstrate: (1) the adequacy of the margin of safety for 

subcriticality by ensuring the margin is large compared to the uncertainty in the calculated value 

of keff, (2) the calculation of keff is based on a set of variables whose values lie in a range for 

which the methodology used to determine keff has been validated, and (3) trends in the bias 

support the extension of the methodology to areas outside the area(s) of applicability. Thus, a 

specific commitment to meet the acceptance criteria in Section 3.4 as they relate to subcriticality 

is not necessary.

Based on independent calculations, the staff determined that a 1 wt percent increase in 

enrichment translates into at least a 3 percent change in keff (NRC, 2011). Based on this staff 

analysis. the conservative margin in enrichment of 3 wt percent produces, in combination with 

the MoS of 0.03 to 0.05 and margin due to the applicant’s other technical practices, an 

acceptable margin of subcriticality for safety to satisfy the requirement of 10 CFR 70.61(d).

5.3.5.2 NCS Technical Practices

The review described in this section of the SER was based on Section 5.4.3.4.2 of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002), which describes technical practices related to NCS, which include, as 

described above, the use of controlled parameters to prevent criticality, the inclusion of 

controlled parameters in calculational models, and the establishment of controls to maintain 

parameters within appropriate limits.

In Sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant discusses NCS technical 

practices. NCS controls are established to ensure that limits on controlled parameters are 

maintained. The parameters that the applicant may control for NCS are: (1) mass; (2) 

geometry; (3) enrichment; (4) reflection; (5) moderation; (6) concentration or density; (7) 

interaction; (8) neutron absorbers; and (9) process characteristics.

NCS Controls

In Section 5.4.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant discusses NCS controls. The four means 

of control, in order of preference, are passive engineered control, active engineered control, 

augmented administrative control, and simple administrative control (GLE, 2011a). Active 

engineered controls are designed such that the failure of the control will result in a safe 

condition (i.e., fail-safe) (GLE, 2011a). Administrative controls which are combined with a 

physical device to alert operators or otherwise add substantial assurance to human 

performance are preferred over simple administrative controls (GLE, 2011a). Administrative 

controls which require operator action before proceeding with an operation are preferred to 

those which require operator actions to interrupt an operation (GLE, 2011a). In general, 

administrative controls will be limited to situations where an engineered control is impractical 
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(GLE, 2011a). This addresses the acceptance criteria of Section 5.4.3.4.2(3) of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002) that address the order of preference for NCS controls.

Each NCS control must be capable of preventing a criticality accident independent of the 

operation or failure of any other NCS control for credible initiating events (GLE, 2011a). The 

relative effectiveness and reliability of controls are considered during the CSA process (GLE, 

2011a). 

All NCS controls are considered to be safeguards for the purpose of conducting the ISA (GLE, 

2011a) though not all NCS controls will be IROFS. The ISA process will be used to determine 

which of these NCS controls are to be designated as IROFS (GLE, 2011a). As stated in the 

“Glossary of Definitions” in the LA (GLE, 2011a), at a minimum, an NCS control will be 

designated as an IROFS when: (1) the control is needed to maintain the system subcritical 

under normal and credible abnormal conditions; and (2) the control is relied on to ensure that 

the likelihood of a criticality accident sequence does not exceed 10-5 events per year (GLE, 

2011a). These commitments are consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 70.61(e), which 

requires that engineered and administrative controls relied on the meet the performance 

requirements of 10 CFR 70.61(b) or (d) must be IROFS, and are, therefore, acceptable to the 

staff.

Mass

In Section 5.4.4.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant discusses mass control. Mass control 

may be used to limit the amount of uranium in process operations or vessels. Mass may be 

controlled by direct measurement, fixed geometric dimensions, analytic methods, or nondestructive methods (GLE, 2011a). A conservative process density is assumed when geometry 

is used to control mass (GLE, 2011a). This addresses the acceptance criteria of Sections 

5.4.3.4.2(7)(a) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). This acceptance criterion states that when a 

given mass has been determined, a percentage factor is used to determine mass percentage of 

Special Nuclear Material (SNM). In the staff’s judgment, this criterion only applies when mass 

limits are based on assumptions about the percentage of SNM, and states that any such 

assumptions should be confirmed by physical measurement, or else the entire mass should be 

assumed to be SNM. The applicant’s commitment with regard to analytic or non-destructive 

methods meet the intent of confirming the percentage of SNM in bulk material, whereas the 

applicant’s commitment to direct measurement is applicable to the case where the entire mass 

is assumed to be SNM. Therefore, the above commitments meet the intent of Section 

5.4.3.4.2(7)(a) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that mass be determined based on material 

composition.

A conservative process density is assumed when geometry is used to control mass (GLE, 

2011a). This addresses the acceptance criterion of Section 5.4.3.4.2(7)(b) of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002) that when fixed geometric devices are used to limit the mass, a conservative 

process density is used. Establishment of mass limits will also consider enrichment, 

moderation, reflection, geometry, spacing, and material composition (GLE, 2011a). The 

consideration of material composition address the acceptance criteria of Section 5.4.3.4.2(7)(a) 

of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that mass be determined based on material composition.

Section 5.4.3.4.2(7)(c) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) contains the acceptance criterion that 

when mass is measured, instrumentation will be used. The general commitment to use 

instrumentation when NCS parameters are controlled by measurement is made in Section 

5.4.2.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). This general commitment addresses the acceptance criteria in 
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Section 5.4.3.4.2(6) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that address avoiding human error through 

the use of reliable measurement instruments and Section 5.4.3.4.2 (7)(c) of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002) that when mass is measured, instrumentation will be used.

.

The applicant will either use handbook values or validated analytic methods to establish mass 

limits (GLE, 2011a). For handbook values, the minimum critical mass is assumed to be an 

optimally moderated sphere with full water reflection and the maximum credible enrichment 

(GLE, 2011a). When double batching is credible and mass is the only controlled parameter, the 

most conservative mass limits are applied (GLE, 2011a). In this case, mass will be limited to 45 

percent of the minimum critical mass when handbook values are used or to 50 percent of the 

safe mass when an analytic method is used (GLE, 2011a). This is appropriate because the 

values listed in the acceptance criterion are only applicable to limits derived from experimental 

data, not analytic methods. When engineered controls prevent over batching or mass is one of

two or more parameters being controlled, mass will be limited to either 75 percent of the 

minimum critical mass listed in a handbook or to a safe mass as determined by an analytic 

method (GLE, 2011a). This addresses the acceptance criteria of Section 5.4.3.4.2(7)(d) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that when using double-batching as a single-parameter limit control 

from experimental data, and double-batching is possible, the mass of special nuclear material is 

limited to no more than 45 percent of the minimum critical mass based on spherical geometry 

and Section 5.4.3.4.2(7)(e) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that when using double-batching as a 

single-parameter limit control from experimental data and double-batching is not possible, the 

mass of special nuclear material is limited to no more than 75 percent of the critical mass based 

on spherical geometry.

Geometry

In Section 5.4.4.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant discusses geometry controls. 

Subcritical limits for geometry controls are derived using either a validated analytic method or 

experimental data (GLE, 2011a). When experimental data is used, the geometry is limited to no 

more than 90 percent of the minimum critical cylinder diameter, 85 percent of the minimum 

critical slab thickness, or 75 percent of the minimum critical sphere volume (GLE, 2011a). This 

addresses the acceptance criteria of Section 5.4.3.4.2(8)(b) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that 

when using large single units as a single-parameter control from experimental data, the margins 

of safety are 90 percent of the minimum critical cylinder diameter, 85 percent of the minimum 

critical slab thickness, and 75 percent of the minimum critical sphere volume.

Favorable geometry assumes full water or concrete equivalent reflection, optimal moderation, 

worst credible heterogeneity, and maximum credible enrichment (GLE, 2011a). Fabrication 

tolerances and dimensional changes that may occur are evaluated when establishing geometry 

controls (GLE, 2011a).

Consistent with ANSI/ANS 8.1 (ANSI/ANS, 2007a), processes are examined in the as-built

condition to validate the safety design and verify the equipment conforms to the specifications in 

the CSA (GLE, 2011a). This addresses the acceptance criteria in Section 5.4.3.4.2(8)(a) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that before beginning operations, all dimensions and nuclear 

properties that use geometry control are verified, and the facility configuration management 

program should be used to maintain these dimensions and nuclear properties.
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Enrichment

In Section 5.4.4.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant discusses enrichment controls. 

Enrichment controls can be used to segregate materials by enrichment or to prevent over 

enrichment of materials (GLE, 2011a). Enrichment controls can be active engineered or 

administrative controls used either to: (1) measure or verify enrichment; or (2) to prevent the 

introduction of higher enriched material than allowed in a particular system (GLE, 2011a). 

Section 5.4.3.4.2(10)(b) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) addresses the acceptance criteria that, 

when enrichment is measured, instrumentation will be used. The general commitment to use 

instrumentation when NCS parameters are controlled by measurement is made in Section 

5.4.2.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a).

The proposed facility will be designed for a target enrichment of 8 wt percent 235U, which means 

that the applicant does not intend to produce greater than 8 wt percent 235U at any point in the 

process (GLE, 2011a). Based upon the 8 wt percent 235U target enrichment, the applicant 

assumes the maximum credible enrichment for the facility is 8 wt percent 235U, which is used in 

the CSA when enrichment is not a controlled parameter (GLE, 2011a).

Section 5.4.3.4.2(10)(a) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) addresses the acceptance criteria that a 

method of segregating enrichments will be used to ensure that differing enrichments are not 

interchanged, unless the most limiting enrichment is used for all materials. The applicant stated 

that 8 wt percent enrichment will be used for all areas except Tails and In-Process Pads, Feed 

Vaporization, and Tails Withdrawal (GLE, 2011a). All these areas will be limited to natural or 

depleted uranium (GLE, 2011a). Controls on enrichment will primarily be used to ensure that 

enriched uranium is kept separate from natural or depleted uranium (GLE, 2011a). Therefore, 

the staff determined that the commitments above to prevent intermixing of natural and enriched 

uranium adequately address these acceptance criteria.

Reflection

In Section 5.4.4.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant discusses reflection controls. Systems 

are typically evaluated using optimum reflection (e.g., 12 inches of water surrounding a system) 

so controls on reflection are not typically required (GLE, 2011a). Reflectors that are more 

effective than water (e.g., concrete) and any adjacent structural materials are considered when 

appropriate (GLE, 2011a). This addresses the acceptance criteria of Section 5.4.3.4.2(11)(a) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that when investigating an individual unit, the wall thickness of the 

unit and all reflecting adjacent materials of the unit are considered and any adjacent materials 

should be further than twelve inches from the unit. Less than optimal reflection may be used 

when controls on reflection are applied (GLE, 2011a).

Section 5.4.3.4.2(11)(b) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) contains the acceptance criteria that 

controls used to prevent the presence of potential reflectors should be identified as IROFS in 

the ISA Summary. The staff determined that this acceptance criterion is not applicable. If 

reflection controls are required to meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61, the ISA 

approach requires they be identified as IROFS. If they are not credited to meet the performance 

requirements, it is unnecessary to consider them IROFS to comply with the regulations.
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Moderation

In Section 5.4.4.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant discusses moderation controls. The 

applicant commits to ANSI/ANS 8.22 (ANSI/ANS, 1997b). The applicant committed to identify 

credible sources of moderation intrusion and preclude or control the ingress of moderator in 

accordance with the double contingency principle (GLE, 2011a). This addresses the 

acceptance criteria in Section 5.4.3.4.2(12)(g) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that, after 

evaluating all credible sources of moderation for the potential intrusion into a moderationcontrolled area, the ingress of moderation is precluded or controlled. The applicant commits to 

ANSI/ANS 8.22 (ANSI/ANS, 1997b). Areas where moderation is controlled for NCS purposes 

are designated as a Moderator Controlled Area (MCA). The MCA designation would fall under 

the definition of a moderator control area as used in ANSI/ANS 8.22 (ANSI/ANS, 1997b), and 

would be subject to the provisions in the standard that apply to moderator control areas. This 

addresses the acceptance criteria in Section 5.4.3.4.2(12)(a) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that 

when using moderation, the applicant commits to ANSI/ANS 8.22 (ANSI/ANS, 1997b).

When moderation is a controlled parameter, the applicant will ensure that combustible materials 

are controlled and fire fighting methods are documented in approved procedures. This 

commitment ensures that any use of moderating fire fighting agents will be subject to review by 

NCS, resulting in any appropriate restrictions on moderators being included in the approved 

procedures. The acceptance criteria in Section 5.4.3.4.2(12)(f) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) 

that, when developing firefighting procedures for use in a moderation controlled area, 

restrictions are placed on the use of moderating material. This may or may not be appropriate, 

depending on the results of the criticality analysis. Therefore, the applicant’s commitment is 

sufficient to ensure that the intent of the acceptance criterion in Section 5.4.3.4.2(12)(f) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that when developing firefighting procedures for use in a moderation 

controlled area, restrictions are placed on the use of moderating material is met.

If moderation is the only controlled parameter, and moderator control relies upon sampling, the 

applicant will use redundant independent sampling methods (GLE, 2011a). This addresses the 

acceptance criteria of Section 5.4.3.4.2(12)(e) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that when 

moderation needs to be sampled, dual independent sampling methods are used.

Section 5.4.3.4.2(12)(c) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) addresses the acceptance criteria that 

when moderation is measured, the measure is obtained by using instrumentation. The general 

commitment to use instrumentation when NCS parameters are controlled by measurement is 

made in Section 5.4.2.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), which addresses these acceptance criteria.

Section 5.4.3.4.2(12)(b) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) addresses the acceptance criteria that 

when process variables can affect moderation, the process variables are shown in the ISA 

Summary to be controlled by IROFS. The staff determined that these acceptance criteria are not 

applicable. If moderation controls are required to meet the performance requirements of 10 

CFR 70.61, the ISA approach requires they be identified as IROFS pursuant to 10 CFR 

70.61(e). If they are not credited to meet the performance requirements, it is unnecessary to 

consider them IROFS to comply with the regulations.

Section 5.4.3.4.2(12)(d) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) addresses the acceptance criteria that 

when designing physical structures, the design precludes the ingress of moderation. However, 

the ISA considers all credible accident sequences leading to criticality, including those resulting 

from the ingress of moderation (GLE, 2011a), which may or may not be a criticality concern 

(e.g., it would not be a criticality concern if processes are shown to be subcritical with optimum 
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moderation). If necessary to comply with the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 and 

the double contingency principle, controls will be established (GLE, 2011a). The controls could 

include other forms of moderation control, or moderation control may not be necessary to 

demonstrate subcriticality. Thus, it is not necessary to address these acceptance criteria. 

Concentration/Density

In Section 5.4.4.6 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant discusses concentration/density 

controls. The applicant may use concentration or density as a controlled parameter (GLE, 

2011a). For NCS purposes, the applicant treats concentration and density as the same 

parameter since they are both controlled by limiting the fissile material mass to volume ratio 

(GLE, 2011a). For this section, concentration and density are considered synonymous (GLE, 

2011a).

The most reactive credible fissile material concentration is assumed unless engineering controls 

are used to detect or mitigate the effects of high concentration within the system (GLE, 2011a). 

This addresses the acceptance criteria of Section 5.4.3.4.2(13)(b) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) 

that high concentrations of SNM in a process are precluded unless the process is analyzed safe 

at any credible concentration. When concentration is the only controlled parameter to prevent a 

criticality accident, two controls will be used that are independently capable of preventing the 

concentration limit from being exceeded (GLE, 2011a). This commitment, applied to sampling, 

addresses the acceptance criteria of Section 5.4.3.4.2(13)(d) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that 

when concentration needs to be sampled, dual independent sampling methods are used. 

Precautions will be taken to ensure that precipitating agents are not inadvertently introduced 

into concentration-controlled solutions (GLE, 2011a). This addresses the acceptance criteria in 

Section 5.4.3.4.2(13)(e) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that after identifying possible 

precipitating agents, precautions are taken to ensure that such agents will not be inadvertently 

introduced.

Sections 5.4.3.4.2(9)(a) and (13)(a) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) address the acceptance 

criteria that when process variables can affect density or concentration respectively, they are 

shown in the ISA Summary to be controlled by IROFS. The staff determined that these 

acceptance criteria are not applicable. If moderation controls are required to meet the 

performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61, the ISA approach requires they be identified as 

IROFS pursuant to 10 CFR 70.61(e). If they are not credited to meet the performance 

requirements, it is unnecessary to consider them IROFS to comply with the regulations.

Section 5.4.3.4.2(9)(b) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) addresses the acceptance criteria that

when density is measured, the measurement will be obtained using instrumentation. The 

general commitment to use instrumentation when NCS parameters are controlled by 

measurement is made in Section 5.4.2.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). Therefore, these acceptance 

criteria have been addressed.

Section 5.4.3.4.2(13)(c) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) addresses the acceptance criteria that 

when using a tank containing concentration controlled solution, the tank is normally closed. 

This is not specifically addressed in the LA (GLE, 2011a). However, the regulations in 10 CFR 

Part 70, Subpart H, require that all credible accident sequences leading to criticality be 

identified. This would require the establishment of IROFS if the accidental dumping of high 

concentration solutions or precipitating agents into a concentration-controlled tank could lead to 

criticality. These controls may include closing or locking the tank lid, or other means, but other 

appropriate controls could also be used to meet the regulatory requirements, as long as they 
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are sufficiently available and reliable to meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. 

Therefore, the staff determined that a specific commitment to keep the lid closed is not needed 

to comply with the regulations.

Interaction

In Section 5.4.4.7 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant discusses interaction controls. 

Interaction controls are based on either isolation or spacing of units (GLE, 2011a). Spacing 

refers to the separation of units to control the neutron leakage of the system of units (GLE, 

2011a). Isolated units are effectively non-interacting, this condition depends upon both spacing 

and shielding between units (GLE, 2011a). Models of interacting equipment or arrays should be 

modeled using the most reactive credible interstitial moderation. While there was not an explicit 

commitment to this, the applicant has committed to evaluate processes assuming credible 

optimum conditions when parameters are not specifically controlled. This general commitment 

would require consideration of the most reactive interstitial moderation for systems containing 

interacting arrays. The criteria for determining that a unit is isolated are specified in the license 

application; these are consistent with common industry practice and what has previously been 

approved at other fuel facilities. 

If controlling interaction, physical separation between operations, vessels, or containers may be 

provided by engineered or augmented administrative controls (GLE, 2011a). Where engineered 

controls are required (e.g., spacers or racks), the structural integrity must be sufficient for both 

normal and credible abnormal conditions. This addresses the acceptance criteria in Section 

5.4.3.4.2(14)(a) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that when maintaining a physical separation 

between units, engineered controls or augmented administrative controls are used to ensure a 

minimum spacing; structural integrity of spacers or racks should be sufficient for normal and 

credible abnormal conditions.

Neutron Absorbers

In Section 5.4.4.8 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant discusses neutron absorption controls. 

If the applicant uses fixed neutron absorbers for NCS purposes, they will be are used in a 

manner consistent with ANSI/ANS 8.21 (ANSI/ANS, 1995) . This addresses the acceptance 

criteria of Section 5.4.3.4.2(15)(b) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits to 

ANSI/ANS 8.21 (ANSI/ANS, 1995). With regard to materials of construction used as neutron 

absorbers, the applicant stated that it did not currently credit these materials in this manner 

(GLE, 2011a). However, in the event materials of construction were credited, the applicant will 

evaluate systems with and without the use of these materials to determine the effect on the 

calculated keff (GLE, 2011a). If the use of materials of construction is needed to demonstrate 

subcriticality under normal or credible abnormal conditions, neutron absorption will be identified 

as a controlled parameter and the absorber designated as an IROFS (GLE, 2011a). ANSI/ANS 

8.21 (ANSI/ANS, 1995) will, therefore, apply (GLE, 2011a).

The neutron spectrum will be considered when evaluating the absorber effectiveness in the 

CSA (GLE, 2011a). This addresses the acceptance criteria of Section 5.4.3.4.2(15)(c) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that when evaluating absorber effectiveness, neutron spectra are 

considered. Non-fixed neutron absorbers (e.g., borated Raschig Rings) will not be used at the 

proposed facility for NCS purposes (GLE, 2011a). Thus, a specific commitment to the 

acceptance criterion in Section 5.4.3.4.2(15)(a) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is unnecessary.
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Volume

Volume is not a distinct controlled parameter used by the applicant, but may be used as a 

means of mass or geometry control (see Sections 5.4.4.1 and 5.4.4.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a)). 

Thus, it is unnecessary to address the acceptance criteria in Section 5.4.3.4.2(16)(a) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that when using volume control, fixed geometry is used to restrict 

the volume of SNM with engineered devices to limit accumulation) and Section 5.4.3.4.2(16)(b) 

of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that when volume is measured, instrumentation is used, because 

mass and geometry control are covered by their own acceptance criteria as discussed 

previously.

Process Characteristics

In Section 5.4.4.9 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant discusses process characteristic 

controls. The applicant may decide to use process characteristics as a means of NCS control 

(GLE, 2011a). For NCS purposes, process characteristics are the physical, chemical, and 

nuclear properties of the process or materials (GLE, 2011a). In the CSA, credit for process 

characteristics is identified as either a bounding condition or an operating limit (GLE, 2011a). 

Bounding conditions must be based upon established physical, chemical, or nuclear reactions, 

scientific principles, or facility-specific experimental data supported by operational history (GLE, 

2011a). Operating limits are maintained by a control (engineered or administrative) that must 

be treated in the same manner as any other NCS control to take credit for it in the CSA (GLE, 

2011a).

Acceptance criteria for use of process characteristics are contained under the headings for the 

main controlled parameters (e.g., Section 5.4.3.4.2(9)(a), (12)(b), and 13(a) of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002) for process variable control related to density, moderation, and concentration). 

The staff finds that the commitments above adequately address the acceptance criteria in these 

sections.

Heterogeneity

Although not an NCS controlled parameter, heterogeneity will be considered in the CSA for 

systems where the particle size varies (see Section 5.4.4.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a)). This 

addresses the acceptance criteria in Section 5.4.3.4.2(4) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that 

when evaluating a controlled parameter, the applicant should consider heterogeneous effects.

5.3.5.3 NCS Methods and Technical Practice Findings

The staff has reviewed the NCS methods and technical practices and finds that they are 

acceptable because the applicant has adequately addressed the acceptance criteria in 

Sections 5.4.3.4.1, 5.4.3.4.2, 5.4.3.4.4, and 5.4.3.4.5 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). These 

acceptance criteria include, as summarized previously, criteria for the use and validation of 

calculational methods to demonstrate subcriticality under normal and credible abnormal 

conditions (Section 5.4.3.4.1); the selection of controls and controlled parameters, adherence to 

the double contingency principle, and criteria for evaluating and controlling each of the possible 

controlled parameters (Section 5.4.3.4.2); establishing suitable controls to meet the 

requirements of 10 CFR 70.61(d) (Section 5.4.3.4.4); and adherence to the baseline design 

criteria of 10 CFR 70.64 (Section 5.4.3.4.5). The applicant commits to the double contingency 

principle as required by 10 CFR 70.64(a)(9). The staff finds that the NCS methods and 
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technical practices, if applied as described in the LA (GLE, 2011a), will provide an adequate 

margin of subcriticality for safety as required by 10 CFR 70.61(d).

5.3.6 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM

The review described in this section of the SER was based on the acceptance criteria in 

Section 5.4.3.4.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), which describes criteria for the installation, 

operation, and maintenance of CAAS systems, including adherence to ANSI/ANS 8.3 

(ANSI/ANS, 1997a) and for the establishment of associated emergency response procedures.

5.3.6.1 Criticality Accident Alarm System Description

In Section 5.3.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant discusses the CAAS. The applicant 

commits to have a CAAS that meets the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 and ANSI/ANS 8.3 

(ANSI/ANS, 1997a), as modified by Regulatory Guide 3.71, (NRC, 2010). This addresses the 

acceptance criteria of Section 5.4.3.4.3(2) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the CAAS meets 

the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 and ANSI/ANS 8.3 (ANSI/ANS, 1997a), as modified by 

Regulatory Guide 3.71, (NRC, 2010). In addition, the CAAS will be designed and located such 

that it will be:

• Operational during a design basis earthquake;

• Protected to minimize damage due to fire, and other credible events; 

• Uniform throughout the facility; and

• Clearly audible in areas that must be evacuated or a visual means of notifying personnel 

to evacuate will be provided (GLE, 2011a).

These commitments address the acceptance criteria of Section 5.4.3.4.3(3) of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits to having a CAAS that is uniform throughout the facility 

for the type of radiation detected, mode of detection, alarm signal, and system dependability; 

Section 5.4.3.4.3(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits to having a CAAS 

that is designed to remain operational during credible events such as a fire, an explosion, a 

corrosive atmosphere, and other credible conditions; and Section 5.4.3.4.3(6) of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits to having a CAAS alarm that is clearly audible in areas 

that must be evacuated or provides alternate notification methods documented to be effective in 

notifying personnel that evacuation is necessary.

Section 5.4.3.4.3(4) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) addresses the acceptance criteria that the 

CAAS be designed to remain operational during credible events such as a seismic shock 

equivalent to a design basis earthquake or equivalent value specified in the International 

Building Code (ICC, 2006). This is addressed by the applicant’s commitment with regard to a 

seismic event. Other such events are covered by provisions in ANSI/ANS 8.3 (ANSI/ANS, 

1997a) and ANSI/ANS 8.23 (ANSI/ANS, 1997c), to which the applicant has committed. The 

applicant will maintain documentation demonstrating compliance with the requirements of 10 

CFR 70.24 (GLE, 2011a). 

The regulations in 10 CFR 70.24(a) require the applicant to provide CAAS coverage in each 

area where it will handle, use, or store SNM. The applicant identified the areas where it will 

handle, use, or store SNM in Sections 1.1.2.1 and 1.1.2.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). The 

applicant will provide CAAS coverage, with at least two detectors, for all of these areas except 

the UF6 Cylinder Storage Pads, Trailer Storage Area, and UF6 Cylinder Staging Area. (The 
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applicant applied for an exemption for these areas; see Section 1.2.5.7 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) 

and Sections 1.2.3.7.7 and 5.3.6.3 of the SER). This commitment to have CAAS coverage in all 

areas of the facility in which special nuclear material is present (with the exception of those 

areas covered by any exemption that is granted) addresses the acceptance criteria in Section 

5.4.3.4.3(1) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant documents that the CAAS meets 

the requirements of 10 CFR Part 70.

The applicant has an emergency plan and commits to follow ANSI/ANS 8.23 (ANSI/ANS, 

1997c) (GLE, 2011a). This addresses the acceptance criteria in Section 5.4.3.4.3(8)(a) and (b) 

of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits to the requirements of ANSI/ANS8.23-1997 (ANSI/ANS, 1997c) and Section 5.4.3.4.3(8)(b) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that 

the applicant either has an emergency plan or satisfies the alternate requirements in 10 CFR 

70.11(h)(1)(i). The CAAS is backed up by emergency power that will automatically activate 

upon loss of normal power. This addresses the acceptance criteria in Section 5.4.3.4.3(8)(d) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits to provide emergency power for the 

CAAS or provide justification for the use of continuous monitoring with portable instruments. If 

CAAS coverage is lost, operations in the affected areas will promptly be put into a safe condition 

(GLE, 2011a). The exact time to shut down an operation or put it in a safe state is dependent 

upon the process and conditions at the time of the event (GLE, 2011a). When the CAAS is not 

functioning, compensatory measures such as limiting access and halting fissile material 

movement will be employed (GLE, 2011a). As discussed in Section 5.3.5 of the LA (GLE, 

2011a), the applicant defines ‘promptly’ as being initiated within one hour and completed within 

previously specified completion times. Processes will be rendered safe by initially going into 

Standby Mode, in which all fissile material activities are suspended, or by suspending that 

portion of processes with the potential to result in an inadvertent criticality (those involving fissile 

material of a sufficient quantity and enrichment to sustain criticality) (GLE, 2011a). This action 

will be taken within four hours, unless longer time periods have been determined and justified in 

advance (GLE, 2011a). During such suspension of fissile activities, process systems will be 

idled, enrichment will be ceased, and any manual movement, handling, or processing of fissile 

materials outside of process equipment will be halted (GLE, 2011a). 

The staff determined that the suspension of activities within the time frames specified will be 

acceptable given the low risk of criticality in the facility. The criticality alarms do not prevent 

criticality, but provide an added layer of protection that mitigates the dose to workers in the 

event of criticality. Criticality accidents must be rendered ‘highly unlikely,’ using other preventive 

controls, and therefore the risk of criticality occurring in a four-hour period would be acceptable. 

In some cases, longer time periods may be required to suspend operations in a safe manner, 

and this would be justified and documented.

The applicant stated in Section 5.3.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) that extending the time period 

would be justified in the event that it is either not feasible, or not safe, to shut down operations 

within four hours. One example would be placing the facility into Modified Standby Mode, in 

which gaseous UF6 must be desublimed to the solid state. Although this would take more than 

four hours, it would result in transforming the material into a more stable and safe form in the 

case of an emergency. The staff finds that extending the time in such situations along with such 

measures (e.g., placing the facility into Modified Standby Mode) would be justified because it 

results in a net reduction in risk, or, as stated in the acceptance criterion in Section 5.4.3.4.3(7) 

of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits to rendering operations safe, by 

shutdown and quarantine if necessary, in any area where CAAS coverage has been lost and 

not restored within a specified number of hours, this time to be determined on a process-byprocess basis, because shutting down certain processes, even to make them safe, may carry a 
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larger risk than being without a CAAS for a short time. The applicant further commits to 

compensatory measures (e.g., limit access, halt movement) when the CAAS system is not 

function, because shutting down certain processes, even to make them safe, may carry a larger 

risk than being without a CAAS for a short time. The applicant’s plan for addressing a nonfunctional CAAS, as described in the preceding paragraphs, addresses the acceptance criteria 

in Section 5.4.3.4.3(7) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant render operations safe if 

CAAS coverage is lost and not restored within a set time.

Section 5.4.3.4.3(8)(c) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) addresses the acceptance criterion that 

the applicant provide fixed and personnel accident dosimeters in areas requiring a CAAS. This 

is not specifically addressed in the LA (GLE, 2011a). However, the applicant has committed to 

ANSI/ANS-8.23 (ANSI/ANS, 1997c). Sections 4.1(9) and 5.2.4(4) of this standard require fixed 

and personnel accident dosimeters. Therefore, a specific commitment to this criterion is 

unnecessary.

These commitments for the CAAS system will ensure that a nuclear criticality will be detected 

promptly so as to minimize radiation exposure to workers, addressing the acceptance criteria of 

Section 5.4.3.4.1(4) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that an inadvertent criticality will be detected 

promptly to ensure that radiation exposures to workers are minimized.

5.3.6.2 CAAS in the ISA Summary

The regulations in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(4) require that the ISA Summary contain information that 

demonstrates compliance with the criticality monitoring and alarm requirements of 10 CFR 

70.24. The acceptance criteria for the CAAS are described in Section 5.4.3.4.3 of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002), which address the applicant’s commitments to establish a CAAS that meets 

the requirements on 10 CFR 70.24. The ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) did not contain sufficient 

information regarding the CAAS, because the detailed CAAS designs have not been completed 

at this time. To satisfy the requirements in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(4), an applicant must provide 

information in the ISA Summary demonstrating compliance with 10 CFR 70.24. To ensure that 

these requirements will be met, the staff is granting an exemption to the requirements in 10 CFR 

70.65(b)(4), and is imposing the following license condition:

The licensee is granted an exemption to the requirements in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(4) to 

require that the ISA Summary contain information that demonstrates compliance with the 

criticality monitoring and alarm requirements of 10 CFR 70.24. At least 90 days prior to 

obtaining licensed material, the licensee shall submit to the NRC for approval Criticality 

Accident Alarm System design information to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 

70.65(b)(4) for all areas for which NRC has not granted an exemption to 10 CFR 70.24, 

and in which special nuclear material is handled, used, stored, or transported (including 

outdoor transport routes), and include this information in the ISA Summary. 

The basis for the exemption to 10 CFR 70.65(b)(4) is discussed in Section 1.2.3.7.8 of this SER.

The applicant indicated that CAAS coverage will be necessary for the Operations Building 

(except the laser area, which does not contain SNM), classified storage area, and unclassified 

storage area. These areas plus those areas where an exemption to the CAAS requirements 

has been requested covers the primary areas where fissile material is expected to be handled, 

used, or stored. In the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant did not indicate CAAS coverage would 

be provided for transport paths between these areas; however, coverage of these areas is 

expected and can be verified once the final CAAS system layout is determined. The staff 
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determined that the applicant’s statements concerning CAAS coverage, combined with the 

above imposed license condition are sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that CAAS 

coverage of the transportation paths will be provided.

5.3.6.3 CAAS Exemption Request

In Section 1.2.5.7 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant discusses its exemption request related 

to the CAAS. In the request, the applicant requested an exemption from the CAAS coverage 

requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 for the UF6 Cylinder Storage Pads, Trailer Storage Area, and 

UF6 Cylinder Staging Area. The exemption request is also discussed in Section 1.2.3.7.7 of this 

SER. (There are no acceptance criteria related to the review of a CAAS exemption request; the 

staff evaluated this against the criteria in 10 CFR 70.17, as discussed below.)

The exemption will not apply to any of the areas where 48GLE cylinders with enriched material 

will be handled, used, or stored. These cylinders are much larger than 30B cylinders normally 

used for enriched material. Procedures will be in place to preclude the transfer and storage of 

48GLE or 30B cylinders to the CAAS-exempt areas, which would be readily apparent due to 

their different color.

The UF6 Cylinder Storage Pads consist of the Tails, In-Process, and Product Pads (GLE, 

2011a). The Tails and In-Process Pads do not require CAAS coverage under normal 

circumstances since no SNM will be present (GLE, 2011a). It is possible that a 30B could 

inadvertently be transferred to either the Tails or In-Process Pads, but due to the size difference 

between 30B and other cylinders this should be obvious and quickly remedied.

Enriched uranium will be handled and stored in 30B cylinders on the Product Pads, Trailer 

Storage Area, and UF6 Cylinder Staging Area. Transportation, handling, and storage of 30B 

cylinders only involve solid UF6. All other NCS commitments will continue to be met, such that 

the operations with 30B cylinders will be adequately subcritical, a criticality accident is highly 

unlikely, and the double contingency principle will be met. The 30B cylinder is engineered, 

tested, and inspected in accordance with ANSI N14.1, “Nuclear Materials––Uranium 

Hexafluoride––Packaging for Transport” (ANSI, 2001), such that they are leak-tight and will 

prevent moderators from entering the cylinder. Only approved overhead crane rigging, forklift, 

or transport carrier will be used to prevent cylinder breach.

30B cylinders will not be stored for long periods of time, so it is considered highly unlikely for a 

breach to go unnoticed for a significant amount of time (GLE, 2011a). In addition, it would take 

several days of extremely heavy rainfall before a criticality would be possible if a large breach 

were to occur (GLE, 2011a). In addition, as discussed in Section 1.1.2.2.1 through 1.1.2.2.3 of 

the LA (GLE, 2011a), the storage pads are designed to preclude the buildup of rainwater on the 

outside of the cylinders.

The installation of the criticality monitors would have to be mounted high over the storage pads 

(GLE, 2011a). The maintenance requirements for the CAAS would increase vehicular traffic 

and, therefore, the likelihood of a cylinder breach (GLE, 2011a). Installation of criticality 

monitors would also increase the likelihood that an individual would be present in the area and 

susceptible to both routine radiation and criticality accident doses (GLE, 2011a). Therefore, the 

installation of criticality monitors would increase the overall risk to workers (GLE, 2011a).

Based on the above evaluation of the request for an exemption to 10 CFR 70.24 for the UF6

Cylinder Storage Pads, Trailer Storage Area, and UF6 Cylinder Staging Area, the NRC staff 
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finds that there is a low risk of a criticality accident with product cylinders in these areas. In 

addition, the staff finds that the installation of a CAAS in these areas would not significantly 

reduce the risk to the workers or the public:

Under 10 CFR 70.17, the Commission may grant exemptions from the requirements of the 

regulations as it determines are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the 

common defense and security and are otherwise in the public interest. NRC staff evaluated the 

applicant’s exemption request and determined that the requested exemption is not prohibited by 

law. Staff also determined that the installation of a CAAS in the UF6 Cylinder Storage Pads, the 

Trailer Storage Area, and the UF6 Cylinder Staging Area would not significantly reduce the risk 

to the workers or the public because there is a low risk of a criticality accident with product 

cylinders in these areas. Therefore, the approach will not endanger life or property or the 

common defense and security. Because the proposed approach will reduce the applicant’s 

expenses in implementing its nuclear criticality safety program, the staff has determined that the 

proposed approach will be in the public interest by reducing unnecessary regulatory costs. 

Therefore, the staff grants the requested exemption as provided in Section 1.2.5.7 of the LA 

(GLE, 2011a). The following license condition will be imposed in the license to address the 

applicant’s proposed changes to the CAAS program:

The licensee is granted an exemption to the requirements in 10 CFR 70.24, which 

require the licensee to maintain a criticality accident alarm system, for the UF6 Cylinder 

Storage Pads, the Trailer Storage Area, and the UF6 Cylinder Staging Area.

5.3.6.4 CAAS Findings

The staff reviewed the applicant’s commitment to the CAAS requirements in 10 CFR 70.24 and 

finds that it is acceptable because the applicant maintains a CAAS that is capable of energizing 

a clearly audible alarm signal if accidental criticality occurs, and the applicant maintains 

emergency procedures for each area in which SNM is handled, used, or stored to ensure 

prompt personnel evacuation upon the sounding of the alarm. Additionally, the staff finds that 

the applicant adequately addressed the acceptance criteria in Section 5.4.3.4.3 of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002), which pertain to the implementation of a CAAS system meeting the requirements 

of 10 CFR 70.24(a), including adherence to the ANSI standard ANSI/ANS 8.3 (ANSI/ANS, 

1997a).

The staff has reviewed the information about the CAAS provided in the applicant’s LA (GLE, 

2011a) and ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) and determined that the applicant’s commitments in 

regard to 10 CFR 70.24 and ANSI/ANS 8.3 (ANSI/ANS, 1997a) meet the acceptance criteria 

discussed above. In addition, 10 CFR 70.65(a)(4) requires, in part, that the ISA Summary 

include information that demonstrates compliance with the requirements for criticality monitoring 

and alarms in 10 CFR 70.24. Because a criticality cannot occur if there is no fissionable 

material onsite, an operating CAAS is not needed until the applicant obtains licensed material. 

Therefore, the staff is granting an exemption to the requirements in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(4) and is 

imposing the following license condition to ensure that the regulatory requirement is met before 

the licensee obtains licensed material:

The licensee is granted an exemption to the requirements in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(4) to 

require that the ISA Summary contain information that demonstrates compliance with the 

criticality monitoring and alarm requirements of 10 CFR 70.24. At least 90 days prior to 

obtaining licensed material, the licensee shall submit to the NRC for approval Criticality 

Accident Alarm System design information to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 
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70.65(b)(4) for all areas for which NRC has not granted an exemption to 10 CFR 70.24, 

and in which special nuclear material is handled, used, stored, or transported (including 

outdoor transport routes), and include this information in the ISA Summary. 

The staff has reviewed the request for an exemption to 10 CFR 70.24 for the UF6 Cylinder 

Storage Pads, Trailer Storage Area, and UF6 Cylinder Staging Area and finds that there is a low 

risk of a criticality accident with product cylinders in these areas. In addition, the staff finds that 

the installation of a CAAS in these areas would not significantly reduce the risk to the workers or 

the public. The staff has reasonable assurance that, with the following license condition, the 

exemption to 10 CFR 70.24 for the areas requested will not endanger life or property or the 

common defense and security:

The licensee is granted an exemption to the requirements in 10 CFR 70.24, which 

require the licensee to maintain a criticality accident alarm system in the UF6 Cylinder 

Storage Pads, the Trailer Storage Area, and the UF6 Cylinder Staging Area.

5.3.7 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

The review described in this section of the SER was based on Section 5.4.3.4.7(7) of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002), which describes the reporting of certain NCS-related events to the NRC, 

which include evaluating the criticality safety significance of events, making the necessary 

notifications to the NRC Operations Center, and meeting the applicable requirements of 10 CFR 

70.50 and 10 CFR Appendix A.

In Section 5.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant discusses NCS reporting requirements. 

The applicant will establish a program to evaluate the significance of events, in terms of NCS, 

using qualified individuals (GLE, 2011a). This addresses the acceptance criteria in Section 

5.4.3.4.7(7)(a) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant has a program for qualified 

individuals to evaluate the criticality significance of NCS events and apparatus in place for 

making the required notification to the NRC Operations Center. The criteria for reporting events 

to the NRC Operations Center under 10 CFR 70.50 and Appendix A to 10 CFR 70 will be 

incorporated into written procedures (GLE, 2011a). This addresses the acceptance criteria in 

Section 5.4.3.4.7(7)(b) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant incorporates the 

reporting criteria of 10 CFR 70.50 and Appendix A into the facility emergency procedures. 

Reports will be made based upon IROFS failure regardless of whether or not safety limits are 

exceeded (GLE, 2011a). This addresses the acceptance criteria of Section 5.4.3.4.7(7)(c) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits to issue the necessary report based on 

whether the IROFS credited were lost, irrespective of whether the safety limits of associated 

parameters were actually exceeded. An event will be reported within one hour of discover when 

the reporting criteria in 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, Paragraph (a), apply or when it cannot be 

determined that these criteria do not apply (GLE, 2011a). This addresses the acceptance 

criteria of Section 5.4.3.4.7(7)(d) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits that, 

if it cannot ascertain within one hour whether the criteria of 10 CFR Part 70 Appendix A, 

paragraphs (a) or (b) apply, the event will be treated as a one-hour reportable event. An event 

will be reported within 24 hours of discovery when the reporting criteria in 10 CFR 70, Appendix 

A, Paragraph (b), apply or when it cannot be determined that these criteria do not apply (GLE, 

2011a).

The staff reviewed the applicant’s commitments to report NCS events to the NRC Operations 

Center and finds that they are acceptable because the applicant has adequately addressed all 
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the acceptance criteria in Section 5.4.3.4.7(7) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant 

describe measures to implement the reporting requirements in 10 CFR Part 70, Appendix A.

5.3.8 INTEGRATED SAFETY ANALYSIS

The review described in this section of the SER was based primarily on Chapter 3 and Section 

5.4.3.4.6, of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). Chapter 3 describes the review of the ISA for all 

regulated facility hazards, while Section 5.4.3.4.6 describes the review as applied specifically to 

criticality hazards. Specifically, Section 5.4.3.4.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) states that the 

criticality hazards should be evaluated consistent with other facility hazards, but that prevention 

must be primary means of control, and that applicable ANSI standards should be followed, as is 

discussed in detail below.

The purpose of the ISA review is to determine that there is reasonable assurance that an ISA is 

conducted in accordance with 10 CFR 70.62(c) which will ensure that the requirements of 10 

CFR 70.61, as they relate to NCS, will be met. This review is divided into two parts: (1) review 

of commitments regarding the conduct of an ISA and ISA Summary and (2) review of the ISA 

Summary. The conclusions reached in this section are supported by a review of selected onsite

ISA documents. The non-public portions of the ISA Summary and onsite ISA document 

(horizontal and vertical slice) review are discussed in Section 3.3.8 of the non-public SER.

5.3.8.1 ISA Commitments

In Chapter 3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant discusses commitments applicable to the 

ISA. This chapter of the SER will only give a brief synopsis of the applicant’s ISA, and will only 

discuss in detail those aspects that are unique to criticality safety. The applicant conducted and 

will maintain an ISA that identifies––for each process––the NCS hazards, credible accident 

sequences (including consequences and likelihood), and IROFS. CSAs are part of the ISA and 

document the criticality hazards and credible criticality accident scenarios. The ISA was 

conducted and will be maintained by a team which includes at least one qualified NCS engineer.

The applicant’s ISA is a two step process as discussed in Chapter 3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) 

(see Chapter 3 of this SER for more details). The first step is to perform a process hazard 

analysis (PHA) based upon the approach described in Chapter 3, Appendix A, of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002). The second step is to perform a quantitative risk assessment (QRA) for each 

scenario identified in the PHA as having unacceptable risk. The CSAs will be used to inform the 

PHA and QRA.

The What-If/Checklist method is used to identify potential hazards. For each credible hazard, 

the ISA team assigns a severity level and unmitigated likelihood using a semi-quantitative risk 

index method. The applicant considers potential criticality accidents to be high consequence 

events. This means that for each criticality accident scenario the ISA team must determine that 

the scenario is either not credible or highly unlikely to occur. An accident sequence is 

considered to be highly unlikely if it occurs at a frequency of less than or equal to 10-5 per year. 

Thus, for criticality hazards there are only three possible outcomes from the PHA:

1. A criticality accident is determined to be not credible. No further analysis is required and 

IROFS are not needed to meet the performance requirements.

2. A criticality accident is presumed credible, but the initiating event is determined to be 

highly unlikely without the need for any controls. The unmitigated accident sequence is 
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assigned a severity ranking of 3 and a likelihood category of 1. The unmitigated risk is 

acceptable and no IROFS or further analysis is required. 

3. A criticality accident is presumed credible and the initiating event is determined not to be 

highly unlikely (without crediting any controls). The unmitigated accident sequence is 

assigned a severity ranking of 3 and a likelihood category of 2 or 3. The unmitigated risk 

is unacceptable and IROFS must be defined. A QRA is performed to demonstrate the 

adequacy of the IROFS. 

The QRA follows probabilistic risk assessment methods developed for the commercial nuclear 

power industry. The QRA report uses event trees to evaluate accident sequences and provides 

a detailed discussion of the initiating events, IROFS, and justification for the overall event 

frequencies.

The applicant commits to select IROFS that are independent of the initiating event and other 

credited IROFS. For criticality hazards, IROFS are a subset of the NCS controls identified in 

CSAs (see Section 5.3.5.2 of this SER).

 

The staff reviewed the applicant’s commitments regarding the conduct of its ISA against the 

acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), as documented in Chapter 

3 of this SER. Section 3.4.3.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) contains acceptance criteria that 

pertain to the review of 10 CFR 70.62 information, specifically process safety information, ISA, 

and management measures. The discussion of their acceptability as applied to NCS hazards is 

documented in Section 3.3.8 of this SER. The following discussion addresses commitments 

related to NCS-specific acceptance criteria in Chapter 5 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002).

Section 5.4.3.4.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) includes acceptance criteria related to the 

performance of the ISA, as discussed below.

Section 5.4.3.4.6(1) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) contains the acceptance criterion that the 

applicant should meet the acceptance criteria of Section 3.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), as 

they relate to NCS. (Section 3.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) contains acceptance criteria 

pertaining broadly to the overall ISA review,) The staff’s review of the applicant’s ISA Summary 

(GLE, 2011b), which includes consideration of criticality hazards, is discussed in Chapter 3 of 

this SER. (The staff’s review of the NCS-related portion of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) is 

discussed in Section 3.3.8 of the non-public SER.)

Section 5.4.3.4.6(2) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) contains the acceptance criterion that the 

applicant should commit to use Appendix A of ANSI/ANS 8.1 (ANSI/ANS, 1998) in determining 

NCS accident sequences. Appendix A is not part of the ANSI standard (meaning that it does 

not need to be followed to be in conformity with the standard). It is simply an example of upsets 

that should be considered as part of a criticality safety review. Criticality accident sequences 

were evaluated as part of the ISA process (GLE, 2011b), as discussed in Section 3.3.8 in 

Chapter 3 of this SER. The ISA is a structured process intended to identify and evaluate any 

credible accident scenarios, including but not limited to any applicable ones in Appendix A of the 

standard. Therefore, the staff’s evaluation in Chapter 3 addresses this criterion.

Section 5.4.3.4.6(3) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) contains the acceptance criterion that the 

applicant should commit to ANSI/ANS 8.10 (ANSI/ANS, 1983b) (as modified by Regulatory 

Guide 3.71 (NRC, 2010)) to determine the consequences of NCS accident sequences. The 

applicant’s facility is not a shielded facility, and therefore the ANSI/ANS 8.10 standard is not 
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applicable. In addition, criticality is considered a high consequence event for the purpose of the 

ISA. Since this is the highest consequence category, this determination is conservative and no 

consequence determination is needed. Therefore, the acceptance criterion does not apply.

5.3.8.2 ISA Summary Review

The purpose of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) review is to verify that the applicant complied 

with the requirements of 10 CFR 70.65(b) as it relates to NCS. The staff review of the ISA 

Summary (GLE, 2011b) against the acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.2 of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002), regarding completeness and description of the site, facility, processes, accident 

sequences, the ISA team, IROFS (including sole IROFS), and definitions of “credible,” “highly 

unlikely,” and “unlikely.” This review was based on the current facility design. As discussed in 

Section 5.3.5 of the SER, the staff is exempting the applicant from the requirements of 10 CFR 

70.65(b)(4) with respect to providing information in the ISA Summary that demonstrates 

compliance with the CAAS requirements in 10 CFR 70.24. The staff is imposing a license 

condition to ensure that this information will be provided to the NRC and included in the ISA 

Summary prior to obtaining licensed material. The only area where the staff is aware of a lack 

of a complete design is the CAAS system. The applicant committed to revising the ISA 

Summary (GLE, 2011b) for any subsequent design changes made in accordance with 10 CFR 

70.72.

In Section 1.2 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b), the applicant discusses the NCS ISA 

program. The ISA Summary requirements that are important for NCS are 10 CFR 70.65(b)(3)–

(6) and (8)–(9). Since the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) contains proprietary, security-related, 

and export controlled information, the review of information required to meet 10 CFR 

70.65(b)(3), (4), (6), and (8) is discussed in Section 3.3.8 of the non-public SER. The following 

paragraphs discuss the ISA requirements as they apply to criticality hazards. The requirements 

of 10 CFR 70.65(b)(5) and (b)(9) are important to NCS, but also apply to other disciplines, and 

they are discussed generally in Chapter 3 of both the public and non-public SERs. Review of 

CAAS information required by 70.65(b)(4) is discussed in Section 5.3.6 of this SER.

10 CFR 70.65(b)(3): Process Description

The ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) is divided into 17 nodes. A node can be a particular process 

(e.g., blending) or can be applicable site-wide (e.g., utilities, external events) (GLE, 2011b). 

Each node contains a description of the processes and major components within the node, and 

a list of interfaces with other nodes or systems (GLE, 2011b). The ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) 

identified the areas where enriched uranium may be present, which is sufficient for determining 

where the criticality hazards exist. Natural and depleted uranium is also used at the facility; 

however no criticality hazards exist for this material (GLE, 2011b). Information regarding 

equipment geometry, presence of moderators, and other factors important to NCS were also 

included in the descriptions (GLE, 2011b). 

The staff reviewed the process descriptions for each node in the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b). 

Specifically, the applicant provided sufficient process information in the ISA Summary (GLE, 

2011b) describing the facility processes, hazards and types of accident sequences to determine 

where criticality hazards exist, and how operations might affect NCS. Therefore, the staff finds 

that the information adequately addresses the acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(3) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), which contains criteria for review of the applicant’s processes, 

hazards, and accident sequences, as it relates to NCS. This is discussed in more detail in 

Section 3.3.8 of the non-public SER.
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10 CFR 70.65(b)(4): Compliance with the Performance Requirements of 10 CFR 70.61

The set of nodes in the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) covers all processes at the facility where 

NCS is important. Based upon reviewing each process node, the staff has reasonable 

assurance that, based on the current facility design, all credible criticality accidents have been 

identified in the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b).

In Section 4.16 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b), the applicant discusses the external event 

accident sequences. External events with the potential to impact NCS are earthquakes, 

flooding, and extreme precipitation (GLE, 2011b). The likelihood of an earthquake occurring 

which would cause equipment to fail in a manner which would exceed the performance 

requirements is demonstrated to be highly unlikely (GLE, 2011b). The facility is above the 500 

year floodplain and no means of rapid flooding (e.g., extreme precipitation, pipe break) exist, so 

the applicant will have ample time to render operations safe (GLE, 2011b). Any increase in 

reflection conditions due to flooding is already accounted for since the CSAs use conservative 

reflection conditions (GLE, 2011b). Section 4.16 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) also 

considers loss of moderation control for each process where this is relevant.

The staff reviewed the information in the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) provided to demonstrate 

compliance with the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 and finds it is acceptable 

because it adequately addresses the acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(4)(a) of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002) that relates to the review of accident sequences and IROFS as they relate to 

NCS; and Section 3.4.3.2(4)(b) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that relates to management 

measures as they relate to NCS. This is discussed in more detail in Section 3.3.8 of the nonpublic SER.

10 CFR 70.65(b)(4): Compliance with 10 CFR 70.64 (Baseline Design Criteria and Defense-inDepth)

Throughout the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) for each node, the applicant discusses the baseline 

design criteria and defense-in-depth. The baseline design criteria in 10 CFR 70.64(a)(9) require 

that the design provide for criticality control, including adherence to the double contingency 

principle. This requirement is met by designing processes such that no single credible failure or 

contingency can result in criticality (GLE, 2011b). This addresses the acceptance criteria of 

Section 5.4.3.4.2(2) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant commits to the policy, 

based on 10 CFR 70.61, that no single credible event or failure can result in a criticality 

accident. Throughout most of the facility, multiple upsets would be required before criticality is 

possible (GLE, 2011b). The main UF6 processing areas are designed to preclude the ingress of 

liquid moderator into uranium-bearing equipment (GLE, 2011b). The use of MCAs is limited to 

those temporary maintenance activities requiring breaching the confinement barrier, such as 

opening equipment to perform maintenance or remove deposits (GLE, 2011b). In these cases, 

local MCAs will be established with engineered barriers (e.g., physical barriers on openings, 

overhead covers) to prevent the introduction of external source of water from entering the 

equipment (GLE, 2011b). Administrative controls will also be established as needed to prevent 

operators from hand carrying moderations into the MCA (GLE, 2011b). Where such engineered 

barriers cannot prevent moderator from fire suppression from entering the equipment, 

applicable National Fire Protection Association requirements will be employed to lock out the 

affected fire suppression system for the duration that the additional moderator controls are 

needed (GLE, 2011b). Moderator controls relied on to demonstrate compliance with the 

performance requirements are appropriately designated as IROFS (GLE, 2011b). (Other 
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moderator controls provide defense-in-depth, but for the purpose of the ISA were presumed to 

be unavailable (GLE, 2011b).) In addition, other upsets would have to occur before sufficient 

quantities of fissile material could accumulate and achieve the correct geometry and reflection 

conditions for criticality to occur (GLE, 2011b). The likelihood of achieving the right combination 

of geometry, moderation, and reflection to attain criticality provides additional defense-in-depth 

(GLE, 2011b).

In addition to the double contingency principle, the baseline design criteria in 10 CFR 70.64 

require adherence to defense-in-depth practices, including: (1) preference for engineered over 

administrative controls and (2) features that enhance safety by reducing challenges to IROFS. 

The principal way in which the design incorporates defense-in-depth practices is through the 

double contingency principle. The staff determined that in its implementation of double 

contingency, the design relies to a great extent on the use of passive engineered controls. 

Challenges to IROFS are minimized by the large safety margins inherent in most facility 

operations, and by the presence of multiple controls. For example, multiple controls would have 

to fail before moderator could be introduced into the main UF6 processing areas, and even if this 

occurred, substantial safety margin would still remain, such that multiple additional unlikely 

events would have to occur concurrently before criticality would be possible.

The staff reviewed the information in the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) provided to demonstrate 

compliance with the baseline design and defense-in-depth criteria of 10 CFR 70.64 and finds it 

is acceptable because it adequately addresses the acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(4)(d) 

of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) addressing baseline design criteria applicable to new facilities or 

new processes at existing facilities, as they relate to NCS.

10 CFR 70.65(b)(6) and (8): IROFS and Sole IROFS

In Section 1.5 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b), the applicant discusses IROFS and sole 

IROFS. The applicant’s ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) states that there are no sole IROFS 

related to nuclear criticality safety. The applicant provided a list of IROFS in its ISA Summary 

(GLE, 2011b) that references the accident sequences where the IROFS applies. Descriptions 

of IROFS and their role in meeting the performance requirements are included with the accident 

sequence descriptions. 

The staff has reviewed the list of IROFS and sole IROFS in the ISA Summary and finds it is 

acceptable because it adequately addresses the acceptance criteria in Section 3.4.3.2(6) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) to provide a descriptive list of all IROFS, as they relate to NCS; and 

Section 3.4.3.2(8) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) to provide a list of sole IROFS, as they relate 

to NCS.

5.3.8.3 ISA Summary Review Conclusions

The staff has reviewed the ISA program and the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) based on the 

acceptance criteria in Section 3.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) for preparing an ISA Summary 

and 5.4.3.4.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) for meeting the performance requirements in 10 

CFR 70.61(b), (c), and (d), and has reasonable assurance that it has conducted an ISA, based 

upon the current facility design, that:
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1. Identified all credible criticality accident scenarios;

2. Identified controls to prevent each credible criticality accident sufficient to meet the 

performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61(b) and (d), comply with the double 

contingency principle in 10 CFR 70.64(a)(9), and provide defense-in-depth as required 

by 10 CFR 70.64(b);

3. Designated as IROFS, as required by 10 CFR 70.61(e), the controls relied on to meet 

the performance requirements as they relate to NCS; and

4. Identified management measures which will be applied to NCS related IROFS to ensure 

they will be available and reliable.

Based upon the review of the ISA commitments in Chapter 3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the ISA 

Summary (GLE, 2011b), and the onsite review of ISA documents, the staff has reasonable 

assurance that an ISA will be performed and maintained in accordance with 10 CFR 70.62(c) 

such that the requirements of 10 CFR 70.61, as they relate to NCS, will be met. The staff has 

reasonable assurance that the ISA program described in Chapter 3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) is 

sufficient to identify all credible nuclear criticality accidents and the IROFS necessary to make 

such events highly unlikely.

5.3.9 FACILITY CHANGES AND CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT

The review described in this section of the SER was based on Section 5.4.3.4.7 of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002), which describes aspects of the NCS Program related to configuration 

management, change control, and the 10 CFR 70.72 change process. Specifically, this section 

contains acceptance criteria that pertain to the detection and correction of facility deficiencies, 

evaluation of facility changes by NCS, records retention, evaluating changes against the criteria 

of 10 CFR 70.72, and reporting events in accordance with 10 CFR 70.50 and 10 CFR 70, 

Appendix A.

In Sections 5.1.1, 5.3.3, and 11.1.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant discusses facility 

changes and the configuration management program as it applies to NCS. This addresses the 

acceptance criteria in Section 5.4.3.4.7(2) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) that the applicant 

commits that NCS evaluations will be made of changes to processes, operating procedures, 

IROFS, and management measures. As part of configuration management, the applicant must 

assess whether NRC approval is required before a change is implemented (GLE, 2011a). 

Changes to the site, structures, processes, systems, equipment, components, computer 

systems, and activities of personnel may be changed without NRC approval if the criteria in 10 

CFR 70.72(c) are met (GLE, 2011a). In Section 1.2.5.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant 

also requested authorization to make changes to its facility or processes as described in its LA 

(GLE, 2011a), or conduct tests or activities not presented in its license, without prior approval 

under specified conditions. This authorization does not change any of the 10 CFR 70.72(c) 

requirements, but does clarify which changes are authorized or prohibited by license condition. 

The requested authorization is evaluated in Section 1.2.3.7.2 of this SER. 

Section 5.4.3.4.7(3) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) contains the acceptance criterion that the 

applicant should commit to upgrade the NCS program to reflect changes in the ISA or new NCS 

methods and to modify operating and maintenance procedures so as to reduce the likelihood of 

criticality. The staff finds that there is no requirement to improve safety beyond what is found 

necessary at the time of licensing to comply with the regulations, and therefore a commitment to 
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upgrade the NCS program as described in the acceptance criteria in Section 5.4.3.4.7(3) of 

NUREG-1520 as described above is unnecessary.

Section 5.4.3.4.7(4) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) contains the acceptance criterion that the 

applicant should commit to retain records of the NCS program and document any corrective 

actions taken. The applicant has made commitments to these criteria in Sections 5.3.6 and 

5.3.7 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). 

Sections 5.4.3.4.7(6)(a), (b), and (c) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) contain acceptance criteria 

pertinent to the applicant’s change control process. Specifically, Section 5.4.3.4.7(6)(a) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) states that the applicant commits to a change control process that is 

sufficient to maintain the safety basis over the facility lifetime. The change process should be 

documented in written procedures and should evaluate the effect of the change on the safety 

basis of the process, including the effect on bounding process assumptions, the reliability and 

availability of NCS controls, and the safety of connected processes. Section 5.4.3.4.7(6)(b) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) states that the change control process should be connected to the 

configuration management system to ensure that changes to NCS bases are incorporated into 

procedures, evaluations, postings, drawings, other safety basis documentation, and the ISA 

Summary. Section 5.4.3.4.7(6)(c) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) states that the applicant 

commits to a program to determine whether facility changes require NRC approval under 10 

CFR 70.72(c). This program should be documented in written procedures and must involve 

individuals qualified to determine the incremental effect of changes to the safety basis as 

documented in the ISA Summary. With regard to NCS changes, in Section 5.1.1 of the LA 

(GLE, 2011a), the applicant committed to perform NCS reviews for any new or existing 

processes, or any changes to existing processes, which may have an impact on the established 

basis for NCS. In Section 5.3.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant committed to consider the 

effect of any changed CSAs on the ISA and ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b). Section 11.1.4 of the 

LA (GLE, 2011a) contains detailed commitments with regard to the change control process, for 

all changes (not just those relating to criticality). These commitments address the acceptance 

criteria of Section 5.4.3.4.7(6)(a), (b), and (c) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) as summarized 

above.

In Section 5.4.1.3.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant discusses commitments related to the 

MoS. The regulations in 10 CFR 70.61(d) require that the MoS for safety be approved by NRC. 

In Section 5.4.1.3.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant discusses commitments related to the 

MoS. The NRC is approving a MoS for safety consisting of an MoS of 0.03 or 0.05, depending 

on the area of applicability, and the margin due to conservative modeling practices as described 

in Section 5.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). The approved MoS for safety is applicable to the area(s) 

of applicability as determined in accordance with the applicant’s reviewed validation method. 

The staff, therefore, finds that the applicant’s MoS, together with the margin due to conservative 

technical practices, provides adequate assurance of subcriticality under normal and credible 

abnormal conditions, when applied to evaluations conducted within the validated area(s) of 

applicability.

Typically, a licensee must request an amendment under 10 CFR 70.34 to make changes to the 

license application because it is incorporated into the license by reference. The authorization 

request described in Section 1.2.5.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) would allow some changes to be 

made without NRC approval (i.e., without an amendment to the license), when a revision to the 

license application or other licensing basis documents is necessary. The staff determined in 

Section 1.2.3.7.2 of this SER that the proposed authorization to make changes to the LA (GLE, 

2011a) is acceptable because the applicant explicitly commits to not make any change to its 
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license which would decrease the effectiveness of its commitments without prior NRC approval. 

The applicant may also make changes to the facility or process described in the license 

application, or conduct tests or activities no described in the license application, provided they 

do not degrade the safety commitments or conflict with any specific conditions in the license 

application.

The staff also reviewed the applicant’s commitments for configuration management presented in 

Sections 5.1.1 and 5.3.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) as it relates to NCS and finds that it is 

acceptable because the applicant has adequately addressed the acceptance criteria in Section 

5.4.3.4.7 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), which describes additional program commitments 

related to the prompt detection and correction of deficiencies, the performance of NCS 

determinations of changes, upgrading of the NCS program to reflect changes to the ISA or new 

NCS methodologies, retention of records, the use of approved methodologies and technical 

practices to evaluate NCS accident sequences, the change control process as related to NCS, 

and the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 70.50 and Appendix A.

5.4 EVALUATION FINDINGS

The staff reviewed the LA (GLE, 2011a), the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b), the GEMER code 

validation report (GLE, 2010), and onsite ISA documents as it relates to NCS to satisfy the 

acceptance criteria in Chapter 5 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) as described in the previous 

sections. Based on this review, the staff has reasonable assurance that:

1. The applicant will have a staff of managers, supervisors, engineers, process operators, 

and other support personnel who are qualified to develop, implement, and maintain the 

NCS program in accordance with the facility organization and administration and 

management measures.

2. The applicant’s conduct of operations will be based on NCS methods and technical 

practices, which will ensure that SNM will be possessed, stored, and used safely 

according to the requirements in 10 CFR Part 70.

3. The applicant will provide an adequate MoS for safety as required by 10 CFR 70.61(d), 

for evaluations conducted within the validated area(s) of applicability in accordance with 

the methods and technical practices committed to in its LA.

4. The applicant’s safety programs and management measures will ensure that the MoS is

maintained such that processes will meet the subcriticality requirements of 10 CFR 

70.61(d) and the baseline design criteria requirements in 10 CFR 70.64(a).

5. The applicant will develop, implement, and maintain a CAAS in accordance with the 

requirements in 10 CFR 70.24 and the facility emergency management program.

6. The requested exemption to the CAAS requirements in 10 CFR 70.24 for the areas 

specified in the license, and the exemption to the requirement in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(4) to 

provide information demonstrating compliance with 10 CFR 70.24 in the ISA Summary, 

will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, and will be in the 

public interest.
5-43

7. The applicant will perform and maintain an ISA in accordance with 10 CFR 70.62(c) 

such that the requirements of 10 CFR 70.61, as they relate to NCS, will be met.

This finding is predicated on the applicant’s compliance with the following license conditions:

The licensee shall not make changes to the validation report that decrease the 

effectiveness of commitments in Section 5.4.1.3 or 5.4.1.4 of the license application, or 

that degrade the approved margin of subcriticality for safety, without prior NRC approval. 

Prior NRC approval is required for changes meet one or more of the following criteria: 

(1) result in an increase in the upper subcritical limit, (2) expand the area of applicability, 

(3) necessitate extrapolation beyond the area of applicability, (4) employ a statistical 

method less conservative than that described in Section 5.4.1.3.2 of the license 

application (including less conservative levels of confidence), or (5) use new codes or 

calculational methods, or (6) use any other non-conservative change to the validation 

method or results.

The licensee shall provide a minimum 60-day notice to NRC prior to initial customer 

product withdrawal of licensed material exceeding 5 weight percent 235U enrichment. 

This notice shall identify the necessary equipment and operational changes to support 

customer product shipment for these assays and shall provide the facility documents 

demonstrating compliance with all criticality safety regulatory requirements. The 

licensee may not implement the changes in enrichment until NRC approves the 

changes.

No changes shall be made, without prior NRC approval, to Section 5.4 of the License 

Application that would result in modifying the current values for criticality-based analysis 

in a less conservative direction, with regard to either validation or criticality evaluation of 

nuclear processes.

The licensee is granted an exemption to the requirements in 10 CFR 70.65(b)(4) to 

require that the ISA Summary contain information that demonstrates compliance with the 

criticality monitoring and alarm requirements of 10 CFR 70.24. At least 90 days prior to 

obtaining licensed material, the licensee shall submit to the NRC for approval Criticality 

Accident Alarm System design information to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 

70.65(b)(4) for all areas for which NRC has not granted an exemption to 10 CFR 70.24, 

and in which special nuclear material is handled, used, stored, or transported (including 

outdoor transport routes), and include this information in the ISA Summary. 

The licensee is granted an exemption to the requirements in 10 CFR 70.24, which 

require the licensee to maintain a criticality accident alarm system in the UF6 Cylinder 

Storage Pads, the Trailer Storage Area, and the UF6 Cylinder Staging Area.

Based on the above review and proposed license conditions, NRC staff concludes that if the 

applicant’s NCS program will meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 70 and provide reasonable 

assurance for the protection of public health and safety, including workers and the environment.

5.5 REFERENCES

(ANSI, 2001) American National Standards Institute (ANSI). ANSI N14.1, “Nuclear Materials––

Uranium Hexafluoride––Packaging for Transport”, 2001.
5-44

(ANSI/ANS, 1975) American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society 

(ANSI/ANS). ANSI/ANS 8.7, “Guide for Nuclear Criticality Safety in the Storage of Fissile 

Materials,” 1975.

(ANSI/ANS,1981) American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society 

(ANSI/ANS). ANSI/ANS 8.15, “Nuclear Criticality Control of Special Actinide Elements,” 1981.

(ANSI/ANS, 1983a) American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society 

(ANSI/ANS). ANSI/ANS 8.6, “Safety in Conducting Subcritical Neutron-Multiplication 

Measurements In Situ,” 1983.

(ANSI/ANS, 1983b) American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society 

(ANSI/ANS). ANSI/ANS 8.10, “Criteria for Nuclear Criticality Safety Controls in Operations with 

Shielding and Confinement,” 1983.

(ANSI/ANS, 1984) American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society 

(ANSI/ANS). ANSI/ANS 8.17, “Criticality Safety Criteria for the Handling, Storage, and 

Transportation of LWR Fuel Outside Reactors,” 1984. 

(ANSI/ANS, 1987a) American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society 

(ANSI/ANS). ANSI/ANS 8.12, “Nuclear Criticality Control and Safety of Plutonium-Uranium Fuel 

Mixtures Outside Reactors,” 1987.

(ANSI/ANS, 1987b) American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society 

(ANSI/ANS). ANSI/ANS 8.9, “Nuclear Criticality Criteria for Steel-Pipe Intersections Containing 

Aqueous Solutions of Fissile Materials,” 1987. 

(ANSI/ANS, 1991) American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society 

(ANSI/ANS). ANSI/ANS 8.20, “Nuclear Criticality Safety Training,” 1991.

(ANSI/ANS, 1995) American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society 

(ANSI/ANS). ANSI/ANS 8.21, “Use of Fixed Neutron Absorbers in Nuclear Facilities Outside 

Reactors,” 1995.

(ANSI/ANS, 1996) American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society 

(ANSI/ANS). ANSI/ANS 8.5, “Use of Borosilicate-Glass Raschig Rings as a Neutron Absorber 

in Solutions of Fissile Material,” 1996. 

(ANSI/ANS, 1997a) American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society 

(ANSI/ANS). ANSI/ANS 8.3, “Criticality Accident Alarm System,” (ANSI/ANS, 1997);

(ANSI/ANS, 1997b) American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society 

(ANSI/ANS). ANSI/ANS 8.22, “Nuclear Criticality Safety Training Based on Limiting and 

Controlling Moderators,” 1997.

(ANSI/ANS, 1997c) American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society 

(ANSI/ANS). ANSI/ANS 8.23, “Nuclear Criticality Accident Emergency Planning and 

Response,” 1997.
5-45

(ANSI/ANS, 2005) American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society 

(ANSI/ANS). ANSI/ANS 8.19, “Administrative Practices for Nuclear Criticality Safety,” 2005.

(ANSI/ANS, 2007a) American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society 

(ANSI/ANS). ANSI/ANS 8.1, “Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Material 

Outside Reactors,” 2007.

(ANSI/ANS, 2007b) American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society 

(ANSI/ANS). ANSI/ANS 8.24, “Validation of Neutron Transport Methods for Nuclear Criticality 

Safety Calculations,” 2007.

(ANSI/ANS, 2007c) American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society 

(ANSI/ANS). ANSI/ANS 8.26, “Criticality Safety Engineering Training and Qualification 

Program,” 2007.

(ANSI/ISA, 2006) American National Standards Institute/Instrumentation, Systems, and 

Automation Society (ANSI/ISA). ANSI/ISA 67.04.01, “Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-Related 

Instrumentation,” 2006.

(GLE, 2010) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “GEMER Monte Carlo 

Code Validation Report,” Revision 5.1, 2010.

(GLE, 2011a) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “GE-Hitachi Global 

Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility License Application,” Revision 6, 2011.

(GLE, 2011b) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “Integrated Safety 

Analysis Summary for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility 

License Application,” Revision 4, 2011.

(GLE, 2011c) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). Email dated 

October 21, 2011, from Julie A. Olivier to Timothy Johnson.

(ICC, 2006) International Code Council, Inc. (ICC). “International Building Code,” 2006. 

(NRC, 2002) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG-1520, "Standard Review 

Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility," 2002.

(NRC, 2005) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Interim Staff Guide FCSS-ISG-03, 

“Nuclear Criticality Safety Performance Requirements and Double Contingency Principle.” 

2005.

(NRC, 2010) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 3.71, “Nuclear 

Criticality Safety Standards for Fuels and Material Facilities,” Revision 2, 2010.

(NRC, 2006) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Interim Staff Guide FCSS-ISG-10, 

“Justification for Minimum Margin of Subcriticality for Safety,” 2006.

(NRC, 2011) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). “GLE SER – Sensitivity of keff to 

Changes in Enrichment,” March 16, 2011 (ML110750038).

6-1

6.0 CHEMICAL PROCESS SAFETY

The purpose of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) review of the General 

Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC (GLE or applicant) chemical safety program and 

the design of its proposed laser-based uranium enrichment facility is to evaluate whether the 

applicant will adequately protect workers, the public, and the environment during normal 

operations against chemical hazards of licensed material and its by-products. The chemical 

safety program and the facility’s design must also protect against credible facility conditions or 

operator actions that can affect the safety of licensed materials and thus present an increased 

chemical risk.

6.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 

The regulatory bases for the review are the general and additional contents of an application 

that addresses chemical process safety, as required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR) 70.22(a)(6), 70.22(a)(7), 70.22(a)(8), 70.23(a)(2), 70.23(a)(3), 

70.23(a)(4), and 70.65. In addition, the chemical process safety review should provide 

reasonable assurance of compliance with 10 CFR 70.61, 70.62, and 70.64.

6.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 

The guidance applicable to NRC's review of chemical process safety for the proposed facility is 

contained in Chapter 6 of "Standard Review Plan for the Review of a License Application for a 

Fuel Cycle Facility," NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). This chapter is applicable in its entirety. The 

staff also used NUREG-1601, “Chemical Process Safety at Fuel Cycle Facilities” (NRC, 1997a), 

and NUREG-1513, “Integrated Safety Analysis Guidance Document” (NRC, 2001), as guidance 

documents for this review. The acceptance criteria applicable to this review are contained in 

Section 6.4.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002).

6.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 

NRC staff reviewed the License Application (LA) (GLE, 2011a) and the Integrated Safety 

Analysis (ISA) Summary (GLE, 2011b) submitted by the applicant and considered the following 

areas:

1. Process Description;

2. Chemical Accident Sequences;

3. Chemical Accident Consequences;

4. Chemical Process Items Relied on for Safety (IROFS);

5. Management Measures;

6. Emergency Management; and

7. Baseline Design Criteria (BDC).
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The staff reviewed the applicant’s LA and ISA documents to determine if the facility’s design 

complied with the requirements specified in 10 CFR 70.61(a) and 70.64(b), respectively. 

Compliance with these regulations is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 of this Safety 

Evaluation Report (SER). The staff’s evaluation and general information about the proposed 

facility are summarized in the following sections.

6.3.1 PROCESS DESCRIPTION

6.3.1.1 General Process Description

The applicant describes the proposed facility and process systems in Section 1.1 of the LA 

(GLE, 2011a) and in Chapters 3 and 4 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b). The applicant is 

proposing to utilize laser-based enrichment technology to enrich natural uranium hexafluoride 

(UF6) in gaseous form by separating a feed stream containing the naturally occurring 

proportions of uranium isotopes containing approximately 0.72 weight percent uranium-235 

(U235) into a product stream enriched in the U235 isotope up to 8 weight percent U235 and a tails 

stream depleted in the U235 isotope. The proposed facility uses the laser-based enrichment 

technology within an area of the facility known as the Cascade/Gas Handling Area. The 

nominal capacity of the facility is six million Separative Work Units per year. The process 

utilizes lasers tuned to specific frequencies to selectively excite UF6 gas molecules to enable 

separation of the U235 isotope in UF6 feed stock. The result is a UF6 product stream enriched in 

the U235 isotope and a UF6 tails stream in which the fraction of U235 isotope is reduced or 

depleted. The feed, product, and tails streams are all in the form of UF6. 

The proposed facility utilizes industry standard UF6 containers and processes for material 

handling aspects of enrichment facility operations similar to those utilized at other uranium 

enrichment facilities. These similar UF6 handling processes include the movement of uranium 

feed stock from its solid UF6 form in cylinders to gaseous form used in the enrichment cascade 

via vaporization techniques, the filling of UF6 cylinders with UF6 gas condensed into solid UF6 

form after the enrichment process, the blending of UF6 gas of different enrichments to create 

specific desired product enrichments, and the sampling of UF6 as a liquid in autoclave pressure 

vessels.

Technical details of the laser-based enrichment technology are proprietary, are subject to export 

controls by U.S. laws and regulations, and involve classified information, access to which is 

further limited by U.S. laws and regulations.

The proposed facility enrichment process consists of the following four major systems and two

enrichment support systems:

Major Enrichment Process Systems

1. UF6 Feed and Vaporization

2. Cascade / Gas Handling

3. Product Withdrawal

4. Tail Withdrawal

Enrichment Support Systems

1. Blending

2. Sampling
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6.3.1.2 Chemical Process Inventories 

In Section 6.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant stated that the inventories of chemicals will 

be maintained below the threshold quantities set forth by the Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration (OSHA) Process Safety Management (PSM) standard, 29 CFR 1910.119, and 

the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Risk Management Program standard, 40 CFR 

Part 68. An inventory, as well as locations, is listed in the Radiological Contingency and 

Emergency Plan (RC&EP) (GLE, 2011c) in accordance with the Emergency Planning and 

Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA). 

The licensee expects to possess source material and special nuclear material as part of the 

process and byproduct radioactive materials as calibration sources. The majority of the 

calibration sources will be sealed and will not constitute a chemical hazard in the facility.

6.3.1.3 Chemical Safety Strategy

The applicant’s proposed chemical safety strategy and program are discussed in Section 6.2 of 

the LA (GLE, 2011a). Safety in normal operations will be maintained by the applicant through 

the implementation of the defense-in-depth engineering philosophy. The main design feature 

that ensures chemical process safety is robust equipment to contain UF6 during the enrichment 

process. Physical barriers include fire walls throughout the facility; glove boxes in the laboratory 

and decontamination and maintenance areas; isolation and check valves in piping containing 

UF6; siphon breaks in the Radioactive Liquid Effluent Treatment System (RLETS) piping; 

overflow vessels in the RLETS; and chemical traps for collecting UF6 vapors during connection 

and disconnection of cylinders to process lines.

The applicant will also implement a chemical safety strategy through the following:

• Chemical Safety Program – The Chemical Safety Program is applicable to chemicals 

associated with authorized activities and including UF6, hydrogen fluoride (HF), and 

other hazardous chemicals associated with activities involving licensed material. The 

Chemical Safety Program provides oversight of the handling, use, and storage of 

chemicals at the facility. The Chemical Safety Program will be documented in approved 

written procedures that ensure processes and operations will comply with applicable 

Federal and State regulations pertaining to chemical safety.

• Chemical Evaluation and Approval – Prior to a new hazardous chemical being brought 

on site or used in an activity, the applicant will require approval by the Chemical Review 

Committee. The Chemical Review Committee’s approval process will include reviewing 

the health and safety risks of the chemical, as well as appropriate handling, storage, and 

disposal information.

• Labeling and Identification – Hazardous materials or conveyance systems will be 

labeled to meet applicable regulations. Hazardous chemicals will also be identified for 

personnel through the availability and maintenance of Material Safety Data Sheets 

(MSDSs). 

Inventories of chemicals will be tracked through the procurement process. The facility’s RC&EP 

(GLE, 2011c) will also contain an inventory of bulk chemical quantities and locations, as 

required by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s EPCRA, Section 312, Tier II. The 
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RC&EP (GLE, 2011c), as well as the MSDSs, are provided to applicable offsite responders. 

The RC&EP will be updated annually.

6.3.1.4 Hazardous Chemicals and Chemical Interactions 

As discussed in Section 6.2.1.1.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the main chemical hazard present in 

the proposed facility will be UF6 and its two hydrolysis products, HF and uranyl fluoride (UO2F2). 

Any UF6 that is released will react exothermically with moisture in the air to produce HF and 

UO2F2. All three compounds are chemically toxic. The most important toxic effect of uranium 

products (UF6 and UO2F2) is damage to the kidneys, due to functional loss. It is also known to 

induce some damage to liver and muscle tissue. It is also known to induce some damage to 

liver and muscle tissue. HF exposures to the eye can cause severe burns, as well as marked 

lowering of serum calcium from a skin exposure, if not treated. High exposures to HF vapor due 

to inhalation can cause progressive destruction of mucus membranes and swelling of lung 

tissue, which can be fatal.

Other chemicals expected to be used at the proposed facility include lubricant oil, process 

gases, and chemical trap media. Lubricant oil primarily comprises a combustible hazard, and 

the addition of this system is addressed in the fire hazards in Section 7.3.4 of this SER. The 

applicant will implement industry-recognized standards in the use of these chemicals. Other 

proprietary chemicals were evaluated and determined to have no significant chemical process 

hazards.

Lubricant Oils

In addition to interaction with moisture, UF6 can also react exothermically with hydrocarbons. 

The applicant has committed that it will not use hydrocarbon lubricants in equipment that 

contacts UF6. Where lubricants are needed for equipment that could contact UF6 gas, the 

applicant will use lubricants that are compatible with UF6 and HF. In Chapter 4 of the ISA 

Summary (GLE, 2011b), the applicant states that it will use Fomblin oil (or its equivalents), 

which is a trade name for polyfluoropolyether (PFPE). Fomblin oil is an inert, fully fluorinated

lubricant that does not react with UF6 under any operating conditions. It also has minimal 

flammability and toxicity.

Chemical Trap Media

In Section 4.13 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b), “Cylinder Wash,” the applicant describes two 

types of chemical traps, one containing activated alumina designed to absorb HF, and a second 

type containing sodium fluoride media designed to absorb UF6. In addition to normal operating 

modes, Section 4.13 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) includes a description of trap 

evacuation and media replacement. Accident sequences associated with the traps are included 

in Section 4.13 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b). 

Materials of Construction

In Section 6.2.1.2.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant committed to utilizing approved 

materials of construction throughout the process and operations areas that are compatible with 

UF6 or are corrosion resistant to UF6. These materials of construction will also be compatible 

with the process operational physical parameters of temperature and pressure.
6-5

The applicant states that the cylinders to be used at the proposed facility for transport, 

processing, and storage of UF6 will be designed and maintained in accordance with American 

National Standards Institute (ANSI) ANSI N14.1, “Nuclear Materials: Uranium Hexafluoride –

Packaging for Transport,” (ANSI, 2001). These containers are appropriate due to the resistance 

of the materials to corrosion by UF6. These cylinders will be painted to resist corrosion from 

atmospheric conditions, and the cylinders will be inspected on a routine basis to assess 

corrosion and corrosion rates.

6.3.1.5 Process Description Conclusion 

In the LA (GLE, 2011a) and the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b), the applicant provided process 

descriptions that are sufficiently detailed to allow an understanding of the chemical process 

hazards and to allow the development of potential accident scenarios. The information that the 

applicant provided, as described above, meets the acceptance criteria in Section 6.4.3.1(1) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable.

The staff finds that the applicant has provided descriptions of the approach employed for 

adequately maintaining safety in normal operations. The information that the applicant 

provided, as described above, as well as the hierarchy of policies and procedures discussed in 

Section 6.3.4.2.2 of this SER, meets the acceptance criteria in Section 6.4.3.2(1) of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002), and is therefore, acceptable.

The staff also finds that the applicant has provided a description of the chemical hazards that 

could result from potential chemical interactions. This information is sufficient to develop 

potential accident sequences involving chemical hazards. The information provided by the 

applicant meets the acceptance criteria for the evaluation of potential process chemical 

interactions in Section 6.4.3.1(1) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), and is therefore, acceptable.

The ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) and Chapter 3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) discuss the screening 

criteria the applicant employed to identify chemicals for further analysis in the hazard evaluation. 

The approach used to perform the hazards evaluation phase is also discussed in these 

chapters. The staff finds that the methods in the LA meet the acceptance criteria in Section 

3.4.3.2(4) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and provide a basis for reasonable assurance of 

compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 70.61.

6.3.2 CHEMICAL ACCIDENT SEQUENCES 

In Section 1.2 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) and Section 3.2.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the 

applicant discusses the consequence criteria the applicant used to identify chemicals for further 

analysis in the hazard evaluation. The approach used to perform the hazards evaluation phase 

is also discussed in these sections.

The applicant has identified the chemical hazards which are produced by the licensed material, 

could affect the safety of licensed material, or from chemicals which are co-mingled with 

licensed material, and therefore must meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 70. Also, the 

MSDSs for chemicals used in the facility process were reviewed by the applicant for hazards to 

the workers. Liquid HF solutions were determined to present a potential health hazard. 

However, the applicant identified no other chemicals as presenting potential serious or longlasting health hazards as used at the facility.
6-6

Chapter 4 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) includes potential chemical accident sequences 

associated with each facility area and identifies specific controls that either prevent or mitigate 

the consequences to an acceptable level. The applicant evaluated the process by 

systematically breaking down the process system, subsystem, facility area, or operation being 

studied into well-defined nodes. These nodes established study area boundaries in which the 

various process systems and supporting systems entering or exiting the node, or activities 

occurring in the area, can be defined to allow interactions to be studied. The chemical accident 

sequences covered potential chemical accidents at the following nodes: Node 4200 – Feed and 

Vaporization (ISA Section 4.3); Node 4300 – Product Withdrawal (ISA Section 4.4); Node 4400 

– Tails Withdrawal (ISA Section 4.5); Node 4700 – Blending (ISA Section 4.6); Node 4800 –

Sampling (ISA Section 4.7); Node 4900 – Liquid Radioactive Waste (ISA Section 4.8); Node 

5200 – Decontamination/Maintenance (ISA Section 4.12); Node 5210 – Cylinder Wash, 

Valve/Plug Repair, and Trap Shop (ISA Section 4.13); and Node 5400 – Laboratory Operations 

(ISA Section 4.14). The accident sequences covered the range of events that could result in the 

loss of confinement of UF6, the hazardous chemicals produced from UF6 (i.e., HF, UO2F2), and 

the potential interactions of UF6 with materials of construction. The accident sequences 

addressed both intermediate and high consequence events. 

6.3.2.1 Review of Selected Accident Sequences

Compliance with the requirements for an ISA of chemical accident sequences is discussed in 

more detail in Chapter 3 of this SER. As part of the process of evaluating compliance with the 

ISA requirements, the staff performed a risk-informed vertical slice review of chemical accident 

sequences. The vertical slice review consists of a detailed evaluation of ISA documentation at 

the applicant’s site of several risk-informed accident sequences. The vertical slice review is 

further discussed in Section 3.3.17 of this SER. The staff confirmed that the applicant had 

identified credible accident scenarios and the resulting risk in terms of consequences and 

likelihood.

6.3.2.2 Chemical Accident Sequences Conclusion

For each of the process systems (nodes), the staff concludes that the applicant has adequately 

identified credible chemical accident sequences, including appropriate accident likelihoods, 

based on the applicant’s use of a combination of approved hazards analysis methods (WhatIf/Checklist or Quantitative Risk Analysis) to identify those sequences and the staff’s review of 

selected chemical accident sequences. For each process node in Chapter 4 of the ISA 

Summary (GLE, 2011b), the applicant provides a description of potential interactions of 

chemicals and an evaluation of the risks (both consequence and likelihood) as well as a 

description of controls to minimize the risks and mitigate the consequences of accident 

scenarios. The information provided by the applicant meets the accident sequence and 

likelihood acceptance criteria in Section 6.4.3.1(2) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, 

therefore, acceptable. 

6.3.3 CHEMICAL ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCES

In Section 1.2 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) and in Section 3.2.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), 

the applicant addresses the chemical quantitative risk levels used in determining the impact of 

potential accidents on the workers and the public. The applicant chose to use Acute Exposure 

Guideline Levels (AEGLs) to evaluate accidents associated with chemical events involving HF, 

in a manner consistent with NUREG-1520, Table A-5, “Consequence Severity Categories 

Based on 10 CFR 70.61,” (NRC, 2002). For events involving soluble uranium compounds, the 
6-7

applicant defined action levels to be in agreement with the performance requirements using the 

intake of soluble uranium in milligrams. These consequence levels are also discussed in 

Section 3.3.7 of this SER. The staff finds this approach to be consistent with the acceptance 

criteria in Section 6.4.3.1(6) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), which recommends the use of 

standards such as AEGLs and is, therefore, acceptable. 

In Section 3.2.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant describes its approach for evaluating 

chemical and radiological hazards at the proposed facility. The applicant used a WhatIf/Checklist Method, for systematically identifying hazards. Using this method, the applicant 

evaluated a complete spectrum of facility chemical hazards in process components and with 

facility staff and the public. This method is consistent with recommendations in Section 

3.4.3.2(3) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and Section 2.3 of NUREG-1513 (NRC, 2001).

The applicant calculated the accident consequences using the 10-minute AEGL values for HF 

and UF6 in the case of personnel exposure where a worker would be expected to be in the 

immediate proximity of a release; and public exposures were estimated to last for a duration of 

30 minutes. This is consistent with self-protection criteria for UF6/HF plumes listed in 

NUREG-1140, "A Regulatory Analysis on Emergency Preparedness for Fuel Cycle and Other 

Radioactive Material Licensees," (NRC, 1988).

Liquid HF solutions created during laboratory operations were determined to be 4 percent HF or 

lower. The effects from a dermal or ocular exposure were evaluated using industry guidance for 

potential exposures to HF, and determined to not exceed the performance criteria. The 

applicant committed to a medical treatment program as defense-in-depth, but it is not relied 

upon to prevent or reduce the likelihood of an event.

The applicant calculated source terms using methods prescribed in NUREG/CR-6410, "Nuclear 

Fuel Cycle Accident Analysis Handbook" (NRC, 1998), and supporting documents. The specific 

modeling methods utilized conservative methods for source term determination, release 

fractions, dispersion factors, and meteorological conditions. For indoor releases, conservative 

leak path fractions were assumed as recommended by NUREG/CR-6410 (NRC, 1998).

The computer codes used in chemical consequence analyses were RASCAL 3.0.5 from 

NUREG-1887, “RASCAL 3.0.5: Description of Model and Methods” (NRC, 2007), and 

ARCON 96, “Code System to Calculate Atmospheric Relative Concentrations in Building 

Wakes,” (NRC, 1997b). Both of these models are widely-accepted by the nuclear industry as 

appropriate for chemical dispersion modeling.

The staff finds that the applicant has identified and used appropriate techniques and valid 

assumptions, including source terms, in estimating the consequences from analyzed chemical 

accident sequences and the consequences have been conservatively estimated. The applicant 

uses the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61(b) and 70.61(c). Source term and 

dispersion models are wide-accepted by the nuclear industry and consistent with the guidance 

in NUREG/CR-6481, “Review of Models Used for Determining Consequences of UF6 Release” 

(NRC, 1997c). The applicant used models appropriate for their specific application and 

consequence analyses consistent with NRC guidance in NUREG/CR-6410 (NRC, 1998). The 

information provided by the applicant meets the acceptance criteria in Sections 6.4.3.1(3), 

6.4.3.1(4), and 6.4.3.1(5) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable. 

 

The staff performed a vertical slice review of a representative sample of potential accident 

sequences at the proposed facility using the process descriptions and block diagrams provided 
6-8

in Chapter 4 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b). The accident sequences vary in magnitude, 

and include those initiated by natural phenomena, operator error, and equipment failure. 

Analytical results indicate that the accidents pose acceptably low risks. The NRC staff 

concluded that through a combination of plant design, passive and active engineered controls, 

and administrative controls, accidents at the facility pose an acceptably low risk to workers, the 

environment, and the public. 

Based on the review of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b), onsite visits to evaluate supporting ISA 

documentation, and the review of selected accident sequences, the staff concludes that the 

applicant has adequately identified the consequences and likelihoods of the accident sequences 

involving the chemical hazards of licensed material and hazardous chemicals produced from 

licensed material. The applicant used a What-If/Checklist approach to evaluating chemical 

hazards that considered a complete range of chemical interactions with facility components and 

personnel. As discussed in Section 6.3.5 of this SER, the applicant also provided reasonable 

assurance that measures to mitigate the consequences of accident sequences identified in the 

ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) are consistent with the actions described in the RC&EP (GLE, 

2011c). The information the applicant provided meets the acceptance criteria in Section 

6.4.3.1(2) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) for evaluation of potential interactions of process 

chemicals with facility personnel, and is, therefore, acceptable. 

6.3.4 IROFS AND MANAGEMENT MEASURES

6.3.4.1 Chemical Process IROFS 

The applicant’s ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) includes chemical accident sequences which 

describe credible high or intermediate consequence accidents at the following nodes: Node 

4200 – Feed and Vaporization (ISA Section 4.3); Node 4300 – Product Withdrawal (ISA Section 

4.4); Node 4400 – Tails Withdrawal (ISA Section 4.5); Node 4700 – Blending (ISA Section 4.6); 

Node 4800 – Sampling (ISA Section 4.7); Node 4900 – Liquid Radioactive Waste (ISA Section 

4.8); Node 5200 – Decontamination/Maintenance (ISA Section 4.12); Node 5210 – Cylinder 

Wash, Valve/Plug Repair, and Trap Shop (ISA Section 4.13); and Node 5400 – Laboratory 

Operations (ISA Section 4.14).

The accident consequences and the need for IROFS were determined by applying the criteria 

described in 10 CFR 70.61. IROFS were selected to prevent or mitigate the consequences to 

the public, workers, and the environment. A table in the section of the ISA Summary (GLE, 

2011b) for each facility node lists the identified IROFS and the accident sequences that take 

credit for each IROFS. The staff reviewed selected chemical accident sequences and their 

respective process IROFS for the proposed facility. NRC staff reviewed the process 

descriptions and process flow diagrams provided in Chapter 4 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 

2011b) and how the IROFS would function to prevent or mitigate the consequences of the 

identified accident sequences.

Based on the above reviews and the examination of the ISA documentation during the vertical 

slice visit, the staff concludes that the applicant adequately identified chemical process 

administrative and engineered IROFS to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accident 

sequences involving the chemical hazards of licensed materials and hazardous chemicals 

produced from licensed material. The information the applicant provided meets the acceptance 

criteria in Section 6.4.3.2(2) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) to identify the controls and 

associated management measures and is, therefore, acceptable. 
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6.3.4.2 Management Measures

The applicant’s commitments regarding management measures are described in Section 6.2.3 

and Chapter 11 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). After selecting the IROFS, management measures 

were selected to ensure that IROFS would be available and reliable to perform their safety 

function when required. The applicant committed to apply management measures to IROFS on 

a continuing basis to provide reasonable assurance that IROFS are available and able to

perform their intended functions when needed. The applicant will apply management measures 

in a graded approach based on unmitigated risks as described in the ISA Summary (GLE, 

2011b). A Quality Level will be assigned to each IROFS based on the following criteria 

described in the Quality Assurance Program Description (QAPD) (GLE, 2011d):

QL-1 A sole IROFS preventing or mitigating a high consequence event

QL-2 Applies to two or more IROFSs credited with preventing or mitigating a high 

consequence event or an IROFS preventing or mitigating an intermediate 

consequence event 

QL-3 Other

The programmatic requirements applied to QL-1 and QL-2 IROFS are discussed in the QAPD 

(GLE, 2011d). In the QAPD (GLE, 2011d), the applicant commits to ensure that management 

measures required for the safe design, construction, and operation of the facility through design, 

procurement, and document control, procedures and drawings, and inspection and testing 

programs, thus meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 70.64(a)(1). 

According to criteria defined in approved written procedures, the relative importance of an 

IROFS is to be determined using both the severity of consequence and unmitigated likelihood of 

an initiating event. Based on the assigned importance, the appropriate type and number of 

management measures will be assigned to assure the IROFS are functional when needed.

6.3.4.2.1 Configuration Management

The applicant’s commitments regarding management measures are described in Section 6.2.3 

and Chapter 11 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). The Configuration Management (CM) program will 

address maintenance of facility design information; identification of IROFS; control of 

information used to operate and maintain the facility; documentation of changes; assurance of 

adequate safety review of changes; and periodic performance assessment of specific safety 

controls to ensure conformance to design basis documentation. The CM program will be 

administered by the CM Manager. During design and construction, the CM Manager will report 

to the Operations Engineering Manager. During the operational phase, the CM Manager will 

report to the Operations Manager.

The applicant will perform planned internal and independent assessments to evaluate the 

application and effectiveness of management measures and implementation of programs 

related to facility safety. Periodic assessments of the CM Program will be conducted to 

determine the program’s effectiveness and correct any identified deficiencies. The 

assessments will include review of documentation and system walk downs of the as-built facility. 

CM assessments will be performed, at a minimum, on an annual basis. The CM Program is 

further described in Section 11.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) and evaluated Section 11.3.1 of this 

SER. 
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6.3.4.2.2 Procedures

The applicant’s commitments regarding management measures are described in Section 6.2.3 

and Chapter 11 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). The applicant will employ a hierarchy of policies, 

plans, and procedures to document management expectations and commitments as described 

in Section 11.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). Policies and plans are upper tier documents that define 

and describe senior management expectations and guidelines for safe operation of the 

proposed facility and compliance with State and Federal regulations, permits, and licenses. 

Procedures are used to ensure implementation of the requirements set forth in policies and 

plans. Activities involving licensed material or IROFS will be conducted in accordance with 

approved written procedures.

Procedures at the proposed facility will be categorized as either management control 

procedures or operating procedures/instructions. Chemical safety will be addressed in both 

types of procedures. General chemical process safety will be addressed in management 

control procedures, while task specific hazards and emergency response will be addressed in 

specific operating procedures and instructions.

The applicant’s safety program design requires the establishment and maintenance of approved 

written procedures for Environmental Health and Safety (EHS) limitations and requirements to 

govern the safety aspects of operations. Requirements for procedure control and approval 

authorities will be documented.

6.3.4.2.3 Training and Qualification

The applicant’s commitments regarding management measures are described in Section 6.2.3 

and Chapter 11 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). Training and qualification are described in Section 

11.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). The objective of the training program is to ensure safe and 

efficient operation of the facility and ensure compliance with applicable regulatory requirements. 

Training requirements will be applicable to, but not restricted to, those personnel who have a 

direct relationship to the operation, maintenance, testing, or other technical aspects of plant 

operations. The responsibility for training will be shared between the ESH disciplines and line 

management.

Facility personnel will be trained to recognize and overcome safety hazards, such as chemical 

hazards, that may be encountered in the facility under normal or abnormal conditions. The odor 

threshold for HF is less than 1 part per million, and the irritating effects of HF are intolerable at 

concentrations well below those that could cause permanent injury or which could produce 

escape-impairing symptoms. Therefore, the facility will also adopt the “See and Flee” policy. 

This policy specifies that personnel immediately move away from the release area to a safe 

location. Facility employees will be trained in proper actions to take in response to a release.

Continuing or periodic retraining will be established, when applicable, to ensure personnel 

remain proficient. Periodic training will be conducted to ensure retention of knowledge and skills 

important to operations. The training may consist of periodic retraining exercises, instructions, 

or review of subjects as appropriate to maintain the proficiency of personnel assigned to the 

facility. Retraining is required due to facility modifications, procedure changes, and Quality 

Assurance (QA) Program changes resulting in new or changed information. The results of the 

retraining will be documented.
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Training records will be maintained to support management information needs associated with 

personnel training, job performance, and qualifications. Training records will be retained in 

accordance with approved written record management procedures.

6.3.4.2.4 Maintenance and Inspection

The applicant’s commitments regarding management measures are described in Section 6.2.3 

and Chapter 11 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). Maintenance is described in Section 11.2 of the LA 

(GLE, 2011a). The maintenance program will cover:

• Corrective Maintenance - Corrective maintenance refers to situations where repairs, 

replacements, or major adjustments, such as re-calibration occur. The applicant 

commits to promptly perform corrective actions to remediate unacceptable performance 

deficiencies in IROFS.

• Preventive Maintenance (PM) - PM will be performed on a periodic basis to prevent 

failures, facilitate performance, and maintain or extend the life of equipment. PM helps 

ensure IROFS are available and reliable. The bases for PM tasks will be developed 

through a review of manufacturer recommendations, available industry standards, and 

historical operating information, where available.

• Surveillance and Monitoring - The Surveillance and Monitoring Program provides a 

periodic check of the ability of IROFS to perform their design safety function when called 

upon to do so. Surveillances are in the form of performance checks, calibrations, tests, 

and inspections.

• Functional Testing - Functional testing of IROFS will be performed as appropriate, 

following initial installation, as part of periodic surveillance testing, and after corrective 

maintenance, PM, or calibration to ensure that the item is capable of performing the 

designed safety function when required. The applicant commits to perform functional 

tests in accordance with approved written procedures that define the method for the test 

and the required acceptable results. The results of the tests will be recorded and 

maintained.

• Preoperational Testing - The major objective of preoperational testing is to verify that 

IROFS, essential to the safe operation of the facility, are capable of performing their 

intended function. Initial startup testing will be performed beginning with the introduction 

of UF6 and ending with the startup. The purpose of initial startup testing is to ensure 

safe and orderly UF6 feeding, and to verify parameters assumed in the ISA.

• Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) – PMT provides assurance that IROFS will perform 

their intended function following maintenance activities. PMT will be performed, with 

acceptable results, prior to returning the equipment to service.

The maintenance function will utilize a systems-based program to plan, schedule, track, and 

maintain records for maintenance activities. Maintenance procedures and instructions are 

described in Section 11.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). Key maintenance requirements for safety 

controls, such as calibration, functional testing, and replacement of specified components, are 

derived from the analyses described in the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b).
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6.3.4.2.5 Chemical Process Safety Records

The applicant’s commitments regarding management measures are described in Section 6.2.3 

and Chapter 11 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). Records Management (RM) is described in Section 

11.7 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). The Quality Assurance and Infrastructure Program Manager will 

be responsible for the RM Program during the design and construction phases of the project. 

The Infrastructure Program Manager will be responsible for the RM Program during the 

operations phase. The RM Program functions include directing the development, 

implementation, and maintenance of methods and procedures encompassing a RM Program, 

and assuring the laws, codes, standards, regulations, and company procedures pertaining to 

recordkeeping requirements are met.

The following are examples of chemical safety records that will be maintained by the applicant’s 

RM Program:

• Chemical process safety procedures, plans, diagrams, charts, and drawings;

• Records pertaining to chemical process inspections, audits, investigations, and 

assessments;

• Records pertaining to chemical process incidents, unusual occurrences, or accidents;

• Chemical process safety reports and analyses; and

• Chemical process safety training.

6.3.4.2.6 Audits and Assessments

The applicant’s commitments regarding management measures are described in Section 6.2.3 

and Chapter 11 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). Audits and Assessments are described in Section 11.5 

of the LA (GLE, 2011a). Qualified facility personnel will perform periodic audits and 

assessments to verify safety during operations. Management performs assessments to verify 

the effective implementation of the safety program elements (chemical safety, radiation 

protection, nuclear criticality safety, industrial safety, security and emergency preparedness, 

and environmental protection), management measures, and QA Program elements. The 

applicant also commits to perform independent assessments of its safety program elements. 

The assessment scope includes compliance to procedures, conformance to regulations, and the 

overall adequacy of the safety program.

Formal scheduled safety audits of uranium enrichment and process support areas will be 

performed in accordance with approved written procedures. These audits will be performed to 

determine if operations conform to chemical safety, nuclear criticality safety, radiation 

protection, and industrial safety requirements. Industrial safety audits will be performed under 

the direction of the Industrial Safety Manager. The applicant will make provisions for reporting 

and corrective actions, where warranted, in accordance with the Corrective Action Program.

6.3.4.2.7 Incident Investigation

The applicant’s commitments regarding management measures are described in Section 6.2.3 

and Chapter 11 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). Conduct of incident investigations is described in 
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Section 11.6 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). The applicant commits to maintain a system to identify, 

track, investigate, and implement corrective actions for abnormal events (unusual incidents). 

This system will be employed to investigate abnormal events that may occur during operation of 

the facility, determine the specific or generic root causes and generic implications, recommend 

corrective actions, and report to NRC as required by 10 CFR 70.50 and 10 CFR 70.74.

Incident investigations will be performed to assure that upset conditions are understood and 

appropriate corrective actions are identified and implemented to prevent recurrence. 

Management Measures will include documenting upset conditions in unusual incident reports 

(UIRs). UIRs are documented and the associated corrective actions tracked to completion.

Investigations will commence within 48 hours of an unusual event, or sooner, depending upon 

the safety significance of the event. The investigators are independent from the function 

involved in the investigation. Qualified internal or external investigators will be appointed to 

serve on investigating teams when required. The teams will include at least one process expert 

and at least one team member trained in root cause analysis.

The incident investigation process will contain a step in which proper closure documentation for 

the incident and corrective actions is provided to the licensing organization for distribution to the 

appropriate regulatory agencies, e.g., NRC, State of North Carolina, etc.

6.3.4.3 IROFS and Management Measures Conclusion

The staff finds that for each process area or node in the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b), the 

applicant has adequately identified the administrative and engineered controls and IROFS to 

prevent or mitigate chemical process risks at the proposed facility. Safety grading is described 

in the QAPD (GLE, 2011d). In the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b), all IROFS and their safety 

grade are summarized at the end of each process area or node. The information the applicant 

provided, as described above, meets the acceptance criteria in Section 6.4.3.2(2) of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable. 

In the QAPD (GLE, 2011d), the applicant provided a detailed description of the graded 

approach to implement the performance requirements of each type of control for high and 

intermediate consequence events, as well as the management measures associated with each 

level. The staff finds that the applicant has provided a sufficient description of how IROFS and 

management measures will be graded and how such grading is commensurate with the 

reduction in risk that the IROFS are designed to achieve. The information that the applicant 

provided, as described above and in Chapter 11 of this SER, meets the acceptance criteria in 

Sections 3.4.3.2(2) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable. 

In Section 6.2.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant committed to written procedures to 

ensure worker actions and other administrative controls provide the level of safety described in 

the safety basis. Detailed descriptions of each sub process are provided in the ISA Summary 

(GLE, 2011b). The staff finds that the applicant has provided a sufficient description of its 

procedures to ensure the reliable operation of engineered controls and administrative controls 

will be correctly implemented. The information the applicant provided, as described above and 

in Chapter 11 of this SER, meets the acceptance criteria in Section 6.4.3.2(3) of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable. 
6-14

6.3.5 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

The applicant’s emergency management program is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8 of 

this SER and in the applicant’s RC&EP (GLE, 2011c). In Chapter 8 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the 

applicant commits to developing the RC&EP (GLE, 2011c) in accordance with 10 CFR 

70.22(i)(3) and 10 CFR 40.31(j), which meets the criteria in Chapter 8 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002). Emergency management is further discussed in Chapter 8 of this SER.

The applicant maintains Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with offsite support 

organizations identified in the RC&EP (GLE, 2011c). The applicant will provide information to 

responding fire departments, that include the type of event (fire, chemical, spill, explosion, etc.) 

location, and hazard, in addition to any safety-related items (e.g., from the MSDS sheets). 

These organizations, in addition to the State of North Carolina Division of Emergency 

Management and the State of North Carolina Division of Environment and Natural Resources 

Radioactive Materials Section, reviewed the RC&EP (GLE, 2011c) pursuant to the requirement 

in 10 CFR 70.22(i)(4) and 10 CFR 40.31(j)(4). 

UF6 process systems in the proposed facility will generally operate at sub-atmospheric pressure. 

Exceptions will utilize systems designed per applicable pressure vessel codes and standards. 

This design feature is key to containment controls and preventing UF6 leakage. Active pressure 

and temperature instrumentation monitors the integrity of appropriate systems and vessels. 

Chemical/toxic hazard detection includes process gas leak monitors and associated pressure 

instrumentation. If a process leak were to occur, air in-leakage would initially result causing a 

system pressure increase, which may typically be sensed by instrumentation and initiate 

applicable alarms, system isolation, and enable automated or manual shutdown of effected 

systems. Because UF6 reacts with moisture in air to form UO2F2 and HF, process gas leak 

monitors consist of HF detectors to sense HF concentrations and initiate alarms. With a UF6

release outside the facility, personnel are trained in hazard recognition (“See and Flee” policy) 

and would detect the release because the resultant UO2F2 would be visible and the presence of 

HF would easily be detected due to its strong odor even below hazardous concentrations. The 

staff reviewed the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) and determined that these actions are consistent 

with the accident sequences and mitigating IROFS identified in the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) 

and are consistent with the actions described in Chapter 8 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002).

The staff finds that the applicant has provided reasonable assurance that measures to mitigate 

the consequences of accident sequences identified in the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) are 

consistent with actions described in Chapter 8 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The information 

the applicant provided, including interaction of chemicals with the atmosphere as described 

above, meets the acceptance criteria in Section 6.4.3.1(2) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), and is, 

therefore, acceptable.

6.3.6 BASELINE DESIGN CRITERIA

In Section 3.2.4.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant commits to the BDC in 10 CFR 70.64, 

and provides design basis information for chemical process safety IROFS in the LA (GLE, 

2011a) and ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b). The regulations in 10 CFR 70.64(a)(5) state the 

following, with respect to chemical protection:

“Chemical protection. The design must provide for adequate protection against chemical 

risks produced from licensed material, facility conditions which affect the safety of 

licensed material, and hazardous chemicals produced from licensed material.”
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The main chemicals of concern at the proposed facility will be UF6 and its reaction products 

formed when it reacts with water (see Section 6.3.1.3 of this SER). Descriptions of the design 

and safety features can be found in Chapters 1 and 6 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) and Chapter 4 of 

the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b). The applicant will have IROFS in place to prevent various high 

and intermediate consequence accidents and to mitigate consequences to the public and 

workers. The applicant further identified additional safety controls that will constitute defense-indepth in the facility’s design. In describing the application of the chemical protection to the 

BDC, the applicant proposed no facility-specific relaxations or additions to the BDC.

The staff reviewed the applicant’s design of the proposed facility contained in the ISA Summary 

(GLE, 2011b) and Chapters 1 and 6 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). The uranium enrichment process 

is a physical separations process that separates the U235 isotope from the U235 isotope based on 

mass difference. The specific uranium enrichment process utilized by the proposed facility 

utilizes lasers tuned to specific frequencies to selectively excite UF6 gas molecules to enable 

separation of the U235 isotope in UF6 feed stock. The process is generally performed at subatmospheric pressure. Therefore, any process leak would result in the in-leakage of air into the 

system as the system pressure increased to atmospheric pressure. Under normal process 

temperatures, the gaseous UF6 will desublime directly into the solid phase as the system 

approaches atmospheric pressure. The physical behavior of UF6 and its reaction products are 

such that the majority of the uranium bearing material is likely to accumulate near the process 

breach. Furthermore, the applicant will have IROFS in place and implement defense-in-depth 

practices as part of the design of the facility. Based on the operational mode of the laser 

enrichment system and the applicant’s proposed safety strategy, the staff concludes that the 

proposed design basis will provide adequate protection against chemical risks.

The applicant will use internationally recognized codes and standards as part of the design of 

the proposed facility. The licensed material will be stored and transported in cylinders compliant 

with ANSI N14.1 (ANSI, 2001). These cylinders serve as the primary containment for UF6. 

Licensed material in the liquid state will be contained in autoclaves and piping. The autoclaves 

will be designed to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) standard, “Boiler and 

Pressure Vessels Code, Section VIII,” (ASME, 2004a) and will act as secondary containment. 

All process piping will meet the appropriate ASME code (i.e., ASME B31.3, “Process Piping,” 

2004 (ASME, 2004b)). The applicant committed to using materials of construction that are 

compatible with UF6 and HF to ensure structural integrity of process equipment. 

In Section 3.2.4.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant commits to the BDC in 10 CFR 70.64, 

and provides design basis information for chemical process safety IROFS in the LA (GLE, 

2011a) and ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b). In the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b), the applicant 

describes its preference for passive controls over engineered and administrative controls, as 

well as good engineering and defense-in-depth practices designed to reduce the hazards from 

chemical inventories. The applicant provided a comprehensive evaluation of the high and 

intermediate consequence accident scenarios in Chapter 4 of the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b). 

No relaxations of the BDC were requested. The applicant also described how the chemical 

process safety BDC were applied in establishing design principles, features, and control 

systems. Based on the above, the staff concludes that the information that the applicant 

provided and the applicant’s proposed design meets the acceptance criteria in Sections 

6.4.3.3(1), (2), and (3) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), provides for adequate protection against 

chemical risks produced from licensed material, facility conditions that affect the safety of 

licensed material, and hazardous chemicals produced from licensed materials, and meets the 

requirements of 10 CFR 70.64(a)(5). 
6-16

6.4 EVALUATION FINDINGS 

The staff evaluated the application using the criteria in NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and NUREG1513 (NRC, 2001). Based upon review of Chapter 6 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) and ISA Summary 

(GLE, 2011b), NRC staff concludes that the applicant has described and assessed accident 

consequences that can result from the handling, storage, or processing of licensed materials 

that can potentially have significant chemical consequences and effects. In its ISA, the 

applicant prepared a hazard analysis that identifies and evaluates those chemical process 

hazards and potential accidents and established safety controls providing reasonable assurance 

of safe facility operations. To ensure that the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70, 

Subpart H, are met, the applicant provided controls to ensure that IROFS are maintained 

available and reliable to perform their safety-related functions when needed. As part of the 

review, the staff reviewed a representative sample for the safety controls and the applicant’s 

plan for managing chemical process safety. The staff finds reasonable assurance that the 

applicant identified chemical hazards and accident sequences and credited IROFS sufficient to 

meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61, Subpart H, consistent with the 

acceptance criteria in Section 6.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002).

The staff concludes that the applicant’s plan for managing chemical process safety and 

chemical process safety controls meet the requirements of 10 CFR 70 and provides reasonable 

assurance that the public health and safety, and the environment, will be protected.

6.5 REFERENCES

(ANSI, 2001) American National Standards Institute (ANSI). ANSI N14.1, “Nuclear Materials: 

Uranium Hexafluoride – Packaging for Transport,” 2001.

(ASME, 2004a) American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). ASME Boiler and 

Pressure Vessels Code, Section VIII, “Pressure Vessels,” 2004.

(ASME, 2004b) American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). ASME B31.3, “Process 

Piping,” 2004.

(GLE, 2011a) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “GE-Hitachi Global 

Laser Enrichment, LLC Commercial Facility License Application,” Revision 6. 2011.

(GLE, 2011b) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “Integrated Safety 

Analysis Summary for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment, LLC Commercial Facility,” 

Revision 4. 2011.

(GLE, 2011c) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “Radiological 

Contingency and Emergency Plan for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment, LLC 

Commercial Facility,” Revision 3. 2011.

(GLE, 2011d) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “Quality Assurance 

Program Description for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility,” 

Revision 7. 2011.
6-17

(NRC, 1988) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG-1140, "A Regulatory 

Analysis on Emergency Preparedness for Fuel Cycle and Other Radioactive Material 

Licensees," 1988.

(NRC, 1997a) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG-1601, “Chemical Process 

Safety at Fuel Cycle Facilities.” 1997.

(NRC, 1997b) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG/CR-6331, “Atmospheric 

Relative Concentrations in Building Wakes," Revision 1. 1997. 

(NRC, 1997c) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG/CR-6481, “Review of 

Models Used for Determining Consequences of UF6 Release,” Revision 1, 1997.

(NRC, 1998) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG/CR-6410, "Nuclear Fuel 

Cycle Accident Analysis Handbook." 1998.

(NRC, 2001) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG-1513, “Integrated Safety 

Analysis Guidance Document.” 2001 

(NRC, 2002) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG-1520, "Standard Review 

Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility." 2002.

(NRC, 2007) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG-1887, “RASCAL 3.0.5: 

Description of Model and Methods,” 2007.

7-1

7.0 FIRE SAFETY

The purpose of this review is to determine with reasonable assurance that General ElectricHitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC (GLE or the applicant) has designed a facility that 

provides adequate protection against fires and explosions that could affect the safety of licensed 

material and hazardous chemicals and thus present an increased health risk to facility workers 

and the public. The review should also establish that the application has considered 

radiological and chemical consequences of fires and will institute suitable safety controls to 

protect workers, the public, and the environment.

7.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS

The regulatory basis for the fire safety review is the general and additional contents of 

application as required by Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 30.33, 40.32, 70.22 and 

70.65. In addition, the fire safety review should focus on providing reasonable assurance that 

the operation of the facility will be in compliance with 10 CFR 70.61, 70.62, and 70.64, as 

applicable. The regulations in 10 CFR 70.61, 70.62, and 70.64 describe performance 

requirements for fuel cycle facilities, the development of a safety program based on an 

integrated safety analysis (ISA), and requirements for new facilities.

7.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

The acceptance criteria the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) uses for review of fire 

safety are outlined in Sections 7.4.3.1 through 7.4.3.5 of the AStandard Review Plan for the 

Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility,@ NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). All of 

Chapter 7 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is applicable to the License Application (LA) (GLE, 

2011a) and ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) review of the proposed facility. The following section, 

“Staff Review and Analysis,” in this Safety Evaluation Report (SER) provides details on the 

acceptance criteria and describes how the applicant satisfies them.

7.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

This section addresses the staff’s review of the facility fire protection, including fire safety 

management measures, fire hazards analysis (FHA), facility fire protection, process fire safety, 

and fire safety and emergency response, as presented in the LA (GLE, 2011a), the ISA 

Summary (GLE, 2011b), and the applicant’s Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) (GLE, 2010a).

The proposed facility and its fire safety program were reviewed to determine applicability and 

level of compliance with the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standard NFPA 801, 

“Standard for Fire Protection for Facilities Handling Radioactive Materials” (NFPA, 2008a), and 

the applicable standards referenced within. The staff finds that the use of these consensus 

codes and standard to be in accordance with the guidance in Section 7.4.3 of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002) in regard to the use of nationally recognized codes and standards that may be 

used to measure reasonable assurance of fire safety. Therefore, the staff considers the use of 
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the above codes and standards appropriate to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 70.64(a), 

Baseline Design Criterion 3, “Fire Protection.”

7.3.1 FIRE SAFETY MANAGEMENT MEASURES

Fire safety management measures are described by the applicant in Section 7.1 of the LA 

(GLE, 2011a). These measures include a reference to fire protection Items Relied on for Safety 

(IROFS) defined in the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b), responsibilities for management policy and 

direction and the various aspects of the fire protection program including:

• Fire Prevention Program;

• Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance;

• Control of Impairments;

• Onsite Emergency Response Organizations;

• Offsite Emergency Response Organizations; and

• Pre-incident Planning.

7.3.1.1 Fire Safety Management and Direction

In Section 7.1.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant described the management policy and 

direction for the proposed facility. The primary responsibility for fire protection resides with the 

Environmental, Health, and Safety (EHS) Organization. The EHS Manager is assisted by the 

Fire Safety Manager in accordance with the fire safety program. The Fire Safety Manager 

position is described in Section 2.2.9.7 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) as administratively independent 

of Operations and as having the authority to shut down operations when imminent hazardous 

fire safety conditions are identified. Designated responsibilities of the Fire Safety Manager are 

also listed. The Fire Safety Manager shall have as a minimum, a bachelor’s degree (or 

equivalent) in an engineering or scientific field and four years experience in fire protection. 

Engineering support staff available to the Fire Safety Manager shall include a licensed fire 

protection engineer with a minimum of seven years fire protection related experience.

The Facility Safety Review Committee (FSRC) reviews issues affecting the safety of the 

proposed facility operations, including fire safety. 

7.3.1.2 Fire Protection Program 

In Section 7.1.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant described the fire protection program for 

the proposed facility. The fire protection program complies with the criteria in NFPA 801 (NFPA, 

2008a) to ensure fire protection requirements of applicable NFPA codes or other nationally 

recognized codes and standards are adequately implemented. The fire protection program 

includes the following elements:
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• Administrative controls for changes in processes, equipment, or facilities as well as fire 

protection and management review of planned activities and modifications to ensure that 

building design and operating features are maintained in an analyzed condition.

• A fire prevention program which includes requirements for conducting documented 

facility inspections; description of general housekeeping practices and control of 

transient combustibles; control of flammable and combustible liquids, gases, and 

oxidizers in accordance with applicable NFPA codes and standards; control of ignition 

sources, including hot work in accordance with NFPA 51B, “Standard for Fire Prevention 

During Welding, Cutting, and Other Hot Work” (NFPA, 2009a); fire reports including 

investigations and corrective actions in accordance with NFPA 901, “Standard 

Classifications for Incident Reporting and Fire Protection Data” (NFPA, 2006a); fire 

prevention surveillance in accordance with NFPA 601, “Standard for Security Services in 

Fire Loss Prevention” (NFPA, 2005a); restriction of smoking to designated areas; and 

protecting construction, demolition and renovating activities in accordance with 

NFPA 241, “Standard for Safeguarding Construction, Alteration, and Demolition 

Operations” (NFPA, 2004a).

• Inspection, testing, and maintenance activities are performed in accordance with 

applicable codes and standards such as NFPA 25, “Inspection, Testing, and 

Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection Systems” (NFPA, 2008b) for water based 

systems.

• Fire protection impairment procedures include identification, tagging, and tracking of 

impaired equipment; identification of personnel to be notified; and determination of 

needed compensatory fire protection and fire prevention measures. Section 7.1.3.5 of 

the LA (GLE, 2011a) lists four different types of impairments (sprinkler system, fire 

alarm, fire barrier, and water supply) and the potential compensatory measures that may 

be applied to each type of impairment.

• Pre-fire plans are developed in accordance with NFPA 801 (2008a) and NFPA 1620, 

“Recommended Practice for Pre-Incident Planning” (NFPA, 2003). Once developed, 

these plans will be provided to onsite and offsite emergency response organizations.

7.3.1.3 Fire Protection Quality Assurance Measures

All engineered fire protection IROFS will be provided under Appendix A of the applicant’s 

Quality Assurance Program Description (QAPD) (GLE, 2011c) as an alternative to the quality 

assurance measures used for other IROFS. These alternative quality assurance measures are 

necessary as fire protection equipment is not reasonably available under the proposed 

management measures used for other IROFS. Quality assurance measures are further 

discussed in Chapter 11 of this SER and Appendix A to Chapter 11 of this SER. Appendix A to 

the QAPD (GLE, 2011c) prescribes design, procurement, installation, acceptance, inspections, 

testing and maintenance to be in accordance with applicable NFPA or other national and 

international codes and standards. These codes and standards are consensus standards 

widely accepted by industry and government to provide an acceptable level of fire safety to 

ensure that IROFS will be reliable and available when needed. These codes and standards

also require key fire protection system components to be listed or approved by a nationally 

recognized testing laboratory such as Underwriters Laboratories (UL) or Factory Mutual 

Research Corporation (FMRC). These testing laboratories are accredited by the Nationally 
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Recognized Testing Laboratories Program under the Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration. Manufacturers that are certified by UL or FMRC are capable of supplying 

products that meet UL or FMRC established testing criteria for attributes that are important to 

component functionality and reliability. Based on the performance history of certified 

components, the NRC staff considers such components to be of adequate quality to be used in 

fire protection systems for nuclear fuel cycle facilities.

The use of UL and FMRC approved and/or listed components is consistent with fire protection 

practices for commercial nuclear power reactors licensed under 10 CFR 50 and the guidance in

Regulatory Guide 1.189, “Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants” (NRC, 2009), which 

specifically exempts fire protection systems from the scope of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, “Quality 

Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants,” unless the 

licensee has committed to include such systems under the plant’s Appendix B program. 

Fire protection IROFS will also be in conformance with all applicable management measures 

and the reporting requirements of 10 CFR Parts 70 and 21.

7.3.1.4 Fire Safety Management Measures Conclusions

Based on the information above, the staff concludes that the application is consistent with the 

acceptance criteria in Section 7.4.3.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) because the LA (GLE, 

2011a) reflects a commitment to ensure that IROFS as identified in the ISA Summary (GLE, 

2011b) are available and reliable. In addition, the facility maintains fire safety awareness 

among employees, controls transient ignition sources and combustibles, and maintains a 

readiness to extinguish or limit the consequences of fire. The LA (GLE, 2011a) identifies a 

senior-level manager who has the authority and staff to ensure that fire safety receives 

appropriate priority. The LA (GLE, 2011a) documents the fire safety management measures in 

sufficient detail to identify their relationship to and functions for, normal operations; anticipated 

events; and accident safety. Therefore, the staff concludes that the facility meets the 

requirements of 10 CFR 70.22, 70.61, 70.62, 70.64, and 70.65 as they pertain to fire safety 

management measures and is, therefore, acceptable.

7.3.2 FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS

In Section 7.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant described the FHA (GLE, 2010a) 

conducted for the proposed facility. An FHA (GLE, 2010a) was performed at the beginning of 

the facility design process and is revised as necessary when significant changes are made to 

ensure that the fire prevention and protection requirements have been evaluated per NFPA 801 

(NFPA, 2008a). The FHA (GLE, 2010a) evaluation considers:

• Facility specific design, layout, and operating needs;

• Acceptable means for separation and control of hazards;

• The control or elimination of ignition sources;

• Suppression of fires; and

• Storage and use of radioactive materials under fire or explosion conditions.
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The FHA (GLE, 2010a) is a part of the ISA and evaluates credible fire scenarios to establish the 

radiological and toxic chemical consequences of an unmitigated fire. From these scenarios, the 

FHA (GLE, 2010a) and ISA also describe and evaluate preventive and mitigative controls from 

which the fire protection IROFS are selected.

The FHA (GLE, 2010a) was prepared in accordance with the guidance provided in Annex B of 

NFPA 801 (NFPA, 2008a).

Fire hazards at the operational/process level are analyzed with respect to potential accident 

sequences, likelihoods, consequences, and resultant risk. Fire/explosion-related accident 

sequences with the potential to create high or intermediate consequences as defined in 

10 CFR 70.61 are controlled by the application of IROFS. 

Sections of the FHA (GLE, 2010a) that support the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) are evaluated in 

Section 7.3.4 of the non-public Safety Evaluation Report (SER).

Based on the above, the staff concludes that the application is consistent with the guidance in 

Section 7.4.3.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) because the applicant, in its FHA (GLE, 2010a), 

developed bounding credible fire scenarios for each fire area containing significant fire loading, 

and then assessed the consequences of an unmitigated fire. The FHA (GLE, 2010a) includes a 

description, by fire area, of the fuel loading, fire scenarios, methods of consequence analysis, 

the potential consequences, and a description of the mitigative controls. The FHA (GLE, 

2010a) was used to identify possible fire initiators and accident sequences leading to 

radiological and chemical consequences resulting from interaction with special nuclear material. 

Therefore, the staff concludes that the facility meets the requirements of 10 CFR 70.22, 70.61, 

70.62, 70.64, and 70.65 as they pertain to fire hazards analysis and is, therefore, acceptable.

7.3.3 FACILITY DESIGN

In Section 7.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant described the fire protection design for the 

proposed facility. The Operations Building is constructed of non-combustible materials meeting 

the requirements of Type IA or IB as described in Chapter 6 of the “International Building Code” 

(IBC) (ICC, 2006). The Operations Building is a mixed occupancy of Factory Industrial (F-1) 

and High Hazard (H-3) as classified by Chapter 3 of the IBC (ICC, 2006). The High Hazard 

H-3 fire areas will be of NFPA 220, “Standard on Types of Building Construction” (NFPA, 

2009b) Type I (442 or 332). 

Type IA construction requires structural frame and exterior and interior bearing wall elements to 

meet the requirements for 3-hour fire rated construction. Type IB construction requires the 

structural frame and exterior and interior bearing walls to meet the requirements of 2-hour firerated construction.

The Operations Building is subdivided into separate fire areas as determined by the FHA (GLE, 

2010a). The fire barriers meet the minimum requirements of the IBC (ICC, 2006) for sprinklered 

and unsprinklered occupancy categories. The minimum fire resistance of sprinklered and 

unsprinklered bearing walls is 3-hours. Openings and penetrations within the envelope of each 

fire area are sealed with protective assemblies consistent with the designated fire rating in 

accordance with NFPA 221, “Standard for High Challenge Fire Walls, Fire Walls, and Fire 

Barrier Walls” (NFPA, 2009c). Door openings are protected with fire rated doors, frames, and 
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hardware in accordance with NFPA 80, “Fire Door Openings and Other Opening Protectives” 

(NFPA, 2007a). Fire dampers are provided where ventilation ductwork penetrates fire rated 

barriers in accordance with NFPA 90A, “Installation of Air-Conditioning and Ventilating Systems” 

(NFPA, 2009d).

The interior surface of the Operations Building is designed to meet the requirements of Sections 

5.8.1 and 5.8.2 of NFPA 801 (NFPA, 2008a). The interior surface finish of walls and ceilings in 

process and storage areas are Class A in accordance with NFPA 255, “Surface Method of Test 

of Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials (NFPA, 2006b). The floor finish is 

Class I in accordance with NFPA 253, “Standard method of Test of Critical Radiant Flux for 

Floor Covering Systems Using a Radiant Heat Energy Source,” (NFPA, 2006c).

The Solid Waste Storage Buildings (SWSBs) are used for storage of solid, radioactive, or 

industrial waste, generated and packaged for transport at the Operations Building. The SWSBs 

are constructed of noncombustible materials meeting the requirements of NFPA 801 (NFPA, 

2008a) for fire resistant or noncombustible construction, typically NFPA 220 (NFPA, 2009b) 

Type I or Type II. The SWSBs are not subdivided into separate fire areas. Each building is 

considered a separate fire area. The interior surface finish of walls and ceilings in process and 

storage areas are Class A in accordance NFPA 255 (NFPA, 2006b). The floor finish is Class I 

in accordance with NFPA 253 (NFPA, 2006c).

Electrical systems in the Operations Building and in the SWSBs are designed in accordance 

with NFPA 70, “National Electric Code” (NFPA, 2008c). Switchgear, motor control centers, 

panel boards, uninterruptible power supply systems, and control panels are mounted in metallic 

enclosures and contain only small amounts of combustible material. Cable trays and conduits 

are metallic and the cables in cable trays meet the requirements of UL 1277, ”Electrical Power 

and Control Tray Cables with Optional Optical-Fiber Members” (UL, 2001).

In the Operations Building and the SWSBs, life safety features (such as occupancy separation, 

means of egress, illumination and exit marking and signage, etc.) meet the requirements of 

NFPA 101, “Life Safety Code” (NFPA, 2009e) and the IBC (ICC, 2006). Rated fire barriers (in 

the Operations Building) are in accordance with NFPA 101 (NFPA, 2009e) and the FHA (GLE, 

2010a) and are provided to prevent unacceptable fire propagation. Security requirements will 

not prevent safe means of emergency egress as required by NFPA 101 (2009e) and the IBC 

(ICC, 2006). The applicant’s Physical Security Plan (GLE, 2010b) addresses the establishment 

of permanent and temporary controlled access areas.

In the Operations Building, ductwork, accessories, and support systems for ventilation, filtration, 

and containment are designed and tested in accordance with NFPA 801 (NFPA 2008a); NFPA 

90A (NFPA, 2009d); NFPA 90B, “Installation of Warm Air Heating and Air-conditioning Systems” 

(NFPA, 2009f); and NFPA 91, “Standard for Exhaust Systems for Air Conveying of Vapors, 

Gases, Mists and Noncombustible Particulate Solids” (NFPA, 2004b). Where shutdown of the 

ventilation system is not appropriate, fire/smoke dampers are not required for ventilation duct 

penetrations. Alternative means of protecting against fire propagation include fire-rated 

construction wrapping or encasing the duct for 3.05 meters (10 feet) on either side of the rated 

barrier. The rated construction encasing the duct will match the rating of the fire barrier 

penetrated. High-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtration systems and high-efficiency gas 

absorption systems are part of the confinement function of the monitored central exhaust 

system. HEPA filters meet the requirements of UL 900, “Test performance of Air Filter Units” 

(UL, 2004); and UL 586, “High-Efficiency Particulate Air Filter Units” (UL, 2009). The HEPA 

filters also meet the spot flame resistance of American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
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(ASME) AG-1, “Code on Nuclear Air and Gas Treatment” (ASME, 2009). Smoke control 

systems are designed in accordance with the IBC (ICC, 2006).

Operations Building control, computer, and telecommunications rooms meet the applicable 

requirements of NFPA 75, “Standard for the Protection of Information Technology Equipment” 

(NFPA, 2009g).

Water that may discharge from the firewater system or from firefighting activities (water runoff) 

that could be contaminated with radioactive materials will be confined in accordance with NFPA 

801 (NFPA, 2008a) and will be stored, sampled, and treated, if necessary. Water runoff from 

the Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6) Cylinder Pads will be collected in the monitored retention basin. 

Where water-based fire suppression is undesirable due to nuclear criticality safety concerns, 

redundant fire protection features are provided to ensure effective mitigation, including clean 

agent suppression, automatic detection, fire barriers, ignition controls, combustible loading 

controls, and emergency response activities. When called upon, the fire brigade or responding 

offsite fire departments typically extinguish fire in these areas with the use of portable and 

wheeled dry chemical fire extinguishers.

The lightning protection system for the facility is in accordance with applicable portions of 

NFPA 780, “Standard for the Installation of Lightning Protection Systems” (NFPA, 2008d) or 

other nationally recognized codes and standards.

Wildland fire protection was assessed in the FHA (GLE, 2010a) in accordance with applicable 

portions of NFPA 1143, “Standard for Wildland Fire Management” (NFPA, 2009h) and NFPA 

1144, “Standard for Reducing Structure Ignition Hazards from Wildfire” (NFPA, 2008e). The 

FHA (GLE, 2010a) determined that the wildland fire threat for the GLE site is a moderate hazard 

and that additional fire protection measures are not required. In addition, the applicant 

performed an exposure analysis of the Operations Building and the two SWSBs in the FHA 

(GLE, 2010a) and determined that there were no wildland areas that could threaten either type 

of building.

Fire risk from a buried natural gas line was also assessed in the FHA (GLE, 2010a) and is 

evaluated by the staff in Section 7.3.4 of the (non-public) SER. 

Based on the above, the staff concludes that the application is consistent with the guidance in 

Section 7.4.3.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) because the application documents the fire safety 

considerations used in the general design of facility features. These features include building 

construction, fire area determination, electrical installation, fire safety, ventilation, drainage and 

lightning protection. Also considered in the application in regard to fire protection design were 

criticality concerns, environmental concerns, physical security concerns, compliance with the 

baseline design criteria (through compliance with NFPA 801 (NFPA, 2008a) and other 

appropriate fire codes), and defense-in-depth. Therefore, the staff concludes that the facility 

meets the requirements of 10 CFR 70.22, 70.61, 70.62, 70.64, and 70.65 as they pertain to 

facility design in regard to fire protection and is, therefore, acceptable.

7.3.4 PROCESS FIRE SAFETY

Process hazards as related to fire safety are described in Section 7.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). 

Event descriptions are described in the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) and the FHA (GLE, 2010a). 

The major process material of concern is UF6 which can react with hydrocarbon-based 
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lubricating oils at high temperatures. UF6 is not flammable or combustible, but can be released 

if UF6 cylinders are exposed to heat or fire such as from an external cylinder transporter fire.

A major interior fire hazard of concern is from flammable process gases. Hydrogen is 

generated at battery charging stations throughout the facility. Natural or mechanical ventilation 

will be provided in the charging stations to ensure that hydrogen and process gas

concentrations do not exceed 25 percent of the Lower Explosive Limit.

A fire hazard both internal and external is transient combustibles such as trash, construction 

materials, and personal protective equipment (PPE). Such transient combustible fires could 

threaten UF6 cylinders as well as dispersible radioactive materials.

Fire related process hazards are evaluated in more detail by the staff in the non-public section 

of this SER.

The staff concludes that the LA (GLE, 2011a) is consistent with the acceptance criteria in 

Section 7.4.3.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) in regard to process fire safety because, in areas 

that have fire hazards that may threaten licensed material, the applicant identified the 

hazardous chemicals, processes, and design standards used to ensure fire safety. These firerelated process hazards are evaluated in more detail in the non-public section of the SER. 

Therefore, the staff concludes that the facility meets the requirements of 10 CFR 70.22, 70.61, 

70.62, 70.64, and 70.65 as they pertain to facility fire protection design and is, therefore, 

acceptable.

7.3.5 FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE

7.3.5.1 Fire Protection Systems

7.3.5.1.1 Firewater Supply System

The existing site firewater supply and distribution system consists of a 1.14 million liter (300,000 

gallon (gal)) (379,000 liters (100,000 gal) devoted to fire)) water storage tank and a water 

reservoir containing about 2.55 million liters (675,000 gal). The water is distributed throughout 

an underground 25-centimeter (cm) (10-inch) looped gridded firewater distribution system, 

supplying water to existing facilities and hydrants, via 5680 liters per minute (lpm) (1,500 gallons 

per minute (gpm) electric and diesel fire pumps. 

The fire water supply system for the proposed facility is installed, in accordance with NFPA 801 

(NFPA, 2008a), Section 6.2, with fire pump arrangement and installation meeting the 

requirements of NFPA 20, “Installation of Stationary Pumps for Fire Protection” (NFPA, 2007b). 

The minimum firewater flow and volume required is 5680 lpm (1,500 gpm) for four hours (1.36 

million liters (360,000 gal)).

7.3.5.1.2 Fire Detection and Alarm Systems

Automatic fire detection is provided for fire areas in accordance with the requirements of the IBC 

(ICC, 2006), Section 907; NFPA 101 (NFPA, 2009e), Section 40.3.4.1; and NFPA 801 (NFPA, 

2008a), Section 6.8. The fire alarm system is designed and installed per the requirements of 

NFPA 72, “National Fire Alarm Code” (NFPA, 2007c). 
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Manual pull stations are located at exits and throughout the facility to allow occupants to initiate 

an alarm. Area detection is provided as well as detection for automatic closing doors, 

fire/smoke damper operation, and air handler shutdown. Suppression system activation is also 

monitored by the fire alarm system.

7.3.5.1.3 Automatic Suppression Systems

Automatic sprinkler protection will be provided in the Operations Building and the SWSBs. The 

sprinkler systems are designed as ordinary hazard, Group 2 systems and have a design density 

of 6.11 lpm per meter2 (m2

) (0.15 gpm per feet2 (ft2)) over the most hydraulically remote 372 m2

(4,000 ft2

)

 area as per NFPA 13, “Installation of Sprinkler Systems” (NFPA, 2007d).

In those areas where automatic sprinkler systems are not provided, other systems will be 

considered. These systems are identified in the non-public portion of Section 7.4 of this SER.

7.3.5.1.4 Standpipes

Class I standpipe systems are installed in the Operations Building in accordance with NFPA 14, 

“Standard for the Installation of Standpipe and Hose Systems” (NFPA, 2007e) in each required 

exit stairway. Hose connections for use by emergency personnel are located at each 

intermediate landing.

7.3.5.1.5 Portable Extinguishers

Fire extinguishers are provided throughout the Operations Building in accordance with 

NFPA 10, “Portable Fire Extinguishers” (NFPA, 2007f). In areas where moderator control is 

considered, carbon dioxide and dry chemical extinguishers are provided so that an uncontrolled 

moderator source is not created.

7.3.5.2 Emergency Response Capability

The facility will have an onsite fire brigade which meets the NFPA 600, “Standard on Industrial 

Fire Brigades” (NFPA, 2005b) requirements for interior structural fire fighting. Documented 

training and drills will be conducted. Appropriate equipment, including portable 

communications, lighting, thermal protective clothing and protective equipment is available in 

sufficient quantities and sizes to fit each fire brigade member expected to enter hot or warm fire 

zones. The fire brigade will have at least five staff members available at all times.

For fires that propagate beyond the incipient stage, response agreements are in place to 

request emergency offsite assistance, when needed. The New Hanover County Fire 

Department is a fully equipped fire department incorporating nearby volunteer companies, which 

would respond with pumper engines and adequate resources, if requested. The travel time 

from the site to the nearest responding station is about 5 minutes (ESCI, 2009).

7.3.5.3 Fire Protection and Emergency Response Conclusion

Based on the above, the staff concludes that the application is consistent with the acceptance 

criteria in Section 7.4.3.5 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) because the application describes the 

NFPA codes and standards used for the design of the fire water system and the detection and 

alarm systems. The application also describes the onsite manual fire suppression capabilities 

including an onsite fire brigade and offsite fire departments capable of prompt response. Also 
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described are the facility standpipe system and portable fire extinguishers. The identification of 

IROFS in the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) is evaluated in Section 7.3.4 of the non-public SER. 

Therefore, the staff concludes that the facility meets the requirements of 10 CFR 70.22, 70.61, 

70.62, 70.64, and 70.65 as they pertain to fire protection and emergency response and is, 

therefore, acceptable.

7.4 EVALUATION FINDINGS

The staff’s review has verified that the applicant: (1) provides sufficient information to satisfy the 

intent of 10 CFR Part 70 requirements related to the overall safety program; and (2) is 

consistent with the fire safety criteria of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The staff concludes that:

• The applicant has established a fire protection function meeting the acceptance criteria 

in Chapter 7 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The function includes a Facility Safety 

Review Committee responsible for integrating modifications to the facility and a fire 

safety manager responsible for day-to-day program implementation. Fire prevention, 

inspection, testing, and maintenance of fire protection systems and the qualification, 

drills, and training of facility personnel are in accordance with applicable NFPA codes 

and standards. 

• The applicant has conducted risk analyses in accordance with NFPA 801 (2008a). The 

FHA (GLE, 2010a) identified credible fire scenarios that bound the fire risk. The ISA 

used these scenarios and identified fire protection IROFS (in particular, automatic fire 

suppression in process areas, combustible material controls, and fuel limits for cylinder 

transporters). A memorandum of understanding with the fire department documents the 

required assistance and the annual exercises. Procedures are in place to allow the fire 

department efficient access to process areas during fire emergencies. Worker egress is 

designed and maintained in accordance with NFPA 101 (NFPA, 2009e). 

• The applicant has demonstrated that it incorporated appropriate fire safety 

considerations in the design of its facilities. The applicant has also demonstrated that the

facility has appropriate active fire protection systems. 

• The staff concludes that the applicant’s submittals provide sufficient information in 

accordance with requirements of 10 CFR 30.33 and 10 CFR 40.32, both entitled 

“General Requirements for Issuance of Specific Licenses,” and those of 10 CFR 70.22 

and 10 CFR 70.65 on potential fire hazards, consequences, and required controls for the 

proposed processes. The NRC staff determined that the applicant demonstrated 

compliance with the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 for fire protection 

related to postulated accident scenarios. The design that the applicant proposes also 

satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR 70.64(a)(3) and the defense-in-depth requirements 

of 10 CFR 70.64(b) (as required). 

7.5 REFERENCES

(ASME, 2009) American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). ASME AG-1, “Code on 

Nuclear Air and Gas Treatment,” 2009.
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(ESCI, 2009) Emergency Services Consulting International (ESCI). “New Hanover County, 

North Carolina Fire Protection Master Plan and Cooperative Effort Feasibility Study,” 2009.

(GLE, 2010a) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “Fire Hazards Analysis 

for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility,” Revision 2, 2010.

(GLE, 2010b) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “Physical Security Plan 

for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility,” Revision 1, 2010.

(GLE, 2011a) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “GE-Hitachi Global 

Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility License Application,” Revision 6, 2011.

(GLE, 2011b) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “Integrated Safety 

Analysis Summary for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility 

License Application,” Revision 4. 2011.

(GLE, 2011c) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “Quality Assurance 

Program Description for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility,” 

Revision 7, 2011.

(ICC, 2006) International Code Council (ICC). “International Building Code,” 2006

(NFPA, 2003) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 1620, “Recommended 

Practice for Pre- Incident Planning, 2003.

(NFPA, 2004a) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 241, “Standard for 

Safeguarding Construction, Alteration, and Demolition Operations,” 2004.

(NFPA, 2004b) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 91, “Standard for Exhaust 

Systems for Air Conveying of Vapors, Gases, Mists and Noncombustible Particulate Solids,” 

2004.

(NFPA, 2005a) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 601, “Standard for Security 

Services in Fire Loss Prevention,” 2005. 

(NFPA, 2005b) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 600, “Standard on 

Industrial Fire Brigades,” 2005.

(NFPA, 2006a) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 901, “Standard 

Classifications for Incident reporting and Fire Protection Data,” 2006.

(NFPA, 2006b) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 255, “Standard Method of 

Test of Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials,” 2006.

(NFPA, 2006c) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 253, “Standard Method of 

Test for Critical Flux For Floor Covering Systems Using a Radiant Energy Heat Source,” 2006.

(NFPA, 2007a) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 80, “Fire Door Openings 

and Other Opening Protectives,” 2007.
7-12

(NFPA, 2007b) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 20, “Installation of 

Stationary Pumps for Fire Protection,” 2007. 

(NFPA, 2007c) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 72, “National Fire Alarm 

Code,” 2007.

(NFPA, 2007d) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 13, “Installation of 

Sprinkler Systems,” 2007. 

(NFPA, 2007e) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 14, “Standard for the 

Installation of Standpipe and Hose Systems,” 2007.

(NFPA, 2007f) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 10, “Portable Fire 

Extinguishers, 2007.

(NFPA, 2008a) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 801, “Standard for Fire 

Protection for Facilities Handling Radioactive Materials”, 2008.

(NFPA, 2008b) National Fire protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 25, “Inspection, Testing, 

and Maintenance of Water Based Fire Protection Systems,” 2008.

(NFPA, 2008c) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 70, “National Electric 

Code,” 2008.

(NFPA, 2008d) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 780, “Standard for the 

Installation of Lightning Protection Systems, 2008.

(NFPA, 2008e) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 1144, “Standard for 

Reducing Structure Ignition Hazards From Wildfire”, 2008.

(NFPA, 2009a) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 51B, ”Standard for Fire 

Prevention During Welding, Cutting, and Other Hot Work”, 2009.

(NFPA, 2009b) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 220, “Standard on Types 

of Building Construction,” 2009.

(NFPA, 2009c) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 221, “Standard for High 

Challenge Fire Walls, and Fire Barrier Walls,” 2009.

(NFPA, 2009d) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 90A, “Installation of Air 

Conditioning and Ventilating Systems,” 2009.

(NFPA, 2009e) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 101, “Life Safety Code,” 

2009.

(NFPA, 2009f) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 90B, “Installation of Warm 

Air Heating and Air Conditioning Systems,” 2009.

(NFPA, 2009g) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 75, “Standard for 

Protection of Information Technology Equipment,” 2009.
7-13

(NFPA, 2009h) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 1143, “Standard for 

Wildland Management,” 2009. 

(NRC, 2002) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG-1520, “Standard Review 

Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility,” 2002.

(NRC, 2009) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 1.189, “Fire 

Protection for Nuclear Power Plants,” 2009. 

(UL, 2001) Underwriters Laboratories (UL). UL 1277, “Electrical Power and Control Cables 

with Optional-Fiber Members,” 2001.

(UL, 2004) Underwriters Laboratories (UL). UL 900, “Test Performance of Air Filter Units,” 

2004.

(UL, 2009) Underwriters Laboratories (UL). UL 586, “High-Efficiency Particulate Air Filter 

Units,” 2009.

8-1

8.0 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

8.1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of reviewing the General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC (GLE) 

Radiological Contingency and Emergency Plan (RC&EP) (GLE, 2011) is to determine if the 

RC&EP (GLE, 2011) has established adequate emergency management facilities and 

procedures to protect workers, the public, and the environment. The Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission staff’s review of the RC&EP contains Proprietary, Security-Related, and Export 

Control Information and is addressed in the non-public version of this Safety Evaluation Report.

The Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas (GNF-A) and the applicant have established an emergency 

plan for responding to the radiological hazards resulting from a release of radioactive material or 

hazardous chemicals relating to the processing of licensed material in accordance with 10 CFR 

30.32(i)(1)(ii), 10 CFR 40.31(j)(1)(ii), and 10 CFR 70.22(i)(1)(ii). As part of the license 

application, an integrated RC&EP for both the GNF-A fuel fabrication facility and the GLE laserbased enrichment facility was provided. This plan provides emergency planning for both the 

GNF-A facility and the proposed GLE commercial enrichment facility. Emergency planning for 

the GNF-A facility was originally reviewed and included under License Condition 13 in the 

GNF-A license (Special Nuclear Material (SNM) License SNM-1097) issued by the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) on April 23, 1979. The GNF-A emergency plan was later 

reviewed as part of the GNF-A license renewal and found adequate to meet the requirements of 

10 CFR 70.23(a)(11) in the “Safety Evaluation Report for the Renewal of SNM-1097 Global 

Nuclear Fuel – Americas Wilmington, North Carolina” (NRC, 2009).

8.2 EVALUATION FINDINGS

The NRC staff reviewed the RC&EP (GLE, 2011a) with respect to 10 CFR 30.32(i)(1)(ii), 10 

CFR 40.31(j)(1)(ii), 10 CFR 70.22(i)(1)(ii), 10 CFR 70.22(i)(3), and the acceptance criteria in 

Section 8.4.3.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The NRC staff concluded that the RC&EP (GLE, 

2011) is adequate to demonstrate compliance with the regulatory requirements, in that: (1) the 

facilities are properly configured to limit releases of radioactive materials in the event of an 

accident; (2) a capability exists for measuring and assessing the significance of accidental 

releases of radioactive materials; (3) appropriate emergency equipment and procedures are 

provided onsite to protect workers against radiation and other chemical hazards that might be 

encountered after an accident; (4) a system has been established to notify Federal, State and 

local government agencies, and to recommend appropriate protective actions to protect 

members of the public; and (5) necessary recovery actions are established to return the facility 

to a safe condition after an accident.

8.3 REFERENCES

(GLE, 2011) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC (GLE). “Radiological 

Contingency and Emergency Plan (RC&EP) for Global Nuclear Fuel – Americas, LLC and GEHitachi Global Laser Enrichment, LLC at Wilmington, NC,” Revision 3, 2011.
8-2

(NRC, 2002) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG-1520, “Standard Review 

Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility,” 2002.

(NRC, 2009) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). “Safety Evaluation Report for the 

Renewal of SNM-1097 Global Nuclear Fuel – Americas Wilmington, North Carolina,” 2009.
9-1

9.0 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

The purpose of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) review of the applicant’s 

environmental protection plan for its proposed GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE) 

facility is to determine whether the applicant’s proposed environmental protection measures are 

adequate to protect the environment, and the health and safety of the public, as required by 

Title 10 Code of Regulations (CFR) Parts 20, 30, 40, 51, and 70.

9.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS

To be considered acceptable, the applicant must satisfy the following regulatory requirements 

regarding environmental protection:

1. The regulations in 10 CFR Part 20 specify the effluent control and treatment measures 

necessary to meet dose limits and dose constraints for members of the public specified 

in Subparts B, D, and F; the waste minimization requirements in 10 CFR 20.1406; the 

survey requirements of Subpart F; the waste disposal requirements of Subpart K; the 

records requirements of Subpart L; and the reporting requirements of Subpart M.

2. The regulations in 10 CFR 30.33 specify in part that an application for the possession 

and use of byproduct material will be granted provided that, among other things, the 

applicant’s proposed equipment and facilities are adequate to protect health and 

minimize danger to life or property, and that the applicant is qualified by training and 

experience to use the byproduct material for the purpose requested in such a manner as 

to protect health and minimize danger to life and property.

3. The regulations in 10 CFR 40.31(k) state that, "A license application for a uranium 

enrichment facility must be accompanied by an Environmental Report required under 

subpart A of Part 51 of this chapter."

4. The regulations in 10 CFR 40.32(b) specify that the applicant must be qualified by 

reason of training and experience to use the source material for the purpose requested 

in such manner as to protect health and minimize danger to life or property.

5. The regulations in 10 CFR 40.32(e) state that, "In the case of an application for a license 

for a uranium enrichment facility, or for a license to possess and use source and 

byproduct material for uranium milling, production of uranium hexafluoride, or for the 

conduct of any other activity which the Commission determines will significantly affect 

the quality of the environment, the Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and 

Environmental Management Programs or his designee, before commencement of 

construction of the plant or facility in which the activity will be conducted, on the basis of 

information filed and evaluations made pursuant to subpart A of part 51 of this chapter, 

has concluded, after weighing the environmental, economic, technical and other benefits 

against environmental costs and considering available alternatives, that the action called 

for is the issuance of the proposed license, with any appropriate conditions to protect 

environmental values. Commencement of construction prior to this conclusion is 
9-2

grounds for denial of a license to possess and use source and byproduct material in the 

plant or facility. As used in this paragraph, the term ‘commencement of construction’ 

means any clearing of land, excavation, or other substantial action that would adversely 

affect the environment of a site. The term does not mean site exploration, roads 

necessary for site exploration, borings to determine foundation conditions, or other 

preconstruction monitoring or testing to establish background information related to the 

suitability of the site or the protection of environmental values."

6. The regulations in 10 CFR 51.60(b)(1)(vii) specify that the applicant must submit an 

environmental report (ER) for construction and operation of a uranium enrichment 

facility. 

7. The regulations in 10 CFR 70.22(a)(7) specify that the applicant must provide a 

description of the equipment and facilities which will be used by the applicant to protect 

health and minimize danger to life or property.

8. The regulations in 10 CFR 70.23(a)(2) specify that the applicant must be qualified by 

reason of training and experience to use the material for the purpose requested.

9. The regulations in 10 CFR 70.59 outline the radiological effluent monitoring reporting 

requirements for a 10 CFR Part 70 licensee.

10. The regulations in 10 CFR 70.65(b) specify that an applicant for a facility must provide 

an "Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) Summary" that includes a list of the Items Relied on 

for Safety (IROFS) established by the applicant.

9.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

The acceptance criteria for the NRC’s review of the applicant’s environmental protection 

program are outlined in Section 9.4.3.2 of the “Standard Review Plan for the Review of a 

License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility,” NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). Other acceptance 

criteria in Chapter 9 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) relating to environmental documents 

developed pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) are not applicable to this 

review. These NEPA-related acceptance criteria apply to evaluating the adequacy of the 

applicant’s ER and to determining whether the staff should prepare an environmental 

assessment (EA) or an environmental impact statement (EIS) pursuant to regulatory 

requirements found in 10 CFR Part 51.

9.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

9.3.1 TRAINING AND QUALIFICATIONS

The regulations in 10 CFR 30.33, 40.32(b), and 70.23(a)(2) require that the applicant be 

qualified by reason of training and experience to use the material for the purpose requested. 

The acceptance criteria in Section 9.4.3.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) indicate that the 

applicant’s environmental protection measures will be acceptable if it provides for qualified and 

trained staff associated with environmental protection. This will include the qualification and 

training of managers, supervisors, technical staff, operators, technicians, and maintenance 
9-3

personnel whose levels of knowledge are important to the environment and protect the health 

and safety of the public. In addition, managers and staff will be expected to have levels of 

education and experience commensurate with the responsibilities of their positions.

Personnel training and qualification requirements are established and implemented in 

accordance with approved written procedures. The applicant’s training program is described in 

Section 11.3 of its License Application (LA) (GLE, 2011a); its qualification requirements for key 

management positions are described in Section 2.2 of its LA (GLE, 2011a).

9.3.1.1 Personnel Training

As noted in Section 11.3 of its LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant indicates that training programs 

are provided through shared responsibility of the environmental, health, and safety (EHS) 

disciplines and line management, and its programs are designed primarily to ensure that 

personnel who perform activities relied on for safety have the appropriate skills to design, 

operate, and maintain the facility in a safe manner. Training requirements are applicable 

primarily to those personnel who have a direct relationship to various aspects of IROFS. In 

addition to its safety focus, the training program also is designed to ensure that assigned 

personnel are trained and tested as necessary to perform their responsibilities important to the 

protection of the environment.

As discussed in Section 11.3.2.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), technical training consists of initial, 

on-the-job, continuing, and special training, as applicable to assist personnel to gain an 

understanding of specific assigned technical duties. Professional development, which uses 

internal or external professionals via formal workshops, tutorials, and selected training 

programs, assists personnel in gaining additional understanding of technical practices common 

to their assigned job functions. Job-specific training is performance-based. Lesson plans that 

are developed are based on job performance requirements, and are reviewed by line 

management and by the responsible organization for the subject matter. Under its training 

program, the applicant also provides continuing or periodic retraining to assure personnel 

remain proficient and retain important knowledge and skills. Retraining may be required as a 

result of facility modifications or changes in procedures or in the Quality Assurance (QA) 

program which would result in new or changed information. As discussed in Section 11.3.8 of 

the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant evaluates trainee understanding and proficiency through 

observation, demonstration, or examinations, and training results are documented. 

The applicant also performs periodic evaluations of its training program to assess program 

effectiveness. These evaluations identify program strengths and weaknesses. The evaluations 

are also used to help determine whether training content matches current job needs and 

whether corrective actions are needed to improve training program effectiveness. In addition, 

the applicant may also perform independent audits to evaluate the overall training program 

effectiveness.

9.3.1.2 Personnel Qualifications

In Section 2.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant identifies key management and supervisory 

positions, hierarchy and functions, including personnel qualifications for each key position. In 

Figure 2-2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant provides an overview of those management 

positions and functions. In Section 2.2 of its LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant provides a 
9-4

description of those key management positions and qualifications that relate to, among other 

things, Environmental Protection, including the following: 

• The Facility Manager, who reports to the GLE President and Chief Executive Officer

(CEO), provides for safety, control of operations, and protection of the environment by 

delegating and assigning responsibility to qualified line management and to area 

managers. The Facility Manager is required to have, as a minimum, a bachelor’s degree 

in an engineering or scientific field and four years of experience in nuclear facility 

operations.

• The Operations Manager, who reports to the GLE President and CEO during the design 

and construction phases and to the Facilities Manager during operations, has the 

responsibility of directing the day-to-day operation of the facility, which includes 

responsibility for activities related to UF-6 processes and handling, as well as for the 

identification and mitigation of any off-normal operating conditions. The Operations 

Manager is required to have, as a minimum, a bachelor’s degree (or equivalent) in an 

engineering or scientific field and four years of experience in nuclear facility operations.

 

• Area Managers, who report to the Operations Manager, are the designated individuals 

responsible for ensuring that activities necessary for safe operations and protection of 

the environment are conducted properly within their assigned area(s) of the facility in 

which uranium materials are possessed, handled, or stored. They are also required to 

be knowledgeable of the safety program procedures, including, among other things, 

Environmental Protection. Area Managers are required to have, as a minimum, a 

bachelor’s degree (or equivalent) in a technical field and two years of experience in 

operations, one of which is in fuel cycle facility operations. Alternatively, Area Managers 

are required to have a high school diploma and five years of operations experience, two 

of which are in fuel cycle facility operations.

• Shift Supervisors, who report to the Operations Manager, are the interface between 

management and facility operators. Shift Managers are required to be knowledgeable of 

the safety program procedures, including, among other things, Environmental Protection. 

Shift Supervisors are required to have, as a minimum, a high school diploma and three 

years of experience in a technical field.

• The Training Manager is responsible for establishing and maintaining the training 

program described above. The Training Manager is also responsible for conducting 

training and maintaining training records for personnel at the facility. The Training 

Manager is required to have, as a minimum, a bachelor’s degree (or equivalent) in an 

engineering or scientific field and four years of related experience.

• The EHS Manager, who reports to the Facility Manager, has the authority and 

responsibility to contact the GLE President and CEO with any EHS concerns. The EHS 

Manager has the overall responsibility to establish and manage, among other things, 

Environmental Protection and Radiation Protection Programs to ensure compliance with 

applicable federal, state, and local regulations and laws. This position is independent 

from other management positions at the facility in order to ensure the ability to conduct 

objective EHS audit, review, and control activities. The EHS Manager is required to 

have, as a minimum, a bachelor’s degree (or equivalent) in an engineering or scientific 

field and five years of management experience in assignments involving regulatory 
9-5

activities. In addition, the EHS Manager is required to have experience in the 

understanding and management of nuclear criticality safety, environmental protection, 

and industrial safety programs.

• The Environmental Protection Manager, who reports to the EHS Manager, is 

administratively independent of Operations and has the authority to shut down 

operations having potentially adverse environmental impacts. Environmental Protection 

responsibilities are identified in Section 2.2.9.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). The 

Environmental Protection Manager is required to have, as a minimum, a bachelor’s 

degree (or equivalent) in an engineering or scientific field and two years of experience in 

assignments involving regulatory activities (or equivalent); or a high school diploma and 

eight years of experience in assignments involving regulatory activities.

The staff conducted a review of the applicant’s training program identified in Section 11.3 of the 

LA (GLE, 2011a) and of the applicant’s personnel qualifications identified in Section 2.2 of the 

LA (GLE, 2011a), which includes the qualification and training of managers, supervisors and 

technical staff who are associated with environmental protection. Because the applicant 

identified specific training areas and provides that managers and staff have levels of education 

and experience commensurate with the responsibilities of their positions, the staff finds that the 

applicant has established that its training, testing and qualification of these personnel meets the 

regulatory requirements found in 10 CFR 70.22(a)(6) and the acceptance criteria found in 

Section 9.4.3.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and Sections 11.3.3(1) through (10) of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002). 

9.3.2 RADIATION SAFETY

9.3.2.1 As Low As Reasonably Achievable Goals for Air and Liquid Effluent Control 

The regulations in 10 CFR 20.1101 require each licensee to implement a radiation protection 

program. This environmental review of the applicant’s radiation protection program focuses on 

the applicant’s proposed methods to maintain public doses As Low As Reasonably Achievable 

(ALARA) in accordance with 10 CFR 20.1101. Acceptance criteria are found in Section 

9.4.3.2.1(1), (2), and (3) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The applicant’s proposed ALARA 

program will be found acceptable if the applicant’s program is consistent with Regulatory Guide 

8.37, “ALARA Levels for Effluents form Materials Facilities” (NRC, 1993). In addition, the 

applicant’s ALARA goals should be established at a modest fraction (10 to 20 percent) of the 

values in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table 2, Columns 1 and 2, and Table 3 and the external 

exposure limit in 10 CFR 20.1302(b)(2)(ii), or the dose limit for members of the public, if the 

applicant proposes to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 20.1301. The applicant’s constraint 

approach is acceptable if it is consistent with the guidance in Regulatory Guide 4.20, “Constraint 

on Releases of Airborne Radioactive Material to the Environment for Licensees Other Than 

Power Reactors” (NRC, 1996) and provides sufficient detail to demonstrate specific application 

of the guidance to proposed routine and non-routine operation, including anticipated events. 

The applicant also needs to describe its proposed effluent controls to maintain public doses 

ALARA and demonstrate a commitment to reduce unnecessary exposure to members of the 

public and releases to the environment. The applicant also needs to commit to annual reviews 

of the content and implementation of the radiation protection program, which includes the 

ALARA program. The review needs to consider analysis of trends in release concentrations, 

environmental monitoring data, and radionuclide usage; determinations of whether operational 

changes are needed, and evaluations of designs for system installations or modifications. In 
9-6

addition, the results of the annual review should be reported to senior management, along with 

recommendations for changes to facilities or procedures that are necessary to achieve ALARA 

goals.

The applicant’s ALARA and Radiation Protection Program are described in Chapter 4 of the 

applicant’s LA (GLE, 2011a) and Section 4.12.2.2 of its ER (GLE, 2008). The applicant stated 

that it will maintain and use gaseous and liquid treatment systems, as appropriate, to maintain 

releases of radioactive material to unrestricted areas below the limits specified in 10 CFR 

20.1301 and in accordance with ALARA policy. The applicant maintains an Environmental 

Protection Program for the proposed GLE facility which builds on the existing Wilmington Site 

Nuclear Safety Program. In Section 9.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that the 

primary purpose of this program is to ensure that exposure of the workers, public and 

environment to radioactive materials used in facility operations is kept ALARA. As discussed in 

Chapter 6 of the applicant’s ER (GLE, 2008), compliance with the ALARA concept is a part of 

the applicant’s Environmental Protection Program. Air and liquid effluent controls are used to 

maintain public doses ALARA. 

The applicant’s approach is sufficiently detailed to demonstrate that the applicant is in 

compliance with regulatory dose limits found in 10 CFR 20.1301, that air and liquid dose 

constraints meets the acceptance criteria in Section 9.4.3.2.1(1) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), 

and that the applicant’s ALARA program for controlling gaseous and liquid effluents is within the 

guidance found in NRC Regulatory Guide 8.37, “ALARA Levels for Effluents From Materials 

Facilities" (NRC, 1993).

Air Effluent ALARA Goal

For radiological ALARA goals for air effluent control, the applicant proposes an ALARA goal of 

being within the 10 CFR 20.1101 constraint of 0.1 milliSievert per year (mSv/yr) (10 milliRem 

per year (mrem/yr)) total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) for the maximally exposed member 

of the public. The applicant’s proposal satisfies the 0.1 mSv/yr (10 mrem/yr) ALARA goal 

recommended in NRC Regulatory Guide 8.37, Regulatory Position C.1.2, “ALARA Goals” (NRC, 

1993), meets the acceptance criterion found at 9.4.3.2.1(1) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), and 

is, therefore, acceptable to the staff.

Liquid Effluent ALARA Goal 

As noted in Section 4.2 of the applicant’s LA (GLE, 2011a), liquid effluent does not provide a 

significant pathway for radiological exposure to the general public. Liquid radioactive wastes 

and process wastewaters are treated to remove uranium and fluoride. The remaining 

radioactive material is then packaged and disposed of as a solid, dry, Class A low-level 

radioactive waste (LLRW). The treated wastewaters are then discharged ultimately to the 

Northeast Cape Fear River. Average annual release concentrations of liquid effluents will be in 

compliance with limits in 10 CFR 20.1302, and will not exceed the values in 10 CFR Part 20, 

Appendix B. There will be negligible increases to the environmental or public radiological 

exposures resulting from liquid effluents. ALARA levels for liquid effluents will be consistent 

with guidance described in NRC Regulatory Guide 8.37 (NRC, 1993). Radiation Program 

procedures incorporate the ALARA philosophy into facility operations and ensure exposures are 

below 10 CFR 20.1101(d) limits. For the proposed facility, the level of radioactivity from liquid 

effluents to the public and the environment would be within the regulatory goal of 0.1 mSv/yr (10 

mrem/yr) recommended in NRC Regulatory Guide 8.37 (NRC, 1993), meets the acceptance 
9-7

criteria found in Section 9.4.3.2.1(1) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), and is, therefore, acceptable 

to the staff. 

9.3.2.2 Air Effluent Controls to Maintain Public Doses ALARA 

Small amounts of radiation and radiological materials may be released from routine operations 

to the environment via gaseous emissions, liquid effluent, and direct radiation. In 

Section 1.1.6.2 of its LA (GLE, 2011a) and Section 4.12.2.2.2 of its ER (GLE, 2008), the 

applicant identifies the route of exposure for the general public as being by way of gaseous 

emissions to the atmosphere through a rooftop vent stack (the Operations Building stack). As 

noted in Section 4.6 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), control of the release of radiation or radioactive 

materials is a fundamental requirement for facility and equipment design for areas in which 

uranium and other sources of radiation are handled, processed, or used in processes.

The containment of uranium hexafluoride (UF6), and therefore the concentration of radioactive 

material in air, is accomplished through several engineered controls, including containment and 

ventilation systems. Process systems are operated at consistent sub-atmospheric pressure so 

that any leaks would be into the system as opposed to into work areas. Process system 

components that are equipped with removable covers or hatch openings are equipped with 

seals and mechanical closure devices to ensure containment of the UF6. 

UF6 is processed in the UF6 Feed and Vaporization, Product Withdrawal, Tails Withdrawal, and 

Cascade and Gas Handling Areas. As noted in Section 4.6.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) and 

Section 4.6.2.2.1 of the ER (GLE, 2008), some short-term gaseous releases potentially could 

occur inside the Operations Building during activities associated with operations of the 

enrichment process. An example would be the connection and disconnection of the UF6

cylinders to process equipment, as well as during equipment maintenance activities. These 

gaseous releases would be contained within the Operations Building process areas and routed 

through the ventilation system containing high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) and highefficiency gas absorption (HEGA) filter media. In addition, pre-filters are provided where 

necessary to treat effluents before filtration to ensure that filter effectiveness is maintained. The 

ventilation system would be designed to remove over 99 percent of particulates and gaseous 

pollutants from the air stream. The ventilation system exhausts to the environment through the 

Operations Building stack. 

Constraints on atmospheric releases are established so that no member of the public is 

expected to receive a TEDE in excess of 0.1 mSv/yr (10 mrem/yr) from these releases. The 

applicant will use the guidance in Regulatory Guide 4.20 (NRC, 1996) to determine compliance 

with dose limits to members of the public. The applicant estimated the cumulative radiological 

impact of uranium emissions from both the proposed GLE facility and its existing General 

Electric-Hitachi Global Nuclear Fuels – Americas (GNF-A) fuel manufacturing facility as being 

representative of the most realistic scenario for gaseous releases from the proposed facility. 

Section 4.12.2.2.2.1 of the ER (GLE, 2008) indicates that because there are no publically 

available source test data for quantifying the level of air emissions from the laser-enrichment 

process, the applicant used 2006 air monitoring data for a subset of the fuel manufacturing 

facility process vents as a reasonable surrogate for the proposed facility. This is because the 

applicant expects emissions from the fuel manufacturing facility to be greater than the emissions 

from the proposed laser enrichment facility (GLE, 2008). A more detailed basis for the 

applicant’s use of the fuel manufacturing facility data is found in Section 4.6.2.2.1.1 of the ER 

(GLE, 2008). 
9-8

As noted in Section 4.12.2.2.2.2 of the ER (GLE, 2008), the applicant estimated offsite

radiological impacts to key receptors from routine effluent releases using the GENII model 

(Version 2.06). In addition, Appendix S of the ER (GLE, 2008) describes the assumptions and 

results of air emissions dispersion modeling for the proposed facility. Table S-2 of the ER (GLE, 

2008) provides total uranium and uranium isotope emission rates for ambient air dispersion 

modeling. 

Staff Evaluation of Air Effluent Controls

The staff evaluated the air effluent controls and effects described in Sections 4.6.1, 9.2.1.1 and 

9.2.1.2 of the applicant’s LA (GLE, 2011a) and Sections 4.6.2.2.1 and 4.12.2.2 of the ER (GLE, 

2008). The Committed Effective Dose Equivalent (CEDE) for the adult Maximally Exposed 

Individual (MEI) (which is the highest calculated CEDE) from the combined existing fuel 

fabrication facility and proposed enrichment facility emissions was calculated to be 9.2E-6

mSv/yr (9.2E-4 mrem/yr) per year. Dose equivalents for the MEI from gaseous effluents for the 

total body in adults, teens, children, and infants are presented in Tables 4.12-1 and 4.12-2 of 

the ER (GLE, 2008). These doses are well below (orders of magnitude) the U.S Environmental 

Protection Agency (EPA) 0.1 mSv/yr (10 mrem/yr) standard in 40 CFR Part 190. This estimated 

maximum public dose is also well below the 0.1 millSievert (mSv) (10 milliRem (mrem)) ALARA 

constraint on air emissions described in 10 CFR 20.1101. Because public receptors at other 

sites of interest are more distant than the MEI, their doses would be even lower because of 

dispersion of uranium at the more distant locations.

The staff finds that the applicant’s controls will ensure that radiation levels to the public will 

remain well below regulatory limits and ALARA air effluent goals, that the applicant’s approach 

to effluent controls meets the acceptance criteria found in Section 9.4.3.2.1(2) of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002), and are, therefore, acceptable to the staff. Therefore, the staff finds that the 

applicant has demonstrated that its air effluent controls will reduce releases to provide adequate 

protection of the environment and of the health and safety of the public.

9.3.2.3 Liquid Effluent Controls to Maintain Public Doses ALARA 

As noted in Section 4.13.2.2.1.1 of the applicant’s ER (GLE, 2008), uranium-enrichment 

operations inside the Operations Building would generate process wastewater streams from the 

collective drain water resulting from decontamination, cleaning, and laboratory activities. The 

liquid radioactive waste would be collected in closed-drain systems that discharge to an 

accumulator tank. The liquid would then be treated to remove uranium through precipitation 

and to remove fluoride through evaporation. The resulting solids would be dried and disposed 

as LLRW.

In the liquid effluent treatment process described in Section 4.13.2.2.1.1 of the ER (GLE, 2008), 

a caustic solution is added to the wastewater in the accumulator tank, which increases the pH of 

the solution and results in the precipitation of uranium from the solution. The uraniumcontaining slurry would be pumped to a centrifuge. The solids collected from the centrifuge 

would be oven-dried, sampled, and packaged for disposal as a solid LLRW. The solution from 

the centrifuge would be sampled to evaluate the residual uranium concentration to determine 

whether further treatment of the solution would be required to precipitate uranium. Once the 

concentration is determined to be acceptably low (i.e., within concentrations and corresponding 

release limits in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B), it would ultimately be discharged from the liquid 
9-9

effluent treatment system via a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 

permitted Outfall 001 to the Wilmington site effluent channel where it mixes with stormwater 

discharging groundwater and treated sanitary wastewater effluent. The effluent channel flows 

into Unnamed Tributary #1 and to the Northeast Cape Fear River.

Stormwater runoff collected from the UF6

will be monitored to ensure that no unanticipated radiological discharge occurs to the

storage pads will be routed to a holding pond that

stormwater wet detention basin. Should unanticipated radioactivity be detected in the holding

pond, it will be allowed to settle and precipitate. The liquid would then be pumped from the

holding pond and, if necessary, routed to the effluent treatment system. The contaminated

portions of the contained solids will be disposed of as LLRW. In Section 4.13.2.2.1.4 of the

ER (GLE, 2008), the applicant indicates that no more than trace levels of radiological 

contamination will be released from the UF6 storage pads area stormwater holding pond and 

these releases will be within the effluent release requirements in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B. 

Staff Evaluation of Liquid Effluent Controls

As noted above and in Section 9.2.1.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), liquid effluents from facility 

operations will be treated to remove uranium and fluoride prior to being released to the 

environment. Uranium will be precipitated from wastewater streams and disposed as LLRW. In 

addition, stormwater runoff will contain only trace levels of radiological contamination and these 

releases will be within the effluent release requirements in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B. 

The staff finds that these trace levels and any resulting doses would be much less than the 

regulatory limit, and well within the ALARA goal for liquid effluents described above. In addition, 

the staff finds that the applicant’s approach to liquid effluent controls meets the acceptance 

criteria found in Section 9.4.3.2.1(2) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). Thus, the applicant’s 

controls and approach to the controls are acceptable to the staff. Therefore, the staff finds that 

the applicant has demonstrated that it will reduce liquid effluents to provide adequate protection 

of the environment and of health and safety of the public.

9.3.2.4 ALARA Reviews and Reports to Management

In Section 4.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant describes an ALARA program for the 

proposed facility. The ALARA program is also described in Section 4.3.2 of this Safety 

Evaluation Report (SER). The ALARA program provides for an annual review of the content 

and implementation of the radiation protection (RP) program, including the effluent control 

program. The Facility Safety Review Committee (FSRC) is responsible for conducting annual 

ALARA reviews. The FSRC is an independent advisory committee that reports directly to the 

Facility Manager. In conducting its ALARA review, the FSRC considers the following:

• Programs and projects undertaken by the RP Manager and the Radiation Safety 

Committee (RSC);

• Performance including trends in airborne concentrations of radioactivity, personnel 

exposures, and environmental monitoring results; and

• Programs for improving the effectiveness of equipment and procedures used for effluent 

and exposure control.
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As discussed in Sections 4.1.2.3 and 4.3.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the RP Manager is 

responsible for the overall implementation of the RP program and has direct access to the 

Facility Manager who, in turn, has the overall responsibility for safety and activities conducted at 

the proposed facility. 

As discussed in Section 4.2.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the RSC is composed of the Chairperson 

and representatives from the RP, Environmental Protection, Operations, Engineering and 

Maintenance programs. The RSC provides oversight of the RP program and functions as the 

ALARA Committee (GLE, 2011a). The RP Manager chairs the RSC and compiles and 

maintains related records and distributes monthly meeting summaries to the Facility Manager as 

well as to line and area managers (GLE, 2011a). Results of the ALARA review are reported to 

senior management, along with recommendations for changes in facilities or procedures that 

are necessary to achieve ALARA goals (GLE, 2011a). Reports are retained for at least three 

years (GLE, 2011a). As described in Section 4.3.2 of this SER, the ALARA program will be 

implemented in accordance with 10 CFR 20.1101 through approved written procedures and 

policies (GLE, 2011a). The approach described above meets the acceptance criteria found in 

9.4.3.2.1(3) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), and is, therefore, acceptable to the staff. 

 

9.3.2.5 Waste Minimization

The requirements in 10 CFR 20.1406 require an applicant for a license to describe how the 

facility design and procedures for operation will minimize, to the extent practicable, 

contamination of the facility and the environment, facilitate decommissioning, and minimize, to 

the extent practicable, the generation of radioactive waste. Acceptance criteria are addressed 

in Section 9.4.3.2.1(4) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The applicant’s program for waste 

minimization will be acceptable if the applicant describes how the facility’s design procedures for 

operation will minimize, to the extent practicable, contamination of the facility and the 

environment, facilitate decommissioning, and minimize, to the extent practicable, the generation 

of radioactive waste. In addition, the program needs to have senior management support; 

provide methods to characterize waste generation and waste management costs; provide for 

periodic waste minimization assessments; provide provisions for technology transfer to seek 

and exchange technical information on waste minimization; and provide methods to implement 

and evaluate waste minimization recommendations.

In Section 4.7.8 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) and in Section 4.13.3 of the ER (GLE, 2008), the 

applicant commits to design and operate its facility to meet waste minimization requirement in 

10 CFR 20.1406. The applicant describes its Waste Minimization Plan (WMP) to: (1) reduce 

the quantity of waste generated by a source; (2) recycle or reprocess the material so that it can 

be reused; (3) treat the waste to remove hazard constituents: or 4) reduce the waste volume. 

The goal of the WMP is to reduce targeted waste activities to the technically feasible and 

economically practicable minimum by implementing projects and work practices identified in the 

plan. In Section 4.13.3 of its ER (GLE, 2008), the applicant states that it would work toward 

achieving its goals by a combination of waste reduction assessments, procedural 

improvements, equipment and manufacturing process improvements, material substitution, and 

employee training, as applicable. The WMP would contain the following elements:

• Policy statement with senior management commitment;

• Plan scope and objectives;

• Waste Minimization Committee;

• Waste stream assessments;
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• Waste minimization project identification and selection;

• Selected waste minimization projects implementation;

• Results measurement and progress evaluation; and

• Periodic plan review procedures.

As described in Section 3.12 of the applicant’s ER (GLE, 2008), minimization practices include 

reclamation, recycle, reuse, compaction, and design features or procedures to avoid or reduce 

the generation of wastes. Examples of current waste minimization efforts at the Wilmington Site 

that the applicant expects to carry over to the proposed facility include: (1) changes in 

manufacturing processes that resulted in the elimination of most of the process wastewater 

streams discharged into the drain system; (2) concentration of aqueous HF and transferred to a

chemical company for industrial and industrial uses; (3) use of treated sanitary wastewater 

effluent as makeup water in cooling towers; and (4) various solid wastes such as packaging 

materials, worn-out equipment, spent process chemicals and used oils are reduced in volume or 

separated for recycling, recoverable materials are salvaged, and other materials, such as 

combustible uranium-contaminated maintenance items (LLRW) are disposed in an onsite

incinerator.

In Section 1.1.4.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant described its solid waste management 

program at the proposed facility for industrial (nonhazardous), radioactive, and hazardous 

wastes. Solid waste will be grouped into one of these waste categories. The applicant may 

send wastes that are candidates for volume reduction, recycling, or treatment to licensed 

treatment facilities that have the ability to reduce the volume of most Class A LLRW. The 

applicant proposes to dispose of all solid radioactive wastes as Class A LLRW. Industrial 

waste, including miscellaneous trash, vehicle air filters, empty cutting oil cans, miscellaneous 

scrap metal, and paper will be shipped offsite for disposal at a permitted waste landfill.

The WMP meets the requirements specified in 10 CFR 20.1406, “Minimization of 

Contamination,” which provides in part that the applicant will provide procedures that will 

minimize the generation of radioactive waste. The WMP also will be consistent with the 

guidance provided in NRC Information Notice 94-23, “Guidance to Hazardous, Radioactive, and 

Mixed-Waste Generators on the Elements of a Waste Minimization Program” (NRC, 1994) and 

in Regulatory Guide 4.21, “Minimization of Contamination and Radioactive Waste Generation: 

Life-Cycle Planning” (NRC, 2008); and meets Section 9.4.3.2.1(4) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002). The applicant’s proposed waste minimization program is, therefore, acceptable to the 

staff. The staff finds that the applicant’s implementation of its program for management of solid 

radiological and non-radiological wastes related to facility operation, including its volume 

reduction and recycling programs, will reduce unnecessary exposures to these wastes and 

assure adequate protection of public health and safety and the environment.

 

9.3.3 EFFLUENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING

The regulations in 10 CFR 20.1302 require a licensee to make or cause to be made, as 

appropriate, surveys of radiation levels in unrestricted and controlled areas and radioactive 

material in effluents released to unrestricted and controlled areas to demonstrate compliance 

with the dose limits for individual members of the public in 10 CFR 20.1301.

Acceptance criteria for effluent monitoring are addressed in Section 9.4.3.2.2(1)(a) through (n) 

of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). An applicant’s effluent monitoring program will be found 
9-12

acceptable if known or expected concentrations of radioactive materials in airborne and liquid 

effluents are ALARA and are below the limits specified in Table 2 of Appendix B to 10 CFR 

Part 20, or site-specific limits are established in accordance with 10 CFR 20.1302(c). In 

addition, if the applicant proposes to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 20.1301 by using 

calculations of the TEDE, the applicant needs to perform pathway analyses using appropriate 

models, codes, and assumptions. The applicant also needs to identify and monitor all liquid and 

airborne effluent discharge locations and continuously sample airborne effluents from all routine 

and non-routine operations, unless periodic sampling or other means has been justified (NRC, 

2002). Sample collection and analysis methods and frequencies need to be appropriate for the 

effluent medium and the radionuclides being sampled. Radionuclide-specific analyses need to 

be performed using appropriate samples using justified methods. In addition, the minimum 

detectable concentration (MDC) for sample analysis needs to be adequate (sufficiently 

sensitive) for comparison to the concentration limits in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, and 

laboratory quality control procedures need to be adequate to validate the analytical results. The 

applicant also needs to establish action levels and proposed action if action levels are 

exceeded. In addition, the applicant needs to completely and accurately describe all applicable 

Federal or State discharge limits for gaseous and liquid effluents applicable to the proposed 

facility. Leakage detection systems also need to be in-place to detect leaks from tanks, ponds, 

or lagoons that could affect ground water, surface water, and soils. The applicant needs to 

control and maintain releases to sewer systems to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 20.2003. 

The applicant also needs to have reporting procedures that comply with 10 CFR 70.59 and the 

guidance in Regulatory Guide 4.16, “Monitoring and Reporting Radioactivity in Releases of 

Radioactive Materials in Liquid and Gaseous Effluents from Nuclear Fuel Processing and 

Fabrication Plants and Uranium Hexafluoride Production Plants” (NRC, 1985). In addition, the 

applicant’s procedures and facilities for solid and liquid waste handling, storage, and monitoring 

need to result in safe storage and timely disposition of the material.

Acceptance criteria for environmental monitoring are found in Section 9.4.3.2.2(2)(a) through (i) 

in NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). An applicant’s environmental monitoring program will be found 

acceptable if it is commensurate with the scope of activities at the facility and the expected 

impacts from operations as identified in the ER. In addition, the program needs to include the 

establishment of background and baseline radionuclide concentrations in environmental media. 

Monitoring needs to include sampling and analyses for air, surface water, ground water, soil, 

sediments, and vegetation, as appropriate, and identify adequate and appropriate sampling 

locations and frequencies for each environmental medium and the analyses to be performed for 

each medium. Monitoring procedures need to employ acceptable analytical methods and 

instrumentation and instrumentation needs to be appropriately maintained and calibrated. If the 

applicant proposes to use its own laboratory for environmental sample analyses, the applicant 

needs to commit to providing third-party verification of its methods such as a round-robin 

measurement program. In addition, the applicant needs to identify appropriate action levels and 

actions to be taken if action levels are exceeded for each environmental medium and 

radionuclide. Action levels should be selected based on pathway analyses that demonstrate 

that below those concentrations, doses meet the ALARA and 10 CFR Part 20, Subpart B limits. 

The applicant also needs to specify MDCs for sample analyses at least as low as those selected 

for effluent monitoring in air and water consistent with the selected action levels. Data analysis 

methods and criteria need to be provided for evaluating and reporting the results of 

environmental sampling and indicate when an action level is being approached in time to take 

corrective actions. The applicant also needs to provide a description of the status of all 

licenses, permits, and other approvals for facility operation that is complete and accurate. In 

addition, the program needs to be adequate to assess environmental impacts from potential 
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radioactive and non-radioactive material releases as identified in high and intermediate 

consequence events in the ISA.

The applicant describes its effluent and environmental monitoring programs for radiological and 

non-radiological effluents released from the proposed facility in Section 9.2.2 of its LA (GLE, 

2011a) and in Chapter 6 of its ER (GLE, 2008). In its introduction to Chapter 6, the applicant 

commits to perform measurements and monitoring necessary to demonstrate that the amount of 

radioactive material present in effluent from the proposed facility will be kept ALARA in 

compliance with 10 CFR Part 20. The applicant also identifies guidance in Regulatory Guide 

4.16 (NRC, 1985) to assure that it will adhere to the ALARA principle such that there will be no

undue risk to the public health or safety at or beyond the Wilmington site boundary. Monitoring 

during decommissioning and closure is discussed briefly in Section 4.12.3 of the ER (GLE, 

2008). 

9.3.3.1 Air Effluent Monitoring

Expected Concentrations

Expected concentrations of radioactive materials in airborne and liquid effluents are addressed 

in Section 9.2.2.1 of the applicant’s LA (GLE, 2011a) and in Section 4.12.2.2.2 of its ER (GLE, 

2008), in which concentrations were estimated using conservative assumptions. As described 

in Section 9.3.2.1 of this SER, the staff finds that the expected concentrations of radioactive 

materials in airborne effluents would be well below the regulatory limits specified in 10 CFR 

20.1302(c). The applicant demonstrated compliance with air effluent limits by calculation of the 

TEDE to the individual who is likely to receive the highest dose in accordance with 10 CFR 

20.1302(b)(1). 

The staff finds that the applicant’s control of these concentrations is ALARA and below limits 

specified in 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table 2, meets the acceptance criteria found in Section 

9.4.3.2.2(1)(a) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), and is, therefore, acceptable to the staff. 

TEDE

The applicant established constraints on atmospheric releases for the proposed facility such 

that no member of the public is expected to receive a TEDE in excess of 0.1 mSv/yr (10 

mem/yr) from these releases. Written procedures approved by applicant management dictate 

atmospheric releases to be monitored and measured. In Section 4.12.2.2.2.2 of the ER (GLE, 

2008), the applicant provides a detailed description of the calculation of the TEDE to the 

individual who is likely to receive the highest dose, which includes a pathway analysis and an 

analysis of the dose contribution from the existing GNF-A fuel fabrication facility, using GENII 

(version 2.06), which implements dosimetry models recommended by the International 

Commission on Radiological Protection. In Tables 4.12-1 and 4.12-2 of its ER (GLE, 2008), the 

applicant provides calculated dose equivalents for the MEI and nearest resident to the proposed 

facility, which dose equivalents are well below (by orders of magnitude) the regulatory limit in 10 

CFR 20 and well within the EPA regulatory standard n 40 CFR 190. The staff finds that the 

applicant’s approach is in accordance with requirements in 10 CFR 20.1302(b)(1), meets the 

acceptance criteria found in Section 9.4.3.2.2(1)(b) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), and is, 

therefore, acceptable to the staff. 
9-14

Locations, Continuous Sampling, and Analysis Methods of Airborne Effluents

The applicant’s air effluent monitoring program is described in Sections 9.2.2.1 and 1.1.6.2 of 

the LA (GLE, 2011a), and in Section 6.1.2 of the ER (GLE, 2008). The source of air emissions 

from the proposed facility is the Operations Building stack, which is identified in Section 9, 

Figure 9-1, of the applicant’s LA (GLE, 2011a). The air monitoring locations are identified in 

Chapter 6, Figure 6-1, of the applicant’s ER (GLE, 2008). 

As noted above in Section 9.3.2.2 of this SER, the ventilation system air stream will pass 

through a series of HEPA and HEGA filters before being vented to the atmosphere through the 

Operations Building stack and being monitored for uranium and hydrogen fluoride (HF). Initially, 

the stack will be sampled continuously to measure radioactivity of the exhausted air, and the

collection filter in the sample system will be analyzed daily for gross alpha activity. Sampling 

frequency will depend upon the results, and will decrease to weekly if the results are 

continuously low during normal operations. Radionuclide analyses are performed more 

frequently whenever there is a significant non-routine, unexplained increase in gross 

radioactivity in effluents (gaseous or liquid) or whenever a process change or other 

circumstance change may cause a significant variation in the radionuclide composition. 

As indicated in Section 6.1.2 of the applicant’s ER (GLE, 2008), in addition to stack monitoring, 

ambient air is also monitored for activities from UF6 cylinder pads. Active air monitors are used 

for analysis of gross alpha activity and concentrations of uranium isotopes. These monitors are 

placed around the restricted area fence line of the site of the proposed facility and are based on 

predominant wind directions. These monitors are placed in various locations near the UF6 

cylinder pads to measure levels of radioactive material from storage pads and the stack; one is 

placed at the site boundary near the point of highest potential impact from the Operations 

Building stack. The sampling program includes analysis of a weekly composite sample for 

gross alpha activity and concentrations of uranium isotopes. 

Trends in gaseous emissions and liquid effluent monitoring data are to be reviewed annually by 

the applicant to evaluate whether changes are needed in systems or practices to achieve 

ALARA effluent goals. The Expanded Monitoring Program would be revised as appropriate to 

maintain the Program’s effectiveness as changes are noted, such as those related to operations 

or other factors identified in Chapter 6 of the ER (GLE, 2008).

In Section 6.2 of its ER (GLE, 2008), the applicant states that HF would be collected 

continuously on particulate filters in vent stacks and analyzed weekly. Also, as noted in Section 

6.1.2 of its ER (GLE, 2008) and in Section 9.2.2.1.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), uranium isotopes 

would also be collected continuously on particulate filters in air samplers located around the 

proposed facility and initially would be analyzed daily. However, the applicant expects the 

periodicity for uranium sampling to decrease to weekly if results are continually low during 

normal operations (GLE, 2008). 

The staff finds that the applicant has identified and will monitor all airborne effluent discharge 

locations to determine contributions to dose limits in accordance with requirements in 

10 CFR Part 20, and that the applicant’s effluent monitoring meets the acceptance criteria found 

in Section 9.4.3.2.2(1)(c) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), which is applicable to both airborne and 

liquid effluents. The staff also finds that the applicant will monitor continuously samples of 

airborne effluents from all routine and non-routine operations in a manner that meets the 

acceptance criteria found in Section 9.4.3.2.2(1)(d) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), and will
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assure that the air sample collection and analysis methods and frequencies described in the 

applicant’s radiological monitoring program are appropriate to meet the acceptance criteria 

found in Section 9.4.3.2.2(1)(e) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), which is applicable to both 

airborne and liquid effluent discharges. Therefore, the staff finds the applicant’s airborne 

effluent monitoring and analysis program to be acceptable.

Radionuclide-Specific Analyses

Radionuclide-specific analyses will be performed on selected composite samples. Sample 

locations, types and other information are provided in Table 9-1 of the applicant’s LA (GLE, 

2011a). Monitoring reports in which the quantities of individual radionuclides are estimated on 

the basis of methods other than direct measurement would include an explanation and 

justification of how the results were obtained. In Section 9.2.2.1.13 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the 

applicant states that it will submit to the NRC a single semiannual report for the Wilmington Site 

that would include the proposed facility would be submitted to the NRC. The report would 

include the concentrations of principal radionuclides released in the unrestricted area as well as 

other information necessary to evaluate the radiation doses from effluent releases to the public 

in liquid and gaseous effluents. The report also would include the MDC for analysis and the 

error for each data point. 

The staff finds that the applicant’s proposed radionuclide-specific analyses and reporting will 

comply with the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 70.59 and the guidance specified in NRC 

Regulatory Guide 4.16 (NRC, 1985), meets the acceptance criteria found in Section 

9.4.3.2.2(1)(f) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), and is, therefore, acceptable to the staff.

Minimum Detectable Concentrations

MDCs for effluent and environmental samples are listed in Table 9.2 of the applicant’s LA (GLE, 

2011a) and in Table 6.2 of the applicant’s ER (GLE, 2008). The listed MDCs are consistent with 

the analytical methods employed as established in the existing Wilmington Site Monitoring 

Program. The staff finds that the MDCs for various listed media would be sufficiently low to 

meet action level, regulatory, and permit requirements, as well as the requirements of 

environmental media monitoring programs, is consistent with acceptance criteria found in 

Section 9.4.3.2.2(1)(g) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), and is, therefore, acceptable to the staff. 

Laboratory Quality Control

Laboratory quality control (QC) is addressed in Section 9.2.2.1.8 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) and in 

Chapter 6 of its ER (GLE, 2008). Laboratory procedures include the use of established 

standards such as those used by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), as 

well as standard analytical procedures such as those established by the National Environmental 

Laboratory Accreditation Conference (NELAC). 

The applicant’s Extended Monitoring Program would fall under the oversight of the QA Program 

and would be subject to periodic audits performed by QA personnel. Written procedures would 

be used to ensure that sampling and monitoring equipment is properly maintained, calibrated, 

and is in good working condition. Samples would be analyzed onsite for facility-related 

radiological constituents and may be shipped to a qualified independent laboratory for analyses. 

Laboratories would participate in third-party comparison studies to validate their performance. 

All radiological and non-radiological laboratory vendors will be certified by the National 
9-16

Environmental Laboratory Accreditation Program (NELAP) or an equivalent state laboratory 

accreditation agency. 

The staff finds that the laboratory QC procedures are adequate to validate the analytical results 

produced by the Environmental Monitoring Program to assure compliance with the monitoring 

requirements in 10 CFR Part 20, meet the acceptance criteria in Section 9.4.3.2.2(1)(h) of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), and are, therefore, acceptable to the staff.

Action Levels

The action level for environmental measurements is the concentration (or mass) of an analyte 

that indicates that some action needs to be taken, such as initiating an investigation or, if the 

level is sufficiently high, shutting down operations. Action levels established below compliance 

levels will be specified in approved written procedures according to the type of sample and the 

specific analysis. A program of corrective actions will be implemented to ensure that the cause 

for the action level exceedance can be identified and corrected, applicable regulatory agencies 

are notified, if required, lessons learned are communicated to appropriate personnel, and 

applicable operational procedures are revised accordingly, if needed. Action levels provide 

guidance in ensuring that concentrations of radioactivity are within 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, 

limits. 

The applicant’s proposed development of action levels and related actions meets the regulatory 

requirements of 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, meets the acceptance criteria found in Section 

9.4.3.2.2(1)(i) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), and is, therefore, acceptable to the staff.

Federal and State Permits

As described in Section 1.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), in addition to meeting NRC requirements, 

the applicant will also comply with requirements provided in applicable Federal permits as well 

as those specified in the North Carolina Department of Air Quality permit for the monitoring of 

fluorides. For example, the applicant has been issued an air permit from the North Carolina 

Division of Air Quality that contains the regulatory requirements for the emission of fluoride from 

the Operations Building stack. The air permit also contains the requirements for the operation 

of the diesel back-up generators. The staff finds that the applicant adequately describes 

Federal or State standards for discharges as well as any permits issued by Federal, State, or 

local governments for gaseous and liquid effluents as documented in Section 1.4 of the ER 

(GLE, 2008), which meets the acceptance criteria found in Section 9.4.3.2.2(1)(j) of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002), and is, therefore, acceptable to the staff.

Air Effluent Monitoring Summary Evaluation

Based on the staff review of the applicant’s LA (GLE, 2011a) and ER (GLE, 2008) described in 

Section 9.3.3.1 of this SER, above, the staff finds that the air effluent monitoring program during 

operation of the proposed facility will detect and measure concentrations of radioactivity in air 

effluent to demonstrate that air effluent concentrations are below the regulatory limits in 10 CFR 

Part 20, Appendix B, meets the acceptance criteria found in Section 9.4.3.2.2(1) of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002), and is, therefore, acceptable to the staff.
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9.3.3.2 Liquid Effluent Monitoring 

The applicant’s liquid effluent monitoring program is described in Section 9.2.2 of its LA (GLE, 

2011a) and in Sections 3.4.2 and 6.1 of its ER (GLE, 2008). Figure 9-2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), 

which identifies outfalls, effluent channel, and process lagoons, shows the location of the liquid 

effluent discharges. In addition, Table 6-1 of the applicant’s ER (GLE, 2008) identifies media 

(e.g., surface water, groundwater, and treated wastewater), sample locations, and sample type 

for liquid effluent monitoring. The Expanded Monitoring Program will maintain the current 

surface water monitoring activities in the effluent channel and in the Northeast Cape Fear River. 

Figure 6-2 of the ER (GLE, 2008) identifies groundwater monitoring locations for the proposed 

facility. The sources and estimated quantities of wastewater generated by facility operations are 

summarized in Section 1, Tables 1-3 and 1-4, of the applicant’s LA (GLE, 2011a). 

Uranium enrichment operations performed inside the Operations Building generate process 

wastewater from decontamination, cleaning wash water, and laboratory wastes (GLE, 2011a). 

Liquid radioactive wastes would be collected in closed drain systems that discharge to an 

accumulator tank (GLE, 2011a). The liquid would then be treated to remove uranium through 

precipitation (GLE, 2011a). The resulting solids would be dried and disposed of as LLRW (GLE, 

2011a). The liquid also would be treated to remove fluoride through evaporation (GLE, 2011a). 

Treated wastewaters from the Radioactive Liquid Effluent Treatment System (RLETS) would be 

monitored and discharged to the existing Final Process Lagoon Treatment Facility, and then 

discharged via NPDES-permitted Outfall 001 to the Wilmington Site effluent channel (GLE, 

2011a). This treated effluent then would be combined with stormwater, discharging 

groundwater, and treated sanitary effluent (GLE, 2011a). The effluent channel flows to the 

unnamed Tributary No. 1 to the Northeast Cape Fear River (GLE, 2011a). 

Detection of Leaks to Groundwater, Surface Water, or Soil 

The liquid is monitored to ensure compliance with 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, limits and for 

compliance with NPDES permit levels for fluoride and other constituents specified in the permit. 

Thus, as described in Section 9.3.2.3 of this SER, any discharges of liquid effluents to the 

Wilmington Site effluent channel are expected be within regulatory limits of 10 CFR Part 20, 

Appendix B.

As part of the applicant’s Expanded Monitoring Program, leak detection systems will be 

operated and maintained in areas where liquid effluents are processed, which includes leak 

detection on tanks, pipes, sumps, and drains to prevent unplanned releases to groundwater, 

surface water, and soil. As noted above, surface water monitors are currently located in the 

effluent channel and downstream of the Wilmington Site. Thirteen additional monitoring wells 

will be added to the existing groundwater monitoring wells located at different depths across the 

Wilmington site. Finally, soil samples will continue to be taken at various existing locations 

identified in Figure 9-4 of the applicant’s LA (GLE, 2011a). 

The staff finds that the systems for detecting leaks are adequate to assure liquid effluents will be 

in compliance with 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, limits, meet the acceptance criteria found in 

Section 9.4.3.2.2(1)(k) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), and are, therefore, acceptable to the staff.
9-18

Releases to Sewer Systems

As noted by the applicant in Section 9.2.2.1.12 of its LA (GLE, 2011a), there will be no releases 

of liquid effluents to the sewer system. Drains from showers and hand wash stations in 

contaminated area change rooms would be routed to the RLETS and ultimately discharged to 

unnamed Tributary No. 1 to the Northeast Cape Fear River, as discussed above. In Section 

4.12.2.1.2.2 of the ER (GLE, 2008), the applicant indicated that sanitary effluents from the 

proposed facility (e.g., originating from washrooms) would be pumped to the Wilmington Site 

Sanitary Wastewater Treatment Facility for treatment and for industrial reuse as process water. 

Because there will be no radiological liquid effluent releases to the sewer system and no 

radiological releases from the sewer system to the environment, the staff finds that the releases 

to the sewer systems are controlled and maintained to meet the regulatory requirements of 10 

CFR 20.2003, and meet the acceptance criteria found in Section 9.4.3.2.2(1)(l) of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002), and are, therefore, acceptable to the staff.

Reporting Procedures 

In Section 9.2.2.1.13 of its LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant committed to comply with reporting 

procedure requirements of 10 CFR 70.59 and the guidance specified in Regulatory Guide 4.16 

(NRC, 1985). As noted in the discussion of radionuclide-specific analyses in Section 9.3.3.1 of 

this SER, above, it is expected that the applicant will submit to the NRC a single semiannual 

report for the Wilmington Site that would include the proposed facility. The report would include 

the concentrations of principal radionuclides released in the unrestricted area as well as other 

information necessary to evaluate the radiation doses from effluent releases to the public in 

liquid and gaseous effluents. The report also would include the MDC for analysis and the error 

for each data point.

The staff finds that the applicant has committed to reporting procedures that will comply with the 

regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 70.59 and the guidance specified in NRC Regulatory 

Guide 4.16 (NRC, 1985), the procedures meet the acceptance criteria found in Section 

9.4.3.2.2(1)(m) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), and are, therefore, acceptable to the staff.

Liquid and Solid Waste Handling

The applicant addresses liquid and solid waste management in Section 3.12 of its ER (GLE, 

2008) and in Section 9.2.2.1.14 of its LA (GLE, 2011a). As discussed in Sections 9.3.2.3 and 

9.3.2.5 of this SER, above, liquid effluents will be treated to remove uranium through 

precipitation and remove fluoride through evaporation prior to release of liquid effluents to the 

environment. Discharges from the RLETS will be monitored and controlled to ensure that the 

uranium and fluoride concentrations in the effluents are in compliance with concentrations and 

mass limits in the NPDES permit and in 10 CFR 20.1301 and 20.1302. Many liquid and semisolid wastes, such as uranium sludges, at the Wilmington Site will be temporarily stored and 

managed onsite in containers, and shipped to a licensed LLRW disposal facility.

Solid waste management facilities, with sufficient capability to enable preparation, packaging, 

storage, and transfers to licensed disposal sites in accordance with applicable regulations, will 

be provided and maintained in proper operating condition to support the operation of the 

proposed facility. Solid waste will be grouped into industrial (nonhazardous), radioactive, mixed, 

and hazardous wastes. Radioactive and mixed waste will be further segregated according to 
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the quantity of liquid that is not readily separable from the solid material. The applicant may 

send wastes that are candidates for volume reduction, recycling, or treatment to licensed 

treatment facilities that have the ability to reduce the volume of most Class A LLRW and to 

process contaminated oils. The applicant proposes to dispose of all solid radioactive wastes as 

Class A LLRW. Industrial waste, including miscellaneous trash, vehicle air filters, empty cutting 

oil cans, miscellaneous scrap metal, and paper will be shipped offsite for minimization and then 

sent to a permitted waste landfill.

Depleted uranium from the proposed facility operations will be stored temporarily in 48-inch 

cylinders before being shipped offsite to a depleted uranium deconversion facility. The Tails 

Pad is designed to provide storage capacity for approximately 9,000 of the cylinders, which is 

equivalent to about ten years of facility operation. Work practices to manage the Tails Pad 

include periodic inspections and radiological surveys to ensure cylinder integrity. Operators are 

trained in safe cylinder handling and maintenance procedures. There will be no onsite disposal 

of depleted uranium at the Wilmington Site. The applicant indicated that it will use the U.S. 

Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) depleted uranium disposition path under Section 3113 of the 

United States Enrichment Corporation Privatization Act, which directs DOE to accept depleted 

uranium for disposal at the request of an NRC-licensed uranium enrichment facility. 

The staff finds that the applicant’s program for management of liquid and solid wastes will 

reduce unnecessary exposures per 10 CFR Part 20 ALARA requirements, meets the waste 

handling acceptance criteria found in Section 9.4.3.2.2(1)(n) of NUREG-1529 (NRC, 2002), and 

is, therefore, acceptable to the staff.

Liquid Effluent Monitoring Summary Evaluation

Based on the staff review of the applicant’s LA (GLE, 2011a) and ER (GLE, 2008) described in 

Section 9.3.2.2 of this SER, above, the staff finds that the liquid effluent monitoring program 

during operation of the proposed facility will detect and measure concentrations of radioactivity 

in liquid effluent to demonstrate that liquid effluent concentrations will be below the regulatory 

limits in 10 CFR Part 20, meets the acceptance criteria found in Section 9.4.3.2.2(1) of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002), and is, therefore, acceptable to the staff.

9.3.3.3 Environmental Monitoring

Section 9.2.2.2 of the applicant’s LA (GLE, 2011a) and Section 6 of its ER (GLE, 2008) describe 

the applicant’s environmental monitoring program. Table 9-1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) provides a 

summary of the applicant’s environmental monitoring program, including air and water 

monitoring. Table 6.1 of the ER (GLE, 2008) also provides a summary, in which the medium 

(e.g., air, water, soil), sample locations, sample type, parameter (e.g., gross alpha, gamma, 

beta) and frequency, is presented. Environmental monitoring during facility operation is also 

discussed in Section 4.12.2.2 of the ER (GLE, 2008).

Background and Baseline Radionuclide Concentrations

As stated above, the GLE Environmental Monitoring Program was developed using the existing 

Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas (GNF-A) Environmental Monitoring Program, which was 

expanded where needed to include the requirements of the proposed facility. This expanded 

program, which meets the needs of both facilities, is referred to as the Expanded Monitoring 

Program.
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As noted in Section 9.2.2.2.1 of the applicant’s LA (GLE, 2011a), the existing GNF-A 

Environmental Monitoring Program has established historical radiological and non-radiological 

data to provide information about the site environs. In addition, as discussed more fully below, 

soil and groundwater samples were collected from the proposed facility location and air and 

water samples are collected from remote locations and analyzed to determine a baseline to be 

used in evaluating changes in potential environmental conditions that could be caused by the 

proposed facility operation. Section 9.2.2.2 of the applicant’s LA (GLE, 2011a) and Section 6.1 

of the applicant’s ER (GLE, 2008) describe operational radiological monitoring under its 

Expanded Monitoring Program. 

The staff finds that the applicant has established background and baseline concentrations of 

radionuclides in environmental media through sampling and analyses under the Expanded 

Monitoring Program for the proposed facility. These data will be used as part of its radiation 

protection program and trending analyses to ensure that doses to individual members of the 

public will be within the dose limits identified in 10 CFR Part 20, Subpart D, and the provisions 

of the EPA’s generally applicable environmental radiation standards in 40 CFR Part 190. In 

addition, the Expanded Monitoring Program meets the acceptance criteria in Section 

9.4.3.2.2(2)(a) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), and is, therefore, acceptable to the staff.

Sampling and Analyses for Monitoring

Table 9-1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) and Table 6.1 of the ER (GLE, 2008) provide summaries of 

the Expanded Monitoring Program, including the medium sampled, sampling locations, sample 

type (e.g., thermal luminescent dosimeters, grab samples), and analyte/parameter frequency 

(e.g., total uranium sampled quarterly).

As noted in Section 9.3.3.1 of this SER, above, air monitoring would include continuous 

sampling of the stack of the main process building as well as weekly composite samples for 

gross alpha activity and concentrations of uranium isotopes from eleven active air monitors 

placed around the restricted area fenceline as indicated in Figure 9-1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) 

and Figure 6-1 of the applicant’s ER (GLE, 2008). The applicant would conduct periodic 

surveys in and around outdoor storage areas and use dosimeters at the fenceline to ensure 

direct radiation doses are maintained ALARA.

Wastewater effluent and surface water monitoring would include collection of continuous 

proportional samples of treated process wastewater effluent and analysis of a weekly composite 

of the daily samples for gross alpha activity and gross beta activity. Surface water would 

continue to be monitored for gross alpha activity, gross beta activity, and uranium 

concentrations. Stormwater runoff from the UF6 storage area would be routed to a holding pond 

to be analyzed for uranium and gross alpha and beta activity before the stormwater is released 

to the proposed facility stormwater wet detention basin.

The groundwater monitoring program would include continued analysis of existing wells and of 

thirteen additional wells around the proposed facility at varying depths to monitor uranium for

gross alpha and gross beta activity. Initially, sampling would be conducted quarterly and would 

begin prior to commencement of operations to further establish baseline groundwater conditions 

and continue throughout operations and decommissioning. Proposed facility groundwater 

sampling locations are identified in Figure 9-3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) and Figure 6.2 of the ER 

(GLE, 2008). 
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The soil monitoring program would include existing on and offsite soil sample locations as well 

as two additional pairs of locations specific to the proposed facility. These locations are 

identified on Figure 9-4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) and Figure 6-3 of the applicant’s ER (GLE, 

2008). Soil samples would be analyzed for uranium concentrations. Semi-annual sampling 

would begin prior to commencement of operations to establish baseline conditions and would 

continue through decommissioning. Sediment monitoring includes collection of samples in the 

effluent channel downstream from the final process basins to be analyzed for uranium.

As described in Section 6.1.8 of the ER (GLE, 2008), the North Carolina Division of Radiation 

Protection currently conducts an area surveillance program that would be expanded to include 

the proposed facility. The program includes sampling and analysis of vegetation, sediment, soil, 

surface water, and groundwater. The program also has low-volume air samplers that operate 

continuously.

The staff finds that the applicant’s monitoring includes sampling and analyses for monitoring air, 

surface water, groundwater, soil, sediments, and vegetation meets the acceptance criteria in 

Section 9.4.3.2.2(2)(b) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), and is, therefore, acceptable to the staff. 

The staff also finds that the applicant’s description in Section 9.2.2 (GLE, 2011a), together with 

Table 9-1, of its LA (GLE, 2011a), adequately identifies sample media, locations, types, and 

sampling frequencies is consistent with guidance found in Section 9.4.3.2.2(2)(c) of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002), and is, therefore, acceptable to the staff.

Monitoring Procedures

As noted in the staff’s discussion of laboratory QC in Section 9.3.2.1, above, the applicant will 

use written procedures to ensure that sampling and monitoring equipment would be properly 

maintained, calibrated at regular intervals, which would include functional testing and routine 

checks, and in good working condition. Samples would be analyzed onsite for facility-related 

radiological constituents and may be shipped to a qualified independent laboratory for analyses. 

Laboratories would participate in third-party comparison studies to validate their performance. 

Sections 11.7 and 11.8 of the applicant’s LA (GLE, 2011a) also address, in part, aspects of the 

QA Program related to maintaining monitoring-related records, as well as developing and 

implementing monitoring-related procedures. 

The staff finds that the applicant’s monitoring procedures would employ acceptable analytical 

methods, instrumentation, laboratory validation methods, and laboratory procedures that are 

adequate to validate analytical results and meet the acceptance criteria in Section 

9.4.3.2.2(2)(d) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002).

Action Levels

An action level is the concentration (or mass) of an analyte that indicates that some action 

needs to be taken, such as an investigation or if the level is high enough, shutting down 

operations. Action levels are specified in procedures according to the type of samples and the 

specific analysis. Action levels for monitored environmental parameters will be included in 

documented procedures as appropriate to provide guidance to assure compliance within 

appropriate regulatory limits specified in 10 CFR Part 20, Subpart B. The action levels will be 

consulted on an ongoing basis to initiate internal review and adjustments of operations and 

other procedures. Response actions for elevated measurements would be set in documented 
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procedures at increasing levels of priority, ranging from (1) increasing monitoring frequency, (2) 

to adjusting operations, and (3) performing corrective actions to prevent exceedances of 

regulatory compliance levels.

The staff finds that the applicant’s use of parameter action levels will ensure that concentrations 

of radioactivity will be below the regulatory limits in 10 CFR Part 20, meets the acceptance 

criteria in Section 9.4.3.2.2(2)(e) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), and is, therefore, acceptable to 

the staff.

Minimum Detectable Concentrations

MDCs for both effluent and environmental samples are listed in Table 9-2 of the LA 

(GLE, 2011a), and identify the medium (e.g., surface water), activity (e.g., gross alpha, gross 

beta, total uranium), and typical MDCs (e.g., pCi/L, ppm). The MDCs are typical for the 

analytical methods employed as previously established for the existing Wilmington Site 

Monitoring Program.

The staff finds that the MDCs would be sufficient to meet action level, regulatory, and permit 

requirements, as well as the requirements of environmental media monitoring programs, meet

the acceptance criteria in Section 9.4.3.2.2(2)(f) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), and are, 

therefore, acceptable to the staff. 

Data Analysis 

Field and laboratory analytical procedures address the collection of representative samples, use 

of appropriate sampling methods and equipment, proper location of sampling points, and proper 

handling and analysis or samples.

The staff finds that data analysis methods and criteria to be used in evaluating and reporting 

environmental sampling results would indicate when an action level is being approached in time 

to take corrective actions to assure concentrations will be within regulatory limits in 10 CFR 

Part 20, Appendix B, meets the acceptance criteria in Section 9.4.3.2.2(2)(g) of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002), and is, therefore, acceptable to the staff. 

Federal, State, and Local Requirements

Section 1.4 of the applicant’s ER (GLE, 2008) contains a complete description of required 

licenses, permits, and other approvals that are required by the Federal government, as well as 

agencies of the State of North Carolina and New Hanover County, and Table 1-6 also provides 

the status of each of these requirements. The applicant commits to follow applicable 

requirements for effluent monitoring activities described in Section 9.2.2.1 of the LA (GLE, 

2011a).

Based on the information in Table 1-6 of the ER (GLE, 2008), the staff finds that the information 

provided satisfies the acceptance criteria in Section 9.4.3.2.2(2)(h) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002), and is, therefore, acceptable to the staff.
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Measurement of Accidental Radioactive and Non-Radioactive Releases to the Environment

In Section 3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant describes its ISA, which evaluates potential 

risks and radiological and non-radiological (e.g., chemical) hazards from postulated unmitigated 

accident scenarios that could result in injuries to workers and the public or in significant 

environmental impacts. Assessments of these accidents are documented in the applicant’s ISA 

Summary (GLE, 2011b). The ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) also identifies engineered or 

administrative IROFS that would prevent or mitigate the likelihood and consequences of those 

accident scenarios to acceptable levels. In Section 3.2.5.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the 

applicant identifies two hazards of concern for the proposed facility. The first is related to a 

release of UF6, which, when exposed to moisture in the air, would form HF as a byproduct that 

is highly toxic and that could be transported beyond the site boundary. The second hazard is 

the occurrence of a criticality event that would result in the release of radiation and airborne 

fission products that, in turn, could result in direct radiation exposure and chemical/radiological 

inhalation exposure to workers and the public. Table 3-2 of the applicant’s LA (GLE, 2011a) 

identifies, among other things, consequence descriptions to the offsite public and the 

environment for high and intermediate severity accidents. Table 3-3 identifies EPA Acute 

Exposure Guideline Levels for UF6, HF, and soluble uranium. The applicant also addresses 

radiological and non-radiological accident analyses, including mitigation measures to attenuate 

releases to the environment, in Sections 4.12.2.1.2.3 and 4.12.2.2.2.3 of its ER (GLE, 2008). 

As noted above, the staff’s evaluation of these two hazards is found in Chapter 3 of this SER. 

As noted above in Sections 9.3.3.1, 9.3.3.2, and 9.3.3.3 of this SER, the Expanded Monitoring 

Program provides for effluent and environmental monitoring of airborne and liquid releases of 

uranium, UF6, and HF. For example, air emissions from the Operations Building stack are 

monitored continuously for uranium and HF. In addition ambient air is monitored for activities 

from the UF6 cylinder pads. Active air monitors (dosimeters) are also placed around the 

restricted area fenceline for analysis of gross alpha activity and concentrations of uranium 

isotopes.

The staff finds that the applicant’s environmental monitoring is adequate to assess impacts to 

the environment from potential radioactive and nonradioactive releases, as identified in high and 

intermediate consequence accident sequences identified in the ISA, adequately addresses 

related performance requirements in 10 CFR 70.61 for individuals located outside the controlled 

area, and meets the acceptance criteria in Section 9.4.3.2.2(2)(i) of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), 

and is, therefore, acceptable to the staff.

9.3.4 ISA SUMMARY

In Chapter 3 of this SER, the staff provides its evaluation of the ISA Summary, and documents 

its conclusion that the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) is complete, provides reasonable estimates 

of the likelihood and consequences of each accident sequence, and provides sufficient 

information to determine whether adequate engineering or administrative controls are identified 

for each accident sequence. Chapter 11 of this SER contains the staff’s evaluation of 

management measures used to ensure that IROFS will satisfactorily perform their intended 

safety functions. The staff verified that environmental release limits would be met using existing 

IROFS. Therefore, no additional IROFS are identified for the proposed facility for reducing the 

environmental risks of natural phenomena and potential accidents.
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Under 10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H (paragraphs 70.60 through 70.76), an applicant is to assure, 

among other things, compliance with various performance requirements. The regulations in 10 

CFR 70.61(c)(3) identify the environmental performance requirement that the applicant apply 

controls such that a credible intermediate consequence event is unlikely to occur or that the 

consequence of such an event will not exceed a 24-hour averaged release of radioactive 

material outside the restricted area in concentrations 5000 times the values in Table 2 of 

Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 20. 

In its ISA Summary (GLE, 2008c), the applicant identified various sequences for radiological 

and non-radiological accidents which were evaluated to assure adequate protection of worker 

health and safety. By assuring that all credible high-consequence events are rendered highly 

unlikely and that all intermediate-consequence events are unlikely, the applicant also assured 

that the environmental performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61(c)(3) will be met. The staff 

determined that environmental consequences could occur only if uncontrolled, intermediate or 

high consequences to workers were also present. The staff did not identify any accident 

sequence that would fail to meet the environmental performance requirements of 10 

CFR 70.61(c)(3). 

The applicant’s approach to risk reduction is to be accomplished through a combination of 

preventive and mitigative measures, with an emphasis on preventive measures. A more 

complete discussion is found in Chapter 3 of the SER, which addresses accident sequences for 

high and intermediate consequence events. It also addresses preventive and mitigative 

measures.

The staff finds that the applicant’s ISA Summary complies with 10 CFR Part 70, meets the 

acceptance criteria in section 9.4.3.2.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), and is, therefore, 

acceptable to the staff.

9.4 EVALUATION FINDINGS 

The applicant has developed a program to implement adequate environmental protection 

measures during operation. These measures include: (1) environmental and effluent 

monitoring and (2) effluent controls to maintain public doses ALARA as part of the radiation 

protection program. The NRC staff concludes that the applicant’s program, as described in its 

application, is adequate to protect the environment and the health and safety of the public, and 

complies with regulatory requirements imposed by the Commission in 10 CFR Parts 20, 30, 40, 

51, and 70.

The NRC staff will issue a Final EIS as part of this licensing action, as required by 10 CFR 

51.20. The Final EIS will consider the environmental impacts of the proposed construction, 

operation, and decommissioning of the proposed facility and compare alternatives to inform the 

NRC staff recommendation concerning the license application for the proposed facility.

9.5 REFERENCES

(GLE, 2008) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “Environmental Report 

for the GLE Commercial Facility,” 2008.
9-25

(GLE, 2011a) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “GE-Hitachi Global 

Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility License Application,” Revision 6, 2011.

(GLE, 2011b) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “Integrated Safety 

Analysis Summary for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility,” 

Revision 4. 2011.

(NRC, 1985) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 4.16, "Monitoring 

and Reporting Radioactivity in Releases of Radioactive Materials in Liquid and Gaseous 

Effluents from Nuclear Fuel Processing and Fabrication Plants and Uranium Hexafluoride 

Production Plants," Revision 1, 1985.

(NRC, 1993) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 8.37, “ALARA 

Levels for Effluents From Materials Facilities," 1993.

(NRC, 1994) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Information Notice 94-23, 

"Guidance to Hazardous, Radioactive, and Mixed-Waste Generators on the Elements of a 

Waste Minimization Program," 1994.

(NRC, 1996) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 4.20, “Constraint 

on Releases of Airborne Radioactive Material to the Environment for Licensees Other Than 

Power Reactors,” 1996.

(NRC, 2002) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG-1520, "Standard Review 

Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility." 2002.

(NRC, 2008) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 4.21,

“Minimization of Contamination and Radioactive Waste Generation: Life-Cycle Planning.” 

2008.

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10.0 DECOMMISSIONING

The purpose of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) review of General ElectricHitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC’s (GLE’s) decommissioning approach is to evaluate 

whether the application provides for decommissioning the facility safely and in accordance with 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements.

At the time of the initial license application (LA) for a uranium enrichment facility, the applicant is 

required to submit a decommissioning funding plan (DFP). The purpose of NRC’s review of the 

DFP is to determine whether the applicant has considered decommissioning activities that may 

be needed in the future, has performed a credible site-specific cost estimate for those activities, 

and has presented NRC with financial assurance to cover the cost of those activities in the 

future. The DFP, therefore, should contain an overview of the applicant’s proposed 

decommissioning activities, the methods used to determine the cost estimate, and the financial 

assurance mechanism. This overview should contain sufficient detail to enable the reviewer to 

determine whether the decommissioning cost estimate is reasonably accurate. In its LA, the 

applicant submitted both public and non-public, proprietary versions of its DFP (GLE, 2010a).

10.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS

The following NRC regulations require planning, financial assurance, and recordkeeping for 

decommissioning, as well as procedures and activities to minimize waste and contamination:

• 10 CFR 20.1401-1406 “Radiological Criteria for License Termination”

• 10 CFR 30.35 “Financial Assurance and Recordkeeping for 

Decommissioning”

• 10 CFR 30.36 “Expiration and Termination of Licenses and 

Decommissioning of Sites and Separate Buildings or 

Outdoor Areas”

• 10 CFR 40.14 “Specific Exemptions”

• 10 CFR 40.36 “Financial Assurance and Recordkeeping for 

Decommissioning”

• 10 CFR 40.42 “Expiration and Termination of Licenses and 

Decommissioning of Sites and Separate Buildings or 

Outdoor Areas”

• 10 CFR 70.17 “Specific Exemptions”

• 10 CFR 70.22(a)(9) “Contents of Application” (Proposed Decommissioning 

Funding Plan)

• 10 CFR 70.25 “Financial Assurance and Recordkeeping for 

Decommissioning”

• 10 CFR 70.38 “Expiration and Termination of Licenses and 

Decommissioning of Sites and Separate Buildings or 

Outdoor Areas”
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10.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

The guidance applicable to NRC’s review of the decommissioning section of the LA (GLE, 2011) 

is contained in Chapter 10 of “Standard Review Plan for the Review of a License Application for 

a Fuel Cycle Facility,” NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and in Volume 3 of “Consolidated NMSS 

Decommissioning Guidance,” NUREG-1757 (NRC, 2006). Chapter 10 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002a) is applicable to the proposed facility, except that the review used NUREG-1757 (NRC, 

2006), which is the updated version of NUREG-1727, “NMSS Decommissioning Standard 

Review Plan” (NRC, 2000a), referenced in NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance 

criteria applicable to this review are contained in Section 10.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a).

NUREG-1757 (NRC, 2006), Volumes 1 and 2, provides guidance for developing final 

decommissioning plans required under 10 CFR 30.36(g), 10 CFR 40.42(g), and 10 CFR 

70.38(g). A final decommissioning plan will be provided at the time of decommissioning. At the 

time of initial licensing and for license renewals, Section 10.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) 

describes an overview of the proposed decommissioning activities needed to develop the DFP. 

This overview is a more generalized discussion of the detailed information that would be needed 

for the final decommissioning plan described in NUREG-1757 (NRC, 2006), Volumes 1 and 2. 

Section 10.5.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) indicates that the decommissioning safety review

should ensure that the proposed decommissioning approach, principal remediation activities, 

and worker and environmental radiation protection programs are acceptable. 

In the Commission’s January 7, 2010, Order initiating the GLE license proceeding (NRC, 2010), 

the Commission provided criteria for addressing the treatment of depleted uranium produced 

from the proposed facility. In the Order, the Commission stated that unless GLE demonstrates 

a use for uranium in the depleted tails, the depleted tails will be considered waste. The 

Commission previously concluded that depleted uranium from an enrichment facility is 

appropriately classified as low-level radioactive waste. See Louisiana Energy Services 

(National Enrichment Facility) CLI-05-05, 61 NRC 22, 36 (NRC, 2005). An approach for 

disposition of tails that is consistent with the USEC Privatization Act, such as transfer to the U.S. 

Department of Energy (DOE) for disposal, constitutes a “plausible strategy” for disposition for 

GLE depleted tails. Consequently, depleted uranium generated in the operation of the 

proposed facility is considered as a potential decommissioning obligation in the DFP.

10.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

NRC’s staff review of the DFP (GLE, 2010a) focused on the applicant’s conceptual 

decommissioning activities for the proposed facility, the decommissioning cost estimates, and 

the financial assurance for decommissioning activities. In Chapter 10 of the LA (GLE, 2011), 

the applicant identified the decommissioning activities that may be needed in the future for 

decommissioning and presented site-specific estimates of decommissioning costs for those 

activities. The applicant submitted to the NRC public and non-public, proprietary versions of the 

DFP (GLE, 2010a). The non-public version provides a proprietary estimate of the cost to 

decommission the facility and dispose of the depleted tails. The DFP (GLE, 2010a) also 

contains a draft financial assurance instrument that will be used to cover the decommissioning 

cost estimate.

The following subsections describe the applicant’s proposed decommissioning program, and 

NRC staff’s assessment of the applicant’s proposed decommissioning plan, cost estimate, and 

funding plan. Before license termination, the applicant will provide a detailed decommissioning 
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plan that will include specific activities which will be used to protect workers, the public, and the 

environment.

10.3.1 CONCEPTUAL DECONTAMINATION AND DECOMMISSIONING PLAN

10.3.1.1 Decommissioning Strategy

Section 10.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) states that the DFP needs to contain an overview 

of the proposed decommissioning activities. This section of this Safety Evaluation Report (SER) 

describes the staff’s review of the overview of the decommissioning activities used to develop 

the site-specific cost estimate in the DFP. A detailed decommissioning plan will be provided at 

the time of decommissioning in accordance with 10 CFR 30.36(g), 10 CFR 40.42(g), and 10 

CFR 70.38(g).

In Section 10.1.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011), the applicant stated that it would decommission the 

proposed facility after facility shutdown to reduce the level of radioactivity remaining in the 

facility to residual levels acceptable for release of the facility for unrestricted use and for NRC 

license termination pursuant to 10 CFR 20.1401 and 10 CFR 20.1402. Prior to 

decommissioning, an assessment of the radiological status of the proposed facility will be made. 

Decommissioning and closure activities will include the cleaning and removal of radioactive and 

hazardous waste contamination that may be present on materials, equipment, and structures.

In Section 10.1.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011), the applicant stated that decommissioning of the 

proposed facility will require longer than 24 months. The regulations in 10 CFR 30.36(h)(1), 

40.42(h)(1), and 70.38(h)(1) state that licensees shall complete decommissioning of the site or 

separate building or outdoor area as soon as practicable but no later than 24 months following 

the initiation of decommissioning, except as provided in paragraphs 30.36(i), 40.42(i), and 

70.38(i). The regulations in 10 CFR 30.36(i), 40.42(i), and 70.38(i) state that the Commission 

may approve a request for an alternate schedule for completion of decommissioning of the site 

or separate building or outdoor area, and license termination if appropriate, if the Commission 

determines that the alternative is warranted by consideration of five factors, including whether it 

is technically feasible to complete decommissioning within the allotted 24-month period. 

Therefore, the applicant requested an alternate schedule in accordance with 10 CFR 30.36(i), 

40.42(i), and 70.38(i). The reason for the project taking longer than 24 months is due to the 

complexity and scope of the project. Therefore, it is not technically feasible to complete 

decommissioning within the allotted 24-month period. Overall, decommissioning is estimated to 

require approximately 3.5 years from facility shutdown to completion of the final status survey of 

radiological conditions. The decommissioning schedule is presented in Figure 10-1 of the LA 

(GLE, 2011).

Section 2.6 of NUREG-1757 (NRC, 2006), Volume 3, provides review criteria related to 

decommissioning timeliness. As described above, the applicant plans to initiate 

decommissioning at the time of facility shutdown, but requested an extension of the 24-month 

decommissioning schedule because of the technical complexity of decommissioning the 

proposed facility. The applicant proposed a 3.5-year decommissioning schedule. The NRC 

staff reviewed the applicant’s justification for requesting an alternate schedule for 

decommissioning and agree that decommissioning of the facility is technically complex. NRC 

staff considers that the size of the facility and the complexities of dispositioning classified 

equipment justify an extended decommissioning schedule. In addition, the facility has a 

radiation protection program in place described in Chapter 4 of the LA (GLE, 2011) that will 

ensure that an adequate health and safety program is conducted to protect workers and the 
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public. Therefore, a longer period of time to decommission the facility is reasonable and will not 

endanger health and safety. Based on the considerations in 10 CFR 30.36(i), 40.42(i), and 

70.38(i), the staff finds that the applicant’s proposed alternative 3.5-year schedule is acceptable.

In Sections 10.1.1.1 and 10.1.1.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011), the applicant describes in accordance 

with 10 CFR 20.1406 that the proposed facility will be designed and operated in such a way to 

minimize contamination, facilitate eventual decommissioning, and minimize, to the extent

practicable, the generation of radioactive waste. As a result, worker exposure to radiation and

radioactive waste volumes during operations and decommissioning are maintained as low as

reasonably achievable (ALARA).

Section 10.5.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) indicates that the decommissioning safety review 

should ensure that the proposed decommissioning approach, principal remediation activities, 

and worker and environmental radiation protection programs are acceptable. Section 4 of 

NUREG-1757 (NRC, 2006), Volume 3, indicates that a DFP outlines the scope of work needed 

to decommission the facility. As described above, the applicant is proposing to decommission 

the facility to the unrestricted release standard in 10 CFR 20.1402. The NRC staff reviewed the 

applicant’s proposed decommissioning strategy and determined that it contains adequate 

commitments to meet the radiological criteria for unrestricted use contained in 10 CFR 20.1402, 

and to be timely, in accordance with the alternative schedule approved in accordance with 10 

CFR 30.36(i), 40.42(i), and 70.38(i). The applicant’s commitments also meet the evaluation 

criteria in Section 10.5.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and Section 4 of NUREG-1757 (NRC, 

2006), Volume 3, and are, therefore, acceptable, because the applicant proposed an acceptable 

decommissioning strategy and scope of work for decommissioning the facility. 

10.3.1.2 Decommissioning Steps

In Section 10.1.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011), the applicant describes the decommissioning methods 

to be employed at the proposed facility, and Section 10.1.8 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) addresses 

the decontamination process. NRC’s review of the applicant’s decontamination process is 

explained in Section 10.3.1.8 of this SER.

Decommissioning activities will generally include: (1) shutdown and purging/draining of process 

systems; (2) dismantling and removal of equipment; (3) decontamination and destruction of 

classified material in accordance with 10 CFR Part 95; (4) sales of salvaged materials (sale of

salvaged materials is not included in the decommissioning cost estimate); (5) waste disposal; 

and (6) completion of a final radiation survey.

Installation of new facilities will not be required for decontamination of facility components and 

structures. The applicant will use existing facilities in the Decontamination/Maintenance Area in 

the Operations Building for these activities. This area is capable of accommodating the 

cleaning of equipment and maintenance/cleaning of large components.

In Section 10.1.2.7 of the LA (GLE, 2011), the applicant stated that a final radiation survey must 

be performed to verify proper decontamination to allow the site to be released for unrestricted 

use. The evaluation of the final radiation survey is based in part on an initial radiation survey 

performed prior to initial operation. The applicant will perform an initial survey to determine the 

natural background radiation of the area prior to site preparation and construction. These 

measurements will be used to determine any increase in levels of radioactivity during facility 

operations. The applicant will follow the guidance in the following documents to perform the 

initial survey:
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• NUREG-1505, “A Nonparametric Statistical Methodology for the Design and Analysis of 

Final Status Decommissioning Surveys,” Section 2.2.5 (NRC, 1998);

• NUREG-1575, “Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual,” Section 

4.5 (NRC, 2000b); and

• NUREG-1757, “Consolidated Decommissioning Guidance,” Volume 2, “Characterization,

Survey, and Determination of Radiological Criteria” (NRC, 2006).

The final survey will be a systematic measurement of radioactivity over the entire site. The 

number of survey points will vary depending on the location and levels of radioactivity. The 

survey will be conducted in accordance with current NRC guidance. The results will be 

evaluated to demonstrate that the site can be released for unrestricted use. If data show that 

radioactivity is above allowable residual radioactivity limits, further decontamination will be 

performed.

Section 10.5.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) indicates that the decommissioning safety review 

should ensure that the proposed decommissioning approach, principal remediation activities, 

and worker and environmental radiation protection programs are acceptable. The evaluation 

criteria in Section 4.1 of NUREG-1757 (NRC, 2006), Volume 3, indicate that the 

decommissioning planning information used in the decommissioning cost estimate should be 

sufficient to allow NRC staff to determine if the applicant’s cost estimate is adequate. NRC staff 

reviewed the applicant’s proposed decommissioning steps and determined that it has the 

essential steps needed to decommission the facility to meet the restricted release criteria in 10 

CFR 20.1402. In addition, the proposed decommissioning steps provide reasonable assurance 

that the decommissioning process can be performed in a manner that will minimize the 

generation of radioactive and hazardous wastes and protect the health and safety of workers 

and the public. NRC staff determined that the applicant’s commitment to following the specified 

NRC guidance for conducting initial and final radiation surveys provides reasonable assurance 

that the final survey will be adequate to demonstrate that the site can be released for 

unrestricted use in accordance with 10 CFR 20.1402 and the evaluation criteria in Section 

10.5.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and Section 4.1 of NUREG-1757 (NRC, 2006), Volume 3. 

The proposed decommissioning steps are, therefore, acceptable.

10.3.1.3 Management and Organization

In Section 10.1.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011), the applicant stated that an appropriate organization 

structure will be used for the decommissioning operations. The organizational structure will 

ensure that appropriate resources are available to perform the technical and administrative 

tasks required for decommissioning, including experienced and knowledgeable staff. The 

organizational structure and decommissioning capabilities would be presented in the 

decommissioning plan submitted at the time of decommissioning.

The applicant will conduct proper training and prepare applicable procedures to ensure worker 

health and safety. The decommissioning program will emphasize the minimization of wastes 

and worker exposures to hazardous or radioactive materials. Qualified decommissioning 

contractors will meet facility security and training requirements and work under facility 

procedural controls. 
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Section 10.5.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) indicates that the decommissioning safety review 

should ensure that the proposed decommissioning approach, principal remediation activities, 

and worker and environmental radiation protection programs are acceptable. NRC staff has 

determined that the applicant’s commitment to develop a management organization to support 

the decommissioning program will provide reasonable assurance that the applicant will be able 

to execute the proposed decommissioning strategy described in Sections 10.3.1.1 and 10.3.1.2 

of this SER. This commitment meets the evaluation criteria in Section 10.5.2 of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002a), and is acceptable.

10.3.1.4 Health and Safety

In Section 10.1.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011), the applicant provides commitments to keep individual 

and collective occupational radiation exposures ALARA, and to maintain the radiation protection 

program and the nuclear criticality safety function during decommissioning. The Radiation 

Protection Program, described in Section 4.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011), establishes a program for 

worker protection and for use of survey and monitoring instruments. The ALARA program is 

described in Section 4.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011) and provides a program for meeting facility 

ALARA goals. The Nuclear Criticality Safety function, described in Chapter 5 of the LA (GLE, 

2011), ensures that special nuclear material (SNM) is safely processed, packaged, and stored 

to prevent inadvertent criticalities. The applicant will use the change process identified in 

Section 11.1.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011) for their removal.

Section 10.5.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) indicates that the decommissioning safety review 

should ensure that the proposed decommissioning approach, principal remediation activities 

and worker and environmental radiation protection programs are acceptable. NRC staff has 

determined that the applicant’s commitment to maintain radiation protection, and nuclear 

criticality safety during decommissioning provides reasonable assurance that health and safety 

will be protected during decommissioning in accordance with 10 CFR 20, Subpart C and, 

therefore, the evaluation criteria in Section 10.5.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a), and is 

acceptable.

10.3.1.5 Waste Management

In Sections 9.2.2.1.14 and 10.1.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011), the applicant states that radioactive 

and hazardous wastes generated in the facility decommissioning will be collected, handled, and 

disposed of in accordance with requirements applicable to the proposed facility at the time of 

decommissioning. Waste management procedures are expected to be similar to those for 

wastes produced during facility operations. These wastes will be disposed of in licensed 

radioactive or hazardous waste disposal facilities. Non-hazardous and non-radioactive wastes 

generated during decommissioning will be disposed of consistent with standard industrial 

practice and in accordance with applicable requirements.

Under Section 3113 of the USEC Privatization Act of 1996 (Title 42 U.S.C. 2297h), DOE is 

required to accept depleted uranium tails from NRC-licensed uranium enrichment plants, if the 

depleted uranium tails are low-level radioactive wastes, and if requested by the enrichment 

facility. In addition, the generator of the waste must reimburse DOE for the disposal of the 

depleted uranium in an amount equal to DOE’s costs, including a pro rata share of any capital 

costs. In Section 10.2.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011), the applicant stated that depending on future 

technical advances and the existence of facilities, depleted uranium may be marketable for 

further enrichment or other commercial uses. However, for the purposes of estimating 

dispositioning costs, it is assuming that the total quantity of depleted uranium tails generated at 
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the proposed facility would be dispositioned by DOE under the provisions of the USEC 

Privatization Act. Therefore, the applicant’s proposed approach for dispositioning depleted 

uranium tails would constitute a “plausible strategy” for depleted uranium tails in accordance 

with the Commission Order, dated January 7, 2010 (NRC, 2010). As discussed in Section 

10.3.2.1 of this SER, the applicant provided a cost estimate from DOE for tails disposition.

Section 10.5.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) indicates that the decommissioning safety review 

should ensure that the proposed decommissioning approach, principal remediation activities, 

and worker and environmental radiation protection programs are acceptable. NRC staff has 

reviewed the applicant’s commitments to manage depleted uranium tails and wastes generated 

during decommissioning activities and has determined that they are consistent with the 

applicable NRC regulations in 10 CFR 20, Subpart K, the Commission Order of January 7, 2010 

(NRC, 2010), the evaluation criteria in Section 10.5.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a), and are, 

therefore, acceptable.

10.3.1.6 Security and Nuclear Material Control

In Section 10.1.6 of the LA (GLE, 2011), the applicant states that it will maintain its physical 

security program and nuclear material control and accountability (MC&A) program during 

decommissioning in a manner similar to the programs in force during facility operation. For 

operations, the physical security program is described in the Physical Security Plan (PSP) 

(GLE, 2010b) and the Nuclear Material Transportation Security Plan (NMTSP) (GLE, 2010c). 

The MC&A program is described in the Fundamental Nuclear Material Control Plan (FNMCP) 

(GLE, 2010d). The PSP (GLE, 2010b) is evaluated in Chapter 13 of the SER, the NMTSP 

(GEL, 2010c) is evaluated in Chapter 14 of this SER, and the FNMCP (GLE, 2010d) is 

evaluated in Chapter 12 of this SER. The applicant will propose any changes to these 

programs in the Decommissioning Plan (DP) to be submitted near the end of plant life.

Section 10.5.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) indicates that the decommissioning safety review 

should ensure that the proposed decommissioning approach, principal remediation activities, 

and worker and environmental radiation protection programs are acceptable. NRC staff has 

reviewed the applicant’s commitment to maintain physical security and MC&A requirements 

during decommissioning and determined that they provide reasonable assurance that the 

applicant will meet the regulatory requirements in 10 CFR 70.23(a)(6) and (a)(10) and 10 CFR 

Parts 73 and 74. As described above, these commitments are, therefore, acceptable. 

10.3.1.7 Recordkeeping

In Section 10.1.7 of the LA (GLE, 2011), the applicant states that records important for safe and 

effective decommissioning of the proposed facility will be maintained in accordance with the 

Records Management procedural requirements and the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 

30.35(g), 40.36(f), and 70.25(g). Under this decommissioning recordkeeping program, the 

applicant will maintain records of spills and unusual occurrences involving the spread of 

radioactive contamination; as built drawings, including modification of structures and equipment 

where radioactive contamination could exist; a list contained in a single document updated 

biennially of areas that contain, are designated to contain, or formerly contained radioactive 

materials; and records associated with decommissioning cost estimates.

Records management is further discussed in Section 11.7.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011). 

Decommissioning records are maintained in this program as stated in Section 11.7.3.4 of the LA 

(GLE, 2011). Under the records management program, records are maintained in specific 
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locations designated to contain records, will be legible, maintained in organized files, stored in 

steel cabinets, and controlled by procedure and access requirements. Procedures will be in 

place to avoid loss or tampering of records and to enable record auditing with clearly designated 

management responsibilities. The applicant will use those procedures for reviewing, approving, 

handling, identifying, updating, retention, retrieval, and maintenance of records. 

Section 3.1 of NUREG-1757 (NRC, 2006), Volume 3, provides guidance on implementing the 

decommissioning recordkeeping requirements during licensed operations. As described above, 

the applicant proposed a decommissioning recordkeeping program that requires record storage 

in defined locations, use of records management procedures, verification of legibility, protection 

against loss or tampering, provisions for updating, efficient retrieval, clear responsibility of 

management, and management review and audits. The applicant committed to maintaining 

records of spills and unusual circumstances resulting in radioactive contamination and records 

of facility, equipment, and site drawings useful for decommissioning. The NRC staff has 

reviewed the applicant’s commitments to maintain decommissioning records and determined 

that they are in accordance with NRC regulations in 10 CFR 30.35(g), 40.36(f), and 70.25(g), 

and Section 3.1 of NUREG-1757 (NRC, 2006), Volume 3, and, therefore, are acceptable. 

10.3.1.8 Decontamination Process

In Section 10.1.8 of the LA (GLE, 2011), the applicant provides an overview of the proposed 

decontamination methods.

The methods to be used to decontaminate and decommission the proposed facility will be 

developed based upon the site characterization survey performed during that phase of 

decommissioning planning. These methods will be described in detail in the DP to be submitted 

to the NRC prior to commencing decommissioning activities. The applicant will use past 

experience and lessons learned from previous decommissioning efforts in selecting the 

methods to be used. Typical decommissioning steps include removing surface contamination 

on equipment and building internals and purging lines to remove licensed material internal to 

piping systems and components.

Some of the equipment, most of the buildings, and the outdoor areas are expected to be 

acceptable for release for unrestricted use in accordance with 10 CFR 20.1402 without the need 

for extensive decontamination. If these areas were inadvertently contaminated during 

enrichment operations, these areas will likely have been remediated when the contamination 

was discovered.

Decontamination is expected to be performed in the existing Decontamination/Maintenance 

Area. This area will be used for decontamination of large and small components and for 

packaging prior to temporary storage and shipping of radioactive wastes to a licensed disposal 

facility.

The applicant will develop and use procedures for decontamination operations. These 

procedures will be approved by facility management in accordance with the management 

measures described in Section 11.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011). These procedures will be 

developed to minimize worker exposure and waste volumes, and to ensure work is carried out 

safely.

Section 10.5.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) indicates that the decommissioning safety review 

should ensure that the proposed decommissioning approach, principal remediation activities, 
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and worker and environmental radiation protection programs are acceptable. As stated in 

Section 4 of NUREG-1757 (NRC, 2006), Volume 3, for an applicant submitting a DFP at the 

time of license application, NRC staff will review the accuracy and appropriateness of the 

methods used by the licensee to estimate the costs of decommissioning. NRC staff has 

reviewed the applicant’s conceptual decontamination methods and has determined that the 

proposed methods are appropriate and that the applicant will be able to develop a detailed 

decommissioning plan at the time of decommissioning that will meet applicable NRC regulations 

and guidance. The proposed decommissioning methods are, therefore, acceptable.

10.3.2 DECOMMISSIONING COSTS AND FINANCIAL ASSURANCE

10.3.2.1 Decommissioning Costs

In Section 10.2.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011), the applicant described the Decommissioning Cost 

Estimate (DCE) for the proposed facility. The applicant also submitted both a public and 

proprietary DFP (GLE, 2010a) to meet the requirements in 10 CFR 30.35, 10 CFR 40.36, and 

10 CFR 70.25. The DFP was intended to be consistent with the recommendations in NUREG1757 (NRC, 2006), Volume 3, “Consolidated NMSS Decommissioning Guidance - Financial 

Assurance, Recordkeeping, and Timeliness.” The DFP (GLE, 2010a) includes a DCE for the 

proposed facility and a cost estimate prepared by DOE for providing depleted uranium 

hexafluoride (UF6) conversion and disposal services to the applicant. The applicant presented a 

detailed facility description and the number and dimensions of facility components to be 

decommissioned in Tables C3.4 and C3.5 of the DFP (GLE, 2010a); estimates of labor required 

by decommissioning activity and labor category in Tables C3.6 to C3.12; and its DCE 

breakdown in Tables C3.13 through C3.19 of the DFP and in Tables 1 through 4 of the DOE 

cost estimate. Decommissioning cost information includes labor costs by labor category, 

proposed decontamination methods and unit costs, radioactive waste packaging, shipping, and

disposal costs, final survey costs, and costs for dispositioning depleted uranium tails. 

Restoration of contaminated areas on facility grounds is not expected to be required because 

routine surveys will detect contamination and the contamination will be removed. The applicant 

plans decommissioning such that the facilities can be released for unrestricted use; therefore, 

site stabilization and long-term surveillance are not necessary.

The specific details of the cost estimate for decommissioning the Operations Building, which 

includes the process, support, and waste storage areas are proprietary. The staff reviewed the 

proprietary information to evaluate the completeness of the estimate, the level of detail 

presented, and the reasonableness of the estimate (i.e., the accuracy and magnitude of the 

estimated costs), as identified in NUREG-1757, Volume 3, Appendix A, Section A.3.1 (NRC, 

2006). The staff confirmed that the DCE included detailed estimates for the costs of planning 

and preparation, descriptions of the number and dimensions of facility components, estimates 

for the costs of decontamination or dismantling of radioactive facility components, and the final 

radiation survey. The staff reviewed the estimates for the necessary labor categories and laborhours to decontaminate the operations, the proposed decontamination and decommissioning 

activities, the estimated volumes and types of materials resulting from decommissioning these 

operations, and packaging, shipping and disposal costs for radioactive wastes, and confirmed 

that they were reasonable. The basis for the staff’s conclusion was that the applicant developed 

its DCE using the format and addressing the topics at the level of detail recommended in 

NUREG-1757, Volume 3, Appendix A, Tables A.3.4 through A.3.18 (NRC, 2006).

The applicant based its labor estimates on the cost, including overhead and profit, of 

independent third parties to perform the work. Removal costs for certain components are based 
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on Unit Cost Factors (UCFs) based initially on the approach in Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF) 

AIF/NESP-036, “Guidelines for Producing Commercial Nuclear Power Plant Decommissioning 

Cost Estimates” (AIF, 1986) and adjusted based on extensive experience by a contractor to the 

applicant with more than 20 years of experience in performing nuclear decommissioning work. 

Other costs are based on the estimated numbers and dimensions of facility components.

The staff reviewed the detailed explanation of the derivation of the UCFs and the UCFs 

themselves and concluded they were reasonable, using the criteria in NUREG-1757, Volume 3, 

Appendix A, Section A.3.1.3, that if cost justifications are based on past experience the 

experience must be relevant with respect to facilities, materials, processes, management, 

regulatory requirements, and price levels. When possible, the staff compared the applicant’s 

estimates to the estimates in NUREG/CR-6477, “Revised Analyses of Decommissioning 

Reference Non-Fuel-Cycle Facilities” (NRC, 2002b). Although the cases in NUREG/CR-6477 

(NRC, 2002b) do not include a case for decommissioning a laser uranium enrichment plant, and 

while in many cases NUREG-6477 (NRC, 2002b) did not have a directly corresponding activity 

or component, some information can be compared with the cost estimates provided by the 

applicant.

The applicant’s costs for packaging, shipping, and disposal of radioactive wastes provided in 

Table C3.14 of Appendix C of the DFP (GLE, 2010a) are based on cost estimates provided by a 

third party transport company and on existing contracts for waste disposal services. The latter 

are escalated to FY 2009 dollars using the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index 

(CPI). The packaging, shipping, and disposal costs are provided in detail, and the staff 

concluded they are reasonable estimates. The staff confirmed that the applicant’s DCE

includes a 25 percent contingency and confirmed that no credit is taken for salvage of materials 

or equipment. The use of independent third party labor costs, a 25 percent contingency factor,

and taking no credit for salvage value are all consistent with staff guidance in NUREG-1757, 

Volume 3, Section A.3.1 (NRC, 2006). 

The publicly available estimate for decommissioning the remainder of the facility was also 

reviewed to evaluate the completeness, level of detail, and reasonableness of the estimate. 

The staff evaluated the estimated labor costs, decontamination methods and unit costs, waste 

disposal costs, depleted uranium disposition costs, and final survey costs. The applicant is 

designing the facility with specific features that simplify the eventual facility decommissioning 

and minimize worker exposure by minimizing the level and potential spread of radioactive 

contamination during operation. These features are described in Sections 10.1.1.1 and 10.1.1.2 

of the LA (GLE, 2011).

Consistent with the recommendations in Section 10.5 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a), the DFP 

was evaluated against the NRC requirements and acceptance criteria identified in NUREG-1757 

(NRC, 2006). Both the proprietary and nonproprietary estimates were evaluated and found to 

be complete, to have the necessary level of detail, and to be reasonable, considering the 

accuracy and magnitude of the estimated costs. 

In Section 10.2.1.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011), the applicant described how it would update the DFP. 

In accordance with 10 CFR 30.35(e), 10 CFR 40.36(d), and 10 CFR 70.25(e), the applicant will 

update the decommissioning cost estimate for the facility and the associated funding levels, 

over the life of the facility. These updates will take into account changes resulting from inflation 

or site-specific factors, such as changes in facility conditions or expected decommissioning 

procedures. These funding level updates will also address anticipated accumulated tails. As 

required by 10 CFR 30.35(e), 10 CFR 40.36(d), and 10 CFR 70.25(e), such updates will occur 
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at least every 3 years. In Section 10.2.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011) the applicant is committing to 

adjust the cost estimate for UF6 tails disposition annually, as discussed below. 

In Section 10.2.1.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011), the applicant described its recordkeeping plans 

related to decommissioning funding. In accordance with 10 CFR 30.35(g), 40.36(f), and 

70.25(g), the applicant will retain records of information that may have a material effect on the 

ultimate costs of decommissioning until the termination of the license. The records will include 

information regarding the following: (1) spills or other contamination that causes contamination 

to remain following cleanup efforts, (2) as-built drawings of structures and equipment, and 

modifications thereto, where radioactive contamination exists (such as from the use or storage 

of such materials); (3) original and modified cost estimates of decommissioning; and (4) original 

and modified decommissioning funding instruments and supporting documentation. The staff 

confirmed that these recordkeeping plans are consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 

30.35(g), 40. 36(f), and 70.25(g) and meet the minimum criteria stated in NUREG-1757, Volume 

3, Appendix A, Section A.1.5. (NRC, 2006).

In Section 10.2.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011) and in the DFP (GLE, 2010a), the applicant described 

its plan for dispositioning depleted UF6 tails. Under Section 3113 of the USEC Privatization Act 

of 1996 (Title 42 U.S. Code 2297h), DOE “at the request of the generator, shall accept for 

disposal low-level radioactive waste, including depleted uranium, if it is ultimately determined to 

be low-level radioactive waste, generated by any person licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission to operate a uranium enrichment facility.” The generator must reimburse DOE for 

the disposal of depleted uranium in an amount equal to DOE’s costs, including a pro rata share 

of any capital costs. On January 18, 2005, the Commission issued an order stating that 

depleted uranium is a low-level radioactive waste (NRC, 2005). Therefore, if the applicant 

requests, DOE is required under the USEC Privatization Act of 1996 to accept the depleted 

uranium generated by the applicant. At the request of the applicant, DOE provided a cost 

estimate for dispositioning depleted uranium generated by the applicant (DOE, 2009) included 

as Appendix E to the DFP (GLE, 2010a).

At full capacity, the facility will generate approximately 10,500 MT of UF6 tails annually. The 

applicant estimates that it will take approximately 8 years after issuance of the license for the 

facility to ramp up to the full capacity of 6 million Separative Work Units (SWU) per year. The 

applicant indicated that the waste processing and disposal costs for UF6 tails disposition are 

$7.75/kg UF6 tails. This cost is based on the total of the four cost components that make up the 

total disposition cost for DUF6 (i.e., capital costs for the conversion facility, conversion

operations, transportation and disposal, and decontamination and decommissioning of the 

conversion facility), as estimated by DOE. The staff reviewed the basis of each of these cost 

components, and has concluded that they are reasonable.

The capital costs component of the deconversion cost represents the applicant’s pro rata share 

of the projected cost to design and construct the necessary facilities. The estimate for design 

and construction is based on a current contract between DOE and Uranium Disposition 

Services, LLC (UDS), which is the construction and initial operations contractor. An estimated 

cost increase from 2008 has been added by DOE to the UDS construction baseline cost from 

November 2007. The staff confirmed that DOE’s calculation of capital costs to be amortized 

over the life of conversion operations (presented as cost per kilogram of depleted UF6 ) is 

reasonable, based on the total amounts of depleted UF6 to be processed.

The staff reviewed the elements of the DOE cost estimate comprising the annual operations 

cost estimate for deconversion, which are based on estimates provided to DOE by UDS, the 
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initial operations contractor, in 2007 dollars. The estimated cost per kilogram DUF6 includes 

direct operations of the deconversion facilities, project management and fee to UDS, and DOE 

management and contingency costs. Costs are presented for both minimum and maximum 

throughput over the course of the UDS contract with DOE. Transportation and disposal costs 

are based on rail shipment from the DOE conversion facility to a transload facility and truck 

shipments to the Nevada Test Site (NTS). DOE is directly funding the NTS operations and 

transload facility, and the transportation and disposal costs are based on DOE’s 2007 

Operations Baseline estimate for its own operations. DOE concluded that disposal at an Energy 

Solutions site would result in higher disposal costs, but lower transportation cost, and that on 

balance the cost difference would have a minimal impact on the cost per kilogram estimate. 

The decontamination and decommissioning of the conversion facility is estimated to begin in 

2050, and is estimated at $200 million in 2007 dollars. The staff noted that the DOE cost 

estimate takes into account only the conversion and disposal of GLE’s projected inventory and 

DOE’s current inventory of DUF6. According to DOE, “If DOE were to convert and dispose of 

additional inventories of DUF6, DOE anticipates that the estimated unit cost . . . would likely 

decrease” (GLE, 2010a, Appendix E).

The applicant based its estimate for the total disposal cost per kilogram of UF6 tails on the 

maximum amount in 2007 dollars per kilogram from the DOE 2009 cost estimate, escalated to 

2009 dollars, using the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI. The applicant also increased the DOE 

estimate, which did not include transportation costs to the DOE conversion facility, by estimated 

transportation costs from the proposed GLE facility to the DOE conversion facility in Piketon, 

Ohio. The applicant based these shipping and transportation costs on estimates provided by 

third parties. The applicant then added a 25 percent contingency to reach the estimated cost of 

$7.75/kg UF6.

Staff considers that the DOE estimate of depleted uranium disposition costs, as increased by 

the applicant to cover shipping, transportation, and contingency, provides assurance that the 

applicant’s estimate is reasonable. In addition, in Sections 1.2.5.3 and 10.2.2 of the LA (GLE, 

2011), the applicant requested an exemption to the decommissioning financial assurance 

requirements in 10 CFR 40.36(d) and 10 CFR 70.25(e) to allow incremental funding of the 

required decommissioning funding plan for DUF6 disposition. The approval of this exemption 

request is further discussed in Section 1.2.3.7.5 of this SER. Under this exemption, the 

applicant would incrementally fund financial assurance, in a forward-looking manner, for the 

disposition of DUF6 based on the expected amount of tails to be generated annually. Thus, if 

the DOE cost per kilogram for disposition of DUF6 increases, the applicant will be notified of the 

increase and the updated amount per kg DUF6 will be no less than the updated DOE estimate.

The applicant is proposing to provide initial financial assurance in the approximate amount of 

$200 million ($185 million for full facility decommissioning and $13.5 million for the first year’s 

generation of UF6 tails). Total decommissioning financial assurance over the full 40-year life of 

the facility is estimated to be $3.22 billion in 2009 dollars ($185 million for facility 

decommissioning and $3.04 billion for tails disposal), including a 25 percent contingency. 

Based on the staff’s review of the proprietary and nonproprietary information, the staff found that 

the cost estimate for decommissioning the facility is reasonable and the cost estimate meets all 

of the evaluation criteria in NUREG-1757, Volume 3, Section 4.1 (NRC 2006) as follows: 

• The cost estimate meets the applicable regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 30.35(e), 10 

CFR 40.36(d), and 10 CFR 70.25(e);
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• The cost estimate is based on documented and reasonable assumptions;

• The unit cost factors used in the cost estimate are reasonable and consistent with NRC 

cost estimation reference documents;

• The cost estimate includes detailed costs for labor, equipment and supplies, overhead 

and contractor profit, sampling and laboratory analysis, and miscellaneous expenses, 

including license fees, insurance, and taxes;

• The cost estimates for individual facility activities and components are reasonable and, 

to the extent possible, consistent with cost estimation reference documents;

• The computations are correct;

• The cost estimate includes an adequate contingency factor of 25 percent; 

• The cost estimate does not take credit for any salvage value that might be realized from 

the sale of potential assets during or after decommissioning or reduced taxes that might 

result from payment of decommissioning costs. The cost estimate includes an annual 

property tax cost during decommissioning;

• The means identified in the DFP for adjusting the decommissioning cost estimate and 

associated funding level over the life of the facility is adequate;

• The cost estimate reflects decommissioning under appropriate facility conditions; and

• The cost estimate includes costs for all major decommissioning activities specified in 

Section A.3 of NUREG-1757, Volume 3 (NRC, 2006), including planning and 

preparation; decontamination or dismantling of facility components; packaging, 

shipment, and disposal of radioactive wastes; and the final radiation survey. Restoration 

of contaminated areas on facility grounds and site stabilization and long-term 

surveillance are not necessary.

10.3.2.2 Financial Assurance for Decommissioning

In Section 10.2.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011), the applicant stated it will utilize a surety bond method 

to provide reasonable assurance of decommissioning funding as required by 10 CFR 

30.35(f)(2), 10 CFR 40.36(e)(2) and 10 CFR 70.25(f)(2). The applicant provided draft copies of 

the surety bond and standby trust language. The draft language is consistent with the guidance 

in NUREG-1757 (NRC, 2006), Volume 3, Section A.9 for surety bonds and Section A.17 for 

standby trusts. Finalization of the specific financial instruments to be utilized will be completed, 

and signed originals of those instruments and a certification of financial assurance will be 

provided to the NRC for final confirmation of the instrument at least 21 days prior to the 

applicant receiving licensed material at the facility.

The surety bond method to be adopted by the applicant will provide a guarantee that 

decommissioning costs will be paid in the event the applicant is unable to meet its 

decommissioning obligations at the time of decommissioning. The surety bond will be 

structured consistent with applicable NRC requirements and in accordance with NRC regulatory 

guidance contained in NUREG-1757, Volume 3 (NRC, 2006). Accordingly, in Section 10.2.3 of 
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the LA (GLE, 2011), the applicant stated that its surety bond will contain, but not be limited to, 

the following attributes:

1. A company that is listed as a qualified surety in the U.S. Department of 

Treasury’s most-recent edition of Circular 570 for the State where the surety was 

signed with an underwriting limitation greater than or equal to the level of 

coverage specified in the bond will issue the bond.

2. The bond will be written for a specified term and will be renewable automatically 

unless the issuer serves notice at least 90 days prior to expiration of intent not to 

renew. Such notice must be served upon the NRC, the trustee of the external 

trust or standby trust, and GLE. Further, in the event GLE is unable to provide 

an acceptable replacement within 30 days of such notice, the full amount of the 

bond will be payable automatically, prior to expiration, without proof of forfeiture. 

The surety bond will require that the surety company deposit any funds paid 

under its terms directly into either an external trust or a standby trust.

In assessing the applicant’s commitment to use a surety company listed in Treasury Circular 

570 (Treasury, 2011), the staff reviewed the basis for listing of a surety company in the most 

recent edition of Treasury Circular 570 (Treasury, 2011). The Financial Management Service 

(FMS) of the U.S. Department of the Treasury is responsible for implementing the Federal law 

and regulations relating to sureties and surety bonds and issues Certificates of Authority to 

bonding companies to do business with the United States. (31 U.S.C 9304-9308, “Authorizing 

the Acceptance of Corporate Surety Companies on Bonds Given to the United States,” and 31 

CFR Part 223, “Regulations Governing Surety Companies Doing Business With the United 

States.”) Treasury Circular 570 (Treasury, 2011) provides a list, updated effective July 1 of 

each year, of companies holding Certificates of Authority as acceptable sureties. All Certificates 

of Authority expire on June 30, and must be renewed annually. 

To obtain a Certificate of Authority a company must submit to the FMS a copy of its charter or 

articles of incorporation demonstrating that it is authorized to be a surety “on obligations 

permitted or required by the laws of the United States.” It must also provide a sworn statement 

showing its assets and liabilities. FMS reviews the company’s financial statement and “any 

further evidence or information” that may be required to determine whether the company has 

capital “fully paid up in cash of not less than $250,000, is solvent and financially and otherwise 

qualified to do the business . . . .” (31 CFR 233.3) The cash capital and other funds of the 

company must be “safely invested” and valued in accordance with guidelines promulgated by 

Treasury. FMS may place its own valuation on the assets and liabilities of the company. (31 

CFR 223.7 and 223.9)

In addition to Treasury requirements, a surety company must be licensed in States in which it 

provides a bond, and will be subject to State regulation and inspection. The National 

Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) has developed model laws, regulations, and 

guidelines; financial analysis, audit and examination procedures; and model accounting 

practices and procedures that have been adopted in whole or part by numerous States. State 

license information in Treasury Circular 570 (Treasury, 2011) is provided by the companies. 

Updated information, if needed, is available directly from State Insurance Departments. The 

staff considers that State licensing and regulation provides a second source of scrutiny into the 

financial soundness of a surety company.
10-15

Certified companies must submit to FMS quarterly financial statements, reports of federal 

business written during the quarter and outstanding, and a detailed “Schedule of Excess Risks” 

(FMS Form 199). The latter form allows FMS to implement a strict “underwriting limitation.” 

Regulations provide that “no company holding a certificate of authority shall underwrite any risk 

on any bond or policy on behalf of any individual, firm, association, or corporation, whether or 

not the United States is interested as a party thereto, the amount of which is greater than 10 

percent of the paid-up capital and surplus of such company, as determined by the Treasury.” 

(31 CFR 223.10) If the proposed bond would exceed the underwriting limitation, the company 

must coinsure with one or more other companies or obtain reinsurance from another company 

holding a Certificate of Authority. However, no certificate-holding company may cede to a 

reinsuring company any risk in excess of 10 percent of the reinsuring company’s paid-up capital 

and surplus. (31 CFR 223.11) 

NRC guidance parallels the FMS underwriting limitation requirements. NUREG-1757, Volume 

3, Appendix A in Section A.9.1 (NRC, 2006) states that “the company’s underwriting limitation 

(also specified in Circular 570) must be at least as great as the level of coverage for the 

license.” A footnote to that statement, however, points out that “A company issuing a surety can 

only exceed its underwriting limitation if it brings another qualified company into the agreement 

to share the risk. When acting together none of the companies may exceed its individual 

underwriting limitation.”

Annual filings to FMS by certified companies must include Certified Public Accountant-audited 

financial statements, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 10K reports, an independent 

actuarial opinion, certain reports defined by NAIC, copies of letters of credit or trust agreements 

for large recoverable amounts, the Schedule of Excess Risks (FMS Form 199), reinsurance 

agreements, a copy of NAIC’s Insurance Regulatory Information System analysis of key 

financial ratios and explanation of any unusual results, a copy of the current State Insurance 

Commission inspection report, and several other documents and analyses addressing the 

financial condition of the company and the quality of its management. (FMS Annual Filing 

Checklist Certified Companies (Treasury, 2009)) This material is considered by FMS in making 

certification decisions for the following year.

In light of this information concerning the basis for a listing in Treasury Circular 570 (Treasury, 

2011) and considering the scope and frequency with which FMS reviews surety companies for 

inclusion on Treasury Circular 570 (Treasury, 2011), the staff has concluded that it is 

reasonable to rely on the expertise of FMS in reviewing the financial soundness of surety 

companies and that listing in Treasury Circular 570 (Treasury, 2011) provides reasonable 

assurance of the financial soundness of a surety company. 

The applicant described its approach to funding the surety bond financial assurance instrument 

to be used and for updating the DFP over time. Financial assurance for decommissioning will 

be provided during the operating life of the facility. Initially, the applicant will provide funding for 

the projected cost of facility decontamination and decommissioning, assuming operation at full 

capacity, and annually on a forward looking basis for disposition of the tails generated. Funding 

for tails dispositioning will thereafter be provided at annual intervals. The applicant requested 

an exemption to fund decommissioning on an incremental basis as required in 10 CFR 40.14 

and 10 CFR 70.17. Updates of the DFP and the financial assurance instrument will be provided 

as follows:
10-16

• In the initial executed financial assurance instrument submitted prior to receipt of 

licensed material, the applicant will provide full funding for decontamination and 

decommissioning of the full-size facility.

• In the initial executed financial assurance instrument submitted prior to receipt of 

licensed material, the applicant will provide funding for the disposition of depleted 

uranium tails in an amount needed to disposition the first year of depleted uranium tails 

generation.

• Subsequent updated decommissioning funding estimates and revised funding 

instruments for facility decommissioning will be provided at least every three years. 

• Subsequent updated decommissioning cost estimates and revised funding instruments 

for depleted uranium disposition will be provided annually on a forward-looking basis to 

reflect projections of depleted uranium byproduct generation. The annual depleted 

uranium disposition cost update schedule exceeds the requirements of updating the 

DFP at least every three years in accordance with 10 CFR 30.35(e), 10 CFR 40.36(d), 

and 10 CFR 70.25(e).

This approach to funding the financial assurance instrument is acceptable to NRC staff because 

the amount of financial assurance will be sufficient to cover the decommissioning obligation of 

the licensee at any point in time in the event that the licensee is unable to complete 

decommissioning for any reason. Because final executed copies of the financial assurance 

mechanism will not be provided to NRC until prior to receipt of licensed material, NRC staff is 

imposing the following license conditions:

The Decommissioning Funding Plan shall be updated as follows:

a. The Licensee shall provide to NRC for review an updated Decommissioning 

Funding Plan at least six months prior to the planned date for obtaining licensed 

material, and subsequently, after resolution of any NRC comments, final 

executed copies of the financial assurance instruments shall be provided to NRC 

at least 21 days prior to receipt of licensed material. The amount of the financial 

assurance instrument shall be updated to current year dollars and include any 

applicable change to the decommissioning cost estimate.

b. In the first executed financial assurance instrument submitted prior to receipt of 

licensed material, the licensee shall provide full funding for decontamination and 

decommissioning of the full-size facility.

c. In the first executed financial assurance instrument submitted prior to receipt of 

licensed material, the licensee shall provide funding for the disposition of 

depleted uranium tails in an amount needed to disposition the first year of 

depleted uranium tails generation. The cost estimate shall include an update to 

the DOE depleted uranium disposition cost estimate. The total amount funded 

for depleted uranium disposition shall be no less than the updated DOE cost 

estimate.

d. Subsequent updated decommissioning funding estimates and revised funding 

instruments for facility decommissioning shall be provided for review, at a 
10-17

minimum, every three years. Any proposed reduction in the funding estimate 

based on operational changes shall be submitted six months prior to the change.

e. Subsequent updated decommissioning cost estimates and revised funding 

instruments for depleted uranium disposition shall be provided for review 

annually on a forward-looking basis to reflect projections of depleted uranium 

byproduct generation. The cost estimate shall include an update to the DOE 

depleted uranium disposition cost estimate. The total amount funded for 

depleted uranium disposition shall be no less than the updated DOE cost 

estimate.

The applicant’s DFP is being evaluated against the NRC requirements and acceptance criteria 

identified in NUREG-1757 (NRC, 2006). Section 4 of NUREG-1757, Volume 3 (NRC, 2006), 

specifies that for a licensee submitting a DFP at the time of license application, NRC staff will 

review the accuracy and appropriateness of the methods used by the licensee to estimate the 

costs of decommissioning; the acceptability of the licensee’s submitted financial assurance 

mechanism(s) for decommissioning; and the means identified in the DFP for adjusting the cost 

estimate and associated funding level over the life of the facility. NRC staff finds the 

decommissioning cost estimate to be adequate, as discussed in Section 10.2.3.1 of this SER. 

As discussed in Section 10.2.3.2 of this SER, with the above proposed license conditions and 

the exemption discussed in Section 1.2.3.7.5 of this SER, NRC staff finds the proposed surety 

bond and means for adjusting the cost estimate and associated funding level to be adequate. 

10.4 EVALUATION FINDINGS

The NRC staff has evaluated the applicant’s plans and financial assurance for decommissioning 

in accordance with NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and NUREG-1757 (NRC, 2006). On the basis 

of this evaluation and the imposition of the following license conditions, the NRC staff has 

determined that the applicant’s plans and financial assurance for decommissioning comply with 

the NRC’s regulations and provide reasonable assurance of protection for workers, the public, 

and the environment:

The Decommissioning Funding Plan shall be updated as follows:

a. The Licensee shall provide to NRC for review an updated Decommissioning 

Funding Plan at least six months prior to the planned date for obtaining licensed 

material, and subsequently, after resolution of any NRC comments, final 

executed copies of the financial assurance instruments shall be provided to NRC 

at least 21 days prior to receipt of licensed material. The amount of the financial 

assurance instrument shall be updated to current year dollars and include any 

applicable change to the decommissioning cost estimate.

b. In the first executed financial assurance instrument submitted prior to receipt of 

licensed material, the licensee shall provide full funding for decontamination and 

decommissioning of the full-size facility.

c. In the first executed financial assurance instrument submitted prior to receipt of 

licensed material, the licensee shall provide funding for the disposition of 

depleted uranium tails in an amount needed to disposition the first year of 

depleted uranium tails generation. The cost estimate shall include an update to 
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the DOE depleted uranium disposition cost estimate. The total amount funded 

for depleted uranium disposition shall be no less than the updated DOE cost 

estimate.

d. Subsequent updated decommissioning funding estimates and revised funding 

instruments for facility decommissioning shall be provided for review, at a 

minimum, every three years. Any proposed reduction in the funding estimate 

based on operational changes shall be submitted six months prior to the change.

e. Subsequent updated decommissioning cost estimates and revised funding 

instruments for depleted uranium disposition shall be provided for review 

annually on a forward-looking basis to reflect projections of depleted uranium 

byproduct generation. The cost estimate shall include an update to the DOE 

depleted uranium disposition cost estimate. The total amount funded for 

depleted uranium disposition shall be no less than the updated DOE cost 

estimate.

10.5 REFERENCES

(AIF, 1986) Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF). AIF/NESP-036, “Guidelines for Producing 

Commercial Nuclear Power Plant Decommissioning Cost Estimates,” 1986.

(DOE, 2009) U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Letter from F. Marcinowski/DOE to A. 

Kennedy/GE, April 23, 2009.

(GLE, 2010a) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “Decommissioning 

Funding Plan for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility,” Revision 3, 

2010.

(GLE, 2010b) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “Physical Security Plan 

(PSP) for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility,” Revision 1, 2010.

(GLE, 2010c) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “Nuclear Material 

Transportation Security Plan (NMTSP) for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC 

Commercial Facility,” Revision 1, 2010.

(GLE, 2010d) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “Fundamental Nuclear 

Material Control Plan for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility,” 

Revision 2, 2010.

(GLE, 2011) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “GE-Hitachi Global 

Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility License Application,” Revision 6, 2011.

(NRC, 1998) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG-1505, “A Nonparametric 

Statistical Methodology for the Design and Analysis of Final Status Decommissioning Surveys,”

1998.

(NRC, 2000a) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG-1727, “NMSS

Decommissioning Standard Review Plan,” 2000.
10-19

(NRC, 2000b) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG-1575, “Multi-Agency 

Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM),” Revision 1, 2000.

(NRC, 2002a) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG-1520, “Standard

Review Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility,” 2002.

(NRC, 2002b) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG/CR-6477, “Revised 

Analyses of Decommissioning Reference Non-Fuel-Cycle Facilities,” 2002.

(NRC, 2005) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). “Memorandum and Order,” 

Louisiana Energy Services (National Enrichment Facility), CLI-05-05, January 18, 2005.

(NRC, 2006) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG-1757, “Consolidated NMSS 

Decommissioning Guidance,” 2006.

(NRC, 2010) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). “Notice of Receipt of Application for 

License; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of License; Notice of Hearing and Commission 

Order; and Order Imposing Procedures for Access to Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards 

Information and Safeguards Information for Contention Preparation,” CLI-10-04, January 7, 

2010.

(Treasury, 2009) U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury). “Financial Management Service 

Annual Filing Checklist Certified Companies,” http://www.fms.treas.gov/c570/forms/CAchecklist-annual-2010.pdf. December 2009.

(Treasury, 2011) U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury). Department Circular 570, 

“Companies Holding Certificates of Authority as Acceptable Sureties on

Federal Bonds and as Acceptable Reinsuring Companies,” 2011.

11-1

11.0 MANAGEMENT MEASURES

Management measures are functions that General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment, 

LLC (GLE or applicant), performs, generally on a continuing basis, that are applied to items 

relied on for safety (IROFS), to ensure that IROFS are available and reliable to perform their 

functions when needed. Management measures will be implemented to ensure compliance with 

performance requirements, and the degree to which they will be applied will be a function of the 

items’ importance in terms of meeting performance requirements as evaluated in the Integrated 

Safety Analysis (ISA). This chapter addresses each of the management measures included in 

the 10 CFR Part 70 definition of management measures, including: (a) configuration 

management (CM); (b) maintenance; (c) training and qualifications; (d) procedures; (e) audits 

and assessments; (f) incident investigations; (g) records management; and (h) other quality 

assurance (QA) elements. 

The purpose of this review is to verify that the management measures the applicant will apply to 

IROFS are described in sufficient detail in Chapter 11 of the License Application (LA) (GLE, 

2011a) and provide adequate assurance that IROFS will be available and reliable, consistent 

with the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61.

11.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 

The requirements for fuel cycle facility management measures are specified in 10 CFR Part 70, 

“Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material.” 

1. The regulations in 10 CFR 70.4 state that management measures include: (a) CM; (b) 

maintenance; (c) training and qualifications; (d) procedures; (e) audits and assessments; 

(f) incident investigations; (g) records management; and (h) other QA elements. 

2. The regulations in 10 CFR 70.62(a)(3) state that records must be kept for all IROFS 

failures; describe required data to be reported; and set time requirements for updating 

the records. 

3. The regulations in 10 CFR 70.62(d) require an applicant to establish management 

measures, for application to engineered and administrative controls and control systems 

that are identified as IROFS, pursuant to 10 CFR 70.61(e), to ensure they are available 

and reliable.

4. The regulations in 10 CFR 70.72 require a licensee to establish a CM program to 

evaluate, implement, and track changes to the facility; structures, systems and 

components (SSCs); processes; and activities of personnel. 

5. The regulations in 10 CFR 70.22(a)(8) state the requirements for license applications to 

address proposed procedures to protect health and minimize danger to life and property. 
11-2

6. The regulations in 10 CFR 70.72 require a licensee to establish a CM program to 

evaluate, implement, and track changes to the facility; SSCs; processes; and activities of 

personnel. 

7. The regulations in 10 CFR 70.74(a) and (b) state requirements for incident investigation 

and reporting.

11.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

The acceptance criteria for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff’s review of 

applicant’s management measures program are contained in Section 11.4.3 of the “Standard 

Review Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility,” of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002a). This chapter is applicable in its entirety except for sections applying to existing 

facilities only.

The regulatory guidance that is described in Section 11.4.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) 

(American National Standards Institute/American Society of Mechanical Engineers 

(ANSI/ASME) NQA-1-1983, “Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications” 

(ANSI/ASME, 1983), as endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.28, “Quality Assurance Program 

Requirements (Design and Construction)” (NRC, 2010) does not apply to the applicant because 

the regulatory guidance is only pertinent to applications for plutonium processing and fuel 

fabrication facilities.

The additional regulatory guidance documents identified in Section 11.4.2 of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002a) were not applied by the applicant and are thus not relevant to the review of the 

LA (GLE, 2011a):

• American National Standards Institute/International Standards Organization/ American 

Society for Quality (ANSI/ISO/ASQ) standards for quality management, ANSI/ISO/ASQ 

9000 series.

• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safety Guide, “Establishing and 

Implementing a Quality Assurance Program,” Safety Guide 50-SG-Q1, (IAEA, 1996).

• U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Draft, “Implementation Guide for Use with 10 CFR 

Part 830.120 and DOE Order 5700.6C,” (DOE, 1997).

• U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Guidance on Management Controls/Quality 

Assurance, Requirements for Operation, Chemical Safety, and Fire Protection for Fuel 

Cycle Facilities,” Federal Register 54 (No. 53), 11590-11598, March 21, 1989 (NRC, 

1989).

• U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Training Review Criteria and Procedures,” 

NUREG-1220, Revision 1, (NRC, 1993).
11-3

11.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

Chapter 11 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) describes the management measures established by the 

applicant to ensure the availability and reliability of IROFS. The applicant commits to apply 

management measures to IROFS on a continuing basis to ensure that the proposed facility will 

be operated safely and provide adequate protection of the workers, the public, and the 

environment from credible hazards presented in the ISA (GLE, 2011b).

Management measures are applied to IROFS based on their importance. The importance of 

IROFS is determined using a graded approach that considers both the unmitigated likelihood of 

an initiating event and the severity of the consequence. The applicant will also consider the 

following factors for each IROFS: (1) risk significance, (2) regulations, industry codes, and 

standards applicable to the IROFS; (3) complexity or uniqueness of an item/activity and the 

environment in which it has to function; (4) quality history of the item in service or activity; (5) 

degree to which functional compliance can be demonstrated or assessed by test, inspection, or 

maintenance methods; (6) anticipated life span; and (7) degree of standardization; (8) 

importance of data generated; and (9) reproducibility of results (GLE, 2011a). Based on the 

importance of the IROFS and considerations of the factors identified above, the appropriate type 

and number of management measures are assigned to assure the IROFS are functional when 

needed. The applicant determines the extent that attributes of management measures and QA 

program elements are applied to IROFS by evaluating the design, function, and task analyses 

associated with operating and maintaining the IROFS.

The management measures and QA elements assigned to each IROFS will be approved 

through the configuration management process associated with ISA Baseline Documents and 

specifically through approval of the IROFS Boundary Definition Packages throughout the facility 

design and readiness review period.

11.3.1 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s CM program in accordance with the acceptance criteria 

in Section 11.4.3.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.1 

of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address the CM policy, design requirements, document control, 

change control, and assessments. The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.1.6 of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002a) address design reconstitution, which applies only to existing facilities and 

not to new license applications, and were not considered in this review.

The applicant describes the CM program functions in Section 11.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). The 

applicant states that the objective of the CM Program is to ensure that the information used to 

design, construct, operate, and maintain IROFS is current (GLE, 2011a). The safety controls 

implemented for IROFS include SSCs and procedures that prevent or mitigate the risk of 

credible accidents (GLE, 2011a). 

11.3.1.1 CM Policy 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s CM policy in accordance with the acceptance criteria in 

Section 11.4.3.1.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance criteria in Section 

11.4.3.1.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address the overall CM functions covering at least the 

following topics: (1) the scope of the IROFS and management measures to be included in the 

CM function; (2) the objectives of each CM activity; (3) a description of each CM activity; and (4) 

the organizational structure and staffing interfaces.
11-4

In Section 11.1.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant describes the CM Program as a process 

implemented by approved written procedures to ensure that changes from the facility’s technical 

design baseline are identified and controlled. The applicant commits to maintain a CM Program 

in accordance with 10 CFR 70.72 that includes the following activities: (a) maintenance of 

facility design information; (b) control of information used to operate and maintain the facility; (c) 

identification of IROFS; (d) assurance of adequate safety reviews for changes; (e) control of 

information used to operate and maintain the facility; and (f) periodic performance assessments 

(GLE, 2011a). 

As described in Section 11.1.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the CM Manager is responsible for the 

CM Program. The CM Manager reports to the Commercial Facility Project Manager during the 

design and construction phase and to the Operations Manager during the operational phase 

(GLE, 2011a). During the design phase, to establish and maintain the Technical Design 

Baseline, CM is based on design control and the associated procedural controls (GLE, 2011a). 

The applicant states that design documents, including the ISA, provide design input, analysis, or 

results for IROFS and will be reviewed before issuance (GLE, 2011a). During the construction 

phase, changes to drawings and specifications issued for construction, procurement, or 

fabrication will be reviewed, evaluated, and verified for impact before being implemented (GLE, 

2011a). The applicant commits to verify proper implementation of changes and to document 

them in the design basis records (GLE, 2011a). 

The applicant states that controls are implemented to ensure that the quality of the SSCs is not 

compromised by modifications in the facility (GLE, 2011a). The Quality Level (QL) designation 

is used to determine the level of CM applied to the SSCs, processes, equipment, and personnel 

activities (GLE, 2011a). Quality levels are defined in Section 3.1 of the Quality Assurance 

Program Description (QAPD) (GLE, 2011c).

Before changes are implemented, the following items are considered: (a) the technical basis for 

the change; (b) impact on safety, health, and control of licensed material; (c) authorization 

requirements for the change; (d) required modifications to existing procedures; (e) impacts or 

modifications to the ISA and the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b); and (f) the approved duration of 

the change for temporary changes (GLE, 2011a). 

The applicant describes how design requirements and associated design bases will be 

established and maintained through control of the design process to ensure that the quality of 

SSCs will be maintained (GLE, 2011a). The applicant also describes the management structure 

and reporting lines for the CM function and commits to evaluate, implement, and track each 

change to the site, structures, processes, systems, equipment, components, computer 

programs, and activities of personnel (GLE, 2011a). The CM policy description, including the 

CM organizational structure and interfaces, provided by the applicant meets the acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.1.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and is, therefore, acceptable.

11.3.1.2 Design Requirements 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s CM design requirements in accordance with the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.1.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.1.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address how design requirements 

and associated design bases are established and maintained through control of the design 

process and to describe technical review and approval functions.
11-5

In Section 11.1.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that design requirements are 

developed to support safety, environmental impact-oriented, and mission-based functions of the 

proposed facility. The design requirements for IROFS and other SSCs are developed to meet 

the baseline design criteria, as defined in 10 CFR 70.64 (GLE, 2011a). The applicant states 

that the Engineering Organization has the responsibility to develop the design requirements to 

support IROFS and other SSCs and to capture these requirements in design documents (GLE, 

2011a). Before the design documents are approved, the applicant will review them to determine 

accuracy, adequacy, and completeness (GLE, 2011a). After the design document and the ISA 

Summary (GLE, 2011b) are approved, these documents provide the Technical Design Baseline 

for the facility (GLE, 2011a). The ISA and the design documents are considered controlled 

documents and as such must undergo the Change Control Process for any modifications made 

to the documents (GLE, 2011a). 

The applicant’s design process meets the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.1.2 of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002a) in that it will ensure that the development of design requirements (i.e., 

drawings and other statements of requirements), proceeds logically from the design basis, and 

provides the Technical Design Baseline for the facility. The applicant commits to maintain 

design documents as controlled documents and to thus maintain them under the CM program. 

As described in Section 11.1.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the information provided meets the 

acceptance criteria of Section 11.4.3.1.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and is, therefore, 

acceptable.

11.3.1.3 Document Control 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s CM document control in accordance with the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.1.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.1.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address the description of an 

acceptable method to create and control documents within the CM function, including cataloging 

the document database, the information content of the document database, maintaining and 

distributing documents, document retention policies, and document retrieval policies. The 

acceptance criteria also state that the application should include a description of how CM will 

capture documents that are relevant and relied on for safety including design requirements, the 

ISA, as-build drawings, specifications, all procedures that are IROFS, procedures involving 

training, QA, maintenance, audits and assessments, emergency operating procedures, 

emergency response plans, system modification documents, assessment reports, and others 

that the applicant may deem part of CM. A document database should also be used to control 

documents and track document change status.

In Section 11.1.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that document control is 

implemented in accordance with approved written procedures. The document control 

procedures include guidance for the creation, revision, storage, tracking, distribution, and 

retrieval of information including, but not limited to, instructions, drawings, manuals, procedures, 

plans, specifications, design documents, and other documents related to the CM function (GLE, 

2011a). The applicant commits to establish appropriate procedures to control the life-cycle of 

documents and to establish measures to ensure that documents are: (a) adequately reviewed; 

(b) approved; and (c) released for use by authorized personnel (GLE, 2011a). 

The applicant states that it will implement an electronic document management system (EDMS) 

to file project records and to maintain availability of the latest version of controlled documents 

(GLE, 2011a). Controlled documents will be maintained in the EDMS until cancelled or 

superseded. Indices of controlled documents will be maintained and available to personnel and 
11-6

will include identification of documents with unique numbers that include the revision level (GLE, 

2011a). When the EDMS is not available or if so required by approved written procedure, the 

applicant states that controlled documents will be distributed in hardcopy form (GLE, 2011a). 

The applicant’s document control program includes measures to control documents that are 

important to the safety of the proposed facility through: (1) the maintenance of controlled 

documents in an electronic database; (2) the review, approval, and release of documents; and 

(3) the retention of life-cycle documents. These measures, as described in Section 11.1.3 of the 

LA (GLE, 2011a), meet the acceptance criteria of Section 11.4.3.1.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002a) and are, therefore, acceptable.

11.3.1.4 Change Control 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s CM change control in accordance with the acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.1.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance criteria in Section 

11.4.3.1.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address the description of how the CM function will 

maintain strict consistency among the design requirements, the physical configuration, and the 

facility documentation. In addition, the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.1.4 of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002a) states that the applicant should commit to an acceptable process for: (1) 

identifying and authorizing proposed changes; (2) performing appropriate technical, 

management, and safety reviews of proposed changes in IROFS; (4) tracking and implementing 

changes; and (4) documenting changes (including placement of documentation in a document 

control center and dissemination to affected functions such as training, engineering, operations, 

maintenance, and QA). The applicant should also describe an acceptable process, within the 

CM function, for providing reasonable assurance that the ISA is systematically reviewed and 

modified to reflect design or operational changes from an established safety bases, and that all 

documents outside the ISA that are affected by safety basis changes are properly modified, 

authoritatively approved, and made available to personnel. When a change is made in 

accordance with 10 CFR 70.72, changes to the affected onsite documentation must be made 

promptly to avoid inadvertent access by facility personnel to outdated design and other 

specifications for IROFS.

In Section 11.1.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant describes the approved written 

procedures that will be implemented to control the CM process. The applicant commits to 

implement procedures to control design changes and to detail the distinction between different 

types of design changes in procedures (GLE, 2011a). The applicant states that procedures will 

require the review and approval of any changes to controlled documents in order to determine if 

the ISA is affected by the proposed change (GLE, 2011a). Such reviews will be conducted by 

trained safety reviewers and, should the review identify an impact to the ISA, an ISA team will 

review and approve the change in accordance with the process described in the ISA Summary 

(GLE, 2011b).

The applicant commits to implement an interdisciplinary review process during the design phase 

to ensure consistency between documents, including design changes and the ISA (GLE, 

2011a). The interdisciplinary review includes the evaluation of vendor drawings and data to 

ensure compliance with drawings and procurement specifications and to incorporate interface 

requirements into controlled documents (GLE, 2011a). During the construction phase, the 

applicant states that changes to documents issued for construction, fabrication, and 

procurement will be documented, reviewed, approved, and incorporated into each affected 

design document (GLE, 2011a). 
11-7

In Section 11.1.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant describes the change control process 

that will be implemented during the operations phase in accordance with the requirements of 10 

CFR 70.72. Prior to the implementation of design changes, the applicant will ensure that design 

changes are documented, reviewed, and approved and that any facility personnel who may be 

affected by the modification are made aware of the changes (GLE, 2011a). When a 

modification or change is completed to a SSC: (a) the responsible area manager or individual 

will ensure that the applicable testing has been completed to ensure the correct operation of the 

system; (b) the documentation (such as revised process descriptions, checklists for operations 

and flow sheets) will be made available to the Operations and Maintenance Organizations 

when the system becomes operational to ensure that operators are able to operate the modified 

system safely; (c) a notice that the modification has been completed will be distributed to the 

appropriate manager; (d) the modifications will be included in the as-constructed drawings; and 

(e) the records documenting the change will be identified and retained for the duration of the 

facility license (GLE, 2011a). 

In Section 11.1.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant describes the change control process 

that will be implemented for design changes within the CM program. The applicant also 

commits to implement an interdisciplinary review process to ensure consistency between 

documents, including design changes and the ISA (GLE, 2011a). The change control process 

meets the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.1.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) for ensuring 

that: (1) the ISA will be systematically reviewed and modified to reflect design or operational 

changes from the established safety basis; and (2) all documents outside the ISA that are 

affected by safety-basis changes will be properly modified, authoritatively approved, and made 

available to personnel. As described in Section 11.1.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the information 

provided meets the acceptance criteria of Section 11.4.3.1.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) 

and is, therefore, acceptable.

11.3.1.5 Assessments 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s CM assessment process in accordance with the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.1.5 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.1.5 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address the applicant’s 

confirmation that initial and periodic assessments of the CM function are conducted to 

determine the program’s effectiveness and to correct deficiencies. Both assessments and 

physical assessments (system walkdowns) should be conducted periodically to check the 

adequacy of the CM function. All assessments and follow-ups should be documented. These 

reports should provide a basis for future changes. The applicant should also indicate that such 

assessments are systematically planned and conducted in accordance with an overall facility 

audit and assessment function.

In Section 11.1.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that periodic assessments of the 

CM Program are conducted to determine the program effectiveness and to correct identified 

deficiencies. The assessments, which are conducted internally as well as by independent 

entities, will evaluate the application and effectiveness of management measures and the 

implementation of the facility safety programs (GLE, 2011a). The applicant commits to perform 

CM assessments at least on an annual basis by individuals not involved in the area being 

assessed and to include a review of the documentation and system walk downs of the facility in 

the conduct of the assessments (GLE, 2011a). The applicant also addresses assessments in 

Section 11.5.1.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a).
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In the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant commits to perform initial and periodic assessments of the 

CM function to determine the program’s effectiveness and to correct deficiencies. The 

assessments will be performed by the applicant’s personnel as well as by independent entities 

(GLE, 2011a). The commitments described in Section 11.1.5 and 11.5.1 of the LA (GLE, 

2011a) are consistent with the guidance provided in Section 11.4.3.1.5 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002a) and are, therefore, acceptable.

11.3.2 MAINTENANCE

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s CM maintenance program in accordance with the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance criteria 

in Section 11.4.3.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address surveillance and monitoring, 

corrective maintenance, preventive maintenance, and functional testing.

In Section 11.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that the purpose of the IROFS 

maintenance program is to ensure that systems are kept in a readiness condition to perform 

their intended function when required. The applicant states that it will use a systems-based 

approach program to plan, schedule, track, and maintain records for the maintenance activities 

of the facility (GLE, 2011a). 

Facility area managers have the responsibility to ensure the operational readiness of safety 

controls in the facility (GLE, 2011a). Approved written procedures will be used to document the 

selection and qualification of the maintenance program personnel (GLE, 2011a). 

The applicant will use the analyses described in the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) to identify the 

maintenance requirements for safety controls, such as functional testing, calibration, and 

replacement of specified components (GLE, 2011a). Maintenance activities will include four 

categories: (a) surveillance and monitoring; (b) corrective maintenance; (c) preventive 

maintenance (PM); and (d) functional testing (GLE, 2011a). 

11.3.2.1 Surveillance and Monitoring 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s maintenance surveillance and monitoring process in 

accordance with the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.2.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). 

The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.2.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address the 

applicant’s description of IROFS identified in the ISA Summary, the surveillance function and its 

commitment to the organization and conduct of surveillances at a specified frequency. The 

surveillance activity should support the determination of performance trends for IROFS, thus 

providing data useful in determining PM frequencies. The applicant should also describe how 

the results from incident investigations, the review of the failure records required by 10 CFR 

70.62(a)(3), and identified root causes are used to modify the affected maintenance function 

and eliminate or minimize the root cause. Records showing the current surveillance schedule, 

performance criteria, and test results for all IROFS are maintained by the applicant. For 

surveillance tests that can only be done while IROFS are out of service, proper compensatory 

measures are prescribed for the continued normal operation of a process.

In Section 11.2.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that the Surveillance and 

Monitoring Program will provide a periodic check of the ability of IROFS to perform their 

designed safety function when required through performance checks, tests, calibrations, and 

inspections. 
11-9

The applicant states that IROFS will be monitored on a routine basis as part of the operating 

process (GLE, 2011a). The applicant commits to use active engineered controls in routine 

operations as much as practicable and will implement passive engineered systems such as 

fixed physical design features to maintain safe process conditions for IROFS (GLE, 2011a). 

The applicant will perform preoperational audits and periodic verifications to maintain the 

reliability and availability of IROFS (GLE, 2011a). These verifications, which are described in 

the ISA, will consider the safety importance of the IROFS as well as information related to 

reliability and other quality factors (GLE, 2011a). 

The applicant states that the facility work control process will include surveillances to enable the 

timely planning and scheduling of work, establishment of system or facility conditions, execution 

of activities, and documentation of surveillance results (GLE, 2011a). Surveillance frequencies 

will be established in accordance with the degree of safety importance of the IROFS (GLE, 

2011a). Determination of an item’s safety importance is based on the item’s role in satisfying 

performance requirements as evaluated in the ISA. The applicant will use the results of 

surveillances to identify performance trends related to IROFS and will take corrective actions or 

adjust the frequency of PM activities when performance degradation is identified (GLE, 2011a). 

Incident investigations will be performed to identify the root cause of failures that are related to 

maintenance and the lessons learned from incident investigations will be incorporated into the 

PM Program as well as in the Surveillance and Monitoring Program (GLE, 2011a). 

The applicant describes a program for the surveillance and monitoring of IROFS that meets the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.2.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and includes: (1) 

justification for assignment of differing degrees of surveillance and monitoring to individual 

IROFS, based on the item’s contribution to safety; (2) a description of the surveillance function 

and frequency for IROFS identified in the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b); (3) a description of how 

the results of incident investigations, failure records, and identified root causes are used to 

modify the affected maintenance function and eliminate or minimize the root cause; and (4) a 

description of how surveillances support the determination of performance trends for IROFS and 

are used in determining PM frequencies. The GLE Surveillance and Monitoring Program as 

described in Section 11.2.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), is, therefore, acceptable.

11.3.2.2 Corrective Maintenance 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s corrective maintenance process in accordance with the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.2.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.2.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address the documented approach 

used to perform corrective actions or repairs on IROFS. The maintenance function should 

provide a planned, systematic, integrated, and controlled approach for the repair and 

replacement activities associated with identified unacceptable performance deficiencies of 

IROFS. After conducting corrective maintenance and before returning an IROFS to operational 

status, if necessary, a functional test should be conducted to provide reasonable assurance that 

the safety control performs as designed and provides the safety action expected.

The applicant defines corrective maintenance in Section 11.2.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) as 

situations in which replacements, repairs, or major adjustments occur in the facility. The 

applicant commits to promptly perform corrective actions to remediate unacceptable 

performance deficiencies in IROFS (GLE, 2011a). 
11-10

The applicant states that documentation related to the SSCs that have been repaired or 

replaced will be maintained in the Maintenance Planning and Control System (GLE, 2011a). 

Following the repair or replacement of any safety control components, the functionality of the 

component will be verified through post-maintenance testing to ensure that the component will 

perform its designed safety function when required (GLE, 2011a). In the case that the 

performance of a repaired or replaced safety control could differ from the original component, 

the change will be approved under the CM program and preoperational testing will be 

conducted to ensure that the component will perform its desired safety function when required 

(GLE, 2011a). 

The corrective maintenance program is consistent with the acceptance criteria contained in 

Section 11.4.3.2.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and is acceptable based on the following: (1) 

the applicant describes a process for corrective maintenance that will ensure that corrective 

actions or repairs are performed on IROFS as needed; (2) the applicant’s maintenance function 

provides a planned, systematic, integrated, and controlled approach for repair and replacement 

activities associated with identified unacceptable performance deficiencies of IROFS; and (3) 

the applicant commits to maintain documentation related to corrective maintenance in the 

Maintenance Planning and Control System. 

11.3.2.3 Preventive Maintenance 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s PM process in accordance with the acceptance criteria 

in Section 11.4.3.2.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance criteria in Section 

11.4.3.2.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address the applicant’s its PM function, which should 

demonstrate a commitment to conduct preplanned and scheduled periodic refurbishing, or 

partial or complete overhaul, for the purpose of ensuring that unanticipated loss of IROFS do 

not occur. This activity should include: (1) use of results of surveillance data; (2) instrument 

calibration; (3) balancing the objectives of preventing equipment failures and minimizing the 

unavailability of IROFS; (4) conduct of functional testing prior to returning equipment to service; 

(5) the basis for determining PM frequencies; (6) the conduct of incident investigations and root 

cause analysis; (7) using feedback from PM, corrective maintenance, and incident 

investigations to modify the frequency or scope of PM activities; (8) providing a rationale for 

deviating from industry standards or from vendor recommendations for PM; and (9) providing 

records showing PM schedules and results for all IROFS.

Section 11.2.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) describes the PM program for the proposed facility. PM 

will be periodically performed to facilitate performance, prevent failures, and maintain or extend 

the life of equipment to ensure that IROFS will be available and reliable (GLE, 2011a). The 

Maintenance Organization is responsible for the coordination of the PM activities and requires

input from the Engineering and Operations Organizations (GLE, 2011a). 

The Engineering Organization will develop, evaluate, and approve the formal documented 

bases for the PM tasks (GLE, 2011a). The bases for performing PM on IROFS will be based on 

the following: (a) historical operating information, (b) review of manufacturer recommendations; 

and (c) available industry standards (GLE, 2011a). The frequency or scope of the PM activities 

will be appropriately modified according to the feedback received from corrective maintenance, 

incident investigations, and PM (GLE, 2011a). The tasks in the PM activities may be changed 

or modified according to the recommendations made by the Operations, Maintenance, or 

Engineering Organization personnel (GLE, 2011a). 
11-11

A functional test of the SSC may be performed after the PM is completed and before returning 

an IROFS to service, to ensure that IROFS will perform its expected safety functions (GLE, 

2011a). The records related to PM will be maintained in accordance with the Records 

Management (RM) system (GLE, 2011a). 

The applicant’s maintenance function will ensure that IROFS are reliable and available to 

perform their safety function when called upon. The applicant’s PM program description is 

consistent with the guidance contained in Section 11.4.3.2.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) as 

it addresses: (1) the basis for performing PM; (2) development and modification of the scope 

and frequency of PM activities; (3) functional testing provisions; and (4) maintenance of records 

related to PM.

11.3.2.4 Functional Testing 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s functional testing process in accordance with the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.2.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.2.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address the methods used and the 

commitment to perform functional testing, as needed, of IROFS after PM or corrective 

maintenance. These tests should be conducted using applicant-approved procedures and 

should include compensatory measures while the test is being conducted. The applicant should 

design the functional tests to include all operational aspects of the IROFS that are important to 

safety. In addition, al the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.2.4 address recordkeeping, 

administrative controls, work control methods, use of contractors, and how maintenance 

elements will be addressed in IROFS management measures.

In Section 11.2.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant describes the procedures that will be 

used to perform the functional testing of IROFS. The functional testing of IROFS will be 

performed after installation as part of periodic surveillance testing and after corrective 

maintenance, PM, or calibration activities to ensure that the items are able to perform their 

designated safety function when required (GLE, 2011a). The applicant will perform functional 

tests according to approved written procedures that define the testing methods and the required 

acceptable results (GLE, 2011a). The results of tests will be recorded and maintained (GLE, 

2011a). 

The applicant will use approved written procedures to document administrative controls that are 

identified as IROFS (GLE, 2011a). The applicant states that it will ensure that administrative 

controls will be available and reliable during operations through the use of applicable 

procedures, employee training programs, and management measures (GLE, 2011a). 

The applicant’s commitments: (1) to use written procedures for functional testing; (2) to ensure 

that the administrative controls identified as IROFS will be available and reliable to perform their 

intended safety function over extended periods of operation; (3) to maintain records of functional 

test results; and (4) to perform functional testing, as needed, of IROFS after PM or corrective 

maintenance are consistent with the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.2.4 of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002a) and are, therefore, acceptable.

11.3.3 TRAINING AND QUALIFICATIONS 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s training and qualifications program in accordance with 

the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address: (1) the applicant’s training 
11-12

organization and management; (2) the analysis and identification of activities requiring training; 

(3) position training requirements; (4) development of the basis for training and training 

objectives; (5) organization of instruction using lesson plans and other training guides; (6) 

evaluation of trainee accomplishment; (7) conduct of on-the-job training; (8) evaluation of 

training effectiveness; (9) personnel qualification; and (10) provisions for continued assurance.

The applicant discusses the training and qualification program in Section 11.3 of the LA (GLE, 

2011a). The program ensures that the personnel performing activities relied on for safety have 

the knowledge and skills necessary to safely design, operate, and maintain the facility (GLE, 

2011a). Performance-based training is used as the primary management tool to analyze, 

design, develop, conduct, and evaluate training (GLE, 2011a). Facility personnel are trained 

and tested to ensure that they are qualified on practices important to safeguarding licensed 

material, protecting the environment, and public and worker safety (GLE, 2011a). The applicant 

commits to document any exceptions granted from the requirements of the training program and 

to make such exceptions in accordance with approved written procedures and management 

approval (GLE, 2011a). 

11.3.3.1 Organization and Management of the Training Function 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s program for the organization and management of 

training in accordance with the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002a). The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address 

how the organization and management of training is organized, staffed, and managed to 

facilitate planning, directing, evaluating, and controlling a training process for the design, 

construction, modification, maintenance, and decommissioning of the facility. The training 

process should fulfill the objectives for the training identified by the applicant, especially where 

human factors are relied on for safety. Formal training should be provided for each position or 

activity that is relied on for safety. Training may be either or both classroom or on-the-job 

training. The applicant should state what training will be conducted and which personnel will be 

provided with this training. In addition, the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.1 of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002a) state that the applicant should commit to: (1) making line management 

responsible for the content and effective conduct of training; (2) defining the job function, 

responsibility, authority, and accountability of personnel involved in managing, supervising, and 

implementing training; (3) using performance-based training as the primary management tool for 

analyzing, designing, developing , conducting, and evaluating training; (4) documenting and 

implementing procedures to provide reasonable assurance that all phases of training are 

conducted reliably and consistently; (5) linking training documents to the CM system to provide 

reasonable assurance that design changes and modifications are accounted for in the training; 

(6) granting exemptions from training to trainees and incumbents only when justified, 

documented , and approved by management; and (7) maintaining programmatic and individual 

training records to support management needs and provide required data on each individual’s 

training, job performance ,and qualification.

In Section 11.3.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that facility line management and 

the Environmental, Health, and Safety (EHS) disciplines share the responsibility to implement 

training programs for personnel who perform activities relied on for safety. The applicant states 

that performance based training is implemented as the primary tool to assist management in the 

analysis, design, development, conduct, and evaluation of training (GLE, 2011a). As described 

in their position descriptions, line managers have the authority to implement training for 

authorized personnel (GLE, 2011a). Line managers are responsible for the content and 

effective conduct of training for assigned personnel with support from the facility training 
11-13

function. Area managers are responsible for the content and conduct of training for operations 

personnel (GLE, 2011a). 

The applicant states that the requirements for the instruction and training of the personnel 

performing activities relied on for safety and for ensuring the consistent and reliable execution of 

the training program are established in approved written procedures (GLE, 2011a). The 

applicant states that training guides or lesson plans are used in classrooms and on-the-job 

training (OJT) activities to provide a consistent subject matter (GLE, 2011a). The applicant 

commits to update these materials in accordance with the CM program when design changes or 

facility modifications are made and to maintain training records in accordance with RM 

procedures (GLE, 2011a). 

Exemptions from training requirements may be granted if an individual’s qualifications, prior 

training experience, and job performance history provide information that the individual has 

achieved the necessary required skills (GLE, 2011a). Exemptions from training are approved 

by management and will be documented according to written procedures (GLE, 2011a). 

The organization and management of the training function described in Section 11.3.1 of the LA 

(GLE, 2011a) meets the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002a) and is, therefore, acceptable. Specifically, the applicant describes the organization and 

management of training for facility personnel and states that line management will be 

responsible for the content and effective conduct of the training. The applicant defines the job 

function, responsibility, authority, and accountability of personnel involved in managing, 

supervising, and implementing training. Further, the applicant commits to provide formal 

training for each position or activity that is relied on for safety through the use of classroom and 

on-the-job training, or a combination of both. The applicant also commits to document the 

requirements for such training in written procedures. 

11.3.3.2 Analysis and Identification of Functional Areas Requiring Training 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s analysis and identification of functional areas requiring 

training in accordance with the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002a). The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address 

how the applicant will identify, document, and address the analysis and identification of activities 

requiring training for competent and safe job performance. The applicant should also use 

design, construction, operations, training, and other subject matter experts, as appropriate for 

conducting an analysis to identify activities requiring training. These activities should include, as 

a minimum, those activities for managing, supervising, performing, and verifying the activities 

relied on for safety specified in the ISA Summary as preventing or mitigating accident 

sequences. Each activity selected for training (initial or continuing) from the facility-specific 

activities should be matrixed to supporting procedures and training material. The facility-specific 

activities selected for training and the comparison with training materials should be reviewed on 

an established schedule and updated as necessitated by changes in procedures, facility 

systems and equipment, or job scope.

 

In Section 11.3.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that the objective of the Training 

Program is to ensure compliance with the applicable regulatory requirements and to ensure the 

safe and efficient operation of the facility. The program provides training for each individual at 

the facility according to the individual’s assigned roles and responsibilities (GLE, 2011a). 

Training requirements are applicable (but not restricted) to personnel with a direct relationship to 

the maintenance, testing, operation, or other technical aspects of IROFS (GLE, 2011a). 
11-14

Personnel are required to satisfy applicable training and qualification requirements prior to 

performing assigned tasks independently; and fully assuming safety-significant duties (GLE, 

2011a). Line managers responsible for contracted activities will verify that contractor personnel 

meet minimum training and qualification requirements that are required of their duties (GLE, 

2011a). 

The applicant states that the functional areas requiring training include: (a) General Employee 

Training (GET); (b) Nuclear Safety Training; (c) Industrial Safety Training; (d) Technical 

Training; and (e) Professional Development (GLE, 2011a). As stated in Section 11.3.2 of the 

LA (GLE, 2011a), the training requirements associated with the Emergency Response 

Organization (ERO) and emergency response activities are addressed in the Radiological 

Contingency and Emergency Plan (RC&EP) (GLE, 2010). 

The applicant defines the functional areas requiring training at the proposed facility and commits 

to provide training for each individual at the facility according to assigned roles and 

responsibilities. The training requirements, as outlined in Section 11.3.2 of the LA (GLE, 

2011a), meet the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and 

are, therefore, acceptable.

11.3.3.2.1 General Employee Training 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s general employee training in accordance with the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address the specific, minimum 

requirements for positions of candidates whose activities are relied on for safety and who 

perform actions that prevent or mitigate accident sequences described in the ISA Summary. 

Trainees should meet entry-level criteria defined for the position, including minimum 

educational, technical, experience, and, if necessary, physical fitness requirements.

In Section 11.3.2.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant discusses its program for GET. All 

personnel, including contractors and temporary service and maintenance personnel, must 

participate in applicable portions of GET related to their assigned duties (GLE, 2011a). The 

applicant identifies the topics covered in GET as follows: (a) QA policies and procedures; (b) 

nuclear safety (criticality and radiological); (c) industrial safety; (d) fire protection and fire 

brigade; (e) RC&EP and implementing procedures associated with alarm response and 

evacuation; (f) new employee orientation; (g) environmental protection; and (h) general 

administrative controls and procedures and their use (GLE, 2011a). The applicant will conduct 

continuing training in GET topics as necessary to maintain employee proficiency (GLE, 2011a).

The general employee training topics required for all facility personnel, along with the 

commitment to perform additional training as needed to maintain proficiency, is consistent with 

the guidance contained in Section 11.4.3.3.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and is, therefore, 

acceptable.

11.3.3.2.2 Nuclear Safety Training 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s nuclear safety training in accordance with the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address the specific, minimum 

requirements for positions for candidates whose activities are relied on for safety and who 

perform actions that prevent or mitigate accident sequences described in the ISA Summary. 
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Trainees should meet entry-level criteria defined for the position, including minimum 

educational, technical, experience, and, if necessary, physical fitness requirements.

In Section 11.3.2.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant establishes nuclear safety training 

programs for personnel commensurate with their criticality and radiation protection (RP) 

responsibilities. Nuclear Safety Training activities include the following topics: (a) radiation and 

radioactive materials; (b) risks involved in receiving low-level radiation exposure; (c) basic 

criteria and practices for RP; and (d) nuclear criticality safety (NCS) principles (GLE, 2011a). 

The applicant states that it will evaluate personnel understanding and effectiveness of the 

Training Program by requiring personnel to pass an initial training examination that covers 

formal training contents (GLE, 2011a). Employees are required by the facility training policy to 

complete the nuclear safety training before accessing Radiological Controlled Areas (RCAs) 

without an escort (GLE, 2011a). The applicant states that, at a minimum, previously trained 

employees who are allowed unescorted access to an RCA will be trained annually, and visitors 

to any RCA will be escorted by trained employees or will be trained in the formal Training 

Program (GLE, 2011a). The applicant will maintain the Training Program contents current and 

adequate through the implementation of scheduled program reviews, which will be performed by 

the NCS and RP functions (GLE, 2011a).

The applicant’s nuclear safety training program, including training topics, requirements for 

personnel, and the use of program reviews to keep the training material up to date, meets the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and is, therefore, 

acceptable.

11.3.3.2.3 Industrial Safety Training 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s industrial safety training in accordance with the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address the specific, minimum 

requirements for positions for candidates whose activities are relied on for safety and who 

perform actions that prevent or mitigate accident sequences described in the ISA Summary. 

Trainees should meet entry-level criteria defined for the position, including minimum 

educational, technical, experience, and, if necessary, physical fitness requirements.

In Section 11.3.2.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant commits to provide Industrial Safety 

Training as part of employee orientation to ensure that new and transferred employees are 

aware of the rules, hazards, and the safety procedures involved in the their assigned duties.

New employee orientation may include, as appropriate, the review of the following topics: (a) 

employee/employer responsibilities; (b) general site safety rules; (c) the Occupational Safety 

and Health Administration General Duty Clause; (d) fire extinguisher training; (e) emergency 

evacuation procedure; (f) hazard communication training; (g) lockout/tagout awareness; (h) 

laser safety training; and (i) Job Hazards Analysis and Chemical Job Hazards Analysis (GLE, 

2011a).

The applicant describes industrial safety training topics and requirements for personnel to 

ensure site safety. The industrial safety training program, as described in Section 11.3.2.3 of 

the LA (GLE, 2011a), meets the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.3 of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002a) and is, therefore, acceptable.
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11.3.3.2.4 Technical Training 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s technical training in accordance with the acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance criteria in Section 

11.4.3.3.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address the specific, minimum requirements for 

positions for candidates whose activities are relied on for safety and who perform actions that 

prevent or mitigate accident sequences described in the ISA Summary. Trainees should meet 

entry-level criteria defined for the position, including minimum educational, technical, 

experience, and, if necessary, physical fitness requirements.

Technical training, as described in Section 11.3.2.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), is provided to 

support the maintenance and operations personnel in understanding the applicable 

fundamentals, procedures, and technical practices related to nuclear fuel enrichment facilities.

Technical training is specific to assigned technical duties and will consist of: (a) initial training; 

(b) OJT; (c) continuing training; and (d) special training, as applicable (GLE, 2011a).

As described in Section 11.3.2.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the technical training program 

contains the commitment to train operations and maintenance personnel commensurate with 

their responsibilities at the proposed facility. The program for providing technical training to 

personnel meets the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) as 

part of the overall facility training program and is, therefore, acceptable.

11.3.3.2.5 Professional Development 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s professional development training in accordance with 

the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address the specific, minimum 

requirements for positions for candidates whose activities are relied on for safety and who 

perform actions that prevent or mitigate accident sequences described in the ISA Summary. 

Trainees should meet entry-level criteria defined for the position, including minimum 

educational, technical, experience, and, if necessary, physical fitness requirements.

In Section 11.3.2.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant describes the professional 

development activities to assist facility personnel in gaining additional understanding of the 

technical practices and fundamentals related to their job functions. Professional development 

utilizes internal or external professionals through formal workshops, tutorials, and selected 

training programs (GLE, 2011a).

The applicant’s professional development program meets the acceptance criteria in Section 

11.4.3.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and is, therefore, acceptable because it presents 

training mechanisms that ensure that the facility training program conveys all required skills and 

knowledge necessary for personnel performance of assigned duties. 

11.3.3.3 Job Specific Training Requirements 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s job specific training requirements in accordance with the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address the specific, minimum 

requirements for positions for candidates whose activities are relied on for safety and who 

perform actions that prevent or mitigate accident sequences described in the ISA Summary. 
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Trainees should meet entry-level criteria defined for the position, including minimum 

educational, technical, experience, and, if necessary, physical fitness requirements.

In Section 11.3.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant commits to develop minimum training 

requirements for positions associated with activities that are relied on for safety. The applicant 

utilizes employee experience to identify job-specific training requirements for each employee 

(GLE, 2011a). The entry-level criteria for positions, which are contained in position descriptions, 

include education, technical background, and experience (GLE, 2011a). Job-specific training, 

including operator training, is performance-based and is established with the relevant technical 

EHS safety discipline and Operations leadership to develop a list of qualifications for assigned 

duties (GLE, 2011a). Operator training will incorporate the structured elements of analysis, 

design, development, implementation, and evaluation commensurate with assigned duties 

(GLE, 2011a). The applicant will revise the list of qualifications to include changes to facilities, 

processes, equipment, and job duties (GLE, 2011a).

The applicant’s training program includes commitments to: (1) establish minimum requirements 

for positions that involve the performance of activities relied on for safety and (2) identify entrylevel criteria for positions. The applicant also commits to use performance based-training and to 

revise qualification requirements as necessary to reflect facility design changes and 

modifications. These commitments meet the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.3 of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and are, therefore, acceptable. 

11.3.3.4 Basis of Training and Objectives 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s basis of training and objectives in accordance with the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address how the applicant will 

develop the basis for training, including the objectives, to identify training content, define 

satisfactory trainee performance, and identify objectives from the analysis of activities and 

performance requirements. The objectives should state the knowledge, skills, and abilities the 

trainee should acquire, the conditions under which required actions will take place; and the 

standards of performance the trainee should achieve on completion of the training activity.

In Section 11.3.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that the Training Program is 

designed to prepare personnel for the safe, reliable, and efficient operation of the facility and 

that emphasis is placed on safety requirements where human actions are important to safety.

The applicant states that learning objectives are established to: (a) identify the training content; 

(b) define satisfactory trainee performance for the task, or a group of tasks, selected for training 

from the job analysis; (c) state the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities the trainee must 

demonstrate; (d) determine the conditions under which the required actions must take place; 

and (e) determine the standards of performance required of the trainee (GLE, 2011a). The 

learning objectives are: (a) sequenced within training materials based on the relationship to one 

another; (b) documented in lesson plans and training guides; and (c) revised as necessary, 

based on changes in procedures, facility SSCs, or job scope (GLE, 2011a).

As described in Section 11.3.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant commits to develop and 

implement training objectives that identify the knowledge, skills, and abilities that the trainee 

should acquire; the conditions under which required actions will take place; and the standards of 

performance the trainee should achieve upon completion of the training activity. These 
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activities meet the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and 

are, therefore, acceptable.

11.3.3.5 Organization of Instruction 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s organization of instruction in accordance with the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.5 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.5 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address lesson plans and other 

training guides to assure the consistent conduct of training activities. In addition, lessons plans 

and other training guides should be based on required learning objectives derived from specific 

job performance requirements. Plans or guides should be used for in-class training and on-thejob training and should include standards for evaluating acceptable trainee performance. In 

addition, review and approval requirements should be established for all plans or guides and 

other training materials before their issue and use.

In Section 11.3.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that lessons plans are: (a) 

developed from learning objectives that are based on job performance; (b) reviewed by line 

management and the organization responsible for the subject matter; and (c) approved prior to 

issue or use.

The commitment to ensure the consistent conduct of training activities by using lesson plans 

derived from specific job performance requirements, including standards for evaluating 

acceptable trainee performance in lesson plans, and requiring review and approval of lesson 

plans is consistent with the guidance contained in Section 11.4.3.3.5 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002a) and is, therefore, acceptable.

11.3.3.6 Evaluation of Trainee Accomplishment 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s evaluation of trainee accomplishment in accordance 

with the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address how the 

applicant will periodically evaluate trainees to determine their progress toward full capability to 

perform the job requirements and, at the completion of training, to determine their capability to 

perform the job requirements.

As described in Section 11.3.6 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant commits to use individuals 

who are qualified in the training subject matter to evaluate the trainee’s skill and knowledge of 

job performance requirements. Evaluation methods will include observation, demonstration, 

and oral or documented examinations (GLE, 2011a). The applicant commits to ensure that 

operator training and qualification requirements are met: (1) prior to process safety-related 

tasks being performed independently; (2) prior to startup; or (3) following significant changes to 

safety controls (GLE, 2011a).

The measures established for the evaluation of training performance, as described above and in 

Section 11.3.6 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), meet the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.6 of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and are, therefore, acceptable.

11.3.3.7 On-the-Job Training 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s on-the-job training program in accordance with the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.7 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance 
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criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.7 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address the conduct of on-the-job 

training used for activities relied on for safety and listed in the ISA Summary. On-the-job 

training should be conducted using well-organized and current training materials and by 

designated personnel who are competent in the program standards and methods of conducting 

the training. Completion of on-the-job training should be by actual task performance. When the 

actual task cannot be performed and is, therefore, “walked-down,” the conditions of task 

performance, references, tools, and equipment should reflect the actual task to the extent 

possible.

The applicant states that the OJT program objective is to assure the trainee’s ability to 

proficiently perform job duties as required for the assigned role. As described in 

Section 11.3.7 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), OJT is conducted systematically in the work 

environment to provide personnel with the required job related skills and knowledge (GLE, 

2011a). The OJT Qualifications Program for each technical area includes tasks and procedures 

that supplement training received through formal classroom, laboratory, or simulator training 

(GLE, 2011a). The completion of the OJT requirements is demonstrated by employee 

performance of the task using conditions that replicate those of the actual activity to the extent 

practicable (GLE, 2011a).

The applicant’s provisions for OJT meet the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.7 of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and are acceptable because they include commitments to perform 

OJT in the work environment under conditions that mimic those under which the actual work 

tasks will be performed to the extent possible. The OJT program complements other training 

methods and materials, as appropriate, to ensure that personnel achieve the required level of 

skill and knowledge for the task.

11.3.3.8 Evaluation of Training Effectiveness 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s evaluation of training effectiveness in accordance with 

the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.8 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.8 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address reasonable assurance that 

the training conveys all required skills and knowledge and is used to revise the training, where 

necessary, based on the performance of trained personnel in the job setting. A comprehensive 

evaluation of individual training should be conducted periodically by qualified individuals to 

identify strengths and weaknesses. Feedback from trainee performance during training and 

from former trainees and their supervisors should be used to evaluate and refine the training. 

Change actions (e.g., procedure changes, equipment changes, facility modifications) should be 

monitored and evaluated for their impact on the development or modification of initial and 

continuing training and should be incorporated in a timely manner and be accomplished with 

document control through the CM function. Improvements and changes to initial and continuing 

training should be initiated, evaluated, tracked, and incorporated to correct training deficiencies 

and performance problems.

As described in Section 11.3.8 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant commits to assess the 

effectiveness of the facility training program through periodic evaluations of the Training 

Program content and requirements. The data for the periodic evaluations are gathered from 

trainees’ feedback after the completion of training sessions (GLE, 2011a). The evaluations: (a) 

determine whether training content matches current job needs; (b) identify program strengths 

and weaknesses; and (c) determine if corrective actions are needed to improve program 

effectiveness (GLE, 2011a). 
11-20

In addition to trainee feedback as an indicator of training program effectiveness, the applicant 

identifies that independent audits of the EHS safety disciplines may also be used to provide 

independent evaluations of the overall Training Program effectiveness as it relates to the ISA, 

IROFS implementation, and protection of the public, worker, and environment (GLE, 2011a). 

The evaluation objectives applicable to the overall organization and management of the Training 

Program may include, but are not limited to: (a) development and qualification of the matrix 

organization; (b) management and administration of training programs; (c) Training Program 

interface with the CM Program; (d) design and development of training programs, content, and 

conduct of training, and trainee examinations and evaluations; and (e) Training Program 

assessments and evaluations (GLE, 2011a). 

The measures established for the evaluation of training program effectiveness provide 

reasonable assurance that the facility training program conveys all required skills and 

knowledge necessary for personnel competence and will be used to revise the training, where 

necessary, based on demonstrated job needs and program weaknesses. The evaluations, as 

described in Section 11.3.8 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), meet the acceptance criteria in Section 

11.4.3.3.8 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and are, therefore, acceptable.

11.3.3.9 Personnel Qualification 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s personnel qualification program in accordance with the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.9 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.9 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address the applicant's 

commitments regarding minimum qualifications for personnel required to meet NRC 

requirements. Minimum qualifications should be commensurate with the assigned functional 

responsibility and authority of the respective personnel. The application should contain such 

commitments regarding personnel qualification for managers, supervisors, designers, technical 

staff, construction personnel, facility operators, technicians, maintenance personnel, and other 

staff required to meet NRC regulations.

In Section 11.3.9 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant commits to establish and implement 

qualification and training requirements for Operations personnel in accordance with approved 

written procedures. The applicant refers to Chapter 2, “Organization and Administration,” of the 

LA (GLE, 2011a), for the description of qualification requirements for key management 

positions. As described in Chapter 2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant established training 

requirements that meet the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.9 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002a) for key management positions at the facility; thus, the staff finds the personnel 

qualification requirements acceptable. Personnel qualification is further evaluated in Section 

2.3.2 of this Safety Evaluation Report (SER).

11.3.3.10 Provisions for Continuing Assurance 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s provisions for continuing assurance in accordance with 

the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.10 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.10 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) is for the applicant to provide for 

periodic requalification of personnel, by training or testing as necessary, to provide reasonable 

assurance that they continue to understand, recognize the importance of, and be qualified to 

perform activities that are relied on for safety.

 

In Section 11.3.10 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant commits to establish continuing or 

periodic training, when applicable, to ensure the proficiency of the personnel assigned to the 
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facility and to ensure the retention of knowledge and skills important to operations. These 

training activities may include periodic retraining exercises, instructions, or a review of training 

subjects (GLE, 2011a). The applicant requires retraining to include information that is new or 

has changed due to facility modifications, procedure changes, and QA Program changes (GLE, 

2011a). The applicant also commits to appropriately document the results of the retraining 

program (GLE, 2011a).

The applicant has established provisions for continuing assurance of personnel training and 

qualification that meet the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.3.10 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002a) and will ensure that personnel continue to understand, recognize the importance of, and 

be qualified to perform activities that are relied on for safety. The staff, therefore, finds the 

applicant’s provisions for continuing assurance to be acceptable.

11.3.4 PROCEDURES 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s procedure program in accordance with the acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance criteria in Section 

11.4.3.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address procedure preparation and implementation of 

written procedures.

11.3.4.1 Use of Written Procedures

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s program for the development and implementation of 

procedures in accordance with the acceptance criteria in Sections 11.4.3.4.1 and 11.4.3.4.5 of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.1 of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002a) address procedures written or planned for the operations of IROFS and for all 

management measures supporting those IROFS. The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.5 

of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) is for the applicant to include a commitment to conduct activities 

involving licensed Special Nuclear Material (SNM) or IROFS in accordance with approved 

procedures.

In Section 11.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant commits to perform activities involving the 

handling of SNM or activities involving IROFS in accordance with written procedures. The 

applicant commits to use policies and plans to define and describe the following aspects of 

facility operations: (a) senior management expectations; (b) guidelines for the safe operation of 

the facility; and (c) guidelines for compliance with State and Federal regulations, permits, and 

licenses (GLE, 2011a). Procedures are used to ensure the implementation of the requirements 

of policies and plans, which are upper tier documents (GLE, 2011a). The applicant’s 

commitment to conduct all activities involving the handling of SNM or activities involving IROFS 

in accordance with written procedures meets the acceptance criteria in Sections 11.4.3.4.1 and 

11.4.3.4.5 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and is, therefore, acceptable.

In Section 11.4.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that the facility’s procedures are 

categorized as management control procedures or operating procedures/instructions. 

Management control procedures describe general and administrative practices, direct and 

control activities in different organizational functions, and assign functional responsibilities and 

requirements for these activities (GLE, 2011a). Operating procedures are used to directly 

control process operations at the workstation and provide specific direction for task-based work 

(GLE, 2011a). 
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The applicant requires compliance with facility procedures and requires personnel to safely stop 

the operation or activity and contact management if any aspect of a procedure is unclear or 

incorrect as written (GLE, 2011a). Should work be stopped in this manner, the applicant states 

that the operation or activity will not restart until corrective action has been taken (GLE, 2011a). 

The applicant also requires management notification in the event that a situation occurs that is 

not defined in the procedure content or an unexpected response is obtained (GLE, 2011a).

Finally, in response to deviations from operating procedures and unforeseen alterations in 

process conditions that affect nuclear criticality safety, the applicant requires that conditions 

must be reported to management, investigated promptly, corrected as appropriate, and 

documented (GLE, 2011a). 

The procedural controls that are implemented at the proposed facility meet the acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and are acceptable as they include: 

(1) the identification and description of procedure categories that are used at the proposed 

facility (Section 11.4.3.4.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a); (2) the requirement that procedural 

compliance is mandatory for all personnel (Section 11.4.3.4.5 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a); 

(3) provisions that allow for the cessation of operations and the placement of processes in a 

safe condition if a step of a procedure cannot be performed as written; and (4) measures that 

will be implemented for procedural deviations and unexpected conditions that affect nuclear 

safety. 

11.3.4.1.1 Management Control Procedures 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s management of control procedures in accordance with 

the acceptance criteria in Sections 11.4.3.4.1 and 11.4.3.4.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). 

The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address planned 

or written procedures for the operations of IROFS and for all management measures supporting 

those IROFS. The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) 

address important elements of the function described in NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and 

include design, CM, procurement, construction, radiation safety, maintenance, QA elements, 

training and qualification, audits and assessments, incident investigations, records 

management, criticality safety, fire safety, chemical safety, and reporting requirements.

Section 11.4.1.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) identifies activities that are controlled through the use 

of management control procedures. These activities support process operations and may 

include: (a) design; (b) CM; (c) procurement; (d) construction; (e) RP; (f) maintenance; (g) QA; 

(h) training and qualification; (i) audits and assessments; (j) incident investigations; (k) RM; (l) 

NCS; (m) industrial safety; and (n) reporting requirements (GLE, 2011a).

The management control procedures, as described in Section 11.4.1.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), 

are consistent with the description of types of procedures that will be used at the proposed 

facility (per Section 11.4.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a)) and meet the acceptance criteria in Sections 

11.4.3.4.1 and 11.4.3.4.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). As such, the procedures described in 

Section 11.4.1.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) are acceptable.

11.3.4.1.2 Operating Procedures/Instructions 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s management of control procedures in accordance with 

the acceptance criteria in Sections 11.4.3.4.2, 11.4.3.4.6 and 11.4.3.4.11 of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002a). The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) 

address written operating procedures with the following elements: (1) purpose; (2) 
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requirements, guidelines, and policies governing the procedure; (3) procedure type; (4) 

procedure steps; (5) initial startup; (6) normal operations; (7) temporary operations; (8) 

emergency shutdown; (9) emergency operations; (10) normal shutdown; (11) startup following 

emergencies or extended shutdown; (12) hazards and safety considerations; (13) operating 

limits; (14) precautions to prevent exposure to hazardous materials; (15) measures to be taken 

if exposures to hazardous materials occur; (16) IROFS associated with the procedure; and (17) 

timeframe for which the procedure is valid.

The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address the types 

of procedures used during facility operation including management, operating, maintenance, 

and emergency procedures.

The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.11 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address 

maintenance procedures involving IROFS to include pre-maintenance activities, required 

notifications, and comprehensive procedures for control of maintenance work.

In Section 11.4.1.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that operating 

procedures/instructions will include direction for initial startup, normal operations, off-normal 

operations, temporary operations, maintenance, alarm response, normal shutdown, emergency 

operations and shutdown, and startup following an emergency or extended downtime. The 

procedures, as described by the applicant, will ensure that industrial safety, security, emergency 

preparedness, RP, NCS, and environmental protection are maintained (GLE, 2011a).

The applicant states that, as applicable, the operating procedures/instructions will contain the 

following elements: (1) purpose; (2) regulations, policies, and guidelines governing the 

procedure; (3) type of procedure; (4) steps for each operating process (5) hazards and safety 

considerations; (6) operating limits; (7) precautions necessary to prevent exposure to hazardous 

chemicals (resulting from operations with SNM) or to licensed SNM; (8) measures to be taken if 

contact or exposure occurs; (9) IROFS associated with the process and associated functions; 

and (10) the timeframe for which the procedure is valid (GLE, 2011a).

Maintenance procedures involving IROFS for corrective maintenance, PM, testing after 

maintenance, and surveillance maintenance activities will describe the following as needed: (1) 

personnel qualifications; (2) controls applicable to, and specification of, any replacement 

components or materials to be used; (3) post-maintenance testing to verify equipment 

operability; (4) tracking and RM maintenance activities; (5) safe work practices; (6) premaintenance activities that require reviews of the work to be performed; and (7) steps that 

require notification of affected parties (technicians and supervisors) before performing work and 

on completion of maintenance work (GLE, 2011a). 

Alarm response procedures will provide information for the identification of: (1) symptoms of the 

alarm; (2) possible causes; (3) automatic actions; (4) immediate operator action to be taken; 

and (5) required supplementary actions (GLE, 2011a). Off-normal procedures will describe 

actions to be taken during unusual or out-of-the ordinary situations (GLE, 2011a). Emergency 

operating procedures will identify actions necessary to mitigate potential events or events in 

progress that require protection of onsite personnel; public health and safety; and the 

environment (GLE, 2011a).

As described in Section 11.4.1.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant identified operating 

procedures that will be implemented at the proposed facility to control normal and off-normal 

operations, maintenance, alarm response, and emergency operations. The list of operating 
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procedures is consistent with the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.6 of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002a) and is, therefore, acceptable. The applicant commits to include topics relevant to 

corrective and preventive maintenance, functional testing after maintenance, and surveillance 

maintenance activities in maintenance procedures involving IROFS. The topics identified for 

inclusion in maintenance procedures are consistent with the acceptance criteria contained in 

Section 11.4.3.4.11 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and are, therefore, acceptable.

The applicant outlines the elements that will be contained in the procedures. This description of 

the elements that will be included in operating procedures (i.e., purpose, time for which 

procedure is valid, etc.) meets the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.2 of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002a) and is, therefore, acceptable. 

11.3.4.2 Procedure Development Process 

11.3.4.2.1 Identification 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s process for identifying the need for and development of 

procedures in accordance with the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.4 of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002a). The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) 

address a method for identifying, developing, approving, implementing, and controlling 

operating procedures based on ISA results.

The applicant describes the identification phase of the procedure development process in 

Section 11.4.2.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) and states that line managers or other designees are 

responsible for the identification of procedures needed for assigned functional areas. As 

described in the LA (GLE, 2011a), area managers are responsible for the identification of 

procedures that incorporate control and limitation requirements established by the RP, NCS, 

Industrial Safety and Environmental Protection functions (GLE, 2011a). Procedures necessary 

for human actions that are important to safety are identified through the ISAs, and each 

approved written procedure will have a unique identifier that is assigned by the Document 

Control function (GLE, 2011a). The provisions that the applicant described in Section 11.4.2.1 

of the LA (GLE, 2011a), meet the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.4 of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002a) and are, therefore, acceptable.

11.3.4.2.2 Development 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s procedure development process in accordance with the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address a method for identifying, 

developing, approving, implementing, and controlling operating procedures based on ISA 

results.

The applicant describes the procedure development process in Section 11.4.2.2 of the LA (GLE, 

2011a) and states that procedure development is: (1) initiated, developed, and controlled by the 

Document Control Program; (2) completed in accordance with approved written procedures; 

and (3) performed under the responsibility of line managers or other designees. Nuclear safety 

control requirements for workers will be incorporated into the appropriate operating, 

maintenance, and test procedures for uranium enrichment operations and detailed step-by-step 

procedures will not be required for activities that require skills normally possessed by qualified 

personnel (GLE, 2011a). Such activities will be performed in accordance with the appropriate 

documents, such as planning sheets, external manuals, forms, and job descriptions (GLE, 
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2011a). The description of the procedure development process, as described in Section 

11.4.2.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), includes descriptions of lines of authority, document control 

requirements, and provisions for activities not requiring written procedures that meet the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and are, therefore, 

acceptable.

11.3.4.2.3 Verification/Validation 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s procedure verification and validation process in 

accordance with the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.8 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). 

The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.8 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address how the 

applicant verify the technical accuracy of procedures and verify that they can be performed as 

written and to identify who is responsible for verification. The verification process should 

provide reasonable assurance that the technical information, including formulas and set-points, 

and acceptance criteria are complete and correct and include a walk-down of the procedure in 

the field or a tabletop walkthrough. In addition, the process should include cross-disciplinary 

reviews and include both new procedures and changes to existing procedures. The process 

should also address operating limits and IROFS identified in the ISA Summary, QA 

requirements, and responsible management approval.

In Section 11.4.2.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that before procedures are 

used, they are verified and validated to ensure the technical accuracy (verification) and to 

ensure that they can be performed as written (validation). The applicant commits to employ the 

applicable guidance contained in NUREG-0700, “Human-System Interface Design Review 

Guidelines,” (NRC, 2002b) and NUREG-0711, “Human Factors Engineering Program Review 

Model,” (NRC, 2004) in the conduct of verification and validation activities (GLE, 2011a). 

The verification process is performed by the procedure owner during the procedure 

development or change process and includes two basic attributes: (1) a technical accuracy 

verification to ensure that technical information, including formulas, set points, and acceptance 

criteria, are correctly identified in the procedures; and (2) an administrative process to verify the 

procedure format and style and to verify that the procedures meet the requirements specified in 

the approved written CM procedures (GLE, 2011a).

The validation process purpose, as stated in the LA (GLE, 2011a), is to ensure that no technical 

errors or human factor issues were inadvertently introduced during the procedure development 

or review process. The validation process is: (a) required for new procedures and for 

procedure changes; (b) performed in the field by qualified personnel; (c) performed in a training 

environment in situations where a particular system or process is not available for walk-down 

validation; and (d) required to be documented. As described by the applicant, validation may be 

accomplished by detailed scrutiny of the procedure as part of walk-through exercises or drills 

(GLE, 2011a). 

The procedure verification and validation processes of procedure development, as described in 

Section 11.4.2.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), ensures that facility procedures are technically 

accurate and able to be performed as written. These measures meet the acceptance criteria in 

Section 11.4.3.4.8 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and are, therefore, acceptable.
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11.3.4.2.4 Review/Approval 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s procedure review and approval in accordance with the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address a method for identifying, 

developing, approving, implementing, and controlling operating procedures based on ISA 

results.

In Section 11.4.2.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant describes the review and approval 

process for procedures. The applicant states that new procedures and changes to procedures 

undergo review by the appropriate technical and safety disciplines, including cross-discipline 

reviews as necessary (GLE, 2011a). The applicant states that the organization from which the 

procedure originated resolves the comments or questions generated during the review process 

(GLE, 2011a). Upon completion of the review process, procedures are approved by the 

organization manager responsible for the procedure activity (GLE, 2011a). This manager is 

also responsible for ensuring that the appropriate training is completed on the new and revised 

procedures (GLE, 2011a). 

As described in Section 11.4.2.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the QA function reviews QA 

implementing procedures for compliance and consistency with the QA Program and ensures 

that the provisions of the QA Program are effectively incorporated into QA implementing 

procedures.

The procedure review and approval process includes provisions for the issue of new 

procedures, procedure revisions, comment resolutions, training, and management involvement 

in procedure approval. These measures meet the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.4 of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and are, therefore, acceptable, as they will maintain the quality and 

consistency of procedures issued and used at the facility.

11.3.4.2.5 Issuance and Distribution 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s procedure issuance and distribution process in 

accordance with the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.9 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). 

The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.9 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address the 

distribution of documents in accordance with applicable distribution lists and a process that 

limits the use of outdated procedures. In addition, copies of procedures should be available to 

appropriate personnel and the process for issuance and distribution should be documented and 

refer to the records management function.

The applicant commits, in Section 11.4.2.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), to distribute controlled 

documents and approved revisions in a controlled manner in accordance with the Document 

Control Program. As stated in the LA (GLE, 2011a), line managers, or other designees, are 

responsible to ensure that personnel whose work requires the use of procedures have access to 

the controlled copies of such procedures. The procedure issuance and distribution process, as 

described in Section 11.4.2.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), presents measures to ensure that 

documents and revisions thereto are controlled and distributed in accordance with the document 

control program and available to appropriate personnel. This process meets the acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.9 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and is, therefore, acceptable.
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Further descriptions of the provisions of the document control program are found in Section 7 of 

the QAPD (GLE, 2011c). Further evaluation of the applicant’s document control program is 

found in Section 11.A.3.7 of Appendix A to Chapter 11 of this SER.

11.3.4.3 Temporary Changes to Procedures 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s temporary change process in accordance with the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.10 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.10 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address a formal process for 

making temporary changes to procedures. Such changes should not involve changes to the 

ISA and should be conducted in accordance with a documented review and approval process. 

Temporary changes should only be issued when permanent procedures do not exist to (1) direct 

operations during testing, maintenance, and modifications; (2) provide guidance in unusual 

situations; and (3) provide assurance of orderly and uniform operations for short periods. The 

process should establish time frames for use of temporary procedures and set the same level of 

review and approval as used for permanent procedures.

The applicant describes provisions for the use of temporary changes in Section 11.4.3 of the LA 

(GLE, 2011a) and states that temporary changes to procedures can be made when the change 

does not result in a change to the ISA and when the change does not involve an intent change 

(a change in scope, method, or acceptance criteria that has safety significance). Temporary 

changes are documented in accordance with written procedures (GLE, 2011a). Temporary 

procedure changes may be used for identified periods of time that should not exceed 30 days or 

for the period for which the temporary condition exits, whichever is greater (GLE, 2011a). If the 

temporary procedure needs to exceed this period, the temporary change will be assessed to 

ensure that it is appropriate to extend its use or if a permanent change needs to be processed 

(GLE, 2011a). A temporary change may be made permanent after the change is reviewed and 

approved by the requirements of the Procedure Development Process (GLE, 2011a). 

The applicant has established formal requirements governing the use of temporary procedure 

changes. These requirements dictate the conditions under which a temporary procedure 

change may be used, the time period for which it may be implemented, and the review and 

documentation responsibilities associated with the changes. These requirements, as described 

in Section 11.4.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), meet the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.10 of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and are, therefore, acceptable.

11.3.4.4 Temporary Procedures 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s temporary change process in accordance with the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.10 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.10 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address a formal process for 

making temporary changes. Such changes should not involve changes to the ISA and should 

be conducted in accordance with a documented and approval process. Temporary changes 

should only be issued when permanent procedures do not exist to (1) direct operations during 

testing, maintenance, and modifications; (2) provide guidance in unusual situations; and (3) 

provide assurance of orderly and uniform operations for short periods. The process should 

establish time frames for use of temporary procedures and set the same level of review and 

approval as used for permanent procedures.

In Section 11.3.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that temporary procedures are 

issued to address changes in normal conditions that are not addressed in operating procedures; 
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these conditions can be related to safety, quality, production, or maintenance procedures.

Temporary procedures are classified in three categories: (a) emergency; (b) standard (valid for 

up to 90 days from initial start); and (c) long-term (valid for periods not to exceed one year) 

(GLE, 2011a). Long-term procedures, which require equivalent signatures to new operating 

procedures, are used for projects that require a long-term startup phase before facility 

acceptance or process qualification (GLE, 2011a).

The applicant’s description of temporary procedures includes identification of the classification 

categories, conditions of use, and approval requirements for temporary procedures. These 

requirements, as described in Section 11.3.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), meet the acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.10 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and are, therefore, acceptable.

11.3.4.5 Periodic Reviews 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s periodic procedure review process in accordance with 

the acceptance criteria in Sections 11.4.3.4.7 and 11.4.3.4.12 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). 

The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.7 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address how the 

applicant will review procedures after unusual events, such as accidents, unexpected transients, 

significant operator error, or equipment malfunction, or after any modification to the system and 

revise the procedures as needed.

The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.12 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) is for the 

applicant to conduct periodic procedure reviews to assure their continued accuracy and 

usefulness and establish the time frame for reviews of the various types of procedures.

The periodic review of procedures, as stated by the applicant in Section 11.4.5 of the LA (GLE, 

2011a), is performed to assure their continued accuracy and usefulness. The applicant 

commits to review operating procedures at least once every three years and to review 

emergency procedures at least annually (GLE, 2011a). Procedures will be reviewed after 

unusual incidents, including accidents, unexpected transients, significant operator error, or 

equipment malfunctions, to determine if changes are appropriate based on the cause and 

corrective action determination for the particular incident (GLE, 2011a). The applicant identifies 

the frequency with which it will conduct periodic reviews of controlled documents in Table 11-1, 

“Procedure Periodic Reviews,” of the LA (GLE, 2011a).

As described in Section 11.4.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant made commitments to 

perform periodic and issue-based procedure reviews. The applicant’s commitment to review 

procedures periodically and after unusual incidents, including accidents, unexpected transients, 

significant error operator, or equipment malfunctions, meets the acceptance criteria in Section 

11.4.3.4.7 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and is, therefore, acceptable. The applicant’s 

commitment to review procedures to ensure continued accuracy and applicability meets the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.12 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and is, therefore, 

acceptable. 

11.3.4.6 Use and Control of Procedures 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s use and control of procedures in accordance with the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.9 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.9 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address the distribution of 

documents in accordance with applicable distribution lists and a process that limits the use of 

outdated procedures. In addition, copies of procedures should be available to appropriate 
11-29

personnel and issuance and distribution should be documented and refer to the records 

management function.

Section 11.4.6 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) states that line managers and area managers will ensure 

that procedures are readily available in the work area and that personnel are trained in the 

requirements of the procedures. The applicant commits to train personnel to understand the 

policy of mandatory compliance with procedures and to immediately report inadequate 

procedures or the inability to follow procedures (GLE, 2011a). These provisions regarding the 

use and control of procedures ensure that current procedures are available and used at all work 

locations. The procedure use and control measures described in Section 11.4.6 of the LA 

(GLE, 2011a) meet the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.9 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) 

and are, therefore, acceptable.

11.3.4.7 Records 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s procedure records process in accordance with the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address a method for identifying, 

developing, approving, implementing, and controlling operating procedures based on ISA 

results.

In Section 11.4.7 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that the facility Safety Program 

requires the establishment and maintenance of approved written procedures for EHS limitations 

and requirements to govern the safety aspects of operations. The applicant commits to 

document requirements for procedure control and approval authorities (GLE, 2011a). The 

commitment to identify and document the management personnel who are responsible and 

accountable for the approval and maintenance of procedures meets the acceptance criteria in 

Section 11.4.3.4.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and is, therefore, acceptable.

11.3.4.8 Topics to be Covered in Procedures 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s procedure topics in accordance with the acceptance 

criteria in Sections 11.4.3.4.3 and 11.4.3.4.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address important elements of the 

function described in NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and include design, CM, procurement, 

construction, radiation safety, maintenance, QA elements, training and qualification, audits and 

assessments, incident investigations, records management, criticality safety, fire safety,

chemical safety, and reporting requirements.

The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address the types 

of procedures used during facility operation including management, operating, maintenance, 

and emergency procedures.

In Section 11.4.8 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant commits to cover, as a minimum, all the 

activities identified in Section 11.4.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) in controlled documents. The 

applicant provides a listing with of topics to be covered by procedures and identifies that the list 

may not be all-inclusive and is meant for guidance only (GLE, 2011a). Topics identified on the 

list are:
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• Management control procedures 

Training; audits and inspections; investigations and reporting; RM and document control; 

changes in facilities and equipment; modification design control; QA; equipment control 

(lockout/tagout); shift turnover; work and management control; nuclear criticality safety; 

fire safety; chemical process safety; radiation protection; radioactive waste 

management; maintenance; environmental protection; operations; IROFS surveillances; 

calibration control; procurement (GLE, 2011a);

• System procedures that address start-up, operation, and shutdown

Electrical power; ventilation; shift routines, shift turnover, and operating practices; 

sampling; uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinder handling; UF6 material handling 

equipment; decontamination operations; facility air and nitrogen; cooling, sanitary, and 

facility water; temporary changes in operating procedures; purge and evacuation 

vacuum systems (GLE, 2011a);

• Abnormal operation/alarm response

Loss of cooling, instrument air, and/or electrical power; fires; chemical process releases; 

loss of feed or withdrawal capacity; loss of purge vacuum (GLE, 2011a);

• Maintenance activities that address system repair, calibration, inspection and testing

Repairs and preventive repairs of IROFS; calibration and functional testing of IROFS; 

high-efficiency particulate air filter maintenance; safety system relief valve replacement; 

surveillance/monitoring; piping integrity testing; containment device testing; repair of UF6

valves; testing of cranes; UF6 cylinder inspection and testing (GLE, 2011a); and

• Emergency procedures

Toxic chemical releases (including UF6) (GLE, 2011a).

The applicant’s list of the types of activities that are covered, or will be covered, by written 

procedures includes the topics of administrative procedures; system procedures that address 

startup, operation, and shutdown; abnormal operation or alarm response; maintenance activities 

that address system repair, calibration, inspection, and testing; and emergency procedures 

(GLE, 2011a). The applicant also clearly states areas for which a procedure is required, 

including examples of specific activities. The description of facility procedures meets the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and is, therefore, 

acceptable. The commitment to establish and implement procedures to direct fire safety and 

chemical process safety meets the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4.3 of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002a) and is, therefore, acceptable.

11.3.5 AUDITS AND ASSESSMENTS 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s audit and assessment process in accordance with the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.5 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance criteria 

in Section 11.4.3.5 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address the applicant’s audit and 

assessment process to include applicable policy objectives, a commitment to conduct audits 
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and independent assessments, identification of the areas in which audits and assessments are 

conducted, and the commitment to use qualified personnel to conduct audits and assessments.

As described in Section 11.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant commits to implement a 

system of audits and assessments to help ensure that the EHS functions are adequate and 

effectively implemented. The system of audits and assessments will ensure comprehensive 

program oversight at least once every three years (i.e., each program area will be audited or 

assessed at no greater than three year intervals). The applicant’s commitment to conduct 

audits and assessments of activities significant to facility safety and environmental protection 

meets the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.5 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and is, 

therefore, acceptable.

11.3.5.1 Activities to be Audited or Assessed 

11.3.5.1.1 Assessments 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s assessment process in accordance with the acceptance 

criteria in Sections 11.4.3.5.2 and 11.4.3.5.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.5.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address the applicant’s 

commitments to conduct independent assessments of activities significant to facility safety and 

environmental protection. The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.5.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002a) address the conduct of independent assessments by offsite groups or individuals not 

involved in the licensed activity, to verify that the health, safety, and environmental compliance 

functions are effectively achieving their designed purposes.

 

Section 11.5.1.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) states that assessments will be performed by 

management to verify the effective implementation of the Safety Program elements (RP, NCS, 

Industrial Safety, Security and Emergency Preparedness, and Environmental Protection); 

management measures; and QA Program elements. Assessments: (1) include an evaluation of 

procedural compliance, conformance to regulations, and the overall adequacy of the safety 

program; (2) are documented and reported in accordance with approved written procedures; 

and (3) engage the Corrective Action Program as necessary for condition reporting and 

corrective action (GLE, 2011a). The applicant states that it will allow personnel from the area 

being assessed to perform the assessment provided that they do not have direct responsibility 

for the specific activity being assessed (GLE, 2011a). The responsible line manager has the 

responsibility for resolving any observations that arise from programmatic assessments. In 

addition to the management assessments described above, the applicant commits to perform 

independent assessments of its Safety Program elements (GLE, 2011a). 

The applicant commits to: (1) conduct independent assessments of activities significant to 

facility safety and environmental protection to verify that the health, safety, and environmental 

compliance functions are effectively achieving their designed purposes: and (2) ensure that 

these assessments are performed by individuals not involved in the licensed activity (GLE, 

2011a). This meets the acceptance criteria in Sections 11.4.3.5.2 and 11.4.3.5.4 of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002a) and is, therefore, acceptable. The applicant describes the management 

responsibilities related to assessments as well as the documentation and corrective action 

requirements for assessments (GLE, 2011a). The applicant’s program for assessments, as 

described in Section 11.5.1.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), is consistent with the guidance contained 

in Sections 11.4.3.5.2 and 11.4.3.5.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and is, therefore, 

acceptable.
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11.3.5.1.2 Audits 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s audit process in accordance with the acceptance criteria 

in Sections 11.4.3.5.2 and 11.4.3.5.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance criteria 

in Section 11.4.3.5.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address the applicant’s commitment to 

conduct internal audits of activities significant to facility safety and environmental protection. 

The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.5.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address the 

conduct of audits to verify that operations are being conducted in accordance with regulatory 

requirements and commitments in the LA.

The applicant states, in Section 11.5.1.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), that audits are performed to 

determine if operations conform to NCS, RP, and Industrial Safety requirements. As described 

in the LA (GLE, 2011a), audits are: (1) conducted by representatives of the NCS, RP, and 

Industrial Safety functions; (2) performed in accordance with approved written procedures; and 

(3) scheduled to assess the safety of uranium enrichment and process support areas. The 

applicant states that audit results are reported in writing to the Facility Manager, the EHS 

Manager, the NCS Manager, area managers, the manager of the safety function being audited, 

and other line management as appropriate (GLE, 2011a).

The scope of the audit program, organizational responsibilities for audits, guidelines for the 

scheduling and conduct of audits, and the levels of management to which results are reported 

are described in Section 11.5.1.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). The applicant commits to conduct 

audits to verify that operations are being conducted in accordance with regulatory requirements 

and commitments in the license application for NCS, RP, and Industrial Safety. This 

commitment meets the acceptance criteria in Sections 11.4.3.5.2 and 11.4.3.5.3 of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002a) and is, therefore, acceptable.

11.3.5.2 Scheduling of Audits and Assessments 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s audit and assessment scheduling process in 

accordance with the acceptance criteria in Sections 11.4.3.5.1 and 11.4.3.5.5 of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002a). The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.5.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) 

address policy directives covering the audit and assessment function. The acceptance criteria 

in Section 11.4.3.5.5 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address the conduct of audits and 

assessments in the areas of radiation safety, NCS, chemical safety, fire safety, environmental 

protection, emergency management, QA, CM, maintenance, training and qualification, 

procedures, incident investigation, and records management.

As described in Section 11.5.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), an assessment of each management 

measure is performed annually. Assessments may focus on a single organizational element or 

the entire organization and are conducted as follows: (1) NCS and RP audits will be performed 

quarterly (at intervals not to exceed 110 days) under the direction of the manager of the NCS 

and RP functions; (2) weekly nuclear criticality safety walkthroughs of uranium enrichment and 

process support areas will be conducted by facility personnel in accordance with approved 

written procedures, with any findings from the walkthrough being documented and sent to the 

affected line manager or area manager for resolution; (3) triennial independent assessments will 

be conducted of facility safety program elements; and (4) an audit schedule will be developed 

annually by the Environmental Protection function to evaluate the Environmental Protection 

Program (GLE, 2011a).
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The applicant commits to conduct audits and assessments of the Environmental Protection 

Program, RP, NCS, and facility Safety Program elements, which includes management 

measures. These audits and assessments encompass the program areas identified in the 

acceptance criteria of Section 11.4.3.5.5 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a), which include radiation 

safety, NCS, chemical safety, fire safety, environmental protection, emergency management, 

QA, CM, maintenance, training and qualification, procedures, incident investigation, and records 

management. The applicant also describes the frequency of audits that will be conducted as 

part of the audit program. The description of the audit and assessment function (i.e., the 

activities to be audited and audit frequency) meets the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.5.1 

of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and is, therefore, acceptable.

11.3.5.3 Procedures for Audits and Assessments 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s procedures for audits and assessments in accordance 

with the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.5.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.5.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address the policy 

directives covering the audit and assessment function including the areas to be audited, the 

frequency of audits, guidance to be used, assigned responsibilities, and procedures for 

recording results and making recommendations.

The applicant describes its procedure requirements for audits and assessments in Section 

11.5.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). Specifically, the applicant commits to: (1) communicate audit 

results in writing to the responsible line manager, the Facility Manager, area managers, and to 

the EHS Manager; (2) document corrective actions that need to be performed; (3) ensure that 

corrective actions are approved by management and tracked to completion by the EHS function; 

and (4) maintain records of the audit or inspection, instructions and procedures used, persons 

conducting the audits or inspections, audit or inspection results, and corrective actions for 

identified violations of license conditions in accordance with procedural requirements for a 

minimum period of three years in accordance with written procedures (GLE, 2011a). 

The applicant also states that industrial safety audits will be performed under the direction of the 

Industrial Safety Manager, and environmental protection audits will be conducted in accordance 

with approved written procedures to ensure that operational activities conform to documented 

environmental requirements (GLE, 2011a). 

The applicant describes the procedural requirements that will be implemented to control the 

documentation and communication of audit results and corrective actions. As described in 

Section 11.5.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the commitments regarding audit and assessment 

procedures meet the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.5.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) 

and are, therefore, acceptable.

11.3.5.4 Qualifications and Responsibilities for Audits and Assessments 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s qualifications and responsibilities for audits and 

assessments in accordance with the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.5.6 of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002a). The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.5.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) 

address the use of qualified personnel without direct responsibility for the function and area 

being audited or assessed, specify the responsible staff positions and committees for 

conducting the audits and assessments, and specify the levels of management for reporting 

results and corrective actions.

 
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In Section 11.5.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant commits to form audit teams with 

members who: (a) are appropriately trained and experienced; (b) do not report to the audited 

organization; and (c) have no direct responsibility to the function being audited. As stated in the 

LA (GLE, 2011a), audit results in the form of corrective action items are reported to the Facility 

Manager and staff for monitoring of closure status. Also, the responsible line or area manager 

are responsible for addressing corrective action commitments related to nonconformances in 

accordance with approved written procedures (GLE, 2011a). 

As stated in the LA (GLE, 2011a), the Environmental Project Manager, or delegate, are 

responsible for resolution of identified nonconformances associated with the Environmental 

Protection Program. 

In Section 11.5.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant commits to ensure that qualified 

personnel without direct responsibility for the function and area being audited or assessed 

perform audits and assessments. The applicant also specifies the staff positions and 

committees responsible for audits and assessments, describes the levels of management to 

which results will be reported, and includes a description of the process for resolution and 

reporting of nonconformances and corrective actions. The responsibilities and qualification 

requirements for audits and assessments meet the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.6 of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and are, therefore, acceptable.

11.3.6 INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s incident investigation process in accordance with the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance criteria 

in Section 11.4.3.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address the applicant’s description of and 

commitment to a process to investigate abnormal events at the facility, monitor and document 

corrective actions, and maintain documentation of lessons learned. The incident investigation 

process should have a formal policy and procedures and include the investigation of abnormal 

events.

In Section 11.6 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that incident investigations are 

performed to assure that upset conditions are understood and appropriate corrective actions are 

identified and implemented to prevent recurrence. The applicant states that the facility’s 

management measures include the documentation of upset conditions in unusual incident 

reports (UIRs), which will be documented and their related corrective actions will be tracked to 

completion (GLE, 2011a). 

As described in Section 11.6 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the objectives of the incident investigation 

and reporting procedures are to: (a) establish the validity of the data related to the incident; (b) 

develop and implement corrective action plans when appropriate; (c) document an event which 

was or could become a danger to persons or property; and (d) ensure that proper levels of 

management and public agencies are notified. 

11.3.6.1 Incident Identification, Categorization, and Notification 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s incident investigation process in accordance with the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance criteria 

in Section 11.4.3.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address the applicant’s description of and 

commitment to a process to investigate abnormal events at the facility, monitor and document 
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corrective actions, and maintain documentation of lessons learned. The process should have a 

formal policy and procedures and include the investigation of abnormal events.

In Section 11.6.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant commits to maintain a system to 

identify, track, investigate, and implement corrective actions for abnormal events that may occur 

during the operation of the facility. The system will determine the specific or generic root 

causes(s), the generic implication, recommended corrective actions, and report events as 

required by 10 CFR 70.50 and 70.74 (GLE, 2011a). 

The Corrective Action System, as described in the LA (GLE, 2011a), contains the following 

requirements and features: (a) operates in accordance with approved written procedures; (b) 

provides for the documentation, tracking, and reporting of abnormal events to facility 

management; (c) identifies abnormal events associated with IROFS or their associated 

management measures; (d) considers each event in terms of regulatory reporting criteria and in 

terms of severity (where precursor events are considered unusual events and events 

concerning compliance with regulations or license conditions are considered potential noncompliances (PNCs)); (e) requires investigation of UIRs, a determination of root or most 

probable (proximate) cause, and the identification of required corrective action(s); (f) for more 

significant UIRs and PNCs, requires a formal, systematic determination of root cause, creation 

of a Corrective Action Plan, and a higher level management review and approval of the 

investigation and corrective actions; (g) requires that monthly reports covering the status of 

UIRs and PNCs be issued to facility management; (h) grades events for the purpose of an 

ongoing management evaluation of facility performance and use as one element in driving 

safety culture focus; (i) maintains records of the events and the documented evidence of closure 

for a minimum of three years; and (j) uses UIR and PNC information where appropriate when 

performing ISAs.

In Section 11.6.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant provides a description of the process 

that will be used to: (1) investigate abnormal events that may occur during operation of the 

facility to determine their specific or generic root cause(s), generic implications, and risk 

significance; (2) recommend corrective actions; and (3) make any report to the NRC that is 

required by 10 CFR 70.50 or 10 CFR 70.74. The applicant’s description of the corrective action 

system as it relates to the investigation of abnormal facility events and the commitment to 

implement this system in accordance with written procedures will ensure that incident 

investigations will be properly identified, investigated, and resolved. This system meets the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and is, therefore, 

acceptable.

11.3.6.2 Conduct of Incident Investigations 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s incident investigation process in accordance with the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance criteria 

in Section 11.4.3.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address the applicant’s description of and 

commitment to a process to investigate abnormal events at the facility, monitor and document 

corrective actions, maintain lessons learned documents. The process should have a formal 

policy and procedures and include the investigation of abnormal events.

 

In Section 11.6.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant commits to implement the incident 

investigation process in accordance with approved written procedures, perform a prompt riskbased evaluation of the event, and conduct investigations with investigators who are

independent of the function(s) involved with the incident under investigation. When 
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investigations warrant the use of a team, such teams will: (1) include a minimum of one 

individual trained in root cause analysis and one member knowledgeable of the area being 

investigated; (2) undergo no retaliation as a result of their participation in investigations; and (3) 

be composed of qualified investigators, whether internally or externally appointed (GLE, 2011a). 

As described in the LA (GLE, 2011a), investigations will be initiated within 48 hours of the 

abnormal event, or sooner, based on the event’s safety significance, and will include a review of 

the record of IROFS failures as required by 10 CFR 70.62(a)(3). The details of the accident 

event sequence(s) will be compared with accident sequence(s) already considered in the ISA, 

and the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) will be modified to include the evaluation of the risk 

associated with accidents of the type actually experienced (GLE, 2011a). The applicant 

commits to maintain auditable records and documentation related to abnormal events, 

investigations, and root cause analyses so that "lessons learned" may be applied to future 

operations of the facility (GLE, 2011a). The applicant further commits to include a description of 

the event and contributing factors, a root cause analysis, findings, and recommendations in the 

incident report for each abnormal event experienced at the facility (GLE, 2011a). The applicant 

will also review relevant findings with affected personnel and revise records, as required by 

post-failure investigation conclusions, within five working days of investigation completion (GLE, 

2011a). 

The Incident Investigation Process includes the following steps: (1) investigate the problem; (2) 

derive an understanding of the issues and drivers and determine the fundamental or root 

cause(s); (3) develop appropriate corrective and preventive actions; (4) assign responsible 

individual(s) to address each corrective or protective action, determine the required timing for 

each action, and provide scheduled target date for each action; (5) compile adequate records 

(hard copy or electronic files) to demonstrate completion or closure of the corrective actions; (6) 

conduct an investigation to determine if the corrective action was appropriate; (7) ensure that 

identified corrective actions are completed in an appropriate and timely manner; (8) input the 

corrective action completion data, documentation, and any related notes of interest in a hard 

copy or electronic copy file; (9) provide appropriate facility management with closure 

documentation for internal type items; and (10) provide the Licensing Organization with closure 

documentation for external agency items or input the documentation electronically into the 

controlled electronic file (GLE, 2011a). 

The applicant provides a comprehensive description of the activities it will perform as part of 

incident investigations including: (1) comparing details of the event sequence with accident 

sequences already considered in the ISA; (2) modifying the ISA Summary to include evaluation 

of the risk associated with accidents of the type actually experienced; and (3) maintaining 

documentation related to abnormal events (GLE, 2011a). As described in the LA (GLE, 2011a), 

the process for investigating abnormal events meets the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.6 

of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and is, therefore, acceptable.

11.3.6.3 Written Followup Report

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s incident investigation documentation in accordance with 

the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address the applicant’s description of 

and commitment to a process to investigate abnormal events at the facility, monitor and 

document corrective actions, and maintain documentation of lessons learned. The process 

should have a formal policy and procedures and include the investigation of abnormal events.
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In Section 11.6.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that following the completion of 

the incident investigation, a report of the incident and the investigation will be made to ensure 

that corrective and preventive actions are defined, completed, and closed. At least quarterly, a 

status report will be issued by the EHS function and distributed to management and individuals 

responsible for corrective actions (GLE, 2011a). The applicant’s commitments to prepare 

written reports and status reports related to incident investigations meet the acceptance criteria 

in Section 11.4.3.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) as they will ensure that abnormal events will 

be promptly resolved and communicated. The applicant’s provisions for written follow-up 

reports are, therefore, acceptable.

11.3.6.4 Corrective Actions 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s corrective action process in accordance with the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance criteria 

in Section 11.4.3.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address the applicant’s description of and 

commitment to a process to investigate abnormal events at the facility, monitor and document 

corrective actions, and maintain documentation of lessons learned. The process should have a 

formal policy and procedures and include the investigation abnormal events.

In Section 11.6.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that the line and area managers 

have the responsibility to ensure proper action is taken to control any incidents that occur in 

their assigned area through: (a) consulting EHS for a determination as to whether or not the 

investigation of an incident is required; (b) notifying the appropriate management; (c) 

participating in the investigation as required; (d) assuring adequate corrective actions are 

completed; and (e) reviewing and approving the corrective actions associated with each UIR in 

their area of responsibility by creating a corrective action within each UIR. The applicant’s 

delineation of management responsibilities associated with the investigation of unusual 

incidents, including the determination of the need for investigation and the identification, review, 

and approval of corrective actions, will ensure that incidents are appropriately monitored, 

documented, and corrected. These responsibilities meet the acceptance criteria in Section 

11.4.3.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and are, therefore, acceptable. 

11.3.7 RECORDS MANAGEMENT 

11.3.7.1 Records Management Program

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s records management program in accordance with the 

acceptance criteria in Sections 11.4.3.7.1 through 11.4.3.7.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). 

The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.7.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address a records 

management program that includes preparation, verification, characterization, and maintenance 

of records. The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.7.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) 

address a records management program that includes ensuring that records are legible, 

identifiable, and retrievable for their designated lifetimes. The acceptance criteria in Section 

11.4.3.7.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address a records management program that 

includes ensuring records are protected against tampering, theft, loss, unauthorized access, 

damage, or deterioration for their storage lifetime. The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.7.4 

of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address a records management program that includes the 

establishment and documentation of procedures for specifying requirements and responsibilities 

for record selection, verification, protection, transmittal, distribution, retention, maintenance, and 

disposition.
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Section 11.7.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) describes the RM controls performed by the applicant to 

provide identifiable and retrievable documentation of QA records. The QAPD (GLE, 2011c) 

requires procedures for the review, approval, handling, identification, retention, retrieval, and 

maintenance of QA records, which include: (a) results of tests and inspections required by 

applicable codes and standards; (b) construction procurements and receiving records; (c) 

personnel certification records; (d) design calculations; (e) purchase orders; (f) specifications 

and amendments; (g) procedures; (h) incident investigation results and approvals or corrective 

action taken; (i) various certification forms; (j) component data packages; (k) source surveillance 

and audit reports, and (i) any other QA documentation required by specifications or procedures 

(GLE, 2011a). For computer codes and computerized data used for IROFS activities, as 

discussed in the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) and the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that 

procedures are established to maintain readability and usability of older codes and data as 

computing technology changes. 

Section 11.7.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) identifies that QA records are not considered valid until 

they are authenticated and dated by authorized personnel. The applicant commits to maintain 

records at locations where they can be reviewed and audited to establish that the required 

quality has been assured (GLE, 2011a). As described in the LA (GLE, 2011a), the RM function 

is responsible for maintaining a master file of documents and records with controlled access.

Documents in the master file may be originals or reproduced copies and may include computer 

storage of data (GLE, 2011a). 

As described in Section 11.7.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant requires that documents in 

the master file: (1) be legible and identifiable as to the subject to which they pertain; (2) be 

considered valid only if stamped, initialed, signed, or otherwise authenticated, and dated by 

authorized personnel; and (3) be protected in order to prevent deterioration. The applicant also 

requires that all record storage areas (including satellite files) be evaluated to assure that 

records are adequately protected from damage by fire. 

As stated in Section 11.7.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant requires that the master file 

storage system provide for the accurate retrieval of information without undue delay. As such, 

the applicant requires the preparation of approved written instructions regarding the storage of 

records in the master file and states that a designated supervisor is responsible for ensuring the 

implementation of these written instructions (GLE, 2011a). 

The applicant commits to implement procedures for the review, approval, handling, 

identification, retention, retrieval, and maintenance of QA records (GLE, 2011a), which meets 

the acceptance criteria of Section 11.4.3.7.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). As described in 

Section 11.7.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), these procedures will describe RM responsibilities, 

identify records having controlled access in a master file, and provide for the protection of 

records from loss, unauthorized access, damage, or deterioration while in storage. The 

commitment to protect records against tampering, theft, loss, unauthorized access, damage, or 

deterioration for the time they are in storage meets the acceptance criteria of Section 11.4.3.7.3 

of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and is, therefore, acceptable. 

The applicant requires that documents in the master file be legible, identifiable, and retrievable 

for their designated lifetimes consistent with the acceptance criteria of Section 11.4.3.7.2 of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). Furthermore, for computer codes and computerized data used for 

activities relied on for safety, as specified in the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b), the applicant 

commits to establish procedure(s) for maintaining readability and usability of older codes and 

data as computing technology changes. 
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The applicant commits to ensure that: (1) records are verified and validated (stamped, initialed, 

signed, or otherwise authenticated, and dated by authorized personnel); (2) prepared and 

characterized such that they are legible and identifiable as to the subject to which they pertain; 

and (3) maintained in a manner that prevents deterioration or loss. These measures meet the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.7.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and are, therefore, 

acceptable. 

11.3.7.2 Record Retention 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s records record retention process in accordance with the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.7.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.7.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address a records management 

program that includes ensuring records are protected against tampering, theft, loss, 

unauthorized access, damage, or deterioration for their storage lifetime.

In Section 11.7.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant commits to maintain records related to 

the ISA; IROFS; the application of management measures to IROFS, NCS, and RP activities; 

training/retaining; occupational exposure of personnel to radiation; releases of radioactive 

materials to the environment; and other pertinent safety activities to demonstrate compliance 

with license conditions and regulations. The applicant also commits to maintain records of 

criticality safety analyses in sufficient detail to enable the independent review and audit of the 

calculational method and results (GLE, 2011a). In addition, records related to radiation 

exposure will be maintained in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 (GLE, 

2011a). 

The applicant identifies RP records that must be maintained for at least three years (GLE, 

2011a). These records include: (a) records of the Facility Safety Review Committee meetings; 

(b) surveys of equipment for release to unrestricted areas; (c) instrument calibrations; (d) safety 

audits; (e) personnel training and retraining; (f) radiation work permits; (g) surface contamination 

surveys; (h) concentrations of airborne radioactive material in the facility; and (i) radiological 

safety analyses (GLE, 2011a). The LA (GLE, 2011a) specifies that records associated with 

Environmental Protection activities are generated and retained in a manner that complies with 

the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20. 

The applicant’s commitments to maintain records associated with safety-related activities in 

order to demonstrate regulatory compliance and to retain these records for specified retention 

periods meet the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.7.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and 

are, therefore, acceptable. 

11.3.7.3 Organization and Administration 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s records management organization and administration in 

accordance with the acceptance criteria in Sections 11.4.3.7.5 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). 

The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.7.5 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address a records 

management program that includes an organization and procedures to promptly detect and 

correct any deficiencies in the records management system or its implementation.

In Section 11.7.3.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that the QA and Infrastructure 

Program Manager has responsibility for the RM Program during the design and construction 

phases of the project, and the Infrastructure Program Manager has responsibility for the RM 
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Program during the Operations phase. The RM Program functions, as described in Section 

11.7.3.1 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), include: (a) directing the development, implementation, and 

maintenance of methods and procedures encompassing a RM Program; and (b) assuring the 

laws, codes, standards, regulations, and company procedures pertaining to record keeping 

requirements are met. 

In Section 11.7.3.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant commits to manage the RM Program 

with appropriately trained and qualified personnel. The applicant states that although no 

specific experience related to the control of documents or management of records is required, 

previous technical or RM experience is recommended (GLE, 2011a). As described in Section 

11.7.3.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), general training in RM is provided to employees as part of the 

general topics covered in GET, and specific professional development training is provided on an 

as needed basis. 

The applicant identifies examples of the types of records maintained by the RM Program in 

Section 11.7.3.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a). These records include: (a) general information 

(safety analyses, facility and equipment descriptions, drawings, etc.); (b) organization and 

administration (organization charts, position descriptions, personnel exposure records, QA 

records, safety inspections, audits, assessments, and investigations, etc.); (c) the ISA and ISA 

related analyses; (d) radiation safety (radiation training records, radiation work permits, etc.); (e) 

nuclear criticality safety (NCS evaluations, records pertaining to nuclear criticality inspections, 

audits, investigations, etc.); (f) chemical safety (chemical process safety procedures, plans, 

diagrams, charts, and drawings, chemical process safety reports and analyses, etc.); (g) fire 

safety (pre-fire emergency plans, fire hazards analyses, etc.); (h) emergency management 

(emergency drill records, memoranda of understanding with outside emergency response 

organizations, etc.); (i) environmental protection (environmental release and monitoring records, 

etc.); (j) decommissioning (decommissioning records and cost estimates, site characterization 

data, final survey data, etc.); and (k) management measures (approved current operating 

procedures, calibration and testing data for IROFS, training procedures and modules, corrective 

action records, etc.) (GLE, 2011a). 

The applicant defines the organizational responsibilities for RM and commits to provide 

employees with general training in RM as part of GET (GLE, 2011a). The applicant also 

identifies examples of the types of records maintained in the RM Program (GLE, 2011a). The 

applicant identifies responsibilities for the development, implementation, and maintenance of the 

RM Program and for ensuring that all laws, codes, standards, regulations, and company 

procedures pertaining to record keeping requirements are met. The implementation of the RM 

organization, personnel training, and procedures described in Section 11.7.3 of the LA (GLE, 

2011a) will ensure the effectiveness of the RM program, the proper maintenance of records, 

and the prompt detection and correction of any deficiencies in the RM system or its 

implementation. These commitments meet the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.7.5 of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and are, therefore, acceptable. 

11.3.8 OTHER QA ELEMENTS 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s system of other QA elements in accordance with the 

acceptance criteria in Sections 11.4.3.8 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). The acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.8 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) address how the applicant will apply 

other QA elements in proportion to the importance of the item to safety using a graded 

approach. The other QA elements should address: (1) organization; (2) the QA program; (3) 

design control; (4) procurement control; (5) instructions, procedures, and drawings; (6) 
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document control; (7) control of purchased items and services; (8) identification and control of 

material, parts, and components; (9) control of special processes; (10) inspection; (11) test 

control; (12) control of measuring and test equipment; (13) handling, storage, and shipping; (14) 

inspection, control, testing, and operating status; (15) control of nonconforming items; (16) 

corrective actions; (17) QA records; (18) audits; and (19) provisions for change.

As described in Section 11.8 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant developed a QA Program 

that applies to the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of the proposed 

facility. This QA Program is described in the facility QAPD (GLE, 2011c). The QAPD (GLE, 

2011c) is evaluated in Appendix A to Chapter 11 of this SER. As explained in Appendix A to 

Chapter 11 of this SER, the QAPD (GLE, 2011c) meets the acceptance criteria in Section 

11.4.3.8 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a).

11.3.9 DEFINITIONS

In Section 1.2.5.6, “Exemption from 10 CFR 21.3 Definitions,” of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the 

applicant requested approval to replace the definitions of basic component, commercial grade 

item, critical characteristics, dedication, and dedicating entity identified in 10 CFR Part 21 for 

facilities licensed pursuant to 10 CFR Part 70 with modified definitions. The modified definitions 

describe procurement, verification, and dedication measures that will be implemented by the 

applicant to ensure that items purchased as basic components or dedicated will perform their 

IROFS function. The staff’s review and approval of the modified definitions can be found in 

Section 1.2.3.7.6 of this SER.

11.4 EVALUATION FINDINGS 

The staff finds that the management measures, as applied to specific IROFS, are acceptable for 

providing reasonable assurance that the IROFS will be available and reliable to perform their 

safety functions. The NRC staff reviewed the above information and found that the licensee’s 

description of the management measures applied to the IROFS are acceptable to meet the 

requirements of 10 CFR 70.65(b)(4). 

11.4.1 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT

The NRC Staff has reviewed the CM function for the facility described in Section 11.1 of the LA 

(GLE, 2011a) according to Section 11.4.3.1 of the regulatory acceptance criteria of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002a). The staff evaluation of the CM program included the review of the CM 

policy, design requirements, document control, change control and assessments.

The applicant has suitably and acceptably described its commitment to a proposed CM 

program, including the method for managing changes in procedures, facilities, activities, and 

equipment for IROFS. Management-level policies and procedures, including an analysis and 

independent safety review of any proposed activity involving IROFS, are described that will 

provide reasonable assurance that consistency among design requirements, physical 

configuration, and facility documentation is maintained as part of a new activity or change in an 

existing activity involving licensed material. The applicant’s management measures include the 

following elements of CM: 
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11.4.1.1 CM Policy 

The organizational structure, policies, procedures and responsibilities necessary to implement 

the CM program are in place or committed to. 

11.4.1.2 Design Requirements 

The design requirements and design bases are documented and supported by analyses, and all 

the documentation is maintained current. 

11.4.1.3 Document Control 

Documents, including drawings, are appropriately stored and accessible. Drawings and related 

documents maintained in the document control program are those necessary and sufficient to 

adequately describe IROFS. 

11.4.1.4 Change Control 

Responsibilities and procedures adequately describe how the applicant will achieve and 

maintain strict consistency among the design requirements, physical configuration and the 

facility documentation. Methods are in place for suitable analysis, review, approval, and 

implementation of identified changes to IROFS. This includes appropriate CM controls to 

ensure that configurations are appropriately verified, functional tests are performed as needed, 

and accurate documentation is maintained for equipment or procedures that have been 

modified.

11.4.1.5 Assessments 

The applicant committed to conduct initial and periodic assessments to verify the 

implementation and effectiveness of the CM function. 

11.4.2 MAINTENANCE

The applicant has committed to the maintenance of IROFS in Section 11.2 of the LA (GLE, 

2011a). The applicant’s maintenance commitments contain the basic elements to maintain 

availability and reliability of IROFS including: corrective maintenance preventive maintenance, 

functional testing, equipment calibration, and work control for the maintenance of IROFS. The 

applicant’s maintenance function is proactive, using maintenance records, PM records, and 

surveillance tests to analyze equipment performance and to seek the root cause of repetitive 

failures. 

The surveillance and monitoring, preventative maintenance, and functional testing activities 

described in Section 11.2 of the LA (GLE, 2011a) provide assurance that IROFS will be 

available and reliable to prevent or mitigate accident consequences. 

The maintenance function: (1) is based on approved procedures; (2) employs work control 

methods that properly consider personnel safety, awareness of facility operating groups, QA, 

and the rules of CM; (3) uses the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b) to identify IROFS that require 

maintenance and at what level; (4) justifies the preventive maintenance intervals in terms of 

equipment reliability goals; (5) provides for training that emphasizes the importance of IROFS 

identified in the ISA Summary (GLE, 2011b), regulations, codes, and personnel safety; and (6) 
11-43

creates documentation that includes records of all surveillance, inspections, equipment failures, 

repairs, and replacement of IROFS. 

The NRC staff concludes that the applicant’s maintenance functions meet the requirements of 

10 CFR Part 70.62(d) and the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002a), and provide reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the worker and the 

public are provided for. 

11.4.3 TRAINING AND QUALIFICATIONS

Based on the review of Section 11.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant’s description of its 

training and qualification program adequately addresses: (a) training organization and 

management; (b) analysis and identification of functional and position training requirements; (c) 

training basis and objectives; (d) organization of instruction; (e) evaluation of trainee 

accomplishment; (f) conduct of on-the-job training; (g) evaluation of training effectiveness; and 

(h) personnel evaluations and qualifications. The NRC staff has concluded that the applicant 

has adequately described and assessed its personnel training and qualification in a manner that 

satisfies regulatory requirements, meets the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.3 of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002a), and is acceptable. 

There is reasonable assurance that implementation of the described training and qualification 

will result in personnel who are qualified and competent to design, construct, startup, operate, 

maintain, modify, and decommission the facility safely. The NRC staff concludes that 

applicant’s plan for personnel training and qualification meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 

70.62(d). 

11.4.4 PROCEDURES 

In Section 11.4 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant described a suitably detailed process for 

the development, review, approval, implementation, distribution, and revision of procedures.

The applicant adequately described procedures that will control activities involving the handling 

of SNM, activities involving IROFS, and items important to the health of facility workers and the 

public and the protection of the environment. The applicant identified the types of procedures 

that will be implemented at the facility (i.e., management control procedures, abnormal 

operation procedures, maintenance procedures) and described specific topics to be covered by 

the procedures. The applicant also committed to document requirements for procedure control 

and approval authorities. The NRC staff concludes that the applicant’s plan for procedure 

development and implementation meets the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.4 of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002a) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 70.62(d).

11.4.5 AUDITS AND ASSESSMENTS

Based on the review of Section 11.5 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant’s audits and 

assessments program description considers: (a) the structure of audit and assessment 

activities; (b) facility procedures; (c) personnel qualifications and independence from the area 

being reviewed; and (d) the documentation of corrective actions. As described by the applicant, 

the audit and assessment program will help ensure that environmental health and safety 

functions are adequate and effectively implemented through ensuring that a comprehensive 

program oversight is completed at least once every three years. The NRC staff concluded that 

the applicant has adequately described its audit and assessment program and that the program 

meets the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.5 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a). 
11-44

The NRC staff concludes that the applicant’s plan for audits and assessments meets the 

requirements of 10 CFR Part 70.62(d) and provides reasonable assurance of protection of the 

health and safety of the public and workers and the environment. 

11.4.6 INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS

In Section 11.6 of the LA (GLE, 2011a), the applicant committed to perform incident 

investigations to assure that upset conditions are understood and appropriate corrective actions 

are identified and implemented to prevent recurrence. The applicant committed to establish an 

organization responsible for: (a) performing incident investigations of events that may occur 

during operation of the facility; (b) determining the root cause(s) and generic implications of the 

event; and (c) recommending corrective actions for ensuring a safe facility and safe facility 

operations in accordance with the acceptance criteria of Section 11.4.3.6 of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002a). 

The applicant will implement incident investigation and reporting procedures to establish the 

validity of data related to incidents, develop and implement corrective action plans when 

appropriate, document any event that was or could become a danger to persons or property, 

and ensure that proper levels of management and public agencies are notified. The applicant 

has committed to monitoring and documenting corrective actions through to completion and has 

committed to the maintenance of documentation so that lessons learned may be applied to 

future operations of the facility. 

Accordingly, the NRC staff concluded that the applicant’s description of the incident 

investigation process complies with the requirements of 10 CFR 70.62(d), meets the 

acceptance criteria of Section 11.4.3.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a), and is acceptable. 

11.4.7 RECORDS MANAGEMENT

The NRC staff has reviewed the applicant’s RM system described in Section 11.7 of the LA 

(GLE, 2011a) against the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.7 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) 

and concluded that the system: (a) will be effective in collecting, verifying, protecting, and 

storing information regarding the facility and its design, operations, and maintenance; (b) will be 

able to retrieve the information in readable form for the designated lifetimes of the records; (c) 

will provide a records storage area with the capability to protect and preserve health and safety 

records that are stored there during the mandated retention periods, including protection of the 

stored records against loss, theft, tampering, or damage during and after emergencies; and (d) 

will provide reasonable assurance that any deficiencies in the records management system or 

its implementation will be detected and corrected in a timely manner. 

The NRC staff concludes that the applicant’s program for records management meets the 

acceptance criteria contained in Section 11.4.3.7 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a) and meets the 

requirements of 10 CFR Part 70.62(d).

11.4.8 OTHER QA ELEMENTS 

Based on the review of the applicant’s QAPD (GLE, 2011c), the NRC staff concluded that the 

applicant described the application of other QA elements to IROFS and management measures 

in an acceptable manner. The staff further concluded that the applicant provided an adequate 
11-45

description of its quality assurance program and provided reasonable assurance that: (a) 

authorized activities will be carried out in compliance with the license requirements; and (b) 

deviations from requirements will be promptly identified and corrected. In Appendix A to 

Chapter 11 of this SER, the staff documents its review of the QAPD (GLE, 2011c) and the basis 

for the staff’s conclusion that the other QA elements presented in the QAPD (GLE, 2011c) meet 

the requirements of 10 CFR Part 70.62(d) and the acceptance criteria of Section 11.4.3.8 of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002a), and provide reasonable assurance of protection of public health 

and safety, and of the environment.

11.5 REFERENCES

(ANSI/ASME, 1983) American National Standards Institute/American Society of Mechanical 

Engineers (ANSI/ASME). ASNI/ASME NQA-1-1983, “Quality Assurance Requirements for 

Nuclear Facility Applications,” 1983.

(DOE, 1997) U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Draft, “Implementation Guide for Use with 10 

CFR Part 830.120 and DOE Order 5700.6C,” 1997.

(GLE, 2010) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “Radiological 

Contingency and Emergency Plan (RC&EP) for Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas, LLC and GEHitachi Global Laser Enrichment, LLC at Wilmington, NC,” Revision 3. 2010.

(GLE, 2011a) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “GE-Hitachi Global 

Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility License Application,” Revision 6. 2011.

(GLE, 2011b) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “Integrated Safety 

Analysis Summary for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment, LLC, Commercial Facility,” 

Revision 4. 2011.

(GLE, 2011c) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “Quality Assurance 

Program Description for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility.” 

Revision 7. 2011.

(IAEA, 1996) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). IAEA Safety Guide, “Establishing 

and Implementing a Quality Assurance Program,” Safety Guide 50-SG-Q1, 1996.

(NRC, 1989) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). “Guidance on Management 

Controls/Quality Assurance, Requirements for Operation, Chemical Safety, and Fire Protection 

for Fuel Cycle Facilities.” Federal Register 54 (No. 53), 11590-11598, March 21, 1989.

(NRC, 1993) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). “Training Review Criteria and 

Procedures,” NUREG-1220, Revision 1, 1993.

(NRC, 2002a) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG-1520, “Standard Review 

Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility.” 2002. 

(NRC, 2002b) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG-0700, “Human-System 

Interface Design Review Guidelines.” 2002.
11-46

(NRC, 2004) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG-0711, “Human Factors 

Engineering Program Review Model.” 2004.

(NRC, 2010) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 1.28, “Quality 

Assurance Program Requirements (Design and Construction),” 2010.
11.A-1

CHAPTER 11.0, APPENDIX A

QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

The General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC (GLE or the applicant) Quality 

Assurance Program Description (QAPD) (GLE, 2011a) describes the Quality Assurance (QA) 

Program that will be implemented at the applicant’s proposed laser-based uranium enrichment 

facility to satisfy the requirements of Paragraph 70.62 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR), which requires applicants for new facilities to submit a description of the 

safety program that will be applied at the facility. The safety program must contain a description 

of the applicant’s management measures. As defined in 10 CFR 70.4, “management 

measures” mean the functions performed by the licensee, generally on a continuing basis, that 

are applied to items relied on for safety, to ensure the items are available and reliable to perform 

their functions when needed. Management measures include configuration management, 

maintenance, training and qualifications, procedures, audits and assessments, incident 

investigations, records management, and other quality assurance elements.” The QAPD (GLE, 

2011a) supplements the description of the applicant’s management measures, as described in 

Chapter 11 of the License Application (LA) (GLE, 2011b) by providing a description of “Other 

QA Elements.” Management measures are evaluated in Chapter 11 of this Safety Evaluation 

Report (SER). 

11.A.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 

The applicant’s QA Program, applicable to the design, construction (including preoperational 

testing), operation (including testing), maintenance, modification, and decommissioning of the 

proposed facility, is described in the QAPD (GLE, 2011a). 

The QAPD (GLE, 2011a) is part of the applicant’s description of management measures that will 

be applied at the proposed facility in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 70.62(d) and 

10 CFR 70.65(b)(4).

11.A.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

NUREG-1520, “Standard Review Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle 

Facility” (NRC, 2002), which provides guidance and regulatory acceptance criteria to support 

the review of fuel cycle facility license applications, was applied in the completion of this review. 

Acceptance criteria, applicable to the review of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), is found in Section 

11.4.3.8 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) under “Other QA Elements.” 

11.A.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

11.A.3.1 INTRODUCTION

In Section 1 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant commits to maintain full responsibility for 

ensuring that the proposed facility is designed, constructed, operated, and decommissioned in 
11.A-2

conformance with applicable regulatory requirements, design requirements, applicable industry 

standards, and good engineering practices in a manner to protect the health and safety of the 

workers, the public, and the environment. The application of the QA Program, as described in 

the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), is compulsory for items (structures, systems, components (SSCs), 

equipment, and activities) identified as items relied on for safety (IROFS). All IROFS have a 

designated quality level (QL) of QL-1, QL-2, or QL-NFPA, and the QAPD (GLE, 2011a) will be 

applied to all IROFS in a manner consistent with the IROFS’ assigned quality level. The 

applicant commits to apply the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21 to basic components designated 

as QL-1, QL-2, and QL-NFPA. Items and activities designated as QL-3 are non-IROFS and will 

be controlled in accordance with standard commercial practice; hence, the QAPD (GLE, 2011a) 

will not be applied to QL-3 items and activities (GLE, 2011a).

11.A.3.2 ORGANIZATION

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff reviewed the applicant’s organization in 

accordance with the acceptance criteria Section 11.4.3.8.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) call for a description of: 

(a) the organizational structure; (b) the functional responsibilities, (c) the organization charts, 

lines, interrelationships, and areas of responsibility and authority for all organizations performing 

activities relied on for safety, including the applicant’s organization and, as applicable, its 

principal contractors (architect/engineer, constructor, construction manager, and operator). The 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) also state that persons 

or organizations responsible for ensuring the appropriate QA has been established and for 

verifying that activities affecting quality have been correctly performed should have sufficient 

authority, access to work areas, and organizational independence to carry out their 

responsibilities.

In Section 2 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a) and in Chapter 2 of the LA (GLE, 2011b), the applicant 

discusses the QA organization. The applicant described the functional responsibilities, 

interrelationships, and minimum qualifications required for the following quality assurancerelated project personnel and key positions within the QA organization: GLE President and 

Chief Executive Officer; QA Manager; Operations Manager; Engineering Manager; GLE 

Projects Manager; Security Manager; GLE Environmental, Health, and Safety (EHS) Manager; 

and Sourcing Manager (GLE, 2011a). Each of these personnel will have sufficient authority, 

access to work areas, and organizational independence to carry out his or her responsibilities 

(GLE, 2011a). 

The applicant provided an organization chart in Figure 1 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a) and in 

Figure 2-1 of the LA (GLE, 2011b) depicting the lines of authority of key personnel applicable 

during the design and construction phases of the proposed facility. Figure 2-2 of the LA (GLE, 

2011b) depicts the planned organization to be applied during facility operation. Section 2.1.4 of 

the LA (GLE, 2011b) describes in detail the management of personnel and activities as the 

facility transitions from design and construction to operations. The transition description 

included descriptions of the following responsibilities: (1) the Operations Organization will be 

staffed as facility construction nears completion to ensure a smooth transition from construction 

to operations; (2) the EHS Manager and QA Manager positions will be duplicated during the 

transition from design and construction to operations to ensure quality and safety are 

adequately maintained throughout the transition phase; (3) as the construction of systems is 

completed, the systems will undergo acceptance testing, after which systems will be transferred 

from the Projects Organization to the Operations Organization by means of a detailed transition 

plan; and (4) the facility design basis will be maintained throughout the transition process 
11.A-3

through the configuration management program (GLE, 2011b). The Operations Organization 

will be updated prior to the commencement of decommissioning activities; this information will 

submitted to the NRC for review and approval as part of the Decommissioning Plan (GLE, 

2011b).

The applicant identified responsibilities applicable to all facility personnel in Section 2.9 of the 

QAPD (GLE, 2011a). Specifically, every individual working on the project, including contractor 

personnel, will be responsible for quality (GLE, 2011a). Each worker will have an obligation to 

identify concerns using the corrective action process whenever the health and safety of the 

workers, the public, or the environment is involved; or when continued work will produce results 

that are not in compliance with the QA Program (GLE, 2011a). The corrective action process is 

controlled by approved written policies, plans, or procedures that apply to all personnel (GLE, 

2011a). In the event of a nonconforming condition, these approved written policies, plans, or 

procedures are implemented to control safety-related activities until the deficiency or 

unsatisfactory condition has been resolved (GLE, 2011a). The applicant commits to define the 

authority and responsibility for stopping work, the criteria and documentation required to 

process the stop work, and the actions that must be performed before work may resume in 

approved written policies, plans, or procedures (GLE, 2011a). 

In the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant identified the responsibilities, qualifications, and 

authorities of the key personnel responsible for QA during design, construction, operation, 

maintenance, modification, testing, and decommissioning of the proposed facility. These 

responsibilities, qualifications, and authorities are clearly defined and sufficient to ensure that 

competent QA and management staff with sufficient experience will be in place. The applicant 

described the organizational structure and provided charts depicting the lines, interrelationships, 

and areas of responsibility and authority for all organizations performing activities relied on for 

safety. The applicant also committed to ensure that persons or organizations responsible for 

ensuring that appropriate QA has been established and for verifying that activities affecting 

quality have been correctly performed have sufficient authority, access to work areas, and 

organizational independence to carry out their responsibilities. The information provided meets 

the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.1 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, 

acceptable. 

11.A.3.3 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s QA Program in accordance with the acceptance criteria 

Section 11.4.3.8.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.2 

of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) address the application of QA elements in the form of a QA 

Program in which the applicant commits to meet the applicable requirements of applicable 

industry standards. The commitment may describe the applicant’s graded approach to QA, in 

which measures are implemented consistent with the item’s importance to safety, or the 

commitment may describe a QA Program applicable to all IROFS. The application of QA 

elements should be well-documented, planned, implemented, and maintained to provide 

reasonable assurance that, together with the management measures, IROFS will be available 

and reliable when needed. The QA Program should be functional before performing the ISA 

required 10 CFR Part 70.

The QA Program, which is described in Section 3 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), consists of the 

QAPD (GLE, 2011a) and policies, plans, and procedures that implement specific requirements 

of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a). The QA Program will apply to all workers and contractor personnel 

who perform quality-affecting activities associated with safety-related aspects of the proposed 
11.A-4

facility (GLE, 2011a). The QA Program is risk-informed and will be applied to the design, 

fabrication, testing, operation, procurement, inspection, maintenance, and modification of 

IROFS and activities affecting those IROFS (GLE, 2011a). The QA Program, in addition to 

other management measures, will ensure that IROFS will be available and reliable to perform 

their intended safety functions when needed (GLE, 2011a).

In the event that work cannot be accomplished as specified in implementing QA policies, plans, 

or procedures, or accomplishment of such work would result in an unsafe condition, work will be 

stopped until proper corrective action can be taken (GLE, 2011a). Furthermore, if a procedure 

cannot be used as written, then work will be stopped until the procedure has been changed 

(GLE, 2011a). 

Indoctrination and training will be provided to personnel who perform or manage activities 

affecting quality (GLE, 2011a). The training will include familiarization with the QA Program and 

appropriate QA implementing policies, plans, or procedures (GLE, 2011a). Managers will be 

responsible for ensuring that their personnel receive the applicable indoctrination, training, and 

qualifications needed for their work functions (GLE, 2011a). 

Effective implementation of the QA Program will be regularly assessed as follows: (1) line 

management of organizations implementing the QA Program, or portions thereof, will regularly 

assesses the adequacy of the program areas for which they are responsible through a 

combination of reviews, approvals, self-assessments, or audits; and (2) responsible senior 

managers will regularly assess the adequacy and effective implementation of the QA Program 

through review meetings and by performing reviews of audit and corrective action reports (GLE, 

2011a).

11.A.3.3.1 Quality Levels

QLs are discussed in Section 3.1 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a). The applicant defined four QLs 

that will be applied to items and services used in the design, construction, testing, startup, 

operation, maintenance, modification, and decommissioning of the proposed facility (GLE, 

2011a). The QLs describe the applicant’s graded approach to QA, in which management 

measures and other QA elements will be implemented consistent with an item’s importance to 

safety (GLE, 2011a). The QLs include: QL-1, QL-2, QL-NFPA, and QL-3, where QL-1 is applied 

to IROFS of the highest safety significance (GLE, 2011a).

QL-1 is applicable to single (sole) IROFS that prevent or mitigate a high consequence event 

(GLE, 2011a). QL-2 is applicable where two or more IROFS are credited to prevent or mitigate 

a high or intermediate consequence event, or where any single (sole) IROFS prevents or 

mitigates an intermediate consequence event (GLE, 2011a). QL-3 is applicable to items that 

are not IROFS (not QL-1, QL-2, or QL-NFPA) (GLE, 2011a). 

QL-NFPA is applicable only to fire suppression systems identified as IROFS (GLE, 2011a). The 

minimum standards and requirements for the design, testing, installation, inspection, and 

maintenance of fire suppression systems credited as IROFS are established by National Fire 

Protection Association (NFPA) codes and standards as supplemented by QA controls identified 

in Appendix A of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a). The established failure frequencies for fire 

suppression systems identified as IROFS are based on reliability data developed by NFPA such 

that demonstrated conformance with the requirements of NFPA codes and standards will 

provide sufficient control of fire suppression IROFS to ensure their reliability and availability in 
11.A-5

service (GLE, 2011a). Implementation of NFPA QA provisions to fire protection IROFS is 

further discussed in Sections 7.3.1.3 and 11.A.3.21 of this SER.

Management measures will be applied to all IROFS (QL-1, QL-2, and QL-NFPA) consistent with 

the type of IROFS to ensure that IROFS remain reliable at their credited failure frequencies 

when called upon to be available (GLE, 2011a). All applicable QA Program requirements will be 

applied to QL-1, QL-2, and QL-NFPA IROFS in a manner necessary to achieve this level of 

reliability and performance (GLE, 2011a). QL-3 items will be controlled in accordance with 

standard commercial practice and will not require the application of management measures

(GLE, 2011a). Applicable QA Program requirements for QL-1 and QL-2 IROFS are addressed 

in Sections 1 through 20 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a) and in Sections 11.A.3.2 through 11.A3.20 

of this SER. Applicable QA Program requirements for QL-NFPA items are addressed in 

Appendix A of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a) and Section 11.A.3.21 of this SER.

The applicant will determine the extent to which management measures and QA Program 

elements will be applied to IROFS by evaluating the factors that contribute to the reliability of 

each IROFS, including the IROFS’ design, function, and task analyses associated with 

operating and maintaining the IROFS (GLE, 2011a). The applicant will also consider the 

following factors for each IROFS: (1) risk significance, (2) regulations, industry codes, and 

standards applicable to the IROFS; (3) complexity or uniqueness of an item/activity and the 

environment in which it has to function; (4) quality history of the item in service or activity; (5) 

degree to which functional compliance can be demonstrated or assessed by test, inspection, or 

maintenance methods; (6) anticipated life span; and (7) degree of standardization; (8) 

importance of data generated; and (9) reproducibility of results (GLE, 2011a).

After using the evaluation factors identified above to define the management measures and QA 

element attributes assigned to each IROFS, the measures will be approved through the 

configuration management (CM) process associated with Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) 

baseline documents (GLE, 2011a). As the design progresses, facility procedures and training 

programs are developed, and pre-operational readiness reviews are conducted, the 

management measures and QA element attributes assigned to each IROFS will be approved 

through approval of the IROFS Boundary Definition Packages (GLE, 2011a). These packages, 

as defined in the QAPD (GLE, 2011a) are:

“documents that contain the physical descriptions and parameters of structures, 

systems, and components that are used to meet the performance requirements 

of 10 CFR 70.61. IROFS boundary definition packages are also prepared for 

administrative procedures or worker actions, which are defined as IROFS. The 

boundary packages also identify the specific functions to be performed by an 

IROFS and identify any items that may affect the function of the IROFS. The 

boundary packages also identify the facility areas in which the IROFS is used, 

design and functional attributes, management measures, any open items, and 

supporting documentation (e.g., P&IDs [piping and instrumentation diagrams], 

schematics, etc.).”

11.A.3.3.2 Application of Management Measures

The applicant described the application of management measures to IROFS in Section 3.2 of 

the QAPD (GLE, 2011a).
11.A-6

Configuration Management

The elements of CM, including the CM policy, design requirements, document control, change 

control, and assessments, will be applied to QL-1, QL-2, and QL-NFPA IROFS consistent with 

descriptions in the QAPD (GLE, 2011a).

Maintenance

The application of maintenance attributes will be decided based on consideration of the nine 

IROFS evaluation factors (see Section 11.A.3.3.1 of this SER above), as applicable, for each 

IROFS, regardless of its QL designation (GLE, 2011a). This method will be applied to 

maintenance planning because the type of IROFS, the specific components within the IROFS 

boundary, the historical failure frequency associated with the components or with the human 

elements of performance, and the reliability required of the IROFS are critical factors in 

determining the appropriate type(s) of maintenance to perform and the requisite frequency 

(GLE, 2011a). Maintenance activities may include any combination of corrective, preventative, 

surveillance, monitoring, and functions testing (GLE, 2011a). 

Training and Qualifications

Training and qualification attributes will be developed using a systematic approach that 

analyzes the training needs of each task based on the human factors elements associated with 

the task, complexity of the safety function being carried out, skill needed to perform the task, 

and the existing level of knowledge possessed by the individuals involved (GLE, 2011a). Based 

on the results of the task analysis and consideration of the nine IROFS evaluation factors (see 

Section 11.A.3.3.1 of this SER, above), appropriate training will be developed utilizing 

classroom, performance-based, on-the-job, testing, or other training techniques (GLE, 2011a). 

For hazardous operations where QL-1, QL-2, or QL-NFPA IROFS are involved or located 

nearby, minimum training requirements will be established for workers working with, or in the 

vicinity of, such operations (GLE, 2011a).

Procedures

Activities associated with the operation of IROFS will be governed by policies, plans, or 

procedures that cover all aspects of the task (GLE, 2011a). In order to ensure that proper, 

accurate, valid procedures are used for activities involving IROFS, procedures involving IROFS 

will be controlled in accordance with the CM Program (GLE, 2011a).

The level of rigor applied to each task will be based on the task analysis and consideration of 

the nine IROFS evaluation factors (see Section 11.A.3.3.1 of this SER above) (GLE, 2011a). 

The requisite level of rigor, as informed by the task analysis and evaluation factors, will dictate 

the level of detail needed in the procedure and the appropriate usage of policies (GLE, 2011a). 

For instance, some complex activities will require procedures that have higher levels of human 

factors elements incorporated in their use (such as in-hand use, step-by-step check offs, twoperson verification of action confirmation, etc.) in order to ensure appropriate completion of the 

task (GLE, 2011a).
11.A-7

Audits and Assessments

A basic level of audits and assessments will be applied to all IROFS (GLE, 2011a). The 

frequency of audits and assessments will take into consideration the nine IROFS evaluation 

factors (see Section 11.A.3.3.1 of this SER above) as well as the status and importance of the 

activity (GLE, 2011a).

Incident Investigations

Incident Investigations will be performed for all incidents associated with the failure or 

degradation of IROFS (GLE, 2011a). The investigation and resolution of IROFS incidents will 

use the same approach for all IROFS (GLE, 2011a).

Records Management

Records for activities associated with IROFS implementation will be managed with the same 

approach regardless of QL (GLE, 2011a).

Other Quality Assurance Elements

There are no distinctions within the QA program with respect to the treatment of QL-1 and QL-2 

IROFS for the following QA elements: Design Control; Procurement Control; Document Control; 

Control of Purchased Items and Services; Identification and Control of Materials, Parts and 

Components; Control of Measuring and Test Equipment; Handling, Storage and Shipping 

Controls; Control of Nonconforming Items; Corrective Action; and Quality Assurance Records 

(GLE, 2011a). Distinctions for the remaining QA elements are described under the respective 

QA element descriptions in the QAPD (GLE, 2011a). Quality assurance elements for QL-NFPA 

are specified in Appendix A of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a).

A.11.3.3.3 QA Program Evaluation Summary

The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) states that the 

applicant may describe its application of QA elements in the form of a QA Program in which the 

applicant commits to meet the applicable requirements of applicable industry standards. The 

commitment may describe the applicant’s graded approach to QA, in which measures are 

implemented consistent with the item’s importance to safety, or the commitment may describe a 

QA Program applicable to all IROFS. The application of QA elements should be welldocumented, planned, implemented, and maintained to provide reasonable assurance that, 

together with the management measures, IROFS will be available and reliable when needed. 

The QA Program should be functional before performing the ISA required 10 CFR Part 70.

In Section 3.2 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant described its application of QA 

elements. The applicant described its graded approach to QA, in which management measures 

and QA elements will be implemented consistent with an item’s importance to safety. All IROFS 

will be assigned a QL based on their safety significance, and QA controls will be implemented 

commensurate with the designated quality level, as described in the QAPD (GLE, 2011a). The 

application of other QA elements is well-documented and planned in the QAPD (GLE, 2011a) 

and is linked to the implementation of all management measures; as described in the QAPD 

(GLE, 2011a), the QA elements, together with the other management measures, will be 

implemented and maintained to provide reasonable assurance that IROFS will be available and 
11.A-8

reliable when needed. The information provided meets the acceptance criteria in Section 

11.4.3.8.2 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable. 

11.A.3.4 DESIGN CONTROL

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s design control function in accordance with the acceptance 

criteria Section 11.4.3.8.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The acceptance criteria in Section 

11.4.3.8.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) address the establishment of a design control function 

that includes design inputs, process, analyses, verification, interfaces, changes, and design 

documentation and records.

In Section 4 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant discusses design control. The applicant 

commits to use approved written engineering and design policies, plans, or procedures to 

control the design process, identify design control requirements, and ensure that applicable 

requirements are correctly translated into design documents (GLE, 2011a). Design control 

activities will be governed by written policies, plans, or procedures and will include design 

inputs; analyses; outputs; reviews, checks, and approvals; change control; technical interfaces; 

and administrative activities (GLE, 2011a). Engineering management will ensure that design 

documents (including requirement documents, drawings, reports, criteria, specifications, 

analyses, computer programs, system descriptions, technical reports, and the ISA) are 

prepared, reviewed, checked, and approved by qualified individuals (GLE, 2011a).

The applicant commits to apply sound engineering judgment, scientific principles, and 

applicable codes and standards in the design process (GLE, 2011a). The applicant also 

commits to define the work scope and responsibilities applicable to design groups and 

disciplines (GLE, 2011a). As described in the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), typical design control 

activities managed by engineering will include controlling the exchange of technical information 

between internal and external organizations; implementing design policies, plans, or 

procedures; establishing technical requirements and design standards; preparing design 

documents; defining the extent of design reviews; determining and specifying acceptance 

criteria, required tests and inspections, and program requirements for records; and controlling 

design changes.

The ISA, which identifies the safety significance of functions performed by IROFS, will be used 

with inputs from the design phase in order to determine the level of rigor that needs to be 

applied to design control activities (GLE, 2011a). The design of both IROFS and non-IROFS 

SSCs that involve a higher than normal level of risk will be subject to a greater degree of design 

control and verification than those of normal or low risk (GLE, 2011a). 

Information from design output documents for IROFS such as IROFS Boundary Definition 

Packages, specifications, system descriptions, and drawings will be used in the development of 

inspection, test, and maintenance instructions and/or procedures to ensure that instructions and 

procedures contain the necessary details and acceptance criteria for design control during 

inspection, test, and maintenance activities (GLE, 2011a). The design control process will also 

take into consideration the useful life expectancy of SSCs in order to facilitate development of 

facility decommissioning, disassembly, and disposal plans (GLE, 2011a).

Written policies, plans, or procedures will be approved and implemented for the development, 

validation, and control of software that is used to produce or manipulate data directly used in the 

design, analysis, and operation of SSCs designated as IROFS (GLE, 2011a). Although 
11.A-9

commercially available software will not undergo validation, the results obtained from such 

software will be independently reviewed and verified (GLE, 2011a).

Records of the design process will be maintained in accordance with Sections 7 and 18 of the 

QAPD (GLE, 2011a). 

In Section 4 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant defined a design control process that will: 

(1) use written approved policies, plans, or procedures to control design inputs; analyses; 

outputs; reviews, checks, and approvals; change control; technical interfaces; and 

administrative activities; (2) use the ISA and other design analysis inputs to determine the rigor 

needed for design control activities; and (3) ensure that applicable requirements are correctly 

translated into design documents. The applicant described activities within the scope of the 

design control program; defined management responsibilities for design activities; and identified 

how documents and records associated with design control will be maintained. The applicant 

also described design control measures that will be applied for software. The information 

provided meets the guidance contained in Section 11.4.3.8.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and 

is, therefore, acceptable. 

11.A.3.5 PROCUREMENT CONTROL

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s procurement control in accordance with the acceptance 

criteria Section 11.4.3.8.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The acceptance criteria in Section 

11.4.3.8.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) address applicable design bases and other 

requirements necessary to provide reasonable assurance of quality are included or referenced 

in documents for procurement of items or services relied on for safety. To the extent necessary, 

suppliers are required to have QA consistent with the quality level of the item or service to be 

procured.

The applicant addresses procurement control in Section 5 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a). The 

applicant commits to develop and approve written policies, plans, or procedures to direct 

procurement activities, including the procurement process (sourcing), procurement documents, 

and the control of procured materials, components, and services (GLE, 2011a). Procurement 

document requirements delineated in these policies, plans, or procedures will include 

requirements for the content, review, approval, and change of procurement documents (GLE, 

2011a). Changes to procurement documents will require the same degree of review, approval, 

and control as that applied to the preparation of the original procurement document (GLE, 

2011a).

Design bases and other requirements necessary to provide reasonable assurance of quality of 

items and services relied on for safety will be included or referenced in procurement documents 

(GLE, 2011a). Procurement documents for QL-1 and QL-2 items or services will include, as 

appropriate, the following information: (1) scope of work; (2) technical requirements; (3) QA 

requirements applicable to the supplier; (4) a description of the interrelationships and areas of 

responsibility/authority for the supplier’s organization if workers will be performing activities 

relied on for safety; (5) requirements for the reporting and control of nonconformances and 

changes; (6) applicability of 10 CFR Part 21 requirements; (7) requirements applicable to subtier suppliers, if applicable; and (8) requirements related to document submittal requirements 

and records retention, turnover, and disposition (GLE, 2011a). 
11.A-10

The extent of the QA program requirements imposed on suppliers will depend on the type and 

application of item or service being procured; as such, procurement documents may require 

suppliers to have a QA Program that is determined to be acceptable by the applicant or a 

system of management measures consistent with the applicable portions of the QA Program in 

order to supply certain items and services (GLE, 2011a). QA requirements specified in 

procurement documents for Q-1 and QL-2 items and services may also include provisions to 

allow access rights to the supplier’s facilities and records for inspection or audit (GLE, 2011a).

To the extent possible, the applicant commits to procure basic components from suppliers that 

possess and implement a QA Program that meets the requirements of Appendix B to 10 CFR 

Part 50 and that have been evaluated and placed on an Approved Supplier List (GLE, 2011a). 

In situations in which an IROFS or part thereof cannot be procured as a basic component 

because the applicable supplier does not have an approved Appendix B QA Program, then the 

applicant will formally dedicate a commercial-grade item for use as (or in) an IROFS (basic 

component) (GLE, 2011a).

As described in Section 5.1 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant will allow QL-1 and QL-2 

items to be procured as commercially available items provided that the item undergoes 

commercial grade dedication (GLE, 2011a). Items and services not relied on for safety may be 

designated as QL-2 or QL-3 and may be procured as commercially available items (GLE, 

2011a). For the purchase of commercial-grade items that will be dedicated, facility procurement 

procedures will require personnel to define to the supplier those elements of the supplier's 

process controls that are mandatory and any other requirements necessary to assure that 

critical characteristics are met (GLE, 2011a). 

In Section 1.2.5.6, “Exemption from 10 CFR 21.3 Definitions,” of the LA (GLE, 2011b), the 

applicant requested approval to replace the definitions of basic component, commercial grade 

items, critical characteristics, dedication, and dedicating entity identified in 10 CFR Part 21 for 

facilities licensed pursuant to 10 CFR Part 70 with modified definitions. The modified definitions 

describe procurement, verification, and dedication measures that will be implemented by the 

applicant to ensure that items purchased as basic components or dedicated will perform their 

IROFS function (GLE, 2011b). The staff’s review and approval of the modified definitions can 

be found in Section 1.2.3.7.6 of this SER.

In Section 5 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant committed to include or make reference 

to applicable design bases and other requirements necessary to provide reasonable assurance 

of quality in procurement documents issued for items or services relied on for safety. The 

applicant also committed to use approved written policies, plans, or procedures to control 

procurement activities. The applicant will require suppliers to have a QA program or a system 

of management measures consistent with the quality level of the item or service to be procured. 

In situations when such a supplier cannot be found for safety-related items, the applicant will 

procure a commercial grade item and perform dedication to provide reasonable assurance that 

the item can perform its IROFS function. Items of all quality levels (QL-1, QL-2, and QL-3) may 

be procured as commercially available items; however, items procured as commercially 

available items that will be used as IROFS will be dedicated. The information provided by the 

applicant with respect to procurement control meets the guidance in Section 11.4.3.8.4 of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable. 
11.A-11

11.A.3.6 INSTRUCTIONS, PROCEDURES, AND DRAWINGS

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s program for instructions, procedures, and drawings in 

accordance with the acceptance criteria Section 11.4.3.8.5 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.5 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) call for the applicant to 

ensure that activities affecting quality are prescribed by and performed in accordance with 

documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type appropriate for the circumstances.

Instructions, procedures, and drawings are described in Section 6 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a). 

Activities affecting the availability or reliability of IROFS will be prescribed by and accomplished 

in accordance with documented specifications, requirements, policies, plans, procedures, 

instructions, and drawings that: (1) include or make reference to acceptance criteria that are 

appropriate for determining that prescribed activities have been satisfactorily accomplished; (2) 

are of a type appropriate to the circumstance; and (3) follow standard guidelines for the format, 

content, review, and approval process that are established in approved written policies, plans, 

or procedures (GLE, 2011a). Policies, plans, and procedures that implement QA requirements 

will be reviewed by the QA function in order to ensure compliance and consistency with the QA 

Program and effective incorporation of QA program provisions (GLE, 2011a).

A hierarchy of policies, plans, and procedures will be used to implement project requirements 

(GLE, 2011a). Policies will be used to establish senior management expectations for quality 

and safety, while implementing policies, plans, and procedures will provide specific instructions 

to workers performing quality-affecting activities associated with safety-related aspects of the 

facility (GLE, 2011a). Functional area managers will be responsible for the preparation, review, 

and approval of policies, plans, and procedures associated with their functional area (GLE, 

2011a).

The applicant will require mandatory compliance with policies, plans, and procedures, and 

should a conflict or error involving a policy, plan, or procedure be identified, the activity in 

question will be placed in a safe condition until the policy, plan, or procedure has been corrected 

or changed (GLE, 2011a). Work activities will not resume until the correction or change has 

been implemented (GLE, 2011a). Policies, plans, procedures, instructions, and drawings, and 

changes thereto, will be controlled in accordance with Sections 4 and 7 of the QAPD (GLE, 

2011a). These sections include requirements to ensure that all changes to documents are 

reviewed and approved at the appropriate level within the facility organization (GLE, 2011a).

Prescriptive, step-by-step policies, plans, or procedures will not be required for activities that 

require skills normally possessed by qualified personnel (GLE, 2011a). These activities will be 

performed in accordance with appropriate documents such as planning sheets, job descriptions, 

or external manuals (GLE, 2011a).

In Section 6 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant states that activities affecting quality will 

be prescribed by and performed in accordance with documented instructions, procedures, or 

drawings of a type appropriate for the circumstances. The applicant also described the 

structure and content of policies, plans, and procedures used at the facility and identified 

responsibilities for the development, review, and approval of these documents. The applicant 

will require compliance with guidance documents, and where compliance to the written 

guidance may not be achieved, the applicant will require that work be stopped and not proceed 

until the policy, plan, or procedure has been reconciled. The information provided by the 

applicant to describe instructions, procedures, and drawings that will be used at the proposed 
11.A-12

facility meets the guidance contained in Section 11.4.3.8.5 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, 

therefore, acceptable. 

11.A.3.7 DOCUMENT CONTROL

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s document control program in accordance with the 

acceptance criteria Section 11.4.3.8.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The acceptance criteria in 

Section 11.4.3.8.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) call for the establishment of a process to 

control the preparation, issuance, and modification of documents that specify quality 

requirements or prescribe activities affecting quality are controlled to provide reasonable 

assurance that the appropriate documents are in use. In addition, document changes need to 

be reviewed for adequacy and approved for implementation by authorized personnel.

In Section 7 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant discusses its document control program. 

The applicant will control documents that identify quality requirements or prescribe activities 

affecting the availability or reliability of IROFS in a manner to ensure the use of the correct 

document (GLE, 2011a). Control of quality-related documents will be implemented in 

accordance with a defined, management-approved process that will apply to original documents 

and changes thereto and will include the review of documents for adequacy, approval for 

release, and maintenance under revision control (GLE, 2011a). Policies, plans, and procedures 

will identify: documents to be controlled; personnel responsibilities for preparing, reviewing, 

approving, and issuing documents; and requirements for establishing and updating distribution 

lists for documents (GLE, 2011a). 

Policies, plans, procedures, instructions, and drawings will be maintained under revision control 

and will ensure that documents are: (1) prepared and reviewed for adequacy, correctness, and 

completeness by a qualified individual; (2) approved for release; and (3) used appropriately in 

performing the activity; and (4) removed or appropriately identified should the document 

become obsolete or be superseded (GLE, 2011a). 

Changes to documents may be classified as minor, major, or temporary (GLE, 2011a). Minor 

changes, such as inconsequential editorial corrections, may be made to documents without 

being subject to the review and approval requirements required of major changes (GLE, 2011a). 

Major changes will be reviewed for adequacy, correctness, and completeness prior to approval 

and issuance (GLE, 2011a). The review and approval of major changes will be performed by the 

same organization that performed the original review and approval unless other organizations 

are specifically designated (GLE, 2011a). Temporary changes to procedures will be performed 

in accordance with applicable procedure controls (GLE, 2011a).

As described in Section 7 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the preparation, issuance, and 

modification of documents that specify quality requirement or prescribe activities affecting 

quality will be controlled by the applicant to provide reasonable assurance that the appropriate 

documents are in use at the proposed facility. The applicant committed to ensure that 

document changes are reviewed for adequacy and approved for implementation by qualified 

personnel and that superseded or obsolete documents are removed or identified to preclude 

inadvertent use. The applicant described the content and control of policies, procedures, and 

plans that will be used to identify document control program provisions and requirements. The 

applicant also described the controls that will be in place for the implementation of minor, major, 

and temporary changes to policies, plans, procedures, instructions, and drawings. The 

applicant’s description of its document control program meets the guidance contained in Section 

11.4.3.8.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable.
11.A-13

11.A.3.8 CONTROL OF PURCHASED ITEMS AND SERVICES

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s program to control purchased items and services in 

accordance with the acceptance criteria Section 11.4.3.8.7 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.7 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) address assurance that 

purchased IROFS and services relied on for safety are controlled to provide reasonable 

assurance of conformance with specified requirements.

Control of purchased items and services is described in Section 8 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a). 

The procurement of items and services will be controlled to ensure that purchased items and 

services conform to procurement requirements through use of supplier (source) evaluation and 

selection; evaluation of objective evidence of quality furnished by the supplier; source 

inspection; audit; and examination of items or services upon delivery or completion (GLE, 

2011a). To ensure a systematic approach to the procurement process, sourcing activities will be 

planned and documented (GLE, 2011a) through a collaborative process involving the sourcing, 

design, and QA organizations. 

Supplier selection will be based, in part, on an evaluation of the supplier's capability to provide 

items or services in accordance with the requirements of sourcing documents (GLE, 2011a). 

Supplier evaluations may include audits or assessments of the supplier program or system for 

ensuring quality, or an evaluation of the supplier's history of providing an identical or similar 

product that performs satisfactorily in service (GLE, 2011a). Measures will be established for 

interface with the supplier and to verify the supplier's performance, as necessary (GLE, 2011a).

Suppliers working to the applicant’s QA Program will receive indoctrination or training on the QA 

Program and the applicable implementing policies, plans, or procedures governing the work 

being performed by the supplier (GLE, 2011a). Work performed under the applicant’s QA 

Program by suppliers will be subject to the same controls implemented for work performed by 

facility personnel (GLE, 2011a). 

Supplier-generated documents will be reviewed for acceptability using verification methods that 

are based on quality level, complexity, and quantity of items or services provided (GLE, 2011a). 

Technical documents used as input to design processes, such as analyses, calculations, or 

drawings, will require an independent technical review (GLE, 2011a). Supplier furnished 

material, equipment, or services related to safety will be reviewed for acceptability by 

performing, as appropriate, one or more of the following, to the items or services being 

procured: (1) monitoring, witnessing, or observing activities performed by the supplier; (2) 

performing a receiving inspection, or (3) performing post-installation testing (GLE, 2011a).

The applicant will retain records of supplier nonconformances, which may be identified by facility

staff or by the supplier (GLE, 2011a). Except where otherwise controlled and documented by 

approved implementing procedures, nonconforming items will not be released for use until the 

nonconforming condition has been reviewed and accepted by the applicant, and the applicant 

has verified that the disposition of the nonconforming condition has been appropriately 

performed (GLE, 2011a).

As described in Section 8 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), purchased items and services that are 

relied on for safety will be controlled to provide reasonable assurance of conformance with 

specified requirements. The applicant described controls for the verification of (1) supplier 

capability to perform safety-related work or supply safety-related items; (2) documentation 

provided by the supplier; (3) quality of procured items and services and their conformance to 
11.A-14

procurement requirements. The applicant committed to control nonconforming items to prevent 

their use and to maintain records or supplier nonconformances. The applicant also identified 

the responsibilities of the sourcing, QA, and design functions for procurement activities. The 

information provided by the applicant to describe the control of purchased items and services for 

the proposed facility meets the acceptance criteria contained in Section 11.4.3.8.7 of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable. 

11.A.3.9 IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF MATERIALS, PARTS, AND 

COMPONENTS

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s program to identify and control material, parts, and 

components in accordance with the acceptance criteria Section 11.4.3.8.8 of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002). The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.8 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) 

address the establishment of provisions to identify and control IROFS and to provide reasonable 

assurance that incorrect or defective items are not used.

Identification and control of materials, parts, and components is discussed in Section 9 of the 

QAPD (GLE, 2011a). Identification of QL-1 and QL-2 material, parts, and components will be 

maintained on the items, in documents traceable to the items, or in a manner that assures 

identification is established and maintained (GLE, 2011a). To the maximum extent possible, 

physical identification will be used; however, when physical identification is either impractical or 

insufficient to control the item, physical separation, procedural controls, or other means will be 

employed (GLE, 2011a). When markings are used to identify material, parts, or components, 

measures will be established to ensure that the markings are clear, legible, and machine 

readable, and are not detrimental to the function or service life of the item (GLE, 2011a). 

Markings will be transferred to each part of an identified item when subdividing, and the 

obliteration of markings by surface treatments or coatings will not be permitted unless other 

means of identification are provided (GLE, 2011a).

Controls will be established for QL-1 and QL-2 items and services to ensure only correct and 

accepted items and services are installed or used. Items will be identified and controlled, as 

necessary, from initial receipt and fabrication through installation and use (GLE, 2011a). The 

installation of incorrect or defective items will be prevented through the implementation of 

receipt inspections; nonconformance controls; onsite handling and storage controls; and written 

and approved drawings and specifications for construction, erection, and field fabrication 

activities. Items having a limited operating or shelf life will be identified and controlled to prevent 

the installation or use of items for which the operating or shelf life has expired (GLE, 2011a). 

Traceability of items to specific records will be provided where required by codes, standards, or 

specifications (GLE, 2011a). 

As described in Section 9 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant has established measures 

to identify and control IROFS and to provide reasonable assurance that incorrect or defective 

items are not use. Specifically, the applicant will enact controls for the identification of 

materials, parts, and components that will ensure that items are identifiable on the item 

(whenever possible) or on documents traceable to the item. The applicant will control all IROFS 

to ensure only correct and accepted items and services are installed or used. The applicant 

also committed to identify and control items with a limited operating or shelf life to prevent their 

use after their useful lifespan has ended. The applicant’s program for the identification and 

control of materials, parts, and components meets the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.8 

of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable. 
11.A-15

11.A.3.10 CONTROL OF SPECIAL PROCESSES

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s program to control special processes in accordance with the 

acceptance criteria Section 11.4.3.8.9 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The acceptance criteria in 

Section 11.4.3.8.9 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) address the establishment of measures to 

maintain the acceptability of special processes used in the course of construction, maintenance, 

modifications, and testing activities (e.g., welding, heat treating, nondestructive testing, and 

chemical cleaning) and to assure that they are performed by qualified personnel using qualified 

procedures and equipment.

Control of special processes is described in Section 10 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a). The 

applicant will control special processes that affect the quality of items and services in order to 

ensure the maintenance of special process parameters and specified environmental conditions 

(GLE, 2011a). Special processes will be controlled in accordance with policies, plans, 

procedures, instructions, drawings, checklists, travelers, work orders, or other appropriate 

means (GLE, 2011a). Policies, plans, or procedures developed for special processes will 

prescribe the necessary equipment, process parameters, calibration, and acceptance criteria for 

the process (GLE, 2011a).

Special processes that control or verify quality will be performed by qualified personnel using 

approved, written policies, plans, or procedures in accordance with specified requirements, 

codes, or standards (GLE, 2011a). These special processes will include welding, heat treating, 

and nondestructive examination. Specified requirements will be enacted to: (1) certify personnel 

for special processes in which personnel skill is critical to the outcome; and (2) pre-qualify the 

special process and equipment for processes in which control of process parameters is critical 

to the outcome (GLE, 2011a). Records will be maintained of currently qualified personnel, 

processes, and equipment for special processes (GLE, 2011a).

As described in Section 10 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant has established measures 

to maintain the acceptability of special processes used in the course of construction, 

maintenance, modifications, and testing activities at the proposed facility. The applicant 

committed to specify requirements to ensure that special processes are performed by qualified 

personnel using qualified processes and equipment. The applicant committed to control qualityrelated special processes in accordance with written, approved guidance and to maintain up-todate records of personnel, processes, and equipment that are qualified for use in special 

processes. The description of the applicant’s program for the control of special processes 

meets the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.9 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, 

therefore, acceptable. 

11.A.3.11 INSPECTION

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s inspection program in accordance with the acceptance 

criteria Section 11.4.3.8.10 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The acceptance criteria in Section 

11.4.3.8.10 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) call for inspections required to verify conformance of 

IROFS with requirements and assure the inspections are planned and executed. The 

acceptance criteria also call for inspection requirements to be specified in written procedures 

with provisions included for documenting and evaluating inspection results, and for personnel 

qualification programs to be established for inspection test personnel.

Inspection is described in Section 11 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a). Inspections will be performed, 

as required, to verify conformance of items or activities to specified requirements (GLE, 2011a). 
11.A-16

The inspection program will implement the following criteria: (1) inspections will be planned; (2) 

inspection requirements will be specified in approved written policies, plans, or procedures; (3) 

inspections will be performed by qualified personnel with appropriate experience, education, or 

certification; (4) persons performing inspections for acceptance will be independent of the 

activity being inspected; and (5) inspection results will be documented and evaluated in 

accordance with approved written policies, plans, or procedures (GLE, 2011a). The training and 

qualification program is described in Section 11.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011b) and in Section 3.2.3 

of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a).

Inspection planning will address criteria that include the characteristics to be inspected, 

personnel responsibilities, method(s) of inspection, measuring and test equipment to be used, 

acceptance criteria, and relevant design documents (GLE, 2011a). Inspection planning will be 

based on: 1) the importance to safety of the item or activity to be inspected; 2) mandatory 

inspections required by codes, standards, regulatory requirements, and commitments; 3) the 

complexity of the item or activity; and 4) the quality history of the process (GLE, 2011a). 

Hold points will be used as part of the inspection planning process, as needed, to ensure that 

work does not bypass required inspections (GLE, 2011a). When a sample is used to verify 

acceptability of a group of items, the sampling policy, plan, or procedure will be documented 

and will clearly identify the sampling basis (GLE, 2011a). Final inspections will include a review 

of the records of previous inspection results and resolution of any identified nonconformance(s) 

(GLE, 2011a). When final inspection is used for acceptance, the inspection will verify that the 

item conforms to specified requirements (GLE, 2011a). Modifications, repairs, or replacements 

of items performed subsequent to final inspection will require re-inspection or re-test, 

appropriate to the circumstances, to verify acceptability (GLE, 2011a).

Inspection records will contain, as a minimum, the inspection plan and documentation 

identifying the item inspected, date of inspection, inspector, type of observation, results or 

assessment of acceptability, and action taken in connection with any identified 

nonconformances (GLE, 2011a).

As described in Section 11 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant will plan and execute 

inspections to verify conformance of items and activities to specified requirements. The 

requirements for inspections will be specified in approved written procedures that include 

provisions for documenting and evaluating inspection results. The applicant committed to 

ensure that personnel performing inspections are independent of the work activity being 

inspected and have the requisite experience, education, or certification to be qualified to 

perform the inspection activities. The applicant established controls for sampling, the use of 

hold points, and the maintenance of inspection records. The information provided detailing the 

applicant’s inspection program meets the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.10 of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable. 

11.A.3.12 TEST CONTROL

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s test control program in accordance with the acceptance 

criteria Section 11.4.3.8.11 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The acceptance criteria in Section 

11.4.3.8.11 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) call for tests to verify that IROFS conform to specified 

requirements and will perform satisfactorily in service. The acceptance criteria in Section 

11.4.3.8.11 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) also call for test requirements to be specified in 

written procedures with provisions included for documenting and evaluating test results and 

personnel qualification programs to be established for test personnel.
11.A-17

Test control is discussed in Section 12 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a). Tests will be planned and 

executed as required to verify that an IROFS conforms to specific requirements and to 

demonstrate satisfactory performance for service (GLE, 2011a). Types of tests performed at 

the proposed facility will include design verification tests, acceptance tests, preoperational and 

operational tests, and post-maintenance tests (GLE, 2011a). Test results will be documented 

and their conformance with acceptance criteria will be evaluated (GLE, 2011a). Test records 

will contain the following information: item tested; test date; tester or data recorder; type of 

observation; test policy, plan, procedure, or reference; results and acceptability; actions taken in 

connection with any deviations noted; and person evaluating the results (GLE, 2011a).

Tests will be conducted in accordance with test policies, plans, procedures, or instructions that 

contain the following information, as appropriate: (1) a description of the test purpose or 

objectives, responsibilities, characteristics to be tested, test methods, acceptance criteria, and 

hold points to be employed; (2) identification of references and related documents; (3) 

provisions for ensuring prerequisites for a given test have been met (i.e., instruments have been 

calibrated, appropriate equipment is used, personnel are trained, etc.); (4) provisions for 

ensuring that adequate instrumentation is available and suitable environmental conditions are 

maintained; (5) provisions for documenting and evaluating test results for conformance with 

acceptance criteria; and (6) qualifications for test personnel (GLE, 2011a).

In lieu of test policies, plans, and procedures, appropriate sections of related documents

(such as, American Society for Testing and Materials methods, external manuals, maintenance 

instructions, approved drawings, or travelers with acceptance criteria) may be used provided 

that the documents include adequate instructions to ensure the required quality of work (GLE, 

2011a). 

As described in Section 12 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant will conduct tests to verify 

that IROFS conform to specified requirements and will perform satisfactorily in service. Test 

requirements will be specified in written procedures with provisions included for documenting 

and evaluating test results. The applicant identified the types of tests that will be implemented 

at the proposed facility and committed to document test results. The applicant also committed 

to include qualifications for test personnel in test policies, plans, and procedures. The 

applicant’s provisions for the planning, conduct, and documentation of tests meets the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.11 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, 

acceptable. 

11.A.3.13 CONTROL OF MEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMENT

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s program to control measuring and test equipment in 

accordance with the acceptance criteria Section 11.4.3.8.12 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.12 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) is for the applicant to 

provide assurance that tools, gauges, instruments, and other measuring and testing devises are 

properly identified, controlled, calibrated, and adjusted at specified intervals to maintain 

performance within required limits.

Control of measuring and test equipment (M&TE) is described in Section 13 of the QAPD (GLE, 

2011a). M&TE used in activities affecting the availability or reliability of IROFS will be 

controlled, calibrated, and adjusted to maintain equipment performance within required limits 

(GLE, 2011a). M&TE will be calibrated at specified intervals or prior to use against equipment 

having a known valid relationship to nationally recognized standards (GLE, 2011a). If no 
11.A-18

nationally recognized standard exists, the basis for calibration will be documented (GLE, 

2011a). Calibration records will be maintained, and equipment will be marked or otherwise 

identified to indicate calibration status (GLE, 2011a). A list of devices that are controlled within 

the calibration control system will be maintained. Calibration control will not be required for 

rulers, tape measures, levels, and stop watches (GLE, 2011a). 

Policies, plans, and procedures will ensure that devices and standards used for measurement, 

tests, and calibration activities are of the proper type, range, and accuracy (GLE, 2011a). M&TE 

will be properly handled and stored to maintain accuracy (GLE, 2011a). When M&TE is found 

to be out of calibration, as-found data will be recorded, and an evaluation will be performed and 

documented to ascertain the validity of previous inspection and test results and of the 

acceptability of items previously inspected or tested (GLE, 2011a). Out-of-calibration devices 

will be tagged or segregated and will not be used until the devices have been re-calibrated 

(GLE, 2011a). When M&TE is consistently found to be out of calibration, it will be repaired or 

replaced (GLE, 2011a). Calibrations will also be performed when personnel performing 

measurements and tests deem the accuracy of the equipment suspect (GLE, 2011a). 

As described in Section 13 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant has established provisions 

that provide reasonable assurance that tools, gauges, instruments, and other measuring and 

testing devices will be properly identified, controlled, calibrated, and adjusted at specified 

intervals to maintain performance within required limits. The applicant has identified equipment 

that will not be subject to calibration and has committed to maintain a list of devices that are part 

of the calibration control program. The applicant has established controls for dealing with 

devices that are found to be out of tolerance and has committed to ensure the proper storage 

and handling of M&TE. The information provided by the applicant with respect to the M&TE 

program meets the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.12 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and 

is, therefore, acceptable. 

11.A.3.14 HANDLING, STORAGE, AND SHIPPING

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s program for the handling, storage, and shipping of IROFS in 

accordance with the acceptance criteria Section 11.4.3.8.13 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.13 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) address the 

establishment of provisions to control the handling, storage, shipping, cleaning, and 

preservation of IROFS, in accordance with work and inspection instructions, to prevent damage, 

loss, and deterioration caused by environmental conditions such as temperature and humidity.

Material, storage, and handling is described in Section 14 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a). Material 

and equipment will be handled, stored, and shipped in accordance with design and procurement 

requirements to protect against damage, deterioration, or loss. Instructions for handling, 

preservation, storage, cleaning, packaging, or shipping will be established and used when 

essential to maintain acceptable quality (GLE, 2011a).

Special coverings, equipment, and protective environments will be used to protect material and 

equipment from damage or deterioration as required. When such features are used, their 

existence will be verified and monitored as necessary to ensure that they continue to fulfill their 

intended function (GLE, 2011a). Where necessary to ensure that items can be handled safely 

and without damage, special handling tools and equipment will be used (GLE, 2011a). Special 

handling tools and equipment will be controlled and maintained in a manner to ensure that they 

will be able to perform their intended function when needed (GLE, 2011a). 
11.A-19

Operators of special equipment will be experienced or trained as required (GLE, 2011a). 

Attention will be given to marking and labeling items during packaging, shipment, and storage 

(GLE, 2011a). Items will be marked or labeled commensurate with the level of control required 

to ensure that items will be properly maintained and preserved (GLE, 2011a). 

As described in Section 14 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant committed to control the 

handling, storage, shipping, cleaning, and preservation of IROFS, to prevent against damage, 

loss, and deterioration. The applicant committed to establish and use instructions for handling, 

storage, and shipping as necessary to maintain acceptable quality. The applicant described 

provisions for the use of special coverings, equipment, environments, and handling tools to 

protect material and equipment. The applicant committed to pay attention to marking and 

labeling items during packaging, shipment, and storage. The applicant also stated that it will 

require that operators of special equipment be adequately trained or experienced. The 

measures described by the applicant to control the handling, storage, and shipping of material 

and equipment meet the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.13 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002) and are, therefore, acceptable. 

11.A.3.15 INSPECTION, CONTROL, TESTING, AND OPERATING STATUS

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s program for inspection control, testing, and operating status 

in accordance with the acceptance criteria Section 11.4.3.8.14 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). 

The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.14 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) address the 

inspection, test, and operating status of IROFS to prevent inadvertent use of nonconforming 

items or bypassing of inspection and tests.

Inspection, control, testing, and operating status is described in Section 15 of the QAPD (GLE, 

2011a). Policies, plans, and procedures will be established to ensure that the status of 

inspection and test activities is either marked or labeled on the item or is identified in documents 

traceable to the item. Indication of inspection and test status will be required as necessary to 

ensure that required inspections and tests of items are performed, and to ensure items that 

have not passed the required inspections and tests are not inadvertently installed, used, or 

operated (GLE, 2011a).

Status indicators such as tags, markings, or inspection records, will be used as appropriate to 

prevent inadvertent operation of systems and components that are not in an operable status 

(GLE, 2011a). Authority for the application and removal of tags, markings, labels, and stamps 

will be specified (GLE, 2011a).

As described in Section 15 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant has committed to establish 

policies, plans, and procedures to control the inspection, test, and operating status of IROFS to 

prevent the inadvertent use of nonconforming items or bypassing of inspections and tests. The 

applicant will use status indicators to indicate the inspection, test, and operability status of 

items, as necessary, and will specify the required authority for the application and removal of 

status indicators. The information provided by the applicant ensure the appropriate control of 

items and identification of inspection, test, and operability status meets the acceptance criteria 

in Section 11.4.3.8.14 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable. 

11.A.3.16 CONTROL OF NONCONFORMING ITEMS

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s program for control of nonconforming items in accordance 

with the acceptance criteria Section 11.4.3.8.15 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The acceptance 
11.A-20

criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.15 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) address the identification, 

segregation, disposition, and prevention of installation or use of nonconforming IROFS.

Control of nonconforming items is discussed in Section 16 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a). Items 

and related activities that do not conform to specified requirements will be controlled to prevent 

inadvertent installation or use through the following controls; nonconforming items will be: (1) 

identified in a manner that does not adversely affect their end use via markings, tagging, and 

other appropriate methods; (2) segregated, when practical, by placing them in a clearly 

identified and designated area until properly dispositioned; (3) reviewed and dispositioned as 

"reject," "rework," "repair," or "use-as-is;" and (4) controlled to prevent further processing, 

delivery, installation, or use until an evaluation has been completed and a disposition has been 

identified and approved (GLE, 2011a). Nonconformance documentation will identify the 

nonconforming item, describe the nonconformance, identify the disposition and any reinspection requirements, and contain the appropriate signatures approving the disposition. 

Written notification will be made to GLE organizations that may be affected by 

nonconformances (GLE, 2011a).

Alternative measures will be employed to preclude inadvertent use of nonconforming items 

when segregation is impractical or impossible due to physical conditions (for example, size, 

weight, or access limitations) (GLE, 2011a). Personnel performing evaluations to determine 

nonconformance dispositions will possess demonstrated competence in the specific area being 

evaluated, an adequate understanding of the requirements and access to pertinent background 

information (GLE, 2011a). The disposition of nonconforming items will be identified and 

documented as required to carry out the disposition (GLE, 2011a). When nonconforming items 

are dispositioned "repair" or "use-as-is," technical justification for the acceptability of the 

disposition will be documented. The disposition process will include consideration of the need 

for design documents to be "as-constructed" to facilitate operations, maintenance, or 

modification (GLE, 2011a). Repaired or reworked items will be re-examined in accordance with 

the original acceptance criteria unless the nonconforming item disposition establishes alternate 

acceptance criteria (GLE, 2011a).

As described in Section 16 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant has established provisions 

to control the identification, control, segregation, evaluation, and disposition of nonconforming 

items to prevent their installation or use. The applicant has identified measures to ensure that 

personnel performing evaluations of nonconformances are appropriately qualified and that 

justification is documented, as needed, to provide the basis for nonconformances dispositioned 

as "repair" or "use-as-is." The applicant has established provisions for the notification of 

affected organizations, maintenance of as-built design records, and documentation of 

nonconformances. The applicant’s program for the control of nonconforming items meets the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.15 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, 

acceptable. 

11.A.3.17 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s corrective action program in accordance with the acceptance 

criteria Section 11.4.3.8.16 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The acceptance criteria in Section 

11.4.3.8.16 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) call for provisions for reasonable assurance that 

conditions adverse to safety are promptly identified and corrected and measures are taken to 

preclude repetition. These actions should be documented and reported to appropriate levels of 

management.
11.A-21

In Section 17 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant discusses its corrective action program. 

Conditions adverse to quality will be identified and corrected as soon as practical (GLE, 2011a). 

The corrective action program will be implemented in accordance with written, approved 

policies, plans, or procedures that specify requirements for the identification and classification of 

conditions adverse to quality and documentation of conditions adverse to quality and corrective 

actions (GLE, 2011a). Procedures will also specify requirements for management notifications, 

follow-up actions, and trending (GLE, 2011a).

When a significant condition adverse to quality is identified, the cause of the condition will be 

determined, corrective action will be taken to preclude recurrence, and follow-up action will be 

taken to verify implementation of corrective actions (GLE, 2011a). Significant conditions 

adverse to quality, their causes, and corrective actions will be documented and reported to 

appropriate levels of management (GLE, 2011a).

As described in Section 17 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant has defined measures to 

provide reasonable assurance that conditions adverse to quality will be promptly identified and 

corrected. The applicant will implement approved written policies, plans, and procedures to 

control the identification, classification, and follow-up of conditions adverse to quality and the 

trending of significant conditions adverse to quality. For significant conditions adverse to 

quality, the applicant will take measures to prevent recurrence and will document the condition, 

causes, and corrective actions and report this information to appropriate levels of management. 

The information provided by the applicant with respect to measures that will be implemented at 

the proposed facility to perform corrective actions for conditions adverse to quality (and 

significant conditions adverse to quality) meets the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.16 of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable. 

11.A.3.18 QUALITY ASSURANCE RECORDS

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s QA records program in accordance with the acceptance 

criteria Section 11.4.3.8.17 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The acceptance criteria in Section 

11.4.3.8.17 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) address provisions for the identification, retention, 

retrieval, and maintenance of records that furnish evidence of the control of quality for IROFS.

In Section 18 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant describes its program for QA records. 

QA records that furnish documentary evidence of quality will be specified, prepared, and 

maintained in accordance with applicable regulatory requirements and approved written 

policies, plans, and procedures (GLE, 2011a). QA records will be: (1) legible, identifiable, and 

retrievable; (2) protected against damage, deterioration, and loss for the specified record 

retention duration; and (3) retained in accordance with retention periods specified in an 

approved records retention schedule (GLE, 2011a). 

Documents that will become QA records will be specified in procedures, and personnel 

responsible for the implementation of such procedures will be responsible for ensuring that the 

QA records required by the procedure are submitted to the Records Center (GLE, 2011a). 

Records turnover and maintenance agreements will be established to control supplier-produced 

records that furnish documentary evidence of quality (GLE, 2011a). Documents will not be 

considered valid records until they have been validated and authenticated (GLE, 2011a). 

Records will be distributed, handled, and controlled in accordance with written procedures 

(GLE, 2011a). Records will be indexed to ensure retrievability (GLE, 2011a). 
11.A-22

Records may be originals or reproduced copies and will be classified for retention purposes as 

lifetime records or nonpermanent records (GLE, 2011a). Records classified as lifetime records 

will be stored in the Records Center under controlled access unless specified otherwise (GLE, 

2011a). Records that are classified as nonpermanent records will be controlled by the 

responsible organization for the designated retention period (GLE, 2011a). The Records Center 

will protect lifetime records against the risk of loss or deterioration and will be access controlled. 

Hard copy, electronic, or microfilm storage facilities will meet the requirements of Section 4.4 of 

Supplement 17S-1 of American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) NQA-1 (ASME, 

1994). Lost or damaged records will be replaced unless replacement is deemed impractical and 

concurrence is obtained from the QA organization (GLE, 2011a). Corrections to records will be 

reviewed and approved by the originating organization and will include the date and the 

identification of the individual authorized to issue the correction (GLE, 2011a). 

As described in Section 18 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant has established provisions 

for the identification, retention, retrieval, and maintenance of records that furnish evidence of the 

control of quality for IROFS. The applicant committed to specify, prepare, and maintain QA 

records in accordance with applicable regulatory requirements and approved written policies, 

plans, and procedures. Furthermore, the applicant committed to meet the requirements of 

Supplement 17S-1 of ASME NQA-1 (ASME, 1994) for QA records. The applicant will ensure 

that records are identifiable, retrievable, and protected from loss, damage, or deterioration for 

the requisite retention time. All documents will be authenticated by authorized personnel prior 

to becoming official records. The applicant described measures that will be implemented: (1) to 

ensure the readability and usability of older codes and data as computing technology changes; 

(2) to provide for the correction and replacement of information in QA records; and (3) to control 

access to records stored in the Records Center. The applicant also identified organizational 

responsibilities for the identification, maintenance, and storage of both lifetime and 

nonpermanent records. The applicant’s program for the management of records that provide 

objective evidence of quality meets the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.17 of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable. 

11.A.3.19 AUDITS

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s audit program in accordance with the acceptance criteria 

Section 11.4.3.8.18 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The acceptance criteria in Section 

11.4.3.8.18 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) address establishment of provisions for planning and 

scheduling assessments and audits to verify compliance with, and to determine the 

effectiveness of, QA; to identify responsibilities and procedures for assessing, auditing, 

documenting, and reviewing results and designating management levels to review assessment 

and audit results; and to incorporate the status of findings and recommendations in 

management reports.

Audits are addressed in Section 19 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a). Audits of organizations 

performing quality-affecting activities associated with safety-related aspects of the facility will be 

performed at a frequency commensurate with the status and importance of the activity (GLE, 

2011a). Audits will be performed on both internal and external organizations providing products 

or services to the project to verify compliance with the QA Program and to determine its 

effectiveness (GLE, 2011a). Audits will be performed: (1) in accordance with policies, plans, 

procedures, or checklists; (2) by personnel who do not have direct responsibility for performing 

the activities being audited; and (3) using an audit plan that is prepared for each audit (GLE, 

2011a). Auditors (including technical specialists) will have training or experience commensurate 

with the scope, complexity, or nature of the audit (GLE, 2011a).
11.A-23

Audit results will be documented, reported to, and reviewed by responsible management (GLE, 

2011a). Any conditions requiring prompt corrective action will be immediately reported to the 

audited organization's management (GLE, 2011a). When adverse audit findings are identified, 

management of the audited organization or activity will investigate the findings, schedule 

corrective action, and notify the QA organization of the action taken (GLE, 2011a). The QA 

organization will evaluate the adequacy of audit responses and verify that corrective action has 

been taken (GLE, 2011a). Verification of corrective action will be documented (GLE, 2011a). 

Follow-up action will be taken by the QA Organization or management of the audited 

organization to verify the implementation and effectiveness of the corrective action and to 

determine if repetitive problems require further corrective action (GLE, 2011a). 

Audit records will include audit plans, audit reports, and as applicable, written responses to the 

audit findings, documentation of corrective action completion, and documentation of corrective 

action verification (GLE, 2011a).

In Section 19 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant described provisions for the planning 

and scheduling of audits to verify compliance with and to determine the effectiveness of the QA 

Program. The applicant identified the responsibilities of audit team members, organizations 

being audited, and the QA Organization with respect to audit planning, documentation, review of 

audit results, investigation of audit findings, corrective action scheduling, follow-up actions, and 

verification of corrective action completion. The applicant described the information that will be 

captured in audit reports and committed to maintain records of audit activities to include audit 

plans, audit reports, and applicable documentation related to corrective and follow-up actions 

taken in response to audit findings. The information provided by the applicant to describe the 

audit program meets the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.18 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002) and is, therefore, acceptable. 

11.A.3.20 PROVISIONS FOR CHANGE

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s change process in accordance with the acceptance criteria 

Section 11.4.3.8.19 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The acceptance criteria in Section 

11.4.3.8.19 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) calls for the establishment of a change control 

process to address reviews and updates to QA documents based on reorganizations, revised 

activities, lessons learned, changes to applicable regulations, and other QA program changes.

The change process for the QAPD (GLE, 2011a) is described in Section 20 of the QAPD (GLE, 

2011a). The QA Program will be reviewed and revised as necessary to reflect any changes that 

occur throughout the facility lifetime as warranted by corrective actions, regulatory, 

organizational, or work scope changes (GLE, 2011a). The QA Program will be maintained 

current through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of the facility through 

revisions that address: (1) lessons learned from audit and assessment findings; (2) program 

improvements identified from the analysis of trends; and (3) changes due to regulations, 

commitments, re-organizations, revised project schedules, or program improvements identified 

as a result of continuous reviews of assessment results and process improvement initiatives 

(GLE, 2011a).

Changes that decrease the effectiveness of QAPD (GLE, 2011a) commitments will not be made 

without prior NRC review and approval. Changes that do not result in a degradation of safety 

commitments found in the license and do not conflict with provisions documented in the license 

application may be made without NRC review and approval (GLE, 2011a). A description of 
11.A-24

such changes, and a copy of affected sections of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), will be submitted to 

NRC within 3 months of implementation of the change (GLE, 2011a).

As described in Section 20 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant described provisions to 

ensure that the QA Program is maintained current based on reorganization, revised activities, 

lessons learned, regulatory changes, and other QA Program modifications. The applicant 

further described the process for submitting QAPD changes to NRC. The applicant’s program 

for ensuring that the QA Program will be reviewed and revised as necessary to reflect any 

changes that occur throughout the life cycle of the facility meets the acceptance criteria in 

Section 11.4.3.8.19 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) for the development, implementation, and 

maintenance of the QA Program and is, therefore, acceptable. 

11.A.3.21 FIRE SUPPRESSION IROFS

11.A.3.21.1 Fire Suppression QA Controls

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s QA Program for fire suppression IROFS in accordance with 

the acceptance criteria Section 11.4.3.8 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). Fire suppression 

IROFS are described in the SER separate from QA provisions for QL-1 and QL-2 IROFS 

because the QA treatment of fire suppression IROFS is different from that of other IROFS due 

to the reliance on compliance with NFPA codes and standards and verification and certification 

activities performed by testing laboratories such as Underwriters Laboratories (UL).

Appendix A of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a) describes the extent to which Sections 1 through 20 of 

the QAPD (GLE, 2011a) apply to the fire suppression systems identified as items and activities

relied on for safety or defines exceptions and describes alternatives to QAPD (GLE, 2011a) 

provisions. The fire suppression systems to which Appendix A applies are detailed in the 

applicant’s boundary package documents for fire suppression systems, which also includes a 

list of applicable NFPA codes and standards (GLE, 2011a).

The following QAPD (GLE, 2011a) sections apply in their entirety to fire suppression systems 

items and activities relied on for safety: Section 1, “Introduction;” Section 2, “Organization;” 

Section 3, “QA Program;” and Section 20, “Provisions for Change” (GLE, 2011a). NRC 

reviewed these sections as discussed in Sections 11.A.3.1, 11.A.3.2, 11.A.3.3, and 11.A.3.20 of 

this SER and found Sections 1, 2, 3, and 20 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a) acceptable..

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s design control function for fire suppression IROFS in 

accordance with the acceptance criteria Section 11.4.3.8.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) call for establishment of 

a design control function that includes design inputs, process, analyses, verification, interfaces, 

changes, and design documentation and records.

As described in Section 4, “Design Control,” of Appendix A of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), fire 

suppression systems identified as IROFS will be designed, fabricated, installed, inspected, and 

maintained according to the requirements of the design documents, NFPA codes and 

standards, manufacturer’s requirements, and nationally recognized testing lab listing 

requirements. Determination of the required rigor of design control for fire suppression IROFS 

will be based upon the design phase and the results of the ISA, which identifies the functions of 

IROFS and the significance to safety of those functions (GLE, 2011a).
11.A-25

The design of fire suppression IROFS will be based upon sound engineering judgment, 

scientific principles, and applicable codes and standards (GLE, 2011a). Engineering 

management will use approved written policies, plans, or procedures to control the design 

process, including inputs, analysis, outputs, reviews/checks/approvals, change control, technical 

interfaces, and administrative activities (GLE, 2011a). Design policies, plans, or procedures will 

ensure that applicable requirements are correctly translated into design documents (GLE, 

2011a). Design documents will be prepared, reviewed, checked, and approved by qualified 

individuals and will include drawings, reports, technical reports, criteria, specifications, analyses, 

computer programs, system descriptions, requirement documents, and the ISA. Design 

documents such as drawings, specifications, and calculations will describe fire suppression 

systems identified as IROFS (GLE, 2011a).

The work scope and responsibilities for design groups and disciplines will be defined. Fire 

suppression systems will be procured by a bid and award process using qualified licensed 

contractors (GLE, 2011a). The fire protection installation supplier will prepare fabrication 

drawings, data sheets, and calculations for submittal and review (GLE, 2011a). Design 

documents will be prepared, reviewed, checked, and approved by qualified independent 

individuals (GLE, 2011a). The applicant will independently review and verify the results 

obtained from software products used to produce or manipulate data directly used in the design, 

analysis, and operation of the fire suppression systems identified as IROFS. Design activities 

associated with fire suppression IROFS will be performed in accordance with approved written 

policies, plans, or procedures that specify applicable engineering and design requirements 

(GLE, 2011a). Records of the design process will be maintained in accordance with Sections 7 

and 18 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), as modified by Appendix A to the QAPD (GLE, 2011a).

In Section 4 of Appendix A of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), Appendix A, the applicant defined a 

design control process for fire suppression IROFS that will: (1) use written approved policies, 

plans, or procedures to control design inputs; analyses; outputs; reviews, checks, and 

approvals; change control; technical interfaces; and administrative activities; (2) use the ISA and 

other design analysis inputs to determine the rigor needed for design control activities; and (3) 

ensure that applicable requirements are correctly translated into design documents. The 

applicant described how documents and records associated with design control will be 

maintained and committed to design, fabricate, install, inspect, and maintain fire suppression 

IROFS in accordance with the requirements of design documents, NFPA codes and standards, 

manufacturer’s requirements, and nationally recognized testing lab listing requirements. The 

information provided meets the guidance contained in Section 11.4.3.8.3 of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable.

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s procurement control for fire suppression IROFS in 

accordance with the acceptance criteria Section 11.4.3.8.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) address applicable 

design bases and other requirements necessary to provide reasonable assurance of quality are 

included or referenced in documents for procurement of items or services relied on for safety. 

To the extent necessary, suppliers are required to have QA consistent with the quality level of 

the item or service to be procured.

As described in Section 5, “Procurement Control,” of Appendix A of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), 

written approved policies, plans, or procedures will delineate the provisions for the procurement 

process (sourcing) and control of procurement documents and procured materials, components, 

and services (GLE, 2011a). Documents for the procurement of items or services relied on for

safety will include or make reference to design basis and other requirements necessary to 
11.A-26

provide reasonable assurance of quality (GLE, 2011a). Requirements for the content, review, 

approval, and change of procurement documents for QL-NFPA items and services will be 

established in approved written policies, plans, or procedures (GLE, 2011a). 

Procurement documents for QL-NFPA items or services will specify requirements, as 

appropriate, such as QA program requirements applicable to the supplier, requirements for 

controlling nonconformances and changes to products/services, technical requirements, and 

documents to be provided by the supplier (GLE, 2011a). Changes to procurement documents 

will be subject to the same degree of control as that applied to the preparation of the original 

procurement document, and review and approval for changes will be at the same level as the 

original document (GLE, 2011a).

Suppliers or sub-tier suppliers will not be required to maintain a QA Program other than as 

specified and necessary to maintain their licenses, certifications, and listings to provide services 

or equipment associated with the design, erection, inspection, test, and certification of fire 

suppression systems (GLE, 2011a). Commercial grade items procured for use as QL-NFPA 

IROFS will be dedicated by the applicant to serve as basic components (GLE, 2011a).

In Section 5 of Appendix A of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant committed to include or 

make reference to applicable design bases and other requirements necessary to provide 

reasonable assurance of quality in procurement documents issued for fire suppression items or 

services relied on for safety. As stated in the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), suppliers or sub-tier 

suppliers for fire suppression IROFS and services will not be required to maintain a QA Program 

other than as specified and necessary to maintain their licenses, certifications, and listings to 

provide services or equipment associated with the design, erection, inspection, test, and 

certification of fire suppression systems. The information provided by the applicant with respect 

to procurement control meets the guidance in Section 11.4.3.8.4 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) 

and is, therefore, acceptable. 

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s program for instructions, procedures, and drawings for fire 

suppression IROFS in accordance with the acceptance criteria Section 11.4.3.8.5 of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002). The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.5 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) 

address the applicant’s methods for ensuring that activities affecting quality are prescribed by 

and performed in accordance with documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type 

appropriate for the circumstances.

As described in Section 6, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” of Appendix A of the 

QAPD (GLE, 2011a), activities affecting the availability or reliability of IROFS will be prescribed 

by and accomplished in accordance with documented specifications, requirements, policies, 

plans, procedures, instructions, and drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstance (GLE, 

2011a). These documents will include or reference appropriate acceptance criteria for 

determining that prescribed activities have been satisfactorily accomplished (GLE, 2011a). 

NFPA codes and standards set forth the minimum requirements and standards for the design, 

installation, inspection, testing, and maintenance of fire suppression systems identified as 

IROFS (GLE, 2011a). The QA function will review QA implementing policies, plans, and 

procedures for compliance and consistency with the QA Program and to ensure that the 

provisions of the QA Program are effectively incorporated into implementing policies, plans, and 

procedures (GLE, 2011a). Policies, plans, procedures, instructions, and drawings, and changes 

thereto, will be controlled in accordance with Sections 4 and 7 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), as 

modified by Appendix A.
11.A-27

In Section 6 of Appendix A of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant established controls for fire 

suppression instructions, procedures, and drawings and made the commitment that activities 

affecting quality will be prescribed by and performed in accordance with documented 

instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type appropriate for the circumstances. NFPA Codes 

and Standards will be used to establish the minimum standards and requirements for the 

design, testing, installation, inspection, and maintenance of fire suppression systems credited 

as IROFS. The information provided by the applicant to describe instructions, procedures, and

drawings that will be used at the facility meets the guidance contained in Section 11.4.3.8.5 of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable. 

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s document control program for fire suppression IROFS in 

accordance with the acceptance criteria Section 11.4.3.8.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) address the 

establishment of a process to control the preparation, issuance, and modification of documents 

that specify quality requirements or prescribe activities affecting quality are controlled to provide 

reasonable assurance that the appropriate documents are in use. In addition, document 

changes need to be reviewed for adequacy and approved for implementation by authorized 

personnel.

As described in Section 7 “Document Control,” of Appendix A of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), 

documents that prescribe activities affecting the availability or reliability of QL-NFPA IROFS will 

be controlled in a manner to ensure the use of correct documents (GLE, 2011a). Such 

documents will be reviewed for adequacy and approved for release in accordance with a 

defined, management-approved process (GLE, 2011a). Obsolete or superseded documents 

will be removed or appropriately identified (GLE, 2011a).

Policies, plans, procedures, and instructions will be maintained under revision control. 

Procedure changes (minor, major, or temporary) will be performed in accordance with controls 

established in a written, approved procedures (GLE, 2011a). Personnel responsibilities for 

document preparation, review, approval, and issuance will be identified in policies, plans, and 

procedures (GLE, 2011a).

In Section 7 of Appendix A of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant identified provisions for 

document control for fire suppression IROFS and stated that documents that prescribe activities 

affecting the availability or reliability of QL-NFPA IROFS and changes thereto will be controlled 

in a manner to ensure the use of correct documents. The applicant committed to ensure that 

documents are prepared and reviewed for adequacy, correctness, and completeness by a 

qualified individual; approved for release; and used appropriately in performing the activity. 

The applicant’s description of its document control program meets the guidance contained in 

Section 11.4.3.8.6 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable. 

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s program to control purchased items and services for fire 

suppression IROFS in accordance with the acceptance criteria Section 11.4.3.8.7 of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002). The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.7 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) 

call for assurance that purchased IROFS and services relied on for safety are controlled to 

provide reasonable assurance of conformance with specified requirements.

As described in Section 8, “Control of Purchased Items and Services,” of Appendix A of the 

QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant will control the procurement of QL-NFPA items and services 

to ensure they conform to procurement requirements through the implementation of supplier 

(source) evaluation and selection; evaluation of objective evidence of quality furnished by the 
11.A-28

supplier; source inspection; and examination of items or services upon delivery or completion, 

as appropriate (GLE, 2011a).

Sourcing activities will be planned and documented to ensure a systematic approach to the 

procurement process (GLE, 2011a). The activities implemented by the applicant to verify the 

acceptability of fire suppression systems will be those established by NFPA codes and 

standards (GLE, 2011a). Supplier furnished material, equipment, or services related to the fire 

suppression systems identified as IROFS will be reviewed for acceptability by performing one or 

more of the following activities, as appropriate to the items or services being procured: (1) 

monitoring, witnessing, or observing activities performed by the supplier; (2) performing a 

receiving inspection; or (3) performing post-installation testing. Nonconformances associated 

with QL-NFPA items may be identified either by the applicant or by the supplier, and records of 

supplier nonconformances will be maintained (GLE, 2011a).

In Section 8 of Appendix A of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), applicant described measures that will 

be implemented for the control of purchased items and services for fire suppression IROFS to 

ensure that purchased items and services conform to specified requirements. The applicant 

identified controls for supplier evaluation and selection and for the verification of purchased item 

acceptability. The information provided by the applicant to describe the control of purchased 

items and services for the proposed facility meets the acceptance criteria contained in Section 

11.4.3.8.7 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable. 

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s program to identify and control material, parts, and 

components for fire suppression IROFS in accordance with the acceptance criteria Section 

11.4.3.8.8 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.8 of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) call for the establishment of provisions to identify and control IROFS 

and to provide reasonable assurance that incorrect or defective items are not used.

As described in Section 9, “Identification and Control of Materials, Parts, and Components,” of 

Appendix A of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a) controls will be established for QL-NFPA items to 

ensure that only correct and accepted items are used or installed (GLE, 2011a). Identification 

will be maintained on QL-NFPA items or in documents traceable to the items per the 

requirements of NFPA codes and standards (GLE, 2011a). Acceptable means of identification 

for QL-NFPA items will include markings from a nationally recognized testing laboratory or 

submittal of data sheets indicating listing with a nationally recognized testing laboratory and 

traceable to the item (GLE, 2011a). Individual fire suppression system components required by 

NFPA to be listed by a nationally recognized testing laboratory will be listed for the purpose for 

which they are installed (GLE, 2011a).

The licensed fire protection contractor(s) selected to design, construct, fabricate, test, and 

certify the fire suppression systems identified as IROFS will be required to demonstrate a

satisfactory work history of having successfully installed fire suppression systems, and will be 

responsible for meeting the requirements of applicable NFPA codes and standards for the 

identification and control of parts, materials, and components (GLE, 2011a). Design 

specifications and other documents for the procurement of the fire suppression systems IROFS 

will specify requirements such as material control, item identification and segregation, and 

marking (GLE, 2011a).

As described in Section 9 of Appendix A of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant has 

established measures for the identification and control of material, parts, and components to 

prevent the use of incorrect or defective items. The applicant committed to maintain 
11.A-29

identification on QL-NFPA items or in documents traceable to the items per the requirements of 

NFPA codes and standards. The applicant stated that requirements such as material control, 

item identification and segregation, and marking will be identified in design specifications and 

other documents for the procurement of the fire suppression systems IROFS. The applicant’s 

program for the identification and control of materials, parts, and components meets the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.8 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, 

acceptable.

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s program to control special processes for fire suppression 

IROFS in accordance with the acceptance criteria Section 11.4.3.8.9 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002). The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.9 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) call for the 

establishment of measures to maintain the acceptability of special processes used in the course 

of construction, maintenance, modifications, and testing activities (e.g., welding, heat treating, 

nondestructive testing, and chemical cleaning) and to assure that they are performed by 

qualified personnel using qualified procedures and equipment.

As described in Section 10, “Control of Special Processes,” of Appendix A of the QAPD (GLE, 

2011a), special processes that control or verify quality will be performed by qualified personnel 

using approved written policies, plans, and/or procedures in accordance with specified 

requirements and applicable NFPA Codes and Standards. The control of special processes will 

be dictated by policies, plans, procedures, instructions, drawings, checklists, travelers, work 

orders, or other appropriate means that meet the requirements of applicable NFPA Codes and 

Standards (GLE, 2011a). Records associated with special processes performed on fire 

suppression systems will be maintained according to the requirements of applicable NFPA 

Codes and Standards (GLE, 2011a).

As described in Section 10 of Appendix A of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant has 

established provisions for the control of special processes associated with fire suppression 

IROFS. Specifically, the applicant committed to ensure that special processes that control or 

verify quality are performed by qualified personnel using approved written policies, plans, and/or 

procedures in accordance with specified requirements and applicable NFPA Codes and 

Standards. The description of the applicant’s program for the control of special processes 

meets the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.9 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, 

therefore, acceptable. 

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s inspection program for fire suppression IROFS in 

accordance with the acceptance criteria Section 11.4.3.8.10 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.10 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) address inspections 

required to verify conformance of IROFS with requirements and assure the inspections are 

planned and executed. The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.10 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002) also call for inspection requirements to be specified in written procedures with provisions 

included for documenting and evaluating inspection results and for personnel qualification 

programs to be established for inspection test personnel. The training and qualification program 

is described in Section 11.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011b) and in Section 3.2.3 of the QAPD (GLE, 

2011a).

As described in Section 11, “Inspection,” of Appendix A of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), inspections 

will be performed, as required, to verify conformance of items or activities to specified 

requirements (GLE, 2011a). Inspection requirements will be defined in approved written 

policies, plans, or procedures, with provisions for documenting and evaluating the inspection 

results (GLE, 2011a). Inspections will be performed by qualified personnel with licensing 
11.A-30

background, experience, education, or certification, as appropriate (GLE, 2011a). Personnel 

other than those who performed or directly supervised the work being inspected will perform 

inspections for acceptance (GLE, 2011a). Inspection records will be maintained and will 

contain, as a minimum, identification of the item inspected, date of inspection, inspector, type of 

observation, inspection plan, a statement of the inspection results and their acceptability, and 

any actions taken in connection with any identified nonconformances (GLE, 2011a).

Inspections will be planned and may utilize hold points, where applicable, to ensure that work 

does not proceed past required inspections (GLE, 2011a). For inspections that are performed 

as part of maintenance measures required to ensure proper function of a QL-NFPA IROFS, the 

inspection requirements will be defined by applicable NFPA codes and standards (GLE, 2011a). 

The licensed fire protection contractor(s) selected to inspect the fire suppression systems 

identified as IROFS will be responsible for meeting the inspection requirements specified in 

applicable NFPA codes and standards (GLE, 2011a). Licensed site personnel with requisite 

experience and certifications may also perform inspections (GLE, 2011a). 

As described in Section 11 of Appendix A of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant identified 

controls for inspections performed to verify conformance of fire suppression items or activities to 

specified requirements. Requirements for inspections will be specified in approved written 

procedures that include provisions for documenting and evaluating inspection results. The 

applicant committed to ensure that personnel performing inspections are independent of the 

work activity being inspected and have the requisite experience, education, or certification to be 

qualified to perform the inspection activities. The information provided detailing the applicant’s 

inspection program meets the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.10 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002) and is, therefore, acceptable. 

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s test control program for fire suppression IROFS in 

accordance with the acceptance criteria Section 11.4.3.8.11 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.11 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) call for tests to verify 

that IROFS conform to specified requirements and will perform satisfactorily in service. The 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.11 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) also call for test

requirements to be specified in written procedures with provisions included for documenting and 

evaluating test results and for personnel qualification programs to be established for test 

personnel.

As described in Section 12, “Test Control,” of Appendix A of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), tests will 

be planned, executed, documented, and evaluated according to the requirements of NFPA 

codes and standards. Test results will be documented and their conformance with acceptance 

criteria will be evaluated (GLE, 2011a). Tests of QL-NFPA items and services will include 

design verification tests, acceptance tests, preoperational and operational tests, and postmaintenance tests as defined in applicable NFPA codes and standards (GLE, 2011a). Planning 

for tests may include mandatory hold points, as required (GLE, 2011a). 

The licensed fire protection contractor(s) selected to design, construct, fabricate, install, test, 

maintain, and certify the fire suppression systems identified as IROFS will be responsible for 

meeting the requirements of applicable NFPA codes and standards regarding testing (GLE, 

2011a). Design specifications and other documents for procurement of the fire suppression 

systems identified as IROFS will require that contractor personnel performing tests are qualified 

based on experience, education, or certification, as appropriate (GLE, 2011a). The training and 
11.A-31

qualification program is described in Section 11.3 of the LA (GLE, 2011b) and in Section 3.2.3 

of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a). 

Test policies, plans, or procedures will contain the following information, as appropriate: (1) test 

purpose or objectives, responsibilities, characteristics to be tested, test methods, acceptance 

criteria, and hold points to be employed; (2) references and related documents applicable to the 

test activity; (3) provisions for ensuring that adequate instrumentation is available for test 

performance and that suitable environmental conditions are maintained throughout testing; (4) 

provisions for documenting and evaluating the test results for conformance with acceptance 

criteria; and (5) qualification requirements for test personnel (GLE, 2011a). Appropriate 

sections of NFPA codes and standards may be used for test guidance in lieu of test policies, 

plans, and procedures as long as the codes and standards include adequate instructions to 

ensure the required quality of work (GLE, 2011a). Test records will contain the following 

information: item tested; test date; tester or data recorder; type of observation; test policy, plan, 

procedure, or reference; test results and acceptability; actions taken in connection with any 

deviations noted; and person evaluating the results (GLE, 2011a).

As described in Section 12 of Appendix A of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant will conduct 

tests to verify that IROFS conform to specified requirements and will perform satisfactorily in 

service. The applicant committed to plan, execute, and document tests according to the 

requirements of NFPA codes and standards and to document and evaluate the conformance of 

test results with acceptance criteria. The applicant identified information that will be included in 

test policies, plans, or procedures and identified that appropriate sections of NFPA codes and 

standards may be used for test guidance in lieu of test policies, plans, and procedures as long 

as the codes and standards include adequate instructions to ensure the required quality of work. 

The applicant also identified the information that will be contained in test records. As described 

in Appendix A of the QAPD, contractor personnel performing tests for fire suppression systems 

identified as IROFS will be qualified based on experience, education, or certification and will be 

responsible for meeting the requirements of applicable NFPA Codes and Standards. The 

applicant’s provisions for the planning, conduct, and documentation of tests meets the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.11 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, 

acceptable. 

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s program to control measuring and test equipment for fire 

suppression IROFS in accordance with the acceptance criteria Section 11.4.3.8.12 of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002). The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.12 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002) call for assurance that tools, gauges, instruments, and other measuring and testing 

devises are properly identified, controlled, calibrated, and adjusted at specified intervals to 

maintain performance within required limits.

As described in Section 13, “Control of Measuring and Test Equipment,” of Appendix A of the 

QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the licensed fire protection contractor(s) selected to design, 

construct/erect, test, and certify the fire suppression systems IROFS will be responsible for 

meeting the requirements of applicable NFPA codes and standards with respect to M&TE. 

Design specifications and other documents for the procurement of IROFS associated with fire 

suppression systems will specify the M&TE-related NFPA codes and standards and will identify 

the revision or date of the code or standard (GLE, 2011a). 

M&TE used in activities affecting the availability or reliability of fire suppression systems 

identified as IROFS will be controlled, calibrated, and adjusted at specified intervals in order to 

maintain equipment performance within required limits (GLE, 2011a). Policies, plans, and 
11.A-32

procedures will be implemented to ensure that devices and standards used for measurement, 

tests, and calibration activities are of the proper type, range, and accuracy (GLE, 2011a). 

Calibration control will not be required for commercial devices such as rulers, tape measures, 

levels, and stopwatches (GLE, 2011a). A list of devices will be established to identify M&TE 

that is maintained within the calibration control system (GLE, 2011a). The list will be 

established by the calibration requirements of applicable NFPA codes and standards and will 

include, as a minimum, the due date of the next calibration and any use limitations applicable to 

equipment that is calibrated for limited use (GLE, 2011a).

M&TE will be calibrated at specified intervals or prior to use against equipment having a known 

valid relationship to nationally recognized standards; if no nationally recognized standard exists, 

the basis for calibration will be documented (GLE, 2011a). M&TE will be handled and stored in 

a manner to maintain equipment accuracy (GLE, 2011a). When M&TE is found to be out of 

calibration, as-found data will be recorded, and an evaluation will be performed and 

documented to evaluate the validity of previous inspections, test results, and the acceptability of 

items previously inspected or tested (GLE, 2011a). Out-of-calibration devices will be tagged or 

segregated and not used until the equipment has been re-calibrated (GLE, 2011a).

As described in Section 13 of Appendix A of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant has 

established provisions that provide reasonable assurance that tools, gauges, instruments, and 

other measuring and testing devices will be properly identified, controlled, calibrated, and 

adjusted at specified intervals to maintain performance within required limits. The applicant has 

established controls for dealing with devices that are found to be out of tolerance and has 

committed to ensure the proper storage and handling of M&TE. The applicant stated that the 

licensed fire protection contractor(s) selected to design, construct/erect, test, and certify the fire 

suppression systems IROFS will be responsible for meeting the requirements of applicable 

NFPA codes and standards with respect to M&TE. The information provided by the applicant 

with respect to the M&TE program meets the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.12 of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable. 

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s program for the handling, storage, and shipping of fire 

suppression IROFS in accordance with the acceptance criteria Section 11.4.3.8.13 of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002). The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.13 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002) address the establishment of provisions to control the handling, storage, shipping 

cleaning, and preservation of IROFS, in accordance with work and inspection instructions, to 

prevent damage, loss, and deterioration caused by environmental conditions such as 

temperature and humidity.

As described in Section 14, “Handling, Storage, and Shipping,” of Appendix A of the QAPD 

(GLE, 2011a), material and equipment will be handled, stored, and shipped in accordance with 

design and procurement requirements to protect against damage, deterioration, and loss. 

Special coverings, equipment, and protective environments will be specified and provided when 

necessary to prevent damage to or deterioration of fire suppression IROFS (GLE, 2011a). 

When such special protective features are implemented, monitoring and verification activities 

will be implemented as necessary to ensure that the features maintain their effectiveness (GLE, 

2011a).

As described in Section 14 of Appendix A of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant committed 

to handle, store, and ship material and equipment in accordance with design and procurement 

requirements to protect against damage, deterioration, and loss. The applicant described 

provisions for the use of special coverings, equipment, and protective environments to protect 
11.A-33

fire suppression material and equipment. The measures described by the applicant to control 

the handling, storage, and shipping of material and equipment meet the acceptance criteria in 

Section 11.4.3.8.13 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and are, therefore, acceptable. 

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s program for inspection control, testing, and operating status 

for fire suppression IROFS in accordance with the acceptance criteria Section 11.4.3.8.14 of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.14 of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002) address the inspection, test, and operating status of IROFS to prevent inadvertent 

use of nonconforming items or bypassing of inspection and tests.

As described in Section 15, “Inspection, Control, Testing, and Operating Status,” of Appendix A 

of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), status indicators such as tags, markings, work-controlling 

documents, stamps, and inspection records will be used as needed to ensure that required 

inspections and tests are performed and to ensure items that have not passed the required 

inspections and tests are not inadvertently installed, used, or operated. Policies, plans, and 

procedures will be established to ensure that the status of inspection and test activities is either 

marked or labeled on the item or in documents traceable to the item (GLE, 2011a). 

The marking, labeling, or documenting of the inspection, test, maintenance, and impairment 

status of systems and components will be performed in accordance with the requirements of 

applicable NFPA codes and standards (GLE, 2011a). Authority for the application and removal 

of tags, markings, labels, and stamps will be specified (GLE, 2011a).

As described in Section 15 of Appendix A of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant committed 

to establish policies, plans, and procedures to ensure that the status of inspection and test 

activities is either marked or labeled on the item or in documents traceable to the item to 

prevent the inadvertent use of nonconforming items or bypassing of inspections and tests. The 

applicant will use status indicators to indicate the inspection, test, and operability status of 

items, as necessary, and will specify the required authority for the application and removal of 

status indicators. The applicant committed to perform the marking, labeling, or documentation 

of the inspection, test, maintenance, and impairment status of systems and components in 

accordance with the requirements of applicable NFPA codes and standards. The information 

provided by the applicant ensure the appropriate control of items and identification of inspection, 

test, and operability status meets the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.14 of NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable. 

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s program for control of nonconforming items for fire 

suppression IROFS in accordance with the acceptance criteria Section 11.4.3.8.15 of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002). The acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.15 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 

2002) call for control of the identification, segregation, disposition, and prevention of installation 

or use of nonconforming IROFS.

As described in Section 16, “Control of Nonconforming Items,” of Appendix A of the QAPD 

(GLE, 2011a), items and activities that do not conform to specified requirements will be 

controlled to prevent inadvertent installation or use (GLE, 2011a). The responsibility and 

authority for the evaluation and disposition of nonconforming items will be defined. Fire 

suppression systems items identified as IROFS will be inspected for conformance to the 

requirements of applicable NFPA codes and standards (GLE, 2011a). Items determined to be 

non-conforming will be: (1) identified and controlled according to the requirements of NFPA 

codes and standards; (2) marked, tagged, or otherwise identified in a manner that does not 
11.A-34

adversely affect the end use of the item; and (3) segregated, when practical, by placing them in 

a clearly identified and designated area until properly dispositioned (GLE, 2011a). 

Applicant personnel or suppliers performing evaluations to disposition nonconformances will be 

competent in the specific area being evaluated, have an adequate understanding of the 

requirements, and have access to pertinent background information (GLE, 2011a). The 

disposition of nonconforming items will be identified and documented as required to carry out 

the disposition (GLE, 2011a). Nonconformance documentation will include identification of the 

nonconforming item, a description of the nonconformance, identification of the nonconformance 

disposition and any re-inspection requirements, and appropriate signatures approving the 

disposition per the applicable requirements of NFPA codes and standards. (GLE, 2011a)

As described in Section 16 of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant has established provisions 

to control the identification, control, segregation, evaluation, and disposition of fire suppression 

items that do not conform to the requirements of applicable NFPA codes and standards to 

prevent their installation or use. The applicant has identified measures to ensure that personnel 

performing evaluations of nonconformances are appropriately qualified and that nonconforming 

conditions and their dispositions are adequately documented. The applicant’s program for the 

control of nonconforming items meets the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.15 of NUREG1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable.

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s corrective action program for fire suppression IROFS in 

accordance with the acceptance criteria Section 11.4.3.8.16 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.16 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) call for reasonable 

assurance that conditions adverse to safety are promptly identified and corrected and measures 

are taken to preclude repetition. These actions should be documented and reported to 

appropriate levels of management.

As described in Section 17, “Corrective Actions,” of Appendix A of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), 

conditions adverse to quality will be identified and corrected as soon as practical. Approved 

written policies, plans, or procedures will specify requirements for identifying, documenting, 

classifying, and correcting conditions adverse to quality as well as for notifying appropriate 

levels of management when necessary (GLE, 2011a). Conditions requiring corrective action in 

fire suppression IROFS will be identified, corrected, and documented as soon as practical and 

in accordance with the requirements of applicable NFPA codes and standards (GLE, 2011a).

When a significant condition adverse to quality is identified, the cause of the condition will be 

determined, and corrective action will be taken to preclude recurrence (GLE, 2011a). 

Significant conditions, their causes, and corrective actions will be documented and reported to 

appropriate levels of management (GLE, 2011a). For significant conditions adverse to quality, 

follow-up action will be taken to verify implementation of corrective actions and trending will be 

required to monitor any trends in adverse conditions (GLE, 2011a).

As described in Section 17 of Appendix A of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant committed 

to identify and correct conditions adverse to quality as soon as practical. The applicant will 

implement approved written policies, plans, and procedures to ensure that conditions adverse to 

quality are indentified, classified, corrected, and documented in accordance with the 

requirements of applicable NFPA codes and standards and that appropriate management 

notifications are made. For significant conditions adverse to quality, the applicant will take 

measures to prevent recurrence and will document the condition, causes, and corrective actions 

and report this information to appropriate levels of management. The information provided by
11.A-35

the applicant with respect to measures that will be implemented at the proposed facility to 

perform corrective actions for conditions adverse to quality (and significant conditions adverse 

to quality) meets the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.16 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) 

and is, therefore, acceptable. 

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s QA records program for fire suppression IROFS in 

accordance with the acceptance criteria Section 11.4.3.8.17 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.17 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) address provisions for 

the identification, retention, retrieval, and maintenance of records that furnish evidence of the 

control of quality for IROFS.

As described in Section 18, “Quality Assurance Records,” of Appendix A of the QAPD (GLE, 

2011a), QA records that furnish documentary evidence of quality will be specified, prepared, 

and maintained in accordance with applicable regulatory requirements and approved written 

policies, plans, and procedures. QA records for fire suppression systems identified as IROFS 

will include documents required by applicable NFPA codes and standards, record drawings (asbuilt drawings, including calculations), and records of acceptance testing (GLE, 2011a). 

Requirements and responsibilities for the generation, classification, retention, receipt, storage, 

and preservation of QA records will be established in approved written policies, plans, or 

procedures (GLE, 2011a). 

QA records will be legible, identifiable, and retrievable, and will be protected against damage, 

deterioration, and loss for the specified record retention period (GLE, 2011a). Applicable design 

specifications, procurement documents, test procedures, operating procedures, or other 

documents and procedures will specify records that must be generated, supplied, or maintained 

in association with fire suppression IROFS (GLE, 2011a). Documents will be considered valid 

records only if authenticated (e.g., stamped, initialed, or signed and dated by authorized 

personnel, or otherwise authenticated) and validated (verified to be legible, retrievable) (GLE, 

2011a). Records will be indexed to ensure retrievability and will be distributed, handled, and 

controlled in accordance with written procedures (GLE, 2011a).

The Records Center will protect against the risk of loss or deterioration of lifetime records (GLE, 

2011a). The Records Center will be access controlled, and the Records Center will not be left 

unattended unless it is properly secured (GLE, 2011a). Hard copy or microfilm storage facilities 

will meet the requirements of ASME NQA-1 (ASME, 1994), Supplement 17S-1, Section 4.4, 

“Supplementary Requirements for Quality Assurance Records.” In the event that records are 

lost or damaged, they will be replaced unless deemed impractical; in situations in which in it is 

not practical to replace lost or damaged records, concurrence of the QA organization will be 

required (GLE, 2011a).

Records maintained by a supplier at its facility or other locations will be accessible to the 

applicant directly or through the sourcing function and will not be disposed of until contractual 

requirements have been satisfied (GLE, 2011a). 

As described in Section 18 of Appendix A of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant has 

established provisions for the identification, retention, retrieval, and maintenance of records that 

furnish evidence of the control of quality for fire suppression IROFS. The applicant committed 

to specify, prepare, and maintain QA records in accordance with applicable regulatory 

requirements, NFPA codes and standards, and approved written policies, plans, and 

procedures. Furthermore, the applicant committed to meet the requirements of Supplement 

17S-1 of ASME NQA-1 (ASME, 1994) for hard copy and microfilm storage facilities. The 
11.A-36

applicant will ensure that records are identifiable, retrievable, and protected from loss, damage, 

or deterioration for the requisite retention time. All documents will be validated and 

authenticated by authorized personnel prior to becoming official records. The applicant’s 

program for the management of records that provide objective evidence of quality meets the 

acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.17 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, 

acceptable. 

NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s audit program for fire suppression IROFS in accordance with 

the acceptance criteria Section 11.4.3.8.18 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). The acceptance 

criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.18 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) address the establishment of 

provisions for planning and scheduling assessments and audits to verify compliance with, and to 

determine the effectiveness of, QA; to identify responsibilities and procedures for assessing, 

auditing, documenting, and reviewing results and designating management levels to review 

assessment and audit results; and to incorporate the status of findings and recommendations in 

management reports.

As described in Section 19, “Audits,” of Appendix A of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), audits will be 

performed on internal organizations performing quality-affecting activities associated with 

safety-related aspects of the facility to verify compliance with the QA Program and to determine 

its effectiveness. Audits will be performed: (1) in accordance with policies, plans, procedures, 

or checklists; (2) at a frequency commensurate with the status and importance of the activity; 

and (3) by personnel who do not have direct responsibility for performing the activities being 

audited (GLE, 2011a). Auditors (including technical specialists) will have training or experience 

commensurate with the scope, complexity, or special nature of the audit (GLE, 2011a). Audit 

results will be documented, reported to, and reviewed by responsible management (GLE, 

2011a). Whenever conditions requiring prompt corrective action are discovered, they will be 

immediately reported to the audited organization’s management (GLE, 2011a).

Audit records will include audit plans, audit reports, and, as applicable, written responses to the 

audit findings, the documentation of corrective action completion, and documentation of 

corrective action verification (GLE, 2011a). Management of the audited organization or activity 

will investigate adverse audit findings, schedule corrective action, including measures to prevent 

recurrence (if appropriate), and notify the QA organization of the action taken (GLE, 2011a). In 

response, the QA organization will evaluate the adequacy of audit responses and verify the 

implementation of corrective actions (GLE, 2011a). Follow-up action will be taken by the 

audited organization to verify the implementation and effectiveness of the corrective action and 

to determine if repetitive problems require further corrective action (GLE, 2011a). 

Audits will not be performed on suppliers or sub-tier suppliers of fire suppression systems 

identified as IROFS as these suppliers will not be required to maintain a QA Program other than 

as specified and necessary to maintain their licenses, certifications, and listings to provide 

services or equipment associated with the design, erection, inspection, test, and certification of 

fire suppression systems (GLE, 2011a).

In Section 19 of Appendix A of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the applicant committed to plan and 

schedule audits to verify compliance with and to determine the effectiveness of the QA 

Program. Audits will be performed in accordance with policies, plans, procedures, or checklists 

at a frequency commensurate with the status and importance of the activity by personnel who 

do not have direct responsibility for performing the activities being audited. The applicant 

described the information that will be captured in audit reports and committed to maintain 

records of audit activities. The information provided by the applicant to describe the audit 
11.A-37

program meets the acceptance criteria in Section 11.4.3.8.18 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and 

is, therefore, acceptable. 

11.A.3.21.2 Summary of Fire Suppression QA Controls

Appendix A of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a) establishes the QA requirements applicable to fire 

suppression IROFS. As described in Appendix A, the following aspects of the QAPD (GLE, 

2011a) will be managed consistently for all IROFS (QL-1, QL-2, and QL-NFPA): Section 1, 

“Introduction”; Section 2, “Organization”; and Section 20, “Provisions for Change.” Section 3 of 

the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), “Quality Assurance Program,” will be applied to QL-NFPA IROFS 

consistent with the processes applied to QL-1 and QL-2 IROFS, or as indicated when the 

processes differ. 

As described in Appendix A of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), measures will be implemented to 

provide reasonable assurance of the reliability and availability of fire suppression IROFS. 

These measures include quality assurance provisions as well as reliance on nationally 

recognized codes and standards and testing laboratories. Further description of the basis for 

the acceptability of the use of NFPA codes and standards and testing laboratories such as UL 

and Factory Mutual is provided in Section 7.3.1.3 of this SER. Furthermore, in Chapter 2 of the 

LA (GLE, 2011b), the applicant committed to perform an annual review of fire suppression 

IROFS to identify any recalls that have been issued that may affect installed components or 

systems. The information provided by the applicant for the implementation of other QA 

elements for fire suppression IROFS meets the guidance contained in Section 11.4.3.8 of 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) and is, therefore, acceptable. 

11.A.4 EVALUATION FINDINGS

Based on its review of the QAPD (GLE, 2011a), the NRC staff has concluded that the applicant 

has adequately described the application of other QA elements (and the applicable QA 

elements of its principal contractors). The staff concludes further that: 

1. The applicant has established and documented a commitment to an organization 

responsible for developing, implementing, and assessing the management measures for 

providing reasonable assurance of safe facility operations.

2. The applicant has established and documented a commitment to QA elements, and the 

administrative measures for staffing, performance, assessing findings, and implementing 

corrective action are in place. 

3. The applicant has developed a process for preparation and control of written 

administrative plant procedures, including procedures for evaluating changes to 

procedures, IROFS, and tests. A process for review, approval, and documentation of 

procedures will be implemented and maintained.

4. The applicant has established and documented surveillances, tests, and inspections to 

provide reasonable assurance of satisfactory performance of IROFS. Specified 

standards or criteria and testing provisions have been provided.
11.A-38

5. Periodic independent audits will be conducted to determine the effectiveness of 

management measures. Management measures will provide for documentation of audit 

findings and implementation of corrective actions.

6. Training requirements have been established and documented to provide employees 

with the skills to perform their jobs safely. Measures have been provided for evaluation 

of the effectiveness of training against predetermined objectives and criteria.

7. The organizations and persons performing QA element functions have the required 

independence and authority to effectively carry out their QA element functions without 

undue influence from those directly responsible for process operations.

8. QA elements cover the IROFS, as identified in the ISA Summary, and measures are 

established to prevent hazards from becoming pathways to higher risks and accidents.

Accordingly, the staff concludes that the applicant's application of other QA elements (and the 

applicable QA elements of its principal contractors) meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 

70.62 and provides reasonable assurance of protection of public health and safety and of the 

environment.

11.A.5 REFERENCES

(ASME, 1994). American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). NQA-1, “Quality 

Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications,” 1994.

(GLE, 2011a) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “Quality Assurance 

Program Description for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility.” 

Revision 7. 2011.

(GLE, 2011b) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “GE-Hitachi Global 

Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility License Application,” Revision 6. 2011.

(NRC, 2002) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG-1520, “Standard Review 

Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility.” 2002.
12-1

12.0 MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING

12.1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this review was to verify that the applicant, General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser 

Enrichment LLC (GLE), provided sufficient information in its Fundamental Nuclear Material 

Control Plan (FNMCP) (GLE, 2010) to determine that the Material Control and Accounting 

(MC&A) program meets the applicable regulatory requirements in Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (CFR) Part 74, AMaterial Control and Accounting of Special Nuclear Material.@ The 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff’s review of the FNMCP contains Proprietary, SecurityRelated, and Export Control Information and is addressed in the non-public version of this Safety 

Evaluation Report (SER).

12.2 EVALUATION FINDINGS

The staff concluded that the applicant provided an acceptable FNMCP for the proposed facility 

that will meet the applicable 10 CFR 74 requirements. The FNMCP (GLE, 2010) described 

acceptable methods for achieving the performance objectives in 10 CFR 74.33(a) and the 

system capabilities of 10 CFR 74.33(c). In addition, the applicant’s MC&A program elements 

satisfy the guidelines specified in NUREG/CR-5734, ARecommendations to the NRC on 

Acceptable Standard Format and Content for the Fundamental Nuclear Material Control Plan 

Required for Low-Enriched Uranium Enrichment@ (NRC, 1991); Regulatory Guide 5.67, AMaterial 

Control and Accounting Requirements for Uranium Enrichment Facilities Authorized to Produce 

Special Nuclear Material of Low Strategic Significance@ (NRC, 1993); and reporting requirements 

described in NUREG/BR-0006, AInstructions for Completing Nuclear Material Transaction 

Reports (DOE/NRC Forms 741 and 740M)@ (NRC, 2009a); NUREG/BR-0007, AInstructions for 

the Preparation and Distribution of Material Status Reports (DOE/NRC Forms 742 and 742C)@

(NRC, 2009b); and NUREG/BR-0096, AInstructions and Guidance for Completing Physical 

Inventory Summary Reports (NRC Form 327)@ (NRC, 1992).

The regulations in 10 CFR 74.33(c)(5) require that a licensee establish, document, and maintain 

a detection program, independent of production, that provides high assurance of detecting:

i. Production of uranium enriched to 10 percent or more in the U235 isotope, to the extent 

that special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance could be produced within 

any 370 calendar day period;

ii. Production of uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U235 isotope; and

iii. Unauthorized production of uranium of low strategic significance.

In Section 9 of the FNMCP (GLE, 2010a), the applicant described a program for precluding and 

detecting unauthorized production of enriched uranium, including monitoring of the enrichment 

within the process system and monitoring of material quantities against possession limits.

However, because the final facility design is not yet in-place, the applicant has not analyzed 

potentially credible diversion scenarios by which unauthorized enrichment activities can take 
12-2

place. The staff determined that the applicant needs to provide a detailed analysis of potentially 

credible diversion scenarios by which unauthorized enrichment activities and unauthorized 

production of enriched uranium could occur. In addition, the applicant needs to conduct a 

detailed analysis of the processes and determine, based on the credible diversion scenarios, the 

management measures that are best suited to satisfy the detection program goals. Therefore, 

NRC is granting an exemption to 10 CFR 74.33(c)(5) and is imposing the following license 

condition requiring the submittal of the detailed analyses for review and approval as follows:

The Licensee is granted an exemption to the requirements in 10 CFR 74.33(c)(5) to 

require that a licensee establish, document, and maintain a materials control and 

accounting detection program, independent of production. To meet the requirements of 

10 CFR 74.33(c)(5) for establishing a detection program for unauthorized enrichment 

activities, the Licensee shall submit for review and approval 90 days prior to receipt of 

licensed material, a description of its detection program for unauthorized enrichment 

activities to include a detailed analysis of conceptual and credible diversion scenarios for 

unauthorized production of enriched uranium, and related management measures that 

provide high assurance of detecting unauthorized production of enriched uranium. NRC 

approval of the detection program, as required under 10 CFR 74.33(c)(5), is required 

prior to the Licensee’s receipt of licensed material.

This exemption is also discussed in Section 1.2.3.7.9 of this SER.

As required by 10 CFR 70.32(c)(1), the following license condition will also be imposed:

The licensee shall maintain and follow the Fundamental Nuclear Material Control Plan for 

control and accounting and measurement control of uranium source material and special 

nuclear material at the facility pursuant to 10 CFR 74.33. The licensee shall make no 

change to material control procedures essential for the safeguarding of uranium source 

material or special nuclear material that would decrease the effectiveness of the material 

control and accounting program implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 74.33 without prior 

approval of the Commission. If the licensee desires to make changes that would decrease 

the effectiveness of its material control and accounting program or its measurement control 

program, the licensee shall submit an application for amendment to its license pursuant to 

10 CFR 70.34.

The licensee shall maintain records of changes to the material control and accounting 

program made without prior Commission approval a period of five years from the date of the 

change. The licensee shall furnish to the Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and 

Safeguards, using an appropriate method listed in 10 CFR 70.5(a), a report containing a 

description of each change within six months of the change if it pertains to uranium enriched 

less than 20 percent in the uranium-235 isotope.

12.3 REFERENCES

(GLE, 2010) “Fundamental Nuclear Material Control Plan for GE-Hitachi Global Enrichment LLC 

Commercial Facility,@ Revision 2. 2010.
12-3

(NRC, 1991) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG/CR-5734. 

ARecommendations to the NRC on Acceptable Standard Format and Content for the 

Fundamental Nuclear Material Control Plan Required for Low-Enriched Uranium Enrichment,@

1991.

(NRC, 1992) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG/BR-0096, AInstructions and 

Guidance for Completing Physical Inventory Summary Reports (NRC Form 327),@ 1992.

(NRC, 1993) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 5.67, AMaterial 

Control and Accounting Requirements for Uranium Enrichment Facilities Authorized to Produce 

Special Nuclear Material of Low Strategic Significance,@ 1993.

(NRC, 2009a) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG/BR-0006, AInstructions for 

Completing Nuclear Material Transaction Reports (DOE/NRC Forms 741 and 740M),@ Revision 

7, 2009.

(NRC, 2009b) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NUREG/BR-0007, AInstructions for 

the Preparation and Distribution of Material Status Reports (DOE/NRC Forms 742 and 742C),@

Revision 6, 2009.

13-1

13.0 PHYSICAL SECURITY

13.1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this review is to verify that the applicant, General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser 

Enrichment LLC (GLE), provided sufficient information in its “Physical Security Plan (PSP) for the 

GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility” (PSP) (GLE, 2010a) to conclude, 

with reasonable assurance, that there is an adequate physical protection plan for special nuclear 

material (SNM) of low strategic significance and classified matter at the proposed laser-based 

uranium enrichment facility to be located in Wilmington, North Carolina. The Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission staff’s review of the PSP contains Proprietary, Security-Related, and Export Control 

Information and is addressed in the non-public version of this Safety Evaluation Report.

The protection of classified matter is described in the AStandard Practice Procedures Plan for the 

Protection of Classified Matter for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial 

Facility@ (GLE, 2010b). Evaluation of this plan is discussed in Section 1.2.3.7 of this Safety 

Evaluation Report.

13.2 EVALUATION FINDINGS

NRC staff reviewed the applicant=s PSP (GLE, 2010a) for fixed site physical protection of SNM of 

low strategic significance. The methods and procedures outlined in the PSP (GLE, 2010a) 

satisfy the performance objectives, systems capabilities, and reporting requirements specified in 

10 CFR 73.67 and 73.71. The PSP (GLE, 2010a) for the facility is acceptable and provides 

reasonable assurance that the requirements for the physical protection of SNM of low strategic 

significance will be met.

13.3 REFERENCES

(GLE, 2010a) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC (GLE). “Physical Security 

Plan (PSP) for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility,” Revision 1, 

2010.

(GLE, 2010b) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC (GLE). AStandard Practice 

Procedures Plan for the Protection of Classified Matter for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser 

Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility,@ Revision 2, 2010.

14-1

14.0 PHYSICAL SECURITY OF THE 

TRANSPORTATION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL 

OF LOW STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE

14.1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this review is to verify that the applicant, General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser 

Enrichment LLC (GLE), provided sufficient information in its “Nuclear Material Transportation 

Security Plan (NMTSP) for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility” 

(TSP) (GLE, 2010) to conclude, with reasonable assurance, that there is an adequate physical 

protection plan for the transportation of special nuclear material of low strategic significance 

(SNM-LSS) to, or from, the applicant=s proposed uranium enrichment facility, to be located in 

Wilmington, North Carolina. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff’s review of the TSP 

contains Proprietary and Security-Related Information and is addressed in the non-public version 

of this Safety Evaluation Report.

14.2 EVALUATION FINDINGS

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff reviewed the applicant’s TSP (GLE, 2010) for SNMLSS shipments originating from, or arriving at, the facility. The approaches and procedures 

outlined in the TSP (GLE, 2010) satisfy the performance objectives, systems capabilities, and 

event and advance notification requirements specified in 10 CFR 73.67(a), 73.67(f)(g)(1)-(5), 

73.71, 73.73, and 73.74. The TSP (GLE, 2010) for the facility is acceptable and provides 

reasonable assurance that the requirements for the in-transit physical protection of SNM-LSS will 

be met.

14.3 REFERENCES

(GLE, 2010) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC (GLE). “Nuclear Material 

Transportation Security Plan (NMTSP) for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC 

Commercial Facility,” Revision 1, 2010.

15-1

15.0 HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING

15.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes the human factors engineering (HFE) review of the General ElectricHitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC (GLE or applicant) License Application (LA) (GLE, 2011a) 

for a proposed laser-based uranium enrichment facility. The purpose of this review is to 

determine whether the applicant has identified and committed to incorporate appropriate HFE 

guidance and practices into their safety program. Specifically, this review addresses the 

standards, guidance, and practices that specify the design and implementation of the humansystem interfaces (HSIs) (e.g., alarms, displays, and controls) for Items Relied On For Safety 

(IROFS) that require operator actions at the proposed facility. The Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission staff’s review of the HFE program contains Proprietary Information and is 

documented in the non-public version of this Safety Evaluation Report.

15.2 EVALUATION FINDINGS

The staff reviewed the applicant’s LA (GLE, 2011a), the HFE Plan (GLE, 2011b), Integrated 

Safety Analysis Summary (GLE, 2011c), the Quality Assurance Program Description (GLE, 

2011d), and the application of HFE to personnel activities for the proposed facility.

The LA (GLE, 2011a) and the HFE Plan (GLE, 2011b) provide acceptable objectives/purposes, 

expected results, and plans for documentation. The staff concludes that the applicant has 

committed to incorporate into its safety program accepted HFE guidance and practices to design 

and implement those HSIs that support IROFS requiring operator actions. The guidance and 

practices, when implemented properly, should result in HSIs that will perform their intended 

function and meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 70.

Since the HFE program is not complete, follow-up review activities will be needed as part of the 

inspection program conducted under 10 CFR 40.41(g) and 70.32(k) to ensure that the applicant’s 

commitments to HFE provided by the documents reviewed and found acceptable in this SER 

Section have been successfully completed.

15.3 REFERENCES

(GLE, 2011a) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “GE-Hitachi Global 

Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility License Application,” Revision 6. 2011.

(GLE, 2011b) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “Human Factors 

Engineering Program Plan,” NEDE-33539P, Revision 1. 2011.

(GLE, 2011c) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “Integrated Safety 

Analysis Summary for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility,” 

Revision 4. 2011.

(GLE, 2011d) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “Quality Assurance 

Program Description for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility,” 

Revision 7. 2011.

16-1

16.0 ELECTRICAL POWER AND 

INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

16.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter of the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) contains a summary of the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff’s review and evaluation of the electrical power and 

instrumentation and control (I&C) systems for the proposed General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser 

Enrichment LLC (GLE or applicant) uranium enrichment facility. The objective of this review was 

to verify whether the aspects of the design of the electrical and I&C systems will meet the 

regulatory requirements specified in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 

70, Subpart H, “Additional Requirements for Certain Licensees Authorized to Possess a Critical 

Mass of Special Nuclear Material.” To conduct this review, the NRC staff evaluated the 

adequacy of the proposed conceptual design and intended operations of these systems as 

reflected in the applicant’s commitments and goals with respect to that design. Staff evaluated 

the applicant’s commitments for completing the design of the electrical and I&C systems in a 

manner that addresses specific regulatory requirements and acceptance criteria applicable to 

electrical and I&C systems. The applicant’s proposed electrical power and I&C system designs 

are described within the applicant’s License Application (LA) (GLE, 2011a) and the Integrated 

Safety Analysis (ISA) Summary (GLE, 2011b). The NRC staff’s review of the electrical and I&C 

systems contains Proprietary, Security-Related, and Export Control Information and is 

documented in the non-public version of this SER.

16.2 EVALUATION FINDINGS

The NRC staff concludes that the applicant’s commitments to electrical and I&C design and 

management measures will be adequate to provide reasonable assurance that Items Relied on 

for Safety (IROFS) will be available and reliable to perform their intended safety function(s) when 

needed and in the context of the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. In addition, the 

NRC staff concludes that the applicant’s proposed designs for the electrical and I&C systems 

meet the applicable Baseline Design Criteria in 10 CFR 70.64(a) and the defense-in-depth 

criteria in 10 CFR 70.64(b).

The applicant has not proposed the use of IROFS that use software, firmware, microcode, 

Programmable Logic Controllers, or any digital device, including hardware devices which 

implement data communication protocols. However, in the future, if the applicant uses such 

components, prior NRC approval will be necessary. The NRC staff is, therefore, imposing the 

following license condition:

Currently, there are no IROFS that have been specified as using software, firmware, 

microcode, programmable logic controllers, or any digital device, including hardware 

devices which implement data communication protocols (such as fieldbus devices and 

Local Area Network controllers), etc. Should the design of any IROFS be changed to 

include any of the preceding features, the licensee shall obtain Commission approval 
16-2

prior to implementing the change(s). The licensee's design change(s) shall comply with 

accepted best practices in software and hardware engineering, including software quality 

assurance controls as discussed in the Quality Assurance Program Description 

throughout the development process and the applicable guidance of the following 

industry standards and regulatory guides:

• American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) NQA-1-1994 Edition, “Quality 

Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications,” Part II, Subpart 2.7, 

“Quality Assurance Requirements of Computer Software for Nuclear Facility 

Applications,” as revised by the NQA-1a-1995 Addenda of ASME NQA-1-1994 

Edition, Part 1, Supplement 11S-2, “Supplementary Requirements for Computer 

Program Testing;”

• Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) NP-5652, "Guideline for the Utilization of 

Commercial Grade Items In Nuclear Safety Grade Applications," June 1988;

• EPRI Topical Report (TR)-102323, “Guidelines for Electromagnetic Interference

Testing in Power Plants,” Revision 1, December 1996;

• EPRI TR-106439, “Guideline on Evaluation and Acceptance of Commercial

Grade Digital Equipment for Nuclear Safety Applications," October 1996;

• Regulatory Guide 1.152, "Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems in 

Nuclear Power Plants,” Revision 3, July 2011

• Regulatory Guide 1.168, Revision 1, "Verification, Validation, Reviews, and Audits 

for Digital Software Used in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants,” October, 

2004;

• Regulatory Guide 1.169, “Configuration Management Plans for Digital Computer 

Software Used in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants," September 1997;

• Regulatory Guide 1.170, "Software Test Documentation for Digital Computer 

Software Used in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants," September 1997;

• Regulatory Guide 1.172, "Software Requirements Specifications for Digital 

Computer Software Used in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants," September 

1997; and

• Regulatory Guide 1.173, “Developing Software Life Cycle Processes for Digital 

Computer Software Used in Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Plants,” 

September 1997.

16.3 REFERENCES

(ASME, 1994) American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). ASME NQA-1, “Quality 

Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications,” Part II, Supplement 11S-2, 

“Supplementary Requirements for Computer Program Testing,” 1994.
16-3

(ASME, 1995) American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). NQA-1a-1995, “Addenda to 

ASME NQA-I -1994 Edition, Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications,” 

Subpart 2.7, “Quality Assurance Requirements of Computer Software for Nuclear Facility 

Applications,” 1995.

(EPRI, 1988) Electric Power and Research Institute (EPRI). NP-5652, “Guideline for the 

Utilization of Commercial Grade Items in Nuclear Safety Grade Applications,” 1988.

(EPRI, 1996a) Electric Power and Research Institute (EPRI). EPRI Topical Report TR-102323, 

“Guidelines for Electromagnetic Interference Testing in Power Plants,” Revision 1, 1996.

(EPRI, 1996b) Electric Power and Research Institute (EPRI). EPRI Topical Report TR-106439, 

“Guideline on Evaluation and Acceptance of Commercial Grade Digital Equipment for Nuclear 

Safety Applications,” 1996.

(GLE, 2011a) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “GE-Hitachi Global 

Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility License Application,” Revision 6. 2011.

(GLE, 2011b) General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE). “Integrated Safety 

Analysis Summary for the GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC Commercial Facility,” 

Revision 4. 2011.

(NRC, 1997a) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 1.169, 

“Configuration Management Plans for Digital Computer Software Used in Safety Systems of 

Nuclear Power Plants,” 1997.

(NRC, 1997b) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 1.170, “Software 

Test Documentation for Digital Computer Software Used in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power 

Plants,” 1997.

(NRC, 1997c) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 1.172, “Software 

Requirements Specifications for Digital Computer Software Used in Safety Systems of Nuclear 

Power Plants,” 1997.

(NRC, 1997d) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 1.173, 

“Developing Software Life Cycle Processes for Digital Computer Software Used in Safety 

Systems for Nuclear Power Plants,” 1997.

(NRC, 2004) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 1.168, 

“Verification, Validation, Reviews, and Audits for Digital Software Used in Safety Systems of 

Nuclear Power Plants,” Revision 1, 2004.

(NRC, 2011) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide 1.152, “Criteria for 

Digital Computers in Safety Systems in Nuclear Power Plants,” Revision 3, July 2011.

17-1

17.0 SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT PREPARERS

The individuals and organizations listed below are the principal contributors to the preparation of

this Safety Evaluation Report. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) staff

directed the effort and contributed to the technical evaluations. The staff also used contractor

support from Brookhaven National Laboratory, the Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory 

Analyses, and ICF Consulting in the preparation of this document.

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CONTRIBUTORS

Timothy C. Johnson, Office of Nuclear Material NRC Project Manager; General

 Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) Information; Organization and 

Administration

Brian W. Smith, NMSS Branch Chief, Uranium Enrichment

 Branch

Mary Adams, NMSS Decommissioning

Damaris Arroyo, NMSS Management Measures

Sabrina Atack, NMSS Management Measures

Merrit Baker, NMSS Integrated Safety Analysis; Chemical 

 Safety

Luis Betancourt, Office of Nuclear Electrical; Instrumentation and

 Regulatory Research (RES) Controls

Araceli Billoch-Colon, Office of Nuclear Management Measures

 Reactor Regulation (NRR)

Jonathan DeJesus-Seguarra, NMSS Chemical Safety

Ira Dinitz, NRR Liability Insurance

Stan Echols, NMSS Environmental Protection

Keith Everly, Office of Nuclear Security Protection of Classified Information

 and Incident Response (NSIR)

Christian Fisher, NMSS Nuclear Criticality Safety

Stephen Fleger, RES Human Factors Engineering

Herman Graves, RES Seismic and Structural
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Thomas Grice, NMSS Material Control and Accounting

Shawn Harwell, NRR Financial Qualifications

Doug Hase, NSIR Protection of Classified Information

Kenneth Kline, Office of Federal and State Decommissioning Financial

 Materials and Environmental Management Assurance

 Programs (FSME)

Margaret Kotzalas, NMSS Management Measures

Gary Langlie, NSIR Protection of Classified Information

Tyrone Naquin, NMSS Radiation Protection; Accident

 Analysis

Michael Norato, Office of New Reactors Chemical Safety

Michael Norris, NSIR Emergency Management

Tom Pham, NMSS Material Control and Accounting

Blake Purnell, NMSS Nuclear Criticality Safety

Roman Przygodzki, FSME Decommissioning Financial

 Assurance

David Rahn, NRR Electrical; Instrumentation and

 Controls

Christopher Tripp, NMSS Nuclear Criticality Safety

Rex Wescott, NMSS Fire Protection

Barry Wray, NSIR Physical Protection

BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY

James Higgins Human Factors Engineering

John O’Hara Human Factors Engineering
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CENTER FOR NUCLEAR WASTE REGULATORY ANALYSIS

Asadul Chowdhury Structural Design

Sui-Min (Simon) Hsiung Structural Design

John Stamatakos Seismic Design

ICF CONSULTING

Craig Dean Decommissioning Financial

 Assurance

Paul Bailey Decommissioning Financial

 Assurance

A-1

APPENDIX - ACCIDENT ANALYSIS

A.1 INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff’s analysis of the approach, assumptions, 

data, and results for the potential impacts on individual workers and members of the public 

resulting from routine or normal operations and accidents from the proposed General ElectricHitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC (GLE or the applicant) uranium enrichment facility, 

including a description of how radioactive material, such as uranium, results in radiation doses 

and a comparison of these doses to applicable standards, contains Proprietary, SecurityRelated, and Export Control Information and is presented in the non-public version of this Safety 

Evaluation Report.

A.2 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS SUMMARY

Staff selected and evaluated a representative subset of the potential accidents that could occur 

at the proposed facility. The accident consequences vary in magnitude, and include accidents 

initiated by operator error and equipment failure. Analytical results indicate that accidents at the 

facility pose acceptably low risks. The facility design reduces the risk (likelihood) of these 

events. In each accident sequence evaluated, the applicant has applied IROFS that present a 

proven historical record. The NRC staff concludes that through the combination of plant design, 

passive and active engineered IROFS, and administrative controls, accidents at the facility pose 

an acceptably low risk to workers, the environment, and the public.




UNITED STATES 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001

--------------------

OFFICIAL BUSINESS
NUREG

-2120Safety Evaluation Report for the General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser 

Enrichment LLC Laser-Based Uranium Enrichment Plant 

in Wilmington, North Carolina