SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5351-16T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

LONNIE HILL, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

Submitted November 14, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Ostrer and Currier.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Union County, Municipal Appeal No. 6190.

Michael S. Doran, attorney for appellant.

Michael A. Monahan, Acting Union County 

Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (James C. Brady, 

Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant 

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

March 12, 2019
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A-5351-16T4

Defendant Lonnie Hill, Jr. appeals from the Law Division's order entered

after a de novo trial on the record. The Law Division judge found defendant 

guilty of refusing to submit to a breath test in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a. 

After reviewing the contentions in light of the record and the applicable legal 

principles, we affirm.

Defendant was charged with driving while intoxicated, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, 

refusal to submit to a breath test, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a, possession of an open 

container of alcohol in a motor vehicle, N.J.S.A. 39:4-51b, operating a motor 

vehicle while in possession of a controlled dangerous substance, N.J.S.A. 39:4-

49.1, obstructing the passage of other vehicles, N.J.S.A. 39:4-67, parking on an 

angle on a one-way street, N.J.S.A. 39:4-135, and improper parking in front of 

driveway, N.J.S.A. 39:4-138d.

1

We derive the facts from the testimony presented at the municipal court 

trial. On the night of these events, Linden police received a call reporting an 

unknown vehicle parked in the caller's driveway. When Officer James 

Schulhafer arrived at the scene, he noticed a black vehicle, with the engine 

 

1 Defendant was also charged with third-degree possession of a dangerous 

controlled substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1), which was dismissed prior to 

trial. 
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running, keys in the ignition, and the windows rolled down. He approached the 

vehicle and saw defendant "sleeping or passed out" in the driver's seat, with 

empty beer cans scattered throughout the vehicle. When Schulhafer was finally 

able to wake defendant after several minutes, defendant informed the officer "he 

was chilling." Defendant stated he had been driving from Newark and stopped 

to use his phone. He believed he was in Elizabeth. During this conversation,

Schulhafer observed defendant's "eyes were bloodshot and watery," his speech 

was "slurred and a bit slow," and he smelled of alcohol. When Schulhafer went 

to retrieve defendant's identification from the center console, he found a 

prescription pill bottle prescribed to another individual. 

Believing defendant was under the influence of drugs or alcohol, 

Schulhafer conducted field sobriety tests, including a nine-step "walk and turn" 

and a "one-legged stand" test. As defendant performed the "walk and turn" test, 

Schulhafer observed numerous signs of intoxication: defendant began the test 

before the instructions were completed, took an incorrect number of steps, could 

not count his steps, could not walk in a straight line, could not keep his hands at 

his sides, and failed to pivot as instructed. The officer concluded defendant also 

failed the "one-legged stand" test because he could not keep his hands at his 

sides and stopped the test earlier than instructed. When defendant refused to 
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use a portable breath test, Schulhafer placed him under arrest and transported 

him to the police station. 

After observing defendant for twenty minutes, and following the required 

protocol for the administration of the Alcotest, Schulhafer requested defendant 

blow into the machine. Defendant agreed to do so verbally, but ultimately never

provided a breath sample. Schulhafer then read defendant the standard 

statement regarding refusal.

2 The statement informs a defendant of his right to 

refuse and the ramifications. Paragraph five provides: "If you refuse to provide 

samples of your breath, you will be issued a separate summons for the refusal. 

A [c]ourt may find you guilty of both refusal and driving while intoxicated." 

Paragraph eight informs:

Any response from you that is ambiguous or 

conditional, in any respect to my request that you 

provide breath samples, will be treated as a refusal to 

submit to breath testing. Even if you agree to take the 

test, but then do not follow my instructions, do not 

properly perform the test, or do not provide sufficient 

breath samples, I will charge you with refusal to submit 

to breath testing. 

 

2 N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(e) requires the reading of a uniform statement to all persons 

before they submit to a breath test. The statement apprises drivers of the 

consequences of refusing to submit to a breath test. State v. Marquez, 202 N.J. 

485, 497-98 (2010).
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Schulhafer again tried to administer the Alcotest, but defendant began to 

"play[] games," questioning why he needed to give numerous samples and 

asking Schulhafer to re-read the statement. Perceiving this as defendant's 

attempt to "delay the process," Schulhafer gave defendant a "final warning," but 

defendant never provided a breath sample. 

Defendant testified that he understood the instructions and the statement 

"loud and clear." He said he blew in the tube at the station as requested but had

numerous questions as to why he had to do so. He disputed that he refused the

Alcotest. 

The municipal court judge found defendant guilty of refusal to submit to 

a breath test in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a.3 Defendant appealed to the 

Law Division, where the court conducted a trial de novo on the record. The Law 

Division judge issued a well-reasoned, written opinion on June 30, 2017, finding 

defendant guilty of refusal, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a. 

In his decision, the Law Division judge found Schulhafer more credible 

than defendant "with regard to the administration of the breathalyzer based upon

 

3 The municipal court judge also found defendant guilty of possession of an 

open container of alcohol in a motor vehicle. N.J.S.A. 39:4-49.1. He does not 

appeal that determination. Defendant was found not guilty of the remaining 

charges. 
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a review of the [dashcam] video, [d]efendant's comportment and testimony at 

trial, and the documentary evidence." 

The judge found defendant's actions constituted a refusal as he initially 

consented to provide a breath sample and then refused. The judge opined 

defendant "was not ambiguous or equivocal regarding his consent," and 

therefore a reading of the additional statement was unnecessary. The Law 

Division imposed the same fines and penalties as the municipal court: a sevenmonth driver's license suspension, twelve hours of Intoxicated Driver Resource 

Center classes, six months of an ignition interlock device and the requisite fines, 

fees, and costs. 

On appeal, defendant argues:

POINT I

THE COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT THE 

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT NEED NOT BE READ 

WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND, AS A 

RESULT, DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR 

REFUSAL SHOULD BE REVERSED.

Our scope of review is limited to whether the conclusions of the Law Division 

judge "could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present 

in the record." State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964). We do "not undertake to 

alter concurrent findings of facts and credibility determinations made by two lower 
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courts absent a very obvious and exceptional showing of error." State v. Robertson, 

228 N.J. 138, 148 (2017) (quoting State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999)). 

We give substantial deference to a trial judge's findings of fact. Cesare v. 

Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998) (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invr's Ins. 

Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). These findings should only be disturbed when there 

is no doubt that they are inconsistent with the relevant, credible evidence presented 

below, such as to result in a manifest denial of justice. 154 N.J. at 412. We owe no 

deference to the trial judge's legal conclusions. Manalapan Realty, LP v. Twp. 

Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).

In order to sustain a conviction for a refusal charge, the following four 

elements must be satisfied: 

(1) the arresting officer had probable cause to believe 

that defendant had been driving or was in actual 

physical control of a motor vehicle while under the 

influence of alcohol or drugs; (2) defendant was 

arrested for driving while intoxicated; (3) the officer 

requested defendant to submit to a chemical breath test 

and informed defendant of the consequences of 

refusing to do so; and (4) defendant thereafter refused 

to submit to the test.

[State v. O'Driscoll, 215 N.J. 461, 475 (2013) (quoting 

Marquez, 202 N.J. at 503); see also N.J.S.A. 39:4-

50.2(e); N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a].
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Defendant contends the third element was not satisfied because his 

consent was ambiguous, therefore requiring Schulhafer to read the additional 

statement before charging him with refusal. We disagree. 

To "ensure that defendants understand the mandatory nature of the 

breathalyzer test," its purpose, the consequences of a refusal, "and the need for 

unequivocal, affirmative consent," the Legislature requires officers to read a 

standard statement to anyone subjected to the breath test under N.J.S.A. 39:4-

50.2(e). State v. Widmaier, 157 N.J. 475, 489 (1999). 

The Supreme Court has stated that "anything substantially short of an 

unconditional, unequivocal assent to an officer's request that the arrested 

motorist take the breathalyzer test constitutes a refusal to do so." Id. at 497 

(quoting State v. Bernhardt, 245 N.J. Super. 210, 219 (App. Div. 1991)). "The 

occasion is not one for debate, maneuver or negotiation, but rather for a simple 

'yes' or 'no' to the officer's request." Bernhardt, 245 N.J. Super. at 219 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). "Once the defendant says anything except an 

unequivocal 'yes' to the officer's request after the officer has informed the 

defendant of the consequences of a refusal, the defendant cannot legally cure the 

refusal." Ibid.
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The reading of the additional paragraph on the standard statement form, 

referred to as the additional statement, is not a material element to a violation of 

N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a.4 The paragraph was intended as an additional "procedural 

safeguard to help ensure that defendants understood the mandatory nature of the 

breathalyzer test, their limited rights to counsel for purposes of the test, and the 

need for unequivocal, affirmative consent." Widmaier, 157 N.J. at 489. As 

such, it is only required if "after all other warnings have been provided, a person 

detained for driving while intoxicated either conditionally consents or 

ambiguously declines to provide a breath sample." State v. Spell, 196 N.J. 537, 

539 (2008). 

Here, the additional statement was not required because defendant was 

warned of the consequences of refusing to submit to the breath test prior to 

giving his consent. See O'Driscoll, 215 N.J. at 476. Schulhafer read aloud the 

entire standard statement, including paragraphs five and eight as required under 

N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(e). Defendant testified he understood the statement "loud 

and clear." He also does not dispute that he initially agreed to provide breath 

 

4 The additional statement reads: "Your answer is not acceptable. The law 

requires that you submit samples of your breath for breath testing. If you do not 

answer, or answer with anything other than 'yes' I will charge you with refusal. 

Now I ask you again, will you submit to breath testing?"
10 A-5351-16T4

samples. Moreover, to paragraph nine of the statement, "Will you submit 

samples of your breath?" defendant responded "yes." Defendant's subsequent 

conduct does not make his earlier unequivocal consent ambiguous. See State v. 

Schmidt, 206 N.J. 71, 85 (2011) ("Because defendant unequivocally consented 

to the breath test, his later failures to provide the necessary volume and length 

of breath samples did not render his earlier consent ambiguous or conditional."). 

As the Law Division judge noted:

Officer Schulhafer's testimony, which is accepted 

by this [c]ourt, establishes that [d]efendant sought to 

delay and obstruct the administration of the test after 

giving consent. . . . Therefore, it was unnecessary for 

Officer Schulhafer to read the [a]dditional [s]tatement 

or engage in verbal jousting with [] [d]efendant about 

"why" [he] had to perform the test. 

We discern no basis to disturb the trial judge's decision. He thoroughly 

reviewed the facts and we are satisfied there is sufficient credible evidence in 

the record to substantiate his findings. 

Affirmed.