_________________

POLICY ISSUE 

(Information)

June 10, 2016 SECY-16-0076 

FOR: The Commissioners 

FROM: Victor M. McCree 

 Executive Director for Operations 

SUBJECT: STAFF STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE UNCONTESTED HEARING 

FOR ISSUANCE OF COMBINED LICENSES FOR THE LEVY NUCLEAR 

PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 (DOCKET NOS. 52-029 AND 52-030) 

PURPOSE: 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff has completed its review of the 

application for two combined licenses (COLs) to authorize construction and operation of the 

Levy Nuclear Plant (LNP) Units 1 and 2, located in Levy County, Florida. This subsequent COL 

(SCOL) application references the Advanced Passive 1000 (AP1000) Design Control Document 

(DCD), Revision 19. 

The staff presents this information paper in accordance with the revised Internal Commission 

Procedures dated March 24, 2016. Issuance of this paper follows the issuance of the final 

safety evaluation report (FSER) on May 31, 2016 (Agencywide Documents Access and 

Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML16084A664). The agency issued the final 

environmental impact statement (FEIS) on April 27, 2012 (NUREG-1941, Volumes 1, 2, and 3 

(ADAMS Accession Nos. ML12100A063, ML12100A068, and ML12100A070, respectively)). 

The draft COLs for LNP Units 1 and 2, and the draft Summary Record of Decision are 

CONTACTS: Don Habib, NRO/DNRL 

 301-415-1035 

 

 Mallecia Sutton, NRO/DNRL 

 301-415-0673 
The Commissioners - 2 - 

referenced in this Commission paper (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML120310144, ML13035A234, 

and ML16112A317, respectively). This paper does not address any new commitments or 

resource implications. 

This paper serves as the staff’s primary pre-filed testimony for the uncontested (mandatory) 

hearing for issuance of the LNP Units 1 and 2 COLs. This paper, with its references, also 

provides the information requested to support the Commission’s determination that the staff’s 

review has been adequate to support the findings set forth in Title 10, “Energy,” of the Code of 

Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 52.97, “Issuance of Combined Licenses,” and 10 CFR 51.107, 

“Public Hearings in Proceedings for Issuance of Combined Licenses; Limited Work 

Authorizations.” 

In accordance with the Internal Commission Procedures, this paper focuses on non-routine 

matters. Non-routine matters with regard to areas of particular importance in supporting the 

findings related to 10 CFR Part 51, “Environmental Protection Regulations for Domestic 

Licensing and Related Regulatory Functions,” and Part 52, “Licenses, Certifications, and 

Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants,” are matters that relate to any unique features of the facility 

or novel issues that arose as part of the review process. 

SUMMARY: 

This paper addresses each of the findings in 10 CFR 52.97(a) and 10 CFR 51.107(a) and 

provides an adequate basis for the Commission to conclude that each of these findings can be 

made for the LNP Units 1 and 2 COL application. This paper also focuses on non-routine 

matters, such as unique features of the facility or novel issues that arose as part of the review 

process. This paper does not address routine aspects of the safety and environmental review 

process. 

BACKGROUND: 

I. Application History 

Application, Ownership, and Location 

Duke Energy Florida, LLC (DEF) is the applicant for the planned LNP Units 1 and 2. The 

application was initially submitted by Progress Energy Florida (PEF) on July 28, 2008 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML082260277). The applicant changed its name in April 2013 following a 

July 2012 corporate merger between Progress Energy, Inc. and Duke Energy Corporation. As 

part of the initial application, PEF requested that limited work authorizations (LWAs) under 

10 CFR 50.10(d) be issued before issuance of the COLs to allow the early performance of 

safety-related construction activities. In a letter dated May 1, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML091250350), the applicant notified the NRC that it was withdrawing its request for the LWAs. 

DEF is primarily engaged in the generation, transmission, distribution, and sale of electricity in 

portions of central and north Florida. DEF will own both the LNP Unit 1 and Unit 2 facilities and 

have responsibility for the costs and outputs of both facilities, if licensed. Subsequent to the 

2012 merger, the ultimate corporate parent of DEF is Duke Energy Corporation. 

 
The Commissioners - 3 - 

DEF most recently updated the LNP Units 1 and 2 COL application on April 6, 2016 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML16111A960). The publicly available portions of the application are available 

in ADAMS and on the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/col/levy.html. 

There are portions of the application that contain non-public information, including the security 

plan, which contains Safeguards Information (SGI). The SGI portion of the LNP Units 1 and 2 

COL application is located on the NRC’s secure local area network. 

The location for proposed LNP Units 1 and 2 in Levy County, Florida, is a primarily rural area 

located southwest of Gainesville and west of Ocala, approximately 15.5 kilometers (km) (9.6 

miles (mi.)) northeast of the Crystal River Energy Complex. The nearest towns are Inglis and 

Yankeetown, which are located 6.6 km (4.1 mi.) southwest and 12.9 km (8.0 mi.) southwest 

from the site, respectively. The Gulf of Mexico is located approximately 12.8 km (7.9 mi.) west 

of the proposed LNP site, and Lake Rousseau lies about 4.8 km (3.0 mi.) to the south. 

Additional information about the applicant and ownership appears in Part 1 (General and 

Administrative Information) of the COL application. Additional information about the site location 

and characteristics appears in Part 2 (Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)), Chapters 1 and 2, 

of the COL application. 

Referenced Design Certification and Design Certification Amendments 

The LNP Units 1 and 2 COL application references the AP1000 certified design, as amended in 

DCD Revision 19. Westinghouse Electric Company (Westinghouse) was the applicant for 

design certification of the AP1000 amended design. The Revision 19 design (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML11171A287) was certified in Appendix D, “Design Certification Rule for the 

AP1000 Design,” to 10 CFR Part 52. The NRC staff issued the FSER for this DCD (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML112061231) in August 2011 and subsequently published the FSER as 

Supplement 2 to NUREG-1793, “Final Safety Evaluation Report Related to Certification of the 

AP1000 Standard Design,” in September 2011, Volumes 1 and 2 (ADAMS Accession Nos. 

ML11293A087 and ML11292A141, respectively). On December 30, 2011, the NRC published 

the AP1000 design certification amendment final rule (ADAMS Accession No. ML113480014) in 

the Federal Register (FR). 

Subsequent Combined License 

The staff followed the design centered review approach described in Regulatory Issue Summary 

2006-006 (ADAMS Accession No. ML053540251). In this approach, the first COL application 

for a given design is designated the reference COL (RCOL) application and later COLs are 

designated SCOL applications. The staff performs a single review of information appearing in 

an RCOL application and, if identical information (designated as “standard”) appears in a later 

SCOL application, the staff confirms that the appropriate information submitted by the SCOL 

applicant is identical to that previously reviewed for the RCOL application. The staff also 

evaluates any site-specific differences to ensure that they do not affect the SCOL application 

analysis. 

SECY-11-0110, “Staff Statement in Support of the Uncontested Hearing for Issuance of 

Combined Licenses and Limited Work Authorizations for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, 

 
The Commissioners - 4 - 

Units 3 and 4 (Docket Nos. 52-025 and 52-026),” discusses how initially the Bellefonte Units 3 

and 4 (Docket Nos. 52-014 and 52-015) COL application and later the Vogtle Electric 

Generating Plant (Vogtle) Units 3 and 4 COL application were designated as the RCOL 

application for the AP1000 design center (ADAMS Accession No. ML110600264). 

The LNP Units 1 and 2 COL application is designated as an SCOL application in the AP1000 

design center, and it contains some of the same information initially evaluated in the FSER for 

Vogtle Units 3 and 4 COLs. 

In this paper, the staff does not discuss issues addressed under the Bellefonte Units 3 and 4 or 

Vogtle Units 3 and 4 COL application reviews that the staff recognized as “standard” matters 

under the design centered review approach and that are also applicable to the LNP Units 1 

and 2 COL application. The FSER for the LNP COLs for Units 1 and 2 identifies matters from 

the Bellefonte Units 3 and 4 and Vogtle Units 3 and 4 COL applications determined to be 

“standard” and applicable to the LNP Units 1 and 2 COL application, and the FSER discusses 

them in Section 1.2.3. 

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards 

To support the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) in providing an independent 

review and report to the Commission regarding the LNP Units 1 and 2 COL application, the staff 

presented the results of its safety review to the ACRS AP1000 subcommittee at meetings on 

October 18–19, 2011; January 18, 2013; April 9, 2014; September 17, 2014; and April 5, 2016. 

The staff presented the results of its review to the ACRS full committee on December 1, 2011, 

and April 7, 2016. The ACRS issued its reports fulfilling the requirement of 10 CFR 52.87, 

“Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards,” on December 7, 2011 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML11339A126), and April 18, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16102A149). 

The ACRS conclusions and recommendations and the staff responses are discussed further in 

later sections of this paper. 

II. Outreach 

Public Meetings 

Prior to the NRC docketing the application, the staff held a public outreach meeting in Crystal 

River, Florida, on June 5, 2008, to explain the COL review process and take questions from the 

public. The staff held a public meeting on July 28, 2008, at the NRC Headquarters Office in 

Rockville, Maryland, to discuss geotechnical topics associated with the proposed LNP site. 

Additionally, the staff held a SCOL application orientation meeting on August 21, 2008, at the 

NRC Headquarters Office to discuss the COL application, environmental report, site 

characteristics, and request for an LWA related to LNP Units 1 and 2. 

On December 4, 2008, the NRC staff held two scoping meetings in Crystal River, Florida, to 

present the environmental scoping process and to give members of the public an opportunity to 

provide comments on which environmental issues the NRC should consider during its review of 

the application. After issuing the draft environmental impact statement (DEIS) (ADAMS 

Accession Nos. ML102140231 and ML102140235) on August 13, 2010, the staff held two public 

 
The Commissioners - 5 - 

meetings in Crystal River, Florida, on September 23, 2010, to present an overview of the DEIS 

and to accept comments on the document. While reviewing the application, the staff conducted 

a total of 96 public meetings and teleconferences. 

Federal Register Notices 

The NRC published the following FR notices, as required for licensing process key milestones. 

• After receiving the application on July 30, 2008, the NRC published notice of such 

receipt on October 14, 2008 (73 FR 60726). 

• The application was accepted for docketing on October 6, 2008, and the agency 

published a notice of docketing in the FR on October 14, 2008 (73 FR 60726). 

 

• On October 24, 2008, the NRC published a notice of intent to prepare an environmental 

impact statement (EIS) and to conduct scoping (73 FR 63517). 

• On December 8, 2008, the NRC published a notice of order, hearing, and opportunity to 

petition for leave to intervene (73 FR 74532). 

• On March 2, 2009, the NRC published a notice that an Atomic Safety and Licensing 

Board (ASLB) was being established to preside over the COL application proceeding 

(74 FR 9113). This proceeding concerned a petition to intervene and request for hearing 

from the Green Party of Florida, the Ecology Party of Florida, and the Nuclear 

Information and Resource Service, that was submitted in response to the notice of order, 

hearing, and opportunity to petition for leave to intervene. 

• On August 13, 2010, the NRC published a notice of availability of the DEIS 

(75 FR 49539) for public comment and information on planned public meetings to 

present an overview of the DEIS and accept public comments on the document. On 

August 13, 2010, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published a notice 

that it received the DEIS (EIS No. 20100311) from the NRC and that it was available to 

the public (75 FR 49486). 

• On November 18, November 25, December 2, and December 9, 2011, the NRC 

published notices of the COL application in accordance with Section 182(c) of the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and 10 CFR 50.43(a)(3) (76 FR 71608, 

76 FR 72725, 76 FR 75566, and 76 FR 77021). 

• On December 13, 2011, the NRC published a notice that the ASLB would accept oral or 

written limited appearance statements from members of the public regarding the 

application. Members of the public were invited to submit oral or written statements, 

referred to as ‘‘limited appearance statements,’’ related to Contention 4A (76 FR 77561). 

Details on Contention 4A are described in the Adjudicatory Actions section of this paper. 

• On May 3, 2012, the NRC published a notice of availability of the FEIS (77 FR 26316). 

 
The Commissioners - 6 - 

Consultations 

In accordance with Section 657 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the NRC consulted with the 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security (ADAMS Accession No. ML091960397). As part of its 

environmental review, in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as 

amended (NEPA) and other applicable statutes, including the Endangered Species Act and the 

National Historic Preservation Act, the staff consulted with and obtained input from appropriate 

Federal, State, local, and Tribal organizations. 

Adjudicatory Actions 

On December 8, 2008, the NRC published in the FR (73 FR 74532) a notice of hearing and 

opportunity to petition for leave to intervene in the LNP Units 1 and 2 COL proceeding. On 

February 6, 2009, the Nuclear Information and Resource Service, the Ecology Party of Florida, 

and the Green Party of Florida (intervenors) filed a petition for leave to intervene (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML090371107). 

On February 23, 2009, an ASLB was established to handle the matter and to preside over any 

contested adjudicatory proceeding relating to the LNP Units 1 and 2 COL application (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML090540936). On July 8, 2009, ASLB granted the intervenors’ petition, ruling 

that they had shown standing and that three of their proffered contentions (Contentions 4, 7, 

and 8) were admissible (ADAMS Accession No. ML091890822). Currently, all contested issues 

in this proceeding are resolved. The ASLB closed the hearing record for the contested 

proceeding following the resolution of all admitted and pending contentions (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML15062A375). A brief description of each admitted contention adjudicated by the ASLB is 

provided below. 

Contention 4 

Contention 4 was admitted, as narrowed by the ASLB, and subsequently identified as 

Contention 4A, concerning the evaluation of cumulative environmental impacts of dewatering 

and of salt drift and salt deposition during construction and operation of the proposed plant. The 

intervenors alleged that there were various inadequacies in the NRC staff’s DEIS relating to the 

discussion of environmental impacts resulting from dewatering and salt drift operation of the 

LNP. Specifically, Contention 4A was defined as follows: 

The DEIS fails to comply with10 CFR Part 51 and NEPA because it fails to specifically 

and adequately address, and inappropriately characterizes as “small,” certain direct, 

indirect, and cumulative impacts, onsite and offsite, of constructing and operating the 

proposed LNP facility: 

a. Impacts to wetlands, floodplains, special aquatic sites, and other waters, 

associated with dewatering, specifically: 

1) impacts resulting from active and passive dewatering; 

 
The Commissioners - 7 - 

2) impacts resulting from the connection of the site to the underlying 

Floridian aquifer system; 

3) impacts on outstanding Florida waters, such as the Withlacoochee and 

Waccasassa Rivers; 

4) impacts on water quality and the aquatic environment caused by 

alterations and increases in nutrient concentrations caused by the 

removal of water; and 

5) impacts on water quality and the aquatic environment caused by 

increased nutrients resulting from destructive wildfires resulting from 

dewatering. 

b. Impacts to wetlands, floodplains, special aquatic sites, and other waters 

associated with salt drift and salt deposition resulting from cooling towers (that 

use salt water) being situated in an inland, freshwater wetland area of the LNP 

site. 

c. As a result of the omissions and inadequacies described above, the DEIS also 

failed to adequately identify, and inappropriately characterizes as “small,” the 

proposed project’s zone of: 

1) environmental impacts; 

2) impact on Federally listed species; 

3) irreversible and irretrievable environmental impacts; and 

4) appropriate mitigation measures. 

On October 31 and November 1, 2012, the ASLB conducted an evidentiary hearing on the 

intervenors’ challenge to the FEIS in Contention 4A. On March 26, 2013, the ASLB resolved 

Contention 4A in the NRC staff’s favor, ruling that the staff carried its burden of demonstrating 

that the FEIS complies with NEPA and 10 CFR Part 51 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13085A128). 

Contentions 7 and 8 

Contentions 7 and 8 were initially admitted by the Licensing Board as challenges to alleged 

omissions from the applicant’s Environmental Report and FSAR, respectively, concerning 

extended onsite storage of low-level radioactive waste (LLRW). The Licensing Board 

subsequently dismissed these contentions, and intervenors filed new contentions, identified as 

Contentions 7A and 8A, challenging the adequacy of the NRC staff’s DEIS and the applicant’s 

FSAR on the same subject matter. 

Specifically, Contention 7A alleged that the NRC’s DEIS: 

fails to comply with 10 C.F.R. Part 51 and the National Environmental Policy Act 

because it fails to adequately address, and inappropriately characterizes as 

SMALL, direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts, onsite and offsite, of generating 

and managing so-called Low-Level Radioactive Waste (so-called LLRW) from 

operating the proposed two AP1000 reactors . . . 

 
The Commissioners - 8 - 

The ASLB ruled that Contention 7A’s challenges to aspects of a design certification and to 

alleged inadequacies in Table S-3, “Table of Uranium Fuel Cycle Environmental Data,” in 10 

CFR 51.51 were outside the scope of the adjudicatory proceeding as impermissible challenges 

to rules. Additionally, the ASLB determined that the intervenors did not identify specific 

inadequacies regarding the DEIS conclusions on extended storage and management of LLRW. 

For these and other reasons, the ASLB declined to admit Contention 7A (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML110750407). 

Contention 8A alleged that the COL application was inadequate under 10 CFR 52.79(a) 

because it failed to address the management of LLRW for a longer term than envisioned in the 

COL application. Specifically, Contention 8A alleged that the COL application 

is inadequate to satisfy 10 C.F.R. 52.79 because it assumes that class B and C 

radioactive waste generated by proposed Levy Units 1 and 2 will be promptly 

(e.g., within two years) shipped offsite, while currently there is an absence of 

access to a licensed disposal facility or capability to isolate the radioactive waste 

from the environment. The proposed amendment to the Levy County COL also 

fails to offer sufficient information to demonstrate the adequacy of PEF’s plans 

for storing Class B and C radioactive waste on the Levy site if offsite disposal 

capacity is not available within two years. PEF’s plan to postpone most of its 

decisions regarding how and where to store the waste (including “minimizing” the 

volume of the waste) until sometime after issuance of the license for Levy 

violates Section 52.79 and also the Atomic Energy Act’s requirement that safety 

findings must be made before the license is issued. 

Subsequent to admission of Contention 8A, the applicant submitted additional information about 

how it plans to handle LLRW in the period beyond the initial 2 years of operation of LNP Units 1 

and 2, and proposed to revise Section 11.4 of its FSAR to include the additional information 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML11112A087). The ASLB subsequently dismissed the contention, 

ruling, among other things, that the applicant’s revised LLRW plan satisfies applicable NRC 

regulations (ADAMS Accession No. ML11308A267). 

Other Significant Adjudicatory Matters 

Following the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident in Japan in March 2011, a petition to 

suspend all reactor licensing decisions and certain aspects of ongoing licensing proceedings 

was filed in several proceedings beginning on April 14, 2011. Although the petition was not filed 

in this proceeding, the petition filed in other proceedings included references to LNP Units 1 

and 2. On September 9, 2011, the Commission denied the suspension petition, but granted the 

intervenors' request for a safety analysis to the extent that the NRC would conduct a short-term 

and long-term lessons-learned analysis of the Fukushima accident (CLI-11-5, ADAMS 

Accession No. ML14028A554). 

On February 27, 2014, a petition was filed in this and other proceedings to suspend licensing 

decisions pending the resolution of a rulemaking petition regarding the environmental impacts of 

high-density spent fuel pool (SFP) storage. The Commission denied this petition on 

July 17, 2014 (CLI-14-07, ADAMS Accession No. ML14198A106). 

 
The Commissioners - 9 - 

A contention, motion to reopen, and suspension petition concerning safety issues related to 

disposal of spent nuclear fuel were filed in this proceeding and others on September 29, 2014. 

The Commission denied the contention, motion to reopen, and suspension petition on 

February 26, 2015 (CLI-15-4, ADAMS Accession No. ML15057A277). On January 28, 2015, a 

petition was filed to supplement the FEIS in this and other proceedings to reference the 

“Continued Storage” generic environmental impact statement (GEIS). The Commission denied 

this petition on April 23, 2015 (CLI-15-10, ADAMS Accession No. ML15113A295). The 

intervenors subsequently filed a hearing request, intervention petition, and motion to reopen 

seeking admission of a “place-holder” contention regarding the NRC’s reliance on the Continued 

Storage Rule and GEIS. The Commission denied these requests on June 9, 2015 (CLI-15-15, 

ADAMS Accession No. ML15160A179). 

III. Review Process/Methodology 

The key processes and methodologies used to ensure quality, consistency, and completeness 

in preparation of the FSER and FEIS are described below. 

NUREG-0800, “Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for 

Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition.” The principal purpose of the standard review plan 

(SRP) is to ensure the quality and uniformity of staff safety reviews. The staff uses the SRP as 

a routine tool for evaluating the safety of nuclear power plant designs. The SRP, 

comprehensively updated in 2007, is the most definitive basis available for evaluating whether 

an application meets the set of regulations established by the Commission. Each section of the 

SRP outlines the specific regulations that will be met when the review is complete, including the 

general design criteria from Appendix A, “General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,” to 

10 CFR Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities.” Section 1.9.2 of 

the applicant’s FSAR identifies the departures from the SRP associated with the LNP Units 1 

and 2 COL application. This listing does not include SRP departures associated with the 

AP1000 DCD that have been incorporated by reference. 

NUREG-1555, “Standard Review Plans for Environmental Reviews for Nuclear Power 

Plants: Environmental Standard Review Plan.” This guidance, including a 2007 update that 

addresses environmental reviews for COL applications, includes environmental SRPs (ESRPs) 

that NRC staff uses when conducting environmental reviews of applications related to nuclear 

power plants, in accordance with the NEPA and the NRC’s NEPA implementing regulations in 

10 CFR Part 51. 

NUREG-2157, “Generic Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Storage of Spent 

Nuclear Fuel,” (ADAMS Accession No. ML14198A440). The NRC prepared a final 

GEIS that provides a regulatory basis for the final rule entitled “Continued Storage of Spent 

Nuclear Fuel.” As directed by 10 CFR 51.23(b), the impacts assessed in NUREG-2157 are 

deemed to be incorporated in an EIS for a COL application. 

SRM-SECY-12-0025, “Proposed Orders and Requests for Information in Response to 

Lessons Learned from Japan’s March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami,”

(ADAMS Accession No. ML120690347). This Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) 

 
The Commissioners - 10 - 

provides direction to the staff on implementing the Commission-approved recommended actions 

to be taken in response to Fukushima lessons learned. 

Design-Centered Review Approach, SECY-06-0019, “Semiannual Update on the Status of 

New Reactor Licensing Activities and Future Planning for New Reactors” (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML053530315). Under the design-centered review approach, the Office of New 

Reactors (NRO) has used, to the extent practicable, a “one issue-one review-one position” 

strategy to optimize the review effort and resources needed to perform these reviews. Within 

the AP1000 design center, the staff has conducted one technical review for each reactor design 

issue and is using this one decision to support the review of multiple COL applications. 

“Addressing Construction and Preconstruction Activities, Greenhouse Gas Issues, 

General Conformity Determinations, Environmental Justice, Need for Power, Cumulative 

Impact Analysis, and Cultural/Historical Resources Analysis Issues in Environmental 

Impact Statements,” (ADAMS Accession No. ML100760503). This guidance assisted the staff 

in addressing certain aspects of the environmental reviews for early site permit (ESP) and COL 

applications that had evolved since the 2007 update to NUREG-1555 or were identified during 

the first several reviews of ESP and COL applications. 

Regulatory Guides. Regulatory guides (RGs) provide guidance to licensees and applicants on 

implementing specific parts of the NRC's regulations, techniques used by the NRC staff in 

evaluating specific problems or postulated accidents, and data needed by the staff in its review 

of applications for permits or licenses. Appendix 1AA,”Conformance with Regulatory Guides,” 

to the applicant’s FSAR identifies the RGs associated with the LNP Units 1 and 2 COL 

application and if the applicant conformed with or departed from each RG. This listing does not 

include departures from regulatory guidance associated with the AP1000 DCD that have been 

incorporated by reference. 

Interim Staff Guidance. For areas in which the existing SRP does not contain review 

guidance, the staff prepared and used interim staff guidance (ISG) documents. ISGs are found 

at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/isg/. The ISGs clarify technical review 

approaches and address questions related to processes and licensing. The staff used the 

following ISGs in the LNP Units 1 and 2 COL review, and indicated below is the FSER 

section(s) to which each ISG primarily relates: 

• DC/COL-ISG-1, “Interim Staff Guidance on Seismic Issues of High Frequency Ground 

Motion,” dated May 19, 2008; see FSER Section 19.55 

• DC/COL-ISG-3, “PRA Information to Support Design Certification and Combined 

License Applications,” dated June 11, 2008; see FSER Sections 19.55, 19.58, 

and 19.59 

• DC/COL-ISG-7, “Assessment of Normal and Extreme Winter Precipitation Loads on 

the Roofs of Seismic Category I Structures,” dated June 23, 2009; see FSER 

Section 2.3.1 

 
The Commissioners - 11 - 

• DC/COL-ISG-8, “Necessary Content of Plant-Specific Technical Specifications,” dated 

December 9, 2008; see FSER Section 16.1 

• DC/COL-ISG-11, “Finalizing Licensing-Basis Information,” dated November 2, 2009; 

see FSER Section 1.1 

• DC/COL-ISG-15, “Post-Combined License Commitments,” dated October 7, 2009; 

see FSER Sections 1.4.4 and 1.5.5 

• DC/COL-ISG-16, “Compliance with 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) and 10 CFR 52.80(d),” 

(nonpublic), dated June 9, 2010; see FSER Section 19A 

• DC/COL-ISG-17, “Ensuring Hazard-Consistent Seismic Input for Site Response and 

Soil Structure Interaction Analyses,” issued March 24, 2010; see FSER Section 20.1 

• DC/COL-ISG-20, “Seismic Margin Analysis for New Reactors Based on Probabilistic 

Risk Assessment,” dated March 15, 2010; see FSER Sections 19.55 and 19.58 

• DC/COL-ISG-22, “Interim Staff Guidance on Impact of Construction of New Nuclear 

Power Plants on Operating Units at Multi-Unit Sites,” dated February 7, 2011; see 

FSER Section 1.4.4

• JLD-ISG-2012-01,“Compliance with Order EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with 

Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External 

Events,” dated August 29, 2012; see FSER Section 20.2

• JLD-ISG-2012-03,“Compliance with Order EA-12-051, Reliable Spent Fuel Pool 

Instrumentation,” dated August 29, 2012; see FSER Section 20.3

• NSIR/DPR-ISG-01, “Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants,” dated 

November 2011; see FSER Sections 13.3 and 13.3C 

Office Instructions. In its review, the staff followed administrative guidance contained in office 

instructions. These internal documents address a range of procedural matters, including the 

staff’s process for issuing requests for additional information (RAI); handling audits; ensuring the 

qualification and training of technical staff and managers; ensuring consistency between staff 

offices; and overseeing interactions with applicants, intervenors, and public stakeholders. 

New and Significant Review Process. The staff has developed a generic process to address 

circumstances in which there is an extended delay between the issuance of the FEIS for a 

particular license application review and the start of that proceeding’s mandatory hearing phase 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML13199A170). This process provides guidance to the environmental 

staff on identifying potentially new and significant information after the DEIS or FEIS is issued in 

order to determine its significance, and to consider whether this information requires 

supplementation of the DEIS or FEIS in accordance with 10 CFR 51.72(a) or 10 CFR 51.92(a). 

For example, the staff applied this process to the recent Memorandum and Order, CLI-16-07 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML16125A150), issued by the Commission on May 4, 2016. 
The Commissioners - 12 - 

IV. Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Reports 

December 7, 2011, ACRS Letter and Staff Response 

The ACRS review of the LNP Units 1 and 2 COL application resulted in a letter to the 

Commission dated December 7, 2011, concluding that there is reasonable assurance that LNP 

Units 1 and 2 can be built and operated without undue risk to public health and safety and that 

the Commission should approve the LNP Units 1 and 2 COL application following 

implementation of two recommendations related to the tsunami hazard review (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML11339A126). On January 24, 2012, the staff issued a response to the ACRS 

letter, which provided additional explanation related to the staff’s review of the LNP site tsunami 

hazard (ADAMS Accession No. ML113550463). The ACRS conclusions and recommendations 

and the staff’s response are summarized below. 

The ACRS recommended that a license condition be established to require inclusion of a 

probabilistic evaluation of the tsunami hazard in the site-specific, full-scope probabilistic risk 

assessment (PRA) required before the fuel load. The ACRS noted that, although the staff 

concluded that the LNP site elevation at 51 (feet) ft. above sea level is adequately protected 

against the probable maximum tsunami (PMT) runup based on use of what is deemed to be a 

realistic friction factor and source characteristics, given the uncertainties in the parameters used 

in the analysis, a probabilistic approach would provide additional confidence that the risk of 

wave runup exceeding the site elevation is acceptably low. The ACRS stated that this 

probabilistic analysis of the tsunami hazard should be included in the full scope PRA that is 

required prior to fuel load, and that this should be done regardless of whether a consensus 

standard is available. 

In its response letter (ADAMS Accession No. ML113550463), the staff said that it does not think 

it is appropriate to impose a license condition requiring an analysis of tsunami hazard 

probabilities. The staff explained the NRC currently evaluates tsunami hazards for new license 

applications in terms of determining the PMT and that the staff performed an independent 

analysis confirming the applicant’s results. The applicant used state-of-the-art models to 

calculate the inundation level for the bounding tsunami for the LNP site. The applicant 

concluded that storm surge and probable maximum precipitation flooding were of greater 

concern. The staff’s independent analysis confirmed the applicant’s results, and the staff 

concluded that the risk from flooding by a conservatively calculated maximum tsunami is not 

significant for the LNP site. 

The staff’s response stated that, for the PRA, the staff screened out flooding events from further 

analysis because the risk of external flooding events is negligible, in accordance with RG 1.200, 

“An Approach for Determining the Technical Accuracy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results 

for Risk-Informed Activities.” The staff continues to find that NRC regulations 

(10 CFR 52.79(a)(46)) have been satisfied and, for these reasons, does not think it appropriate 

to impose a license condition requiring an analysis of tsunami hazard probabilities. The staff 

response also described specific details regarding how it conducted its analyses and what other 

experts were doing with regard to developing probabilistic tsunamic hazard assessments that 

may be applicable in the future. 

 
The Commissioners - 13 - 

The second ACRS recommendation concerns the effect of a nearby shipping canal and 

watercourse on the tsunami runup at the site. Noting that the Advanced Safety Evaluation 

(ASE) and FSAR do not discuss the effect of the canal and watercourse, the ACRS stated that 

the staff should verify that inclusion of the canal and watercourse would not significantly affect 

the conclusions of its deterministic tsunami hazard evaluation described in the ASE. 

In its response, the staff explained that it considered a range of simulation conditions in its 

independent analysis, including the Cross-Florida Barge Canal. The staff’s independent 

analysis, documented in “Technical Letter Report with No Open Items for the Levy County, 

Florida, COL Review” (ADAMS Accession No. ML12017A152), considered a range of simulation 

conditions, including both realistic and conservative conditions. The staff’s most conservative 

and least plausible condition used a one-dimensional simulation assuming zero friction. 

Another two-dimensional simulation assuming no friction on both the land and sea floor 

provided an upper physical limit for the inundation distance. The staff response explained that 

the canal’s impact on the overall water level at the site resulting from a tsunami is negligible 

given the canal’s size (150 ft. wide, 12 ft. deep, and 8.3 mi. long) and location (3 miles from the 

site). The staff response stated that it evaluated the applicant’s methodology and was satisfied 

that the Cross-Florida Barge Canal had been adequately considered. No additional 

deterministic analyses are needed to support the conclusions of the deterministic tsunami 

hazard evaluation described in the ASE. 

April 25, 2012, ACRS Letter and Staff Response 

In a letter dated April 25, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12108A270), the ACRS commented 

on the staff’s January 24, 2012, response and asked the staff to present additional information. 

• The ACRS requested an update on the status and schedule outlook for the availability of 

the probabilistic tsunami hazard assessment guidance discussed in the staff’s 

January 24, 2012, response. 

• The ACRS requested confirmation of how external hazards can be screened out of PRA 

analyses by virtue of meeting the applicable portion of the Standard Review Plan, as 

described in RG 1.200. 

The staff received clarification from the ACRS that these concerns were generic and not 

specifically related to the LNP Units 1 and 2 COL review. On May 29, 2012, the staff responded 

to the ACRS (ADAMS Accession No. ML12132A289) and committed to schedule a future 

briefing for the ACRS to address these issues. 

April 18, 2016, ACRS Letter and Staff Response 

Following the issuance of the December 7, 2011, ACRS letter, the applicant submitted—and the 

staff reviewed—additional information in several areas. The staff presented summaries of these 

additional reviews to the ACRS AP1000 subcommittee. 

• January 18, 2013 − The staff presented a summary of a seismic reevaluation of the site 

considering new information from NUREG-2115, “Central and Eastern United States 

 
The Commissioners - 14 - 

Seismic Source Characterization for Nuclear Facilities.” This evaluation was in 

consideration of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation 2.1. 

• April 9, 2014, September 17, 2014, and April 5, 2016 - The staff presented several 

exemption requests common to all COL applicants referencing the AP1000 design. The 

design changes associated with these exemption requests address the following aspects 

of the AP1000 certified design and are described further in the “Exemptions and 

Departures” section of this paper: 

o Containment cooling changes in regard to passive core cooling system 

condensate return 

o Main control room dose 

o Main control room heatup 

o Combustible gas control in containment 

o Source range neutron flux doubling block permissive 

The ACRS review of these exemption requests resulted in a letter to the Commission dated 

April 18, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16102A149), concluding that (1) these five 

exemptions are needed to enable the certified design to perform intended functions and should 

be approved and (2) the causes for the exemptions have been identified and addressed for the 

AP1000 certification. The ACRS letter also recommended that the staff evaluate on a generic 

basis whether there are any lessons learned, relative to ongoing and future oversight of the 

quality assurance (QA) program implementation during development of designs seeking 

certification under 10 CFR Part 52. The ACRS requested an opportunity to meet with the staff 

on this generic matter at the appropriate time. 

The staff issued a response to the ACRS on May 22, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML16117A447), stating that the staff agrees with the Committee’s conclusions regarding the five 

exemptions and will document its evaluation of these exemptions in Chapter 21 of the FSER. 

The staff response also committed to working with the ACRS to schedule a future briefing to 

discuss on a generic basis the Committee’s recommendation to evaluate lessons learned 

relative to the QA program. 

V. NTTF Recommendations Regarding the Evaluation of Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear 

Power Plant Events and the Review of the Application 

Both SECY-12-0025 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12039A103) and its associated SRM (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML120690347) address the requirements and regulatory actions resulting from 

the Fukushima NTTF Tier 1 recommendations. The NRC staff determined that four of the NTTF 

Tier 1 recommendations (and the resulting Commission Orders and requests for information) 

were applicable to the LNP Units 1 and 2 COL application, and issued several RAIs. The RAIs 

asked the applicant to complete the following four actions: 

1. Provide an evaluation of the LNP Units 1 and 2 site for updated seismic hazards 

(Recommendation 2.1). 

2. Develop mitigation strategies for beyond-design-basis external events 

(Recommendation 4.2). 

 
The Commissioners - 15 - 

3. Provide reliable SFP instrumentation (Recommendation 7.1). 

4. Evaluate emergency preparedness staffing and communications (Recommendation 9.3). 

The NRC staff evaluated the applicant’s responses to the RAIs in FSER Chapter 20, 

“Requirements Resulting from Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendations.” A 

discussion of the remaining Tier 1 recommendations and why they did not apply to the LNP 

Units 1 and 2 COL review appears in the introduction to Chapter 20. The draft licenses for LNP 

Units 1 and 2 contain license conditions to address Recommendations 4.2, 7.1, and 9.3. 

Fukushima NTTF Recommendation 2.1 Seismic Reevaluation 

SECY-12-0025 contains a request for information letter addressing NTTF Recommendation 2.1 

and describes an acceptable process for developing the information requested. The NRC 

issued an RAI requesting that the applicant address this recommendation. The staff based its 

review on the applicant’s supplemental RAI response, dated August 1, 2012 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML122230155), Revision 5 of its COL application, dated July 31, 2012, (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML12254A837), and additional clarifications provided by the applicant on 

October 15 and 31, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML12291A857 and ML12313A163, 

respectively). 

The information submitted by the applicant included a comparison of the seismic hard rock 

hazard using the new central and eastern United States seismic source characterization 

(CEUS-SSC) model with that of the previously computed seismic hazard determined based on 

the updated Electric Power Research Institute-Seismic Owners Group (EPRI-SOG) seismic 

source models for the central and eastern United States. 

The applicant subsequently compared the ground motion response spectra (GMRS), the 

performance based site response spectra, and the foundation input response spectra (FIRS) 

using the local soil properties. 

Based on the results, the applicant increased the GMRS and FIRS by a factor of 1.212 to bound 

the new hazard, and revised the FSAR accordingly. The staff performed a detailed audit of the 

applicant’s calculations and computer model and agrees that the new GMRS and FIRS bound 

the revised hazard from the CEUS-SSC model. The revised FIRS remains bounded by the 

certified seismic design response spectra for the AP1000 design. The applicant also 

reevaluated the soils under the adjacent Annex, Turbine, and Radwaste buildings for 

liquefaction potential considering the ground motion obtained using the new CEUS-SSC model, 

and the staff agrees with the applicant’s conclusion that the peak ground acceleration values 

determined using the CEUS-SSC model are bounded by the corresponding values determined 

using the updated EPRI-SOG model. 

Fukushima NTTF Recommendation 4.2, Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External 

Events 

In SECY-12-0025, the NRC staff indicated its intent to review information provided by COL 

applicants to describe their mitigation strategies for beyond-design-basis external events. The 

AP1000 standard design includes passive design features that provide core cooling, 

 
The Commissioners - 16 - 

containment, and SFP cooling capabilities for 72 hours, without reliance on ac power. The 

AP1000 design also includes equipment to maintain required safety functions in the long term 

(beyond 72 hours to 7 days). As such, provisions related to obtaining sufficient offsite resources 

to sustain these functions indefinitely must be addressed. The NRC issued an RAI requesting 

that the applicant address this recommendation. The applicant submitted a report containing 

the AP1000 integrated diverse and flexible coping strategies (FLEX) plan describing the 

strategies for mitigating beyond-design-basis external events (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML15114A359). The applicant also proposed a license condition modeled after the 

corresponding license condition imposed by the Commission in the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear 

Station (Summer), Units 2 and 3 COLs (see ADAMS Accession No. ML12090A531, page 22). 

The staff recognizes that full implementation of the mitigation strategies for beyond-design-basis 

external events at AP1000 reactors cannot be established until after licensing (e.g., during 

procedure development). The staff prepared a license condition for LNP Units 1 and 2, based 

on the applicant’s proposed license condition with specific enhancements to provide 

consistency with current NRC staff guidance, per JLD-ISG-2012-01, “Compliance with Order 

EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for 

Beyond-Design-Basis External Events.” Completion of the activities associated with the license 

condition, including lessons learned from initial AP1000 implementation, can be verified through 

NRC inspection activities. 

Fukushima NTTF Recommendation 7.1, Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation 

SECY-12-0025 states that the staff will request all COL applicants to provide information 

regarding spent fuel pool instrumentation through the review process. The NRC issued an RAI 

requesting that the applicant address this recommendation. The applicant provided the 

Westinghouse Technical Report, “Response to NRC Orders EA-12-051 and EA-12-063, and 

Background Information for Future Licensees on AP1000 Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation, 

Redacted” (ADAMS Accession No. ML13023A265). The report identified aspects of the 

AP1000 certified design that addressed requirements for arrangement, environmental 

qualification, power supply, and display, and provided additional information about accuracy and 

recalibration following a loss of power. The applicant incorporated key aspects of the additional 

recalibration information into Section 9.1.3 of the FSAR. The applicant provided a license 

condition to address the maintenance and training requirements. 

Fukushima NTTF Recommendation 9.3, Emergency Preparedness Communications and 

Staffing 

SECY-12-0025 states that the staff will request all COL applicants to provide information 

regarding emergency preparedness communications and staffing through the review process. 

The NRC issued an RAI requesting that the applicant address this recommendation. In 

response the applicant proposed a license condition. As part of its proposed license condition, 

the applicant committed to perform assessments using NEI 12-01, Revision 0, “Guideline for 

Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities” 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML12125A412). The staff reviewed the applicant’s proposed license 

condition and revised the timeframe of the completion of this license condition to be consistent 

with the schedules provided in 10 CFR 52.99(a) and 10 CFR 52.103(a). 
The Commissioners - 17 - 

DISCUSSION: 

I. Excluded Matters 

This paper does not discuss matters that were previously addressed and resolved in the context 

of other reviews undertaken as part of the 10 CFR Part 52 process. Such excluded matters 

include issues addressed under the AP1000 design certification amendment review. 

Also excluded from consideration in the uncontested hearing are substantive issues within the 

scope of contentions admitted and adjudicated during the COL contested proceeding. As 

described above, there are currently no contested issues in the proceeding. 

II. Exemptions and Departures 

Part 7 of the LNP COL application requested 7 exemptions and identified 11 departures from 

the AP1000 certified design. Only one of the departures is unique to the Levy COL application. 

The other departures are common to other AP1000 COL applications. Five of these departures 

also contain changes to the AP1000 Tier 1 information or technical specifications (TS) so 

exemptions are required in accordance with 10 CFR Part 52 Appendix D, Section VIII in order 

for the staff to find them acceptable. The remaining two exemption requests are similar to other 

exemptions requested by other COL applicants and approved by the Commission. 

Exemptions from NRC Regulations 

The staff evaluated and found acceptable the following seven exemptions from NRC regulations 

associated with the review of the application. 

Description Regulation Location of 

Evaluation in FSER 

COL application organization and 

numbering 

10 CFR Part 52, 

Appendix D, 

Section IV.A.2.a 

Section 1.5.4 

Special nuclear material control and 

accounting (MC&A) program description 

10 CFR 70.22(b), 

70.32(c), 74.31, 

74.41, 74.51 

Section 1.5.4 

Containment cooling changes in regard to 

passive core cooling system condensate 

return 

10 CFR Part 52 

Appendix D, 

Section III.B1

Section 21.1 

 

 

1 While the applicant describes the requested exemption as being from Section III.B of 10 CFR Part 52, 

Appendix D, the entirety of the exemption pertains to proposed departures from Tier 1 information or 

generic TS in the generic DCD. The NRC evaluated the exemption as an exemption from Tier 1 

information and/or generic TS to match the language of Sections VIII.A.4 and VIII.C.4 of 10 CFR Part 52, 

Appendix D, which specifically govern the granting of exemptions from Tier 1 information and generic TS. 
The Commissioners - 18 - 

Description Regulation Location of 

Evaluation in FSER 

Main control room dose 

10 CFR Part 52 

Appendix D, 

Section III.B1

Section 21.2 

Main control room heatup 

10 CFR Part 52 

Appendix D, 

Section III.B1

Section 21.3 

Combustible gas control in containment 

10 CFR Part 52 

Appendix D, 

Section III.B1

Section 21.4 

Source range neutron flux doubling block 

permissive 

10 CFR Part 52 

Appendix D, 

Section III.B1

Section 21.5 

a. Exemptions similar to those granted to COL holders 

COL application organization and numbering 

The exemption request for COL organization and numbering is substantively the same 

as the exemption request by Vogtle Units 3 and 4 and Summer Units 2 and 3. For this 

request, the applicable regulation requires that a COL application referencing a certified 

design include a plant-specific DCD using the same organization and numbering as the 

generic DCD. In support of its exemption request, the applicant asserted that complying 

with this requirement would be less efficient and indicated that a modified organization is 

needed to address the topics identified in RG 1.206, “Combined License Applications for 

Nuclear Power Plants (LWR Edition),” and NUREG-0800 and to include plant-specific 

discussions. The staff’s reasoning in finding this exemption acceptable is the same as 

that used to address the corresponding exemption request considered in the Vogtle and 

Summer COL reviews and is described in SECY-11-0110 and SECY-11-0115 (ADAMS 

Accession Nos. ML110600264 and ML111320113). 

Special nuclear MC&A program description 

The MC&A program exemption request is similar to exemptions granted to other COL 

applicants for the Vogtle, Summer, Fermi, and South Texas Project COLs. The 

applicable regulations in 10 CFR Part 70, “Domestic licensing of special nuclear 

material,” and 10 CFR Part 74, “Material control and accounting of special nuclear 

material,” require that a special nuclear material license application describe an MC&A 

program and that the applicant establish, implement, maintain, and follow an MC&A 

program. These regulations contain an exclusion for licensees governed by 10 CFR 

Part 50 but not 10 CFR Part 52. The applicant noted that when reviewing the MC&A 

program there is no reason to treat reactors licensed under these two parts differently. 

The staff’s reasoning in finding this exemption acceptable is the same as that used to 

address the corresponding exemption request considered in the South Texas Project, 

 
The Commissioners - 19 - 

Units 3 and 4 COL review and is described in SECY-15-0123 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML15316A408). 

b. Exemption requests common to other COL applicants referencing the AP1000 

design 

Containment cooling changes in regard to passive core cooling system condensate 

return 

The applicant revised Tier 1 information by adding components to the condensate return 

system used to direct water that has condensed on the containment shell to the incontainment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) during accident scenarios. This 

change adds intermediate gutters at the top and bottom of the polar crane girder and at 

the containment shell intermediate ring stiffener. It blocks drain holes that were in these 

structures and adds dams where needed to collect condensate. It adds downspouts 

from these gutters to the IRWST. It also modifies the gutter drip lip so that condensate 

is not lost between the containment wall and the gutter. This change would increase the 

fraction of condensate returning to the IRWST when there is steam in containment and 

enable the passive core cooling system (PXS) to more effectively perform its design 

functions. The applicant’s request also proposed changes to the generic TS 

Surveillance Requirement regarding the downspout screens. This exemption is 

discussed further below in Section III, “Unique Facility Features or Novel Issues.” 

Main control room dose 

Westinghouse, vendor for the AP1000 design, identified the need to update the designbasis accident (DBA) analyses in order to show compliance with the main control room 

(MCR) habitability regulatory requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General 

Design Criterion (GDC) 19, “Control Room,” because: (1) the analyses did not account 

for the MCR emergency habitability system (VES) filter direct dose in the control room 

and (2) the nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system (VBS) radiation monitor 

setpoints for control room ventilation system actuation did not account for all DBA 

release scenarios. The applicant also chose to revise the analyses that estimated the 

MCR dose contribution from direct radiation and skyshine. The applicant determined 

that a comprehensive change was necessary to correct the errors in the certified design. 

The applicant provided revisions to the AP1000 DBA dose analyses that affect both the 

MCR and offsite dose results. The applicant revised Tier 1 information and generic TS 

to reflect the revised DBA dose analyses and design changes. 

Main control room heatup 

Westinghouse identified additional heat sources in the control room that were not 

accounted for in the original analysis that may challenge the ability of the plant to meet 

control room habitability requirements and equipment qualification limits. The AP1000 

design normally uses the non-safety related VBS to provide heating, ventilation, cooling, 

and filtration to the MCR when power is available. During events where VBS is 

 
The Commissioners - 20 - 

unavailable, however, the VES uses a combination of bottled air and passive heat sinks 

to maintain the MCR in a habitable state. As a result of development of the detailed 

AP1000 design, the applicant identified that the VES is not capable of maintaining the 

MCR in an acceptable condition for human performance during certain transients. 

During events where the MCR is isolated and VES is actuated, but offsite power is 

available to power other plant equipment, the heat loads in the MCR exceed those set 

forth in the certified design. Considering the above, the applicant determined that a 

revised approach to evaluate the heat load in the MCR was required. The applicant 

revised Tier 1 information and generic TS to reflect, in part, a design change to add a 

load shedding arrangement to some of the MCR heat loads and a revision of the heat 

loads in the MCR and associated equipment rooms to reflect revised analyses. 

Combustible gas control in containment 

The Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) currently contained 

in the AP1000 DCD for control of containment hydrogen concentration for beyonddesign-basis accidents was based on the original AP600 and AP1000 design. The 

applicant determined that changes during the development of the current detailed design 

have resulted in inconsistencies between the design and the ITAAC acceptance criteria. 

The applicant revised the ITAAC acceptance criteria for (1) the primary vent paths 

through the ceilings of the passive core cooling system valve/accumulator rooms and (2) 

the proximity of these paths to the containment shell. 

Source range neutron flux doubling block permissive 

According to 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(3), “Safety Systems,” applicants for a COL must comply 

with Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Std. 603–1991, “IEEE 

Standard Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,” and the 

associated correction sheet dated January 30, 1995. Operating bypasses are 

addressed in Clause 6.6 of the standard. Under certain conditions, it may be acceptable 

to bypass a safety function. All of the conditions that permit bypassing the function must 

exist before the bypass is activated. If an operating bypass has been activated and 

plant conditions change so that the bypass is no longer permissible, the safety system 

must automatically do one of three things: 1.) restore plant conditions so that bypass is 

permissible, 2.) remove the active bypass, or 3.) initiate the safety function. 

In the AP1000 certified design, safety functions are initiated by the protection and safety 

monitoring system (PMS). All of the protective actions initiated by the PMS in Revision 

19 of the AP1000 DCD comply with IEEE Std. 603-1991, Clause 6.6, “Operating 

Bypasses,” with one exception. The exception is the manually activated operating 

bypass of the safety function called the boron dilution block from the source range 

neutron flux doubling logic. The boron dilution blocking function is normally activated 

when neutron flux doubles too quickly while reactor power is in the source range. 

However, bypassing this block is permitted above a certain temperature when boron 

dilution can no longer lead to inadvertent criticality. The AP1000 design of the PMS flux 

doubling logic for the boron dilution block did not meet the operating bypass 

requirements of IEEE Std. 603-1991 because the logic programmed in the PMS did not 

 
The Commissioners - 21 - 

include a permissive to allow the block of the flux doubling function under the 

appropriate conditions. The applicant made required changes for the PMS source range 

neutron flux doubling logic to comply with the requirements of IEEE Std. 603-1991, 

Clause 6.6 and changed a generic TS to add the appropriate permissive. 

10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D, Section VIII.A.4 states that exemptions from Tier 1 information are 

governed by the requirements of 10 CFR 52.63(b) and 10 CFR 52.98(f). 10 CFR Part 52, 

Appendix D, Section VIII.C.4 states that an applicant may request an exemption from the 

generic TS or other operational requirements. The Commission may grant such a request only 

if it determines that the exemption will comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 52.7. 

The staff has determined that, as required by Section VIII.A.4 of Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 52, 

the exemptions from Tier 1 information described above: (1) are authorized by law, (2) present 

no undue risk to the public health and safety, (3) are consistent with the common defense and 

security, (4) have special circumstances that outweigh the potential decrease in safety because 

of reduced standardization, and (5) do not significantly reduce the level of safety at the 

applicant’s facility. The staff has also determined, pursuant to Section VIII.C.4 of Appendix D to 

10 CFR Part 52, that the generic TS portions of these exemption requests: (1) are authorized 

by law, (2) present no undue risk to the public health and safety, (3) are consistent with the 

common defense and security, and (4) demonstrate the existence of special circumstances. 

Therefore, the staff grants the applicant the requested exemptions. The staff’s evaluation of 

these exemption requests appears in FSER Chapter 21. 

Departures from AP1000 Design Control Document Revision 19 

The staff evaluated and found acceptable the applicant’s proposed departures from information 

in the AP1000 DCD Revision 19, presented in the table below. Part 7, Section A, of the COL 

application describes and justifies the departures and evaluates each departure against the 

criteria in Section VIII.B.5 of Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 52 to determine whether the applicant 

could implement the departure without NRC approval. Part 7 of the COL application also 

identifies the affected FSAR sections and provides a summary, justification, and evaluation of 

each departure. 

The two departures designated in the table below as “STD,” are standard for COL applicants 

adopting the AP1000 design. Of the remaining nine departures designated as “LNP,” only one 

departure, LNP DEP 3.7-1, is unique to the LNP COL application. The other departures are 

common to multiple COL applications. 

Description Location of 

Evaluation in FSER 

STD DEP 1.1-1. Departure for organization and numbering for 

the FSAR sections. 1.5.4 

LNP DEP 1.8-1. Departure correcting an inconsistency in 

regulatory citation in an interface description. 1.5.4 

 
The Commissioners - 22 - 

Description Location of 

Evaluation in FSER

LNP DEP 3.7-1. Departure to address use of site-specific 

horizontal seismic response spectra for the design of drilled 

shafts that support the seismic Category II portions of the Annex 

and Turbine Buildings. 

3.7 

LNP DEP 3.11-1. Departure revising the “Envir. Zone” numbers 

for SFP Level instruments. 20.3 

LNP DEP 6.2-1. Departure revising the ITAAC Acceptance 

Criteria for the in-containment PXS compartment vents to reflect 

the current plant configuration. 

21.4 

LNP DEP 6.3-1. Departure to quantify the term “indefinitely” as 

used in the DCD for maintenance of safe shutdown conditions 

using the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger (PRHR 

HX) during non-loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs). 

21.1 

LNP DEP 6.4-1. Departure revising estimated maximum doses 

to control room operators to meet 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, 

General Design Criterion 19, “Control Room.” 

21.2 

LNP DEP 6.4-2. Departure revising the heat generated in the 

control room during accident conditions and the conditions for 

actuating the normal ventilation system supplemental filtration 

and the emergency ventilation system. 

21.3 

LNP DEP 7.3-1. Departure modifying the engineered safety 

features to provide an operating bypass for the boron dilution 

block to meet the requirements of IEEE 603-1991 in accordance 

with 10 CFR 50.55a(h), “Protection and safety systems.” 

21.5 

STD DEP 8.3-1. Departure for Class 1E voltage regulating 

transformer current limiting features. 8.3.2 

LNP DEP 1.8-1 – This departure is to correct an inconsistency in DCD Tier 2 Table 1.8-1 (Sheet 

6 of 6), Item 13.1. This item references 10 CFR 50, Appendix O, for features that may affect 

plans for coping with emergencies as opposed to 10 CFR 52.137(a)(11). There is no change in 

substantive requirements, only a clarification of the reference to the applicable regulation. 

LNP DEP 3.7-1 – This departure involves the plant foundation design for the Annex, Radwaste, 

and Turbine buildings, which is based on the use of drilled shafts for vertical and horizontal 

support of the buildings. The drilled shaft configuration at Levy is not one of the six soil types 

analyzed in the Westinghouse generic design. Although the vertical seismic design for these 

Category II structures is based on the AP1000 generic analysis, the lateral (horizontal) seismic 

demand is based on a site-specific analysis. 

 
The Commissioners - 23 - 

LNP DEP 3.11-1 – This departure corrects an inconsistency in a DCD table. The environmental 

zone numbers for three SFP level instruments are being revised to accurately reflect their actual 

location; the locations of the SFP instruments are not being changed from the designed 

locations. 

STD DEP 8.3-1 – This standard departure involves the applicant’s use of breakers and fuses to 

provide the isolation function instead of current limiting devices in Class 1E voltage regulating 

transformers. It is the same as the departure that the staff previously evaluated for the Vogtle 

and Summer COL applications. 

The remaining departures are associated with the exemption requests described above: 

• STD DEP 1.1-1 – COL application organization and numbering 

• LNP DEP 3.2-1 and LNP DEP 6.3-1 - Containment cooling changes in regards to 

passive core cooling system condensate return 

• LNP DEP 6.4-1 – Main control room dose 

• LNP DEP 6.4-2 – Main control room heatup 

• LNP DEP 6.2-1 – Combustible gas control in containment 

• LNP DEP 7.3-1 – Source range neutron flux doubling block permissive 

III. Unique Facility Features or Novel Issues 

Safety Matters 

a. Geologic and Geotechnical Site Characteristics 

In the FSAR, the applicant identified the potential for surface deformation resulting from 

carbonate dissolution and collapse or subsidence related to karst development as the only 

geologic hazard in the site area. Therefore, the geologic characteristic of primary concern in the 

site area and at the site is related to the potential for the occurrence of subsurface dissolution 

cavities, the dimension of which may be enhanced along individual vertical fractures or 

horizontal bedding planes or where vertical fractures and horizontal bedding planes intersect. 

The applicant’s original site characterization boreholes revealed some missing core and rod 

drops, which could possibly indicate the presence of dissolution voids in the subsurface. 

However, the applicant performed carefully controlled drilling in a series of boreholes offset from 

the original site characterization boreholes to document the occurrence of softer weathered rock 

material, a part of the normal stratigraphic section, which was washed out by drilling fluids 

during initial drilling, rather than dissolution voids. The applicant also conducted grout uptake 

tests and determined that measured grout uptakes did not indicate large dissolution voids or 

cavities in the subsurface, caused either by individual vertical fractures or horizontal bedding 

planes enlarged by dissolution, or by dissolution at the intersections of fractures and bedding 

planes. Based on field data gathered during rock coring, the vertical dimension of potential 

dissolution cavities ranges from 0 to 1.5 m (0 to 5.0 ft.), with most being much less than 1.5 m 

(5.0 ft.). As stated above, minimal voids were found in the controlled drilling program. The 

largest horizontal dissolution cavity dimension was determined to be 1.6 m (5.3 ft.) based on 

analysis of grout uptake. The applicant also documented that the Avon Park Formation, the 

foundation-bearing unit at the Levy site, is extensively dolomitized, and that dolomitized 

 
The Commissioners - 24 - 

limestone, or dolostone, is characterized by dissolution rates which are lower than the rates for 

pure limestone. Using data from the Crystal River site, which is founded on the Ocala 

Limestone, the applicant determined that the dissolution rate for the dolomitized Avon Park 

Formation would be less than that for the Ocala limestone at the Crystal River site (i.e., less 

than 0.006 percent) over a projected 60-year life of the facility. The staff independently 

confirmed the applicant’s site characterization results through geologic and geotechnical field 

audits that involved examination of sparse rock outcrops, borehole lithologic logs and rock core, 

and geophysical logs. 

In the FSAR, the applicant described the plan for excavation and backfill beneath the nuclear 

islands, including a roller-compacted concrete (RCC) bridging mat designed to conservatively 

take into account the potential for subsurface dissolution voids. Beneath the proposed LNP 

Units 1 and 2 nuclear islands, approximately the uppermost 21.3 m (70 ft.) of soil and rock will 

be excavated and backfilled with a 10.7 m (35 ft.) thick RCC mat, as described in detail in the 

next section, prior to nuclear island construction. 

Prior to excavation, the applicant plans to construct reinforced concrete diaphragm walls and 

inject grout to allow dewatering of the proposed LNP Units 1 and 2 nuclear island areas. 

Because of the high groundwater table and permeability of the carbonate rock underlying the 

proposed LNP site, the applicant intends to place the diaphragm walls around each entire 

nuclear island area to a depth of approximately 30.5 m (100 ft.) below the ground surface to 

minimize lateral groundwater inflow into the excavation. In addition, the applicant plans to 

implement a grout injection program that will minimize upward seepage from the rock into the 

excavation to resist possible uplift pressures. Injection grouting will be performed concurrent 

with installation of the diaphragm walls to form a 22.9 m (75 ft.) thick bottom layer for filling any 

possible existing dissolution voids associated with vertical fractures and horizontal bedding 

planes. Although this planned grouting is not safety-related, the applicant has stated that it will 

be performed under a quality program. The staff reviewed the applicant’s grout testing program, 

geotechnical calculations, and excavation plans and determined them to be state-of-the-art and 

acceptable. 

The staff’s review of the geologic, seismic, and geotechnical data for the LNP site did not 

identify features that would preclude safe operation of the proposed nuclear facilities. However, 

the staff is requiring the applicant via a geologic mapping license condition to perform a final 

check for potentially detrimental tectonic (i.e., faulting) and nontectonic (i.e., dissolution effects) 

geologic features in safety-related excavations at the LNP site. This license condition is 

identified in FSER Section 2.5.3.4.8 and FSAR Section 2.5.3.8.1. The geologic mapping license 

condition will ensure that no potentially detrimental tectonic or nontectonic geologic features 

occur in the safety-related excavations for LNP Units 1 and 2. 

b. Roller Compacted Concrete Foundation Design 

To address the foundation design of the proposed LNP site, the applicant designed an RCC 

bridging mat. The lowest level of the proposed nuclear island excavation will be filled with a 

10.7 m (35 ft.) thick RCC bridging mat, which is the only safety-related structure outside of the 

scope of the AP1000 certified design. This foundation design concept was not utilized by the 

Vogtle or Summer applicants. The RCC bridging mat will be constructed on top of a 22.9 m (75 

 
The Commissioners - 25 - 

ft.) deep grouted Avon Park formation, bridging the space between the nuclear island basemat 

and the grouted portion of the Avon Park formation. The RCC bridging mat will replace the 

undifferentiated soils and sediments beneath the nuclear island basemat. As noted above, 

concrete grout will be injected into the underlying Avon Park formation to infill any horizontal or 

vertical dissolution voids, should any exist under the nuclear islands. The applicant designed 

the RCC bridging mat as a seismic Category 1 structure that is capable of supporting the 

nuclear island loads and bridging a 3.0 m (10 ft.) diameter dissolution cavity in the Avon Park 

formation. Based on the data gathered during rock coring and analysis of grout uptake, the staff 

confirmed that this cavity dimension is a conservative estimate for maximum cavity size 

anticipated at the LNP site. 

A waterproof membrane will be placed between the RCC bridging mat and a 6-inch thick 

concrete mudmat, consistent with the commitments in the AP1000 DCD. The staff reviewed the 

applicant’s calculations along with Westinghouse analyses to confirm that the stability of the 

nuclear island foundation is not affected by postulated soil liquefaction at the LNP site because 

the RCC bridging mat and the Avon Park formation are non-liquefiable. The staff also 

confirmed the applicant’s analyses that the nuclear island is stable against sliding. To ensure 

the stability of the nuclear island against sliding, the applicant proposed an ITAAC requiring that 

the mudmat-waterproofing-RCC interface beneath the nuclear island basemat has a coefficient 

of friction to resist sliding of equal or greater than 0.55. As a result, there is no quality 

requirement for the backfill adjacent to the nuclear island to maintain stability against sliding. 

The applicant intends to construct the RCC bridging mat using industry codes and standard 

methods that have been successfully implemented on large commercial RCC projects. The 

LNP RCC bridging mat will be constructed according to the American Concrete 

Institute (ACI) 349, ACI 318 code requirements and USACE guidance and practices, which 

include development of RCC mixes and procedures for RCC placement and compaction. The 

staff reviewed the applicant’s RCC testing program, which includes building and testing a 

prototype pad in order to define the material properties and develop the quality control 

requirements. The applicant proposed an ITAAC and a license condition for the RCC bridging 

mat and the prototype testing. The ITAAC and license condition are included in the draft COLs 

for Units 1 and 2. 

c. Condensate return design change 

GDC 34 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 requires that nuclear power plant designs have a 

system capable of removing residual heat, defined such that the decay heat does not exceed 

design limits for the fuel and pressure boundary. Inherent in this requirement is the need to 

bring the plant to a safe, stable condition following an anticipated transient not related to a 

LOCA. 

For the AP1000, the credited safety-related system designed to remove decay heat following a 

non-LOCA transient is the PRHR HX, which is located in the IRWST. Upon actuation of the 

PRHR HX, reactor coolant is driven from the reactor coolant system (RCS) hot leg through the 

heat exchanger by natural circulation and returned to the corresponding steam generator exit 

plenum to the cold leg. 

 
The Commissioners - 26 - 

In order to support long term operation in a closed loop configuration using the PRHR HX, the 

passive core cooling system must also achieve a sufficient condensate return rate such that 

inventory in the IRWST is maintained in order to retain the heat transfer capability of the PRHR 

HX. Water is steamed from the IRWST following actuation of the PRHR HX as it removes 

decay heat from the RCS. The resulting steam that reaches the containment shell condenses 

and returns to the IRWST through a gutter system. 

The applicant discovered that the existing design was incapable of meeting the previously 

assumed condensate return rate, precluding operation within the bounds of the licensing basis, 

and that design changes were required in order to rectify this. Because of the relative novelty 

associated with the system and passive design, significant analysis was required to determine 

the performance of the PRHR HX and related passive core cooling systems. 

The design changes to improve the amount of condensate returned to the IRWST are 

implemented to maintain the Chapter 15 design basis events crediting the PRHR HX as is and, 

in conjunction with revised analysis in the updated FSAR in Chapter 19E, continue to meet the 

design goal of safe shutdown to 420 °F in 36 hours following a non-LOCA event. The design 

changes also prompted revisions to the mission time associated with the operation of the PRHR 

in Chapter 6.3 of the FSAR. 

The applicant’s analysis approach involved a more rigorous treatment of the calculation method 

than had been submitted in the AP1000 DCD by coupling an evaluation of containment 

response and the RCS and incorporating test data to determine transient condensate losses 

and the associated performance of the PRHR HX. Staff reviewed these analyses in detail and 

the staff’s evaluation is available in Section 21.1 of the FSER. 

In the AP1000 DCD, the PRHR HX is specified to sustain indefinite operation following a nonLOCA event. During the review of this design change the applicant determined that indefinite 

operation was no longer possible, and thus the revised FSAR replaced indefinite with a 72-hour 

safety-related period of operation and a 14-day non-safety-related design requirement. This 72-

hour operational period is consistent with the NRC’s position for compliance with GDC 34 and 

44 as stated in SECY-94-084, “Policy and Technical Issues Associated with the Regulatory 

Treatment of Non-Safety Systems in Passive Plant Designs,” and SECY-95-132, “Policy and 

Technical Issues Associated with the Regulatory Treatment of Non-Safety Systems (RTNSS) in 

Passive Plant Designs (SECY-94-084),” as well as regulatory guidance associated with the 

Regulatory Treatment of Non-Safety Systems in Section 19.3 of the SRP. The passive 

containment cooling water storage tank inventory was already sized to allow 72 hours of 

capability without refill, and therefore this change has no impact on the expected design basis 

performance following a non-LOCA event. In addition, the plant retains the ability to transition to 

open loop cooling by using the Automatic Depressurization System at any time following the 

onset of the event, and can remain in this mode for an extended period of time. 

Consistent with Commission policy as expressed in SECY-94-084, the plant is capable of 

achieving a safe shutdown condition of 420 °F in 36 hours following a non-LOCA accident using 

only the PRHR HX. The supporting analysis located in the shutdown temperature evaluation in 

Chapter 19E of the FSAR has been revised to incorporate the design changes and account for 

the additional condensate loss mechanisms identified during the review. The staff reviewed the 

 
The Commissioners - 27 - 

supporting calculations, and the acceptance criteria are consistent with the calculations used in 

the certified design in Revision 19 of the AP1000 DCD. 

The staff anticipates that the LNP condensate return design changes will likely be employed by 

other AP1000 applicants and license holders, and thus the staff’s evaluation is expected to be 

generally applicable to other AP1000 COLs unless there are plant specific differences. 

The staff found the applicant’s design change and associated revisions to the supporting 

analysis in the FSAR acceptable, and details are documented in the publically available FSER, 

Section 21.1. 

Environmental Matters 

d. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Biological Opinion 

In November 2008, the NRC initiated consultation under Section 7 of the Endangered Species 

Act for the proposed LNP Units 1 and 2, which included communication with the U.S. Fish & 

Wildlife Service (FWS) and National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). The NRC must consult 

with these agencies to ensure that its actions, such as issuance of a COL, will not jeopardize 

the existence of any threatened or endangered species within their jurisdiction. USACE is a 

cooperating agency on the LNP EIS and performed its Section 7 consultation jointly with the 

NRC. 

The NRC staff coordinated its Section 7 consultation with the broader environmental review 

conducted pursuant to NEPA. NRC published the draft EIS on August 13, 2010, and made it 

available for public comment for a period of 75 days. NRC concurrently submitted a Biological 

Assessment to FWS and NMFS for comments. Comments on the draft EIS and Biological 

Assessment were received by the NRC from both agencies. NMFS responded that no further 

action was required, concluding its consultation with the NRC. FWS concluded that the only 

species subject to adverse effects is the Florida scrub-jay. However, FWS comments indicated 

that additional surveys for threatened and endangered species may need to be completed along 

the transmission line corridors before the FWS would consider consultation complete. 

After several meetings between NRC staff and FWS to discuss potential terms and conditions to 

protect the Florida scrub-jay, the FWS issued a Biological Opinion (BO) for the project. This 

was the first BO received in relation to a new reactor license application under review by the 

NRC’s NRO. 

The BO and incidental take statement included terms and conditions addressing protection of 

the Florida scrub-jay. FWS also indicated in the BO that updated licensee surveys and 

protective measures for several additional plant and animal species would be needed in order to 

support an FWS conclusion that building and operating the LNP facility would not adversely 

affect those species. The NRC staff contacted the FWS Jacksonville field office to clarify the 

scope of the conditions necessary to close Section 7 consultation. Following a coordination 

process to develop conditions that would meet the needs of both agencies, the NRC and FWS 

agreed upon specific conditions to include in the environmental protection plan that would 

implement all terms and conditions that FWS intended to be included in the BO. Those 

conditions cover a total of three animal species (Florida scrub-jay, sand skink, and indigo snake) 

 
The Commissioners - 28 - 

and two plant species (Britton’s beargrass and longspurred mint). The results of these 

subsequent interactions are consistent with the NRC staff’s conclusions in the final EIS. Both 

NRC and FWS worked efficiently and effectively together to meet both agencies’ regulatory 

obligations. 

e. Alternative Sites 

Background 

The NRC staff implements the requirements of the NEPA through its regulations in 10 CFR Part 

51, “Environmental Protection Regulations for Domestic Licensing and Related Regulatory 

Functions.” Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.71(d), any NRC EIS must include an analysis that considers 

and weighs “the environmental impacts of alternatives to the proposed action.” NRC staff 

guidance specific to the evaluation of alternative sites is provided in ESRP Section 9.3, “Site 

Selection Process,” last revised in July 2007. 

ESRP Section 9.3 directs the staff to determine whether the process that the applicant used to 

identify and evaluate sites was adequate. The guidance indicates that three to five alternative 

sites in addition to the proposed site could be viewed as adequate. If the staff concludes that 

the process was adequate, then it proceeds to perform an independent evaluation of the 

alternative sites and compares them to the proposed site. 

Analysis of the Site Selection Process in the Draft EIS 

In Section 9.3.1 of the DEIS the review team2 evaluated each portion of the applicant’s site 

selection process (e.g., identification of candidate areas). The review team concluded that the 

applicant’s process for selecting its region of interest, candidate areas, potential sites, candidate 

sites, alternative sites, and the proposed LNP site was reasonable; resulted in the identification 

of alternative sites that were among the best that could reasonably be found in the region of 

interest; did not arbitrarily exclude locations that might be suitable choices for siting two new 

nuclear generating units to satisfy the need for power identified in Chapter 8; and was 

consistent with the guidance in ESRP Section 9.3. The process implemented by the applicant 

led to the identification of four alternative sites, referred to by the applicant as the Crystal River 

site, the Dixie site, the Putnam site, and the Highlands site. 

Notable New Information after the DEIS was Published 

Two issues were identified related to alternative sites after the DEIS was published. First, on 

October 6, 2010, the South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD) submitted a comment 

letter that expressed concern regarding the availability of water for the Highlands site. Second, 

in the course of discussions with USACE, the applicant stated that, for the purposes of the 

consideration of alternatives under Section 404(b)(1) of the Clean Water Act, it did not consider 

the Crystal River site to be a practicable alternative. Both of these issues were considered by 

the review team during the preparation of the FEIS. 

 

 

2 The review team for the EIS consisted of the NRC staff and staff from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). 

USACE was a cooperating agency for the preparation of the EIS for the Levy Nuclear Plant combined license 

application.
The Commissioners - 29 - 

Highlands Site 

In its evaluation of the Highlands site, the applicant indicated that it would use water from the 

Kissimmee River for plant cooling water. The development of the site would also require 

construction of a roughly 1300 acre reservoir for use during periods of low flow in the river. In 

the DEIS, the review team determined that the consumptive use of 62 cubic feet per second 

(cfs) would represent 11 percent of the lowest mean annual flow and 22 percent of the lowest 

mean monthly flow. The review team concluded that the cumulative impacts of this water use 

would be MODERATE. 

In its October 6, 2010, letter, the SFWMD expressed concern regarding the Highlands site and 

its potential to interact with other water uses and programs in the area (e.g., the Kissimmee 

River Restoration Project). The SFWMD concluded that the availability of water from the 

affected basin is limited. 

RG 4.7, “General Site Suitability Criteria for Nuclear Power Stations,” states that “there should 

be reasonable assurance that permits for consumptive use of water” for the plant can be 

obtained from the appropriate agency – in this case the SFWMD. ESRP Section 9.3 states that, 

for any candidate site (and therefore any alternative site), the consumptive use of water should 

not cause significant adverse effects on other users. It is unclear whether the Highlands site 

meets either of these guidelines. 

In the FEIS, the review team decided not to remove the analysis of the Highlands site even 

though these water availability considerations raised the possibility that it may not be a viable 

alternative site. The site had already been evaluated in detail and removing that information 

from the FEIS would not serve any useful purpose. The new information from the SFWMD 

supported the review team’s conclusion that the Highlands site was not environmentally 

preferable to the LNP site. 

After the FEIS was published, and during the staff’s review of a COL application for Turkey 

Point Units 6 and 7, the staff received additional information regarding the availability of water in 

the vicinity of the Highlands site. In a June 29, 2012, letter to the NRC, the SFWMD indicated 

that it may be possible to obtain water for the inland alternative sites discussed in the Turkey 

Point application. This includes the Okeechobee 2 site, which is near the Highlands site. The 

SFWMD letter discussed some of the challenges likely to be faced in developing a water source 

for a site in that region. This new information indicates that the Highlands site is a viable 

alternative. But the new information would not change the review team’s conclusions regarding 

the impacts of the site as discussed in the LNP FEIS. 

Crystal River Site 

The Crystal River site is located adjacent to the existing Crystal River Energy Complex (CREC). 

At the time the FEIS was published, the CREC had five operating units with a combined 

capacity of almost 3200 MW. In addition to the review team’s environmental review, the 

USACE completed other review activities to satisfy its responsibilities before issuing a 

Department of the Army permit under Section 404(b)(1) of the Clean Water Act. Among other 

 
The Commissioners - 30 - 

things, the USACE had to determine that the project (including the chosen location for the plant) 

represents the least environmentally damaging practicable alternative (LEDPA). 

In a June 30, 2010, letter to USACE, the applicant indicated that for business reasons, it no 

longer considered the Crystal River site to be practicable for the purposes of the USACE 

LEDPA determination. The applicant determined that adding two nuclear units to the existing 

units at the Crystal River site would result in the concentration of a large fraction of the 

applicant’s total generation capacity at one site, which could be subject to disruption by a single 

event. 

The review team considered what this new information meant in terms of the site selection 

review in the EIS. Ultimately, while the applicant’s strategic concern about the overconcentration of its generating capacity at one site influences its proposal of the Levy site, it 

does not make consideration of the Crystal River site as an alternative inappropriate. The 

conclusions of the review team in the EIS regarding the Crystal River site are unaffected by this 

information – the site appears to be licensable and its ranking in terms of environmental impacts 

is competitive with the proposed site. The review team concluded that the Crystal River site 

remained a viable alternative site for the purposes of the EIS. 

After the FEIS was published, the applicant announced that it would retire Crystal River Unit 3. 

In addition, it announced plans to build a new natural gas combined cycle plant next to the 

Crystal River site, and retire Crystal River Units 1 and 2. Combined, these changes involve the 

retirement of 1730 MW, and the addition of 1640 MW, of generating capacity, as discussed in 

the applicant’s June 24, 2014, letter to the USACE. These changes would not affect the review 

team’s conclusions in the FEIS because the Crystal River site would still have a high 

concentration of the applicant’s generating capacity. 

Conclusion 

The review team concluded that the LNP application provides the staff with an adequate 

number of viable alternative sites. The review team also concluded in the FEIS that the process 

used by the applicant to identify sites was adequate and that the identified sites were among the 

best in the region of interest. There remains, therefore, a sound basis under NEPA for 

accepting the Levy site as the site for the two proposed units. 

IV. Findings 

10 CFR 52.97(a)(1) 

(i) The applicable standards and requirements of the Act and the Commission’s regulations 

have been met. 

The staff reviewed the application and evaluated it against the applicable regulations in 

10 CFR Parts 20, 26, 30, 31, 32, 40, 50, 51, 52, 55, 70, 73, 74, 100, and 140. The staff 

performed this evaluation using applicable portions of the SRP, ISG documents, 

regulatory guides, bulletins, and generic letters. Based on the staff’s review, 

documented in the FSER and the FEIS, and the conclusions of the ACRS, the staff 

 
The Commissioners - 31 - 

concludes that, for the purpose of issuing COLs for LNP Units 1 and 2, the applicable 

standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the 

Commission’s regulations have been met. 

(ii) Any required notifications to other agencies or bodies have been duly made. 

As required by Section 182c of the Atomic Energy Policy Act of 1954, as amended, and 

10 CFR 50.43(a), on December 15, 2011, the NRC notified the Public Service 

Commission of Florida of the LNP Units 1 and 2 COL application (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML112521258). In addition, in November and December 2008, the NRC published 

notices of the application in The Newscaster/Nature Coast News, the Ocala Star Banner, 

the Levy County Journal, and the Citrus County Chronicle. In accordance with 

Section 182c., the staff also published a notice of the application in the FR on November 

18, November 25, December 2, and December 9, 2011 (76 FR 71608, 72725, 75566, 

and 77021). 

Based on the staff’s completion of notifications to regulatory agencies and issuance of 

the public notices described above, the staff concludes that, for the purpose of issuing 

COLs for LNP Units 1 and 2, all required notifications to other agencies or bodies have 

been duly made. 

(iii) There is reasonable assurance that the facility will be constructed and will operate in 

conformity with the licenses, the provisions of the Act, and the Commission’s 

regulations. 

The staff reviewed information provided by the applicant to ensure that the plants will be 

constructed and will operate in conformity with the licenses, applicable provisions of the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and applicable regulations. This includes the 

FSAR and other portions of the application, including general and financial information; 

TS; the emergency plan; requests for departures and exemptions; the QA plan; and the 

security plan. 

In areas where the staff found that the information submitted initially was incomplete or 

insufficient to allow the staff to reach a reasonable assurance conclusion, the staff 

issued RAIs to the applicant to obtain sufficient information. The staff reviewed applicant 

responses to ensure that the additional information provided was sufficient to support the 

staff conclusion. Where necessary, the applicant provided multiple supplemental 

responses. As necessary, the staff also conducted audits of the applicant’s records and 

calculations and performed its own confirmatory calculations to confirm applicant 

statements. 

In some cases, the staff’s reasonable assurance finding required the imposition of 

license conditions or ITAAC as part of the licenses. The draft COL lists the license 

conditions, including license conditions for the squib values, the Fukushima NTTF 

recommendations, and ITAAC. The basis for each license condition or ITAAC appears 

in the technical evaluations in the LNP Unit 1 and 2 COL FSER and the AP1000 DCD 

FSER referenced by the LNP Units 1 and 2 COL application. 

 
The Commissioners - 32 - 

On the basis of the staff’s review of the application discussed in this paper and 

documented in the FSER and FEIS, the staff concludes that, for the purpose of issuing 

COLs for LNP Unit 1 and Unit 2, there is reasonable assurance that the facilities will be 

constructed and will operate in conformance with the licenses, the provisions of the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission’s regulations. 

(iv) The applicant is technically and financially qualified to engage in the activities 

authorized.

The staff reviewed information provided by the applicant regarding technical and 

financial qualifications. 

a. Technical Qualification. The staff reviewed information provided by the applicant 

regarding technical qualifications. The review included an evaluation of the 

applicant’s operating experience, organizational structure, and QA program. The 

review included the fact that the applicant operated Crystal River Unit 3, which is a 

838-megawatt electric, pressurized water reactor plant now in permanent shutdown 

mode located approximately 80 mi. north of Tampa, Florida. The applicant holds a 

10 CFR Part 50 license for Crystal River Unit 3 and has demonstrated its ability to 

build and operate a nuclear power reactor. The applicant has demonstrated the 

ability to choose and manage the oversight of nuclear steam supply system vendors, 

architect-engineers, and constructors of nuclear-related work. Thus, the NRC staff 

concludes that the applicant has the capability to subcontract, to procure, to 

schedule, and to manage the work associated with the detailed design (including 

licensing), procurement, and construction of LNP Units 1 and 2. The staff’s review of 

the applicant’s organizational structure concluded that the management, technical 

support, and operating organizations are acceptable. The staff reviewed the QA 

program and found it acceptable. This QA program includes requirements that will 

be implemented by the applicant’s engineering, procurement, and construction 

contractor, Westinghouse and Shaw. 

The staff’s evaluation of this information appears in Sections 1.4 and 13.1 and 

Chapter 17 of the FSER. Based on the staff’s evaluation of the applicant’s 

experience with licensing and operating a nuclear power plant, its operating 

organization, and its QA program, the staff finds that the applicant is technically 

qualified to hold a 10 CFR Part 52 license in accordance with 10 CFR 52.79(a)(1)(iv). 

b. Financial Qualification. The staff reviewed information provided by the applicant 

about financial qualifications. The review included an evaluation of the financial 

qualifications, decommissioning funding assurance, foreign ownership, and nuclear 

insurance and indemnity. The staff evaluated information pertaining to the total cost 

of LNP Units 1 and 2, consisting of engineering, procurement, construction costs, 

owners’ costs, financing costs, inflation, and information pertaining to funding 

sources for the owner. Applicable regulations and guidance considered by the staff 

included 10 CFR Part 140, “Financial Protection Requirements and Indemnity 

Agreements”; 10 CFR 52.97(a)(1)(iv);10 CFR 50.33; 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix C, “A 

Guide for the Financial Data and Related Information Required to Establish Financial 

 
The Commissioners - 33 - 

Qualifications for Construction Permits and Combined Licenses,” and NUREG-1577, 

“Standard Review Plan on Power Reactor Licensee Financial Qualifications and 

Decommissioning Funding Assurance.” 

The staff’s evaluation of this information appears in Chapter 1 of the FSER. Based 

on the financial information provided by the applicant, the NRC staff concludes that 

the owner of LNP Units 1 and 2 has demonstrated that it possesses or has access to 

the financial resources necessary to meet estimated operation, construction costs, 

and related fuel cycle costs. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the applicant, 

as owner of LNP Units 1 and 2, is financially qualified to construct and operate LNP 

Units 1 and 2 and to engage in the activities authorized by the licenses. 

(v) Issuance of the licenses will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to 

the health and safety of the public. 

The NRC staff reviewed the application to assure that issuance of the license will not be 

inimical to the common defense and security or to public health and safety. Specifically, 

the staff evaluated the applicant’s analysis and conclusions about site-specific 

conditions, including the geography and demography of the site; nearby industrial, 

transportation and military facilities; site meteorology; site hydrology; and site geology, 

seismology, and geotechnical engineering to ensure that issuance of the licenses will not 

be inimical to public health and safety. The review also evaluated the design of 

structures, components, equipment, and systems to ensure safe operation, 

performance, and shutdown when subjected to extreme weather, floods, seismic events, 

missiles (including aircraft impacts), chemical and radiological releases, and loss of 

offsite power to the extent not already resolved by the incorporation of the AP1000 

design. The review confirmed that radiological releases and human doses during both 

normal operation and accident scenarios will remain within regulatory limits, which 

supports the staff’s conclusion that issuance of the licenses will not be inimical to public 

health and safety. 

The review determined that the security measures to be implemented at the site are 

adequate to protect the facility in accordance with NRC security regulations, which 

supports the staff’s conclusion that issuance of the licenses will not be inimical to the 

common defense and security. Also, the staff is not aware of any information presenting 

inimicality or foreign ownership, control, or domination concerns. The applicant is based 

in the United States. DEF is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the 

State of Florida and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Florida Progress Corporation. All 

members of the senior management and the Board of Directors for Duke Energy 

Corporation and for DEF are United States citizens. 

The review also determined that operational programs identified by the applicant are 

sufficiently described to assure the staff of compliance with regulations. Where the staff 

needed to confirm operational program implementation to reach a reasonable assurance 

finding, but the details of program implementation were not governed by specific 

regulatory requirements, the draft license contains license conditions to ensure that plant 

operation will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to public health and 

 
The Commissioners - 34 - 

safety. The NRC staff’s evaluation addressed the operational programs identified in the 

SRM, dated February 22, 2006, on SECY-05-0197, “Review of Operational Programs in 

a Combined License Application and Generic Emergency Planning Inspections, Tests, 

Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria,” as well as three additional operational programs, 

including a cybersecurity program, an MC&A program for special nuclear material, and a 

special nuclear material physical security program. The staff’s review of the applicant’s 

emergency planning information concluded that the emergency plan is acceptable and 

supports the staff’s conclusion that issuance of the licenses will not be inimical to public 

health and safety. 

On the basis of the staff’s review of the application, as discussed in this paper and the 

referenced documents, the staff concludes that issuance of the COLs for LNP Units 1 

and 2 will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to public health and 

safety. 

(vi) The findings required by Subpart A of Part 51 of this chapter have been made. 

As discussed below, the staff concludes that, for the purpose of issuing COLs for LNP 

Units 1 and 2, the environmental review has been adequate to support the findings set 

forth in 10 CFR 51.107(a). 

10 CFR 52.97(a)(2): 

The staff concludes that there are no acceptance criteria from ITAAC in the referenced standard 

design certification that the applicant has asserted are met. Therefore, no Commission finding 

under this section is required for the purpose of issuing COLs for LNP Units 1 and 2. 

10 CFR 51.107(a) 

(i) Determine whether the requirements of Section 102(2) (A), (C), and (E) of National 

Environmental Protection Act and the regulations in this subpart have been met. 

The staff reviewed the application and evaluated it against the applicable regulations in 

10 CFR Part 50, 10 CFR Part 51, 10 CFR Part 52, and 10 CFR Part 100. The staff 

performed this evaluation using applicable portions NUREG-1555, issued in 2000 and 

updated in 2007, and ISG documents, regulatory guides, and generic letters. The staff 

addressed supplemental guidance providing additional information on contemporary and 

evolving issues in a memorandum dated December 10, 2010 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML100760503). 

In accordance with NEPA Section 102(2)(A) (42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(A)), the staff prepared 

the FEIS (NUREG-1941, “Final Environmental Impact Statement for Combined Licenses 

(COLs) for Levy Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2) based on its independent assessment of 

the information provided by the applicant and information developed independently by 

the staff, including through consultation with other agencies. The staff’s technical 

 
The Commissioners - 35 - 

analysis used a systematic, interdisciplinary approach to integrate information from 

many fields, including both natural and social sciences. 

In accordance with NEPA Section 102(2)(C)(i–v) (42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C)(i–v)), the FEIS 

for the LNP Units 1 and 2 COLs addresses (1) the environmental impact of the proposed 

action, (2) any unavoidable adverse environmental effects, (3) alternatives to the 

proposed action, (4) the relationship between local short-term uses of the environment 

and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (5) any 

irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources that would be involved in the 

proposed action should it be implemented. 

As supported by correspondence presented in Appendix F to the FEIS, the staff 

concludes that it fulfilled the requirement of NEPA Section 102(2)(C) by consulting with 

and obtaining comments from other Federal agencies with jurisdiction by law or special 

expertise (see 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C)). USACE fully participated with the NRC in 

preparing this EIS as a cooperating agency and participated collaboratively on the 

review team under the Commission’s Memorandum of Agreement with USACE. The 

staff did not identify any other Federal agencies as cooperating agencies in preparation 

of the FEIS. 

The staff concludes that the FEIS demonstrates that the staff adequately considered 

alternatives to the proposed action to the extent that it involves unresolved conflicts 

concerning alternative uses of available resources, consistent with the requirements of 

NEPA Section 102(2)(E) (42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(E)). The alternatives considered in the 

FEIS include the no-action alternative, site alternatives, energy alternatives, system 

design alternatives, and mitigation alternatives for severe accidents. 

For the reasons given above, the staff also concludes that its review comports with the 

NRC’s requirements in Appendix A, “Format for Presentation of Material in 

Environmental Impact Statements,” to 10 CFR Part 51. The staff concludes that 

environmental findings in the FEIS constitute the “hard look” required by NEPA and have 

reasonable support in logic and fact. 

(ii) Independently consider the final balance among conflicting factors contained in the 

record of the proceeding with a view to determining the appropriate action to be taken. 

Section 10.6.3 of the FEIS provides the staff summary of the cost-benefit assessment. 

The staff concludes that “the construction and operation of the proposed LNP Units 1 

and 2, with mitigation measures identified by the review team, would have accrued 

benefits that most likely would outweigh the economic, environmental, and social costs. 

For the NRC-proposed action (NRC-authorized construction and operation) the accrued 

benefits would also outweigh the costs of construction and operation of Units 1 and 2.” 

(iii) Determine, after weighing the environmental, economic, technical, and other benefits 

against environmental and other costs, and considering reasonable alternatives, whether 

the COL should be issued, denied, or appropriately conditioned to protect environmental 

values. 

 
The Commissioners - 36 - 

As noted above, in its FEIS, the staff considered the cost-benefit analysis, including the 

need for power, as well as reasonable alternatives. Based on that analysis, the staff 

recommends that the COLs be issued. The staff based its recommendation on (1) the 

LNP Units 1 and 2 COL application environmental report, (2) consultation with Federal, 

State, Tribal, and local agencies (3) the staff’s own independent review, (4) the NRC 

staff’s consideration of public comments and, (5) the assessments summarized in the 

FEIS, including the potential mitigation measures identified in the environmental report 

and in the FEIS. In addition, in making its recommendation, the staff determined that 

none of the alternative sites assessed is environmentally preferable or obviously 

superior to the LNP site. The NRC staff also determined that none of the reasonable 

energy alternatives and none of the reasonable system design alternatives were 

environmentally preferable to those proposed. 

The NRC’s determination is independent of the USACE’s determination of a “least 

environmentally damaging practicable alternative” under the Clean Water Act (CWA) 

Section 404(b)(1) guidelines and its required public interest review (PIR). The USACE’s 

independent regulatory permit decision documentation referenced relevant analyses 

from the EIS and, as necessary, included a supplemental PIR; CWA Section 404(b)(1) 

evaluation; cumulative impact analysis; compensatory mitigation plan that is in 

accordance with 33 CFR Part 332, “Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic 

Resources;” and other information and evaluations that may be outside the NRC’s scope 

of analysis and not included in the FEIS, but that are required by the USACE to support 

its permit decision. 

(iv) Determine, in an uncontested proceeding, whether the National Environmental 

Protection Act review conducted by the NRC staff has been adequate. 

The staff conducted an independent evaluation of the application; developed 

independent, reliable information; and conducted a systematic, interdisciplinary review of 

the potential impacts of the proposed action on the human environment and of 

reasonable alternatives to the applicant’s proposal. Before developing the DEIS, the 

staff issued a notice of intent to conduct scoping and invited public participation. The 

staff also provided opportunities for governmental and general public participation during 

the public meeting on the DEIS and used publicly available guidance in the development 

of its FEIS. 

The staff considered the purpose of and need for the proposed action, the environment 

that could be affected by the action, and the consequences of the proposed action, 

including mitigation that could reduce impacts. The FEIS considered the no-action 

alternative, energy alternatives, alternative sites, system design alternatives, and the 

potential impact of conservation measures in determining the demand for power and 

consequential need for additional generating capacity. The FEIS compared the 

alternatives to the proposed action. The staff considered any adverse environmental 

effects that could not be avoided should the proposed action be implemented, the 

relationship between short-term uses of the human environment and the maintenance 

and enhancement of long-term productivity, and any irreversible or irretrievable 

commitments of resources that would be involved in the proposed project. 

 
The Commissioners - 37 - 

The NRC filed the DEIS with the EPA for its review consistent with the requirements of 

Section 309, “Policy Review,” of the Clean Air Act (see 42 U.S.C. 7609). The staff 

considered all comments received on the DEIS and, in Appendix E to the FEIS, 

described the manner in which each comment was dispositioned. 

On these bases, the staff concludes that, for the purpose of issuing the COLs, it 

conducted a thorough and complete environmental review sufficient to meet the 

requirements of NEPA and adequate to inform the Commission’s action on the COL 

request. 

V. Other Aspects of the Staff Review Not Tied to Specific Findings 

a. Severe Accident Management Guidelines 

In the draft rule on mitigation of beyond-design-basis events (SECY-15-0065 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML15049A123)), the staff proposed to require implementation of severe accident 

management guidelines (SAMGs). In the associated SRM, the Commission approved 

publication of the draft rule for public comment subject to the removal of the proposed 

requirements for SAMGs (ADAMS Accession No. ML15239A767). As described below, the 

staff is proposing a license condition for LNP regarding SAMGs that is consistent with the 

Commission’s decisions on the Vogtle and Summer combined licenses. The staff is monitoring 

the development of the mitigation of beyond-design-basis events rule and will be prepared to 

make conforming licensing adjustments, as appropriate. 

SAMGs were an industry initiative and remain voluntary for most licensees. However, the 

AP1000 design certification rule incorporates the AP1000 DCD, which specifies implementing 

the AP1000 severe accident management guidance on a site-specific basis. This is a condition 

of the licenses for current AP1000 COLs (Vogtle Units 3 and 4 and Summer Units 2 and 3). For 

consistency within the AP1000 design center, one of the proposed license conditions for LNP 

Units 1 and 2 is the implementation of site-specific SAMGs. 

COLs referencing other certified designs have addressed SAMGs differently. For example, the 

Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor (ESBWR) design certification rule incorporates the 

ESBWR DCD, which specifies that a severe accident management program will be developed 

by each COL holder that references the ESBWR DCD. Consequently, implementation of sitespecific SAMGs is a condition of the Fermi license. On the other hand, the Advanced Boiling 

Water Reactor (ABWR) design certification rule incorporates the ABWR DCD, which specifies a 

COL action item. Applicants referencing the ABWR design must address procedures and 

training related to accident management. The COL for South Texas Project Units 3 and 4 (STP) 

references the ABWR design and includes a commitment to implement accident management in 

the STP FSAR (ADAMS Accession No. ML15124A421). The staff accepted this in the STP 

FSER and no license condition was proposed (ADAMS Accession No. ML15232A128). 

b. Non-Concurrences 

In the course of the environmental review, two non-concurrences were filed. Both nonconcurrences relate to the environmental review and related NHPA and ESA consultations 

 
The Commissioners - 38 - 

regarding NRC regulations at 10 CFR 72.210. The regulation grants a general license to 

construct and operate an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) to certain 

licensees, including COL holders, if certain conditions are met. Non-concurring staff asserted 

that additional steps were warranted to account for the fact that a COL holder is also authorized 

to construct an ISFSI per the regulation. Staff management does not agree with the 

interpretation of the non-concurring individuals. Staff management and the non-concurring 

individuals were able to agree to a resolution of the concerns and the non-concurring staff 

ultimately concurred on the documents. In accordance with Management Directive 10.158, the 

resolution of the non-concurrences is documented in NCP-2016-006 and NCP-2016-008 

(ADAMS Accession Nos. ML16162A060 and ML16155A278), which are non-public because 

they contain deliberative process and attorney-client privileged information 

COORDINATION: 

The Office of the General Counsel has reviewed this paper and has no legal objection. 

 

/RA/ 

 Victor M. McCree 

 Executive Director 

 for Operations 

Enclosures: 

1. NCP-2016-006 

2. NCP-2016-008
The Commissioners 38 

regarding NRC regulations at 10 CFR 72.210. The regulation grants a general license to 

construct and operate an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) to certain 

licensees, including COL holders, if certain conditions are met. Non-concurring staff asserted 

that additional steps were warranted to account for the fact that a COL holder is also authorized 

to construct an ISFSI per the regulation. Staff management does not agree with the 

interpretation of the non-concurring individuals. Staff management and the non-concurring 

individuals were able to agree to a resolution of the concerns and the non-concurring staff 

ultimately concurred on the documents. In accordance with Management Directive 10.158, the 

resolution of the non-concurrences is documented in NCP-2016-006 and NCP-2016-008 

(ADAMS Accession Nos. ML16162A060 and ML16155A278), which are non-public because 

they contain deliberative process and attorney-client privileged information 

COORDINATION: 

The Office of the General Counsel has reviewed this paper and has no legal objection. 

 /RA Michael R. Johnson Acting for/ 

 Victor M. McCree 

 Executive Director 

 for Operations

Enclosures: 

1. NCP-2016-006 

2. NCP-2016-008 

ADAMS ACCESSION NO.: PKG: ML16155A446 *via email SECY-012 

OFFICE PM:DNRL:LB4* PM:DNRL:EPB LA:DNRL: LB4* PM:DNRL:LB4 Tech Editor* 

NAME DHabib MSutton (PVokoun 

for) RButler CSantos JDougherty 

DATE 04/03/16 06 /07 /16 04/07/16 4 /03/16 05/10/15 

OFFICE BC:DNRL:EPB BC:DNRL:LB4 D:NRO:DCIP* D:NRO/DEIA* D:NRO/DSEA 

NAME JDixonHerrity JMcKirgan MCheok (BAnderson for) MMayfield (BCaldwell for) SFlanders 

DATE 4/ 29/16 4 / 29/16 5 / 4 /16 5 / 9 /16 06/03/16 

OFFICE D:NRO/DSRA* D:NRR/DIRS* D:NSIR/DSP* D:NSIR/DPR* 

NAME JMonninger SMorris*(SHelton for) MGalloway (CJackson for) MBailey 

DATE 5/ 3 /16 5 / 6 /16 5/ 5 /16 5/ 6 /16 

OFFICE OGC D:DNRL D:NRO OEDO 

NAME KRoach FAkstulewicz JUhle VMcCree (MJohnson for) 

DATE 6/03/16 06/03/16 06/03/16 06/10 /16 

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
2 

REFERENCES 

1. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), “Final Safety Evaluation Report for Combined 

Licenses for Levy Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2,” May 31, 2016 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML16084A664). 

2. NRC and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), NUREG-1941, “Final Environmental 

Impact Statement for Combined Licenses (COLs) for Levy Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2,” 

Volumes 1, 2, and 3, April 27, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML12100A063, 

ML12100A068 and ML12100A070). 

3. NRC, “Combined License, Levy Nuclear Plant Unit 1,” Progress Energy Florida, Inc., Draft, 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML120310144). 

4. NRC, “Combined License, Levy Nuclear Plant Unit 2,” Progress Energy Florida, Inc., Draft, 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML13035A234). 

5. NRC, “Summary Record of Decision for Levy Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2,” Draft, (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML161121317). 

6. Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 51, “Environmental Protection 

Regulations for Domestic Licensing and Related Regulatory Functions.” 

7. Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 52, “Licenses, Certifications, and 

Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants.” 

8. Progress Energy, Letter from James Scarola (Progress Energy) to Michael Johnson 

(USNRC), “Application for Combined License for Levy Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2,” 

July 28, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML082260277). 

9. Progress Energy, Letter from Garry D. Miller (Progress Energy) to Document Control Desk, 

“Levy Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 52-029 and 52-030 Notification to 

Withdraw Request for a Limited Work Authorization,” May 1, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML091250350). 

10. Duke Energy Florida, “Levy Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Combined License Application,” 

April 6, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16111A960). 

11. NRC, “Westinghouse AP1000 Design Control Document Revision 19,” June 13, 2011, 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML11171A287). 

12. NRC, “Final Safety Evaluation Report Related to Certification of the AP1000 Standard Plant 

Design,” August 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML112061231). 

13. NRC, “Final Safety Evaluation Report Related to Certification of the AP1000 Standard Plant 

Design,” Volume 1, Supplement 2, September 2011, (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML11293A087). 
3 

14. NRC, “Final Safety Evaluation Report Related to Certification of the AP1000 Standard Plant 

Design,” Volume 2, Supplement 2, September 2011, (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML11292A141). 

15. Federal Register Notice, Final Rule, AP1000 Design Certification Amendment, December 

30, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML113480014). 

16. NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-06, “New Reactor Standardization Needed to 

Support the Design-Centered Licensing Review Approach,” May 31, 2006 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML053540251). 

17. SECY-11-0110, “Staff Statement in Support of the Uncontested Haring for Issuance of 

Combined Licenses and Limited Work Authorizations for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, 

Units 3 and 4 (Docket Nos. 52-025 and 52-026), August 9, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML110600264). 

18. SECY-11-0115, “Staff Statement in Support of the Uncontested Hearing for Issuance of 

Combined Licenses for the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Units 2 and 3 (Docket Nos. 

52-027 and 52-028)” (ADAMS Accession No. ML111320113). 

19. SECY-15-0123, “The Staff Statement in Support of the Uncontested Hearing for Issuance 

of Combined Licenses for the South Texas Project, Units 3 and 4” (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML15316A408). 

20. ACRS, “Report on the Safety Aspects of the Progress Energy Florida, Inc. Combined 

License Application for Levy Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2,” December 7, 2011 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML11339A126. 

21. NRC, EDO Letter, “Report on the Safety Aspects of the Progress Energy Florida 

Combined License Application for Levy Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2,” January 24, 2012 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML113550463). 

22. ACRS, “Response to the January 24, 2012, EDO Letter Regarding the Progress Energy 

Florida Combined License Application for Levy Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2,” April 25, 

2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12108A270). 

23. NRC, EDO Letter, “Progress Energy Florida, Combined License Application for Levy 

Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2,” May 29, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12132A289). 

24. ACRS, “Exemptions to the AP1000 Certified Design Included in the Levy Nuclear Plant 

Units 1 and 2 Combined License Application,” April 18, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML16102A149). 

25. NRC, EDO Letter, “Exemptions to the AP1000 Certified Design Included in the Levy 

Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 Combined License Application,” May 22, 2016 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML16117A447). 

26. NRC and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), “Draft Environmental Impact Statement 

for Combined Licenses (COLs) for Levy Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2,” Volumes 1 and 2, 

ADAMS Accession Nos. ML102140231 and ML102140235, August 13, 2010. 
4 

27. NRC, “Progress Energy Florida, Inc. Notice of Receipt and Availability of application for 

Combined License,” Federal Register, 73 FR 60726, October 14, 2008 

28. NRC, “Progress Energy Florida, Inc.,” Federal Register, 73 FR 63517, October 24, 2008 

29. NRC, “Progress Energy Florida, Inc.; Application for the Levy County Nuclear Power Plant 

Units 1 and 2; Notice of Order, Hearing, and Opportunity to Petition for Leave to 

Intervene,” Federal Register, 73 FR 74532, December 8, 2008 

30. NRC, “Progress Energy Florida, Inc.; Establishment of Atomic Safety and Licensing 

Board,” Federal Register, 74 FR 9113, March 2, 2009 

31. NRC, “Notice of Availability of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Combined 

Licenses for Levy Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2,” Federal Register, 75 FR 49539, August 

13, 2010 

32. EPA, “Environmental Impact Statements; Notice of Availability,” Federal Register, 

75 FR 49486, August 13, 2010 

33. NRC, “Notice of Availability of Combined License Applications,” Federal Register, 

76 FR 71608, 76 FR 72725, 76 FR 75566, and 76 FR 77021, November 18, 

November 25, December 2, and December 9, 2011 

34. NRC, “Atomic Safety and Licensing Board; In the Matter of Progress Energy Florida, Inc.; 

(Levy County Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2),” Federal Register, 76 FR 77561, 

December 13, 2011 

35. NRC, “Progress Energy Florida; Final Environmental Impact Statement for Combined 

Licenses for Levy Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2,” Federal Register, 77 FR 26316, May 3, 

2012 

36. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, 42 USC 4321 et seq. 

37. NRC, LBP-15-8, “Order,” ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A375, March 3, 2015 

38. NRC, LBP-13-4, “Partial Initial Decision,” ADAMS Accession No. ML13085A128, 

March 26, 2013. 

39. NRC, “Memorandum and Order,” ADAMS Accession No. ML110750407, March 16, 2011. 

40. Progress Energy, Letter from John Elnitsky to Document Control Desk, “Levy Nuclear 

Power Plant Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 52-029 and 52-030 Voluntary Supplemental 

Response to Request for Additional Information Letter No 073 Related to Solid Waste 

Management System,” April 14, 2011, ADAMS Accession No ML11112A087. 

41. NRC, LBP-11-31, “Memorandum and Order,” November 4, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML11308A267). 
5 

42. NRC, CLI-11-05, “Memorandum and Order,” September 9, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML14028A554). 

43. NRC, CLI-14-07, “Memorandum and Order,” July 17, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML14198A106). 

44. NRC, CLI-15-04, “Memorandum and Order,” February 26, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML15057A277). 

45. NRC, CLI-15-10, “Memorandum and Order,” April 23, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML15113A295). 

46. NRC, CLI-15-15, “Memorandum and Order,” June 9, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML15160A179). 

47. NRC, NUREG-0800, “Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for 

Nuclear Power Plants, LWR Edition,” March 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML070660036). 

48. NRC, NUREG-1555, “Standard Review Plans for Environmental Reviews for Nuclear 

Power Plants: Environmental Standard Review,” available at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1555/ 

49. NRC, NUREG-2157, “Generic Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Storage of 

Spent Nuclear Fuel,” September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14198A440). 

50. NRC, SECY-06-0019, “Semiannual Update of the Status of New Reactor Licensing 

Activities and Future Planning for New Reactors,” January 31, 2006 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML053530315). 

51. NRC, “Addressing Construction & Preconstruction Activities; Greenhouse Gas Issues, 

General Conformity Determinations, and Environmental Justice, Need for Power, 

Cumulative Impact Analysis, and Cultural/Historical Resources Analysis Issues in EIS,” 

December 10, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML100760503). 

52. NRC, “Staff Process for Determining if a Supplement to an Environmental Impact 

Statement is Required in Accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 

Part 51.92(a) or 51.72(a),” November 24, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13199A170). 

53. SECY-12-0025 - Proposed Orders And Requests For Information In Response To 

Lessons Learned From Japan's March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake And Tsunami, 

February 17, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12039A111). 

54. SRM-SECY-12-0025 - Proposed Orders and Requests for Information in Response to 

Lessons Learned from Japan's March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami, 

March 9, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML120690347). 

55. NRC, Letter from Mark Tonacci (NRC) to John Elnitsky (PEF), “Request for Additional 

Information Letter No. 108 Concerning Implementation of Fukushima Near-Term Task 

Force Recommendations,” March 15, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML120550146). 
6 

56. PEF, Letter from Christopher M. Fallon (PEF) to the NRC, “Levy Nuclear Plant, Units 1 

and 2 Docket Nos. 52-029 and 52-030 Supplement 2 to Response to NRC RAI Letter 108 

– Implementation of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendations,” August 1, 

2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML122230155). 

57. PEF, Letter from Christopher M. Fallon (PEF) to the NRC, “Levy Nuclear Plant, Units 1 

and 2, Docket Nos. 52-029 and 52-030 Supplement 4 to Response to NRC RAI Letter 108 

– Implementation of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendations,” October 15, 

2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12291A857). 

58. PEF, Letter from Christopher M. Fallon (PEF) to the NRC, “Levy Nuclear Plant, Units 1 

and 2 Docket Nos. 52-029 and 52-030 Revised Supplement 4 to Response to NRC RAI 

Letter 108 – Implementation of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendations,” 

October 31, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12313A163). 

59. NRC, CLI-12-09, “Memorandum and Order,” March 30, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML12090A531). 

60. Duke Energy Florida, Letter from Christopher M. Fallon to the NRC, “Levy Nuclear Plant, 

Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 52-029 and 52-030 Supplement 9 to Response to NRC RAI 

Letter 108 – Implementation of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendations,” 

April 22, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15114A359). 

61. Westinghouse, Technical Report, “Response to NRC Orders EA-12-051 and EA-12-063, 

and Background Information for Future Licensees on AP1000 Spent Fuel Pool 

Instrumentation, Redacted,” January 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13023A265). 

62. Nuclear Energy Institute, NEI 12-01, Revision 0, “Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design 

Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities,” May 2012 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML12125A412). 

63. Progress Energy Florida, Inc. (PEF), Letter from Robert Kitchen (PEF) to Gordon A. 

Hambrick III (USACE), “Levy Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, USACE Application File 

No. SAJ-2008-00490(IP-GAH), Response to Comments Received on the Levy Nuclear 

Units 1 and 2 (LNP) Section 404(b)(1) Alternatives Analysis, Revision 3,” June 30, 2010 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML101820645). 

64. South Florida Water Management District, Letter from James J. Golden (South Florida 

Water Management District, Lead Planner, Intergovernmental Policy and Planning 

Division) to the NRC, “Subject: Progress Energy Levy Nuclear Plant Units 1 & 2 Draft 

Environmental Impact Statement Combined License Application Review,” October 6, 2010 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML102871136). 

65. NRC, Regulatory Guide 4.7, “General Site Suitability Criteria for Nuclear Power Stations,” 

Washington, DC, 1998. 

66. SECY-15-0065, “Proposed Rulemaking: Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events,” 

April 30, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15316A408). 
7 

67. SRM-SECY-15-0065, “Staff Requirements – SECY-15-0065 – Proposed Rulemaking: 

Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events (RIN 3150-AJ49),” August 27, 2015 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML15239A767). 

68. NRC, “Final Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Combined Licenses for South Texas 

Project, Units 3 and 4, September 29, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15232A128). 

69. NRC, CLI-16-07, “Memorandum and Order,” May 4, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML16125A150).