Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and

Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce,

House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 9:00 a.m., Tuesday,

July 9, 2002 HOMELAND SECURITY

Title III of the Homeland

Security Act of 2002

Statement of (Ms) Gary L. Jones

Director, Natural Resources and Environment

GAO-02-927T
Page 1 GAO-02-927T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss several aspects of

the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The proposed legislation would bring

many federal entities with homeland security responsibilities into a

Department of Homeland Security in an effort to mobilize and focus assets

and resources. Title III of the proposed legislation would task the new

department with developing national policy for and coordinating the

federal government’s research and development efforts for responding to

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. It would also

transfer to the new department responsibility for certain research and

development programs and other activities, including those of the

Department of Energy (DOE).1

In my testimony today, which focuses on Title III of the proposed

legislation, I will address (1) the need for clarification of certain roles and

responsibilities of the new department and (2) our observations on

transferring certain activities of DOE to the new department. Our

testimony is based largely on our previous and ongoing work on national

preparedness issues,2

 as well as a review of the proposed legislation.

In concept and if properly implemented, this proposed legislation could

lead to a more efficient, effective and coordinated research effort that

would provide technology to protect our people, borders, and critical

infrastructure. However, the legislation does not address many issues that

could impact the Department of Homeland Security’s potential

effectiveness. For example, while it is tasked with coordinating federal

“civilian” research, the new department will also need to coordinate with

the Department of Defense and the intelligence agencies that conduct

research and development efforts designed to detect and respond to

weapons of mass destruction. Further, the proposed legislation does not

specify that a critical role of the new department will be to establish

collaborative relationships with programs at all levels of government and

to develop a strategic plan for research and development to implement the

national policy it is charged with developing. In addition, the proposed

legislation is not clear on the role of the new department in setting

standards for the performance and interoperability of new technologies so

 1

 Sections 301, 302, and 303 of the President’s proposed legislation primarily cover these

changes.

2

 See “Related GAO Products” at the end of this testimony.
Page 2 GAO-02-927T

that users can be confident that the technologies they are purchasing will

perform as intended. Lacking this, the Department of Homeland Security

may not be able to efficiently and effectively focus the research and

development resources of the federal government to address the most

important terrorist threats.

Regarding the transfer of certain activities of DOE to the new department,

we believe that some of the transfers proposed in the legislation are

appropriate, such as DOE’s nuclear threat assessment program and the

Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML). However, we are

concerned that the transfer of certain DOE research and development

activities may complicate research currently being performed to

accomplish multiple purposes. For example, some research programs,

such as Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s advanced scientific

computing research program, have broad missions such as ensuring the

reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile that are not easily separated

into homeland security research and research for other purposes.

Furthermore, in some cases, such as the energy security and assurance

program activities at DOE, the legislation does not clearly indicate exactly

what research would be transferred.

In response to global challenges the government faces in the coming years,

the creation of a Department of Homeland Security provides a unique

opportunity to create an extremely effective and performance-based

organization that can strengthen the nation’s ability to protect its borders

and citizens against terrorism. There is likely to be considerable benefit

over time from restructuring some of the homeland security functions,

including reducing risk and improving the economy, efficiency and

effectiveness of these consolidated agencies and programs. Realistically,

however, in the short term, the magnitude of the challenges that the new

department faces will clearly require substantial time and effort, and will

take additional resources to make it fully effective.

Recently, we testified that Congress should consider several very specific

criteria in its evaluation of whether individual agencies or programs

Background
Page 3 GAO-02-927T

should be included or excluded from the proposed department.

3 Those

criteria include the following:

• Mission Relevancy: Is homeland security a major part of the agency or

program mission? Is it the primary mission of the agency or program?

• Similar Goals and Objectives: Does the agency or program being

considered for the new department share primary goals and objectives

with the other agencies or programs being consolidated?

• Leverage Effectiveness: Does the agency or program being considered for

the new department create synergy and help to leverage the effectiveness

of other agencies and programs or the new department as a whole? In

other words, is the whole greater than the sum of the parts?

• Gains Through Consolidation: Does the agency or program being

considered for the new department improve the efficiency and

effectiveness of homeland security missions through eliminating

duplications and overlaps, closing gaps and aligning or merging common

roles and responsibilities?

• Integrated Information Sharing/Coordination: Does the agency or program

being considered for the new department contribute to or leverage the

ability of the new department to enhance the sharing of critical

information or otherwise improve the coordination of missions and

activities related to homeland security?

• Compatible Cultures: Can the organizational culture of the agency or

program being considered for the new department effectively meld with

the other entities that will be consolidated? Field structures and

approaches to achieving missions vary considerably between agencies.

• Impact on Excluded Agencies: What is the impact on departments losing

components to the new department? What is the impact on agencies with

homeland security missions left out of the new department?

Federally sponsored research and development efforts, a key focus of the

proposed legislation, enhance the government’s capability to counter

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear terrorist threats by

providing technologies that meet a range of crisis- and consequencemanagement needs. Research and development efforts for these

technologies, however, can be risky, time consuming, and costly. Such

efforts also may need to address requirements not available in off-the-shelf

 3

U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has

Merit, But Implementation Will be Pivotal to Success, GAO-02-886T (Washington, D.C.:

June 25, 2002).
Page 4 GAO-02-927T

products. These factors limit private and public research and development

efforts for these technologies, necessitating federal government

involvement and collaboration.

Many federal agencies and interagency working groups have recently

deployed or are conducting research on a variety of technologies to

combat terrorism. Recently deployed technologies include a prototype

biological detection system used at the Salt Lake City Olympics and a

prototype chemical detection system currently being used in Washington

D.C.’s metro system that was developed by DOE. Technologies under

development include new or improved vaccines, antibiotics, and antivirals

being developed by the National Institutes of Health. In addition, the

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, in collaboration with other

federal agencies, are conducting research on the diagnosis and treatment

of smallpox. Moreover, the Food and Drug Administration is investigating

a variety of biological agents that could be used as terrorist weapons.

Other federal agencies such as the Department of Defense and intelligence

community are engaged in similar research and development activities,

such as research on technology to protect combatants from chemical and

biological agents.

Certain roles and responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security

in managing research and development need to be clarified. Under the

proposed legislation, the Department of Homeland Security would be

tasked with developing national policy for and coordinating the federal

government’s civilian research and development efforts to counter

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. However, while

coordination is important, it will not be enough. Federal agency

coordination alone may not address the specific needs of state and local

governments, such as those of local police and fire departments that will

use this technology. In our view, the proposed legislation should also

specify that a role of the new department will be to develop collaborative

relationships with programs at all levels of government—federal, state,

and local—to ensure that users’ needs and research efforts are linked. We

also believe the legislation should be clarified to ensure that the new

department would be responsible for the development of a single national

research and development strategic plan. Such a plan would help to

ensure that research gaps are filled, unproductive duplication is

minimized, and individual agency plans are consistent with the overall

goals. Moreover, the proposed legislation, as written, is unclear about the

new department’s role in developing standards for the performance and

interoperability of new technologies to address terrorist threats. We

Roles and

Responsibilities of the

Proposed Department

of Homeland Security

Need to be Clarified
Page 5 GAO-02-927T

believe the development of these standards must be a priority of the new

department.

The limitations of existing coordination and the critical need for a more

collaborative, unified research structure has been amply demonstrated in

the recent past. We have previously reported that while agencies attempt

to coordinate federal research and development programs in a variety of

ways, breakdowns occur, leading to research gaps and duplication of

effort.

4

 Coordination is limited by compartmentalization of efforts because

of the sensitivity of the research and development programs, security

classification of research, and the absence of a single coordinating entity

to ensure against duplication. For example, the Department of Defense’s

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency was unaware of U.S. Coast

Guard’s plans to develop methods to detect biological agents on infected

cruise ships and, therefore, was unable to share information on its

potentially related research to develop biological detection devices for

buildings.

Although the proposed legislation states that the new department will be

responsible for developing national policy and coordinating research and

development, it has a number of limitations that could weaken its

effectiveness. First, the legislation tasks the new department with

coordinating the federal government’s “civilian efforts” only. We believe

the new department will also need to coordinate with the Department of

Defense and the intelligence agencies that conduct research and

development efforts designed to detect and respond to weapons of mass

destruction. The proposed transfer of some DOE research and

development efforts to the Department of Homeland Security also does

not eliminate potential overlaps, gaps, and opportunities for collaboration.

Coordination will still be required within and among the 23 DOE national

laboratories. For example, our 2001 report noted that two offices within

Sandia National Laboratory concurrently and separately worked on similar

thermal imagery projects for two different federal agencies, rather than

consolidating the requests and combining resources. In addition, local

 4

U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical and Biological Defense: Coordination of

Nonmedical Chemical and Biological R&D Programs, GAO/NSIAD-99-160 (Washington,

D.C.: August 16, 1999), and U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Selected

Challenges and Related Recommendations, GAO-01-822 (Washington, D.C.: September 20,

2001).

Shortfalls in Current

Research Coordinating

Efforts

Opportunities to Improve

Existing Legislative

Proposal
Page 6 GAO-02-927T

police and fire departments and state and local governments possess

practical knowledge about their technological needs and relevant design

limitations that should be taken into account in federal efforts to provide

new equipment, such as protective gear and sensor systems. To be most

effective, the new department will have to develop collaborative

relationships with all these organizations to facilitate technological

improvements and encourage cooperative behavior.

The existing proposal leaves a number of problems unaddressed as well.

For example, while the proposed legislation is clear that the position of

Undersecretary for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

Countermeasures will be responsible for developing national policy for

federal research and development, there is no requirement for a strategic

plan for national research and development that could address

coordination, reduce potential duplication, and ensure that important

issues are addressed. In 2001, we recommended the creation of a unified

strategy to reduce duplication and leverage resources, and suggested that

the plan be coordinated with federal agencies performing research as well

as with state and local authorities.

5

 The development of such a plan would

help to ensure that research gaps are filled, unproductive duplication is

minimized, individual agency plans are consistent with the overall goals,

and a basis for assessing the success of the research and development

efforts.

Also, while the legislation calls for the establishment of guidelines for state

and local governments to implement countermeasures for chemical,

biological, radiological, and nuclear terrorism threats, it is not clear to us

what these guidelines are to entail. In this regard, we believe it will be

important to develop standards for the performance and interoperability

of new technologies, something that the legislation does not specifically

address. For example, we had discussions with officials from the Utah

State Department of Health who prepared for the 2002 Winter Olympic

Games. These officials said that local police and fire departments had been

approached by numerous vendors offering a variety of chemical and

biological detection technology for use during the Olympics. However,

these state and local officials were unsure of the best technology to

purchase and could find no federal agency that would provide guidance on

the technologies. They told us that if the science backing up the

 5

GAO-01-822.
Page 7 GAO-02-927T

technology is poor or the data the technology produces are faulty, the

technology can do more harm than good.

Further, the legislation would allow the new department to direct, fund,

and conduct research related to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,

and other emerging threats on its own. This raises the potential for

duplication of efforts, lack of efficiency, and an increased need for

coordination with other departments that would continue to carry out

relevant research. We are concerned that the proposal could result in a

duplication of capacity that already exists in the current federal

laboratories.

Under Title III of the proposed legislation, a number of DOE programs and

activities would be transferred to the new department. Some of these

transfers seem appropriate. However, in other cases we are concerned

about the transfers because of the potential impact on programs and

activities that currently support missions beyond homeland security.

Finally, in some cases, transfers proposed by the legislation are not laid

out in enough detail to permit an assessment. We discuss each of these

groups of transfers below.

Title III proposes to transfer to the Department of Homeland Security

certain DOE activities that seem appropriate. Specifically, Title III

proposes to transfer the nuclear threat assessment program and activities

of the assessment, detection, and cooperation program in DOE’s

international Materials, Protection, and Accountability Program (MPC&A).

The threat assessment program and activities, among other things,

assesses the credibility of communicated nuclear threats, analyzes reports

of illicit nuclear material trafficking, and provides technical support to law

enforcement agencies regarding nuclear material/weapons. We would

agree with officials of the Office of Nuclear Threat Assessment and

Detection who view the potential transfer to the Department of Homeland

Security positively. We base our agreement on the fact that, according to

officials from DOE, the transfer would not have a negative impact on the

rest of the MPC&A program because the functions are separate and

distinct. Further, the transfer could tie the office in more closely with the

other agencies they work with, such as Customs.

Another program that we believe could be appropriately transferred to the

new department is the Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML),

located in New York City. This government-operated laboratory operates

Transferring Certain

Activities of DOE to

the Department of

Homeland Security

Raises Concerns

Transfer of Certain DOE

Activities Seems

Appropriate
Page 8 GAO-02-927T

under the Office of Science and Technology in the Office of Environmental

Management at DOE. EML provides program management, technical

assistance and data quality assurance for measurements of radiation and

radioactivity relating to environmental restoration, global nuclear

nonproliferation, and other priority issues for DOE, as well as for other

government, national and international organizations. According to the

laboratory director, the laboratory is completely in favor of the transfer to

the proposed Department of Homeland Security and would fit in very well

with it. We believe the transfer is appropriate because, unlike some other

transfers proposed under Title III, the entire laboratory would be

transferred. While it is a multiprogram laboratory serving several elements

of DOE as well as other organizations, serving multiple clients could

continue under a “work for others” contracting arrangement whether the

laboratory was housed within DOE or the Department of Homeland

Security.

Title III proposes transferring the parts of DOE’s nonproliferation and

verification research and development program that conduct research on

systems to improve the nation’s capability to prepare for and respond to

chemical and biological attacks. The legislation also proposes transferring

a portion of the program’s proliferation detection research. This includes

work on developing sensors to help the Coast Guard monitor container

shipping at ports of entry. These proposed transfers raise concerns

because much of the program’s research supports both homeland security

and international nonproliferation programs. These programs have broad

missions that are not easily separated into homeland security research and

research for other purposes and the proposed legislation is not clear how

these missions would continue to be accomplished. Furthermore, we are

concerned that the legislation does not clearly indicate whether only the

programmatic management and funding would move or also the scientists

carrying out the research. Moving the scientists may not be prudent. This

is because the research is currently conducted by multiprogram

laboratories that employ scientists skilled in many disciplines who serve

many different missions and whose research benefits from their

interactions with colleagues within the laboratory.

In addition, we believe transferring control of some scientists within the

DOE national laboratories to the Department of Homeland Security could

complicate an already dysfunctional DOE organizational structure by

blurring lines of authority and accountability. DOE carries out its diverse

missions through a network of multilayered field offices that oversee

activities at the national laboratories and other DOE facilities widely

Some Proposed Transfers

Give Reasons for Concern
Page 9 GAO-02-927T

dispersed throughout the country. The structure inherited by DOE and the

different program cultures and management styles within that structure

have confounded DOE’s efforts to develop a more effective organization.

Transferring control of scientists within the national laboratories could

complicate the accomplishment of homeland security missions and DOE’s

other missions by adding additional lines of authority and accountability

between the laboratory scientists, DOE, and the Department of Homeland

Security. One alternative would be for the new department to contract

with DOE’s national laboratories to conduct the research under “work for

others” contracts. This would allow for direct contact between the

Department of Homeland Security and the laboratories conducting the

research without creating a new bureaucracy. Many federal agencies such

as the Department of Defense and intelligence agencies currently use this

contracting arrangement with the national laboratories.

We have similar concerns about transferring two other activities to the

new department:

• The advanced scientific computing research program and activities at

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory are developing supercomputer

hardware and software infrastructure aimed at enabling laboratory and

university researchers to solve the most challenging scientific problems at

a level of accuracy and detail never before achieved. Research conducted

under the program include; designing materials atom-by-atom, revealing

the functions of proteins, understanding and controlling plasma

turbulence, designing new particle accelerators and modeling global

climate change. This program is an integral part of DOE’s efforts to ensure

that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe and secure. This program may

be difficult to separate into homeland security research and research for

other purposes.

• The Life Sciences Division within the DOE Office of Science’s Biological

and Environmental Research Program manages a diverse portfolio of

research to develop fundamental biological information and to advance

technology in support of DOE’s missions in biology, medicine, and the

environment. For example, it is determining the whole genome sequences

of a variety of infectious bacteria, including anthrax strains—a first step

toward developing tests that can be used to rapidly identify their presence

in the environment.

In both of these instances, the programs serve multiple missions. These

dual-purpose programs have important synergies that we believe should

be maintained. We are concerned that transferring control over these

programs to the new department has the potential to disrupt some

programs that are critical to other DOE missions, such as the reliability of
Page 10 GAO-02-927T

our nuclear weapons. We do not believe that the proposed legislation is

sufficiently clear on how both the homeland security and these other

missions would be accomplished.

The details of two other transfers proposed in the legislation are unclear.

First, Title III would transfer the intelligence program activities at

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. These intelligence activities are

related to the overall program carried out by DOE’s Office of Intelligence.

The Office of Intelligence gathers information related to DOE’s missions—

energy, nuclear weapons, nuclear proliferation, basic science, radiological

research and environmental cleanup. To support this overall intelligence

program, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, like other weapons

laboratories, conducts intelligence activities. At Lawrence Livermore, the

“Z” division conducts these activities and has special intelligence expertise

related to tracking the nuclear capabilities of countries other than Russia

and China. Importantly, the “Z” division receives funding from other DOE

programs and/or offices as well as funding from other federal agencies

(Department of Defense, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central

Intelligence Agency, etc.). According to officials at DOE Headquarters and

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, only about $5 million of the

division’s $30-50 million budget comes from DOE’s Office of Intelligence.

These officials said the transfer would most likely affect only the

$5 million that DOE’s Office of Intelligence directly provides to the

laboratory, but this is not clear in the proposed legislation. As with other

DOE programs discussed in this testimony, the staff that carry out these

activities are contractor employees and it is not clear how they would be

transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. Moreover, DOE

headquarters and other laboratories also have a role in intelligence, and

the legislation does not propose to transfer any of their intelligence

functions.

Another area of Title III where the details are unclear is the transfer of

“energy security and assurance program activities.” These activities are

carried out by the Office of Energy Assurance, which was created in

November 2001 to work with state and local government and industry to

strengthen the security of the United States through the application of

science and technology to improve the reliability and security of the

national energy infrastructure. The national energy infrastructure includes

(1) physical and cyber assets of the nation’s electric power, oil, and

natural gas infrastructures; (2) interdependencies among physical and

cyber energy infrastructure assets; (3) national energy infrastructure’s

interdependencies with all other critical national infrastructures. At the

Transfer of Some Activities

Is Unclear
Page 11 GAO-02-927T

time this testimony was being prepared, DOE and the Office of Homeland

Security were trying to define the scope of the proposed transfer.

Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to

respond to any questions you or other Members of the Committee may

have at this time.

Contact and Acknowledgments

For further information about this testimony, please contact Gary Jones at

(202) 512-3841. Gene Aloise, Seto J. Bagdoyen, Ryan T. Coles, Darryl W.

Dutton, Kathleen H. Ebert, Laurie E. Ekstrand, Cynthia Norris and Keith

Rhodes also made key contributions to this testimony.
Page 12 GAO-02-927T

Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnership

Will Be Critical to Success. GAO-02-901T. Washington, D.C.: July 3, 2002

Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnership

Will Be Critical to Success. GAO-02-900T. Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2002

Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnership

Will Be Critical to Success. GAO-02-899T. Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2002

Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but

May Complicate Priority Setting. GAO-02-893T. Washington, D.C.:

 June 28, 2002.

Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has Merit, but

Implementation Will Be Pivotal to Success. GAO-02-886T. Washington,

D.C.: June 25, 2002.

Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but

May Complicate Public Health Priority Setting. GAO-02-883T.

Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002.

Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but

Uncertainty Remains. GAO-02-610. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002.

Homeland Security: Responsibility and Accountability for Achieving

National Goals. GAO-02-627T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002.

Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction and Partnership

Sought. GAO-02-490T. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2002.

Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short- and

Long-Term National Needs. GAO-02-160T. Washington, D.C.: November 7,

2001.

Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide

Preparedness Efforts. GAO-02-208T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001.

Homeland Security: Need to Consider VA’s Role in Strengthening Federal

Preparedness. GAO-02-145T. Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2001.

Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach.

GAO-02-150T. Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001.

Related GAO Products

Homeland Security
Page 13 GAO-02-927T

Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Efforts.

GAO-01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001.

Bioterrorism: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Role in

Public Health Protection. GAO-02-235T. Washington, D.C.: November 15,

2001.

Bioterrorism: Review of Public Health Preparedness Programs.

GAO-02-149T. Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2001.

Bioterrorism: Public Health and Medical Preparedness. GAO-02-141T.

Washington, D.C.: October 9, 2001.

Bioterrorism: Coordination and Preparedness. GAO-02-129T.

Washington, D.C.: October 5, 2001.

Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness Activities.

GAO-01-915. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2001.

Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk Assessment and

Inventory Management Are Needed. GAO-01-667. Washington, D.C.:

September 28, 2001.

West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for Public Health Preparedness.

GAO/HEHS-00-180. Washington, D.C.: September 11, 2000.

Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation

Should Follow Results Act Framework. GAO/NSIAD-99-159. Washington,

D.C.: August 16, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public

Health Initiatives. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112. Washington, D.C.: March 16,

1999.

National Preparedness: Technologies to Secure Federal Buildings.

GAO-02-687T. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2002.

National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private

Sector Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland

Security. GAO-02-621T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002.

Public Health

Combating Terrorism
Page 14 GAO-02-927T

Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the

Development of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local

Preparedness. GAO-02-550T. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a National

Preparedness Strategy. GAO-02-549T. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to

Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-548T. Washington, D.C.:

March 25, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a National

Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-547T.

Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance

State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-473T. Washington, D.C.: March 1,

2002.

Chemical and Biological Defense: DOD Should Clarify Expectations for

Medical Readiness. GAO-02-219T. Washington, D.C.: November 7, 2001.

Anthrax Vaccine: Changes to the Manufacturing Process. GAO-02-181T.

Washington, D.C.: October 23, 2001.

Chemical and Biological Defense: DOD Needs to Clarify Expectations for

Medical Readiness. GAO-02-38. Washington, D.C.: October 19, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in

Chemical and Biological Preparedness. GAO-02-162T. Washington, D.C.:

October 17, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related

Recommendations. GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD Antiterrorism

Program Implementation and Management. GAO-01-909. Washington,

D.C.: September 19, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Comments on H.R. 525 to Create a President’s

Council on Domestic Terrorism Preparedness. GAO-01-555T. Washington,

D.C.: May 9, 2001.
Page 15 GAO-02-927T

Combating Terrorism: Accountability Over Medical Supplies Needs

Further Improvement. GAO-01-666T. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal

Response. GAO-01-660T. Washington, DC: April 24, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Accountability Over Medical Supplies Needs

Further Improvement. GAO-01-463. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and

National Strategy. GAO-01-556T. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: FEMA Continues to Make Progress in

Coordinating Preparedness and Response. GAO-01-15. Washington, D.C.:

March 20, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied

Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination.

GAO-01-14. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2000.

Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of

Mass Destruction Training. GAO/NSIAD-00-64. Washington, D.C.: March

21, 2000.

Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies Are

Poorly Managed. GAO/T-HEHS/AIMD-00-59. Washington, D.C.: March 8,

2000.

Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies Are

Poorly Managed. GAO/HEHS/AIMD-00-36. Washington, D.C.: October 29,

1999.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and

Biological Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-50. Washington, D.C.: October 20,

1999.

Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk

Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks. GAO/NSIAD-99-163.

Washington, D.C.: September 14, 1999.

Chemical and Biological Defense: Coordination of Nonmedical Chemical

and Biological R&D Programs. GAO/NSIAD-99-160. Washington, D.C.:

August 16, 1999.
Page 16 GAO-02-927T

Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is

Unclear. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184. Washington, D.C.: June 23, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs.

GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181. Washington, D.C.: June 9, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response

Equipment and Sustainment Costs. GAO/NSIAD-99-151. Washington,

D.C.: June 9, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is

Unclear. GAO/NSIAD-99-110. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat

Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness

Program Focus and Efficiency. GAO/NSIAD-99-3. Washington, D.C.:

November 12, 1998.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici

Domestic Preparedness Program. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16. Washington, D.C.:

October 2, 1998.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues.

GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 1998.

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize

and Target Program Investments. GAO/NSIAD-98-74. Washington, D.C.:

April 9, 1998.

Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs

Requires Better Management and Coordination. GAO/NSIAD-98-39.

Washington, D.C.: December 1, 1997.

Disaster Assistance: Improvement Needed in Disaster Declaration

Criteria and Eligibility Assurance Procedures. GAO-01-837. Washington,

D.C.: August 31, 2001.

Disaster Assistance
Page 17 GAO-02-927T

Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing

States for Emergencies. GAO-01-850. Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2001.

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Status of Achieving Key

Outcomes and Addressing Major Management Challenges. GAO-01-832.

Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2001.

Budget Issues: Long-Term Fiscal Challenges. GAO-02-467T. Washington,

D.C.: February 27, 2002.

Results-Oriented Budget Practices in Federal Agencies. GAO-01-1084SP.

Washington, D.C.: August 2001.

Managing for Results: Federal Managers’ Views on Key Management

Issues Vary Widely Across Agencies. GAO-01-592. Washington, D.C.:

May 25, 2001.

Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High

Risks. GAO-01-159SP. Washington, D.C.: November 2000.

Managing for Results: Using the Results Act to Address Mission

Fragmentation and Program Overlap. GAO-AIMD-97-146. Washington,

D.C.: August 29, 1997.

Government Restructuring: Identifying Potential Duplication in Federal

Missions and Approaches. GAO/T-AIMD-95-161. Washington, D.C.: June 7,

1995.

Government Reorganization: Issues and Principles.

GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-95-166. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 1995.

Grant Programs: Design Features Shape Flexibility, Accountability, and

Performance Information. GAO/GGD-98-137. Washington, D.C.: June 22,

1998.

Federal Grants: Design Improvements Could Help Federal Resources Go

Further. GAO/AIMD-97-7. Washington, D.C.: December 18, 1996.

Budget and

Management

Grant Design
Page 18 GAO-02-927T

Block Grants: Issues in Designing Accountability Provisions.

GAO/AIMD-95-226. Washington, D.C.: September 1, 1995.

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