Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Government

Efficiency, Financial Management, and

Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on

Government Reform, House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m.,

Wednesday, July 3, 2002 HOMELAND SECURITY

Intergovernmental

Coordination and

Partnership Will Be

Critical to Success

Statement of JayEtta Hecker,

Director, Physical Infrastructure

GAO-02-901T
Page 1 GAO-02-901T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I appreciate the opportunity to be here to discuss issues critical to

successful federal leadership of, assistance to, and partnership with state

and local governments to enhance homeland security. As you are aware,

the challenges posed by homeland security exceed the capacity and

authority of any one level of government. Protecting the nation against

these unique threats calls for a truly integrated approach, bringing

together the resources of all levels of government.

In my testimony today, I will focus on the challenges facing the federal

government in (1) establishing a leadership structure for homeland

security, (2) defining the roles of different levels of government, (3)

developing performance goals and measures, and (4) deploying

appropriate tools to best achieve and sustain national goals. My comments

are based on a body of GAO’s work on terrorism and emergency

preparedness and policy options for the design of federal assistance,1

 our

review of many other studies,2

 and the Comptroller General’s June 25,

2002, testimony on the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

proposal. In addition, I will draw on GAO’s ongoing work for this

Subcommittee, including an examination of the diverse ongoing and

proposed federal preparedness programs, as well as a series of case

studies we are conducting that examine preparedness issues facing state

and local governments. To date, we have conducted interviews of officials

in four geographically diverse cities: Baltimore, Maryland; New Orleans,

Louisiana; Denver, Colorado; and, Los Angeles, California. We have also

interviewed state emergency management officials in these states.

In summary:

• The proposed Department of Homeland Security will clearly have a central

role in the success of efforts to enhance homeland security. Many aspects

of the proposed consolidation of homeland security programs have the

potential to reduce fragmentation, improve coordination, and clarify roles

and responsibilities. Realistically, however, in the short term, the

 1

See attached listing of related GAO products.

2

These studies include the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for

Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, Third Annual Report (Arlington, Va.:,

Dec. 15, 2001); and the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Road

Map for Security: Imperative for Change (February 15, 2001).
Page 2 GAO-02-901T

magnitude of the challenges that the new department faces will clearly

require substantial time and effort, and will take additional resources to

make it effective. Moreover, formation of a department should not be

considered a replacement for the timely issuance of a national homeland

security strategy, which is needed to guide implementation of the complex

mission of the department.

• Appropriate roles and responsibilities within and between the levels of

government and with the private sector are evolving and need to be

clarified. New threats are prompting a reassessment and shifting of

longstanding roles and responsibilities, but these shifts are being

considered on a piecemeal and ad hoc basis without benefit of an

overarching framework and criteria to guide the process. A national

strategy could provide such guidance by more systematically identifying

the unique capacities and resources of each level of government to

enhance homeland security and by providing increased accountability

within the intergovernmental system.

• The nation does not yet have performance goals and measures upon which

to assess and improve preparedness at all levels of government. Standards

are a common set of criteria that can demonstrate success, promote

accountability and determine areas where additional resources are

needed, such as improving communications and equipment

interoperability. Standards could also be used to help set goals and

performance measures as a basis for assessing the effectiveness of federal

programs. In the intergovernmental environment, these are often best

defined through cooperative, partnership approaches.

• A careful choice of the most appropriate assistance tools is critical to

achieve and sustain national goals. The choice and design of policy tools,

such as grants, regulations, and tax incentives, can enhance the capacity of

all levels of government to target areas of highest risk and greatest need,

promote shared responsibilities by all parties, and track and assess

progress toward achieving national preparedness goals.

Homeland security is a complex mission that involves a broad range of

functions performed throughout government, including law enforcement,

transportation, food safety and public health, information technology, and

emergency management, to mention only a few. Federal, state, and local

governments have a shared responsibility in preparing for catastrophic

terrorist attacks as well as other disasters. The initial responsibility for

planning, preparing, and response falls upon local governments and their

organizations—such as police, fire departments, emergency medical

personnel, and public health agencies—which will almost invariably be the

first responders to such an occurrence. For its part, the federal

Background
Page 3 GAO-02-901T

government has principally provided leadership, training, and funding

assistance.

The federal government’s role in responding to major disasters has

historically been defined by the Stafford Act,3

 which makes most federal

assistance contingent on a finding that the disaster is so severe as to be

beyond the capacity of state and local governments to respond effectively.

Once a disaster is declared, the federal government—through the Federal

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)—may reimburse state and local

governments for between 75 and 100 percent of eligible costs, including

response and recovery activities.

In addition to post disaster assistance, there has been an increasing

emphasis over the past decade on federal support of state and local

governments to enhance national preparedness for terrorist attacks. After

the nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway system on March 20, 1995, and

the Oklahoma City bombing on April 19, 1995, the United States initiated a

new effort to combat terrorism. In June 1995, Presidential Decision

Directive 39 was issued, enumerating responsibilities for federal agencies

in combating terrorism, including domestic terrorism. Recognizing the

vulnerability of the United States to various forms of terrorism, the

Congress passed the Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of

1996 (also known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici program) to train and

equip state and local emergency services personnel who would likely be

the first responders to a domestic terrorist event. Other federal agencies,

including those in FEMA; the Departments of Justice, Health and Human

Services, and Energy; and the Environmental Protection Agency, have also

developed programs to assist state and local governments in preparing for

terrorist events.

As emphasis on terrorism prevention and response grew, however, so did

concerns over coordination and fragmentation of federal efforts. More

than 40 federal entities have a role in combating and responding to

terrorism, and more than 20 in bioterrorism alone. Our past work,

conducted prior to the establishment of an Office of Homeland Security

and a proposal to create a new Department of Homeland Security, has

shown coordination and fragmentation problems stemming largely from a

lack of accountability within the federal government for terrorism-related

 3

Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 93-288) as amended

establishes the process for states to request a presidential disaster declaration.
Page 4 GAO-02-901T

programs and activities. Further, our work found there was an absence of

a central focal point that caused a lack of a cohesive effort and the

development of similar and potentially duplicative programs. Also, as the

Gilmore Commission report notes, state and local officials have voiced

frustration about their attempts to obtain federal funds from different

programs administered by different agencies and have argued that the

application process is burdensome and inconsistent among federal

agencies.

President Bush took a number of important steps in the aftermath of the

terrorist attacks of September 11th to address the concerns of

fragmentation and to enhance the country’s homeland security efforts,

including the creation of the Office of Homeland Security in October 2001.

The creation of such a focal point is consistent with a previous GAO

recommendation.4

 The Office of Homeland Security achieved some early

results in suggesting a budgetary framework and emphasizing homeland

security priorities in the President’s proposed budget.

The proposal to create a statutorily based Department of Homeland

Security holds promise to better establish the leadership necessary in the

homeland security area. It can more effectively capture homeland security

as a long-term commitment grounded in the institutional framework of the

nation’s governmental structure. As we have previously noted, the

homeland security area must span the terms of various administrations

and individuals. Establishing a Department of Homeland Security by

statute will ensure legitimacy, authority, sustainability, and the

appropriate accountability to Congress and the American people.5

The President’s proposal calls for the creation of a Cabinet department

with four divisions, including Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and

Nuclear Countermeasures; Information Analysis and Infrastructure

Protection; Border and Transportation Security; and Emergency

Preparedness and Response. Table 1 shows the major components of the

proposed department with associated budgetary estimates.

 4

U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related

Recommendations, GAO-01-822 (Washington, D.C.: June 2002).

5

U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Responsibility And Accountability

for Achieving National Goals, GAO-02-627T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 11, 2002).

Proposed Department

Will Have A Central

Role in Strengthening

Homeland Security
Page 5 GAO-02-901T

Table 1: Department of Homeland Security Component Funding (FY 2003 Requested)

Dollars in millions FTE (1)

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures

Civilian Biodefense Research Programs (HHS) $1,993 150

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (DOE) 1,188 324

National BW Defense Analysis Center (New) 420 -

Plum Island Animal Disease Center (USDA) 25 124

3,626 598

Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection

Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (Commerce) 27 65

Federal Computer Incident Response Center (GSA) 11 23

National Communications System (DOD) 155 91

National Infrastructure Protection Center (FBI) 151 795

National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (DOE) 20 2

364 976

Border and Transportation Security

Immigration and Naturalization Service (DOJ) 6,416 39,459

Customs Service (Treasury) 3,796 21,743

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA) 1,137 8,620

Coast Guard, (DOT) 7,274 43,639

Federal Protective Services (GSA) 418 1,408

Transportation Security Agency (DOT) (2) 4,800 41,300

23,841 156,169

Emergency Preparedness and Response

Federal Emergency Management Agency 6,174 5,135

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response Assets (HHS) 2,104 150

Domestic Emergency Support Team - -

Nuclear Incident Response (DOE) 91 -

Office of Domestic Preparedness (DOJ) - -

National Domestic Preparedness (FBI) 2 15

8,371 5,300

Secret Service (Treasury) 1,248 6,111

Total, Department of Homeland Security $37,450 169,154

Note: Figures are from FY 2003 President’s Budget Request.

(1) Estimated, final FTE figures to be determined.

(2) Before fee recapture of $2,346 million.

Source: “Department of Homeland Security,” President George W. Bush, June 2002.

The DHS would be responsible for coordination with other executive

branch agencies involved in homeland security, including the Federal

Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency. Additionally,

the proposal to establish the DHS calls for coordination with nonfederal
Page 6 GAO-02-901T

entities and directs the new Secretary to reach out to state and local

governments and the private sector in order to:

• ensure that adequate and integrated planning, training, and exercises

occur, and that first responders have the equipment they need;

• coordinate and, as appropriate, consolidate the federal government’s

communications systems relating to homeland security with state and

local governments’ systems;

• direct and supervise federal grant programs for state and local emergency

response providers; and

• distribute or, as appropriate, coordinate the distribution of warnings and

information to state and local government personnel, agencies and

authorities, and the public.

Many aspects of the proposed consolidation of homeland security

programs are in line with previous recommendations and show promise

towards reducing fragmentation and improving coordination. For

example, the new department would consolidate federal programs for

state and local planning and preparedness from several agencies and place

them under a single organizational umbrella. Based on its prior work, GAO

believes that the consolidation of some homeland security functions

makes sense and will, if properly organized and implemented, over time

lead to more efficient, effective and coordinated programs, better

intelligence sharing, and a more robust protection of our people, and

borders and critical infrastructure.

However, as the Comptroller General has recently testified,6

implementation of the new department will be an extremely complex task,

and in the short term, the magnitude of the challenges that the new

department faces will clearly require substantial time and effort, and will

take additional resources to make it effective. Further, some aspects of the

new department, as proposed, may result in yet other concerns. As we

reported on June 25, 2002,7

 the new department would include public

health assistance programs that have both basic public health and

 6

U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has

Merit, but Implementation Will Be Pivotal to Success, GAO-02-886T (Washington, D.C.:

June 25, 2002).

7

U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve

Coordination but May Complicate Public Health Priority Setting, GAO-02-883T

(Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002).
Page 7 GAO-02-901T

homeland security functions. These dual-purpose programs have

important synergies that should be maintained and could be disrupted, as

the President’s proposal was not sufficiently clear on how both the

homeland security and public health objectives would be accomplished.

In addition, the recent proposal for establishing DHS should not be

considered a substitute for, nor should it supplant, the timely issuance of a

national homeland security strategy. At this time, a national homeland

security strategy does not exist. Once developed, the national strategy

should define and guide the roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and

local entities, identify national performance goals and measures, and

outline the selection and use of appropriate tools as the nation’s response

to the threat of terrorism unfolds.

The new department will be a key player in the daunting challenge of

defining the roles of the various actors within the intergovernmental

system responsible for homeland security. In areas ranging from fire

protection to drinking water to port security, the new threats are

prompting a reassessment and shift of longstanding roles and

responsibilities. However, proposed shifts in roles and responsibilities are

being considered on a piecemeal and ad hoc basis without benefit of an

overarching framework and criteria to guide this process. A national

strategy could provide such guidance by more systematically identifying

the unique capacities and resources of each level of government and

matching them to the job at hand.

The proposed legislation provides for the new department to reach out to

state and local governments and the private sector to coordinate and

integrate planning, communications, information, and recovery efforts

addressing homeland security. This is important recognition of the critical

role played by nonfederal entities in protecting the nation from terrorist

attacks. State and local governments play primary roles in performing

functions that will be essential to effectively addressing our new

challenges. Much attention has already been paid to their role as first

responders in all disasters, whether caused by terrorist attacks or natural

hazards. State and local governments also have roles to play in protecting

critical infrastructure and providing public health and law enforcement

response capability.

Achieving national preparedness and response goals hinge on the federal

government’s ability to form effective partnerships with nonfederal

entities. Therefore, federal initiatives should be conceived as national, not

Challenges Remain in

Defining Appropriate

Intergovernmental

Roles
Page 8 GAO-02-901T

federal in nature. Decisionmakers have to balance the national interest of

prevention and preparedness with the unique needs and interests of local

communities. A “one-size-fits-all” federal approach will not serve to

leverage the assets and capabilities that reside within state and local

governments and the private sector. By working collectively with state and

local governments, the federal government gains the resources and

expertise of the people closest to the challenge. For example, protecting

infrastructure such as water and transit systems lays first and most often

with nonfederal levels of government.

Just as partnerships offer opportunities, they also pose risks based upon

the different interests reflected by each partner. From the federal

perspective, there is the concern that state and local governments may not

share the same priorities for use of federal funds. This divergence of

priorities can result in state and local governments simply replacing

(“supplanting”) their own previous levels of commitment in these areas

with the new federal resources. From the state and local perspective,

engagement in federal programs opens them up to potential federal

preemption and mandates. From the public’s perspective, partnerships if

not clearly defined, risk blurring responsibility for the outcome of public

programs.

Our fieldwork at federal agencies and at local governments suggests a shift

is potentially underway in the definition of roles and responsibilities

between federal, state and local governments with far reaching

consequences for homeland security and accountability to the public. The

challenges posed by the new threats are prompting officials at all levels of

government to rethink long standing divisions of responsibilities for such

areas as fire services, local infrastructure protection and airport security.

The proposals on the table recognize that the unique scale and complexity

of these threats call for a response that taps the resources and capacities

of all levels of government as well as the private sector.

In many areas, the proposals would impose a stronger federal presence in

the form of new national standards or assistance. For instance, the

Congress is debating proposals to mandate new vulnerability assessments

and protective measures on local communities for drinking water

facilities. Similarly, new federal rules have mandated local airport

authorities to provide new levels of protection for security around airport

perimeters. The block grant proposal for first responders would mark a

dramatic upturn in the magnitude and role of the federal government in

providing assistance and standards for fire service training and equipment.
Page 9 GAO-02-901T

Although promising greater levels of protection than before, these shifts in

roles and responsibilities have been developed on an ad hoc piecemeal

basis without the benefit of common criteria. An ad hoc process may not

capture the real potential each actor in our system offers. Moreover, a

piecemeal redefinition of roles risks the further fragmentation of the

responsibility for homeland security within local communities, blurring

lines of responsibility and accountability for results. While federal, state,

and local governments all have roles to play, care must be taken to clarify

who is responsible for what so that the public knows whom to contact to

address their problems and concerns. The development of a national

strategy provides a window of opportunity to more systematically identify

the unique resources and capacities of each level of government and better

match these capabilities to the particular tasks at hand. If developed in a

partnerial fashion, such a strategy can also promote the participation,

input and buy in of state and local partners whose cooperation is essential

for success.

Governments at the local level are also moving to rethink roles and

responsibilities to address the unique scale and scope of the contemporary

threats from terrorism. Numerous local general-purpose governments and

special districts co-exist within metropolitan regions and rural areas alike.

Many regions are starting to assess how to restructure relationships

among contiguous local entities to take advantage of economies of scale,

promote resource sharing, and improve coordination of preparedness and

response on a regional basis.

For example, mutual aid agreements provide a structure for assistance and

for sharing resources among jurisdictions in preparing for and responding

to emergencies and disasters. Because individual jurisdictions may not

have all the resources they need to acquire equipment and respond to all

types of emergencies and disasters, these agreements allow for resources

to be regionally distributed and quickly deployed. The terms of mutual aid

agreements vary for different services and different localities. These

agreements provide opportunities for state and local governments to share

services, personnel, supplies, and equipment. We have found in our

fieldwork that mutual aid agreements can be both formal and informal and

provide for cooperative planning, training, and exercises in preparation for

emergencies and disasters. Additionally, some of these agreements involve

private companies and local military bases, as well as local entities.
Page 10 GAO-02-901T

The proposed Department, in fulfilling its broad mandate, has the

challenge of developing a performance focus. The nation does not have a

baseline set of performance goals and measures upon which to assess and

improve preparedness. The capability of state and local governments to

respond to catastrophic terrorist attacks remains uncertain. The

president’s fiscal year 2003 budget proposal acknowledged that our

capabilities for responding to a terrorist attack vary widely across the

country. The proposal also noted that even the best prepared states and

localities do not possess adequate resources to respond to the full range of

terrorist threats we face. Given the need for a highly integrated approach

to the homeland security challenge, performance measures may best be

developed in a collaborative way involving all levels of government and

the private sector.

Proposed measures have been developed for state and local emergency

management programs by a consortium of emergency managers from all

levels of government and have been pilot tested in North Carolina and

North Dakota. Testing at the local level is planned for fiscal year 2002

through the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP).

EMAP is administered by the National Emergency Management

Association—an association of directors of state emergency management

departments—and funded by FEMA. Its purpose is to establish minimum

acceptable performance criteria, by which emergency managers can

assess and enhance current programs to mitigate, prepare for, respond to,

and recover from disasters and emergencies. For example, one such

standard is the requirement (1) that the program must develop the

capability to direct, control, and coordinate response and recovery

operations, (2) that an incident management system must be utilized, and

(3) that organizational roles and responsibilities shall be identified in the

emergency operational plans. In recent meetings, FEMA officials have said

that EMAP is a step in the right direction towards establishing much

needed national standards for preparedness. FEMA officials have

suggested they plan on using EMAP as a building block for a set of much

more stringent, quantifiable standards.

Standards are being developed in other areas associated with homeland

security. For example, the Coast Guard is developing performance

standards as part of its port security assessment process. The Coast Guard

is planning to assess the security condition of 55 U.S. ports over a 3-year

period, and will evaluate the security of these ports against a series of

performance criteria dealing with different aspects of port security.

According to the Coast Guard’s Acting Director of Port Security, it also

Performance Goals

and Measures Needed

in Homeland Security

Programs
Page 11 GAO-02-901T

plans to have port authority or terminal operators develop security plans

based on these performance standards.

Communications is an example of an area for which standards have not

yet been developed, but various emergency managers and other first

responders have continuously highlighted that standards are needed. State

and local governments often report there are deficiencies in their

communications capabilities, including the lack of interoperable systems.

Additionally, FEMA’s Director has stressed the importance of improving

communications nationwide.

The establishment of national measures for preparedness will not only go

a long way towards assisting state and local entities determine successes

and areas where improvement is needed, but could also be used as goals

and performance measures as a basis for assessing the effectiveness of

federal programs. At the federal level, measuring results for federal

programs has been a longstanding objective of the Congress. The Congress

enacted the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (commonly

referred to as the Results Act). The legislation was designed to have

agencies focus on the performance and results of their programs rather

than on program resources and activities, as they had done in the past.

Thus, the Results Act became the primary legislative framework through

which agencies are required to set strategic and annual goals, measure

performance, and report on the degree to which goals are met. The

outcome-oriented principles of the Results Act include (1) establishing

general goals and quantifiable, measurable, outcome-oriented

performance goals and related measures; (2) developing strategies for

achieving the goals, including strategies for overcoming or mitigating

major impediments; (3) ensuring that goals at lower organizational levels

align with and support general goals; and (4) identifying the resources that

will be required to achieve the goals.

However, FEMA has had difficulty in assessing program performance. As

the president’s fiscal year 2003 budget request acknowledges, FEMA

generally performs well in delivering resources to stricken communities

and disaster victims quickly. The agency performs less well in its oversight

role of ensuring the effective use of such assistance. Further, the agency

has not been effective in linking resources to performance information.

FEMA’s Office of Inspector General has found that FEMA did not have an

ability to measure state disaster risks and performance capability, and it

concluded that the agency needed to determine how to measure state and

local preparedness programs.
Page 12 GAO-02-901T

In the area of bioterrorism, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

(CDC) within the Department of Health and Human Services is requiring

state and local entities to meet certain performance criteria in order to

qualify for grant funding. The CDC has made available 20 percent of the

fiscal year 2002 funds for the cooperative agreement program to upgrade

state and local public health jurisdictions’ preparedness for and response

to bioterrorism and other public health threats and emergencies. However,

the remaining 80% of the available funds is contingent on receipt, review,

and approval of a work plan that must contain 14 specific critical

benchmarks. These include the preparation of a timeline for assessment of

emergency preparedness and response capabilities related to bioterrorism,

the development of a state-wide plan for responding to incidents of

bioterrorism, and the development of a system to receive and evaluate

urgent disease reports from all parts their state and local public health

jurisdictions on a 24-hour per day, 7-day per week basis.

Performance goals and measures should be used to guide the nation’s

homeland security efforts. For the nation’s homeland security programs,

however, outcomes of where the nation should be in terms of domestic

preparedness have yet to be defined. The national homeland security

strategy, when developed, should contain such goals and measures and

provide a framework for assessing program results. Given the recent and

proposed increases in homeland security funding as well as the need for

real and meaningful improvements in preparedness, establishing clears

goals and performance measures is critical to ensuring both a successful

and fiscally responsible effort.

The choice and design of the policy tools the federal government uses to

engage and involve other levels of government and the private sector in

enhancing homeland security will have important consequences for

performance and accountability. Governments have a variety of policy

tools including grants, regulations, tax incentives, and information-sharing

mechanisms to motivate or mandate other levels of government or the

private sector to address security concerns. The choice of policy tools will

affect sustainability of efforts, accountability and flexibility, and targeting

of resources. The design of federal policy will play a vital role in

determining success and ensuring that scarce federal dollars are used to

achieve critical national goals.

The federal government often uses grants to state and local governments

as a means of delivering federal assistance. Categorical grants typically

permit funds to be used only for specific, narrowly defined purposes.

Appropriate Tools

Need to Be Selected

For Providing

Assistance

Grants
Page 13 GAO-02-901T

Block grants typically can be used by state and local governments to

support a range of activities aimed at achieving a broad, national purpose

and to provide a great deal of discretion to state and local officials. In

designing grants, it is important to (1) target the funds to state and

localities with the greatest need based on highest risk and lowest capacity

to meet these needs from their own resource base, (2) discourage the

replacement of state and local funds with federal funds, commonly

referred to as supplantation, with a maintenance-of-effort requirement that

recipients maintain their level of previous funding, and (3) strike a balance

between accountability and flexibility. At their best, grants can stimulate

state and local governments to enhance their preparedness to address the

unique threats posed by terrorism. Ideally, grants should stimulate higher

levels of preparedness and avoid simply subsidizing local functions that

are traditionally state or local responsibilities. One approach used in other

areas is the “seed money” model in which federal grants stimulate initial

state and local activity with the intent of transferring responsibility for

sustaining support over time to state and local governments.

Recent funding proposals, such as the $3.5 billion block grant for first

responders contained in the president’s fiscal year 2003 budget, have

included some of these provisions. This grant would be used by state and

local government’s to purchase equipment, train personnel, exercise, and

develop or enhance response plans. FEMA officials have told us that it is

still in the early stages of grant design and is in the process of holding

various meetings and conferences to gain input from a wide range of

stakeholders including state and local emergency management directors,

local law enforcement responders, fire responders, health officials, and

FEMA staff. Once the details of the grant have been finalized, it will be

useful to examine the design to assess how well the grant will target funds,

discourage supplantation, provide the appropriate balance between

accountability and flexibility, and whether it provides temporary “seed

money” or represents a long-term funding commitment.

Other federal policy tools can also be designed and targeted to elicit a

prompt, adequate, and sustainable response. In the area of regulatory

authority, the Federal, state, and local governments share authority for

setting standards through regulations in several areas, including

infrastructure and programs vital to preparedness (for example,

transportation systems, water systems, public health). In designing

regulations, key considerations include how to provide federal

protections, guarantees, or benefits while preserving an appropriate

balance between federal and state and local authorities and between the

public and private sectors. An example of infrastructure regulations

Regulations
Page 14 GAO-02-901T

include the new federal mandate requiring that local drinking water

systems in cities above a certain size provide a vulnerability assessment

and a plan to remedy vulnerabilities as part of ongoing EPA reviews while

the new Transportation Security Act is representative of a national

preparedness regulation as it grants the Department of Transportation

authority to order deployment of local law enforcement personnel in order

to provide perimeter access security at the nation’s airports.

In designing a regulatory approach, the challenges include determining

who will set the standards and who will implement or enforce them. There

are several models of shared regulatory authority offer a range of

approaches that could be used in designing standards for preparedness.

Examples of these models range from preemption though fixed federal

standards to state and local adoption of voluntary standards formulated by

quasi-official or nongovernmental entities.8

As the Administration noted protecting America’s infrastructure is a

shared responsibility of federal, state, and local government, in active

partnership with the private sector, which owns approximately 85 percent

of our nation’s critical infrastructure. To the extent that private entities

will be called upon to improve security over dangerous materials or to

protect critical infrastructure, the federal government can use tax

incentives to encourage or enforce their activities. Tax incentives are the

result of special exclusions, exemptions, deductions, credits, deferrals, or

tax rates in the federal tax laws. Unlike grants, tax incentives do not

generally permit the same degree of federal oversight and targeting, and

they are generally available by formula to all potential beneficiaries who

satisfy congressionally established criteria.

Since the events of September 11th, a task force of mayors and police

chiefs has called for a new protocol governing how local law enforcement

agencies can assist federal agencies, particularly the FBI, given the

information needed to do so. As the U.S. Conference of Mayors noted, a

close working partnership of local and federal law enforcement agencies,

which includes the sharing of intelligence, will expand and strengthen the

nation’s overall ability to prevent and respond to domestic terrorism. The

USA Patriot Act provides for greater sharing of intelligence among federal

 8

For more information on these models, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Regulatory

Programs: Balancing Federal and State Responsibilities for Standard Setting and

Implementation, GAO-02-495 (Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2002).

Tax Incentives

Information Sharing
Page 15 GAO-02-901T

agencies. An expansion of this act has been proposed (S1615; H.R. 3285)

that would provide for information sharing among federal, state and local

law enforcement agencies. In addition, the Intergovernmental Law

Enforcement Information Sharing Act of 2001 (H.R. 3483), which you

sponsored Mr. Chairman, addresses a number of information sharing

needs. For instance, the proposed legislation provides that the Attorney

General expeditiously grant security clearances to Governors who apply

for them and to state and local officials who participate in federal counterterrorism working groups or regional task forces.

The proposal to establish a new Department of Homeland Security

represents an important recognition by the Administration and the

Congress that much still needs to be done to improve and enhance the

security of the American people. The DHS will clearly have a central role

in the success of efforts to strengthen homeland security, but it is a role

that will be made stronger within the context of a larger, more

comprehensive and integrated national homeland security strategy.

Moreover, given the unpredictable characteristics of terrorist threats, it is

essential that the strategy be formulated at a national rather than federal

level with specific attention given to the important and distinct roles of

state and local governments. Accordingly, decisionmakers will have to

balance the federal approach to promoting homeland security with the

unique needs, capabilities, and interests of state and local governments.

Such an approach offers the best promise for sustaining the level of

commitment needed to address the serious threats posed by terrorism.

This completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to

any questions you or other members of the Subcommittee may have.

For further information about this testimony, please contact me at (202)

512-2834 or Paul Posner at (202) 512-9573. Other key contributors to this

testimony include Matthew Ebert, Thomas James, Kristen Massey, David

Laverny-Rafter, Yvonne Pufahl, Jack Schulze, and Amelia Shachoy.

Conclusion

Contacts and

Acknowledgments
Page 16 GAO-02-901T

Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has Merit, But

Implementation Will Be Pivotal to Success. GAO-02-886T. Washington,

D.C.: June 25, 2002.

Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but

Uncertainty Remains. GAO-02-610. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002.

National Preparedness: Integrating New and Existing Technology and

Information Sharing into an Effective Homeland Security Strategy.

GAO-02-811T. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002.

Homeland Security: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private

Sector Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland

Security GAO-02-621T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a National

Preparedness Strategy. GAO-02-549T. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2002.

Homeland Security: Progress Made, More Direction and Partnership

Sought. GAO-02-490T. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2002.

Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short- and

Long-Term National Needs. GAO-02-160T. Washington, D.C.: November 7,

2001.

Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide

Preparedness Efforts. GAO-02-208T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001.

Homeland Security: Need to Consider VA’s Role in Strengthening Federal

Preparedness. GAO-02-145T. Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2001.

Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach.

GAO-02-150T. Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001.

Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Issues.

GAO-01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the

Development of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local

Preparedness. GAO-02-550T. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2002.

Related GAO Products

Homeland Security

Combating Terrorism
Page 17 GAO-02-901T

Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a National

Preparedness Strategy. GAO-02-549T. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to

Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-548T. Washington, D.C.:

March 25, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a National

Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-547T.

Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance

State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-473T. Washington, D.C.:

March 1, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in

Chemical and Biological Preparedness. GAO-01-162T. Washington, D.C.:

October 17, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related

Recommendations. GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Antiterrorism

Program Implementation and Management. GAO-01-909. Washington,

D.C.: September 19, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Comments on H.R. 525 to Create a President’s

Council on Domestic Preparedness. GAO-01-555T. Washington, D.C.:

May 9, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal

Response. GAO-01-660T. Washington, D.C.: April 24, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and

National Strategy. GAO-01-556T. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: FEMA Continues to Make Progress in

Coordinating Preparedness and Response. GAO-01-15. Washington, D.C.:

March 20, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied

Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination.

GAO-01-14. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2000.
Page 18 GAO-02-901T

Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of

Mass Destruction Training. GAO/NSIAD-00-64. Washington, D.C.: March

21, 2000.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and

Biological Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-50. Washington, D.C.: October 20,

1999.

Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk

Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attack. GAO/NSIAD-99-163.

Washington, D.C.: September 7, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs.

GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181. Washington, D.C.: June 9, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response

Equipment and Sustainment Costs. GAO-NSIAD-99-151. Washington,

D.C.: June 9, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is

Unclear. GAO/NSIAD-99-110. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat

Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness

Program Focus and Efficiency. GAO-NSIAD-99-3. Washington, D.C.:

November 12, 1998.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici

Domestic Preparedness Program. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16. Washington, D.C.:

October 2, 1998.

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize

and Target Program Investments. GAO/NSIAD-98-74. Washington, D.C.:

April 9, 1998.

Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs

Requires Better Management and Coordination. GAO/NSIAD-98-39.

Washington, D.C.: December 1, 1997.
Page 19 GAO-02-901T

Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but

may Complicate Public Health Priority Setting. GAO-02-883T.

Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002.

Bioterrorism: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Role in

Public Health Protection. GAO-02-235T. Washington, D.C.: November 15,

2001.

Bioterrorism: Review of Public Health and Medical Preparedness.

GAO-02-149T. Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2001.

Bioterrorism: Public Health and Medical Preparedness. GAO-02-141T.

Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2001.

Bioterrorism: Coordination and Preparedness. GAO-02-129T.

Washington, D.C.: October 5, 2001.

Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness Activities.

GAO-01-915. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2001.

Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk Assessments and

Inventory Management Are Needed. GAO-01-667. Washington, D.C.:

September 28, 2001.

West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for Public Health Preparedness.

GAO/HEHS-00-180. Washington, D.C.: September 11, 2000.

Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and

Biological Attacks. GAO/NSIAD-99-163. Washington, D.C.: September 7,

1999.

Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation

Should Follow Results Act Framework. GAO/NSIAD-99-159. Washington,

D.C.: August 16, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public

Health Initiatives. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112. Washington, D.C.: March 16,

1999.

Disaster Assistance: Improvement Needed in Disaster Declaration

Criteria and Eligibility Assurance Procedures. GAO-01-837.

Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2001.

Public Health

Disaster Assistance
Page 20 GAO-02-901T

FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing States for

Emergencies. GAO-01-850. Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2001.

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Status of Achieving Key

Outcomes and Addressing Major Management Challenges. GAO-01-832.

Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2001.

Managing for Results: Progress in Linking Performance Plans with

Budget and Financial Statements. GAO-02-236. Washington, D.C.:

January 4, 2002.

Results-Oriented Budget Practices in Federal Agencies. GAO-01-1084SP.

Washington, D.C.: August 2001.

Managing for Results: Federal Managers’ Views on Key Management

Issues Vary Widely across Agencies. GAO-01-0592. Washington, D.C.: May

2001.

Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High

Risks. GAO-01-159SP. Washington, D.C.: November 2000.

Managing for Results: Using the Results Act to Address Mission

Fragmentation and Program Overlap. GAO/AIMD-97-156. Washington,

D.C.: August 29, 1997.

Government Restructuring: Identifying Potential Duplication in Federal

Missions and Approaches. GAO/T—AIMD-95-161. Washington, D.C.:

June 7, 1995.

Grant Programs: Design Features Shape Flexibility, Accountability, and

Performance Information. GAO/GGD-98-137. Washington, D.C.:

June 22, 1998.

Federal Grants: Design Improvements Could Help Federal Resources Go

Further. GAO/AIMD-97-7. Washington, D.C.: December 18, 1996.

Block Grants: Issues in Designing Accountability Provisions.

GAO/AIMD-95-226. Washington, D.C.: September 1, 1995.

Budget and Management

Grant Design

(544049)