IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 16-0411

Filed May 11, 2016

IN THE INTEREST OF J.R., O.R., P.R., AND S.R.,

Minor children,

M.S., Mother,

Appellant,

J.R., Father,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Susan Cox, District 

Associate Judge.

A mother and a father appeal separately from the order terminating their 

parental rights. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

Karen A. Taylor of Taylor Law Offices, Des Moines, for appellant mother.

Steven L. Cooper of Cooper, Goedicke, Reimer & Reese Law Firm, P.C., 

West Des Moines, for appellant father.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathryn K. Lang, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Paul L. White of the Juvenile Public Defender’s Office, Des Moines, 

attorney and guardian ad litem for minor children.

Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and Bower, JJ.
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DOYLE, Judge.

M.S., the mother, and J.R., the father, separately appeal the termination of 

their parental rights to their children J.R., O.R., P.R., and S.R. The mother

claims that the State failed to prove the statutory grounds for termination and that 

she should be granted additional time to work toward reunification. The father 

claims the juvenile court erred in not granting his motion to continue the 

termination proceedings. Both claim termination is not in the children’s best 

interests. We affirm the juvenile court’s order.

We review termination-of-parental-rights proceedings de novo. See In re 

A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014). The three-step statutory framework 

governing the termination of parental rights is well established and is not 

repeated here. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40-41 (Iowa 2010). The juvenile 

court issued a lengthy, fact-intensive, thorough, and well-reasoned ruling 

terminating the mother’s and the father’s parental rights. After carefully reviewing 

the record and the briefs of the parties, we adopt the findings and conclusions set 

forth in the juvenile court’s order as our own.

The juvenile court terminated the parents’ parental rights upon the 

grounds set forth in Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) and (h) (2015). Paragraphs 

(f) and (h) of section 232.116(1) are essentially the same but for the applicable 

age of the child and the amount of time the child has been out of the home. 

Compare Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f) (“The child is four years of age or older” and 

“has been removed . . . for at least twelve of the last eighteen months”), with id. 

§ 232.116(1)(h) (“The child is three years of age or younger” and “has been 

removed . . . for at least six months of the last twelve months”). Both paragraphs 
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require the State to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the child cannot be 

returned to the custody of the child’s parents at the present time. See id. 

§ 232.116(1)(f)(4), (h)(4). It is this element of each ground that the parents

challenge. Upon our de novo review, we find the State met its burden.

As to the two older children, the mother asserts on appeal that the State 

failed to prove the children could not be returned her custody “within a relatively 

short period of time.” As to the two younger children, the mother asserts on 

appeal that the State failed to prove the children could not be returned to her

custody “at the present time or within a relatively short period of time.” At the 

hearing the mother testified she was residing at the Fresh Start Women’s Facility 

in Mitchellville and was at least two weeks away from being released from the 

facility. Asked if she was asking the judge to return her children “today,” the 

mother responded, “No.” She agreed the children could not be returned to her at 

the time of the hearing. She requested an extension of six months.

About a week prior to the termination-of-parental-rights hearing, the father 

filed a motion to enlarge or amend permanency findings and continue the 

hearing. Anticipating his release from custody and parole, the father requested 

an additional six months for reunification. The motion was denied. At the time of 

the termination-of-parental-rights hearing, the father was incarcerated at the 

Newton Correctional Facility. He agreed the children could not be returned to 

him at the time of the hearing. He opined he would be in a position to safely 

parent the child two weeks after his release from prison. On appeal, he asserts 

“there is a reasonable likelihood that the children could be returned to [his] care 

within the next six months.”
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With regard to the mother, the juvenile court found:

[The mother] acknowledges that the children cannot be 

returned to her today. She is living at the Women’s Correctional 

Facility. In order to be discharged, [the mother] must reach level

Four. [The mother] plans to be discharged in the next few weeks.

The court is not as optimistic . . . . [The mother] has had four major 

infractions in two months. [The mother]’s problems at the facility 

have directly impacted her children. Late January 2016, during a 

visit with the children, [the mother] became upset about the facility 

rules and began swearing about her probation officer. The court 

hopes [the mother] has engaged in meaningful reflection, 

necessary for long term change.

[The mother] currently has two supervised visits with the 

children per week for two hours. [A service provider] supervises 

one visit, and [the mother’s sister] supervises the other weekly visit. 

During supervised visits, [the mother] does a good job taking care 

of the kids and “they appear to enjoy their time with their mom.” 

Recently, [the mother] has been late for visits. [The mother]’s

parental ability during a supervised visit, while living under the

Department of Corrections supervision, does not equate with 

minimally adequate parenting. [The mother] still has significant 

unresolved issues, the same issues as when the children were

removed.

. . . .

In justifying her request for a six-month extension, [the 

mother] discusses the random UA’s at House of Mercy—“all of 

which have been clean.” This claim directly contradicts [an exhibit]. 

[The mother] has not provided any random UA’s for the House of 

Mercy.

(Citation omitted.) Finally, in finding the children could not be returned to the 

mother’s custody at the time of the termination hearing, the juvenile court 

concluded:

[The mother] is at the Women’s Residential Facility. 

Currently, [the mother] has not fully participated in services. She 

has missed mental health therapy appointments, House of Mercy 

substance abuse appointments, and House of Mercy UA testing.

Also, [the mother] has been deceitful to law enforcement, [the Iowa 

Department of Human Services (DHS)], and the court.

Having reviewed the record de novo, we agree the children could not be returned 

to the mother at the time of the termination hearing. The State proved by clear 
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and convincing evidence the grounds for termination under section 232.116(1)(f) 

and (h).

With regard to the father, the juvenile court found:

Most of the last year, [the father] spent away from his 

children in prison, jail, halfway houses, or homeless shelters. [The 

father] was given repeated probation opportunities but continued to 

violate probation conditions. One probation violation report stated 

“(i)t is evident [the father] has little regard for his probation rules 

and has been unsuccessful at community supervision despite all 

interventions.” After repeatedly violating his probation, [the father]

was given the “option of Bridges treatment facility but turned it

down because his prison sentence was shorter.” [The father] has 

not seen the children in more than six months.

. . . .

“[The father] has reported being diagnosed with depression 

and anger since the age of 19.” [The father] stated that he did 

“better with medication [that] helps anger and anxiety and 

depression.” DHS reports that [the father] has also been diagnosed 

as bipolar and has a family history of this disease. [The father] told 

DHS he has a “history of struggling with anger management and 

mood swings.” [The father] testified that he now realizes his history 

of anger management and mood swings were caused by drugs.

This claim is not supported by the exhibits.

[The father] has admitted to a lengthy drug history. He 

started using when he was 15-16 years old and is now 24 years 

old. [The father]’s drug of choice is opiates. In the visits before he 

was incarcerated, [the father] was highly under the influence. “He 

did not help with the children unless prompted by [the mother] and 

the worker.” [The father] has participated in treatment in prison—

yet testified “right now, I know that I am not an addict.” [The father]

does not believe that he needs treatment when released from 

prison.

(Citations omitted.) Finally, in finding the children could not be returned to the 

father’s custody at the time of the termination hearing, the juvenile court 

concluded:

[The father] is at Newton Prison and has been away from the 

children for almost one year because of his ongoing criminal 

choices. Currently, [the father] has not addressed his domestic 

violence needs. He does not believe that he is an addict or needs 

any additional treatment, despite an admitted lengthy drug history.
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Having reviewed the record de novo, we agree the children could not be returned 

to the father at the time of the termination hearing. The State proved by clear 

and convincing evidence the grounds for termination under section 232.116(1) (f) 

and (h).

Additionally, although the parents maintain termination of their parental 

rights is not in the children’s best interests, the record clearly demonstrates 

otherwise. The parents have been given more than ample time to address their 

issues and demonstrate they could provide a safe, stable, drug-free home for the 

children. They have not been able to do so. In concluding termination was in the 

children’s best interests and that terminating the parents’ parental rights would be 

less detrimental to the children than the harm caused by continuing the parentchild relationship, the juvenile court stated:

Since October 2014, these four wonderful children have 

waited patiently for [the parents] to focus on them, instead of drugs, 

alcohol, criminality, and dishonesty.

Their mother has repeatedly abused alcohol—OWI 

conviction and violation of electronic monitoring rules—yet fails to 

understand that she has an addiction. Currently, she is not fully 

participating in substance abuse treatment, testing, or mental 

health treatment.

Their father was provided numerous services in the 

community—including the Salvation Army—yet was unable and/or 

unwilling to make the necessary changes. He has now not seen 

his children for almost one year. The father turned down a chance

to go to Bridges treatment facility because he wanted to do less 

time in prison. Despite his significant drug history, [the father]

testified “I know that I am not an addict” and does not believe [he]

needs additional treatment when released from prison.

A relative does have custody of the children, but the court 

continues to find that termination is in the children’s best interests.

They deserve permanency and not to continue waiting for their 

parents.

The court does note a close bond between the mother and 

the children. The court still finds that termination is in the children’s 

best interests. The children have not lived with their mother for 
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approximately one year and see her for two supervised visits per 

week.

We agree termination of the parents’ parental rights to these children is in the 

children’s best interests. And, in making this determination, we “give primary 

consideration to the child[ren]’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the 

long term nurturing and growth of the child[ren], and to the physical, mental, and 

emotional condition and needs of the child[ren].” Iowa Code § 232.116(2).

Finally, for the above reasons, we find an extension of time for the parents

to work toward reunification is not warranted. “It is well-settled law that we 

cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a ground for 

termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be 

a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” P.L., 778 N.W.2d at

41; see also In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 778 (Iowa 2012) (noting the parent’s 

past conduct is instructive in determining the parent’s future behavior). Children 

are not equipped with pause buttons. “The crucial days of childhood cannot be 

suspended while parents experiment with ways to face up to their own 

problems.” In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1987). At some point, as is 

the case here, the rights and needs of the children rise above the rights and 

needs of the parent. See In re C.S., 776 N.W.2d 297, 300 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009). 

While the law requires a “full measure of patience with troubled parents who 

attempt to remedy a lack of parenting skills,” this patience has been built into the 

statutory scheme of chapter 232. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 494 (Iowa 2000).

Our supreme court has stated that “the legislature, in cases meeting the 

conditions of [the Iowa Code], has made a categorical determination that the 
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needs of a child are promoted by termination of parental rights.” In re M.W., 458 

N.W.2d 847, 850 (Iowa 1990). The public policy of the state having been 

legislatively set, we are obligated to heed the statutory time periods for 

reunification. We agree any additional time in limbo would not be in the 

children’s best interests.

The children were adjudicated in need of assistance in December 2014, 

and the statutory time frames for reunification have passed. These children are 

in need of permanency, and they should not have to wait any longer in limbo 

while the parents attempt to resolve the issues that led to the adjudication. We 

conclude a grant of additional time for the parents to work toward reunification is 

not justified under these circumstances. For these reasons, we affirm the order 

terminating the mother’s and the father’s parental rights.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.