SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA 

En Banc 

 

STATE OF ARIZONA ) Arizona Supreme Court 

ex rel. RICHARD M. ROMLEY, ) No. CV-04-0321-SA 

Maricopa County Attorney, ) 

) 

Petitioner, ) Court of Appeals 

) Division One 

v. ) No. 1 CA-SA 04-0199 

) 

HON. BRIAN R. HAUSER, JUDGE OF ) Maricopa County 

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE ) Superior Court 

OF ARIZONA, in and for the ) No. CR2004-012682-001DT 

County of Maricopa, ) 

) 

 Respondent, ) O P I N I O N 

 and ) 

) 

MARK D. DANCY, aka SHAWN WOODS, ) 

) 

 Real Party in Interest. ) 

________________________________ ) 

Special Action from the Superior Court of Maricopa County 

The Honorable Brian R. Hauser, Judge 

No. CR2004-012682-001DT 

JURISDICTION ACCEPTED, RELIEF GRANTED 

RICHARD M. ROMLEY, FORMER MARICOPA COUNTY ATTORNEY Phoenix 

ANDREW P. THOMAS, MARICOPA COUNTY ATTORNEY 

 By: Gerald R. Grant, Deputy County Attorney 

Attorneys for Petitioner 

JAMES J. HAAS, MARICOPA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER Phoenix 

 By: Edith M. Lucero, Deputy Public Defender 

Attorneys for Real Party in Interest 

Gregory T. Parzych Mesa 

Attorney for Amicus Curiae 

Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice 
H U R W I T Z, Justice 

¶1 Real party in interest Mark Dancy was indicted for 

theft of a means of transportation, a class three felony, in 

violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 13-1814 

(2001). The State amended the indictment to allege prior 

offenses for purposes of sentencing enhancement under A.R.S. § 

13-702.02 (2001). The amendment alleged that Dancy had 

committed theft, a class six felony, on February 24, 1991, for 

which he was convicted on July 22, 1999, and possession of 

marijuana, also a class six felony, on April 28, 1994, for which 

he was convicted on January 21, 1997. 

¶2 Dancy moved to strike these allegations because the 

prior convictions involved offenses committed more than five 

years before the current alleged offense and thus could not be 

used for sentence enhancement under A.R.S. § 13-604(V)(2)(c) 

(Supp. 2004). The State argued in response that the time limits 

in § 13-604(V)(2)(c) do not apply to sentence enhancement under 

§ 13-702.02. The superior court granted Dancy’s motion and 

stayed the trial pending the resolution of the State’s special 

action petition. The court of appeals declined special action 

jurisdiction and the State filed a special action petition in 

this court. 

¶3 We accepted jurisdiction of the State’s petition 

because the issue is one of statewide importance, is likely to 

 2 
recur, and the State has no adequate remedy by appeal. See

Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 8(a).1

 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

Article 6, Section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 

12-120.24 (2003). 

I. 

¶4 The sole issue before us is whether a prior felony 

conviction that falls outside the definition of a “historical 

prior felony conviction” in A.R.S. § 13-604(V) may nonetheless 

be used for sentence enhancement under § 13-702.02. We review 

decisions involving statutory construction de novo. State v. 

Christian, 205 Ariz. 64, 66 ¶ 6, 66 P.3d 1241, 1243 (2003). In 

such cases “we begin with the text of the statute. This is so 

because the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning 

is the plain text of the statute.” Id. 

II. 

¶5 Section 13-702.02(A) provides: 

A person who is convicted of two or more felony 

offenses that were not committed on the same occasion 

 

1 Although we exercised our discretion to accept jurisdiction 

of the State’s special action petition, we stress that, in the 

absence of “exceptional circumstances,” the refusal of the court 

of appeals to take jurisdiction of a special action “shall be 

reviewed by the Supreme Court only upon petition for review.” 

Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 8(b). The fact that time is of the 

essence is in itself normally not an exceptional circumstance 

justifying the filing of a new special action petition in this 

court after denial of jurisdiction by the court of appeals. 

Id., Court Cmt. [2000 Amendment]. In such cases, the proper 

procedure is to file a petition for review with a motion seeking 

expedited consideration. Id. 

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but that either are consolidated for trial purposes or 

are not historical prior felony convictions as defined 

in section 13-604 shall be sentenced, for the second 

or subsequent offense, pursuant to this section. 

¶6 Under this subsection, two distinct types of felony 

convictions trigger the sentencing enhancement provisions of §

13-702.02: (1) those that “were not committed on the same 

occasion” but “are consolidated for trial purposes” and (2) 

those that “were not committed on the same occasion” and “are 

not historical prior felony convictions as defined in section 

13-604.” See State v. Thompson, 200 Ariz. 439, 441 ¶ 9, 27 P.3d 

796, 798 (2001). 

¶7 This case does not involve offenses consolidated for 

trial purposes. Therefore, the only question is whether the 

alleged prior felony offenses “are not historical prior felony 

convictions as defined in section 13-604.” 

¶8 Section 13-604 provides enhanced sentences for 

defendants who are convicted of a felony and have a “historical 

prior felony conviction.” As we have previously explained, 

whether a prior felony conviction falls within the definition of 

“historical prior felony conviction” in § 13-604(V) generally 

depends on the seriousness and age of the prior offense. See 

Christian, 205 Ariz. at 66-67 ¶¶ 7-8, 66 P.3d at 1243-44. At 

issue in this case is § 13-604(V)(2)(c), which defines 

“historical prior felony conviction” in relevant part as “[a]ny 

 4 
class 4, 5 or 6 felony . . . that was committed within the five 

years immediately preceding the date of the present offense.” 

¶9 The amended indictment alleges two prior convictions 

for class six felonies; each prior offense was committed more 

than five years preceding the date of the offense alleged in 

this case. Thus, Dancy’s two prior felony convictions “are not 

historical prior felony convictions as defined in section 13-

604.” See Thompson, 200 Ariz. at 441 ¶ 9, 27 P.3d at 798 

(“[W]hen felonies are tried together, any enhancement must be 

pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-702.02. Additionally, any prior offense 

that predates the present offense by more than the period 

prescribed by A.R.S. § 13-604(V)(1)(b) or (c) [now (V)(2)(b) or 

(c)] is covered by A.R.S. § 13-702.02.”). The plain language of 

§ 13-702.02 thus provides that Dancy can be sentenced, if 

convicted of the current theft charge, pursuant to that statute. 

III. 

¶10 “When the plain text of a statute is clear and 

unambiguous there is no need to resort to other methods of 

statutory interpretation to determine the legislature's intent 

because its intent is readily discernable from the face of the 

statute.” Christian, 205 Ariz. at 66 ¶ 6, 66 P.3d at 1243. 

Dancy nonetheless argues that application of the enhancement 

provisions of § 13-702.02 to his case would be contrary to the 

legislature’s intent and would lead to an absurd result. 

 5 
A. 

¶11 Dancy contends that the history of the statutory 

scheme demonstrates that the legislature did not intend § 13-

702.02 to allow sentence enhancement on the basis of offenses 

falling outside the time limitations of § 13-604(V). To the 

contrary, the statutory history is quite consistent with the 

statute’s plain language. 

¶12 Under the version of A.R.S. § 13-604 in effect prior 

to 1993, a defendant convicted of multiple offenses not 

committed on the same occasion but consolidated for trial could 

be sentenced as a repeat offender. See A.R.S. § 13-604(H) 

(1989) (“Convictions for two or more offenses not committed on 

the same occasion but consolidated for trial purposes, may, at 

the discretion of the state, be counted as prior convictions for 

purposes of this section.”). 

¶13 In 1993, the legislature eliminated the “consolidated 

for trial” provision of § 13-604(H) (and redesignated this 

subsection as § 13-604(M)), and thus put an end to sentence 

enhancement under § 13-604 for “prior” convictions occurring at 

the same trial. 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 255, § 7; see 

Thompson, 200 Ariz. at 441 ¶ 8, 27 P.3d at 798 (discussing 

legislative history).2

 But, instead of allowing a defendant to 

 

2 The 1993 amendments made a number of other significant 

changes to the statutory framework. Among other changes, the 

 6 
avoid all sentence enhancement from a “prior” conviction 

obtained at the same trial as the principal offense, the 

legislature created a new statute, A.R.S. § 13-702.02, providing 

for a less punitive range of enhancement when a defendant “is 

convicted of two or more felony offenses not committed on the 

same occasion but consolidated for trial purposes.” 1993 Ariz. 

Sess. Laws, ch. 255, § 12 (codified at A.R.S. § 13-702.02(A) 

(Supp. 1993)); see Thompson, 200 Ariz. at 441 ¶ 9, 7 P.3d at 798 

(discussing legislative history). 

________________________________________ 

legislature enacted revised time limits on the use of prior 

convictions for sentence enhancement under § 13-604. 1993 Ariz. 

Sess. Laws, ch. 255, § 7 (codified at § 13-604(V)); see 

Christian, 205 Ariz. at 68 ¶ 15 n.11, 66 P.3d at 1245. The 

legislature also changed the relevant inquiry with respect to 

the time limits. Before 1993, the relevant measurement was from 

the date of the prior conviction to the date of the present 

offense. See A.R.S. § 13-604(A) (1989) (“[A] person who . . . 

stands convicted of a class 3, 4, or 5 felony . . . and who has 

previously been convicted of any felony within ten years next 

preceding the date of the present offense.”). Since 1993, the 

relevant measurement has been from the date of the prior offense 

to the date of the present offense. See A.R.S. § 13-

604(V)(2)(b) (“Any class 2 or 3 felony . . . that was committed 

within the ten years immediately preceding the date of the 

present offense.”); A.R.S. § 13-604(V)(2)(c) (“Any class 4, 5 or

6 felony . . . that was committed within the five years 

immediately preceding the date of the present offense.”). These 

changes to the measurement calculus were designed to eliminate 

so-called “Hannah priors.” See State v. Hannah, 126 Ariz. 575, 

617 P.2d 527 (1980) (holding that under prior version of statute 

sequence of convictions, rather than offenses, determined 

eligibility for enhancement); State ex rel. Collins v. Superior 

Court, 142 Ariz. 280, 282, 689 P.2d 539, 541 (1984) (relying on 

Hannah for the proposition that “it [was] not necessary that the 

‘prior conviction’ be also a prior offense”). 

 7 
¶14 Dancy argues that the 1993 amendments were intended to 

do away with sentence enhancement based on prior felony 

convictions not meeting the definition of “historical prior 

felony conviction” under what is now § 13-604(V)(2), with the 

sole exception of felony offenses not committed on the same 

occasion but consolidated for trial. That argument accurately 

describes the state of the law in 1993. But the argument does 

not satisfactorily explain the 1996 amendment of § 13-702.02. 

¶15 In 1996, the legislature amended § 13-702.02(A) to 

provide: 

A person who is convicted of two or more felony 

offenses THAT WERE not committed on the same occasion 

but THAT EITHER ARE consolidated for trial purposes OR 

ARE NOT HISTORICAL PRIOR FELONY CONVICTIONS AS DEFINED 

IN SECTION 13-604 . . . shall be sentenced, for the 

second or subsequent offense, pursuant to this 

section. 

1996 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 123, § 2 (additions noted in capital 

letters) (codified at A.R.S. § 13-702.02(A) (Supp. 1996)).3

 

Thus, in 1996, § 13-702.02 enhancement was made available not 

only in cases of felony offenses not committed on the same 

occasion but consolidated for trial, but also in cases in which 

a prior felony conviction fell outside the § 13-604 definition 

of “historical prior felony conviction.” 

 

3 The only subsequent amendment to A.R.S. § 13-702.02(A) 

occurred in 1999, and simply removed a reference to the specific 

subsection of § 13-604 containing the definition of “historical 

prior felony conviction.” 1999 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 261, § 10. 

 8 
¶16 Dancy nonetheless contends that because § 13-702.02 is 

entitled “Multiple offenses not committed on the same occasion,” 

the statute is still meant to apply only when a defendant is 

charged with multiple offenses consolidated for trial. This 

argument is unavailing. “[H]eadings to sections . . . do not 

constitute part of the law.” A.R.S. § 1-212 (2002). Although 

“where an ambiguity exists the title may be used to aid in the 

interpretation of the statute,” State v. Eagle, 196 Ariz. 188, 

190 ¶ 7, 994 P.2d 395, 397 (2000), section 13-702.02 is not 

ambiguous. Moreover, any alleged inconsistency between the 

title and text of A.R.S. § 13-702.02 is easily explained. The 

title completely and accurately described the scope of this 

statute when it was first enacted. The legislature simply 

failed to change the title of this statute when it amended the 

text in 1996. This oversight does not negate the effectiveness 

of the 1996 amendment. Cf. City of Scottsdale v. Mun. Court, 90 

Ariz. 393, 396, 368 P.2d 637, 638 (1962) (refusing to read title 

of statute as creating limitation that text of the statute would 

not support). 

¶17 Second, Dancy argues that the use of a present tense 

verb in § 13-702.02 (“a person who is convicted of two or more 

felony offenses that were not committed on the same occasion”) 

(emphasis added) demonstrates the legislature’s intent to 

restrict the scope of the statute to simultaneous convictions. 

 9 
But this argument renders the clause added in 1996 superfluous, 

because § 13-702.02 already applied to simultaneous convictions 

for offenses not committed on the same occasion. See Bilke v. 

State, 206 Ariz. 462, 464 ¶ 11, 80 P.3d 269, 271 (2003) (“The 

court must give effect to each word of the statute.”). 

¶18 Dancy also relies on the language from the legislative 

fact sheet for Senate Bill 1165, which became the 1996 amendment 

to § 13-702.02. The fact sheet suggests the following “example” 

of the proposed amendment’s scope: 

[I]f a person commits two offenses not on the same 

occasion and is convicted of the second offense before 

being convicted of the first offense, the multiple 

sentencing enhancement could be used by the judge in 

sentencing the defendant for the first offense, for 

which he was convicted later. 

Fact Sheet to S.B. 1165, 42nd Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (1996). 

Dancy argues that the 1996 amendment was intended to reach only 

such situations. 

¶19 The basic problem with this interpretation is that, 

even assuming arguendo that this was the intent of whoever 

drafted the “fact sheet,” the legislature did not in the end 

adopt language that was so limited. Moreover, the fact sheet 

simply posits the quoted language as an “example” of what the 

proposed amendment would cover, not as a complete description of 

its effects. 

 10 
¶20 In any event, as adopted, the 1996 amendment does not 

cover this hypothetical. Section 13-702.02(A) only allows 

enhancement of a sentence “for the second or subsequent offense”

(emphasis added).4

 A “second or subsequent offense” is plainly 

one which occurs after the “prior” offense that provides the 

basis for sentence enhancement. Cf. Thompson, 200 Ariz. at 441 

¶ 6, 27 P.3d at 798 (recognizing that for § 13-604 enhancement 

“the prior offense must precede the present offense”). 

Conviction for the later offense therefore cannot be used under 

§ 13-702.02 to enhance the sentence for the earlier offense, no 

matter when the conviction for the later offense occurs. 

¶21 Thus, Dancy’s proffered interpretation once again 

gives no meaning to the language added to § 13-702.02 by the 

1996 amendment. If the 1996 amendment is to have any meaning, 

it must provide that prior convictions for prior offenses that 

are too old to be “historical prior felony convictions” under § 

13-604 can be used as the basis for an enhanced sentence under § 

13-702.02.

B. 

¶22 Finally, Dancy claims that the State’s interpretation 

of the 1996 amendment leads to an absurd result. See Bilke, 206 

Ariz. at 464 ¶ 11, 80 P.3d at 271 (stating that this Court is 

 

4 This phrase was added by 1994 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 236, § 

4. 

 11 
bound to apply the plain meaning of a statute, “unless 

application of the plain meaning would lead to impossible or 

absurd results”). This argument also fails. 

¶23 The obvious result of the 1996 amendment was to 

require that those with prior felony convictions that did not 

trigger § 13-604 enhancement be treated differently than those 

with no prior felony convictions at all. Section 13-604 

provides for a more punitive range of enhanced penalties for 

those defendants whose prior offenses are most recent, most 

serious, or most numerous. If the prior felony convictions do 

not fit the § 13-604(V)(2) parameters of recency, numerosity or 

seriousness (or, if the “prior” conviction comes at the same 

trial as the principal offense and involves an offense not 

committed on the same occasion), the defendant will be sentenced 

under the comparatively more lenient enhanced sentence ranges 

set forth in § 13-702.02. 

¶24 This result is neither irrational nor absurd. Before 

1993, the legislative scheme treated those in Dancy’s position 

the same as those with more recent prior offenses.5

 The 1993 

 

5 See A.R.S. § 13-604(B) (1989) (providing that when present 

offense is a class two or three felony there is no time limit on 

the use of a prior felony conviction for enhancement). For 

those charged with a class four, five, or six felony, A.R.S. § 

13-604(A) (1989) provided a ten-year limit, running from the 

date of the prior conviction to the date of the present offense, 

on the use of a prior felony conviction for enhancement. 

 12 
amendments to §§ 13-604 and 13-702.02 resulted in a statutory 

scheme under which those in Dancy’s position were treated the 

same as those who had no prior felony convictions.6

 The 

legislature could have reasonably determined in 1996 that a 

middle ground between these two extremes was more desirable and 

that the better policy was to provide for some sentence 

enhancement under § 13-702.02 for those in Dancy’s position 

while making that enhancement less onerous than that applicable 

under § 13-604 for those with more recent or more serious prior 

felony offenses. Such policy judgments are within the 

legislature’s prerogative. 

IV. 

¶25 For the reasons above, we vacate the order of the 

superior court striking the state’s allegations of prior felony 

convictions for purposes of potential sentence enhancement under 

§ 13-702.02 and remand this case to the superior court for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

 

 Andrew D. Hurwitz, Justice 

 

6 See A.R.S. § 13-604(U)(1)(c) (Supp. 1993) (defining as a 

“historical prior felony conviction” a “class 4, 5 or 6 felony 

. . . committed within the five years immediately preceding the 

date of the present offense”); A.R.S. § 13-702.02 (Supp. 1993) 

(providing for enhancement only for persons “convicted of two or 

more felony offenses not committed on the same occasion but 

consolidated for trial purposes”).

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CONCURRING: 

 _

Charles E. Jones, Chief Justice 

 ______

Ruth V. McGregor, Vice Chief Justice 

 _

Rebecca White Berch, Justice 

 _

Michael D. Ryan, Justice 

 14