Issue Date: 12/19/12 1 0308, Att 3, App B

APPENDIX B

TECHNICAL BASIS FOR

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION PROCESS 

1.0 OVERVIEW OF THE EP SIGNFICANCE DETERMINATION PROCESS

The framework of the Emergency Preparedness (EP) Cornerstone is described in SECY-99-

007, dated January 8, 1999, and SECY-99-007a, dated March 22, 1999. The Cornerstone 

Objective and Performance Expectation are the bases for the related inspection program and 

performance indicators:

EP Cornerstone Objective

Ensure that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to 

protect public health and safety in the event of a radiological emergency.

EP Performance Expectation

Demonstrate that reasonable assurance exists that the licensee can effectively 

implement its emergency plan to protect public health and safety adequately in 

the event of a radiological emergency.

To meet the cornerstone objective and performance expectation, the staff of the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) assesses licensee performance in this cornerstone by 

considering performance indicators (PIs) with regard to thresholds and the significance of 

inspection findings. The significance determination process (SDP) provides a method to place 

inspection findings in context for risk-significance in a manner that allows them to be considered 

in conjunction with the results from the PIs to assess overall licensee performance in the 

cornerstone. This information is then used to determine the level of NRC engagement in 

accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) Action Matrix.1

 

The NRC policy statement “Safety Goals for the Operation of Nuclear Power Plants,” (51 FR 

30032) states, “. . . emergency response capabilities are mandated to provide additional 

defense-in-depth protection to the surrounding population.” EP and many other elements of 

reactor safety (e.g., remote siting and containment) are implemented as a matter of prudence 

rather than in response to a quantitative analysis of accident probabilities. Accordingly, the EP 

SDP is risk-informed, rather than risk-based, and does not involve numerical estimates of risk

metrics such as core damage frequency (CDF) or large early release fraction (LERF). The 

planning basis for EP is not predicated on a single accident sequence or even a limited number 

of sequences, but rather on a spectrum of accidents that differ in release characteristics, timing, 

and potential consequences. A low probability sequence may have the higher consequences;

while a higher probability sequence could have lower consequences. Consequently, the 

probability of a reactor accident requiring implementation of the licensee’s emergency plan has 

no relevance in determining the significance of EP findings. Colloquially, if the emergency plan 

is being activated in response to a radiological emergency, the event has occurred (i.e., 

probability = 1.0)

 1 Found in Inspection Manual Chapter 0305, “Operating Reactor Assessment Program”
Issue Date: 12/19/12 2 0308, Att 3, App B

2.0 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS REGULATORY BASIS

An applicant is required by various provisions in 10 CFR Parts 50 and 52, as applicable, to 

submit, as part of its application, plans for coping with emergencies including the items specified 

in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E. A nuclear power reactor applicant is further required by 

10 CFR 50.47(b) to meet the 16 PLANNING STANDARDS (PS)2 established in 10 CFR

50.47(b)(1) through (16). 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(a), no early site permit,3 initial operating license, or initial combined 

operating license, will be issued unless a finding is made by the NRC that there is reasonable 

assurance that protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological 

emergency.

Once an operating license is issued under Part 50 or a combined license under Part 52,4 a 

nuclear power reactor licensee is required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2) to follow and maintain the 

effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the 

supporting requirements in Appendix E. The EP SDP is largely based upon the PS because the 

requirements in Appendix E are generally expansions on the broadly worded standards.5

 These 

regulations, the licensee’s approved emergency plan, along with relevant license conditions, 

Commission orders, and other commitments, comprise the REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS

that the licensee’s EP program must meet.

Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.101, “Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power 

Reactors,” Revision 5 [ML050730286], states that the criteria and recommendations contained 

in Revision 1 of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 are considered to be acceptable methods for 

complying with the PS in 10 CFR 50.47(b) that must be met in onsite and offsite emergency 

response plans. The regulatory guide also endorses certain industry emergency action level 

scheme guidance.

NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, “Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological 

Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants”

[ML040420012] provides guidance to State and local governments and licensees in the 

development of E-plans. Implementation guidance is provided in the form of evaluation criteria

for each PS. The methods and capabilities described in the emergency plan are evaluated 

against these criteria in determining whether the plan complies with the PS. As with all NRC 

guidance documents, the licensee may propose alternative approaches of demonstrating 

compliance with the PS. The licensee’s arrangements for meeting these evaluation criteria, as 

modified or supplemented by commitments made in the licensee’s approved emergency plan, 

comprise the PROGRAM ELEMENTS (PE) that form the basis for evaluating the EP

Cornerstone. 

 2 Capitalized words and phrases used in this appendix are defined in Section 2.0 of the EP SDP (IMC 

0609, App. B). Also, acronyms of these phrases include the singular and plural, as applicable. 3 If the early site permit contained a complete and integrated emergency plans.

4 After the Commission makes the finding under 10 CFR 52.103(g). 5 The PS are applicable to both onsite and offsite plans whereas the requirements in Appendix E are 

directed to the licensee.
Issue Date: 12/19/12 3 0308, Att 3, App B

In December 2011, an amendment to the EP regulations at 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.54(q), 

and Appendix E became effective. Supporting guidance was issued:

• Regulatory Guide 1.219, “Guidance on Making Changes to Emergency Response Plans 

for Nuclear Power Reactors” [ML102510626]

• NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Supplement 3, “Guidance for Protective Action Strategies”

[ML113010596]

• NUREG/CR-7002, “Criteria for Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies”

[ML113030515]

• NSIR/DPR-ISG-01, “Interim Staff Guidance: Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power 

Plants” [ML113010523]

The latter document provides interim guidance that modifies previous guidance found in 

NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, and other previously issued guidance, until the earlier guidance is 

updated. 

3.0 DEVELOPMENT OF THE EP SDP

During the development of the EP SDP, the most risk-significant PS (i.e., RISK-SIGNIFICANT 

PLANNING STANDARDS (RSPS)) were identified as being distinct from the other PS. These 

development efforts were performed by a group of EP subject matter experts, including NRC 

staff and industry stakeholders, with input from members of the public. Timely and accurate 

classification of events (§ 50.47(b)(4)), notifications to OFFSITE RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS (OROs) (§ 50.47(b)(5)), assessments of radioactivity releases (§ 50.47(b)(9)), and 

development and recommendation of protective measures (§ 50.47(b)(10)), are essential if 

adequate measures are to be taken to minimize the risk to the public should a radiological 

emergency occur at the facility. If these functions are not performed adequately during an 

actual event, the public may be placed at greater risk. Similarly, if a PE in the emergency plan 

is non-compliant, the function(s) may not be adequately implemented should an actual 

emergency occur.

This is not to say that findings related to the other 12 PS may not warrant enforcement action;

but, that they are not as significant as RSPS6 findings. The non-RSPS often support the RSPS. 

For example, findings in EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION (ERO) staffing under PS

10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), could impact the performance of the RSPS.

Because the PS are broadly worded to be applicable to both onsite and offsite emergency plans 

and they describe what is required to be in an emergency plan, rather than what is to be done 

by the licensee during an emergency, one or more functions for each PS were developed. 

These PS FUNCTIONS are paraphrases of the PS in terms of the significant functions that need 

to be accomplished, or the capabilities that need to be in place, to maintain the effectiveness of 

the emergency plan. The PS FUNCTIONS are used in assessing significance, not compliance, 

and are identified in the EP SDP.

4.0 EP SIGNIFICANCE PROCESS

 6 RSPS are a subset of the PS. References to “planning standard” or “PS” include the RSPS, but 

references to “RSPS” do not include the PS. 
Issue Date: 12/19/12 4 0308, Att 3, App B

The EP SDP addresses three categories of findings, those findings that:

• are associated with the licensee’s failure to follow its emergency plan—an emergency 

response issue—during an actual radiological emergency, referred to as a FAILURE TO 

IMPLEMENT (FTI);

• are associated with the licensee’s failure to maintain its emergency plan—an emergency 

preparedness issue—typically identified through baseline and supplemental inspections, 

referred to as a FAILURE TO COMPLY (FTC); 

• are associated with the licensee’s failure to identify a WEAKNESS in a drill or exercise, 

or to correct that WEAKNESS. These findings are addressed as FTC. WEAKNESSES

that are identified by the licensee in a drill or exercise, and entered into a corrective 

action program are not considered findings in the EP SDP and are not assigned 

significance; or;

The EP SDP is not applied to offsite deficiencies identified by the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA).

7

 However, if the licensee has assumed responsibility (i.e., selfimposed standard) for alert and notification system (ANS) testing and maintenance 

commitments made in the FEMA-approved ANS final design report, the EP SDP will be applied 

to findings related to these commitments.

The significance of non-compliances with REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS that are not

associated with a PS, such as non-compliance with 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4), (5), and (6); 50.54(t), 

50.72,8 or certain requirements of Appendix E (e.g., § VI), are assigned Green significance by 

the EP SDP because of the very low safety significance of these findings.

4.1 Failure to Implement (FTI)

4.1.1 Description

A FTI occurs when performance deficiencies are observed in a licensee’s response to an actual 

radiological emergency in which the failure precluded effective implementation of the licensee’s 

PE. A FTI denotes that a PE was not effectively implemented by the licensee’s ERO during an 

actual radiological emergency such that protection of the public may have been impacted. Such 

a finding may be identified by reviewing the licensee’s ERO performance during (or after) a 

radiological emergency for compliance with REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS and would 

generally be associated with failure of the licensee to follow its emergency plan as required by

10 CFR 50.54(q)(2). The EP SDP incorporates the following considerations:

• A performance deficiency that occurs during an actual radiological emergency might not 

rise to the level of a FTI, particularly if the deficiency is self-identified by the ERO (e.g., 

peer review) and corrected in a timely manner such that the PS FUNCTIONS are 

successfully accomplished. 

 7 Including deficiencies identified by FEMA in offsite plans developed by the licensee pursuant to 10 CFR 

50.47(c)). 8 In accordance with the enforcement policy Section 2.4.C.2.c.1, a failure to make NRC notification of a 

condition is assigned the significance of the unreported condition.
Issue Date: 12/19/12 5 0308, Att 3, App B

• The failure of the ERO to implement a single PE does not necessarily mean that any of 

the associated PS FUNCTIONS were not accomplished. 

• A FTI may uncover performance deficiencies in the licensee’s emergency program (e.g., 

the emergency plan is less than adequate, the EP program design is not fully adequate, 

or, ERO personnel are not capable of implementing the plan). The EP SDP requires 

that such findings be evaluated as a FTI and as a FTC with the higher significance being

assigned to the finding.

• There are specific requirements for the licensee to maintain a capability to make 

classifications, notifications, and PARs, within certain time criteria. However, there may 

be unanticipated circumstances during an emergency that cause the licensee’s 

performance to be delayed. Such delays do not necessarily represent a FTI.

9

 

4.1.2 Significance Determination

The significance of a FTI is based on the emergency classification level that was, or should 

have been, declared during the event and whether a RSPS was involved. Generally, findings 

associated with a FTI are assigned greater significance than those associated with a FTC

because findings that occur during actual events may have a greater impact on public health 

and safety. The minimum significance level of a FTI is Green;10 the maximum is Red.11 In 

comparison, the maximum significance level for a FTC associated with a lost RSPS FUNCTION

is Yellow. This elevated significance is consistent with the increased risk to the public of the 

non-compliance during an actual radiological emergency.

Because the significance of a FTI is based in part on the emergency classification applicable to 

the event, the EP SDP requires the inspector to base the significance on what the licensee 

should have declared. Further, the failure to declare the appropriate emergency classification 

is, in itself, a finding and is to be evaluated separately from the other finding, with the finding 

having the greater significance cited. 

Because an over-classification by the licensee could result in unnecessary protective actions, 

the EP SDP provides for significance determination based on whether the OROs initiated 

protective actions for the public. The EP SDP assigns a Yellow significance if the licensee’s 

classification causes public officials to implement a public evacuation; a White significance for a 

protective action other than evacuation (e.g., school or park closures, sheltering, etc.); and 

Green significance otherwise. This protocol is consistent with the increased risk of unnecessary 

public evacuations, and does not apply if the ORO action was clearly inappropriate (e.g., 

ordering a public evacuation at an Alert).

4.2 Failure to Comply (FTC)

4.2.1 Description

 9 This is consistent with the definition of a finding in that only those issues under the control of the 

licensee to foresee or prevent can be considered as findings. 10 Significance is determined by the EP SDP for more than minor findings only; the minimum significance 

is Green. 

11 Such FTI may have actual safety consequences and the associated finding may be treated under 

traditional enforcement.
Issue Date: 12/19/12 6 0308, Att 3, App B

A FTC occurs when a licensee’s EP program is noncompliant with a REGULATORY 

REQUIREMENT where the cause was reasonably within the licensee’s ability to foresee and 

correct, and which should have been prevented. Such findings are associated with 

preparedness issues rather than response issues (i.e., FTI). 

A FTC denotes that a PE is not adequate, not compliant with the PS, or otherwise not functional 

to such an extent that the PS is not available for emergency response. It may be that certain 

emergency plan commitments are not met; the emergency plan is less than adequate; 

implementing procedures are not effective; personnel are not capable of implementing the PE; 

or the EP program design is not fully adequate. If the deficient PE was implemented, or could 

not be implemented by the ERO, the PS FUNCTION would not be met. Such findings are 

generally identified during normal program inspection activities. The EP SDP provides the 

following considerations:

• A single noncompliant PE does not necessarily mean that the associated PS

FUNCTION(S) could not be accomplished. 

• A FTI may uncover performance deficiencies in the licensee’s emergency program (e.g., 

the emergency plan is less than adequate, the EP program design is not fully adequate, 

or, ERO personnel are not capable of implementing the plan). The EP SDP requires 

that such findings be evaluated as a FTC and as a FTI with the finding having the higher 

significance cited.

• A single noncompliant PE may affect more than one PS FUNCTION. For example, 

inadequate ERO staffing (non RSPS 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2)) may affect one or more 

RSPS. 

• There are specific requirements for the licensee to maintain a capability to make 

classifications, notifications, and PARs, within certain time criteria, as a matter of 

preparedness. The licensee is expected to demonstrate these capabilities in exercise 

and program inspections. Generally, if the licensee’s procedures, staffing, equipment, 

etc., do not provide the requisite capabilities, a performance deficiency exists because

the licensee had the ability to foresee and correct the condition.

4.2.2 General Significance Determination

Generally, a finding associated with a FTC is assigned lesser significance than that associated 

with a FTI, because a FTC finding identified during routine oversight activities has only a 

prospective impact on public health and safety. The minimum significance level of a FTC is 

Green; the maximum is Yellow. 

The significance of a FTC is based on whether a RSPS was involved and whether the FTC

constituted a loss of the licensee’s ability to implement a PS FUNCTION if an emergency had 

occurred or was to occur in the future, or a degradation in that ability. Four resulting conditions 

and the associated significance levels are:

• LOST RSPS FUNCTION Yellow

• DEGRADED RSPS FUNCTION White

• LOST PS FUNCTION White
Issue Date: 12/19/12 7 0308, Att 3, App B

• DEGRADED PS FUNCTION Green

The EP SDP provides that a LOSS OF PS FUNCTION exists when PE are not adequate, are 

noncompliant with the PS, or otherwise not functional to the extent that the PS FUNCTION

would not be accomplished if a radiological emergency were to occur. A LOSS OF PS

FUNCTION would be assigned White significance. A LOSS OF RSPS STANDARD would be 

assigned Yellow significance consistent with its increased potential impact on public health and 

safety.

There are instances in which the PS FUNCTION is degraded, but not lost. The finding category 

of DEGRADED PS FUNCTION was incorporated into the EP SDP to address these situations 

and allow an intermediate level of significance to be assigned. A licensee may be noncompliant 

with a PE, but there could be reasonable assurance that the associated PS FUNCTION would 

be accomplished if a radiological emergency were to occur. The EP SDP provides guidance for 

the inspector to consider diverse and/or redundant PE, MITIGATING FACTORS, and

COMPENSATORY MEASURES, taken in determining if the affected PS FUNCTION would still 

be accomplished, albeit in a degraded manner, thereby justifying a lesser significance. 

An EP finding not associated with a PS is generally assigned Green significance. A logic chart 

in the EP SDP illustrates this significance determination and the EP SDP provides a series of 

significance examples for each PS.

A FTC is assessed significance based upon a qualitative predictive evaluation of the potential 

impact of the noncompliant PE on the licensee’s capability to implement its emergency plan and 

to take measures to protect the public health and safety if a radiological emergency occurred, or 

was to occur in the future. Re-paraphrased, the question becomes, “What would have been the 

likely impact of this noncompliant PE if a radiological emergency had occurred, or was to occur 

in the future and the finding had not been corrected?” This assessment does not consider the 

circumstances that existed at the time of discovery because the adverse condition could occur 

under different circumstances when the impact of the noncompliant PEs would be greater. For 

example, the fact that a plant is shut down when an at-power emergency action level (EAL) was 

determined to be inadequate has no bearing on the significance of the ineffective EAL.

The following sections explain some exceptions to the above significance determination 

methodology.

4.3 Significance of Emergency Action Level Findings

The EP SDP provides separate guidance for significance determination of findings associated 

with EALs. Such findings may involve an EAL that has been rendered ineffective such that it no 

longer results in a timely and accurate declaration, or is associated with a deficient EAL process 

that results in over-classification of an emergency condition. Such findings are cited against 

10 CFR 50.54(q)(2) and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and treated under ROP. However, if these 

conditions were the result of emergency plan changes made by the licensee without prior NRC 

approval pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(q)(3), the issue will be treated under traditional enforcement 

as a violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q)(3). The significance determination is made in the same 

manner in either case.
Issue Date: 12/19/12 8 0308, Att 3, App B

4.3.1 Ineffective EALs

PS 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) requires that a standard emergency classification and action level 

scheme be in use by the nuclear facility operator. Emergency classification schemes typically 

have a series of initiating conditions (IC), which represent a particular classification level and, for 

each IC, one or more EALs that identify particular indications or conditions that correspond to 

the IC. An EAL may be rendered ineffective when, for whatever reason, the EAL no longer 

results in a timely and accurate declaration for the IC. EALs may be rendered ineffective by 

unavailability or mis-calibration of instruments relied upon by the EAL, errors in calculation of 

the EAL threshold, and by deficiencies in classification procedures, ERO staffing or training, or 

any other capability necessary to complete the classification or declaration. A particular EAL 

may include a list of redundant instrument channels; however, it is treated as a single EAL for 

significance purposes. 

The significance of findings related to ineffective EALs is based on: (1) the emergency 

classification level the EAL is associated with; and, (2) one of the following characteristics:

• The emergency would not be declared for a particular off-normal event (i.e., LOSS OF 

RSPS FUNCTION),

• The emergency would not be declared for a particular off-normal event, but because of 

other EALs, an appropriate declaration could be made in a degraded manner (i.e., 

DEGRADED RSPS FUNCTION), or,

• The emergency would not be declared for a particular off-normal event, but because of 

other EALs, an appropriate declaration could be made in an accurate and timely manner 

(i.e., Green).

The EP SDP generally requires that the alternative EAL being credited be one of those specified 

in the EAL scheme for the same IC. The staff included this condition because each IC 

addresses a particular abnormal condition that gives rise to an emergency (e.g., uncontrolled 

radioactivity release, loss of one or more fission product barriers, natural phenomena, etc.). An

ineffective EAL affects the licensee’s ability to classify that particular abnormal condition. For 

example, an IC may be “a release of radioactivity that results in doses at the site boundary 

exceeding X dose.” While one may argue that X dose could not occur without one or more EAL 

thresholds in the fission product barrier matrix being exceeded, a release that may result in X

dose may be due to a condition not encompassed by the fission product barrier matrix (e.g., 

spent fuel pool accident, distinguishing between Site Area or General Emergency for a steam 

generator tube rupture with steam release to the environment).

The consideration of the emergency classification does not factor into most FTC significance 

assessments, but is appropriate here because an ineffective EAL has an impact only if that

emergency classification occurs; whereas, a finding related to a notification could affect all 

emergencies classifications. Accordingly, an ineffective General Emergency EAL has greater 

potential significance than would an ineffective EAL associated with a Notice of Unusual Event 

(NOUE). 

4.3.2 Deficient EAL Processes that Could Cause Over-classifications 
Issue Date: 12/19/12 9 0308, Att 3, App B

The EP SDP also establishes significance for emergency action level scheme findings that 

could lead to over-classifications and unwarranted declarations:

• A finding associated with a deficient emergency classification process that would cause 

over classification and would result in OROs implementing unnecessary protective 

actions for the public would have White significance. The White significance is 

consistent with the emergency classification function being degraded rather than lost 

(e.g., other EALs in scheme are effective) and the fact that the deficiency was identified 

during normal operations, rather than an emergency. The EP SDP applies this criterion 

only in cases in which the offsite response would be explicitly driven by ORO response 

procedures triggered by the declared classification (e.g., “...when the plant reports this, 

do this...”) or the licensee makes an unnecessary PAR to the OROs because of an overclassification.

• A finding associated with a deficient emergency classification process that would cause 

over-classification and would result in an unnecessary emergency declaration would 

have Green significance. 

4.4 Significance of Findings Related to Hardware Issues

The EP SDP addresses findings related to hardware issues (e.g., instrumentation or 

communication system unavailability), in which the significance may be reduced if the licensee 

implements COMPENSATORY MEASURES within a certain period following discovery. This 

protocol recognizes that not all hardware failures are under the control of the licensee and 

instead assesses significance on the timeliness and adequacy of short-term COMPENSATORY 

ACTIONS, and/or, the scope of the outage. 

4.5 Significance of Findings Related to Alert and Notification System

Alert and notification systems (ANS) are used by OROs to alert and to provide instructions to 

the public (i.e., notify) during an actual radiological emergency. Because many licensees have 

assumed responsibility for the testing and maintenance of ANS on behalf of the ORO officials

(i.e., self-imposed standard), significance examples related to the ANS have been included in 

the EP SDP. 12 The EP Cornerstone does not evaluate the ability of the ANS to alert and notify 

the public as the technical adequacy of the ANS and its testing and maintenance is under the 

purview of FEMA. Rather, the EP cornerstone of the ROP evaluates the licensee’s 

performance with regard to maintaining the ANS in accordance with the testing and 

maintenance commitments as outlined in the FEMA-approved final design report. 

Within the EP Cornerstone, there is a performance indicator (ANS PI) based on the reliability of 

the ANS system as demonstrated in scheduled testing. Although the EP SDP contains 

significance examples under Section 5.5 of the EP SDP that appear similar in purpose, the EP 

SDP examples are based on the availability, rather than the reliability, of the ANS. The EP SDP 

does provide that if the ANS PI has fallen below the Green band, or fallen below the White 

 12 Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, Section IV.D.3, requires that the licensee demonstrate that 

administrative and physical means have been established for alerting and providing prompt instructions 

to the public within the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone. The regulation does not 

require the licensee to provide the capability. The licensee demonstrates the capability exists via the 

FEMA-approved ANS Final Design Report.
Issue Date: 12/19/12 10 0308, Att 3, App B

band, during the period under consideration an additional finding is not necessary, as the 

appropriate regulatory response will already be taken.

4.6 Significance of Findings Related to Exercise CRITIQUES

The EP Cornerstone of the NRC Reactor Oversight Process is designed to foster drill, exercise, 

and training programs that develop and maintain ERO skills. Licensees are required under 

Appendix E, §IV.F.2.g to provide for formal CRITIQUES for all exercises, drills, and training that 

provide performance opportunities to develop, maintain, and demonstrate key skills, and to 

correct all weaknesses identified in those CRITIQUES. The licensee’s failure to identify 

WEAKNESSES is a FTC with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14). 

It is the nature of an exercise and drill program that WEAKNESSES in ERO performance will 

occur and that equipment, facility and procedure problems will be identified. The identification 

and correction of these WEAKNESSES is a positive and vital aspect of the program that 

enhances and maintains key ERO skills. A WEAKNESS observed during an exercise or drill 

has little or no direct safety-significance if the WEAKNESS is identified and corrected as this will

ultimately enhance the ERO performance during an actual radiological emergency. If NRC 

oversight were to penalize the identification of WEAKNESSES, this enhancement might not 

occur and ERO performance could degrade. For these reasons, the EP SDP does not treat 

ERO performance WEAKNESSES as performance deficiencies and instead places focus on the 

licensee’s ability to identify a WEAKNESS and on the timeliness and adequacy of the corrective 

actions taken. A licensee’s ability to observe, evaluate, and CRITIQUE a weakness associated 

with a RSPS is critical. Although all drill or exercise WEAKNESSES are required to be identified 

and corrected, the EP SDP puts the highest priority to WEAKNESSES associated with a RSPS.

This treatment of exercise and drill WEAKNESSES is consistent with the licensee response 

band green threshold of 90 percent for the Drill and Exercise Performance (DEP) performance 

indicator (PI). The DEP PI tracks ERO performance in drills and exercises in three RSPS: 

emergency classification; protective action recommendation (PAR); and notification. ERO 

performance in a fourth RSPS, dose assessment, would most likely be reflected in the PAR 

performance. If the DEP PI falls below 90 percent, signifying WEAKNESSES in greater than 10 

percent of classification, PAR, and notification opportunities, the increased regulatory response 

band is entered. Although the DEP PI only tracks performance in the RSPS, the same 

oversight philosophy is appropriate when considering ERO performance in areas not addressed 

by the DEP PI.

Identification of exercise and drill WEAKNESSES is critical to maintaining the validity of the EP 

Cornerstone licensee response band, which is predicated in part on accurate PI data from drill 

and exercise CRITIQUES. If the licensee does not appropriately assess DEP PI opportunities

through the CRITIQUE process, the validity of the DEP PI and the licensee response band is 

brought into question. Accordingly, findings related to the identification of WEAKNESSES are

assigned significance as follows:

• The failure of a licensee to identify a WEAKNESS that constitutes a DEP PI failed 

opportunity involving a RSPS in a CRITIQUE for a FULL-SCALE EXERCISE is 

considered a LOST PS FUNCTION and is assigned a White finding. FULL-SCALE

EXERCISES provide more opportunity for ERO members to exercise key skills and 

response functions and to be observed by a number of observers/evaluators.

Accordingly, the failure of the licensee to adequately identify WEAKNESSES under 
Issue Date: 12/19/12 11 0308, Att 3, App B

these circumstances is deemed to have greater significance. This level of significance is 

also based on the NRC’s need to ensure the efficacy of the licensee’s CRITIQUE

program and, hence, the licensee response band. 

• Licensee failures to identify WEAKNESSES in limited scope drills, including those that 

constitute a DEP PI successful13 opportunity involving a RSPS are assigned Green 

significance.

A WEAKNESS in ERO performance may uncover inadequate PE. For example, an incorrect 

emergency classification by the ERO may have been caused by an incorrect procedure. In this 

case, the ERO performance may have been in accordance with the procedure, but the 

procedure was wrong. These inadequate PE are performance deficiencies that the EP SDP 

treats as FTC, rather than WEAKNESSES, even if the licensee identifies the performance 

deficiency in its CRITIQUE.

4.7 Significance of Findings Related to Failure to Correct Weaknesses

The EP Cornerstone of the ROP is based on the licensee response band established by the PI 

program and the licensee’s problem identification and resolution (PI&R) program. As it relates 

to emergency preparedness, PI&R encompasses the drill and exercise CRITIQUE program, 

CRITIQUES of actual events and other assessment activities (such as QA audits and reviews 

performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(t)), as well as the corrective action program. The 

EP baseline inspection program provides oversight of a licensee’s efforts to CRITIQUE drills 

and exercises and correct WEAKNESSES. NRC regulations in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and 

Section IV.F.2.g of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 require licensees to formally CRITQUE drills 

and exercises to identify and correct any WEAKNESSES.

The EP SDP provides that determination of a failure to correct a drill or exercise WEAKNESS

requires a detailed review of the WEAKNESS and the associated corrective actions. It is not 

intended that a single repetition of a WEAKNESS (e.g., in a drill) should automatically be 

deemed to be a failure of the corrective action system. Conversely, success in a drill or 

exercise (e.g., by one well-drilled team) should not necessarily be considered a success of the 

corrective action system. When an apparent failure to resolve a WEAKNESS is observed, 

specific corrective actions, as well as similar occurrences in response to actual events, drills, 

exercises and training evolutions, are reviewed. The status of relevant performance indicators

and the corrective action, self-assessment and inspection records for an entire inspection cycle 

with emphasis on similar issues are also considered. In addition, completion of corrective 

actions is verified. The intent of these actions is to discover a pattern of recurring performance 

issues in similar activities in order to identify ineffective corrective actions.

The EP SDP assigns significance for failure to correct a WEAKNESS as follows: 

• For a WEAKNESS associated with the RSPS 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), -(5), and -(10), a 

failure to correct is assigned White significance, a high standard based on the reliance 

that NRC places on timely corrective actions to maintain the integrity of the licensee 

response band. 

 13 For example, a correct emergency classification, consistent with scenario expectations, may have been 

made based on misinformation, lack of information, or invalid indications. 
Issue Date: 12/19/12 12 0308, Att 3, App B

• For the RSPS incorporated in the DEP PI, if the DEP PI has fallen below the license 

response band, there is no need for an additional finding as the regulatory response 

band (or higher band) would have been entered because of the PI.

• For RSPS 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), White significance will be assigned if the original 

WEAKNESS is observed in more than 10 percent of the performance opportunities; 

otherwise, no finding is assessed. This treatment of uncorrected WEAKNESSES is 

consistent with the licensee response band threshold of 90 percent for the DEP PI. This

includes all observed WEAKNESSES having a common uncorrected root cause.

• Similarly, Green significance will be assigned to non-RSPS WEAKNESSES if observed 

in more than 10 percent of the performance opportunities; otherwise, no finding is 

assessed. 
Issue Date: 12/19/12 Att1-1 0308, Att 3, App B

Revision History for IMC 0308, Att 3, App B

Commitment 

Tracking 

Number

Accession

Number

Issue Date

Change Notice

Description of Change Description of Training 

Required and

Completion Date

Comment and Feedback 

Resolution Accession 

Number

07/28/2005 Initial issuance.

N/A ML12284A512

12/19/12

CN 12-029

This IMC has been revised to reflect the 

changes made to IMC 0609, Appendix B 

(02/24/2012)

N/A ML12285A314