Arms Control and Nonproliferation

Advisory Board

Report on the Review of the 

2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 

November 6, 2006 
DISCLAIMER

This is a report of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Advisory Board (ACNAB), a Federal 

Advisory Committee established to provide the Department of State with a continuing source of 

independent insight, advice and innovation on scientific, military, diplomatic, political, and 

public diplomacy aspects of arms control, disarmament, international security, and 

nonproliferation. The views expressed herein do not represent official positions or policies of 

the Department of State or any other entity of the United States Government. 

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ACNAB REVIEW OF THE 2002 NATIONAL STRATEGY

TO COMBAT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Report on the Review of the 2002 National Strategy to Combat WMD ........................................ 1 

Appendix A – Summary of Recommendations .......................................................................... A-1 

Appendix B - Terms of Reference.............................................................................................. B-1

Appendix C - Members and Project Staff................................................................................... C-1 

Appendix D - Individuals Consulted by the Task Force............................................................. D-1 
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Report on the Review of the

2002 National Strategy to Combat WMD 

TASKING. The Arms Control and Nonproliferation Advisory Board (ACNAB) has been asked 

to assess implementation of the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 

(WMD), and to recommend changes which could strengthen both strategy and implementation. 

The four elements of our Terms of Reference (TOR), and the ACNAB’s response to each, are set 

forth below. The first two cover assessment; the last two set forth recommendations. Strategy 

recommendations are “S” series; implementation recommendations are “A” [action] series. 

Important Note: At issue here is U.S. National Strategy, thus much of our assessment relates to 

organizations and agencies other than the Department of State, and many of our 

recommendations are the responsibility of these other organizations (NSC, DOD, DOE, DHS, 

the intelligence community, etc.) Failure of these others to implement recommendations which 

apply to them could well disable the National Strategy, therefore the Department of State should 

exert all possible influence to have all agencies act upon these recommendations. 

REPORT OVERVIEW. The 2002 National Strategy to Combat WMD is a comprehensive and 

timely policy document. It lays out—in concise, unclassified form—U.S. counterproliferation 

and nonproliferation goals, as well as some principal tools for achieving these goals. This 

ACNAB report recommends six changes to improve this strategy. 

Implementation of the National Strategy, however, has been uneven. There have been individual 

successes—some quite notable—but many areas show weaknesses in implementation. Most 

critical has been lack of centralized oversight and follow-up. Additionally, specific 

responsibilities within many agencies are unspecified, unclear, or not enforced; timelines and 

milestones for achievement have not been established; metrics for performance are not specified; 

and line-item budgets have rarely been created. Most of the recommendations in this ACNAB 

report are focused on improving implementation of the strategy. 

There is a real need to improve implementation. The United States is facing a global threat in a 

rapidly changing world. Some adversaries are showing increased ability to coordinate their 

activities. Some are attempting to force us into proxy battles. Regional terrorist forces have 

blended into civilian populations. Immigration into European nations and many other factors 

(preoccupation with domestic politics and economics, resurgent protectionism, etc.) has reduced 

the resolve of some of our allies to defend our common interests. The United States can combat 

these trends only if we implement a coordinated strategy ourselves.

Although some past gains have been achieved in counterproliferation and nonproliferation, the 

United States faces two enormous challenges—North Korea and Iran—our handling of which 

should dwarf all prior proliferation-prevention activities. If either state goes into continuing 

production of nuclear weapons, the world will cross—irreversibly—a major threshold of danger. 

Both nations could well sell such weapons to other rogues or provide them to terrorist 

organizations for use. 

While proliferation by North Korea and/or Iran could encourage similar moves anywhere in the 

world, the likelihood is that North Korea’s might be followed by that in Japan, South Korea, or 
2

Taiwan. Similarly, proliferation in Iran could stimulate it in such Middle Eastern states as Egypt, 

Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Syria, and Algeria. With this impetus, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, 

Germany, Ukraine, and others may believe their security will be enhanced by possessing nuclear 

weapons. The world is headed for a near-term danger level never before seen; and if the United 

States is unsuccessful in halting these two rogue states, America’s half-century of efforts against 

proliferation will have failed. 

TOR TASK #1: ASSESS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STRATEGY, INCLUDING AN 

ASSESSMENT OF THE PROGRESS ON ENDING PROLIFERATION TRADE BY 

ROGUE STATES, INDIVIDUALS, AND GROUPS IN PREVENTING TERRORIST 

ACQUISITION AND USE OF WMD. 

Counterproliferation. At present the National Strategy addresses three counterproliferation 

elements: Interdiction, Deterrence, and Defense and Mitigation. A fourth element—“Offensive 

Operations”—should be inserted following the first two. It is quite different from the listed 

three, and very important. It would encompass such actions as strikes on WMD production 

facilities, storage, or launch sites; seizing WMD material tracked by interdiction activities; 

securing or eliminating WMD in unstable states which become hostile through internal takeover; 

covert operations, etc. The Department of Defense's “National Military Strategy to Combat 

WMD” (a derivative document) lists eight Mission Areas, the first two of which address offense. 

Offensive targeting of the WMD threat may need to be broadened to include specific individuals 

who have an enabling role (military, scientific, industrial, or political), whether or not they are 

affiliated with the proliferator. This targeting should also include every element of the WMD 

process: research and development, testing, acquisition, production, assembly, storage, transfer, 

deployment, launch, etc. 

The integrated employment of interdiction, credible deterrence, offensive operations, and 

defense and mitigation produces a counterproliferation effect the whole of which is greater than 

the sum of its parts. 

Recommendation S1. Expand the Counterproliferation section of the National 

Strategy (pages 2-3) by adding an “Offensive Operations” subsection (strikes, seizures, 

elimination of WMD, etc.) as the third major element (of four). 

Counterproliferation is made more important—and more difficult—by the world’s rapid 

evolution into a new era. Past distinctions are becoming blurred. Terrorist organizations are 

becoming political parties, and vice versa. Failed and failing states abound. Nationwide votes 

elect terrorist organizations into governance. Individual states are fractured by civil wars over 

religious differences; while religious ties closely bind sects in several different states. Virulent 

Islamic fundamentalism, with its exploitation of suicide, is on the rise; in some cases including a 

desire for world domination. 

These growing realities, and the asymmetrical threats that accompany them, deserve more 

recognition in the National Strategy. An extreme hypothetical example might be the case of a 

stolen Russian nuclear weapon, fitted to a North-Korean developed cruise missile by rogue 
3

Pakistani engineers, deployed on a Hezbollah-crewed leased merchant ship, and launched against 

a U.S. population center. Threats of this type may be more likely than the straightforward ones 

implied in the Strategy. 

Recommendation S2. Review all elements of the National Strategy, from 

intelligence collection to attribution (forensics), for changes necessitated by the world’s 

accelerating evolution into today’s more dissociated, diffused international environment. 

Interdiction. The one specific sub-tasking in our TOR is in Task #1. It asks the ACNAB 

specifically to assess “progress on ending proliferation trade by rogue states, individuals, and 

groups in preventing terrorist acquisition and use of WMD.” Since this centers on interdiction, 

the ACNAB addresses it here. The National Strategy calls for effective interdiction capabilities 

to prevent the movement of WMD materials, technology, and expertise to hostile states and 

terrorist organizations. This is an extraordinarily difficult task because of the technical 

limitations of detection, because it depends in large degree on international cooperation, and 

because dual-use technologies are increasingly widespread as a result of economic growth and 

globalization.

Clearly this has been one of our highest national priorities of the last several years. In response 

to the threats and the need, the federal government has been reorganized and focused. A few 

specific accomplishments: issuance of our National Strategy to Combat WMD itself; sweeping 

overhaul of the intelligence community; creation of the Department of Homeland Security with 

its major interdiction responsibilities; establishment of the National Counter Terrorism Center 

and National Counter Proliferation Center; the Department of Defense’s issuance of the National 

Military Strategy to Combat WMD, its creation of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), its 

assignment of responsibility for combating WMD to U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), 

and establishment of that command’s new Center for Combating WMD. 

The paramount need to foster a global network of partners has also been a top national priority, 

and it has resulted in significant advances. Most notable is the Proliferation Security Initiative 

(PSI), launched in 2003, which now counts over 80 partner nations and is still expanding. It has 

helped to interdict more than 30 WMD-related shipments, including that of centrifuge parts 

which played an important role in Libya’s decision to abandon its nuclear and chemical weapons 

programs. Other major advances have been: the 2002 Global Partnership against the Spread of 

Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction; the 2004 United Nations (UN) Security Council 

Resolution 1540; the 2005 Nuclear Terrorism Convention; and most recently the new “Global 

Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism,” launched by Presidents Bush and Putin on July 15 at 

the St. Petersburg G8 meeting. On a more focused scale, numerous bilateral and multilateral 

interdiction programs have been put in place and are growing at key international border 

crossings. 

In response to the TOR, the ACNAB’s assessment must be mixed. Major successes have been 

achieved in a remarkably short time: Iraq’s reversal from a WMD threat and sponsor of 

terrorism to a potentially democratic nation; Libya’s opting to abandon their WMD ambitions; 

exposure and extensive disruption of A.Q. Khan’s global black market nuclear weapons 

proliferation network. On the other hand, the United States’ (and the world’s) decade of failure 

in halting North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear weapons production ambitions and the imminence of 
4

their success, and the mushrooming growth of terrorist organizations with WMD aims and global 

reach, illustrate vividly that the threat is far from under control. 

Deterrence. In coping with actual proliferation activities, deterrence is the indispensable 

ingredient, and the United States needs to enhance our declaratory policy and our deterrent 

posture. The most significant omission in the National Strategy is under-appreciation of the 

immense power of deterrence; and the greatest weakness in the Strategy’s implementation is our 

seeming reluctance to use deterrence effectively in response to today’s and tomorrow’s WMD 

challenges. Historically, negotiations on difficult issues must be linked to the threat of force to 

be effective; and this approach offers the best chance of achieving a successful outcome without 

military action. Deterrence is based upon fear. We deter someone from taking an action against 

us (whether that action is use of nuclear weapons or production of nuclear weapons) by instilling 

fear of the consequences. The essential element of deterrence is credibility. Our adversary must 

believe that if he persists with his actions the consequences for him will be unacceptable. To 

achieve this, U.S. declaratory statements (written and verbal), must be clear, specific, and 

consistent; and these statements must be reinforced by a wide range of visible actions 

demonstrating our readiness and capability to follow through. Our adversary must be convinced 

the United States has both the will and the capability to carry out our threats.

The credibility of our deterrent threats will depend heavily on whether we, and our allies, will 

consider our actions acceptable after we have implemented them. Our adversaries are totally 

aware of our sensitivities, and they’re counting on them. Our deterrent threats will simply not be 

credible unless they quite clear about damage-limiting measures for civilians. All of our 

planning for possible use of military force must place great emphasis on reducing collateral 

damage, and this places an advance burden on us for development of tailored weapons systems 

and tactics. 

At the highest level of deterrence, U.S. declaratory policy must continually make it absolutely 

clear that any use of WMD against our nation will be met by devastating retaliation using, as 

necessary, all our capabilities. Our response will not necessarily be comparable to the attack. 

At a slightly lower level of deterrence is the case of nuclear weapon production programs in 

North Korea and Iran. Nuclear weapons in the hands of the world’s most dangerous regimes 

pose a threat like no other. Targeted on some modern states, these weapons might cause 

destruction of civil society. The United States has been negotiating, without appreciable effect, 

with both nations for over a decade to get them to abandon these programs, and time is getting 

short. We should consider openly stating that—to enforce nonproliferation—the United States 

reserves the right to use military force to prevent irresponsible or belligerent states from 

producing, deploying, transferring, or using nuclear weapons. To be credible, this statement 

would have to become national policy, supported by all leaders (some of whom have even 

publicly taken U.S. military force off the table on this issue). Additionally, the United States 

should engage in a wide and continuing range of credibility-reinforcing measures (visible 

military procurement, training, exercises, etc.), to emphasize that we have both the will and the 

capability. Because these North Korean and Iranian threats are indeed nuclear, and because 

these weapons are predominantly in hardened underground facilities, the United States should 
5

ensure that our nuclear forces add a clearly credible deterrent to that of our conventional forces.1

In making the above statement, we should make it clear that this is not new policy; it is an 

existing right we and other states reserve, the right of a sovereign nation to deal with a threat to 

international security and peace. We should execute a prepared public diplomacy strategy to 

mitigate backlash. 

Recommendation S3. Add the great power of deterrence to U.S. diplomatic 

efforts with North Korea and Iran. In the Deterrence section of the National Strategy (page 3), 

change the wording to: “The United States reserves the right to use military force to prevent 

irresponsible or belligerent states or organizations from producing, deploying, transferring, or 

using WMD.” 

Recommendation A1. Engage the entire Administration, and key Congressional 

leaders, in a continuing effort to understand the nation’s strategy to combat WMD and agree to 

the paramount importance of having our leaders speak with one voice on vital strategic issues. 

Recommendation A2. The Department of Defense (DoD) should develop plans 

to carry out a wide spectrum of reinforcing measures to lend credibility to deterrent threats made 

to convince adversaries that their continuation of a particular course of action will be met by U.S. 

military force. Examples are accelerated R&D and procurement of improved weapons 

specialized for this mission, publicized testing of weapons, visible and focused 

counterproliferation exercises, announced deployments, increased readiness, elevated alert 

levels, etc. These activities, also, should be covered by our prepared public diplomacy plans. 

This is an absolutely vital issue. Deterrence offers an approach that might carry the day for us 

without use of force, and the United States should bring it to bear. Notably, our first instance of 

success of using deterrence to halt determined proliferation in such a state would have immense 

global nonproliferation benefits through assurance and dissuasion, as well as deterrence!

The power of deterrence is not limited to the above specific examples. As new WMD 

technologies are developed in the future, it is likely that an effective form of deterrence can be 

developed to meet the threat. Credible deterrence gives the President a wider spectrum of 

options for attempting to meet these varied challenges. 

Defense and Mitigation. Deserving of mention is the impressive implementation of 

missile defense programs since promulgation of the National Strategy to Combat WMD in 2002. 

This not only enhances defense, but it also enables the United States and our allies to use 

stronger deterrent measures against adversaries with WMD. 

Following-up on the National Strategy, a National Policy for Biodefense was issued in 2004, 

assigning responsibilities to agencies, setting up oversight, prioritizing objectives, mitigating 

effects of an attack, etc. Consideration should be given to issuing similar policy documents for 

dealing with nuclear and chemical weapons threats (e.g., detecting an adversary’s assets; 

destroying these assets prior to use; rapidly attributing the source of a WMD attack; conducting 

post-conflict operations to destroy residual WMD). A noteworthy example of the above need in 

1

 One member does not agree with any suggestion that we need to develop new types of nuclear weapons to meet 

this challenge. 
6

the nuclear area is the threat of electromagnetic pulse attack, which is only now beginning to be 

readdressed as a result of the Congressionally mandated 2004 “Report of the Commission to 

Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack.” 

Recommendation A3. Consider issuing National Policy documents for Nuclear 

Defense and Chemical Defense, following the pattern of the 2004 National Policy for 

Biodefense.

Recommendation A4. With a high priority, address in a formal way the urgent 

national need to respond to the threat of electromagnetic pulse attack. Key military equipment 

should be hardened; and vital national infrastructure assets (electric power, communications, 

transportation, financial networks, medical facilities, etc.) should be made survivable or 

reconstitutable.

Nonproliferation. Most of today’s “global nonproliferation regime” (the UN, the General 

Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament, many large blocs of states, countless NGOs, etc.) 

focuses on total nuclear disarmament, rather than nonproliferation. However, disarmament was 

never equated to nonproliferation when the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 

(NPT) was being formulated, and it should not be now, notwithstanding the hope (then and now) 

that sometime in the future nuclear weapons could be abolished. 

Nuclear weapons remain the most formidable weapons ever developed, and will most assuredly 

remain so for the foreseeable future. We are now seeing what many have long expected—that 

advances in knowledge and technology, as well as the spread of nuclear technologies for 

peaceful purposes as called for in the NPT, have permitted many more states the option of 

developing nuclear weapons. While treaties, diplomatic pressures, threats of sanctions, and 

economic incentives have been, and will continue to be, major nonproliferation actions, the need 

for a credible nuclear deterrent will not diminish as long as rogue states continue to defy 

international norms. Recent U.S.-Japanese talks, in the wake of the North Korean nuclear test, 

illustrate vividly that the United States’ extended nuclear umbrella is critical to nonproliferation 

for a number of important states. 

Recommendation A5. In the nation’s widespread and multifaceted 

nonproliferation activities, the United States should be forthcoming about emphasizing the 

beneficial role nuclear weapons have played in protecting the United States (and much of the 

world) from nuclear attack.2

 If the world community does not or cannot roll back nuclear 

weapons programs in radical or unpredictable regimes, our nuclear capabilities will be vital in 

deterring use against us. 

 Diplomacy. Public diplomacy is not specifically addressed in the National Strategy, but 

it should be added as an important tool of U.S. nonproliferation diplomacy. Public opinion plays 

a key role in helping governments and international organizations (e.g., UN and International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)) “do the right thing” with regard to nonproliferation. There is a 

real need for public diplomacy, particularly in non-Western and less-developed countries. 

2

 One member does not agree with this recommendation, believing that U.S. policy should be to devalue nuclear 

weapons. 
7

Despite recent advances in public diplomacy by the Department of State (DOS), there is ample 

evidence that the United States is losing the battle for minds. Al-Jazeera, for example, 

broadcasts stridently anti-American messages through satellites to Arabs worldwide. The United 

States has no effective counter aimed at Al-Jazeera’s audience. 

The U.S. public diplomacy task is made more difficult by the fact that our adversaries have 

learned how to take advantage of the globalization of communications. For example, Iranian 

President Ahmadinejad recently visited other Muslim nations to drum up international support 

for Iran’s position that its nuclear program is peaceful and that the United States is unwarranted 

in its opposition to the program. He achieved a fair measure of success. The United States needs 

to significantly expand—and be more creative with—our public diplomacy efforts.

Recommendation S4. Add public diplomacy to the National Strategy (pages 3-

4) as an element of active nonproliferation diplomacy. 

Recommendation A6. Increase priority and funding for public diplomacy. 

Focus U.S. activities on North Korea, Iran, neighboring states, Muslim nations, potential future 

proliferators, etc. Employ internet, TV, radio, and print media vigorously to raise local 

awareness of the benefits to them of America’s strong nonproliferation program. 

 Threat Reduction Cooperation. Threat reduction programs were well conceived at the 

outset, and much has been achieved by them; but targets of opportunity at present are 

diminishing. In the years ahead, however, it is probable that new worldwide opportunities—

principally fast-breaking ones—will arise in which threat reduction programs will be highly 

useful in countering proliferation.

Recommendation A7. Conduct an Executive Branch review of all threat 

reduction programs to: (1) improve their ability to respond without delay to future opportunities 

such as possible North Korean or Iranian decisions to abandon their nuclear ambitions (making 

use of lessons learned in Libya); (2) examine all past U.S. policies governing DoD’s Cooperative 

Threat Reduction program, the Department of Energy's nonproliferation programs, and DOS’s 

program for redirection of scientists, to identify cases where changes in our U.S. “ground rules” 

would significantly reduce WMD threats; (3) terminate programs which have proven difficult to 

negotiate or have low probabilities of success; and (4) rebalance the funding levels among these 

three departments based upon past results and future plans.

Controls on Nuclear Materials. In the past, one of our protections against proliferation 

has been the many years required for states to acquire or produce nuclear materials, and the leadtime (or warning) this gave us. Today the United States is losing this safety factor because of the 

widespread use of nuclear power, the greater number of enrichment or reprocessing facilities, the 

increasing number of states with nuclear weapons and materials, and the increasing proliferation 

trade among rogue states, terrorist organizations, and others. 

Simultaneously, satellite television and the internet have put pressure on developing nations’ 

leaders to catch up with the “haves,” rapidly. This requires a significant expansion of their 

energy supplies, which may be possible only through broader use of nuclear power. It is 
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imperative that these have-not countries have access to proliferation-resistant nuclear power 

plant designs and reactor fuel. 

Because of this, the National Strategy states that the United States will work to develop recycling 

and fuel treatment technologies that are cleaner, more efficient, less waste-intensive, and more 

proliferation-resistant. This commitment is so important to our WMD objectives of preventing 

proliferation that its priority and funding should surely be raised.

One new concept to achieve this is the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), a 

collaborative effort among nuclear-energy-supplier states to select and demonstrate technologies 

that will close the fuel cycle by recycling and consumption of long-lived radioactive waste, while 

promoting nonproliferation. A key objective of the project is for these suppliers to lease fuel to 

countries desiring to use nuclear energy, recovering the spent fuel for reprocessing.

Recommendation S5. Include the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) in 

the National Strategy, under Controls on Nuclear Materials (pages 4-5).

The technology-development portion of GNEP is moving forward, but the political efforts 

required to make fuel-leasing and control a reality have scarcely begun. And, as past nuclear 

power issues have so clearly demonstrated, the political issues become highly emotional and are 

fraught with problems and delay. The United States should take the lead in developing a plan to 

provide nuclear-energy assistance, including fuel supplies and fuel return. As with the 

technological portion of GNEP, the preferred approach is for the United States to work outside 

the UN with the five nuclear suppliers, while keeping the IAEA informed. 

Recommendation A8. The GNEP initiative has such potential to contribute to 

the solution of worldwide energy and nonproliferation problems that it should have the priority 

and funding to advance at the fastest possible pace, the United States working directly with 

nuclear fuel suppliers.

Integrating the Pillars. 

Targeted Strategies Against Proliferants. A major weakness in implementation of the 

National Strategy is in the area of “targeted strategies.” The Strategy calls for targeted strategies 

against proliferators whose leaders are determined to possess WMD. (These targeted strategies 

are much broader than traditional military contingency planning.) The United States has not yet 

developed effective strategies, yet they are absolutely essential for several reasons: 

First, a targeted strategy starts by addressing the end-game. That is, if all diplomatic efforts fail 

to stop and roll back proliferation in the country concerned, exactly what is the United States 

willing to do? Specifically, are we willing to undertake military action? This question—

essentially one of going to war—requires the most detailed, searching examination by the 

President and top national leadership, at the very highest security level. Centrally, it involves the 

long-range issue of whether future U.S. national security will be better served by having the 

target country in continuing production of nuclear weapons, or by having ended this proliferation 

threat and advanced the cause of nonproliferation everywhere, but incurred the adverse effects of 
9

the military action we initiated. Most importantly, this decision needs to be addressed several 

years before it would be acted upon, and updated continuously thereafter. 

Second, these targeted strategies (with this early start) are essential because the tentative decision 

on the end-game will guide every aspect of diplomacy and negotiating strategy with the country 

involved from today forward. Although the proliferation issue is the driver, every other aspect of 

our U.S. “country strategy” for that nation must be integrated into the targeted strategy. 

Third, if military action is likely, targeted strategies are needed to guide the years of focused 

intelligence collection, planning, military procurement, organization, training, and exercising that 

are required. These might be highly classified; or quite open, used as reinforcing measures of a 

deterrent strategy.

Fourth, the targeted strategy, with its (originally tentative) end-game decision, will influence 

every aspect of our political and diplomatic interaction with allies, friends, neutrals, and 

adversaries for the next several years. 

Fifth, only a targeted strategy, with its multi-year time span, can allow us to plan, well in 

advance, the key dates for each successive political and diplomatic action, including, if 

necessary, military strikes. 

All targeted strategies should be based on the assumption that the United States and all relevant 

international bodies will continue to employ every possible diplomatic effort to halt the 

proliferation danger, that inducements, sanctions, and other coercive methods will be exercised 

as most appropriate, and that military force will be considered only as a last resort. 

Because the United States has developed no targeted strategies, we currently tend to be reactive 

rather than proactive. With each potential proliferator we tend to make day-to-day decisions, 

based on current interactions with the country involved and the current state of world affairs; and 

we have no clear plan, one, two, three, years ahead, as to our strategic intentions. If this 

continues, we may arrive at strategic decision points unable to act because of inadequate 

preparations.

Recommendation A9. As an urgent, top-priority action to improve 

implementation of the National Strategy, develop comprehensive national political and military 

“Targeted Strategies” for North Korea and Iran. 

A great benefit of targeted strategies is that they force high-level consideration of the options in 

time to allow the extensive planning and risk-reduction actions required if diplomacy fails. If 

desired, options can be carried forward for future decision. For example, a targeted strategy 

might identify four options. One, the easiest (and probably the worst), might be to allow the 

proliferator to develop and produce nuclear weapons. A second option might be to attempt 

regime change (or “regime adjustment”)—either overtly or covertly. A third option might be 

early preemptive conventional military strikes, to damage or destroy the proliferator’s key 

nuclear facilities without warning. A fourth option might be to bring a tough new deterrent line 

to the negotiations, informing the proliferator that we will not permit them to produce nuclear 

weapons, that if all negotiations fail we will destroy their nuclear facilities by military action. 

We would then reinforce this by intense, continuing visible preparations. The hope here is that 
10

the clear threat of force, backed up by intense enabling measures, will eventually gain credibility; 

causing the proliferator to roll back its nuclear program, accept our alternative positive offers, 

and carry out its own regime adjustment from within.3

Regardless of what targeted strategy is settled upon, it should be implemented by all agencies as 

a true national strategy. In today’s complex world, exercising strategies serves to refine them, 

develop understanding of the roles of others, build confidence and relationships, and speed 

responses to adversaries’ actions.

TOR TASK #2: ASSESS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERAGENCY 

COORDINATION IN IMPLEMENTING THE NATIONAL STRATEGY. 

Lack of interagency coordination has been one of the major weaknesses in implementing the 

National Strategy. This document itself, over its six pages, uses the phrases: “we must 

pursue...”, “we will ensure...”, “we must take...”, “we will not permit...”, “we must accord...”, 

“we must enhance...”, and similar phrases about 75 times. Each promises future action. In the 

great majority of cases the commitment requires joint action by numerous agencies. 

After extensive inquiries, the ACNAB has not found any evidence of an overall listing of 

commitments that must be met, or of any national-level effort to follow-up on these directed 

actions. Nor have we found any department or agency which was aware of the actions required 

of their organization by the National Strategy, or which had a plan to fulfill these requirements. 

Thus there clearly is an oversight and follow-up problem. 

Who’s in charge? This needs to be determined for the National Strategy itself, for each agency 

with regard to that agency’s responsibilities, and for each specific commitment. Then, to some 

degree, a plan is needed for fulfilling each commitment. Timelines and milestones should be 

established, linked to line-item budgets. Measures of effectiveness are needed to determine 

when the commitment has been met. And there’s a continuing need for the follow-up function, 

because prodding is often required. 

Recommendation S6. Add a brief section on “Implementation” to the 

unclassified version of the National Strategy. Require the National Security Council (NSC) to 

oversee and coordinate the strategy’s implementation, using an Executive Agent (e.g., DOS, 

DoD). Staff members from other agencies could be transferred to the Executive Agent on a 

permanent-change-of-station basis; and technical support could be provided.

Recommendation A10. The nineteen recommendations in this report address 

U.S. National Strategy, thus their implementation in many cases is the responsibility of agencies 

other than the Department of State. Failure to implement these others could well disable the 

National Strategy itself, therefore the DOS should exert all possible influence to have all 

agencies act upon these recommendations. 

Many of these commitments or action programs are of vital national importance. For example, 

under the counterproliferation summary (top of page 2), the National Strategy states: “We will 

3

 One member does not believe military threats could be effective. 
11

ensure that all needed capabilities to combat WMD are fully integrated into the emerging defense 

transformation plan.” DoD has been actively pursuing defense transformation for conventional 

forces since 2001, but as yet there has been no counterpart transformation on the nuclear 

weapons side. Both our nuclear strategy and our nuclear weapons stockpile need to be 

transformed from the Cold War’s massive retaliation focus to one appropriate to today’s and 

tomorrow’s adversaries and threats. There is an urgency here, as full implementation will 

require decades.

Recommendation A11. To provide credibility to our national deterrent force, the 

United States should commence transformation of our nuclear strategy and stockpile. U.S. 

nuclear weapons should have the characteristics needed to deter the threats of today.4

National Strategy commitments regarding intelligence are also in urgent need of interagency 

coordination in implementation. All aspects of the U.S. program to combat WMD need better 

intelligence support. This—possibly more than any other support program—can serve to focus 

actions across the U.S. Government. Much has been said of our intelligence deficiencies in “The 

9/11 Commission Report” and the report of “The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of 

the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction.” Many actions have been, or are in 

the process of being, implemented as a result, including the creation of the position of the 

Director of National Intelligence. But one startling revelation in both of these reports is the 

disconnect between how poorly senior policymakers, nearly unanimously, viewed the quality of 

intelligence received; and how intelligence providers themselves viewed their product. Senior 

policymakers need to inform the Director of National Intelligence clearly, and in writing, of their 

intelligence requirements and their views of intelligence shortcomings. Evaluation of 

intelligence support should come from policymakers, not intelligence professionals. Intelligence 

consumers should not accept “too hard” as a reason for not gathering the intelligence vital to 

successful implementation of the National Strategy.

Recommendation A12. The head of each agency directly involved in combating 

WMD should report at least annually to the Director of National Intelligence the state of 

intelligence support received in programs important to this National Strategy. The Director of 

National Intelligence should include these in his annual report. 

Recommendation A13. Departments of State and Defense, working with other 

Government agencies, should begin a program of table-top exercises on combating WMD 

scenarios, to inform policy and diplomacy. Exercises should evaluate effectiveness of deterrence 

options, plan effective public diplomacy programs, help select targets in event of an adversary’s 

WMD use, and enable more rapid implementation if needed. These should result in an effective 

combating WMD strategy that is refined through exercises that take into account all political and 

military aspects and options. 

As regards targeting, a true “intelligence revolution” is required—one which shifts decisively 

from a half-century’s focus on our enemies’ order of battle to one focused on individuals, 

activities, and specific objects. Today, intelligence must identify and track appropriate WMD 

4

 One member does not believe that new U.S. nuclear weapons need to be developed to meet this requirement. 
12

targets the same way it supported the Strategic Air Command's Single Integrated Operational 

Plan mission in the Cold War. 

In summary, considerable progress has been made in implementation of the National Strategy, 

but it is uneven. It needs improvement particularly in the area of interagency coordination. By 

no means does this mean the National Strategy is ineffective. It is a remarkable guidance 

document, and many individual agencies, recognizing the need, have implemented substantial 

portions of it which fall in their areas of responsibility and which are compatible with their own 

priorities and funding.

TOR TASK #3: RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN THE NATIONAL STRATEGY 

These six changes are listed in report at appropriate points. They are aggregated in Appendix A. 

TOR TASK #4: RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 

NATIONAL STRATEGY

These thirteen changes are listed in report at appropriate points. They are aggregated in 

Appendix A. 

Final Note. The National Strategy to Combat WMD is composed of three pillars: 

counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and consequence management. This report does not 

address consequence management. The decision to leave this topic for future addressal was 

made and reported during initial ACNAB organization work, for four reasons: consequence 

management was not included in the TOR’s four tasking elements; time was not available for 

adequate coverage; counterproliferation and nonproliferation are of vital, urgent interest to the 

Department of State, whereas much of the responsibility for consequence management lies 

within the Homeland Security Department; and the subject matter of the topic is of a completely 

different nature from counterproliferation and nonproliferation. This does not imply that the 

Department of State does not play an important role in consequence management, or does not 

have important responsibilities therein. 
A-1

Appendix A – Summary of Recommendations 

STRATEGY RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation S1. Expand the Counterproliferation section of the National Strategy (pages 

2-3) by adding an “Offensive Operations” subsection (strikes, seizures, elimination of WMD, 

etc.) as the third major element (of four). 

Recommendation S2. Review all elements of the National Strategy, from intelligence 

collection to attribution (forensics), for changes necessitated by the world’s accelerating 

evolution into today’s more dissociated, diffused international environment. 

Recommendation S3. Add the great power of deterrence to U.S. diplomatic efforts with North 

Korea and Iran. In the Deterrence section of the National Strategy (page 3), change the wording 

to: “The United States reserves the right to use military force to prevent irresponsible or 

belligerent states or organizations from producing, deploying, transferring, or using WMD.”

Recommendation S4. Add public diplomacy to the National Strategy (pages 3-4) as an element 

of active nonproliferation diplomacy. 

Recommendation S5. Include the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) in the National 

Strategy, under Controls on Nuclear Materials (pages 4-5).

Recommendation S6. Add a brief section on “Implementation” to the unclassified version of 

the National Strategy. Require the NSC to oversee and coordinate the strategy’s implementation, 

using an Executive Agent (e.g., DOS, DoD). Staff members from other agencies could be 

transferred to the Executive Agent on a permanent-change-of-station basis; and technical support 

could be provided.

IMPLEMENTATION RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation A1. Engage the entire Administration, and key Congressional leaders, in a 

continuing effort to understand the nation’s strategy to combat WMD and agree to the paramount 

importance of having our leaders speak with one voice on vital strategic issues. 

Recommendation A2. DoD should develop plans to carry out a wide spectrum of reinforcing 

measures to lend credibility to deterrent threats made to convince adversaries that their 

continuation of a particular course of action will be met by U.S. military force. Examples are 

accelerated R&D and procurement of improved weapons specialized for this mission, publicized 

testing of weapons, visible and focused counterproliferation exercises, announced deployments, 

increased readiness, elevated alert levels, etc. These activities, also, should be covered by our 

prepared public diplomacy strategy. 
A-2

Recommendation A3. Consider issuing National Policy documents for Nuclear Defense and 

Chemical Defense, following the pattern of the 2004 National Policy for Biodefense.

Recommendation A4. With a high priority, address in a formal way the urgent national need to 

respond to the threat of electromagnetic pulse attack. Key military equipment should be 

hardened; and vital national infrastructure assets (electric power, communications, 

transportation, financial networks, medical facilities, etc.) should be made survivable or 

reconstitutable.

Recommendation A5. In the nation’s widespread and multifaceted nonproliferation activities, 

the United States should be forthcoming about emphasizing the beneficial role nuclear weapons 

have played in protecting the United States (and much of the world) from nuclear attack.5

 If the 

world community does not or cannot roll back nuclear weapons programs in radical or 

unpredictable regimes, our nuclear capabilities will be vital in deterring use against us. 

Recommendation A6. Increase priority and funding for public diplomacy. Focus U.S. 

activities on North Korea, Iran, neighboring states, Muslim nations, potential future proliferators, 

etc. Employ internet, TV, radio, and print media vigorously to raise local awareness of the 

benefits to them of America’s strong nonproliferation program. 

Recommendation A7. Conduct an Executive Branch review of all threat reduction programs to: 

(1) improve their ability to respond without delay to future opportunities such as possible North 

Korean or Iranian decisions to abandon their nuclear ambitions (making use of lessons learned in 

Libya); (2) examine all past U.S. policies governing DoD’s Cooperative Threat Reduction 

program, DOE’s nonproliferation programs, and DOS’s program for redirection of scientists, to 

identify cases where changes in our U.S. “ground rules” would significantly reduce WMD 

threats; (3) terminate programs which have proven difficult to negotiate or have low probabilities 

of success; and (4) rebalance the funding levels among these three departments based on past 

results and future plans.

Recommendation A8. The GNEP initiative has such potential to contribute to the solution of 

worldwide energy and nonproliferation problems that it should have the priority and funding to 

advance at the fastest possible pace, the United States working directly with nuclear fuel 

suppliers.

Recommendation A9. As an urgent, top-priority action to improve implementation of the 

National Strategy, develop comprehensive national political and military “Targeted Strategies” 

for North Korea and Iran. 

Recommendation A10. The nineteen recommendations in this report address the U.S. National 

Strategy, thus their implementation in many cases is the responsibility of agencies other than the 

Department of State . Failure to implement these others could well disable the National Strategy 

itself, therefore the DOS should exert all possible influence to have all agencies act upon these 

recommendations. 

5

 One member does not agree with this recommendation, believing that U.S. policy should be to devalue nuclear 

weapons. 
A-3

Recommendation A11. To provide credibility to our national deterrent force, the United States 

should commence transformation of our nuclear strategy and stockpile. U.S. nuclear weapons 

should have the characteristics needed to deter the threats of today.6

Recommendation A12. The head of each agency directly involved in combating WMD should 

report at least annually to the Director of National Intelligence the state of intelligence support 

received in programs important to this National Strategy. The Director of National Intelligence 

should include these in his annual report.

Recommendation A13. Departments of State and Defense, working with other Government 

agencies, should begin a program of table-top exercises on combating WMD scenarios, to inform 

policy and diplomacy. Exercises should evaluate effectiveness of deterrence options, plan 

effective public diplomacy programs, help select targets in event of an adversary’s WMD use, 

and enable more rapid implementation if needed. These should result in an effective combating 

WMD strategy that is refined through exercises that take into account all political and military 

aspects and options.

6

 One member does not believe that new U.S. nuclear weapons need to be developed to meet this requirement. 
B-1. Terms of Reference 

Appendix B - Terms of Reference 


C-1. Members and Project Staff

Appendix C - Members and Project Staff 

Board Members

Senator Fred Thompson (Chairman) 

Dr. Michael R. Anastasio Dr. Keith Payne 

Dr. Kathleen Bailey Dr. Robert Pfaltzgraff 

Ms. Alison B. Fortier Senator Charles Robb 

Dr. William Graham Dr. Amy Sands 

Mr. Stephen Kappes Dr. James Schlesinger 

Mr. Mitchel B. Kugler Dr. William Schneider 

Dr. Ronald F. Lehman Dr. William Van Cleave 

VADM Robert Monroe, USN (ret.) Mr. James Woolsey 

Dr. Gordon Oehler 

Task Force

VADM Robert Monroe, USN (ret.) (Chairman) 

Dr. Kathleen Bailey 

Mr. Mitchel Kugler 

Dr. Gordon Oehler 

Dr. James Schlesinger 

Dr. William Schneider 

Project Staff

Dr. George Look 

Executive Director, ACNAB 

 Mr. Michael Landweber 

Executive Secretary 

Mr. Matthew Zartman 

Deputy Executive Director, 

ACNAB

Mr. Brandon Buttrick 

Deputy Director, Office of 

Strategic Planning and Outreach 

(SPO), DOS

Ms. Thelma JenkinsAnthony

Executive Assistant 

Ms. M. Wendy Reid 

SAIC Senior Analyst 
D-1. Individuals Consulted by Task Force 

Appendix D - Individuals Consulted by the Task Force 

May 10, 2006 

Ms. Catherine Montie Associate Director, Combating WMD Enterprise, 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) 

Mr. Bruce Pease Director, Weapons Intelligence Nonproliferation and 

Arms Control, Central Intelligence Agency 

June 1, 2006 

Ambassador Kenneth Brill Director, National Counterproliferation Center, 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

Maj. Gen. Richard Newton (USAF) Director, Plans and Policy, U.S. Strategic Command 

Dr. James Tegnelia Director, DTRA 

July 12, 2006 

Dr. Robert Joseph Under Secretary of State, Arms Control and 

International Security 

Mr. Frank Record Acting Assistant Secretary of State, International 

Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) 

Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, USAF (ret.) President, The Scowcroft Group 

August 4, 2006 

Mr. Jack David Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Combating 

Weapons of Mass Destruction and Negotiations 

Policy

Mr. John Rood NSC Senior Director, Counterproliferation Strategy 

and ISN Assistant Secretary-nominee 

 
D-2. Individuals Consulted by Task Force 

Other U.S. Government Officials Consulted 

by Task Force Members 

May – August 2006 

Larry Brown Senior Policy Advisor, Department of Energy (DOE) 

Alex Burkart Deputy Director, ISN/Office of Nuclear Energy, Safety and 

Security

Maureen Clapper DOE 

Jeremy Curtin Principal Deputy Coordinator, Bureau of International Information 

Programs, DOS 

Phillip Dolliff Deputy Director, ISN/ Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction 

(CTR)

David Evans Consultant, ISN/CTR 

Michael Foughty Deputy Director, ISN/Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund 

James Kelman Senior Public Diplomacy Advisor, ISN/ Office of Strategic 

Planning and Outreach 

James Marshall Analyst, Intelligence and Research (INR), DOS 

Jonathan Medalia Specialist in National Defense, Congressional Research Service 

(CRS)

Adam Scheinman Assistant Deputy Administrator, Office of Non-proliferation and 

International Security, National Nuclear Security Administration, 

DOE

Tom Schieber Director of Strike Policy and Integration, Office of the Secretary 

of Defense (OSD) Forces Policy, DoD 

Andrew Semmel Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, ISN 

Bruce Sherman Strategic Planning Manager, Broadcasting Board of Governors 

Dan Smith Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, DOS 

David Stein OSD Forces Policy 

Scott Walker Korea Country Officer, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 

DOS

Christian Westermann Analyst, INR 

Amy Woolf Specialist in National Defense, CRS