SMALL UNIT ACTIONS

 

France: 2d Ranger Battalion at Pointe du Hoe

Saipan: 27th Division on Tanapag Plain

Italy: 351st Infantry at Santa Maria Infante

France: 4th Armored Division at Singling

American Forces in Action Series

Historical DivisionWAR DEPARTMENT  WASHINGTON, D.C.

Facsimile Reprint, 1982, 1986, 1991

CMH Pub 100-14

Center of Military History  United States Army  Washington, DC

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,   Washington, D.C. 20402

ii

FOREWORD

In a nation at war, teamwork by the whole people is necessary for victory.   But the issue is decided on the battlefield, toward which all national effort   leads. The country's fate lies in the hands of its soldier citizens; in the   clash of battle is found the final test of plans, training, equipment, and-above   all�the fighting spirit of units and individuals.

**AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION SERIES** presents detailed accounts of particular   combat operations of United States forces. To the American public, this record   of high achievement by men who served their nation well is presented as a preface   to the full military history of World War II. To the soldiers who took part   in the operations concerned, these narratives will give the opportunity to see   more clearly the results of orders which they obeyed, and of sacrifices which   they and their comrades made, in performance of missions that find their meaning   in the outcome of a larger plan of battle.

 

s/Dwight D. Eisenhower  DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  Chief of Staff.

iii

WAR DEPARTMENT  Historical Division  Washington 25, D. C.  4 April 1946

	*Small Unit Actions*, eleventh in the series of monographs on American   operations in World War II, marks a departure from earlier numbers in that series.   It presents, instead of a coordinated treatment of a larger operation, four   detailed narratives dealing with small units which took part in such operations.   Each narrative has a unity of its own, but the actions dealt with are separate   and distinct, relating to four campaigns in three main theaters of war.

	There are several reasons that justify such a publication. The most important   is to give both the military reader and the American public solid, uncolored   material for a better understanding of the real nature of modern battle. Military   operations on the scale of this war if treated, as they must usually be, in   terms of armies and corps, can give only an outline account of the fortunes   of units smaller than a battalion, and very often the battalion is treated as   the smallest counter in the moves described on a battlefield. This tends to   be misleading; a battalion has no such unity as a battleship, but is a complex   organism that maneuvers ordinarily on a front half a mile or more in width,   includes a variety of specialized weapons, and often has attachments of engineers   or tanks to provide greater tactical flexibility. In jungle or hedgerow country,   the battalion frequently exists only as a mechanism to coordinate, perhaps with   the greatest difficulty, the separate engagements of companies, platoons, or   even squads. When the record (or the military history) sums up an action by   saying, "The 3d Battalion fought its way forward against heavy resistance for   500 yards," only the man who has himself experienced combat is likely to realize   what this can involve, and what the phrase conceals. It does not give the story   of the front line action as experienced by the combat soldier. That story, hardest   of all military operations to recapture and make clear, lies in detail such   as that offered by the narratives presented here.

	A further reason for such a publication has been recognized in the past   by American military leaders, as by others. In training for modern war, particularly   in armies largely officered in lower units by men taken from civilian life,   there is much need for concrete, case-history material which company and field-grade   officers can use to find out what actually happens in battle. Manuals must deal   with doctrines and theory; their material is generalized. There has always been   need for factual supplement, to show how tactical doctrines, good and bad, actually   work under the stress of battle conditions. But military literature has tended   to leave this field of research to the novelists, and military records have   not in the past been designed to furnish an adequate basis for study of small-unit   actions. After the First World War, the American Army endeavored to collect   such materials, and found them hard to get and difficult to evaluate. The best   were included in a useful and interesting volume, *Infantry in Battle*,   prepared under the auspices of The Infantry School, Fort Benning.

	From its inception in 1943, the Historical Division, War Department Special   Staff, had as one of its alms the securing of sufficient data to support future   work of this type. For obtaining this data, as well as information at higher   levels and on other phases of operations, the Information and Historical Units,   attached to field armies, conducted extensive interviews with personnel of units   engaged in typical, unusual, or critical actions. The interviews were accompanied   by terrain study of the battlefield, sometimes conducted with members of the   units being interviewed. Every effort was made, by careful checking and rechecking,   to obtain a full and accurate account�not for the sake of a colorful story,   but to have a trustworthy record for

v

whatever use it afforded. Sometimes (as in the case of two of the actions published   here) practically all survivors of participating units were involved in group   interviews that might last two or three days for a single group. The scale of   the effort is suggested by the fact that some 2,000 indexed interviews have   come back to the War Department archives from one theater.

	The four narratives given here will serve as samples of the source materials   thus obtained, containing in very large measure data which are not to be found   in unit records. The latter were used in every case, however, to check and supplement   interviews.

	The actions chosen for this publication illustrate widely varying tactical   problems and methods. Only one (Pointe du Hoe) represents a highly specialized   form of action; the others are typical of scores of battles in their respective   theaters of operations. All are average in the sense that they are not "success"   stories, but cross sections of a war which involved reverses as well as victories.   This fact will be obscured in histories of campaigns and major battles. for,   in these, U.S. forces were almost uniformly successful. But the larger successes   were won by actions like those recorded here; in every phase of the war battalions   and companies went through a daily fare of experience that was never uniform,   that nearly always included some measure of trial and even defeat as part of   the fuller pattern which, over a longer period, added up to victory.

	The interviews for, and preparation of, the four narratives should be credited   as follows: *Pointe du Hoe*, Historical Section, European Theater of Operations:   *The Fight on Tanapag Plain*, 1st Information and Historical Service: *Santa   Maria Infante*, 7th Information and Historical Service (Fifth Army); *Singling*,   3d Information and Historical Service (Third Army).

	*Small Unit Actions* is based on the best military records available.   As far as possible, names and ranks of personnel were checked with records in   The Adjutant General's Office. Roster of the enlisted men who participated in   the *Santa Maria Infante Operation* and *The Fight on Tanapag Plain*   were not accessible. It was impossible to obtain full names of all men mentioned   in the operations and to check last names, so it is expected that some errors   occur in spelling of names and in grade designations

	Five photographs (pp. 9, 13, 37, 75, 91) are by the U.S. Navy: three (pp.   79. 87. 107) were taken by the U.S. Marine Corps; eleven (pp. 1, 8, 10, 20,   32, 42, 49, 126, 130. 160, 182) are from the U.S. Army Air Forces; three (pp.   92, 105, 109) are by the 1st Information and Historical Service; twelve (pp.   176, 191, 192. 193, 194, 198, 199, 200, 202, 203, 204, 210) were taken by the   3d Information and Historical Service: four (pp. 116, 123, 142, 212) were taken   by the Joint Intelligence Collecting Agency. All others were furnished by the   U.S. Army Signal Corps.

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vi

CONTENTS

|      ***Page      **POINTE DU HOE (2d RANGER BATTALION, 6 JUNE         1944)
     
Assault Plans    
4    
The Landing    
5    
The Cliff Assault    
9    
Capture of the Point    
19    
Advance to the Highway    
26    
Morning at the Point: Action on the Left Flank    
34    
Morning at the Point: The CP Group    
36    
Afternoon Counterattacks    
43    
The Advance Group During D Day    
45    
The German Night Attack: First Phase    
48    
Night Attack: Second Phase    
56    
Night Attack: Finale    
57    **THE FIGHT ON TANAPAG PLAIN (27th DIVISION,         6 JULY 1944)
     
Background: The Attack on 5 July    
69    
Morning of 6 July: Attack on the Plain    
74    
Change in Attack Plans    
81    
The Morning Attack at Harakiri Gulch    
86    
The Afternoon Attack at Harakiri Gulch    
89    
Afternoon: Plans for a New Attack (105th Infantry)    
100    
Advance of the 1st Battalion (105th Infantry)    
102    **SANTA MARIA INFANTE (351st INFANTRY, 11-14         MAY 1944)
     
Task of the 351st Infantry    
119    
The Night Attack: Jump-Off    
128    
Sergeant Pyenta's Group at Hill 103    
131    
Lieutenant Panich's Group at Hill 103    
132    
Sergeant Eddy's Group at Hill 103    
135    
Advance to the Tame Road    
137    
Company E at The Spur: 1st Platoon    
143    
Company E at The Spur: The Main Body    
145    
Company G is Stopped at The Spur    
149    
The 3d Battalion is Stopped at Hill 103 (12 May)    
151    
Capture of Company F (12 May)    
154    
Plans for Renewed Attack (13 May)    
158    
The Enemy Holds Out on The Spur (13 May)    
161    
Hill 103 Again Stops the 3d Battalion    
163    
1st Battalion Gains at the S-Ridge    
165    
Capture of Santa Maria Infante (14 May)    
170    **vii**
     ***Page      **SINGLING (4th ARMORED DIVISION, 6 DECEMBER         1944)
     
Background of the Attack    
179    
A Change in Plan    
183    
The Infantry Attack    
188    
Stalemate in Singling    
200    
Relief of Team B    
206    
**ANNEX**:         Abbreviations     
212    
Illustrations

     ***Page      **Pointe du Hoe      
     
Pointe du Hoe Cliffs
1    
Tip of Pointe du Hoe
3    
Western Half of Fortified Area
8    
Bomb and Shell Holes
9    
Last Lap of the Climb
13    
Cratered Ground
17    
Wrecked Emplacements
18    
Wreckage on the Point
19    
Top of German OP Position
22    
Ruins on Exit Road
25    
Farm Buildings on Exit Road
27    
Lane Leading South
31    
Col. Rudder's CP
37    
After Relief
41    
Orchard South of Rangers' Position
47    
Area of Highway Positions
49    
Typical Norman Orchard
53    
Hedgerows
60    
Preparing to Leave the Point
61    
Men of 2d and 5th Rangers
62    **The Fight on Tanapag Plain      
     
Tanapag Plain
71    
Aerial Photo of Tanapag Plain Battle         Zone
75    
Infantry and Medium Tanks
79    
Paradise Valley
87    
Aerial Photo of Harakiri Gulch Sector
91    
Capt. Lawrence J. O'Brien
92    
A Pause in the Battle
101    
CP of the 1st Battalion, 105th Infantry
103    
The Ditch that Dorey Cleaned Up
104    **viii**
     ***Page      
Capt. Louis F. Ackerman
105    
Cliff Walls
106    
T/Sgt. Charles Gannaway
109    **Santa Maria Infante      
     
Terrain of Fifth Army's Battle
116    
The Objective of the 351st Infantry
121    
Terrain of the Initial Attack
123    
The Ridge Road
124    
Terrain of Opening Attack
126    
Minturno
128    
Tame
141    
Minturno-Santa Maria Infante Ridge
142    
The Bare Slopes of the S-Ridge
157    
Terrain of Later Attacks, 13 May 1944
160    
Santa Maria Infante
170    
Returning to Ruined Homes
172    
Panorama
opposite page 175    **Singling      
     
Church at Singling
176    
Aerial View of Singling
182    
Enemy Self-propelled Guns
186    
Singling Main Square
190    
Garden
192    
Main Street in Singling
193    
View Northeast from Singling
194    
Courtyard
198    
Open Yard
199    
Hauptman's Destroyed Tank
200    
Fitzgerald's Firing Position
202    
Mark V Tank
203    
Lt. Goble's Tank
204    
Scene Near Bining
211    
Maps

**Pointe du Hoe**
     ***No.      ***Page      
1 Assault at Omaha Beach
2    
2 Plan for Assault at Pointe du Hoe
6    
3 The Assault Landings at Pointe du         Hoe
10    
4 Advance to the Highway
21    
5 Morning Near the Point
32    **ix**
***No.******Page      
6 Afternoon Counterattacks
42    
7 Highway Position, 0830-2000 6 June
46    
8 The German Night Attack, 6/7 June         1944
50    **The Fight on Tanapag Plain      
     
1 V Amphibious Corps on Saipan,         Morning 5 July 1944
66    
2 27th Division Zone, Morning 5         July 1944
68    
3 Night Positions, 5 July, 105th         Infantry
70    
4 V Amphibious Corps, Morning 6         July 1944
72    
5 105th Infantry Attack, Morning         6 July 1944
74    
6 The New Attack Zones
82    
7 Harakiri Gulch
90    
8 Final Attack on the Plain
99    
9 V Amphibious Corps, Night of Banzai         Attack, 6/7 July 1944
112    **Santa Maria Infante      
     
1 Fifth Army Objectives
118    
2 Mt. Bracchi Hills, 11 May 1944
120    
3 Plan of Opening Attack, 351st Infantry
122    
4 2d Battalion, 351st Infantry
130    
5 Company F, Sgt. Pyenta's Group at         Hill 103
132    
6 Company F, Lt. Panich's Group at Hill         103
133    
7 Company F, S/Sgt. Eddy's Group at         Hill 103
136    
8 Company F, Advance to the Tame Road
138    
9 Company F, Position at the Culvert
140    
10 Company E, 1st and 2d Platoons at         The Spur
143    
11 Company E, 3d and 4th Platoons at         The Spur
144    
12 Company E, the Assault of the Crest
146    
13 Company G at The Spur
148    
14 Situation at Dawn, 12 May 1944
150    
15 3d Battalion Attack on Hill 103
152    
16 New Plan of Attack, 351st Infantry
156    
17 The Attack on The Spur
161    
18 The Attack on Hill 103
164    
19 The Attack on the S-Ridge
166    
20 The End of the Battle on Mt. Bracchi         Hills
171    **Singling      
     
1 Third Army Front, 5 December         1944
178    
2 4th Armored Division, Plan for         6 December 1944
180    
3 The Attack on Singling
184    
4 The Fight in the Village
opposite page 212    **x**
**Document formatted by CPT Timothy R. Frambes,   CMH Intern, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2001**

*page created 16 November 2001*

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