[January 2006]

Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction

Iraq Reconstruction

Lessons in Human 

Capital Management

1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

 Introduction 1 

 Lessons Learned Findings 3

 Policy Alignment: 4

Policy and Regulatory Guidelines 

 for Staffing a Temporary “Surge” Organization

 Workforce Planning and Deployment: 11

Dealing with Mission Flux and 

 Interagency Culture Conflicts

 Recruitment: 23

Matching Skills with Need

 Continuity: 34

Dealing with Staff Turnover and 

Information Hand-off

 Lessons Learned Recommendations 45

 Forum Participant Biographies 53

JANUARY 2006 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 1

INTRODUCTION

This is the first report of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s (SIGIR) Lessons Learned Initiative (LLI). The LLI is designed 

to enhance ongoing efforts in Iraq as well as to inform future U.S. reconstruction and stabilization planning and programs. The initiative focuses 

on three key subject areas:

• Human Capital Management

• Contracting

• Program and Project Management

In each subject area, SIGIR gathers information through research and 

interviews, collating and distilling the results into a white paper. Each 

white paper is then reviewed by a panel of experts that evaluates the 

findings and makes recommendations. 

About the Human Capital Management Forum

On September 20, 2005, SIGIR conducted its first Lessons Learned 

Forum, which focused on human capital management. The forum 

culminated months of work on the range of personnel issues that have 

emerged during the Iraq reconstruction enterprise. Much of the data 

SIGIR developed was derived from interviews with personnel who had 

first-hand experience in Iraq reconstruction human resource matters.

SIGIR gathered more than 30 experts drawn from government, 

industry, and academia, including many who served in Iraq, for a 

full-day forum at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D.C., to 

evaluate the findings and provide recommendations. This report presents 

those findings and recommendations. 
2 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT
Lessons Learned Findings
4 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

POLICY ALIGNMENT: 

POLICY AND REGULATORY GUIDELINES 

FOR STAFFING A TEMPORARY 

“SURGE” ORGANIZATION

Given the sheer complexity of post-conflict reconstruction efforts, 

developing a clear strategic plan of action at the outset is critical to 

success. Such a plan should articulate the U.S. interests at stake, 

define U.S. objectives for reconstruction, and lay out the strategy 

for achieving these policy objectives, along with a clear division of 

labor delineating who is responsible for what aspects of the plan’s 

implementation. Perhaps even more important than the plan itself 

is the strategy development and planning process, which allows 

key players to build working relationships, hammer out differences, 

identify potential inconsistencies and gaps, synchronize their 

actions, and better understand their roles.1

Play to Win,

Center for Strategic and International Studies

 and the Association of the U.S. Army
JANUARY 2006 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 5

History teaches that reconstruction programs in post-conflict environments are neither easy nor expeditious. The most noteworthy of 

these efforts—the post-World War II reconstruction of Japan and 

Germany—took many years and a continuing commitment of U.S. 

forces and funds to reach its goals. Other U.S. reconstruction or 

relief endeavors—although less costly and protracted—were generally more troublesome or, as in Somalia, ultimately unsuccessful. 

This report on the use of human resources within the U.S. reconstruction program in Iraq reveals a central if unsurprising point: 

there was insufficient systematic planning for human capital management in Iraq before and during the U.S.-directed stabilization 

and reconstruction operations. The practical limitations ensuing 

from this shortfall adversely affected reconstruction in post-war 

Iraq. Moreover, the somewhat fitful creation of the initial coalition reconstruction organizations, and the unanticipated post-war 

collapse of virtually all Iraqi governing structures, substantially 

hindered coalition efforts to develop and rapidly execute an effective 

reconstruction program. 

A variety of causes led to the problems that burdened human 

capital management in Iraq. When planning for managing postwar Iraq began in mid-2002, no comprehensive policy or regulatory guidelines existed to staff a temporary “surge” organization 

for stabilization and reconstruction. One senior Department of 

Defense (DoD) official told the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction (SIGIR) that the U.S. government was not systemically structured to execute overseas reconstruction and stabilization 

programs. Further, overall operational planning naturally focused 

on military requirements. 
6 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

Shortly after overt hostilities ended, the shortcomings in reconstruction and stabilization human resources became evident:

• There was no existing contingency organization to lead the 

reconstruction and relief process.

• There was no regulatory template for recruiting personnel to staff 

a temporary “surge” relief and reconstruction organization.

A senior Department of State (DoS) official noted that:

[the U.S. government was not prepared]...to be an occupying power. 

We have no contemporary doctrine for occupying another country 

[and] no basic doctrine on which to base an effective personnel 

policy...the jobs that we were asking people to do...required constant, 

consistent judgments; a common understanding of goals and 

policies; a common discipline; a common sense of accountability; 

etc. This is what comes from years and decades of an evolving group 

culture. It cannot happen overnight. And it cannot be achieved 

by bringing together disparate individuals whose loyalty and 

accountability is to the company that hired them rather than the USG.2

Executing an effective reconstruction and stabilization program in 

Iraq would have been greatly enhanced if there had been an existing 

“civilian reserve corps” to deploy in support of relief operations. But 

no trained and deployable cadre of interagency experts was available for the Iraq relief effort. And the large-scale reconstruction and 

stability operations in Iraq could not be solved by contracting out 

those duties. 
JANUARY 2006 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 7

Initial Planning Phase

The initial phase of post-conflict planning for Iraq began in mid2002 when several interagency groups, coordinated by the National 

Security Council (NSC) and the Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB), began developing operational plans for relief and reconstruction. These groups engaged in limited information sharing 

across agency lines.3

 DoS simultaneously sponsored the “Future of 

Iraq” project, which created a 1,200-page document that proposed 

a variety of ambitious concepts for post-Saddam Iraq. The project’s 

report, however, did not provide a comprehensive plan for the U.S. 

management of post-war Iraq. 

Formal development of a more detailed reconstruction administrative plan began in January 2003 when Lieutenant General Jay 

Garner, USA (Ret.), was appointed to head the newly created Office 

of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). According to General Garner, ORHA had no pre-existing guidelines or 

regulatory templates for acquiring human resources. Thus, after 

General Garner’s appointment, ORHA rapidly began to develop a 

staffing plan based on authorizations for “detailing” federal employees, which were provided in a January 2003 Presidential Decision 

Memorandum. General Garner observed, “We started [our staffing 

plan] in the first [week] of February... for a March problem.”4

Planning Guidelines

Two DoD documents served as guides to addressing human capital 

management in post-war Iraq: 

• Civilian Personnel Management Guide for Management 

Officials During Contingencies and Emergencies 

• Joint Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations
8 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

In March 2003, DoD published the Civilian Personnel Management Guide for Management Officials During Contingencies and 

Emergencies, which identified human resource management regulatory provisions that apply during emergency situations. The guide 

lists a variety of “Hiring Flexibilities” available during contingencies and emergencies, including temporary excepted appointments, 

emergency appointments to senior level positions, and Senior 

Executive Service (SES) limited appointments. However, the guide 

does not provide a framework for establishing a temporary organization like ORHA or the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). 

The other relevant DoD document was Joint Publication 1-0, Joint 

Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations, which provides 

guidance for developing personnel requirements during the planning and execution of joint operations. Although the planning document presumes the use of DoD civilians and contractors within joint 

operations, its primary focus is on the allocation of military and 

support personnel directly involved in military operations. Moreover, this document does not provide any guidance for managing 

post-conflict personnel requirements. 
JANUARY 2006 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 9

There was no contingency organization to 

lead the reconstruction and relief process.

There was no template for recruiting 

personnel to staff a temporary “surge” 

relief and reconstruction organization.
10 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

The 3161 Provision 

The primary statutory provision that was used for employing civilians in Iraq was Title 5, Section 3161 of the U.S. Code. The 3161 

provision enables temporary organizations to acquire staff through 

temporary appointments to the excepted service of the Civil Service. 

ORHA and CPA used 3161 extensively to hire civilian personnel for 

periods of up to one year (with the possibility of renewal). Depending on the designated tour length, 3161 personnel could receive most 

federal benefits, but their 3161 service time did not count toward 

certain federal rehiring privileges, including Civil Service status.

According to a former CPA personnel specialist, the 3161 hiring 

authority had long existed under 5 CFR 213.3199, but it had been 

typically used to fill boards or commissions. The provision was useful for rapid hiring because it allowed appointments from outside 

government without the usual competition required under formal 

job classifications.5 The use of 3161 to staff the temporary stabilization and reconstruction organizations in Iraq appears to have been 

unprecedented. But without the authority and agility provided by 

3161, it would have been impossible to overcome the shortfall that 

would have arisen by relying only on interagency detailees. Among 

employees working for CPA in March 2004, more than 20% had 

been hired under 5 USC 3161.
JANUARY 2006 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 11

WORKFORCE PLANNING AND DEPLOYMENT: 

DEALING WITH MISSION FLUX AND 

INTERAGENCY CULTURE CONFLICTS

Workforce planning is fundamental to establishing a successful 

government-managed reconstruction organization. To be effective, 

planning should clearly identify current and future human capital 

needs, the number of personnel required to accomplish a specific 

mission, the specific competencies necessary, and the sources from 

which skilled personnel can be drawn. Appropriate workforce planning should also include elements for evaluating and revising plans. 

The Iraq reconstruction experience was affected by special circumstances and requirements that inhibited management’s capacity 

to execute effective workforce planning activities. These circumstances included: 

• The wide-ranging role of CPA: CPA was the de facto government 

of Iraq that oversaw the reestablishment of Iraqi ministries, 

consulted with an advisory “legislature,” promulgated laws and 

regulations, provided diplomatic links with foreign governments, 

and coordinated with the coalition’s military leadership. 

• CPA’s temporary status: CPA had only a few months to define its 

mission, design an organization to meet that mission, and staff 

the organization. The lack of sufficient pre-conflict planning and 

the absence of an existing governmental structure to address 

such problems made it difficult to arrive rapidly at an adequate 

human capital solution.

• The deteriorating security environment: The security situation 

affected all plans and operations and was the most inhibiting 

factor in recruitment. 
12 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

• Inaccurate assumptions about the Iraqi government bureaucracy:

Pre-war reconstruction planning assumed that Iraq’s bureaucracy would go back to work when the fighting stopped. When it 

became clear that the Iraqi bureaucracy was in widespread disarray, ORHA and CPA had to find coalition personnel to perform 

these tasks. Forum participants described this as a key factor 

underlying all of CPA’s organizational and operational difficulties. 

Several operational shortcomings exacerbated the extraordinarily 

challenging circumstances that ORHA and CPA faced in Iraq:

• limited personnel sources

• constantly changing requirements

• inconsistent interagency coordination

Limited Personnel Sources

The workforce planning and deployment process for Iraq’s 

reconstruction began before the start of hostilities when ORHA 

developed a staff to address Iraq’s post-war requirements. ORHA 

was assigned three major tasks or “pillars” —reconstruction, civil 

administration, and humanitarian affairs. It built a structure to 

address these pillars and sought personnel from the appropriate 

U.S. government agencies to staff the mission.7 The only apparent 

systematic manpower plan, however, was the military Joint Manning 

Document (JMD), which authorized 94 military positions within 

ORHA.8 Civilian detailees and direct hires were not included in this 

initial manning plan. 

ORHA sent requests to civilian and military agencies for personnel support but did not prepare detailed job descriptions because 

of time constraints. For functions that were “not military-unique,” 

ORHA put out the call to agencies to provide civilian personnel.9

Personnel began trickling in, and ORHA’s staffing count rose to 150 
JANUARY 2006 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 13

in mid-March 2003. An ORHA document shows that about half of 

ORHA’s personnel were military detailees (both officer and enlisted). 

Civilian personnel included contingents from DoD, DoS, the U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID), and a few from 

other government agencies.10

According to a former ORHA staff member, the number of civilian personnel in ORHA began to increase rapidly after deployment 

to Kuwait in March 2003. Before moving on to Baghdad in April, 

ORHA’s staff exceeded 500 people, including security and other support personnel. “People just kept coming in...we were running out 

of billeting space,” said one ORHA interviewee. Meanwhile, actual 

staffing patterns began to deviate sharply from the JMD as individual assignments were shifted to respond to rapidly evolving events on 

the ground in Iraq.11

Creation of CPA

CPA was created in April 2003 and was intended to be a more 

comprehensive governing entity than ORHA. In May 2003, when 

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III arrived in Baghdad as CPA administrator, ORHA’s mission and personnel were immediately subsumed 

by CPA. CPA required a much more ambitious staffing plan than 

ORHA had, and rapidly expanded its staffing blueprint as a result. 

Ambassador Bremer and CPA senior advisors recognized that their 

broader mission required many more people and hired accordingly. 

Further, as CPA evolved the composition of the organization evolved 

from primarily military to primarily civilian. 

Lack of an Adequate Staffing Document 

Except for the JMD passed down from ORHA, CPA had no formal 

program for manpower planning. A “pull system” evolved in which 

personnel needs were determined in Baghdad and passed back to 
14 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

Washington for execution. According to a March 2004 report of the 

CPA Inspector General (CPA-IG):

At the initial standup of the CPA Baghdad, the CPA Personnel Office 

(HRM Forward) was manned by one individual who was on a threemonth assignment and then replaced. The CPA senior advisors 

assigned to the various Iraqi Ministries determined their initial 

manning requirements and forwarded these...to HRM Forward, 

who...sent them to CPA Washington for action. HRM officials in 

Washington contacted agencies throughout the government and 

began the process of recruiting personnel to fill CPA positions 

...throughout this process, the CPA manning document changed 

constantly in terms of the number of required personnel. There 

was no known ceiling to the number of civilians needed to support 

the CPA.12

Senior CPA officials in Baghdad sometimes recruited personnel directly from various U.S. government agencies without going 

through CPA Washington. These informal hires were then presented to CPA Washington for processing, which contributed to the 

haphazard human resources situation.13 Moreover, because CPA was 

expected to be a short-term organization, little attempt was made 

early on to ensure that personnel committed to assignments in Iraq 

beyond three to six months. 

Eventually, CPA Baghdad prepared a more detailed JMD and 

provided it to CPA Washington. This document contained a civilian 

segment that constituted the most detailed civilian planning document created for Iraq reconstruction. Military officials in Washington, however, removed the civilian section because their offices were 

not structured to deal with civilian appointments.14
JANUARY 2006 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 15

ORHA sent requests to civilian and military 

agencies for personnel support but did not 

prepare detailed job descriptions because 

of time constraints. For functions that were 

“not military-unique,” ORHA put out the 

call to agencies to provide civilian personnel.
16 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

INTRA-CPA COMMUNICATIONS

One SIGIR interviewee noted that, in the first months of the CPA, 

some sections were well staffed, with qualified people drawn from 

cooperative home agencies in Washington, while other offices, 

without such direct support, often had insufficient personnel or were 

short on necessary expertise and leadership. CPA’s departments in 

Baghdad had limited communication on personnel issues, especially 

during this early period, and no CPA Baghdad authority conducted 

a comprehensive inventory of staff.15 

CREATION OF THE CPA RECRUITING TEAM

By mid-to-late summer 2003, the changing circumstances facing 

CPA in post-war Iraq altered original assumptions about length of 

stay and thus placed new demands on the developing recruiting system in Washington. At the same time, according to one senior U.S. 

reconstruction official, the ability and willingness of U.S. government agencies to provide detailees to CPA had declined.

To resolve this situation, a new CPA recruiting team was set up 

within the Pentagon’s White House Liaison Office (WHLO), based 

in part on the “transition team” model used to staff new Presidential 

administrations. This team immediately began a strong recruitment 

drive for temporary, direct-hire 3161s to staff CPA and to cover the 

shortfall in detailee contributions from federal agencies.16

The WHLO CPA recruiting team was successful in quickly hiring 

hundreds of new temporary employees, but some possessed what 

proved to be inconsistent skill sets. Furthermore, no long-term 

human resource strategic plan was developed. CPA senior staff and 

ministry advisors in Baghdad continued to determine manpower 
JANUARY 2006 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 17

needs, and the recruiting team matched their requests to an 

applicant pool.*

Constantly Changing Requirements

Major changes in circumstances on the ground in Iraq substantially 

altered personnel requirements within CPA. This began in May 

2003 when the newly created CPA subsumed ORHA. The swift 

and complete collapse of virtually all of Iraq’s governing structures 

required CPA to expand its role to the complete management of the 

Iraqi government as well as reconstruction. The lack of a functioning 

indigenous security force and the dissolution of the Iraqi ministries 

generated unanticipated demands on the coalition, requiring the 

deployment of a larger number of military and civilian personnel 

than originally envisioned. 

In November 2003, President Bush announced that CPA would 

terminate by the end of June 2004 and would transfer all governing authority to the Iraqi Interim Government. The President also 

announced that, with this transition, DoS would assume (from 

DoD) the lead role in managing Iraq’s relief and reconstruction. 

These important decisions immediately changed the CPA’s mission 

plan and put the future of many pending CPA positions on hold. 

Since the middle of 2003, CPA had expected to be in operation for at 

least two more years. The President’s announcement changed these 

expectations and thus fundamentally altered CPA’s human capital 

management. By the spring of 2004, many job offers and deployment 

actions remained frozen while CPA and DoS decided whether these 

positions would continue after the June 2004 turnover.17 

*There were some reports that certain employment decisions were politically 

influenced, especially for mid-level hires. SIGIR Interview, June 2004. The DoD 

WHLO vigorously disputed such reports.

JANUARY 2006 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 19

���� ���� ���� ����

���� ���� ���� ����

����� ��� ��� ���� ����� ��� ��� ����

����� ��� ��� ���� ����� ��� ��� ����

����� ��� ��� ���� ��� �������� ��� ��� ���� ��� ���

����

������������

����

��� ��� � �� � � � ��� ��� � ����

����������

�����������������

� ��� ���������������

�������������������������������

����

����

��������������������

������������������������������

���� �����������������������

������������������

��������������

����������������������

���������

�����

������������������������������������������

����������

�����������

�����������

��������������������

��������

�������

�����������

����

�������

�����������������

�������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������ � � � � ��������������������������������������������������������� � � � � � ����������������������������������������������

� � ���������������������������������������� �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������

�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������

���������������������������������������������������

��������

��������

���������������� ��� ����������������
20 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

Inconsistent Interagency Coordination

Relatively few agencies responded effectively to the call for volunteer 

detailees for CPA. One ORHA official pointed to DoD’s initial “go it 

alone” attitude as a factor. The agencies that did provide personnel 

may have acted through requests from senior officials in Baghdad 

who had influence in their agencies—not through any formal coordination or tasking process. Interagency coordination was generally 

weak on human resource management within the U.S. government. 

One of the causes of this coordinative weakness was the lack of any 

systemic process within the U.S. government to manage reconstruction and stabilization programs. In August 2004, the DoS addressed 

this issue by creating the new office of Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). This office will: 

lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. government civilian 

capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations. S/CRS 

is building civilian capacity to plan and coordinate stabilization 

and reconstruction efforts. S/CRS and its interagency partners 

also draw on expertise from nongovernmental organizations, think 

tanks, private firms, and universities. The U.S. government will use 

these resources to encourage and coordinate activities with other 

governments and international organizations.6

One forum participant expressed surprise at the degree to which 

many federal agencies gave only “lip service” to taskings from the 

White House and the NSC for Iraq detailees. This participant suggested that the White House should insist that Cabinet secretaries 

support detailee initiatives and be held accountable. 

Another forum participant emphasized that most civilian agencies are not structured for surge events. Some senior government 

officials stressed that domestic agencies do not have the required 
JANUARY 2006 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 21

numbers or types of personnel available for overseas reconstruction duty. One agency representative stated that his agency met CPA 

demands by reprioritizing work, which caused lower-priority, nonIraq initiatives to be delayed.

Although temporary, direct-hire 3161s were able to fill many of 

the billets for which government detailees were unavailable, they 

often had no military or government experience and thus were 

unfamiliar with the management environment. Moreover, most U.S. 

government detailees to CPA had not worked with the military or 

in a post-conflict environment. Better workforce planning by CPA 

might have helped to alleviate this problem. One senior CPA 

official noted:

The civilians in the Coalition generally had no knowledge of military 

organization, and thus no idea of which parts of the military might 

either assist them or need to know what they were planning. The 

civilians didn’t know whom to call.18

It should be noted that this situation was not true of ORHA, 

which had a high proportion of military detailees and civilian 

personnel with military experience, according to a senior ORHA 

official. DoD officials indicate that this mix was deliberate, to allow 

ORHA to function, it was hoped, as an intermediary between the 

U.S. Military Central Command and civilian reconstruction 

specialists.

The Iraq Reconstruction and Development 

Council (IRDC) 

In an ambitious effort to tap the expertise of Iraqi exiles and expatriates for the reconstruction program, DoD created the Iraq 
22 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

Reconstruction and Development Council (IRDC) in 2003. IRDC 

was tasked with helping to rebuild Iraqi government structures by 

embedding Iraqi exiles and expatriates as technical advisors in 23 

Iraqi ministries and provincial centers. Under a $33 million U.S. 

government contract for IRDC recruiting, a U.S.-based firm hired 

Iraqi expatriates to support CPA efforts to bring relief to Iraq. 

The program’s main goal was to leverage the expatriates’ professional knowledge and cultural understanding to help rebuild the 

government infrastructure. There are mixed reports about this 

program’s effectiveness and the qualifications of IRDC personnel. 

Problems arose in a variety of areas. For example, IRDC members 

had an ambiguous status that differentiated them from mainstream 

CPA colleagues and from their native Iraqi counterparts. Additionally, the chain of command established for IRDC was unclear to 

CPA management because their personnel were deployed on a broad 

range of projects, with no central CPA point of contact for guidance 

and management.

While many IRDC members claimed that they were underemployed and not given the responsibilities that they expected, others had clear records of individual achievement. Perhaps the best 

example was provided by a DoS official who noted that IRDC set 

up a shadow council of economic advisors led by Sinan al-Shabbibi, 

who is now the governor of the Central Bank of Iraq. 

One forum participant said that IRDC’s “major shortcoming was 

[that] the goals and commitments set forth through the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense were not communicated to ORHA/CPA 

personnel in Baghdad. As a result, IRDC and ORHA/CPA expectations never completely meshed.” DoD officials involved in organizing 

IRDC, however, assert that CPA “was repeatedly informed of IRDC’s 

availability, but declined to make use of this resource.”19 A former 

CPA official recalled that some IRDC personnel had limited skills, 
JANUARY 2006 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 23

unrealistic expectations about their status, and were reluctant to 

accept the authority of senior CPA officials, thus making it difficult 

to use them effectively.

The Iraq experience has shown the critical need for in-depth 

understanding among relief and reconstruction specialists of the cultural, political, and socioeconomic underpinnings of the post-conflict country or region. A cadre of experts drawn from that country’s 

expatriate population could provide a unique resource to meet this 

need. One lesson learned from Iraq in this area is that using an expatriate corps requires clear lines of authority and careful matching of 

skills and jobs. 

RECRUITMENT: 

MATCHING SKILLS WITH NEEDS

The Coalition nations have millions of the most talented individuals 

in the world. We needed, and did not have, several thousand of 

them. Our partners sent some of their best and brightest. The 

United States did not proportionally provide. There were all sorts of 

reasons that sending enough good people to Iraq was difficult, from 

simply the lack of places to sleep, to the difficulty in getting people 

to put their lives on hold to do a demonstrably dangerous job. 

Those involved in staffing the Coalition found every one of these 

obstacles. We simply did not have sufficient people for the task. 

There was no time to maintain a record of what was occurring—it 

was difficult enough in my Directorate to maintain even the 

semblance of a correspondence chronological file.20

“Restarting the Economy in Iraq,”

Rear Admiral David Oliver, USN (Ret.), 

former CPA Director for Management and Budget
24 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

As with any large and diverse organization, CPA’s ability to 

accomplish its mission was directly linked to the quality and skill of 

the people who staffed it. Therefore, the personnel recruiting process 

was a fundamental component of CPA’s operational success. Recruiters needed to determine the necessary skills and experience, identify 

candidates who possessed these traits, and hire and retain these 

candidates. They also had to ensure that managers properly matched 

their skills to CPA positions. These circumstances and requirements 

combined to create challenges to planning and executing personnel 

recruitment for Iraq reconstruction. 

CPA’s experiences yielded lessons that could improve ongoing 

recruiting processes in Iraq. Among these lessons were: 

• lack of matching talent to mission requirements

• inappropriate or inconsistent tour lengths

• the overtime disincentive

• lack of interagency support

Lack of Matching Talent to Mission Requirements

The process of hiring reconstruction personnel must be aligned with 

the expected mission’s goals and requirements so that skills critical to mission success are clearly defined and the correct personnel 

are hired. The essential elements of a competitive staffing plan must 

be developed in advance and a cadre of relief and reconstruction 

experts must be ready to deploy. The new S/CRS office has now been 

empowered by National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 

to coordinate personnel and other post-conflict requirements for all 

agencies, which should help in this process.
JANUARY 2006 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 25

SKILL ALIGNMENT 

One of CPA’s critical personnel shortcomings was the inadequate 

link between position requirements and necessary skills. The process for identifying qualified personnel and hiring them for specific positions was never systematically coordinated. Gaps existed 

not only in the type of experience among those hired, but also in 

the quality and depth of their experience relative to their assigned 

job. Although most of the dedicated personnel deployed to CPA 

proved to be flexible, adaptable, and resilient in facing the rigors and 

dangers of post-war Iraq, they could not, in some cases, overcome 

shortfalls in skills or experience. This problem was especially apparent among mid-level appointees.21

Iraq reconstruction veterans interviewed by SIGIR noted that 

there were personnel in CPA without the appropriate skills for the 

position to which they were assigned. Similarly, a SIGIR audit on the 

administration of Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) contracts found 

that personnel and resource shortfalls contributed to the ineffective 

monitoring of DFI contracts, poor document execution, and inaccurate collection of data. SIGIR found that the general shortage of 

personnel (and the widespread lack of required skill and experience 

among those available) affected all facets of reconstruction assistance.22

The management of talent in contingency operations must include 

the correct alignment of skills and experience to do the job. To 

handle the hiring surge, CPA personnel management should have 

been streamlined and adequately resourced once it became clear that 

the more broad-based CPA would subsume ORHA’s limited role. 
26 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

The Need for a Standing Reconstruction 

Reserve Corps

The CPA experience demonstrated the U.S. government’s critical 

need for a reserve civilian corps of talented professionals, with the 

proper expertise, willing to work in a hostile environment during 

post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction periods. Such a contingency organization ideally would be identified, recruited, trained in 

advance, exercised regularly, and be ready—like a military reserve 

unit—to deploy and meet the needs of conflict/post-conflict relief 

and reconstruction.23 One forum participant suggested that such a 

group should include a “human resources management SWAT team” 

available on short notice to provide planning for an emerging reconstruction event. Such an organization, however, would be expensive. 

One former CPA official suggested that we aim more modestly 

for “procedures in hiring, a good Rolodex, and a single line of 

authority.”22

THE CPA HIRING CYCLE

Another impediment to securing qualified people for Iraq was the 

unpredictable length of the CPA hiring cycle, especially for personnel from outside the federal government. SIGIR surveys suggested 

that the hiring process was often long and unresponsive to job candidates. Some CPA personnel were hired and deployed in 3–15 weeks; 

others experienced delays of up to 10 months. Many personnel, 

recruited months earlier for CPA, were not deployed until after the 

June 2004 transfer of governance authority. They became employees 

of the DoS Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO), which 

took over CPA’s reconstruction function.25

Once a job was identified in Iraq, recruiting staff reviewed 

resumes and interviewed candidates in Washington until a suitable person was hired for that position. However, by the time that 
JANUARY 2006 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 27

person was approved, in-processed, and deployed, circumstances 

on the ground in Iraq had frequently changed. The position might 

no longer be required, or it might have been filled by someone else 

in Iraq.26 The bottom line is that delays in the recruiting pipeline in 

Washington often required those on the ground in Iraq to develop 

alternative recruitment strategies.

Some forum participants were concerned that appropriate pools 

of qualified people were not fully used. One participant stated that it 

should have been possible to take greater advantage of the expertise 

within the Civil Service to fill Iraq reconstruction positions, despite 

existing hurdles. Another noted that over the last decade at least 

1,000,000 Americans have had experience in post-conflict reconstruction environments, and they should have been more effectively 

tapped as a personnel resource. This participant called for the development of a “more agile” recruiting approach that could do more 

than “just finding people in the U.S. government.”

Forum participants from the CPA recruiting team disagreed with 

these observations, stating that CPA recruited outstanding people 

with the proper skills. These divergent comments reflect the differing perceptions of those who hired and those who managed CPA 

personnel, thereby underscoring the need for a fully developed preconflict staffing plan that clearly lays out what level of expertise and 

skills are required. 

Inappropriate/Inconsistent Tour Length

Of all the personnel problems that affected the Iraq reconstruction program, the continual turnover of key personnel was perhaps 

the most burdensome. Organizations need to plan and implement 

employment strategies that ensure that personnel, especially those 

with critical skills, serve out their expected tours of duty. In Iraq, 

inconsistent deployment cycles significantly impeded reconstruction 
28 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

efforts. The causes for this are varied, but they include the failure 

to focus on implementing reliable mechanisms for recruiting and 

retaining individuals well-suited for the mission and the systemic 

lack of established pools of follow-on personnel ready to deploy as 

existing tour cycles expired. 

STANDARD DEPLOYMENT CYCLE

Developing standard practices for temporary deployments is 

essential to a successful personnel system in stabilization and 

reconstruction environments. Thus, a system should be developed 

early on that provides for standard tour lengths, the identification of 

personnel with necessary skills, and the development of a cadre of 

follow-on personnel. 

In Iraq, CPA did not establish a standard deployment cycle for 

personnel detailed from supporting agencies. In addition, non-government, direct-hire personnel (3161s), were on deployment cycles 

that differed from federal detailees. Moreover, the 3161s were under 

no legal obligation to remain in Iraq for a full tour, and some ended 

their deployments early. As a general rule, the 3161s had steeper 

learning curves in Iraq than their federal counterparts. It was thus 

a daunting task to maintain continuity of effort within this diverse 

pool of personnel with varying tour lengths and skill sets.

VARYING TOUR LENGTHS

Military tour lengths for those supporting Iraq reconstruction were 

also inconsistent. Iraq tour lengths stabilized at one year for Army 

personnel, six months for Navy, and four months for Air Force. The 

Marine Corps used a more complex system: its personnel served 

multiple, relatively short tours in country, with breaks between 

tours. Detailees from federal agencies other than DoD and DoS were 

recruited for six-month tours.27 DoS detailees were originally asked 
JANUARY 2006 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 29

to serve three-month temporary duty (TDY) assignments, which 

were extended to six-month TDYs in January 2004. In the post-CPA 

period, DoS tours were extended to one year.28

The tours for 3161 employees were initially six months but were 

later extended to one year. In practice, the tours for CPA-assigned 

3161 hires and federal detailees varied widely and were often curtailed early, making accurate deployment cycle planning difficult, if 

not impossible. One DoS CPA detailee described CPA recruiters as 

being “willing to take people for as long as people were willing to 

stay.”29

 Forum participants noted that short-term stays were almost 

the rule rather than the exception during the early days of CPA.

Audit of Personnel Management

On June 25, 2004, CPA-IG issued an audit of CPA personnel management30 that cited a number of factors causing high turnover of 

personnel in CPA, including: 

• uncertain length of rotations

• high work volume

• intense operational tempo

• limited incentives

• high-risk environment

• shortfalls in qualified personnel

No substantial effort was made to deter the recruitment of government employees by contractors in Iraq. Some SIGIR interviewees 

claimed that private sector organizations’ pirating of personnel from 

government agencies increased U.S. government labor costs. Private 

sector organizations were typically able to offer higher pay and other 

incentives.

Aggressive incentives, such as retention rewards for completion 

of deployment, might have helped keep individuals in their rotation 
30 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

and deterred contractors from recruiting government personnel. 

In the future, positive and negative incentives should be provided 

within the personnel management process so that the leadership and 

the human resources managers have the appropriate tools to encourage or require personnel to fulfill their assigned tours. 

The Overtime Disincentive

Forum participants noted that many 3161 direct hires claimed large 

amounts of overtime pay, which caused them to reach federal annual 

pay caps months before their scheduled tour completion dates. This 

created a disincentive toward tour completion and caused early 

departures. 

The problem manifested itself most strongly among the senior 

staff, whose base salary was already at annual pay cap levels 

($135,000). Because of large overtime payments, these people often 

reached the pay cap after only six to eight months of what was to 

be a one-year assignment. One forum participant suggested that, to 

maintain the integrity of the senior leadership cadre, overtime pay 

should not be authorized or be very limited for such personnel. 

Lack of Interagency Support

A U.S. Institute of Peace report discussing the CPA experience 

stated that: 

even if planners had correctly anticipated the difficulty of 

establishing stability and governance in post-war Iraq, there is 

simply no capacity in U.S. civilian government agencies to mobilize 

large numbers of the right people quickly. One source of tension 

(and there were many) between the military and the CPA stemmed 

from the utter mismatch in capabilities. The CPA was the ultimate 

authority in the land and charged with rebuilding the country, but 

it was composed of a pickup team, and it underwent enormous 

turnover; it was not unusual for CPA employees to stay in Iraq for 

only a month.31
JANUARY 2006 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 31

Early in the planning process, CPA made assumptions about the 

availability of personnel. To accomplish its mission, CPA expected 

to be able to draw people from agencies throughout the U.S. government; however, support from U.S. government agencies fell well 

short of expectations. Forum attendees agreed that involuntary 

assignment of civilian detailees—though perhaps legal—would not 

work in practice.

Many sources corroborate the finding that CPA was understaffed, 

largely because the expected interagency support did not materialize. A CPA report explained concerns at the time:

U.S. government departments are reluctant to send the requested 

number of people or their best people because they see CPA as 

a DoD project. DoD was also slow to deploy their best people to 

Baghdad.32

CPA-IG data from March 2004 illustrate the low level of response 

from U.S. government agencies. At that time, CPA was estimated to 

have filled 1,196 billets of the 2,117 authorized. Other than DoS and 

DoD, federal cabinet-level agencies filled just 64 of these positions 

(about 5.4%). Of the remainder, DoS and USAID filled 91 positions 

(about 7.5%). The remaining 1,041 positions were filled by coalition members, 3161s, smaller federal and local government agency 

detailees, and military detailees.

In addition, to compensate for the lack of available candidates, 

agencies hired personnel from outside the government to deploy 

to Iraq. This aggravated the human capital management problem 

because newly hired civilians proved to be more difficult to deploy 

than federal workers, whose clearance status, among other things, 

was already established. Non-government personnel had to be 

in-processed, cleared, and trained, which added substantial time to 

the recruiting and deployment cycles. In some cases, hiring delays 

caused qualified outside applicants to terminate their candidacies.33 
32 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

A DoD HR specialist interviewed by SIGIR noted that these 

March 2004 figures probably constitute the high point in CPA 

staffing. From May 2003 to March 2004, the total numbers and the 

specific contributions of individual agencies were lower than these 

numbers, although rising slowly.34

 The following table illustrates the 

contributions of selected Cabinet departments.

Number of CPA Detailees from Selected 

U.S. Government Departments

Department Detailees

Dept. of Agriculture 3

Dept. of Commerce 6

Dept. of Energy 10

Dept. of Health and Human Services 4

Dept. of the Interior 1

Dept. of Justice 9

Dept. of Transportation 5

Source: CPA-IG Working Paper #3; Management of 

Personnel Assigned to the Coalition Provisional Authority 

in Baghdad, Iraq; June 25, 2004

One success story in terms of detailee and civilian staffing, however, was the Ministry of Health. Shortly after CPA began operations, 

the highly experienced former head of the Michigan Department of 

Community Health was appointed as advisor to the Iraqi Ministry 

of Health. Working closely with CPA recruiting at the Pentagon, he 

took personal responsibility for putting together a 25-person team 

before going to Iraq. The team comprised U.S. government detailees, 

military personnel, IRDC personnel, and civilians. 
JANUARY 2006 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 33

U.S. government workforce planning 

for Iraq’s reconstruction suffered from 

a poorly structured, ad hoc personnel 

management process.
34 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

Upon arrival in Baghdad, this group began working with the 

Iraqi Ministry of Health, which had 120,000 employees, 240 

hospitals, and 1,200 clinics. The original Iraqi budget of $16 million grew to $1 billion a year later when the Ministry of Health 

became the first ministry to be transferred to full Iraqi control. A 

key lesson learned from this situation was the value of organizing 

a coherent and cohesive team before deployment.35

CONTINUITY: DEALING WITH STAFF TURNOVER 

AND INFORMATION HAND-OFF

U.S. government workforce planning for Iraq’s reconstruction 

suffered from a poorly structured, ad hoc personnel management 

process. Problems caused by this process were aggravated by the 

mounting insurgency that substantially hindered progress on all 

fronts in Iraq. 

As Iraq’s reconstruction became increasingly difficult, the need 

for more U.S. reconstruction personnel to stay longer—or at least 

for more predictable periods of time—became essential. Moreover, the stresses associated with living in Iraq and the increase 

in the security threat demanded the development of a clearly 

structured deployment cycle with well-defined tour lengths and 

sufficient overlap with successors. 

The Need for Continuity

An ideal tour cycle should include sufficient time to develop 

necessary job knowledge, to apply that expertise, and to transfer 

that knowledge to a successor. A face-to-face transition is 
JANUARY 2006 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 35

...the stresses associated with living 

in Iraq and the increase in the security 

threat demanded the development of 

a clearly structured deployment cycle 

with well-defined tour lengths and 

sufficient overlap with successors.
36 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

essential for mission continuity because, particularly for Iraq, predeployment briefing information is limited. Thus, successors should 

be chosen and prepared to deploy well in advance of their predecessors’ departure. 

Many sources stated that CPA never developed a formal deployment cycle for detailees or 3161s. These were the key shortcomings 

regarding the continuity of personnel:

• temporary mindset

• lack of synchronized deployment

• uncertain tour length, personnel turnover, and control

Temporary Mindset 

CPA was a temporary organization. The definition of “temporary” 

for CPA, however, changed over time. Originally, the United States 

was expected to use ORHA to supervise a three-month transition of 

most governing functions to a new Iraqi government staffed largely 

by Iraqi expatriates who would move ahead with a democratic vision 

for Iraq. But in the spring of 2003, as it became apparent that the 

recovery of Iraq would require a more extensive presence, the U.S. 

government created CPA, which subsumed ORHA and assumed the 

role of interim governing authority for Iraq. 

This development immediately made continuity of in-country 

staff a key issue. Except for U.S. Army personnel, however, most 

personnel assigned to Iraq were requested to serve for no more than 

six months; in practice, their tours were often shorter. According 

to forum participants, the “temporary mindset” among CPA staff 

continued for several months after CPA’s establishment, despite its 

ever-expanding role. Most CPA personnel at that time expected to 

complete the mission and turn the government over to the Iraqis 

within a few months after the organization’s inception. 
JANUARY 2006 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 37

By the autumn of 2003, this mindset had changed, and a general 

sense of a long-term role for CPA prevailed. Moreover, in September 2003, Ambassador Bremer had stated that CPA would probably 

operate for at least two years. In November 2003, however, the President announced that CPA would turn over sovereignty to the Iraqis 

in June 2004. Seven months later, on June 28, 2004, CPA transitioned 

governance authority to the Iraqi Interim Government. At that time, 

the U.S. Mission Iraq and other U.S. government agencies assumed 

responsibility for the reconstruction program. Thus, as this chronology shows, CPA spent half of its 14-month life span preparing for its 

own expiration.

This situation did not promote long-term commitment among 

staff and did not allow for the orderly execution of a strategic plan. 

A RAND study of U.S. post-conflict reconstruction efforts since 

the end of World War II concluded that one key factor in successful reconstruction, or nation-building, was long-term commitment: 

“Five years seems the minimum required to enforce an enduring 

transition to nation-building.”36 It is important to note that the U.S. 

commitment to reconstruction remains strong, even though the 

organization that launched the reconstruction effort, the CPA, was 

subsumed by the U.S. Embassy.

Lack of Synchronized Deployment

A lack of cooperation among U.S. government agencies hampered 

the early management of Iraq reconstruction. Numerous accounts 

detail the frustration that tour lengths were too short and not coordinated among agencies. High-level DoD field assessment teams 

and SIGIR interviews of CPA personnel suggest that the varying 

deployment lengths within diverse federal agencies contributed to 

the overall human resources problem and that interagency coordination was needed. Because of disparate deployment lengths, an ad hoc 
38 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

rotation schedule, weak personnel tracking, and a lack of retention 

incentives, government agencies could not ensure that personnel 

actually completed their rotations. 

Moreover, USAID and other organizations were already critically 

short of personnel worldwide and did not have a surge capacity from 

which to rapidly deploy personnel to Iraq. This forced these organizations to obtain many personnel through direct contracting or by 

reducing commitments to existing programs.37

SIGIR interviews and various reports confirm that no agency 

developed, or was able to enforce, a deployment cycle that included 

a standard overlap period to ensure transmission of critical information from predecessors to successors. New personnel arrived in Iraq 

facing steep learning curves and lengthy orientation periods, which 

complicated the development and execution of the reconstruction 

program. 

In a SIGIR interview, a former Drug Enforcement Administration 

(DEA) official who served as a CPA and IRMO senior advisor to the 

Iraqi Ministry of the Interior agreed that there were serious problems with the personnel process. He observed:

this revolving door that they had over here [and] the weaknesses on 

the staffing...you had all these 90-day wonders getting their tickets 

punched that [said], “I’ve been in Baghdad.”38

He was one of many SIGIR interviewees who expressed concern about the frequency of turnover and the lack of information 

exchange among reconstruction personnel in Iraq. Several senior 

CPA human resources personnel also told SIGIR that the lack of 

interagency deployment coordination was a serious obstacle to proper staffing. The deployment cycle should have included a requirement to stay the requisite amount of time, required a significant 
JANUARY 2006 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 39

transition period with successors, and stipulated that tour length be 

tied to contract performance milestones.

Uncertain Tour Length, 

Personnel Turnover, and Control

The volunteers that did come to Iraq performed heroically, but 

people frequently rotated through every four to eight weeks, and, 

when they departed, too often took their invaluable knowledge with 

them.39

This comment by the former Director of the CPA Office of Management and Budget typifies what SIGIR learned from many CPA 

officials about deployment difficulties in Iraq. Neither CPA nor 

supporting government agencies developed an integrated framework 

from which to source and deploy people to Iraq. 

In a SIGIR interview, a Department of the Army Human Resource 

Regional Director, who was detailed to CPA as a human resources 

and staffing specialist, said:

We really didn’t have a grasp because the Coalition Provisional 

Authority was such a different experiment...you had coalition 

partners that were here, you had 3161 direct hire employees, you 

had people...who became detailed here, you had soldiers, and 

Marines, and people from all the services, and you had contractors. 

So, we really had five sources of individuals... and some here for 

three months, some for six months, some for a year, some for two 

weeks.40

This interviewee stated that the CPA policies for hiring personnel 

did not meet the needs of the personnel on the ground and did not 

anticipate the evolving needs of the organization. The interviewee 

(and others) noted that there was no way to enforce deployment 
40 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

lengths—especially for civilian 3161s. Therefore, personnel were 

held to a “moral commitment” to stay for an agreed-upon period. 

This commitment, however, was frequently breached by personnel 

who terminated their deployments early. Adding a provision to 3161 

hiring contracts that required a mandatory tour length would have 

been useful in alleviating this problem. 

A forum participant noted that the stress endured by deployed 

personnel negatively affected tour lengths: there was nowhere to go 

for rest and recreation. The result was a high burnout rate; many 

personnel returned to the United States “when they got worn out.” 

Departures were often sudden and unplanned, and the long processing pipeline for hiring meant that replacements were not readily 

available. No overlap or hand-off was possible. 

The continuous personnel turnover was a major reason why the 

U.S. reconstruction effort never reached its authorized working staff 

level during CPA’s tenure. Despite this ongoing operational limitation and regular interagency meetings, no interagency coordination 

was ever established to monitor and manage the plethora of personnel challenges that CPA and other U.S. government agencies faced 

in Iraq. 

Several sources noted that a Washington, D.C.-based interagency control office that was fully integrated into Iraq operations 

could have provided coordination, leadership, and credibility to the 

recruiting effort in Baghdad. Such an entity could have controlled 

the flow of personnel in and out of Iraq, ensured coordination 

among agencies, and managed personnel demands to provide the 

needed experience in Baghdad. 

An article on outsourcing in post-conflict operations in the 

Journal of Public and International Affairs recommended the 

establishment of:
JANUARY 2006 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 41

a head office in Washington, D.C., and a main office in each area 

of operation (i.e., Baghdad and Kabul) staffed with specialists in 

contract management (either contracted out or hired from U.S. 

government offices with contracting experience, such as Defense 

Contract Management Agency and the USACE) and subject experts 

(knowledgeable in areas such as construction, engineering, 

electricity, etc.).41

This idea of a centralized and professionally staffed operations 

center in Washington, D.C., was echoed in the “Personnel Assessment Team Report” to the Secretary of Defense on CPA operations 

in Iraq.42

 The report noted that there was no personnel transition 

control and that turnover was resulting in a loss of continuity that 

created a severe burden for reconstruction efforts. The study further 

recommended that an oversight office be established to improve 

coordination of personnel and limit duplication of effort. The report 

underscored the need for a 24-hour reach-back center for coordination by relating a story of how DoD and DoS deployed six people to 

relieve one person and how, in other instances, personnel were sent 

to regions that had no use for them.43 

ACCOUNTING FOR PERSONNEL

The U.S. government also experienced shortcomings in accounting 

for personnel deployed to Iraq—especially civilians and contractors. 

There was, and still is, a lack of effective control procedures at many 

entry and exit points for Iraq, and there is no interagency personnel 

tracking system. Official and contract personnel often arrived and 

departed with no systematic tracking of their whereabouts or activities, or in some cases, with no knowledge of their presence in country. Shortly before its dissolution in June 2004, CPA was still unable 

to account for 10% of its staff in Iraq. A CPA-IG report in June 2004 
42 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

The report noted that there was 

no personnel transition control and 

that turnover was resulting in a loss 

of continuity that created a severe 

burden for reconstruction efforts.
JANUARY 2006 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 43

noted that this situation adversely affected both contingency planning and CPA’s general ability to forecast life-support requirements. 

Forum participants said that while this issue has been more or 

less resolved for official personnel, it remains an acute problem for 

contractor personnel. Mechanisms to track contractors supporting CPA have been left largely to the contractors’ individual firms 

and have not been enforced. The SIGIR Human Capital Management Forum developed a variety of recommendations to remedy 

contractor accountability problems. These recommendations were 

echoed in a recent proposed interagency policy change to cover U.S. 

government contractors in Iraq. 
44 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT
Lessons Learned Recommendations
46 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

RECOMMENDATIONS

The President recently empowered the Secretary of State via a 

National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-44) to coordinate all 

overseas reconstruction and stabilization activities. SIGIR expects 

that the following recommendations will help advance the policies 

undergirding the new DoS Coordinator for Reconstruction and 

Stabilization.

The recommendations are:

• Congress should fund, expand, and empower the S/CRS, pursuant to NSPD-44. This organization should serve as the primary 

point of authority within the U.S. government for planning and 

programming for future relief and reconstruction efforts. In 

coordination with other agencies, S/CRS should develop standardized HR practices.

• DoD should develop complementary plans and programs, pursuant to Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.05 that 

coordinate military responses with S/CRS and that integrate 

S/CRS personnel and initiatives into exercises.

• The Administration and Congress should develop a “civilian 

reserve corps” that would serve as reconstruction and stabilization first responders, and would include a quick-reaction human 

resources team that pre-identifies human resources requirements 

for potential relief and reconstruction contingency operations. 

• The U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) should manage 

the development and implementation of a uniform set of human 

resources rules that would apply to all federal personnel deployed 

for contingency operations. OPM should coordinate these new 

human resources rules with the new DoD National Security 

Personnel System and other new federal personnel systems to 
JANUARY 2006 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 47

ensure that hiring flexibilities and benefits will not be adversely 

affected. These rules should provide guidance that addresses the 

tour length and personnel turnover problems that have burdened 

Iraq reconstruction.
48 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

Endnotes

1 Play to Win, Center for Strategic and International Studies and the 

Association of the U.S. Army, January 2003, p. 11. 

2

 Comments to SIGIR from former CPA and DoS official, November 2005. 

3 “Preparing for War, Stumbling to Peace,” by Mark Fineman, Robin Wright, 

and Doyle McManus, Los Angeles Times, July 18, 2003; and SIGIR interview 

with Lt. Gen. Jay Garner, USA (Ret.), April 22, 2004.

4

 SIGIR interview with Lt. Gen. Jay Garner, USA (Ret.), former ORHA Director, 

April 22, 2004, p. 1.

5 SIGIR interview with Anthony W. Whitehouse, Army Civilian Human 

Resources Regional Director for the western United States and former CPA 

HR Specialist, July 1, 2004. 

6

 Presentation at a Joint Center for Strategic and International Studies/ Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars event, October 20, 2004, by 

Ambassador Carlos Pascual, S/CRS.

7

 SIGIR interview with Lt. Gen. Jay Garner, USA (Ret.), April 22, 2004.

8

 SIGIR interview (name withheld), June 2003. 

9

 Garner interview, op. cit.

10 ORHA, “Current Manning and Personnel Gaps,” PowerPoint Presentation, 

March 23, 2003. 

11 SIGIR interview (name withheld), June 2003. 

12 “Management of Personnel Assigned to CPA in Baghdad,” CPA-IG Audit 

Report No. 04-002, June 25, 2004. 

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid. 

17 SIGIR conversation with CPA HR personnel, April 2004. 

18 “Restarting the Economy in Iraq,” unpublished manuscript by Rear Admiral 

David Oliver, USN (Ret.), former Director of CPA Office of Management and 

Budget. 
JANUARY 2006 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 49

19 SIGIR interview with officials from DoD/Under Secretary of Defense, Policy, 

October 2005. 

20 David Oliver, op. cit.

21 U.S. Policy in Iraq: A “Realist” Approach to its Challenges and 

Opportunities, Anthony H. Cordesman, August 6, 2004; DoD Personnel 

Assessment Team, Report to the Secretary of Defense, CPA Baghdad, 

February 11, 2004; and SIGIR discussions with former CPA officials.

22 “Administration of Contracts Funded by DFI,” SIGIR Audit No. 05-008, 

April 30, 2005.

23 Ambassador Carlos Pascual presentation, op. cit. 

24 Comments to SIGIR from former CPA and DoS official, November 2005. 

25 SIGIR interviews, surveys, and discussions with CPA and IRMO personnel 

(various). 

26 SIGIR discussion with ORHA/CPA and IRMO personnel specialists. 

27 Anthony W. Whitehouse interview, op. cit. 

28 SIGIR discussion with DoS CPA detailees.

29 Ibid. 

30 CPA-IG Audit Report No. 04-002, op. cit.

31 The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Governance in Iraq, 

Celeste J. Ward, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington D.C., May 2005.

32 Personnel Assessment Team Report to the Secretary of Defense, CPA Baghdad, 

February 11, 2004.

33 SIGIR discussion with CPA and IRMO personnel. 

34 Anthony W. Whitehouse interview, op. cit. 

35 E-mail to SIGIR from James Haveman, former CPA official, December 2005. 

36 America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, James Dobbins et 

al., RAND Corporation, 2003.

37 Foreign Assistance: USAID Needs to Improve its Workforce Planning and 

Operating Expense Accounting, GAO, September 2003.
50 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

38 SIGIR interview of Steve Casteel, former CPA Senior Advisor to the Iraqi 

Ministry of the Interior, July 3, 2004. 

39 David Oliver, op. cit., p. 37.

40 Anthony Whitehouse interview, op. cit., p. 2. 

41 “Outsourcing in Post-conflict Operations: Designing a System for Contract 

Management and Oversight,” Blake W. Mobley, Journal of Public and 

International Affairs, Princeton, NJ, spring 2004, p. 34. 

42 DoD Personnel Assessment Team, Report to the Secretary of Defense, op. cit. 

43 Ibid, pp. 11-12
JANUARY 2006 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 51
52 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT
JANUARY 2006 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 53

Forum Participant Biographies
54 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

Mr. Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., serves as the Special Inspector General for 

Iraq Reconstruction. He was appointed as Inspector General for the 

Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA-IG) on January 20, 2004, by the 

Secretary of Defense with the concurrence of the Secretary of State. 

With the enactment of the Defense Authorization Act for 2005, CPAIG was re-designated as SIGIR. 

Before his appointment as CPA-IG, Mr. Bowen was a partner at 

the law firm of Patton Boggs. Prior to that, Mr. Bowen served as 

Special Assistant to the President and Associate Counsel, and later as 

Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy Staff Secretary at the 

White House under President George W. Bush. 

Maj. Gen. William L. Nash, USA (Ret.), was appointed Director of the 

Council on Foreign Relation’s Center for Preventive Action in April 

2001. He leads the Council’s efforts to work with governments, international organizations, the business community, and non-governmental organizations to anticipate international crises and to provide 

analysis and specific recommendations for preventive action. 

Dr. Frederick Barton currently serves as a Senior Adviser in the 

International Security Program and Co-director of the Post-Conflict 

Reconstruction Project at the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies (CSIS). Concurrently, Mr. Barton teaches as a visiting lecturer 

at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, where he was 

previously the Frederick H. Schultz Professor of Economic Policy. 

Mr. Rodney Bent served on the staff of the Foreign Operations, 

Export Finance, and Related Programs Subcommittee of the House 

Appropriations Committee. Before joining the Committee, he 

worked in Baghdad, Iraq, as the senior advisor at CPA for the Iraqi 

Ministry of Finance and the Iraqi Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation.
JANUARY 2006 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 55

Ms. Katja Bullock serves as a Special Assistant to the President for 

Presidential Personnel. She held the same position and duties under 

Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush. In 2003, Ms. Bullock was 

detailed to Iraq as Director of Civilian Personnel to help set up the 

CPA government in Iraq, later returning to prepare for the transfer 

of governance authority to the Iraqi people.

Dr. James Jay Carafano is Senior Fellow for National Security and 

Homeland Security, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute 

for International Studies, and The Heritage Foundation. He is one of 

The Heritage Foundation’s leading scholars in defense transformation, military operations and strategy, and homeland security. 

Mr. Bruce N. Crandlemire is the acting Inspector General for the 

U.S. Agency for International Development, directing worldwide 

audit and investigation activities covering five government agencies 

with appropriations of over $15 billion. 

Colonel Dennis J. DeGraff, USAF, is the Chief, Military Personnel 

Resources, Directorate of Personnel, United States Air Forces in 

Europe, headquartered at Ramstein Air Base, Germany. In 2003-

2004, Colonel DeGraff served as the Director of Manpower and 

Personnel (C-1) for the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian 

Assistance in post-war Baghdad, Iraq.

Mr. Greg Gardner is Vice President, Government and Homeland 

Security Solutions, at Oracle Corporation. From April to November 

2003, Mr. Gardner served with CPA in Iraq as Chief of Staff for the 

Senior Advisor, Ministry of National Security and Defense. He then 

returned to Washington to coordinate personnel activities for CPA 

before leaving government service in March 2004.
56 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

Mr. Patrick Garvey is a member of the professional staff on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by U.S. Senator Richard 

G. Lugar. His portfolio includes oversight for Iraq stabilization and 

reconstruction efforts, counter-terrorism, and broader Middle-East 

policy. He had a direct role in producing 23 Iraq oversight hearings. 

Mr. Christopher J. Hoh serves at the Department of State as the 

Director for Response Strategy and Resource Management in the 

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. He 

is responsible for developing initiatives and procedures to pre-position people, money, equipment, and guidance for significant civilian operations in failing, failed, and post-conflict states. During 

2003 and 2004, he served as a Special Adviser for Secretary of State 

Powell’s Diplomatic Readiness Initiative. 

Mr. Allan G. Kaupinen is the Director of Recruiting for the Iraq 

Reconstruction Management Office at the Department of State. He 

manages the identification, vetting, and orientation of personnel to 

staff IRMO in Iraq. Mr. Kaupinen held a similar position with CPA 

at the Department of Defense from the time the staffing of CPA 

was initiated. 

Ambassador Patrick Kennedy is Deputy Director for Management 

for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. He served in 

Iraq as the Chief of Staff for the CPA.

Mr. C. Morgan Kinghorn is President of the National Academy of 

Public Administration. Elected an Academy Fellow in 1992, he has 

more than three decades of distinguished public and private sector 

leadership, having managed and reengineered some of government’s 

most complex organizations.
JANUARY 2006 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 57

Dr. Rosslyn S. Kleeman is currently Distinguished Executive in 

Residence, Department of Public Policy and Public Administration, 

George Washington University. Her responsibilities include intern and 

professional development and teaching a professional development 

course. She frequently lectures and consults on public policy issues.

Mr. James Kunder is Assistant Administrator for Asia and the Near 

East at USAID. He provides leadership on the Agency’s Middle East 

and Asia programs. Mr. Kunder has extensive government and private 

sector experience in international development. From July 2002 to July 

2004, he served as Deputy Assistant Administrator for Asia and the 

Near East. Previously, from January to May 2002, he was Director for 

Relief and Reconstruction in Afghanistan. 

Mr. Dayton Maxwell is Special Advisor to the Administrator of 

USAID, where he is assisting in the establishment of a new USAID 

office of military affairs. Previously, he worked on a detail from USAID 

to JFCOM, serving as a senior advisor in the new DoS Office of Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. In 2003, he deployed on 

detail to Iraq where he worked in the Office of Policy Planning and 

Analysis for CPA until the end of 2003. 

Mr. Joseph T. (Mickey) McDermott is the Assistant IG for Audit at 

SIGIR. He serves as the principal advisor to the Inspector General and 

the Deputy Inspector General for all audit matters, including audit 

policy and planning. He spends most of his time in Baghdad with his 

audit staff. 
58 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

Mr. Chris Mihm is the Managing Director of the GAO Strategic 

Issues Team, leading work on government-wide, long-term issues 

that support transition to a more accountable federal government, 

including federal agency transformations, budgeting and the nation’s 

long-term fiscal outlook, strategic human capital management, Civil 

Service reform, the decennial census, and federal tax policy and 

administration.

Mr. James O’Beirne is Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 

for White House Liaison. He provides program advice and support in identifying placement opportunities for political appointees 

within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the military departments. Mr. O’Beirne has served as Deputy Special Assistant and as 

Special Assistant, during the launch of ORHA and CPA.

Rear Admiral David R. Oliver, Jr., USN (Ret.), is Executive Vice 

President and Chief Operating Officer of EADS North America. He 

has a diverse career, including extensive experience in government, 

industry, and the military. Immediately before joining EADS North 

America, Mr. Oliver served in Iraq as the Director of CPA Office 

of Management and Budget. Mr. Oliver completed a distinguished 

career in the U.S. Navy in 1995, retiring as a Rear Admiral.

Lieutenant General Jeffrey W. Oster, USMC (Ret.), is Chairman of 

the Marine Corps Scholarship Foundation and the Military Ministry 

of the Campus Crusade for Christ. During 2004, he served as the 

CPA Deputy Administrator and Chief Operating Officer. 
JANUARY 2006 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 59

Dr. R. Nicholas Palarino is the Senior Policy Analyst for the House 

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform. This subcommittee has held several hearings regarding Iraq reconstruction issues 

and challenges.

Mr. John M. Palguta is Vice President for Policy and Research at the 

Partnership for Public Service, responsible for the implementation 

of a comprehensive program of research and analyses on human 

capital issues in the federal government. The results of these efforts 

assist federal government policy makers, managers, and other interested individuals and organizations in developing viable solutions to 

recruit, motivate, and retain a highly talented and diverse workforce. 

Ms. Hannah Sistare is Director of the Human Resources Management Consortium at the National Academy of Public Administration. She is also Executive Director of the National Commission on 

the Public Service (Volcker Commission) Implementation Initiative 

at the Academy.

Mr. Stan Z. Soloway is president of the Professional Services Council, the principal national trade association representing the government professional and technical services industry. PSC is known 

for its leadership on the full range of government acquisition/procurement and outsourcing and privatization issues. Mr. Soloway 

assumed the presidency in January 2001. 
60 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

Ms. Toni B. Wainwright was reappointed to the Senior Executive 

Service (SES) as Deputy Director of Civilian Personnel, Department 

of the Army, in February 2005. She assists in overseeing the largest 

civilian workforce in the federal government. She is also responsible 

for supervision and oversight of all staff and line HR functions for 

the U.S. Army’s civilian personnel management program. In June 

2004, Ms. Wainwright served as Director of Personnel Policy with 

the Office of National Security Affairs in Baghdad, Iraq.

Dr. Ruth Whiteside is a career member of the Senior Executive Service at the Department of State, and she served in the Foreign Service from 1978 to 1984. In June 2001, she began serving as Principal 

Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Office of the Director General, 

Bureau of Human Resources.
JANUARY 2006 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 61