4137 Commerce Circle, Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401 

Phone: 208-524-5300, 800-699-3108 Fax: 208-424-1411 

Website: www.intisoid.com 

October 17, 2011 

ATTN: Document-Control Desk 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

NRC Docket No. 40-9086 

Subject: Submittal of Responses to Requests for Additional Information (RAI) 

TAC L32739 

To Whom it May Concern, 

The following document is provided as a response to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

RAIs pertaining to the International Isotopes Fluorine Products Inc. December 30, 2009 

application to license a depleted uranium hexafluoride de-conversion and fluorine extraction 

process facility. 

(1) Official Responses to Final RAIs 

Please contact me by phone at 208 524-5300 or email at jjmiller@intisoid.com if you have any 

questions regarding this letter or require additional information. 

 

Sincerely, 

John J. Miller, CHP 

Radiation Safety Officer 

JJM-2011-55 

Enclosure as Stated 

cc: Dr. Matthew Bartlett 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Mail Stop E2C40M 

6003 Executive Blvd. 

Rockville, MD 20852 
Official Responses to Final RAIs October 14, 2011 

 Page | 1 

RESPONSES TO FINAL RAIs 

Human Factors: 

In order to demonstrate compliance with the acceptance criteria in NUREG-1520 Revision 1, Appendix E 

to Chapter 3, please provide the following information. 

FRAI-1. The LA Sections 3.1.4.4 and 3.1.4.5 of the HFE IP provide a number of references to human 

factors standards including NUREG/CR-3331, MIL-STD-1478 and MIL-HDBK-46855A, and 

IEEE-1023, with respect to standards to be referenced for the Task Analysis, Functional 

Requirements, and HSI Design elements of the HFE IP. The references to these standards in 

the application use the phrases “similar to” and “or equivalent guidance.” The NRC staff 

understands that significant portions of the guidance documents listed above do not apply to 

a Part 40 Deconversion facility (e.g., IIFP) which is not a nuclear power plant. Therefore a 

commitment to the entire standard is not appropriate. The NRC staff does need adequate 

assurance that all appropriate portions of the guidance will be implemented. Therefore for 

each of the three standards listed above, replace the phrase “similar to” with a commitment 

to implement portions of the guidance used to meet the acceptance criteria listed in NUREG1520 Appendix E. Also, remove the reference to equivalent guidance. 

Example: HFE-IP section 3.1.4.4 (last paragraph): “IIFP intends to use applicable 

standards as guidance for the functional allocation analysis process. The FAA will utilize 

description analysis methods drawn from NUREG/CR-3331 similar to that described in 

consistent with the sections needed to demonstrate compliance with the acceptance criteria in 

NUREG-1520 Appendix E of NUREG/CR-3331 or equivalent guidance

RESPONSE: IIFP will strengthen the language in Chapter 3 of the License Application, 

(Sections 3.1.4.4 and 3.1.4.5) which refers to standards to reflect that applicable portions of 

these standards will be used to demonstrate compliance with acceptance criteria in NUREG1520 Appendix E. 

License Documentation Impact (1): In the IIFP License Application, Chapter 3 Section 

3.1.4.4, the third paragraph under “Functional Allocation Analysis – Implementation 

Actions” will read as follows: 

IIFP intends to use applicable standards as guidance for the functional allocation analysis 

process. The FAA will utilize applicable description analysis methods drawn from similar to 

that described in NUREG/CR-3331 or equivalent guidance consistent with the sections 

needed to demonstrate compliance with the acceptance criteria in NUREG-1520 Appendix E.

License Documentation Impact (2): In the IIFP License Application, Chapter 3 Section 

3.1.4.4, the second paragraph under “Task Analysis – Implementation Actions” will read as 

follows: 

IIFP intends to use applicable standards as guidance for the task analysis process. The Task

Analysis will utilize applicable task description analysis methods drawn from similar to that 

described in MIL-STD-1478 orand/or MIL-HDBK-46855A consistent with the sections 

needed to demonstrate compliance with the acceptance criteria in NUREG-1520 Appendix E. 

or equivalent guidance

 
Official Responses to Final RAIs October 14, 2011 

 Page | 2 

License Documentation Impact (3): In the IIFP License Application, Chapter 3 Section 

3.1.4.5, the second paragraph under “HSI Design – Implementation Actions” will read as 

follows: 

Human factors design relative to HSI will be established using proven HFE principles, 

guidelines and experience gained from similar facilities and design review criteria derived 

from published standards as guidance. The HSI design process will utilize applicable 

methods similar to that described in drawn from IEEE-1023 “IEEE Recommended Practice 

for The Application of Human Factors Engineering to Systems, Equipment and Facilities of 

Nuclear Power Generating Stations and Other Nuclear Facilities” consistent with the sections 

needed to demonstrate compliance with the acceptance criteria in NUREG-1520 Appendix E. 

2004 or equivalent guidance.

FRAI-2. The original HFE RAI-1(a) response (Revision A) contained the following two sentences, 

“Human factors and human-system interface were considered as part of the accident analysis 

review and discussion process. However, these considerations of human factor aspects were 

not done at the level and structure of the current NUREG- 1520, Appendix E because the 

accident analysis and PHA information used in developing the IIFP License Application was 

conducted and completed prior to the revisions to NUREG-1520, Revision I Appendix E, 

criterion E.” 

This text was not included in the second HFE-RAI response (Revision B). Please incorporate 

a similar statement into LA Section 3.1.4, or other location as appropriate. This information 

is needed to clarify that the human system interface was evaluated as part of the accident 

analysis. 

RESPONSE: The human system interface was evaluated in the original accident analysis 

using the “what if” methodology. However, this evaluation did not include the level of detail 

and documentation as is now required to demonstrate compliance with acceptance criteria in 

NUREG-1520 Appendix E. 

License Documentation Impact: In the IIFP License Application, Section 3.1.4.2, a new 

fourth paragraph will be added under “ISA Team and Qualifications” to read as follows: 

Human factors and human-system interface were considered as part of the accident analysis 

review and discussion process following NUREG-1520. However, these considerations of 

human factor aspects were not done at the level and structure of the current NUREG- 1520, 

Appendix E because the accident analysis and PHA information used in developing the IIFP 

License Application was conducted and completed prior to the revisions to NUREG-1520, 

Revision 1 Appendix E, criterion E. 

FRAI-3. License Application Section 11.1.3, titled “Configuration Management Controls on the 

Design Requirements” contains a commitment to conduct design verification. Provide a 

cross reference in the HFE-IP which refers to LA Section 11.1.3 and states that this design 

verification will also be applied to human factors. This information is needed to clarify that 

the design verification will be applied to human factors. 

RESPONSE: A cross reference to the IIFP LA, “Management Measures”, Section 11.1.3 

will been made to clarify that design verification will be applied to human factors. 
Official Responses to Final RAIs October 14, 2011 

 Page | 3 

License Documentation Impact: In the IIFP License Application, Section 3.1.4.9, the 

paragraph under “HFE Design Verification” will be revised to read as follows: 

HFE design verification is used to determine whether HFE has been used in the design of 

HSI. Sections 11.1.2 and 11.1.3, Chapter 11 of the IIFP License Application, “Configuration 

Management Controls on the Design Requirements” contain the commitment to conduct 

design verification. The commitment will also apply to human factors involved in HSI.

FRAI-4. For RAI HF-F2-1 License Documentation Impact 4 through 8 indicate the HFE Expert will 

be incorporated into the ISA Team. For clarity, add a statement or cross reference in HFEIP section 3.1.4.2 which indicates the HFE Expert will be part of the ISA team. This 

information is needed to ensure consistency between LA section 3.1.4.2 and the ISA Summary 

Table 5-2. 

RESPONSE: As specified under “HFE Expertise” in Section 3.1.4.2 of the IIFP LA, the 

HFE professional will be added to the project prior to beginning design of IROFS SSCs. At 

that time, he/she will become involved in subsequent reviews and updates of accident 

analyses and he/she will join the ISA Team and work with both this team and the design team 

to ensure that HFE and human-system interface requirements are met. 

License Documentation Impact: In the IIFP License Application, Section 3.1.4.2, the 

second paragraph under “HFE Expertise” will read as follows: 

This arrangement and approach provide for the HFE professional to advise on HFE related 

matters, to become involved in subsequent accident analyses and to ensure continuity of HFE 

considerations by the detail design team as the project progresses. The HFE professional will 

be become part of the ISA Team and will work with other members of ISA Team and with 

the detail design team to ensure that HFE and human-system interface (HSI) requirements are 

being met.

Request for Special Authorization: 

FRAI-5. Special Authorization (Has been removed from the RAI questions and will be addressed 

through separate documentation) 

Seismic: 

FRAI-6. Issue: 

In response to “Follow-Up Clarification to RAI SS-7(5)” the applicant has stated that load 

combination 4 for “Severe Environmental Load Combinations” has not been used since the 

operating basis earthquake load (earthquake load for which plant's power production 

equipment is designed to remain functional without undue risk to public health and safety) is 

not applicable. The emergency generator and UPS system are designed to remain functional 

during any postulated natural phenomena hazard event.” 

This combination pertains to continued operation of the IROFS structures after earthquakes. 

Request: 

Expand the justification for not using the Severe Environmental Load Combinations listed in 
Official Responses to Final RAIs October 14, 2011 

 Page | 4 

follow-up RAI response #SS-7-5 section 3(a) #4 , 3(b) #5, and 3(c) #5. Provide a justification 

based on compliance with 70.61(e) i.e., IROFS remain available and reliable and have 

management measures (Note: Consider including a cross reference to LA section 3.1.3 (or 

other sections), which contain a commitment to utilize Management Measures to maintain the 

IROFS.)

RESPONSE : The response to “Follow-Up Clarification to RAI SS-7(5)” for RAI SS-7-5 

sections 3(a) #4, 3(b) #5, and 3(c) #5 has been replaced (red text) with additional and more 

clear language as follows to provide justification that IROFS remain available and reliable 

and have management measures. 

3. Load Combinations for Process Buildings: 

For process buildings and structures which house IROFS equipment, the following load 

combinations will be considered: 

a) Concrete Load Combinations per ACI 349-06 (Combinations are numbered below as 

listed in the Code): 

Normal Load Combinations 

1. 1.4 (D + F + Ro) + To 

2. 1.2 (D + F + To + Ro) + 1.6 (L + H) + 1.4 C + 0.5 (Lr or S or R) 

3. 1.2 (D + F + To + Ro) + 0.8 (L + H) + 1.4 C + 1.6 (Lr or S or R) 

 Severe Environmental Load Combinations 

4. The specific load combination is not needed or used because the process 

buildings are IROFS that are subject to design verification and are maintained at 

their design basis integrity through the use of management measures. The process 

buildings and the IROFS within the process buildings are designed and 

maintained and have management measures to remain available and reliable 

during any of the postulated natural phenomena hazard events. IIFP has 

committed to the use of management measures as stated in the IIFP LA, Chapter 

3 Section 3.1.3 and described in detail in LA Chapter 11 “Management 

Measures”. 

5. 1.2 (D + F + Ro) + 1.6 (L + H + W) 

Extreme Environmental and Abnormal Load Combinations 

6. 1.0 (D + F + C + H + Ta + Ra + Es) + 0.8L 

7. Not used since straight wind (W) governs over tornado wind (Wt) for the Facility 

site due to probability of occurrence. 

8. 1.0 (D + F + C + H + Ta + Ra) + 1.2 Pa + 0.8L 

9. Not used since no postulated high energy pipe reaction (Yr), jet impingement 

(Yj) or pipe missile impact (Ym) are expected during a design basis natural 

phenomena hazard. 
Official Responses to Final RAIs October 14, 2011 

 Page | 5 

Preliminary analysis has shown that flood load (F) is negligible for the design of the IIFP process 

buildings. 

Ra, Ro and To and Ta are expected to be negligible. 

Rain load (L) on process building roofs is negligible, since all process building roofs are sloped 

metal (5/12) pitch minimum with no parapets or other appurtenances that might inhibit roof 

drainage. 

Crane load (C) is only applicable in Autoclave Building. 

b) Steel Load Combinations Per AISC N690-06 if Load and Resistance Factor 

 Design (LRFD) is used:

 Normal Load Combinations 

1. 1.4 (D + Ro) + To +C 

2. 1.2 (D + Ro + To) + 1.6L + 1.4C + 0.5 (Lr or S or R) 

3. 1.2 (D + Ro + To) + 1.6 (Lr or S or R) + 0.8L + 1.4C 

 Severe Environmental Load Combinations 

4. 1.2 (D + Ro) + 1.6W + 0.8L + C + 0.5 (Lr or S or R) + To 

5. This specific load combination is not needed or used because the process 

buildings are IROFS that are subject to design verification and are maintained at 

their design basis integrity through the use of management measures. The process 

buildings and the IROFS within the process buildings are designed and 

maintained and have management measures to remain available and reliable 

during any of the postulated natural phenomena hazard events. IIFP has 

committed to the use of management measures as stated in the IIFP LA, Chapter 

3 Section 3.1.3 and described in detail in LA Chapter 11 “Management 

Measures”. 

 Extreme Environmental and Abnormal Load Combinations 

6. D + 0.8L +C + To + Ro + Es 

7. Not used since straight wind (W) governs over tornado wind (Wt) for the Facility 

site due to probability of occurrence. 

8. D + 0.8L + C + 1.2 Pa + Ra + Ta 

9. Not used since no postulated high energy pipe reaction (Yr), jet impingement 

(Yj) or pipe missile impact (Ym) are expected during a design basis natural 

phenomena hazard. 

 c) Steel Load Combinations Per AISC N690-06 if Allowable Strength Design (ASD) is 

 used: 

 Normal Load Combinations 
Official Responses to Final RAIs October 14, 2011 

 Page | 6 

1. D + L + Ro + To + C 

2. D + (Lr or S or R) + Ro + To +C 

3. D + 0.75L + 0.75(Lr or S or R) + To +C 

 Severe Environmental Load Combinations 

4. D + Ro + W + .75L + C + 0.75(Lr or S or R) + To 

5. The specific load combination is not needed or used because the process 

buildings are IROFS that are subject to design verification and are maintained at 

their design basis integrity through the use of management measures. The process 

buildings and the IROFS within the process buildings are designed and 

maintained and have management measures to remain available and reliable 

during any of the postulated natural phenomena hazard events. IIFP has 

committed to the use of management measures as stated in the IIFP LA, Chapter 

3 Section 3.1.3 and described in detail in LA Chapter 11 “Management 

Measures”. 

Extreme Environmental and Abnormal Load Combinations 

6. D + L + C + Ro + To + Es 

7. Not used since straight wind (W) governs over tornado wind (Wt) for the Facility 

site due to probability of occurrence. 

8. D + L + C + Pa + Ra + Ta 

9. Not used since no postulated high energy pipe reaction (Yr), jet impingement 

(Yj) or pipe missile impact (Ym) are expected during a design basis natural 

phenomena hazard. 

License Documentation Impact : No additional changes. 

ISA : 

FRAI-7. LA section 3.2.4.3, “New Facilities or New Processes at Existing Facilities” contains 

commitments to implement the Baseline Design Criteria (BDC), consistent with 10 CFR 

70.64. The BDC are intended to ensure that a minimum level of good engineering practices, 

defense-in-depth, and safety considerations are incorporated throughout the facility. The 

BDC must be applied to the entire facility, including those safety features which are not 

designated as IROFS. The current commitments in LA section 3.2.4.3 appear to only apply to 

IROFS. These commitments need to be expanded to also apply to the entire facility, including 

safety features which are not designated as IROFS. Consistent with the requirements in 10 

CFR Part 70.62(a), expand the subsections of 3.2.4.3 including Natural Phenomena Hazards, 

Fire Protection, Chemical Protection, and Emergency Capability to indicate that the BDC 

addresses the safety systems throughout the entire facility. 
Official Responses to Final RAIs October 14, 2011 

 Page | 7 

RESPONSE: The BDC are intended to ensure that a minimum level of good engineering 

practices, defense-in-depth and safety considerations are incorporated throughout the facility. 

The following License Documentation Impact describes the changes that will be made to the 

LA, Chapter 3 to show the commitment that BDC meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 

70.62(a).

License Documentation Impact: Consistent with the requirements in 10 CFR Part 70.62(a) 

and further clarifications, the subsections of the IIFP LA, Section 3.2.4.3 “New Facilities or 

New Processes at Existing Facilities” are amended as follows: 

3.2.4.2 New Facilities or New Processes at Existing Facilities 

Baseline design criteria (BDC) that must be used for new facilities are specified in 10 CFR 

70.64, “Requirements for New Facilities or New Processes at Existing Facilities”, (CFR, 

2009e). The ISA accident sequences for the credible high and intermediate consequence 

events for the IIFP Facility includes accidents defined as design basis events (DBE), which 

includes seismic and other bounding credible events. The IROFS for these events ensure that 

the associated BDC are satisfied. The BDC in 10 CFR 70.64 are used as bases for the design 

of the IIFP Facility as described in the following paragraphs. 

Quality Standards and Records 

SSCs that are determined by the ISA to be IROFS are designed, fabricated, erected and tested 

in accordance with the graded levels of the IIFP QAP. Appropriate records of the design, 

fabrication, erection, procurement and testing of SSCs that are IROFS are maintained 

throughout the life of the IIFP Facility. Management Mmeasures applicable to IROFS are 

discussed in the IIFP LA Chapter 11. 

Natural Phenomena Hazards 

The IIFP Facility design has been developed with natural phenomena considered such that if 

an external event should occur, the health and safety of the workforce from licensed material 

or chemicals produced from licensed material are maintained. SSCs that are determined to be 

IROFS are designed to withstand the effects of, and be compatible with, the environmental 

conditions associated with the IIFP Facility operation, maintenance, shutdown, testing and 

accidents for which the IROFS are required to function. 

Fire Protection 

The IIFP Facility design provides adequate protection from credible fire and explosion 

accident scenarios by adherence to the requirements of the ISA and recognized codes and 

standards. SSCs that are IROFS are designed and located so that they can continue to 

perform their safety functions effectively under credible fire and explosion exposure 

conditions. Non-combustible and heat resistant materials are used wherever practical 

throughout the IIFP Facility, particularly in locations vital to the control of hazardous 

materials and to the maintenance of safety control functions. Fire detection, alarm and 

suppression systems are designed and provided with sufficient capacity and capability to 

minimize the adverse effects of fires and explosion on IROFS. The design includes 

provisions to protect against adverse effects that may result from either the operation or the 

failure of the fire suppression system. 
Official Responses to Final RAIs October 14, 2011 

 Page | 8 

Environmental and Dynamic Effects 

The IIFP Facility design has been developed with dynamic effects considered such that if an 

external or abnormal event should occur, the health and safety of the workforce from licensed 

material or chemicals produced from licensed material are maintained. SSCs that are IROFS 

are protected against dynamic effects, including effects of missiles and discharging fluids that 

may result from natural phenomena: 1) accidents at nearby industrial, military or 

transportation facilities, 2) equipment failure and 3) other similar events and conditions both 

inside and outside the IIFP Facility. 

Chemical Protection 

The IIFP Facility design provides for adequate protection against chemical risks produced 

from licensed material. Chemical protection is addressed in the LA, Chapter 6 “Chemical 

Process Safety”. 

SSCs that are IROFS are protected against chemical risks directly from licensed material and 

by hazardous chemicals produced from licensed material that have not been separated from 

licensed material. Chemical risks from hazardous chemicals are not address as IROFS under 

the ISA methodology provided IIFP Facility conditions or hazardous chemicals do not affect 

radiological safety

Emergency Capability 

The IIFP Facility design provides for emergency capability to maintain control of licensed 

material and hazardous chemicals produced from licensed material, evacuation of on-site 

personnel and on-site emergency facilities and services. SSCs that are required to support the 

IIFP Emergency Plan (EP) (IIFP, 2009b) are designed for emergencies. The design provides 

accessibility to the equipment of onsite and available offsite emergency facilities and services 

such as hospitals, fire and police departments, ambulance service and other emergency 

agencies. 

Utility Services 

On-site utility service systems required to support the BDC IROFS are provided. Each utility 

service system required to support IROFS is designed to perform its function under normal 

and abnormal conditions. Utility systems are described in the ISA Summary. 

Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance 

SSCs are inspected, tested and maintained in accordance with the graded levels of the IIFP 

QAP. SSCs that are determined to be IROFS have applicable management measures applied 

as discussed in IIFP LA, Chapter 11. are designed to permit inspection, maintenance, and 

testing. 

Instrumentation and Controls 

Instrumentation and control systems are provided to monitor variables and operating systems 

that are significant to safety over anticipated ranges for normal operation, abnormal 
Official Responses to Final RAIs October 14, 2011 

 Page | 9 

operation, accident conditions and safe shutdown. These systems ensure adequate safety of 

process and utility service operations in connection with their safety function. 

The variables and systems that require surveillance and control include process systems 

having safety significance requiring or involving IROFS including overall confinement 

system, confinement barriers and their associated systems, and other systems. Controls shall 

be provided to maintain these variables and systems within the prescribed operating ranges 

under normal conditions. Instrumentation and control systems are designed to fail into a safe 

state or to assume a state demonstrated to be acceptable on some other basis if conditions 

such as disconnection, loss of energy or motive power or adverse environments are 

experienced. 

Defense-in-Depth Practices 

The IIFP Facility and system designs are based on defense-in-depth practices. The design 

incorporates a preference for engineered controls over administrative controls to increase 

overall system reliability. Furthermore, the engineered controls preference is for use of 

passive engineered controls over active engineered controls. The design also incorporates 

features that enhance safety by reducing challenges to IROFS. The IIFP Facility and system 

IROFS are identified in the ISA Summary. 

Exemption Request for Financial Assurance: 

FRAI-8. By letter dated August 12, 2011 (ML112351140) INIS submitted an exemption request to 10 

CFR 40.36(e) for financial assurance. Specifically the exemption requested a modified 

timeframe for submitting financial assurance for decommissioning which states, “provide the 

financial assurance instruments to the NRC 6 months prior to operations and to fund the 

instruments 21 days prior to operations. 

In a phone conversation held September 16, 2011 (ML112700375) the NRC expressed 

concern that INIS may receive contaminated equipment during construction as part of their 

purchase of equipment from the Sequoyah Fuels former uranium deconversion facility. The 

exemption mentions that decommission costs may be required for this contamination, but 

does not include the decommissioning cost analysis or funding mechanism required by 40.36. 

In subsequent phone conversions, the NRC staff has come to understand that the 

contamination consists of source material (UF4) and would not exceed 15 lbs. This 

information has not been provided formally to the NRC. 

Consistent with the regulatory requirements in 40.14 and 40.36, provide additional 

information in the exemption request on the type, quantity, and chemical form of 

“contamination” which may be received on site during construction. Specify how the 

material will be licensed and whether or not it needs to be addressed as part of the financial 

assurance exemption request. If the material is part of the exemption request (e.g., not 

licensed under a general license), address the decommissioning costs associated with this 

“contamination.” If the intent is to limit the “contamination” below a regulatory threshold 

during construction (e.g., a general license, 40.22 or 40.36(b)), provide a commitment in the 

license application which specifies the material will not exceed the threshold and summarize 

the basis for not providing financial assurance during construction.
Official Responses to Final RAIs October 14, 2011 

 Page | 10 

RESPONSE: The subject “request for exemption” has been re-written to further clarify the 

request and will be included in the IIFP LA, Chapter 1 as described in the License 

Documentation Impact below. 

License Documentation Impact: A new Section 1.5.2 will be added to Section 

1.5 Special Exemptions and Special Authorizations 

1.5.2 Exemption from Certain Provisions of 10 CFR 40.36, “Financial Assurance and 

Recordkeeping for Decommissioning, Paragraph (d)”. 

In accordance with 10 CFR §40.14 (CFR, 2011), "Specific exemptions," IIFP requests an 

exemption from certain provisions of 10 CFR 40.36 (CFR, 2011), "Financial assurance and 

recordkeeping for decommissioning," paragraph (d). Specifically, 10 CFR 40.36(d) requires 

that "...the decommissioning funding plan must also contain a certification by the licensee 

that financial assurance for decommissioning has been provided in the amount of the cost 

estimate for decommissioning...." 

As stated in Section 1.2.2 Financial Qualification of the License Application; “IIFP presently 

intends to utilize a surety bond and Standby Trust Fund method to provide reasonable 

financial assurance of decommissioning funding will be available at the time of 

decommissioning the facility. At least six months prior to the receipt of licensed material in 

quantities and form requiring decommissioning funding, IIFP will provide NRC the financial 

assurance instrument that IIFP intends to execute. Upon finalization of the specific funding 

instrument to be used and at least 21 days prior to the commencement of operations, IIFP will 

supplement its application to include the signed, executed documentation.” 

The justification to provide the financial assurance instruments to the NRC 6 months prior to 

operations and to fund the instruments 21 days prior to operations is to allow issuance of the 

license so construction can commence without accruing costs associated with funding the 

financial assurance mechanism while at the same time providing the NRC with a sufficient 

amount of time to review the financial assurance instruments before licensed material would 

be brought on site. 

Uranium contaminated equipment obtained from the Sequoyah Fuels facility will be 

decontaminated prior to transfer to the construction site. If residual uranium contamination, 

as uranium tetrafluoride or uranium oxides, associated with Sequoyah Fuels equipment 

cannot be decontaminated to unrestricted use levels, then this equipment will be received onsite and controlled in accordance with New Mexico Administrative Code, 20.3.3.304 B. 

Small Quantities of Source Material. This equipment has been included in the 

decommissioning cost estimate and will be funded for decommissioning when the financial 

assurance mechanism is implemented as described above. 

Therefore, IIFP specifically requests an exemption from the 10 CFR 40.36(d) (CFR, 2011) 

requirement that the “decommissioning funding plan must also contain a certification by the 

licensee that financial assurance for decommissioning has been provided in the amount of the 

cost estimate for decommissioning and a signed original of the financial instrument obtained 

to satisfy the requirements of paragraph (e) of this section”; and alternatively that IIFP can 

provide the financial assurance instruments to the NRC 6 months prior to the receipt of 

licensed material in quantities and form requiring decommissioning funding and to fund these 

instruments 21 days prior to the receipt of licensed material in quantities and form requiring 

decommissioning funding. 
Official Responses to Final RAIs October 14, 2011 

 Page | 11 

Consistent with §40.14(a); 

Granting the exemption is authorized by law; 

The decommissioning liability associated with a site that does not possess licensed material, 

as would be the case during construction, should be considered zero. This is consistent with 

the Prepayment funding mechanism described in §40.36(e)(1) which states (emphasis added); 

“Prepayment is the deposit prior to the start of operation into an account segregated from 

licensee assets and outside the licensee’s administrative control...”. This method of funding 

is also consistent with International Isotope Inc. License SUB-1587 Amendment 1 (Docket 

No. 40-9058) Block 17. 

Granting the exemption will not endanger life or property or the common defense and 

security; 

Delaying the funding of financial assurance until the receipt of licensed material in quantities 

and form requiring decommissioning funding does not endanger life or property or the 

common defense and security because the cost associated with decommission the facility 

during the construction phase is considered zero. Financial assurance for decommission will 

be in place prior to the receipt of licensed material in quantities and form requiring 

decommissioning funding when the decommission liability costs would be assured. 

Granting the exemption is otherwise in the public interest;

A requirement for funds to be set aside for the cost of decommissioning the facility prior to 

the receipt of licensed material in quantities and form requiring decommissioning funding 

presents an undue financial burden on IIFP. The decommissioning liability associated with 

the IIFP facility during the construction phase is considered to be zero. The cost associated 

with maintaining financial assurance instruments during the construction phase of the project 

is not warranted, these costs could be allocated toward construction activities which provide 

employment opportunities to the local community which is in the public interest. 

Granting the exemption meets the categorical exclusion criteria cited in §51.22(c)(25)(vi)(H) 

and (I) and therefore does not require a revision to the Environmental Report submitted with 

the License Application or a standalone environmental review. 

FRAI-9. The current language in the exemption request contains a number of phrases which do not 

provide an adequate scope to define the extent of the exemption. The original exemption 

request contains several different phrases including, “prior to operations,” “prior to startup,” “prior to licensed operations,” “provide reasonable financial assurance,” etc. These 

phrases are not well defined. 

Consistent with the requirements in 40.36(d), clarify the meaning of the phrases 

“operations” and “start-up” to be the receipt on site of radioactive material under the 

proposed license. Replace the phrase “reasonable financial assurance” with “financial 

assurance in the amount of the cost estimate” 

RESPONSE: The response is incorporated as part of the response to FRAI-8 above. 

License Documentation Impact: See License Documentation Impact for FRAI-8 above.