1 

 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON 

 TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES

 Public Hearing

 Tuesday, April 1, 2003

 Alexander Hamilton U.S. Custom House 

 Auditorium 

 One Bowling Green 

 New York, York 
 2 

 COMMISSION MEMBERS 

 Thomas H. Kean 

 Chair 

 Lee H. Hamilton 

 Vice Chair 

 Richard Ben-Veniste

 Max Cleland 

 Fred F. Fielding

 Jamie S. Gorelick 

 Slade Gorton 

 John F. Lehman 

 Timothy J. Roemer 

 James R. Thompson

 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 

 Philip D. Zelikow 
 3 

 C O N T E N T S 

 BORDERS, MONEY, AND TRANSPRTATION SECURITY PAGE 

 Glenn Fine, U.S. Department of Justice 5

 Lee Wolosky, Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP 15

 Gerald Dillingham, Civil Aviation Issues, 

 General Accounting Offices 23

 Questions and Answers 32 

 LAW ENFORCEMENT, DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE, 

 AND HOMELAND SECURITY 

 Steven Brill, Author 112

 Michael Wermuth, RAND 135

 Zoe Baird, Markle Foundation 143

 Randy Larsen, ANSER Institute for 

 Homeland Security 153

 Questions and Answers 163 

 IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO THE ATTACKS 

 Shawn Kelley, Arlington County 

 Fire Department 215

 William Baker, American Society of 

 Civil Engineers 223

 Ken Holden, New York Department of 

 Design and Construction 232

 Questions and Answers 245
 4 

 P R O C E E D I N G S 

 MR. KEAN: As we start I want to do

 two things. One is to make part of the 

 permanent record -- we have a statement here 

 from Senator Lieberman, who sent in a statement

 to make part of our record, and a statement 

 from Chris Chez from Connecticut. We will make

 both those statements part of the permanent 

 record. 

 I also want to recognize people who

 should have been recognized yesterday, I think, 

 because they are absolutely vital to our work.

 Phil Zelikow, our Executive Director who is 

 behind me with Chris Kojm, Deputy Director and 

 Dan Marcus, who is General Counsel. They are

 absolutely essential, and will be, to our work. 

 I want to recognize, as well,

 Stephanie Kaplan and Tracey Shycoff, who did 

 all the work really to put these hearings 

 together these two days. 
 5 

 Our first panel this morning is on 

 borders, money and transportation security.

 Let me see, we are missing one person 

 I thought was going to be here. Alright, so 

 going in order -- no, I'm alright, I am looking

 at the wrong one. 

 We start out with Glenn Fine, unless

 you have some sort of order you all would like 

 to go in? 

 (Pause.)

 MR. KEAN: Okay, from the U.S. 

 Department of Justice.

 MR. FINE: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice 

 Chairman, and Members of the National 

 Commission, I appreciate the opportunity to

 testify before the Commission about the work of 

 the Department of Justice Office of the

 Inspector General on border security issues. 

 Both before and after the September 11 

 terrorist attacks, we have focused much of our 
 6 

 resources on these and other national security 

 issues in the Department of Justice.

 Today, I will describe findings from 

 several of these reviews that examined programs 

 in the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

 That agency had responsibility for immigration 

 and border security issues until March 1, 2003,

 when it was transferred into the new Department 

 of Homeland Security. 

 At the outset of my remarks, I want to

 stress that while we have noted serious 

 deficiencies over the years in various INS

 operations, this should in no way diminish the 

 important work of thousands of INS employees, 

 now DHS employees. Most of them perform

 diligently, under very difficult circumstances, 

 and their mission is critical to the security

 of our country. Yet, our reviews have revealed 

 significant problems that left gaps in the 

 INS's attempts to secure the nation's borders. 
 7 

 In one important review, we examined

 the INS's contacts with two September 11

 terrorists - Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi. 

 We investigated how these two were admitted in 

 the United States. We also examined how, six

 months after the terrorist attacks, a Florida 

 flight school received notification that Atta

 and Alshehhi's applications to change their 

 immigration status from "visitors" to 

 "students" had been approved. The mailing of

 these forms raised serious concerns about the 

 INS's tracking of foreign students in the

 United States. 

 With regard to Atta and Alshehhi's 

 entries into the U.S., the evidence did not

show that the inspectors who admitted them 

 violated INS policies and practices.

 However, our review found that the 

 adjudication of their change of status 

 applications was untimely and significantly 
 8 

 flawed. The INS took more that 10 months to 

 adjudicate the applications, well after Atta

 and Alshehhi had finished their training course 

 at the Florida flight school. In addition, the 

 INS adjudicator who approved their applications

 did so without adequate information, including 

 the fact that they had left the country twice

 after filing their applications, which meant 

 they had abandoned their request for a change 

 of status.

 We also found that historically the 

 INS has devoted little attention to monitoring

 foreign students, and its paper-based tracking 

 system was inefficient, inaccurate, and 

 unreliable. The new internet-based foreign

 student tracking system, called SEVIS, has the 

 potential to dramatically improve the foreign

 student program.

 Last month, the OIG completed a 

 follow-up review to assess the INS's progress 
 9 

 in implementing the SEVIS system. We found 

that while the INS has made progress, the

 system is not fully implemented. Significant 

 deficiencies remain, such as a lack of adequate 

 oversight and training of contractors hired to

 conduct site visits of schools, and a lack of 

 procedures to identify and refer potential

 fraud for enforcement action. 

 In my written statement, I describe in 

 greater detail a series of other reviews that

 the OIG has conducted on border security 

 issues. One review examined the INS's efforts

 to prevent illegal immigration along the 

 northern border. Until recently, the INS 

 devoted significant resources to deterring

 illegal immigration along the southwest border, 

 but did not focus such attention on the

 northern border. For example, as late as 1999, 

 only 311 of the national total of approximately 

 8,000 Border Patrol agents were assigned to the 
 10 

 northern border. We concluded that the level 

 of illegal activity on the northern border

 clearly exceeded the Border Patrol's capacity

 to respond. 

 After September 11, we issued a

 follow-up review that found the INS had made 

 some improvements to enhance the security of

 the northern border. However, we concluded 

 that increased staffing and resources for the 

 northern border continued to be a critical

 need. 

 We also have conducted other reviews

 related to border security. For example: We 

 reviewed the INS's record in deporting aliens 

 who have been issued final orders of removal.

 We found that the INS removed 92 percent of 

 detained aliens with final removal orders, but

 only 13 percent of non-detained aliens. 

 In addition, we reviewed the Visa 

 Waiver Program which allows visitors from 28 
 11 

 countries to enter the U.S. without first 

 obtaining a visa. We found that INS inspectors

 did not check passports of all of these 

 visitors against the INS's computerized lookout 

 system, and that the use of stolen passports

 from some of these visa waiver countries

 presented a serious problem.

 A theme we found repeated in many of 

 our reviews was that the INS's information 

 technology systems needed significant

 improvement. Many OIG reviews have questioned

 the reliability of the INS's information

 systems and the accuracy of the data produced 

 by them. 

 In addition, INS information systems

 are not always integrated with other agencies’ 

 systems. For example, the INS and the FBI

 developed their agency's automated fingerprint 

 identification systems separately, and full 

 integration of the systems remains years away. 
 12 

 I also want to mention, briefly, one 

 other review that, while not addressing border

 security issues, does relate squarely to the 

 Commission's work. 

 At the request of FBI Director Mueller

 in June 2002, we initiated a review to examine 

 aspects of the FBI's handling of intelligence

 information prior to the September 11 attacks. 

 Our review focuses on how the FBI handled an 

 electronic communication written by an agent in

 its Phoenix office regarding extremists 

 attending flight schools in Arizona. Our

 review also is examining aspects of the FBI's 

 handling of the Moussaoui investigation and its 

 handling of other intelligence before September

 11. I believe the final results of this review 

 will be useful to the Commission, and we intend

 to cooperate fully with your review of these 

 subjects. 

 Based on the significant body of work 
 13 

 by the OIG during the last several years, I 

 believe there are several broad themes that the

 Commission may want to examine relating to 

 border security. 

 First, information and intelligence

 sharing among all levels of government remains 

 a critical component of the effort to prevent

 terrorist attacks in the United States. 

 Without adequate intelligence, the ability of 

 front-line employees to screen effectively

 those who seek to enter the country is limited. 

 Second, our reviews have found that

 the current systems for identifying when aliens 

 enter and leave the country are clearly 

 inadequate. Implementing an effective

 entry-exit tracking system is a daunting

 challenge that will require substantial efforts

 and a large investment of resources. 

 Third, we encourage the Commission to 

 focus on the often-overlooked issue of human 
 14 

 capital. To fulfill its mission, the 

 Department of Homeland Security must have

 sufficiently trained immigration staff and 

 supervisors. Historically, this has been a 

 challenge for the INS.

 Fourth, I think it is also important to 

 note that timely and consistent processing of

 the millions of benefit applications has been a 

 longstanding problem for the INS, and now for 

 the DHS. An enhanced focus on border security

 should not override this important 

 service-related responsibility.

 And finally, the transfer of the INS 

 to the Department of Homeland Security presents 

 enormous management challenges. The transfer

 will not, in itself, resolve the issues I have 

 identified today. Solutions to border security

 issues will require innovation and aggressive 

 management oversight. 

 In sum, I believe that these border 
 15 

 security issues present many potential areas 

 for the Commission to examine in the months

 head. We will be pleased to provide any 

 information or assistance to the Commission as 

 it performs this critically important task.

 That concludes my statement. I would 

 be pleased to answer any questions.

 MR. KEAN: I think we will do the 

 panel and come back, probably with questions. 

 Lee Wolosky from Boies, Schiller &

 Flexner, come in. 

 MR. WOLOSKY: Thank you for inviting

 me to testify before you on the subject of 

 terrorist financing. It is an honor and a 

 privilege to be able to appear before you

 today. 

 Unlike other terrorist leaders, Osama

 bin Laden is neither a military hero, a 

 religious authority, or an obvious 

 representative of the downtrodden and 
 16 

 disillusioned. Rather he is a rich financier. 

 He built al-Qaeda's financial network from the

 foundation of a system originally designed to 

 channel resources to the mujahadeen fighting 

 the Soviets in Afghanistan the 1980s.

 Thanks to the leadership of the Bush 

 administration that network has been disrupted,

 but it has certainly not been destroyed. And 

 as long as al-Qaeda retains access to a viable 

 financial network, it will remain a lethal threat

 to the United States. 

 Like al-Qaeda itself, its financial

 network is deliberately compartmentalized, and 

 is characterized by layers and redundancies. 

 Al-Qaeda raises money from a variety of sources

 and moves money in a variety of manners. It 

 runs businesses operating under the cloak of

 legitimacy and criminal conspiracies ranging 

 from the petty to the grand. The most

 important source of al-Qaeda's money, however, 
 17 

 is its continuous fund-raising efforts. 

 Al-Qaeda's global fund-raising network

 is built upon a foundation of charities, 

 nongovernment organizations, mosques, Muslim 

 community centers, web sites, intermediaries,

 facilitators and banks and other financial 

 institutions. Some whose money goes to

 al-Qaeda know full well the illicit and violent 

 purposes that it will further. Other donors 

 believe their money will fund legitimate

 humanitarian efforts, but the money is 

 nonetheless diverted to al-Qaeda. For years,

 individuals and charities based in Saudi Arabia 

 have been the most important source of funds 

 for al-Qaeda.

 Al-Qaeda moves its funds through the 

 global financial system, the Islamic banking

 system, and the underground hawala system, 

 among other money transfer mechanisms. It uses 

 its global network of businesses and charities 
 18 

 as a cover for moving funds. And it uses such 

 time-honored methods as bulk cash smuggling and

 the global trade in gold and other commodities 

 to both move and store value. 

 Following September 11, 2001, the Bush

 administration, building on the policies of the 

 previous administration, undertook tactical

 actions to disrupt particular individual nodes 

 in the terrorist financial network and 

 strategic initiatives to change the environment

 within which terrorists raise and move funds. 

 Tactical initiatives include law

 enforcement and intelligence activities, along 

 with public designations under the 

 International Emergency Economic Powers Act

 (IEEPA) of persons, businesses, and financial 

 institutions associated with the financial

 network of al-Qaeda and other terrorist 

 organizations. 

 Since much of the subject matter is 
 19 

 highly classified, the effectiveness of 

 tactical measures is difficult to determine.

 Clearly, there have been successes, such as the 

 recent action targeting the al-Farooq mosque 

 just across the East River from here.

 Successes have been made possible due to 

 markedly improved law enforcement and tactical

 intelligence cooperation from foreign states 

 since September 11. 

 By contract, progress in the strategic

 arena, in my judgement, has simply not been 

 made a high enough priority. Far too many key

 countries, including virtually all in the 

 Middle East and South Asia, still have in place 

 ineffective or rudimentary bank supervisory and

 anti-money laundering regimes. In no country, 

 including the United States, are either Islamic

 charities or the underground hawala system 

 effectively regulated. 

 Fundamentally, U.S. efforts to curtail 
 20 

 the financing of terrorism are impeded not only 

 by a lack of institutional capacity abroad, but

 by a lack of political will among key foreign 

 partners. Some have a history of ignoring the 

 problem. Some perceive, correctly or

 incorrectly, that the U.S.'s attention on the 

 subject has waned. Some simply disagree with

 the U.S. view of the nature and severity of the 

 problem. 

 Confronted with this lack of political

 will, the current administration, in my view, 

 has not made full use of all relevant and legal

 policy tools at its disposal. For example, 

 punitive provisions of Title III of the USA 

 PATRIOT ACT enable the Executive Branch to

 restrict or prohibit access to the U.S. 

 financial system for foreign states or foreign

 financial institutions that lack adequate 

 anti-money laundering regimes. This powerful 

 tool remains unused in a terrorist financing 
 21 

 context. 

 Finally, I would like to say a few

 words about the war in Iraq, which I support, 

 but which I fear may retard progress on these 

 critical issues.

 Even supporters of the war must 

 concede that the United States has not

 effectively justified the war to many members

 of the international community. 

 This state of affairs may set back

 ongoing U.S. efforts to fight terrorism. 

 Terrorist financing is a transnational problem

 requiring transnational solutions. In almost 

 all cases, the money trail leads or originates 

 overseas. Curtailing terrorist financing

 therefore requires comprehensive law 

 enforcement and intelligence cooperation with

 foreign states.

 Political commitment defines the 

 nature and scope of that cooperation. An 
 22 

 internationally unpopular war may make the 

 necessary commitment more difficult.

 At the same time, the diplomatic 

 imperatives of fighting a war in Iraq may have 

 bumped terrorist financing down the bilateral

 agenda with critical front-line states. By all

 external indications, the Saudis and other

 front-line states have not taken sufficient 

 steps to change the strategic environment that 

 funds extremism. Appropriate regulation of

 charities, hawala and the formal banking 

 system, along with the reining in of the

 madrassa educational system, among other 

 things, requires a fundamental commitment to 

 long-term structural reform. While laws,

 regulations and decrees are difficult to come 

 by, there is no credible evidence that

 comprehensive structural reform is taking 

 place. 

 And yet we do not appear to be holding 
 23 

 the Saudis' feet to the fire. Rather than 

 speaking out loudly and forcefully about their

 and other states' failure to take steps 

 necessary to assure U.S. security, the United 

 States remains publicly silent on these issues,

 no doubt captive to the near-term diplomatic 

 imperatives of waging war, and assuring the

 basing and overflight rights, along with the 

 petroleum production commitments, that are 

 necessary or desirable in connection with that

 undertaking. 

 Thank you very much.

 MR. KEAN: Mr. Dillingham is from 

 Civil Aviation and General Accounting Office.

 MR. DILLINGHAM: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

 Mr. Chairman, Vice Chairman Hamilton, 

 Members of the Commission, thank you for

 inviting GAO to participate in this very 

 important national forum. 

 As many of you know, GAO is the 
 24 

 investigative arm of the United States 

 Congress. Over the years our reports have been

 a key source of information about the security 

 of the nations transportation system. 

 In June of 2000 we reported that the

 terrorist threat of attacks using aircraft was 

 a persistent and growing concern for the United

 States. The report also said that the trend in 

 terrorism against targets was towards large 

 scale incidents designed for maximum

 destruction, terror and media impact. Fifteen 

 months later 9/11 happened.

 Mr. Chairman, I have submitted a 

 formal statement, for the record. This morning 

 I would like to summarize that statement around

 two questions. First, how has transportation 

 security changed since 9/11? And second, where

 do we go from here? 

 Regarding the first question about 

 changes since September 11. Overall I think 
 25 

 the nation has come a long way. Before 9/11 

 security was never treated as a national

 priority and it had never gotten the kind of 

 attention or resources that it receives today. 

 We now have a federal agency whose primary

 mission is ensuring security for all modes of 

 transportation. That agency is the

 Transportation Security Administration. TSA is 

 the largest agency within the new Department of 

 Homeland Security.

 During the first 18 months of its 

 existence the primary focus of TSA has been in aviation 

 security. Before 9/11 the airlines, the 

 airports and the federal aviation

 administration were all in charge of some 

 aspect of aviation security. Unfortunately, as

 is often the case, when everybody is in charge, 

 no one is really in charge and things can and 

 did fall through the cracks.
 26 

 Prior to 9/11 the very critical task 

 of passenger and baggage screening, what was

 referred to as the last line of defense, was 

being handled by persons who were not properly 

 trained, who were not properly supervised,

 whose salaries were not even competitive with 

 the salaries of nearby fast food restaurants,

 and who had probably got the job less than six 

 months. 

 Now most of the security screeners have been

 federalized. The question is whether screening 

 is better because the staff are now federal

 employees. I submit to you that screening 

 probably is better, but not because workers are 

 federal employees. Screening is better because

 the workers are more skilled, because they are 

 receiving a decent wage and because they are

 getting better training and supervision. 

 However, I want to point out that the 

 TSA reports that since it took over screening 
 27 

 they have confiscated literally millions of 

 prohibited items. I know that you have seen in

 the media, earlier on, about knitting needles 

 and scissors and things of that nature. We are 

 not talking about those kind of things. We are

 talking about over a million knives and box 

 cutters. We are talking about more than a

 thousand firearms. 

 Since 9/11 there is a long list of 

 security initiatives that have been undertaken.

 Some of which are classified and some of which 

 are widely publicized, such as all baggage

 being screened before it goes on the aircraft, 

 the installation of reinforced cockpit doors, 

 and the presence of thousands of Federal Air

 Marshals. 

 In spite of all that has been

 accomplished, there are still vulnerabilities 

 and occasional lapses in the aviation security 

 system. The system is far from perfect and a 
 28 

 hundred percent secure. I submit to you that 

 occasional lapse will probably continue to

 occur. The goal should be perfection, but

 there should also be a recognition that 

 perfection is not attainable. The question is,

 are we doing as much as practicable to move 

 towards that goal?

 I think for the most part the answer

 is yes. With most of the goals that Congress 

 set for TSA regarding aviation security now

 behind them, TSA is in the very early stages of 

 working with the other transportation modes to

 enhance security in those modes. 

 Unlike the direct and pervasive role 

 it played with regard to aviation, TSA

 envisions serving more as a transportation 

 system security manager for the other modes.

 TSA will establish security standards and 

 facilitate coordination and collaboration 

 across the six transportation modes. TSA has 
 29 

 also provided some relatively small amounts of 

 money to the other modes for security projects.

 For the most part, state and local 

 authorities and the private sector, in 

 collaboration with a variety of federal

 agencies, such as the Coast Guard, Customs and 

 federal law enforcement agencies, have been

 responsible for as much of what has been done 

 to improve security in the other modes. These 

 improvements have largely been a few new

 security initiatives or increased frequency of 

 existing activities.

 The new initiatives are activities 

 such as conducting vulnerability assessments, in 

 establishing first response teams. The

 increased frequency type activities includes 

 things like additional training for emergency

 preparedness and revising emergency plans and 

 conducting emergency drills. 

 The bottom line is that actions are 
 30 

 being taken and some progress is being made 

 towards securing the nation's transportation

 system. But what could be considered as 

 constituting an effective overall multi-modal

 transportation security environment, may very

 well be years away. 

 Turning to our last question. Where

 do we go from here and how do we get there? 

 The nation faces a very difficult and 

 resource-intensive task to secure the

 transportation system. I would like to offer 

 some thoughts and observations of where we need

 to go to move closer to the goal. 

 First, we must recognize that it is 

 not possible to anticipate and counter every

 risk. Priorities must be assigned with time 

 and money devoted to those threats and hazards

 that are best established and most likely to 

 cause the most harm. In short, we need to plan 

 and act strategically. 
 31 

 Second, effective coordination must be 

 established among the many public and private

 entities responsible for transportation 

 security. 

 Third, terrorists are creative. We

 need to address a significant proportion of our 

 energies to identifying possible new terrorist

 risks and threats rather than simply preparing 

 for the last type of attack that occurred. And 

 in the final analysis, transportation security,

 which is crucial to our nation, it must be 

 considered in the larger context of other

 national priorities and weighed and supported 

 accordingly. 

 Mr. Chairman and Members of the

 Commission, this is very much a 

 work-in-progress and much needs to be done.

 The GAO stands ready to help. 

 Thank you very much. 

 MR. KEAN: Thank you, Mr. Dillingham. 
 32 

 Commissioner Gorelick. 

 MS. GORELICK: Thank you, Mr.

 Chairman. I would like address my first couple 

 of questions to Inspector General Fine. 

 First of all, I would like to say we

 have a very able and talented public servant in 

 Glenn Fine. We are very happy to have you here

 today, and very pleased that you are doing your 

 job in the Justice Department. 

 First question, I understand that the

 CIA launched an internal review immediately 

 after 9/11 of its conduct before 9/11. Did the

 Justice Department do the same thing? 

 MR. FINE: No. The Justice Department 

 did not do a broad after action report similar

 to what you describe with the CIA. Initially 

 the Justice Department deferred to the Joint

 Intelligence Committee which was doing a broad 

 review that looked at the actions of various 

 Federal Government agencies, including the 
 33 

 Justice Department and others. After that, it 

 has deferred to this Commission to do that broad

 review. 

 However, also the Inspector General, 

 Department of Justice, my office, has done a

 series of reviews on national security issues, 

 some of which I describe in my report in my

 written testimony, others on the FBI. 

 In addition when we have been 

 confronted with particular issues such as the

 Atta and Alshehhi visa issue or change of 

 application issue, we have done reviews on

 that. In June, as I mentioned, of last year at 

 the request of Director Mueller we launched a 

 review on how the FBI handled the intelligence

 information related to the September 11 attacks. 

 So we are doing that kind of review. But the

 broad after action review similar to the CIA has 

 not been undertaken by the Justice Department 

 itself. 
 34 

 MS. GORELICK: Thank you. My second 

 question is this. As I read your report, I see

 very different reviews occurring for a 

 foreigner who wants to come into this country 

 as a student, depending on what route he takes.

 So could you contrast, for example, a 

 foreigner who wants to come into this country

 as a student, but who applies for a visa in a 

 visa waiver country, comes in as a visitor and 

 then tries to change his status to a student

 status, which would allow him to stay longer, 

 versus, someone who applies to be a student

 from a non waiver country and goes through the 

 consular process for a student waiver. Could 

 you describe the two?

 MR. FINE: Sure. It is a different 

 review process.

 For the student who applies abroad in 

 his or her own country, they have to show ties 

 to the country, their own country, and show an 
 35 

 indication that they will return to the country 

 afterwards. They have to show financial means,

 they have to show that they have been accepted 

 at an accredited school in the United States, 

 and normally, although not always, they

 normally go through an interview process with 

 consular officer. As a result they get a

 student visa. They come to the United States. 

 They present the visa to the immigration 

 inspector at the port of entry, and they enter

 into the United States and take up studies. 

 That is a different process than a

 foreign student who did not get visa abroad but 

 who comes to the United States on a visitor 

 visa or who may come to the United States

 without a visa because they are from one of the 

 28 visa waiver countries. So they enter the

 United States either with a visitor visa or 

 without a visa from a visa waiver country, and 

 in the United States they then apply to change 
 36 

 their status to student. 

 In the United States it is largely a

 paper process. They fill out the I-589 form. 

 They show they have been accepted by a school. 

 They show financial means, and then the INS

 adjudicates their status on paper without an 

 interview. Also, prior to September 11, as we

 found in the Atta and Alshehhi case, without

 even checks of the database that would show 

 what their status was when they applied to the

 United States. So it is a different process 

 depending on which route they take.

 MS. GORELICK: So if you are clever, 

 you can figure out a way to come into this 

 country and stay for a substantial period of

 time without anyone ever interviewing you as to 

 the appropriateness of that occurring?

 MR. FINE: It is possible to do that. 

 MS. GORELICK: Has that changed since 

 September 11? 
 37 

 MR. FINE: It has not markedly changed

 since September 11, particularly from the visa

 waiver countries. 

 MS. GORELICK: Mr. Dillingham, did you 

 want to add something?

 MR. DILLINGHAM: Yes, I did. To the 

best of our knowledge, the State Department is

 denying student visas to people who want to come in to 

 study flying in the United States. That, in 

 fact, has changed.

 MS. GORELICK: I'm glad to hear that.

 One other general question for you,

 Mr. Fine. What is the state of connectivity 

 between the intelligence community and INS 

 today, INS either at the Justice Department or

 at the Department of Homeland Security? How 

 much information flows between the Intelligence

 Community and those who are guarding our 

 borders and vice versa? 

 MR. FINE: Connectivity is better than 
 38 

 it was in the past. Now immigration inspectors 

 and INS officials do connect through their own

 databases, through the interagency or board 

 information system to State Department

 databases, the class database, tip-off systems,

 and in those databases is intelligence 

 information provided by intelligence agencies.

 In addition, the INS has more direct 

 contacts with the intelligence agencies through 

 their Office of Intelligence. However, the

 information is often unclassified, often 

 sometimes vague and not in a particular usable

 form, we have been told by some immigration

 inspectors. I think that is a critical issue, 

 that this Commission and the government needs

 to look at. The connectivity of information. 

 The integration of the systems and the ability

 to get usable information, usable intelligence 

 information to the front-line employees who 

 need to use that information to screen people 
 39 

 who come to the United States. Without that it 

 is an enormously difficult job that they do.

MS. GORELICK: Thank you very much.

MR. KEAN: Mr. Gorton.

 MR. GORTON: Mr. Fine, assuming that 

 in 2001 the INS have been substantially better 

 funded, maybe twice as much money, and equally

 more efficient in carrying on its duties. How 

 many of the 19 hijackers could have been in the

 United States or would have perfectly valid 

 first entry into the United States, in any 

 event?

 MR. FINE: That actually, I think, is 

 speculative and I can't really answer that

 question. 

 What we do know is that many of them, 

 most of them, entered into the United States

 with valid visas and the immigration inspectors 

 did not have any information or intelligence

 that would change the outcome of their 

 inspection of them. 

 So for that it is hard to say what the 
 40 

 difference would have been had the INS been 

 better funded or had more information, but I do

 think it is an important issue that needs to be 

 addressed going forward. 

 MR. GORTON: I take it then that most,

 if not all of them, could at least have had a 

 first entry into the United States as visitors

 even if the INS had been much more efficient? 

 MR. FINE: That's correct, and really 

 the issue there is the State Department. The

 State Department's interviews of them, giving 

 visas to them, and my understanding is --

 MR. GORTON: But they wouldn't have 

 required interviews at all if they were just 

 coming here first as tourists, would they?

 MR. FINE: Pardon me? 

MR. GORTON: Would they not have

 required interviews at all if they were just 

 coming here first as tourists? 

 MR. FINE: From some countries they 
 41

 would have, yes. From the visa waiver 

 countries they wouldn't have required

 interviews. But many of them came from non 

 visa waiver countries such as Saudi Arabia and 

 elsewhere, where they did require interviews.

 The Inspector General of the 

 Department of State has looked at that and from

 my understanding of it, has indicated that 

 there were some gaps in the processing of those 

 19 terrorists for their visas, but that's an

 issue for the State Department's Inspector 

 General.

 MR. GORTON: The question is basically 

 leading to this. I think you have pointed out 

 very eloquently, particularly in your written

 statement, the INS or any similar agency 

 doesn't exist simply to keep people out. It

 exists in order to let the right people in, 

 whether they are tourists, full-time

 immigrants, doing business here, or anything 
 42 

 else. One of your statistics is 500 million 

 particular contacts at one time or another.

 So I guess my question is, how much 

 can we realistically expect to increase safety 

 and the exclusion of dangerous aliens simply by

 a more efficient bureaucracy or homeland 

 security agency, and how uch for providing for the safety

 of the people of the United States, is on the 

 laps of Congress perhaps to make different 

 policies and to make the system less complex

 and easier to administer than it is. 

 Does the Department of Justice have

 views on that subject? 

 MR. FINE: Well, I am not sure I can 

 speak for the Department of Justice per se, but

 I do believe the issues need to be addressed at 

 all levels. It can't simply be looking at the

 INS and the end product of the process, saying all 

 the onus or burden goes upon them. There does 

 have to be a look at how to allow the flow of 
 43 

 travellers and commerce across our borders, but 

 in a way that attempts to screen out ones who

 shouldn't be here. 

 Perhaps through trusted traveller 

 lanes, or ways to increase the ability of cargo

 to be inspected in advance. So that is an 

 important issue. There are policy issues that

 the United States Congress has to look at as 

 well. 

 What we have looked at is the INS's

 aspect of it and we have found deficiencies. I 

 am not saying that is the sole problem in

 protecting our country. 

 MR. GORTON: One more question of that 

 nature, you spoke of the 28 visa waiver

 countries in your written testimony, at least. 

 You speak to the fact that there is a great

 deal of theft of passports from those 

 countries. Of course they are, in a sense, 

 valid passports. Is there any practical 
 44 

 solution to that problem? Obviously from very 

 friendly countries a visa waiver is probably a

 good policy decision, but how do we prevent the 

 misuse of visa waiver passports? 

 MR. FINE: I think there are several

 ways to do that. One is to ensure that those 

 countries have better accountability of their

 passports, and if their passports are being 

 stolen we might want to look to see whether 

 those countries should remain in the visa

 waiver program. 

 Secondly, once those passports were

 stolen they have to be reported so that the 

 numbers of those passports can be entered into 

 lookout systems, and when someone travelling

 with that passport shows up at a port of entry, 

 an INS inspector can check the database, see

 that it's a stolen passport, see that it is 

 illegitimate and stop that person. 

 What we found in our reviews is that 
 45 

 foreign countries sometimes --

 MR. GORTON: How are we going to

 determine whether the passport was stolen? 

 MR. FINE: By the foreign country 

 having clear internal controls about passports.

 They know they are missing, they know they are 

 stolen. They report it to the United States.

 It is entered into a look-out system, and then 

 we can stop people trying to use those 

 passports. That's what happens, but we found

 that is not happening on a consistent basis and 

 in come cases the INS inspectors didn't even

 check the look-out systems to determine whether 

 the passport had been reported as stolen. That 

 is one thing that we can do.

 MS. GORELICK: Let me follow up on 

 that and then move to more questions of Mr.

 Wolosky and Mr. Dillingham. 

 The INS, as I understand from your 

 report and my own experience, has utilized 
 46 

 biometric measures for the identification of 

 individuals trying to come into this country

 which, obviously, are harder to forge than a 

 passport, and certainly harder to steal. 

 Do you see a future in the utilization

 more broadly of biometric measures as a form of 

 identity checks at our borders?

 MR. FINE: Yes, I do. I think it is 

 critical. Names can be changed. Names can be 

 misspelled. Names are not a full enough

 identifier. There does need to be some use of 

 biometrics to ensure that the person showing up

 at the border is the person that received the 

 visa, and also that the person is who he or she 

 says he is.

 So, yes, biometrics are clearly needed 

 to be incorporated into our identification

 systems. 

 MS. GORELICK: Finally, you have 

 raised serious questions about the visa waiver 
 47 

 program. In your professional opinion, should 

 that program be continued?

 MR. FINE: I think the visa waiver 

 program does have significant benefits. It is 

 a policy question whether those benefits

 outweigh the costs, and I am not in a position 

 to say that the program should be discontinued.

 But I do think the countries that are in it 

 should be carefully screened and held 

 accountable to ensure that the appropriate

 measures, that its passports are not being 

 fraudulently used.

 MR. GORTON: Have we ever picked up a 

 suspected terrorist who came here on a stolen 

 passport from a visa waiver country?

MR. FINE: Yes, we have. 

 MS. GORELICK: I would like to ask Mr.

 Dillingham a couple of questions, not just 

 about aviation security, but as I understand 

 it, you previously were director of physical 
 48 

 infrastructure issues, generally, at the GAO. 

 There have been published reports that

 the Transportation Security Administration has 

 poured, in fact, more resources into aviation 

 security than perhaps we are needing at the

 moment. Yet we hear that there is not the same 

 degree of attention being paid to our ports, to

 container shipments, to bridges, to tunnels. 

 And as you have said, if everyone is in charge, 

 no one is in charge.

 You have contrasted the way in which 

 TSA is approaching its role in aviation

 security with what, I think you have described 

 as, a more management role setting standards, 

 creating a collaborative role with all of the

 many parties who have responsibilities for all 

 of these other transportation modes.

 Could you comment on whether the 

 resources are adequate to maintain and increase 

 our security in these other areas of 
 49 

 transportation, and whether the management 

 structure that you have described is adequate?

 MR. DILLINGHAM: Yes. I think, 

 without a doubt, there has been 

 disproportionate resources applied to aviation.

 Aviation is different from the rest of the 

 modes in that there was a Federal, a large

 Federal presence associated with aviation prior 

 to 9/11. It was, of course, the FAA. 

 The other modes are also different in

 their characteristics. Mass transit, for 

 example, is very hard to secure because of the

 nature of it. It's large, it has to be open. 

 There are lots of ways to get into it. 

 Ports, a huge undertaking needs to be

 done, but there is also this sort of mix of 

 stakeholders, local, state and federal players

 with regard to some of these other modes of 

 transportation. Clearly, there is a gap 

 between what has been done for aviation and 
 50 

 what needs to be done for the rest of the 

 modes. Money is a big issue.

 Just by example, we came up from 

 Washington on the Amtrack. We came through a 

 very heavily populated northeast corridor, and

 to my knowledge there was no metal detector 

 check. There was no screening to speak of, and

 we pulled in under Penn Station. 

 That could have been a very bad 

 situation. A situation that occurred in

 Baltimore a year or so ago with a chemical fire 

 on a freight train. All of this points to the

 notion that there are definite gaps, whether 

 there are going to be enough resources to 

 address that is a real question.

 What the TSA is doing now is, trying 

 to establish what are vulnerabilities

 associated with these various modes, and to 

 move from there. 

 The management structure you ask 
 51 

 about, I think there is no way that it can be 

 the same as with aviation. Aviation was

 mandated by legislation, so I think the 

 coordination and the collaboration and the 

 structure that TSA is trying to put in place

 is, in fact, a good first step and it is 

 probably a logical step to take in terms of

 managing. 

 It will still be a case where -- well 

 it wouldn't be a case where no one is in

 charge. TSA will be in charge by statute. 

 They are in charge of all transportation

 security. They will, therefore, have a 

 statutory basis to coordinate and for 

 cooperation and setting standards across the

 system. 

 MS. GORELICK: Well, Mr. Dillingham,

 if I might make an observation. Before 

 September 11, 2001, the GAO and other agencies 

 made numerous reports about the vulnerability 
 52 

 of our aviation security system. And the 

 response was often, you need to understand how

 disperse power is. There are various entities 

 with various responsibilities. There are local 

 transportation authorities. There is the

 aviation industry, et cetera, and of course, 

 this is very costly, and trying to figure out

 who bears the burden is very complicated. 

 That sounds actually quite similar to 

 what we are hearing now about transportation

 outside the aviation security arena. I am 

 prepared to concede that there is a lot of

 complexity, but I wonder whether we have the 

 same urgency being brought to bear around our 

 ports, in particular, around container

 shipments in particular, around the security of 

 our bridges and tunnels, and whether you, having

 broad experience and lengthy experience in this 

 area, feel that we have the right level of 

 effort and the right structure being brought to 
 53 

 bear. 

 MR. DILLINGHAM: I think the process

 that is in place is the necessary process. 

 That is, to determine what's important. This 

 is all being done on a risk-assessment basis,

 meaning that the TSA is looking across all 

 modes trying to see what the vulnerabilities

 and the threats are, and then to prioritize 

 that across all threats and across all modes. 

 Because, as I said in my statement, there is no

 way that we, as a country, can secure against 

 all risk. So we have to prioritize and we have

 to prioritize according to what the threat is 

 and the likely harm that would come if that 

 threat is in fact realized.

 I think ports are high on the agenda.

 Right now, only two percent of the thousands of

 containers that come into the country are 

 physically inspected, but neither the 

 technology nor the manpower is available to 
 54 

 inspect 100 percent of them. But we are moving 

 in the direction of getting better technology

 and finding ways, both internationally and 

 domestically to address the issue. 

 MR. GORTON: Mr. Dillingham, you were

 very optimistic about the degree of progress we 

 have made since 9/11 with respect to air

 transportation. First, I just wanted to make 

 sure, you talked about six modes, have I got 

 the other five right, car, train, mass transit,

 bus and maritime? Would those be the other 

 five?

 MR. DILLINGHAM: Yes, sir. 

 MR. GORTON: Which of those five is 

 the highest priority and the greatest threat,

 as far as you are concerned, from the point of 

 view of moving in the direction of the degree

 of progress we have made with airlines. 

 MR. DILLINGHAM: I think ports. I 

 think maritime because maritime cannot only be 
 55 

 a place of substantial infrastructural damage, 

 but it can have cascading effects on the

 economy. We can see when our ports were closed 

 for a very short time a few months ago, how 

 that effected the economy and international

 commerce. So I think ports are probably the 

 next highest priority, and probably highest in

 terms of vulnerability as well. 

 MR. GORTON: One other question, if I 

 may, both for you and for Mr. Fine.

 How would you characterize the 

 cooperation of the commercial airlines

 themselves in connection with air 

 transportation safety? That question is for 

 you. And the question for you, Mr. Fine, with

 respect to tracking emigrants and immigrants 

 from the United States?

 MR. DILLINGHAM: When you say their 

 cooperation with regard to safety could you say 

 more. What do you mean? 
 56 

 MR. GORTON: The whole TSA attempt, 

 which you characterized as being pretty

 successful so far, would you characterize all 

 or most of the airlines as being highly cooperative 

 with the safety measures or reluctant from time

 to time? 

 MR. DILLINGHAM: I think the airlines

 are -- it is probably both. The airlines, of 

 course, are in some economic distress. So the 

 airlines will often sort of push back with

 regard to at least paying for some of the 

 security measures that are being put in place

 and they see them as unfunded mandates. 

 However, the airlines on the other 

 hand recognize that if the flying public do not

 believe that security is much improved, the 

 flying public will not come back and the

 airline industry will suffer even greater 

 economic woes, which in turn has a cascading

 effect on the rest of the economy. 
 57 

 MR. GORTON: How about with tracking 

 people?

 MR. FINE: I think it is mixed. I 

 don't think that they have been uncooperative. 

 I do think that there are issues regarding the

 collection of departure cards, I-94, and 

 whether they are universally collected and

 provided to the INS. They are clearly not. 

 There are also issues with regard to 

 airport facilities, inspection facilities,

 ensuring that they are safe and secure. 

 In the end, though, it is a Government

 function to ensure that it is handled 

 appropriately. I think the onus is on the 

 federal government to ensure that whatever

 needs to be done is done. And I think that's 

 where the answer lies.

 MS. GORELICK: Mr. Wolosky, we had a 

 witness here yesterday who basically said that 

 there is so much money, as he put it I think, 
 58 

 "sloshing around" in the Islamic charitable 

 community, and so relatively little of it is

 needed, if you will, to successfully fund 

 terrorism, that the ability to squeeze out the 

 part that has been siphoned off to support

terrorism activities is extremely challenging, 

 let's say. Could you give us your assessment

 of that? After all, you said we need to do 

 that. We need to identify those sources of 

 funds and eliminate them.

 MR. WOLOSKY: Sure. First, I 

 absolutely think it is true that there is a

 very large amount of money as you said, or as 

 the witness said "sloshing around" through 

 that system. In part because it is actually

 one of the five pillars of Islam, Zacat, to 

 give at least 2.5 percent of your income to

 charitable endeavors. That is collected both 

 through retail charities, at mosques and Muslim 

 community centers, and through larger 
 59 

 donations, typically by Gulf Arabs. 

 But particularly when it is given at

 mosques and Muslim community centers, again, 

 like the mosque across the river, it is 

 frequently collected by a community leader. It

 is co-mingled. It is dispersed at the 

 discretion of the community leader, most

 frequently without any record keeping or any 

 accountability. 

 But I don't agree with the premise that

 just because a large amount of money moves 

 through that system that the United States

 should not take steps to regulate that activity 

 within its own borders. Nor do I agree with 

 the premise the United States should forego

 instruments of foreign policy to compel other 

 states in which this activity occurs to engage

 in similar regulatory efforts. 

 I think that there are really two 

 reasons to take such action, notwithstanding 
 60 

 the fact that a relatively small amount of 

 money can contribute to devastating terrorist

 attacks. 

 The first is that where particular 

 nodes are identified, you actually can take

 steps to prevent attacks from occurring by

 choking off the financing.

 Secondly, to the extent that you force 

 systemic changes, you make it harder for 

 terrorists to raise and move money. To the

 extent that you achieve that objective, you are 

 forcing them to spend more time worrying about

 how they are going to raise and move money, 

 than spending time and effort on planning and 

 executing deadly attacks.

 MS. GORELICK: Thank you for that 

 response. I think it will help us as we

 consider the kind of factual inquiry we need to 

 be making here. 

 You raised, I think, two fairly 
 61 

 dispiriting points. One is that the issue of 

 attacking the sources of terrorism funding has

 moved lower on the bilateral foreign policy 

 agenda. And also, that the necessity for some 

 international rubric for attacking terrorist

 financing has been undermined by the lack of 

 international consensus for this effort.

 I was struck by the fact that in 

 November of '02, when you did your report, you 

 actually observed that while immediately in the

 aftermath of 9/11 there was a lot of 

 international cooperation, you said, “that

 coalition may be fraying" and you noted a 

 "widening gap between the U.S. and Europe" on 

 the basic salience and perimeters of global

 terrorism. 

 My question to you is this, here we

 are six months later, how are our requests for 

 international cooperation in the area of 

 financing of terrorism being met? How are 
 62 

 other key participants in the international 

 community currently responding to our request

 for help? 

 MR. WOLOSKY: I think with respect to 

 both questions, unfortunately they are better

 posed to someone who is currently working on 

 these issues on behalf of the United States

 Government, but I do think that, as a general 

 matter, there is substantial evidence to 

 suggest that our foreign partners -- you have

 to remember, the way this process has worked 

 insofar as IEEPA designations is concerned, is

 that the United States, through executive 

 order, has named individuals and organizations 

 that are part of the terrorist financial

 network, the assets of which are frozen, 

 assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction are frozen.

 U.S. persons are prohibited by law from 

 transacting business with those persons or 

 organizations. 
 63 

 That process has been 

 multi-lateralized through U.N. Security Council

 Resolution 1390 whereby the same names of 

 individuals or organizations has gone to the 

 United Nations and gone out to the member

 states of United Nations for similar action, as 

 the member states may wish to engage in.

 There have been, in my experience, two 

 problems with the multi-lateralization of that 

 process. The first is that many states lack

 the technical capacity to actually freeze 

 funds. That was illustrated for me personally

 when I visited, in recent months, a 

 strategically significant African country and I 

 asked them the question: What happened to this

 piece of paper with all these names that came 

 from the United Nations? Where did it go?

 Answer: It went to the Foreign Ministry. 

 I go to the Foreign Ministry and say, 

 what did you do with this piece of paper with 
 64 

 all the names on it? Well, we sent it to the 

 Central Bank.

 Go to the Central Bank, as I did and 

 say, what happened to this list? Well, we sent 

 it to our banks.

 Go to the banks, as I did: What 

 happened to this piece of paper with all the

 names? Well, we put it over there because we 

 don't have any ability to go through our 

 accounts and identify the beneficial holders of

 the accounts. 

 So that is a point on technical

 capacity which needs to be addressed in this 

 context. 

 The second point has to do with

 differing standards of who and what constitutes 

 a terrorist, and also the evidentiary standards

 with respect to the type of information that 

 foreign states have asked for in connection 

 with supporting the U.S. designations. 
 65 

 With respect to the first subpoint, as 

 the report of the Council on Foreign Relations

 notes, the European Union still to this day 

 permits Hamas and Hizbollah to legally raise 

 funds on its territory.

 Secondly, with respect to evidentiary 

 standards, what we have found post 9/11 was

 that while there was initial willingness of 

 other states to freeze funds over designated 

 individuals and organizations originated by the

 U.S. Government, that willingness faded as the 

 months went on and foreign states asked for

 increasingly sensitive intelligence information 

 that supported the original U.S. designations, 

 which when it wasn't provided caused them to

 fail to take steps to freeze the accounts of 

 designated individuals and organizations.

 MR. GORTON: Mr Wolosky, would you 

 give us a brief description of how the Hawala 

 system works. What kind of financial system is 
 66 

 it? 

 And secondly, what the United States

 has done with respect to its illegitimate use 

 for the support of terrorism when the deposits 

 originate here in the United States.

 And third, whether there is really 

 anything we can do with respect to such an

 informal system when the transactions take

 place entirely overseas. 

 MR. WOLOSKY: Sure. The way it works

 is essentially as follows. 

 Let's assume that I am a Pakistani

 immigrant living in Brooklyn and wish to 

 transfer $500 to my parents living in 

 Islamabad. The way I can use the Hawala system

 to accomplish that money transfer is by going 

 to a local individual, a hawaladar in Brooklyn,

 giving him my $500. He uses his network, which 

 is most frequently a clan or family-based

 network and contacts his counterpart in 
 67 

 Islamabad, and he says, when someone comes in 

 with a particular identifying code, give him

 the $500. 

 That system enables money to be moved 

 without the physical movement of money --

 MR. GORTON: Is not that individual in 

 Brooklyn engaged in banking activities under

 the laws of New York? 

 MR. WOLOSKY: Well, until recently the 

 problem has been that there has been no Federal

 regulation of that activity. Post 9/11, using 

 preexisting legal authorities, the Department

 of the Treasury has begun to require that 

 activity, individuals who engage in that 

 activity to register.

 MR. GORTON: I see. 

 MR. WOLOSKY: Because the activity

 fundamentally is intended to be anonymous, 

 without record keeping, without paper trails. 

 The likelihood that the individuals will 
 68 

 register is quite remote. 

 But notwithstanding that fact, it

 provides a basis for prosecution in Federal 

 court if they fail to register. Prior to 9/11 

 frequently there was no basis for prosecution

 in Federal court. Now if they fail to 

 register, they can be prosecuted.

 MR. GORTON: Is that effectively our 

 method of stopping some portion of that $500 

 from going, not to the parent in Islamabad, but

 to terrorism? 

 MR. WOLOSKY: Yes. I think a basic

 point which you alluded to is that this system 

 of moving money is used for mainly legitimate 

 purposes. It is unique to several different

 cultures in south Asia and east Asia. It has 

 been used for centuries. It is used by

 terrorists and other criminals, but it is also 

 used by a lot of people who just want to move 

 money and avoid formal banking. They have 
 69 

 access to formal financial systems, but they 

 want to avoid it, for whatever reasons.

 But you asked whether that was the 

 primary method of regulating this activity in 

 the United States. I believe that it is,

 through a registration system. 

 And you also asked whether it -- what

 steps or whether the United States should take 

 action to prevent other countries from being 

 part of abuses of this system.

 I think the answer is yes. Again, if 

 you look under Title 3 of the U.S.A. Patriot

 Act, it authorizes the Executive Branch to 

 restrict or prohibit access to the U.S. financial 

 system on the part of states or foreign

 financial institutions that lack adequate 

 anti-money laundering regimes.

 This is ultimately the most powerful 

 tool in the arsenal of the U.S. Government. 

 It has not -- and it provides leverage over 
 70 

 states that, for instance, refuse to regulate 

 in any manner the Hawala system.

 It hasn't really been used to this 

 point in this context and the findings of the 

 distinguished Bipartisan Commission and the

 Council on Foreign Relations was that it 

 should.

 MR. GORTON: One follow-up question. 

 You may have left out the middle of this 

 transaction. Your Pakistani has gone and given

 $500 to the Hawala person in Brooklyn who has then 

 called Islamabad or communicated with

 Islamabad, which gives $500 to the parent 

 there, but somehow or other the $500 has still 

 got to get from Brooklyn to Islamabad, does it

 not? 

 MR. WOLOSKY: No. It doesn't. That's

 how the system works. 

 In other words, it is credited through 

 family relationship, let's say, or a clan-based
 71 

 relationship. The money itself physically does 

 not move.

 If you, for instance, if your uncle 

 called you and asked you to loan some $500 to 

 someone who he wanted you to loan the money to,

 you probably would do it, even if he didn't 

 advance you the $500. You would rely on the

 fact of your family relationship for settlement 

 to occur in the manner of your choosing, at 

 some future day. That is exactly how the

 Hawala system works. 

 MS. GORELICK: There would be an

 off-setting transaction at some point in the 

 future? 

 MR. WOLOSKY: At some point in the

 future. Again, at a time of convenience, 

 whatever the circumstances may require. It

 doesn't have to be in cash. It could be in 

 gold or it could be through some co-mingled

 account in an Islamic bank. It can occur in a 
 72 

 variety of different ways. 

 MS. GORELICK: One of the challenges

 for this Commission is to look at 

 organizational issues and to make sure, A, our 

 Government is arrayed correctly and organized

 correctly and, B, that it is using all of its 

 authorities.

 The Council on Foreign Relations 

 report and your testimony note, a lack of 

 organizational accountability for the money

 laundering issue. You made a number of 

 recommendations with regard to who should have

 the leadership and who should have the ultimate 

 responsibility. 

 Since that report was issued, can you

 describe what, if anything, has been done to 

 address the organizational problems that you

 identified, and could you describe briefly

 those organizational deficiencies? 

 MR. WOLOSKY: Sure. The report 
 73 

 suggested that notwithstanding the significance 

 of this issue, the fundamental significance of

 this issue, there was no single U.S. official 

 with the correct mandate and authority to 

 coordinate U.S. policy on terrorist financing

 issues. Policy is currently coordinated

 through a policy coordination committee that is

 headed by the General Council of the Treasury 

 Department. 

 The Bipartisan Commission of the

 Council on Foreign Relations concluded that 

 that, for a variety of reasons, was not the

 most effective way to coordinate various 

 diplomatic, intelligence and law enforcement 

 and regulatory ingredients that contribute to

 effective and sustained U.S. policy response. 

 For one thing, the report of the

 Council on Foreign Relations concluded that the 

 Treasury Department was not the appropriate 

 agency to coordinate diplomatic or intelligence 
 74 

 activities. 

 There is also the question as to

 whether or not even the most capable General 

 Counsel of the Treasury -- and I don't know the 

 General Counsel of the Treasury, but I am told

 that he is extraordinarily competent -- given 

 his other statutory and institution responsibilities,

 has other things to worry about than the 

 suppression of terrorist financing. 

 MS. GORELICK: I take it from your

 report, though, that the Congress has vested 

 this responsibility in the Treasury Department

 and other agencies of Government have resisted 

 implementing that; is that correct? 

 MR. WOLOSKY: I think that the

 Executive Bank has vested this responsibility 

 in the Treasury Department. There is no

 statutory authority whatsoever with respect to 

 terrorist financing. 

 Our report concluded that because of 
 75 

 the very different and difficult ingredients 

 that contribute to an effective response,

 ranging from diplomatic activities to 

 intelligence activities to regulatory 

 activities, that that was best coordinated out

 of the White House. 

 MS. GORELICK: An organizational

 question for you, Mr. Fine. 

 You have noted that a very substantial 

 portion of the immigration and naturalization

 service responsibilities that are the subject 

 of your reports, have now been transferred to

 the Department of Homeland Security. 

 Your office has evidently built up a 

 tremendous amount of expertise in the review

 and oversight of those functions. Has all of 

 that capacity in your office been transferred

 to the Department of Homeland Security so that 

 that oversight can continue uninterrupted in 

 that new department? 
 76 

 MR. FINE: All of our capacity has not 

 been transferred, but we have transferred a

 portion of our capacity. 

 There is a Department of Homeland 

 Security, Office of the Inspector General that

 has been created. It has been created with 

 resources from various entities. We have

 provided resources to it. The Department of 

 Treasury Inspector General's Office has 

 provided resources to it. The Department of

 Transportation Inspector General's Office has 

 provided resources, FEMA and others. So there

 is a newly developed Department of Homeland Security, 

 OIG. We have provided investigators and some 

 managers to that entity.

 A lot of our capacity is involved with 

 the INS, but it is also involved with the FBI,

 the DEA, the Marshal Service. So there is not a 

 distinct unit that we could transfer over 

 there. 
 77 

 I do think it is a critical issue that 

 you raised, though, because I do think that is

 it is critically important that there be 

 adequate, aggressive and strong oversight over 

 this new entity, ranging from the INS to the

 Customs Service, to the Secret Service to the 

 TSA. It is going to be a daunting challenge

 for that new agency, the Department of Homeland 

 Security OIG, to get up and running, and to 

 ensure that there is continuity of oversight.

 We believe strongly in it and we think 

 that that new OIG ought to be adequately funded

 to perform its mission in an aggressive way. 

 MR. HAMILTON: Mr. Wolosky, -- well, 

 first of all let me say, this has been a

 marvelous panel. Each of the three of you 

 have been very helpful to the Commission and we

 appreciate it. 

 Mr. Wolosky, I was focused on your 

 final paragraph. "We don't hold the Saudis 
 78 

 feet to the fire." 

 I gather from your testimony that we,

 the United States, and the countries that are 

 most responsible here, if we had the political 

 will to crack down on financing, we could do

 it. But, because of policy considerations that 

 are very important, we don't do it.

 We have to have the oil. We have to 

 have the overflight rights. We have to have 

 the basing rights. And because we have to have

 those things, we do not hold their feet to the 

 fire. Is that your view?

 MR. WOLOSKY: That is my view. 

 Unfortunately, I wasn't called before you to 

 testify on policy with regard to Saudi Arabia

 in the current context of --

 MR. HAMILTON: I know, I appreciate

 that. I am not being critical of you in any 

 way. It is just a very good illustration of 

 how policy gets in the way of, in this case, 
 79 

 enforcement. 

 MR. WOLOSKY: Yes. That's the point

 of my testimony. In other words, I am not here

 to make judgments of whether or not particular 

 issues should be prioritized over other issues,

 but what I can tell you is that the United 

 States, at the highest levels, has not spoken

 out loudly and forcefully on the terrorist 

 financing issue as it relates to Saudi Arabia. 

 That is not to say that things aren't being

 done. I have every reason to believe that a 

 lot is being done, but it is being done in the

 shadows. The conclusion of the Council of 

 Foreign Relations' report was that it was time 

 to bring it out of the shadows. For the

 President of the United States or for other 

 senior officials to state clearly,

 unequivocally and unambiguously what was 

 required of the Saudi Government on the 

 terrorist financing issue. 
 80 

That is not being done, and in the 

 judgment of this task force it needed to be

 done in order to set benchmarks for the Saudis 

 and to enable the Saudi Government to 

 communicate to its own citizens what kind of

 conduct was and was not acceptable. 

 MR. THOMPSON: Mr. Dillingham, I don't

 want to sound like a cranky business traveller, 

 but I would like to get into an area of focus 

 on the part of TSA in terms of air travel

 security, because funding follows focus, as we 

 know, and your testimony and that of Mr. Fine

 this morning, have pointed out some rather 

 large funding gaps, particularly with regard to 

 port security which you testified to, and the

 issue of water security that Mr. Fine testified 

 to.

 I acknowledge that TSA employees, the 

 new ones especially, are finding and retrieving 

 large amounts of weapons. But if news stories 
 81 

 are to be credited, some weapons still get 

 through. I understand it is a system which

 depends not just on technology, but on human 

 instinct and humans paying attention as well. 

 But it seems to me that a fault of government

 is it fights yesterday's battles. 

 As I go through airline security

 screening processes, I see this sort of almost 

 obsessive focus on belts, and shoes. And at 

 the same time you are telling me that

 containers are coming into the United States 

 inspected only at the level of 2 percent, if

 that. And Mr. Fine is telling me that the 

 northern border is, in many respects, an 

 unprotected area, particularly with regard to

 24/7 coverage. While everybody is down in the 

 Southwest trying to prevent undocumented

 workers from crossing the border to work in the 

 United States and take jobs that Americans 

 won't do. 
 82 

 Is our focus on airline security 

 wrong? Who makes these policies? Who reviews

 these policies? How are they kept up to date? 

 Are we anticipating ways in which terrorists 

 can use airline vulnerability, or are we saying

 that because Richard Reid got on an airplane 

 and tried to light his shoes, that we are going

 to focus on shoes of millions and millions of 

 American business travellers. And for the life 

 of me, maybe you can explain it, but I don't

 see the relevance of showing your belt buckle 

 open as opposed to your belt buckle closed, and

 yet we have these jam-ups at the security 

 system screening depots with people milling 

 around. We have all seen this process.

 Is this the right balance? Is there 

 somebody sitting in Washington to say, well,

 let's look at what we are doing about airline 

 security and try and anticipate future attacks? 

 MR. DILLINGHAM: Yes, Governor, if I 
 83 

 could. 

 I think it is part of, if you have

 only got a hammer, all of the answers you use 

 that hammer for. That's sort of how aviation 

 security has evolved. That was the first thing

 that came out of the box and we have applied 

 all of our resources to it.

 It may seem -- if I can give you just 

 sort of a story behind the belt buckle. What 

 has been determined is that before 9/11 people

 would -- the belt buckle would send off an 

 alarm and the screener would pass by and say,

 okay, belt buckle, no problem. 

 But the process of testing the system, 

 if you have a belt buckle and you can hide a

 weapon inside or behind that belt buckle, and 

 it is only passed as, it is only a buckle, it

 is not a weapon. That's the kind of situation 

 that they were focusing on. 

 It is the same thing with people at 
 84 

 airports. They see grandmothers and children 

 being examined and it seems embarrassing, in

 fact it can be, but they also have intelligence 

 to say that the terrorists have used these kind 

 of ways to get things through.

 We are now seeing a ratcheting back of 

 the things that don't make sense. We are

 seeing a rationalization of security. You are 

 no longer asked did you pack your bag, has it 

 been with you the whole time. There is no

 longer the prohibition of driving up to the 

 airport.

 We are seeing ratcheting back. We are 

 seeing a rationalization of it. So there is 

 someone who is looking at this. After 9/11 it

 was, let's do everything that we can to change 

 the situation for aviation security, and now

 there are changes. 

 You are right, that has been the 

 reputation of security in this country, 
 85 

 fighting the last battle and not looking for 

 what's coming. I can tell you that our office

 is looking at that issue and trying to 

 understand, you know, to what extent are we 

 looking for the next generation of technology.

 To what extent are we moving beyond where we 

 were being prepared for the threats that we

 haven't seen yet, but we know were out there. 

 MR. THOMPSON: Mr. Fine, going back to 

 the students for the moment. Do we have a

 rough idea how many students are in the United 

 States at any one particular time?

 MR. FINE: About half a million. 

 MR. THOMPSON: Have a million? 

 MR. FINE: Yes.

 MR. THOMPSON: I noticed all the way 

 through you written testimony, and a little bit

 in your oral testimony as well, that almost 

 every system that we have developed or 

 identified to deal with some of the issues 
 86 

 about student entry or student remainder or 

 student registration, don't yet seem to be

 working or up to snuff. I mean, is the shear 

 number of foreign students in the United States 

 at any one time going to overwhelm any system?

 MR. FINE: It clearly overwhelmed the 

 paper-based system which was antiquated and

 inefficient. A computer-based system I am not 

 sure will overwhelm the ability of the system 

 to track who is in the country, who is not in

 the country, who has shown up at school, who 

 had has gotten a student visa, came to the

 United States and then never showed up in the 

 school, as actually one of the September 11 

 hijackers did. He got a visa to show up at a

 language school, never showed up. The school 

 didn't do anything about it and none of the

 authorities knew this. 

 So we need a system that tracks that 

 and can provide that information. What is 
 87 

 going to be very difficult is what to do with 

 that information and how to decide what is the

 important ones to follow through with and how 

 to prioritize what happens with an enormous 

 amount of information. For that, I think,

 there needs to be intelligence and adequate 

 intelligence to determine where the threats are.

 But in the first step there does have 

 to be a system, a computerized system that does 

 track the status of the students. I believe

 that the SEVIS system that is being implemented 

 is a good system and has the potential to do

 it, it is just simply not fully implemented and 

 needs more steps to go. 

 MR. THOMPSON: Assuming the systems

 work, can we ever hire enough people to

 follow up on the information in the system and

 go track the people down who disappear from the 

 system? To me that is a really devilish 

 problem. 
 88 

 MR. FINE: I don't think you can hire 

 enough people to track all of them, but I think

 you can do some efforts with some issues where 

 there is intelligence that indicates you need to. 

 It is also important to be able to

 provide information from that system to other 

 law enforcement agencies, so that when other

 law enforcement agencies come in contact with 

 somebody, they will know that this is a person 

 out of status, this is a student who never

 showed up at school. So they have that 

 information and can act upon it. Prior to this

 computerized system, there was no possibility 

 of that.

 MR. THOMPSON: Could you or Mr.

 Dillingham comment on the status of the 

 technology or efforts, pilot programs, or

 anything else that is out there to prescreen 

 business travellers on airlines, or prescreen 

 workers who come into the United States during 
 89 

 the course of day and go back to their host 

 country in the evening.

It seems to me we haven't made much 

 progress there and the result is, I presume, 

 that we are still using a lot of human

 resources to screen the same people 

 day-in-day-out that present what you presume to

 be a low security risk. Are there enough 

 people to guard our northern border? 

 MR. FINE: Those are important

 projects. There are some projects that provide 

 trusted travellers access across the border.

 They are not universally available. I believe 

 that is an issue that needs to be addressed and 

 needs to be more widely used.

 Part of the issue is the money. 

 Sometimes the fees are higher than people want

 to pay. But it is a program that I think 

 provides some relief from the crushing workload 

 that inspectors have along the border, an 
 90 

 ability to speed some people up and allow 

 greater scrutiny of others.

 MR. THOMPSON: The technology is there, 

 I presume? 

 MR. FINE: Yes.

 MR. DILLINGHAM: Yes. Following what 

 Mr. Fine said, the TSA is in fact looking at

 programs such as trusted travellers, starting 

 with identifying, using identification with 

 biometrics for all transportation workers. So

 that is in process. 

 And at an international level, I think

 it is one of the unresolved issues. There is 

 some cooperation between other countries and 

 the United States in terms of supplying

 passenger lists for international travellers 

 ahead of time. That is one of the issues that

 needs to be further explored. Bilateral, 

 multilateral agreements with regard to security 

 and security operations between the United 
 91 

 States and other countries. It is clearly an 

 open area.

 MR. KEAN: I have one question and 

 then Commissioner Ben-Veniste and Commissioner 

 Lehman.

 I think I read about a year ago for the first time that 

 the greatest danger out there was probably

 containers, and containers in container ports. 

 You said practically the same thing again today 

 and I read it a number of times in between.

 You said, well the technology has got to be 

 developed.

 Can you give us any kind of 

 approximate timetable when that kind of danger 

 is going to be lessened or are we just going to

 live with it? 

 MR. DILLINGHAM: We are certainly

 going to live with it for a while. There are 

 some technologies out there that can be used. 

 What's missing right now is better technology 
 92 

 and also the balance between screening and 

 moving cargo. There are ways in which you can

 x-ray these containers, you can physically 

 inspect these containers, but what you are 

 talking about is slowing the commercial

 process. That is where the balance has to be 

 struck.

 Technologies are, in fact, being 

 developed. In some cases the technology is so 

 expensive at this point that it is also not

 being readily accepted by the maritime 

 community.

 MR. KEAN: Is there any kind of a 

 timetable, six months a year, two years? 

 MR. DILLINGHAM: I would go with

 multiple years. Not six months, not a year, 

 but a few years.

 MR. THOMPSON: What do other countries 

 do? 

 MR. DILLINGHAM: They are petty much 
 93 

 in the same way. Those are the containers that 

 are coming here. What we have now is we are

 trying to work with other countries to do some 

 screening, some random screening of containers 

 at their point of origin so there is less to be

 concerned about as they arrive on U.S. shores, 

 but it is an international issue. It is an

 international issue, so they aren't doing any more 

 than we are doing. 

 You will find, for example, in an

 aviation context, El Al does a lot more with 

 containers that are going on board and cargo

 that is going on board than the U.S. does. But 

 the thing about that is, it is such a small 

 operation compared to what we do in the States

 that it is not even comparable almost. 

 MR. KEAN: Commissioner Ben-Veniste.

 MR. BEN-VENISTE: Thank you. Mr. 

 Fine, I want to express our appreciation for 

 your offer of complete cooperation with this 
 94 

 Commission. We will definitely take you up on 

 it.

 In the limited time we have available, 

 it is imperative that we take advantage of the 

 pre-existing work that has been done in order

 to identify what needs to be done further and 

 to make recommendations to the Congress and the

 President. 

 I want to mention, yesterday Mr. 

 Wolosky, we had a panel that included Professor

 Ranstorp and Brian Jenkins who spoke about the 

 galvanizing effect of 9/11 on the cooperation

 of international intelligence agencies with our 

 own in connection with the anti-terrorism

 efforts.

 You have made a very provocative 

 statement with respect to the potential for

 degrading that cooperative effort as the result 

 of political differences relating to the war in 

 Iraq. Do you have any concrete evidence or 
 95 

 information to suggest that the multilateral 

 intelligence services have in any way slacked

 off from their cooperation with our 

 intelligence community in that respect? 

 MR. WOLOSKY: No, I don't. But I can

 tell you that having worked these issues 

 day-in-day-out, they are very difficult under

 the best of circumstances. What I fear is that 

 we may be entering into the worst of 

 circumstances with respect to our efforts to

 cooperate with states that disagree with U.S. 

 policies in Iraq, which I happen to support.

 But my point is that it may be 

 increasingly difficult for moderate Arab 

 regimes, and even our traditional allies, to

 continue to engage in the type of cooperation 

that, I agree, was unprecedented following

 September 11. 

 MR. BEN-VENISTE: So your observation 

 is one based on informed speculation rather 
 96 

 than actual evidence? 

 MR. WOLOSKY: Correct.

 MR. BEN-VENISTE: Let me ask just one 

 other question of Mr. Fine and Mr. Dillingham. 

 We have heard about the potential for the

 trusted traveller card, perhaps utilizing 

 biometric information.

 Is this the precursor, is this the 

 camel's nose under the tent for a national 

 identity card utilizing such information?

 MR. FINE: I don't believe it is the 

 camel under the tent. It is an option for

 people to undertake if they want to go quickly 

 across the border. It is a voluntary thing 

 that people can participate in or not

 participate in if they want to. 

 I think there are clear benefits to

 it, to them and to the system to allow certain 

 people who have been prescreened to go across 

 the border quickly. 
 97 

 MR. DILLINGHAM: I would agree. I 

 wouldn't say that it is the nose under the

 tent, but I would want to point out that as far 

 an as transportation is concerned, this does 

 not mean that passengers or persons would not

 be subject to screening. They would still go 

 through a screening process. It means that

 they would not necessarily have that second

 screening at the gate. Again, I agree that it 

 is a voluntary process.

 Right now transportation is developing 

 what's called a Computer Assisted Passenger

 Profiling System, CAPS, which is based on 

 information about the passenger that allows 

 them to be sort of placed in the various

 categories of screening. Almost like our 

 national terrorist alert sort of thing, red,

 green, yellow in terms of degree of screening. 

 At the end of that flight, that information is 

 purged and not kept. There is clearly civil 
 98 

 liberties and privacy issues and organizations

 looking at that.

 We think that it is a way to make our 

 system more efficient and focus our resources 

 on those places where they need to be focused,

 finite resources for security.

 MR. KEAN: Okay we have to move on

 with Commissioner Lehman, Commissioner Fielding 

 and Commissioner Roemer who have suggested that 

 they would like to ask brief questions, I hope.

 MR. LEHMAN: I have two brief 

 questions for Mr. Dillingham.

 First, while little old ladies are 

 being frisked at La Guardia, it is possible for 

 an Arab businessman to pick up the phone and

 make a call an go up to Whiteplains and charter 

 a Gulfstream or 737 Boeing executive jet which

 have no reinforced doors, no armed pilots and 

 no screening for him and his party to go 

 through. 
 99 

 Are there any plans to do anything 

 about this rather huge lacuna in our civil

 aviation security? 

 MR. DILLINGHAM: Yes, Mr. Secretary. 

 We have pointed out that charter flights,

 general aviation, cargo, these are still 

 significant gaps in security and they, in fact,

 have to be addressed. It is a matter of 

 priorities and funding. 

 Almost any aircraft can be a weapon.

 I mean, we saw in the Florida case where just a 

 general aviation aircraft was stolen and flown

 into a building. That could have very well 

 been an aircraft that had some chemical 

 biological agents on it as well.

 The point is, the threats and the 

 vulnerabilities are everywhere.

 MR. LEHMAN: Yes, but this one is so 

 obvious, what is taking so long? Here we are a 

 long time after 9/11 and nothing has been done, 
 100 

 I can assure you, because I use these planes 

 fairly frequently and I have never seen a touch

 of security. 

 MR. DILLINGHAM: It is recognized. We 

 keep pointing it out, but we can't make them do

 it. Hopefully the Commission will point this 

 out, as well, as one of the gaps and that is a

 gap that needs to be addressed. 

 MR. LEHMAN: I would say it is a 

 fairly urgent and glaring one considering the

 urgency that has been applied to some other 

 sectors. Anyway, enough said.

 The other question I have, as a 

 veteran of the Reagan Administration, I 

 participated in a major crisis effort to

 increase airline security after several 

 hijackings in the early days of the Reagan

 Administration. I recall that a U.S. marshal 

 program was put into effect at that time with 

 great urgency. I also recall that there was an 
 101 

 edict put out, to put reinforced doors and to 

 see that the pilots -- that the door were kept

 closed throughout the flight and that only the 

 pilot had the key. 

 What ever happened to those programs?

 MR. DILLINGHAM: Unfortunately, the 

 history has been when the particular event

 leaves the headlines, the follow through has 

 not always been what we would want it to be, 

 and that's the case with many of the

 recommendations that took place after Pan Am 103, 

 after the TWA 800. We have 9/11 and we have a

 situation where the Federal Air Marshal Service 

 went from less than thirty or less than a hundred, to several thousand 

within a 

 short period of time. We have a situation

 where the recommendation that you made early on 

 about cockpit doors being locked and so forth,

 that now some 10, 15 years later we now have, 

 as a result of 9/11, we have 80 percent of the 

 fleet with doors installed and the deadline 
 102 

 being at the end of the week for all of the 

 fleet.

 It's the nature of where we have been, 

 as long as there is oversight and constant 

 reinforcement that these things must be done,

 the more likely that they will, in fact, be 

 done.

 MR. KEAN: Commissioner Fielding. 

 MR. FIELDING: Thank you. I have two 

 quick questions to you, Mr. Dillingham.

 First of all, I guess as a cranky 

 flyer I ought to tell you that I think the TSA

 people are a vast improvement and are obviously 

 trained in attitude as well, and I applaud you 

 for that.

 You gave us the list of priorities, of 

 vulnerability priorities, and I understand air

 and then maritime, but for our planning 

 purposes could you go a little further down the 

 list? 
 103 

 MR. DILLINGHAM: I think the next one 

 on the list would be mass transit, freight rail

 would follow that. The reason I say mass 

 transit is because so many persons use mass 

 transit and an incident on mass transit would

 have not only disastrous human effect, but the 

 psychology of that would also be tremendous.

 Rail, it's hard to prioritize too much 

 because a chemical-biological accident 

 associated with rail has both the human

 dimension as well as the psychological 

 dimension. So it is in that order I would go,

 aviation, maritime mass transit, rail. 

 Now, having said that, more people 

 ride the bus than many of these modes combined,

 but it is the incident. I mean, the likelihood 

 of you going to do damage to enough buses at

 one point in time as opposed to what would 

 happen in mass transit, as we saw in the Japan

 incident, it is different. So it's the 
 104 

 greatest harm to the greatest number of people 

 is part of the decision about where things

 rank. 

 MR. FIELDING: Thank you, the other 

 thing is just to follow up on what Secretary

 Lehman asked you. 

 Your answer to light aircraft issue,

 which has boggled everybody's mind who has ever 

 been around those, is "you can't make them do 

 it." Who is "them"?

 MR. DILLINGHAM: Well, you can make 

 recommendations and usually our recommendations

 will go to the U.S. Congress. We make 

 recommendations to the agencies who in turn are 

 responsive to the U.S. Congress. So it has to

 be a congressional priority that is followed 

 through, and often times -- I think someone

 mentioned today, that action goes 

 where the money goes. 

 It is not for us to sort of make 
 105 

 policies. It is for us to present the 

 information to the policy makers, and from

 there, they can make them do it. 

 MR. FIELDING: How about the Executive 

 Branch?

 MR. DILLINGHAM: Those are the people 

 that we generally are saying need to do

 something. We are a congressional agency and 

 our mission is oversight, generally, of the 

 executive agencies.

 I don't want to sound like they don't 

 do anything, but generally the implementation

 is not the way we want it to be. Some of the 

 recommendations that have been made about 

 aviation have been around for years. They were

 either not implemented or partially 

 implemented.

 After 9/11 there was a new urgency to 

 it. We have been talking about screeners not 

 doing what they are supposed to do for 15 
 106 

 years. 

 MR. FIELDING: Thank you. Thank you, Mr.

 Chairman. 

 MR. KEAN: Last question for 

 Commissioner Roemer.

 MR. ROEMER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

 I too want to join in applauding the help that

 this particular panel has been to the 

 Commission. 

 I want to ask Mr. Fine, having been on

 the Education Committee for 12 years in 

 Congress and having sat through many oversight

 hearings of SEVIS and heard time and time and 

 time again that we couldn't implement the 

 program, it would be another year, it would be

 another year. We are experiencing this program 

 problem and that problem.

 When is this finally going to be ready 

 to be fully implemented and working in our 

 country? 
 107 

 MR. FINE: Well, it has been 

 implemented. There is the SEVIS system

 available. It applies to new students now. 

 There are clearly bugs in it, there are clearly 

 problems with it, but I believe the INS has

 made significant progress in implementing the 

 system.

 We have pointed out where deficiencies 

 are. They need to address those deficiencies. 

 Come August, they say that it will apply to

 every student, not solely the new students but 

 also the continuing students. So according to

 their schedule, by August of this year the 

 SEVIS system will be up, running, available and 

 we hope will be adequately followed through

 with all the things that need to be done to 

 ensure that is fully implemented as well.

 MR. ROEMER: You have confidence that 

 that deadline is going to be reached? 

 MR. FINE: I wouldn't say with 
 108 

 confidence that it is going to be reached, 

 because I have seen similar things that you have

 seen. What I will say is, they have made 

 progress and they need to make more progress. 

 MR. ROEMER: Mr. Wolosky, one quick

 question for you. 

 With respect to Saudi Arabia and the

 efforts they are making internally and 

 bilaterally with the United States to do more 

 about cracking down on the financing of

 contributions to terrorist operations, how 

 would you measure the lack of progress since

 9/11 internally? What have they done

 internally to crack down? And secondly, externally and

 bilaterally with the United States? In 

 addition to elevating this to the highest

 levels of concern for us, what other steps need 

 to be taken to make this communication more of 

 a priority in terms of benchmarks and 
 109 

 implementing programs? 

 MR. WOLOSKY: Sure. Well, in

 assessing what has been done I think it is 

 helpful to distinguish, again, between tactical 

 measures and strategic measures.

 The tactical measures are, again, ones 

 that target particular nodes of the terrorist

 financing infrastructure, particular 

 individuals, particular charities, et cetera. 

 Much of that activity is conducted by

 law enforcement intelligence agencies. Much of 

 it is not transparent and should remain not

 transparent. 

 There has been a substantial amount of 

 activity, as I understand it, between the

 United States Government and the Saudi 

 Government at the tactical law enforcement and

 intelligence level. 

 At the same time, there have been 

 indications that there are problems, chiefly, 
 110 

 with respect to the two public designations 

 that were made of organizations or individuals

 that support terror. Jointly, I mean joint 

 designations under the IEEPA statute with the 

 Saudi Government, there were two last year.

 One targeted the Al Aman charity and the 

 other was targeting an individual who was

 identified by the Treasury Department as a 

 significant contributor—one of the cofounders 

 of al-Qaeda is what I believe the Treasury

 press release said. 

 Now, with respect to Al Aman the

 problems are published reports that it is still 

 in business with respect to the individual who 

 is identified in September and designated by

 U.S. Government. The problem is that in the 

 days after his designation by the U.S.

 Government, the designation was questioned by 

 senior Saudi officials. 

 So that indicates to me, at least, 
 111 

 that notwithstanding substantial efforts, there 

 are still problems at the tactical level in

 identifying particular nodes within terrorist

 financial system with Saudi Arabia. 

 Now, at the strategic level, there you

 get into questions of regulation of charities, 

 steps that are taken or avoided with respect to

 putting in place, know your customer rules and 

 suspicious activity reporting requirements 

 within Saudi financial institutions.

 Regulations of charities, like hawala, things 

 of that sort.

 Again, that information should be 

 publicly available. It should be available to 

 this Commission. It should be available to the

 United States Government. It should be 

 available to me as a concerned private citizen

 when I log onto the web. At least with respect 

 to my efforts, I haven't been able to find it. 

 MR. ROEMER: Thank you. 
 112 

 MR. KEAN: Thank you very much. This 

 has been a very, very helpful panel. I hope we

 can come back to some of you again. Thank you very 

 much for your help. 

 (Recess.)

 MR. KEAN: The next panel consists of 

 Michael Wermuth of RAND Corporation, Steven

 Brill, author of a book many of us have read, 

 “After: How America Confronted the September 12 

 Era.” Zoe Baird of the Markle Foundation, and

 Randy Larsen of ANSER Institute for Homeland 

 Security.

 And I know, Mr. Brill, you have a hard 

 and fast deadline, so maybe if with start off 

 with you, sir.

 MR. BRILL: Thank you very much,

 Governor. I appreciate your accommodating me.

 I am delighted to be here this morning 

 and honored to be asked to share some of my 

 views with you. I think the primary benefit 
 113 

 that I might be able to offer the Committee, 

 which is something less than the expertise of

 the witnesses you have just heard, is that for 

 the last year-and-a-half I travelled this 

 country, trying to get a grip on all of the

 questions you have been dealing with and, in 

 particular, the questions you were dealing with

 this morning. 

 I spoke at great length not only to 

 the people at the top of the issues, Attorney

 General Ashcroft, Secretary Ridge, Bob Bonnard, 

 Jim Loy and people like that, and their staffs,

 but also to the people who are actually out in 

the field trying to implement and make sense of 

 what was going on in Washington during some

 very difficult times. 

 My goal was to make a connection

 between policy, between discussions like the 

 ones we are having today and what was actually 

 happening in the airports, at the docks, at the 
 114 

 borders. 

 What I found, I think I can keep my

 remarks fairly brief and I hope quite simple, 

 really falls much more under the category of 

 what we can go do going forward as opposed to

 mistakes we might have made in the past. But I 

 did come across some of those mistakes that we

 made in the past. 

 First, one general observation that I 

 suspect everyone in this room shares and I

 really got to see firsthand in, I think, a very 

 special way, we are -- the people out there

 doing this job, are, I think, the worthy 

 successors to the greatest generation that Tom 

 Broker wrote about. They are people in

 Customs, in INS, in the Coast Guards, of 

 course, men and women overseas who have really

 risen to the challenges of, what I call, the 

 September 12 Era. 

 The issue is what kind of support 
 115

 those people are going to get. Their 

 dedication is constant. Their attention spans

 are long. I sat in on meetings of people who 

 have been dealing with the container, the cargo 

 container security issue, who have been dealing

 with this issue for 10, 11, 12 years or 20 

 years. I have sat in on meetings where the

 Office of Homeland Security brought people 

 together for the first time from the Department 

 of Transportation, from Customs, the Coast

 Guard, from Treasury, the Department of State, 

 to deal with the problem like container

 security, or deal with the problem like 

 borders, and they were delighted to meet each 

 other. They had all been working off in their

 corners in different places dedicated to those 

 issues.

 Their attention span is long. I can't 

 say the same, with all respect, to many of you 

 on this panel from members of Congress, from 
 116 

 members of Executive Branch and certainly from 

 members of the press. Their attention spans are

 quite something else. 

 First, let me just recount a couple of 

 the obvious pre 9/11 mistakes that I

 encountered. One was that on the evening of 

 September 11, airline executives started to get

 a fax from the FAA. The FAA's fax was, guess 

 what, a watch list, a no fly list. Don't let 

 these 300 people fly. This is the evening of

 September 11. 

 Airline executives had the same

 reaction that I suspect you had: ‘it is too bad 

 we didn't get this the morning of September 11.’ 

 There are 300 names on that list. That list

 had been sitting around. It had been provided 

 both by the CIA and the FBI to the head of

 Civil Security at the FAA, and they hadn't yet 

 developed over a period of months a protocol 

 for how to add names or subtract names from the 
 117 

 list, and under whose letterhead it was going 

 to be issued, so they hadn't issued it. The

 evening of September 11, they decided to issue 

 it. 

 The second story that I think

 illustrates the lack of urgency. On the 

 northern border, this is something that

 Inspector General Fine has reported on more 

 times than you are ever going to have hearings. 

 On the northern border they were two border

 patrol agents who in 1999 testified before 

 Congress about something called the "catch and

 release program." Here is what the "catch and 

 release program" is. 

 They would catch people sneaking over

 the border in Detroit, walking through the 

 train tunnel or coming in on little boats on

 the shore. They would catch them and then what 

 they would do is, they would give them a 

 self-addressed postcard. And they would hand 
 118 

 them the card after they caught them and 

 arrested them. They would hand them this card

 and say, ‘listen, when you get an address in the 

 United States, the country you are sneaking 

 into, that you are not supposed to be in, when

 you establish an address, send us back this 

 postcard. Then we will know your address, and

 then we can mail you a notice of your 

 deportation hearing. Then you can come for a 

 hearing, and then we can deport you.’ A lot of

 these people didn't really show up for 

 deportation hearing or send the postcards back.

 They testified about it in 1999. What 

 happens in October of 2001 -- I am sorry, not 

 October, the week after September 11, 2001?

 They tell a reporter for the Detroit Free Press 

 something less than what I have just told you.

 Much less in detail, that the northern border 

 isn't secure. That we don't have the 

 resources. We can't hold people in detention 
 119 

 when we catch them. Guess what happens to them.

 They get a notice that they are going to be

 fired. 

 Luckily, the Inspector General stepped 

 in. The office of, I think it is the Special

 Counsel Office that protects whistle blowers, 

 stepped in. They did not get fired, but that

 was the INS border patrol reaction. 

 That policy after there was yet 

 another hearing in November of 2001, that

 policy has now been changed somewhat. But this 

 took September 11. It took an Inspector

 General. It took some reports in the Detroit 

 Free Press before that policy -- talk about

 obvious gaps such as the general aviation gap,

 this is a fairly obvious gap. 

 One more example, just before the

 millennium there was a very well publicized 

 arrest of someone who was attempting to sneak 

 in over the northern border in Washington 
 120 

 State, who had plans to blow up Los Angles 

 Airport.

 Ray Kelly, who was then the Customs 

 Director, thought that as a result of that, 

 this was a good time to reinforce the northern

 border with as many customs agents as he could 

 possibly send there. His attitude, as I

 recount in the book was, I will send them there 

 and surely Congress will pay for it now that we 

 have made the arrest. Surely the issue of the

 budget to protect the northern border going to 

 be solved by this obvious manifestation of the

 crisis, and those extra agents lasted for a few 

 months. Congress lost interest, it went back 

 to being just the way it was.

 The air marshals -- just one more 

 point. On the September 11, the air marshals,

 there was 31 U.S. air marshals in the United 

 States of America, none of them were on a 

 single airplane on the morning of September 11. 
 121 

 There are now, their target is something 

 upwards of 3,000, I think, now, and we are

 doing it urgently, and, I guess that's good. 

 But today as we speak the attention 

 span is still mixed. It still takes the INS,

 they say, five to seven months to render an 

 environmental impact statement before they can

 put a pole up that will hold a camera at a 

 strategic point on the northern border, or to

 put motion detectors. They have to do

 environmental impact statements, five to seven 

 months in an administration that is not

 otherwise really quite that well known for its 

 sensitivity to the environment.

 The dilemma of all this is -- I could sit

 here for two or three hours as could the other 

 members of this panel and talk about the gaps.

 The really serious issue is that we can never 

really be doing enough. We can all trade 

 anecdotes and we can all decide that we are not 
 122 

 doing enough, and we really cannot do enough in 

 a country that has 7500 miles of border, that

 has thousands of miles of natural gas 

 pipelines, tens of thousands of facilities 

 storing or shipping dangerous chemical,

 infinite entrances to subways, to trains and to 

 office buildings, and just as many

 vulnerabilities relating to food or water 

 supply, and even to office building ventilation 

 systems.

 So the critics that say we are not 

 doing enough are always going to be right. The

 issue is, how can we make the debate and the 

 way we go forward a little more constructive 

 than that. There is never going to be enough

 money to solve everything. I think the 

 opportunity that this Commission has, that some

 independent nonpartisan body can have, whether 

 it is the GAO or a commission like this that 

 goes forward, that goes on, is that it can set 
 123 

 specific tangible standards for improvement in 

 homeland security. It can set up, to give you

 an example, it can declare that if we have our 

 undercover people who work for a commission 

 like this, trying to sneak something into the

 port, it should be detected by Customs, by 

 Homeland Security 99.6 percent of the time and

 let's give the American people a report every 

 quarter or every half year of how we are doing. 

 Let's set goals. We can target these things

 and we can set goals. We can't do everything. 

 The debate we have today is really one

 where it is easy to be partisan. It is really 

 easy because you can always say, if there is a 

 terror attack, and there is going to be another

 terror attack, and when there is whether it is 

 in the subways, or general aviation or ports,

 there will always be a way to point and say 

 that somebody screwed up. 

 For example, Customs has initiated a 
 124 

 very intelligent program in risk management 

 called The Customs Partnership. What they do

 is, they prescreen the truck drivers who drive 

 the most over the Ambassador Bridge in Detroit. 

 They are screened in advance and because they

 are screened they get something which gets them 

 on a fast line. That is really intelligent.

 We can all sit here and say that is 

 intelligent. 

 The test for this country, the test

 for the dialogue we are all going to have is 

 that if, God forbid, one of the people who has

 gone through that screening does something 

 terrible, are we going to have all kinds of 

 recriminations and say, “we should stop every

 truck. That was a stupid plan, how could we 

 have done it.” Or are we going say, “well, we

 started a system, the system still makes sense. 

 It didn't work in this case, that doesn't mean 

 we scrap the system and go back to what we were 
 125 

 doing at the airports on September 12, which 

 was checking everybody, no matter who they were

 or what they were.” 

 The point I am really trying to make 

 is that we have to think about intelligent risk

 management. The most important place we have 

 to think about it is in the private sector, or

 certainly not the Federal sector. There are 

 1750 check points at all the airports in the 

 United States of America combined, 1750. There

 are approximately 1760 entrances to the New York 

 City subway system. We all agree that TSA is

 doing a great job. 

 So for only $6 billion and 45,000 new 

 employees, we could protect the New York City

 subway system the way we are protecting the 

 airports.

 For those of us who ride the subway, 

 that sounds like a pretty good idea, but we 

 can't do that. And by the way, when we decide 
 126 

 to do that we have to deal with the 17,000 

 entrances to office buildings in Manhattan.

 When we get through there, we probably want to 

 start thinking about Chicago, San Francisco, 

 Los Angles and everywhere else.

 We can't simply throw that kind money 

 at the problem. We have to get the private

 sector involved. I think we have to have 

 something on the order of a voluntary identity 

 card that companies in the private sector can

 issue to people that screens them, voluntarily, 

 so that when we have lines, as we are going to

 have in office systems, subway stations and 

 train terminals, we are going to have those 

 lines after the next attack. And when we do

 that we are managing the risk a little more 

 rationally.

 The one thought I really want to leave 

 you with is, I think the best thing a 

 commission like this can do is either suggest 
 127 

 or else go and do it itself, setting specific 

 goals in all the areas you are talking about.

 And then instead of the Democrats criticizing

 the Republicans for not spending enough money 

 here, and the Republicans saying yes, but we

 have reorganized the Government and we now have 

 this department so obviously we are doing

 enough. We hold a press conference to say we 

 are spending this much money here, that is not 

 a constructive debate.

 You can quantify this. You can manage 

 this the way people in the private sector

 manage lots of problems by settling specific 

 goals, specific timetables, and having a 

 nonpartisan body report on how we are doing.

 I thank you. 

 MR. KEAN: If it is acceptable to the

 other members of the panel, knowing Mr. Brill 

 has to leave, is it all right if he takes five 

 minutes of questioning now? 
 128 

 MR. BRILL: Thank you for you

 courtesy.

 MR. KEAN: I understand that. In that 

 case Commissioner Ben-Veniste and Commissioner 

 Fielding will ask five minutes worth of

 questions. 

 MR. BEN-VENISTE: Mr. Brill, I am

 quite interested in the fact that you have, in 

 the course of the past year or so, spoken to 

 people who are on the front line of protecting

 the United States in the post 9/11 environment, 

 and have not limited yourself to those who are

 in supervisory positions, who are at the very 

 top of the agencies. 

 You state that it is necessary to

 demonstrate our support for these individuals 

 whose views in the long term, rather than in

 less optimal kinds of supervision, that 

 Congress and others are able to maintain. 

 How would you coordinate that kind of, 
 129 

 or conform that kind of appreciation for to 

 those who are dedicated to protecting this

 country, with the kind of accountability and 

 review that is also necessary for us to conduct 

 so that we may inform our recommendations, at

 the end of the day, with a body of information 

 that not only provides an historical record,

 but provides a baseline for our 

 recommendations? 

 MR. BRILL: I think that's the

 challenge. I don't want to minimize that 

 challenge. Indeed, if I just sat here and

 said, well, you know you need to have as many 

 whistle blowers as possible come and sit at 

 this table and tell you what's wrong with each

 and every Federal agency, that would be much 

 too simple. A lot of whistle blowers just have

 gripes that relate to labor problems, or their 

 own personal problems, they haven't been 

 promoted or they are just unhappy. All 
 130 

 organizations have that. 

 So it is not simply, “let the whistle

 blowers speak.” It is much more trying to set 

-- just to give you an example, if Washington 

 says that the ports are safer and, by the way,

 the ports are safer. The 2 percent number is a 

 fiction. They are inspecting a much higher

 ratio of the truly dangerous cargo and they deserve 

 a lot of credit for that, but the people who 

 deserve the credit for that are not only Bob

 Bonner and his team in Washington, but the 

 customs inspectors on the port that I sat with

 here in New Jersey, and in other places, who 

 devised their own factoring system so that they 

 could take a container and have notice of a

 container and decide which ones were the high 

 risk containers.

 What happened was, Washington, they 

 consulted with those people and said, you tell 

 us, tell us what should be in this list of a 
 131 

 hundred or two hundred factors that we should 

 look at. You guys have the experience. There

 are some agencies that do that, there are other 

 agencies don't. If you want a sweeping

 generalization I will give you one; Customs -

 good, INS - bad. 

 There is no deadline the INS has ever

 had in anyone's memory in this room that they 

 have ever met. There is nothing they have ever 

 said they are going to do that they ever did.

 I keep kidding my friend, Tom Ridge, that is 

 now your problem and I can't wait to see how

 you solve it. Because a lot of people, 

 including some of the people at this table, 

 such as the former Deputy Attorney General,

 have been in charge of solving that problem and 

 haven't solved it.

 But the way to do it is, again, to try 

 to take the politics out of it. It is easy for 

 a senator to say you are not spending enough 
 132 

 money on this because you can never spend 

 enough, and it is easy for people in power to

 hold a press conference saying we are do doing 

 this, we are doing this, we are doing this. 

 They are right, they are, and they are well

 motivated sincere people. 

 The issue is, we don't care what you

 say, what we want to know is, is the port 

 x-percent safer today than it was last month? 

 Is general aviation any safer?

 The way Washington has solved general 

 aviation issue is, you can't fly into National

 Airport. That is the one thing they have done, 

 that the gentleman here didn't talk about. 

 That is the only safety measure, so far, for

 general aviation. There have got to be other 

 standards you can set for that. There ought to

 be productivity standards. This management 

 goal, this management goal, did you meet it, 

 did you not meet it? And that takes a 
 133 

 nonpartisan group, like the group assembled 

 here, who can issue reports to the country the

 way we get economic reports every quarter. We 

 are this much safer here, we are not safer 

 there.

 MR. BEN-VENISTE: Just to follow-up --

 MR. KEAN: I just want to get

 Commissioner Fielding in. We only have two 

 minutes of questions. 

 MR. FIELDING: I just want you to

 thank you for sugarcoating your comments about 

 the INS.

 MR. BRILL: Actually, they were 

 sugarcoated. 

 MR. FIELDING: I am sure they were.

 MR. BRILL: No profanities or 

 anything.

 MR. FIELDING: Just to follow-up,

 since we are short on time. One of our tasks 

 is to try to figure out what's the best way to 
 134 

 proceed every day as we go forward, because we 

 get a little bit of information and then we get

 a little bit more and we try to put it all 

 together in some sort of a mosaic. 

 We have hearings like this, where

 people come in and are limited by their time, 

 by their statements and that sort of thing. So

 we are very free and easy to ask of people, 

 such as yourself, if you would stay with us and 

 cooperate with us as we move forward?

 MR. BRILL: I would love to. This is 

 a particularly bad day for me, today --

 MR. FIELDING: I understand that. 

 MR. BRILL: I will spend all day any 

 day to help you with this.

 MR. FIELDING: You obviously have a 

 list of people or categories of people that we

 could learn from as we move forward. We don't 

 intend to only speak with people in charge. 

 MR. BRILL: I certainly didn't mean to 
 135 

 imply that either. 

 MR. FIELDING: I understand that. So

 if you could do that. 

 The other thing which I think we could 

 call upon you, is obviously goals and standards

 could be the same management issues as anything 

 else. We have to figure out and prioritize

 goals and standards so that we may have goals 

 for bus traffic, but we might not have goals 

 for taxis.

 MR. BRILL: Exactly. 

 MR. FIELDING: There, again, I would

 hope that we could call on you as we work our 

 way through this. Thank you. 

 MR. BRILL: Thank you.

 MR. KEAN: Thank you very much, Mr. 

 Brill.

 MR. BRILL: You're welcome. 

 MR. KEAN: I call on Mr. Wermuth. 

 MR. WERMUTH: Thank you Mr. Chairman, 
 136 

 Mr. Vice-Chairman, distinguished members of the 

 panel. Thank you for the opportunity to be

 here today. 

 As many of you know from other 

 positions that you have held, RAND has been

 doing terrorism research and analysis for more 

 than 35 years. We have some of the leading

 experts in the country who have been involved 

 in that process for a long time. In fact, at 

 least one and perhaps more will appear before

 this panel in the coming days. 

 I am going talk primarily about the

 work that we have been honored to do for the 

 last four years now, in providing the research 

 and analytical support to the advisory panel to

 assess domestic response capabilities for 

 terrorism involving weapons of mass

 destruction, also euphemistically known as the 

 Gilmore Commission. 

 From the written testimony that I 
 137 

 submitted, you will see the Congressional 

 authority for the creation of that panel, and

 its specific Congressional mandate, a lot of 

 information on the composition of that panel 

 and why many people think that panel is unique

 primarily because it is made of men and women 

 who represent the first response or community,

 people in law enforcement, fire services, 

 emergency medical services, public health as 

 well as people who have Washington experience

 and intelligence, and military affairs and 

 other matters.

 This panel lost one of its most 

 distinguished members in the attacks of 

 September 11, Ray Downey, Deputy Department

 Chief of Special Operations of the Fire 

 Department of the City of New York. Of course,

 the incident commander on the day of those

 attacks died in the collapse of the North Tower that 

 morning. 
 138 

 You will see from the written 

 testimony, in considerable detail, that this

 panel has been very consistent from its 

 inception, and long before September 11, 2001, 

 it submitted its first report to the President

 and the Congress in December of 1999. It has 

 now submitted four and will submit a fifth in

 December of this year, before it goes out of

 business. 

 But throughout its deliberations and

 policy pronouncements to President and Congress, 

 it has consistently adhered to the view that

 intelligence is key to this entire effort. And 

 that the proper organizational structure, the 

 proper coordination of intelligence collection,

 analysis and dissemination, not only within a 

 few select federal agencies, but even with

 state and local response entities, and now what 

 is becoming increasingly obvious is that 

 perhaps key elements of the private sector have 
 139 

 to be included in that process. That getting 

 the intelligence piece right is paramount to

 everything that we do. 

 Prior panelists, I am sure others on 

 this panel will continue to note that we are

 infinitely vulnerable. We cannot defend 

 against everything. We cannot secure and

 protect against everything. The importance of 

 intelligence and getting that intelligence into 

 the hands of people who need it is critical to

 all of our efforts. The nexus between 

 intelligence and law enforcement is also

 critical. 

 Having people both in the 

 intelligence world and all law enforcement

 world, understand and appreciate what the other 

 parts of all of that effort really means.

 This panel started in 1999 and 

 throughout its reports have made significant

 substantive recommendations about both 
 140 

 structure and process for improving our 

 intelligence collection analysis and

 dissemination efforts.

 In December of 2000, in its second 

 report, it recommended the creation of an

 entity in the Executive Office of the 

 President. Similar, though not exactly, to

 what eventually became the Office of Homeland 

 Security under Tom Ridge. As part of that 

 recommendation this panel said we need a better

 structure. We need a coordinated intelligence 

 effort that brings together all of the

 agencies, as well as state and local response 

 entities. To have a more complete, a more 

 comprehensive, a more effective way of

 gathering and disseminating intelligence 

 information.

 In subsequent reports the panel has 

 continued with those themes in ways to improve 

 some of the specific pieces of intelligence 
 141 

 operations in its most recent report, and that 

 is also detailed for you in the written

 testimony. We have also provided copies of 

 that report to the Commission staff for each 

 of you to have.

 The panel recommended the creation of 

 something that it called the "National Counterterrorism Center" an 

all-source intelligence 

 fusion analysis and dissemination center that 

 would be comprised of pieces of the various

 agencies directly involved. The Central 

 Intelligence Agency, the Department of Justice,

 other components of the intelligence community, 

 to bring together all of the raw intelligence 

 data, if you will, and to try to make some

 sense out of that in a comprehensive fashion. 

 To include in that process, representatives of

 states and localities that would also help to 

 inform through their resources, all the way 

 down to the local beat cop on the street, and 
 142 

 to develop the best possible intelligence 

 products for dissemination to people who have

 need to know that information. 

 The President announced in his State 

 to the Union address, something called the

 Terrorism Threat Integration Center. Something 

 similar to what this panel had recommended two

 months before, not exactly the same and I would 

 be happy to address the differences between 

 what this panel recommended and what the

 President has called for. But needless to say, 

 this panel was focused on this and a number of

 other issues that you can see in our reports, 

 long before September 11. It has been open and 

 unabashed about its policy recommendations.

 One of the things that it has said 

 consistently with all due deference to the

 former United States senators and the two 

 former members of Congress on this panel, but 

 Congress still doesn't have its act together.
 143 

 It is getting better, but for a long time was 

 not willing to organize itself in a way that

 would address these issues more effectively. 

 At least the House of Representatives have now 

 started doing do that.

 With that, I will complete my oral 

 remarks by thanking you again for the

 opportunity to be here and to offer this 

 Commission any assistance that this advisory 

 panel can provide to you and, of course,

 anything that the RAND Corporation and any of 

 it components can do, to help you with your

 very challenging tasks in the months ahead. 

 MR. KEAN: Thank you, Mr. Wermuth. I 

 have a feeling we will be taking you up on that

 offer. 

 Zoe Baird.

 MS. BAIRD: Thank you very much. I 

 appreciate the opportunity to be here. We all, 

 in our small way, hope that we can honor the 
 144 

 memories of victims of 9/11 and we thank you 

 for giving us this opportunity to contribute

 to your effort to do that. 

 I have a few comments I would like to 

 make, but I must say that my contribution to

 this Commission is already so large that 

 anything else I say will be purely redundant

 and additive because you have the privilege of 

 having the Executive Director of the Markle 

 Task Force now as your executive director, and

 that will be the most important decision you 

 have made. So I commend you. And if I can

 help in other ways too, I am happy to. 

 Our task force was focused on the use 

 of information in order to prevent terrorism

 and protect the national security. September 11 

 exposed for world view what was already well

 known in Washington, that we needed to reform 

 our intelligence and information systems in 

 order to deal with new threats. 
 145 

 I had the privilege of serving in 1995 

 on a congressionally created commission on the

 future roles and missions of the intelligence 

 community, and at that point in time there was 

 no mandate from Congress to look at terrorism

 or weapons of mass destruction. We added it to 

 our agenda, but it wasn't in the public debate

 as an important future role for the 

 intelligence community. 

 That is of great significance because

 we had several years which would have been 

 terribly important to develop the capabilities

 we need to protect the country in which we 

 didn't do that. Where we had few people who 

 spoke the languages we needed to understand.

 Where we didn't begin to think about the 

 revamping of the very essence of how we do

 business and intelligence and information 

 sharing. But instead we tried to patch a 

 system that was designed against a singular 
 146 

 state enemy instead of trying to understand the 

 new enemies and emerging threats.

 I think that you can't fail to look at 

 that as you do your work, because you need to 

 know what we have to do differently now.

 There is a great deal of discussion in 

 Washington about the need for every agency to

 invest in filling these stove pipes with more 

 information, or in connecting the dots and 

 connecting information between agencies. But

 that is the same debate that we had about 

 revamping the intelligence community in 1995

 and 1996. It is using the same model of how we 

 have always done business, to say that we 

 should be able to do more of it.

 The current need is radically 

 different. You have heard from a number of

 people about the need for information down at 

 the ends of the system, if you will, with state 

 and local responders, with police, with 
 147 

 firefighters. You know the numbers, you know 

 there are 11,000 plus FBI agents and there are

 50 times that in terms of state and local law 

 enforcers. What do we want these people to be 

 doing? What is their role in the system?

 We don't, in this country, want a 

 system which will make all of those people and

 the UPS truck drivers intelligence agents. Our 

 country isn't worth protecting if it becomes a 

 police state where everyone is collecting

 information and putting it into massive 

 databases that we can then run programs against

 in order to find out who is doing what. 

 But we do need to develop a system 

 which moves the information to the people in

 local communities who need it when they need, 

 and what they need, not everything, but

 what they need. We need to have a system that 

 pulls that information into central places in 

 Federal Government when it is needed for the 
 148 

 purposes that it is needed. 

 That system -- our task force which

 was composed of one of the imminent members of 

 your panel, Senator Gorton, as well as the 

 whole range of people with experience both in

 Washington and in intelligence and on the Hill, 

 as well as people from the state and local

 governments, and quite a number of people from 

 the information technology community. 

 We looked at this problem and we said

 the system can be built in a way that both 

 enhances security and protects the privacy and

 liberty interests. As long as those two 

 interests are the key design elements for the 

 system, and it is built together, that the

 system can be built with existing technology.

 This is not a matter of creating substantial

 new technologies over a long period of time 

 that are more sophisticated and do more. In 

 fact, a great deal of what we want to be able 
 149 

 to do, is already done in the private sector. 

 So the question then becomes, how do

 you construct the system in a way that is 

 comprehensive in the reach of who can 

 participate in it, but not undermining of the

 civil liberties of people about whom you 

 collect information.

 Our conclusion is that the essence of 

 doing that, is that the President has to 

 develop guidelines for creating the balance

 between privacy and security, and that there 

 needs to be a public debate about what the

 criteria should be for those guidelines. 

 We made a number of recommendations in 

 our report, but your forum may be a very good

 one in which to inspire the public debate. 

 Because as Steve Brill was saying and others,

 unfortunately we still swing wildly and polemically from the 

 “protect security,” to the “protect privacy” sides 

 of the spectrum, and it doesn't do us any good 
 150 

 to have a unanimous resolution passed to shut 

 down a program on privacy grounds, and then to

 have actions taken by the Attorney General 

 without consultation on security grounds. 

 We are swinging back and forth in a

 way which won't enhance security and we are 

 doing it in a political environment, which is

 just going to leave people sitting here a year 

 from now when you report, feeling no more 

 secure than they do today.

 We couldn't possibly harden all the 

 targets. I mean, this is a refrain you will

 hear from everyone. Even if you pursue the 

 kind of management tool that Steve was talking 

 about, which seems very, very sensible, you

 will still not be able to harden all the 

 targets.

 So what do you need to do? You need 

 to have an information system that enables you 

 to know who it is that is in the country who is 
 151 

 hostile and might be inclined to undertake 

 these actions. And when does that hostility

 merge with the capability to actually carry out 

 an action, so that you have a real threat to 

 the country. That is an information challenge.

 People who are hostile do us no harm unless 

 they also have the capability to act.

 You need information on both sides of 

 that, and you need to understand when those 

 come together to actually create a threat.

 We know that if we had used the 

 information we already had on 9/11, that there

 is a great deal we would have learned, that 

 two of these terrorists were on the INS 

 terrorist watch list, that they had common

 addresses and common frequent flyer numbers 

 with other terrorists.

 Now, out of the vast amount of 

 information, even if we had the kind of systems 

 that we talk about, could we have prevented 
 152 

 that attack? I can't tell you that we could

 have. But we could have felt much, much better

 about the role our government plays in 

 protecting our citizens, which is one of its 

 highest callings.

 Therefore, it seems to me that as we 

 are looking at what we need to do in the

 immediate term, we need to have the public 

 debate that talks about the balance between 

 privacy and security. The President needs to

 develop guidelines which will govern the 

 Federal Government and inform the states and

 localities, and we need to, in addition, invest 

 in state and local governments being part of 

 this system, because the funding isn't there

 for them to participate. 

 There are some very good people doing

 good work in their local areas, but they don't 

 have the guidelines that empower them and 

 constrain them, and they don't have the funds to 
 153 

 undertake what they need to pursue. 

 So with that I will close my comments

 and be happy to answer questions. Thank you. 

 MR. KEAN: Thank you very much. Mr. 

 Larsen.

 MR. LARSEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, 

 distinguished members. At the Institute for

 Homeland Security we have been working on this 

 specific topic for about three years. We are 

 just about ready to finish and submit a report

 which we will provide copies to this Committee. 

 It will not be released to the general public,

 due to the sensitive nature. 

 We have focussed on intelligence and 

 law enforcement from a somewhat nontraditional

 perspective. We got together 15 senior people 

 from each of four communities; law enforcement,

 intelligence, public health and agriculture, to 

 look at how they could better share 

 information. Food supply is a great concern in 
 154 

 this country about how it could be attacked. 

 We have discovered there are great

 cultural barriers to that. It took us about 

 six hours to figure out what "business casual" 

 meant with that community in our first outset.

 When the word "prevention" came up we found out 

 that people in the intelligence community have

 a completely different definition than people 

 from public health or agriculture. 

 In the Department of Defense where I

 spent 32 years, we have a DOD dictionary of 

 military and associated terms. So we all know

 what the term "general war" means. We may not 

 agree with it, but that's what the Secretary of 

 Defence signed. That does not happen in interagency

 community, but we will be happy to 

 provide a copy of that, and I think you will

 find it interesting. 

 I submitted my comments last week so I 

 will not repeat them, but I will highlight 
 155 

 three issues from there. I see from the letter 

 that I was sent from this Commission it says

 you are chartered to prepare full and complete 

 account of the circumstances surrounding the 

 events of September 11, 2001. As a tax payer,

 I would prefer that you focus on the future, 

 not the past. If this Commission were

 beginning one month after 9/11, that might be 

 available. I have seen so many changes, I am 

 not sure of the value looking at the old

 system. 

 When I say you should focus on the

 future, I am not talking about next year, 

 because you are not going to fix it for the 

 next year, about what we need in the 21st century.

 I think your focus should be out around the 

 five year point, about which this country is

 going to need. 

 I think there are two alternative 

 futures for the day you release your report. I 
 156 

 believe May of next year. One of them will be,

 there will be in new attacks on the American

 Homeland and the American people, and Congress 

 will expect a certain sort of recommendation 

 from a Commission that is operating in that

 environment. 

 The other alternative is, I think is,

 we could have had several attacks, perhaps major 

 attacks, perhaps even an attack with a weapon 

 of mass destruction. And I think the American

 people and Congress would expect a completely 

 different recommendation from this committee.

 I think we all understand that 9/11 

 was not what changed everything. It is the 

 technological revolution that has changed

 the threat to hour homeland. Because of the 

 technological resolution small nations and

 small well-financed terrorist organizations can 

 threaten our survival in this country. That is 

 the scenario you must work with because that is 
 157 

 going to happen whether it is next month, next 

 year or five years, we know there has been a

 fundamental change in the international

 security equation. That is what you must deal 

 with.

 We did an exercise last November, John 

 Hamre from CSIS and myself led Silent Vector.

 It was the follow on to the Dark Winter 

 exercise that we did 18 months ago. I have 

 given you a handout from Silent Vector, and

 once again I apologize, because we cannot 

 release this to the public. It is not

 classified or anything, but we think it is 

 sensitive and we don't like to provide 

 terrorists information that would end up in the

 newspapers or something. 

 But what we discovered when we were

 working on this exercise was, it was an 

 unusual. Senior leaders, Sam Nunn played the 

 President; Jim Woolsey played Bill Sessions 
 158 

 former FBI Governor, Governor Gilmore played 

 Governor of Virginia. The attack never

 occurred in the exercise. It was about 

 specific incredible intelligence information 

 coming in, and John Hamre and I wanted to see

 where we could force them to make decisions

 that would have an enormous economic impact,

 perhaps even more than the attack itself, what 

 they would do. 

 What we discovered in the six months

 that we were preparing for the exercise was, 

 there is no system in the Federal Government

 today, no organization that looks at 

 intelligence information that flows in, law 

 enforcement information and a vulnerability

 assessment and puts them into a fusion center, 

 or as some people like to say, an integration

 center to look at all this. And then combine 

 that with the sort of data-binding capabilities 

 other panel members were talking about, that 
 159 

 could then provide real time information to 

 senior elected and appointed officials about

 how to use their limited resources. If you are 

 the president, governor, mayor or county 

 executive. How do you do that?

 I spent a lot of time talking to 

 mayors and chiefs of police. Two weeks ago I

 was talking to the Sheriffs' Association of 

Illinois and I said, how would you know what's 

 protecting your county, if I told you there is

 a specific threat? Where is your big 

 vulnerability?

 With a chart like this, and this is 

 rather simple, that just eight people put 

 together over a few months. There is no

 organization doing this. 

 Now the NAPSI that I know, Commission,

 you worked on for a while, was somewhat focused 

 on the cyber aspects of it, and it was a good 

 model because they did look at all sources of 
 160 

 intelligence information, law enforcement, but 

 I don't think the vulnerability assessment

 covered enough of the physical. 

 But when you look at this, we came up 

 with some very specific information, if you

 only have limited resources to use your 

 national guard or state troopers or whatever,

 it gives you an idea where you have got to go. 

 This integration center we are talking about, 

 is not only valuable for prevention, it is also

 valuable for how we are going to spend the 

 money for mitigation and response.

 This sort of center could provide that 

 information on as a vulnerability assessment, 

 what the threats are, what the capabilities

 are, what the intentions are, so we know where 

 to spend our money.

 Because my bottom line and the whole 

 thing about homeland security, and I began 

 studying this in 1994, biological warfare is 
 161 

 what brought me into the homeland security 

 business. My greatest threat, even though I am

 very worried about the future of genetically 

 engineered biological weapons, which I think is 

 a very serious threat, Nuclear weapons, cyber

 weapons, you name it. The one that I fear the 

 most is uncontrolled spending. If we do not

 establish the right priorities, we will spend 

 ourselves into bankruptcy like the Soviet Union 

 did in the Cold War.

 7500 miles of border, are we going to 

 spend billions on building imaginal lines along

 our border, when Ramsey Josef in 1993 attacked

 the World Trade Center with a bomb built across 

 the river. Timothy McVeigh built his bomb in

 Kansas. When Aum Shinrikyo made their sarin, 

 they made it in Tokyo a few miles from where

 they attacked.

 The only weapon you need to bring 

 across our border is a nuclear weapon. You 
 162 

 don't even need to bring a radiological 

 disposal device across our border. I saw a

 picture in a newspaper the other day, one of 

 these scanners that looks at the shipping 

 containers. The x-ray uses cesium-137. That

 is one of the best things to use for 

 radiological disposal device. You just put the

 bomb in the container, you don't even need the 

 radiological material, it is in the x-ray

 machine right there at the port.

 My point is, we cannot build a Maginot

 line. I am concerned about setting priorities

 and I think that's the most valuable thing this 

 Commission can provide American people. A 

 sense of priorities on this information

 integration center that will help not only for 

 prevention, but mitigation and response.

 That information will be most important. It 

 will be the best investment this country can 

 make in security. 
 163 

 Thank you, sir. 

 MR. KEAN: Thank you, Mr. Larsen.

 Commissioner Ben-Veniste and Commission 

 Fielding. 

 MR. BEN-VENISTE: Can I first turn to

 Mr. Wermuth and Ms. Baird. First of all, we 

 are very grateful for your contribution. You

 have submitted very important materials that go 

 far beyond your oral presentations today, and 

 we thank you for those and for your pledge of

 cooperation, which we will take you up on. 

 To comment very briefly on Mr.

 Larsen's observation as a tax payer; we are 

 charged by our statute to investigate the 

 circumstances of 9/11, but we are not starting

 from September 12. We are building upon the 

 very good work done by the Joint Inquiry and

 other entities which have investigated that, 

 and our mandate is to use that material as a 

 jumping-off point to conclude the 
 164 

 investigation, hopefully, to provide a 

 definitive review of what went wrong on

 September 11 that will withstand historical 

 scrutiny. But we are not going to reinvent the 

 wheel, and please be assured of that.

 Both of you have talked about the 

 balance between technological improvements for

 our security and the imperative of protecting 

 our civil liberties. There is obviously a 

 great deal of tension between those two.

 I am interested that, Ms. Baird, you 

 have suggested that this Commission may be an

 appropriate forum for the national debate with 

 respect to those perhaps competing objectives. 

 Protecting our security and yet protecting our

 civil rights, for it is quite clear that if we 

 spend days hiding under the table or afraid

 because of increased scrutiny on us, that our 

 civil liberties are gone. Then our opponents 

 will have won a victory just as easily as Mr. 
 165 

 Larsen has said, we spend ourselves into 

 bankruptcy as the Soviet Union did.

 So I would like to ask you to 

 elaborate on what you view as the principal

 points between enhanced security and protection

 of our civil liberties. 

 MR. WERMUTH: The advisory panel has,

 on more than one occasion, used a quotation, I 

 think, to describe how it feels about that 

 issue and the quote goes, "They that would give

 up essential liberty for a little temporary 

 safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety." 

 That's Benjamin Franklin in 1759. 

 This panel has been focused on civil 

 liberties. It has said consistently the civil

 liberties of the citizens of the United States 

 are really what make us unique in the all the

 world. Nobody else has the kind of system and 

 protections for civil rights and privacy 

 considerations that we do in the United States. 
 166 

 Having said that, the panel has 

 articulated ways that we can use existing laws.

 We don't need significantly expanded laws, more 

 intrusive capability. A lot of this is 

 structure and process. It is simply taking

 things that we can already acquire under our 

 laws, whether it is through the Foreign

 Intelligence Surveillance Act or other court 

 supervised activities, or simply information 

 that can be gathered legally in any number of

 other contexts.

 The idea is to bring all that

 information together and to fuse it, to use 

 that term of the vernacular, to analyze it, to 

 create some products out of it that makes sense

 and then get it into the hands of people who 

 need to have it.

 This panel has been concerned, Randy 

 mentioned, with subsequent terrorist attacks. This 

 panel has been concerned that we have an 
 167 

 opportunity now to get this right, structurally 

 and process wise. If we don't, the hue and cry

 from the American public, if it is still wrong 

 when the next attack occurs, may cause that 

 pendulum to swing too far, and we will feel

 compelled or there will be public pressure to 

 compel the Government, perhaps, to be more

 intrusive, to chip away at civil liberties. 

 The men and women, at least of this 

 organization and certainly RAND's research has

 been articulating that over the years, we 

 don't want to do that. We want to find things

 that are consistent with the Constitution,

 consistent with the statutes that are on the 

 books and protections that we have, where we

 don't find ourselves under the kind of pressure 

 of another attack or pending attacks where we

 do something. That is not consistent with 

 those values that we have held for so long and 

 make us then very much like a lot of other 
 168 

 countries who don't have the kinds of 

 protection that we do.

 MS. BAIRD: I would suggest that there 

 are two ways that you might look at this 

 question. First of all, the development of

 guidelines are really the essence of striking 

 that balance. And what I mean by "guidelines"

 are directives that make very clear for people 

 in the system, from Washington out into the 

 local communities. What it is that they can do

 and what it is that they can't do. What they 

 are empowered to do and what the limits are on

 their actions. 

 Right now we have a drive for unfocused 

 collection of information everywhere, and then

 even less focused or less targeted oversight 

 of the collection of that information. We have

 privacy czars, we have Congressional oversight 

 bodies, and everyone is trying to grab at what 

 they think is the area where they need to limit 
 169 

 what's going on. 

 The dynamic then that gets set up is

 those who have these weighty responsibilities, 

 who don't want to be sitting here in front of 

 you having failed when another terrorist attack

 occurs, are doing everything they can to use 

 information to provide security. But they

 don't have guidance and accountability being 

 assumed by policy makers for what it is they 

 should be doing, and what the limits are of

 what they should be doing. 

 So you have a system that really does

 not provide either security or privacy. So 

 these guidelines, we believe, are really the 

 essence of making the clear determinations

 about what kind of information we need, who 

 needs to have it, who should be providing it,

 and how that information moves in and out of 

 those who need it, both in the public sector 

 and the private sector. 
 170 

 The other part of this guideline

 point that I would make is, that a great deal

 of the information that we need to enhance 

 security is in the private sector. It is our 

 belief that it ought to stay in the private

 sector and be drawn on the when the Government 

 needs it. This is not necessarily popular in

 the private sector because it creates an 

 obligation and a relationship with the government 

 which doesn't exist in every part of the

 private sector, but where it does exist in the 

 financial services community, for example, it

 has been very successful and not unduly 

 burdensome for the private sector. Again, with 

 very clear guidelines about what kind of

 information people in the private sector are

 required to retain, for how long, how it is

 accessed and what their liability is for that. 

 Just again to be brief, the second 

 point that I would make, that I would encourage 
 171 

 you to look at, is the responsibility of the 

 FBI in relationship to other agencies of the

 Government. 

 It is our belief that the FBI should 

 do collection, if you will,

 the kind of law enforcement collection of 

 information that the FBI undertakes now; but

 that the FBI should not be the agency that is

 our equivalent of a domestic intelligence 

 agency. We won't probably ever say we have a

 domestic intelligence agency, but in fact, the 

 collection of information to inform policy

 makers, which is what intelligence is, as 

 opposed to information that is collected for 

 law enforcement. It is our belief should be driven

 out of the Department of Homeland Security. 

 That is for important civil liberty

 reasons as well as capabilities of different 

 agencies, because if the people who collect the 

 information are those who can take away your 
 172 

 liberty by arresting you, then there is a 

 greater threat to civil liberties from the

 collection of information by the government, 

 and it is unnecessary given that we have to 

 build this capability for the first time

 somewhere. So we concluded that building it at 

 the FBI was not the right place, again, as part

 of that balance. 

 MR. BEN-VENISTE: We are going to 

 drill down a little further on who gets the

 authority for the collection and dissemination, 

 because I think each of you have a different

 views about that. But just to follow up on 

 this point, what I hear from both of you is 

 that the means that we have available,

 presently existing, are sufficient. That there 

 is no great need for some other silver bullet

 kind of intrusive collection mechanism, but 

 rather the dissemination, the coordination was 

 the failure. 
 173 

 As we go forward and recognizing the 

 imperative of individuals who are charged with

 guarding our homeland security, and their

 natural response to the obligations they have, 

 where do you see the point of where the rubber

 meets the road on the civil liberties issue? 

 Where do you see it coming down?

 MS. BAIRD: One way to look at that is 

 the question of whether you need to collect 

 information on individuals, or at what point do

 you need to collect information on individuals, 

 and what kind of information. For example, if

 a police officer stops Mohamed Atta and needs 

 to go to a database to find out about this 

 person, he doesn't know need to know everything

 about Mohamed Atta. He just needs to know not 

 no to let him go. He needs to know to bring

 him in so that whoever has information about 

 him is informed, this person where the red 

 lights go off, has been stopped. 
 174 

 I think a very key part of the design 

 of the system is to decide who needs to know

 what about individuals, and who needs to know 

 what about events or activities that they need 

 to report to others. There are a lot of ways

 to -- you probably get news alerts on your 

 e-mail all the time. There are a lot of ways

 to move information around, to alert people to 

 things that are developing, or to have people 

 understand that they have come across something

 that others need to know about, without having 

 to actually inform everyone in the system about

 everything. 

 I think that is a very important part

 of the design of the role of all the actors in

 the system. 

 MR. WOLOSKY: I don't know that there

 is a hard and fast rule that you can apply to 

 say something is or is not an encroachment on

 civil liberties that will apply in every 
 175 

 context. 

 Fortunately, the American people are

 not reticent about speaking up on things that

 they think are problems with their own privacy 

 and liberty, as well as security interest.

 We all know, those of us, and half of 

 this panels that are lawyers by profession, and

 some of the rest of us who are here testifying, 

 with every civil liberty, with every civil 

 right there is a corresponding obligation.

 We are willing in a reasonable context 

 to do things like going through searches of our

 person and our baggage when we go on airplanes 

 because we know security risk. So there are 

 things that have to be applied in different

 situations, but I suggest it is a commonsense 

 rule. We simply need to be cognizant of not

 going too far in any context so that we 

 encroach on civil liberties, but we are always 

 going to be in that balancing act between 
 176 

 security and civil liberties, and we just need 

 to make sure that we try to address as many of

 those as we can in the calm between the storms, 

 if you will, so that we are not forced into a 

 situation of going overboard, as I said before,

 when the next attack occurs. 

 MR. KEAN: Mr. Larsen, you want speak.

 MR. LARSEN: Yes, sir. In December I 

 met with some folks here in New York City

 Police Department, their intelligence

 organization, and they talked to me about a 

 program we need to look at called Advance

 Tip-offs. It is technology that already 

 exists, they were asking if they could only 

 have the funding to make it work.

 If they would have existed on July 5, 

 2001, when the Florida State Trooper pulled

 over Mohamed Atta for speeding, and punched it 

 into the National Crime Information Center, it 

 would have tied it to 17 different watch lists, 
 177 

 everybody from Customs, INS, DEA, CIA and 

 others. As Zoe said, It would not say we want

 him for this or whatever, it would just say, 

 don't let him go. 

 I think the American people would have

 no problem with that. The technology can 

 protect some of the privacy. But I think

 privacy is going to be one of the most 

 important issues you ate going to address. It should 

 be addressed when you have a year to sit down

 and do this. Not the two weeks that it took to 

 pass the Patriot Act, 362 pages that changed 17

 laws. I haven't had time to read that. I 

 wonder how many members of Congress read it, 

 and how difficult it is when it says change

 subparagraph c from "and" to "or." That would 

 take a tremendous amount of work. I doubt if

 any member of Congress read the entire Patriot 

 Act. That's what this Commission can do. 

 I think you also need to look at, what 
 178 

 are the real standards of privacy in this 

 country today. We hosted a seminar at George

 Washington University, cohosted with the 

 Institute in the Elliot School a couple of 

 weeks ago, where we looked at law enforcement

 intelligence and one thing, what's the new 

 standard?

 One of the professors at George 

 Washington recently made a trip to a conference

 in California and as he got to the airport he

 realized he forgot his running shoes, he is a 

 big runner. He said, no problem, I will buy

 some new ones, he had got a lot of miles on 

 them. He checks into the hotel, he goes to the 

 store and finds the running shoes that he

 likes, he buys those. He sees a great pair of 

 mens dress shoes on sale, a pretty good price,

 so he buys them. 

 Did you ever have it when your credit 

 card comes back saying, you're little it bit 
 179 

 out of the profile, what's your mother's maiden 

 name or whatever that is.

 This guy is a computer information 

 specialist at George Washington University, so 

 he asked the person on the phone, what made it

 pop out of your computer. He said, three 

 things. First of all, you never bought shoes

 in California, you never bought two pair of 

 shoes in one day, and you have never bought 

 black dress shoes.

 Now, I am not going to tell you which 

 credit card this was, but one of those big

 credit cards knows that about you too. 

 Now, that sort of information would 

 not be available to the FBI, but it would be to

 your bank card. What are the standards? We 

 allow the banks to get away with that. I think

 you need to spend some time with folks in here, 

 very seriously talking about new standards of 

 privacy. 
 180 

 We all lived in a small farming 

 community where I grew up. We knew what

 everybody was going because it was a small 

 community and we knew everyone. It is a 

 different society we live in now and I think you

 really need to spend some time looking at what 

 those standards are.

 MR. FIELDING: Obviously, that is an 

 issue that we could go on all afternoon, but 

 unfortunately we are short of time.

 I would also like to thank you all for 

 your cooperation and for coming here today, and

 the tremendous paperwork that you have provided 

 for us, which is going to be first read by 

 those people and then by us. We do appreciate

 it. 

 I am afraid we have to get onto really

 some organizational issues which are apparent 

 from this topic, but it has been suggested to 

 us in various ways that there is no real need 
 181 

 for additional organization structure, 

 especially within the Federal Government. That

 the authorities that are needed for that exist, 

 they are just not fulfilled. I would 

 appreciate each of your comments on that, as an

 initial subject on the organizational side of 

 this.

 MR. WERMUTH: I think we would agree 

 in terms of the authority to conduct certain 

 activities, as you see will from the written

 testimony in connection with this national 

 counter-terrorism center which, to a certain

 extent, has some of the characteristics that 

 the President's initiative for the terrorist 

 threat integration center terms of fusion.

 The research that we did, the 

 recommendation that Gilmore Commission made for

 the creation of that center was not to create 

 something new in addition to existing 

 structures, but to bring pieces of other 
 182 

 agencies together and put them in the same 

 room, if you will, and require them to work

 together collectively, comprehensively, rather 

 than working from some distance apart with all 

 the culture problems and other barriers that

 exist between and among Federal entities. 

 The panel said, take people that are

 already doing this and put them together. 

 Don't create something brand new and in 

 addition to everything else. We have got

 statutory authority. We have got existing 

 capability. We have got expertise in these in

 compartments, but they are simply not together. 

 Bring them together. We happen to say a little 

differently than what the Markle Foundation

 recommendation was. Don't it put it in 

 either Department of Homeland Security or the

 Central Intelligence Agency or any other 

 department. Put it where it is truly 

 independent and objective, an honest broker 
 183 

 because they are a lot of customers. The 

 Department of Homeland Security is not the only

 customer. The Central Intelligence Agency is 

 not the only customer. The Department of 

 Justice is not the only customer.

 Put it in a place where there really 

 aren't the inherent pressures, if you will, and

 the competition for resources within an 

 existing agency. Make it free-standing,

 objective, independent, but bring all the

 pieces together into that single location. 

 That's what we said in a structure standpoint.

 And by the way, we don't need 

 additional statutory authority other than 

 authority maybe to move the responsibilities

 for those from the agencies where they are into 

 this other structure.

 MR. FIELDING: Ms. Baird. 

 MS. BAIRD: Yes, I would just say that 

 I think that there is so much to be done to 
 184 

 build on the existing capabilities and to 

 create the activities that need to be

 undertaken, that I would put your focus there 

 rather than putting your focus on thinking 

 about new laws or new authorities, because

 there is a great deal of capability, legal 

 authority, and talent and agency commitment that

 needs to be developed. That should really be 

 the priority. 

 I do think that the Department of

 Homeland Security has an important domestic 

 role to play, that you can encourage, be played

 out by that department. It has quite a number 

 of agencies in it that have a great deal of 

 information that needs to be part of this

 system and that needs to be drawn on by the 

 rest of the Government and the locales.

 It also had the potential of being a 

 single point of contact for much of the private 

 sector information, which is not going to 
 185 

 comfortably be shared with CIA or foreign 

 intelligence community. So as the Department

 of Homelands Security is ramping up and much of 

 the activity that was hoped for by those who 

 passed the legislation on Capitol Hill, is

 being pulled into other agencies other than 

 Department of Homeland Security or umbrella

 agencies.

 You might look hard at what you would 

 encourage the Department of Homeland Security

 to be able to do, and particularly on the 

 domestic front, what is important to have

 happened in an agency that is not under the 

 direction of the Director of Central 

 Intelligence. What will the American people be

 more comfortable having undertaken and be 

 guided by a domestic agency as opposed to a

 foreign intelligence agency. And I think you 

 have seen some of the debates on Capitol Hill, 

 much more skittishness about the potential for 
 186 

 privacy intrusions from the Defense Department 

 or the foreign intelligence community, than

 people feel about domestic agencies, and I 

 would look hard at that. 

 MR. FIELDING: But, of course, the DCI

 exists as a concept. Is it your feeling that 

 that's just not a popular vehicle for doing

 this? 

 MS. BAIRD: I don't think you will 

 ever persuade the American people that the

 Director of Central Intelligence is a benign 

 entity, because we have operated outside this

 country with rules we will not be comfortable 

 applying inside the country, and he has been 

 responsible for those operations.

 Perhaps five or ten years from now, 

 after the system sorts itself out and people

 understand comfortably how we can use 

 information domestically to protect security, 

 people with come to that. But I think that
 187 

 will not be a comfortable place to have the 

 leadership for domestic intelligence or

 information collection, particularly from the 

 private sector.

 MR. LARSEN: I don't think this new

 organization, that I would like to see, fits 

 under the Department of Justice or DCI. At one

 time I thought it might fit under the new 

 Department of Homeland Security, but I am no 

 longer sure now.

 Unfortunately, I think what John 

 Gannon was trying to do over there got

 derailed. I think there was some potential 

 there. Clearly the terrorism threat 

 intelligence center does not give us what we

 need, and clearly, we cannot have it under law 

 enforcement, that is the part I think the

 American people will insist, that we must 

 protect the rights of the accused. So I think 

 there are other models we can look at in other 
 188 

 countries that could perhaps give you some 

 vision here. My final recommendation here was,

 I think you need to start with a blank piece of 

 paper. 

 The first time I went to visit the

 NAPSI, and I say NAPSI was a wonderful model 

 that came out of PDD 39, the previous

 administration, where they fused those things 

 together. But when you first walked in the 

 door, the first day I visited there, they

 reached in, they pulled out their badges, they 

 were cops. And they admitted that only 14

 percent of computer crime was reported, because 

 businesses didn't want to go to Justice, 

 because if you said there has been a computer

 crime and they came out and investigate, 

 anything they found out could be used against

 you in a court of law. 

 So we are going to have to remove it 

 from Justice and, I think, the intelligence 
 189 

 community. 

 MR. FIELDING: That raises a question,

 I guess, I really would like all three of your 

 comments too. 

 We have obviously had an historic role

 for the FBI, an historic role for the CIA. One 

 was overseas and one was domestic. And the FBI

 is an adjunct to the Department of Justice. It 

 provides information for the Department of 

 Justice, their indictments come down. Suddenly

 all the information goes into the black hole. 

 It can't be shared, it is grand jury

 information, it is law enforcement information, 

 but it is being used in the adjudication of 

 criminal cases and, therefore, doesn't get

 disseminated. 

 How are we going to solve that problem

 in any of these schemes? 

 MR. LARSEN: I think there is a model. 

 The national infrastructure protection center 
 190 

 is being moved to the new department. They 

 looked at all source intelligence information,

 law enforcement sensitive information which 

 even included grand jury testimony, and with as 

 the vulnerability. But like I say, once again,

 primarily focussed on cyber aspects of it. 

 That model is there. It works. There

 are certain things that take place in the 

 counter terrorism task force that also works. 

 I agree, I don't think we need new legislation,

 I think we new need new organization. I think 

 General Eisenhower got it right when he said

 "the right organization will not guarantee 

 success, but the wrong organization will 

 guarantee failure."

 Now we have the wrong organization. 

 We need a new one.

 MR. FIELDING: Zoe. 

 MS. BAIRD: Well, you have probably 

 the leading expert on your own Commission in 
 191 

 Jamie, on that question. So I won't even try 

 to venture into how information gets shared,

 because she will make sure you are straight there. 

 But I would say something that is 

 perhaps not responsive, but I think important,

 which is that if much of this information is 

 not collected by law enforcement, if

 intelligence information which is intended for 

 policy makers is collected through other means, 

 or under the direction of the Department of

 Homeland Security, then you don't put the FBI 

 in the challenging position of deciding not to

 pursue its own rules. You then have a policy 

 maker who says, okay, this is what we know 

 about this group of people. What policy action

 should be taken? Do we want to prosecute them 

 to get them off the street? Do we want to

 deport them? Do we want to continue to follow 

 them to see who they are working with outside 

 the country, or at other levels or in other 
 192 

 cells? Do we want to engage in diplomacy with 

 the country from which they came to try and

 learn more about what's going on in that 

 country that could lead to a more substantial 

 terrorist threat by virtue of the fact that we

 have this information on their citizens, 

 perhaps information about relationships between

 their citizens and others. 

 So, if you have in the first instance 

 the information going to policy makers, then

 the policy makers can decide that this is 

 something that should go into that law

 enforcement box. And how black the box is 

 today is a little grayer than it used to be. 

 But be as I say, Jamie is the best person to

 inform you about that. 

 MR. KEAN: Mr. Wermuth.

 MR. WERMUTH: Intelligence collection 

 for law enforcement purposes investigation, 

 arrest and prosecution is, in our view, very 
 193 

 different than intelligence collection analysis 

 and dissemination for deterrents, prevention

 and detection. 

 We have said that in our reports, that 

 the FBI is the best law enforcement agency in

 the world. They don't understand intelligence 

 collection analysis at the strategic level.

 They do it for law enforcement and it is 

 different. They protect it, as you have 

 suggested, in the grand jury testimony and

 investigations. That is one of the reasons 

 this panel said take the FISA collection

 responsibilities out of the FBI and put it into 

 this reconstructed, this new design of 

 capability in a stand-alone center.

 Let me offer an anecdote that I think 

 is an analogous. In a prior -- I had something

 to do with counter drug policy making and 

 operations. 

 In 1990, about this time of year in
 194 

 1990, if memory serves, the counter-narcotic

 center at the Center Intelligence Agency came

 to the FBI and DEA and said, could we see all 

 of your files on Columbian drug 

 operations. Of course, the answer that you

 might expect was, we can't turn over all our 

 files to you, there are open investigations,

 there is grand jury testimony in there, we might 

 taint evidence that would be presented in a 

 court.

 So the CNC went away and scratched 

 their heads for a few months and came back and

 said, okay, can we see all of your closed 

 files.

 After some agonizing with people in

 the Office of Legal Policies and the Department 

 of Justice, and elsewhere within the

 structures, the Bureau and the DEA turned over 

 their closed files to the Counter Narcotics 

 Center. Ninety days later the CNC had mapped the 
 195 

 Cally Cartel to about 95 percent level of 

 assurance.

 That is the kind of things we are 

 talking about when we talk about strategic 

 intelligence versus intelligence for law

 enforcements. It is different situation, and 

 this panel has said that they are not sure that

 the FBI would ever be able to change their 

 culture to understand the difference in the 

 two. And even if they could, it would take new

 generation of FBI agents and leadership, 

 despite all the great things that Director

 Muller and some of the senior people in the FBI 

 are trying to do. 

 It is an inherent culture in that

 organization that they do things for law 

 enforcement purposes. They don't do it for

 strategic purposes, for deterrents, prevention 

 and protection. 

 MR. KEAN: We will take five more 
 196 

 minutes. 

 MR. BEN-VENISTE: With respect to

 comment that Ms. Baird made in her written 

 materials relating to agencies rushing out to 

 collect information and technology on their

 own, resulting in stove-piping of systems. We 

 have seen the unfortunately named Total

 Information Assessment Office recently 

 defunded. Undoubtedly, throughout the 

 Government, since there is this great infusion

 of funds thrown at counter terrorism, what have 

 you observed in terms of duplication of

 efforts, duplication of funding, which perhaps 

 we, in being on the scene and in realtime, 

 observers of situation can perhaps influence in

 some way. And if we could, what would you have 

 us do?

 MS. BAIRD: A great deal of funding is 

 being put into the information collection 

 capability for the government, but it is being 
 197 

 put into filling up the stove pipes, by and 

 large. It is not being put into developing a

 system of sharing information and at the 

 federal, state and local level. So very little 

 money is going into the intersection between

 agencies or between the federal and local, and 

 having the state and local governments fail to

 be able to be part of the system. 

 I would encourage you to look at, and 

 to ask people to provide you with information

 about the dollars that are going to developing 

 the systems of sharing and integration of a

 national system as opposed to filling the stove 

 pipes of particular federal agencies. 

 MR. WERMUTH: I am trying to find the

 exact cite that the National Strategy for 

 Homeland Security talked about the creation of

 something that it call it a Collaborative 

 Classified Enterprise, and that was supposed to 

 be exactly the kind of stuff that Zoe was 
 198 

 talking about, to link all of this together for 

 both intelligence and information sharing so

 that you could get information to the people 

 who needed to have it, at the right time, at 

 the right place. You could bring information

 that was gathered in appropriate ways, into 

 this collaborative classified enterprise, was

 what the national strategy called it. 

 We suggested that be in this new 

 national counter-terrorism center that the

 panel called for. It wouldn't have to be 

 there, but it certainly needs to be, as Zoe

 said, a comprehensive focused prioritized 

 mechanism for doing exactly what she was 

 suggesting.

 MR. BEN-VENISTE: I approach this with 

 no preconception, but one of the things that we

 have heard a lot about and will continue to 

 study, is the question of whether this domestic 

 intelligence collection enterprise is moved out 
 199 

 of the FBI, where it basically now resides, and 

 put somewhere else.

 Two things: One, you have this great 

 aircraft carrier of the FBI turning. We are in 

 the process of turning. They have devoted

 assets, they have re-trained. They are trying 

 to do what we are asking them to do.

 At the same time there are discussion

 that we should go to something like a British 

 MI5 or the Canadian bifurcation or the French,

 God forbid, or something 

 else.

 Is there a suggestion from your 

 collective experience as to one country which 

 would be a model, in a democratic country,

 which operates in an efficient way that should 

 be a model, at least in part, for us.

 MR. LARSEN: We looked at MI5 very 

 closely, for example. But we deliberately 

 stayed away from trying to draw a comparison 
 200 

 with what this panel was recommending with the 

 national counter-terrorism center, including

 the domestic collection piece and MI5. 

 The simple fact is, the laws are 

 different. The concerns about civil liberties

 are different. The concerns about privacy are 

 different. You might compare some structure

 just in terms of where it is located, who it 

 reports to it, and who can task it and what 

 some of the limitations are.

 We finally came to the conclusion that

 there wouldn't be anything advantageous from

 making those comparatives because so many 

 things are different. This panel said this is 

 a U.S. problem, we need a U.S. solution, and

 that's why it recommended what it did, without 

 any artifical or arbitrary comparisons to the

 structures in other countries. 

 MR. KEAN: We have a couple of 

 minutes. We have three commissioners who have 
 201 

 been waiting to ask questions; Senator Gorton, 

 Commissioner Gorelick and Senator Cleland.

 Fast questions and answers, if we can. 

 MR. GORTON: Mine would take far too 

 long, so I will defer -- I couldn't even ask

 the question in the time. 

 MS. GORELICK: We all want to hear

 that question at some point. 

 MR. GORTON: You will. 

 MS. GORELICK: First let me say to Zoe

 Baird and to the Markle Foundation, thank you 

 for directing our attention to, A, the low

 hanging fruit of engaging state and local 

 government agencies and corporate America, and 

 for teeing up the very important question of

 the balance between privacy and the efficacy of 

 law enforcement and counter terrorism.

 My questions are primarily directed to 

 Mr. Wermuth and Mr. Larsen. They go to the 

 question of efficacy of commissions. 
 202 

 Mr. Wermuth, I would have thought that 

 if you read your commission recommendations,

 together with the conclusions of the joint 

 inquiry which just, after all, looked at 

 intelligence failures, but nevertheless, that

 it would have been sickening to you because you 

 recommended, well before September 11, 2001,

 that we have a fusion of intelligence, law 

 enforcement, immigration information, and that 

 we engage fully state and local law

 enforcement. And when you put that together

 with what the joint inquiry said would have

 occurred in terms of the apprehension of 

 leadership of those who perpetrated 9/11, that 

 if you had gotten that information together you

 could have apprehended those people, or 

 possibly you could have.

 It is a very disturbing picture. And 

 here we are, ten commissioners, a very able 

 staff, very able people willing to help us, and 
 203 

 my question to you as we are in this first 

 public hearing, looking to the end of our

 process is, do you have any second thoughts 

 about what you did with your recommendation?

 Are there things that we can learn about how to

 be more effective and have greater impact, so 

 that the scenario I just described wouldn't be

 repeated in the future? 

 MR. WOLOSKY: It certainly is 

 frustrating when you look at this from an

 historical context now, to realize how many, 

 what now appeared to be pressing

 recommendations this panel made before 

 September of 2001. But you have served in a 

 major department of government and the highest

 levels. Others of you have, others have served 

 in Congress and as chief executives of states.

 You know the tensions that exist. You know the

 parochial nature of certain issues that exist. 

 You know the politics, both with a little P and 
 204 

 a big P that often enter into deliberations of 

 legislative bodies and Executive Branch

 agencies. 

 That is not to say that any of that 

 was not well intentioned at the time. Our

 agencies do compete with each other. Our 

 political parties compete with each other.

 Heavens, the two Houses of Congress compete 

 with each other. 

 I think there is significant value in

 commissions just like the one on which you now 

 sit because you bring a wealth of information

 to the discussion without the constraints, 

 maybe, that you once had when you served within 

 a specific branch of government or represented

 a party in a particular house of Congress.

 You will be able, from what we have

 learned, you will be able to be more open and 

 honest and comprehensive, and nonpartisan in a 

 capacity like this, than perhaps you were in 
 205 

 positions in which you served in the past. 

 To us that's beneficial. That is not

 to say that you need to establish a national 

 commission for every single problem and expect 

 it to solve the problems, but you can have some

 impact. Of the 79 recommendations that our 

 advisory panel made in its first three reports,

 66 of them have been adopted in whole or in 

major part. So you can have an impact. That 

 doesn't mean that you will get all of the

 things right, but if you are a panel that is 

 composed of the kind of people that are clearly

 on this panel, with your expertise and national 

 recognition. Suffice it to say that, your 

 recommendations and I dare say they will be

 reasonable and logical and sound and supported 

 by the evidence and everything else, you will

 have an impact. You shouldn't be concerned 

 about that. 

 The only concern would be, can you do 
 206 

 it fast enough to get them into play before the 

 next events happen.

 MS. GORELICK: Thank you. I would 

 like to hear any comments from Mr. Larsen and 

 Ms. Baird.

 MR. LARSEN: I don't often disagree 

 with Michael. I disagree a little bit. We had

 a close mutual friend, Philip Coleman, when he 

 sat down to be the director on the Presidential 

 Commission on Critical Infrastructure and

 Protection. He went back and looked at a whole 

 bunch of commissions and what effect did they

 really have. It is pretty discouraging when 

 you really look at the data out there. 

 MS. GORELICK: Well, he also, his

 commission, the Presidential Commission on 

 Critical Infrastructure catalogued all of the

 vulnerabilities of each of the sectors in this 

 report, and one questions what has happened to all 

 that information, and is it being used. 
 207 

 MR. LARSEN: A very good question. I 

 know NAPSI was very focussed in cyber owning

 and the physical dropped off the scope. 

 But I tell you in January -- a 

 recommendation I have for you how to get better

 action out of your report. You don't want it 

 to become shelfware, like so many do, okay,

 another report, let's stick it over there. 

 In January of 2001, Dr. Tara O'Toole 

 from Johns Hopkins and I, were terribly

 concerned about this country being vulnerable 

 to an attack of smallpox. Something we know

 that Iraq has, that could threaten the survival 

 of the nation. 

 Now, we could have gotten a small

 study funded by the Markle Foundation or 

 someone, and gone out and written a report and

 put it up there and what would it have done? 

 What we did together was put together that 

 exercise, Dark Winter, and then not so much the 
 208 

 exercise, but how we took that 35-minute

presentation in a dramatic format, and sat down

 with Senator Warner in his office with Senator 

 Roberts, with Vice President Cheney. We 

 briefed Vice President Cheney nine days after

 9/11 and said this is what it means to this 

 country only having 15 million doses of smallpox

 vaccine. I accept that is very focused, one 

 small issue. We got a $500-million program out 

 of that and the country is far more secure.

 There is another commission going on 

 right now looking at another threat and has

 come to us and said, could you do a Dark Winter 

 style thing for us to help us when we finish 

 our study and our scientific work, to put it

 together so we can take it around town and sit 

 down either in Congressional hearings or

 one-on-one with senior leaders and say, let us 

 show you what it would be like if we have 

 another serious threat coming to our country 
 209 

 with the system we have now. Let us show you 

 what it would be like if we had this new system

 we recommend. 

 A dramatic 30 minute presentation like 

 that, is something that might help you market

 your recommendations. 

 MS. GORELICK: Zoe, do you want to have the

 last word on that question? 

 MS. BAIRD: No. I think enough has 

 been said. Thank you.

 MR. KEAN: Last question from Senator 

 Cleland.

 MR. CLELAND: Thank you very much, Mr. 

 Chairman. Just one quick one. We may be 

 getting lost in the weeds here, for the second

 day in a row here, I have heard distinguished 

 panelists say there is going to be another

 attack. Mr. Larsen, you said that, the 

 gentleman here and Ms. Baird. We heard that 

 yesterday from an expert on terrorism, who has 
 210 

 been studying that since 1974, I think. 

 That's very scary. Given the fact

 that what little we know about Osama bin Laden, 

 and we haven't found him yet apparently, is 

 that he generates his energy from the

 allegation that particularly America is overstepping 

 its bounds and has a footprint on

 Islamic lands in Egypt, in Saudi Arabia and now 

 we have a war in Iraq. I mean, are these aid 

 to Egypt, aid to and a base in Saudi Arabia,

 the war in Iraq. Are these actions by the 

 United States more likely to produce the

 counterattack or this next attack, Mr. Larsen? 

 What elements are there that make you 

 think we are going to get hit again, and what

 would lessen those elements? 

 MR. LARSEN: The fact that we are at

 war in Iraq today, in my mind, there is no 

 question that it increases the threat of 

 attacks on our homeland in the short term. 
 211 

 However, if we are we were not at war 

 in Iraq today and Saddam refused to disarm, I

 think the long term, the threat would be even 

 be more significant. We're not at war today in 

 Iraq to make it safer this week or this month.

 I think it is trying to make a safer 

 internationally security environment for my

 children and your children and grandchildren. 

 That is what it is. 

 The international security equation

 has changed, as I said in the beginning, with 

 technology, small actors can seriously threaten

 us. It is not just Osama bin Ladin, it is 

 others, but you mentioned Osama bin Ladin. He 

 doesn't hate us for what we do in our foreign

 policy, I think, as much as and what we are 

 and what we believe in in this country. That's

 not going to change. So I think we have to 

 understand it. I hate saying that. I hate 

 saying that to my kids and grandkids down in 
 212 

 Texas that there are going to be more attacks,

 but it is a fact that we have to adjust to.

 It is going to happen. 

 MR. CLELAND: Anyone else, Mr. 

 Wermuth.

 MR. WERMUTH: I happen to think that 

 whether we were in Iraq or not -- we said this

 clearly, even before the current conflict 

 started that the likelihood, for the for all 

 the reasons that Randy has mentioned, there are

 people out there and not just Osama bin Laden,

 there are just people out there who don't like

 us. And are likely now because the mold has 

 been broken, and we have had significant 

 terrorist attacks inside the United States,

 that others will be emboldened to do it. 

 But I mean, let's face it, we had

 what could have been a disastrous attack right 

 down the street in 1993 and a lot of people 

 said you better be paying attention to that.
 213 

 You need to understand what implications that 

 has for the future, and some people listened

 but not enough people listened. 

 The operations in Iraq may do as 

 someone said yesterday, create another hundred

 Osama bin Ladens, but I would suggest that any 

 number of policies of this country, just

 because we do what we do, we are who we are, 

 might just as well push some of those people 

 over the edge into attacking us at some point

 in time. 

 So I don't think that this country can

 stop taking decisive action when it is in the 

 U.S. national interest to do that, as long as 

 we have good grounds to do it. Whatever it

 is, whether it is economic policy or military 

 engagement or types of diplomacy or sanctions

 or whatever else it happens to be, just because 

 we are scared of the next terrorist attack. 

 And I know Senator, that is not what 
 214 

 you were suggesting. I think we, 

 obviously, have to take into consideration what

 reactions our actions may cause in other parts 

 of the world and within other cultures, but we 

 still need to continue to try to do the right

 thing wherever we interest in the world. 

 MR. CLELAND: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

 MR. KEAN: Thank you very, very much. 

 It has been a wonderful panel. Thank you so 

 much for your help and for your past work, and

hopefully we can call on you as we go along in 

 the future.

 Thank you all very much. We will try 

 to get back, if we can, a 35 minute recess, if 

 we can do that.

 (Recess.) 

 MR. KEAN: The Commissioner of Police

 and the Commissioner of Fire. They were here 

 yesterday and have promised future cooperation 

 with the Commission. 
 215 

 We have also got a statement to be 

 read into the record by Senator Corzine.

 Senator Corzine has been very interested in the 

 Commission and very helpful to the Commission 

 at this point, and he had a statement which we

 will read into the record. 

 Today's panel starts now and will end

 at 3:00. We have Shawn Kelley, who is in the 

 Arlington County Fire Department. I appreciate 

 your being here. William Baker, of the American

 Society of Civil Engineers, and Ken Holden from 

 New York Department of Design and Construction.

 I thank you all for being here. 

 Mr. Kelley, would you like to start. 

 MR. KELLEY: Good afternoon. My name

 is Shawn Kelly and I am Assistant Chief with 

 Arlington County Fire Department and was one of

 the incident commanders throughout the rescue 

 and recovery efforts at the Pentagon. 

 On behalf of the Arlington County 
 216 

 Government and the men and women of the fire 

 services in Northern Virgina and the Washington

 D.C. area, thank you for allowing me to address 

 you today. 

 Like most fire departments in the

 region, the Arlington County Fire Department 

 participated in regional disaster drills

 consisting of hospital or college dorm fires, 

 mass transportation accidents and even 

 structural collapses. But never did we think of

 training for an incident that combined an 

 airliner crash into a large building,

 structural collapse, along with large building 

 fire that was fuelled by jet fuel. 

 Following the March 1995 sarin nerve

 agent attack in a Tokyo subway that killed 

 twelve commuters and injured hundreds more, the

 Arlington County Fire Department recognized 

 that America's first responders were not 

 trained or equipped to handle such emergency.
 217 

 Our training changed its focus towards large 

 scale incident management.

 From the moment American Airlines 

 flight 77 crashed into the west side of the 

 Pentagon at 0938 a.m. and for the subsequent

 ten days, this was a major fire and rescue 

 incident, the responsibility of the Arlington

 County Fire Department. 

 The destruction caused by the attack 

 was immediate and catastrophic. The 270,000

 pounds of metal and jet fuel hurling into the 

 solid mass of Pentagon is the equivalent in

 weight to a diesel train locomotive, except it 

 is travelling at more than 400 miles per hour. 

 More than 600,000 airframe bolts and rivets,

 and 60 miles of wire were instantly transformed 

 into white-hot shrapnel.

 The resulting impact, penetration and 

 burning fuel had catastrophic effects on five 

 floors and three rings on the Pentagon 
 218 

 corridors numbers 4 and 5. 

 This act of evil cost the lives of 198

 persons in the Pentagon attack; 194 were innocent 

 victims and 5 terrorist perpetrators of this 

 criminal act.

 Though the Arlington County Fire 

 Department did not feel its response to

 terrorist attack on the Pentagon was 

 extraordinary, it did not happen by chance. 

 The Arlington County Fire Department's

 preparedness was a result of years or hard 

 work, reorganization, intensive contemporary

 training and updating command staff education. 

 The successful response to the 

 terrorist attack on the Pentagon can be

 attributed to effects of ordinary men and women 

 preforming in extraordinary fashion. These

 efforts are described through an after-action

 report that was prepared for the Arlington 

 County by Titan Systems Corporation. 
 219 

 It was accomplished through a grant 

 from and support of the Department of Justice,

 Office of Justice Programs, Office of Domestic 

 Preparedness. 

 The After Action Report describes the

 activities of Arlington County and the 

 supporting jurisdictions, government agencies

 and other organizations in response to the 

 September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the 

 Pentagon.

 It is organized into four principal 

 annexes and four supporting annexes. Annex A

 is fire department operations and emergency 

 medical service activities, and it is the bulk 

 of the report.

 Annex B is about the response of the 

 local area hospitals and clinics and their

 ability to handle communications and the number 

 of patients that could have been brought to 

 them. 
 220 

 Annex C covers local, federal and 

 private law enforcement agencies.

 And Annex D is the emergency 

 management and emergency operation center that 

 supported the first responders and citizens or

 Arlington County. 

 You will see on September 12,

 Arlington County public schools were open and 

 trash was picked up and services continued in 

 that jurisdiction.

 Although the response to the September 

 11, 2001, terrorist attack is commendable, the

 After Action Report contains 235 recommendation 

 and lessons learned. Each which must be 

 understood within the context and setting of

 the Pentagon response. 

 The first segment describes

 capabilities others should emulate and speaks 

 to incident command system and the unified 

 command that was established at this event.
 221 

 Mutual aid with surrounding and supporting 

 jurisdictions and outside support, and the

 Arlington County emergency management plan that 

 was put into place, the Employee Assistance 

 Program, the training that we had undergone,

 exercises that we had performed and shared 

 experiences.

 The final segment describes challenges

 that must be met and speaks to self 

 dispatching, fixed and mobile command and

 control facilities, communications, logistics 

 and hospital coordination.

 The Arlington County Fire Department 

 is addressing these challenges by updating its 

 communications system, the purchase of a

 dedicated command vehicle, establishment of 

 a logistic segment within the department, and

 ongoing coordination with local and regional 

 hospitals. 

 In summary, the response to 2001 
 222 

 terrorist attack on the Pentagon was successful 

 by any measure. Although the tragic loss of

 life from this horrific event could not be 

 avoided, it was minimized. Had it not been for 

 the heroic actions from the response force and

 the military and civilian occupants of the 

 Pentagon, clearly the number of casualties could

 have been much higher. 

 Damage, although severe, was contained 

 in area and the fire was brought quickly under

 control. The fact that the response force did 

 not suffer a single fatality or serious injury,

 is testimony to the training, professionalism 

 and leadership of the Arlington County and the 

 response community.

 Terrorism, in any manifestation, is an 

 insidious phenomenon. It strikes without

 warning, often targeting innocent people. It 

 is not intended to defeat an enemy by 

 overwhelming military force, but to undermine 
 223 

 and weaken its resolve. If the terrorist 

 intended to weaken our resolve by attacking the

 Pentagon, they failed. 

 In the words of our County Manager,

 Ron Carlee, "The cowardly and evil effort to

 terrorize our community and our country served 

 only to unite us more strongly than ever

 before." 

 Thank you. 

 MR. KEAN: Thank you very much.

 Mr. Baker. 

 MR. BAKER: Yes, my name is Bill Baker

 and I am the partner in charge of structural 

 engineering in Skidmore, Owings and Merrill. I 

 am here today representing the American Society

 of Civil Engineers. 

 I wish to express my sincere

 appreciation for being asked to address the 

 Commission on behalf of the ASCE/FEMA World 

 Trade Center Building Performance Assessment 
 224 

 Team. 

 My comments relate to my role on the

 ASCE/FEMA team as well as my experiences as a 

 structural engineer assisting the fire fighters 

 and contractors in the early days after the

 attack on the World Trade Center. 

 In addition, I will offer my

 recommendations as to what may be valuable to New 

 York and other urban areas in dealing with the 

 aftermath of future terrorist attacks. These

 recommendations include: immediate coordination 

 of on-site contractors and structural

 engineers; an archived depository for 

 construction drawings of all city-wide

 buildings and infrastructure; and federal

 "good Samaritan" legislation for those 

 assisting.

 When I arrived at the World Trade 

 Center site after the attack, I was awestruck 

 at the extent of the devastation. While the 
 225 

 media focused on the destruction of the twin 

 towers, the damage went far beyond anything

 that was conveyed to the general public. The 

 damage included the total collapse of four 

 major buildings, the partial collapse and

 burnout of three major buildings and extensive 

 damage to seven additional buildings. Many

 other buildings suffered minor damage. The 

 district's infrastructure, including utilities 

 and the subway system in the area, was

 extensively damaged and parts of it were 

 destroyed.

 The New York City Department of Design 

 and Construction performed a brilliant job in 

 organizing the efforts of the engineering and

 construction industries to support the search 

 and rescue and, later, clean up of the site. The

 DDC divided the district into four sectors. 

 Each sector was assigned to a team of 

 contractors. This was a very successful 
 226 

 approach. 

 Because the contractors were top-notch

 and adept at managing very large private and 

 public sector projects, they knew how to 

 organize the teams, deal with heavy equipment

 and marshal resources. However, the 

 contractors needed the professional assistance

 of structural engineers. 

 The Structural Engineering Association 

 of New York stepped forward to organize the

 services of structural engineers from across 

 the city, state and country. SEAoNY, as it is

 called, assembled teams of structural engineers 

 to assist each of the four contractor teams. I 

 urge the Commission to use this approach

 developed by the DDC and SEAoNY as a model for 

 dealing with possible large urban disasters.

 In many ways, New York City was a fortunate to 

 have the DDC and major players from the 

 engineering and construction industries 
 227 

 available to assist at the site. 

 In the first critical hours and days

 following the attack, what was not readily 

 available or well organized were drawings 

 of the buildings, plazas, subway tunnels,

 freight tunnels, et cetera. As engineers and 

 contractors were investigating the extent and

 severity of damage, drawings of the original 

 structure were sorely needed. When it was 

 necessary to bring in large cranes across

 subway tunnels, vaults and plazas, drawings 

 were an absolute necessity. I strongly urge

 all major cities to develop an archive 

 depository for construction drawings and other 

 critical information to be available to the

 authorities on short notice. A duplicate copy 

 should be housed in a redundant location.

 The structural engineers who assisted 

 at the World Trade Center site were often in 

 uncharted territory with respect to 
 228 

 professional liability. There should be 

 appropriate national "Good Samaritan"

 legislation to promote the assistance of 

 engineers in such situations. While such 

 legislation exists in high seismic states such

 as California and some of the West Coast 

 states, all states are vulnerable to terrorist

 attacks and there should be appropriate 

 legislation. 

 At this point, I would like to focus

 my comments on the efforts of the ASCE/FEMA 

 Building Assessment. The Structural

 Engineering Institute, a division of the 

 American Society of Civil Engineers, was 

 responsible for organizing this effort and

 bringing together the relevant professional 

 societies with support of FEMA, for an

 assessment of the World Trade Center site. 

 Under the leadership of ASCE, a team of 

 structural engineers and fire engineering 
 229 

 experts from around the country were brought 

 together. Because of my expertise in designing tall

 buildings, I was asked to join the effort and 

 be on the five-member core group that directed 

 the assessment.

 This type of effort is important 

 because the advancement of construction of

 buildings has often come from the analysis of 

 failures. These tragic events of 9/11 provided 

 an opportunity to see how building emergency

 systems and structural systems behave in 

 extraordinary events. Although the media has

 focused on the twin towers, there is more to be 

 learned from the ordinary buildings that were 

 damaged by the events. We saw and documented

 the performance of structures that resisted 

 extraordinary forces and maintained their

 overall integrity. But we also saw and documented 

 collapses that, based on previous experiences, 

 should not have happened. It is through the 
 230 

 study of these behaviors that the art of 

 building design is advanced.

 Unfortunately, the ASCE/FEMA team 

 faced many obstacles while studying the World 

 Trade Center. The team was not able to

 assemble on the site until October 6th. We 

 could only request and cajole to get drawings

 and other information. In fact, we did not 

 receive access to the twin tower drawings until 

 January. Nonetheless, the team was able to

 perform an invaluable service in our initial, 

 overall evaluation of the buildings in order to

 focus and prioritize future investigations and 

 research. 

 In response to this, fortunately, the

 National Construction Safety Act that was 

 signed into law on October 1, 2002 addresses

 many of the difficulties faced by the ASCE/FEMA team at 

 the World Trade Center site. This act 

 authorizes the National Institute of Standards 
 231 

 and Technology to investigate building 

 failures. This is similar to the National

 Transportation Safety Board investigations of 

 airlines and other transportation accidents. 

 This allows NIST teams access to

 building failure sites; provides the power to 

 subpoena evidence; provides access to drawings,

 records and other documents; and allows for the 

 removal and storage of evidence. None of this 

 was available to the ASCE team.

 This legislation is a significant step 

 forward in creating a vehicle by which the

 design and construction industry can learn from 

 failures. This will help to advance building 

 technology and improve the safety and

 reliability of future construction. 

 As a structural engineer, the World

 Trade Center collapse represents the largest 

 structural failure in the history of mankind. 

 From this tragedy, I am confident that we can 
 232 

 learn now to approach catastrophic building 

 failures in the future and through the National

 Construction Safety Act we will continue to 

 learn how to improve building construction. 

 Thank you for your attention.

 MR. KEAN: Thank you. Mr. Holden. 

 MR. HOLDEN: Good afternoon Chairman

 Kean, Vice-Chair Hamilton and members of the 

 Commission. My name is Kenneth Holden and I am 

 the Commissioner of the New York City

 Department of Design and Construction. Thank 

 you for allowing me to appear in front of you

 today. 

 The City's Department of Design and 

 Construction, DDC, was created by the Mayor in

 1996 to consolidate most of the City's capital 

 construction programs. Its mission is to

 streamline the design and construction of the 

 City's infrastructure and facilities by 

 ensuring that the City's projects are delivered 
 233 

 in a safe, timely, and cost-effective manner. 

 DDC's clients include OEM, the Police,

 Fire, Environmental Protection, Transportation, 

 Aging, Juvenile Justice, Correction, Health and 

 Cultural Affairs Departments; the

 Administration for Children's Services; the 

 Human Resources Administration; the Public

 Library System and the Board of Education. 

 On the morning of September 11, 2001, 

 I was preparing to leave my office in Long

 Island City for a meeting at City Hall when I 

 first learned that a plane had hit the World

 Trade Center. I immediately went into downtown 

 Manhattan, and was on the steps of City Hall 

 when the first tower collapsed. I, along with

 many others that day, ran north. Eventually, 

 around 11:00 that morning I ended up at One

 Police Plaza, which was being set up as a 

 command center. It was there that DDC's role 

 began. 
 234 

 We realized that the entire 

 infrastructure of the Port Authority, which was

 headquartered in the North Tower and is the 

 owner of the site, had been decimated, and 

 therefore a response from them was likely

 impossible. FEMA and the Army Corps of 

 Engineers had not arrived yet. I thus began

 trying to get contractors and structural 

 engineers to the site to conduct a 

 walk-through, in order to assess the stability

 of the site and the scope of the response that 

 was required. DDC was uniquely qualified to

 jump into action in this emergency: We had many 

 construction project mangers and engineers on 

 staff with significant and varied experience

 and we had established numerous contacts with 

 experienced firms that could immediately

 mobilize the equipment and personnel necessary 

 to help with the search and rescue operation. 

 Our ability to draw on our own internal 
 235 

 expertise and these widespread outside contacts 

 allowed for the quick and efficient

 decision-making this situation required. 

 At approximately 5:00 that evening, I 

 conducted a walk-through with several engineers

 and construction managers. The immediate need 

 was for lighting, since all electricity was

 out. I spent Tuesday night and Wednesday in a 

 mad scramble to locate light towers to 

 illuminate the site, and also to bring in heavy

 equipment to lift debris, so that fire fighters 

 could fight fires, and the search and rescue

 operations could go on. We worked closely with 

 the Police Department to set up police escorts 

 to get the contractors over the bridges.

 DDC staff was pulled from their 

 regular duties to organize and manage

 demolition, excavation and debris removal 

 operations. Many worked 18-hour days, seven 

 days a week, to respond to the emergency. 
 236 

 In the first days, I recall being 

 stunned by rescue efforts to lift and demolish

 the north pedestrian bridge with many fire 

 trucks underneath, and wondering if there were 

 any survivors. I watched a priest praying over

 the smoldering remains of Building 7, and ran 

 into a contractor and cried on his shoulder.

 However, I could not allow myself much time to 

 feel, because we assumed there were survivors 

 in the piles of debris and we had to come up

 with a plan to get them out. 

 Using emergency procurement

 procedures, four construction companies were 

 hired on a "time and material" basis. Those 

 firms hired numerous subcontractors for

 scaffolding and netting, demolition, health and 

 safety planning and monitoring, hazardous

 materials removal, shoring, structural 

 engineering, hauling and barging. 

 In cooperation with the Port 
 237 

 Authority, the Fire Department, Police 

 Department and numerous other agencies, DDC

 handled hundreds of details and questions every 

 hour. The site was immediately and immensely 

 hazardous for rescue and clean up workers. We

 divided the site into quadrants and placed 

 netting on surrounding buildings, to secure the

 site for the rescue effort. We came up with a 

 Site Safety Plan to address hazards throughout 

 the site, from cranes dangling ironworkers in

 baskets facing precariously leaning pieces of 

 the towers, to voids in the debris that could

 swallow a grappler. 

 Just walking on the site was hazardous 

 because the debris could shift at any moment.

 Yet hundreds of fire fighters, police officers, 

 rescue workers, laborers, crane operators, iron

 workers, construction management personnel and 

 DDC staffers worked around the clock in close 

 proximity to literally hundreds of potentially 
 238 

 dangerous objects and situations. Throughout 

 this time, the war-like atmosphere was surreal,

 with Army, National Guard and NYPD providing 

 armed security. 

 Quick, but safe decisions regarding

 where to put the cranes had to be made, 

 inspection of the slurry wall and water in the

 basement were conducted, while numerous fires 

 were still burning and smoldering. Underground, 

 it was still so hot that molten metal dripped

 down the sides of the wall from Building 6. 

 Cars both burned and pristine, were suspended

in the air balanced on cracked parking garage 

 slabs. 

 Along with the Building Department and

 Structural Engineers Association of New York, 

 DDC assessed 400 buildings in the surrounding

 area for structural integrity. Over 200 

 engineers worked, above and below ground, to 

 monitor the structural integrity of the 
 239 

 buildings that surrounded the World Trade 

 Center complex, to ensure that the debris pile

 remained stable during debris removal and to 

 monitor the stability of the slurry wall. 

 There was constant inter-agency

 coordination, and daily meetings were held, 

 which included many Federal, State and City

 agencies. 

 Government agencies brushed aside 

 their normal bureaucratic tendencies and

 effectively said to one another, "What can we 

 do to help?" Although FEMA and the Army Corps

 of Engineers usually take over disaster sites, 

 to their credit, they recognized that DDC had 

 pulled together an effective team of the best

 and brightest, so instead they worked with us. 

 They told the City to continue its work and

 they guided us to make sure we were doing the 

 work in a manner that would allow FEMA to 

 reimburse us. They allowed us to use "time and 
 240 

 materials" contracts, which they do not 

 normally allow.

 Police officers, fire fighters and 

 Port Authority Police officers spent countless 

 hours searching for survivors and remains. DOT

 re-routed traffic, the Mayor's Community 

 Affairs unit set up a family assistance center

 and consoled families of victims, the Fire 

 Department put out the fires, the National Guard 

 and Police Department provided security. The

 Department of Sanitation cleaned the site and 

 watered down the streets, and OEM mobilized

 command centers at the Police Academy and Pier 

 92 from which it supplied the coordination and 

 organizational focus necessary to complete a

 job of this magnitude and complexity. 

 Throughout the operation, finding

 survivors, and then later human remains, was 

 always a priority. But to do that we had to be 

 able to remove the debris and steel.
 241 

 Cooperation between Federal, State and City 

 agencies was especially crucial in setting up

 bargaining operations at Piers 25 and 6, to 

 handle the staggering amount of steel and other 

 debris that had to be removed from the site.

 The Fresh Kills Landfill, which was closed, was 

 re-opened and mobilized to accept the steel and

 debris from the site. Steel and debris from 

 the site was sent to Fresh Kills where it was 

 examined and sifted. As the Department of

 Sanitation could no longer handle the steel 

 with their existing equipment, and our

 engineers thought the steel would destabilize 

 the landfill, DDC received verbal permission to 

 ship the steel to New Jersey. By the end of

 June 2002, an astounding total of over 1.6 

 million tons of steel and other debris were

 removed from the site. 

 As the site became more a 

 reconstruction area, infrastructure 
 242 

 coordination was required to handle numerous 

 concerns, including massive amounts of conduit

 in the streets; sewer, water main and street 

 repair; reducing the perimeter to allow 

 businesses and residents to return;

 establishing roads in the World Trade Center 

 complex; fewer cranes, more grapplers;

 continued focus on site safety; and equipment 

 maintenance, especially in view of the strain 

 of keeping machines operating 24/7 in the

 extreme conditions of heat and dust; all the 

 while trying to remain sensitive to the

 emotions of victims' families and uniformed 

 rescuers, proceeding with dignity and 

 solemnity, and trying to get the job done

 safely. 

 What's happening now and what are our

 plans for the future? DDC is working together 

 with OEM to address future preparedness 

 concerns and to make sure efforts are 
 243 

 coordinated, and in fact, is currently 

 re-building OEM's new emergency command center.

 DDC and OEM have received a grant to create a 

 protocol for emergency responses for 

 contractors, and specifications for procuring

 contractors in the event of an emergency.

 Please urge Congress to enact

 legislation providing for federal indemnity, 

 making it clear that contractors can go in and 

 do the work in the event of another disaster,

 and not incur liability. The four construction 

 companies that DDC contacted put aside all

 other business and standard operating 

 procedures and responded with a sense of 

 patriotism, working without contracts. The

 indemnity issues remain unresolved, and these 

 companies have been incredibly patient.

 However, the costs of defending themselves 

 against lawsuits may be economically 

 devastating, and such considerations could 
 244 

 prove prohibitive, in the event that they are 

 called upon again.

 The largest and most emotional rescue 

 and recovery job in American history was also 

 an exceptionally safe project, due to a

 combination of our safety plan and its 

 enforcement, and luck. There were no deaths

 and minimal injuries; which is absolutely 

 incredible, in light of the magnitude of this 

 job and its hazards.

 The work that the City and its 

 employees accomplished reflects the

 extraordinary talent, dedication and heart that 

 makes New York such a special place. From the 

 first days at emergency headquarters at P.S.

 89, a few blocks from Ground Zero, where we all 

 struggled to make sense of what needed to be

 done and to find ways to do what was necessary, 

to the final emotional days of the cleanup, DDC 

 staff and other City employees exhibited a 
 245 

 strength of character, determination, and a 

 sense of duty that is inspiring.

 New York City can do extraordinary 

 things. Everyone involved, engineers and 

 architects, surveyors, uniformed personnel,

 numerous diverse groups of City workers, 

 Salvation Army and Red Cross volunteers,

 private contractors and construction project 

 managers, operating engineers, ironworkers and 

 laborers, can all be proud of what we all

 achieved together, possible only because we 

 were united in a spirit of cooperation and

 resolve to get the job done. 

 Thank you. 

 MR. KEAN: Senator Max Cleland will

 lead the questions. 

 MR. CLELAND: I'd like to say that Mr.

 Kelley and Mr. Baker and Mr. Holden, I don't 

 think any local responders have ever been 

 called upon to do what you have been able to 
 246 

 do. From Arlington to New York City, all of us 

 in America are proud of all of you. Mr. Baker,

 you said this was the greatest structural 

 collapse in the history of the world and, Mr. 

 Holden, that makes your clean up the biggest

 clean up that has ever been done based on this 

 structural collapse.

 Mr. Baker, I understand there were 

 some conclusions to the Civil Engineers' 

 report. Could you talk a little about that,

 about some of the weakness you found in the 

 structure of the World Trade Center.

 MR. BAKER: This initial report was 

 really more of question of our report than it 

 was trying to find findings. It was a very,

 very complicated site with a lot happening. We 

 are trying to get this document released, the

 Word Trade Center Performance Study, which is a 

 FEMA document is available to you. What we 

 were trying to do was, we are trying to pull 
 247 

 the information together that was available, 

 and somewhat package it so that it would be

 available for future researchers and try to 

 prioritize. That was mainly the emphasis. 

 We put together a few likely scenarios

 for some of the collapses, but we gained no 

 conclusions as to what they were. A lot of our

 questions, certainly there were a lot of 

 discussions about the nature of the collapses 

 of the twin towers.

 As a structural engineer, I have to 

 say that most structural engineers were

 surprised at the collapse after it had survived 

 the airplane impact, but in retrospect, maybe 

 we should have known better.

 One of the things that surprised us 

 quite a bit was the collapse of Building 7. It

 didn't get a lot of press, but it was a 

 47-story building, 2 million square feet, a big 

 building. And it was the first building that 
 248 

 had ever collapsed, ever, that had been a 

 fireproof steel building that collapsed in an

 uncontrolled fire. So it was the first time. 

 That building was not hit by an airplane, so 

 the collapse of that building is a very

 important one, and that is one that the study 

 is ongoing on.

 There were two likely scenarios 

 presented. One is, diesel fuel, and a lot of 

 emergency generation in that building. Some

 people give that credibility. We don't know. 

 The other was perhaps just a simple paper

 storage fire. Turns out one of the best 

 sources of fuel there is, is paper, okay. It 

 could have been something as simple as a file

 room that burned for seven hours. 

 Those are things -- it really wasn't a

 question of nailing the thing. I think it will 

 probably take a couple of years before we 

 really know why some of these buildings 
 249 

 actually collapsed. 

 MR. CLELAND: From the audience I

 heard a phrase there "what about fire 

 proofing?" I guess it was based on code; right? 

 MR. BAKER: Yes. There are questions

 about fire proofing in the buildings. Building 

 7, I am not aware of any issues, and that's

certainly part of the new study. There were 

 some questions about the fireproofing in the 

 towers. There had been efforts to increase the

 thickness of some of the fireproofing in the 

 towers, and whether or not that was done. It

 was not complete at the time of the impact. 

 Tower 2, which is the second one hit, 

 the first one collapsed, was hit in a zone

 where the fire proofing had not been upgraded. 

 It is an unknown thing if that was significant

 or not. It is quite likely that that 

 particular structure would not have survived 

 regardless, because there is a theory that is 
 250 

 kind of post this report is that, even though 

 the fires, that were burning there weren't in

 the sense of building fires that large, there 

 was a lot of fireproofing that was knocked off. 

 MR. CLELAND: Lot of what?

 MR. BAKER: A lot of fireproofing that 

 was knocked off by the impact of the airplane.

 These airplanes were going extremely fast. 

 They are going cruising speeds down that low. 

 It was, I think, close around 560, 600 miles

 per hour, if I remember correctly. So they are 

 going very, very quickly. There is a lot of

 debris, ripping off a lot of fireproofing, and then the ensuing fire. 

 MR. CLELAND: Mr. Kelley, what was 

 your biggest challenges at the Pentagon?

 MR. KELLEY: Our challenges were 

 actually manifold. First was perimeter scene

 security. Here you have the nation's defense. 

 You have a hole in the building. You have 

 rescuers and responders responding to assist 
 251 

 and aid. Both civilian, fire, police and 

 gaining control of those folks and making sure

 that we had accountability for those people. 

 Getting logistics to the scene and 

 getting the materials that we needed to the

 scene. Though it wasn't a huge problem, it was 

 at first because the Federal Government had let

 out because there was a terrorist attack, so 

 now this log jammed all the highways and byways 

 that we needed in order to get materials in,

 until we got control and got all those people 

 gone, and then we could start getting in the

 resources that we needed. Those were 

 probably the two biggest things in a large 

 scope.

 Insofar as the Fire Service is 

 concerned, the attack inside the Pentagon -- it

 is a very big building. You have 982-foot

 corridors. We wear 45-minute, 30-minute air 

 packs and we had to do some very creative air 
 252 

 management with our air packs where we would 

 actually stay off air, crawl down hallways as

 long as we could, go on air, try and fight some 

 fire, and remember how long it took us to get 

 in so that we had air to get back out, so we

 wouldn't lose anybody. 

 Another challenge was each of the

 evacuations on the first day while we were 

 actively engaged in firefighting. The first 

 evacuation was the structural collapse on the

 heliport side of the building. Dropping 

 the hose lines, losing ground that we had

 gained in fighting the fire to evacuate out. 

 Those hose lines being burned up, equipment we 

 had left behind, having to re-amass that

 equipment and go at it again. Those were all 

 challenges to us on that first day in order to

 get the fire under control. 

 MR. CLELAND: That's amazing. Hearing 

 your testimony, all of you, it reminds me of a 
 253 

 line from Admiral Nimitz after the battle of 

 Iwo Jima that "uncommon valor was a common

 virtue" and it sounds like it to me. 

 Mr. Holden, I would like for you to 

 shift a little gear here and talk to me about

 the psychological impact of you and your 

 wonderful people and crew working for so long

 on such a massive project, dealing with such 

 tragedy. Has the City put together any kind of 

 program to help the psychological readjustment

 of those workers who worked so hard at Ground 

 Zero. What do you see about that?

 MR. HOLDEN: Actually, I believe FEMA 

 has put together a program that is open to all 

 New Yorkers, as well as the people who -- both

 the construction workers and engineers who were 

 down at Ground Zero. I believe it is Project

 Cope and the Liberty Project which are these 

 broad-based counseling services. 

 I have talked to all my people and 
 254 

 still meet with them quite regularly, and a lot 

 of people have taken advantage of these FEMA-

 sponsored programs. They have told me that the 

 people are really quite competent and quite 

 helpful, and it has been a big help actually.

 MR. CLELAND: It seems like to me that 

 that's part of the terror of terrorism. It is

 not just the people who die in the incident, 

 but the impact, the washover, the 

 psychological impact on the entire country and

 on those people who were nearest the flames, so 

 to speak. In many ways just like combat, they

 live with that experience forever. 

 Mr. Kelley, do you want to talk to us 

 a little bit about some of your workers and the

 psychological impact on you? 

 MR. KELLEY: Yes. In our Department

 and in Arlington County Government they embrace 

 a very strong Employee Assistance Program. 

 At Ground Zero, at the Pentagon, from 
 255 

 the very moment after the attack, we actually 

 had EAP workers with the collapse rescue teams

 and the firefighters right there on the scene, 

 24 hours a day, for all ten days that we were 

 there. Even if it was just to go get somebody

 an apple or to bring a cell phone to them to 

 speak to their spouse or their family while they

 still working, to take some of the stress and 

 pressure away. It was very important. 

 As far as wellness for the community

 and to make Arlington whole again and the 

 region whole, once again we got a grant and

 they started a program called Community 

 Resilience, where they went physically door to 

 door -- they learned this from Oklahoma City,

 where they had clinicians that went door to 

 door throughout the resident and the business

 community, first in the Pentagon region and 

 Crystal City area, but then expanded out 

 through Arlington and into the schools, to help 
 256 

 the community deal with stress and to deal

 with the things that they find after an attack

 like this. 

 There is a website that folks can go 

 to, to get pointers and to get tips and it's

 www.communityresilience.com, and it has very 

 good information for any community.

 MR. CLELAND: As a firefighter, and 

 you and your firefighters, when you go in to 

 talk to kids and children, they have been

 powerfully impacted. They don't have a lot of 

 defenses that adults have, maybe sometimes that

 good. Can you tell us a little bit about the 

 impact on some of the kids in the schools, and 

 what you are telling the kids?

 MR. KELLEY: Well, the impact is 

 twofold. The impact is to our own children who

 are scared when their parents, the police 

 officers and the firefighters, go to work now. 

 Daddy or mommy, are you sure you are going to
 257 

 come home? And so to reassure them and get 

 them well.

 In the schools, the best way that we 

 deal with kids -- we got wonderful drawings and 

 wonderful sentiments from the kids and you

 could really see their feelings, in what you were 

 talking about, in their art work and in what

 they were saying, which we used as inspiration. 

 We have these things in all our fire stations, 

 hung all over the place. We brought them down

 to the scene and put them right up on the side 

 of the Pentagon as folks would send these

 things to us, to keep the rescue workers going. 

 We say to the kids, yes, we are still 

 here. Yes, some horrible things have happened

 and this is a tragic event, but we are still 

 here. We are going to be safe. We were there

 and we are standing here now talking to you. 

 We need to move on. 

 That's kind of how we are handling it, 
 258 

 but at a more elementary level. 

 MR. CLELAND: Mr. Holden, you have a

 whole city, a whole big community to deal with. 

 For you and some of your workers, I am sure you 

 get called upon by the schools to go out and

 talk about the experience. What are you 

 telling the kids, can you share that with us?

 MR. HOLDEN: Actually, I haven't given 

 a lot of talks to kids. I have given talks to 

 university students and engineering students

 primarily about the engineering projects. But 

 insofar as disaster response, I have not given

 a whole lot of talks, if any, to elementary or 

 junior high school kids. 

 MR. CLELAND: Mr. Baker, you have

 looked at this report. What is the one 

 conclusion that you would draw and would give

 to this Commission or to your fellow structural 

 engineers around America about what you have 

 learned? 
 259 

 MR. BAKER: It sounds trivial, but you 

 cannot allow large airplanes to fly into

 buildings. 

 MR. CLELAND: I am sorry? 

 MR. BAKER: You cannot allow large

 airplanes to fly into buildings. You cannot 

 design against it. Smaller planes, like that

 tragedy down in Tampa where the kid flew the 

 little airplane, that is not gong hurt a 

 building.

 But if you have a large commercial 

 aircraft, passenger or cargo, I don't care why

 it is there, those large airplanes, you cannot design 

 against it. If you look at the 767, it is a 

 big airplane. There are bigger airplanes out

 there, quite a bit bigger. There are the 747s, 

 there is A380 Airbus which is on the boards in Europe, much

 larger planes. Both cargo and passenger 

 airplanes have to have foolproof safety systems. 

 MR. CLELAND: Mr. Chairman, some of 
 260 

 the other Commissioners might have some 

 questions.

 MR. KEAN: Yes, they do. Commissioner 

 Roemer. 

 MR. ROEMER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

 First of all, I remember 9/11 as if it 

 was yesterday, as a member of Congress, and a

 member of the Intelligence Committee and as 

 somebody who was right across the river from 

 the Pentagon, Mr. Kelley.

 After a full day of scrambling around 

 trying access to intelligence and figure out

 what was happening to the country and how we 

 should react in making sure the legislative 

 branch was moving forward in getting the right

 briefings, I felt like many Americans and 

 wanted to contribute somehow.

 Everybody had seen what had happened 

 in New York all day. So at about 11:00 or 

 12:00 at night, I drove across the river and 
 261

 was able to get through the barricades and 

 right to the front, about 500 yards from the

 Pentagon. I sloshed through ankle-deep water 

 to get over there to see if there was anything 

 I could do, or at least to see it, so that I

 could see what these terrorists had done to our 

 country. I was mesmerized, looking at this

 huge fortress, this structure that looked like 

 a steel boot had come down on the top of it and 

 just made a paper accordion out of it.

 You were there. You had fire trucks' 

 ladders going up both sides of the building

 that was still on fire at that time of night. 

 Your folks were scrambling everywhere to see 

 what they could do to help others. And I will

 never forget, and I tell my four kids about 

 this, turning around from that site of horror

 and terror and seeing all of you as an army of 

 America, lined up to heal America and take them 

 forward. And you guys did it, and accomplished 
 262 

 so much, and I think it's the story of courage 

 and bravery that so many of us are proud of,

 and inspire us to work hard and try to get to 

 the bottom of what happened and try to make the 

 country a better place in the future, as well.

 I want to personally thank you and 

 everybody in the Fire Department of Arlington

 and Alexandria, and rescue crews, and if you 

 can take that back to them, this Commission 

 very much appreciates what you help us with.

 And New York, Mr. Holden, I can't say 

 I was fortunate enough to come up to New York

 City. I can say that I will never forget it, 

 coming up a couple of days afterwards as a 

 member of Intelligence Committee, and going to

 Ground Zero. And I went on a boat up the 

 Hudson River because it was too difficult to

 get through the town. A sergeant of the Police 

 Department was taking us up, driving the boat. 

 I asked Tony what he was doing on the 
 263 

 day and how he felt New York was reacting to 

 it. After telling me about all the people that

 were literally jumping off into the water to 

 try to get away from the collapsing buildings, 

 and he would ferry them over to New Jersey for

 triage. 

 I asked him again, how does New York

 feel they are doing now. This grizzled veteran 

 of probably all kinds of things that he had 

 seen and heard in New York, looked at me. He

 was 55 or 60, he had huge tears falling down 

 his cheeks. He said, "we feel like we could

 never do enough to help each other." 

 Well you did, and you came forward and 

 did extraordinary work in record time to clean

 things up and to move people forward to try to 

 heal the process.

 I wish Commissioners Scoppetta and 

 Kelly were here so that we could thank them. I 

 hope you will pass that on, on our or behalf 
 264 

 and I hope you will make sure that we get an 

 opportunity to talk to them at a later date.

 Along those lines, Mr. Baker, I want 

 to ask you, based upon your expertise and your 

 insight on this, it is quite a compliment to

 pick somebody of your skill for this kind of 

 endeavour, to look at the twin towers, in

 particular, and see what happened. So I want 

 to ask you, specifically, given this counsel 

 that you bring, this insight that you bring to

 this report. 

 You said you were pleasantly surprised

 by the integrity and the structure of some of 

 the other buildings. Were you concerned or 

 disturbed at all by any of the features, the

 design and the structural engineering of the 

 twin towers when you studied them?

 MR. BAKER: It took a long time to 

 come to grips with the collapse. 

 MR. ROEMER: When you did come to 
 265 

 grips with it, what did you conclude? 

 MR. BAKER: I am not sure that -- I

 think the building performed remarkably well, 

 actually. You never want it to collapse, but 

 one of the things you might say about it, it

 was a very strong building. It took a huge 

 amount of damage. So many columns were knocked

 out. We counted the ones on the perimeter and 

 a large number of columns were knocked out 

 initially.

 Later studies, ongoing studies have indicated 

 that a large number of core columns were

 knocked out and the building still did not come 

 down immediately. So the nature of the 

 structure was enough that it could hold itself

 together long enough for people to get out. 

 A lot of people did get out and

 approximately, I believe, 99 percent of the 

 people who were below the impact zones were 

 able to get out, according to articles in New 
 266 

York Times and U.S.A. Today. 

 MR. ROEMER: I just have a couple of

 questions and then I want to make sure the 

 other Commissioners have an opportunity to ask 

 questions as well.

 Apart from the plane hitting these 

 buildings and bringing them down, let me ask

 you specifically about the structure of the 

 buildings, or the uniqueness of them apart from 

 the plane hitting them.

 Do you know of any other high-rise or 

 super-high-rise buildings that have floors

 composed of open-web trusses spanning up to 60 

 feet? 

 MR. BAKER: No, I do not.

 MR. ROEMER: Is that something that 

 would concern you?

 MR. BAKER: It is something to be 

 looked at very closely. We were not able to 

 look at that closely in this situation. 
 267 

 What you are referring to is these are 

 commonly called bar joists. You see them in

 the roofs and ceilings of big-box retail like a 

 Wal-Mart. It is a very lightweight truss. 

 There are things the industry needs to do to

 study these things further. 

 MR. ROEMER: So that could be of

 concern and that disturbed you? 

 MR. BAKER: It is something that we 

 don't have the answer on and I personally would

 not ever use them in this type of building. 

 MR. ROEMER: So you will recommend

 other high-rise buildings not use them. 

 MR. BAKER: Until we know more about 

 it. If fact, there is draft out for the New

 York City Code which has recommended a 

 temporary moratorium on the use of these types

 of trusses in high-rise buildings until it is 

 better understood how they can be fireproofed 

 and the integrity of the fireproofing. 
 268 

 The issue comes down that they are 

 very small bars, about one inch diameter and

 whether or not you can adequately fireproof 

 those. 

 MR. ROEMER: Specifically, I know

 Senator Cleland asked a general question about 

 fireproofing. Let me ask you a more specific

 one. 

 Was half-an-inch thickness of 

 fireproofing on the floor trusses sufficient to

 give a three-hour fire rating, in your view? 

 MR. BAKER: I doubt that a three-hour

 fire rating was required for the floor trusses, 

 just an as a point of reference. 

 MR. ROEMER: I didn't ask that.

 MR. BAKER: No. I would be very 

 surprised if a half inch would give three

 hours. We did not study that specifically, but 

 I would be very surprised. 

 MR. ROEMER: Finally, did you see or 
 269 

 hear of any evidence in the course of your 

 inquiry, that the fireproofing of the twin

 towers was inadequate? Obviously, you just 

 said you had a concern, but any others? 

 MR. BAKER: We do know there was an

 ongoing program to replace fireproofing in the 

 towers, that the Port Authority, as the floors

 are re-tenantized and made available, that they were 

 going back in there and putting additional 

 fireproofing onto the floor trusses.

 There had been some issues of some of 

 the fireproofing falling off of some of the

 core columns in the elevator shafts, and there 

 had been some earlier lawsuits. We were not 

 able to get access to that information to know

 the details. 

 MR. ROEMER: You tried get access to

 it? 

 MR. BAKER: Yes, we had no authority. It 

 was all locked up in legal -- there were 
 270 

 nondisclosure agreements on lawsuits and the 

 like. We couldn't get the information.

 MR. ROEMER: Thank you, Mr. Baker. 

 MR. LEHMAN: First, I would like to 

 associate myself with the earlier comments of

 great admiration. I think that you and you 

 colleagues made the whole country very proud,

 and impressed it the world with the way the

 response was immediate. It engaged every asset 

 available in the cities and the districts

 available, and everyone on the sites showed 

 courageous disregard for their own personal

 safety, not to mention the trial lawyers 

 association, which the Mayor alluded to earlier 

 on.

 So please take the questions that I am 

 going to ask, in the spirit that they are

 intended, which is to get onto the record as 

 much of the lessons learned as possible so that 

 we can make appropriate recommendations for the 
 271 

 future. This is not intended to try and point 

 fingers at anyone or so forth.

 There have been a lot of questions 

 raised since then about why, after it was 

 clear, this was perhaps a measure of weeks

 rather than days, that there could be no more 

 survivors from the wreckage, why was the site not

 made a crime zone and given the proper 

 protection so that evidence and forensic 

 investigations could be taking place? Why

 wasn't that done? 

 MR. HOLDEN: I believe that security

 around the site, and the Police Department, in 

 fact, did call it a crime zone, and it was very 

 difficult to get access to the site as the

 Police Department and the National Guard and 

 Army were called in to provide security to

 prevent people who need not be at the site, you 

 know, were kept away from the site. 

 As you mentioned, we believed that 
 272 

 there were, in fact, survivors for many weeks 

 early on. So our main goal was basically to

 remove, particularly the heavy steel beams to 

 allow the Fire Department and Police Department 

 to continue with their searching operations,

 with their rescue operations. 

 MR. LEHMAN: You mentioned the steel.

 There have been other questions raised about 

 why the steel was removed to a site and then 

 ordered destroyed without being made available

 to the overall investigation of the structural 

 clues that would have helped in really

 evaluating where failures took place and 

 whether these codes were met. Why and how was 

 the decision made to destroy that steel?

 MR. HOLDEN: Again, you have to go 

 back 19 months and put yourself in the position

 of trying to find survivors. 

 Our priority at that time, in 

 September and October, was still looking for 
 273 

 survivors. The steel was precluding that from 

 happening because much of the debris early on

 was being sent to the Fresh Kills Landfill. It 

 became clear after three or four days that the 

 equipment that the Department of Sanitation had

 to handle the City's garbage was not equipped 

 to be able to pick up those large pieces of

 steel. And those large pieces of steel were 

 preventing the rescue workers from crawling 

 into crevices and voids underground.

 We really had no place to put it. 

 There is no place to put 170,000 or 180,000

 tons of structural steel. We were pressed by 

 the urgency of trying to find survivors. We 

 looked at a number of operations. We knew that

 some of the steel might have asbestos-

 containing materials on it. We knew that we

 couldn't just dispose of it, but it was not an 

 option to continue sending it to the Fresh 

 Kills Landfill where all the debris was being taken.
 274 

 The only options, based on discussions both 

 internally with our engineers, as well with New

 York State with the State of New Jersey and with 

 the Environmental Protection Agency was to 

 basically ship it off to New Jersey and recycle

 it. No one was volunteering to just store that 

 huge volume of steel. They would only take it

 if they could melt it and recycle it. 

 We really couldn't figure out any 

 other option at the time.

 MR. LEHMAN: This was a sort of crisis 

 management group decision, it wasn't any one

 person that dictated it? 

 MR. HOLDEN: This was my decision. 

 MR. LEHMAN: Okay. I have read that

 the twin towers, because they were owned by the 

 Port Authority were actually exempt or outside

 of the enforcement codes for the City of New 

 York. Is that true? 

 MR. HOLDEN: I'm not a Port Authority 
 275 

 employee, but the buildings are in fact Port 

 Authority and I am almost certain that they are

 exempt from following New York City Building 

 Code requirements. 

 MR. LEHMAN: Isn't that something that

 we ought to address or that should be remedied? 

 Why should a building like that in the middle

 of the City of New York be exempt from State 

 and City codes? 

 MR. HOLDEN: I think that warrants

 looking into. 

 MR. LEHMAN: Mr. Baker, I would like

 to ask you, did the buildings conform, at the 

 time of their construction, to prevailing 

 standards of survivability and structural

 integrity that were prevailing at the time of 

 their construction?

 MR. BAKER: In the short period of 

 time that we produced this report, that was not 

 studied in detail. My understanding is that 
 276 

 NIST, at this point, has actually, is trying to 

 commission a study to do a detailed review of

 the prevailing codes, particularly the New York 

 City Building Codes vis-a-vis the construction 

 documents. So that was not done as part of the

 study. 

 MR. LEHMAN: We look forward to

 receiving that when that is done, or if we can 

 be of any assistance to see that it is 

 completed before the end of our report, that

 would be very helpful. 

 Mr. Baker, how was the decision made,

 or what were obstacles made to keep you from 

 the site for so long while so much of the 

 evidence was being removed? I don't mean

 evidence in terms of liability and so forth, 

 but evidence in terms of learning the lessons.

 MR. BAKER: I am not sure I know all 

 the details, but basically we were told that 

 the folks on site did not necessarily want 
 277 

 other extraneous people walking around. They 

 had their hands full at the moment.

 I personally was on the site much 

 earlier than that because as part of the other 

 activities, as part of assisting the search and

 rescue. But the rest of the team was not able 

 to get access because of the nature of

 activities before October 6, when we actually 

 did get access. I believe we were deemed to be 

 superfluous at that point.

 MR. LEHMAN: Perhaps, Mr. Holden, you

 might shed a little light on it. Was it

 because they were deemed to superfluous or was 

 it, by this time had the fear of litigation, as 

 the Mayor spoke to yesterday, begun to enter

 the calculations of City officials. 

 MR. HOLDEN: It took a lot of months

 to go by before I started thinking about 

 litigation, quite frankly. 

 I am not sure exactly about when the 
 278 

 American Society of Civil Engineers came on 

 site. I know we worked with SEAoNY, which Mr.

 Baker alluded to earlier, which was a State 

 organization of structural engineers who worked 

 with numerous city structural engineers, as

 well as structural engineers we had hired to 

 both examine buildings and look at the site.

 The problem, again, going back 18, 19 

 months ago, was that you had a very difficult 

 site to control. As you alluded to earlier, it

 was a crime scene so access was limited. We 

 also, especially that first week or two, had

 thousands of volunteers coming down to the 

 site, which a was a wonderful and much 

 appreciated outpouring of spirit. However, it

 was an extremely unsafe site and we were very 

 concerned that having hundreds and thousands of

 people walking around the site, could cause 

 further fatalities. And if the Mayor gave us 

 one clear marching order, it was that no one 
 279 

 else was to die at that site.

 I am not exactly certain when the

 American Society of Civil Engineers were 

 looking to gain access, but early on some of 

 the constraints were, in fact, the fact that it

 was a crime scene and there were just safety 

 concerns. We were trying to grapple with what

 was there, and how many people we could allow 

 on site, how stable the various piles were, how 

 unstable.

 I am sure you remember the facades of 

 towers 1 and 2, we were not certain about

 stable those facades were. We were very 

 concerned about having so many people walk 

 around the site.

 However, I would never use word that 

 Mr. Baker used, calling the engineers

 "superfluous," they were extremely helpful. 

 Those are just some of the general 

 difficulties in allowing people on the site. 
 280 

 MR. LEHMAN: Thank you for your 

 responses. They are very helpful.

 MR. KEAN: Thank you, Commissioner 

 Ben-Veniste.

 MR. BEN-VENISTE: I have a question

 for Mr. Holden. Following up on my friend and 

 colleague, Max Cleland, who was quite

 interested in the effects of terrorism and the 

 lingering trauma of those who have experienced 

 it firsthand, My alma mater, Stuyvesant High

 School is located four blocks north of World 

 Trade Center. On September 11, 2001, they were

 evacuated from the school. The evacuation 

 notice was "run for your lives."

 Hundreds and hundreds of teenagers,

 from all parts of the City, made their way on 

 their own out of the toxic plume, watching as

 people jumped to their deaths from these 

 buildings, an extraordinary traumatic 

 experience. 
 281 

 Can you comment on what the City has 

 done with respect to trying to provide guidance

 counselling follow-up for the children who were 

 directly exposed to this tragedy? 

 MR. HOLDEN: I wish I could, but I am

 really not qualified. Those questions are 

 really much better addressed either to the

 Commission of Department of Mental Health, or what is now 

 the Department of Education. But really the 

 Department of Design and Construction was

 really limited in its focus to demolition of 

 the existing structures and debris removal.

 I am just not qualified to speak to 

 your question. 

 MR. KEAN: Commissioner Gorelick.

 MS. GORELICK: This is for Shawn 

 Kelley. A number of us on this panel have

 served at various times at the Pentagon and we 

 are aware that the cafe in the middle of the 

 Pentagon is called Ground Zero. 
 282 

 MR. KELLEY: Not anymore. 

 MS. GORELICK: It was. So we knew

 that we were working in a place that was a 

 possible target. 

 We heard testimony yesterday that the

 evacuation procedures at the Pentagon were not 

 understood, at least, and not well practiced

 and could not be followed by the people in the 

 building. 

 So my question for you is, did you

 conclude or did your After Action Report 

 conclude that there were any failures in the

 evacuation process at the Pentagon after the 

 plane slammed into it? 

 MR. KELLEY: We have emergency

 incidents at the Pentagon every day. We run an 

 average of two responses a day at the Pentagon.

 I personally investigated a fire there two 

 weeks prior. So it is 11 percent of our call 

 volume is to federal facilities within 
 283 

 Arlington. 

 We have never experienced in the past

 a problem in evacuating the occupants from 

 different sections or parts of that building,

 out and away from where the danger is, along

 with the assistance of the Defense Protective 

 Services, the police officers, that work in and

 out everyday around the building. 

 In this particular event or in this 

 particular incident, to have this plane and

 almost the entire plane made it into the first 

 floor of this building, and to penetrate in

 three rings, and I am not going to go into the 

 floorplan of the Pentagon, but to penetrate in 

 three rings and then pop out into what they

 call A&E Drive. 

 I will say that most all the fire

 doors did work, in the outer corridors. That 

 is good and bad. The fire doors closed like they 

 should, and then it was dark and held smoke and 
 284 

 could have possibly caused further injury or 

 death to some of the folks.

 They had also just done construction 

 and updated the Pentagon and installed some new 

 windows which were not openable. That also had

 some impact on the building not being able to 

 breathe or let out its products.

 With regard to where the Pentagon is 

 now, I can share with you that they have 

 installed some enhancements to assist in easier

 evacuation. In fact, in my opinion, it is 

 state of the art now. It is an example for the

 rest of nation to follow. Some of those things 

 can't be shared. It is truly, truly an example 

 now. The employees do practice evacuation

 drills.

 The Pentagon has even approached my

 office, the Fire Marshal's office, to have two 

 deputy marshals assigned down there, a third party to 

 ensure that proper code enforcement is 
 285 

 conducted. Not that it isn't now, but just to 

 have a third party assessment to assist in

 things like evacuation plans and drills, and 

 things like that. 

 MS. GORELICK: Thank you very much.

 MR. KELLEY: You're welcome. If I 

 may, the After Action Report, if you don't

 mind, you did mention it. It is available for 

 free for everyone, I am not trying to make an 

 ad, but it is real important in the Fire

 Service that we study ourselves and learn from 

 action and have other persons learn, good or

 bad. If there is criticisms, then folks need 

 to fix them so that if things didn't go so 

 well, that they are prepared or do better.

 MS. GORELICK: That is an excellent 

 great note on which to end the hearing.

 MR. KEAN: I would like ask a question

 before we end. Mr. Holden, first, when you got 

 to the site, who was in charge? 
 286 

 MR. HOLDEN: I would say the Fire 

 Department and the Police Department.

 MR. KEAN: Jointly in charge? 

 MR. HOLDEN: Yes, the Fire Department 

 was clearly putting out fires and the Police

 Department was handling security. 

 MR. KEAN: Three or four hours later,

 who was in charge? 

 MR. HOLDEN: The same people. 

 MR. KEAN: Did that change later?

 MR. HOLDEN: I don't think that really 

 changed until, again, now I am just giving you

 my impressions. I don't think that really 

 changed until several days later when the 

 National Guard, Governor Pataki brought in the

 National Guard, and I believe some Army units

 were down helping with security. Although

 certainly, the Fire Department was playing a 

 major focus on the interior. 

 MR. KEAN: Mr. Baker, when you got on 
 287 

 site, who was in charge then? 

 MR. BAKER: My impression when I was

 there was that the people in overall charge of 

 it was the Fire Department of the sectors, but the 

 operational control were the contractors.

 These contractors were very, very good. They 

 are used to managing very large projects and

 have command structures within their groups, 

 who know how to bring in heavy equipment. They 

 know how to deal with subcontractors, and all

 that kind of stuff. 

 So a lot of the operational, who goes

 there, we want to see if that building is going 

 collapse, let's go into this thing and look 

 around. Really our interface was with

 the general contractors, they did an excellent 

 job.

 MR. KEAN: I want to thank you all 

 very, very much. This has been a very good 

 panel and a very instructive panel. Thank you 
 288 

 for your answers. Thank you for your presence, 

 we appreciate it very much.

 That ends our hearing. 

 (Whereupon, the proceedings were 

 adjourned.)