Affirmed and Opinion Filed April 13, 2022. 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-21-00447-CR 

EX PARTE DONTE TAYLOR 

On Appeal from the 416th Judicial District Court 

Collin County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 416-02294-2021 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Myers, Partida-Kipness, and Carlyle 

Opinion by Justice Partida-Kipness 

Donte Taylor appeals the trial court’s order denying relief on his pretrial 

application for writ of habeas corpus seeking his release on a reduced bond pursuant 

to article 17.151 of the code of criminal procedure. We affirm the trial court’s order. 

FACTS

On January 12, 2021, appellant was arrested in Dallas County on Denton 

County warrants for failure to appear to answer four aggravated assault charges. He 

was placed in the Denton County Jail on $50,000 bail for each case. On January 15, 

2021, while confined in the Denton County Jail, appellant was arrested by Collin 

County for murder. On January 16, 2021, a Denton County Magistrate arraigned him 

for the Collin County murder offense and set a $1,000,000 bond. On April 9, 2021, 
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he was transferred to Collin County to stand trial. Appellant’s bond was reduced to 

$750,000. 

On May 3, 2021, appellant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus 

contending he was entitled to be released with a reduced bond under article 17.151 

of the code of criminal procedure because he had been detained for more than ninety 

days without an indictment being returned. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 17.151, 

§1(1). On May 20, 2021, appellant was indicted in Collin County. The trial court 

denied habeas relief on May 24, 2021. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s habeas determinations 

regarding alleged violations of article 17.151. Ex parte Vanorman, 460 S.W.3d 700, 

702 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2015, no pet.); Ex parte Craft, 301 S.W.3d 447, 448 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) (mem. op. on reh’g). A trial court abuses its 

discretion if it acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles or if its 

actions are arbitrary or unreasonable. Ex parte Miller, 442 S.W.3d 478, 481 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the trial court’s ruling. Vanorman, 460 S.W.3d at 702; Craft, 301 S.W.3d at 448–49. 

ANALYSIS
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In a single issue on appeal, appellant contends the trial court erred and abused 

its discretion by denying his writ application and refusing to set a reasonable bond 

pursuant to article 17.151. The statute, in relevant part, provides: 

Sec. 1. A defendant who is detained in jail pending trial of an 

accusation against him must be released either on personal bond or by 

reducing the amount of bail required, if the state is not ready for trial of 

the criminal action for which he is being detained within: 

(1) 90 days from the commencement of his detention if he is 

accused of a felony. 

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 17.151, §1(1). 

The court of criminal appeals has stated article 17.151 has “the obvious 

legislative intent to provide assurance that an accused will not be held in custody 

indefinitely while the State is not at least prepared to bring him to trial.” Jones v. 

State, 803 S.W.2d 712, 715 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Under the case law interpreting 

the relevant portion of article 17.151, the State is automatically considered not ready 

for trial if an indictment has not been returned within the ninety-day period. Ex parte 

Lanclos, 624 S.W.3d 923, 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). 

Assuming the State has indicted the defendant in a timely manner, an 

announcement by the State within the ninety days that it is ready for trial, or a 

retrospective announcement that was ready for trial within the ninety days, satisfies 

the State’s burden and constitutes a prima facie showing of readiness. Jones, 803 

S.W.2d at 717–18. The burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut the State’s prima 

facie showing of readiness. See Jones, 803 S.W.2d at 718. The defendant may rebut 
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the State’s showing of readiness by, for example, showing the State did not have a 

key witness or important evidence available within the ninety days. Id. 

Appellant contends his period of detention under article 17.151 for the Collin 

County murder offense began on January 15, 2021 when Collin County arrested him 

in the Denton County Jail. Because he was not indicted until May 5, 2021, appellant 

contends 125 days elapsed and the State could not, as a matter of law, be ready for 

trial. As such, appellant maintains he is entitled to release under a reasonable bond 

he can afford. Appellant does not raise any other issues with the State’s readiness. 

In response, the State contends the ninety-day period should start when Collin 

County took custody of appellant on April 9, 2021. Under the State’s theory, because 

appellant was detained for only forty-one days on the murder charge before he was 

indicted, habeas relief is unavailable because there was no unlawful confinement. 

To support its position, the State relies upon two authorities that address intercounty transfers like the one in this case. In the first case, Balawajder v. State, the 

defendant was indicted in 1985 in Tarrant County for two felony offenses alleged to 

have occurred in 1983. See Balawajder v. State, 759 S.W.2d 504, 505 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 1988, pet. ref’d). Although Tarrant County placed a detainer on the 

defendant in Oklahoma City where he was jailed, he was eventually transferred 

under another detainer to Dallas County, spent time in jail in Dallas County, 

Oklahoma, and California, and served time in a Texas prison. Id. at 505–06. On June 

10, 1987, the defendant was arrested in Brazoria County to face the Tarrant County 
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charges and transferred to Tarrant County on June 14, 1987. Id. at 506. Without 

explaining its reasoning, the court of appeals rejected the defendant’s argument that 

the ninety days began when he was charged in 1985, concluding instead that the 

State’s ninety days did not begin until June 10, 1987 when the defendant was arrested 

at Tarrant County’s behest. See id. 

The second case the State cites is Ex parte Remeika, No. 10-09-00379-CR, 

2010 WL 1495746 (Tex. App.—Waco Apr. 14, 2010, pet. dism’d) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication). The defendant in Remeika was confined in the Madison 

County jail on a Madison County charge. See Remeika, 2010 WL 1495746, at *1. 

On April 23, 2009, Walker County placed a detainer on the defendant for a Walker 

County arrest warrant. Id. On April 24, 2009, a Madison County magistrate 

arraigned the defendant on the Walker County arrest warrant and paperwork was 

served on him. After the defendant made bond on the Madison County charge, he 

was transferred to Walker County on September 1, 2009 where bond was set at 

$25,000. He then filed for habeas relief, contending Walker County had detained 

him since April 23, 2009 without an indictment, and he was, therefore, entitled to 

release under article 17.151. Id. 

The court of appeals rejected the defendant’s contention. The court reasoned 

that the paperwork from his arraignment showed he was not arrested on the Walker 

County charge when the Madison County Justice of the Peace arraigned him on 

April 23. Remeika, 2010 WL 1495746, at *2. Further, while in the Madison County 
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jail, the defendant was being detained on the Madison County charge and not the 

Walker County charge. Id. The appellate court concluded the State’s ninety-day 

period to show it was ready for trial did not begin until the defendant was transferred 

to Walker County. Id. 

The State does not contest that Collin County arrested appellant on the murder 

charge on January 15, 2021. The trial court’s conclusions of law, drafted by the State, 

conclude appellant was arrested on the murder charge. The State instead contends 

article 17.151, by its terms, is triggered by detention and not by arrest. Thus, the 

State argues Balawadjer and Remeika support its position because, although they 

calculate the commencement of the ninety days from the defendants’ arrests, in each 

case, the article 17.151 clock commences to run when the charging county obtains 

control over the defendant. When a defendant is detained and controlled by another 

county on extraneous charges, the charging county cannot compel the other county 

to transfer the defendant to its custody and the State cannot try the defendant without 

first having control over him. Thus, the State argues, its article 17.151 clock did not 

begin to run until April 9 when appellant was transferred into Collin County’s 

custody and control. 

In addressing the State’s authorities, appellant points out that in Balawajder, 

the appellate court concluded the State’s time began to run on June 10, 1987—the 

date Tarrant County formally arrested the defendant in the Brazoria County Jail—

rather than from June 14, 1987, when he was transferred to Tarrant County. Thus, 
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appellant contends, Balawajder shows the ninety days should run from the date of 

his arrest on January 15, 2021. 

Appellant points out that in Remeika, the appellate court highlighted that 

Remeika had a detainer placed against him, but was not formally arrested until he 

was transferred to Walker County. Appellant contends his arrest distinguishes his 

case from the facts of Remeika. Appellant cites no cases holding that article 17.151 

applies even when the State has no right to control the defendant and no power to 

bring him to trial pending resolution of charges in another jurisdiction. 

We agree with the State that both Balawajder and Remeika support its 

position. In both cases, the appellate courts concluded the State’s ninety days under 

article 17.151 did not begin to run until the State obtained custody of the defendant. 

See Balawajder, 759 S.W.2d at 506; Remeika, 2010 WL 1495746, at *2. 

Although appellant correctly notes that the appellate court in Balawajder

determined the statutory ninety days ran from the date of arrest in Brazoria County 

four days before the defendant was physically transferred to Tarrant County, the 

opinion also states that Brazoria County arrested and detained him at Tarrant 

County’s request. See Balawajder, 759 S.W.2d at 506. Because the defendant was 

not detained to face any Brazoria County charges, it was clear the defendant was 

detained solely to stand trial in Tarrant County and, therefore, he was detained for 

purposes of article 17.151 from the date of his arrest. See id. 
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Although the appellate court in Remeika did mention the placement of a 

detainer rather than an arrest of the defendant as a factor in its decision, it did so in 

the context of determining that it was Madison County, rather than Walker County, 

that had the defendant detained for purposes of article 17.151. See Remeika, 2010 

WL 1495746, at *2. The appellate court ultimately held that it was the transfer to 

Walker County that started the State’s time clock to be ready for trial. Id. Moreover, 

in a subsequent case, the appellate court reaffirmed its holding in Remeika that when 

a defendant is held on charges in one county and then transferred to a second county 

for trial on different charges, the time period for the State to be ready for trial under 

article 17.151 does not commence for the transferee county until the transferee 

county receives custody of the defendant. See Ex parte Smith, No. 10-13-00243-CR, 

2014 WL 702812, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco Feb. 20, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication). 

We agree with Balawajder, Smith, and Remeika that when a defendant facing 

charges in multiple counties is transferred from one county to another to stand trial, 

the date when custody of the defendant is transferred is the proper point for starting 

the State’s time clock under article 17.151 for the transferee county. 

The purpose of article 17.151 is to ensure that the State is diligent in preparing 

for trial so the defendant does not languish in jail. See Jones, 803 S.W.2d at 715. In 

construing the statute, we presume the legislature enacted it intending a just and 

reasonable result. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.021. 
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Article 17.151 does not require merely that the State indict a defendant 

accused of a felony within 90 days, it requires the State to release the defendant from 

custody if the State is not actually ready for trial within 90 days. See TEX. CODE 

CRIM. PROC. art. 17.151, §1(1); Lanclos, 624 S.W.3d at 926. It does not advance the 

purpose of the statute to start the State’s time clock to be ready for trial when the 

defendant is detained on other charges in a different jurisdiction and the State may 

not, as illustrated by Balawajder, be able to obtain control over the defendant and 

the power to try the defendant for an uncertain period of time that might stretch into 

years. See Jones, 803 S.W.2d at 715; Balawajder, 759 S.W.2d at 505–06. 

Running the statute from the time the State obtains control over the defendant, 

rather than from some earlier period when a defendant is in the custody of another 

jurisdiction, also encourages the State to take timely action to secure future pretrial 

detention of persons under the control of other jurisdictions, and promotes a just and 

reasonable result by making it less likely that an individual will be released purely 

because of the State’s lack of attention to an obscure time clock that does not serve 

justice or the statute’s purpose. 

Accordingly, under the facts presented in this case, we conclude the State’s 

time period to be ready for trial under article 17.151 did not begin until April 9, 2021, 

when Collin County received appellant into custody with the power to bring him to 

trial. See Balawajder, 759 S.W.2d at 506; see also Smith, 2014 WL 702812, at *1; 

Remeika, 2010 WL 1495746, at *2. 
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Finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying habeas relief 

pursuant to article 17.151 of the code of criminal procedure, we affirm the trial 

court’s order denying appellant’s application for writ of habeas corpus. 

Do Not Publish 

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b) 

210447F.U05 

 

/Robbie Partida-Kipness/

ROBBIE PARTIDA-KIPNESS 

JUSTICE 
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S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

EX PARTE DONTE TAYLOR 

No. 05-21-00447-CR 

 On Appeal from the 416th Judicial 

District Court, Collin County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 416-02294-

2021. 

Opinion delivered by Justice PartidaKipness. Justices Myers and Carlyle 

participating. 

 Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the order of the trial court denying 

relief on appellant’s application for writ of habeas corpus is AFFIRMED. 

Judgment entered April 13, 2022