alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 904.502 Bonded release of seized property. ( a ) As authorized by applicable statute, at any time after seizure of any property, NOAA may, in its sole discretion, release any seized property upon deposit with NOAA of the full value of the property or such lesser amount as NOAA deems sufficient to protect the interests served by the applicable statute. In addition, NOAA may, in its sole discretion, accept a bond or other security in place of fish, wildlife, or other property seized. The bond will contain such conditions as NOAA deems appropriate.
( b ) Property may be released under this section only if possession thereof will not violate or frustrate the purpose or policy of any applicable law or regulation. Property that will not be released includes, but is not limited to: ( 1 ) Property in which NOAA is not satisfied that the requester has a substantial interest;
( 2 ) Property whose entry into the commerce of the United States is prohibited;
( 3 ) Live animals, except in the interest of the animals' welfare; or
( 4 ) Property whose release appears to NOAA not to be in the best interest of the United States or serve the purposes of the applicable statute.
( c ) If NOAA grants the request, the amount paid by the requester will be deposited in a NOAA suspense account. The amount so deposited will for all purposes be considered to represent the property seized and subject to forfeiture, and payment of the amount by requester constitutes a waiver by requester of any claim rising from the seizure and custody of the property. NOAA will maintain the money so deposited pending further order of NOAA, order of a court, or disposition by applicable administrative proceedings.
( d ) A request for release need not be in any particular form, but must set forth the following: ( 1 ) A description of the property seized;
( 2 ) The date and place of the seizure;
( 3 ) The requester's interest in the property, supported as appropriate by bills of sale, contracts, mortgages, or other satisfactory evidence;
( 4 ) The facts and circumstances relied upon by the requester to justify the remission or mitigation;
( 5 ) An offer of payment to protect the United States' interest that requester makes in return for release;
( 6 ) The signature of the requester, his or her attorney, or other authorized agent; and
( 7 ) A request to defer administrative or judicial forfeiture proceedings until completion of all other related judicial or administrative proceedings (including any associated civil penalty or permit sanction proceedings).
[71 FR 12448, Mar. 10, 2006, as amended at 87 FR 38942, June 30, 2022]
### Part III—General and Administrative Provisions
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARYANN CELEDON,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant

- Appellee. No. 17

- 16979

D.C. No. 1:16

- cv

- 00440

- JLT

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Jennifer L. T hurston , Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 9, 2019 **

Before: LEAVY, TROTT, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges

Maryann Celedon appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the

Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability

insurance benefits and supplemental security income b enefits under Titles II and

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

SEP 11 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 17

- 16979

XVI of the Social Security Act. At step four of the sequential evaluation process,

the administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Celedon could perform her past

relevant work as a switchboard operator

. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We review a district court’s decision not to apply the law of the case

doctrine for abuse of discretion and whether an ALJ has followed the remand order

of the district court in compliance with the rule of ma ndate de novo, Stacy v.

Colvin , 825 F.3d 563, 567

- 68 (9th Cir. 2016) , and we affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply the law of

the case doctrine. The district court remanded the ALJ ’ s initial d ecision because

the record was not fully developed

, and the ALJ on remand properly developed the

record by eliciting additional vocational expert testimony and accepting additional

medical evidence in order to clarify Celedon ’ s residual functional capacity

(“RFC”)

. See id. at 567 (stating that the law of the case doctrine should not be

applied “ when the evidence on remand is substantially different. ” )

.

The district court did not err in concluding that the ALJ did not violate t he

rule of mandate with respect to the ALJ’s reformulation of Celedon’s RFC because

the district court’s remand order did not preclude the ALJ from reformulating

Celedon’s RFC. See id. at 568

- 69 ( stating that an ALJ may “ reexamine any issue

on remand that is not foreclosed by the mandate. ” ).

AFFIRMED.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-7834

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

ANDRE JOSEPH ASHTON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. James C. Turk, Senior District

Judge. (CA-03-525-7; CR-99-37)

Submitted: February 19, 2004 Decided: February 26, 2004

Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Andre Joseph Ashton, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Andre Joseph Ashton seeks to appeal the district court’s

order denying relief on his motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255

(2000). The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or

judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue

absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this

standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that

his constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive

procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or

wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); Slack

v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676,

683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and

conclude that Ashton has not made the requisite showing.

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the

appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL**

**FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT BY**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with this Quarterly Report of Bekem Metals, Inc., (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Zhassulan Bitenov, Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 

 

|   | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--------|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

|   | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company. |
|--------|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

| Date: November 13, 2009 | By: | /s/ Zhassulan Bitenov |  
 

Zhassulan Bitenov

 

Chief Financial Officer

 

 

 

  |
|-------------------------|-----|-----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
### SUBCHAPTER I—PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY SYSTEMS
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-6263

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. RUSSELL WRIGHT, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., District Judge. (1:05-cv-00700-NCT-PTS; 1:97-cr-00231-NCT-2; 1:97- cr-00226-NCT-2) Submitted: May 22, 2008 Decided: May 29, 2008 Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Russell Wright, Appellant Pro Se. Angela Hewlett Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.- 2 - PER CURIAM: Russell Wright seeks to appeal the district court’s orders denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion and denying his motion for certificate of appealability. The district court referred this case to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (2000). The magistrate judge recommended that relief be denied and advised Wright that the failure to file timely objections to this recommendation could waive appellate review of a dis trict court order based upon the recommendation. Despite this warning, Wright failed to object to the magistrate judge’s recommendation. The timely filing of specific objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation is necessary to preserve appellate review of the substance of that recommendation when the parties have been warned of the consequences of noncompliance. Wright v. Collins , 766 F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th Cir. 1985); see alsoThomas v. Arn , 474 U.S. 140 (1985). Wright has waived appellate review by failing to timely file specific objections after receiving proper notice. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. DISMISSED
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-1748

RECARDO W. EVANS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

JOHN E. POTTER, Postmaster General,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge. (CA02-4043-RDB)

Submitted: April 29, 2005 Decided: May 12, 2005

Before WILLIAMS and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ralph T. Byrd, Laytonsville, Maryland, for Appellant. Allen F.

Loucks, United States Attorney, Kristine L. Sendek-Smith, Assistant

United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Recardo W. Evans appeals the district court’s orders

granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this action

alleging disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act of

1973 and denying Evans’ motion for reconsideration. We have

reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we

affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. See Evans v.

Potter, No. CA-02-4043-RDB (D. Md. Sept. 9, 2003, and May 7, 2004).

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
### Part C—Specific Provisions Respecting National Research Institutes
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Stanley Moore, Appellant.

[819 NYS2d 921]

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Megan Tallmer, J.), entered on or about July 15, 2004, which adjudicated defendant a level three sex offender and a sexual predator under the Sex Offender Registration Act (Correction Law art 6-C), unanimously modified, on the law, to vacate the sexual predator adjudication and reduce the sex offender adjudication to level two and, except as so modified, affirmed, without costs.

As the People concede, the classification of defendant as a statutory sexual predator is unsupported by the requisite diagnosis of mental disease (Correction Law § 168-a [7] [a]). The court correctly concluded that defendant’s point score warranted a level two assessment. The proof submitted at the risk assessment hearing failed to support, by clear and convincing evidence, the court’s upward departure to level three based on enumerated special circumstances *(see People v Guaman,*8 AD3d 545 [2004]; *cf. People v Sanford,*16 AD3d 1082 [2005], *lv denied*4 NY3d 711 [2005]; *People v Roland,*292 AD2d 271 [2002], *lv denied*98 NY2d 614 [2002]). The parties having been extended the opportunity to reopen the proceedings to submit further evidence and having failed to respond, we find no basis upon which to remand for further proceedings. To the extent defendant argues that he was denied a fair hearing, the record indicates that the court accorded defendant a full opportunity to be heard on all relevant matters. We have considered defendant’s remaining arguments and find them unavailing. Concur — Buckley, P.J., Tom, Saxe, Sullivan and Williams, JJ.
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL**

**FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT BY**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with this Quarterly Report of Bekem Metals, Inc., (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the *“Report”*), I, Yermek Kudabayev, Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 

 

 (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

 

 (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company. 

 

 

| Date: November 13, 2007 | By: | /s/ Yermek Kudabayev |  
 

Yermek Kudabayev

 

Chief Financial Officer

 

 

  |
|-------------------------|-----|----------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
#### § 241.1 Capacities.

(a) The capacities of the standard barrel for fruits, vegetables, and other dry commodities, other than cranberries, and its subdivisions, are as follows:

| Size | Cubic inches | Bushels1 | Quarts1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Barrel | 7,056 | 3.281 | 105 |
| 3/4 barrel | 5,292 | 2.46 | 783/4 |
| 1/2 barrel | 3,528 | 1.641 | 521/2 |
| 1/3 barrel | 2,352 | 1.094 | 35 |
| | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 Struck measure. | | | |

(b) The capacities of the standard cranberry barrel and its subdivisions are as follows:

| Size | Cubic inches | Bushels1 | Quarts1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Cranberry barrel | 5,826 | 2.709 | 8645/64 |
| 3/4 cranberry barrel | 4,369.5 | 2.032 | 651/64 |
| 1/2 cranberry barrel | 2,913 | 1.355 | 4311/32 |
| 1/3 cranberry barrel | 1,942 | .903 | 2829/32 |
| | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 Struck measure. | | | |

(Sec. 1, 38 Stat. 1186; [15 U.S.C. 234](https://www.govinfo.gov/link/uscode/15/234))
### Part G—National Community Economic Partnership
#### City of Chicago, Defendant in Error, v. Henry Jacobi, Plaintiff in Error.

Gen. No. 21,510.

(Not to be reported in full.)

Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John A. Mahoney, Judge, presiding.

Heard in this court at the October term, 1915.

Affirmed.

Opinion filed January 17, 1916.

Statement of the Case..

Prosecution by the City of Chicago against Henry Jacobi, defendant, charging defendant with a violation of. section 2012 of the Revised Municipal Code of Chicago. To reverse a judgment of conviction entered on a verdict of guilty, with a fine of two hundred dollars, defendant prosecutes this writ of error.

Cantwell & Smith, for plaintiff in error.

Samuel A. Ettelson and Harry B. Miller, for defendant in error; Daniel Webster, of counsel.

See Illinois Notes Digest, Vols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number.

Mr. Justice Holdom

delivered the opinion of the court.

*494Abstract of the Decision.

1. Appeal and error, § *822*
      ***
      *—when rulings on motions must he preserved in hill of exceptions.*In order to preserve for review the rulings of the trial court on motions, the evidence of such rulings must be preserved in a bill of exceptions, and it is not sufficient that the rulings are copied into the statutory record.

2. Appeal and error, § *824*
      ***
      *—when exceptions to rulings of trial court not part of record.*Exceptions to the rulings of the trial court which appear in the record but are not preserved by the bill of exceptions are not a part of the record, and the errors assigned thereon cannot be considered on review.

3. Municipal Court of Chicago, § *28*
      ***
      *—how rulings on petition for change of venue must he preserved for review.*The rulings of the Municipal Court on a petition for a change of venue are not before the Appellate Court unless the petition and rulings thereon appear either by a bill of exceptions, stenographic report or a statement of facts as provided by section 23 of the Municipal Court Act (J. & A. H 3335).

4. Appeal and error, § *1751*
      ***
      *—when judgment affirmed on writ of error.*On a writ of error where the questions sought to be presented are not preserved in such manner that they can be reviewed by the Appellate Court, the judgment of the lower court must be affirmed.
NRC SCHEDULES MEETING WITH TVA TO DISCUSS SUPPLEMENTAL 

INSPECTIONS AT BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff has scheduled a public meeting for 

Wednesday, Dec. 5, to discuss the completion of three supplemental inspections for one White 

inspection finding and two White performance indicators at the Browns Ferry nuclear plant.

The meeting is scheduled for 6 p.m. CST at the Calhoun Community College Aerospace 

Training Center, 6250 Highway 31 North in Tanner, Ala.

Supplemental inspections, such as the ones to be discussed at the meeting, are added to 

the NRC's normal, or baseline, inspection program in response to specific events or declining 

regulatory performance. One of the inspections at Browns Ferry reviewed TVA’s response to a 

White inspection finding related to operators and staff not being adequately trained on new 

shutdown procedures. The two other inspections looked at the response to a White performance 

indicator caused by Unit 1’s high pressure injection system being out of service more than 

expected and a White performance indicator related to unplanned shutdowns on Unit 3. 

These supplemental inspections were conducted to assure that the causes of the issues 

were understood, that the extent of condition was identified, and that TVA’s corrective actions 

were sufficient. The main purpose of the Dec. 5 meeting is to discuss TVA’s performance and 

corrective actions for these issues, but NRC officials also plan to discuss the current status of the

ongoing supplemental inspections for the Red finding issued in 2011.

The NRC evaluates both inspection findings and performance indicators at commercial 

nuclear power plants with a color-coded system which classifies them as green, white, yellow or 

red, in increasing order of safety significance. As the significance increases, the NRC increases 

the level of oversight for that plant. If a plant takes appropriate corrective actions and improves 

safety performance, the agency returns to its normal, but still extensive, inspection schedule.

###

NOTE: Anyone wishing to take photos or use a camera to record any portion of a NRC meeting should 

contact the Office of Public Affairs beforehand.

News releases are available through a free Listserv subscription or by clicking on the EMAIL UPDATES 

link on the NRC homepage (www.nrc.gov). E-mail notifications are sent to subscribers when news releases are 

posted to NRC's website. For the latest news, follow the NRC on www.twitter.com/NRCgov.

NRC NEWS

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Office of Public Affairs, Region II

245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE, Suite 1200

Atlanta, GA 30303-1257

Site: www.nrc.gov

Blog: http://public-blog.nrc-gateway.gov

No: II-12-066

CONTACT: Roger Hannah (404) 997-4417

 Joey Ledford (404) 997-4416 

 November 28, 2012

E-mail: OPA2.Resource@nrc.gov
Exhibit 32.2

Certification of Chief Financial Officer Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002

Mark H. McKinnies, as Chief Financial Officer of ADA-Es, Inc. (the Company), certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) the Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for
the quarter ended June 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the Company.



|                      |  |                        
|--------------------- |  | -----------------------
|/s/ Mark H. McKinnies
|Name:                 |  | Mark H. McKinnies      
|Title:                |  | Chief Financial Officer
|Date:                 |  | August 8, 2007
# GEORGIAINAUGURATES CASPIAN OIL TERMINAL

 

A tanker full of Caspian Sea oil bound for Italy via Ukraineleft Georgia’s Black Sea port of Supsa on April 17, 1999, inaugurating thewestern route for early Caspian oil from Azerbaijan. Georgian President EduardShevardnadze, Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev, and Ukrainian PresidentLeonid Kuchma were present to officially open the Supsa oil terminal and markthe completion of repairs to the pipeline from Baku. Representing the UnitedStates were U.S. Department of Commerce Counselor and NIS Ombudsman Jan Kalickiand Special Advisor for Caspian Basin Energy Development Richard Morningstar,who read a congratulatory statement from President Clinton. The presidentspushed a ceremonial button to begin filling the tanker.   

** **

According to **AzerbaijanInternational Operating Company** (AIOC) President David Woodward, thesuccess of the pipeline should give confidence to other investors to come tothe region. Morningstar stated at the ceremony that the Baku-Supsa pipeline mayserve as “the cornerstone of an east-west corridor that can promote economiccooperation and growth among all the countries of the Caucasus and CentralAsia.”

** **

On the same day, a new ferry line connecting Poti, Georgia,to Odessa, Ukraine, was opened. The two events together mark the beginning ofthe revitalization of the Great Silk Road (the ancient trading route thatcaravans traveled through the Central Asian and Caucasus regions to reachEurope) and highlight the viability of an east-west transit corridor.   

** **

During a trip to Washington, D.C.,  in early April, Georgian Minister of Economy Vladimer Papavavisited **BISNIS**’ office. Papava wasoptimistic about the significance of the new Supsa terminal for the Georgianeconomy, stating that “the opening of the terminal creates new possibilities”for investment in Georgia.

 

*JoanMorgan covers Georgia for **BISNIS**inWashington, D.C.*