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Filed 4/22/14 Rucker v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(San Joaquin)

XENIA RUCKER,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 

APPEALS BOARD,

Defendant and Respondent.

C072303

(Super. Ct. No. 39-2012-

00280238-CU-WM-STK)

Xenia Rucker, appearing pro se, filed a petition for writ of administrative 

mandamus in the superior court to overturn a decision of the California Unemployment 

Insurance Appeals Board (the Board) denying her claim for unemployment compensation 

benefits. The superior court denied the petition; Rucker appeals from the superior court’s 

judgment denying the requested relief.1 We affirm.

 

1

 The Board declined to file a respondent’s brief.
2

BACKGROUND

Rucker worked as a communications operator for AT&T for 10 years. In 

December 2008, she accepted a separation package from AT&T and stopped working.

In January 2010, Rucker applied for unemployment insurance benefits. The 

Employment Development Department (EDD) concluded that Rucker was ineligible for 

unemployment benefits. Rucker challenged EDD’s findings, and an administrative law 

judge (ALJ) conducted a hearing at which Rucker appeared. The ALJ determined that 

EDD correctly concluded that Rucker was disqualified from receiving benefits because 

she voluntarily left her most recent employment without good cause within the meaning 

of Unemployment Insurance Code section 1256.2 3 The ALJ reasoned that neither 

quitting a job to attend school, nor accepting an employer’s financial incentives to retire,

absent an immediate threat of layoff, constituted good cause for voluntarily leaving one’s 

employment within the meaning of the statute. A copy of the ALJ’s decision was mailed 

to Rucker on May 17, 2010, stating that the decision would be final unless appealed 

within 20 days.

Rucker appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Board on September 17, 2011, more 

than a year after the decision had been rendered. She stated she wished “to submit new 

and additional evidence” to demonstrate her eligibility for unemployment insurance 

benefits. Good cause exists for her prior failure to produce the “ ‘Untimely 

 

2

 Unemployment Insurance Code section 1256 states in pertinent part: “An individual is 

disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits if the director finds that he or she 

left his or her most recent work voluntarily without good cause or that he or she has been 

discharged for misconduct connected with his or her most recent work.”

3

 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Unemployment Insurance Code.
3

Documents,’ ” Rucker stated, because “. . . I was in court proceedings of an Unlawful 

Detainer action from January 2010 through April 2010, to try and prevent from becoming 

homeless. [Exhibits.] I began storing my personal belongings in March when I received 

the initial summons to appear. Subsequently, hardship became the factor. Therefore, at 

the time I was unable to research, I was unorganized and unprepared with the 

documentary evidence to appeal from the departmental determination. . . . On April 30, 

2010, my son and I became homeless. From this point as a single parent, I was helping 

him to cope with something he was not use[d] to. The hardship and transition of not 

having our own place to live, I encouraged him to stay focused on his academics, 

athletics and to maintain his B Grade Point Average. In August, his Fall term he became 

a Senior in high school, at which time we were still homeless up until his graduation and 

currently until he went off to college. To this day I am currently homeless and have no 

income; however, I am diligently placing applications online and looking for work.” 

Rucker also disputed the ALJ’s determination that she voluntarily left her most recent 

employment without good cause. She concluded: “When I filed for Unemployment 

Compensation Benefits and to Appeal the department[’]s determination, I was in crisis 

amid hardship, and forthcoming homelessness. I ask the Board to take a look at my 

situation in the past and presently, to allow for this information to be admitted to 

determine benefits that were initially claimed for and determine eligibility beginning with 

Benefit Year January 17, 2010.”

The Board concluded Rucker’s appeal was untimely because she filed it after the 

20-day limitation period had expired (§§ 1328, 1334); consequently, it lacked jurisdiction

to determine the merits of the appeal. “[Rucker] provided the following reason for not 

filing a board appeal within 20 calendar days from the issuance of the decision. [¶] 

[Rucker] asserts that she has been homeless since May 2010, to at least the day of her 

board appeal in September 2011. During this period [she] assisted her son in completing 

his high school education and getting off to college.” However, Rucker’s “reason for 
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delay in filing the board appeal does not constitute good cause based on the following. 

[¶] [Her] success in assisting her son in completing his high school education and getting 

off to college while homeless is certainly laudable. However, this also demonstrates that 

[Rucker] has not been completely helpless during the one-year and three-month period 

that [she] required to belatedly file her appeal to the board. In addition, [Rucker’s] 

extensive appeal further demonstrates that [she] is well educated and that she possesses 

research skills and resources necessary to prepare a lengthy appeal. Other than [her] 

alleged homelessness, [Rucker] provides no grounds for her delay in filing her appeal to 

the board. In all, we find that [Rucker] did not establish good cause for her delay of more 

than one year to file her appeal to the board. Consequently, the deadline to file [her] 

appeal is not extended and [Rucker’s] board appeal is dismissed as untimely.”

Rucker then filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus in the superior 

court. The court denied her petition, concluding that Rucker had been afforded a fair 

hearing and her appeal is untimely.

DISCUSSION

We review de novo the trial court’s determination, on undisputed facts, of the 

propriety of the Board’s ruling that Rucker failed to show good cause for filing her 

administrative appeal to the Board more than a year late. (See Stermer v. Board of 

Dental Examiners (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 128, 132; cf. MacGregor v. Unemployment Ins. 

Appeals Bd. (1984) 37 Cal.3d 205, 211-212.) 

The time limitation for filing an administrative appeal to the Board from the ALJ’s 

determination that unemployment insurance benefits have been properly denied is 

contained in section 1334. That section states that the ALJ’s decision, rendered “after 

affording a reasonable opportunity for fair hearing,” shall be final “unless, within 20 days 

after mailing of such decision, further appeal is initiated to the appeals board.” (§ 1334.) 

The 20-day limitation may be extended for good cause, which “shall include, but not be 

limited to, mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” (§ 1334; accord, 
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§ 1328 [appeal to ALJ]; cf. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22, § 5000, subd. (hh).)

Rucker asserts her failure to file a timely appeal with the Board was attributable to 

excusable neglect, and “there is an indefinite extension of time allowed for good cause.” 

We disagree.

Although section 1334 does not set an outer limit on allowable extension of the 

20-day limitation period that would otherwise apply, that does not mean courts have 

interpreted it to create an “indefinite” potential limitations period, as Rucker urges. 

The concept of good cause “should not be enshrined in legal formalism” but it 

requires the sharing of a good reason for a party’s failure to perform that specific 

requirement from which she seeks to be excused. (County of Santa Clara v. Myers

(1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 684, 690.) 

What constitutes “good cause” for filing a late appeal was the issue in Gibson v. 

Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 494 (Gibson), where a three-day delay 

in filing an appeal had occurred because of the heavy workload in a legal office. The 

California Supreme Court found “no justification for an administrative construction of 

[the applicable appeals limitation statute] to preclude relief in cases of brief, nonprejudicial delay arising from excusable error of counsel.” (Id. at p. 496.) Other 

decisions that have considered “good cause” for filing a late appeal have tended to fall 

either into the Gibson category of de minimis delay (often caused by counsel), in which 

the delay was found to have been justified (e.g., Flores v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals 

Bd. (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 681 [one day]; United States Postal Service v. Unemployment 

Ins. Appeals Bd. (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 506 [three days]), or into the category of 

substantial delay without much justification, resulting in denial of the late appeal. (E.g., 

Amaro v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1977) 65 Cal.App.3d 715, 719 [one month]; 

Fermin v. Department of Employment (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 586, 588 (Fermin) [three 

months]; Perez v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 62, 64-65 (Perez)

[five months].) 
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This case falls into the latter category of a substantial delay after expiration of the 

limitations period, without much proffered justification. Rucker was properly notified of 

the 20-day limitations period, yet delayed more than a year before filing her appeal with 

the Board. She, not counsel (cf. Gibson, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 496), was responsible for 

the delay. (See Perez, supra, 4 Cal.App.3d at p. 65 [claimant failed to timely appeal 

because he initially believed the decision was correct]; Fermin, supra, 214 Cal.App.2d at 

p. 588.) And although Rucker explains she was homeless for some or all of the 15

months between the expiration of limitations period and her filing of an appeal with the 

Board, she does not contend she lost access to the documents relevant to her claim for 

benefits, or was otherwise prevented from filing a notice of appeal, and she never sought 

an extension of time within which to appeal to the Board. Where the excuse for delay 

involved illness and housing problems, the Board’s determination of lack of good cause

has been upheld by the courts. In Martinez v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1976) 

63 Cal.App.3d 500, the petitioner filed his appeal 20 days late, and his excuses were 

illness in his family and the need to find another place to live. In affirming the superior 

court’s denial of petitioner’s writ of mandate, the court focused on the fact that the 

petitioner caused the delay himself, noting: “All he had to do was sign the notice of 

appeal form and mail it.” (Id. at p. 505.) 

We would prefer to have matters such as these determined on their merits; but on 

the undisputed facts of this case, it cannot be said that Rucker has shown good cause, as a 

matter of law, to justify her delay of more than a year in filing her appeal with the Board. 

(See Martinez v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 500, 505.) 
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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

 BLEASE , Acting P. J.

We concur:

 HULL , J.

 DUARTE , J.