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DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: KEY TO

THE CRISIS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 3, 2003

Serial No. 108–14

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

CHRIS BELL, Texas 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota 

THOMAS P. SHEEHY, Subcommittee Staff Director 

MALIK M. CHAKA, Professional Staff Member 

NOELLE LUSANE, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

GREG GALVIN, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Charles R. Snyder, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, 

U.S. Department of State .................................................................................... 7

Francois Grignon, Central Africa Project Director, International Crisis Group 28

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa: Prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 3

The Honorable Donald M. Payne, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New Jersey: Prepared statement .......................................................... 6

Charles R. Snyder: Prepared statement ................................................................ 11

Francois Grignon: Prepared statement .................................................................. 30

APPENDIX 

Howard Wolpe, Consulting Director, The Africa Project, The Woodrow Wilson 

International Center: Prepared statement ........................................................ 45

Anne C. Edgerton, Advocate, Refugees International: Prepared statement ....... 49

Gerard Powers, Director, Office of International Justice and Peace, United 

States Conference of Catholic Bishops and Ken Hackett, Executive Director, 

Catholic Relief Services: Prepared statement .................................................... 52

(1)

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: KEY TO 

THE CRISIS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION 

THURSDAY, APRIL 3, 2003

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:12 p.m. in Room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Mr. ROYCE. This hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa will 

come to order. 

Today’s hearing is Democratic Republic of Congo: Key to the Crisis in the Great Lakes Region, and today we are going to look at 

the turmoil in the Great Lakes region in Africa. While our country 

is rightly focused on the war in Iraq, it is important that other regions of the world not be overlooked. That includes the often overlooked regions in Africa. 

It is hard to argue that the humanitarian nightmare in the 

Democratic Republic of Congo has received the attention it deserves from the international community. Some estimates have between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000 Congolese perished over the last 5 

years due to this conflict. This horrific situation cries out for attention. 

Instability in the DRC stems from the ethnic rivalry throughout 

the region between the Hutus and Tutsis, which exploded into 

Rwanda’s 1994 genocide and other massive blood lettings. The 

DRC’s collapsed state is a haven for armed forces wishing ill on 

Rwanda and on Burundi. If it is to stay in business, the U.N. 

peacekeeping force in the Congo must more effectively promote security in eastern Congo. We should be exploring alternative security arrangements if the U.N. is not up to the task. 

A less appreciated factor fueling instability in the Great Lakes 

region is the scramble for the Congo’s vast mineral wealth. I applaud the United Nations report on natural resource exploitation in 

the DRC released last October. This U.N. report is a landmark 

work, reporting on how government officials in Rwanda, in Uganda, in Zimbabwe and even the DRC act in collaboration with international criminals, with warlords and others. These elite networks 

are gorging on minerals, on farm produce, on clear cutting the timber in the rain forest, on land and on tax revenue. 

The victims of this exploitation are the Congolese people. Their 

prospects for economic development are being undermined. They 

see little or no economic gain from this activity, which corrupts 

2

governments and which undermines the rule of law. This circumstance also undermines their environment. 

I thought I would just briefly share with you some observations 

from this U.N. report released in October, and I recommend it to 

anyone concerned about the tragedy that is occurring in the Great 

Lakes Region. 

The United Nations reports that these conflicts are fought over 

minerals, over farm produce, land and tax revenues. Criminal 

groups linked to the armies of Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe and 

the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo have benefitted from the micro conflicts. These groups will not disband voluntarily even as the foreign military forces continue their withdrawals. They have built up a self-financing war economy centered 

on mineral exploitation. 

All three countries have anticipated the day when pressure from 

the international community would make it impossible to maintain 

large forces in the DRC. The Governments of Rwanda and 

Zimbabwe, as well as powerful individuals in Uganda, have adopted their strategy for maintaining the mechanisms for revenue generation, many of which involve criminal activities, once the troops 

have departed. 

It goes on to report that the elite network of Congolese and 

Zimbabwean political, military and commercial interests seek to 

maintain its grip on the main mineral resources—diamonds, cobalt, 

copper—of the government controlled area. The network has transferred ownership of at least $5,000,000,000 worth of assets from 

the state mining sector to private companies under its control over 

the last 3 years. 

The most troubling aspect, of course, of this resource exploitation 

is it fuels the conflict. The U.N. report accused Uganda’s military 

of provoking conflict in the Ituri region to legitimize its continued 

military presence there, allowing for its continued resource exploitation. 

It challenges the Rwandan claim that its military operations in 

Congo are driven by the need to check genocidaires, instead pointing to economic interests, and it charges that a network of Congolese and Zimbabwean political, military and commercial interests, 

as I said, engaged in exploitation that benefits from the instability 

that it fuels by supporting armed groups opposing Rwanda and Burundi. 

The U.N. panel observes that these networks, as I said, ‘‘will not 

disband voluntarily’’ and instead will adopt alternative strategies. 

The U.N. report recommends that aid to Burundi, Rwanda, 

Zimbabwe and Uganda be linked to a halt in their illegal exploitation of Congo’s resources. It recommends that financial restrictions and travel bans be considered for companies and individuals 

most responsible for this exploitation. 

These are important conflict resolution tools. Until resource exploitation is treated as central to the Great Lakes crisis, the diplomatic progress that has been made, including the latest peace accord signed in Sun City, will sputter. 

There has been progress with the Burundi peace process. President Buyoya is scheduled to turn over power to a Hutu on May 1, 

which will be a major test for Tutsi-Hutu reconciliation. I am glad 

3

to see that armed forces of several African countries plan to deploy 

to Burundi for an African Union peacekeeping effort. 

The U.S. needs to be as supportive as possible of democratic development and national reconciliation in Burundi and also Rwanda 

and Uganda. It will not be easy, but conflict will continue until the 

vast majority of citizens of these countries feel that their voice is 

heard. 

The Great Lakes region is a tinderbox. No one can say we will 

not see another genocide, and this makes this region of the world 

unique and one that warrants great attention. 

I would now like to turn to the Ranking Member, Mr. Don Payne 

of New Jersey, for his opening statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Royce follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EDWARD R. ROYCE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

AFRICA

WASHINGTON, D.C.—The following is the opening statement of Africa Subcommittee Chairman Ed Royce (R–CA–40) at this afternoon’s hearing on the turmoil 

in the Great Lakes region of Africa: 

‘‘Today we will look at the turmoil in the Great Lakes region of Africa. While our 

country is rightly focused on our war in Iraq, it is important that other regions of 

the world not be overlooked. That includes the often-overlooked regions in Africa. 

‘‘It is hard to argue that the humanitarian nightmare in the Democratic Republic 

of the Congo [DRC] has received the attention it deserves. Some estimates have between two and three million Congolese perishing due to conflict there over the last 

five years. This horrific situation cries out for attention. 

‘‘Instability in the DRC stems from the ethnic rivalry throughout the region between the Hutus and Tutsis, which exploded into Rwanda’s 1994 genocide and other 

massive bloodlettings. The DRC’s collapsed state is a haven for armed forces wishing ill on Rwanda and Burundi. If it is to stay in business, the U.N. peacekeeping 

force in the Congo must more effectively promote security in eastern Congo. We 

should be exploring alternative security arrangements if the UN is not up to this 

task. 

‘‘A less appreciated factor fueling instability in the Great Lakes region is the 

scramble for the Congo’s vast natural resources. I applaud the United Nations report on natural resource exploitation in the DRC, released last October. This is a 

landmark work, reporting on how government officials in Rwanda, Uganda, 

Zimbabwe, and even the DRC act in cahoots with international criminals, warlords, 

and others. These ’elite networks’ are gorging on minerals, farm produce, land and 

tax revenue. 

‘‘The victims of this exploitation are the Congolese people. Their prospects for economic development are being undermined. They see little to no economic gain from 

this activity, which corrupts governments and undermines the rule of law. This exploitation also degrades their environment. 

‘‘The most troubling aspect of this resource exploitation is that it fuels conflict. 

The U.N. report accused Uganda’s military of provoking conflict in the Ituri region 

to legitimize its continued military presence there, allowing for its continued resource exploitation. It challenges the Rwandan claim that its military operations in 

Congo are driven by the need to check genocidaires, instead pointing to economic 

interests. And it charges that a network of Congolese and Zimbabwean political, 

military and commercial interests engaged in exploitation benefit from the instability that it fuels by supporting armed groups opposing Rwanda and Burundi. 

‘‘The Panel observes that these networks ’will not disband voluntarily even as the 

foreign military forces continue their withdrawals,’ and instead will adopt alternative strategies for exploiting resources. The U.N. report recommends that aid to 

Burundi, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, and Uganda be linked to a halt in their illegal exploitation of Congo’s resources. It also recommends that financial restrictions and travel 

bans be considered for companies and individuals most responsible for this exploitation. These are important conflict resolution tools. Until resource exploitation is 

treated as central to the Great Lakes crisis, the diplomatic progress that has been 

made, including the latest peace accord signed at Sun City, will sputter. 

‘‘There has been progress with the Burundi peace process. President Buyoya is 

scheduled to turn over power to a Hutu on May 1, which will be a major test for 

4

Tutsi-Hutu reconciliation. I am glad to see that armed forces of several African 

countries plan to deploy to Burundi for an African Union peacekeeping effort. The 

U.S. needs to be as supportive as possible of democratic development and national 

reconciliation in Burundi, and also Rwanda and Uganda. It won’t be easy, but conflict will continue until the vast majority of citizens of these countries feel that their 

voice is heard. 

‘‘The Great Lakes region is a tinderbox. No one can say we won’t see another 

genocide. This makes this region of the world unique, and one that warrants great 

attention.’’

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me express my deep appreciation to you for calling this important hearing on the Great Lakes region. As you mentioned, it is an extremely important region that has suffered devastating situations 

for many, many years, even before this new conflict. 

During the Cold War it was one of the pivotal points of conflict 

in the ideology of the two powers in the world, and we are very 

pleased that the democracy that the U.S. has been talking about 

since the end of World War II won out in the long run, but the 

Congo region, the Great Lakes region, really was a serious pawn 

in that battle between the two giants. As a matter of fact, in Africa, 

they say when elephants fight, the grass suffers. We have seen a 

lot of people suffer by virtue of the problems of the superpowers. 

While the international community is understandably focused on 

the war in Iraq, as you have alluded to, important developments 

are occurring in Africa. The Great Lakes region continues to face 

serious challenges, and the people in that region have suffered for 

far too long. 

Just a few weeks back, conditions in the Democratic Republic of 

the Congo (DRC) looked horrendous. Today, I am more optimistic 

about the DRC than I have been in a long time. The persistent effort of many, including South Africa, the United Nations and the 

parties themselves, appear to have paid off and have paved the 

way for what promises to be a final settlement in the conflict in 

the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

Indeed, the challenges ahead are enormous and will require a 

strong commitment by the leadership of the DRC, but they have 

come a long way, and it is important. The recent agreement 

reached in South Africa by the parties is an important breakthrough and should be supported by the international community. 

The agreement calls for a 2-year transition period to be followed 

by elections. In Burundi, the 3-year transition period mediated by 

former President Nelson Mandela is still holding. The transition is 

at its pivotal juncture as the transfer of power from the current 

President to the Vice President is expected to take place in less 

than 2 months. 

Burundi, like its immediate neighbors, has been marred by violence for over a decade. Hundreds of thousands of people have died 

as a result of ethnic clashes and systematic and deliberate extermination of citizens by government forces and extremist groups. The 

smooth transition of power in Burundi is critical, not only to Burundi’s survival as a nation, but also to regional stability. 

The Government of South Africa has done a remarkable service 

in support of peace in Burundi by deploying over 700 troops. The 

African Union and several other African countries have committed 

to send peacekeeping troops to Burundi. 

5

Mr. Chairman, we must not overlook these remarkable African 

led achievements. In Rwanda, the 9-year-old transitional process is 

coming to an end with presidential and parliamentary elections 

scheduled to take place in June or July of this year. Recently, 

President Kagame assured me that the elections will be fair and 

free and transparent. 

That said, it is critical that we take into account Rwanda’s terrible history. The 1994 genocide is still fresh in the minds of many 

people, and divisions between the two communities remain very 

deep. We should not expect a perfect society overnight. This will require time and patience. Rwanda must try to balance the desire of 

majority rule with the security and safety of the minority if Rwanda is to survive as a nation and avoid another genocide. 

Rwanda would have been a good example where the U.N., with 

very little resources since they were already there, could have prevented the genocide by sending in some reinforcements, but it was 

decided at that time that the world powers were not willing to support peacekeeping in Rwanda or even peacemaking. As a result, 

the genocide took place. 

We all have to bear the problems that we have seen in the area, 

some of which would have been preventable by even less; with not 

very heavy forces, the U.N. probably could have prevented the 

genocide, so we must not be reckless and attempt to impose what 

might not work in a society like Rwanda until we are sure that it 

can work because the consequences are too grave. 

I am alarmed and disappointed to hear about the rising tension 

between Rwanda and Uganda. These once friendly countries have 

fought three times in Kisangani, Congo, in 1999 and 2000. Since 

then, despite serious efforts by the United States and the United 

Kingdom, tension persists. We have seen unnecessary death and 

destruction during the senseless war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. 

Rwanda and Uganda must resolve their differences peacefully or 

risk isolation by the international community. This kind of behavior not only affects the people in that region, but also damages the 

image of Africa. Likewise, I call on the Ethiopian Government to 

respect the decision of the Border Commission. Recent statements 

by Ethiopia concerning this matter are not helpful. 

I would just like to conclude by once again thanking you for calling this important hearing. I hope that we could also have a hearing about the peace process in Sudan because the Administration 

is expecting to submit a report on the peace process on April 21 as 

is mandated in the Sudan Peace Act. 

Finally, I would like to also mention the U.N. report, which 

found that illegal activities of different actors as far as exploitation 

have taken place in the DRC and that countries we mentioned—

Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe—are benefitting from taking the 

resources. 

I might want to mention that there are seven U.S. companies 

that are also implicated in that report, and I and Mr. Houghton are 

sending a letter to Secretary Powell calling for the United States 

to investigate those seven U.S. companies that are participating in 

the exploitation that is taking place in the Congo. 

With that, I yield back the balance of my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Payne follows:]

6

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD M. PAYNE, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Mr. Chairman, let me first express my deep appreciation to you for calling this 

important hearing on the Great Lakes region. While the international community 

is understandably focused on the war in Iraq, important developments are occurring 

in Africa. 

The Great Lakes region continues to face serious challenges and the people in 

that region have suffered for far too long. 

Just a few weeks back conditions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 

looked horrendous. Today, I am more optimistic about the DRC than I have been 

in a long time. The persistent efforts of many, including South Africa, the United 

Nations, and the parties themselves appears to have paid off and has paved the way 

for what promises to be a final settlement of the conflict in the DRC. 

Indeed, the challenges ahead are enormous and will require a strong commitment 

by the leadership in the DRC. But they have come a long way—and this is important. The recent agreement reached in South Africa by the parties is an important 

breakthrough and should be supported by the international community. The Agreement calls for a two-year transition period to be followed by elections. 

In Burundi, the three-year transition period, mediated by former President Nelson 

Mandela, is still holding. The transition is at its pivotal juncture as the transfer of 

power from the current president to the vice president is expected to take place in 

less than two months. 

Burundi, like its immediate neighbors, has been marred by violence for over a 

decade. Hundreds of thousands of people have died as a result of ethnic clashes and 

systematic and deliberate extermination of civilians by government forces and extremist groups. 

The smooth transfer of power in Burundi is critical not only to Burundi’s survival 

as a nation but also to regional stability. The Government of South Africa has done 

a remarkable service in support of peace in Burundi by deploying over 700 troops. 

The African Union and several other African countries have committed to send 

peacekeeping troops to Burundi. 

Mr. Chairman, we must not overlook these remarkable African-led achievements. 

In Rwanda, the nine-year old transitional process is coming to an end with presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled to take place in June or July of this 

year. Recently, President Kagame assured me that the elections will be free and fair 

and transparent. 

That said, it is critical that we take into account Rwanda’s torturous history. The 

1994 genocide is still fresh in the minds of many people, and divisions between the 

two communities remain very deep. We should not expect a perfect society overnight; this will require time and patience. 

Rwandans must try to balance the desire of the majority to rule with the security 

and safety of the minority if Rwanda is to survive as a nation and avoid another 

genocide. We must not be reckless and attempt to impose what might not work in 

a society like Rwanda because the consequences are grave. 

Mr. Chairman, I am alarmed and disappointed to hear about the rising tensions 

between Rwanda and Uganda. These once friendly countries have fought three 

times in Kisangani, Congo in 1999 and 2000. Since then, despite serious efforts by 

the United States and U.K., tensions persist. 

We have seen the unnecessary death and destruction during the senseless war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Rwanda and Uganda must resolve their difference 

peacefully or risk isolation by the international community. This kind of behavior 

not only affects the people in that region but also damages the image of Africa. 

Likewise, I call on the Ethiopian government to respect the decision of the Boarder Commission. Recent statements by Ethiopia concerning this matter are not helpful. 

Mr. Chairman, let me thank you once again for calling this important hearing and 

urge you to consider a hearing on the peace process in Sudan. The Administration 

is expected to submit its report on the peace process on April 21st, as it is mandated 

by the Sudan Peace Act.

Mr. ROYCE. I think that is good Don, and I think your suggestion 

that we have a hearing soon on Sudan and the peace process there 

is also a good one. We will be in touch with your staff to make sure 

we do that. 

I am going to introduce Mr. Charles Snyder. He is Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. Prior to becoming Deputy AssistVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:41 May 21, 2003 Jkt 086303 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AFRICA\040303\86303 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
7

ant Secretary, he served as Director of the Office of Regional Affairs in the Africa Bureau. He is a career Africanist. He served in 

the Senior Intelligence Service at the Central Intelligence Agency 

as National Intelligence Officer for Africa from 1992 until 1995. 

Previously, Snyder served for 22 years in the U.S. Army, serving 

as Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations for military training 

and assistance programs throughout sub-Saharan Africa. He also 

worked as an African analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency 

and on the staff of the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. 

I am going to ask you, Charles, if you will, to just keep your presentation to 5 minutes and if you can summarize because we already have your printed copy, all right? 

STATEMENT OF CHARLES R. SNYDER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I assure you that I know 

you can read my statement much better than I can orally present 

it, and I will try and do something a little different maybe to set 

the frame and which we can go forward with this discussion. 

The testimony itself that we submitted for the record is quite detailed and longer than normal because we did try and address the 

questions that were outlined in your invitation, so I hope you will 

find that satisfactory. 

This region is recently one of the most unstable and tumultuous 

on the continent. It has actually begun to show some signs of movement toward peace. In my written testimony today I describe those 

developments in some detail and indicate how the United States intends to support the region in its peace efforts. 

Let me instead talk a bit about this as a foreign policy problem 

and how we have approached it just to give you some inside, baseball framework for this. Our foreign policy objectives in the region 

are very unremarkable and traditional. The main thing we are trying to accomplish in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 

is an end to the 5-year-old civil war. 

Within that context, of course, we are trying to pursue democratization of governmental institutions, which in some cases do not 

exist or are moribund, and the improvement of the humanitarian 

situation about which both you and the Ranking Member talked at 

some length. 

Our foreign policy objective in Rwanda is the same. It is the 

transition to a long-term, internal, stable regime that takes some 

account of the bad history and also permits economic development, 

some attempt to get justice and reconciliation inside the country. 

In the case of Burundi, it is its economic development, an attempt 

to establish democratic institutions and an attempt to see this 

transition and to see the civil war end in Burundi. 

These are not at all unremarkable objectives. We have been at 

this since we started 2 years ago, and I will try and tell you my 

personal assessment of where we are toward the end of this brief 

presentation. 

I think to really get an idea of what happened, we need to remember that this is an African problem. The Africans have framed 

8

this conflict for African reasons, just like they are stepping up, particularly the South Africans, in an attempt to solve the problem 

now, and I regard some of the efforts as quite successful. I think 

we are at a very high point today. Thabo Mbeki and some others 

have pushed the ball in the right direction in both the DRC and 

in Burundi. 

What kind of tools do we have to play in this game? What have 

the Africans given us to work with? The principal thing they have 

given us is the Lusaka cease-fire agreement, which is really the 

backbone of the whole process. It has the four key elements we 

need to solve this problem and which the Africans themselves have 

outlined for us as the solution. 

The first one is the cease-fire. It has been in place since December 2000 on and off with some real horror stories particularly in 

the Ituri area, but, nonetheless, a cease-fire of some consequence. 

Large areas of the country have been pacified for quite a while 

now; again, the Ituri being the exception to that. 

They have given us the withdrawal of foreign forces as an objective, and in fact that has occurred between July and December 

2002. The biggest exception is the large Ugandan presence in Ituri 

and the heavy fighting that occurred there not long ago. 

Ugandans, who were in the process of pulling out, had an agreement with the Congolese Government in the form of President 

Kabila to have about 1,500 troops in that part of the Congo. They 

have boosted it back up to 6,000 because of a perceived threat to 

themselves in that area, and they reduced one of the internal factions, the so-called Union of Patriotic Congolese (UPC) led by 

Thomas Lubanga, to a militarily ineffective position right now. 

Nonetheless, we strongly protested this activity because it is a violation of the basic agreement which the Africans themselves have 

pushed. They now promise to withdraw by April 24. 

The Inter-Congolese dialogue is the other key piece to this. As 

there is an allusion in the Chairman’s statement, that has come 

around right in the sense that it has been signed in Sun City just 

yesterday. There were some problems with that, and I am sure we 

will get into that in the questions, but it is still a remarkable 

achievement, and it is a dogged achievement that we owe a lot of 

credit to the South Africans for, as well as several senior U.N. officials. The Special Representative in particular, Masire, played a 

significant role in driving this to conclusion. 

The devil is always in the details. The problem is going to be 

standing up this transitional government that they have agreed on. 

It is a remarkable compromise with a President and four Vice 

Presidents distributed among very untrusting factions that have 

just been at war with each other. It is going to take an effort by 

all of us, not just the Africans, to keep this on track, but it is the 

best shot we have, and they made a significant advance yesterday. 

We need to now try and consolidate that gain. 

The last piece of it, and this is the weakest piece of it, is the disarmament, demobilization and repatriation (DDRR) primarily of 

Rwandan Hutu rebels. This piece, frankly, has not happened. 

Maybe 1,400, maybe 1,500 people have been repatriated under various DDRR programs, but some estimates go as high as 40,000 people potentially eligible for this kind of program. It is only the beginVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:41 May 21, 2003 Jkt 086303 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AFRICA\040303\86303 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
9

ning of this, and this is one of the reasons this process I believe 

is a little unbalanced and not moving forward as far as we would 

like to see it. 

What else have they given us? They have given us MONUC to 

work with. MONUC is not the most effective peacekeeping force we 

have ever seen, but it has kept at it consistently and has contributed to the process. They have now begun to put together two task 

forces, one South African task force to begin to address this DDRR 

problem and to supply a little more sense of stability out in Ituri. 

If there is enough business for the first task force, we will agree 

to come back to the Hill and consult and perhaps increase the ceiling a little more to get a second task force to address this DDRR 

problem. Are we wildly optimistic? The statistics are against us. If 

we have only gotten 1,500 people in approximately 2 years, to be 

charitable, it is unlikely we are going to get the 38,000 remainder 

in any rapid period. Nonetheless, we have to try and push this 

process forward with the agreements of the others in the area. 

The panel report that you referred to, the exploitation of the 

Congo, is a very valuable tool, frankly. It is the one search light 

we have that can shine down into the rat hole of the exploitation, 

which several of you pointed out exists. 

We are hoping come May 31 that we get a meaningful follow up 

report from the U.N., which will allow us to then go forward with 

OECD and other standards to begin to push back and make real 

consequences happen to the people that have done this exploitation, whether they be governments or others. We will have to see 

what comes our way May 31 and react accordingly. 

Finally, our allies in the region have been key to this. The

P–5+1, the +1 being South Africa, has really pushed this diplomatic process in Kinshasa and elsewhere. They have been very active and very engaged. A lot of the baggage that we carry elsewhere with our allies on Iraq has not carried into the Congo situation. In fact, we work quite closely and continue to work quite 

closely with all the other members of the P–5 and with the South 

Africans providing that necessary African dynamic to the situation. 

What is our secret weapon? What is our force multiplier? It is 

our Ambassadors in the region. Ambassador Hooks, the man we 

have in Kinshasa, cut his teeth in conflict resolution and in fact 

ran the African Crisis Response Initiative program. He is a tough 

diplomat, and he is exactly the right man for the Kinshasa posting. 

He is the kind of diplomat that I prefer, the man who is prepared 

to go in when his government tells him to and tell the head of state 

to go to hell, but has the grace and skill to make the head of state 

say I am looking forward to the trip. So I think we have the right 

man in the right spot on that job. 

Margaret McMillion, our Ambassador to Rwanda, spent a lot of 

time in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) as the director of the African Affairs Office learning about this problem the 

hard way, down to the nuts and bolts of the problem. She has done 

quite well with a very difficult brief. Our relationship with Rwanda 

has been troubled. We have cut off the IMET program and other 

kinds of military assistance. 

On the other hand, when they have moved forward successfully, 

we responded. When they pulled out, of course, they managed to 

10

find their way to Blair House. There is a real dynamic here, but 

it is a very tough situation, and we have the right Ambassador out 

there. 

The third and I think the most important chess piece right now 

in the Burundi situation is our Ambassador, Jim Yellen. He ran 

the Central African Office and knows that problem and the players 

inside out. In fact, I think the other diplomats in Burundi would 

admit that if we did not have Ambassador Yellen at several points, 

the Burundi peace process would have come undone. He held it together with spit, not a lot of help from Washington, and, frankly, 

the odd change that we could spare him. 

He has a major role in this Burundi process, and I think the 

South Africans have said publicly on a couple of occasions that they 

are grateful for the role he has played. We have those tools out 

there to play with to put the policy in perspective. 

At the very beginning of this process when we tried to 

operationalize our policy we looked at this as a three-legged stool. 

The three legs of the stool have to all be solid or the stool will fall. 

The first one is the Inter-Congolese dialogue. I think, based on 

what happened yesterday, we are in reasonably good shape on that. 

That is a fairly solid stool we have there. We know the way forward. The Africans have outlined it. 

The second leg of the stool was the foreign troop withdrawal, 

calming down the war. We managed to do that, and there was a 

lot of U.S. pushing and shoving behind scenes and publicly on some 

occasions to get people out. They by and large have gotten out. 

That stool is relatively stable. Ugandan peace is the long pole in 

the tent, but April 24 is not that far away. There will be consequences if the Ugandans do not withdraw. 

The Rwandans, as you know, are making current threats to move 

back in. We have spoken quite bluntly with our Rwandan friends, 

but we do not see this as the kind of security threat that justifies 

the move that they are talking about. Let the diplomats and 

MONUC work. They have heard us. Now, whether or not they follow our advice is a separate question. 

The third leg of the stool, as I pointed out before, is a disaster. 

It is one of the reasons I think the thing is unstable. It is the 

DDRR. Why is that such a key piece? It is really the answer to the 

Rwandan security question. The war in the Congo in the terms 

that it was justified strategically from the Rwandans’ point of view 

has to do with their security. We cannot address their security successfully unless we can disarm and demobilize the ex-FAR 

Interahamwe. Whether that is a 40,000 man bill or something less, 

we have to put ‘‘Paid’’ on that bill. We have done very little in 

terms of getting there. We have some new strategies to push that. 

One last 2-second comment. What do we do with this? How do 

we move it forward? What is the U.S. strategy? In step with the 

1999 Lusaka cease-fire agreement, our strategy in the DRC has 

been to urge a withdrawal of the foreign forces, support the formation of an inclusive transition government and reunify the country. 

Congolese sovereignty is one of the other keys to this process. We 

also have tried to encourage the DDRR for the armed rebel groups, 

supported access for humanitarian assistance, cessation of human 

rights abuses, and cessation of the illegal exploitation of the DRC’s 

11

resources. Our engagement on all these issues is constant and active. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Snyder follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES R. SNYDER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, 

BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Chairman Royce, members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify 

today on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and its neighbors in the Great 

Lakes region of Africa. 

This region, recently one of the most unstable and tumultuous of the continent, 

has shown signs of movement toward peace in recent months. In my testimony 

today, I intend to describe those developments in some detail and to indicate how 

the United States intends to support the region in its current efforts. 

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Our primary foreign policy objective in the DRC remains a peaceful resolution of 

the nearly five-year civil war in the Congo. At the same time, we strongly support 

democratization of Congolese governmental institutions, and an improvement in the 

humanitarian situation in the DRC. With respect to the war, at various times up 

to nine countries were involved in this conflict, including foreign armed forces introduced by Uganda, Rwanda, Angola, and Zimbabwe. 

Lusaka Cease-Fire Agreement: Backbone of the Process 

The Lusaka Agreement, signed in 1999, governs the DRC peace process, along 

with a number of other bilateral and multilateral agreements intended to stabilize 

the DRC. The Lusaka Agreement establishes a number of actions among the signatories:

• A cease-fire, which has been in place since December 2000, supported by the 

United Nations;

• Withdrawal of foreign forces, which occurred between July and December of 

2002, with the exception of the Ugandan contingent in northeastern Congo;

• The Inter-Congolese Dialogue, intended to create and to oversee a transitional 

framework, which is still in progress among the parties; and

• Disarmament, demobilization, and repatriation of primarily Rwandan Hutu 

rebels. Some rebels have been demobilized, but there is still much work to 

be done in this area. 

Ugandan Presence in Ituri 

Currently, the most significant foreign force in the DRC are the approximately 

6000 Ugandan troops in the Ituri region of northeastern DRC. Under a September 

6 agreement signed in Luanda September 6, Uganda and the DRC agreed to form 

a group called the Ituri Pacification Committee to work out local administrative arrangements in preparation for the departure of the Ugandan forces. However, after 

serious fighting with an armed Congolese group know as the Union of Patriotic Congolese (UPC), in early March Uganda increased its military presence in Ituri from 

around 1500 to 6000 troops. Uganda and the DRC have recently agreed that Ugandan troops will withdraw from the DRC by April 24, so long as a security mechanism for the Ituri region is agreed to by that time through the work of the Ituri 

Pacification Committee. 

The Ituri Pacification Committee has just begun its work, and that group as well 

as the UN and other parties are considering possible options for establishing the 

necessary security conditions urgently. We have called on Uganda to begin withdrawing its troops immediately. We have also urged the DRC government to withdraw its approximately 600 troops from Beni in northeastern Congo until a transitional government is formed and a mechanism for an integrated Congolese military 

is agreed to by all parties. At the same time, we have stressed to Rwanda the need 

to cease any and all support for Congolese groups such as the UPC. We have also 

strongly urged Rwanda not to carry out its recent threat to re-insert its military 

in Congolese territory, a threat based at least in part on the continuing presence 

of Ugandan troops in Ituri. 

12

The UN Peacekeeping Effort in the DRC—United Nations Organization Mission in 

the DRC (MONUC) 

A UN peacekeeping operation, MONUC, was created in 1999 to assist the Lusaka 

signatories with the peace process. Between 2001 and the present, MONUC has 

largely focused on monitoring the cease-fire lines and the disengagement of forces. 

In mid-2002, significant progress occurred towards a peaceful resolution of the 

Congo conflict, including the withdrawal of most foreign forces and progress in the 

on-going transitional political discussions. That led us, late in 2002, to consult with 

Congress and ultimately to support a revision of MONUC’s mandate and an increase in MONUC’s troop ceiling. MONUC is now authorized, under certain conditions, to deploy up to a total of 8700 personnel. These personnel will continue to 

carry out MONUC’s responsibilities under the Lusaka Agreement and will also oversee the disarmament, demobilization, and repatriation (DDR) of as many as 40,000 

mainly Rwandan Hutu rebels in the DRC. One or two robust task forces will undertake this process. South Africa has agreed to provide around 1200 troops for the 

first task force. The deployment date of the South African task force is expected to 

occur in May or early June. 

The DDR process will be a difficult one. In order for MONUC to reach those rebels 

desiring repatriation, secure conditions must exist in eastern Congo. The present 

continuing violence is both an obstacle to DDR and a source of continuing acute humanitarian need. Presently, there are reports of continuing violence among various 

Congolese rebel groups including the Congolese Rally for Democracy—Goma faction 

(RCD–G), the Movement for Congolese Liberation (MLC), the Congolese Rally for 

Democracy—Nationale (RCD–N), the Congolese Rally for Democracy—Liberation 

Movement (RCD–ML), the Mai Mai, and other ethnic Congolese militias. We continue to impress upon all parties, particularly the Kabila government, the RCD–G, 

and Rwanda, the need to stop supporting militias and to avoid further military aggression in eastern Congo. 

Implications of July 30 Pretoria Agreement 

The past nine months have witnessed progress in moving the DRC peace process 

forward. With the July 30 Pretoria Agreement between the DRC and Rwanda, 

which led directly to the Rwandan withdrawal from the Congo, the Congolese population, for the first time in modern history, now has the opportunity to try to create 

its own governmental system, free from the influences of larger or stronger states. 

December 17 Transitional Agreement 

On December 17, 2002, the Congolese parties, with the support of South Africa 

in Pretoria, agreed to a transitional framework. For the first time since the signing 

of the 1999 Lusaka Accord, the three principal armed belligerents—the DRC government, the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), and the Rally for Congolese Democracy—Goma faction (RCD–G)—all signed the same agreement, which, 

in turn, was also signed by representatives of Congolese political parties and civil 

society. This agreement was followed by a March agreement relating to the transitional constitution and security in Kinshasa by the same parties. Talks took place 

the last week in March on outstanding military integration issues. The Inter-Congolese Dialogue formally ratified the agreement on April 1–2 in Sun City, South Africa, as called for under the Lusaka Accord. 

The transitional formula outlined in the Pretoria agreement—which includes one 

president (current President Joseph Kabila) and four vice-presidents—is a true compromise. We believe the framework is a good one and can work, so long as the parties remain committed to its implementation. 

For this reason, we have strongly encouraged President Kabila to take steps to 

begin implementing the agreement, including discussions to resolve outstanding 

military issues. We have also encouraged, in the strongest terms, MLC leader JeanPierre Bemba and RCD–G head Adolphe Onusumba, to cease military confrontation 

in northeastern and eastern DRC. Continued fighting among parties that have 

signed a peace accord is completely unacceptable. 

U.S. Strategy for Moving the Process Forward 

In step with the 1999 Lusaka Cease Fire Agreement, our strategy in the DRC has 

been to urge the withdrawal of foreign forces, to support the formation of an inclusive transitional government and reunification of the country, and to encourage the 

DDR of armed rebel groups in the DRC. We have also strongly supported access for 

humanitarian assistance throughout the country, cessation of human rights abuses, 

and the cessation of illegal exploitation of the DRC’s resources. Our engagement on 

all these issues has remained constant and active. Our primary focus currently is 

to ensure the achievement of an inclusive transitional government, along with a cesVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:41 May 21, 2003 Jkt 086303 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AFRICA\040303\86303 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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sation of all hostilities in eastern Congo, the implementation of a successful DDR 

program, and an improvement of the dire humanitarian situation, particularly in 

eastern Congo. 

Withdrawal of Foreign Forces 

Our interventions with the Rwandan and Ugandan governments were instrumental in realizing the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan forces from the Congo 

in late 2002. The withdrawal of these troops (less the Ugandan troops still in the 

DRC) was a factor in the Zimbabwe and Angolan decisions to withdraw their troops 

from the DRC also in late 2002. 

Support for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue 

From early on in the DRC peace process, we have been strong proponents of the formation of an inclusive transitional government in the DRC. We contributed $1.5 

million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to Inter-Congolese Dialogue Facilitator 

Masire’s efforts prior to the Sun City session in South Africa in early 2002. Our encouragement during the Sun City session was instrumental in the achievement of 

a partial agreement there. We have continued to work with all parties to the dialogue and our encouragement helped the Congolese achieve an inclusive transitional 

agreement on December 17. 

We are now focused on ensuring that the December 17 agreement be implemented 

as quickly as possible. The Congolese have not yet begun to move this process forward. We are currently working with other interested parties (French, Belgian, 

South African, British) to formulate a strategy for international engagement with 

this process, including the formation of the international committee called for in the 

December agreement. We also encouraged Facilitator Masire to arrange for the formal ratification of this agreement as quickly as possible. We remain ready to commit up to $1 million in ESF funds to support the transitional process, including support to the various committees called for in the agreement. 

Support for DDR process 

We continue to work closely with the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) as it moves forward with its Phase III (DDR) program for MONUC. 

We supported the expansion of MONUC’s mandate to include DDR activities, as 

well as the accompanying necessary increase in MONUC’s troop ceiling. We have 

provided $800,000 in FY2002 PKO funds to the South African/UN Third Party 

Verification Mission (TPVM) process in support of the July 30 DRC/Rwanda agreement which includes a program for the DDR of Rwandan Hutu forces in the DRC. 

We have encouraged the TPVM to work closely with MONUC in order to ensure a 

comprehensive and targeted DDR program in the DRC. We have maintained a constant pressure on the DRC government to cease military support for Rwandan Hutu 

rebels in eastern Congo, as well as to Congolese militias including the Mai Mai and 

the RCD–ML. We remain ready to commit up to an additional $1.2 million in PKO 

funds and $1 million in ESF funds to support the DDR process. 

We strongly support active, effective, and forceful UN leadership in the DRC, both 

for MONUC and for peace negotiations, to match the UN’s increase in peacekeeping 

resources for resolution of the DRC conflict. 

Support for Humanitarian Operations 

The on-going armed conflict in eastern Congo—among the Mai Mai, the RCD–G, 

the Rwandan Hutu rebels, and other groups in North and South Kivu, and among 

the MLC, the RCD–N, the RCD–ML, and ethnic extremist groups in the northeastern Ituri region—continues to cause a dire humanitarian situation throughout 

eastern Congo. This fighting has displaced thousands of civilians and has exposed 

thousands of Congolese men, women, and children to horrific human rights abuses, 

including allegations of rape, murder, and atrocities such as cannibalism. Unfortunately, the on-going conflict and the lack of security guarantees has made it extremely difficult, if not impossible in many instances, for humanitarian aid organizations to reach the suffering population. We have maintained a constant pressure 

on all groups in the DRC to allow humanitarian organizations the ability to dispense their assistance. 

Since the March 6 re-taking of Bunia by the Ugandan military, the UPDF’s stabilizing effect in Bunia and other major towns in Ituri has created new opportunities 

for humanitarians to expand their activities to previously inaccessible populations. 

Elsewhere in Ituri, however, insecurity and lack of humanitarian access remain 

problems. The UN is working with local authorities to establish a new humanitarian 

protocol for activities in Ituri. USAID/OFDA-funded non-food item kits delivered by 

UNICEF are in Bunia and OFDA plans to assist German Agro-Action (GAA) to 

bring in additional kits. USAID/OFDA is also supporting NGO Premiere Urgence 

14

in southern Ituri in a food security project. As of January 2003, OFDA has provided 

nearly $1 million in humanitarian assistance to the Ituri region. 

However, in order to ensure any real improvement in the situation of the local 

population in eastern Congo, a cessation of hostilities there must take place. To this 

end, we are exploring ways to work with groups in the Kivus in order to reach a 

mediated solution. In Ituri, we continue to pressure the parties to the September 

6 Luanda Agreement to establish the Ituri Pacification Commission called for in the 

agreement. This commission is charged with mediating a solution to the on-going 

crisis in that area. We remain ready to provided technical or financial assistance 

to this commission, and we have encouraged the Angolan government, which was 

the broker of the September 6 agreement, to take steps to constitute this commission. 

Overall FY 2002 humanitarian assistance to the DRC is nearly $42 million, in addition to nearly $26 million in development assistance. During FY 2002, USAID’s 

Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) provided more than $26.0 

million in emergency assistance to the DRC, in the food security and nutrition sectors, emergency market infrastructure rehabilitation, and agricultural programs for 

war-affected, vulnerable, and internally displaced persons. USAID’s Office of Food 

for Peace (USAID/FPP) and the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) provided 

nearly $11.6 million in P.L. 480 Title II emergency food assistance in FY2002. The 

Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migrations (State/PRM) provided more than 

$5.5 million in FY2002to the UNHCR and the International Rescue Committee 

(IRC) for support to refugees in the DRC. 

Whither the Exploitation Panel 

One of the most perplexing issues in the DRC conflict remains that of the continued exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources. It has long been established that 

the exploitation of these resources, including coltan, gold, and diamonds in eastern 

Congo, and diamonds, copper, cobalt, and timber in central DRC, contributed to and 

exacerbated the conflict in the DRC. Concerned with reports of pillaging of resources 

by the foreign forces, the UN Security Council mandated an independent panel to 

investigate these allegations. The panel has produced a series of reports, detailing 

the circumstances of this exploitation. 

In January 2003, in the UN Security Council, we supported a resolution (1457) 

calling for a six-month extension of the panel’s mandate to explore ways to address 

this continued exploitation. The Panel’s mandate includes formulating recommendations on measures the transitional government and other regional governments 

could take to develop and enhance their policies, legal framework and administrative capacity to ensure the resources of the DRC are used legally and on a fair commercial basis to the benefit of the Congolese people. 

Parties named in the Panel’s last report have been asked to send, by May 31, reactions to the UN Secretariat. The UN Security Council resolution also urged all 

countries, particularly those in the region, to conduct their own investigations into 

this issue, and encouraged the transitional government to establish a special commission to examine the validity of economic and financial agreements regarding natural resources in the DRC. However, it should be noted that the Panel’s findings 

are not necessarily established facts and do not constitute a finding of ‘‘guilt’ or ’innocence’ of entities involved in the exploitation, legal or otherwise, of the DRC’s natural resources. 

Next Steps 

We hope to see the implementation of a transitional government within the next 

few months. Although the parties involved in the government will surely encounter 

many difficulties in keeping the new government on course, the establishment of 

such a government would help to increase the likelihood of a successful DDR process, would signal the completion of the Lusaka peace process, and would mark a 

new beginning for self-governance in the Congo. 

RWANDA

Our greatest foreign policy challenge with Rwanda is to promote policies that support Rwanda’s transition and that will bring long term internal stability, economic 

development, and justice and reconciliation to Rwanda and its neighbors. 

Regional Stability 

We applauded Rwanda’s decision last year to withdraw its combat forces from the 

DRC and continue to believe that Rwanda made a wise and appropriate choice in 

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15

tween Presidents Kagame and Kabila, was an important step forward in the peace 

process. 

However, Rwanda believes that its interests are threatened by events in eastern 

Congo. As a result of this perception, Rwanda continues to exercise influence in 

eastern Congo through Congolese allies, whom it supports financially and with military supplies and advisory personnel. Rwanda has raised the possibility that it 

might be forced to intervene again in eastern Congo. 

Though the threat to Rwanda from Rwandan Hutu rebels, some of whom were 

involved in the 1994 genocide, has been greatly reduced since 1996 and 1998, these 

forces do continue to operate in eastern Congo. Attempts to demobilize and repatriate these fighters have had only limited success. This is partially due to a lack 

of cooperation by the various belligerents, including at times the Congolese Government and Congolese Rwandan allies, but mostly because of the strong resistance of 

the Hutu rebel leadership to allow the rank and file—many of whom appear to want 

to return to Rwanda—to reach demobilization centers. The July 30 Pretoria Agreement and the subsequent withdrawal of Rwandan troops led to a break in the relationship between the Congolese government and the Rwandan rebel groups. However, it is unclear if these Rwandan groups continue to receive some supplies from 

the Congolese Government or through local Congolese allies. 

We support efforts by the regional parties to reduce tensions between Rwanda and 

Uganda. The relationship between President Kagame and Ugandan President 

Museveni has steadily worsened over recent years and each President accuses the 

other of supporting rebel elements against him. The recent warming of relations between Kampala and Kinshasa is also of concern to Rwanda. The international community—most notably the British—has made several efforts to lower tensions between the two Presidents, and we strongly support our British allies in this effort. 

Clashes between Ugandan troops and groups allied with Rwanda have already occurred in northeastern DRC. A direct clash between their armies is possible. Various Congolese factions have taken advantage of the Rwanda-Uganda divide, in an 

effort to improve their own standing militarily or politically, making northeastern 

DRC particularly volatile. 

The challenge for the United States is to stimulate positive developments in the 

region that will enable Rwanda to conclude that its security and economic interests 

are better served through fostering stability at home and improving relations with 

its neighbors than by allowing its neighbors’ turmoil to deflect Rwanda from its chosen path of peace, reconciliation, democracy, and economic development. 

Internal Stability 

The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) has made good strides in bringing stability 

and normality to Rwanda since 1994. Rwanda is at a crossroads this year, with the 

prospect of a constitutional referendum at mid-year and elections late in 2003. 

Thus, in addition to promoting regional stability, the United States encourages 

and assists the GOR to pursue policies that will lead to a more open, democratic 

political system. We are strongly urging the GOR to take steps to ensure that the 

national elections slated for later this year are free and fair. This must include freeing political prisoners, allowing political parties to operate and campaign, and easing restrictions on the press. 

The GOR has expressed concerns about the need to control speech and assembly 

due to Rwanda’s experience during the genocide. These concerns are understandable, though we do not agree fully with them. We believe that Rwanda should minimize such controls in order to empower its citizens to conduct legitimate political 

activity and to express dissent. 

Justice and Reconciliation 

The GOR has made efforts to promote justice and reconciliation in post-genocide 

Rwanda. The National Unity and Reconciliation Commission has done excellent 

work in Rwandan villages. The Government has set up the ‘‘gacaca’’ system, a traditional system of justice, which is now operating in pilot districts, to bring to justice 

the overwhelming number of genocide suspects in its jails, most of whom were not 

organizers and planners of the 1994 tragedy. The leaders will still be dealt with in 

the regular Rwandan judicial system or the International Criminal Tribunal for 

Rwanda (ICTR). 

The GOR’s relations with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, located in Arusha, Tanzania, which operates independently of the Rwandan judicial 

system, have been rocky, at best. U.S. policy is to encourage improved communications between the GOR, survivors’ groups, and the ICTR. 

The United States continues to support, both financially and politically, the 

Rwandan judicial system, ‘‘gacaca’’, and the ICTR. 

16

BURUNDI

The Republic of Burundi is nearing the mid-point of a transitional government 

that was inaugurated in November 2001 following the signing of the Arusha Peace 

and Reconciliation Agreement in Tanzania in August 2000. This agreement did not 

include the two main Hutu rebel groups as signatories, and the conflict that began 

with the 1993 assassination of Burundi’s first democratically elected president, 

Melchior Ndadaye, has continued to rage. Those two rebel groups later splintered 

into four separate factions. 

The country is at a critical point in its transition. Cease-fire agreements have 

been signed with three of the four rebel groups, including the largest, the National 

Council for the Defense of Democracy/Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD/

FDD) led by Pierre Nkurunziza, on December 3, 2002. The cease-fire agreements 

have, however, been frequently violated by both Government and rebel forces, and 

implementation of the provisions of the agreement has been slow. 

Further, the transition of the presidency from President Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi 

and member of the Tutsi-dominated National Unity and Progress Party (UPRONA), 

to current Vice President Domitien Ndayizeye, a Hutu and member of the Hutudominated Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) party is scheduled for May 

1. Tensions surrounding this transition, mandated by the Arusha and related accords as well as by the Transitional Constitution, were reduced when President 

Buyoya stated in a national radio address that he would relinquish the presidency 

on schedule. Tension caused by speculation that President Buyoya would seek to 

stay on beyond May 1 was substantially reduced as a result of this announcement. 

The humanitarian crisis that has developed as a result of this conflict is tremendous. Of a population of just over six million, approximately one million Burundians 

are either refugees in neighboring countries, most notably the United Republic of 

Tanzania, or chronically internally displaced both in United Nations camps or on 

their own. Public services have been devastated in Burundi, and basic needs are not 

being met in the areas of health, sanitation and nutrition. Human rights abuses 

against non-combatants are far too common, from both the Burundian Armed Forces 

and the armed rebel groups. 

U.S. Interests 

U.S. interests are to:

(1) End the conflict;

(2) Ameliorate the humanitarian crisis;

(3) Assist in the development and strengthening of democratic systems and 

principles. 

The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement 

The U.S. strongly supported the process, led initially by the late Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere and then by former South African President Nelson Mandela, 

that brought about the conclusion of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (APRA) in August 2000. The Transitional Government of Burundi was inaugurated in November 2001. 

Post-Arusha Cease-Fire Negotiations 

While the Arusha Accords were a major step toward peace in Burundi, the two 

armed rebel groups were not signatories leading to continued fighting in Burundi. 

Those two rebel groups subsequently splintered. Ugandan President Yoweri 

Museveni led a regional effort to broker a cease-fire, along with Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa, South African President Thabo Mbeki, and Gabonese President Omar Bongo. These negotiations began to bear fruit in the fall of 2002. South 

African Deputy President Jacob Zuma facilitated talks that resulted in cease-fire 

agreements between the Transitional Government of Burundi and three of the four 

rebel groups, including the largest, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy—Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD–FDD) led by Pierre Nkurunziza. 

African Mission Peacekeeping Force 

While agreements with the two smaller groups were relatively straightforward, 

that with Nkurunziza’s CNDD–FDD left many key issues to further negotiation, 

and relied on the deployment of an ‘‘African Mission’’ peacekeeping force under the 

auspices of the African Union. 

At its February meeting in Addis Ababa, the African Union’s Central Organ endorsed the mission, recognized that the force would be comprised of troops from 

Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa, and charged South Africa with taking the 

17

lead on planning and operations. Support from international donors, including the 

United States, was requested. 

We view deployment of the AU force to be critical to the success of the cease-fire, 

and important to a successful transition of the Burundian presidency on May 1 as 

well as full implementation of the Arusha Accords. We are in touch with the AU, 

troop contributing countries, and other possible donors seeking detailed information 

to determine what type of support the United States can best provide. Since FY2002, we have provided $5 million in Africa Peacekeeping Operations 

funds to support the deployment of South African troops to Bujumbura who are taking part in a Special Protection Unit to provide protection to Hutu leaders returning 

to Bujumbura to take part in the transitional government. In addition, approximately $4.5 million in FY2001 and FY2002 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) was 

provided to support the operation of South Africa’s C–130 fleet, a portion of which 

was used to support the South African detachment in Bujumbura. 

Democracy and Human Rights Concerns 

The human rights situation in Burundi continues to be poor. A necessary measure 

for adequately protecting human rights in Burundi is a just and enduring peace 

based on democratic principles. 

We view the three most important human rights issues in Burundi to be:

• the killing and abuse of civilians by both the Burundian army and Burundian 

rebels;

• the lack of a fair and independent justice system that would provide for accountability;

• the absence of basic rights such as freedom of the press and freedom of assembly.

Details of the continued abuse of human rights in Burundi can be found in the 

Country Human Rights Report just released by the Secretary of State this past 

Monday. 

Security forces and rebels that commit extrajudicial killings and torture are rarely 

held accountable by the government or rebel organizations. This impunity to prosecution for such crimes is one central element of the Arusha Accords. 

The Humanitarian Crisis and Development 

Continued fighting, massive population movements, general insecurity and a poor 

socio-economic environment are all factors that complicate Burundi’s development. 

Quality of life continues to deteriorate as the conflict destroys infrastructure, prevents access to basic services, and reduces agricultural output. School attendance 

has dropped to 48%, life expectancy is 43 years, infant mortality has risen to 136 

per 1,000 births, and maternal mortality averages 1,000 per 100,000. The HIV/AIDS 

prevalence rate is approximately 19% in urban areas and 7% in rural areas, and 

there are an estimated 230,000 AIDS orphans. 

Of a population of just over six million, more than one million Burundians are 

either refugees in neighboring countries, most notably the United Republic of Tanzania, or chronically internally displaced both in United Nations camps or on their 

own. Public services have been devastated in Burundi, and basic needs are not 

being met in the areas of health, sanitation and nutrition. 

Due to massive instability and insecurity, work on repairing and, in many cases, 

creating an infrastructure in Burundi has been limited. The United States, along 

with most donors, has focused efforts on humanitarian assistance, and relatively 

limited activities aimed at supporting the Arusha-based transition to a democratically elected, representative government. In FY2002, the United States provided over $22.5 million dollars in assistance to 

Burundi, the vast bulk in the form of humanitarian assistance (nutrition, 

healthcare). 

Mr. Chairman, let me express again my appreciation for the opportunity to describe the policies we are following toward this troubled region. I would be happy 

to respond to any questions you or members of the Committee might have.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Snyder. 

I will start by asking you about a recommendation that the U.N. 

report makes in terms of international support to the Governments 

of Rwanda and Zimbabwe and Uganda and Burundi. The argument 

is made that international support should be linked to a halt in 

their illegal exploitation of Congo’s resources. My question would 

be, does the United States support that policy? 

18

I guess my follow up question is, you mentioned the U.N. report 

on May 31 that is going to be a follow up to their initial audit and 

assessment. Can you share with me what you think the U.S. position should be on that? 

Mr. SNYDER. I learned long ago never to make policy into a 

microphone, but let me tell you what the working approach to this 

problem will be. 

I think if the report shows smoking guns of a significant kind, 

we will have to approach our allies and the Africans in the region 

with a serious look at taking those kind of sanctioning activities 

you have outlined. 

Strictly U.S. sanctions in the area, while it would be satisfying 

to us, will be ineffective. I am not saying we would not go there 

in the end, but we need to bring the P–5 and our other allies along, 

and we need to bring the Africans along. I think the South Africans 

have stepped up to this to the level that I think we can actually 

build a program. 

We will have to show solid evidence, and a problem with a lot 

of the U.N. reports is they tend to be indicative, but not that smoking gun. I think this one is. 

Mr. ROYCE. I understand, Secretary Snyder, but I would recommend that those here that are interested in this issue read this 

report because it is exhaustive, and it has a treasure trove of information about illegalities, but go ahead. 

Mr. SNYDER. We intend particularly to take a look at the OECD 

aspects of this. The Europeans and ourselves have pledged to do 

certain things, and I think there is good evidence in here that 

needs to be looked at by enforcement people. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, part of this report says that the DRC Government has seen its state mining agency transfer ownership of 

$5,000,000,000 in assets to a network of Congolese and 

Zimbabwean political and military and commercial interests with 

how much going to the state coffers in return? According to this report, what was received in consideration? Zero to the state coffers. 

It would seem to me pretty easy to verify whether that report is 

accurate, and it seems to me that the reporting done in this exhaustive U.N. document is first rate. I would ask how would this 

bear on our support for IMF and other aid to the Kabila government. Say for a minute we wait for the May 31 follow up report, 

and it supports all of these allegations and findings. What action 

would we then take? 

Mr. SNYDER. It is always a situation, and I think if it was exactly 

as today and you could point a smoking gun back to specific individuals, we would try to go after them, but if this transition government begins to take shape and the allegations go at people 

below that level, we will have to take a look, for the sake of moving 

the political process forward, how far we are willing to go. 

That is not to say that we will not try to bring justice to them 

if that is what they need, but we need to work very carefully with 

the people in the region as well so that we do not inadvertently tip 

the apple cart. Now, clearly if you are going to——

Mr. ROYCE. The apple cart has been tipped. If $5,000,000,000 in 

resources has been moved out of the hands of the Congolese people 

with nothing going to state coffers, if 2,000,000 to 3,000,000 people 

19

have now been massacred over the last 5 years in the Eastern 

Congo, the apple cart has been tipped. 

The question is, why have international sanctions against the 

plunder of Congolese resources not been imposed? I would suggest 

that the United States, in concert with African countries and the 

rest of the international community, move with all deliberate speed 

to make certain that these governments know that those sanctions 

are going to be imposed unless these contracts cease and unless 

these resources are turned back to the Congolese. 

Mr. SNYDER. I hear you, Mr. Chairman. We are definitely going 

to take a hard look. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, sir. 

I will now go to Mr. Don Payne, the Ranking Member. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I would just like to say that 

I, too, support a strong stand about wars that are being waged because of private interests and that we try to find what parties from 

Africa and various groups are benefitting and that we should have 

some way of stopping it and, as it has been indicated, try to recoup. 

I also, as I mentioned earlier, feel that we need to take a strong 

look at the corporations that are profiting, whether they be European corporations or whether they be American corporations. If we 

are going to expect African leaders to adhere to a mandate that we 

feel should be promulgated, then we should also hold the companies, whether they are U.S. or foreign, accountable also. I think 

that you cannot have one without the other and so we need to put 

pressure on both. 

The Administration recommended a severe cut in peacekeeping 

from 2003, $146,000,000, to 2004 down to $80,000,000. I suppose 

it will continue in that direction. With the successes that we have 

seen in Sierra Leone, with the fact that we have minute at a very 

small level and with the Lusaka accords being implemented, could 

you explain or try to inform me how the Administration has decided to make such serious cuts in peacekeeping when we have 

seen some relative successes and with the solution to some of the 

problems, for example, Ethiopia-Eritrea with the border problem, 

probably additional peacekeepers would be required there. 

Why in a trillion dollar budget would we cut peacekeeping in Africa in half almost? Is there another plan, some other account that 

we might be funding this from? 

Mr. SNYDER. You know, Mr. Payne, the Administration also 

asked for a $100,000,000 contingency fund, and clearly the Africa 

Bureau hopes for additional peacekeeping funds from that contingency fund. 

Part of the problem we always face, because in the nature of conflict, is projecting solid numbers and solid figures. We have been 

assured that we will get more than our fair share of that contingency fund, assuming it is approved, but that is the short answer 

to your question. That is our best hope in terms of the peacekeeping account. 

Clearly if we have some major success and some of my colleagues 

do less well, there will be the usual shuffling bureaucratically of 

money to good efforts, but again that is a hypothetical. These are 

the bureaucratic actions we will take. You have seen the figures 

20

yourself. Really our only hope is the $100,000,000 contingency 

fund. 

Mr. PAYNE. The recent peace accord signed, the Lusaka Accord, 

continuing forward with the President and the four Vice Presidents. Will the Masire’s office remain as this transition moves forward, to your knowledge, or will that office cease and desist to be 

a functioning office? 

Mr. SNYDER. It has not been decided yet. Our intention and our 

hope and our recommendation is that someone assume that role 

and we continue to have that kind of hands-on Special Representative attention to this problem, but again the final decision has not 

been taken. 

That is what we are pushing for, and I do not want to sit here 

and tell you we are sure we are going to get it. We are hopeful, 

but I cannot guarantee it. 

Mr. PAYNE. I do not see anything about the Mai-Mais. Has there 

been any kind of work with the group to have them involved in the 

process? 

I see there are four Vice Presidents, and I wonder if there is any 

recognition, whether it is a political group or entity or how is it 

viewed? How are they viewed, and do they qualify as a significant 

player in the solution in the Congo? 

Mr. SNYDER. I think we would ignore the Mai-Mai at our peril. 

One of the problems is the Mai-Mai is a convenient catch-all term 

for a whole number of diverse groups with diverse opinions and, 

frankly, different relationships with even the outside actors. Some 

of the so-called Mai-Mai are aligned clearly with Kabila’s government. Some of the Mai-Mai are aligned with the Rwandans and 

others, some are their own men clearly. So it is a diversity. 

I think what will happen, and what I am pushing for, is that 

they be included in the kind of regional political change that will 

be necessary as this transition moves forward. That is how you 

take care of their political needs. 

They clearly raised themselves as Congolese Nationalists in response to an external threat. They need to be accommodated as 

well in the military future in one way or the other, either being incorporated hopefully with African assistance on how to do this into 

a new army or put into the demobilization process so they recognize some tangible rewards, not unlike what happened to the 

Renamo soldiers in Mozambique. 

That is the right answer. It is too soon in this transition to be 

able to see how this will happen. But that is certainly where the 

United States Government will be pushing to shape it. 

Mr. PAYNE. Just concluding, with the reduction in this sort of 

peacekeeping fund, is there any fund or has there been any plan 

to end demobilization? 

Many times demobilization works best when there is an incentive 

to demobilize, when there are funds for reintegration, where the 

ex-combatants are given land to farm or some utensils with which 

to do that. Is there any plan in the demobilization of the warring 

factions and demobilization to have any kind of incentive for the 

ex-combatants? 

Mr. SNYDER. We will have a funding problem. That is an Office 

of Transition Initiative (OTI) kind of thing. It is USAID money. DeVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:41 May 21, 2003 Jkt 086303 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AFRICA\040303\86303 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
21

pending on the plan, together with our allies we will find some 

funds for that. That is what OTI is for. The package itself, though, 

needs to be designed very much by the African leadership. They 

know what will work best. It is different in each country and each 

place. 

I know that one of the other witnesses was unable to make it, 

but I think if Howard Wolpe was here, he would have been able 

to speak at length on the World Bank’s demobilization plan which, 

frankly, is quite comprehensive and looks to me as an old military 

man quite sensible. Again, it is the right kind of multilateral forum 

to get the financing. 

We are aware of the problem. It is just too early to give you anything more than shadows on the wall of where we will go. I think 

what Mr. Wolpe would have had to say is 70 or 80 percent in the 

right direction. 

Mr. PAYNE. I guess my time has expired. Once again, thank you 

very much. 

Mr. ROYCE. We will go to Mr. Tancredo from Colorado. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Snyder, just two questions. I would like for you to expand 

a little more upon the third leg of that stool and just exactly what 

it is you think we can do to stabilize it. Maybe I should say what 

should be done and then what we can do to stabilize it. 

There have been reports from Congolese citizens that indicate 

that Rwandan troops have returned into the DRC since announcing 

their withdrawal in October, and I want to know if you know if 

these reports are accurate. 

Mr. SNYDER. Let me take the easy part of the question first, 

which is DDRR, which tells you how hard the second part is. 

The key to that process is going to be a combination of things 

that the transitional government will have to do. The Rwandan 

piece of the DDRR process is absolutely in place. The people that 

have gone back into Rwanda we have put through the system. 

We have monitored carefully for human rights abuses and other 

kinds of things that we were afraid of, and it just has not happened. In fact, a lot of the people who are trying to recruit more 

people into the DDRR process are graduates of the Rwandan process. That piece of it is okay. The plan, the reception plan inside of 

Rwanda for the returnees, if that is what they choose to do, is very 

good. 

The piece that is missing is what are we going to do about those 

5,000 or 8,000 at the end of the day that decide they are not going 

to demobilize? How do we go about disarming them under a situation of some duress? 

Again, that is going to depend on a number of things. The Congolese transition is going forward, and a lot of the Congolese actors 

are satisfied that their sovereignty is being restored. They will be 

much more inclined to help in that process. 

The same thing with the other Africans. If they see this being 

a successful end game, they will be much more inclined to put the 

kind of pressure on and offer the kind of alternatives where these 

residual 5,000 or 8,000 men can go. 

The money will not be the problem. If the U.N. task forces which 

are going to do this little testing next begin to get a real in-flow 

22

of people because people begin to accept that this process is moving 

forward, we are at the beginning of an end game, and they see they 

are better off individually taking the deal and the package of 

goodies that we are offering, whatever that is. We will have plenty 

of ability through the U.N. system to make that happen. Our aid 

missions and others will fill in where necessary. 

What worries me most about this right now is the ownership of 

this is a bit at play because we do not have that transitional government in place with its 2-year time line firm. They don’t know 

who the Vice President for this is, who the minister of that is, to 

make the kinds of operational decisions that are necessary to get 

the funds from the rest of it. That is where the problem is. 

To straighten this leg of the stool out, we have to move that last 

little piece of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) just a little bit 

further because of the way this is played out. I think we have a 

sporting chance at it over the next 2 weeks or 3 weeks as we push 

them. Right now it is not there. Again, I cannot be optimistic until 

I know what that piece is. 

I think we can get the money, and I think the Rwandans are prepared to do their part. The big X factor is will the Congolese transition let us get at it, let organizations like World Bank and others 

really get on the ground and do something about it. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Before you get on to the second point, you do 

bring up something there that certainly piques my curiosity. The 

way you have explained the situation and what we know to be the 

case where the country is really divided up into these little areas, 

thiefdoms where warlords rule. 

Can we really expect that a 2-year transition phase is at all realistic? Given what you have told us about the situation and the 

other things we know to be the case, is that not far too optimistic 

a projection? 

Mr. SNYDER. Again, the Africans have to decide, and it is the African plan. Having played this game out in a lot of places, if it becomes obvious and we get a real transition going and there is a 

real diplomatic and political exchange between the parties, having 

a mutual agreement at the end, if we need another 6 months or 

a year, will not be a problem. If we do not get that dynamic, 2 

years is not going to be any kind of a problem. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Yes. 

Mr. SNYDER. We will not get close to 2 years. The 2 year thing 

does not worry me. They need to have a target. I am glad that it 

is a tight target. There are plenty of ways to finesse it, provided 

this African solution begins to get its momentum going. It is too 

soon to judge. 

Mr. TANCREDO. And how about the return? 

Mr. SNYDER. Of the Rwandans? Is there a smoking gun? No. 

Have they been able to parade a captured Rwandan soldier on the 

stage, ID card in hand? No. 

I am hearing from a lot of people, not just U.S. intelligence 

sources, but NGOs and others out there, and they have been out 

there a long time, that there are still Rwandans. Some of them 

never left, but there were advisors, et cetera. 

There are more recent reports, much more disturbing reports, 

and we have taken this up in diplomatic channels, that larger 

23

Rwandan groups are going back. We are still in the process of 

working that out diplomatically. 

For now I am more than willing to give my Rwandan diplomatic 

colleagues the benefit of the doubt, but there is clearly smoke, but 

the smoking gun? A lot of people say it is there. We have not found 

it yet, but there is a lot of smoke. 

Mr. TANCREDO. All right. Thank you very much, Mr. Snyder. 

Mr. ROYCE. Congresswoman McCollum from Minnesota? 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I would like to focus on peacekeeping a little more, the Administration’s position on peacekeeping. Would the Administration support expanding peacekeeping? 

Mr. SNYDER. I think in Africa we are going to wind up doing 

more peacekeeping just because the key to getting to our basic development of a democracy package is you have to end the conflicts. 

There are a whole number of conflicts on the continent. 

We do not have visibility now to make proposals to the Congress 

with sound dollar figures at this point. Trust me, the Africa Bureau 

will not hesitate to make the bureaucratic pitch to get more money 

when the time is right. 

If you are asking me do I think there is going to be a need for 

more peacekeeping, I think absolutely in the case of Africa, but I 

cannot give you a number now. What I can tell you, as I told Congressman Payne, is I am hopeful that if this contingency fund goes 

through we will get our fair share of it, and I think I can already 

begin to make the case, if the transition goes forward, for some 

more of that peacekeeping money. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Could you give me some examples of how you 

would use this contingency fund for more peacekeeping? 

Mr. SNYDER. Well, for instance, let us say that we do get a solution in the Congo where it becomes obvious that the peacekeeping 

force, for instance, is one of the subsets of the details in this African plan. There could be a third party peacekeeping force in 

Kinshasa to provide the reassurance to all the parties that they are 

safe in the city, somebody other than the parties themselves and 

somebody other than one of the belligerents. 

In the U.N. system, it could take months to get it going. So what 

would probably happen in that case, given the South African leadership, is the South Africans, working as chairmen of the African 

Union, will try and find somebody, some group to do that, whether 

it is 750 or 1,000 men. 

We would then get a dialogue together with our allies and say 

okay, this is going to cost us X. Using U.N. figures per month, 750 

men, let us say roughly $10,000,000 for a 4-month period for 750 

men. 

The U.S. share of that after we negotiated a bit with our P–5 

friends might be $2,000,000. We would then go to the contingency 

fund and put in that request in the normal fashion for the 

$2,000,000 to be spent for that purpose. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. I am new to the International Relations Committee, new to the Africa Subcommittee. I am baffled, and maybe 

you can help explain to me, in light of what is going on, in light 

of some of the dynamic testimony I have heard about Africa since 

24

being on this Subcommittee, why the Administration dropped by 

more than $80,000,000 dollars the funds going into peacekeeping. 

Mr. SNYDER. I can take that question. That is outside my area 

of competence because it goes to the issue of the big picture budget. 

I can only tell you about the piece we fought for. I suspect the 

usual budget exigencies drove it, but I will take that question and 

get you an answer. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. I would appreciate that, sir. 

You made a comment, and in light of the way this word has been 

used so much recently, you talked about creating a stable regime. 

Do you mean a stable government? 

Mr. SNYDER. A stable government. I have been in the African 

business too long. You know, it is hard to change your vocabulary 

after all these years. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. I thought so. I just thought for the record you 

might want to clarify that. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. SNYDER. Democratic government, in fact. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. We would like that. 

Mr. SNYDER. Concerned with its population’s development. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Meeks of New York? 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let us just pick up from that, because I, being a Member of Congress, think that we do need to make sure that there is a democratic government, and some responsibility falls directly on us, 

given our history in the Congo and our support of Mr. Mobutu, who 

caused a lot of the problems that are currently in the area and 

after the Cold War similar to what I think we have done in Afghanistan. 

You know, after the Cold War we just left the area and left the 

people. We might have propped up someone who was there not for 

the benefit of the people. I think that has some undercurrent as to 

what is still going on in that whole region. 

Therefore, we bear some responsibility, and, therefore, when you 

are talking about cutting dollars, as my colleague from Minnesota 

just talked about, it is tremendously baffling to me why we would 

reduce that budget and then take away the 2004 budget request 

and cut the funding for peacekeeping in the Congo. 

You would have to agree that some of the problems there still 

emanates from the Mobutu regime. Is that not correct? 

Mr. SNYDER. Oh, absolutely. It is part of the pattern. 

Mr. MEEKS. Let me ask this question. Does the United States 

have a current interest? I guess our interest in the Congo at the 

time was trying to make sure that Communism did not move or 

anything of that nature. Does the United States have a current interest in the Congo? 

Mr. SNYDER. Absolutely. Any African policy that purports to be 

a truly continental policy has to take the Congo as one of the most 

serious states in the region. 

It is potentially an engine in Africa if we can turn this around. 

Right now it is the pit in which the regional groups have fought 

out for their own reasons—security in many cases, political and 

exploitive and others—this drama of what some people have called 

the first world war in Africa. 

25

The Congo itself, given the resources, et cetera, and the energy 

of the people, could easily become one of the linchpin states in the 

region. It has all kinds of mineral resources; for instance, the old 

Gecamines. You know, it would take at least $1,000,000,000 to turn 

that around, but that is not an unreasonable price, provided you 

can set up a stable government in the Congo that really has the 

right kind of outlook in terms of trade and other kinds of assurances, et cetera. Somebody could turn that around to the benefit 

of the Congo, not to mention the company itself. 

The Inga Shaba project, just because it was of a grand scale and 

in the old days was dismissed as too grand, et cetera, is actually 

a highly valuable project if it is looked at in a regional context. The 

electric power from the hydroelectric process in the Inga Shaba region could literally power the lights in Capetown more efficiently 

and more cheaply than anything else in the area. 

One study I saw showed that you could actually turn the lights 

on in Cairo, even building that huge, enormously long transmission 

line, more cheaply with power generated from an Inga Shaba kind 

of project than you could using say the flared gas from the Nigerian fields or others and a much shorter distance with a preexisting 

pipeline. 

Those kinds of resources, and those are just two examples. Never 

mind what the parties are exploiting out in the Kivus in terms of 

rare earth and gold and diamonds and other things. The country 

is potentially an economic engine, an engine the central part of Africa can use. 

We are not dismissive of that, but before I can get to that in a 

sensible way I have to get past the conflict resolution piece. We are 

working, as you were asking earlier, on the democratic piece. Democracy is hard to do in terms of getting traction and setting up 

institutions. 

It is not expensive. IRI and NDI can do wonders with half a million and a million dollars. We put them in play where we can in 

the Congo. They have not been in play recently because this transition has been delayed. We will certainly put them back in play if 

this moves forward to do the kind of institution building that make 

our claims that we are supporting democracy viable and help the 

process. 

The money is there for that. The peacekeeping money cannot 

really be used for democracy. It is essential to get the conflict out 

of the way so that we can effectively spend our democracy and development money, but we will not hesitate to exploit the opening 

and put real, live experts on the ground. 

Mr. MEEKS. And that is tremendously important because, you 

know, and the reason why I opened up the way I did is our credibility is at stake and, just as in other parts or other regions of the 

world, some people are distrustful or may be distrustful of what we 

do and how we do it. Therefore, when we take away the money for 

peacekeeping, when we take away other kinds of aid money, then 

it again goes back to well, folks do not really care about us. I think 

that we should lead by example. 

I would like to ask you this because I concur 100 percent and 

want to associate myself with the opening remarks or the opening 

question of Chairman Royce, but it would seem to me from some 

26

reports that I have read there are also some U.S. companies who 

have taken advantage of and are plundering the Congo’s resources. 

I am wondering whether you or the current Administration 

would actually lead by example and would do something as far as 

a lawsuit or take some other kind of action against U.S. companies 

that are currently plundering some of the resources of the Congo. 

That would, therefore, be leading by example and trying to help 

others to begin to follow. We could then talk to our European allies 

and others as far as the weapons because the weapons are coming 

in from other areas and other places also, some say from some of 

our European allies. 

What would your position be with us leading by example with 

reference to the U.S. companies that may be plundering some of 

the resources? 

Mr. SNYDER. We will take that into account. We will have a serious policy debate over this issue with the May 31 report. We will 

have some insight into where this report is going before that. 

We need to take a hard look at that. It is beyond the State Department. Potentially it goes to the Justice Department. We are a 

long way from me being able to give you a yes answer to that, but, 

believe me, it is going to be a serious, hard look at this. 

In our judgment, and I for one would argue this may be a case 

if it turns out that we have that kind of smoking gun evidence, 

where we would try and lead by example, but we need to see what 

it is at the end of the day. The competent people at Justice and 

others have to take a look at what we get at the end of the day. 

I would not dismiss us taking a lead in that fashion, but it is too 

soon. It is too hypothetical at this point. I do not want to mislead 

you and be up here in 6 months tap dancing. We have not taken 

that decision yet because we do not have the report, the May 31 

report. 

Mr. MEEKS. If I may, Mr. Chairman, just one last question. This 

goes to peace again. 

My question is, is peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 

possible without an effective disarmament, demobilization and resettlement process for the Congo based Hutu armed groups which 

are targeting Burundi and Rwanda? 

Part of the issue with Rwanda, you know, I understand some of 

their issues. It is similar to some of the problems, quite honestly, 

I think that our allies have in Israel. When they had their genocide, no one came to its defense and so, therefore, they are saying 

we are going to protect ourselves because no one has protected us 

before. We have to disarm so the borders are respected, et cetera. 

Rwanda is afraid that the genocide will take place again, and you 

have the individuals coming from the Congo, the Hutu coming 

back. Can peace happen without this resettlement and without disarmament? 

Mr. SNYDER. The short answer is no. It is A key part, which is 

why I am so concerned about that piece of the stool, as I pointed 

out earlier. It can happen in a number of ways, and to think it will 

happen in the pattern and according to the program we designed, 

based on my experience, is not what will happen, but that program 

will do a large number of these people once we get it going. 

27

The Congolese sovereignty, which is one of the objectives we 

have, cannot be restored if there is an armed group whose business 

is elsewhere, whether it is in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Central 

Africa Republic. 

Part of restoring sovereignty is giving the Congolese a national 

entity that has some capacity to enforce its own rules so that the 

neighbors have security. You cannot leave a 25,000 or 40,000 man 

army intact with an agenda elsewhere and have restored sovereignty. We have to deal with this, and that is the ultimate outcome we want. You cannot do any of the rest of this unless you 

have restored sovereignty. 

It does not have to be some highly centralized thing. For example, Mobutu never really ruled the Kivus. In fact, no Congolese government sitting in Kinshasa ever really controlled the Kivus in a 

tight fashion, but sovereignty needs to exist. Responsibility needs 

to exist for that area. I think the Rwandans and the Ugandans in 

the beginning were saying the Congolese government was not taking responsibility and that they had to act in self-defense, a valid 

argument the first time they made it. 

We are a little further down the road now, but your central point 

about the DDRR process is essential. Those people have to be 

brought into the system. I do not want to prejudge whether they 

all have to be resettled. I think a lot of them will probably want 

to be resettled if we get our hands on them in the right way. Some 

of them will not under any circumstances. 

Some of them will be charged with war crimes, genocide and 

other thing, the leadership. Some of the others will disappear, but 

if they disappear in a way that they are not a threat to anybody 

and they really, truly disappear where nobody can find them, that 

is a solution. It is not elegant. It does not go to the issue of justice, 

but it would not shock me if some percentage does that. 

It is a very complex game. We will set up a plan to do the number we think it is, the high number, 40,000. You always plan for 

the worst case. My guess is if this really rolls the right way we will 

do 25,000 or so, and the rest we will find out have resettled on 

their own or are out among the residual armed groups. Some will 

be charged, in the hundreds probably. I do not know the number. 

It is too soon to tell. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. 

I would like to recognize, Mr. Snyder, that diplomatic progress 

has been made, and the Administration has played a key role in 

that, but I would suggest that we add the resource issue as the 

fourth leg of that stool that you mentioned that this will stand on 

because that resource issue is very corrosive. It is undermining the 

very states that we are trying to bring together here. 

From my own perspective on this, in 1997 I authored a bill putting us on record as opposing Mr. Mobutu. Lee Hamilton co-sponsored that bill, as did Mr. Payne. We had the opportunity the week 

or several days after the government fell in Congo to meet with 

Laurent Kabila. We had conversations with him at the time. I had 

suggested a constitution for that country. We had put him in contact with the individual who had written the constitutions for 

28

many of the eastern European governments to try to bring the rule 

of law. 

Today, the bottom line is that we find $4,000,000,000 worth of 

assets, mining assets, in Eastern Congo that the Congolese Government has transferred to the Zimbabwean military officials without 

one dime going into the public purse for the benefit of the Congolese. At the end of the day, we find Rwandan and Ugandan forces 

operating in Eastern Congo using the excuse of security when the 

U.N. now tells us that it is resource exploitation. 

I am hopeful that when the United Nations meets again to work 

out the recommendations and the solution, that the United States 

will take a very hard line with regard to the actions that we take 

against those regimes unless the militaries of those governments 

pull out the criminal elements that are exploiting the resources, 

lose their contracts and let the rule of law come back to Congo. 

That is a message that I think this Congress just needs to share 

with the representatives of those respective governments, and I 

thank you very much for taking the time to testify here today with 

us, Mr. Snyder. 

Mr. SNYDER. Thank you. 

Mr. ROYCE. We are now going to go to our second panel. 

[Pause.] 

Mr. ROYCE. Dr. Francois Grignon is a Central Africa project director for the International Crisis Group. He has worked in East 

Africa since 1993. Prior to joining ICG, he served as deputy director of the French Institute for Research in Africa. 

He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Montesquieu University in Bordeaux, France. His research has focused primarily on the 

democratization process in Kenya, in Uganda and in Tanzania, and 

also on electoral studies and the changing political economy of 

these countries under structural adjustment programs. 

I will note that this panel was to include Dr. Howard Wolpe, a 

former seven term Member of Congress who served for 10 years as 

Chairman of this Subcommittee. Among his many experiences, 

Howard has worked on the Burundi peace process as a former 

Presidential Special Envoy to Africa’s Great Lakes region. Currently, he is consulting director of the Africa Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center. 

Howard very much wanted to be with us today. Staff has been 

in contact with him, and his testimony will be entered in the 

record. He has agreed to answer questions that any of the Members may have for him. 

We will go now. Francois, do you want to take 5 minutes and 

summarize your remarks? Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF FRANCOIS GRIGNON, CENTRAL AFRICA 

PROJECT DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP 

Mr. GRIGNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is indeed a summary of my testimony. Thank you very much again for inviting me 

here to testify on behalf of the International Crisis Group. 

I have lived and done intensive research in East and Central Africa for the past 10 years, during which I had the opportunity to 

meet the Presidents Paul Kagame of Rwanda, Pierre Buyoya of Burundi and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, as well as many other AfVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:41 May 21, 2003 Jkt 086303 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AFRICA\040303\86303 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
29

rican players in the multi-layered conflict of the Great Lakes region. 

The crisis in Central Africa is one of the world’s most complex 

regional conflicts created by originally separate civil wars in Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC and characterized by mass violence and disastrous humanitarian crises. It still poses the most 

difficult moral and political test of the international community’s 

willingness to indeed prevent mass violence and build viable states 

in Africa. 

Today as we speak, as you mentioned, peace processes in Burundi and DRC show signs of hope. On 28 March, the President of 

Burundi announced that he will comply with the terms of the 

Arusha agreement and will hand over power to the non-armed 

Hutu opposition on 1 May, 2003. 

Yesterday, in Sun City, South Africa, the parties to the InterCongolese dialogue, the political chapter of the Lusaka cease-fire 

agreement, signed an inclusive peace agreement and opened the 

way for the installation of a government of national unity in the 

coming months. 

However, many challenges remain in the DRC. The future government of transition will be faced with the uphill task of stopping 

violence, reunifying a country torn by three intertwined series of 

conflicts—regional conflict, national conflict and a series of local 

conflicts—and, of course, the outcome of 30 years of destructive politics by Mobutu Sese Seko. Separatist political forces and ethnic 

warlords, supported by some of Congo’s neighbors, are already creating obstacles to the implementation of the new agreement. 

At the time when the United States is so focused on fighting the 

roots and effects of international disorder and terrorism, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) demands a much higher place on 

its agenda as the country could easily slip back into endless chaos 

and fragmentation. Such statelessness in the Congo carries the 

great risk of offering endless supplies of natural resources for the 

financing of illicit networks of arms, human and drug trafficking, 

as well as terrorism. 

Because the Congo peace process has reached now an implementation stage, a crucial implementation stage, I think it is time for 

the U.S. Government to increase its involvement notably through 

the following steps. 

First, the U.S. Government has to take a leading role to strongly 

warn all foreign actors involved in the Congo conflict that their 

continued presence in the Congo is totally unacceptable. Recent deployment of both Ugandan and Rwandan forces into Eastern Congo 

puts the progress made in the Congo peace process at risk and will 

prevent the reunification and the restoration of national authority 

throughout the country by the future government of transition. 

The U.S. Government should also continue to pressure Joseph 

Kabila to follow through on its Pretoria commitments and participate more actively in the disarmament and demobilization of the 

Rwandan armed groups who have now regrouped and reorganized 

themselves in the Kivus. 

The U.S. Government should also push for the U.N. Security 

Council to give MONUC a more robust mandate, as well as the 

wherewithal to carry out disarmament and demobilization. As long 

30

as MONUC is not given the political and the technical support to 

do it and to restore a minimum of peace and order in Ituri by supporting a neutral authority in charge of pacifying and policing the 

area, external actors will find excuses to come back to the Congo, 

sustain their economic exploitation of natural resources and, in 

fine, that will, of course, undermine the credibility of the peace 

process and of the transitional government. 

Third, we would like the U.S. Government to propose to the 

other permanent members of the Security Council the appointment 

of the high profile Special Representatives of the Secretary General, who are politically respected and with political authority, so 

that MONUC can strongly support the implementation of the peace 

process and actually push the belligerents and the other signatories 

to actually respect their commitment so that this agreement is not 

another document signed with actually no meaning. It must make 

a difference on the ground. 

Fourth, the U.S. Government should also strongly support the establishment of the international committee foreseen in the Pretoria 

agreement that will establish a joint peace bargaining strategy for 

the implementation of the global and inclusive peace agreement 

produced by the Inter-Congolese dialogue. Bilateral and multilateral funding should not be disbursed indiscriminately to the transition government. 

As the previous discussion showed, indeed we need to fix some 

rules on how aid is going to be used in the Congo and how the 

transitional government is going to handle the management of its 

own resources to the benefit of the Congolese population. 

Finally, in coordination with other Western and African partners, 

the U.S. could play indeed a special role in helping to create a reformed national army to establish a regulatory environment and 

codes of conduct for business in the Congo in order to destroy the 

international channels of illicit trade, as well as a tax system that 

would benefit the reconstruction of the country and help give the 

central government a regular source of income. 

There is no alternative option than the reconstruction of the Congolese state to guarantee long-term stabilization of the Great Lakes 

and to prevent criminal use of its natural resources. Such reconstruction, which is currently undermined by some of the Congo’s 

neighbors, requires a concerted effort by the Congolese and the 

international community and needs the leadership and the support 

of the U.S. Government. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Grignon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FRANCOIS GRIGNON, CENTRAL AFRICA PROJECT DIRECTOR, 

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for inviting me here to testify on behalf of 

the International Crisis Group. I have lived and done intensive research in East and 

Central Africa for the past ten years, during which I had the opportunity to meet 

Presidents Paul Kagame of Rwanda, Pierre Buyoya of Burundi and Thabo Mbeki 

of South Africa, as well as many other key African players in the multi-layered conflict of the Great Lakes region. 

The crisis in Central Africa is one of the world’s most complex regional conflicts, 

created by originally separate civil wars in Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and DRC, 

and characterized by mass violence and disastrous humanitarian crises. This crisis 

erupted with the break out of wars in Rwanda (1990) and Burundi (1993), followed 

31

by the genocide in Rwanda (1994) and the war in the ex-Zaire (1996–1997); it still 

poses the most difficult moral and political test of the international community’s 

willingness to prevent mass violence and to build viable states in Africa. 

Today, as we speak, peace processes in Burundi and DRC show signs of hope. On 

28 March, the president of Burundi announced that he will comply with the terms 

of the Arusha agreement and hand over power to the non armed Hutu opposition 

on 1st May 2003. Yesterday in Sun City, South Africa, the parties to the Inter-Congolese dialogue—the political chapter of the Lusaka ceasefire agreement—signed an 

inclusive peace agreement and opened the way for the installation of a government 

of national unity in the coming months. 

However, many challenges remain in the DRC. The future government of transition will be faced with the uphill task of stopping violence, reunifying a country torn 

by three intertwined series of conflicts (regional, national and local) and the outcome of thirty years of destructive politics under Mobutu Sese Seko. Separatist political forces and ethnic warlords supported by Congo’s neighbors are already creating obstacles to the implementation of this new agreement. 

A key entry point into the recent history of the conflict in DRC is the organization 

of the Burundian and Rwandan Hutu armed insurgencies—including perpetrators 

of the Rwandan genocide—in the refugee camps of Eastern Congo. Their presence 

has led to two wars that have affected the whole continent: the first in 1996–1997 

that led to the overthrow of President Mobutu; the second which began in 1998 and 

continues today. The result has been a three and a half year occupation of DRC territory by six foreign armies, the partition of Congo into three separately—administered territories, and the deaths of more than two million people—mostly civilians—

from war, famine and disease. 

The war has contributed to the complete collapse of state authority across the 

DRC, the destruction of economic infrastructure and generated predatory behavior 

from the occupying armies and factions as well as from regional and international 

corporations. The violence committed by multiple armed factions, and the generalized communal division and hostility, have encouraged the emergence of warlords 

and of illegal trade networks of diamonds, minerals, and arms, as documented by 

the UN panel reports on the illegal exploitation of DRC natural resources. 

The regional war has also aggravated several local sub-conflicts, particularly in 

Eastern Congo, leading to destruction of local authority, interethnic killings, the 

fragmentation of rebel groups and new tensions between occupying forces, Rwanda 

and Uganda. 

At a time when the United States is so focused on fighting the roots and effects 

of international disorder and terrorism, the Democratic Republic of Congo demands 

a much higher place on its agenda, as the country could easily slip back into endless 

chaos and fragmentation. Such statelessness in the Congo carries the risk of offering 

endless supplies of natural resources for the financing of illicit networks of arms, 

human and drug trafficking as well as terrorism. 

STATUS OF THE PEACE PROCESS

The 1999 Lusaka Agreement mandated a three-part interlocking process: disarming the non-Congolese armed groups in Eastern Congo; the withdrawal of foreign forces; and an Inter-Congolese Dialogue among government, rebels, unarmed 

opposition and civil society. 

After the failure of the Inter-Congolese dialogue in Sun City in April 2002, the 

South African government and the United Nations took the lead in the mediation 

and brokered a series of security and political agreements providing a number of 

breakthroughs in the peace process. 

On 30th July 2002, the governments of Rwanda and the DRC first signed a bilateral security agreement in Pretoria that traded the dismantlement and disarmament of the Rwandan ex-FAR and Interahamwe by the Congolese government 

against the withdrawal of the Rwandan Defense Forces from the Congo within 90 

days. By early October 2002, under pressure from the US government to show its 

commitment to a political solution of the Congo conflict, Kigali withdrew most of its 

troops from Eastern Congo. Kinshasa expelled the leadership of the main Rwandan 

Hutu rebel group, the Democratic Forces of the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), from 

Congo’s territory and arrested one of its key leaders. 

After Rwanda’s withdrawal, Zimbabwe and Angola decided to complete the withdrawal of their own troops from the Congo. On 6 September 2002, Uganda also 

signed a bilateral security agreement with the DRC government, facilitated by Angola. The agreement traded the withdrawal of the Ugandan army for the organization of a joint security mechanism at the Ugandan border and the establishment 

of a Pacification Commission in the troubled region of Ituri, which borders Uganda. 

32

On 16 December 2002, the parties to the Inter-Congolese dialogue finally concluded an inclusive political agreement for power sharing over a two-year transition 

period. The agreement provides that:

• President Kabila remains Head of State until general elections are held;

• The RCD-Goma, the MLC, the Government and unarmed political opposition 

are each granted a Vice-presidential position with different strategic portfolios;

• The five components of the Inter-Congolese dialogue will share 61 other Minister and deputy-Minister positions, more than 400 positions in the National 

Assembly and Senate, as well as other key government positions;

• A follow-up committee to the agreement, chaired by President Kabila and 

composed of the signatories, is created to facilitate the installation of the new 

institutions of transition;

• An international committee is proposed to assist the parties in implementing 

the agreement;

• An interim neutral international force, as well as bodyguards, will be deployed to ensure the security of the transitional institutions and leaders in 

Kinshasa. The force will be replaced by an integrated police force composed 

of the different parties to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.

Three months later, on 6 March 2003, the parties also finalized a Constitution of 

transition and agreed on a roadmap for the integration of all belligerent forces in 

a new reformed national army. 

The progress made in the negotiations unfortunately contrasts dramatically with 

the situation on the ground and the continued political fragmentation and humanitarian deterioration of the situation in the East of the country. Despite their respective commitments, the DRC government, Rwanda and Uganda continue to fight a 

proxy war in Eastern Congo which clearly jeopardizes the implementation of the political agreements signed in Pretoria. The de-facto partition of the Congo between 

three zones of influence—those of the Kinshasa Government, MLC, and RCDGoma—risks producing further fragmentation and opening the way to claims of regional autonomy. Supported by Kigali and Kampala, an increasing number of ethnic 

warlords already claim control and authority on small parts of the national territory 

and reject the outcome of the current peace process. 

SCORCHED EARTH IN THE KIVUS

The Kivus have been known as the Congo’s powder keg; ethnic massacres first 

exploded there in the 1990s and regional war broke out in 1996 and 1998. Indeed, 

the Kivus were at the centre of three intricately linked conflicts inherited from Belgian colonialism, 30 years of misrule under Mobutu and institutionalization of ethnic discrimination against Kinyarwanda-speaking citizens, and the extension of the 

Burundian, Rwandan and Ugandan civil wars. The Kivu situation is now complicated by the direct military involvement of external actors, multiplication of local 

warlords and active exploitation of natural resources by both. All regional actors are 

making strong efforts to mould the provinces to their own strategic needs. The withdrawal of most Rwandan and Ugandan troops in 2002 has not fundamentally 

changed this dynamic. 

The Rwandan Hutu armed groups, which set off the conflict in 1998, have now 

all regrouped in the mountains of the Kivu regions of Eastern Congo, beyond the 

control of both the Kinshasa government and the Rwanda supported rebels of the 

RCD-Goma. All sides have acknowledged that they must be disarmed, demobilized, 

repatriated to Rwanda, reintegrated and resettled there or in a third country—a UN 

process known as DDRRR. However, no one—not even the Rwandan army, arguably 

the best military force in Africa—has managed to actually accomplish this. The 

Hutu groups are still allied to the local Mai Mai militias, themselves supported by 

Kinshasa and refuse to disarm without a political negotiation with Kigali. The UN 

observer mission’s (MONUC) has an insufficient mandate to negotiate voluntary disarmament and lacks the military capacity to isolate the Hutu militias and prevent 

them from launching cross border infiltrations and operations of destabilization in 

Rwanda and Burundi . The task forces in charge of DDRRR for Kisangani and 

Kindu—hundreds of kilometers from the field of operations—will neither deter the 

militias nor influence them to negotiate, let alone opt to disarm. As a result, voluntary operations of disarmament have been extremely limited and Rwanda’s security concerns have not been dealt with. 

Under heavy international pressure, especially from the U.S., Rwanda has 

changed tactics by pulling most of its troops out. But it has reorganized militarily, 

33

creating a rapid reaction force under the disguise of the RCD-Goma. Rwanda recently redeployed up to several thousands troops in the Congo. Kigali has also found 

alternative allies on the ground to the national RCD leadership who hold the real 

power in Goma and Bukavu, and sponsors separatist movements for the Kivus. 

Rwanda now seems less interested in controlling Kinshasa and has resolved to consolidate its long-term influence in Eastern Congo by making the most out of the 

Kivus—a policy akin to that on which Uganda embarked several years ago. 

CHAOS IN ITURI

On 6 March 2003, the Ugandan army redeployed up to 4,000 men into the troubled region of Ituri. This was done with the tacit support of the Congolese government, with which Kampala has operated a strategic ‘‘rapprochement’’ over the last 

year. The official justification of this military operation was to remove a recalcitrant 

ethnic warlord who opposed the establishment of the Ituri Pacification Commission, 

which was created by the bilateral Uganda-DRC Agreement signed in Angola. Yet, 

the Ugandan army also has a huge responsibility for the current lawlessness that 

characterizes its neighboring Congolese territories. For the past five years, Uganda 

has enthroned and dethroned the successive leaders of Ituri, regardless of their responsibilities in local communal violence and for the sole purpose of maintaining 

control over the exploitation of Ituri’s resources (gold, diamond, timber). All ethnic 

groups of Ituri have now formed their own militias and are prepared to fight for 

a share of the natural resources they were denied access to for so many years. The 

political fragmentation of eastern Congo will only end if foreign forces totally withdraw and an independent Congolese pacification and reconciliation process supported by a MONUC peacekeeping force takes place. 

Ituri is also the theatre of a proxy war between Rwanda and Uganda. The Ugandan government is convinced that Ituri had become a platform for the destabilization of its western provinces by a new Ugandan rebel group supported by Rwanda, 

the People’s Redemption Army (PRA). For its part, Rwanda accused Kampala of 

supporting ex-FAR and Interahamwe militias in North Kivu and preparing a destabilization campaign of its western provinces. The distrust between Rwanda and 

Uganda over their alleged respective activities in the Congo and support to their respective rebel movements dates back to the beginning of the second Congo war. In 

1999 and 2000, the Uganda and Rwandan armies fought three times for the control 

of the town of Kisangani. Uganda was beaten every time. By the end of 2001, a new 

peak of tension had to be defused by the intervention of the British government and 

led to the establishment of a verification mechanism of the allegations traded by the 

two governments. 

After Uganda’s recent redeployment in North-eastern Congo, Rwanda demanded 

from the UN Security Council that Uganda be forced to withdraw immediately from 

Bunia or it would take the necessary action to preserve its own security. This time, 

the government of South Africa took the initiative to mediate between the two countries and managed to defuse the tension. Yet, as long as Rwanda and Uganda are 

not held accountable by their Western allies and supporters for their undermining 

of the implementation of the Congo peace process, the chances of its success will 

remain extremely weak. 

A STRATEGY FOR THE US GOVERNMENT

Because the Congo peace process has reached its crucial implementation stage, it 

is time for the US government to increase its involvement, notably through the following steps:

1. The US government should strongly warn all foreign actors involved in the 

Congo conflict that their continued presence in the Congo is unacceptable. 

Recent redeployment of both Rwanda and Uganda forces into Eastern Congo 

puts the progress made in the Congo peace process at risk, and will prevent 

the reunification and restoration of national authority throughout the country by the future transition government. Uganda has to withdraw its forces 

as soon as possible from Ituri to be replaced by a neutral peacekeeping force. 

The UPDF should start immediately by removing the armored vehicle and 

heavy artillery it deployed in Bunia. Keeping the security of Bunia and its 

surroundings does not require such heavy equipment. Rwanda should also be 

warned that keeping troops in the Congo under the disguise of the RCDGoma will not be tolerated. Rwanda does not suffer currently from any kind 

of destabilization attempt from the Kivus and has no justification for redeploying under cover into the Congo. The US government should also continue 

to pressure Kabila to follow through on its Pretoria commitments and participate more actively in the DDRRR of Rwandan armed groups.

34

2. The US government must push for the UN Security Council to give MONUC 

a peacekeeping mandate, as well as the wherewithal to carry out the DDRRR 

process. As long as MONUC is not given the political and technical support 

to do it and to restore a minimum of peace and order in Ituri by supporting 

a neutral authority in charge of pacifying and policing the area, external actors will find excuses to come back to the Congo, sustain their economic exploitation of the Congo’s resources and, in fine, undermine the credibility of 

the future transitional government. 

The US government should therefore propose to the other P5 of the Security Council:

• The appointment of a high-profile and politically respected SRSG for 

MONUC to support the implementation of the Congo peace process in its 

political and security chapters. The SRSG should in particular: a. take 

the leadership of the international committee provided by the 16 December Pretoria agreement to help with the formation of the institutions of 

transition, the creation of unified national army, and the restoration of 

the DRC sovereignty; b. lead the political negotiations for the DDRRR of 

the FDLR in the Kivus and help the government of transition to achieve 

local reconciliation prior to any elections; c. immediately intervene to 

verify and report on any foreign forces redeployment in the Congo;

• The strengthening of MONUC’s capacities to do effective DDRRR and to 

monitor border security between Congo, Rwanda and Burundi, and provision for the means to pacify and police the region of Ituri. MONUC does 

not necessarily need many more troops. UN Security Council resolution 

1445 of 4 December 2002 already authorized the deployment of 3,000 additional personnel taking its deployment to a total of 8,775. But MONUC 

needs to make the most out of its contingent, with a new mandate and 

concept of operation allowing if necessary the use of force to oppose the 

destabilization of Rwanda and to disarm ethnic militias in Ituri.

• The authorization of the international neutral force that will ensure 

Kinshasa’s security by the UN Security Council. The coordination of the 

neutral force’s activities and of the training of the integrated police force 

should be done under MONUC’s authority.

3. The US government should strongly support the establishment of the international committee foreseen in the Pretoria agreement that will establish a 

joint peace-bargaining strategy for the implementation of the global and inclusive peace agreement produced by the Inter-Congolese dialogue. Bilateral 

and multilateral funding should not be disbursed indiscriminately to the 

transition government.

4. Finally, in coordination with other Western and African partners, the U.S. 

could play a special role in helping to create a reformed army, integrating 

the FAC, the RCD and the MLC as well as the smaller rebel groups and the 

Mai Mai militias; to train the Congolese integrated police force; and to establish a regulatory environment and codes of conduct for business in Congo, 

in order to destroy the international channels for illicit trade, as well as a 

tax system that would benefit the reconstruction of the country and help give 

the central government a regular source of income.

Without strong international involvement, the Congolese state will remain incapable of reestablishing security on its territory. There is no alternative option than the 

reconstruction of the Congolese State to guarantee long term stabilization of the 

Great Lakes, and to prevent criminal use of its natural resources. Such reconstruction, which is currently undermined by its neighbors, requires a concerted effort by 

the Congolese and the international community and needs the leadership and support of the United States government. 

Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. 

Doctor, I was going to ask you about the challenge we have had 

with hate radio in the region in the past and whether you have any 

information that these types of broadcasts are occurring again. Is 

there anyone trying to use these types of messages in the region 

in order to stir up ethnic division and unrest? 

Mr. GRIGNON. Right now, the Economist Weekly reported last 

week that indeed President Kabila was supporting hate radio, 

35

which is based in Bunia and which has actually worked against the 

disarmament of the armed groups by inciting the armed Hutu 

rebels to actually keep on fighting. This is, of course, highly detrimental to the peace process, and it must be stopped. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let me go to the point that I made with our last witness. How has the pillaging of Eastern Congo’s bountiful resources 

complicated the search for peace? 

Also, how credible do you think it is that we can put an end to 

those types of contracts between criminal elements and the governments that have set up these arrangements? 

Mr. GRIGNON. Well, there are different elements to a strategy. I 

think indeed there is need to act in order to stop the illegal exploitation of resources, but we also must understand that exploitation 

of resources sustains the lives of many Congolese. 

We talked about the exploitation of diamonds in the region of 

Kasai. Thousands of diggers are living through the exploitation. 

The problem is many Congolese do not get a fair deal for the exploitation of the resources of their own region. It is true in the east. 

It is true in Kasai. 

The second aspect is that the countries of the region perceive the 

foreign or let us say the Western involvement in the Congo and especially in economic activities in the Congo as a way to sideline 

them, and they do want to have their share in the exploitation of 

resources. The issue of legality and illegality is usually pushed 

away because they say by the way, there has never been really a 

clean business in the Congo. 

From the early colonial days it was actually embedded in an attempt to extort as much resources as possible from the Congo to 

the post-colonial days where there was heavy foreign investment in 

the exploitation of resources. We have seen a country which has 

been systematically exploited for its resources at the expense of the 

Congolese population. 

What we need to find is indeed some regulatory system and some 

legal tools in order to restrict to the minimum the possibilities for 

illegal contracts or contracts with some benefit to the Congolese to 

be signed, but we also need to have a real strategy for the region 

to work together toward standards of regional integration and 

standards of regulation of trade in Central Africa so that trade and 

economic activities not only benefit the Congolese, but also their 

neighbors because there is no other option also for the many parts 

of the Congo than to work with your neighbors. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let me go back, and we will try to do that through 

the United Nations. Let me go back though, to my question about 

the radio broadcasts. 

We had a debate. Some years ago I raised the issue of the radio 

broadcasts that were being made to the Hutu population encouraging them to slaughter the Rwandan Tutsi population. At that 

time, I remember that there was a lawyer in the State Department 

who argued that we should not be in the business of trying to silence hate radio; that that was in some way a violation of free 

speech if the United States attempted to jam that broadcast. I disagreed vehemently with that position. 

Would you say that our government or the international community should be looking at jamming or blocking these messages that 

36

are emanating out of Congo on the basis of ethnic hatred that are 

again hate radio broadcasts? Should we look at closing those down? 

Mr. GRIGNON. Absolutely. It is very, very important, and actually 

it is also one of the key trust and confidence building measures 

that should be taken on the part of the Congolese Government to 

actually show its true commitment to end this conflict and to respect its commitments to the 30 July Pretoria agreements where 

Joseph Kabila committed himself to help in the disarmament of the 

ex-FAR and Interahamwe. 

Secondly, these broadcasts worked directly against the work of 

MONUC. MONUC has set up in the Congo local radio, which is 

called Radio Okapi which has been broadcasting from Goma and 

Bucabo in Eastern Congo messages encouraging the Rwandan 

Hutus to actually go back home, to get disarmed voluntarily, so 

this radio actually goes against the peace process. 

Mr. ROYCE. My last question. Can I get a copy of the broadcast 

from you? If you happen to have a translation of the broadcast, it 

would be helpful to me. 

Mr. GRIGNON. I will get them for you. 

Mr. ROYCE. I will talk with you afterwards. Again, thank you for 

making the trip here to testify before our panel today. 

We will now go to Mr. Payne, who is the Ranking Member of this 

Committee. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I would like to associate myself with the remarks of the Chairman regarding the hate radio. 

As you may recall, it was Radio Tele Libre Mille Collines during 

the time the genocide was going on that started to insist that people get involved with modern Hutus and then with Tutsis. The 

radio was continually pushing it. We both suggested that it be 

taken out by our government, but they refused to do that. I think 

that much of what happened might have been stymied. 

The other question is Laurent Kabila did some hate business before he passed away, for several years before he died, doing the 

same, telling people in the Congo that you know what those Tutsis 

look like. Use your hoe and use your rakes and go in and attack 

them. You may recall that. It is disturbing to once again hear that 

this kind of thing is going on again. 

I had the privilege to meet on a number of occasions even before 

the father Kabila took over when he just took over in Goma right 

after the 2,000,000 refugees left from Lake Goma back to when the 

Interahamwe were being pushed out by Mobutu and the Banyamulenge people were being pushed out, and that is when they 

joined force with the Kabila force and the Rwandans. 

The whole destabilization with the Interahamwe still being 

there, some of the ex-FAR, part of the agreement was that President Kabila would expel or turn over at least the Interahamwe to 

the Government of Rwanda, therefore taking away the argument 

that Kagame’s forces had to remain in the Eastern Congo to protect 

their border. 

It is a little disturbing that total cooperation has not happened. 

On my last trip there we did have a chance to meet with President 

Kabila, President Kagame, President Museveni. We met Mr. 

Buyoya, we met with the Vice President, and we met with the leaders of RCD Goma. We met with everyone up in the area. 

37

As it is indicated, there are a large number of diverse groups. 

Perhaps the only question might be what do you feel would be necessary not only from the United States’ standpoint, but from the 

EU to see this agreement that at least has been tentatively struck? 

What is necessary to see it move forward and to be irreversible? 

Mr. GRIGNON. Well, first of all, we would like to see the member 

states and the U.S. Government work together for the creation of 

the international community in Kinshasa as soon as possible to 

show the Congolese population and to show the signatories of the 

agreement that the international community is watching, the international community is concerned, and the international community 

wants this process to move forward. There is no better sign than 

actually seeing this international community be created. 

Second of all, some initiatives should be taken for the creation 

of mutual force and for the support of MONUC in this respect. Mutual force is going to be in charge of guaranteeing the security of 

all the members of government in Kinshasa, and it is important 

that it is supported by the different western governments who are 

likely to give it also credibility, especially in the eyes of the Congolese population. 

Another very important point also is to show to the governments 

of the region who are extremely doubtful about the success of this 

peace process, about the possibility for the Congolese to actually 

work together and achieve anything, to show them that there is 

knowledge and there is concern from the United States Government, that there is a tendency to undermine that peace process, 

and any return of troops in the Congo is unacceptable, will not be 

tolerated and will actually be counterproductive for those countries 

because they would have to be accountable for their actions in the 

Congo. 

We are geared for this position to be taken after the Kisangani 

fighting between Rwanda and Uganda, and when we see the degradation of the situation between those two countries and this coalition, the possibility of escalation of conflict between them in Eastern Congo right now, I think again to tell those countries that they 

will have to be accountable for what they do in the Congo is an important step to be taken by the U.S. Government and the international community at large. 

There were times when they could do whatever they wanted in 

the Congo because we had a collapsed state. However, we have now 

a peace process. We are supporting that peace process, and we are 

going to help it by countering any action of countries who are undermining it. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. I think, Mr. Chairman, perhaps we could 

get a note or a communication to our Secretary of State urging Mr. 

Powell to be in communication with both Presidents to urge them 

to abide by the new peace accord that is there and that we would 

appreciate their cooperation and perhaps go back to their own borders. 

Mr. ROYCE. We are going to go to Mr. Tancredo. Go ahead. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Grignon, you seem to me to present a series of observations 

far more aggressive in nature in terms of how you think the United 

38

States ought to respond here than did the previous speaker, Mr. 

Snyder. 

As you heard perhaps, he said on more than one occasion or at 

more than one time in his presentation that you have to rely heavily upon Africa to solve these African problems. He presented it in 

a way so as to make me feel anyway that the challenge to us is 

to instigate that kind of African dialogue. 

Now, you suggested a far more aggressive posture for the United 

States. You said several times that we have to make it clear to 

these countries that their involvement is not welcome, and that is 

all fine and dandy, but really and truly what is the stick that we 

have, because I am not sure how many carrots we have. 

Let us look, for instance, at just this one issue of the exploitation 

of the resources. If we are to suggest that sanctions would be applied, for instance, against countries who are meddling in the 

Congo, you would have to say that the sanctions would have to be 

more difficult for them and cost them more than they are making 

essentially from the exploitation of the minerals. What does it benefit them to say okay, we better stop doing that? 

I mean, can we really and truly create such an environment? 

What do we really have? Again, sanctions have all kinds of other 

outcomes, maybe unintended, in terms of the way individuals in 

the region are treated and whether or not real help can get to them 

under sanction regimes. 

I guess I am wondering. If in fact you want us to act that much 

more aggressively than what I heard Mr. Snyder say, and maybe 

I am misinterpreting your remarks, how exactly do we do that? 

Just saying things like we have to force them to, we have to encourage them to, we have to demand this or that, in reality you 

have to have something to back that up. Do you know what I 

mean? 

We have to have something that we can use, both carrots and 

sticks and mortar, to make it happen because they are certainly 

not going to do it just because Secretary Powell calls them up and 

says come on you guys. Go back to square one. 

Mr. GRIGNON. African solutions for African problems is actually 

an important approach indeed in the DRC conflict and the Great 

Lakes conflict at large, but we also have to remember that the African problems that led to that conflict or the sources or the conflict 

are not strictly African, so there is still a western responsibility in 

this conflict and in particular in the situation of the Congo State. 

What are the tools that indeed can be used? MONUC is one tool. 

Mr. TANCREDO. I am sorry? 

Mr. GRIGNON. MONUC. The U.N. mission for the Congo is one 

tool. So far, MONUC has been limited to a very minimal role in 

the peace process. Now with the time of implementation——

Mr. TANCREDO. And why is that, by the way? What do you think 

has restricted that role specifically? 

Mr. GRIGNON. MONUC has had a very limited role in part because the negotiations were not over for the transition. It was difficult in order to take any other when you had some limitations on 

the basic consensus for the organization of the Congo State to actually be reached. 

39

You had to finish the negotiations. You also had to have concluded implementation of that peace process, in particular the 

Inter-Congolese dialogue, so that MONUC could help implementation. At the same time, MONUC was given very little political support in its role for the observation of the cease-fire, but especially 

for DDRR. We can see right now that the DDRR operation in the 

Kivus has not delivered results. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Yes. 

Mr. GRIGNON. MONUC needs political, technical and financial 

support to do this. This would mean that the conceptive operation 

and the mandate of MONUC be changed so that it can make a difference, and also it can actually operationalize DDRR through political negotiation. 

The process of disarmament and demobilization is not only a 

technical process where people—you know, you do not administer 

it. You do not just manage it in a way where you offer the possibilities to people who want to disarm just to go home. You have to deal 

with aggressive armed groups which were organized which have 

military capacity, and also one of the problems is that there is a 

direct connection between the positions and the strategy of this 

armed group and the situation inside Rwanda. 

The issue of DDRR cannot be dealt only in the context of the 

Congo peace process. It is also an internal Rwandan issue. If you 

do not have a special envoy of the U.N. with strong political mandate, with strong political authority that actually engages those 

people that are in the Kivus and tell them these are the boundaries 

of what you would be allowed to do and not to do, but voluntary 

disarmament does not mean that we do not recognize that you may 

have some problems inside Rwanda. 

You must also tell them that there are guarantees which are possible to establish, and there is a dialogue with the Government of 

Rwanda is possible, but in a certain framework. You have to come 

clean on the genocide. You have to come clean on the involvement 

and on your own desire to actually succeed in reconciliation inside 

Rwanda. 

It is very much a political process, and right now MONUC does 

not have a mandate to do that. It does not have a mandate to engage, to engage to lead this political process. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. 

We are going to go to Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a couple brief questions. 

From what I am hearing of the Great Lakes region, what is its 

blessing, it is probably also its curse. As I look at the rest of the 

other witness questions with regard to Rwanda and as I look at 

Uganda, for example, where they have begun to turn their economy 

around, where they have reduced the incidences of HIV and AIDS 

and going back into the kinds of things that would seem to be 

hopeful for not only Uganda, but would spread, therefore, into the 

other territories, I am still baffled why it does not. Maybe I am. 

Maybe I am not. 

40

Let me ask you first off. In your view, what would you say are 

the top three causes—not the symptoms, but the causes—of the 

war in the Congo and the instability in the region? 

Mr. GRIGNON. A collapse of the Congo State, the war in Rwanda, 

especially the externalization of the war inside the Congo and the 

fact that it became generally a regional war, and I think the third 

important cause which has come up especially in the past few 

years is the search for resources in the Congo, which is generally 

a problem of governance and a problem of absence of good governance in the Congo, but in the entire region, also in countries neighboring the Congo. 

Mr. MEEKS. I am glad you said that because I thought that you 

had mentioned earlier, and I think that is what you are talking 

about, the need for creating institutions and structures and laws 

regarding and regulating and supervising the development and the 

exportation of Congo’s resources in ways which benefit the people. 

We have talked about that, earlier I asked Mr. Snyder whether 

or not the U.S. could lead by example by going after U.S. companies that may be doing things there that did not benefit the people. 

The problem with that is that I find in various regions, but the 

Congo in particular, there are organizations like the IMF involved 

in economic policy reforms in the Congo. Is anyone putting those 

kinds of resources in the area? We talk here a lot about and hear 

support for trade liberalization and privatization in the Congo, but 

I very rarely hear about any building on the kinds of regulatory authorities that must take place for an economy to work. 

It seems to me that what makes this economy is we have our 

regulatory authorities. We have had problems here, but because of 

the bodies of the institutions we have in place we are able to catch 

them and then, you know, fix them in essence. Those kinds of regulatory systems are not even in place, you know, to stop corruption, 

to make sure that the money is coming back to benefit the people. 

Do you know of any money that is going to help institutions and 

regulatory authority and things of that nature in the Congo? 

Mr. GRIGNON. The creation of these institutions is actually one 

of the most important outcomes of the Inter-Congolese dialogue. 

The meeting in Sun City of the economic and financial commission 

actually outlined a series of measures and regulatory measures to 

recreate those institutions and to recreate the capacity to do, you 

know, legal business. A code of investment is one of the key issues 

actually, the taxation code, et cetera. 

Right now we have, as Secretary Snyder said, a good document, 

which is the series of resolutions which were negotiated and voted 

at the Inter-Congolese dialogue. What we must ensure now is that 

these are implemented. We have a tool. This tool has been endorsed by the Congolese themselves. They promised they are going 

to use it. They promised that they are going to put them in place 

to run their country, to set up systems and the kinds of good governance in the country. 

I think it is the responsibility now of the international community at large, of the financial institutions, to take the Congolese, 

you know, and ask them. Okay, we will support you if you respect 

your own commitment and we can see that good governance is actually being implemented in the Congo because you have negoVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:41 May 21, 2003 Jkt 086303 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AFRICA\040303\86303 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
41

tiated in Sun City, and you have defined the rules. Now abide by 

the rules. If you abide by the rules, we will bring support. 

Mr. MEEKS. Is that happening now? Do you see that the international community and the financial institutions are coming to 

provide the funds, as well as the expertise to set up such regulatory systems? 

Mr. GRIGNON. There is some willingness in the international 

community to actually provide the expertise to help the Congolese 

reorganize, rebuild and set up the necessary mechanisms that they 

agreed on principle to put in place during the Inter-Congolese dialogue. 

Mr. MEEKS. I know I am out of time. Just one last quick question, something similar that I asked the Secretary that I will ask 

you. 

In your opinion, why has disarmament, demobilization, resettlement, reintegration, that whole process, why is it moving at such 

a slow pace? I do not think that, as indicated, peace can happen 

without it. Why do you think it is moving at such a slow pace, and 

what can be done to accelerate it? 

Mr. GRIGNON. It has moved at a very slow pace because the basic 

rule demanding even for MONUC to proceed with it was voluntary 

disarmament, and a number of members of the armed groups 

which are currently in the Kivus and which were previously in the 

Congolese army did not want to go back to Rwanda, be disarmed 

and go back to Rwanda, so they kept on fighting. 

There was no negotiation. There was also no, I would say, muscle, no political or military support to back up that negotiation. 

That is what we are arguing for. If we have a situation whereby 

those armed groups who are currently in the Kivus have a free way 

to come back to Rwanda or to Burundi and do their military operations, there is no position from the international community and 

MONUC. 

Actually, there are two consequences. First, it justifies the reintervention of Rwanda in the Congo and Burundi or Uganda. Second, DDRR cannot work. You must back the negotiation with some 

capacity to deter those infiltrations, to deter the destabilization of 

Rwanda and Burundi and to actually show those people that they 

are in a dead end. They are in a dead end in the hands of the 

Congo. 

If they want to go back home, if even they want to have a dialogue, a political dialogue, there is a beginning. The beginning is 

to put down your weapon because the armed interaction is not the 

solution. That message needs to be backed up by some military 

support to deter them from going on. Right now, we do not have 

that kind of situation. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you. 

Mr. ROYCE. Congresswoman Lee from California? 

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for this hearing. 

I am sorry I was delayed. 

This is a region of the world which I am very interested, as all 

of us are, and concerned about. One of the issues that I often raise 

is that of the whole HIV/AIDS pandemic. In the region, in the 

Congo, in Burundi and in other areas where there is conflict or 

42

there is a transition period, it is hard to get kind of below the radar 

and see what is going on in terms of humanitarian efforts. 

What is going on? Is HIV/AIDS at a crisis of pandemic proportion 

in the Congo? Do we have faith based organizations providing medical assistance? Could you just give us a sense of what is happening with the people in this region at this point and what would 

be an appropriate role for the United States, if any, right now? 

Mr. GRIGNON. Well, the conflict has been going on now for almost 

7 years. The IRC published some figures saying that there were 

2,000,000 to 3,000,000 people who died as a consequence of the conflict. That means that you may have another equal number or even 

more who actually have been displaced because of the conflicts. 

In this respect, the regions of the Kivus and Northeastern Congo 

in particular is really a scorched earth. They have suffered tremendously from the fighting, which has not stopped. Not only refugees, 

but internally displaced Congolese have actually been moving 

around the Congo in the forest with absolutely no care and no support for years now. 

Of course you have underground NGOs and you have faith organizations that actually try to provide some care and some support, 

but this is beyond the needs. I mean, the situation is such a disaster that the peace process now has reached a stage where it also 

needs to deliver in this respect. 

It needs to transform itself from a series of documents signed in 

a luxury resort in South Africa into actually a number of policies 

and a number of initiatives that would make a difference for the 

people of the Congo and that would actually help them deal with 

the pandemic which, as you may guess, is absolutely horrendous 

because of the war, because of the displacements of populations, because of the fighting. 

Ms. LEE. So in terms of the United States, our role, how do you 

see that? Should it be ensuring that USAID is there in a more 

prominent way? Should it be supporting more multilateral assistance? What do you think we should do? 

Mr. GRIGNON. The U.S. role has been quite important in terms 

of supporting the humanitarian operations in the Congo, but, of 

course, now is the time to step up, to step up to be able to make 

a difference, to step up to show that, you know, there is a window 

of opportunity to make an opportunity and that this can end because it also brings confidence in the process. We are talking about 

financial support, of course, but also supporting the Congolese, a 

number of initiatives to actually support the Congolese who, you 

know, lead the organizations that can reach most people. 

The Congo is a country as big as western Europe. You need to 

involve the Congolese civil society in this effort, and you need right 

now to step up, you know, the commitment in terms of the American Government, USAID and the other institutions involved in humanitarian relief need to step up their commitment and their support to these organizations to increase their outreach to the populations. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Congresswoman Lee. 

Dr. Grignon, thank you very much for your testimony here today. 

I think in addition there is also the effective use of leverage. One 

43

case would be the IMF loan to Rwanda in 2002. It was used effectively at the time to get Rwandan troops out of Eastern Congo. 

Now, if they are filtering back in or not is a question for us to look 

at today. 

The way in which the international community can work in tandem to bring pressure to bear using these international institutions 

is something that we are going to continue to look at. 

We appreciate your paper that you have contributed here today 

and your testimony. Thank you so much. 

This meeting stands adjourned. 

Mr. GRIGNON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. ROYCE. For the record, I do have some testimony that I want 

to submit. We have a statement by Anne C. Edgerton of Refugees 

International, and we have joint testimony by Ken Hackett of 

Catholic Relief Services and Gerard Powers of the U.S. Conference 

of Catholic Bishops. Without objection, we will submit those for the 

record. 

Thank you again. We are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:59 p.m. the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(45)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HOWARD WOLPE, CONSULTING DIRECTOR, THE AFRICA

PROJECT, THE WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: 

I welcome this opportunity to testify on the crisis in Africa’s Great Lakes Region. 

This hearing is particularly timely, given very significant recent developments in 

the evolution of both the Congolese and Burundi peace processes. By way of background, I should indicate that I have been deeply engaged in the Great Lakes Region since 1995, either as a consultant to the National Democratic Institute or to 

the World Bank, or as Presidential Special Envoy to the Burundi peace process and 

the Great Lakes region. Currently, I am leading a Burundi leadership training 

project that is being run out of the Woodrow Wilson International Center, with 

funding by the World Bank. Since last October, I have traveled to Central and 

Southern Africa on four occasions, meeting with key Burundian leaders; with persons in South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda that have been actively involved in the 

facilitation of the Burundi and Congolese peace processes; and with a number of analysts and diplomats who have been closely tracking Great Lakes developments. 

My remarks this afternoon will focus on Burundi—because, in my view, the impact of the Burundian conflict on the Great Lakes crisis is often overlooked. Moreover, the Burundi peace process is at a decisive turning point, a historical moment 

characterized both by peril and by significant opportunity. In my view, actions of 

the region and the international community in the weeks and months ahead will 

have a major bearing on whether the progress that has been achieved to this point 

will be sustained, or whether there will be a serious retrogression into intensified 

political conflict, more violence and greater regional instability. I believe that the 

United States, together with others in the international community, can—by judicious interventions—play a decisive role in assisting Burundi in consolidating its 

fragile peace process. 

BURUNDI AND THE GREAT LAKES REGION

Burundi is a small country. No larger than the state of Maryland. A population 

numbering just over 6 million. 

But the dimensions of the human tragedy that has played itself out in Burundi 

since the country’s independence in 1960, are anything but diminutive: an estimated 

400,000 killed; some 800,000 forced to flee the country, many tens of thousands internally displaced. Indeed, the human catastrophe that is Burundi is dwarfed in Africa only by its equally diminutive neighbor, Rwanda, which in 1994 saw up to one 

million of its population fall victim to genocide. 

Moreover, the ramifications of the Burundi conflict have extended far beyond Burundi itself. Indeed, the conflict between Tutsi and Hutu in Burundi, as in Rwanda, 

is at the heart of the Great Lakes crisis, producing massive refugee flows, 

insurgencies and cross-border violence. 

Nor can the Burundi conflict be fully understood, or resolved, without reference 

to the wider region. For the Tutsi/Hutu schism within Burundi and the war within 

the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have been inter-linked. Not only have 

armed groups operated across national borders, but a number of regional states 

have been interested parties in both conflicts. Moreover, Burundian political dynamics have been directly impacted by events in Rwanda and the DRC, just as Burundian developments have affected the perspectives and actions of both Rwandans and 

the Congolese. 

Let there be no mistake: the failure of the Burundi peace process will mean not 

only increased suffering for the Burundian population, but will jeopardize all of the 

46

ongoing efforts to disarm and demobilize armed groups operating within the eastern 

Democratic Republic of the Congo, and will have significant negative consequences 

for all of central and southern Africa. 

INTRACTABILITY OF THE CONFLICT

The conflict between Tutsi and Hutu, both in Rwanda and Burundi, is unique to 

the African continent in that it is the only instance in which inter-communal violence has produced genocide. Most Americans are cognizant of the horrific 1994 

Rwandan genocide, which claimed the lives of up to one million persons, predominantly of Tutsi ethnicity but including as well many moderate Hutus. What is less 

well known is that the first regional genocide took place in Burundi, in 1972, in 

which approximately 150,000 educated Hutus were systematically massacred. And, 

beyond these two tragic moments of mass death there have been many other episodes, both in Rwanda and in Burundi, in which thousands of people—both Tutsi 

and Hutu—have been killed either in inter-communal violence, or as the result of 

indiscriminant killing of civilians either by rebel forces or by national armies. 

But, in addition to the endemic violence, there is a second recurrent theme in contemporary Burundian political life: the economic and political dominance of the minority Tutsi (comprising an estimated 14% of the population), in combination with 

the systematic exclusion of the Hutu majority (approximately 84% of the population) 

from key social, economic and political institutions. 

It is this combination of extreme political and economic inequality, on the one 

hand, and recurrent inter-communal mass violence, on the other, that has made the 

conflict between Tutsi and Hutu perhaps the most intractable conflict in Africa. 

There is virtually no Burundian commune or family that has not been affected in 

some way by this history. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that fear and 

insecurity, and a reciprocal demonization of the two groups, have given rise to exceedingly low levels of inter-communal trust and confidence—and to a pattern of 

pre-emptive violence, each side fearing that restraint invites vulnerability. 

THE ARUSHA AGREEMENT AND THE UNRESOLVED ISSUES

On August 28, 2000, enormous pressure from Burundi peace process Facilitator 

Nelson Mandela and regional leaders resulted in the signing of the Arusha Peace 

Accord by all but a few of the nineteen delegations who had participated in its negotiation. But this political agreement notwithstanding, at the time of the August 

signing the Burundi peace process was still very much a work in progress, having 

left unresolved three of the most contentious and fundamental issues: Who would 

lead the 36-month transition? How would the critical issues of Army reform and the 

integration of armed forces be handled? And what would it take to get the two principal armed groups who were absent from the Arusha negotiations to lay down their 

arms and participate in the newly established Transitional institutions? 

The first of these questions was ultimately resolved by the issuance of a Mandela 

fiat—President Pierre Buyoya would preside over the Transitional government for 

eighteen months, and a Hutu president would take over for the second half of the 

Transition. This understanding was enshrined within a new Transitional Constitution and, only last week, President Buyoya, in an address to his nation, confirmed 

that on May 1—four weeks from now—he will hand over presidential power to the 

current vice-president, Domitien Ndayizeye. 

But the other critical issues remain unresolved. On December 3, 2002, a landmark 

cease-fire agreement was reached between the government and the principal armed 

rebel group, the CNDD–FDD led by Pierre Nkurunziza. This was followed, on January 27, 2003, with the signing of a memorandum of understanding on the implementation of the cease-fire between the government and three of the four rebel groups 

that were not party to the original Arusha Accord. Yet, the implementation of these 

agreements has proceeded at a snail’s pace; the promised Africa Union peacekeeping 

force, charged with monitoring the cease-fire agreement, has yet to be deployed; and 

fighting continues on the ground. In addition, the other armed rebel group that remained outside of the Arusha process, the PALIPEHUTU–FNL of Agathon Rwasa, 

has yet to come to the negotiating table. Finally, negotiations have not yet begun 

on the highly sensitive issues of security reform, the integration of military forces, 

and demobilization. 

Thus, the decision of Buyoya to hand-over power on May 1 could not have been 

an easy one and, indeed, followed a brief, unsuccessful campaign he waged to secure 

a consensual agreement among the key players to postpone the hand-over for a 

short period. While the President has made the right decision—and in so doing 

helped sustain a vital partnership that has developed among the principal governing 

parties—it is imperative that the region and international community act immeVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:41 May 21, 2003 Jkt 086303 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AFRICA\040303\86303 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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diately to address the concerns that motivated Buyoya’s last-minute attempt to 

delay the change-over of executive leadership. 

It is hardly surprising that the Tutsi military command and political leadership 

does not look favorably on critical security issues being addressed after, rather than 

before, presidential power has been transferred to a Hutu president. Indeed, the 

original contemplation of those most deeply involved in facilitating the Burundi 

peace process was that both the cease-fire and the military-related issues would be 

fully resolved before executive power passed from Tutsi to Hutu hands. Moreover, 

the concerns of Buyoya and the Tutsi-led army have been greatly intensified in recent weeks by rebel actions. Taking advantage of the long delay in the deployment 

of a promised Africa Union peacekeeping force (to be constituted of troops from Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa), the FDD rebels have consolidated their control 

of several provinces, and have continued to recruit fighters into their ranks. 

Beyond the security-related issues requiring immediate attention, there are also 

a host of further urgent challenges that must be tackled if Burundian aspirations 

for a sustainable peace are to be achieved:

— the transitional government must accelerate the implementation of the institutional reforms specified in the Arusha Accord;

— rebel forces must be integrated not only militarily, but also in the transitional political institutions;

— the repatriation and reintegration in their home communities of an estimated 1.2 million Burundian refugees will require both organizational and 

political skill inside Burundi, and the mobilization of substantial financial 

resources from the international community;

— and an impoverished population and devastated economy are in urgent need 

both of humanitarian assistance and of international economic cooperation. 

THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS

What can the USG and the international community do to assist in this critical 

period? An excellent roadmap for the international community is provided in the excellent February 21 report of the International Crisis Group, entitled ‘‘A Framework 

for Responsible Aid to Burundi.’’ I can not improve on the ICG’s general recommendations, but would stress a few particular points. 

First, the most urgent need is for the quickest possible deployment of the Africa 

Union Peacekeeping force, pursuant to the cease-fire agreement of last December. 

It is the AU peacekeepers that will assume responsibility for the critical cantonment 

of the armed rebels; absent this cantonment, and related confidence-building initiatives, the fighting will continue. The South Africans have taken the lead in organizing this peace-keeping mission, and the Ethiopians and Mozambicans have also 

generously offered to participate. But these African nations can neither undertake—

nor sustain—this critical mission without the substantial financial and logistical 

support of the United States, and others within the international community. This 

will be an expensive mission—but it is absolutely vital to the efforts Burundian 

themselves are taking to move from war to peace. There can be no higher priority 

than standing up and maintaining this peacekeeping mission. 

Second, like the African Union Observers and Peacekeeping Force, so will the 

newly established Joint Ceasefire Commission require financial and technical support. This Commission, key to the implementation of the cease-fire agreement, can 

also become a major instrument for confidence-building between Army and rebel 

leaders. 

Third, the next urgent priority will be the disarmament of all rebel groups. The 

retention of arms by the cantoned CNDD/FDD fighters (explicitly permitted by the 

December 3, 2002 cease-fire agreement) will inevitably be viewed as evidence of the 

rebel organization’s determination to keep its options open—thereby making much 

more difficult the important task of deepening the trust and confidence of those who 

must now work together to integrate and reform the national Army. Moreover, as 

long as the rebels are cantoned with their arms, the UN will be reluctant to assume 

any leadership of the peacekeeping effort; that is why the Africa Union was forced 

to assume the initial peacekeeper responsibility. 

Fourth, the still recalcitrant PALIPEHUTU–FNL must be pressed by regional 

states, and by the international community, to abandon the war option, and enter 

negotiations for a durable political settlement. Recently, there have been reports of 

contacts and conversations between FNL leaders and the Burundian army. It is to 

be hoped that these are the prelude to more formal negotiations. 

Fifth, the World Bank has estimated that the demobilization and reintegration of 

combatants will cost some $90 million over four years. The Multi-Donor Regional 

48

Trust Fund for Great Lakes Demobilization and Reintegration, administered by the 

World Bank, has funds set aside for a Burundi program—but additional financial 

support will be required. 

Sixth, one of the most daunting tasks faced by Burundi in its post-war reconstruction will be the reintegration of over 1 million refugees and internally displaced persons. Given the absence of required infrastructure, and the collapsed state of the 

Burundian economy, this will be a monumental challenge—requiring generous financial as well as technical support from the international community. How effectively this challenge is addressed will go a long way to determining whether the Burundian peace can endure. 

Seventh, it is time for international donors to honor pledges made over the past 

few years to actively assist in Burundi’s economic and social recovery. Significant 

sums have been pledged at three donor roundtables held since the August 2000 

signing of the Arusha agreement—a total of $l.1 billion—but no more than 20% of 

the pledged amounts has reportedly been delivered. A release of these funds now 

is imperative—so that the Burundian population may at last experience a concrete 

‘‘peace dividend.’’ Intensified international engagement now will contribute significantly to the momentum for peace. 

Eighth, as the ICG emphasizes, it will be vitally important that, in structuring 

their economic assistance to Burundi, donors keep in mind that one of the principal 

underlying causes of the Burundian conflict has been the remarkable concentration 

of economic and political power in the hands of a few. As the ICG correctly observes, 

international aid has often had the effect of reinforcing state control over the economy and unintentionally supporting the unbalanced distribution of resources and 

discriminatory policies that consolidated power in the hands of the elite. The international financial institutions and bilateral donors who wish to assist in Burundi’s 

post-war reconstruction must be attentive to this history, conditioning economic assistance on urgently needed economic liberalization and on structural reforms required to overcome significant economic and social inequities. 

Ninth, the international community must remain committed to a long-term engagement with Burundi—both diplomatically and economically. The Burundi peace 

process has made significant strides in recent months—but the process remains 

fragile. Notwithstanding their deep yearning for an end of the violence and the creation of a more peaceful future, Burundians remain deeply suspicious and mistrustful of one another. This should not be surprising, given the horrendous death toll 

inter-communal violence has produced since Burundi’s independence in 1960. The 

active involvement of outsiders—whether manifested in the South African-led facilitation, or the presence of the South African security protection force, or the pending 

deployment of African Union peacekeepers, or the presence of USAID and other bilateral donors in Bujumbura, or in the World Bank-supported Leadership Training 

Project—has had a significant calming impact. And the knowledge that the international community is now deepening its economic cooperation with Burundi will 

help to strengthen the confidence of those Burundians who are courageously working to establish the conditions for a sustainable peace. 

Tenth, it is vitally important that all countries concerned with the Burundi peace 

process work to coordinate not only their diplomacy—to insure that there will be 

no mixed messages in this critical period—but also their economic cooperation. Time 

and resources are too limited to permit a duplication of effort or anything less than 

a strategic approach to Burundi’s national economic recovery. 

A YEARNING FOR PEACE

While I have concentrated in this testimony on the significant obstacles that lie 

in the way of the consolidation of the Burundi peace process, and the urgently needed assistance of the international community, I want to close on a more positive 

note. For there can be little doubt that Burundi has come a long way since the ugly 

inter-communal violence that exploded following the October 1993 assassination of 

Burundian President Melchior Ndadaye. Burundians today desperately want peace. 

They are tired of war and of the constant state of insecurity in which they have 

lived these many years. Leaders on both sides of the ethnic divide appear determined to do whatever they can to keep the peace process on track. 

During my recent visits to Burundi, I have been struck by the extraordinary contrast in the current political atmosphere from that I encountered during my initial 

encounters with Burundi in 1995–96. Where, in 1995–96 the political polarization 

was so severe that in conversations with Burundians one hesitated even to use the 

terms, ‘‘Hutu’’ and ‘‘Tutsi,’’ today Burundian discourse on issues of war and peace 

is remarkable for its openness and its candor. It was not so long ago that the concept of ‘‘negotiations’’ with armed rebel groups was absolutely taboo; yet, today, not 

49

only are negotiations being pursued on all fronts, but persons and organizations previously demonized by one another as ‘‘killers’’ or ‘‘genocidaires’’ are now contemplating their military and political integration. 

I distinctly recall, in the 1995–96 period, how my conversations with my Burundian interlocutors would invariably invite only the most strident of political polemics; today, what is distinctive about these conversations is their pragmatic and realistic tone. While all Burundians acknowledge continuing mutual mistrust and suspicions among the key players, the common yearning for peace is palpable. Most Burundian leaders appear to be engaged in a search for compromises that will keep 

the peace process on track. And within the transitional government, people are talking to one another—and collaborating—as never before. 

There are two developments that, in my view, provide the most concrete evidence 

that Burundians are at last moving from the logic of war to the logic of peace. The 

first is the acceptance by most Tutsi civilian and political leaders both of South Africans to provide security protection for returning Hutu leaders and of an African 

Union peacekeeping force to oversee the implementation of the recent cease-fire 

agreement. In the past, Tutsi leaders vehemently opposed any such external military intervention, fearing that such intervention would seriously compromise the 

ability of Tutsis to determine their own political and military fate. That Tutsis are 

now as supportive as Hutus of external military intervention is reflective of the 

major change that has occurred in the mind-set of most Tutsis leaders. 

The second development I would cite is the remarkable embrace by virtually all 

Burundian sectors of thenew leadership training initiative that has been launched 

by the Woodrow Wilson International Center, with funding from the World Bank. 

The Burundian Leadership Training Project seeks to develop a sustainable network 

of a diverse cross-section of 100 Burundian leaders that will be able to work collaboratively in developing a common vision for Burundi’s future, and in providing leadership for the development and implementation of concrete projects of economic recovery. The first leadership training workshop, involving 34 Burundian leaders, was 

held in Ngozi, from March 11–16. The participants, who were invited in their individual capacities and not as representatives of their respective organizations, was 

ethnically diverse (14 Tutsi, 18 Hutu, 2 Twa), and included 11 women. They were 

drawn from all institutional sectors—government and non-government, civilian and 

military. Two leading Army officers—a general and a colonel—were joined by persons identified with six of the seven rebel factions. The major political parties were 

all represented, as were many elements of ‘‘civil society’’—the churches, the business 

community, academia, and the media. The social and political diversity of the group 

that was assembled—and the remarkable cohesion that emerged from their six-day 

experience—provide eloquent testimony to the desire of Burundians everywhere to 

fashion a new means of relating to one another. 

Many analysts have noted that the Burundi peace process in some ways put the 

proverbial cart before the horse. First it produced an agreement—the Arusha Accord. Now it must produce the peace—and the trust and mutual confidence—that 

normally are the pre-conditions of sustainable political agreements. That is a tall 

order. Even as we approach the second half of Burundi’s 36-month Transitional period, the violence on the ground continues. And there are many Burundians who remain deeply anxious about what their political future. Yet, there can no longer be 

any question about the courage and political will of Burundians on both sides of 

their ethnic divide to work for a more peaceful and a more secure future. 

At several different points in the last several years, Burundian leaders have taken 

significant risks for peace. Now the international community must provide the 

moral and material support required to consolidate the important gains that have 

been made. In the words of the International Crisis Group, ‘‘Responsible aid would 

consolidate the credibility of the transitional government and become the engine for 

the reforms outlined in Protocol IV [of the Arusha Accord]. It would address the 

structural causes of the conflict and build peace. If donor countries do not provide 

the full political and financial support necessary to implement Arusha, they can anticipate having to face the consequences of its collapse.’’

Thank you for your attention. I would be pleased to take any questions members 

of the Committee might have. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ANNE C. EDGERTON, ADVOCATE, REFUGEES

INTERNATIONAL

I want to thank the Chairman of the Subcommittee on African Affairs, Congressman Edward Royce, and the Ranking Member, Congressman Donald M. Payne, for 

providing the opportunity for Refugees International (RI) to submit written testiVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:41 May 21, 2003 Jkt 086303 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AFRICA\040303\86303 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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mony on the current humanitarian crisis unfolding in the Democratic Republic of 

Congo (DRC). I returned from Ituri district and North Kivu Province in northeastern DRC at the end of February, completing my eighth humanitarian assessment mission for RI in the Great Lakes region of Africa, an area I have worked in, 

studied and written about since January 1995. My focus on this most recent mission 

was on the following issues: internal displacement caused by continuing insecurity; 

humanitarian access to displaced populations; the extent to which foreign countries 

are involved in the Congo; and the current status of children employed, armed, and 

used by the various fighting forces. 

I’d like to stress two points. First, the reality on paper and the reality on the 

ground are two very different things. The U.S. and the international community 

have supported the various cease-fire and peace agreements through several measures, including UN Security Council resolutions, the deployment of the United Nations Organization Mission to the Congo (MONUC), and commitment to the process 

of the inter-Congolese dialogue. While a considerable amount of international pressure has been applied on the conflicting parties to sign documents relating to the 

peace accords, cease-fire, and inter-Congolese dialogue, not a single agreement has 

been followed or has satisfied all political parties. Violent conflict driven by desire 

to control economic and political resources is the source of the humanitarian crisis 

and economic stagnation in the region. The continuous cease-fire and peace agreements for which the region is now infamous, and which are now locally referred to 

as ‘‘sign and shreds,’’ include the political parties, which, without exception, come 

by their positions militarily. 

Second, the solutions to the Congo problem may lie first in small, innovative actions that address humanitarian issues. Outsiders talk about how complex the problem is, how many actors are involved, how huge the Congo is. But the humanitarian 

solutions that have continuously worked against the odds can be a lesson for other 

areas of involvement by the international community. The small solutions that take 

in local dynamics have the largest impact. No roads? An innovative American NGO 

sent bicycles in support of its medical inoculation program. Insecurity? A UN Humanitarian Coordinator consistently rode a motorcycle into the most treacherous 

areas to be able to testify to the horrific malnutrition levels in remote villages in 

eastern Congo. No one shows up for the Disarmament, Demobilization and Repatriation program? MONUC has drawn over 100 ex-combatants with a small, innovative center that works through word-of-mouth, sending family messages to 

Rwandans hiding in Eastern Congo today. 

RI’s specific concerns in the current situation in the DRC include the following: 

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

The fighting in Eastern Congo over the past few years has greatly restricted the 

amount of humanitarian assistance to the area. Now there are signs in Bunia in 

Ituri that the situation may be stabilizing enough to allow humanitarian organizations to enter the area. For example, on March 12, humanitarian workers were able 

to reach one village to which RI was denied access in February by the Union 

Patriotique Congolais (UPC), a mono-ethnic local militia. 

While the increased access is good news, it also creates tremendous challenges. 

Each day more desperate situations come to light. Initial estimates by the very 

small humanitarian community in Bunia reveal a situation that looks to be far 

worse than anything seen in the Congo to date. More aid agencies and personnel 

are required in Ituri immediately and U.S. support is needed to make this happen. 

And since it will take time and money to get any assistance to this remote area of 

the DRC, the U.S. needs to start organizing a response now, beginning with providing emergency funding assistance to non-governmental organizations responding 

to the situation in Ituri. 

CHILD SOLDIERS

Despite United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and international 

protocols prohibiting the recruitment and use of child soldiers, there has been too 

little progress in eliminating this form of child abuse in the Democratic Republic 

of Congo (DRC). 

RI’s experience in the Congo suggests that translating UNSC Resolutions on child 

soldiers into meaningful change in the midst of conflicts will be extremely difficult 

and will require the work of many partners in the field. For example, in December 

2001, following public declarations by the Government of the DRC to demobilize 

child soldiers, two rebel movements, RCD-Goma and the MLC, the latter now involved in the transitional government, made public, verbal commitments on a visit 

to the U.S. to demobilize children from their own armed groups. In the year interVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:41 May 21, 2003 Jkt 086303 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AFRICA\040303\86303 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
51

vening, however, RI found only 104 demobilized by the RCD-Goma, and learned of 

the location of a new training camp for children. The old camp that was used to 

train children, 30 miles outside of Goma, was determined to be too visible to the 

international community and was replaced by a more remote camp for child soldier 

training in distant Katanga Province. 

In the DRC, all the armed groups use child soldiers, recruited either forcibly or 

through the lure of escaping abject poverty. RI’s mission in February confirmed that 

the following groups also continue to use child soldiers: The APC, the armed wing 

of the RCD–K/ML, the FAC (the Congolese government armed forces), the UPC, 

local Mayi-Mayi forces in North Kivu, and the UPDF (the Ugandan government 

armed forces). Belligerents in the DRC conflict will continue to recruit and employ 

child soldiers because children are widely available, easy to recruit, and inexpensive 

to maintain, unless UNSC resolutions are enforced with meaningful sanctions. 

MONUC

The fundamental reality of the Congo is that despite the numerous peace agreements and ceasefires that the belligerents have signed, the fighting continues. RI

believes that in this context the MONUC mandate is problematic on a number of 

levels. 

First, the mandate has little to do with the actual situation in the DRC. MONUC 

was deployed to monitor the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, but the ceasefire 

line has been irrelevant to the violence perpetrated in the eastern portion of the 

country. The current mandate is based on the assumption on paper that the ceasefire has held, and MONUC is to monitor the ceasefire and report on any violations. 

But violations are the norm in the Congo. Rather than monitoring a cease-fire with 

problems, MONUC spends its time negotiating access to areas where sporadic violence and arbitrary killings have occurred, and recording stories of atrocities from 

Congolese without being able to offer appropriate assistance. 

Second, MONUC has never achieved the numbers of military observers or soldiers 

authorized by the Security Council, and some of the troop-contributed nations are 

so financially strapped that they provide poorly-trained and minimally-equipped 

forces. 

Third, Phase III of the MONUC mandate, the demobilization and reintegration 

phase, when MONUC must determine who is a soldier, who belongs to a negative 

force, who doesn’t, who wants to go home voluntarily and who does not, could put 

people at risk, given the lack of sufficient staff who speak the languages required 

to communicate with the various groups. 

Understandably, there is a great deal of dissatisfaction with MONUC inside the 

DRC. Much, but not all, of that dissatisfaction has to do with the mandate. In fact, 

virtually everyone we talked to said the mandate has to change, even MONUC personnel. 

LACK OF OVERALL HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

In fiscal year 2002, the UN received 46% of the requested $202 million for humanitarian assistance intended to respond to the needs of an estimated 2.1 million internally displaced people. This year’s appeal for $268 million, launched in November 

2002, looks to fare far worse, while the estimate of internally displaced people now 

may eclipse 2.7 million. 

The stark reality is that more people have died in the Congo in the last week due 

to violence, malnutrition, and disease than have died in the war in Iraq to date. 

The horror in the Congo is continuous and on-going. RI applauds the initiative of 

the Committee to hold this hearing and hopes that it will result in more vigorous 

efforts by the United States to find solutions to the Congo catastrophe. 

Refugees International therefore recommends:

• U.S. Government pressure the governments of Uganda and Rwanda to comply 

with signed agreements regarding withdrawal and support of proxy forces in 

the Congo.

• U.S. government make a generous contribution to the UN CAP for the DRC 

for 2003 now so that humanitarian assistance to the internally displaced can 

continue.

• The U.S., as a member of the Permanent Committee of Five (P–5) to the UN 

Security Council, fully support the enhanced MONUC mandate and strength, 

and use its leadership position to influence nations to do the same.

• The U.S., as a member of the P–5, influence the Security Council to continue 

to research and publish the names of armed groups that recruit and employ 

52

child soldiers and actively work with the UNSC to create consequences for 

groups that do.

• As the practice of using child soldiers has been declared a war crime, the Security Council take the initiative to work with the International Criminal 

Court to declare the leaders of groups that employ child soldiers as war criminals and prosecute them as such. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GERARD POWERS, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL

JUSTICE AND PEACE, UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS AND KEN

HACKETT, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES

The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) and Catholic Relief 

Services (CRS), the Bishops’ relief and development agency, thank Representative 

Royce and the Subcommittee for providing this opportunity to give written testimony on the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Africa. 

This hearing is just the latest example of the leadership that has been provided 

by this subcommittee and its chairman. The USCCB and CRS have been actively 

involved with the Catholic Church in the DRC and share your deep commitment to 

the search for a just and lasting peace in the DRC; to the promotion of regional security; to reconciliation and healing of the deep wounds afflicting millions of people 

in the region of the Great Lakes; and to providing increased humanitarian and development assistance to those who have survived the cruel and dehumanizing horrors of war. Catholic Bishops from the USCCB and the CRS Board have made numerous visits to the Democratic Republic of Congo and the other nations in the 

Great Lakes region, including the November 2002 trip of the Bishops’ Committee 

on Migration to Tanzania. Many Church leaders from these countries have come to 

the United States. 

As one of the few major institutions still functioning throughout the DRC, the 

Catholic Church provides assistance to the poor, orphaned, homeless, displaced and 

ailing masses in the country suffering from the disastrous effects of a five year war. 

While various armed forces in the regions to the east and north have engaged in 

an effective manipulation of ethnic identity as a means to divide communities and 

weaken the resolve of the Congolese people, the Catholic Church seeks to invite all 

peoples to work together so as to respect and protect the dignity of each human person. While Congolese, Rwandans, Ugandans and others expropriate the vast resources of the country, the Catholic Church and other religious institutions, working 

in partnership with humanitarian relief organizations, provide avenues for the delivery of the few and precious humanitarian resources made available by the people 

of the United States and the international community. Financing and support for 

humanitarian and peace-building programs must be dramatically increased if lives 

are to be saved and a culture of justice and reconciliation fostered. 

The crisis in the DRC takes on heightened urgency and relevance now because 

of the credible reports from the Church and others of the return of foreign forces 

to the DRC in violation of numerous agreements, and the ongoing battle for territory in the east, precisely at a time when the final arrangements are being made 

in Sun City and elsewhere for the creation of a government of transition and the 

inauguration of a durable peace. 

The lack of genuine political will by all parties involved in the conflict, the occupation by foreign military forces, and the subversion and cooptation of otherwise legitimate groups of Congolese citizens seeking to defend family, region, and nation, have 

transformed vast zones of savannah, mountains, and forests into a battlefield where 

the first ’World War’ of Africa is being waged. Congo’s extensive mineral and natural resources, expropriated illegally by all parties to the conflict, provide the fuel 

that perpetuates the stalemate and deepens the humanitarian crisis. 

This war, which engulfs many African nations, is made more complex by a series 

of interrelated local, regional and global factors. Congolese politicians continue to divide the spoils of war, and the military and other forces subject the people to cruel 

and inhumane treatment. Neighboring countries are dealing with their own civil 

wars, the difficult process of democratization, and multiple challenges to political legitimacy. The United Nations’ Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo 

(MONUC) languishes without a clear mandate and lacks sufficient and appropriate 

resources to accomplish its mission. The United States, which is committed to the 

promotion of a just and lasting peace in the region of the Great Lakes, is itself confronted by the many faces of terrorism, and is now at war with Iraq. 

53

Recommendations: 

We urge that the following steps be taken to help bring an end to the conflict, 

restore regional security, and guarantee the rights and protections of all peoples living in the DRC and throughout the region. These recommendations are based on 

proposals of the Bishops of DRC and are supported by the Bishops of Rwanda and 

Burundi.

1. All parties to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue must honor the Lusaka Protocol 

and agreements reached in Pretoria calling for a new political dispensation, 

power-sharing, a government of transition, and elections.

2. The governments in Kinshasa and Kigali must respect and implement the 

conditions set forth in Pretoria calling for the withdrawal of all Rwandan 

military forces, and the implementation by the government in Kinshasa of 

an effective and verifiable program of demobilization and disarmament of exForce Arm(e Rwandaise (ex-FAR) and Interahamwe forces operating in the 

DRC.

3. The territorial integrity of the DRC must be respected and supported by all 

parties to the conflict, and by the international community.

4. The parties involved in the war must support the disarmament and demobilization of the proxy forces in eastern Congo, and all other armed groups on 

Congolese territory, and refrain, in the future, from establishing, training, 

and supplying armed groups.

5. The international community should sanction those public and private entities involved in the illegal exploitation of resources in the DRC.

6. The United Nations, with the full support of the United States and Great 

Britain, should move immediately to strengthen and actively implement the 

mandate of MONUC, providing the necessary and appropriate personnel and 

logistical support to protect the lives of innocent civilian populations, disarm 

the various combatants, and support and assist humanitarian efforts.

7. The United States and the international community should continue to support the peace process in Burundi, encourage political change and deepen 

reconciliation in Rwanda and Uganda, and support the call for an international conference on the Great Lakes as part of a regional strategy to promote peace, security, and development.

8. The United States should expand its aid for the promotion of reconciliation 

and democratization in the nations of the Great Lakes, and increase its assistance to address the urgent humanitarian crises confronting the peoples 

of the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi.

We recognize that there are no easy answers to this complex war and that people 

of good will can differ on how best to bring it to an end. However, we believe that 

these recommendations could provide a useful framework as the United States gives 

this terrible conflict the attention that it so much needs and deserves. 

The Bishops of the Democratic Republic of Congo recently said that: ‘‘[t]he dramatic situation in the Congo should not be considered as inevitable. It calls us to 

take responsibility now so that we might hasten the coming of the rule of law’’ (February 15, 2003). 

The people of the DRC and the region of the Great Lakes face a desperate situation. The historical relationship of the United States and the DRC serves as a permanent reminder of our responsibility to support the search for a just and sustainable peace, to work with the nations of the Great Lakes to promote regional security 

and integral human development, and to protect the lives and dignity of people who 

have suffered so much, for so long.

Æ