alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Flora Trezza, Respondent, v Richard Trezza, Appellant.

[822 NYS2d 121]

In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by judgment dated February 6, 1998, the defendant former husband appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Leibowitz, J.), dated March 25, 2005, as, sua sponte, appointed the plaintiff former wife as receiver of the former marital residence, authorized her to enter into a contract of sale and to execute all documents necessary to sell the property and transfer title thereto on his behalf, and directed the plaintiffs attorney to hold the former husband’s distributive share of the proceeds of the sale in escrow until released upon application to the court.

Ordered that on the Court’s own motion, the notice of appeal is treated as an application for leave to appeal, and leave to appeal is granted *(see*CFLR 5701 [c]); and it is further,

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation of settlement which was incorporated but not merged into the judgment of divorce dated February 6, 1998, the parties agreed that the former marital residence would be sold. The former husband refused to execute a contract of sale, and the former wife moved to hold him in contempt and to have the court appoint her as the agent of the former husband to facilitate the sale of the former marital residence. Thereafter the parties entered into a stipulation dated October 15, 2004, resolving the motion. In the stipulation, the parties agreed that the former marital residence would be appraised and that the former husband would execute a contract of sale as long as the sale price was within $50,000 of the appraised price. The former marital residence was appraised at *1017$600,000 and the former wife entered into a contract of sale with a third party for the sum of $575,000. Upon the former husband’s refusal to execute the contract of sale, inter aha, the former wife was appointed receiver for the limited purpose of authorizing her to enter into a contract of sale and to execute all documents necessary to sell the property and transfer title thereto.

The Supreme Court properly appointed the former wife as receiver to effectuate the sale of the former marital residence. Her appointment as receiver was necessary because the former husband’s willful failure to cooperate in effectuating the sale of the former marital residence as required by the parties’ written stipulation *(see Stern v Stern,*282 AD2d 667, 668 [2001]; *Bock v Bock,*170 AD2d 423, 424 [1991]).

The former husband’s remaining contentions are either improperly raised for the first time on appeal or without merit *(see Mann v All Waste Sys.,*293 AD2d 656 [2002]; *Goldblatt v LaShellda Maintenance Co.,*278 AD2d 451 [2000]). Miller, J.P., Adams, Skelos and Covello, JJ., concur.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

KAMRAN KEIVAN,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 11-50375

D.C. No. 2:11-cr-00076-ODW

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Otis D. Wright, II, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 10, 2012** 

Before: WARDLAW, CLIFTON, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Kamran Keivan appeals from the 34-month sentence imposed following his

guilty-plea conviction for importation of opium, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 952(a), 960(a)(1), and 960(b)(3). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

FILED

SEP 21 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 11-50375

§ 1291, and we affirm.

Keivan first contends that the district court procedurally erred by placing too

much emphasis on the advisory sentencing Guidelines range and arbitrarily

refusing to impose a term below that range. The record does not support this

contention. The court considered Keivan’s arguments in support of a belowGuidelines sentence and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, and concluded

that a downward variance was not warranted in light of the amount of drugs

Keivan imported and other relevant sentencing factors.

Keivan next contends that the district court erred by requiring him to forego

his request for a continuance in exchange for a 30-month sentence, and by

considering factors outside the scope of the section 3553(a) sentencing factors,

specifically defense counsel’s continuance requests. The record belies these

contentions. The district court did not pressure Keivan to withdraw his

continuance request, but rather granted a continuance to permit Keivan to review

the presentence report and to obtain mitigating evidence. Furthermore, the record

reflects that the court selected the 34-month sentence because it concluded that

Keivan’s claim that he imported the opium for personal medicinal purposes was

not credible, and not because of counsel’s continuance requests.
3 11-50375

Keivan additionally contends that the district court abused its discretion by

denying his request for a three-week continuance. The district court did not abuse

its discretion by granting a continuance shorter than the one Keivan requested. See

United States v. Sarno, 73 F.3d 1470, 1492-93 (9th Cir. 1995).

Keivan finally contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. In

light of the totality of the circumstances and the section 3553(a) sentencing factors,

the sentence is substantively reasonable. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51

(2007).

AFFIRMED.
[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 4 (Monday, January 7, 2019)]
[Notices]
[Page 63]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-28473]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. ER19-667-000]


Supplemental Notice That Initial Market-Based Rate Filing 
Includes Request for Blanket Section 204 Authorization: FirstLight MA 
Hydro LLC

    This is a supplemental notice in the above-referenced proceeding of 
FirstLight MA Hydro LLC's application for market-based rate authority, 
with an accompanying rate tariff, noting that such application includes 
a request for blanket authorization, under 18 CFR part 34, of future 
issuances of securities and assumptions of liability.
    Any person desiring to intervene or to protest should file with the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE, Washington, 
DC 20426, in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's 
Rules of Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 and 385.214). Anyone 
filing a motion to intervene or protest must serve a copy of that 
document on the Applicant.
    Notice is hereby given that the deadline for filing protests with 
regard to the applicant's request for blanket authorization, under 18 
CFR part 34, of future issuances of securities and assumptions of 
liability, is January 15, 2019.
    The Commission encourages electronic submission of protests and 
interventions in lieu of paper, using the FERC Online links at http://www.ferc.gov. To facilitate electronic service, persons with internet 
access who will eFile a document and/or be listed as a contact for an 
intervenor must create and validate an eRegistration account using the 
eRegistration link. Select the eFiling link to log on and submit the 
intervention or protests.
    Persons unable to file electronically should submit an original and 
5 copies of the intervention or protest to the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426.
    The filings in the above-referenced proceeding are accessible in 
the Commission's eLibrary system by clicking on the appropriate link in 
the above list. They are also available for electronic review in the 
Commission's Public Reference Room in Washington, DC. There is an 
eSubscription link on the website that enables subscribers to receive 
email notification when a document is added to a subscribed docket(s). 
For assistance with any FERC Online service, please email 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#c68083948589a8aaafa8a395b3b6b6a9b4b286a0a3b4a5e8a1a9b0"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="9ddbd8cfded2f3f1f4f3f8cee8ededf2efe9ddfbf8effeb3faf2eb">[email protected]</span></a>. or call (866) 208-3676 (toll free). For 
TTY, call (202) 502-8659.

    Dated: December 26, 2018.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2018-28473 Filed 1-4-19; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
§ 28.400 Penalties. ( a ) Any person who makes an expenditure prohibited herein shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than $10,000 and not more than $100,000 for each such expenditure made on or before October 23, 1996, and of not less than $11,000 and not more than $110,000 for each such expenditure made after October 23, 1996.
( b ) Any person who fails to file or amend the disclosure form (see Appendix B of this part) to be filed or amended if required herein, shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than $10,000 and not more than $100,000 for each such failure occurring on or before October 23, 1996, and of not less than $11,000 and not more than $110,000 for each such failure occurring after October 23, 1996.
( c ) A filing or amended filing on or after the date on which an administrative action for the imposition of a civil penalty is commenced does not prevent the imposition of such civil penalty for a failure occurring before that date. An administrative action is commenced with respect to a failure when an investigating official determines in writing to commence an investigation of an allegation of such failure.
( d ) In determining whether to impose a civil penalty, and the amount of any such penalty, by reason of a violation by any person, the agency shall consider the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the violation, the effect on the ability of such person to continue in business, any prior violations by such person, the degree of culpability of such person, the ability of the person to pay the penalty, and such other matters as may be appropriate.
( e ) First offenders under paragraphs (a) or (b) of this section shall be subject to a civil penalty of $10,000, absent aggravating circumstances for each such offense committed on or before October 23, 1996, and $11,000 for each such offense committed after October 23, 1996. Second and subsequent offenses by persons shall be subject to an appropriate civil penalty between $10,000 and $100,000 for each such offense committed on or before October 23, 1996, and between $11,000 and $110,000 for each such offense committed after October 23, 1996, as determined by the agency head or his or her designee.
( f ) An imposition of a civil penalty under this section does not prevent the United States from seeking any other remedy that may apply to the same conduct that is the basis for the imposition of such civil penalty.
[55 FR 6737, 6748, Feb. 26, 1990, as amended at 61 FR 55095, Oct. 24, 1996]
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 99.1

      CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                                   PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Gerald J. Burnett, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual
Report of Avistar Communications Corporation on Form 10-K for the fiscal year
ended December 31, 2002 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in
such Annual Report fairly presents in all material respects the financial
condition and results of operations of Avistar Communications Corporation.

                             By: /s/ Gerald J. Burnett
                             ----------------------------
                             Gerald J. Burnett
                             Chief Executive Officer and Chairman
                             (Principal Executive Officer)

I, Robert J. Habig, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual
Report of Avistar Communications Corporation on Form 10-K for the fiscal year
ended December 31, 2002 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in
such Annual Report fairly presents in all material respects the financial
condition and results of operations of Avistar Communications Corporation.

                             By: /s/ Robert J. Habig
                             ----------------------------
                             Robert J. Habig
                             Chief Financial Officer
                             (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
EXHIBIT 32.1  Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002  In connection with the filing of
the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB/A for the period ended June 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
Report) by Gold Horse International, Inc. (the Registrant), I, Liankuan Yang, Chief Executive Officer of the
Registrant, hereby certify that:  1.
        The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and
  2.
        The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial conditions and results of operations of Registrant.
  /s/ Liankuan Yang Name: Liankuan Yang Title: Chief Executive Officer  Dated: August 1, 2008  A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement has been provided to the company and will be retained by the company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Aircraft

SUPPORTED BATTERY - DJI 5200mAh LiPo Battery

WEIGHT (BATTERY & PROPELLERS INCLUDED) - 1242g

HOVER ACCURACY (READY TO FLY)- Vertical: 0.8m; Horizontal: 2.5m

MAX YAW ANGULAR VELOCITY - 200°/s

MAX TILTABLE ANGLE - 35°

MAX ASCENT / DESCENT SPEED - Ascent: 6m/s; Descent: 2m/s

MAX FLIGHT SPEED - 15m/s (Not Recommended)

DIAGONAL MOTOR-MOTOR DISTANCE - 350mm

Gimbal

WORKING CURRENT - Static : 750mA; Dynamic : 900mA

CONTROL ACCURACY - ±0.03°

CONTROLLABLE RANGE - Pitch : -90°-0°

MAXIMUM ANGULAR SPEED - Pitch : 90°/s

Camera

OPERATING ENVIRONMENT TEMPERATURE - 0°C-40°C

SENSOR SIZE - 1/2.3"

EFFECTIVE PIXELS - 14 Megapixels

RESOLUTION - 4384×3288

HD RECORDING - 1080p30 & 720p

RECORDING FOV - 110° / 85°

Remote Control

OPERATING FREQUENCY - 5.728 GHz-5.85 GHz

COMMUNICATION DISTANCE (OPEN AREA) - CE Compliance: 400m; FCC Compliance: 800m

RECEIVER SENSITIVITY (1%PER) -93dBm

TRANSMITTER POWER - CE Compliance: 25mW; FCC Compliance: 100mW

WORKING VOLTAGE - 120 mA@3.7V

BUILT-IN LIPO BATTERY WORKING CURRENT/CAPACITY 3.7V, 2000mAh

Range Extender

OPERATING FREQUENCY 2412-2462MHz

COMMUNICATION DISTANCE (OPEN AREA) 500-700m

TRANSMITTER POWER 20dBm

POWER CONSUMPTION 2W
Home > NRC Library > ADAMS Public Documents

# SECY-11-0151 - Annual Update of the Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Plan

Accession Number: ML112620700

Date Released: Monday, November 14, 2011

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409 P.2d 130

#### Donato LOVATO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Leslie HICKS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 7775.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Dec. 20, 1965.

Melvin L. Robins, Albuquerque, for appellant.

McAtee, Toulouse, Marchiondo, Ruud & Gallagher, James E. Casados, Albuquerque, for appellee.

COMPTON, Justice.

The plaintiff appeals from an order of the district court dismissing his complaint with prejudice under § 21-1-1(41) (e), N.M.S.A. 1953. The pertinent provisions of the rule read:

> “(1) In any civil action or proceeding pending in any district court in this state, when it shall be made to appear to the court that the plaintiff therein or any defendant filing a cross-complaint therein has failed to take any action to bring such action or proceeding to its final determination for a period of at least two years after the filing of said action or proceeding or of such cross-complaint unless a written stipulation signed by all parties to said action or proceeding has been filed suspending or postponing final action therein beyond two years, any party to such action or proceeding may have the same dismissed with prejudice to the prosecution of any other or further action or proceeding based on the same cause of action set up in the complaint or cross-complaint by filing in such pending action or proceeding a written motion moving the dismissal thereof with prejudice.”

We find no error in the ruling of the court. The court record discloses the following facts. The complaint was filed March 3, 1961; the defendant entered his *612appearance March 27, 1961; plaintiff’s demand for a jury was filed April 24, 1961; defendant’s motion to. dismiss with prejudice under Rule 41(e) was filed July 16, 1964; the order granting the motion was filed August 17, 1964. Admittedly, there was no written stipulation signed by the parties and filed in the case suspending or postponing final action in the case beyond two years.

However, on August 31, 1962, appellant wrote a letter to the trial court requesting an early hearing of the case. The court responded thereto on September 9, 1962, advising the plaintiff that an early hearing could not be afforded him. Plaintiff’s letter and a copy of the reply were mailed by the court to the clerk of the court and placed in the file for future references.

Appellant asserts that the correspondence between the court and counsel was sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss under Rule 41(e). We disagree; this correspondence was not a part of the court record. A like contention was made in Sarikey v. Sandoval, 75 N-.M. 271, 404 P.2d 108/ and. on authority of that case we conclude that the order of the court should be affirmed.

It is so ordered.

CARMODY, C. J., and CHAVEZ, J, concur.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 19
- 0688 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. BANNER LEE BOYD,

Defendant and Appellant
.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including November 16 , 2020 , within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

October 8 2020

10/08/2020

Case Number: DA 19-0668
#### In the Matter of Oshea L. and Others, Infants. Onondaga County Department of Social Services, Respondent; Pamela K., Appellant.

(Appeal No. 2.)

[821 NYS2d 544]

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Onondaga County (Bryan R. Hedges, J.), entered November 10, 2005 in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 10. The order directed respondent to observe certain conditions of behavior.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed without costs. Present — Kehoe, J.P., Gorski, Martoche, Smith and Pine, JJ.
#### Seven Seventeen Corp., Appellant, v JP Morgan Chase & Co., Respondent.

[821 NYS2d 561]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Richard B. Lowe, III, J.), entered August 8, 2005, which granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint and denied plaintiffs cross motion for leave to amend, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Plaintiff’s contract cause of action, alleging that amounts were not properly credited to its account with defendant, did not give notice of the transactions complained of and the conduct resulting in the alleged breach *(see*CPLR 3013). Although it is clear that the parties’ agreements required compliance with plaintiffs instructions *(see 805 Third Ave. Co. v M.W. Realty Assoc.,*58 NY2d 447, 451 [1983]), the amended complaint failed to set forth the instructions with which defendant failed to comply. Plaintiff failed to show that any amendment would cure the fatal deficiencies of the amended complaint *(see “J. Doe No. 1” v CBS Broadcasting Inc.,*24 AD3d 215, 216 [2005]), and failed to submit a copy of any proposed amendment *(see Fernandez v HICO Corp.,*24 AD3d 110 [2005]). Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P., Andrias, Sullivan and McGuire, JJ.
#### Sidney Sperber, Appellant, v. Skyline Lake Corp., Respondent, et al., Defendants.

Judgment unanimously affirmed, with costs. No opinion. Present— Glennon, J. P., Dore, Cohn, Callahan and Botein, JJ.