COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

July 16, 2020

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2019AP708-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2017CF129

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT IV

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

JUSTIN D. BLANCHARD,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Columbia County: 

ALAN J. WHITE, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Fitzpatrick, P.J., Kloppenburg, and Graham, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 
No. 2019AP708-CR

2

¶1 PER CURIAM. Justin D. Blanchard appeals the judgment of 

conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of battery and disorderly conduct 

as acts of domestic abuse perpetrated against E.U., with whom he lived and had a 

child. Blanchard argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion, 

and denied him his constitutional right to present a defense, when it excluded

evidence relating to certain photographs that E.U. took of herself and sent to 

Blanchard days after the incident that formed the basis of the charges of which 

Blanchard was convicted. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 According to the criminal complaint, E.U. told law enforcement that 

one day in March 2017, E.U. and Blanchard were arguing when Blanchard 

suddenly grabbed E.U. by her throat and squeezed very hard, causing E.U. to 

suffer pain and experience difficulty breathing. E.U. said that she was upset and 

frightened of Blanchard and that she believed that Blanchard was capable of 

killing her. We will generally refer to this event as “the incident” or “the March 

2017 incident.” The complaint charged Blanchard with one count of strangulation 

and suffocation, one count of battery, and one count of domestic abuse-related 

disorderly conduct, all as a domestic abuse repeater.

¶3 The primary defense theory was that E.U. fabricated the facts 

forming the basis of the charges. 

¶4 Before trial, Blanchard moved the circuit court to admit, and to

allow cross-examination of E.U. about, one photograph showing E.U. nude above 
No. 2019AP708-CR

3

the waist because E.U. sent the photograph to Blanchard’s cell phone three days 

after the incident. Blanchard submitted three photographs along with the motion.1 

At a hearing on the motion, trial counsel elaborated that the photographs, or at 

least E.U.’s testimony describing the photographs and admitting that she sent them 

to Blanchard shortly after the incident, were critical to the defense in that she 

“does not look terrified” in them. The circuit court denied the motion, ruling that 

the evidence was not critical to the defense in light of other evidence that would be 

admissible, including eliciting testimony from E.U. on cross-examination that she 

had sexual relations with Blanchard after the incident and that she had a 

continuing relationship with Blanchard both after the incident and after prior 

incidents of physical violence. At a subsequent motion hearing, the court 

confirmed that at trial E.U. could be asked whether her relationship and sexual 

relations with Blanchard continued after the incident and after prior incidents of 

physical violence. 

¶5 Blanchard renewed his motion after E.U.’s direct testimony at trial, 

arguing that the photographs would impeach E.U’s testimony that she did not 

“engage” Blanchard after the incident. The circuit court again denied the motion, 

ruling that E.U. could be impeached by other methods, including by eliciting

testimony that she was with Blanchard the day after the incident and continued to 

have a relationship with him after incidents of physical violence since 2014. 

 

1

 At subsequent proceedings in the circuit court, the parties referred inconsistently to one 

photograph and to three photographs. The circuit court in its rulings on this issue, and the parties 

on appeal, refer consistently to “photographs.” Accordingly, from this point in this opinion we 

will refer to “photographs.”

At a pretrial motion hearing, the State advised the circuit court that E.U. admitted to 

taking the photographs and to sending them to Blanchard.
No. 2019AP708-CR

4

¶6 After E.U. finished testifying, the State called the officer who 

interviewed both E.U. and Blanchard. Blanchard called his brother’s girlfriend 

who knew E.U. Pertinent details of E.U.’s testimony, as well as additional details 

of Blanchard’s arguments and the circuit court’s rulings regarding the 

photographs, will be presented in the Discussion section below.

¶7 The jury found Blanchard guilty of battery and disorderly conduct, 

both as acts of domestic abuse, and not guilty of strangulation.

DISCUSSION

¶8 As stated, Blanchard argues that the circuit court erroneously 

exercised its discretion, and denied him his constitutional right to present a 

defense, when it excluded “evidence that E.U. sent nude photos to [him] just days 

after she claimed he strangled and battered her.”2 For the following reasons, we 

conclude that Blanchard fails to show that the circuit court erroneously exercised

its discretion in denying Blanchard’s requests, and fails to show that the exclusion 

of the evidence denied Blanchard his right to present a defense.

¶9 We first summarize the standard of review and applicable legal 

principles, next present additional pertinent background, and then explain our 

conclusion.

 

2

 More specifically, Blanchard argues that the circuit court erred in excluding both 

cropped versions of the photographs and any cross-examination about the photographs. The 

circuit court in effect treated both requests as one request each time it ruled on the requests. We 

follow the court’s lead and generally refer to the subject of both requests as “evidence relating to 

the photographs.”
No. 2019AP708-CR

5

A. Standard of Review and Pertinent Legal Principles

¶10 Generally, we review a circuit court decision to admit or exclude 

evidence for an erroneous exercise of discretion, upholding such a ruling unless 

the court failed to apply the proper legal standard or the record lacks reasonable 

support for the ruling. State v. Jackson, 2014 WI 4, ¶43, 352 Wis. 2d 249, 841 

N.W.2d 791. The circuit court has broad discretion, and our review is highly 

deferential; the question is not whether this court would have permitted the 

evidence to come in, “but whether the [circuit] court exercised its discretion in 

accordance with accepted legal standards and in accordance with the facts of the 

record.” Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, ¶29, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 N.W.2d 698

(citation omitted). We will not find an erroneous exercise of discretion if the court 

had a rational basis for its evidentiary decision. Id. 

¶11 “Whether photographs are to be admitted is a matter within the 

[circuit] court’s discretion.” State v. Linton, 2010 WI App 129, ¶25, 329 Wis. 2d 

687, 791 N.W.2d 222. “Photographs should be admitted if they help the jury gain 

a better understanding of material facts and should be excluded if they are not 

substantially necessary to show material facts and will tend to ... direct the jury’s 

attention to improper considerations.” Id. (citation omitted); see also State v. 

Pfaff, 2004 WI App 31, ¶34, 269 Wis. 2d 786, 676 N.W.2d 562 (casting doubt on 

admitting photographs that have only the purpose “to inflame and prejudice the 

jury”) (citation omitted). 
No. 2019AP708-CR

6

¶12 Relevant evidence is generally admissible. WIS. STAT. § 904.02 

(2017-18).3 However, relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 

issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, 

or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” WIS. STAT. § 904.03. 

¶13 “[W]hether the exclusion of evidence denies an accused the right to 

present a defense is a question of constitutional due process and is determined by 

this court.” State v. Prineas, 2012 WI App 2, ¶15, 338 Wis. 2d 362, 809 N.W.2d 

68 (2011) (citing State v. St. George, 2002 WI 50, ¶¶16, 38, 52, 252 Wis. 2d 499, 

643 N.W.2d 777). “[T]he Constitution permits judges to exclude evidence that is 

repetitive, only marginally relevant or poses undue risk of harassment, prejudice, 

or confusion of the issues.” Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 326-27 

(2006) (internal quotations, ellipses, and citation omitted).

B. Additional Pertinent Background

¶14 Pretrial. Blanchard’s Motion and Arguments. As stated, Blanchard 

filed a pretrial motion to admit evidence of nude photographs that E.U. had taken 

of herself and sent to Blanchard’s phone three days after the incident. In the 

motion, Blanchard stated, “The significance of the photo[s] is that [they were] sent 

to Blanchard’s phone on March 13th, 2017,” just days after the date of the 

incident. At the hearing on the motion, Blanchard’s attorney elaborated on his 

reason for seeking admission of the photographs, asserting that the photographic 

 

3

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise 

noted.
No. 2019AP708-CR

7

evidence “goes to [E.U.’s] credibility, the whole thing about did this really 

happen. If it did happen, if you were strangled, if this is ... at least the third time 

you’ve been strangled, isn’t it true you sent these photos and isn’t it true that you 

had sexual contact with him [just days] after the incident?” Blanchard’s attorney

also asserted that the photographs “can be described as kind of inviting. She does 

not look terrified.” Blanchard’s attorney also clarified that if the photographs 

were not admitted, he sought permission to ask E.U. “to admit, in front of the 

jury,” that the photographs exist and that she sent them. 

¶15 The State’s Arguments. The State argued against the admission of 

evidence relating to the photographs, asserting that there was “no legitimate 

purpose in the defense presenting even the existence of these photos to the jury. 

This is just another way for this defendant to try to humiliate this victim, as he has 

done.” 

¶16 The Circuit Court’s Ruling. The circuit court directed that the 

photographs neither be mentioned nor shown to the jury. The court found that it 

would be “very humiliating for [E.U.] to have [the photographs] put before the 

jury,” and that even to ask E.U. about the photographs “would be degrading to 

her.” The court also determined that, while the photographs may be probative of 

the fact that E.U. and Blanchard’s relationship continued after allegations of 

assault, “that can be shown in many [other] ways,” including that through 

evidence related to this and prior incidents of physical violence, the jury would 

hear and be aware of evidence regarding whether E.U. and Blanchard still lived 

together, and “still had an amorous feeling toward each other or still engaged in 

sexual intercourse with each other” after incidents of physical violence. 
No. 2019AP708-CR

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¶17 At a subsequent motion hearing two days later, the circuit court 

reiterated: “There [are] going to be no photographs shown, and they’re not going 

to be testified to.... No mentioning of nude photos. No mentioning of any 

photos.” The court explained, “I don’t want this alleged victim to be humiliated 

by continual questions about sexual relations with the defendant because it doesn’t 

have to be put into those terms. Their relationship continued.... It’s a sexual 

relationship.” The court expressly confirmed that, at trial, defense counsel could

ask E.U. whether her relationship and sexual relations with Blanchard continued 

after the March 2017 incident and prior incidents of physical violence.

¶18 Trial. E.U.’s Testimony on Direct Examination. E.U. testified on 

direct examination in pertinent part as follows.

¶19 E.U. and Blanchard began dating in 2013, after which time they 

lived together on and off. In April 2014, Blanchard grabbed E.U. by the throat 

and squeezed, after which Blanchard stood over E.U. and kicked her. When E.U. 

asked him what had happened, Blanchard told her that he had “choked [her] out.” 

This incident made E.U. aware that Blanchard is “more than capable of killing 

me.” In June 2014, Blanchard assaulted E.U., which led to her losing her top row 

of teeth. E.U. and Blanchard had a child together, born in 2015.

¶20 In March 2016, when their daughter was about nine months old, 

E.U. and Blanchard had a disagreement, during which time Blanchard became 

very angry and agitated. E.U. told Blanchard that she was leaving and that she did 

not want to have her children there with him. In response, Blanchard grabbed 

E.U. by the throat, pushed her down, and told her that she could not leave. 

Blanchard did not live with E.U. from August 2016 until January 2017, during 

which period E.U. sought domestic violence education online and at a domestic 
No. 2019AP708-CR

9

violence shelter. E.U. understood that Blanchard was receiving treatment and 

education about domestic violence during this same period. 

¶21 On Friday March 10, 2017, E.U. returned to her apartment where she 

and Blanchard lived. That evening, E.U. and Blanchard had an argument because 

E.U. had broken off their relationship a few days before. While yelling at E.U., 

Blanchard “flung” his arm, which scared their daughter. E.U. told Blanchard that 

“I know how you operate.... I read up all about your kind.” Blanchard then 

grabbed E.U. by her throat and squeezed, telling E.U. that “I am not the typical 

narcissistic psychopath that you know. I am different.” E.U. thought that 

Blanchard was going to kill her in front of their daughter. Once she broke free of 

his grip, E.U. grabbed her daughter and “was choking back tears because I did not 

want her to see me so upset and distraught. And I went into the living room and 

sat down and I proceeded to feed her.” E.U. did not leave the apartment after the 

choking because she knew, based on the way Blanchard had reacted when she 

tried to leave in March 2016, it would put her and her daughter in harm’s way. 

During her domestic violence training, E.U. had learned to “do what you have to 

do to be safe.... I knew we could not leave, so I proceeded to keep my distance 

from him. I proceeded to not engage him in any way or make him agitated or 

upset. So I just—I took a step back and I just kept my distance from him.” On 

March 22, 2017, a domestic violence shelter encouraged her to contact the police 

about the March 10 incident. 

¶22 Blanchard’s Renewed Request to Admit the Photographs. After 

E.U.’s direct examination, out of the presence of the jury, Blanchard renewed his 

request that the circuit court allow the photographs’ admission, because E.U. had 

“testified, when she was talking about [domestic violence] counseling, she had 

gotten advice ... to stay calm and not engage the person in any way. It appears 
No. 2019AP708-CR

10

[that] when the [nude photographs] were sent, that she was engaging him....

[G]iven that she said she did not engage him in any way, that seems contrary and 

she could be impeached on that.” The court rejected Blanchard’s request either to 

present the photographs or to question E.U. about them, reiterating its prior 

reasoning that E.U. could be impeached without showing any photographs, with 

questions going to E.U.’s pattern of continued sexual relations with Blanchard 

after each of Blanchard’s assaults. The court also noted that the gist of E.U.’s 

testimony was that she had learned to do whatever she needed to do to keep things 

calm and keep herself safe and that her testimony about her sexual relations with 

Blanchard could be viewed either as contrary to what she testified she learned, or 

“might fit right in with the profile.”

¶23 E.U.’s Testimony on Cross-Examination. On cross-examination,

E.U. testified as follows. She continued to live and have a relationship and sexual 

relations with Blanchard after the 2014 incidents. The day after the March 10, 

2017 incident, she and Blanchard went to Walmart to get ingredients for a shared 

dinner and later that day they had sexual relations. E.U. stayed with Blanchard 

that weekend “because I had nowhere to go. And I was just keeping the peace 

between me and him.... I was doing nice stuff. I wasn’t doing anything to make 

him angry or upset, to do what I’ve got to do to keep me and my daughter safe. 

And if he wasn’t upset and angry, we were safe.” 

¶24 E.U. believed that if she went to the police about Blanchard, he 

would kill her, and that there had been several instances in which the police were 

called before, but Blanchard would “take off” and “wait for the police to leave. 

Then he would turn around and come back to the home. Then he would threaten 

me.” When E.U. contacted the police about the March 2017 incident, she told an 
No. 2019AP708-CR

11

officer that she had no injuries from the incident and had not sought out medical 

attention after it.

C. Analysis

¶25 As we explain, we conclude that Blanchard fails to show that the 

circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion or denied Blanchard his 

constitutional right to present a defense. 

¶26 As summarized above, both before and during trial, the basis of 

Blanchard’s relevancy argument in favor of admitting evidence relating to the 

photographs was that, to the extent the evidence showed E.U.’s continued 

relationship with Blanchard so soon after the incident, that evidence went to 

E.U.’s credibility about whether the incident really happened.

4

 As summarized 

above, when the circuit court rejected Blanchard’s argument, it repeatedly

referenced other admissible evidence, namely E.U.’s own testimony about her

continuing relationship including sexual relations with Blanchard both after the 

 

4

 On appeal Blanchard argues additional, alternative theories of relevance supporting the 

admission of this evidence, including that the photographs would have impeached E.U.’s stated 

timeline of her presence in her apartment; that the photographs would have impeached E.U.’s 

account of strangulation because, according to Blanchard, the photographs “show no signs of 

bruising, abrasion, swelling, or puffiness, or any other indication of trauma”; and that no other 

“temporally close corroborative physical evidence” was presented. Blanchard failed to give the 

circuit court an opportunity to consider these alternative theories of relevance and we reject them 

on that basis. See State v. Rogers, 196 Wis. 2d 817, 827, 539 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995) (the 

forfeiture rule requires that a party must “make all of [its] arguments to the [circuit] court” to 

preserve them on appeal); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hunt, 2014 WI App 115, ¶32, 358 

Wis. 2d 379, 856 N.W.2d 633 (“Arguments raised for the first time on appeal are generally 

deemed forfeited.”). Moreover, Blanchard’s assertion that that the photographs are relevant to 

show lack of physical markings on E.U. is made for the first time in his reply brief. “It is a wellestablished rule that we do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.” Bilda 

v. County of Milwaukee, 2006 WI App 57, ¶20 n.7, 292 Wis. 2d 212, 713 N.W.2d 661. 
No. 2019AP708-CR

12

March 2017 incident as well as after prior incidents of domestic violence, and the 

degrading nature of the photographic evidence. From these comments, it can be 

reasonably inferred that the circuit court determined that whatever probative value 

the evidence had was substantially outweighed by its needless cumulative nature. 

“When the probative value of evidence ... is needlessly duplicative and 

cumulative in character, the circuit court need not admit it.” State v. Speese, 199 

Wis. 2d 597, 605, 545 N.W.2d 510 (1996); see also WIS. STAT. § 904.03 (relevant 

evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by ...

considerations of ... needless presentation of cumulative evidence”). The record 

shows that the circuit court made a reasonable decision consistent with the law and 

the facts when it excluded the evidence relating to the photographs.

¶27 We now explain why we reject Blanchard’s arguments to the 

contrary.

¶28 Blanchard appears to concede that the circuit court properly 

determined that the fact that Blanchard and E.U. “had an ongoing relationship ...

could be shown in other ways,” but argues that the photographs would in addition 

have “called into question whether E.U. was actually scared of [him], thus 

providing the jury more reason to doubt her account of the [incident].” Blanchard 

does not persuade us that showing E.U. was not scared of Blanchard is 

meaningfully different from showing that E.U. continued her relationship with 

him. Moreover, the circuit court acknowledged the absence of any such difference 

when it noted that E.U.’s testimony of her pattern of a continued relationship with 

Blanchard after the March 2017 and prior incidents of domestic violence could be 

viewed either as contrary to what she testified she learned about not provoking 

Blanchard, or “might fit right in with the profile” of a victim of domestic abuse. 

Thus, the court did not disregard this aspect of the photographs.
No. 2019AP708-CR

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¶29 Blanchard argues that any humiliation to E.U. could be ameliorated 

by cropping the photographs or only allowing cross-examination of E.U. about the 

photographs. However, the record supports the inference that the circuit court 

determined that any reference to the photographs would be humiliating to E.U. 

Moreover, this argument disregards the primary basis for the court’s rulings, 

which was that the probative value of any evidence relating to the photographs 

was substantially outweighed by the evidence being needlessly cumulative.

¶30 Blanchard argues that the evidence relating to the photographs 

shows that E.U. “engaged” Blanchard shortly after the March 2017 incident and, 

thus, “directly impeached E.U.’s testimony that she had learned from her domestic 

violence training to stay away from Mr. Blanchard following these sorts of 

outbursts” and impeached E.U.’s testimony that she did “not engage him” after the 

March 2017 incident. However, the record establishes, and the circuit court 

determined, that by “not engage” E.U. meant “not [to] make [Blanchard] agitated 

or upset” in order to keep herself and her daughter safe. The court reasonably 

rejected the argument that the evidence relating to the photographs contradicted 

E.U.’s testimony that she learned not to provoke Blanchard after a violent

incident, and endeavored not to provoke him after the March 2017 incident.

¶31 In sum, we conclude that Blanchard fails to show that the circuit 

court erroneously exercised its discretion when it rejected Blanchard’s requests to 

admit evidence relating to the photographs.

¶32 Our conclusion defeats Blanchard’s argument that the circuit court’s 

exclusion of the evidence relating to the photographs denied him his constitutional 

right to present a defense. We have explained that the circuit court had a valid 

basis to exclude the evidence based on its cumulative nature, and there could be no 
No. 2019AP708-CR

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constitutional dimension to an evidentiary argument that we reject on that ground. 

Blanchard develops no argument supported by pertinent legal authority to the 

contrary. 

CONCLUSION

¶33 For the reasons stated, we affirm.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE 

809.23(1)(b)5.