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87–871 PDF 2003

S. HRG. 108–56

REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHANGING

NUCLEAR EQUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 12, 2003

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia

JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Staff Director

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared statement . 4

Cha, Dr. Victor D., D.S. Song Associate Professor of Government and Asian

Studies, director, American Alliances in Asia Project, Edmund A. Walsh

School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, DC .............. 42

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 44

Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, prepared statement .. 21

Gill, Dr. Bates, Freeman Chair in China Studies, Center for Strategic and

International Studies [CSIS], Washington, DC ................................................. 48

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 52

Kelly, Hon. James A., Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific

Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC ................................................. 8

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 10

Lilley, Hon. James, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC ................ 36

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 39

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 3

(III)

(1)

REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHANGING

NUCLEAR EQUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 12, 2003

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in room SH–

216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Lugar (chairman of

the committee), presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Alexander,

Sununu, Dodd, Feingold, Bill Nelson, and Rockefeller.

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee is called to order.

Before making an opening comment, recognizing my colleague,

the distinguished Senator from Connecticut, I would like to greet

to this hearing 60 students from Evansville and Elkhart High

Schools in Indiana that include—and out of home town pride, I will

recite all of them—Evansville Bosse High School, Evansville Harrison, Evansville Central, Evansville Reitz, Evansville Memorial,

the Signature Learning Center, Elkhart Central High School, and

Elkhart Memorial High School.

In addition to that, Reverend Jack Scott, of Columbia City

United Methodist Church, has brought 25 students from Columbia

City, Fort Wayne, Goshen, and Valparaiso to our hearing today.

So all 85 of these distinguished Hoosier students and teachers

are with us, Secretary Kelly, so you have a good, fair, critical audience for your testimony.

Today, the Foreign Relations Committee will examine the regional implications of the changing nuclear equation in North

Korea. This will be the fifth hearing we have held this year that

has dealt with issues related to North Korea. On February 4, we

reviewed the broad strategic implications of weapons of mass destruction on the Korean Peninsula. That same week, we welcomed

Secretary of State Colin Powell, who addressed many questions related to North Korea. On February the 25th, the committee considered the issue of global hunger with specific reference to North

Korea. Last Thursday, we explored the possible structure and objectives of diplomatic engagement between the United States and

North Korea.

We have devoted this concentrated attention to the Korean Peninsula because of the enormous stakes for United States national

security. The stakes are high, in part because the North Korean

2

pursuit of nuclear weapons will change the security calculations of

Japan, China, Russia, South Korea, and Taiwan, among others.

These are extremely important nations to the United States. Japan

and China are our third and fourth largest trading partners. South

Korea and Taiwan rank seventh and eighth, respectively. The cooperation of each of these countries is critical to northeast Asian

security and the broader war on terrorism.

Given North Korea’s extreme isolation in past years, it has been

tempting to de-emphasize its impact on northeast Asia outside of

the Korean Peninsula. Commerce and economic development have

moved forward in the region almost without reference to North

Korea. But the continuation of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program will force its neighbors to adopt new strategic strategies, perhaps including the acquisition or repositioning of nuclear weapons.

Our analytic task would be simplified if all the security responses

of northeast Asian nations were directed at North Korea like

spokes connected to the hub of a wheel. But security enhancements

undertaken by any of North Korea’s neighbors will, in turn, change

the calculations of the rest of the group. The North Korean nuclear

weapons program could spark a northeast Asian arms race that is

fed by the interlocking activities of each of its neighbors.

President Bush is working to construct a multilateral approach

to the escalation of nuclear activity by North Korea. Multilateral

diplomacy is a key element to any long-term reduction of tensions

on the Korean Peninsula. But it is vital that the United States be

open to bilateral diplomatic opportunities that could be useful in

reversing North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and in promoting stability. We must be creative and persistent in addressing

an extraordinarily grave threat to national security.

In reviewing the regional impact of North Korea’s nuclear program and also considering previous testimony before this committee regarding North Korea, many questions deserve close attention and will be a focus of our hearing today.

One, if North Korea does not abandon its nuclear program, will

South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan eventually develop nuclear capabilities?

Two, given our lack of knowledge about North Korea and our inability to verify operational details of their weapons of mass destruction programs, how can we be certain that North Korea is not

already exporting plutonium or perhaps biological or chemical

weapon components?

Third, there are recent reports that China has sold North Korea

large amounts of a chemical known as tributyl phosphate, TBP,

which can be useful in extracting material for nuclear bombs from

spent nuclear fuel. Although TBP also has commercial applications,

is this sale evidence that China is not fully engaged in helping

achieve a peaceful solution?

And how can we involve China as a positive influence on North

Korea? Or how do calculations in China and South Korea about the

possibility of an abrupt collapse of the North Korean regime impact

the ways in which those countries, China and South Korea, approach the North Korean crisis?

And, fifth, Russian officials have visited Pyongyang as part of

their diplomacy in response to the crisis on the Korean Peninsula.

3

How can the United States maximize cooperation with Russia on

this issue?

Sixth, in the event that North Korea does not agree to suspend

its nuclear programs and subscribe to a full verification, how

should our security guarantees to Japan, South Korean, and Taiwan be adjusted, and should we pursue a common theater missile

defense for the region?

These questions, admittedly, only scratch the surface of the security challenges that we face in regard to the Korean Peninsula.

Currently, the United States is deeply engaged in diplomatic efforts

related to Iraq. But, simultaneously, we must be working with allies in Asia to develop an effective strategy toward North Korea,

and this committee looks forward to the testimony of each of our

witnesses today as we continue that inquiry into these critical

problems.

[The opening statement of Senator Lugar follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Today the Foreign Relations Committee will examine the regional implications of

the changing nuclear equation in North Korea. This will be the fifth hearing that

we have held this year that has dealt with issues related to North Korea. On February 4, we reviewed the broad strategic implications of weapons of mass destruction on the Korean Peninsula. That same week we welcomed Secretary of State

Powell, who addressed many questions related to North Korea. On February 25, the

Committee considered the issue of global hunger with specific reference to North

Korea. Last Thursday, we explored the possible structure and objectives of diplomatic engagement between the United States and North Korea.

We have devoted this concentrated attention to the Korean Peninsula because of

the enormous stakes for U.S. national security. The stakes are high, in part, because North Korean pursuit of a nuclear weapons arsenal will change the security

calculations of Japan, China, Russia, South Korea, and Taiwan. These are extremely important nations to the United States. Japan and China are our third and

fourth largest trading partners. South Korea and Taiwan rank seventh and eighth

respectively. The cooperation of each of these countries is critical to Northeast Asian

security and the broader war on terrorism.

Given North Korea’s extreme isolation, in past years it has been tempting to deemphasize its impact on Northeast Asia outside of the Korean Peninsula. Commerce

and economic development have moved forward in the region almost without reference to North Korea. But the continuation of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program will force its neighbors to adopt new security strategies—perhaps including

the acquisition or repositioning of nuclear weapons. Our analytic task would be simplified if all of the security responses of Northeast Asian nations were directed at

North Korea like spokes connected to the hub of a wheel. But security enhancements undertaken by any of North Korea’s neighbors will in turn change the calculations of the rest of the group. The North Korean nuclear weapons program could

spark a Northeast Asian arms race that is fed by the interlocking anxieties of each

of its neighbors.

President Bush is working to construct a multilateral approach to the escalation

of nuclear activity by North Korea. Multilateral diplomacy is a key element to any

long-term reduction of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. But it is vital that the

United States be open to bilateral diplomatic opportunities that could be useful in

reversing North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and in promoting stability. We

must be creative and persistent in addressing an extraordinarily grave threat to national security.

In reviewing the regional impact of North Korea’s nuclear program and also considering previous testimony before this committee regarding North Korea, many

questions deserve close attention.

1. If North Korea does not abandon its nuclear program, will South Korea,

Japan and Taiwan eventually develop nuclear capabilities?

2. Given our lack of knowledge about North Korea and our inability to verify

operational details of their weapons of mass destruction programs, how can we

be certain that North Korea is not already exporting plutonium or perhaps biological or chemical weapons components?

4

3. There are recent reports that China has sold North Korea large amounts

of a chemical known as tributyl phosphate (TBP), which can be useful in extracting material for nuclear bombs from spent nuclear fuel. Although TBP also

has commercial applications, is this sale evidence that China is not fully engaged in helping achieve a peaceful solution? How can we involve China as a

positive influence on North Korea?

4. How do calculations in China and South Korea about the possibility of an

abrupt collapse of the North Korean regime impact the ways in which China

and South Korea approach the North Korean crisis?

5. Russian officials have visited Pyongyang as part of their diplomacy in response to the crisis on the Korean Peninsula. How can the United States maximize cooperation with Russia on this issue?

6. In the event that North Korea does not agree to suspend its nuclear weapons program and subscribe to full verification, how should our security guarantees to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan be adjusted and should we pursue a

common theater missile defense for the region?

These questions only scratch the surface of the security challenges that we face

in regard to the Korean Peninsula. Currently, the United States is deeply engaged

in diplomatic efforts related to Iraq. But simultaneously, we must be working with

allies in Asia to develop an effective strategy toward North Korea. The committee

looks forward to the testimony of each of our witnesses as we continue our inquiry

into this critical problem.

First we will hear from Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs,

James Kelly. The second panel is composed of Ambassador James Lilley, now with

the American Enterprise Institute; Dr. Victor Cha, Associate Professor of the Department of Government and the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at

Georgetown University; and Dr. Bates Gill, Freeman Chair in China Studies at the

Center for Strategic and International Studies.

The CHAIRMAN. We are honored to have you all with us this

afternoon. First we will hear from the Assistant Secretary for East

Asian and Pacific Affairs, James Kelly. The second panel is composed of Ambassador James Lilley, now with the American Enterprise Institute, Dr. Victor Cha, associate professor of the Department of Government and the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign

Service at Georgetown University, and Dr. Bates Gill, Freeman

Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

It is my privilege to call now upon the distinguished Senator

from Connecticut, Senator Dodd, for an opening statement.

Senator DODD. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And

once again, it was said yesterday, that Senator Biden, of course, is

the ranking Democrat on this committee, but is recovering from

some surgery and not going to be in the Senate this week. And

Senator Sarbanes is unavoidably tied up in another meeting and

could not make this one. So there could be statements submitted

by them and, if so, I would ask that they be included in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be included in the record in full.

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

NORTH KOREA: LISTENING TO ALLIES

Mr. Chairman, North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear arms, in clear breach of its international treaty obligations has brought Pyongyang to the edge of the same precipice

it approached in 1994.

Our challenge is clear: we must stop North Korea from becoming a plutonium factory churning out fissile material for the highest bidder. We must not acquiesce to

the North’s nuclear ambitions. In order to accomplish this objective, we will need

the active cooperation of friends and allies.

There is good news on this score. All of our regional partners—South Korea,

Japan, China, Russia—as well as several other interested parties—the European

5

Union, Australia, Thailand, Singapore—share our goal of preventing North Korea

from building nuclear weapons. All recognize that their own interests would be undermined if North Korea were to continue on its present path.

The bad news is that we do not have consensus on how to deal with the North

Korean threat. South Korea supports an engagement strategy backed by maintenance of a strong deterrence. They want to avoid coercive measures and have ruled

out military moves to take out the North’s nuclear facilities.

Japan, China, the European Union, and Russia all support direct talks between

Washington and Pyongyang in an effort to defuse the crisis.

The Bush administration insists that this problem must be resolved through a

multilateral process, rightly pointing out that North Korea’s violation of its Nuclear

Nonproliferation Treaty commitments is a matter of concern for the entire world,

not just for Washington. Although the administration prefers a peaceful diplomatic

solution, it has made clear that all options, including the use of force, remain on

the table. The administration has refused to sit down with the North for direct, bilateral, dialog, arguing that such talks would constitute a reward for North Korean

bad behavior.

For its part, North Korea has repeatedly rejected any multilateral forum, arguing

that its problem is with Washington. Pyongyang wants direct bilateral talks with

Washington and claims that it is prepared to abandon its nuclear weapons program

only in exchange for formal security assurances from the U.S. Government.

One fact is undeniable: while we argue about the shape of the table, the Korean

Peninsula is becoming more dangerous by the day, with cruise missile tests, DMZ

incursions, interceptions of U.S. reconnaissance aircraft, and threats by North Korea

to reprocess the spent fuel from its Yongbyon reactor. If North Korea takes that

fateful step, they could harvest enough fissile material for 5-6 nuclear bombs by the

end of the summer.

As I have said before, the North says the ball is in our court. We say it is in their

court. And from where I sit, the ball is stuck in the net and someone better go get

it. In fact, I think we’re putting form over substance and losing sight of the ball.

The whole point of doing something multilaterally is to secure the support of

friends and allies who have something to contribute to the resolution of this crisis.

Well guess what? We have consulted our friends and allies, and they all agree

that we should sit down and talk with the North to test their willingness to abandon their nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Our friends stand ready to assist

those talks and to contribute diplomatically and economically to a solution.

At a Washington Post forum on North Korea policy held on February 6, 2003,

Deputy Secretary of State Wolfowitz explained the administration’s insistence on a

multilateral framework this way: ‘‘I think absolutely key as we go forward to solving

this nuclear problem, but also to achieving our larger goals in Northeast Asia, is

to maintain the solidarity that we have had with South Korea and with Japan over

many years.’’ I couldn’t agree more. But in this case, ironically, maintaining solidarity with our

allies means being willing to sit down bilaterally with North Korea.

As for whether bilateral talks would constitute a ‘‘reward’’ for North Korea, I

guess that depends on the content of the dialog. I believe the purpose of any dialog

is to articulate clearly and convincingly why the world rejects North Korea’s pursuit

of nuclear weapons and to hold out to them the promise of a fundamentally different

future—including positive security assurances—if and only if they are prepared to

abandon their nuclear weapons ambitions.

This is not appeasement. This is not a reward for bad behavior. This is about offering North Korea a choice of two futures, and I would add, making our own future

much more secure.

Frankly, I am not optimistic that at this stage North Korea can be convinced to

change course. It’s a long shot. But I can promise you this: if the administration

sustains its current policy of malign neglect of the Korean Peninsula, North Korea

is almost certain to accelerate its nuclear program. If that happens and we move

to adopt sanctions or other coercive measures against the North, as seems likely,

we will have a tough time rallying allies to our cause if we have ignored their advice

all along. They will rightly ask us why we failed to test the North’s intentions by

sitting down and talking directly to them.

Senator DODD. And I, too, want to welcome, by the way, these

students. Is anyone left in Indiana? You have filled the room here

with all these wonderful students, and we are delighted you are

here. And what an honor it is to have you as an audience in the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and what a true honor it is

6

for you to be here and watch your Senator preside as chairman of

the committee.

I have served with Senator Lugar for 22 years now in the U.S.

Senate, and I do not say this merely because he is here or you are

here, America is truly blessed to have someone of Dick Lugar’s talents and abilities to be serving as the chairman of this committee,

and you in Indiana are very, very lucky to have him as United

States Senator.

So we are glad you are here to witness and listen to Senator

Lugar, who has made a very fine opening statement asking some

very pointed and serious questions about the problems that persists

in North Korea and, as well, to thank him once again for having

a series of hearings as we have had on major foreign policy issues

around the world that the United States must deal with and the

challenge for us to be able to multi task, which is difficult for any

nation, but if you are in the position we are as the United States

where so much depends upon what we do every day, it is important

that we be able to juggle, if you will—maybe ‘‘juggle’’ is not the

right word I would like to use, but the idea of handling a variety

of challenges that confront us every single day. And certainly the

issue of North Korea is one of those issues, despite the problems

in the Middle East, that we are going to have to grapple with.

So I thank the chairman immensely for holding what has now

been the third hearing examining North Korea and our policy toward North Korea in the last month, reflecting the urgent nature

of this crisis.

Now, I know that the administration does not like me to use the

word ‘‘crisis,’’ or anyone else to use the word ‘‘crisis,’’ but I do not

know how else to describe the prospect of North Korea, where they

might, in a matter of days, and that is not an exaggeration, become

a plutonium factory selling fissile material to the highest bidder

around the globe. There has been a lot of talk recently about what

we are going to do about this particular problem, how we can convince North Korea to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons and

the long-range ballistic missiles.

The Bush administration says it is willing to sit down with North

Korea, but only in a multilateral setting. The President has argued, rightly, in my view, that North Korea’s nuclear activities are

the concern of the world, not just the United States. He is absolutely correct in that view. So it is desirable for many interested

parties—South Korea, China, Japan, Russia, the European Union,

perhaps others—to participate in the solution to this particular crisis. And I agree with him. That would be the best possible way to

proceed.

But I would add, Mr. Chairman, that there is a bit of an irony

here, the administration insisting on a multilateral approach to the

North Korean crisis while pursuing what many see as almost a

unilateralist strategy with respect to Iraq.

In any case, there is a catch with respect to any multilateral approach to North Korea, namely that North Korea has categorically

rejected multilateral talks. They want to sit down directly with us

and no one else at the table. I regret that. I think that is a mistake. But, nonetheless, that is the situation we find ourselves in.

They seek security assurances from the United States, in exchange

7

for which they claim they are prepared to address our concerns

about their nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

So how should we resolve this impasse? What do we do about

this? We should start by listening, really listening, to our friends,

in my view. Our South Korean allies, who understand the North

Koreans probably better than anyone else, have a suggestion. They

have urged us to engage in direct bilateral talks to test North Korea’s intentions. I think we should listen to them. What do the

other players say? China, Russia, the members of the European

Union all agree that direct U.S./North Korean talks have the best

chance of convincing North Korea to change direction. I think we

should listen to them, as well.

We have the blessing, indeed the encouragement, of our friends

and allies to sit down with the North for direct talks. In my view,

we should proceed with bilateral talks, all the while, of course,

keeping our allies informed of how they can contribute not just in

the negotiations, but also to any agreement that promises to fully

and irreversibly dismantle the North’s nuclear and ballistic missile

programs.

Now, I understand, of course, the President’s reluctance to negotiate with North Korea. The regime of Kim Jong Il is one of the

most brutal authoritarian governments on the planet; not just now,

but throughout history. They cannot be trusted, in my view, and

they have a track record of behaving badly, very badly, in order to

get the world’s attention and to try and extract concessions in return for more reasonable behavior.

But this is not about trusting or liking North Korea. We did not

trust or like the Soviet Union either when we engaged in arms-control treaties with them throughout almost five decades. And this is

not about rewarding bad behavior either. Talks are not a reward

unless the message is surrender. Certainly the administration

knows this.

When General Anthony McAuliffe of the 131st Airborne Division

held direct bilateral talks with German officers on December 22,

1944, during the Battle of the Bulge, he did not engage in appeasement. He answered their call for surrender with one word, ‘‘Nuts.’’

The reason for us to talk with North Korea, in my view, is to test

their intentions and to offer them an alternative to the disastrous

path that they are currently on. If North Korea is prepared to

verifiably dismantle its nuclear and ballistic missile program, then

we should stand ready with our friends and allies to offer them a

brighter future.

But maybe they will tell us, ‘‘Nuts.’’ If the North Koreans refuse

to take the path of peace and reconciliation, at least we will have

tried. And if we, in the end, return to a containment or even more

coercive steps, then we will have a far better chance, in my view,

of securing multilateral support for our efforts if we have first exhausted diplomatic avenues. Surely, the administration can appreciate this given all that is going on in New York this week.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. I

am deeply grateful to the Assistant Secretary for being here to

share his thoughts with us, and our other witnesses, who bring a

wonderful expertise to the particular issue of the Korean PeninVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:35 Jul 01, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 87871 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
8

sula. It can be tremendously helpful to all of us in gathering our

own opinions and deciding what course we ought to follow.

Certainly, we have had wonderful witnesses already, and scholars, including Ambassadors Donald Gregg and Arnie Cantor, all of

whom have endorsed, of course, that dialog with North Korea is essential to any peaceful solution to this crisis. And I look forward

to hearing from the witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd.

It is a real privilege to have Assistant Secretary Kelly before us

today. He is a veteran of the trail of American diplomacy, with a

remarkable career, and he is an expert on the subject on which he

is going to testify today from his personal experience.

Now, I just want to say that I hope we can release Assistant Secretary Kelly sometime around 3:45 or thereabouts so that he can

continue his work of American diplomacy in addition to his work

with us today. But he is flexible, and members will be heard. So

I want to offer that reassurance that we will have opportunities to

question our witness.

Would you please proceed, Assistant Secretary Kelly?

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES A. KELLY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. KELLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members

of the committee and distinguished citizens of Indiana, as well. I

thank you very much for this opportunity to discuss the regional

implications of the changing nuclear equation on the Korean Peninsula, which is, as you have said, an issue of vital importance.

With your permission, I would submit my longer statement for

the record and will get right to the bottom line.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be published in full, and proceed as you

wish.

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, sir.

In the past several months, North Korea has initiated a number

of serious provocations designed to blackmail the United States and

to intimidate our friends and allies into pushing the United States

into a bilateral dialog with the North, giving the North what it

wants and on its terms. What the North wants is acceptance by us

that North Korea’s nuclear weapons are somehow only a matter for

the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [DPRK] and the United

States. This may be tempting to some nations, but it is not true.

We tried the bilateral approach 10 years ago by negotiating the

U.S./DPRK Agreed Framework. In 1993 and 1994, and subsequently over the past decade, we made a number of statements relating to North Korea’s security. We met our end of the bargain.

While the Agreed Framework succeeded in freezing the North’s nuclear weapons program for 8 years, it was only a partial solution

of limited duration. It was easier for North Korea to abrogate its

commitments to the United States under the Agreed Framework

thinking it would receive the condemnation of only a single country.

This time, a more comprehensive approach is required, and that

is because nuclear North Korea could change the face of northeast

Asia undermining the security and stability that have underVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:35 Jul 01, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 87871 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
9

written the region’s economic vitality and prosperity and possibly

triggering a nuclear arms race that would end prospects for a lasting peace and settlement on the Korean Peninsula. The stakes are

equally high for the international community, which would face the

first-ever withdrawal from among the 190 signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

We and others fear an economically desperate North Korean regime might sell fissile material or nuclear arms abroad, and other

nuclear aspirants are watching. If North Korea gains from its violations, others may conclude that the violation route is a cost-free

one. In fact, the past 6 months has shown the international community is united in its desire to see a nuclear-weapons-free Korean

Peninsula.

States cannot undertake this task alone. International institutions, particularly the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]

and the U.N. Security Council, will have an equally important role

to play. For all these reasons, we are moving forward with plans

for multilateral, rather than bilateral, talks to achieve a verifiable

and irreversible end to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

Achieving a multilateral resolution to North Korea’s nuclear

weapons program will take time. The key States to northeast

Asia—South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia—all share the common goal of seeking a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. However,

each also have a unique historical experience with North Korea

and very distinct concerns. Japan has suffered a legacy of North

Korean abductions of innocent Japanese civilians, as well as the

threat posed by North Korea’s ballistic missile program. The cool

admission of kidnapings from the Japanese home islands followed

by untimely deaths stunned many Japanese.

For China, a nuclear North Korea raises the specter of a regional

arms race in a neighbor with a very unstable economic backdrop

to its nuclear ambitions and a potentially huge burden on Chinese

resources.

Russia is, likewise, concerned about a regional arms race and instability on its far eastern border.

And the people of South Korea want national reconciliation, yet

worry about the economic costs and burdens that this could impose.

As the foregoing should make clear, all of North Korea’s immediate neighbors feel they have a stake in the outcome of the diplomatic process, and they want to be consulted and engaged in

achieving a resolution. They all support the principle of multilateral dialog. Indeed, since the Secretary’s trip to the region just 2

weeks ago, our discussions with Japan, South Korea, China, and

others have been focused on the specific modalities of a multilateral

approach, rather than on its merits. These countries have also

asked that the United States address DPRK concerns directly. We

have told our partners that we will do so, but in a multilateral context. This time, we need a different approach. We cannot risk another partial solution.

The United States is open to ideas about the format for a multilateral solution. The process for achieving a durable resolution will

require patience. It is essential that North Korea not reprocess its

spent nuclear fuel into plutonium. That could produce significant

plutonium within some 6 months. But the highly enriched uranium

10

alternate capability is not so far behind. Resolution is not just a

matter of getting the North to foreswear its nuclear weapons ambitions, but also to accept a verifiable and reliable regime of that

verification, including declaration, inspection, and verified elimination.

North Korea has, so far, rejected a multilateral approach, but we

do not believe this is necessarily its last word or its final position.

In the end, North Korea will have to make a choice. Over the past

10 years, Pyongyang has been in pursuit of two mutually exclusive

goals—the first is nuclear weapons; the second is redefining its

place in the world community and, incidentally, its access to international largesse—by broadening its diplomatic and foreign economic relations. The DPRK needs to accept that it cannot do both.

The international community is impressing on the North that its

in its own best interests to end its nuclear arms program.

In the past, North Korea has indicated it wanted to transform its

relations with the United States, South Korea, and Japan. It has

the ability to achieve such a transformation. The question is

whether it has the will.

President Bush has repeatedly said we seek a peaceful diplomatic solution with North Korea, even though he has taken no option off the table. The President has said he would be willing to reconsider a bold approach with North Korea which would include

economic and political steps to improve the lives of the North Korean people and to move our relationship with that country toward

normalcy once the North dismantles its nuclear weapons program

and addresses our longstanding concerns.

While we will not dole out rewards to convince North Korea to

live up to its existing obligations, we and the international community as a whole remain prepared to pursue a comprehensive dialog

about a fundamentally different relationship with that country

once it eliminates its nuclear weapons program in a verifiable and

irreversible manner and comes into compliance with its international obligations.

Of course, for full engagement, North Korea will need to change

its behavior on human rights, address the issues underlying its appearance on the State Department’s list of states sponsoring terrorism, eliminate its illegal weapons of mass destruction programs,

cease the proliferation of missiles and missile-related technology,

and adopt a less provocative conventional force disposition. But we

remain confident of a peaceful diplomatic solution based on the

common interests of our friends and allies, and we will continue to

work closely with the Congress as we move ahead.

Thank you, sir. I am ready to respond to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kelly follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES. A. KELLY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, it is an honor and a privilege to

appear before you today to discuss a vitally important issue, the regional implications of the changing nuclear equation on the Korean Peninsula.

THE PROBLEM

Let me begin by recapping the problem.

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For many years, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has been of concern to

the international community.

In 1993, North Korea provoked a very serious situation on the Peninsula with its

announced withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, setting in motion

a crisis-and-negotiation scenario that culminated in the 1994 Agreed Framework.

While North Korea adhered to the Agreed Framework ‘‘freeze’’ on its declared plutonium production facilities at Yongbyon, last summer it became apparent that the

North had been pursuing for several years another track covertly to acquire nuclear

weapons, a uranium enrichment program.

Our discovery of this program and North Korea’s refusal even after acknowledging

it to us, to dismantle it, forced us to set aside a policy we had hoped would put us

on a path towards resolving all of our concerns with North Korea—a path that

would have offered North Korea an improved relationship with the United States

and participation in the international community, with the benefits and responsibilities conferred by membership in the international community.

Instead of undoing its violations of existing agreements with the U.S. and South

Korea, as well as of the NPT and IAEA Safeguards agreement, the North has escalated the situation, first by expelling IAEA inspectors, then announcing its withdrawal from the NPT.

More recently, the North restarted its reactor at Yongbyon, conducted test firings

of a developmental cruise missile, and intercepted an unarmed U.S. aircraft operating in international airspace with four armed North Korean fighter aircraft.

Each of these North Korean provocations is designed to blackmail the United

States and to intimidate our friends and allies into pushing the United States into

a bilateral dialogue with the North—giving the North what it wants, and on its

terms. What the North wants is acceptance by us that North Korea’s nuclear weapons are somehow only a matter for the DPRK and the U.S. This may be tempting

to some nations. But it is not true.

WHY A MULTILATERAL APPROACH

We tried the bilateral approach ten year’s ago, by negotiating the U.S.-DPRK

Agreed Framework.

We agreed to organize an international consortium to provide the light water reactor project and to finance heavy fuel oil shipments, in exchange for the freezing

and eventual dismantling of the North’s graphite-moderated nuclear program. Our

agreement also set. aside North Korea’s obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In 1993 and 1994, and over the past decade, we made a number of statements

relating to North Korea’s security.

And we found the North could not be trusted.

This time, a new and more comprehensive approach is required.

The stakes are simply too high.

North Korea’s programs for nuclear weapons, and the means to deliver them at

increasingly longer range, pose a serious regional and a global threat.

A nuclear North Korea could change the face of Northeast Asia—undermining the

security and stability that have underwritten the region’s economic vitality and

prosperity, and possibly triggering a nuclear arms race that would end prospects for

a lasting peace and settlement on the Korean Peninsula.

The stakes are no less compelling for the international community, which would

face the first-ever withdrawal from among the 190 signatories to the NPT, dealing

a serious blow to an institution that may be even more relevant and necessary today

than ever in its history.

And an economically desperate North Korean regime might sell fissile material

or nuclear arms abroad.

Make no mistake, we believe we can still achieve, through peaceful diplomacy, a

verifiable and irreversible end to North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs.

However, to achieve a lasting resolution, this time, the international community,

particularly North Korea’s neighbors, must be involved. While the Agreed Framework succeeded in freezing the North’s declared nuclear weapons program for eight

years, it was only a partial solution of limited duration. That is no longer an option.

That is why we are insisting on a multilateral approach, to ensure that the consequences to North Korea of violating its commitments will deny them any benefits

to their noncompliance.

It was easier for North Korea to abrogate its commitments to the United States

under the Agreed Framework, thinking it would risk the condemnation of a single

country.

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In fact, the past six months have shown that the international community is

united in its desire to see a nuclear-weapons free Korean Peninsula. North Korea

has no support in its policies as reflected in the 35-0-0 and 33-0-2 IAEA votes.

If our starting point for a resolution is a multilateral framework, therefore, we

believe that this time, it will not be so easy for North Korea, which seeks not only

economic aid, but also international recognition, to turn its back on all of its immediate neighbors and still expect to receive their much-needed munificence.

This would further North Korea’s own isolation with an even more terrible price

to be paid by its people, who are already living in abject poverty and face inhumane

political and economic conditions.

States cannot undertake this task alone. International institutions, particularly

the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UN Security Council, will have an

equally crucial role to play.

Thus, as Secretary Powell explained to our friends and allies in Northeast Asia

when he visited the region last month, we are moving forward with plans for multilateral rather than bilateral talks to resolve this issue.

But the rubber hits the road when we are faced with violations of those agreements and commitments.

Moreover, it is important to underscore that multilateral support for such regimes

as reflected in the NPT is critical.

We must, in dealing with North Korea, be mindful that other would-be nuclear

aspirants are watching. If North Korea gains from its violations, others may conclude that the violation route is cost free.

Deterrence would be undermined and our nonproliferation efforts—more critical

now than ever—would be grossly jeopardized.

REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS

Achieving a multilateral approach to eliminating North Korea’s nuclear weapons

program will take time. The key states in Northeast Asia—South Korea, Japan,

China and Russia—all share the common goal of seeking a denuclearized Korean

Peninsula. However, each also has a unique historical experience with North Korea

and very distinct concerns.

Japan has suffered a legacy of North Korean abductions of innocent Japanese civilians, as well as the threat posed by North Korea’s missile program. The cool admission of kidnappings from the Japanese home islands followed by untimely deaths

stunned many Japanese.

For China, a nuclear North Korea raises the specter of a regional arms race and

a neighbor with a very unstable economic backdrop to its nuclear ambitions—and

a potentially huge burden on Chinese resources.

Russia is likewise concerned about a regional nuclear arms race and instability

on its far eastern border.

And, the people of South Korea want national reconciliation, yet worry about the

economic costs and burdens that this could impose.

As the foregoing should make clear, all of North Korea’s immediate neighbors feel

they have a stake in the outcome of the diplomatic process and want to be consulted

and engaged in achieving a resolution.

For that reason, all of them support the principle of multilateral dialogue.

Indeed, since the Secretary’s trip to the region last month, our discussions with

Japan, South Korea, China and others have been focused on the specific modalities

of a multilateral approach, rather than its merits.

What I would like the committee to understand, however, is that in response to

North Korean demands for bilateral US-DPRK dialogue, they have asked that we

also address DPRK concerns directly.

We have told our partners that we will do so—but in a multilateral context. This

time, we need a different approach. This time, we cannot run the risk of another

partial solution.

The process for achieving a durable resolution requires patience. It is essential

that North Korea not reprocess its spent nuclear fuel into plutonium. That could

produce significant plutonium within six months. But the HEU alternate capability

is not so far behind. Resolution is not just a matter of getting the North to forswear

its nuclear weapons ambitions, but also to accept a reliable, intrusive verification

regime, including declaration, inspection, and irreversible and verifiable elimination.

North Korea has so far rejected a multilateral approach, but we do not believe

this is its last word or its final position.

Members of the Committee will recall that last year, North Korea loudly refused

our proposal for comprehensive talks until finally convinced to follow through on

that offer by Japan, South Korea, and China. We then had to shelve our talks with

13

the discovery of the clandestine HEU program, of course. This time our friends and

allies have again begun working on North Korea. Indeed, as the South Korean Foreign Ministry noted on March 7, ‘‘North Korea could find some benefits from multilateral dialogue which bilateral dialogue cannot provide.’’ In the end, though, North Korea will have to make a choice. Over the past ten

years, Pyongyang has been in pursuit of two mutually exclusive goals. The first is

nuclear weapons. The second is redefining its place in the world community—and,

incidentally its access to international largesse—by broadening its diplomatic and

foreign economic relations.

The DPRK needs to accept that it cannot do both.

Unfortunately, North Korea’s choice to date has been to proceed with nuclear

weapons development and to escalate international tensions, while demanding commitments and dialogue.

North Korean provocations are disturbing, but they cannot be permitted to yield

gains to North Korea.

The international community must, and indeed is, impressing on the North that

it is in its own best interest to end its nuclear arms program.

The North must understand that to choose the path of nuclear weapons will only

guarantee further isolation and eventual decline, if not self-generated disaster.

The United States is open to ideas about the format for a multilateral solution.

One idea is for the Permanent Five—the U.S., China, France, Great Britain and

Russia—to meet together with the Republic of Korea, Japan, the EU, and Australia.

Others have suggested other ideas, such as six-party talks: North and South

Korea, the U.S., the PRC, Japan, and Russia.

President Bush has repeatedly said we seek a peaceful, diplomatic solution with

North Korea, even though he has taken no option off the table.

The President has also stressed that we will continue to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of North Korea and that we will not use food as a weapon.

We recently announced an initial contribution of 40,000 tons of food aid to North

Korea through the World Food Program, and we are prepared to contribute as much

as 60,000 tons more, based on demonstrated need in North Korea, competing needs

elsewhere, and donors’ ability to access all vulnerable groups and monitor distribution of the food.

In closing, I would note that in the past, North Korea has indicated it wanted

to transform its relations with the United States, South Korea and Japan.

North Korea has the ability to achieve such a transformation.

The question is whether it has the will to do so. The DPRK will need to address

the concerns of the international community.

First, North Korea must turn from nuclear weapons and verifiably eliminate its

nuclear programs.

President Bush has said he would be willing to reconsider a bold approach with

North Korea, which would include economic and political steps to improve the lives

of the North Korean people and to move our relationship with that country towards

normalcy, once the North dismantles its nuclear weapons program and addresses

our long-standing concerns.

While we will not dole out ‘‘rewards’’ to convince North Korea to live up to its

existing obligations, we and the international community as a whole remain prepared to pursue a comprehensive dialogue about a fundamentally different relationship with that country, once it eliminates its nuclear weapons program in a

verifiable and irreversible manner and comes into compliance with its international

obligations.

Of course, for full engagement, North Korea will need to change its behavior on

human rights, address the issues underlying its appearance on the State Department list of states sponsoring terrorism, eliminate its illegal weapons of mass destruction programs, cease the proliferation of missiles and missile-related technology, and adopt a less provocative conventional force disposition.

As I said, we remain confidant that diplomacy can work—and that there will be

a verifiable and irreversible end to North Korea’s nuclear program.

To that end, the United States is intensifying its efforts with friends and allies.

Thank you for this opportunity to discuss this important issue today with you.

We will continue to work closely with the Congress as we seek a multilateral, diplomatic solution with respect to North Korea.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Assistant Secretary Kelly.

We will try a 7-minute limit for each of us on a round of questioning, and I will start the questioning and ask the timekeeper to

start the clock.

14

Secretary Kelly, you have described, certainly, an excellent format for negotiations, a multilateral approach in which all the parties have responsibility for enforcement, and North Korea would

have responsibility to all the parties. I want you to address the

question of timing that is involved in this. Press reports indicate

attempts to engage China and Russia, for example, to be more

forthcoming, to be more cooperative, to indicate that there has been

some progress—and yet not nearly enough, it would appear, thus

far. There are announcements periodically by the North Koreans

that they are progressing with their plutonium program again.

Since we do not have international observers any longer on the

scene, it is difficult to verify that. On the other hand, we would obviously hope that they would not do so, that the proliferation dangers would increase. We would hope to see their ability to hide or

sequester material reduced in due course, quite apart from the

worst option, and that is selling it in some commercial way.

So what if the other parties who are involved in the multilateral

agreement, because of their national interests and their preoccupations with other issues, are unable to work with us to try to get

this format, while the North Koreans continue to indicate that they

may not be interested in it at all? Of course they could change their

minds under some circumstances, while the proliferation dangers

move ahead. What do we do to stop the latter if we are not really

meeting in the former format? And can you give some idea at least

of your own view of the urgency of the proliferation situation, leaving aside the broader issues that we might bring together if we had

this group around the table?

Mr. KELLY. Well, Mr. Chairman, you described the dilemma very

well, that there is an element of urgency. I would not say that it

is a matter of days, but if North Korea begins reprocessing, and so

far we do not have any evidence that they have done so, yes, they

could, within a period of some months, develop this fissionable material.

But you may recall, it was exactly 10 years ago today, on March

12, 1993, when North Korea withdrew from the Non-Proliferation

Treaty [NPT] for the first time. It took until October 21, 1994, in

a bilateral format, before the agreement was completed. This was

a whole year and a half later. A hasty agreement is likely to have

the result of not solving the problem, and we have to solve all aspects of the nuclear weapons problem.

And the element of speed does not only apply to the plutonium

issue. Some have assumed that is somewhere off in the fog of the

distant future. It is not, Mr. Chairman. It is only probably a matter

of months, and not years, behind the plutonium. So we really have

to address this entire issue.

Now, the importance of North Korea not reprocessing is something that is known very much to the North Koreans. We have told

them ourselves. Our allies and friends in the region understand

this very well, and I am sure that many of them have passed on

this information to North Korea.

So I think there are some opportunities that are being worked.

We are mindful of this difficulty. We are able to chew gum and

walk at the same time. This is an important issue that is addressed by our nation’s senior leadership. I talk to Secretary of

15

State Powell about the North Korean issue at least once every single day, and that includes weekends.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is reassuring. At the same time, I suppose, it is very difficult to note the progress of this just as observers.

Now, granted, it took a long while for the bilateral negotiation

to take place. But what you have had to say today about the highly

enriched uranium project is not reassuring. We have concentrated

on the plutonium issue, with which there has been some success,

and presumably there might be some more. We really did not

know, I guess, where the highly enriched uranium project was

going when you had this initial contact that turned out to be a confrontation—you had hoped it might be a talk—with the North Koreans in which they informed you that they were doing this.

All of these announcements that are provocative, such as those

of missile tests or even buzzing a United States aircraft, continue

on. Our responses have been, I suppose, appropriate. We have

sought not to become unduly exercised, to indicate that the military

option is not there, and that we are still plowing ahead. But the

lack of urgency, as perceived by China or Russia, for example, in

this is obvious. And I suppose I am simply curious, do we need

more time simply to pull together our South Korean friends? Is a

part of our lack of urgency the need to take time with them before

we make sure that we are all together in this?

Mr. KELLY. I think the point, Mr. Chairman, is that North Korea

has been working on nuclear weapons for more than 20 years in

various ways and forms. This is not something that is going to be

easily given up on their side, and it is very important that we get

serious results.

As for offering them the alternatives, that is what I did when I

went in in October. My presentation to the North Koreans was not

some ultimatum that they had to give up this uranium enrichment

program that we had learned about. I talked about all the things

that President Bush had had in mind with his bold approach that

is described in the statement here and all these opportunities. And,

in a quiet manner, I wanted to make clear to the North Koreans

that there was another path that they could take.

The allies in the region, in many ways, have problems of their

own. China is in a kind of a transition. There are serious economic

problems in Japan. South Korea has had a President who has been

in office now for 2 weeks and is putting together an administration

also at a time with some economic difficulties facing him. They certainly do all wish that we would take care of this issue in some

way and make it go away so that they did not have to think about

it.

But after 20 years of work on nuclear weapons in North Korea,

the threat and the nature of the problem is one that absolutely involves all of these countries, and I think we have made a great deal

of progress in convincing them. All of us together, really, have to

convince the North Koreans. It is they who have to make the choice

of whether they want to stay the nuclear weapons route or look for

something a little bit better.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dodd.

16

Senator DODD. Well, thank you very much, again, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Assistant Secretary Kelly, for being here.

And just to pick up on those points the chairman is raising, I certainly would agree with you, Mr. Secretary, that all of North Korea’s nuclear issues ought to be resolved and dealt with here, not

just an incremental approach. But would you not agree, as well,

that if, in fact, our willingness to enter into direct talks with North

Korea would result in North Korea bringing about a verifiable

freeze in those programs while those talks were ongoing, would be

a worthwhile goal?

Mr. KELLY. It is very possible, Senator Dodd, for North Korea to

freeze these programs, with plenty of positive outlook. There is

plenty of precedent for security guarantees. I count five that were

given by the United States to North Korea at various times during

the 1990s and the year 2000. All these opportunities are there.

But the other side of their demand for bilateral negotiations is

a demand that the outcome of these be something that is verified

only by the United States. The International Atomic Energy Agency is not supposed to be a part of that. That is just an unacceptable

development for us. The IAEA has to be involved in the nuclear

weapons issues around the globe.

Senator DODD. Well, I do not disagree with that. We are sort of

arriving at the final result of what negotiations would produce. My

question was, if, in fact, you began direct talks, in the result of

doing so there was a freeze on all of their nuclear programs from

going forward, my simple question is would that not be a worthwhile goal if the result of directed talks would produce that result?

Mr. KELLY. The problem, Senator, is we would have no way to

verify that freeze other than what we can do right now, as to

whether North Korea is going forward with existing weapons programs. There are serious limitations on our ability to verify the

uranium enrichment. Of course, I suppose if the reactor were to

shut down, that would perhaps solve that concern.

It is true that this would be one way to make progress. But a

better way to make progress is to convince the North Koreans that

working with other interested countries that do not wish them ill

is also in their interests.

Senator DODD. Well, I do not disagree. If I could—anytime I have

to sit down and negotiate with someone I disagree with, if they

would just agree with me it would be wonderful. My concern here

is they have obviously rejected that, and we need to now find some

common ground here that would let us step back from this pending

crisis.

I certainly acknowledge the fact that this is a 20-year-old problem with North Korea. It did not happen in the last few weeks. But

to pick up on a point the chairman has raised, my concern is that

we are having a series of events here that would—causing the potential to lose that steadiness and stability here, in terms of arriving at a way to resolve these issues, that could explode on us. And

I am worried about that, where all of a sudden you have, instead

of just following a reconnaissance plane, one gets shot down or we

shoot down one of theirs, for instance. All of a sudden, you are

moving divisions closer to the DMZ, you are firing missiles that get

closer, all sorts of things that we have already seen some evidence

17

of that could result in a response that would all of a sudden move

this away from sort of a movements by chess pieces on a board to

something that brings us to a far more serious situation.

And in light of the potentiality of that, and assuming, if you will,

that talks are not a reward, that we have engaged in them historically, to our great success, with people we did not trust, for very

good reason. I am mystified, along with many other people, why we

are taking a position contrary to those of our allies in the region

who have far more at risk than we do immediately, when they have

urged us to move in a direct-talk basis.

I do not disagree with you. They ought to be multilateral talks.

This needs to be a multilateral solution to this problem. It cannot

just be the United States. But it seems to me, to get the ball moving in a direction away from the potential problem we are looking

at here, it is in our interest and the interest of our allies, particularly when they are urging us to do so, to try this. And I am mystified why we are unwilling to take that step.

Mr. KELLY. Well, first of all, Senator, our allies wish that this

problem would go away. This came through very clearly in the visit

of Secretary Powell to Japan and China and South Korea just a

couple of weeks ago. I have had four visits to all those countries

in the last 4 months. It is very clear that there is also a great deal

of interest in the multilateral process, and various formats and

ways are being explored.

North Korea only withdrew from the NPT on the 10th of January. We are less than 2 months away. And I would suggest, Senator, that the timing of when a tack is abandoned is a sensitive

issue.

There is not the slightest doubt that North Korea would like to

enter into these negotiations only with us. They say so, and they

want to underscore this, as you point out, with a whole series of

incidents. The more that they emphasize bilateral negotiations, the

more that we believe that they think that the way to successful negotiations is to get us isolated out there so that after the call is for

talks, then the next call is for concessions. This is a problem that

has gone on for much too long. It was solved in some respects. It

was postponed in others in 1994. We have got to take care of it

once and for all this time, sir.

Senator DODD. Just one last question. My time is almost up.

But you have suggested that because there has not been a reprocessing of spent fuel, that we ought to offer some glimmer of

hope here. Have we been offered any evidence, either directly or indirectly, by the North Koreans, through whatever sources, that

they are not going to reprocess the spent fuel?

Mr. KELLY. They have not said that at all, sir. But if they do so,

it will be a very serious measure, and they certainly know that it

will be a very serious measure that will intensify the difficulty of

this situation significantly.

Senator DODD. But we have no assurances they are not going to

do that, either.

Mr. KELLY. We have no assurances that they are not going to reprocess. They have been working on nuclear weapons for 20 years,

and there is not the slightest sign that they have any interest in

stopping.

18

Senator DODD. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd.

Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I add my welcome to

your constituents from Indiana. I know you are very proud of them,

as they are of you. So we are glad that you are with us today.

Assistant Secretary Kelly, thank you. As always, we appreciate

your time here.

Could you share with the committee thoughts that might reflect

the administration’s thinking about the possibility, if we go to war

in Iraq, the North Koreans might accelerate their dangerous,

threatening behavior, activities? Do you think that might happen,

expect that to happen? What will we do about it if it did happen?

Mr. KELLY. The North Koreans have already, Senator Hagel,

taken quite a number of steps, as you know very well. Some have

been publicized more than others, such as the interception of the

U.S. reconnaissance airplane, which was very distant from North

Korea and very, very far from its territorial airspace. There have

been other somewhat unprecedented, or not recently precedented,

incursions across the northern limit line by a North Korean fighter

airplane.

North Korea is hard at work sending us signals and we cannot

exclude that they will send others, but the ability of our military

forces, and especially, of course, those of our South Korean ally, to

deter serious measures that would break the unstable peace that

has existed, for almost 50 years in South Korea along the DMZ remains very strong.

Senator HAGEL. So you would expect to see an acceleration of activity if we are at war in Iraq?

Mr. KELLY. I cannot speculate about that, Senator Hagel, but I

certainly could not exclude it.

Senator HAGEL. And you have thought through that, I would

suspect——

Mr. KELLY. We and our colleagues at the Department of Defense

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. Military Command in

Korea have thought long and hard about all these options, and we

are not weakened in either our resolve or our capability, given the

situation in Iraq.

Senator HAGEL. Are there any plans underway in thinking—and

I know it is dynamic, always, when we look at forward-deployment

of forces—of withdrawing any of the 37,000 Americans from the

DMZ in Korea?

Mr. KELLY. There have been some press stories about that, Senator. In December, we had a meeting of Secretary Rumsfeld and

his South Korean counterpart, and they launched at that time a

study of the future of our alliance. State and Defense Department

officials visited South Korea just a couple of days after the inauguration, and they are planning to go back in a few weeks. Any

changes that will be made are going to be done in very close coordination with our South Korean ally, and I know that is the position

of the Department of Defense.

Senator HAGEL. So no position, as far as you know, has been

taken regarding that.

19

Mr. KELLY. No decision has been taken about reducing any forces

or, for that matter, increasing forces in South Korea.

Senator HAGEL. Can you tell the committee what you know about

what assistance China gives to the North Koreans?

Mr. KELLY. China is the provider of food and petroleum of last

resort, I would characterize it, to North Korea. Their quantities are

significant. They are also, to the extent anybody is a trading partner with North Korea, probably its largest trading partner, as befits a very long border and a significant number of Chinese citizens

of Korean ancestry. I should mention, of course, the serious concerns we have for refugees who have crossed the border there.

China, of course, has an alliance going back to 1961 with North

Korea, but China has made clear to us in every discussion we have

had, and there have been many, including many recently with Secretary Powell, with the President about to leave office, Mr. Jiang

Zemin, the incoming President, Mr. Hu Jintao, and, of course, Secretary Powell’s counterpart, the Foreign Minister, about China’s response to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. China is firm,

as we are, against the nuclear ambitions of North Korea.

Senator HAGEL. If I might point to part of your testimony and

just quickly paraphrase what you said, if I open it this way,

quoting you, ‘‘President Bush has said he would be willing to reconsider a bold approach with North Korea with which he would include economic and political steps,’’ so on, so on, ‘‘once the North

Koreans dismantle their nuclear weapons program and address our

longstanding concerns.’’

That is a noble effort, obviously, and we would hope they would

do that, but why would you include that in your testimony, when,

in fact, the North Koreans are moving exactly in the opposite direction? What gives you any reason to believe that there is any incentive here or any reason for them to do this?

Mr. KELLY. North Korea has gone through a tumultuous 10

years. It has felt somewhat isolated. North Korea really does not

have any friends around the world. And in a very stilted way, it

has been trying to pursue some economic reforms.

There is the possibility, however remote, that North Korea may

decide to turn its back on these weapons programs and proceed in

a better direction, and we just want to make clear, on the record,

that if it is willing to give up its nuclear ambitions and its nuclear

weapons, there can be a better future. We know that South Korea,

Japan, China, Russia would all support that, and we certainly

would, too.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.

Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Assistant Secretary Kelly, it is good to see you again. And I thank you, Mr.

Chairman, for holding this hearing and thank all the witnesses for

being here today.

I am glad that we are discussing the regional implications of this

crisis today, because obviously those implications are profound.

And I find it hard to argue with President Bush’s characterization

of the situation in North Korea as a regional issue, but it is also,

20

obviously, an international crisis and a major threat to U.S. security.

The prospect of a nuclear weapons producing North Korea, a

country with an extremely troublesome history of proliferation, is

not a problem that I am willing to set aside in the hopes that a

regional solution develops at some point. The sobering testimony

that this committee heard last week relating to the North Korea

crisis left no room for doubt about the stakes for American security.

And so while I am eager to learn more about the very complex regional dimensions to the crisis, I want it to be clear that I believe

the United States’ leadership in this regard is essential and very

urgent at this time.

Mr. Secretary, what is the position of key countries in the region

regarding the U.S. position on engaging in bilateral or direct dialog

with the North Koreans?

Mr. KELLY. As I said earlier, Senator Feingold, about the countries in the region, first of all—I will run through them. Japan

strongly supports the multilateral process. They have had direct

contacts with North Korea themselves to that effect, and they believe this is the best outcome. South Korea is interested in a multilateral process, but would not mind a bit if the United States takes

care of it. China, I would say, is in a similar process. All, however,

do seriously believe and recognize that the best solution of this

longstanding problem is going to be in the multilateral arena and

are helping us explore various modalities that might make this a

more attractive and more likely outcome.

This process has not been going on forever, Senator Feingold, because, as I noted, it is only 2 months since North Korea stepped

back from the NPT.

Senator FEINGOLD. What is Russia’s position on the direct talks,

bilateral talks?

Mr. KELLY. Two weeks ago, I met with the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister. Deputy Secretary Armitage had met in Moscow and

has had long discussions, as has Under Secretary Bolton, with the

Russians, and we are in very close touch with them on this issue.

The Russians are also a little bit ambivalent on this one. First

of all, they tell us—and, frankly, I do not know why—that they are

not so sure that North Korea really is interested in nuclear weapons or has a nuclear weapons program. But they are unequivocal

in taking the strong position that this is an international issue and

concern and that North Korea must not become a nuclear weapons

program. And, that said, they feel that they have useful access to

North Korea and that that is something that they can bring to the

table. And we hope that, in fact, that will turn out to be helpful.

Senator FEINGOLD. Would it be fair to characterize your answer

as saying that Russia really would oppose direct talks, that South

Korea and China would not necessarily be opposed to it, and that

Japan, I took your answer to mean, would be opposed to us?

Mr. KELLY. I think the true answer is that all of those countries,

at the moment, would be very happy if the United States made this

problem go away, but they do recognize the difficulty and the complexity of the problem. Japan is probably the closest to us on multilateral talks, but the others are not at all far behind and are very

heavily engaged in finding a way to solve the problem.

21

Senator FEINGOLD. With regard to South Korea, you indicated

that South Korea would not mind a bit if we were to take care of

it, but have they not really done more? Have they not specifically

called on the United States to have direct bilateral talks?

Mr. KELLY. There have been such statements, particularly during the political campaign, but the government has been in office

now for 2 weeks, and that was not the position that we heard in

our discussions with senior levels of the new South Korean Government. We have a number of other meetings with our friends, the

South Koreans, coming up. The Foreign Minister will be here within the next few days, and President Roh is expected to visit Washington very early in his term.

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me just ask you one other way, because

this is so important, when we talk to our colleagues and our constituents, to understand why we would or would not have direct

talks. Have any of the countries in the region urged us to engage

in direct talks since the North Koreans rejected multilateral talks?

I understand, as you have described with regard to each country,

it might not be their first choice, but is it their preferred choice in

light of the recently stated North Korean position?

Mr. KELLY. Well, first of all, Senator Feingold, direct talks—bilateral talks mean just the United States and North Korea and nobody else. Multilateral talks involve any number of other countries.

Within multilateral talks, there are all kinds of arrangements, but

it is inevitable in such situations that there is a direct conversation, dialog. So I think the direct-talk language has probably been

confusing, especially when used by some of our allies.

Senator FEINGOLD. But if you could just answer, have any of the

countries urged us to engage in direct talks?

Mr. KELLY. They have all urged us to engage in direct talks.

And——

Senator FEINGOLD. Have they urged us to do it?

Mr. KELLY. The question, sir, is whether they have urged us to

be in bilateral talks. Some have done that, and some have not; and

some have urged both bilateral and multilateral talks.

Senator FEINGOLD. And who, again, has urged us to do the bilateral talks? Which countries?

Mr. KELLY. The Chinese and the Russians have made that point,

but they have also—or especially the Chinese—have shown a great

deal of interest in various formulas for multilateral talks.

Senator FEINGOLD. In your view, are the key players in the region, such as South Korea and Japan, sort of, resigned to the idea

of a nuclear weapons producing North Korea?

Mr. KELLY. No, sir.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing and I thank all of the witnesses for being here today.

I am glad that we are discussing the regional implications of this crisis today, because those implications are profound. And I find it hard to argue with President

Bush’s characterization of the situation in North Korea as a ‘‘regional issue.’’ But

it is also an international crisis, and a major threat to U.S. security. The prospect

of a nuclear-weapons-producing North Korea—a country with an extremely troublesome history of proliferation—is not a problem that I am willing to set aside in the

22

hopes that a regional solution develops at some point. The sobering testimony that

this committee heard last week relating to the North Korea crisis left no room for

doubt about the stakes for America’s security. And so while I am eager to learn

more about the complex regional dimensions to the crisis, I want to be clear that

I believe that U.S. leadership is sorely needed now.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.

Senator Chafee.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Welcome,

Assistant Secretary Kelly.

We had a hearing a couple of weeks ago, or last week, and Ambassador Gregg testified, former Security Advisor to Vice President

Bush, I might note. And he was critical of our present approach toward North Korea and especially the language that has heightened

the tensions between our two countries. And obviously ‘‘axis of

evil,’’ referring to the President of North Korea, in very denigrating

personal language, according to Ambassador Gregg, was very

harmful to our relations and what he considered a thaw that was

happening prior to this escalation of harsh rhetoric. And certainly,

common sense would tell you that that kind of language is not

helpful in a diplomatic way. How can you defend that?

Mr. KELLY. Mainly, Senator Chafee, it is because it is true. There

is a problem of weapons of mass destruction being produced by

countries that then offer them for sale through our state and nonstate actors, and that was the defining issue that the President

was talking about in the State of the Union Address of 2002.

I have talked very often with Ambassador Gregg. He is a very

old colleague and friend. In fact, we have talked within the last 24

hours about various topics, and I respect his opinion.

But the State of the Union is not a forum for using diplomatic

language. It is a forum for telling the American people what the

serious issues that endangers and confront us are.

Senator CHAFEE. Would, I assume, a common goal of having

some kind of relationship with North Korea—do you see or foresee

a continuance of this kind of approach?

Mr. KELLY. Well, I have just outlined in my statement our policy

and our approach, which is very broad and which provides all kinds

of opportunities for North Korea, if it is willing to stop and step

back from its nuclear weapons programs, in particular, and also

from its other weapons of mass destruction programs.

Senator CHAFEE. I guess that leads to the question of, similar to

Iraq, how are we going to verify? We are in a situation in Iraq

where we are trying to prove a negative. We say they have weapons of mass destruction; they say they do not. We have not found

any. And certainly North Korea has more of a visible—with reactors and the like. But are we going through a similar exercise down

the road with North Korea?

Mr. KELLY. This has been a problem for a long time, Senator

Chafee. The Agreed Framework provided verification of some aspects of their programs, and it waived a verification to which North

Korea had earlier acceded, specifically, their full responsibilities

under the Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic

Energy Agency. This is a big problem, and it is one that North

Korea is going to have to face if it wants to have an improved relaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:35 Jul 01, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 87871 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
23

tionship with not only its neighbors, but the rest of the world and

certainly with us.

Senator CHAFEE. I just know how difficult it is once you go down

that road of, as you said in your statement, ‘‘eliminating all its

weapons of mass destruction and ceasing proliferation of missiles

and missile-related technology.’’ It is a long, difficult road that you

are asking that country to go on.

But I would like to just change course a little bit. And in your

statement, you continually talk about how important it is to have

a multilateral coalition as we approach the problem of North

Korea, and even mentioning that it is going to be important to

have the U.N. Security Council play a role. And, of course, that

begs the question if what we are doing at present jeopardize our

success at building this multilateral coalition of friends and allies.

And can you play out how what we are doing at present, just in

the hours as are dealing, arm twisting—and even here in Congress,

I saw an article, we are going to ‘‘punish’’ nations that are not

friendly to us in this quest in Iraq. How is that going to help us

down the road? As you have said over and over in your testimony,

it is important to have a multinational approach to this problem.

Mr. KELLY. Well, most countries, and certainly most major countries, view these problems as the problems that they are. Those

other items that I mentioned and you mentioned, Senator, are important, but the nuclear weapons issue certainly takes precedence

right now.

But with respect to that, in the International Atomic Energy

Agency Board of Governors votes in January and then again in

February, the votes were 35 against no opponents and no abstentions on the first vote. The second vote had two abstentions, from

Russia and Cuba, and nobody voted against it, and 33 voted for it.

There is a lot of unity on this.

The French Ambassador, for example, notwithstanding some important differences we have in other areas, has come to see me

with his officers on a number of occasions. The French, I think,

yield to no one in their distaste for the nuclear activities of the

North Koreans, and that is the same for most of the other serious

players in the world.

So the Security Council remains not only an institution with responsibilities for peace and security around the world, but I think

it may well turn out to have a role, if we are not going to get a

breakthrough soon, on North Korea.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you. I am on my last several seconds. So

you can unequivocally say that, as you say in your testimony, that

we are going to have a multilateral approach to the problem in

North Korea, that that is our goal? Because certainly it is at odds

with some members of the administration that are advocating a

sole superpower status in the world. And——

Mr. KELLY. The administration is very solid, Senator Chafee,

that this is a multilateral problem and that it has to be solved in

that way.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.

Senator Nelson.

24

Senator NELSON. Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield to Senator

Rockefeller.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Senator Rockefeller.

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Senator Nelson, very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Kelly, it strikes me, as I listen to this, that we are

talking about North Korea like it was, sort of, like most other countries in the world. And two things come to mind when I think

about the Koreas and northeast Asia. One is that it still amazes

me that Japan was able to shut itself off for 250 years during the

Tokugawa period up until the middle of the 19th century, and then

they had to have bilateral talks with Admiral Perry because he arrived in their harbor. They were not pleased about it. But it says

something remarkable about that area of the world, and there is

quite a lot of DNA history in that part of the world.

Second, that if you look at South Korea, which is—about 48 million people?

Mr. KELLY. Yes, sir.

Senator ROCKEFELLER. There are—I do not know what point this

proves, but it makes a point to me—there are, I think, about 250

last names in the entire country. Now, what does that say? Perhaps not very much, or perhaps it says that this is—and I assume

it is sort of the same in North Korea, with about half that many

people—that it is an entirely different society, that they are extraordinarily disciplined—and I talk now particularly of the North

Koreans. The South Koreans, I think, are going to go through a period when they reevaluate their relationship with us. I think that

is natural; not just generationally, but in terms of the new government and the way the world works, generally. But that is not what

we are talking about.

North Korea is in terrible straits. They are always about to collapse, except they never do because they are always willing to draw

their belts in another two or three inches, because that is what

they do. And they do not blame it on Kim Jong Il; they blame it

on the political commissar around the corner, and so it gets away

with that.

And really there are not a lot of other countries like that, and

yet we, sort of, are treating them like we would treat a European

country or some other country in the way they ought to behave. I

mean, what strikes me from this conversation is that everybody is

saying, well, the Japanese think that we should do multilateral,

the Chinese maybe do and maybe do not. And my theory on the

Chinese is they would probably like to see us do it and then come

in and help, sort of, settle it, take some credit for it, which would

not bother me at all if it settled it. South Koreans have been on

both sides of the issue, as Senator Feingold indicated.

But what strikes me as most important is that North Korea,

which is the country which is at stake, says they want to have bilateral talks, which means that they can say, ‘‘We will not have

multilateral talks.’’ They can decline to talk.

I do not understand what the advantage is if we press for multilateral talks along with some of the other countries, but they decline to have them. Now, there could be reasons they do not want

to have them. It could be simply that they have the nuclear bomb,

25

they have very little else, they seek recognition, they want to have

something which says, ‘‘We are here, and we are important, and we

can engage the United States in bilateral talks if we insist on it.’’ But the important thing is, they can refuse to have the multilateral

talks, that they are controlling, in a sense, in this issue unless we

decide that we are simply so wedded to multilateral talks that we

will not talk with them, which brings in the questions that others

have raised, and that is the way they have upped the stakes. You

used the word ‘‘the stakes are very high,’’ or ‘‘simply too high,’’ in

your own statement, and they have grown a great deal higher rather rapidly.

Now, my question is this. We have been stuck with them before

when they have been in very difficult situations. And, you know,

Jimmy Carter went over there in 1994, and Kim Il Sung had his

wife there, which was kind of unusual. She did not go to those

kinds of things. And then he, Kim Il Sung, turns to—because

Jimmy Carter wants to do something about the MIAs, and he turns

to his wife, and he said, ‘‘What do you think?’’ And she said, ‘‘I

think we should do it.’’ And so he went ahead and did it. And then

he—and Yongbyon got frozen for a period of time.

Well, I mean, maybe that is kind of a—sort of, an odd construct,

but it was a way that seemed to work with Kim Jong Il’s father.

We have never really dealt with Kim Jong Il that way. Maybe

when he deals with U.S. Government officials, that he simply—you

know, that he cannot do that in quite the same way because he has

not had experience in that, he has not been out of the country

enough, or whatever.

So the possibility is twofold, it seems to me. One is that we accede to his request and we do the bilateral. And if the bilateral

does not work, then we are in, sort of, a pickle. But, on the other

hand, I think if we decide to have the multilateral, it would not

work because they would decide that they did not want to do it.

You indicated that they did not want to have international inspections, but then that is exactly the kind of thing which, if you have

a bilateral and you give that to them in a time of high crisis for

us in many parts of the world and enormous danger from them,

that they might either change on—or somebody else could come in,

including—my suggestion would be Jim Baker could come in and

help on that, or the Chinese could come in and help on that.

I mean, I cannot severely predict the failure of bilateral talks,

other than the fact—as you apparently can—other than the fact

that we do not want to have them and that some other countries

would prefer—particularly Japan, would prefer to have the multilateral.

And, to me, the point is that the North Koreans do not want

that, and they do want this. And, frankly, I understand why they

do want it. Because it is what, sort of, needed at this point. It is,

sort of, the equivalent of, let us say, you know, x-billions of tons

of wheat or something of that sort. I mean, it gives them something

that they psychologically need, that he, personally, needs, and the

people will be behind him. Why do we insist on having this process

fail?

Mr. KELLY. Well, one reason, Senator Rockefeller, is that it

would represent advance concessions that the nuclear weapons

26

issue is something to be settled only between the United States

and North Korea.

One of the reasons that North Korea wants to try this is because

it has worked for them before. Yes, the discussion that you describe

went on with President Carter. And then, a number of months

later, an agreement was made which had as its goal the ending of

nuclear weapons programs in North Korea. But it did not end nuclear weapons programs in North Korea. It ended one particular

nuclear weapons program, but it set the stage for another alternate

program to begin.

And so North Korea has had success with bilateral negotiations

and getting the results both ways, and we are determined that this

time we really have to solve its nuclear weapons problem including

verification.

And, incidentally, sir, Kim Jong Il did have discussions with the

Secretary of State of the former administration on that visit in November of 2000.

Senator ROCKEFELLER. That is true.

Mr. KELLY. And that involved some suggestions of offerings of

missiles, that if we would provide some compensation, then maybe

North Korea would stop selling missiles. But when it came to

verification, that administration ran into a complete dead end, and

there was absolutely nothing going forward.

So we feel, Senator Rockefeller, that a different way has to be

tried, and this issue has come to a head within the last couple of

months, and it is one that we would like to see—we would like to

test just what is the best way to solve this. Because we do not

think that the North Koreans are insane or irrational. We think

that they are looking out for their best interests. It may well occur

to them that the way that they have tried in the past is not going

to work and that that is going to lead to increased isolation and

pressure on its already stressed economy.

Your analysis, I think, was just excellent, Senator. One thing I

would say is that I think the North Korea leadership pulls in the

belts of the people and not their own.

Senator ROCKEFELLER. I agree.

Mr. KELLY. But that also is a part of the issue.

Senator ROCKEFELLER. But they do accept it.

Mr. KELLY. They accept it because they do not have any choice,

Senator, as you know very well.

Senator ROCKEFELLER. You are correct. But that is the nature of

the country.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Rockefeller.

Secretary Kelly, let me just say we are indebted to members of

our committee for their loyalty in coming. We had a quorum this

morning to pass the treaties. We have a quorum this afternoon to

see you. This means we have four more Senators.

Mr. KELLY. Whatever your pleasure, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I just wanted to try and establish the fact that

all four of our remaining members could be heard for their 7 minutes and—because we—— Mr. KELLY. There is not much else I can do that is more important than trying to make our case with this committee, sir.

27

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I appreciate that.

Senator Allen.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. And thank you, Assistant Secretary Kelly, for being here and

sharing with us your views.

It is good to have the folks, Mr. Chairman, from Evansville. I

was through Evansville this summer with my son and stopped at

the Flying J truck stop there—decent gas prices—heading west on

Route 41 and Interstate 64. At any rate, good to have you all here.

I wish we still had those gas prices.

I want to commend you, Assistant Secretary Kelly, for your great

diplomacy and calm in what could easily develop into—it is a crisis;

I am not going to argue over words, but something that is much

more worrisome and belligerent.

We are not dealing, in my view, with rational leadership in

North Korea. And it is interesting, or somewhat ironic, that while

others say, ‘‘Gosh, the United States is doing too many things on

their own,’’ in some parts of the world; here, where we are trying

to get multilateral or international folks involved, you are getting

prodded and poked to, well, go ahead and do it the U.S. versus— in interactive bilateral talks—just United States and North Korea.

This is a dangerous situation. I know that you and the Secretary

of State Colin Powell are trying to manage it as best as possible.

The question is, is what—there are several questions. The Japanese. The Japanese, in the past, when it was the United States

versus USSR, felt that they could be under our nuclear umbrella.

Obviously, you have stated none of the countries want North Korea

to have nuclear weapons. They clearly have a few now, and they

are—I do not know what the prospects are that they do not have

nuclear weapons. What will be the Japanese’s, the Japanese Government’s, view be of the United States, of the protection provided

by a nuclear umbrella in the event that North Korea continues to

possess these weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear

weapons, and clearly the missiles capable of hitting the Japanese?

Mr. KELLY. You are right to point that out, Senator Allen. The

Japanese and the U.S./Japan alliance remain very firm, and the

Japanese commitment not to proceed in any direction of nuclear

weapons is a very strong one. And that is true notwithstanding

their serious concern not only over the abductions, but, as you

point out, the missile problem, not to mention the potential nuclear

weapons.

So the U.S./Japan alliance provides that nuclear umbrella, and

that is a very important part of our commitment and our relationship with Japan, and it was strongly emphasized during the visit

that Secretary Powell had not long ago with Prime Minister

Koizumi and in telephone calls from President Bush to Prime Minister Koizumi.

Senator ALLEN. So your view is that the Japanese would not reconsider their nuclear posture?

Mr. KELLY. The Japanese are not going to reconsider it. What is

happening is the Japanese are starting to talk about these issues.

In many ways, this was just a part of the air that was breathed

every day by Japanese people. And now, more and more, there is

a discussion of such things and a recognition in the context of that

28

discussion that the U.S.-Japan alliance is not insignificant and that

it really means something and that this is a situation in which

Japan does not have to throw off its nuclear allergy.

Senator ALLEN. All right. There are questions about who can actually have the greatest influence on North Korea. What percentage of the North Korean Government’s functions are funded by the

People’s Republic of China?

Mr. KELLY. I do not think I know, Senator.

Senator ALLEN. Could you give us a ballpark figure? Would you

say at least half of their support and funding, food, fuel, whatever

all——

Mr. KELLY. I suppose we would say in terms of the assistance in

food and fuel. To the best of my knowledge China is not providing

direct monetary assistance. There is a lot of money that has come

in the past from Japan. There is a lot less of that now. There are

other sources of money for North Korea and they are very hard to

sort out. The sale of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles and arms

is a source of money. The sale of illegal drugs and the sale of counterfeit currency are other sources of income that certainly do not

involve China.

Senator ALLEN. All right, which country provides the most assistance to North Korea?

Mr. KELLY. Unquestionably, China.

Senator ALLEN. Are there any others anywhere close to China?

In the event the People’s Republic of China wanted to use that leverage and their assistance to try to get North Korea to comport

to the desires of the nations, as stated, in this region, would that

have any influence on North Korea’s Government?

Mr. KELLY. It might; but then again, it might not, for the reasons

that have been mentioned here. Additionally, there are some pretty

significant amounts of aid that come from South Korea, as well, including the recent food aid. There have been a lot of reports of

moneys paid from South Korea. So China is not the only one there.

The blunt instrument of China threatening to cutoff North Korea

is one that I think China does not want to explore very much, because they have a lot of fear of instability and refugees.

Senator ALLEN. Right. On refugees, there are hundreds daily, if

not thousands, of people desperately trying to get out of North

Korea and into China. I would hope that we provide as much assistance as we can for to help those people escape this tyrannical

regime, and China is the one place that they are coming in to.

I would ask you if you would—I was reading Ambassador Lilley’s

very thoughtful remarks, and he was talking about, in his remarks,

the worry about them raising the ante of provocation. The biggest

worry is that their economy is falling apart. And so, therefore, I

think his theory—Ambassador, if I am getting it wrong, I am sorry,

but it is still—they are probative questions or thoughts—is would

Kim Jong Il try to strike out and provoke us to try to avoid the

accountability for his own ineptitude and the terrible conditions in

their country, and that hides his economic weaknesses and

vulnerabilities? Is that a legitimate concern as I have paraphrased?

Mr. KELLY. That is a very possible scenario. And Ambassador

Lilley knows a great deal about that subject, and that is one of the

possibilities that we have to recognize.

29

Senator ALLEN. Thank you. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I look forward to working with you as you patiently work

through this very difficult, dangerous situation.

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, sir.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Allen.

Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Secretary, in response to your comments to Senator Rockefeller, it seems like you indicate that the question of bilateral negotiations, discussions, are off the table. Is the military option off the

table?

Mr. KELLY. Nothing is off the table, Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. So your answer to Senator Rockefeller was that

it is still a possibility for bilateral?

Mr. KELLY. I do not want to get into that. The President has

made clear that all of our options with respect to North Korea are

on the table. Now, usually that is thought of as in a different context, but since you put it that way, we are not ruling out anything

at any end. But our position is a very strong and sturdy one right

now, sir, that multilateral negotiations are the way to proceed. We

would certainly have to carry out our own responsibilities in that

process, and we would be ready to do so.

Senator NELSON. Well, let me show you how the logic goes. And

I am just a country boy from Florida, but here is how it sounded

in your response to Senator Rockefeller, that bilateral is off the

table. Certainly, you do not want to put up on the table the military option. They say multilateral is off the table. And that leaves

us nowhere. Sounds like that means that we accept the status quo.

Mr. KELLY. We do not accept the status quo, sir, and we do

not——

Senator NELSON. We certainly—— Mr. KELLY [continuing]. And we do not accept future nuclear developments in North Korea, and neither do the countries in the region.

Senator NELSON. OK. At the end of the day, we want them to

be defanged as a nuclear power.

Mr. KELLY. Yes, sir.

Senator Nelson; That is clearly in our interest, it is clearly in the

interest of the folks in the region. It is in the interest of the world.

How do you do that?

Mr. KELLY. There are a lot of different ways that we work to do

that, and they are not necessarily easy. North Korea has been a

very serious problem for us even before the invasion of June 25,

1950. The armistice in 1953 was never resolved. There have been

series of very dangerous incidents over the years, the 1976 axe

murder of American soldiers, the shooting down of a reconnaissance aircraft, 1969, the seizing of the Pueblo. This is a long-time

troublesome country, and if our problems had been solved, we

would not be having to deal with North Korea now.

Senator NELSON. I agree. But what we want to do is—at the end

of the day, we want them non-nuclear.

Mr. KELLY. Yes, sir.

30

Senator NELSON. And so it seems to me that, first of all, is it any

wonder that we are kind of getting a lot of flack in that part of the

world with our ally, South Korea, that they make the peace overtures with the previous President, suddenly there is a new feeling

of goodwill. Then, the new election occurs, and there is that track

for a peace overture, and the United States looks like it comes

along and throws cold water on that. Is it any wonder that we are

getting a negative reaction from South Korea?

Mr. KELLY. I would argue, sir, that we are not getting so much

of a negative reaction, especially over our negotiation policy. The

withdrawal from the NPT was after the South Korean election. To

be frank, sir, the flack to the administration on whether to pursue

a bilateral or multilateral solution is much more intense in Washington, DC, than it is in any Asian capital.

Senator NELSON. Let me ask you about China. I was really

shocked—first of all, let just say that your boss, I think, is just

marvelous and I think he is one of the best in the business—but

I was shocked when Secretary Powell went to Beijing and he

seemed to be rebuffed by the Chinese. He, of course, would like to

get them into it. We need them in the game, we need Russia in the

game, we need Japan in the game. Why was he rebuffed?

Mr. KELLY. Well, the answer, Senator Nelson, is he was not

rebuffed. He was rebuffed only by anonymous and unnamed

spokespersons here in Washington, DC. I was on the trip, and I

was in all the meetings that he had, and ‘‘rebuffed’’ does not even

begin to describe this.

In fact, there was a very energetic discussion that went way over

time with the Chinese Foreign Minister, went into great detail with

the President and Vice President of China. And afterwards, Secretary Powell gave a press conference and described the meetings

he had had.

But the work is not finished, and the efforts that China is undertaking and that we are trying to work with it are not concluded.

And so I think, as a result of that meetings, some people, if they

do not see the results right away, conclude that there was some

kind of a rebuff, and that is absolutely not the case, sir.

Senator NELSON. Well, that is encouraging. Would you say, then,

if we were not rebuffed, that there is really a chance that we can

get China in the game to defang the nuclear North Korea?

Mr. KELLY. Secretary Powell met with the Foreign Minister of

China again in New York last Friday, a second meeting in less

than 2 weeks, and discussed this issue, and this is working along.

I am not able to go into the details of it in this kind of session,

though, sir.

Senator NELSON. Mr. Secretary, you give me hope. Thank you.

Mr. KELLY. Well, sir, we are going to try to work on it to see if

we can get some results. Working with the Chinese, the South Koreans, Japanese, Russians, and there are others who want to help.

The ASEAN Regional Forum has some ideas. Various Europeans

have some, too.

Senator NELSON. The fact that you give me hope, I would just

offer this one piece of advice in passing, Mr. Chairman, and that

is that where we have gotten into trouble with this Iraq situation,

sometimes with our European allies, sometimes with Turkey, in

31

appearing too heavy-handed and appearing too arrogant, maybe we

have to go and meet somebody one to one and look them in the eye.

And if that is what it takes to defang them, then that would be my

advice.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.

Senator Alexander.

Senator ALEXANDER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary,

thank you for being here.

Am I correct that it is pretty clear policy that we have said to

North Korea that, ‘‘If you attack South Korea, we attack you’’?

Mr. KELLY. Yes. We will resist the attack and deter the attack.

Senator ALEXANDER. But there is no doubt in their minds that

if they were to——

Mr. KELLY. No, sir.

Senator ALEXANDER [continuing]. If they were to attack South

Korea or Japan, for example, that that would require, in diplomatic

language, the most severe action by us.

Mr. KELLY. Our alliances are clear, firm, and longstanding.

Senator ALEXANDER. So there is no question about that. Everyone understands that.

Now, let us take—and that is the nuclear umbrella, that is the

umbrella that—maybe not nuclear umbrella; that is the defense

umbrella that protects our allies in that region, and we have lived

with that for a long time, people have a good understanding about

that. I have no doubt in my mind that President Bush is absolutely

convince of that.

But now we are moving into a different set of what-ifs, which

makes this all so difficult, it seems to me. Maybe you said this earlier, but is it as clear that we are unwilling to live with North

Korea as a nuclear power? Are we firm about that, or is there some

wiggle room in that?

Mr. KELLY. There is no wiggle room in that, Senator Alexander.

We are determined that North Korea not become a nuclear power,

acknowledged or unacknowledged.

Senator ALEXANDER. So that really leaves us, as we have heard

from other people who have come before this committee in the last

6 weeks, with two general options. One is to negotiate a solution,

and the second is some sort of action by the United States that

stops the development of the nuclear programs in North Korea, or

some multilateral group that stops the development of nuclear programs in North Korea.

Mr. KELLY. Well, the best is for the North Koreans to recognize

what is the truth, that it is not in their interest to proceed this way

and that their suggestions of danger and threats are very overblown and not true.

Senator ALEXANDER. Right. Given that those are—and I will use

my own words and not put words in your mouth—that those are

really the only two general directions left for us; one is some sort

of action to disarm their program or the other is some sort of negotiated settlement of it—would it be fair of me to suggest that the

administration is trying to deal with one crisis at a time here?

I am not so surprised that you are saying that you prefer a multilateral approach and that you are unwilling to commit to a bilatVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:35 Jul 01, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 87871 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
32

eral approach. I think that would be the logical thing for us to do

at this stage, hoping that that is the kind of discussion we eventually end up in. And I would also assume that at this time, with all

of the focus of our country on Iraq, that, just given human nature,

that we will deal with Iraq first and North Korea second. Is that

right?

Mr. KELLY. No, sir. I do not think that is right. There is an urgency and a seriousness all of its own in the North Korean issue,

and this strategy is not a strategy of simply buying some time to

get past the Iraq issue at all. Those individuals that characterize

our strategy in that way are not correct.

It is a strategy that is determined to deal with this problem in

a holistic way. This is a large problem and it is one that is going

to have to be dealt with, and we are determined to work through

that. As the President puts it, a diplomatic solution is the preferred

way, but none of his options are off the table.

Senator ALEXANDER. If I could go back to one of the questions

one of the other Senators asked—I believe it was Senator Allen—

about the umbrella, in a way that is saying, ‘‘If you hit us, we will

hit you.’’ But we are now beginning to live in a world where we

find that even in the United States we cannot think that way always, that we have to look at, for example, Saddam Hussein and

say, ‘‘You may not have hit us, but we may have to hit you anyway.’’ It could be that Japan or Taiwan or South Korea would want

to do that and would not feel like the traditional cold war umbrella

provided by the United States was sufficient, in terms of their defense.

So I wonder if there might not be more of a domino effect here

in the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Asia than we have been

thinking. I wonder if Japan, which could quickly—might not be

able to quickly change its mind, but if it ever did change its mind,

it could quickly move with nuclear programs, or Taiwan, South Korean, others. I wonder if North Korea continued with a program if

we would not have more of a ripple effect. If Japan were to move,

then China would feel threatened, et cetera.

Mr. KELLY. I think we could discuss the relative likelihood of

that. But if North Korea is seen to get away with having nuclear

weapons, there are many players, many far more dangerous than

the ones you name that are—in other parts of the world, that are

going to take sustenance in that. The newspapers have had discussions of Iran’s work in areas of nuclear weapons and there are

other countries that are pretty unstable who might try to go the

same way. And that makes it all the more important that this

strategy that we are working with North Korea be successful.

But with respect to the immediate danger, of North Korea, our

deterrence, our alliances with South Korea, with Japan, are very

firm, and I do not anticipate that either of those countries are

going to feel the need to turn toward nuclear weapons anytime

soon. But it does command their attention in joining with us to resolve this issue, we hope, diplomatically with the North Koreans.

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Alexander.

33

Let me just mention, activities in the outside world that are on

the floor. We are likely to have a rollcall vote in a few minutes’ time.

I am going to recognize Senator Sununu. And in the event, Senator, that all other Senators disappear, you are in charge until you

finish your questioning, at which time Secretary Kelly will retreat,

and we will come back to see another excellent panel. But I want

to try to keep the continuity of the hearing if we can.

Senator Sununu.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let

the record show that I do not believe that offer to put me in charge

temporarily bears in any way as to what the appropriate constitutional succession would be. I do not want such an assumption to

limit my long-term political viability.

Mr. Secretary, in the material that we were provided it says that

the official Russian position has been that North Korea does not

now possess nuclear weapons. That seems to be in direct opposition

to what the stated official U.S. position is, and that is no small difference in my mind. Is that your understanding of the official Russian position?

Mr. KELLY. Their position is a little softer than that, Senator

Sununu. The Russians say the experts that they have think that

the North Koreans are not as far along as we think, and I had a

direct conversation with the Russians about this matter and said

that it was a matter in which we disagreed very, very strongly.

Senator SUNUNU. I do not quite know what to make of the description, soft. Either you have an official position that they are in

possession of a nuclear device, or you have an official position that

they are not currently in possession of a nuclear device, but it

would seem that if there is a difference of opinion on that basic

issue, then it may well be an obstacle to working cooperatively toward a long-term solution, because such a difference of opinion

would indicate likewise a difference in feeling of the immediacy of

the problem.

Mr. KELLY. And it may be a diplomatic way of dodging the problem, too, I would suggest, Senator.

Senator SUNUNU. Is this the reason, or does this in any way relate to the reasons that the Russians have for opposing bringing

this issue to the U.N. Security Council?

Mr. KELLY. It is not clear, sir, that the Russians oppose bringing

it to the U.N. Security Council. They abstained in the IAEA vote.

I do not think we can conclude that they oppose bringing it to the

Security Council and, in fact, the issue has come to the Security

Council and been referred to experts. It is sort of sent off into a

committee until such time as the Security Council brings it back,

but the official words were that members of the Security Council

were seized with the problem, and that included Russia as well as

the other members.

Senator SUNUNU. In your opening remarks you said that a bilateral approach has failed and a multilateral approach is therefore

desired by the United States, and we had a lot of questioning on

that point. I want to give you an opportunity, though, to develop

the arguments for a multilateral approach a little bit more strongly. I think the fact that a bilateral approach has failed in and of

34

itself is not reason not to continue to pursue a bilateral approach.

You can have a bilateral agreement that was a bad agreement, unenforceable, poorly designed, but still believe that a bilateral approach can yield a successful agreement.

Could you lay out in a little bit more detail what the reason is

that a multilateral approach would be more effective, and why a

multilateral agreement would be more likely to last for the foreseeable future?

Mr. KELLY. Well, first of all, because this is inherently a multinational problem, the NPT has been a very widely observed treaty.

Second, by engaging more parties in negotiation, the assurances

that any one of the parties might provide are emphasized and endorsed.

Third, if North Korea chooses to step back from nuclear weapons

programs, the other countries of the region are certainly ready to

begin to offer them all kinds of tangible inducements, building on

things that have been done before, and since North Korea needs literally everything, especially electricity, there are things that other

countries might choose to do. That is way down the line, but those

are among the incentives.

Senator SUNUNU. But you seem to put it, though, in somewhat

material terms, more inducements, more levels of sharing of materials. You mention electricity.

But you also said that the Chinese were not likely to use any of

their current assistance or support as bargaining in a multilateral

negotiation, and if we are just talking about material things, well,

the United States, we are the wealthiest country in the history of

the world. We could certainly provide far and away what any other

group of countries could provide. What other inducements or benefits could be provided by other countries that could not be provided

by the United States in a bilateral agreement?

Mr. KELLY. Well, there is, of course, the negative reason, and I

suppose this is one of the reasons the North Koreans do not want

to proceed multilaterally, is they fear that a multilateral negotiation will emphasize their isolation, and their isolation, as I pointed

out, with these unanimous votes against North Korea in the IAEA,

is, in fact, quite intense on this issue.

But China’s assistance to North Korea is a reality. I do not know

that that would be increased. Japan was on the threshold of offering what it described as economic cooperation that could have certainly been as high as some $12 billion had they reached a settlement, but it was disrupted first of all by the North Korean admission without further explanation of the abductions of Japanese citizens and, second, of the nuclear weapons programs. There is a lot

more money from those sources that, if North Korea earns it, than

would ever practically come from the USA.

Senator SUNUNU. Are you concerned that the reluctance of other

countries to fully embrace a multilateral approach is in part due

to their desire to avoid responsibility for helping to enforce a multilateral approach and their responsibility to take action if, in fact,

the multilateral approach were to fail?

Mr. KELLY. That is possible, Senator, but what is probably more

likely is just that North Korea is a difficult outfit to deal with, and

other countries would perhaps rather have us do it.

35

North Korea, for its part, sees that the United States, as a major

military power, is perhaps the one above all that would interfere

with whatever it is that they might try to do.

Senator SUNUNU. A few of the members talked about the

nuclearization of the peninsula, or asked questions regarding the

nuclearization of the peninsula. It was mentioned in your remarks.

That is naturally a concern.

It was expressed, I think by Senator Alexander, that it was a

concern because it might drive other countries to engage in nuclear

programs, Japan, South Korea, et cetera, but it would seem to me

that that competition of nuclear programs is one concern, and a

genuine one, but perhaps even more pressing would be the risk of

weapons proliferation, not competition, but proliferation, a willingness on the part of the North Koreans to sell this technology.

Can you speak a little bit to the history that the North Koreans

already have for selling missile technology and any other technologies that you are aware of to anyone who is willing to put up

enough money?

Mr. KELLY. Well, you are exactly right, Senator. Proliferation is

a much, much greater worry than the earlier concern cited. North

Korea has a pretty bad history of exporting not only ballistic missiles, but cruise missiles and other military equipment and particularly selling them to countries that have, for excellent reason, difficulty buying this sort of nasty supply anywhere else.

There is not evidence of which I am aware of the sale of chemical

or biological weapons, or of nuclear components, but we cannot exclude that in the future, and that is one of the reasons that this

problem has to be dealt with.

Senator DODD. I want to warn you about that clock and the time.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Senator DODD. Go ahead.

Senator SUNUNU. Is it the Department’s public position today

that North Korea has access to both chemical and biological weapons material?

Mr. KELLY. The administration’s position publicly is, I believe,

that we believe that they definitely possess chemical weapons.

With biological weapons, it is much more obscure, and there is a

little formula that I will provide for the record, but it is not conclusive evidence, Senator Sununu, but it is an unfortunate suggestion.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you.

Senator DODD. Could I just—just to complete the thought that

Senator Sununu has raised, and that was raised earlier, and just

ask you to comment on this quickly, and that is the suggestion

somehow that we might convince the Chinese to reduce their support of food or other such issues. Would that, in your mind, also

increase, then, the danger or the likelihood of North Korea, since

so much of its hard currency seems to be coming from the sale of

these materials, that, in fact, to the extent we reduce or diminish

the support they are getting, whatever, however limited it might

be, increases the likelihood that they may seek, of course, then resources through the sale of these other——

Mr. KELLY. That is logical and possible, Senator Dodd, but I am

not sure that it is the equation. I think to be frank, North Korea

36

will sell these things as fast as they can mainly because they have

hardly any other products.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. We appreciate your staying extra time, too, to hear the questions.

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. The committee will stand in recess until the return of Senator Lugar.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing is called to order again. The Chair

would like to welcome to the panel table Hon. James Lilley, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, Dr. Victor D. Cha, associate professor, Department of Government and the Edmund Walsh

School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Washington,

DC, and Mr. Bates Gill, Freeman Chair in China Studies, Center

for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], in Washington, DC.

Gentlemen, it is a privilege to have you before the committee. I

will ask you to testify in the order in which I introduced you. Your

statements in full will be made a part of the record. Please proceed

as you wish. First of all, Ambassador Lilley.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES LILLEY, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE

INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC

Ambassador LILLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to

take a slightly different approach on this case. Being an Asian

hand, I tend to look at it more in the long-term view, and we have

been talking about the immediate problems today, and I believe we

are making a mistake in focusing too much on that, because the

main issue is, you cannot snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.

We are going to win this one. If we get pushed into premature actions, if we get jerked around by the North Koreans, if our allies

and friends whine too much and we try to follow them around, we

are going to end up in a morass.

We have a chance to really make a difference in North Korea

now, mainly, because China is facing a crossroads on this issue,

and this could help our common cause a great deal. In my paper,

I have gone back into the origins of this, the various ways the Chinese have played a role in the past, but let me just look at this

China question for a minute.

China is approaching a crossroads. They have a new leadership.

The fourth generation is coming in this month, and the message

that we have gotten from them is basically, hold off. We can deal

with this problem. We know it a hundred times better than you.

These are the worst people on the face of the Earth. We have dealt

with them for 50 years, we saved them during the Korean war.

They invaded South Korea and we, in effect, lost Taiwan because

of what Kim Il-Sung did. He said he could take South Korea in 3

weeks, the Americans would not intervene. What happened is, the

Seventh Fleet went in to the Taiwan Strait. He said, I will take

South Korea first, then you can take Taiwan. Well, neither of them

happened.

China is going on a track, and I am dealing with trends now.

They have got the Olympics coming in 2008. They participated in

the Seoul Olympics in 1988, their first real breakout. They have

joined the World Trade Organization. They recognized Seoul in

37

1992. They were the instrument in getting both Koreas into the

United Nations in 1991. Their trade comparisons between North

and South are just astronomical, probably 40 times as much trade

with the South as with the North.

China fever is seizing South Korea, but Seoul too is going

through a transition period. When Vice President Cheney comes in

April, he can start really talking with both China and South Korea

seriously about this North Korean problem.

China tends to go with winners, too. They have made some bad

choices in the past. They supported leaders like Pol Pot, Milosevic,

Hoxha in Albania, and now Kim Jong-Il. They supported big losers

in the past, so they know what it is to lose. I do not think they

are going to make that mistake this time.

What we recognize, and what the Chinese see clearly, is two

things about North Korea, desperation and incompetence. Desperation because North Korea has never been in worse economic shape.

They see that a combination of forces around them are beginning

to coalesce. This is their nightmare, that they have lost their backing from the Soviet Union and China, and they are sitting out

there alone trying to deal with the United States, using these nasty

provocations.

When Kim Il Sung wanted to provoke, he seized the Pueblo or

shot down EC–121. His son so far does not seen to know how to

do it. I am not saying he will not do it, and do something very dangerous and awful, but I am saying the one thing that really characterizes Kim Jong-Il is incompetence. He cannot reform his economy. His economic reform moves in July 2002 were a disaster. He

has his eye on $12 billion worth of reparations he desperately

needs from Japan, and he mishandled it on the abduction cases. It

blows back in his face.

Then he tries this Sinuiju free economic zone, and it is a fiasco.

He gets some Chinese crook over from Manchuria to run it for him.

The guy Yang Bin is in a Chinese jail. The Chinese are fed up with

him, and they see also that if he keeps up on this path of missile

firings and nuclear developments, Japan could go nuclear, Japan

already has an active civilian space program and could get longrange missiles quickly, Taiwan, South Korea could follow. The Chinese can see a ripple effect that is decidedly not in their interest,

also ballistic missile defense could get a boost, and North Korea

has been the cause of this.

How much longer can China prop Kim up? They supply perhaps

80 percent of his oil and food imports, but it is interesting to note,

and you can never prove these things, in 1994, when we were trying to get the Agreed Framework, and the North Koreans were getting very difficult at the end—they tend to do this—Chinese grain

shipments to North Korea were reported to have gone down 40 percent. We cannot make a direct connection, but all of a sudden, Kim

goes along with the Agreed Framework. Again, it was the sweetest

deal he ever got in his life. Why would he not go along with it. He

was trying to extract last-minute concessions.

So I am saying that this is a major situation for the Chinese, and

they have got to begin to move in a different direction, and I think

it is important for us to move in coordination with them, not push

them too hard now.

38

The Japanese appear to be becoming more assertive militarily.

Ishiba makes a statement about preemptive strike on North Korea,

Japan is getting the Patriot PAC–3s, and we are talking about new

standard missiles on the Aegis class destroyers. We are talking to

Japan about interdiction. Some of the people I have talked to recently—who are former U.S. Navy people—say, we can interdict

North Korean attempts to ship WMD if we get the Japanese behind us on the sea, if the Chinese interfere with and inspect North

Korean air travel over China there is a good chance of winning this

interdiction issue, not completely, but enough to cut into what the

North Koreans are trying to do—namely, proliferate WMD to unfriendly nations and possibly to terrorists in the Middle East.

As for South Korea, there is a great deal of fuss being made over

our dismay at their Sunshine Policy. This is not accurate. I was

present in March 2001, when all of this hullabaloo broke loose

about Kim Dae-Jung and the President not getting along. I personally heard two important agreements. First of all, the President

supported the Sunshine Policy. No. 2, Kim Dae-Jung supported the

American-Korean security alliance.

A real possibility of doing something constructive about North

Korea lies in the South Korean movement into the North. Leaders

in South Korea have said confidentially, that bribery and other

huge pay-offs have been counter-productive. The Hyundai project

on tourism was a huge financial loser. The pay-offs for Pyongyang,

were a bad move. It is likely that is not going to happen again. The

linkages of railroads, roads, the Gae Son Industrial Zone, the Inchon Airport, the linking of power grids inevitably will draw North

Korea to the South and, of course, this is the long-term view of

strategists in the South.

The North Koreans know this and they say, we will never allow

ourselves to be taken over by this sort of evolutionary approach by

the South Koreans. They probably no longer have much of a choice.

The United States should resist the temptation to go into talks

with North Korea too quickly—and I am talking about direct bilateral talks. From 1989 to 1992, we did it right. President Bush

pulled the nukes out of South Korea in September 1991. North

Korea signed on for the first time to safeguards agreements which

they had resisted since 1985 when they signed the NPT. We got access to Yongbyon, and an inventory of nuclear materials. The

IAEA, sent inspectors to Yongbyon and the process started to move

forward. Most important, there was active North-South dialog at

the level of premier. Two agreements between North and South

were signed, the joint agreement on denuclearization, and the joint

agreement on reconciliation. These were comprehensive agreements

and brought the North and South together more closely than at

any previous time.

As these processes advanced and as an added inducement, in

January 1992, we had our first bilateral talks with the North Koreans in New York City. They were North Koreans clearly desperate

for them. I was in New York as part of the U.S. delegation. We

talked to them almost all day. As they appeared to be so anxious

for these talks, we laid down two conditions: No. 1, North Korea

could continue to deal with the South, and No. 2, North Korea

should allow challenge inspections of nuclear facilities and North

39

Koreans did not respond but undoubtedly took it back to their

great leader. Not much happened, because they then got caught

cheating on their statements on plutonium. The United States had

previously canceled Team Spirit as a goodwill gesture but this did

not affect North Korean intentions. Team Spirit was started again

in 1993, and this was viewed by the North as a provocation. This

led to the escalation, which culminated in 1994, in the Agreed

Framework agreement. The claim by the U.S. administration at

the time was that the Agreed Framework avoided war.

The people I have talked to in the Clinton administration said

there was no real consideration of a preemptive strike. They knew

it was impossible, and we know that today. A preemptive strike on

North Korea without complete concurrence of South Korea, would

not work. The North Koreans could take out Seoul with conventional artillery poised north of the DMZ, and this is the real problem.

So I end on this note. There is reason to be optimistic. If we go

back through the negotiating record, the 1968 crisis and how it was

managed, the 1993–1994 problem and how it was managed, then

we have precedent in handling the issue in 2003. There is a well

documented historical record of how to deal with these people. We

have written a book documenting 40 years of negotiating in the

Military Armistice Commission. There are certain important techniques which emerge. The need to resist caving to brinkmanship,

demonstration deterrence in strength, understanding their goals,

anticipation of their next move, not treating them like inferiors,

but in a way that they understand what we are trying to do to help

them on the one hand, and then getting reciprocal action out of

them. Also the consequences if they choose a negative path.

So it strikes me that we are moving in the right direction. I

agree with Secretary Kelly that the real problem we have now is

reminiscent to herding cats but it is essential to have a consensus

of our friends and allies before we approach the North. This is no

easy job, with our Chinese friends, our South Korean allies, our

Japanese allies, and the Russians—this is a tough one.

We should have a sense of how to make this work and I believe

we can make it work. We have to be careful about lunging into

some sort of a premature acceptance of their game—namely the

problem is the U.S. threat of North Korean DMZ.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Lilley follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES LILLEY, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

Appearances in Korea can be deceiving. A foreigner’s impressions and generalizations about Seoul or Pyongyang can be misleading. Pyongyang resembles Wal-Mart

and Times Square. Kim Jong-il is interested in the Swedish Economic Model.

Korean folklore touches on this in the anecdote: A foreign missionary comes across

an old Korean walking down a road with his wife six paces behind. The foreigner

explains to him that they should walk together, as they are equals. The Korean answers, ‘‘this is our way, for a thousand years.’’ He moves on. Six months later, the

missionary encounters the Korean again. This time his wife is walking six paces in

front of him. The missionary says, ‘‘You are equals. There is no need for her to walk

in front of you.’’ The Korean replies, ‘‘This road is mined.’’

We often deal with North Koreans with a particular negotiation in mind. Our

knowledge of them is based on the latest intelligence reports. I want to walk back

further and select 2 out of many Korean traditional concepts that influence their

approach to us and to the world.

40

Nunchi: the character and intentions one sees in another’s eyes.

Han: The Korean melancholy view of the world. A shrimp among whales. Resentment of arrogant officials, hatred of colonization by larger powers, a wife’s dislike of an overbearing husband.

Why nunchi? Kim Daijung looked into Kim Jong-il’s eyes in Pyongyang in June

2000 and must have seen things we foreigners can never see. Desperation, fear, arrogance, insecurity, all with unique Korean characteristics. The U.S. knows about

his military hardware, but Kim Daejung looked into his soul. This has both positive

and negative aspects, as Korean history has demonstrated. In the late 16th century,

Hideyoshi, the great Japanese shogun, was preparing to move out militarily against

his neighbors. The Chosen Dynasty sent spies and envoys to Japan to observe his

nunchi. They saw in Hideyoshi the eyes of a rat and declared that no invasion

would happen. The Koreans, however, did not measure his spears, which were

longer than theirs. Hideyoshi struck Korea with initial success. Today we primarily

measure and assess North Korea’s weapons systems—our South Korean friends

tend to emphasize character as a gauge of intentions. Therein lies at the root of

some of our current differences.

The concept of Han focuses on the immediate big guy. Bullies on Korea’s periphery have been around for a long time. Now, the local big guy runs over little Korean

girls with lumbering weapons carriers. Anti-foreignism, anti-Americanism are always below the surface but can flare up dramatically over a single incident.

What are the historic characteristics of North Korean regimes with which we are

dealing? Korean dynasties tend to last a long time. The Chosen Dynasty was around

as long as the Ming and Manchu dynasties together. Corruption, foreign intervention, weakness and incompetence characterized the Chosen for its last 100 years,

but the dynasty lasted and lasted. Leaders, bad as they have been, have had long

tenures. Kim Ilsung’s tenure was about 50 years. Kim Youngnam, the current SPA

president, has been around as a leader since 1960. Collapse of a regime in Korean

History is uncommon. Using discipline, toughness, and insularity, the cunning Koreans have survived but have had to fight for what they wanted—or some big guy

would take it away. By estimates, Korea has had 900 invasions in the last 1000

years. A political vortex exists in North Korea, and until democracy came to South

Korea, it characterized the South. A centralized rule from the top, prevailed with

minimum local autonomy. Part of this was brought about by the homogeneous nature of the Korean people.

Foreign contrivances, such as roadmaps. frameworks, armistice treaties in the

North Korean view are to be circumvented and undermined. North Koreans see

them as devices to lock in foreigners but not to restrict Korean behavior or actions.

These foreign agreements are primarily useful in getting what the Korean regime

needs to survive and to flourish. The conditions are met only in so far as they accomplish these purposes. Power, not trust, is what has gotten the North Korean

compliance such as it is. The 1953 Armistice, the most successful of the foreign contrivances worked not because we were trusted but because we and South Koreans

were strong enough to inflict damaging consequences on North Korean circumventions. The 1968 Blue House Raid, the submarine infiltrations in the late 1990s, the

recent gunboat intrusions, the Rangoon assassination bombing, the sabotage of KA858 are examples of North Korean provocations, their plans, and what they are capable of carrying out.

A few comments on contemporary North Korea: Kim Jong-il and his military are

basically in synch. He is the great symbol of leadership. He has the legacy and the

legitimacy the military needs, and he in turn needs their power to maintain his

most precious commodity—his survival. He needs the military for the security of the

state against foreign threat as well as to maintain domestic stability. Out of 1200

generals, 1100 are probably his. In addition, there are perks: promotions, access to

his luxurious palaces, high-grade consumer goods, and travel overseas.

Although Kim Jong-il is no Kim Ilsung, he is the single dominant leader of North

Korea today. Unlike his father, he has to work in tandem with other forces, particularly the military. He is less able to inflict his will.

Kim Jong-il’s handling of his current challenge—his so-called ‘‘ratcheting it up’’—

almost parrots what his father did in 1993: pull out of the NPT, kick out the IAEA

inspectors, fire a missile, threaten to turn Seoul into a sea of fire. Kim has added

in elements of an earlier crisis in 1968. In 1968, North Korea seized the Pueblo;

in 2003 he directed his MiGs to try to get a U.S. reconnaissance plane, but unlike

his father—he failed. In April, 1968, Kim Il-song’s pilots shot down an EC–l21 with

all aboard lost. This was a great risk by Kim Il-song. Whether Kim Jong-il escalates

terrorism against the ROK, as his father did in 1968 in the failed Blue House Raid,

or creates a new more aggressive approach (in 1968, it was tunnels under the DMZ)

41

is not yet clear. Kim would probably be more likely to keep his focus on U.S. targets

and the threats the U.S. represents to arouse supportive elements in South Korea

who are against the U.S. presence. As in 1969 in Vietnam, the U.S. may be diverted

by another major war—this time Iraq in 2003, and this could create a favorable environment for the North Koreans to act.

A word about the North Korean view of bilateral talks with the U.S.: this has had

some support of Russia, China, and the ROK, and in the U.S., as well in the arguments of the ‘‘why not talk’’ crowd. What is there to lose, they say. Kim’s goal is

to make the U.S. threat the issue and to divert emphasis from their weapons of

mass destruction. The North Koreans are pressing for a non-aggression pact, saying

withdrawl of U.S. forces is a prerequisite for lowering pressure. Before bilateral

talks with the North, the U.S. needs to work with its friends and allies in the area,

notably Japan, ROK, China, and Russia to develop a coordinated program of incentives and disincentives in dealing with North Korea. To jump in prematurely before

China is ready to engage fully would probably accomplish little. Korea is not a U.S.

problem, it is a regional one.

Kim Jong-il has a failed economic system. He is on life support from the outside

in terms of oil and food. Ungrateful as North Korea has been for past aid, this time

it is complicated by a starving population, even including cadres. Kim’s moves so

far on economic reform in July 2002 have failed badly, his attempt to get the Japanese reparations package, for which he lusts, backfired in the Abduction Cases

issue. His economic zone in Sinuiju started out as a fiasco and certainly irritated

the Chinese. Kim still has the generous hand of South Korea reaching out—but now

hopefully in a more measured and balanced way. Huge bribes and grotesque onesided tourism deals to Kum Gang-san lost large amounts of money for Hyundai, and

the ROKG. Hyundai is reported to have funneled $1.7 billion direct to Pyongyang.

South Korean’s Sunshine Policy is viewed by the North’s leadership as a dangerous

subversion, according to the highest level defector Hwang Jong yup, who is the most

complete source on Kim Jong-il. A takeover of the North by the South, Kim Jongil believes, should be resisted at all costs, even if it means less aid.

Perhaps the most disconcerting development for Kim Jong-il is the possible coming together of surrounding states, ROK, China, Japan, Russia, and the U.S. in a

loose coalition. This group of states has already agreed in principle that the Korean

Peninsula should be free of Nuclear weapons and should have economic reform. The

potential use of economic leverage on his WMD programs is a frightening prospect

for Kim and is one of the greatest dangers that, North Korea has faced in the past

50 years.

According to Hwang Jong yup, after the disastrous starvations of 1995 and 1996,

Kim Jong-il was desperate and talked of a strike on the South, which he had persuaded himself could work. He did not do it then. He fired off a three stage missile

instead which then lost him his Japanese contacts and hopes for immediate reparations worth by some estimates to be over $10 billion.

A recent internal KWP document that has surfaced in the Japanese press describing KWP concerns about internal corruption and dissatisfaction among the population. The flight of hundreds of thousands of North Korean refugees to China has

dramatized public desperation in the face of continuing economic hardships. The

combination of factors could move Kim in the direction of more desperate external

moves and to divert attention from domestic failure. In this, he will get the support

of his military.

As was the case in 1968, Kim Jong-il lacks support from Russia and China—who

had backed his father in 1950 and for years after. This undercuts his strength and

his maneuverability.

So will he raise the ante with provocations? Most probably, he will. Will he focus

on the U.S. and not on the ROK? Most likely. Will he risk a major confrontation

with the U.S. by striking out at U.S. installations, military, air, ground and naval

hardware? He will try but will probably stop short of a casus belli. He recognizes

his main vulnerability is his economic weakness and dependency. Again, Hwang emphasizes that this is where Kim Jong-il can be undone. He has to keep economic

aid under continuing tight control, and he must arrange to get credit for it. But it

remains his Achilles heel. And it is the most likely instrument of regime change.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ambassador Lilley. Dr.

Cha.

42

STATEMENT OF DR. VICTOR D. CHA, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR,

DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT AND THE EDMUND WALSH

SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY,

WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. CHA. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for

inviting me to speak today on the regional implications of a nuclear

North Korea. I thought the way I would do this is to focus in particular on South Korea, and what the implications were for South

Korea, and here essentially I wanted to talk about the implications

for the street, for the elite, and then for the alliance.

As you know very well, we have all witnessed the groundswell

of anti-American sentiment in Seoul. The proximate cause for this

was, of course, what was known as the Highway 56 incident, the

death of the two teenage schoolgirls, but also fueling this sentiment

was the perception on the South Korean street that the current crisis with North Korea was, or is as much a fault of U.S. policy as

it is of North Korean truculence. I disagree with this view, but nevertheless, that is the perception on the street.

I guess the one observation I wanted to provide to the committee

on this particular point is, I know that many people view this new

street view as the new reality, that it is permanent, that this is the

view of a younger generation and it is not going to change, and it

seems to me still it is uncertain whether it is permanent or whether it is just ephemeral, and the reason I say this is because I still

believe, and I think the poll numbers show that there are significant numbers of South Koreans in the 30-plus range that really do

see problems with North Korea and that really do not have this

sort of Pollyanna-ish view of the North.

A January 1 poll showed that 47 percent of South Koreans se4e

North Korea’s drive for nuclear weapons as real, and as dangerous,

and that was January 1. That was before the NPT pull-out, that

was before the missile tests, and before the buzzing of the U.S. intelligence plane, so I think that, in short, there is a silent majority

there in Korea that is waiting to be heard, and the more the North

provokes, I think, the more opinion will shift, even among the

younger generation.

Second, in terms of the elite, I cannot disagree in terms of the

implications of a nuclear North Korea in the region with anything

that Ambassador Lilley said. I think it would have a huge implication for Japan, it has major implications for China, and I would

agree that it is a matter of time, that Chinese equities are shifting,

and that they will eventually come onboard, but it is very clear

that they want the United States to do all the heavy lifting first,

and then, as Senator Rockefeller said, sweep in at the end and try

to take credit for it.

Where I would like to focus my comments on the implications of

a nuclear North Korea is with regard to the costs, and particularly

the economic costs, because I think it is something we have not

talked about this afternoon, and there are clearly major economic

costs to East Asia and the United States if this crisis results in a

nuclear North Korea, and these costs are frankly ones that the

South Korean Government discounts, or does not want to talk

about, and I point this out because it is at the core, I think, of the

43

disparate views that the South Korean Government and the United

States hold on dealing with North Korea.

What I mean by this essentially is that the South Korean Government says the only option with regard to dealing with North

Korea is engagement. You have to take off the table any contemplation of coercive measures, whether that is isolation, sanctions, attack, because in their view this could potentially precipitate a collapse of the North, and as one South Korean official said

to me from the Noh Moo-Hyun Government, if you precipitate a

collapse of the North, then the South collapses.

I find a problem with that logic for two reasons, one I think it

overestimates the cost of a North Korean collapse and unification,

and here, rather than go into the details, I would direct you to

some work the Institute for Financial Economics has done recently

that shows the cost of reunification may not be as high as popularly believed, but more importantly, I think the problem with this

logic that we see in Seoul is that it underestimates the costs of a

nuclear North Korea as an outcome.

A North Korea with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles,

would have huge costs in terms of capital flight, slowed growth, faltering stock markets and the like, there is already evidence of this

out there. On February 11, Moody’s downgraded South Korea’s sovereign credit rating and country outlook for the first time in 5

years since the financial crisis, because of the growing threat from

North Korea.

I attended the inauguration in Seoul, and despite the fact that

there was an inauguration, Secretary Powell had a very good meeting with President Noh, the United States announced the resumption of food aid, on that very day the South Korean stock market

index, the KOSPI tumbled 4 percent, largely because the North Koreans shot a missile into the Sea of Japan, and there are many

other examples. After the second North Korean missile test, the

Japanese Nikkei closed at its lowest level since 1983.

The point here is that the costs of a North Korea with a midsize nuclear arsenal, mated with a ballistic missile program, are

much higher than the South Korean Government is willing to contemplate, and more importantly, there are no decoupling incentives

here, which is my essential message. The South Koreans cannot

simply worry about artillery and then say the North Korean proliferation problem is a redundant threat and should be passed off

to the United States.

Senator Sununu asked a moment ago what is one of the logical

arguments for multilateral over bilateral? Well, frankly, one of the

arguments is because you want to prevent decoupling. You want to

prevent allies from being able to say, North Korean nuclear proliferation, that is the United States’ problem, and they should deal

with that, and we decouple from that particular problem.

My final set of points is on the alliance, and it seems to me here,

and I will be very quick, even if the United States and the new

South Korean Government can close some of the gaps on policy to

North Korea, it seems to me that changing the nature of the U.S.

force presence and the alliance is inevitable, if not imminent, and

I think that this is the case because there are a historically unique

constellation of forces that have emerged on the peninsula today

44

having to do with the balance of forces, democratization, development, the revolution in military affairs, the Sunshine Policy, all of

these things may have existed in themselves at one point in the

past, but never have we seen them all come together like we have

now, and for that reason, I think actually the most important issue

that the Government of South Korea is going to have to deal with

before it leaves in 2008 is not North Korea, but it is going to be

the alliance.

Having said that, in my written testimony and in longer pieces

I have written I explain how I think that presence might change.

I will not go into that here. I would only say that however this

presence is going to be reconfigured, it has to be done in a careful,

deliberate fashion, and not a knee-jerk, reactive one.

There are undeniable military rationales for changing the presence, but the value-added of these changes would be even greater

if they could be accomplished without the negative political

externalities of, for example, a North Korea declaring victory, or

our South Korean and Japanese allies fearing abandonment, and

it seems to me that these revisions are entirely possible through

close consultation, as Ambassador Lilley said, while maintaining

the U.S. traditional political influence and stature in the region.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Cha follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF VICTOR D. CHA, D.S. SONG ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT AND ASIAN STUDIES, DIRECTOR, AMERICAN ALLIANCES IN ASIA PROJECT,

EDMUND A. WALSH SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your kind invitation to testify today. I am honored

to have the opportunity to speak before this distinguished Committee on an issue

of vital American interest, the regional implications of the nuclear crisis with North

Korea.

In particular, I have been asked to address South Korean perspectives with regard to the current crisis. I will attempt to address this subject in three parts: 1)

at the ‘‘street’’ level, the groundswell of anti-Americanism in South Korea that has

been, in part, precipitated by the North Korean nuclear revelations; 2) at the ‘‘elite’’

level, the disparity in South Korean and U.S. government views on what is an acceptable outcome to the crisis; and 3) a longer-term look at the future of the USROK alliance.

SOUTH KOREAN PERSPECTIVES: THE STREET

We are all familiar by now with the standard explanations for the groundswell

of anti-Americanism in the streets of Seoul over the past five months. The proximate cause was popular dissatisfaction with the military trial acquitting two US

servicemen in a vehicular accident killing two Korean teenage schoolgirls. As the

Committee members are all aware, however, the brewing crisis with North Korea

after the October 2002 nuclear revelations, fueled this street sentiment to the point

that we witnessed tens of thousands of South Koreans demonstrating in Seoul, ostensibly against the alliance.

These demonstrations highlighted for many how much the domestic political context had shifted in Seoul. Anti-Americanism was not the same radical, ideological

strain (‘‘banmi’’) that was evident in the 1980s among a fringe group of students

and labor, rather it was a view less ideological but no less critical of the United

States (‘‘bimi’’). Moreover, this new strain of anti-Americanism was spread across

a wider swath of society. With regard to the crisis with North Korea, scholarly and

media analyses characterized the link in two ways: First, the demonstrations

against US policy toward North Korea reflected the views of a younger, affluent,

and educated ‘‘post-Korean war’’ generation less fearful of North Korea after the

June 2000 summit. Second, many of these younger generation saw the United

States stand-offish policy toward North Korea to be as much a cause for the current

crisis as the North’s nuclear cheating and truculence. Perhaps the grossest popular

characterization of this was the 60 Minutes portrayal last month of four Korean stuVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:35 Jul 01, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 87871 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
45

1 Chosun Ilbo-Gallup Polls, January 1, 2003.

dents blurting out with impunity that George Bush was more threatening to them

than Kim Jong Ii.

Committee members are undoubtedly aware of these arguments so I won’t go into

them in any more detail. The one observation I would like to make in this regard

is based on numerous academic conferences, Track II dialogues, and meetings with

South Korean legislators, foreign policy advisors, and the new president himself on

this topic.

What has become clear to me is that the South Korean perspective privileges the

self-righteousness of this street sentiment at the expense of underestimating its negative impact on American attitudes toward the alliance. This is a dangerous tendency. Americans see the demonstrations in Seoul; witness the burning of American

flags and effigies of President Bush; hurling of Molotov cocktails onto US bases; and

hear news of US servicemen being accosted in Seoul. These are very real events and

images that upset Americans to no end.

In stark contrast, however, Koreans discount these very acts as the deeds of a

marginal few. Instead, Koreans explain the demonstrations in Seoul not as antiAmericanism but as ‘‘peace’’ marches or anti-war movements. They claim that this

represents the self-expression of a new generation that is not afraid to have a different view on policy to North Korean than its ally. They assert that this difference

of opinion on North Korea should not be construed by Americans as anti-Americanism. They further assert that this new Korean identity is actually very American—i.e., a new generation that speaks their mind without fear of persecution.

The gap in these two views, therefore, is quite stark. If it is not minded (particularly on the Korean side, given the real acts of violence), then the result is, frankly,

a train wreck in slow motion: What Americans focus on as the primary manifestation of anti-Americanism, the South Koreans dismiss as the incorrect message to

take away from the demonstrations. Mutual recriminations would then send the alliance (and popular sentiment on both sides of the Pacific) into a downward spiral.

An important variable or signpost of the extent to which this dynamic could spin

out of control is what I have termed the ‘‘silent majority’’ in South Korea. There

has been tremendous attention given to the younger electorate’s role in bringing the

engagement-friendly Roh Moo-hyun to the South Korean presidency. But there still

exists a significant portion of the population that is less enamored with the sunshine policy after the October 2002 revelations and genuinely worried about North

Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. Polls in January 2003, for example, showed as

high as 47 percent of the street seeing Pyongyang’s nuclear truculence as a real

threat.1 One would imagine that the DPRK’s subsequent withdrawal from the NPT,

restarting of the experimental reactor, and spate of military provocations has

buoyed these numbers. The extent to which this silent majority becomes more

proactive will be an important determinant of how wide the gap becomes.

SOUTH KOREAN PERSPECTIVES: THE ELITE

At the elite level, the tensions over North Korea play out in a different albeit no

less important fashion. It seems to me that the dispute between the United States

and South Korean positions over the nuclear crisis with North Korea boils down to

the inherent tension in two principles held by the Roh Moo-hyun government. The

newly-inaugurated president declares that a nuclear North Korea can never be condoned by Seoul. At the same time, he argues that the use of force is not an option

in dealing with the North. How can one rule out the use of force, Americans ask

however, and hope to advance any policy with the nuclear ambitious regime beyond

a toothless appeasement policy? The South Korean response is that coercive measures (i.e., surgical attack or sanctions) must be ruled out because they could precipitate a collapse of the North, the costs of which could be too crippling to the South.

This is funny math. As I argue in a forthcoming co-authored book, Nuclear North

Korea (Columbia University Press, 2003), it is based on the belief that the costs of

unification are prohibitive for the South. As one member of the Roh Moo-hyun’s foreign policy team stated to me in simple terms: ‘‘We can’t press the North on the

nuclear issue. If we press them, they might collapse. If they collapse, then we collapse.’’ More important, this South Korean view implicitly assumes that there are

relatively lower costs associated with any other option that does not have the potential to precipitate regime collapse—even if this means a nuclear North Korea as an

outcome.

Both are highly questionable propositions. Let’s look at the first part of the equation. It has become a truism that the costs of unification are astronomical. In short,

Germany was expensive, and all the macro socio-economic indicators are that Korea

46

would be more so. Relatively speaking, the population gaps between the Koreas are

smaller, and the economic gaps are wider.

Beyond this superficial understanding, however, current research shows that the

costs of unification may not be as catastrophic as the conventional wisdom argues.

Marcus Noland at the Institute of International Economics shows that if unificationhandlers take advantage of efficiency gains through DPRK marketization, a younger

DPRK (than East German) work force, and optimal movements of labor and capital,

absorption could result not in negative growth, but in only a mild slowing in South

Korean growth rates and overall increases in peninsular output relative to a no-collapse outcome.

Perhaps more important, to fixate on avoiding the potential costs of unification,

as the South Korean government and public do, implicitly assumes that the alternative outcome—a nuclear North Korea—is acceptable. Nothing could be further

from the truth. A North Korea with nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities would

have untold costs both direct and indirect. These include capital flight, and a faltering stock market, not to mention the price of rolling back an extant North Korean

nuclear weapons program and the costs associated with an arms race and nuclear

proliferation ripple effect to Japan, Taiwan and even Southeast Asia, all resulting

in a tension-filled region created by North Korea.

Skeptics might counter that such costs are negligible, if not impossible to calculate with accuracy. The recent record shows otherwise. On February 11, Moodys

downgraded South Korea’s sovereign credit rating and country outlook for the first

time after successive years of positive assessments since the financial crisis some

five years ago. The following week, Standard and Poor’s did not increase Korea’s foreign currency and local corporation credit rating, and cut back expected growth outlook from 5.7 percent to 5 percent. What makes this fairly innocuous judgment significant is that S&P upgraded Korea’s credit rating the year prior (to A–) and its

general country outlook to stable, leading many experts to bank on further upgrades

given improvements in South Korean credit fundamentals in the public and private

sectors, and progress in corporate restructuring.

The primary reason for these sober assessments? S&P Director Takahira Ogawa

could not have been more direct, stating ‘‘There is a risk from the North, which constrains the sovereign rating of South Korea.’’ Those who think that an eternally optimistic South Korean government, committed to the peaceful status quo and engagement with North Korea, will be able to muddle through are sorely mistaken.

All it took was one short-range missile test by Pyongyang into the Sea of Japan for

the KOSPI (Korean Composite Stock Market Price Index) to tumble almost 4 percent (24 points) in one day despite a litany of parallel confidence-inducing events

including Roh Moo-hyun’s inauguration, the US announcement of the resumption of

food aid to the North, and Secretary Powell’s statements in Seoul that the US would

eventually seek to dialogue with North Korea.

After North Korean MiGs intercepted the US surveillance plane in the Sea of

Japan last week, the KOSPI dropped to its lowest level in 16 months. After the

North Koreans tested a second short-range missile in as many weeks on March 9,

the South Korean won depreciated to a four-month low. The Japanese Nikkei 225

closed at its lowest level since March 1983. South Korean economic officials are already expressing concern that these trends could negatively affect FDI in Korea

which has been steadily increasing since the 1998 financial crisis. The Korea Economic Research Institute estimated growth rates for 2003 to be as low as 1.4 percent (2002 was 6.2 percent) because of uncertainties created by the North Korea crisis. I have conducted conference calls with hundreds of institutional investors in the

past month where the primary question was not about the fundamentals of Roh

Moo-hyun’s economic plans or the competencies of his cabinet. The main question

pertained to the effect of the North Korea crisis on investor confidence in Japan and

South Korea.

This is a dynamic that should begin to weigh increasingly more heavily in South

Korean thinking as the North continues to escalate.

The bottom line is that Washington and Seoul need to get back on the same page

vis a vis North Korea both to resolve the current crisis and salvage the alliance.

The anticipated costs of unification are lower than we think. And the costs of a nuclear North Korea are much higher than we think. The argument here is not to advocate the use of force, but that the Roh government may want to rethink the basic

cost calculation that causes them to take it off the table completely as an option.

Historically, the most credible and successful engagement policy has been a

proactive choice of the strong, rather than an expedient of the weak.

47

THE COMING CHANGE IN THE US-KOREA ALLIANCE

Even if the differences in perspectives on North Korea between Washington and

Seoul could be closed, the inevitable fate of the Roh Moo-hyun presidency may be

that the most critical foreign policy issue it will have to contemplate before its departure in 2008 will not be North Korea but the alliance with the United States.

This is because a historically unique constellation of forces indicates that change

to the U.S. military presence in Korea is inevitable, if not imminent. The U.S.

ground troop presence’s success in deterring and defending against North Korean

aggression has also made its tailored forces less useful to overall American strategy

in East Asia. At the same time, the ROK military has grown more robust and capable, a far cry from the feeble force trained by the United States fifty years ago.

As noted earlier, civil-military tensions over the U.S. military footprint have

grown immeasurably in past months, show casing a younger generation of Koreans

who see the United States less favorably than their elders. The sunshine policy also

had the unintended consequence of worsening perceptions of U.S. troops in the body

politic. On the one hand, the exaggerated success of the policy caused the public to

be less welcoming of the U.S. presence. On the other, the failure of the policy led

to the search for scapegoats, for which the U.S. presence was a ready target.

Larger trends in U.S. security thinking also presage change. The Pentagon’s

100,000 personnel benchmark in Asia is viewed as obsolete among experts. The revolution in military affairs, moreover, with its emphasis on long-range, precisionstrike capabilities foreshadow alterations in the face of U.S. forward presence

around the world.

Those Koreans who believe that the U.S. is too comfortably self-interested with

its position on the peninsula to contemplate serious change are dead wrong. As

noted above, the images beamed back to the U.S. of ‘‘Yankee go home’’ demonstrations, burned American flags, accosted GIs, and young Korean assertions that

George Bush is more threatening than Kim Jong-Il have had a real effect in Washington. There is anger, expressed in Congress and in the op-ed pages of major newspapers about South Korean ungratefulness for the alliance. With no imperial aspirations, the United States indeed would withdraw its forces in the face of an

unwelcoming host nation.

Secretary Rumsfeld’s recent remarks about possible modification of U.S. forces in

Korea offers a glimpse, in my view, of a deeper, serious, and longer-term study underway in Washington on revising the alliance. The anti-American tenor of the election campaign in Korea and the subsequent ‘‘peace’’ demonstrations have created a

momentum in Washington that proponents of alliance revision can ride. The ostensible goal of such plans is the same alliance but with a smaller and different (i.e.

less ground, more air/navy) footprint, but if the vicious circle of anti-Americanism

in Seoul bearing anti-Korean backlashes in the U.S. continues unabated, then the

outcome could also entail a downgrading of the alliance in U.S. eyes.

President Roh Moo-hyun does not want to go down in South Korean history as

the leader who ‘‘lost’’ the alliance. His entreaties to NGO groups to damp down the

anti-American rhetoric, and meeting with USFK were well-advised steps in this regard. But he needs to do much more. As is underway in the United States, President Roh and his foreign policy team need to undertake a bottom-up review of the

alliance. They need to assess Korea’s long-term interests in the alliance. And they

need to come up with a longer-term vision of what the alliance stands for, rather

than what it stands against.

This vision must showcase the new U.S.-Korea alliance as the embodiment of values including democracy, open markets, nonproliferation, counter-terrorism, human

rights, rule of law, civilian control of the military, and freedom of worship in a region of the world that does not yet readily accept these values. At its military core,

the alliance’s regional stability function would require a force presence that meets

three criteria. The revamped presence must be militarily potent, but flexible enough

to react swiftly to a broad range of regional tasks (Deployable). The presence, however downsized and changed, must still preserve America’s traditional defense commitment to South Korea (Credible). Finally, as critical as being a potent, credible,

and deployable, the revised presence must not be seen as overbearing by South Koreans (Unobtrusive).

The long-term scope of such a study should not belie its urgency. Coming up now

with a mutually agreeable vision and military rationale for the alliance ensures that

future revisions to the force presence take place in the right political context and

are not misinterpreted. Otherwise, the U.S.-ROK alliance runs the risk of entering

48

2For an expanded study, see Victor Cha, ‘‘Focus on the Future, Not the North,’’ The Washington Quarterly (Winter 2002-2003), http://www.twq.com/03winter/docs/03winter—cha.pdf

its middle ages as a brittle cold war relic, prone to being overtaken and outpaced

by events.2

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Cha. Dr. Gill.

STATEMENT OF DR. BATES GILL, FREEMAN CHAIR IN CHINA

STUDIES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL

STUDIES [CSIS], WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. GILL. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. Thanks also to the

other members for inviting me here today to speak about the regional implications of a changing nuclear equation on the Korean

Peninsula. I was asked to focus most of my remarks on China’s

perspective on this issue, and I will do so in three parts, first offering a brief background of China’s interests vis-a`-vis North Korea,

followed by a discussion of China’s reaction and policy responses,

and then finally focusing on how the changing nuclear equation

might affect U.S.-China relations as we go forward.

First, looking at an overview of key Chinese interests, we do

have to recognize very clearly that China does have an enormous

stake in the outcome of the evolving nuclear equation on the Korean Peninsula, and I am encouraged by some of the things I have

heard today both from the committee and from Assistant Secretary

Kelly, that we are taking China’s role much more seriously, and

that it should be considered as one of the key four players in resolving this problem.

Two-way trade, for example, between China and North Korea

amounted to something on the range of $728 million in 2002, which

accounts for nearly one-third of North Korea’s total trade volume.

The figures I have suggest that approximately 35 to 40 percent of

North Korean imports come from China, and those are largely critical basic commodities such as foodstuffs, fertilizer, and energy.

More importantly, though, of course is the China-North Korea

political-military relationship, which, while it has been troubled in

recent years, has functioned much like a formal alliance for significant periods of the past 50 years, including, importantly, the transfer of military equipment in the late 1950s and early 1960s, as well

as assistance to North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile program as late as the mid-1980s. Recall, too, the 1961 BeijingPyongyang Alliance Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual

Assistance, which is still in effect, and which agrees that both parties, ‘‘will immediately render military and other assistance by all

means at its disposal if either party is subjected to aggression,’’ and

it also stipulates that ‘‘neither contracting party will conclude any

alliance directed against the other contracting party or take part

in any block or in any action or measure directed against the other

contracting party.’’

As I say, neither party has formally withdrawn from this treaty,

and the two sides continue to carry out high-level party-to-party

and military-to-military exchanges. I do not think we can simply

dismiss the fact that this is simply a piece of paper between these

two countries. I think there is more to it than that.

49

We know, however, that the alliance continues to be fraught with

an enormous amount of tension, probably culminating in the August 1992 establishment of diplomatic relations between Beijing

and Seoul. Nevertheless, I would argue that in spite of that step,

China and North Korea have maintained a basically good relationship, and China’s two-Korea policy has been largely a great success. At the end of the day, though, China’s North Korean ally is

increasingly becoming a potentially disastrous burden, rather than

a political-military advantage.

Second, we should ask the question, mutual interest between the

United States and China, but how mutual? We often say that the

United States and China have a shared interest in seeing a nonnuclear North Korea. This is a point that Secretary Kelly came

back to time and time again. I would agree that that is true, but

I think things are more complicated than that.

We have to recognize that, while China may prefer to see a nonnuclear North Korea, its bilateral relationship has chilled considerably with North Korea in the 1980s, especially with the introduction of market reforms, and since China opened relations with

South Korea in 1992. North Korea has returned some snubs of its

own, particularly under the leadership of Kim Jong-Il.

His father, for example, Kim Il-Sung, spent his formative years

in China. He spoke Chinese. He studied in Chinese Manchuria, and

he participated in pre-1945 Chinese Communist political and guerrilla movements and, of course, was eternally indebted to China for

the intervention in the Korean war. Kim Jong-Il has nothing like

that kind of personal or political or security ties to China. That further underscores my point that China’s ability to influence the situation on North Korea is constrained.

China’s position is also constrained because it continues to place,

I think, its highest priority not on a non-nuclear North Korea, but,

rather, on a stable North Korea, and the avoidance of measures

which, in Beijing’s view, would escalate tensions and prompt even

more reckless behavior on the part of Pyongyang. Refugees are just

a near-term problem. Over the longer term, Beijing will want to

avoid measures which would lead to further instabilities of its key

neighbor, such as military action by the United States, and politically Beijing would prefer a gradual change in North Korea, largely

on Chinese terms, which would include the introduction of Chinastyle economic and political reforms, stabilization of North-South

relations, and the eventual reconciliation of a non-nuclear, stable

North Korea within China’s sphere of influence. This is its longterm goal.

A part of this effort, third, is to have the successful two-Korea

policy. China will do nothing, or will be reluctant to do anything

that is going to undermine this very successful two-Korea policy

that has as its long-term goal the reassertion of Chinese influence

over the Korean Peninsula.

Currently, Chinese and South Korean interests are increasingly

similar toward North Korea. We see them both calling for the

downplaying of tensions in favor of a more gradual and accommodating policy toward North Korea. I think in this regard, Mr.

Chairman, we need to be careful not to drive South Korea further

into Beijing’s camp with our policies.

50

Fourth, getting to the point about China’s interests vis-a`-vis the

nuclear weapons program in North Korea, this, too, is complicated

and contradictory. China itself, of course, is responsible in part for

this having provided assistance to North Korea in the 1950s, 1960s,

1970s, and 1980s and, moreover, China should be considered at

least indirectly responsible for the recently revealed enriched uranium bomb program. This pathway to nuclear weapons is similar

to the program that Pakistan pursued, with Chinese assistance.

In any event, China does recognize that it could soon be facing

its fourth nuclear armed neighbor on its borders, joining Russia,

India, and Pakistan. This is a situation it would certainly prefer to

avoid, but it is not necessarily at the top of its priority list, and it

has to be weighed in the balance with other interests that China

has vis-a`-vis the peninsula that we have already discussed here.

Some Chinese strategists and scientists even go so far as to express skepticism that Pyongyang’s program could advance to

weaponization and operational deployment, perhaps similar to

what we hear from the Russians. Whether that is a diplomatic ploy

or a scientific assessment, we need to judge, but it is a point that

we are beginning to hear coming from China.

I would also add that it may be quite telling that even in the face

of the Indian nuclear weapons deployment, where China is obviously a target, Chinese reaction, beyond sort of official and diplomatic rhetoric, has not been particularly forceful, and China and

India continue to have a generally favorable and mutually beneficial relationship. By Chinese comparative reckoning, North Korea

poses a relatively minor nuclear threat at this stage and in the

near term.

So that is a short background, Mr. Chairman, on some of the

views I think China brings to this issue, and its interests. Let me

speak second on China’s policy response. It has basically been a

three-part approach. China insists we restart diplomacy and dialog,

to avoid, second, escalatory and provocative actions, and it seeks to

assure the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. This was reiterated most recently in a telephone conversation between Presidents Bush and Jiang just a couple of days ago.

But reading between the lines of this policy, I think we need to

see some important nuance. First, when they say the importance

of diplomacy and dialog, I think they really are talking about bilateral dialog. There may be some wiggle room and flexibility in there,

but this is an important first step for China because it recognizes

North Korea’s core interests, and second, China can expect bilateral dialog hopefully to result in outcomes that are favorable to

China, like stabilizing the peninsula, denuclearizing North Korea,

but have all that happen without all the heavy lifting, so it makes

some sense for China to pursue, or to encourage us to take the bilateral path.

Also, I think we should expect China in calling for a peaceful resolution to probably oppose the application of coercive measures like

sanctions or force against North Korea, so if it is in our mind to

go to the Security Council for a resolution for sanctions, we will

have to carefully craft that to gain Chinese support.

Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, with just some thoughts about

U.S.-China relations with regard to this issue. We can say, probVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:35 Jul 01, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 87871 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
51

ably fairly, that we do share some common interests with China on

this, but under the surface, there seem to be a number of differences which are apparent, and these differences could increase

in the months ahead as we pursue this issue.

First, as I said, Beijing, like others in the region, like South

Korea and Russia, and even Japan, would likely oppose a coercive

approach to forcing North Korean compliance. A serious split could

emerge between Beijing and Washington over the means to bring

about North Korean compliance if we do not play our cards correctly.

Second, beneath the surface of common interest toward North

Korea, Beijing does not hold Washington blameless. Many strategists in China point out that the Bush administration’s tougher approach toward North Korea only forces North Korea’s back to the

wall, and this can only lead to more provocative and potentially destabilizing responses by Pyongyang.

I do not necessarily fully agree with that analysis, but we have

to recall that this is a widely held view in Beijing, so when we go

into our negotiations with China, we are having to be prepared to

deflect or overcome those views.

In any event, if escalating confrontation does lead to conflict by

either design or miscalculation, Beijing will resent Americans’ insensitivity to Chinese interests, and America’s inability, as the

world’s sole superpower, to chart and lead a negotiated solution to

this.

Third, if things go badly in North Korea, the U.S.-China relationship would also suffer because I think China could be widely seen

as part of the problem for not having taken enough action, and

U.S.-China relations would suffer considerably.

In our dealings with China, and I understand they are intensifying, we need to consistently and persistently convey to Beijing

the risks it takes in not having a more proactive approach, but also

remind them of the benefits that will accrue to them in U.S.-China

relations by doing so. China needs to recognize that most of the

nuclearization that is going to go on in the world following North

Korea, if it goes that path, will happen in its own neighborhood.

China needs to understand that if North Korea chooses to proliferate its nuclear materials to States and sub-State actors who

seek nuclear weapons, that this is only going to further destabilize

the international system, which is against Chinese interests as

well.

North Korea probably represents the most unstable and weakest

regime yet to openly brandish nuclear weapons, which should raise

enormous concerns in Beijing, especially in times of crisis, or the

collapse of political, social, and economic order in North Korea.

I think we can also get to China by reminding them that, as

North Korea’s most important supporter, and a country which has

supported North Korea militarily in the past, it bears an enormous

responsibility in assuring a peaceful outcome in the resolution of

this standoff. China’s reputation as an aspiring great power is at

stake, and it needs to step up to the plate and take a more

proactive position.

We should encourage Beijing to do more as a go-between. It is

political difficult, often, for us to encourage that, but I think we

52

should try, and see if Beijing can facilitate a bilateral dialog between the North and the United States, but embedded within a

multilateral, regional set of consultations which includes North

Korea and South Korea, certainly, and perhaps also Japan and

Russia.

But for all of these words of cautionary diplomatic advice to

work, and to gain greater cooperation from Beijing, the United

States is going to need to demonstrate its seriousness in advocating

a truly multilateral approach to this issue which genuinely offers

others a stake in the outcome of this process. It is going to have

to begin with a much more intensive set of diplomatic consultations

with our allies in the region, getting on the same page, as Dr. Cha

said, with South Korea and Japan, and then moving from that trilateral unity on this issue to engage the others.

This is going to be a very, very difficult process, but if we can

present that more unified front not only to North Korea, but to

China, we can expect greater cooperation from them, and discourage China from exploiting intra- and inter-alliance differences

which are emerging between the United States and its friends in

the region.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gill follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. BATES GILL, FREEMAN CHAIR IN CHINA STUDIES,

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Thank you, Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, and distinguished members of this

committee, for the opportunity to speak with you today on the regional implications

of the changing nuclear equation on the Korean Peninsula. It is highly important

and commendable that the committee convene this series of hearings: a nucleararmed North Korea undermines our national security interests, presents a serious

threat to the global and regional nonproliferation goals of the United States, and

would have negative repercussions for U.S. relationships with key players in Northeast Asia and beyond.

I was asked to place an emphasis in my remarks on the Chinese perspective with

regard to the changing nuclear equation on the Korean Peninsula. In doing so, the

testimony will proceed in three principal parts: (1) a brief background and overview

on Chinese interests vis-a`-vis North Korea and the changing nuclear equation on

the Korean Peninsula; (2) a discussion of China’s reaction and policy response to the

changing nuclear equation on the Korean Peninsula; and (3) a focus on how the

changing nuclear equation will affect U.S.-China relations.

OVERVIEW OF KEY CHINESE INTERESTS

Brief background: China has an enormous stake in the outcome of the evolving

nuclear equation on the Korean Peninsula. China and North Korea share a lengthy

border (at 1,416 kilometers or about 870 miles, it is North Korea’s longest border,

as opposed to only 238 kilometers with South Korea and 19 kilometers with Russia).

China is also North Korea’s largest trading partner. Two-way trade amounted to approximately US$728 million in 2002, accounting for nearly one-third of North Korea’s total trade volume of US$2.23 billion. Approximately 35 to 40 percent of North

Korean imports come from China, largely critical, basic commodities such as foodstuffs, fertilizers, and energy supplies.

Perhaps most importantly, the China-North Korea political-military relationship,

while more troubled in recent years, has functioned much like a formal alliance for

significant periods over the past 50-plus years. The China-North Korea alliance was

established de facto in late 1950 when Chinese troops surged across the Yalu River

to push U.S.-led United Nations forces back across the 38th parallel on the Korean

Peninsula. Chinese forces remained on the peninsula until the latter half of the

1950s. In the early years of this military relationship, China provided generous support to North Korea, including significant transfers of military equipment in the late

1950s and early 1960s, as well as assistance to North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic

missile programs as late as the 1970s and early 1980s.

53

1 ‘‘Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between the People’s Republic of

China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Peking, 11 July 1961’’, in D. C. Watt,

ed., Documents on International Affairs 1961 (London: Oxford University Press, 1965). pp. 258-

59.

In July 1961, as the Sino-Soviet relationship deteriorated, Beijing and Pyongyang

signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. The treaty envisioned that the two sides would ‘‘adopt all measures to prevent aggression against

either of the Contracting Parties’’ and that if either were subjected to aggression by

any state or group of states, the other would ‘‘immediately render military and other

assistance by all means at its disposal.’’ The treaty also stipulated that ‘‘Neither

Contracting Party shall conclude any alliance directed against the other Contracting

Party or take part in any bloc or in any action or measure directed against the other

Contracting Party.’’ 1 Neither side has formally withdrawn this treaty, and the two

sides continue to carry out official Party-to-Party and military-to-military exchanges.

Nevertheless, this alliance was constantly fraught with tension as Pyongyang

sought advantage by playing Moscow and Beijing off one another. While professing

eternal communist fealty with North Korea, the Chinese leadership steadily weaned

itself away from an overtly supportive position toward Pyongyang, and, from the

late-1980s, built a ‘‘two-Korea’’ policy. The culmination of this process was the August 1992 establishment of diplomatic relations between Beijing and Seoul, bringing

a practical and peaceful end to decades of Cold War animosity between China and

South Korea and effectively ending China’s one-sided, pro-Pyongyang approach to

the Korean Peninsula. It is true that China continued to provide considerable material and financial support to the economically faltering North throughout the 1990s

and into the early 2000s, and portrayed itself as a useful political and economic

model for Pyongyang to follow. But what had begun in the 1950s as an alliance hallowed in blood and joint sacrifice had, by the early 2000s, turned into a close relationship for many of the wrong reasons in Beijing: China’s North Korean ally became a potentially disastrous burden, rather than a positive political-military relationship.

Recent irritants in the Beijing-Pyongyang relationship include North Korea’s con- tinued repudiation of Chinese-style economic and political reforms, enduring economic mismanagement, the resultant flow of North Korean refugees—including an

embarrassing flurry of asylum-seekers seeking high-profile entry into foreign diplomatic compounds in the spring 2002—and the effort to open the Sinujiu Special Economic Zone opposite the Chinese border town of Dandong, and have it run by an

errant Chinese businessman, Yang Bin, all without consultation whatsoever with

Beijing. The current and lengthening list of provocations related to the nuclear

stand-off—the clandestine uranium enrichment program, withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), missile tests—only add to Beijing’s headaches

as tensions rise in the region.

Mutual interests, but how mutual?: It is often said that the United States and

China have a shared interest in seeing a non-nuclear North Korea. This is true.

But, for a number of reasons, the difficult Beijing-Pyongyang relationship has complicated U.S.-China cooperation in assuring a non-nuclear North Korea. The committee should weigh these factors carefully in contemplating how and whether the

United States can gain greater support from Beijing on the issue of a nuclear-armed

North Korea.

First and foremost, China-North Korea bilateral relations have chilled considerably since the 1980s and the introduction of market reforms in China, and especially since China opened diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1992. China’s

more reform-minded, outward-looking and growth-oriented leaders viewed its isolated and recalcitrant neighbor with disdain at best and alarm at worst, all the

more so given the political cult style of leadership in North Korea, reminiscent of

the disastrous latter Maoist years in China. By the mid-1990s, China halted officially sanctioned barter trade, no longer accepted payment in non-convertible North

Korean currency, cut off regularized direct subsidies, and required foreign currency

for trade payments, though perhaps at ‘‘friendship prices.’’ Humanitarian aid has

been made available—in 1997, for example, China provided some 262,000 tons of

free food to North Korea—but on a more restricted and case-by-case basis.

In response, North Korea returned some snubs of its own, especially under the

leadership of Kim Jong-il. Unlike his father who spent his formative years in China,

spoke Chinese, studied in Chinese Dongbei (Manchuria), participated in pre-1945

Chinese communist political and guerrilla movements, and was indebted to China

for intervening in the Korean War, North Korea’s current leader, Kim Jong-il does

not have the same personal, political, and security ties to China.

54

2 Information on China-North Korea nuclear related cooperation drawn from the Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies database available from the Nuclear Threat Initiative Web site, www.nti.org.

Second, even in the chillier climate for China-North Korea relations, Beijing

places its highest priority on a stable North Korea, and the avoidance of measures

which, in Beijing’s view, would escalate tensions, prompt even more reckless behavior from Pyongyang, and unnecessarily destabilize North Korea and the strategic

‘‘buffer’’ it provides for Chinese interests. In the near-term, China already faces a

growing presence of illegal North Korean economic migrants who seek better life opportunities across the border in ethnic Korean parts of northeastern China. By some

estimates, there may be as many as 300,000 North Koreans illegally resident in

China. That number, and the challenges they pose to Chinese local and central authorities, would rise exponentially were North Korea to devolve further into economic, social, and political chaos. Beijing has thus far resisted efforts by the United

Nations High Commissioner of Refugees and other U.N. agencies to fully assess the

refugee situation along the China-North Korea border or prepare for the possibility

of larger inflows of persons on the move in a time of greater crisis.

Most importantly, over the long-term, Beijing will want to slow and avoid measures which could lead to further instabilities and uncertainties for this key neighbor. Military conflict in North Korea could be a major factor for instability and open

all kinds of uncertainties for Beijing: potential refugee flows, political instability,

and the possibility of U.S. and allied troops positioned at or near China’s border.

A rapid alteration of the political situation in Pyongyang and on the peninsula could

also stimulate nationalistic responses among China’s ethnic Korean population

along the Jilin Province-North Korea border. Beijing wants to avoid a dramatic

change in North Korea which could quickly result in less-than-positive outcomes for

Chinese strategic interests. Beijing would much prefer a gradual change in North

Korea, largely on Chinese terms, to include the introduction of China-style economic

and political reforms, the stabilization of North-South relations, and the eventual

reconciliation of a stable, non-nuclear, Korea within China’s sphere of influence.

Third—and a point too often overlooked in U.S. assessments—Beijing will work

hard to avoid outcomes which would set back its meticulously crafted two-Korea policy. Since the normalization of Beijing-Seoul relations in 1992, China has carefully—

and largely successfully—balanced relations between both North and South, with

the long-term aim of reasserting China’s traditional sway over the Korean Peninsula. Many near-term benefits have accrued as well, most notably the robust economic and trade relationship enjoyed between China and South Korea: China is

South Korea’s second largest export destination, and is South Korea’s third largest

source of imports; South Korea is China’s third largest import source, and one of

its largest export partners. Politically, too, Beijing and Seoul have come closer together on a range of regional issues. Most recently, their common interests have included similar approaches toward North Korea: downplaying tensions in favor of a

more gradual and accommodating policy of political, economic, and diplomatic engagement. Thus, Beijing’s interests weigh against policies toward North Korea

which would be significantly at odds with those of South Korea. In many respects,

Beijing and Seoul are closer in their approach toward North Korea than Washington

and Seoul.

Fourth, Beijing’s interests vis-a`-vis North Korea’s nuclear weapons program are

likewise complicated and contradictory. To begin, China itself is partially responsible for North Korea’s nuclear pursuits, having provided some assistance to North

Korea’s nuclear development program beginning in the late 1950s. China and North

Korea signed a cooperation agreement in September 1959 for the peaceful development of nuclear energy, and in 1964 China assisted its neighbor to conduct a uranium mining survey. Reports indicate that China continued providing training and

exchange visits for North Korean nuclear engineers and scientists into the late

1970s. By 1987, China apparently halted such official nuclear-related training and

assistance for North Korea, but reports persisted of other forms of cooperation,

mostly involving Chinese enterprises exporting various technologies and components

to North Korea which could have applications for Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons programs. For example, as recently as December 17, 2002, the Washington Times, citing leaked intelligence information, reported China exported some 20 tons of

tributyl phosphate to North Korea, a chemical substance which has commercial applications, but which could also be used in the extraction of fissile material from

spent nuclear fuel.2 Moreover, China should be considered at least indirectly responsible for the recently revealed enriched uranium bomb program: this pathway to nuclear weapons is similar to the program Pakistan pursued with Chinese assistance;

55

Pakistan in turn is believed to have assisted Pyongyang in the development and design of a uranium-triggered weapon beginning in the late 1990s.

While the precise extent of China’s role is unclear and may not in the end have

been critical for the North Korean nuclear weapons development program, nevertheless North Korea is or soon could be China’s fourth nuclear-armed state on China’s

border, joining Russia, India, and Pakistan. Today, this is a situation Beijing would

obviously prefer to avoid, but it must be carefully analyzed and weighed in the balance with the other interests discussed here. On the one hand, many Chinese strategists and scientists discount the nuclear threat from North Korea, either expressing skepticism that Pyongyang’s program could advance to weaponization and operational deployment, or noting that even if North Korea can successfully deploy nuclear weapons, China would probably not be a target.

On the other hand, Chinese strategists and scientists also recognize that North

Korean nuclear and ballistic missile development helps drive military modernization

programs elsewhere in the region, most notably in Japan. Japan’s steps toward the

development and deployment of missile defenses in cooperation with the United

States, are not viewed favorably in Beijing, especially to the degree those systems

might someday strengthen Japanese and U.S.-Japan allied postures during a Taiwan-related confrontation with China. More broadly, threatening North Korean

nuclear- and ballistic missile-related provocations strengthen the case for a more robust and ready Japanese defense and military modernization program, including a

stronger U.S-Japan alliance relationship—and, in some circles, a discussion of a

more offensive conventional and even nuclear capability—again, moves which are

not in Beijing’s interests. Similarly, provocative North Korean steps with regard to

its nuclear program also sparks an escalated American military response, with ‘‘all

options on the table’’, according to the White House. Some Chinese analysts are prepared to concede that a nuclear North Korea could conceivably provide weapons or

weapons-grade material to others, but this concerns is not given anywhere near the

same degree of importance as in the United States.

Consider this: even in the face of Indian nuclear weapons development and deployment, where China is obviously a factor in New Delhi’s planning, Chinese reaction, beyond an initial flurry of rhetoric and continuing low-level diplomacy, has not

been forceful. Indeed, China and India continue to have generally favorable and mutually beneficial political, economic and security relations in spite of India’s nuclear

weapons and ballistic missile development and deployment. By Chinese comparative

reckoning, North Korea poses a relatively minor nuclear threat at this stage and

in the near-term.

Finally, China’s interests regarding the changing nuclear equation on the Korean

Peninsula are further complicated by Beijing’s genuine desire to maintain positive

and friendly relations with the United States. The United States continues to hold

a number of critical keys for China’s overarching national goals of continuing socioeconomic modernization and development at home. On the one hand, the United

States is a major source of markets, capital investment, technology, and know-how,

all of which helps drive the Chinese modernization process forward. On the other

hand, China needs a stable international environment to pursue these goals, especially in East Asia, and will go to great lengths to deflect a crisis in the region involving the United States, and will try most of all to avoid a direct confrontation

with the United States, if possible. Again, with regard to the North Korea nuclear

issue, Beijing is faced with a delicate and increasingly challenging balancing act.

In sum, Beijing’s interests and priorities with regard to North Korea and its nuclear weapons program are a mixture of constraints, frustrations, and difficult

choices. Beijing may wield the most influence in Pyongyang of the major powers

concerned, but it is an influence China is constrained from exercising fully. Placing

Chinese interests within a strategic context, we see that with a direct border on

Korea, stability and peaceful solutions are given highest priority in China, with the

longer-term expectation of expanding China’s traditional geostrategic influence over

the peninsula. With that broad aim in mind, Beijing must balance a host of difficult

to bad choices in its relationship with North Korea.

With specific reference to Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions, while Washington and

Beijing wish to see a non-nuclear North Korea, questions arise over where each side

places that priority on their respective list of interests vis-a`-vis North Korea. Whereas a non-nuclear North Korea would rank at or near the top of such a list for Washington, other priorities and constraints may have greater weight for China. Given

these other contending priorities and constraints, and until the possibility of an

openly nuclear North Korea becomes more evident, Beijing will be reluctant to

strong-arm North Korea and expend what political and economic leverage it may

have in Pyongyang.

56

3From ‘Jiang, Bush Talk over Phone on DPRK, Iraq Issues’’, accessed from the Web site of

the Chinese Embassy in the United States, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/44284/html. 4From ‘‘China opposes pressure, sanctions on North Korea’’, Reuters, March 6, 2003, and condensed in NAPSNet Newsletter, March 6, 2003.

CHINA’S POLICY RESPONSE

Consistent policy approach: Beijing’s policy toward the changing nuclear equation

on the Korean Peninsula has been relatively clear and consistent: faced with a complex and often contradictory situation, Beijing supports a fundamentally cautious

walk-back to the status quo ante, with a strong emphasis on a diplomatic solution,

fearful that any precipitous action would only make a bad situation even worse. China’s preferred solution stresses three elements: (1) restart diplomacy and dialogue;

(2) avoid escalatory and provocative actions; (3) assure the denuclearization of the

Korean Peninsula.

This approach has been consistently reaffirmed at the highest levels in China over

the past five months. During their summit in Crawford, Texas—a mere two weeks

after North Korea acknowledged its clandestine uranium enrichment program—

Presidents Bush and Jiang agreed that both Washington and Beijing oppose nuclear

weapons on the Korean Peninsula and that they would pursue peaceful methods to

bring about a solution to the impasse with Pyongyang. During their summit in December 2002, Jiang Zernin and Vladimir Putin issued a joint statement urging the

United States and North Korea to enter into a dialogue and underscoring their view

that the Korean Peninsula should be nuclear weapons-free. On January 10, 2003,

Presidents Bush and Jiang addressed the North Korea nuclear issue in a telephone

conversation following Pyongyang’s announced intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Both leaders shared the view that the peninsula

should be nuclear weapons-free and that a solution on this issue should be reached

peacefully. Shortly after that conversation, in mid-January, during the visit to Beijing of Undersecretary of State John Bolton and Assistant Secretary of State James

Kelly, China went so far as to make a good-intentioned but ill-defined offer to provide a venue for talks between Pyongyang and Washington.

Most recently, on March 10, 2003, the two presidents spoke again by telephone,

including a discussion about the North Korea situation. According to the official Chinese report on the conversation, President Jiang expressed China’s hope that ‘‘various sides should keep calm and avoid actions which may make the situation tenser’’

and that China supports addressing outstanding issues through dialogue. Jiang

added, ‘‘The form of dialogue is not the most important, the key is that whether

both sides have sincerity, whether the dialogue has substantial content and result,

whether it is favorable to the denuclearization in the peninsula, to solving the matters which the United States and the DPRK care about and to safeguarding the

peace and stability of the peninsula.’’ 3 As recently as last week, the Chinese Foreign

Minister Tang Jiaxuan called on the United States and North Korea to hold direct,

bilateral talks, and added that pressures or sanctions on Pyongyang, ‘‘Rather than

solving the problem . . . can only lead to the complication of the situation.’’ 4

Reading between the lines: Reading between the lines of official Chinese policy, we

can glean other important, but less prominent elements to China’s approach. First,

Beijing continues to emphasize the importance of bilateral, face-to-face dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang. Beijing recognizes this as a core interest for

North Korea, and also sees merits in acting as an outside supporter of such dialogue

and negotiation, but not a direct participant. China may expect that any such faceto-face dialogue would go a long way to stabilize relations on the peninsula, curb

or rollback North Korea’s nuclear weapons (and possibly ballistic missile) program,

and result in some reassurances from the United States about North Korean security, all of which are very much in Beijing’s interests, but without having to do the

heavy lifting or be forced to ‘‘take sides’’ in a multilateral setting.

Second, in advocating dialogue and the eschewal of provocative steps, Beijing expresses its opposition to applying coercive means such as sanctions or force against

North Korea. That language is also Beijing’s diplomatic reminder to the United

States to rein in its threatening posture toward North Korea which, in the Chinese

view, is in part responsible for Pyongyang’s belligerence. At the moment, the threat

or use of force by the United States is Beijing’s primary concern, but the question

of sanctions may arise in the weeks ahead should the Bush administration choose

that route within the United Nations framework. Should it arise, it seems very unlikely Beijing would support a sharp-edged Security Council resolution favoring

tough sanctions, forced inspections, or authorizing the use of force when other

means to gain North Korean compliance are exhausted.

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It is worth noting the degree of consistency versus flexibility in Chinese policy toward North Korea’s nuclear programs over the past 10 years. For example, with the

brief exception of the now-moribund Four Party Talks, Beijing has consistently declined active participation in multilateral mechanisms to resolve security problems

on the Korean Peninsula, preferring instead to support more direct U.S.-North

Korea dialogue. China did not take part in the multilateral Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), though it supported its aims as well as the

bilateral U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework which set up the KEDO mechanism.

China has also consistently opposed or deflected the application of sanctions against

North Korea, dating back to the 1993-94 North Korean nuclear crisis. Since the

early 1990s and China’s accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1992,

China has also consistently sought the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,

beginning with its pressure on Pyongyang in 1992-93 to accept full IAEA safeguards

and inspections.

However, in contemplating future policy approaches with China, Washington

should consider two important exceptions to an otherwise consistent policy. The first

point involves the threat of sanctions. During the 1993-94 crisis, China initially

voiced its outright opposition to the imposition of United Nations sanctions and

open-ended language of ‘‘further Security Council action’’ in the event of North Korean non-compliance, and threatened to exercise a veto if such a resolution came

to a vote. However, as a crisis loomed, the United States readied for military action,

the evidence of North Korean non-compliance mounted, and a Security Council sanctions vote became more likely, Beijing modified its position from opposing sanctions

to ‘‘not supporting’’ sanctions (meaning Beijing would not exercise its veto to quash

a possible sanctions resolution). Shortly after Beijing made this known to North

Korea, Pyongyang moved forward to avoid looming sanctions and negotiate what

would become the Agreed Framework.

Second, while China declined multilateral participation in the KEDO process, Beijing did agree to participate in the Four Party Talks, first proposed in April 1996

by the United States and South Korea and lasting, fitfully, over six rounds, until

August 1999. Beijing may view such a framework more favorably for a number of

reasons. First, the make up and smaller number of parties helped Beijing to appear

‘‘on North Korea’s side’’, while also avoiding the appearance that the region was

‘‘ganging up’’ on North Korea. The smaller framework also allowed Pyongyang to

meet its goal of dealing more directly with the United States, which a larger mechanism might not allow. Of course, in the smaller framework, China’s role was also

comparatively more weighty than it would be in a larger multilateral setting, such

as the proposed ‘‘Six Party Talks.’’ Finally, the Four Party Talks were intended to

address larger strategic issues of replacing the 1953 Korean War armistice agreement (to which China was a direct party) and fostering reconciliation on the Korean

Peninsula, arenas where China can more comfortably operate than dealing with the

stickier questions of North Korean disarmament, which Beijing prefers to view as

a U.S.-North Korea problem.

U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS AND THE NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR CHALLENGE

U.S.-China relations: Given Beijing’s interests and responses thus far regarding

the changing nuclear equation on the Korean Peninsula, a mixed picture emerges

for U.S.-China relations on this issue. On the one hand, the two sides can fairly say

they share common interests in a denuclearized Korean Peninsula and a peaceful

resolution to the issue. But under the surface, a number of differences are apparent,

and, under certain conditions, these differences could increase in the months ahead.

First, Beijing, like others in the region—particularly South Korea and Russia—

will likely oppose coercive steps to force North Korean compliance. In the absence

of overtly hostile acts aimed at the home islands, Japan too would prefer a diplomatic, as opposed to a coerced, solution. In this context, Washington should avoid

driving South Korea too far into Beijing’s camp, a process already underway in some

respects. But depending on how far North Korea takes its gambit and the forcefulness of response deemed necessary in Washington and elsewhere in the region, a

more serious split between Beijing and Washington could emerge over the means

to bring about North Korean compliance.

Second, beneath the surface of common interests toward the North Korea situation, Beijing does not hold Washington blameless. Many strategists in China point

out that the Bush administration’s tougher approach toward North Korea—including Pyongyang in the ‘‘axis of evil,’’ leaking nuclear preemption contingencies aimed

at North Korea as part of the nuclear posture review, and personalizing attacks

against Kim Jong-il—only force North Korea’s back to the wall. In Beijing’s view,

further tough rhetoric and escalatory actions by Washington would only lead to

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more provocative and potentially destabilizing responses by Pyongyang. If escalating

confrontation leads to conflict—by design or miscalculation—Beijing will resent

American insensitivity to its interests and its inability, as the world’s sole superpower, to chart and lead a negotiated solution.

Third, if the current North Korea nuclear situation continues to fester and worsen, pressure will build even further on China to exert greater pressure on

Pyongyang. If matters go badly—the emergence of an openly nuclear-armed North

Korea, a damaging and costly conflict on the peninsula, or the proliferation of nuclear materials from North Korea to American adversaries—China will likely be

seen as part of the problem. Depending on such outcomes, U.S.-China relations

could suffer considerably.

Policy approaches: To avoid these kinds of challenges, Washington should continue to engage with China in order to gain steadily more cooperative responses

from Beijing. In particular, Washington should consistently and persistently convey

to Beijing the risks it takes in not recognizing and acting on the challenges posed

by a nuclear North Korea, and the benefits that would accrue for China and U.S.-

China relations by doing so.

• At a global level, the further weakening and breakdown of international nonproliferation regime inherent in North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons will

only encourage others to more seriously consider the nuclear option, such as

Iran, or to more vigorously pursue their extant nuclear programs, such as Pakistan and India. These countries are in China’s neighborhood for the most part,

holding out the prospect for further nuclearization, rather than

denuclearization, around China’s periphery.

• North Korea has demonstrated its willingness to link with other proliferating

states in the spread of nuclear and ballistic missile technologies. Given this

record, North Korea must appear very attractive to states and sub-state actors

who seek nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and who might use them for

terrorist purposes, further destabilizing the international system.

• China’s own security interests are at stake. North Korea would become the

fourth nuclear-armed nation on China’s borders, joining Russia, India, and

Pakistan. Not only will this even further complicate China’s relations with its

neighbor and ostensible ally, and leave Beijing open to potential nuclear blackmail and coercion at a future date, but further lowers the threshold for possible

nuclear weapons use in China’s backyard.

• North Korea would perhaps represent the most unstable and ‘‘weakest’’ regime

yet to openly brandish nuclear weapons, raising enormous concerns over command and control, reliability, materials protection, control, and accountability,

and potential for misuse, theft, and export, especially in times of crisis or the

collapse of political, social, and economic order.

• Chinese security and economic interests will not benefit from a more disruptive

and unstable regional security environment, especially one brought on by the

potential emergence of a new nuclear power in the region.

• As North Korea’s most important supporter and bordering major power, and as

a country which aided North Korea militarily in the past, including the provision of nuclear technology and assistance for the North Korean missile development program, China bears an enormous responsibility in assuring a peaceful

resolution of the nuclear stand-off and a rollback of the North Korean nuclear

and ballistic missile programs.

• Unlike the current Iraq situation, the North Korea crisis should be of immediate strategic concern to Beijing, and the world will look to China to take a

more proactive and responsible position in assuring a peaceful outcome and the

rollback of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapon programs. China’s reputation as an aspiring great power is at stake.

• As the principal regional player best positioned to work with both the United

States and North Korea, China should be strongly encouraged to do more as a

‘‘go-between’’, clearly conveying messages, constraints, and red lines from both

sides, while facilitating a bilateral dialogue embedded within a regional set of

consultations which includes North Korea and others such as South Korea,

Japan and Russia.

• For these words of cautionary diplomatic advice to work and gain greater cooperation from Beijing in dealing with North Korea, the United States will also

need to demonstrate its seriousness in advocating a multilateral approach to

this issue, and one in which China (and others) have a stake in the process.

In pursuing a multilateral approach, Washington must engage in an even more

59

intensive set of diplomatic consultations to bring the United States, South

Korea, Japan, China, and Russia closer together on how to address the challenges North Korea poses to the international nonproliferation regime and regional security. This process has to begin first with a serious reconstruction of

U.S.-South Korea ties and from there coordinating within and across our Northeast Asian alliances so the trilateral U.S.-Japan-South Korea relationship can

speak in a more effective and unified way. This not only strengthens the U.S.

hand vis-a`-vis Pyongyang, but also discourages others such as China from exploiting intra- and inter-alliance differences which have emerged. With Japan,

South Korea, and the United States working more closely together, the step toward a more region-wide mechanism will be easier to accomplish.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Gill, and I appreciate the testimony of each one of you. You offer complementary

views, at least in my judgment.

I want to explore this situation for the reaction of all three of

you. This morning, in a different venue, the nuclear threat initiative group that is now headed by my partner in the Nunn-Lugar

business, Sam Nunn, and I participated in a press conference. We

had Dr. Matthew Bunn from Harvard and other associates who

have worked on a remarkable report trying to detail all of the nuclear weapons, fissile material that is not weaponized, facilities and

what-have-you, in Russia, just for the sake of having an inventory

of, to the best of our knowledge, what is there.

Because of the openness of the relationship we have a reasonably

good idea of how much of it could in any way be called secure. That

is, there are guards, either Russian, American, or of some combination, as opposed to some laboratories that appear to be unguarded,

or spent fuel even outside the former Soviet Union.

The point of this exercise is that fissile material is sought by

many parties in the world. One of the arguments on Iraq has been

that if a program has not progressed to the point of weaponization,

then surely it would be accelerated if the Iraqi’s became successful

in obtaining fissile material. Most of this material is in the United

States and in Russia, arguably more than 95 percent.

The problem here is that there at least is a fear that without active work on our part with the Russians, first of all securing the

material, and then second go into an active, cooperative destruction

of it, at some point, if not al-Qaeda, some other cells of somebody’s

terrorist organization, not necessarily a nation State, maybe a very

small subgroup, will, in fact, obtain both the expertise and the ability to create even small nuclear weapons. We are talking today just

about nuclear capability. There will be existential problems for our

country and Russia and lots of other places, and these are so difficult for people to imagine. Even though theoretically you see the

concentric circles of destruction wherever it may be, and the hundreds of thousands of people being enveloped, that still is—it seems

far-fetched.

The dilemma that people like I have with the North Korean business is that it appears, for all the reasons you have discussed, that

conceivably this might be a government, through either its desperation or maybe its normal trade practices, that is prepared to

produce even fairly small amounts of fissile material and/or even

small weapons and sell them.

Now, there may be some reassurance, as Ambassador Lilley has

pointed out, in our ability to interdict such shipments, but I do not

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know what the odds are, and small amounts tend to defeat interdiction unless it is extraordinarily multilateral, I would think, and

successful. So this is the dilemma that I see.

For example, I understand from the experience that you had,

Ambassador Lilley, you point out the idea of the Chinese saying

hold off, do not get excited about this thing, we have been there

before. Others could say that, too, including our government, that

in the fullness of time, with all the proper consultations—and they

take time. You try to find some stake that everybody has in them,

and eventually sort of working month by month, maybe year by

year, you get everybody sort of in a mood to get around the table

together, and something good happens.

Now, if our judgment is that nothing really is going to happen

in the meanwhile—first of all that the estimate that North Koreans

already have weapons is untrue, or that our prophecies that as you

split the plutonium off of the rods and such, and move toward

weaponization of that, that, in fact, this is a lot tougher, or it will

take longer, or you really do not get to weapons even in that process, despite all the bluff—why, that is very reassuring indeed.

In other words, we could listen to all the bluff going on, all the

dismissal of the atomic energy inspectors, and say, we have got

time, these folks really cannot do it, and they are trying, struggling

and so forth, but we surely are adept at watching all of this, trying

to stop it, frustrate it, whether we are Chinese or Japanese or so

forth.

But what if, in fact, they do have bombs? What if, in fact, the

prediction comes true that six might be built in another year if this

thing progresses? What if the North Koreans announce all the

steps, provocative or not—in fact, if they are not telling the whole

truth, they are telling enough of it, that this pretty well describes

what they are doing—and in the meanwhile, we continue to say,

hang on here now, do not get half-cocked in trying to make a bilateral deal because you have got all sorts of other factors involved

here and a lot of other unwilling players.

This leads me to be very uneasy. If I were not concerned about

the proliferation issue, about the willing arms, and the fact of people desperately trying to get their hands on this stuff, and the willing seller, the rest of the North Korean situation might work itself

out, but I am not sure this part will, so if that is true, does this

create any more urgency?

Even if it is urgent, you might say, well, urgent or not, there is

not a whole lot you can do about it. Maybe, as Dr. Gill has said,

the Chinese take a calm attitude toward development of nuclear

tests in Pakistan and India, a calm standpoint. They have not apparently tried very hard, through aggressive maneuvers, to stop it,

and maybe we are much more worried about it in the United

States.

We certainly were as we proceeded to Afghanistan, and we are

deeply worried something might be going on in Kashmir even while

we are busy working on the al-Qaeda problem in Afghanistan,

nearby. So we became much more interested in both India and

Pakistan, both because of geographical situations, but likewise,

volatile elements that appeared to be in both countries that might

even have wanted to mix it up, and that maybe did not understand

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the implications of what might happen to them, have not had experience in dealing with these weapons for very long.

So this is my sense. You know, what about the urgency, or is

there urgency? Do we have time? If so, then it appears to me the

general prescription that we heard from Secretary Kelly and maybe

from you, but I am not certain, is right, that carefully, thoughtfully, step by step, understanding the nuances, looking for something, we sort of put the thing together and we are steady and persistent, and we can go at it month after month, year after year,

until we get there.

Do you have any feel about urgency? Is this nuclear thing for

real and, if so, does this not change the equation in terms of a

steady and more patient course?

Ambassador Lilley, do you have any reflection about this?

Ambassador LILLEY. Stating the obvious, Mr. Chairman, diplomacy is all about hard choices, and in this case, as I try to point

out, the solution to this awful situation in North Korea lies in the

economic field. As Sun Tzu said, do not hit them at their strong

point, hit them at their weak one, and economics is where we get

them. That is where you are going to win this fight.

You raise the case about their proliferation. That is what frightens me, not the fact that they are sitting on 20 nuclear bombs in

some cave in North Korea. It is what they are going to do with

them, and here, I think we have common cause with Japan, China,

Russia, et cetera. We have got to have it with South Korea as well.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean they are prepared really to sit with us

and to try to stop it there.

Ambassador LILLEY. The answer is a common cause. The South

Koreans have to help us do everything possible in intelligence,

interdiction, whatever is needed to stop proliferation of WMD from

happening. North Korea must understand it will pay a price, not

necessarily sanctions. The Chinese in the past have had an exquisite and subtle way of exerting leverage without sanctions. None of

these Westernized ‘‘road maps’’ or agreed frameworks for them. If

we get cooperation, we should succeed in the long run. North Korea

will get the message.

Howls, screams, tantrums, threats, everything will emit from the

North. We need to keep a steady course. We need work on our allies and friends. Work on the big countries in Asia, not the ugly

little ones such as North Korea. We need to keep focus on the economic front with our friends and allies, which is the North Korean

weakness, and then to encourage these countries to help us. That

is what we are after, and that is where we can do something with

China. Namely, when those North Korean planes start flying over

you, stop them, inspect them, see what is on them. We will do it,

Japan will do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps, then, maybe we ought to say up front

right now that we are working intensively with each of these countries on nonproliferation. In other words—— Ambassador LILLEY. Of course, China has been no boy scout on

this one.

The CHAIRMAN. No. Well, that is why even this course has its

problems, but as you say, the Chinese, perhaps informally, maybe

when the Vice President goes or somebody, and we sort of discuss

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Realpolitik and the problems of the world makes headway. I am

trying to look for some silver lining in this situation.

Ambassador LILLEY. Yes. Well, our leaders including Paul

Wolfowitz and others, when Xiong Guangkai, the Chinese chief of

their military security intelligence came over here, had two messages for him. First of all, we want to reestablish a military relationship with you. We think this is important and we want to do

it.

No. 2, the first item on the agenda is North Korea. It is not exchanges, it is not waltzing in the officer’s club, it is North Korea.

So I think we can begin to build a common front with China, and

as Bates says, it is very difficult to do, but I think we can do it.

Dr. GILL. Mr. Chairman, there may be some precedent for this,

because while China has, I would say, 99 percent of the time been

opposed to sanctions and more coercive measures, there is, I think,

some precedent back in 1993-1994. China consistently, through

1994, opposed the idea of a U.N. Security Council resolution

issuing sanctions, opposed, opposed, opposed, opposed.

However, as the issue came to a head, and as it became increasingly possible that there would or could be some military action,

and as the international community gathered steam to condemn

North Korean action, lo and behold, messages were quietly sent to

North Korea from Beijing that China would move its position from

oppose a sanction to not support. In other words, they would not

issue their veto.

My point is this. We need to do all we can with the Chinese to

show our hand here, as much as we can, provide the evidence to

the Chinese that this is a looming problem, that we have evidence

of their bomb-making capability, of their intentions to move forward in the development of nuclear weapons. To the degree we are

able to reveal those bits of evidence, I think that is going to go a

long way in convincing the Chinese. That is point one.

Second, mobilize a broad swath of the international community

behind us on this one. We may have squandered a lot of opportunities in other parts of the world. We cannot let that happen here

with North Korea. We have to have a broad cross-section of the

international community behind us on this issue.

With those two cards in our hand, I think we can get the Chinese

to do the kinds of arm-twisting that is going to be needed to get

the North Koreans to come along.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. Cha, do you have a comment?

Dr. CHA. Yes. Mr. Chairman, I would agree with all of the concerns that you have raised, and I think when we think about as

it relates to China, it is very clear, as both Ambassador Lilley and

Bates Gill have said, that the very thing that you are concerned

about, fissile material that could be sitting in one of 10,000 caves

in North Korea that could possibly be sold to a third party is something that is not simply of concern to the United States, it is a concern for China as well.

And I think one of the most important things to do is obviously

to make this aware to China, but in particular, also to say that

China cannot wait. China cannot be tactical about this and hope

that it can reap the benefits by waiting to the very end, after the

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United States has done most of the heavy lifting and then hope to

get onboard at that point, because that is not going to gain the

leadership and the leverage in the region, that Beijing desires.

So I think those are two very important points, and finally, the

third point is that, you asked about urgency. It is a very urgent situation, but how urgent it becomes, I think, will frankly depend on

how much worse North Korean behavior becomes.

I think if we get conclusive evidence that they have already

started reprocessing, that obviously speeds up the clock for all of

us, but in the meantime, I think for both China and the United

States, the notion of going to the U.N. and having a soft Security

Council resolution that does not talk about sanctions, but states

very clearly what is the obvious fact, that North Korea is way outside the nonproliferation treaty, and that they need to come back

into compliance, I would find it very difficult for countries like

China, Russia, France, or others to disagree with that very basic

fact, and that does give you a strong multilateral position from

which to then proceed.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask an entirely different question. What

if the United States were to try to encourage South Korea, even

China—and it is counterintuitive that they would come along at all

with this—but what if we say, we believe in freedom for people in

North Korea? We think they ought to have the ability to emigrate

to other countries. Now, the Chinese have spent a lot of time making sure that if anybody ever did that they were harassed until

they got back or what-have-you, so we have some understanding of

their antipathy to that idea.

The South Koreans usually would appear to be still very resistant, if not the whole idea that sinks both of us to have too much

of this going on sort of pell-mell—although we have had some testimony in one of our hearings on the part of some South Koreans

that they have accepted people from the North—but by and large

very few of them relatively—but what if we in the United States

said, we are prepared to accept people from North Korea, freedomloving people everywhere. The Czechs might take in some North

Koreans.

When we were dealing with the cold war over on the European

side, clearly this idea that people could escape, could find another

life, was very important. We have had that view with regard to Cubans who have come, been sponsored by churches in Indiana, quite

apart from Florida, or people in the South, so that there was at

least some outlet for this.

It seems to me that right now we are in a situation in which all

the parties understand that North Koreans are starving, that they

are in horrible predicaments, but they simply are unprepared, really, to deal with a massive exodus, or even with a small one.

Now, perhaps the North Koreans would see any such invitations

as almost as provocative as economic sanctions being imposed upon

the country. I do not know. That is why I am asking you. I wonder

why, in terms of policy, we have not proceeded more in terms of

the idea of escape, emigration, a better life, people out of there,

given their predicament, as opposed to always treating them inside

the cage with the World Food Programme or whoever else it is, to

the extent that we could minister unto people who were in bad

64

shape, while noting that several hundred thousand were dying in

the process, even while we are at it. We are sympathetic, but not

enough to really relieve the stress.

Does anybody have a feel about that situation?

Ambassador LILLEY. I think, Mr. Chairman, that that situation

is evolving. The real obstacle to handling it the way you suggested

is the Chinese, their agreement of 1986 with the North Koreans to

turn all refugees back, and they have done this maybe 30 percent

of the time, but they have refused NGOs. They have refused the

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees a presence in

Manchuria. The Chinese want to handle it as a bilateral matter

with North Korea.

What I am hearing now is indications of how brutal the negotiations are between the Chinese and the North Koreans. The North

Koreans walk in and say for instance, we want 1 million tons of

grain, we want 700,000 tons of oil for this next year. We want assurances of this. The Chinese say, well, how about 100,000 tons of

grain and 100,000 tons of oil. No. The North Koreans then say, in

effect, and this has to be confirmed, how would you like 3 million

refugees in Manchuria? The Chinese have to reconsider.

There is an element of blackmail in here, but if you do this to

the Chinese enough times, it seems to me that they might begin

to adjust their position on this refugee issue. They have done this

in Vietnam when they took the Vietnam refugees in china. The proposal setting up a first asylum area in Mongolia has been raised

in a different context, but these ideas may again pick up currency

as you deal with the very difficult situation the Chinese are facing

in Manchuria, where they are having these difficult economic problems in the area opposite North Korea.

So I sense that maybe there is something to be done here, and

I think it may be evolving in a positive direction.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Cha.

Dr. CHA. Yes, there is clearly a reluctance in both South Korea

and China to deal with this problem. The Chinese only send back

to South Korea and to third countries those attempted defections

that are caught on television or on tape, or on the radio. All the

rest do not make it.

The notion of the United States accepting North Korean refugees, I think, would set an incredible precedent for both South

Korea and China and Japan for that matter with regard to how to

deal with this very terrible problem. The role of the UNHCR in

China on an issue like North Korean refugees—and again, I do not

know how possible this is, but I would agree with Ambassador

Lilley that the North Koreans are leveraging this refugee threat to

try to gain more out of China, and I think the Chinese are losing

patience with that, and the Chinese refusal to allow the UNHCR

to come in and look at this particular issue may be weakening over

time, particularly if the boundaries of what the UNHCR is allowed

to assess and evaluate are limited, but I do agree that I think patience on Beijing’s part with regard to this problem and the North

Korean traditional use of leverage threatening these refugees to get

what they want from China, their patience is growing thin.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, as Ambassador Lilley has said, a threat of

3 million people going into China, that is a massive number of peoVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:35 Jul 01, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 87871 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
65

ple. I presume there would be 3 million who are prepared to do

that. I do not know how the North Koreans look at this.

But just to pick up your point, because in a hearing we do not

have to make policy. We just visit with each other and we try to

discover the territory. But let us just say for argument that the

United States dramatically announced that we are prepared to accept 100,000 North Koreans, and we would like to get on with it,

because we believe, as a matter of fact, being a peace-loving country, that whatever expenses may be involved in our transporting

and beginning to support through all of our compassionate groups

in the United States 100,000 people they would amount to much

less than preparation for nuclear war, or whatever else is required

to be credible in this particular area.

Now, I say this in the context that clearly there is disagreement

among people, back to the Clinton days in 1994, but I can remember, as a Member of the Senate, in a small group listening to Secretary Perry describing plan C—I cannot remember what A and B

were, but C involved sending several hundred thousand Americans

to South Korea to rescue the country before the North overcame it.

Now, you can say well, that is fatuous. The North never, never

would have shot all those guns. They would have sent the people

across while Seoul was in chaos. They would never have proceeded

on down. I hope that is right, and maybe that is, but I remember

a sense of dismay as we practically discussed practically where the

logistic support for all of these people is.

By this point, you have some facilities in Japan, nothing left in

the Philippines, a little bit in Singapore. Physically, even if you

want to do this, if you want to save South Korea on the ground,

physically, how do you do it? The expense of doing this is enormous.

Now, we could say, well, that is never going to be replicated

again. The military option is off the table. But the fact is, it is

never off the table. Our credibility in the area comes from the fact

that many people believe the United States has been a protective

force. Not uniquely, everybody else is building up forces, but still

they counted upon us, as opposed to abandoning the area, and it

is a given here, and that is expensive as it stands, and it will be

more expensive, as a matter of fact, if things become more tense.

If, instead of sending two dozen bombers out into the area to

counter the buzzing of our aircraft, which was some distance in

North Korea, well, let us say the North Koreans next week try to

out another aircraft, or whatever else may be? I am just hypothetically saying, why do we not take a look and see, as a matter

of fact, if there is another approach.

We announced, as you have all noticed at the inaugural for the

new President, our new food program, or renewed it at that time,

in part because we thought this would be good for our relations

with South Korea, leaving aside people that were to be fed. Obviously they would be helped by the process.

But at the same time, the rest of the world has either reneged

or gotten out of the program. When we had Mr. Morris from the

World Food Programme, he testified that we used to be feeding 6

million people more or less. We would be doing well to get 3 million

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fed, because others are opting out of the process, even while we are

forthcoming.

Again, I am just trying to figure out the disconnect in all of this,

or at least, if we are talking about leverage, examples, relative expense, and humanitarian efforts, it seems to me to offer some possibilities, and I just would testify from the standpoint of the cold

war, or even the Cuban business, that emigration meant a lot to

people. It changed the dynamics of the situation.

Dr. GILL. Just one comment. The opportunity that would become

evident to people inside North Korea of this offer could then lead

to a real, an even greater surge of people trying to get out of North

Korea, which on the one hand, you know, could have its benefits,

of course, because it would hopefully undermine the regime and

maybe bring it to a more cooperative position.

On the other hand, from China’s point of view, is that a good

thing, if we are prepared to take in 100,000 and that spurs 400,000

to come across the border, that is something China may not want

to support.

The CHAIRMAN. How about if South Korea stepped up and said,

well, we will take half of them.

Dr. GILL. Yes. Well, that would be I think—some measures like

that would have to be considered, because obviously if it were

300,000 persons estimated now as refugees in China’s Jilin Province, then clearly the demand, if you will, will be much, much higher if that kind of an opportunity were put on the table to go to

South Korea or to the United States or elsewhere.

One country we have not talked about here yet in questioning

whether this is a good idea or not is North Korea. I doubt that

North Korea would be particularly in favor of this, and may well

take action, maybe very violent action to make sure it does not

happen.

The CHAIRMAN. To stop people from getting out.

Dr. GILL. Or they would do sort of like Haiti did and send us

their least desirable persons.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I expect all of the above.

Dr. GILL. But on the other hand, I like the idea, because I think

it would send an important signal. It would be, I think—China

would recognize it in some way as a benefit, as a kind of recognition of the problem they are facing, and a willingness for us to

reach out our hand and try to help them alleviate a problem they

are trying to tackle.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, but ultimately, part of our goal is to see the

unification of all the Koreans. The South Koreans have always

said, but not yet. We are not Western Germany vis-a`-vis the East.

We just cannot afford this. These people are very, very poor, very,

very desperate, and we are still pulling things together and so

forth, and fair enough, but at some point unification means sort of

commingling of all these needs, and if that is hopefully where we

are headed, which I hope is the case for the sake of the Koreans

that are involved, in the North especially, this is sort of a way of

edging into the situation.

What I see now is a stiff-arming of all of this down to the most

minimal migration of North Koreans into South Korea, with the

thought that somehow this is not the time, not the place, even a

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feeling that even if unification is in the by and by, to be hoped for,

the expense of this, the inconvenience of it and what-have-you is

not now.

So you push back even from the South Korean side, creating

enormous suffering for people in the North and there is great sympathy for them, and then a criticism of us for provoking them so

that there might be conflict in the process, and I am trying to think

of ways to begin unraveling all of this dilemma that is, after all,

a part of history of 50 or 60 years ago, but now there are different

dimensions, a more prosperous South, and for that matter an interested group in Japan might want to be a part of this picture.

If we are talking about multilateral cooperation, why, this may

be a way in which we try to get a united way.

Dr. CHA. Yes, I would agree. I think all the countries in the region have a very difficult time with this issue, and they kind of

wish it was not there.

At the same time, though, I think if the United States were to

do something like this and take the lead on it, it would be very difficult for any country in the region, including China, to actively oppose it or to speak negatively of it, and I think it would actually

force a lot of countries in the region to get on the bandwagon and,

in particular, as you said, try to minimize the negative

externalities in particular for China, because they may experience

the surge after this 100,000 is accepted by the United States.

With regard to this question of what is the real down side of this,

as you mentioned in your initial comments, the down side is, of

course, that the North Koreans might perceive this in a strategic

way, as an attempt to completely unravel the regime, and for that

reason, as Bates said, they might lash out.

I think they would certainly perceive it that way, but whether

they would actually lash out as a result of this particular humanitarian gesture to me is highly—it is a highly questionable or debatable proposition, because as we all know, the notion of North Korea

lashing out really is a last gasp attempt, where they know it is a

self-conscious act of suicide, and whether they would do it in response to a purely humanitarian gesture of this nature, I think it

is a very debatable proposition.

The CHAIRMAN. Having argued all this, let me just say that we

then have, of course, the problem of our own government, our own

policies. In part because of 9/11, the whole immigration situation

has become extremely difficult, so each of you who are involved as

you are in colleges and universities know the extraordinary problems that everybody has now, going to the immigration office, as

I hope you do at your places—you know, we have 5,000 students

at Purdue who are international students, and a great number of

them from countries which have great political difficulties now, and

so we are at that particular point in which we have to work this

out.

Likewise, Vicente Fox in Mexico, when he came to power, hoped

that there would be a difference in the Mexican-American relationship, closer at home, and there has not been, a great disappointment there, which continues. There are profound problems in terms

of our own politics, and so even though I am hypothetically talking

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about our doing this, I have no basis whatever to believe that anybody in our government is on the threshold of such a maneuver.

On the other hand, what I think I hear, and what our members

around here are concerned about, is that this is, we believe, a very

urgent, dangerous predicament. Whether it is elevated to crisis, or

whether you can spin it out, remains to be seen. Historically, if we

are wrong, why, we will be culpable for having had very bad judgment, and that is the problem, if we have some responsibility.

We are not alone in this, in this committee, or in the Senate as

a whole. We have an administration, we have other people, but I

think this is a very serious security problem for our country and

for many others, so this is why you try to think outside the box occasionally and see really where we might head.

But you have all been doing that for a long time, and I appreciate your testimony. The full papers are excellent, and a real contribution, as well as your patience in musing with me about hypothetical situations this afternoon, and I know we will be closely in

touch with you. This will not be our last discussion of the issue,

because we have had, as I started my opening comment, at least

five occasions during barely 60 days or so of our work as a committee to hold hearings about a serious facet of North Korea, or

South Korea, or something on the peninsula.

That is not by chance. It is both because we have a responsibility, and because it is extremely interesting, I think, to our members, so we thank you for being a resource, and the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:32 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene

subject to the call of the Chair.]

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