International Isotopes Fluorine Products, Inc. (IIFP) 

A Wholly Owned Subsidiary of 

International Isotopes, Inc. (INIS)

Fluorine Extraction Process & Depleted 

Uranium De-conversion 

 (FEP/DUP) Plant 

Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) 

Summary 

Revision B 

December 28, 2011

SA-IFP-001 Revision B INTEGRATED SAFETY ANALYSIS (ISA) SUMMARY
SA-IFP-001 Revision B IIFP Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) Summary December 28, 2011 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................................ 1-vii 

LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................................. 1-viii

ACRONYMS and ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................................... 1-x 

ISA SUMMARY and ISA DOCUMENTATION ................................................................................ 1-xvii

References to Introduction Section .......................................................................................................... 1-xx

1 SITE DESCRIPTION ....................................................................................................................... 1-1

 1.1 Site Geography ............................................................................................................................. 1-1

 1.1.1 Site Location Specifics ...................................................................................................... 1-1

 1.1.2 Features of Potential Impact to Accident Analysis ............................................................ 1-2

 1.2 Demographics ............................................................................................................................... 1-2

 1.2.1 Latest Census Results ........................................................................................................ 1-3

 1.2.2 Description, Distance, and Direction to Nearby Population Area ..................................... 1-3

 1.2.3 Proximity to Public Facilities ............................................................................................ 1-3

 1.2.4 Nearby Industrial Facilities ............................................................................................... 1-3

 1.2.4.1 Potential Explosion Hazards from Nearby Highways ...................................... 1-4 

 1.2.4.2 Potential Hazards from Nearby Gas Pipelines ................................................. 1-5 

 1.2.4.3 Potential Aircraft from Nearby Air Transportation Corridors .......................... 1-7 

 1.2.5 Land Use within One Mile of Facility ............................................................................. 1-10

 1.2.6 Uses of Nearby Bodies of Water ..................................................................................... 1-10

 1.3 Meteorology ............................................................................................................................... 1-10

 1.3.1 Primary Wind Direction and Wind Speeds ..................................................................... 1-10

 1.3.2 Severe Weather ................................................................................................................ 1-13

 1.3.2.1 Extreme Temperature ...................................................................................... 1-13

 1.3.2.2 Extreme Precipitation ...................................................................................... 1-13

 1.3.2.3 Extreme Winds ................................................................................................ 1-13

 1.3.2.4 Thunderstorms ................................................................................................. 1-15

 1.3.2.5 Lightning ......................................................................................................... 1-15

 1.3.2.6 Floods .............................................................................................................. 1-16

 1.3.2.7 Snow ................................................................................................................ 1-18

 1.4 Hydrology ................................................................................................................................... 1-19

 1.4.1 Characteristics of Nearby Rivers, Streams and Other Bodies of Water .......................... 1-19

 1.4.2 Depth to the Groundwater Table ..................................................................................... 1-19

 1.4.3 Groundwater Hydrology .................................................................................................. 1-20

 1.4.4 Characteristics of the Uppermost Aquifer ....................................................................... 1-20

 1.4.5 Design Basis Flood Events Used for Accident Analysis ................................................. 1-20

 1.5 Geology and Seismology ............................................................................................................ 1-20

 1.5.1 Characteristics of Soil Types and Bedrock ...................................................................... 1-20
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

 1.5.2 Earthquake Magnitudes and Return Periods ................................................................... 1-21

 1.5.3 Other Geologic Hazards .................................................................................................. 1-21

 1.5.4 Geotechnical and Geophysical Investigation and Analysis ............................................ 1-23

 1.6 References .................................................................................................................................. 1-24 

2 FACILITY DESCRIPTION ............................................................................................................. 2-1

 2.1 Overview of Facility Site ............................................................................................................. 2-1

 2.2 Buildings and Associated Process Areas ..................................................................................... 2-5

 2.3 Building Codes and Standards ..................................................................................................... 2-6

 2.4 Process Buildings and Areas ....................................................................................................... 2-7

 2.4.1 DUF6 Autoclave Building ................................................................................................ 2-8

 2.4.2 DUF4 Process Building ..................................................................................................... 2-9

 2.4.3 DUF4 Container Staging Building .................................................................................... 2-9

 2.4.4 Decontamination (Decon) Building .................................................................................. 2-9

 2.4.5 FEP Process Building ....................................................................................................... 2-9

 2.4.6 FEP Oxide Staging Building .......................................................................................... 2-10

 2.4.7 DUF4 Container Storage Building .................................................................................. 2-10

 2.4.8 FEP Product Storage and Packaging Building ............................................................... 2-10

 2.4.9 FEP Building Dock ......................................................................................................... 2-10

 2.4.10 Plant Potassium Hydroxide Scrubbing System ............................................... 2-10

 2.4.11 Treated Process Off-gas Vent Stacks .............................................................. 2-11

 2.4.12 Environmental Protection Process Building ................................................... 2-11

 2.4.13 AHF Staging Containment and Fluoride Products Trailer Loading Buildings 2-11

 2.4.14 Full DUF6 Cylinder Storage Pad ..................................................................... 2-12 

 2.4.15 Empty DUF6 Cylinder Storage Pad ................................................................. 2-13 

 2.5 Non-Process Buildings ............................................................................................................... 2-13

 2.5.1 Guard House .................................................................................................................... 2-13

 2.5.2 Administrative Building .................................................................................................. 2-13

 2.5.3 Process Offices and Laboratory ....................................................................................... 2-13

 2.5.4 Maintenance and Stores Building .................................................................................... 2-14

 2.5.5 Material Warehouse ......................................................................................................... 2-14

 2.5.6 Utilities Building ............................................................................................................. 2-14

 2.5.7 Main Switchgear Building ............................................................................................... 2-14

 2.5.8 Fire Pump House ............................................................................................................. 2-14

 2.5.9 Water Treatment Building ............................................................................................... 2-14 

 2.6 References ................................................................................................................................... 2-15
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

3 PROCESSES, HAZARDS AND ACCIDENT SEQUENCES ....................................................... 3-1

 3.1 Process Descriptions .................................................................................................................... 3-1

 3.1.1 Process Technology and Chemistry ................................................................................... 3-2

 3.1.2 DUF6 to DUF4 Process ....................................................................................................... 3-3

 3.1.2.1 Process Flows and Operating Parameter Ranges .............................................. 3-3

 3.1.2.2 Receipt of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride ..................................................... 3-8

 3.1.2.3 Vaporizing and Feeding DUF6 (Autoclave) .................................................... 3-11

 3.1.2.4 Return of Empty DUF6 Cylinders to the Supplier/Customer .......................... 3-18

 3.1.2.5 DUF6 to DUF4 Process Major Equipment and Controls ................................. 3-18

 3.1.3 FEP Process for Producing SiF4 ....................................................................................... 3-30

 3.1.3.1 Process Flows and Operating Parameter Ranges ............................................ 3-30

 3.1.3.2 SiF4 Process Major Equipment and Controls .................................................. 3-33

 3.1.4 FEP Process for Producing BF3 ........................................................................................ 3-41

 3.1.4.1 Process Flows and Operating Parameter Ranges ............................................ 3-41

 3.1.4.2 BF3 Process Major Equipment and Controls ................................................... 3-44

 3.1.5 FEP Product Storage and Packaging ................................................................................ 3-51

 3.1.6 FEP Process Purge and Evacuation System ..................................................................... 3-52

 3.1.7 Process Off-gas Emissions Treatment (Plant KOH Scrubbing System) .......................... 3-53

 3.1.8 Environmental Protection Process ................................................................................... 3-54

 3.1.8.1 HF Neutralization ............................................................................................ 3-55

 3.1.8.2 KOH Regeneration .......................................................................................... 3-56

 3.1.9 AHF Staging Containment and Fluoride Products Trailer Loading Buildings ................ 3-56

 3.1.10 Process Vent Stacks .......................................................................................................... 3-58

 3.2 Hazard Identification ................................................................................................................. 3-62

 3.3 Accident Sequences .................................................................................................................. 3-64

 3.4 References ................................................................................................................................. 3-76

4 DEMONSTRATION OF COMPLIANCE ..................................................................................... 4-1

 4.1 Accident Sequence Evaluation and IROFS Designation ............................................................. 4-1

 4.1.1 Accident Sequence Evaluation .......................................................................................... 4-1

 4.1.2 Consequence Analysis ..................................................................................................... 4-45

 4.1.3 Likelihood Analysis ......................................................................................................... 4-57

 4.2 Management Measures .............................................................................................................. 4-57

 4.2.1 Configuration Management .............................................................................................. 4-57

 4.2.2 Maintenance ..................................................................................................................... 4-58

 4.2.3 Training and Qualifications .............................................................................................. 4-59

 4.2.4 Procedures ........................................................................................................................ 4-59
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

 

 4.2.5 Audits and Assessments ................................................................................................... 4-60

 4.2.6 Incident Investigations ...................................................................................................... 4-60

 4.2.7 Records Management ....................................................................................................... 4-60

 4.2.8 Other Quality Assurance Elements ................................................................................... 4-61

 4.3 Criticality Monitoring ................................................................................................................. 4-62

 4.4 Baseline Design Criteria Applicable to IIFP Facility ................................................................. 4-62

 4.4.1 Quality Standards and Records......................................................................................... 4-62

 4.4.2 Natural Phenomena Hazards ............................................................................................ 4-62

 4.4.3 Fire Protection .................................................................................................................. 4-63

 4.4.4 Environmental and Dynamic Effects ................................................................................ 4-63

 4.4.5 Chemical Protection ......................................................................................................... 4-64

 4.4.6 Emergency Capability ...................................................................................................... 4-64

 4.4.7 Utility Services ................................................................................................................. 4-64

 4.4.8 Inspection, Testing and Maintenance ............................................................................... 4-67

 4.4.9 Criticality Control ............................................................................................................. 4-67

 4.4.10 Instrumentation and Controls ........................................................................................... 4-68

 4.5 Defense-In-Depth ........................................................................................................................ 4-68

 4.6 References ................................................................................................................................... 4-71

5 ISA TEAM AND QUALIFICATIONS AND ISA METHODS .................................................... 5-1

 5.1 ISA Team and Qualifications ....................................................................................................... 5-1

 5.2 ISA Methods ................................................................................................................................ 5-3

 5.2.1 Hazard Identification Method ............................................................................................ 5-3

 5.2.2 Process Hazards Analysis Method .................................................................................... 5-8

 5.2.3 Consequence Analysis Method ....................................................................................... 5-17

 5.2.4 Likelihood Evaluation Method ........................................................................................ 5-17

 5.3 References ................................................................................................................................... 5-21

6 LIST OF IROFS ................................................................................................................................ 6-1

 6.1 Descriptive List of IROFS ............................................................................................................ 6-1

 6.2 Accident Sequences for IROFS .................................................................................................. 6-19

 6.3 IROFS with Administrative Controls ......................................................................................... 6-25

 6.4 References ................................................................................................................................... 6-28

7 CHEMICAL CONSEQUENCE STANDARDS .............................................................................. 7-1

 7.1 References ..................................................................................................................................... 7-3
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

8 LIST OF SOLE IROFS (REDACTED)........................................................................................... 8-1

 8.1 References ..................................................................................................................................... 8-3

9 DEFINITIONS OF LIKELIHOOD CATEGORIES ..................................................................... 9-1

 9.1 References ..................................................................................................................................... 9-2

 
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LIST OF FIGURES 

Figure 1-1 IIFP Location of IIFP Site .................................................................................................... 1-1

Figure 1-2 Wind Rose for Midland-Odessa, Roswell, Hobbs, and Eunice for 1993. .......................... 1-11

Figure 1-3 New Mexico Seismic Hazard for a Moment Magnitude (Md) 6 Earthquake .................... 1-22

Figure 1-4 Lea County Seismic Hazard for a Moment Magnitude (Md) 6 Earthquake ...................... 1-22

Figure 2-1 IIFP Facility 40-acre Site Plan ............................................................................................. 2-2 

Figure 3-1 UF6 Phase Diagram .............................................................................................................. 3-4 

Figure 3-2 DUF6 to DUF4 Process Flow Diagram ................................................................................. 3-6 

Figure 3-3 UF6 Phase Diagram - Operating Conditions ....................................................................... 3-15 

Figure 3-4 SiF4 Process Flow Diagram ................................................................................................ 3-31

Figure 3-5 BF3 Process Flow Diagram ................................................................................................ 3-42

Figure 3-6 Plant KOH Process Scrubbing System Flow Diagram ...................................................... 3-54

Figure 3-7 Environmental Protection Process Water Treatment ......................................................... 3-55 

 
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LIST OF TABLES 

Table 1-1 Summary of Monthly Precipitation at Hobbs, New Mexico, from 1914 to 2006. ................ 1-12

Table 1-2 Temperature Extremes at Hobbs, New Mexico ..................................................................... 1-13

Table 1-3 Seismic Criteria for IIFP Site ................................................................................................ 1-23

Table 2-1 Estimated Building Sizes ......................................................................................................... 2-5 

Table 2-2 Code Construction Conformance ............................................................................................ 2-6

Table 3-1 DUF6 to DUF4 Process Parameters (Estimated Ranges) ......................................................... 3-7

Table 3-2 SiF4 Process Parameters (Estimated Ranges) ........................................................................ 3-32

Table 3-3 BF3 Process Parameters (Estimated Ranges) ......................................................................... 3-43

Table 3-4 Design Efficiencies for Process Vent Off-gas Treatment Equipment ................................... 3-58

Table 3-5 Stack Heights and Estimated Flow Rates .............................................................................. 3-60

Table 3-6 IIFP Facility Hazards Identification ...................................................................................... 3-62

Table 3-7 Accident Sequence Descriptions for DUF4 Plant .................................................................. 3-64

Table 3-8 Accident Sequence Descriptions for SiF4 Plant ..................................................................... 3-69

Table 3-9 Accident Sequence Descriptions for BF3 Plant ..................................................................... 3-72

Table 3-10 Accident Sequence Descriptions for the FEP Oxide Dust Collection System ...................... 3-75 

Table 4-1 Example of Accident Sequence Summary and Risk Index Assignment ................................. 4-2

Table 4-2 Reference List of IROFS ......................................................................................................... 4-3

Table 4-3 Accident Sequence Summary and Risk Index Assignment for DUF6 to DUF4 Plant ............. 4-6

Table 4-4 Accident Sequence Summary and Risk Index Assignment for SiF4 Plant ............................ 4-22

Table 4-5 Accident Sequence Summary and Risk Index Assignment for BF3 Plant ............................. 4-32

Table 4-6 Accident Sequence Summary and Risk Index Assignment for Auxillary Process Systems . 4-42 

Table 4-7 Chemical Consequence Analysis Summary .......................................................................... 4-48

Table 4-8 Soluble Uranium Consequence Analysis Summary .............................................................. 4-53
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LIST OF TABLES (Continued)

Table 4-9 Radiological Consequence Analysis Summary ..................................................................... 4-54

Table 4-10 Baseline Design Criteria for Representative Active Engineered IROFS (Example) ............. 4-69

Table 4-11 Baseline Design Criteria for Representative Passive Engineered IROFS (Example) ........... 4-70 

Table 5-1 Experience and Qualifications of ISA Team ........................................................................... 5-1

Table 5-2 ISA Team Members PHA Qualifications ................................................................................ 5-3

Table 5-3 IIFP Facility Hazard Identification Checklist .......................................................................... 5-3

Table 5-4 Process Hazards Analysis (“What if...”) Sample Form .......................................................... 5-8

Table 5-5 IIFP Facility "What-If" Checklist ............................................................................................ 5-9

Table 5-6 IIFP Facility Systems and Components ................................................................................. 5-13

Table 5-7 Consequence Severity Categories.......................................................................................... 5-17

Table 5-8 Initiating Event Failure Frequency Index Values .................................................................. 5-18

Table 5-9 Likelihood Categories ............................................................................................................ 5-18

Table 5-10 Risk Matrix and Risk Index Values ....................................................................................... 5-19

Table 5-11 Failure Probability Index Values for IROFS ......................................................................... 5-20

Table 5-12 Likelihood Category Determination ...................................................................................... 5-20

Table 6-1 Descriptive List of Items Relied on for Safety ........................................................................ 6-3

Table 6-2 Accident Sequences for Items Relied on for Safety .............................................................. 6-20

Table 6-3 IIFP Facility IROFS That Have Administrative Components ............................................... 6-26 

Table 7-1 Chemical Consequence Severity Categories ........................................................................... 7-2

Table 8-1 List of Quality Level 1 Sole IROFS ........................................................................................ 8-1

Table 8-2 List of Quality Level 2 Sole IROFS ........................................................................................ 8-2 

 
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ACRONYMS and ABBREVIATIONS 

AC Administrative Control 

ACEC Area of Critical Environmental Concern 

AEA Atomic Energy Act 

AEC Active Engineered Control 

AEGL Acute Exposure Guideline Levels 

AHF Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride/Anhydrous Hydrofluoric Acid 

AHJ Authority Having Jurisdiction 

ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable 

ALI Annual limit intake 

ANSI American National Standards Institute 

APE Area of Potential Effect 

APF Assigned protection factor 

APTS Advanced Process Technology Systems 

ARI Average Recurrence Interval 

ARTCC Air Route Traffic Control Center 

ASL Approved Suppliers List 

ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers 

ASME American Society for Mechanical Engineers 

ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials 

ATIS Automated Radar Terminal System 

BDC Baseline design criteria 

BMP Best Management Practice 

Bq Becquerel 

BTU British Thermal Unit 

CA Controlled Area 

CDE Committed dose equivalent 

CEDE Committed effective dose equivalent 

CEO Chief Executive Officer 

CEQ Council on Environmental Quality 

CFR Code of Federal Regulations 

Ci Curie(s) 

cm Centimeter 

CM Configuration Management 

CMM Configuration Management Manager 

CMO Communication Officer 

COO Chief Operations Officer 

CPR Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation 

CPS Chemical Process Safety 

CY Calendar Year 

D&D Decontamination and decommissioning 
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DAC Derived air concentration 

DB Design and Build 

dBA Decibels acoustic 

DBE Design Basis Earthquake or Design Basis Event 

DBF Design Basis Fire 

DBFL Design Basis Flood Level 

DCS Distributed Control System 

DEM Design Engineering Manager 

DFP Decommissioning Funding Plan 

DHSEM U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 

DOC Decommissioning Operations Contractor 

DOE U.S. Department of Energy 

DOT U.S. Department of Transportation 

DUP Depleted Uranium De-conversion Process 

DTGW Depth To Groundwater 

E East 

EAC Enhanced Administrative Control 

EAL Environmental Assessment Lead 

EIS Environmental Impact Statement 

EMD Emergency Director 

EMP Effluent Monitoring Program 

EMS Emergency Medical Services 

EMT Emergency Medical Technician 

EOC Emergency Operations Center 

EMP Emergency Management Plan 

EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

EPCRA Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (1986) 

EPIP Emergency Plan Implementation Procedure 

EPP Environmental Protection Process 

ER Environmental Report 

ERPGs Emergency Response Planning Guidelines 

ERO Emergency Response Organization 

ERT Emergency Response Team 

ERTL Emergency Response Team Leader 

ESH Environmental, Safety and Health 

FAA Functional Allocation Analysis 

FEMA U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency 

FEP Fluorine Extraction Process 

FEP/DUP Fluorine Extraction Process & Depleted Uranium De-conversion Plant 

FF Failure Frequency 

FHA Fire Hazards Analysis 

FIC Field Incident Commander 
SA-IFP-001 Revision B IIFP Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) Summary December 28, 2011 

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FLM Front Line Manager 

FP Failure Probability 

FPE Fire Protection Engineer 

FSE Facility Safety Engineer 

FSRC Facility Safety Review Committee 

ft Foot/feet 

ft2 Square foot/feet 

ft3 Cubic/feet 

GET General Employee Training 

gpm Gallons per minute 

GUIs Graphical User Interface 

ha Hectacres 

HAZCOM Hazardous Communication Program 

HAZWOPER Hazardous Operations and Emergency Response 

HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air 

HFE Human Factors Engineering 

HSI Human System Interface 

HUD U.S. Housing and Urban Development 

HVAC Heating Ventilation Air Conditioning System 

IBC International Building Code 

ICRP International Commission on Radiological Protection 

IECC International Energy Conservation Code 

IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 

IFC International Fire Code 

IFR Instrustment Flight Rules 

IIFP International Isotopes Fluorine Products, Inc. 

INIS International Isotopes, Inc. 

IP Industrial Package 

IROFS Items Relied on for Safety 

ISA Integrated Safety Analysis 

ISAL ISA Lead 

ISO International Organization for Standardization 

JHA Job Hazards Analysis 

kg Kilograms 

kgU Kilograms of depleted uranium 

LA License Application 

lbs Pounds 

Ldn Day-Night Average Sound Level 

LLW Low-Level Waste 

LPG Liquefied petroleum gas 

LSC Life Safety Code 

M Meters 
SA-IFP-001 Revision B IIFP Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) Summary December 28, 2011 

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M&TE Measuring and Test Equipment 

MCC Motor Control Center 

mCi Millicuries 

Md Modified Mercalli (scale) 

MDC Minimum detectable concentration 

mg Milligram 

mi Miles 

ml Milliliters 

MHAP Mean Hazard Annual Probability 

MOAs Military Operation Areas 

MOU Memorandum of Understanding 

MPFL Maximum Possible Fire Loss 

mrem Millirems 

MSDS Material Data Safety Sheets 

msl Mean sea level 

mSv Milli-Sieverts 

mw Megawatt 

N North 

NCDC National Climate Data Center 

NCR Nonconforming Report 

NEF obsolete use URENCO USA* (formerly National Enrichment Facility) 

NDA Non-destructive Assay 

NELAC National Environmental Laboratory Accreditation Conference 

NEPA National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 

NESHAP National Environmental Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants 

NFPA National Fire Protection AssociationNatural Gas 

NG Natural Gas 

NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 

NM 483 New Mexico Highway 483 

NMAC New Mexico Administrative Code 

NMCBC New Mexico Commercial Building Code 

NMDGF New Mexico Department of Game and Fish 

NMDHSEM New Mexico Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 

NMDOT New Mexico Department of Transportation 

NMEC New Mexico Electrical Code 

NMED New Mexico Environment Department 

NMED/AQB New Mexico Environment Department /Air Quality Bureau 

NMED/HWB New Mexico Environment Department/Hazardous Waste Bureau 

NMED/RCB New Mexico Environment Department/Radiological Control Bureau 

NMED/GWQB New Mexico Environment Department/Groundwater Water Quality Bureau 

NMED/SWQB New Mexico Environment Department/Surface Water Quality Bureau 
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NMPC New Mexico Plumbing Code 

NMMSS Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System 

NMSA New Mexico Statutes Annotated 

NMSHPO New Mexico State Historic Preservation Office 

NMSLO New Mexico State Land Office 

NMRL/CID New Mexico Regulation and Licensing/Construction Industries Division 

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

NOI Notice of Intent 

NPDES National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 

NPH Natural Phenomena Hazards 

NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

NRHP National Register of Historic Places 

NUREG U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guides 

NWS National Weather Service 

OEM Office of Emergency Management 

OJT On-the-Job Training 

OER Operating Experience Review 

OSHA U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration 

P&E Purge and Evacuation 

P&IDs Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams 

PCS Plant Control Systems 

PEC Passive Engineered Control 

PFDs Process Flow Diagrams 

pga Peak Horizontal Ground Acceleration 

PHA Process Hazard Analysis 

PHMSA Pipeline Hazardous Material Safety Administration 

PLC Project Logic Controller 

PM Plant Manager 

PM Preventive Maintenance 

PM Particulate Matter 

PPE Personal Protective Equipment 

ppm Parts per million 

PO Procurement Officer 

POTW Publicly Owned Treatment Works 

PMT Post-Maintenance Testing 

PSA Pressure Swing Absorption 

psia Pounds per square inch absolute 

psig Pounds-force per square inch gauge 

PSM Process Safety Management 

PSP Physical Security Plan 

QL-1 Quality Level 1 

QL-2 Quality Level 2 
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QA Quality Assurance 

QAPD Quality Assurance Program Description 

QC Quality Control 

QMS Quality Management System 

RAIs Requests for Additional Information 

RAQD Regulatory Affairs and Quality Assurance Director 

RCAs Radiological Controlled Areas 

RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 

rem roentgen equivalent in man 

REMP Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program 

RP Radiation Protection 

RPM Radiation Protection Manager 

RPP Radiation Protection Program 

RWP Radiation Work Permits 

S South 

SCBA Self-contained breathing apparatus 

scfm Standard cubic feet per minute 

SFC Sequoyah Fuels Corporation 

SFPE Society of Fire Protection Engineers 

SHPO State Historic Preservation Office 

SIH Standard Industrial Hazards 

SNM Special Nuclear Material 

SPCC Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasure 

SRC Silicon Controlled Rectifier 

SRP Standard Review Plan 

SSCs Systems, structures and components 

SSP Shift Superintendent 

SUM Startup Manager 

Sv Sievert 

SWPPP Storm Water Pollution Prevention Plan 

TAC Tactical Teams 

TA Task Analysis 

TEDE Total effective dose equivalent 

TLD Thermo-luminescent Dosimeter 

TPSL Training /Procedures Support Lead 

UL Underwriters Laboratories 

UMC Uniform Mechanical Code 

UPC Uniform Plumbing Code 

UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply 

U.S. 62/180 U.S. Highways 62 and 180 

USGS United States Geological Survey 

USFWS U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
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UV Ultraviolet 

V&V Verification and Validation 

VFR Visual Flight Rules 

VOC Volatile organic compound 

W West 

WINK Winkler County Airport 

WIP Work-in-progress 

WIPP Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 

WRCC Western Regional Climate Center 
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ISA SUMMARY AND ISA DOCUMENTATION 

International Isotopes Fluorine Products, Inc. (IIFP), a wholly owned subsidiary of International Isotopes, 

Inc. (INIS), will build and operate a depleted uranium processing facility in Lea County, New Mexico. 

The IIFP Facility is being licensed under the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Title 10 Part 40 (CFR, 

2009e). A License Application (LA) has been submitted to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC). IIFP will provide services to the uranium enrichment industry for converting (de-conversion) 

depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF6) into uranium oxides for long-term stable disposal at an offsite 

licensed disposal facility. IIFP will utilize the extracted fluorine derived from the de-conversion process 

to manufacture high purity fluorine products for sale in electronic, energy storage, solar panel, semiconductor and other markets. Descriptions of the Facility site and discussions of the facilities and 

operation processes are provided in Sections 1, 2 and 3 of this Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) 

Summary. The IIFP Facility is also referred to throughout the LA and this ISA Summary as the Fluorine 

Extraction and Depleted Uranium De-conversion (FEP/DUP) Plant. 

The purpose of this document, the IIFP Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) Summary, is to provide a 

synopsis of the results of the IIFP ISA including the information specified in 10 (CFR) 70.65(b) (CFR, 

2009a). An ISA identifies potential accident sequences in facility operations, designates Items Relied on 

for Safety (IROFS) to either prevent such accidents or mitigate their consequences to an acceptable level 

and describes management measures to provide reasonable assurance of the availability and reliability of 

IROFS. The IIFP ISA Summary principally differs from the ISA by describing and focusing on risk 

accident sequences with consequences that could exceed the performance criteria of 10 CFR 70.61 (CFR, 

2009b). 

The following information, as a minimum, is included in the ISA Summary: 

1. A general description of the site with emphasis on those factors that could affect safety (e.g., 

meteorology, seismology) 

2. A general description of the facility with emphasis on those areas that could affect safety, 

including an identification of the controlled area boundaries 

3. A description of each process system analyzed in the ISA in sufficient detail to understand the 

theory of operation, and for each process, the hazards that were identified in the ISA and 

descriptions of the accident sequences 

4. Information that demonstrates compliance with the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61, 

including brief descriptions of the management measures and the requirements of 10 CFR 70.64 

(CFR, 2009c) 

5. A description of the team, qualifications and the methods used to perform the ISA 

6. A list briefly describing each IROFS in sufficient detail to understand its function in relation to 

the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 

7. A description of the quantitative standards used to assess the consequences to an individual from 

acute chemical exposure to licensed materials, or chemicals produced from licensed materials 

before those product chemicals are separated from the licensed materials 

8. A descriptive list that identifies all IROFS that are the sole item preventing or mitigating an 

accident sequence that exceeds the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 
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9. A description of the definitions of unlikely, highly unlikely and credible as used in the 

evaluations in the ISA 

The ISA was performed by establishing a logical relationship between hazards and the related potential 

risk associated with the hazards. The activities associated with this task were: 1) review of the operation, 

2) identification of the hazards, 3) hazards evaluation and estimation of the potential risk and 4) the 

establishment of safety controls to reduce or eliminate the risk, if needed. This ISA activity was an 

iterative process that depended on the level completeness of the design and as such, the tasks were not 

necessarily performed in any order or performed only once. 

The review phase defined the scope of the ISA. Regulatory guidance and requirements such as NUREG 

1520 (NRC, 2002), the NUREG 1520 Revision 1 (NRC, 2010) and 10 CFR Part 70 Subpart H (CFR, 

2009d) were followed for format and content and to ensure that performance requirements specified in 10 

CFR 70.61 were met. Information was obtained from project documentation including, but not limited to, 

conceptual design Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs), Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs), mass 

balance equations and various engineering design information based on the current level of design. 

Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs) were reviewed for all chemicals/commodities specified in the 

process as a feed, intermediate reaction product or final product, by-product and/or waste. Design criteria 

were reviewed for other energy sources including electrical, mechanical, heat and pressure. Natural 

phenomena events such as earthquake, flood, (external) fire and wind were evaluated for impact on plant 

hazards, particularly the hazardous materials inventory. Interviews with system and process designers 

provided clarification of design intent and projected operational requirements. A broad group of these 

technical specialists were active members of the ISA process and contributed to the development and/or 

review of all the safety basis documentation. 

This ISA is based on the existing level of design detail, much of which is developed from engineering 

calculations and estimates, known physical and chemical data derived from literature and the plant 

equipment and system concepts obtained from knowledge of other similar processes and from some pilot 

plant tests. The design and process parameter data are subject to changes as design detail progresses. The 

Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) and risk-based ISA reflect the safety design features and the prevention 

and mitigation measures developed and evaluated using the existing level of design. The ISA process 

provides the method for continuing review and analysis of design as it develops, becomes more detailed 

or changes and requires updating of the ISA, where applicable. 

The IIFP Facility will not be licensed to possess special nuclear material and therefore will be licensed 

under Title 10 CFR Part 40. While the current regulations do not require applications submitted under 

Title 10 CFR Part 40 to include an ISA, NRC staff has been directed to use 10 CFR Part 70 Subpart H 

performance requirements as part of the licensing basis. The Subpart H requirements are being included 

for the application review of certain new source material facilities as an interim measure pending the 

completion of 10 CFR Part 40 rulemaking (NRC, 2007). 

A meeting conducted on May 7, 2009 between the IIFP licensing team and the NRC concluded that the 

ISA requirements will be imposed through orders and that these orders would require an ISA similar to 

that required by 10 CFR Part 70 Subpart H. This ISA has been developed and is being submitted in 

anticipation of orders and subsequent rulemaking requiring that an ISA for the IIFP Facility meet 

requirements similar to those stipulated in 10 CFR Part 70 Subpart H. 

Consistent with the 10 CFR Part 70.4 (CFR, 2009f) definition of hazardous chemical produced from 

licensed materials, the safety controls associated with those activities that involve the processing, 

collection, storage and transfer of hazardous chemicals that have been separated from licensed material 
SA-IFP-001 Revision B IIFP Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) Summary December 28, 2011 

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are governed by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations (CFR, 

2009g). Risk Management Programs for Chemical Accidental Release Prevention regulations, developed 

by U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, 1994) are followed for the chemicals separated from 

licensed materials as long as a release of these chemicals would not adversely affect licensed materials or 

radiological safety. 

For the purposes of the ISA and subsequent licensed operations, hazardous chemicals are considered 

“separated from licensed materials” if the source material in any chemical mixture, compound or solution 

is less than one-twentieth of 1 percent (0.05 %) of the total weight of the chemical mixture, compound or 

solution, consistent with the criteria specified in 10 CFR 40.13, “Unimportant quantities of source 

material.” The environmental health and safety controls and regulations associated with the storage, 

handling, transportation and disposal of the hazardous chemicals associated with the IIFP licensed 

operations is more restrictive than those controls that would be necessary to protect the worker, public 

and environment from the radiological hazard justification to utilize the 10 CFR 40.13(a) criteria (CFR, 

2009h).
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References to Introduction Section 

CFR, 2009a 10 CFR 70.65(b). Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 70.65, “Additional 

Content of Application,” 2009. 

CFR, 2009b 10 CFR 70.61. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 70, “Domestic Licensing of 

Special Nuclear Material, Section 61, Performance Requirements,” 2009. 

CFR, 2009c Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 70.64, “Requirements for New Facilities 

or New Processes at Existing Facilities,” US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2009. 

CFR, 2009d Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 70, “Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear 

Material, Section 61, Performance Requirements,Subpart H, Additional Requirements for 

Certain Licensees Authorized to Possess a Crtical Mass of Special Nuclear Material” 

2009. 

CFR, 2009e Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 40, “Domestic Licensing of Source Material,” 

2009. 

CFR, 2009f Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 70, "Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear 

Materials," Section 4, Definitions, 2009. 

CFR, 2009g 29, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1910, "Occupational Safety and Health Standards, 

Section 119, Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals ," 2009. 

CFR, 2009h Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 40, "Domestic Licensing of Source Material, 

Section 13, Unimportant Quantities of Source Material," 2009. 

EPA, 1994 "Risk Management Programs for Chemical Accidental Release Prevention, U.S. 

Environmental Protection Agency,"1994. 

NRC, 2002 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulation NUREG-1520. "Standard Review Plan 

for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility," 2002 

NRC, 2007 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, SECY-07-0146, "Staff Requirements 

Memorandum, Regulatory Options for Licensing New Uranium Conversion and Depleted 

Uranium Deconversion Facilities," 2007. 

NRC, 2010 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulation NUREG-1520, Revision 1. "Standard 

Review Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility ," 2010. 
SA-IFP-001 Revision B IIFP Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) Summary December 28, 2011 

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1 SITE DESCRIPTION 

This section contains a summary description of the New Mexico site selected for the IIFP Facility and 

surrounding areas. The IIFP Environmental Report (ER), Revision B contains additional information 

regarding the site and its environs. 

1.1 Site Geography 

This section contains information regarding the site location, including nearby highways, bodies of water 

and other geographical features. 

1.1.1 Site Location Specifics 

The IIFP Site is located in Southeast New Mexico, approximately 19 km (12 mi) west of Hobbs, New 

Mexico (population 28,657). The site is located in Lea County, approximately 26 km (16 mi) west of the 

Texas state border, 87 km (54 mi) northwest of Andrews, Texas (population 10,182) and 362 km (225 mi) 

southeast of Albuquerque, New Mexico (population 712,728). The nearest large population center 

(>100,000 population) and commercial airport is the Midland-Odessa, Texas area which is approximately 

142 km (89 mi) to the southeast. See Figure 1-1 for a depiction of the site location. The approximate 

center of the IIFP Site is located at latitude 32 degrees, 43 min North and 103 degrees, 20 min West 

longitude.

 Figure 1-1 Location of IIFP Site
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Lea County is situated at an average elevation of 1,220 m (4,000 ft) above mean sea level (msl) and is 

characterized by its flat topography. Lea County covers 11,381 km2

 (4,393 mi2) or approximately 

1,142,235 hectares (ha) (2,822,522 acres) which is three times the size of Rhode Island and only slightly 

smaller than Connecticut. From north to south, Lea County spans 173 km (108 mi); the county spans 70 

km (44 mi) from east to west at its widest point. 

The IIFP Site location was chosen out of 958.7 ha (2,369 acres) in Township 18S, Range 36E, Sections 

26, 27, 34 and 35. The 259 ha (640-acre) Section 27 was selected for location of the 16.2 ha (40-acre) 

facility site and lies approximately one (1) mile north of U.S. Highways 62/180 and along the east side of 

New Mexico Highway 483. U.S. Highway 62/180 intersects New Mexico Highway 209 providing access 

from the city of Hobbs south to Eunice and Jal. New Mexico Highway 132 runs north from Hobbs at the 

intersection with U.S Highways 62/180 to Knowles and Denver City. U.S. Highways 62/180 runs 

southwest to Carlsbad, New Mexico, approximately 56 miles from the site. U.S. Highways 62/180 runs 

east through Seminole, Texas, 41 miles from Hobbs to Fort Worth, Texas, 340 miles from the site. 

1.1.2 Features of Potential Impact to Accident Analysis 

The landscape of the site and vicinity is typical of a semi-arid climate and consists of sandy soils with 

desert-like vegetation such as mesquite bushes, shinnery oak shrubs and native grasses. The IIFP Site is 

open, vacant land. Except for man-made structures associated with the neighboring industrial properties 

and the local oil and gas industry, nearby landscapes are similar in appearance. The only agricultural 

activity in the site vicinity is domestic livestock ranching. 

The site is within the southern part of the Llano Estacado or Staked Plains, which is a remnant of the 

southern extension of the Southern High Plains. The Southern High Plains are remnants of a vast debris 

apron spread along the eastern front of the mountains of Central New Mexico by streams flowing 

eastward and southeastward during the Tertiary period. The site and surrounding area has a nearly flat 

surface. Natural drainage is northwest to southeast. Surface drainage is into numerous un-drained 

depressions as well as a small intermittent water tributary running from the northwestern boundary to the 

southeast. 

The site area overlies prolific oil and gas geologic formations of the Pennsylvanian and Permian age. 

Other common features of the Southern High Plains are un-drained depressions called "buffalo wallows” 

which are believed to have formed by leaching of the caliche cap and the calcareous cement of the 

underlying sandstone and subsequent removal of the loosened material by wind. 

There is no mountain range in the site vicinity. Several “produced water" lagoons are located on the 

property. "Produced water" is water that has been injected into oil wells to facilitate the extraction of oil. 

As oil wells mature, the ratio of water to oil in each well increases. This is because the formation of 

“waters out” due to the water injection process. Water becomes a significant by-product of oil and gas 

production. There are two (2) playas on the site but no significant bodies of water such as rivers or lakes. 

There is no park, wilderness area or other recreational area located within or immediately adjacent to the 

IIFP Site. In addition, there is no architectural or aesthetic feature that would attract tourists to the area. 

1.2 Demographics 

This section provides the current census results (calendar year [CY] 2010) for the area surrounding the 

IIFP Site, to include specific information about populations, public facilities and industrial facilities. Land 

use and nearby bodies of water are also described. 
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1.2.1 Latest Census Results 

According to the U. S. Census Bureau, the population of Lea County was 55,508 in 2000 and 67,727 in 

2010. Andrews County, Texas had a population of 13,004 in 2000 and 14,786 in 2010 and the population 

of Gaines County, Texas was 14,467 in 2000 and 17,526 in 2010. Demographic, site and climate data 

used throughout the ISA Summary are taken from the IIFP ER, Revision B. The population increases for 

these three (3) counties over the most recent decade were 22.0%, 13.7% and 21.1% respectively. The total 

population of the three principal counties in the region of influence was approximately 100,000 in 2010 

compared to 83,000 in 2000 representing a 20.6% increase for the three-county area. 

(http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48/48165.html) 

1.2.2 Description, Distance and Direction to Nearby Population Areas 

The IIFP Site is in Lea County, New Mexico. Figure 1-1 also shows the city of Hobbs, New Mexico, the 

closest population center to the site, at a distance of about 12 miles. Other population centers are at 

distances from the site as follows: 

• Eunice, Lea County, New Mexico: 35 km (22 mi) southeast 

• Jal, Lea County, New Mexico: 69 km (43 mi) southeast 

• Lovington, Lea County, New Mexico: 24 km (15 mi) north-northwest 

• Seminole, Gaines County, Texas: 66 km (41 mi) east 

• Denver City, Gaines County, Texas: 55 km (34 mi) north-northeast 

• Andrews, Andrews County, Texas: 87 km (54 mi) southeast 

Aside from these communities, the population density around the site region is extremely low. Other 

communities in Lea County include Buckeye, Caprock, Humble City, Knowles, McDonald, Maljamar, 

Monument, Oil Center and Tatum. 

Surrounding property consists of vacant land and the industrial facilities described in Section 1.2.4 below. 

Cattle grazing on nearby sites occur throughout the year. Land around the site has been mostly developed 

by the oil and gas industry. The nearest residence is situated approximately 2.6 km (1.6 mi) northwest of 

IIFP structures and 1.21 km (0.75 mi) from the site’s western boundary. 

1.2.3 Proximity to Public Facilities 

Urban development is relatively sparse in the vicinity of the IIFP Site. The nearest city, Hobbs, New 

Mexico is approximately 19m (12 mi) to the east. Within Hobbs, New Mexico, several educational 

institutions are available for the education of personnel in the local community. There are two (2) 

colleges, a high school and an alternative high school, three (3) middle schools and twelve (12) 

elementary schools as well as two (2) private schools. 

There is no known public recreational area or hospital within five (5) miles of the site. 

1.2.4 Potential Nearby Events 

Land around the site has been mostly developed by the oil and gas industry. Three (3) gas-fueled electricgenerating plants and a gas-processing facility are located nearby including the Xcel Energy Cunningham 

Station, 1.6 km (1.0 mi) from the site on the west boundary (New Mexico Highway 483); Xcel Energy 

Maddox Station located 3.5 km (2.2 mi) east-southeast of the site; and the Colorado Energy Hobbs 

Generating Station 3.1 km (1.9 mi) east-northeast of the site. The DCP Midstream Linam Ranch Plant, a 

natural gas (NG) processing facility, is located 5.8 km (3.6 mi) southeast of the IIFP Site. 
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Hazard Energy Sources as listed in Table 5-3, “IIFP Facility Hazard Identification Checklist,” include: 1) 

non-facility events such as explosions, fires and power outages and 2) vehicles in motion, e.g. airplanes, 

cranes/hoists, forklifts, helicopters, trains or trucks/cars. 

An explosion analysis determined that a natural gas explosion at the nearest industrial facility, Excel 

Energy Cunningham Power Station located 1.6 km from the nearest IIFP Process Building, will not 

impose a blast wave greater than (or equal to) 6.9 kPa (1 psi) on any of the IIFP Process Buildings. The 

structures of the IIFP Facility are to be designed to withstand a 6.9 kPa (1 psi) overpressure. Thus, a 

natural gas explosion from nearby industrial facilities poses no credible danger to the IIFP safety system 

IROFS. The explosion analysis and results for nearby gas pipelines are discussed in subsection 1.2.4.2. 

Other hazard energy sources from other industrial facilities to the IIFP Facility are fires and power 

outages. Chapter 7 of the IIFP LA, Revision B addresses “Fire Safety.” The Fire Safety Program is 

intended to reduce the risk of fires and explosions at the IIFP Facility and documents how the facility 

administrates the Fire Safety Program at the IIFP Facility. Fires at adjacent industrial facilities could lead 

to power outages or potential explosions at those facilities. Should a fire at an adjacent industrial facility 

not be contained and spread toward the facility, administrative controls are maintained for vegetation 

control and limitations on combustible loads. These administrative controls reduce the potential for a fire 

to be initiated or sustained at the IIFP Facility. 

A non-facility event at a nearby industrial facility could result in a power outage at the IIFP Facility. In 

the event of a power outage, the IIFP Facility has a diesel powered emergency generator located outside 

the Main Switchgear Building. The facility also possesses an Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS) 

system that provides power to all critical loads during the interim period between power failure and the 

generator coming up to full speed to supply the site. All buildings are provided with emergency lighting 

for the illumination of the primary exit paths and critical operation areas where personnel are required to 

operate valves, dampers and other controls in an emergency. Thus, fires and power outages at nearby 

industrial facilities do not pose a credible risk to the safe operation of the IIFP Facility. 

An aircraft crash into the IIFP Facility is an incredible event because all three proximity criteria from 

Section 3.5.1.6 of Standard Review Plan (SRP) NUREG 0800 were met (See Section 1.2.4.3 below). 

Similarly, an aircraft crash into a nearby industrial facility would be a highly unlikely event. Should an 

aircraft crash into a nearby facility, the consequences to the IIFP Facility would be similar to that of an 

explosion potentially caused by the aircraft accident. The process building structures of the facility are to 

be designed to withstand a 6.9 kilopascals (kPa) (1 psi) overpressure per the Regulatory Guide 1.91 

(NRC, 1978). 

There is no military facility within twenty (20) miles of the site. The closest military installation is 

Cannon Air Force Base which is 129 miles from the IIFP Facility. Thus, there is no need to further assess 

effects of non-facility events such as explosions, fires or power outages from military facilities on the 

IIFP Site. 

See Subsection 1.2.4.3 below for the analysis discussion of impact to the IIFP Facility from vehicles in 

motion hazards (aircraft and helicopters) at these nearby facilities and from military operations. 

1.2.4.1 Potential Explosion Hazards from Nearby Highways 

The IIFP Site is situated within Lea County approximately one (1) mile north of U.S. 62/180 and on the 

east side of NM Highway 483. U.S Highways 62/180 is of four-lane construction and is a wellestablished radioactive waste transportation corridor established for shipping transuranic and mixed 

waste. U.S 62/180 runs southwest toward Carlsbad, NM, approximately fifty-six (56) miles (90.1 km) 
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from the proposed site. NM 483 runs from intersection of U.S. 62/180 (Arkansas Junction) to Lovington, 

NM, approximately 15.4 miles (24.1km) from the IIFP Site. 

Regulatory Guide 1.91 provides guidance to address transportation explosion hazards near nuclear power 

plants. The potential hazard has been considered and evaluated in reference to the Regulatory Guide 1.91 

and the NRC Safety Evaluation Report for the National Enrichment Facility in Lea County, New Mexico, 

Louisiana Energy Services, NUREG-1827 (NRC, 2005.) 

In NUREG-1827, the potential hazard of a highway propane explosion was evaluated for likelihood of 

occurrence because the postulated accident was in the approximate safe-separation distance from a 

proposed safety-significant structure. 

In the case of the IIFP Facility, the structures of the facility are to be designed to withstand a 6.9 kPa (1 

psi) overpressure in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.91. 

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The nearest IIFP safety structure is greater than 0.58 miles (0.94 km) from the nearest highway 

transportation route (Highway 483). No further analysis is needed for nearby highway transportation 

routes due to the conservative safe distance of more than 0.42 miles (0.68 km). Likewise, there is no rail 

transportation route within five (5) miles of the IIFP Facility and no further analysis is needed for nearby 

rail transportation routes due to the conservative safe distance of more than 0.58 miles (0.94 km). 

1.2.4.2 Potential Hazards from Nearby Gas Pipelines

A New Mexico licensed engineering company performed a survey of the site to identify nearby 

underground fossil fuel pipelines. Based on easement records filed with Lea County, several underground 

fossil fuel pipelines are located within one (1) mile of the site (one petroleum gas pipeline and several 

natural gas pipelines). An engineering drawing (number 100-C-0004 Revision B) shows the gas pipeline 

locations in reference to the IIFP Facility Site Plan. This drawing is available as part of the IIFP License 

Application Engineering Drawing Package submitted to the NRC. As part of the land survey, each 

pipeline was assigned a designation (i.e., Pipeline 45a). The survey successfully identified the diameter 

and pressure for the liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) pipeline and all but two (2) of the natural gas (NG) 

pipelines. The pressure is unknown for one (1) NG pipeline and the diameter is unknown for the other NG 
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pipeline. Based on the available data for pipelines located near the IIFP Site, the largest NG pipeline 

diameter is twelve (12) inches and the largest NG pipeline pressure is 1500 psi. These values are 

conservatively selected to characterize the two (2) pipelines for which diameter and pressure are 

unknown. 

The leak or rupture of a nearby, underground, fossil fuel pipeline could form an explosive cloud of 

gaseous fuel in the atmosphere. Detonation of the explosive cloud would generate a blast pressure wave. 

The magnitude of the blast pressure wave would depend primarily on fuel type, pipe diameter and 

pressure. Atmospheric conditions (stability class, wind speed and wind direction) would influence the 

transport and dispersion of the gaseous fuel and therefore influence the size of the explosive cloud and the 

magnitude of the blast. The magnitude of a blast pressure wave attenuates rapidly with distance. A blast 

pressure wave less than one (1) psi is considered conservatively safe for industrial structures per NRC 

Regulatory Guide 1.91. 

An evaluation was performed to determine the annual probability that the rupture of a nearby fossil fuel 

pipeline (followed by detonation) could generate a blast pressure wave greater than one (1) psi at a 

process building. Major calculation steps and key analytic assumptions for the pipeline explosion 

probability evaluation are listed below. 

[Step 01] Based on twenty-four (24) years of fossil fuel gas pipeline safety data obtained from the U.S. 

Department of Transportation (DOT) Pipeline Hazardous Material Safety Administration (PHMSA) 

website, an explosion per year per pipeline mile rate is developed for NG pipelines (a separate rate is 

developed for LPG pipelines). 

[Step 02] Guillotine pipeline rupture is assumed to occur; a steady gas release ensues; and detonation of 

the gas plume occurs as much as one hour after the pipeline rupture. 

[Step 03] Blast radii are determined by the EPA approved ALOHA computer code for every set of wind 

speed and stability class that occurs in the Lea County region (there are 43 sets of atmospheric conditions 

identified). Site specific meteorological data was provided by the State of New Mexico. Blast radii are 

determined for a range of average pipeline release rates and a power series curve fit is developed for each 

set of atmospheric conditions (k = 1 to 43): 

ೖ௓ܶ௞ܹ௞ = ݏݑܴܽ݀݅ݐݏ݈ܽܤ

 Where Blast Radiusk is the blast radius (meters); Wk is the mantissa of the power series curve fit; T is the 

average release rate from the pipeline (kg/sec); and Zk is the exponent of the power series curve fit. The 

subscript “k” represents each of the 43 sets of atmospheric conditions. Power series curve fits provide an 

excellent fit to all of the results generated by ALOHA. 

[Step 04] For each pipeline, the initial release rate Qinitial is calculated based on choked flow conditions 

from the end for the broken pipe. Equal flow from both ends of the ruptured pipeline is conservatively 

assumed. Based on empirical data from a year 2000 report published by the Gas Research Institute (GRI00/0189, “A Model for Sizing High Consequence Areas Associated with Natural Gas Pipelines”), a 

release rate decay factor (λ) is calculated based on the first five (5) minutes of the release (λ=0.16). An 

average pipeline release rate, λ × Qinitial, is conservatively assumed to persist for as much as one (1) hour 

before detonation occurs. Although the soil cover would likely attenuate the release rate via diffusion and 

absorption, the analysis assumes no credit for the presence of the soil cover. 

[Step 05] Based on the curve fits in Step 04, for each pipeline, a blast radius is calculated for each set of 

atmospheric conditions (k = 1 to 43). Then, consistent with the method illustrated in Figure 2 of NRC 

Regulatory Guide 1.91 for each blast radius, calculations are performed to determine the pipeline 

exposure distance. Pipeline exposure distance is the span of nearby pipeline with potential to produce a 
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blast pressure wave greater than one (1) psi at a process building. It is conservatively assumed that the 

wind always travels directly toward the nearest process building. 

[Step 06] Each pipeline exposure distance calculated in Step 05 is weighted based on the annual 

frequency of the atmospheric conditions. 

௞ݍ݁ݎܨ × ௞ܽ݊ܿ݁ݐݏ݅ܦ݁ݎݑݏ݋݌ݔܧ = ௞ܽ݊ܿ݁ݐݏ݅ܦ݁ݎݑݏ݋݌ݔܧ݁݀ݐhܹ݁݅݃ 

For example, if the calculations reveal that a nearby pipeline has a 287 foot exposure distance based on D 

stability and 4 m/s wind conditions (D04) and the annual frequency of D04 conditions is 2.3 percent, then 

the weighted exposure distance is 2.3% x 287 feet = 6.6 feet. 

[Step 07] Based on the equation below, a total, annual, weighted average exposure distance (STOT) is 

calculated for each pipeline. The use of a weighted average ensures that redundant exposure distances are 

not double-counted. 

 ்ܵை் = ଵ

௞ݍ݁ݎܨ × ௞ܽ݊ܿ݁ݐݏ݅ܦ݁ݎݑݏ݋݌ݔܧ ∑ ସଷ

ସଷ

௞ୀଵ

[Step 08] Steps 04 through 07 are performed for each nearby fossil fuel pipeline. The combined exposure 

distance for all the NG pipelines is determined separately from the exposure distance for the LPG 

pipeline. The weighted exposure distance results for the NG pipelines are summed. 

ீே்,ை்ܵ = ∑ ܽ݊ܿ݁ݐݏ݅ܦ	݁ݎݑݏ݋݌ݔܧ	ܩܰ 

ீ௉௅்,ை்ܵ = ܽ݊ܿ݁ݐݏ݅ܦ	݁ݎݑݏ݋݌ݔܧ	ܩܲ 

[Step 09] Each result from Step 08 (one result to represent the LPG pipeline and one result to represent 

the NG pipelines) is then multiplied by the appropriate annual pipeline explosion rate developed in Step 

01. The sum of these products represents the total annual probability that a nearby, fossil fuel pipeline 

could rupture, detonate and cause a one (1) psi (or larger) blast pressure wave at a process building. 

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1.2.4.3 Potential Aircraft Accidents from Nearby Air Transportation Corridors 

An aircraft hazard risk determination has been conducted. This analysis follows the methodology as 

described in Standard Review Plan (SRP) NUREG 0800 Section 3.5.1.6 for aircraft hazards evaluation 

(NRC, 2010a). SRP 3.5.1.6 methodology is accepted by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to 

assess the probability of hazards due to airport operations and aircraft transits near nuclear facilities. 

Resource references for data used in the analysis are included in the analysis documentation. 

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Using the method provided in Section 3.5.1.6 of NUREG 0800, the probability of an aircraft on the V68 

airway crashing onto the facility was estimated to be 2.7 x 10-8 for CFR Part121 operations. This 

probability makes the aircraft crash an incredible event and thus requires no further consideration in either 

design or integrated safety analysis. 

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Standard 3014-2006 (DOE, 2006) offers an alternative analytic 

method to evaluate external risk from aircraft operations. To establish additional confirmation of the 

results obtained by the NRC method, the DOE method was also applied. Since the DOE method applies a 

different analytic approach, the results obtained via the DOE method are only relevant in comparison to 

the DOE threshold risk metric, which is not the same as the NRC risk metric. Based on the results from 

the DOE evaluation, the calculated probability of 3.3 x 10-7 crashes per year at the site is less than the 

DOE evaluation guideline of 1.0 x10-6.Therefore, the DOE method also demonstrates that the crash of an 

aircraft into the target areas is an incredible event and thus requires no further consideration in the 

integrated safety analysis. 

All three (3) proximity criteria of Section 3.5.1.6 have been met. Additional calculations estimate that the 

probability per year of an aircraft crashing into the plant from the closest Federal airway (V68) is less 

than the NRC acceptance criteria. Calculations also estimate the annual probability of an aircraft crashing 

into the plant from the same airway is less than the DOE acceptance criteria. This probability is well 

below the NRC threshold metric of 1 x 10-7 which means an aircraft crash into the target area is an 

incredible event and thus requires no further consideration in the integrated safety analysis. 

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SA-IFP-001 Revision B IIFP Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) Summary December 28, 2011 

Page | 1-10 

1.2.5 Land Use within One Mile of Facility 

As described above, very little land use occurs nearby the IIFP Site. Land use within one (1) mile of the 

facility is essentially the same as that within five (5) miles of the facility. 

1.2.6 Uses of Nearby Bodies of Water 

Water resources at the site are minimal. There are two (2) local playas on the site with a small stream that 

runs from northwest to southeast across the property that is predominantly dry during the year. The site is 

above the Ogallala Aquifer that is discussed below in Section 1.4. The site region has semi-arid climate, 

with low precipitation rates and minimal surface water occurrence. Thus, the potential for negative 

impacts on those water resources are very low due to lack of water presence and formidable natural 

barriers to any surface or subsurface water occurrences. Groundwater at the site would not likely be 

impacted by any potential releases, but a groundwater permit application will be filed with the State of 

New Mexico for review and approval. 

1.3 Meteorology 

1.3.1 Primary Wind Direction and Wind Speeds 

Spring is the windy season. Winds of fifteen (15) mph or more occur from February through May. 

Blowing dust and serious soil erosion of unprotected fields may be a problem during dry spells. Winds 

are generally stronger in the eastern plains than in other parts of the State. Winds generally predominate 

from the southeast in summer and from the west in winter, but local surface wind directions will vary 

greatly because of local topography and mountain and valley breezes. Average wind speed and direction 

from four (4) regional locations are shown below in Figure 1-2. 
SA-IFP-001 Revision B IIFP Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) Summary December 28, 2011 

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Figure 1-2 Wind Rose for Midland-Odessa, Roswell, Hobbs and Eunice for 1993 
SA-IFP-001 Revision B IIFP Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) Summary 

Table 1-1 Summary of Monthly Precipitation at Hobbs, New Mexico, from 1914 to 2006 

Rainfall T

Month Mean High Year Low Year 1-Day Maximum Mean 

January 1.14 cm (0.45 in) 7.52 cm (2.96 in) 1949 0.00 1924 3.07 cm (1.21 in) 01/11/1949 3.30 cm (1.3 in) February 1.14 cm (0.45 in) 6.20 cm (2.44 in) 1923 0.00 1917 3.53 cm (1.39 in) 02/05/1988 2.79 cm (1.1 in) March 1.40 cm (0.55 in) 7.57 cm (2.98 in) 2000 0.00 1918 5.08 cm (2.00 in) 03/20/2002 1.27 cm (0.5 in) April 2.03 cm (0.80 in) 13.13 cm (5.17 in) 1922 0.00 1917 4.75 cm (1.87 in) 04/20/1926 0.51 cm (0.2 in) May 5.16 cm (2.03 in) 35.13 cm (13.83 in) 1992 0.00 1938 13.21 cm (5.20 in) 05/22/1992 0.0 June 4.80 cm (1.87 in) 23.62 cm (9.30 in) 1921 0.00 1924 11.23 cm (4.42 in) 06/07/1918 0.0 July 5.33 cm (2.10 in) 23.90 cm (9.41 in) 1988 0.00 1954 11.35 cm (4.47 in) 07/19/1988 0.0 August 6.02 cm (2.37 in) 23.29 cm (9.17 in) 1920 0.10 cm (0.04 in) 1938 11.30 cm (4.45 in) 08/09/1984 0.0 September 6.68 cm (2.60 in) 32.99 cm (12.99 in) 1995 0.00 1939 19.05 cm (7.50 in) 09/15/1995 0.0 October 4.04cm (1.59 in) 20.70 cm (8.15 in) 1985 0.00 1917 14.22 cm (5.60 in) 10/09/1985 .25 cm (0.1 in) November 1.45 cm (0.57 in) 11.00 cm (4.33 in) 1978 0.00 1915 9.65 cm (3.80 in) 11/04/1978 1.52 cm (0.6 in) December 1.42 cm (0.56 in) 12.90 cm (5.08 in) 1986 0.00 1917 4.72 cm (1.86 in) 12/21/1942 2.29 cm (0.9 in) Annual 40.49 cm (15.94 in) 81.76 cm (32.19 in) 1941 13.41 cm (5.28 in) 1917 19.05 cm (7.50 in) 09/15/1995 11.93 cm (4.7 in) cm – centimeter. In – inch. Source: WRCC, 2006. 
SA-IFP-001 Revision B IIFP Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) Summary December 28, 2011 

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As described in the IIFP ER, Revision B the normal annual total rainfall as measured in Hobbs, New 

Mexico is sixteen (16) inches. Precipitation amounts range from an average 0.45 inch in January to 2.63 

inches in September. Maximum and minimum monthly totals are 13.8 inches and zero. Table 1-1 above 

presents a summary of precipitation in the Hobbs area for monthly and annual means from the Hobbs 

weather station with monitoring data from 1914 to 2006. Total snowfall is also shown in Table 1-1. The 

mean snowfall is 5.1 inches with a high of 27.1 inches at this monitoring location. The mean snowfall is 

5.1 inches with a high of 27.1 inches at this monitoring location. 

1.3.2 Severe Weather 

1.3.2.1 Extreme Temperature 

Table 1-2 shows the highest and lowest recorded temperatures in the IIFP Site area. 

Table 1-2 Temperature Extremes at Hobbs, New Mexico 

Station Temperature Extremes [0

C (0F)] 

High Date Low Date 

Hobbs 45.6 (114) June 27, 1998 -21.7 (-7.1) January 11, 1962 

Hobbs FAA Airport 42.2 (108) July 14, 1958 -23.9 (-11) February 1, 1951 

Hobbs 13 W 41.7 (107) June 25, 1998 -16.1 (3) December 8, 2005 

 

1.3.2.2 Extreme Precipitation 

Summer rains fall almost entirely during brief, but frequently intense thunderstorms. Frequent rain 

showers and thunderstorms from June through September account for over half the annual precipitation. 

The general southeasterly circulation from the Gulf of Mexico brings moisture from the storms into the 

State of New Mexico and strong surface heating combined with orographic lifting as the air moves over 

higher terrain causes air currents and condensation. Orographic lifting occurs when air is intercepted by a 

mountain and is forcefully raised up over the mountain, cooling as it rises. If the air cools to its saturation 

point, the water vapor condenses and a cloud forms. The rainiest months are August and September when 

30 to 40 percent of the year’s total moisture falls. 

1.3.2.3 Extreme Winds 

This section describes the basis for evaluation of wind loading on the structures at the IIFP Facility in Lea 

County, New Mexico. Three sources of wind loading are evaluated; wind loading from a hurricane, 

straight wind loading and wind loading from a tornado. 

Hurricanes

The IIFP Facility site is located in the extreme southeastern portion of New Mexico and over 500 miles 

inland from the Gulf of Mexico. Hurricane winds dissipate over Louisiana and Texas enough to prevent a 

wind damage threat to the IIFP Facility site as evidenced by the following information provided by 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), National Climatic Data Center (NCDC). 
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According to NOAA/NCDC, of the 155 thunderstorm events recorded between 01/01/59 and 02/28/10, 

the maximum thunderstorm wind speed recorded for Lea County was eighty (80) knots (92.1 mph) on 

07/14/89. Some of these thunderstorm events likely would have been the result of dissipated hurricanes. 

Tornadoes and Straight Winds

NOAA/NCDC Storm Events includes information for 527 tornado events reported for the state of New 

Mexico for the period 1950-2010 for an average of 8.78 events per year. Lea County reported 92 

tornadoes for the same period for an average of 1.53 tornadoes per year. Of these 92 tornado events for 

Lea County between January 1, 1950 and January 31, 2010, 63 Category F0, 20 Category F1, 8 Category 

F2 and 1 Category F3 tornadoes were reported. During this same sixty-year period, no Category F4 or F5 

tornado was reported. 

The evaluation of tornadoes and straight winds was made based on NUREG/CR-4461, Revision 2 (NRC, 

2007b) including data in Appendices A, B and C of the NUREG, DOE-1020-2002 (DOE, 2002) and 

DOE-STD-1022-2002 (DOE, 2002a) including Appendix D. It was determined from this evaluation that 

straight gust wind speeds will be used as the design basis for buildings and structures at the IIFP Facility. 

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Design wind speeds for all buildings and structures containing licensed material or buildings and 

structures containing chemicals or processes affecting licensed material are determined in accordance 

with NUREG-1520, Revision 1 (NRC, 2010) and by reference to DOE-STD-1020-2002 which, in Table 

3-2, lists recommended peak gust wind speeds for Category C exposure and for tornadoes at 10m (33 ft) 

above the ground versus “Performance Category and Annual Probability of Exceedance” for twenty-three 

(23) DOE sites across the United States. 

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As mentioned above, those structures will meet the performance category of 1x10-4 and be designed to 

withstand a 1x10-4 probability per year occurrence straight-line wind event. Hence, based on the order of 

magnitude scale for determining event likelihood using the ISA methodology in NUREG-1520, Rev. 1, 

the collapse or loss of the building integrity is considered to be highly unlikely and meets the qualitative 

frequency scale of 1x10-5 per year or less. Events that occur at a highly unlikely frequency meet the 

performance criteria for acceptable risk without the need to further reduce the likelihood of hazardous 

release or mitigate its consequences. Therefore, designing the IIFP applicable facilities to withstand 

straight-line wind events with an occurrence frequency of 1x10-4 per year meets ISA risk acceptance 

levels regardless of the hazardous material inventories within the facilities and without consideration to 

mitigation of any hazardous release. 

Sandstorms

Blowing sand and dust may occur occasionally. Large dust storms with the potential of covering a large 

region are rare (DOE, 2003).

1.3.2.4 Thunderstorms 

Thunderstorms occur during every month but are most common in the spring and summer months. 

Thunderstorms occur on an average of 36.4 days/yr in Midland-Odessa. The seasonal average are: 11 

days in the spring (March through May) and 17.4 days in the summer (June through August); 6.7 days in 

the fall (September through November); and 1.3 days in winter (December through February). 

Occasionally, thunderstorms are accompanied by hail. 

1.3.2.5 Lightning 

Only two (2) lightning events having sufficient intensity to cause loss of life, injury, significant property 

damage and/or disruption to commerce were reported in Lea County, New Mexico, between January 1, 

1950 and April 30, 2004 (see IIFP ER, Revision B). The closest lightning event occurred in Hobbs with 

minor property damage of $3,000 on August 12, 1997. The second occurred in Lovington on August 8, 

1996, causing two (2) deaths. 
SA-IFP-001 Revision B IIFP Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) Summary December 28, 2011 

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The NOAA database indicates that Lea County is in a region that has an average flash density of 4 to 5 

flashes/km2

/yr. The conversion of this flash density to a 40-acre basis for the IIFP fenced area indicates 

that the site could expect 0.65 to 0.81 flashes per year (equivalently less than one (1) flash per year). IIFP 

structures, equipment and associated power systems will be designed and built with heavy grounding 

and/or lightning protection to handle lightning strikes. 

1.3.2.6 Floods 

The site is located in an area which does not fall within a mapped 100 year or 500 year flood plain and 

has a semi-arid climate with an average rainfall of twelve (12) to slightly less than sixteen (16) inches per 

year as recorded for Hobbs city (15.93 in/yr), Hobbs airport (12.35 in/yr), Pearl, NM (13.91 in/yr) and 

Roswell, NM (14.66 in/yr). This information was obtained from the Western Regional Climate Center 

(WRCC) website. 

Since there is no significant body of water or river within several miles of the site, it is expected that any 

flooding would be due to extreme short-term precipitation which could result in flash flooding (See 

assessment discussion below). According to information obtained from NOAA National Climate Data 

Center Storm Events, there have been sixty-eight (68) flood events in Lea County, New Mexico between 

1/1/1950 and 2/28/2010, an average of approximately one per year. Of these sixty-eight (68) events, there 

were no deaths reported, and property damage was reported for only fourteen (14) of the events, all of 

which occurred in the cities and towns of Lea County. Twenty-nine (29) of the sixty-eight (68) events 

were reported for Hobbs which is located at an elevation from 125 to 170 feet lower than the site and 

approximately 11.4 miles to the east. The Hobbs airport is at an elevation of about 125 feet lower and 

some 6.9 miles southeast of the site, and it is also in Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 

Zone D and unmapped. 

The IIFP property would likely receive some drainage from New Mexico Highway 483 on the west and 

possibly from the north as parts of these areas are at slightly higher elevations than the facility location. 

However, site topography indicates that water would naturally drain away from the property toward the 

east and south as gradual but significant elevation declines occur in those directions for several miles. 

A preliminary flood hazard assessment for the IIFP Facility was performed using DOE documents DOESTD-1020-2002, DOE-STD-1022-2002 and DOE-STD-1023-95 (DOE, 2002b). For the IIFP Facility, a 

Performance Category-3 (PC-3) facility classification, as defined by the referenced DOE documents, was 

used. From that assessment, IIFP determined that a comprehensive flood hazard assessment is not 

required. Preliminary screening indicates that flooding is not a design basis event other than in 

consideration of storm water runoff. A summary of the preliminary flood hazard assessment is discussed 

below. 

In accordance with DOE-1020-2002 Table 4-1 "Flood Criteria Summary", the Mean Hazard Annual 

Probability (MHAP) for Performance Category PC-3 is 1 x 10-4. The preliminary screening analysis was 

performed with a MHAP of 1 x 10-4 as a minimum. 

A. A preliminary screening for the potential of river flooding of the IIFP Facility site reveals that the 

nearest river (Pecos River) is approximately fifty (50) miles south and southwest from and 700 

feet in elevation below the IIFP Facility site at its nearest point. Based upon this information, the 

potential for river flooding is screened out as a potential source of flooding of the IIFP Facility 

site. 

B. A preliminary screening for the potential of flooding of the IIFP Facility site from a dam failure 

reveals that the nearest dam is Brantley Dam forming Brantley Lake and Lake McMillan. 
SA-IFP-001 Revision B IIFP Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) Summary December 28, 2011 

 Page | 1-17

Brantley Dam is located on the Pecos River approximately sixty-one (61) miles northeast and 

approximately 550 ft below the elevation of the IIFP Facility site. Avalon Dam forming a smaller 

Lake Avalon is located on the Pecos River approximately 66 miles east of and 630 feet in 

elevation below the IIFP Facility site. No other dams or significant bodies of water are located 

within approximately 300 miles of the IIFP Facility site. Therefore, flooding from lakes (storm 

surge, wave action seiche) or from the breaching of dams is screened out as a potential source of 

flooding of the IIFP Facility site. 

C. The IIFP Facility site is approximately 500 miles north of and 3800 feet in elevation above the 

Gulf of Mexico; therefore, storm surges, wave action, seiche or tide effects from hurricanes or 

squall lines from ocean waters is screened out as a source of flooding of the IIFP Facility site. 

D. The IIFP Facility site, being approximately 500 miles north of and 3,800 feet in elevation above 

the Gulf of Mexico, is not subject to Tsunami or tide effects. 

E. As a result of the preliminary screening analysis detailed above, it is determined that the only 

flooding hazard applicable to the IIFP Facility site is storm water runoff from a design basis rain 

event. 

All-season precipitation estimates for the IIFP Site are provided by the National Weather Service (NWS) 

and the NOAA in the “Point Precipitation Frequency Atlas of the United States, NOAA Atlas 14 (Bonnin, 

2011) and its associated database. Using a linear least-squares regression procedure to extrapolate 

NOAA’s precipitation estimates to an average recurrence interval of 100,000 years, it was determined that 

the 1-hour, 24-hour and 48-hour all-season precipitation estimates for 1.0 x 10-5 annual probability are 7.2 

inches, 14.4 inches and 17.0 inches respectively. 

The 40-acre IIFP Facility site is within a 640-acre section of land adjacent to and just east of NM 

Highway 483 and about one (1) mile north of U.S. Highway 62/180. The general slope of the terrain in 

this area is from northwest to southeast. The natural lie of the terrain allows only limited rainwater from 

the northwest (approximately 16.1 acres) to flow over the site in the vicinity of the process buildings. 

Most rainwater is naturally diverted via low areas to the southwest and to the northeast around the 40-acre 

site. 

The slope of run-on to the 40-acre site from the northwest is approximately 0.21%. The slope of the runoff to the northeast is approximately 0.46%, to the southeast is approximately 0.35% and to the southwest 

is approximately 0.38%. Thus the site is naturally self-draining thereby preventing “ponding” or 

accumulation of water except in two small playas (depressions) located near the west boundary. 

According to drainage evaluations (GL, 2010), once drainage is diverted around the IIFP Facility site, the 

terrain tends to drain toward the southeast to a collection playa approximately eight (8) miles away at an 

elevation approximately 225 feet lower than the site of the IIFP Facility. Detailed civil engineering design 

and surveys have not yet been performed. However, the drainage for the area surrounding the 40-acre 

conceptual design IIFP Facility was evaluated using general contours of the area. The contours show that 

the natural drainage in the area promotes constant flow across the site with highly unlikely potential for 

accumulated flooding. Using the general contours evaluation for the conceptual design facility land area 

and assuming no credit for site grading or storm water sewer installation, a maximum design basis flood 

level (DBFL) affecting the process buildings is estimated to be 4.8 inches from a 7.2 inch/hour 1.0 x 10-5 

precipitation event (Bonnin, 2011). This evaluation considered the 1-hour, 24-hour and 48-hour all-season 

precipitation estimates for 1.0 x 10-5 annual probability (7.2 inches, 14.4 inches and 17.0 inches, 

respectively) using the probable maximum area of 16.1 acres of rainfall that might affect the process 

buildings and a slope of run-on (.00207 ft/ft) to the site from the 16.1 acres. The DBFL will be verified 
SA-IFP-001 Revision B IIFP Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) Summary December 28, 2011 

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after the IIFP Facility site detailed civil engineering survey is completed and prior to determination of site 

drainage grade requirements and design of building, roads and infrastructure. 

Due to the natural drainage of the area and the planned site grading and drainage system, it is reasonable 

to predict that rainwater from a design basis rain event will not flood the IIFP Facility site but that any 

rainwater entering the site and that does not percolate into the soil will flow over and off the site.

Based upon the above precipitation estimates for the site and preliminary calculations performed as part 

of the prescreening flood hazard assessment, the effect of extreme precipitation of short duration on 

process buildings and IROFS structures, systems and components (SSCs) at the IIFP Facility is minimal. 

In the area north and northwest of the developed site, the terrain will be contoured to divert run-on around 

the site so that only the precipitation that falls on the developed portion of the site will affect facility 

design. The site storm sewer system will be designed for a 4-inch, 1 hour maximum rain event slightly 

above the 3.2 inch, one (1) hour rain event with a 1.0 x 10-2 annual probability as published in NOAA 

Atlas 14, however the storm sewer system will not be relied on or credited for protection against a design 

basis flood event. Buildings and structures containing IROFS structures, systems and components will be 

constructed a minimum of six inches above grade level and above the level of plant roadways in order to 

physically remove (elevate) them from potential floodwater. Process buildings and structures will be 

provided with curbing a minimum of twelve (12) inches in height in order to prevent internal spills (in 

such an event) from leaving the structure, and this curbing although not credited in the DBFL analysis 

also serves as flood barriers for those structures. 

1.3.2.7 Snow 

The mean annual snowfall is 5.1 inches as recorded at the Hobbs weather station with a high annual total 

of 27.1 inches. The historical maximum snow depth for Hobbs, NM is 12.2 inches, and it occurred during 

the month of November. The 2-day 100-year snowfall is 12.1 inches which also occurred in November. 

The design basis extreme environmental “ground” snow load for the IIFP Site is 96.7 lb/ft2 or 472.5 

kg/m2

. This design basis ground snow load is calculated as the sum of the 100-year return period 

snowpack and the load corresponding to the 48-hour all-season precipitation and an annual probability of 

1.0 x 10-5 for the facility site. The method of determination follows acceptable methodology discussed in 

NRC NUREG-1951(NRC, 2010b). The roofs of all process buildings (involving or affecting licensed 

materials) at the IIFP Facility site will be sloped at a minimum of 5/12 or 22.6 degrees. Using the method 

described in American Society of Civil Engineers Standard 7-05 “Minimum Design Loads for Buildings 

and Other Structures” (ASCE 7-05) to convert the ground snow load into a “roof” snow load, the design 

basis extreme environmental “roof” snow load for the buildings on the IIFP Facility is 81.2 lb/ft2

 (396.8 

kg/m2

). This calculation assumes no runoff of snow or rain notwithstanding that roofs of IIFP process 

buildings (involving or affecting licensed materials) are sloped. This load represents the extreme roof 

snow load for the purpose of building design. 

IIFP used the data collected by the WRCC for the Hobbs, New Mexico area to determine that the 100-

year snowpack was 12.2 inches resulting in a normal (severe) design basis ground snow load of 8.4 lb/ft2

(41.0 kg/m2

) (NRC, 2010b). Since essentially 100 years of snowpack data was available for the area, no 

calculation or extrapolation of the data was necessary. 

All-season precipitation estimates for the IIFP Site are provided by the National Weather Service and the 

NOAA in the “Point Precipitation Frequency Atlas of the United States, NOAA Atlas 14 (Bonnin, 2011) 

and supersedes the “Two-to-Ten Day Precipitation for Return Periods of 2 to 100 Years in the 

Contiguous United States”, 1964 and its associated data base. 

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1.4 Hydrology 

This section describes the IIFP Site's surface water and groundwater resources. Data are provided for the 

IIFP Site and its general area and the regional associations of those natural water systems are described. 

This information provides the basis for evaluation of any potential facility impacts on surface water, 

groundwater, aquifers, use of water and water quality. Subsections address surface hydrology, water 

quality, preexisting environmental conditions, water rights and resources, water use, contamination 

sources and groundwater characteristics. 

1.4.1 Characteristics of Nearby Rivers, Streams and Other Bodies of Water 

Surface drainage at the site is contained within two local playas that have no external drainage. There is 

also a small stream that runs from northwest to southeast across the property that would be predominantly 

dry during the year. Essentially all the precipitation that occurs at the site is subject to infiltration and/or 

evapotranspiration. More information on the movement and fate of surface water and groundwater at the 

site is provided in the IIFP ER, Revision B. There are also several intermittent surface features in the 

vicinity of the IIFP Site that may collect water for short periods of times following heavy rainfall events. 

The climate in southeast New Mexico is semi-arid. Precipitation in the IIFP area averages only 30 to 40 

cm/yr (12 to 16 in/yr). Evaporation and transpiration rates are high which results in minimal, if any, 

surface water occurrence or groundwater recharge. 

Runoff does not drain to one of the state’s major rivers. Surface water is lost through evaporation, 

resulting in high salinity conditions in the waters and soils associated with the playas. These conditions 

are not favorable for the development of viable aquatic or riparian habitats. There is no designated FEMA 

Zone A area for the IIFP Site. The site is located in an area which does not fall within a mapped 100 year 

or 500 year flood plain. 

1.4.2 Depth to the Groundwater Table 

The Ogallala Aquifer underground reservoir system depth varies from actual surface discharge to over 

150 meters (500 feet). Generally the Aquifer is found from fifteen (15) to ninety (90) meters (50 to 300 

feet) below the land surface (WE, 2012). More specifically for the IIFP Site, a drill log of an Xcel 

Energy, Maddox Facility water supply well (M3) located in Section 27 indicates the Ogallala Formation 

was encountered from 30 to 155 feet below the ground surface (bgs). Initial depth to groundwater in M3 

was 55 feet when completed in 1965. Three (3) Xcel Energy, Cunningham Facility monitoring wells are 

located along a north-south axis close to the western boundary of Section 27 and have been monitored for 

depth to groundwater (DTGW) as recently as November of 2009. DWGT within these wells ranges from 

59 feet to 67 feet bgs. (GL, 2010) The site region has semi-arid climate with low precipitation rates and 

minimal surface water occurrence. Thus, the potential for negative impacts on those water resources are 

very low due to lack of water presence and formidable natural barriers to any surface or subsurface water 

occurrences. It is highly unlikely that groundwater at the site would be impacted by any potential releases 

because of the dikes, curbs, collection basins, spill controls and water discharge controls provided in the 

process areas. 
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1.4.3 Groundwater Hydrology 

The IIFP Site is located west of the Llano Estacado caprock and east of the Pecos River in southeastern 

New Mexico. The Llano Estacado surface is underlain by the Ogallala Formation, which is composed of 

fluvial gravels exposed at the base with thicker eolian fine sand above. It is capped by the Caprock, a 3-m 

(9-ft) thick calcrete that is the resistant layer upon which the Llano Estacado if formed. 

The surface geology is dominated by erosion that has exposed the upper weathered surface of the 

Caprock. Bioturbation of site sediments by rodents and insects may be severe. In some places, young 

deposits are present that include slope-wash sediments along the margins of playas and eolian sand 

deposits on the leeward (east) side of playas. Thin eolian deposits also occur along the northern edge of 

the southern lobe of the Llano, the sand derived from the Mescalero Plain. The draws across some areas 

of the Llano are old drainages filled with Holocene-age sediment. 

Most precipitation is contained onsite due to infiltration and/or evapotranspiration. The vegetation on the 

site is primarily shrubs and native grasses. The surface soils are predominantly of an alluvial or eolian 

origin. The texture of the surface soils is generally silt or silt-like sands. Therefore, the surface soils are 

relatively low in permeability, and would tend to hold moisture in storage rather than allow rapid 

infiltration to depth. Water held in storage in the soil is subsequently subject to evapotranspiration. 

Evapotranspiration processes are significant enough to short-circuit any potential groundwater recharge. 

1.4.4 Characteristics of the Uppermost Aquifer 

The Ogallala Aquifer, also known as the High Plains Aquifer, is a huge underground reservoir created 

millions of years ago that supplies water to the region which includes the IIFP Site. The aquifer extends 

under the High Plains from west of the Mississippi River to the east of the Rocky Mountains. The aquifer 

system underlies 174,000 square miles in parts of eight States (Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska, New 

Mexico, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas and Wyoming). 

1.4.5 Design Basis Flood Events Used for Accident Analysis 

The IIFP Site has not been mapped and does not lie within areas that have been mapped and that are in 

the 100-year or 500-yer flood-plain in and around Hobbs, New Mexico according to information provided 

in the FEMA Mapping Information Platform. A detailed discussion of the IIFP flood hazard assessment is 

provided above in Subsection 1.3.2.6. The likelihood of any major flood at the plant site is determined to 

be low and the consequences are limited (due to no fissile material existing at the site). Thus, flood type 

accidents are not a significant risk for facility operations. 

1.5 Geology and Seismology 

This section describes the geology and seismology at the New Mexico site, including soil characteristics, 

earthquake magnitudes and return periods and other geologic hazards. 

1.5.1 Characteristics of Soil Types and Bedrock 

The IIFP Site is located west of the Llano Estacado caprock and east of the Pecos River in southeastern 

New Mexico. Pecos Plains section is characterized by its more irregular erosion topographic expression. 

The boundary between the two (2) sections is locally referred to as Mescalero Ridge. In southern Lea 

County, Mescalero Ridge is an irregular erosion topographic feature with a relief of about 9.1 to 15.2 m 

(30 to 50 ft) compared with a nearly vertical cliff and relief of approximately 45.7 m (150 ft) in 

Northwestern Lea County. The lower relief of the ridge in the southeastern part of the county is due to 
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partial cover by wind-deposited sand. The dominant geologic feature of this region is the Permian Basin. 

The Permian Basin is a massive subsurface bedrock structure that has a downward flexure of a large 

thickness of originally flat-lying, bedded, sedimentary rock. The Permian Basin extends to 4,880 m 

(16,000 ft) below mean sea level. The IIFP Site is located within the Central Basin Platform area. The 

Central Basin Platform divides the Permian Basin into the Midland and Delaware sub-basins. The top of 

the Permian deposits are approximately 434 m (1425 ft) below ground surface at the proposed IIFP Site. 

Overlying the Permian are the sedimentary rocks of the Triassic Age Dockum Group. 

The upper formation of the Dockum Group is the Chinle Formation, a tight claystone and silty clay layer. 

The Chinle Formation is regionally extensive with outcrops as far away as the Grand Canyon region in 

Arizona. In the vicinity of the site, the Chinle Formation consists of red, purple and greenish micaceous 

claystone and siltstone with interbedded fine-grained sandstone. The Chinle (also known as Red Bed) 

Formation is overlain by Tertiary Ogallala, Gatuna, or Antlers Formations (alluvial deposits). Caliche is a 

partly indurate zone of calcium carbonate deposits accumulation formed in the upper layer of surficial 

deposits. Soft caliche is interbedded with the alluvial deposits near the surface. 

1.5.2 Earthquake Magnitudes and Return Periods 

Seismic activity in southeastern New Mexico is uncommon; however one of the most recent major 

earthquakes (moment magnitude of > 4.5 on the Modified Mercalli-Revised 1931 scale) in New Mexico 

occurred south of Eunice in January, 1992. The earthquake was 5.0 on the Modified Mercalli (Md) scale 

with its epicenter at 32.3 degrees North and 103.2 degrees West (Sanford, 2002). The Hobbs Site is in a 

seismically quiet region, with nearby earthquakes being of relatively small (< 2.0 Md) magnitude. No 

Quaternary fault or fold, thought to be associated with most earthquakes of moment magnitude 6 or 

greater over the last 1.6 million years, exists in the southeast New Mexico/west Texas region (Yarger, 

2009). The nearest recent faulting is situated more than 161 km (100 mi) west of the site. 

The New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology has generated probabilistic seismic hazard 

estimates for different magnitude of earthquakes. Figure 1-3 and Figure 1-4 show horizontal peak ground 

acceleration (g) for an earthquake (Md) of 6 in New Mexico (10% probability of exceedance in a 50-year 

period) (Yarger, 2009). 

Probabilistic ground motion for the site area is shown in Table 1-3. Seismic activity is well documented 

as the result of licensing activities of the uranium enrichment facility located near Eunice, New Mexico 

and the extensive network of seismometers established for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility 

near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The Peak Horizontal Ground Acceleration (pga) for a 1,000 and 2,500 year 

return is 0.05g and 0.1g respectively (USGS, 2002), as shown in Table 1-3. 

Seismic activity in southeastern New Mexico is typically of small magnitude and generally caused by oil 

field injection activities. However, one of the most recent major earthquakes (moment magnitude of > 4.5 

on the Modified Mercalli-Revised 1931 scale) in New Mexico occurred south of Eunice in January 1992. 

The earthquake was 5.0 on the Modified Mercalli (Md) scale with its epicenter at 32.3 degrees North and 

103.2 degrees West (Yarger, 2009). 

1.5.3 Other Geologic Hazards 

No other geological hazards are known to exist at the IIFP Plant site. There are no known abandoned oil 

or gas wells on the 40-acre plant site, but as part of the civil engineering work for the facility reviews with 

the State will be conducted for the entire 640-acre Section of property to ensure such wells have been 

plugged or closed in accordance with State of New Mexico requirements. 
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 Source: Adapted from (Lin, 1996) 

 Figure 1-3 New Mexico Seismic Hazard for a Moment Magnitude (Md) 6 Earthquake 

 Source: (Yarger, 2009) 

Figure 1-4 Lea County Seismic Hazard for a Moment Magnitude (Md) 6 Earthquake
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Table 1-3 Seismic Criteria for IIFP Site 

Parameter 

Return Period, T 

500 years 1000 years 2500 years 

P* 0.002 (0.2%) 0.001 (0.1%) 0.0004 (0.04%) 

EP** 0.1 (10%) 0.05 (5%) 0.02 (2%) 

n*** 50 years 50 years 50 years 

Peak Ground Acceleration 0.03g (Weber, 2008) 0.05g (USGS, 2002) 0.11g (USGS, 2002) 

*P=1/T, **EP=1-(1-P)n, ***n=50 years 

1.5.4 Geotechnical and Geophysical Investigation and Analysis 

A preliminary geotechnical and geophysical investigation and analysis plan has been developed to 

determine the site class, seismic site response, liquefaction potential, soil settlement potential and 

allowable bearing capacity of the soil for the IIFP Facility site. Details of the analysis plan and the codes 

and standards to be followed are provided below. 

The proposed scope of the IIFP Facility geotechnical investigation, including the planned tests and their 

use for determining soil parameters, is as follows: 

• Perform pathfinder surveys for determination of essential settlement parameters with dilatometer 

soundings to 150 feet of depth or blade thrust refusal load of 25 tons 

• Perform pathfinder surveys for determination of approximate small strain seismic data and large 

strain shear strength data with Seismic Cone Penetration Test soundings to 150 feet of depth or 

cone thrust refusal load of 25 tons 

• Perform critical determination of small strain seismic shear modulus and Poisson Ratio data with 

Cross-hole Seismic Tests to depths of 150 feet or so depending on the requirements as defined by 

the Engineering use of the individual buildings and geology determined by the dilatometer and 

seismic cone penetration test soundings 

• Perform drilling and borings in select locations, based on data from dilatometer and Seismic Cone 

Penetration Test soundings, including Standard Penetration Test borings, to 150 feet of depth 

• Perform soil sampling in Standard Penetration boreholes to obtain disturbed and undisturbed soil 

samples 

• Perform auger borings to 15 feet of depth and obtain bulk disturbed soil samples 

The proposed drilling and boring location guidelines are as follows: 

• Structures: 1 boring for every 2500 square feet 

• Pier foundations: 1 boring for every pier 

• Roads: 1 boring for every 500 feet 

Geotechnical Standards under which activities and tests will be performed in accordance with American 

Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) standards. See LA, Revision B Chapter 3 “Integrated Safety

Analysis” Section 3.1.5.3 “Geotechnical and Geophysical Codes and Standards” for applicable ASTM 

Standards.
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1.6 References 

ASCE, 2006 American Society of Civil Engineers, ASCE 7-05, “Minimum Design Loads for 

Buildings and Other Structures: SEI/ASCE 7-05 (ASCE Standard),” 2006 

GL, 2010 GL Environmental, “Existing Groundwater Conditions in Section 27, Township 18 

South, Range 36 East,” 2010. 

DOE, 2002 U.S. Department of Energy, DOE STD-1020-2002, “Natural Phenomena Hazards 

Design and Evaluation Criteria for Department of Energy Facilities,” Washington, 

D.C., 2002. DOE, 2002a Standard 1022-94, reaffirmed 2002, “Natural 

Phenonema Hazards Site Characterization Criteria,” 2002. 

DOE, 2002b Standard 1023-95, “Natural Phenomena Hazards Assesssments Criteria,” reaffirmed, 

2002. 

DOE, 2003 DOE/WIPP-95-2065, Revision 7, “Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Contact-Handled (CH) 

Waste Safety Analysis Report,” 2003. 

Lin, K. W., 1996 "Probabilistic Seismic Hazard of the Socorro, New Mexico Area of the Rio Grande 

Rift." Geophysics Open-File Report 82 . Socorro, NM: Geophysical Research Center 

and Earth and Environmental Science Department, New Mexico Institute of Mining 

and Technology, 1996. 

NMCBC, 2009 New Mexico Commercial Building Code, Chapter 7, Part 2, 2009. 

NRC, 1978 Regulatory Guide 1.91, "Evaluation of Explosions Postulated to Occur on 

Transportation Routes Near Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, 1978. 

NRC, 2005 "Safety Evaluation Report for the National Enrichment Facility in Lea County, New 

Mexico," Louisiana Energy Services, NUREG-1827, 2005. 

NRC, 2007b NUREG/CR 4461, Revision 2, "Tornado Climatology of the Continguous United 

States, 2007. 

NRC, 2010 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulation NUREG-1520, Revision 1. 

"Standard Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility," 

2010. 

NRC, 2010a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Standard Review Plan (SRP) NUREG-0800 

Section 3.5.1.6, “Aircraft Hazards,” Washington, DC, 2010 

NRC, 2010b U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1951 “Safety Evaluation Report for 

the Eagle Rock Enrichment Facility in Bonneville County, Idaho, AREVA 

Enrichment Services LLC”, Pages 1-23 to 1-25, Washington, DC, 2010. 

Sanford, A. R., Earthquake Catalogs for New Mexico and Bordering Areas: 1869-1998. Circular 

2002, 210. Socorro, NM: New Mexico Bureau of Geology and Mineral Resources, 

2002. 
SA-IFP-001 Revision B IIFP Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) Summary December 28, 2011 

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USGS, 2002 U.S. Geological Survey, U.S. Department of the Interior "National Seismic Hazard 

Mapping Project," Washington, DC, 2002. 

WE, 2012 Water Encyclopedia Science and Issues website, "Ogallala Aquifer, " 2012. 

Weber, 2008 Neil Weber & Associates, "Regional Seismological Evaluation," Hobbs, New 

Mexico, 2008. 

Yarger, F., 2009 "Seismic Probability in Lea County, NM: A Brief Analysis," New Mexico Institute of 

 Mining and Technology, New Mexico Center for Energy Policy, 2009. 
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2 FACILITY DESCRIPTION 

The IIFP Plant is an integrated facility consisting of multiple chemical processes. There are two (2) main 

chemical process buildings: the Depleted Uranium Tetrafluoride (DUF4) Process Building and the 

Fluorine Extraction Process (FEP) Building. Three (3) other process buildings support the main 

processes. 

In the DUF4 Process Building, depleted uranium hexafluoride is reacted with relatively small amounts of 

gaseous hydrogen and converted to DUF4 powder and gaseous anhydrous hydrogen fluoride (AHF) that is 

then condensed and collected as a liquid. The DUF6, in solid form, is received from suppliers (customers) 

in cylinders; temporarily stored; and transported to the DUF6 Autoclave Building where the cylinder 

contents are vaporized in a containment-type autoclave and fed into the DUF4 reaction vessel to be 

reacted with gaseous hydrogen. The resulting intermediate product DUF4 is sent to the FEP Process 

Building for use as a raw material in making high purity fluoride gas products, such as silicon 

tetrafluoride (SiF4) and boron trifluoride (BF3). The by-product AHF, generated in the DUF4 Building, is 

temporarily stored and sold to customers. 

In the FEP Process Building, DUF4 is reacted with diboron trioxide, also referred to as boric oxide 

(B2O3), or with silicon dioxide (SiO2) to produce the products BF3 or SiF4, respectively. The products are 

collected, packaged and sold as high-purity compressed gases. 

The remainder of the IIFP Facility supports the two (2) main processes, including functions of: 1) 

rendering materials suitable for reaction in the processes, 2) storing, transferring, packaging, performing 

analyses, and shipping, 3) treating waste effluents, 4) ensuring safe operations, 5) providing utilities, 6) 

maintaining the facility and equipment and 7) accommodating plant staff. 

The facility is to be built on an approximate 40-acre tract located within a 640-acre square area as shown 

in Figure 2-1. A larger and more legible engineering drawing (number 100-C-0001 Revision F) showing 

Figure 2-1 is available in the IIFP License Application “Engineering Drawing Package” that is part of the 

license application documentation submitted to the NRC. This 640-acre area is located in Township 185, 

Range 36E Section 27 in Lea County, New Mexico. The southwest corner of Section 27 is located about 

one mile north of the intersection of Highway 62 and Highway 483. The 40-acre site is strategically 

located inside the 640-acre area to avoid existing underground electric and utility lines. 

The entire 40-acre site Controlled Area (CA) as defined in the IIFP LA, Revision B Chapter 1 “General 

Information” is surrounded by a security fence with a surveillance road just inside the fence. Pole 

mounted security lighting is installed around the entire perimeter of the security fence. 

2.1 Overview of Facility Site 

The entrance to the facility is from the west via a paved road (approximately 3/4 mile) that intersects with 

Highway 483. The entrance road terminates at the main security gate of the facility just outside the 40-

acre site. 

Just outside the main gate and to the north is the paved and striped parking lot. The lot provides parking 

for employees and visitors and has marked handicap spaces. 
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 Figure 2-1 IIFP Facility 40-acre Site Plan 

Security Related Information Withhold From Public Disclosure In Accordance With 10 CFR §2.390
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Located just inside the main security gate is the Guard Station from which the main security gate and the 

entrance road inside the gate are controlled to prevent unauthorized entry. Concrete filled pipe bollards 

are anchored several feet into the ground and are located for a distance from the main gate entrance to 

provide a vehicle control barrier just inside the plant fence to prevent the diversion of vehicles around this 

barrier. This arrangement provides a corridor for vehicle control and inspection. The main entrance road 

is configured such that vehicles are hindered from high speed acceleration upon approach to the gate area. 

All vehicles entering the plant require authorization by the guard staff prior to entry. Trucks and other 

vehicles that require entrance to the facility beyond the Administrative Building are checked and logged 

at the Guard House and need-of-entry is verified in accordance with plant access and security procedures. 

Upon leaving the plant, trucks and other vehicles are visually checked and logged at the Guard House 

prior to exiting the main gate. 

The inside-plant road begins at the main security gate and continues in an easterly direction where it 

divides into an intersection with two (2) access roads, one (1) heading north and the other heading south. 

These roads surround the process areas of the facility and eventually meet to form a loop, thereby 

allowing access around the facility in either direction. The loop formed by the road is approximately 700 

feet long (north to south) by 400 feet wide (east to west). For descriptive purposes, the four (4) sections 

of the road loop are designated as the North, South, East and West Roads, so named by their proximities 

to the North, South, East and West boundaries of the 40-acre Facility site. Beyond the main gate, a 

vehicle control barrier is installed coupled with bollards along each side of the inside-plant road extending 

from the main gate to the vehicle control barrier. This barrier is controlled by the guard staff to prevent 

vehicle movement inside the facility pending inspection and authorization by the guard staff. 

The Administrative Building with a change/locker area is located just inside the security fence north of 

the Guard House and east of the parking lot. An access-control station at the security fence allows 

entrance into the plant area leading to the Administrative Building or the change/locker entrance. The 

exit door from the change/locker area and Administrative Building connects with a concrete walkway 

leading to the process area of the facility. The visitor control area at the Guard House can be accessed 

directly from the parking lot. Upon authorization, visitors may then enter the facility via the 

Administrative Building and associated walkways. 

Just south of the intersection of the West and South Roads is the reinforced concrete Full DUF6 Cylinder 

Storage Pad. This pad is used to stage full DUF6 cylinders until moved to the DUF6 Autoclave Building 

for processing. The full cylinder pad is further described in Section 2.4.14 below. 

Approximately 150 ft east of the intersection of the East and South Roads is the Empty DUF6 Cylinder 

Storage Pad. This pad is used to contain empty DUF6 cylinders for cool down and staging in preparation 

for shipment from the facility. An access security fence is installed around the entire perimeter of the 

empty cylinder pad with one entrance opening with clearance for the cylinder hauler to maneuver. The 

pad is described in more detail in Section 2.4.15 below. 

Full DUF6 cylinders are unloaded from trucks and moved as needed into and out of the full cylinder 

storage pad area using a cylinder hauler vehicle. The same hauler is used to move full cylinders from the 

storage pad to just outside the DUF6 Autoclave Building. Emptied cylinders are loaded onto trucks using 

the cylinder hauler. The hauler may also be used to move empty cylinders that are outside the DUF6

Autoclave Building to the Empty DUF6 Cylinder Storage Pad. 

The cylinder hauler is a diesel-powered vehicle with several features that reduce the risk of a diesel-fuel 

fire. Instead of a conventional fuel tank, a safety fuel cell tank configuration will be provided for the 

hauler vehicle diesel fuel storage. The safety diesel fuel cell tank will be designed with a robust steel 
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outer layer and an impact resistant inner container filled with foam-cell baffling. The puncture and impact 

resistant inner layer provides primary containment for the fuel. The outer (secondary) container 

minimizes the risk of fuel leaking and forming a pool of combustible fuel in the event the inner 

containment device fails. Finally, the combined onboard storage capacity of the safety fuel cell tank(s) 

will be limited to less than seventy-four (74) gallons. 

The cylinder hauler will also be equipped with a fire suppression system that includes multiple sensors 

and discharge heads strategically located at positions where fire ignition is more likely to occur (motor, 

muffler, battery, etc). The onboard fire suppression system will reduce the potential for a cylinder hauler 

fuel fire. 

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Centered inside the paved road loop are the main process related buildings and equipment including the 

DUF6 Autoclave Building, DUF4 Process Building, DUF4 Container Staging Building, Decontamination 

Building, FEP Process Building, FEP Oxide Staging Building, DUF4 Container Storage Building, FEP 

Product Storage and Packaging Building, AHF Staging Containment Building, Fluoride Products Trailer 

Loading Building, B2O3 Storage Silo, the Potassium Hydroxide (KOH) Scrubbing System including the 

storage tank, process off-gas scrubbers and scrubber containment pads. All the building area aprons and 

areas around the outside equipment, such as the scrubber systems, have concrete curbing or concrete 

dikes that are adequately designed with a margin of safety to contain and control the single-largest 

container of liquid in the respective area in the event a spill occurs. Pad areas and dikes that serve areas 

containing equipment with potentially hazardous or corrosive chemicals are coated or sealed and 

maintained to prevent leakage through the pad or wall surfaces and joints. Those pad and dike areas are 

also designed with a containment volume with a design margin for the single-largest container volume in 

the respective area. Pumps, including an appropriate number of redundant pumps, are installed inside the 

contained dike areas to transfer liquors to the Environmental Protection Process (EPP) or other 

appropriate collection or treatment equipment. Controls are provided for detection, alarm and notification 

to the area Control Room for Operator response in event of a spill. Also, a second level of detection and 

control is provided to activate automatic pumping to the appropriate treatment facility if the first level of 

spill volume exceeds the alarm-response action. 
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Just north of the process area are located the Process Offices and Laboratory Building with scrubber and 

containment pad, closed-loop cooling tower, solar panels, Material Warehouse, Utilities Building and 

Main Switchgear Building. A truck access road is installed between the Utilities Building and the 

Material Warehouse loading dock. This access road connects with the North Road. 

Inside the intersection of the East and South Roads is located the Maintenance and Stores Building. 

Just east of the East Road are located two (2) above-ground Fire Water Tanks (100,000 gallons each) and 

the Fire Pump House. The Fire Pump House contains the main fire water pump, the back-up diesel fire 

water pump, jockey pump, piping and controls. The IIFP Facility fire protection system is described in 

Chapter 7 of the IIFP License Application, Revision B including the classification of individual buildings. 

2.2 Buildings and Associated Process Areas 

Table 2-1 is a listing of sizes of buildings located on site. 

Table 2-1 Estimated Building Sizes 

Building* 

*Areas where uranium is processed or stored 

are marked in “BOLD” print.” 

Dimensions, ft Approximate 

Area, ft2

Approximate 

Volume, ft3

Length Width 

Eave 

Height 

DUF6 Autoclave Building 

DUF4 Process Building 

DUF4 Container Storage Building 

DUF4 Container Staging Building 

Decontamination (Decon) Building 

FEP Process Building (SiF4 and BF3) 

FEP Oxide Staging Building 

FEP Product Gas Storage and Packaging Building 

AHF Staging Containment Building 

Fluoride Products Trailer Loading Building 

Maintenance and Stores Building 60 50 15 3,000 45,000 

EPP Building 40 30 18 1,200 21,600 

Utilities Building 50 50 18 2,500 45,000 

Material Warehouse 100 50 18 5,000 90,000 

Main Switchgear Building 50 40 18 2,000 36,000 

Fire Pump House 20 20 15 400 6,000 

Water Treatment Building 30 15 15 450 6750 

Process Offices 50 30 15 1,500 22,500 

Laboratory (small uranium samples handled) 30 30 15 900 13,500 

Administrative Building 80 50 15 4,000 60,000 

Guard House 25 20 10 500 5,000 
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2.3 Building Codes and Standards 

The design and construction of the on-site IIFP Facility buildings conform to applicable building codes 

and standards. The IIFP LA, Revision B Chapter 3 Section 3.15 provides a listing of applicable federal, 

state and local codes and standards that the DB contractor will use during the detailed design, 

construction and startup stage of the project to ensure adequate protection against natural phenomena, 

environmental conditions and dynamic effects. 

Table 2-2 is a listing of code conformance for buildings located on site based on NMCBC, 2009, National 

Fire Protection Association (NFPA)-13 (NFPA, 2010) and NFPA-101 (NFPA, 2009). 

Table 2-2 Code Construction Conformance 

Building 

Areas where uranium is processed are shown 

in “BOLD” print 

Code Construction Conformance 

NMCBC 

Class 

NMCBC 

Type 

Sprinkler Code, 

NFPA 13 Life Safety Code, NFPA 101 

DUF6 Autoclave Building H4 IIB ORD HAZ-GP2 SPECIAL PURPOSE IND 

DUF4 Process Building H4 IIB ORD HAZ-GP2 SPECIAL PURPOSE IND 

DUF4 Container Storage Building H4 IIB ORD HAZ-GP2 SPECIAL PURPOSE IND 

DUF4 Container Staging Building H4 IIB ORD HAZ-GP2 SPECIAL PURPOSE IND 

Decontamination (Decon) Building H4 IIB ORD HAZ-GP2 SPECIAL PURPOSE IND 

FEP Process Building (SiF4 and BF3) H4 IIB ORD HAZ-GP2 SPECIAL PURPOSE IND 

FEP Oxide Staging Building H4 IIB ORD HAZ-GP2 SPECIAL PURPOSE IND 

FEP Product Storage and Packaging Building H4 IIB ORD HAZ-GP2 INDUSTRIAL 

AHF Staging Containment Building H4 IB ORD HAZ-GP2 STORAGE 

Fluoride Products Trailer Loading Building H4 IB ORD HAZ-GP2 STORAGE 

Maintenance and Stores Building F1/S2 IIIB ORD HAZ-GP2 STORAGE-MIXED 

EPP Building H4 IIB ORD HAZ-GP2 STORAGE 

Utilities Building F1 IIB ORD HAZ-GP2 INDUSTRIAL 

Material Warehouse S2 IIB ORD HAZ-GP2 STORAGE 

Main Switchgear Building F2 IIB NOT SPKLR INDUSTRIAL 

Fire Pump House F1 IIB ORD HAZ-GP2 INDUSTRIAL 

Water Treatment Building F1 IIB ORD HAZ-GP2 INDUSTRIAL 

Process Offices B IIIB LGT HAZ BUSINESS-MIXED 

Laboratory (small uranium samples handled) B IIIB ORD HAZ-GP2 INDUSTRIAL-MIXED 

Administrative Building B IIIB LGT HAZ BUSINESS 

Guard House B IIIB LGT HAZ BUSINESS 
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2.4 Process Buildings and Areas 

The DUF6 Autoclave Building, DUF4 Process Building, DUF4 Container Storage Building, DUF4

Container Staging Building, Decontamination (Decon) Building, FEP Process Building (SiF4 and BF3), 

the FEP Oxide Staging Building, FEP Product Storage and Packaging Building and the EPP Building are 

of structural steel beam and column construction with metal wall panels and with Class 1 metal roofs. 

The first floor of each building is constructed of reinforced concrete with curbing to function as a 

containment barrier. 

The AHF Staging Containment Building and the Fluoride Products Trailer Loading Building are 

constructed of reinforced concrete floor slabs turned up to form containment barriers. The upper sections 

of these buildings are of concrete block construction with Class 1 metal roofs. 

Radiological boundary control hand-foot monitors are strategically located at building walkway exits of 

areas where licensed materials are handled. Fluoride and radiological detection systems, local alarms and 

alarm notification to Control Rooms are also strategically located in those building areas, where 

applicable. 

The process buildings are multi-story buildings where necessary to provide requirements for equipment 

space and to provide elevations for permitting gravity flow of particulate solids. The upper floors are 

configured such as to provide adequate room for equipment function and maintenance. The upper floor 

areas below equipment and piping containing powdered materials are constructed of reinforced concrete 

with curbing and seal coatings on floor and wall surfaces. Other upper floor areas of the buildings are 

constructed of metal grating or expanded metal flooring. 

Process Control Rooms are provided, including monitoring, recording, alarm notification and control 

instrumentation. During the detail design of Control Room alarms, displays, and control instrumentation, 

the design review (style guide) and the standards criteria developed from the Human Factors Engineering 

(HFE) Implementation Plan will be used as guidance for the design engineers in the consideration of 

human-system interfaces and human factors. The guidance will be developed prior to beginning detail 

design of affected Control Room instrumentation. The affected Control Room alarms, displays and 

control instrumentation will be determined from: 1) the reviews and evaluations of the IROFS, 2) the 

tasks that involve human interaction relative to IROFS functions and responses including development of 

written procedures and Operator aids, 3) the functional analysis of the IROFS structures, systems and 

components and how those functions involve human tasks in support or response of the function, 4) 

evaluation of the alarm, readout, display and instrumentation interface with the Operator for effective and 

accurate communications and 5) the consequences of human action responses relative to an IROFS SSC 

functionality. 

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See Table 2-2 for code construction classification requirements in accordance with the NMCBC-2009, 

NFPA 13-2010 and NFPA 101-2009. 

The process buildings are classified per NFPA 13-2010 as Ordinary Group 2 and are protected with 100 

percent coverage, wet-type fire protection sprinkler systems with Class 1 standpipes between floors in all 

exit stairways of multi-story buildings. 

2.4.1 DUF6 Autoclave Building 

The DUF6 Autoclave Building is 

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2.4.2 DUF4 Process Building 

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2.4.3 DUF4 Container Staging Building 

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2.4.4 Decontamination (Decon) Building 

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2.4.5 FEP Process Building 

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2.4.6 FEP Oxide Staging Building 

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2.4.7 DUF4 Container Storage Building 

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2.4.8 FEP Product Storage and Packaging Building 

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2.4.9 FEP Building Dock 

An elevated dock on the southeast side of the FEP Process Building provides access for truck loading for 

transporting oxide containers to licensed waste disposal facilities and for truck loading for shipping SiF4

and BF3 cylinders to customers. 

2.4.10 Plant Potassium Hydroxide Scrubbing System 

Two (2) three-stage, in-series KOH scrubbing lines (referred to as the Plant KOH Scrubbing System) are 

provided for the IIFP Facility. The KOH venturi-type (primary), packed tower (secondary) and coke box 

(tertiary) scrubbers and pumps; KOH tanks and associated equipment; and dike pad that serve primarily 
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the DUF4 process and pre-condensers from the SiF4 and BF3 processes are located outside and adjacent to 

the east side of the DUF4 Process Building. The KOH venturi-type (primary), packed tower (secondary), 

coke box (tertiary) scrubbers and pumps, KOH tanks and associated equipment and dike pad that serve 

primarily the SiF4 and BF3 processes are located outside and on the west side of the FEP Process 

Building. This configuration provides primary, secondary and tertiary treatment of the final effluents from 

the DUF4 and FEP processes prior to venting to the atmosphere through a common stack. This stack is 

monitored to measure for potential traces of fluorides or uranium in the vent gas. 

The spent liquors resulting from scrubbing the fluorides contain mainly potassium fluoride, water and 

some un-reacted KOH. The spent liquors are sent to the EPP Facility to regenerate the KOH liquid for 

recycle back to the scrubbing system. 

2.4.11 Treated Process Off-gas Vent Stacks 

There are a total of thirteen (13) main vent stacks at the IIFP Facility, excluding building ventilation 

exhausts, where either process related or combustion product gases or particulates are vented to the 

atmosphere. Prior to venting, the process related vent streams are filtered and/or scrubbed to ensure 

effective treatment within the established safety and environmental regulated control limits. Some of the 

vents where uranium and fluorides may be present are filtered or scrubbed through multi-stage equipment 

that is configured in series flow to ensure high removal efficiency. Of the thirteen (13) stacks there is one 

boiler vent stack where combustion products of natural gas primarily used in the production of steam are 

vented to the atmosphere and one Laboratory stack that vents via a scrubber. 

In areas where uranium particulate solids are handled or processed, such as depleted UF4 or depleted 

uranium oxides, dust capture and collection systems are provided. The dust collection systems are filtertype units that are used to remove the uranium material prior to discharging through vent stacks to the 

outside environment. 

Additional information that identifies each stack, heights, estimated vent flow rates and approximate 

location is provided in Section 3.1.10. 

2.4.12 Environmental Protection Process Building 

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The building equipment is used to treat fluoride bearing liquors for recycle and reuse in the plant 

processes. It houses the EPP control systems, rotary vacuum filter, dryer feed screw, dryer and discharge 

screw. Equipment for reacting lime with the fluoride bearing liquors includes the reaction tank, clarifier, 

pumps, regenerated KOH recycle tank, holding/feed tanks and associated equipment. This equipment is 

located outside the EPP Building and within the process dike area. 

 In this process, hydrated lime is reacted with spent KOH solution that is received from the Plant KOH 

Scrubbing System. The reaction results in regeneration of KOH and formation of calcium fluoride (CaF2). 

The solid particulate CaF2 is filtered and dried for shipment to customers or for disposal at an off-site 

licensed disposal facility. The regenerated KOH is pumped back to the Plant KOH Scrubbing System for 

reuse. 

2.4.13 AHF Staging Containment and Fluoride Products Trailer Loading Buildings 

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2.4.14 Full DUF6 Cylinder Storage Pad 

Cylinders containing solid DUF6 are received by truck from customers/suppliers in accordance with 

approved DOT shipping requirements. After following pre-unloading procedures for material 

accountability, cylinder inspection, shipping document verifications and IROFS requirements related to 

assay and weight verification, the cylinder is unloaded for temporary storage at the Full DUF6 Cylinder 

Storage Pad. This pad is used to stage full DUF6 cylinders for processing. Cylinders are moved by a 

special cylinder hauler to the DUF6 Autoclave Building as needed for feeding of contents to the DUF6-toDUF4 process. Protective anchored concrete-filled pipe bollards are installed around the perimeter of the 

cylinder pad in locations where a potential exposure to uncontrolled vehicle traffic exists. The pad is 

constructed of reinforced concrete and is approximately 175 feet wide by 200 feet long and is sized to 

store xxxxxxxx cylinders. The entire storage pad is curbed for storm water collection and is provided with 

underground drains connecting to the Cylinder Pad Storm Water Retention Basin located south of the 

cylinder pad. The surface and slope of the cylinder pad is designed to prevent any significant pooling of 

liquids. The pad is provided with saddles to space and support the cylinders. A full cylinder is placed in a 

saddle for temporary storage and full cylinders are never stacked. 
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2.4.15 Empty DUF6 Cylinder Storage Pad 

Approximately 150 ft east of the intersection of the East and South Roads is the Empty DUF6 Cylinder 

Storage Pad. This pad is used to stage empty DUF6 cylinders in preparation for shipment from the facility. 

A security fence is installed around the entire perimeter of the cylinder pad and has one entrance opening 

with clearance for the cylinder hauler to maneuver. The pad is constructed of reinforced concrete and is 

approximately 105 ft wide x 185 ft long with a layout footprint sized to contain up to forty (40) empty 

cylinders. The pad is provided with saddles to space and support the cylinders. Empty cylinders may be 

double stacked if necessary.

2.5 Non-Process Buildings

Buildings on-site that are not used to process, store or stage raw materials, products or by-products are of 

prefabricated metal construction with reinforced concrete slab floors, structural supports, metal siding and 

sloped metal standing seam roofs. Buildings of this type of construction include Maintenance and Stores 

Building, Material Warehouse, Utilities Building, Main Switchgear Building, Fire Pump House, Water 

Treatment Building, Process Offices and Laboratory, Administrative Building and Guard House. 

Interior partitions in office areas consist of metal studs with 5/8” sheetrock on both sides. Ceilings are 

acoustical tile “lay-in” type with grids on two (2) foot centers. All required means of egress are contained 

in fire barrier walls per NMCBC-2009 and NFPA 101-2009 requirements. 

2.5.1 Guard House 

The Guard House is located just inside the main gate and adjacent to the main entrance road. This 

building is used as the main security entrance for required traffic into and out of the facility and for visitor 

control. The Guard House contains security monitors and main gate controls. 

2.5.2 Administrative Building 

The Administrative Building houses the offices of personnel not directly involved in the production and 

maintenance functions of the facility. This building is accessed directly through the front door from the 

parking lot. The rear portion of this building is the Change/Locker Area with toilet facilities, showers and 

lockers. The main employee entrance and boundary control area are located on the west side of the 

Change/Locker Area. A turnstile with access controls is located at the security fence permitting employee 

entrance into the Controlled Area. 

2.5.3 Process Offices and Laboratory 

The Process Office Building is located adjacent to, and north of the DUF4 equipment access pad. This 

Building contains the offices for the process engineering, Environmental, Safety and Health (ESH) and 

plant management supervisory staff. The north side of this building contains the Laboratory used for 

analysis of raw materials, in-process materials, final product and discharge monitoring samples. The 

Laboratory is furnished with work benches, fume hoods, containment devices and exhaust systems with 

streams exiting to an outdoor scrubber on a containment pad just east of the Laboratory area. The 

Laboratory provides areas that receive, prepare and store various samples as follows: 

• Radiological Protection (Health Physics) Lab for calibration of instruments and radiological 

sample analysis 

• Chemical Laboratory for process and product sample analysis 

• Environmental Monitoring Lab for environmental sample analysis 
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2.5.4 Maintenance and Stores Building 

The Maintenance and Stores Building is located southeast of the Fluoride Products Trailer Loading 

Building. This building contains small tools, and maintenance supplies such as pipe and fittings, 

hardware, electrical parts and other small items required for maintenance of the facility. No raw, licensed, 

or in-process materials or finished products are stored in this building. Offices are provided for plant 

engineering, maintenance supervision and stores personnel. 

2.5.5 Material Warehouse 

The Material Warehouse is located just northeast of the Process Offices and Laboratory Building. This 

warehouse is used to receive and store such items as piping components, electrical conduit, wiring, 

equipment for capital construction projects and spare parts. Small quantities of chemicals such as paints, 

oils and cleaning agents are stored in the warehouse, but the quantities are limited to meet NMCBC-2009 

and NFPA 30-2008 (NFPA, 2008) requirements. No licensed, raw, or in-process materials or finished 

products are stored in this building. Part of the Material Warehouse is used for managing non-radioactive 

waste. This function is described in Subsection 9.2.2.1 Revision B, Chapter 9 “Environmental Protection” 

of the IIFP License Application. 

2.5.6 Utilities Building 

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This building contains the steam boiler and associated equipment and the plant air compressors. 

2.5.7 Main Switchgear Building 

The Main Switchgear Building 

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2.5.8 Fire Pump House 

The Fire Pump House 

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2.5.9 Water Treatment Building 

The Water Treatment Building is located east of the electrical utility substation and adjacent to the facility 

water wells. This building contains the domestic water storage tank, pumps, treatment system and 

controls required to furnish potable water for use throughout the facility.
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2.6 References 

NFPA, 2008 National Fire Protection Association NFPA, 30, “Flammable and Combustibles 

Liquids Code,” 2008 

NFPA, 2009 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 101, "Life Safety Code," Quincy, 

MA, 2009. 

NFPA, 2010 National Fire Protection Association NFPA 13, "Installation of Sprinkler 

Systems," Quincy, MA, 2010. 

NMCBC, 2009 New Mexico Commerical Building Code, Chapter 7, Building Codes General 

Part 2, 2009. 
SA-IFP-001 Revision B IIFP Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) Summary December 28, 2011 

Page | 3-1

3 PROCESSES, HAZARDS AND ACCIDENT SEQUENCES 

This section includes descriptions of each process system analyzed in the ISA, the hazards that were 

identified in the ISA and descriptions of the accident sequences. 

3.1 Process Descriptions 

This section provides additional detail about the processes of the IIFP Facility. The facility description is 

provided in Section 2. This facility: 1) de-converts DUF6 to DUF4, 2) utilizes the DUF4 as a raw material 

for producing fluorine products and 3) provides the infrastructure for supporting the processes. 

The process descriptions are based on the existing level of design detail, much of which is developed 

from: 1) engineering calculations and estimates, 2) known physical and chemical data derived from 

literature and 3) the plant equipment and system concepts obtained from knowledge of other similar 

processes and from some pilot plant tests. The design and process parameter data are subject to some 

changes as design detail progresses. The PHA and risk-based ISA reflect the safety design features and 

the prevention and mitigation measures developed and evaluated using the existing level of design. The 

ISA process provides the method for continuing review and analysis of design as it develops, becomes 

more detailed, or changes and requires updating of the ISA Summary. 

 IIFP is requesting an NRC license for a possession limit of 750,000 kg of depleted uranium. 

Additionally, IIFP has a written agreement with the State of New Mexico Environment Department 

(NMED) on maximum total limits of depleted uranium. Those limits are defined in the IIFP License 

Application, Revision B Chapter 1. 

The IIFP Plant has a de-conversion capacity of approximately eight (8) million pounds (3.4 to 3.7 million 

kg) per year (lb/yr) DUF6. From that de-converted DUF6, the plant will produce approximately 2-3 

million pounds (about 0.9-0.14 million kg) per year of extracted fluorine products and up to nearly one 

(1) million pounds (0.45 million kg) per year of AHF. These annual design capacities are provided only 

for general information. The facility actual production volumes of depleted uranium and fluoride products 

will be the quantities necessary to support routine operations and sales demand. 

The specific process descriptions are presented essentially in the order of material flow through the major 

processes: 

1. Receiving and feeding DUF6 into the plant process 

2. Returning empty DUF6 cylinders 

3. De-converting the DUF6 to DUF4 and the by-product AHF 

4. Producing FEP products, such as SiF4 and BF3, from DUF4 

5. Treating process off-gases 

6. Treating process water discharges and regenerating treating agents 

7. Temporarily storing AHF, SiF4 and BF3 products and loading for shipment 

Flow schematics are shown in each of the sections that describe the processes. An estimated range of 

process operating parameters is presented for the DUF6 to DUF4, SiF4 and BF3 processes. Larger more 

detailed and legible process flow sheets are provided as an Engineering Drawing Package in separate 

document files of the IIFP License Application. 
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3.1.1 Process Technology and Chemistry 

In performing de-conversion services for the uranium enrichment industry, the IIFP Facility utilizes 

fluorine contained in the DUF6 to manufacture high-purity specialty fluoride gases and AHF. The DUF6 is 

reacted with hydrogen and converted to DUF4 and AHF. The resulting DUF4 is reacted with oxides of 

silicon or boron to produce high-purity SiF4 or BF3 gas products, respectively. 

Fluoride gas products are valuable materials for applications in the solar, semiconductor and electronics 

industries. In addition, AHF is a by-product of the DUF6 to DUF4 de-conversion process. The AHF is sold 

in the marketplace as a valuable industrial chemical commodity. The DUF6 ultimately has its fluoride 

content extracted as a value-added product or by-product. The by-product uranium, as a chemically stable 

oxide solid powder, is sent to an off-site licensed disposal site. 

Fluoride compounds are known to result from reaction of the UF4 with oxides of the p- and d-elements of 

the III, IV and VI groups of Mendeleev’s Periodic Table. Volatile fluorides form in the interaction 

according to the general reaction: 

 UF4 + MOn → UO2 + MFm; where M is the element boron, silicon, germanium, titanium, etc. 

The IIFP DUP/FEP Plant processes involve the following major chemical reactions: 

• DUF6 to DUF4 Process 

UF6 + H2 → UF4 + 2HF 

• SiF4 Production Process 

SiO2 + UF4 → SiF4 + UO2 (or U3O8 or a mix of these uranium oxides) 

• BF3 Production Process 

2B2O3 + 3UF4 → 4BF3 + 3UO2 (or U3O8 or mix of these uranium oxides) 

• Process Off-gas Effluent Scrubber Treatment Systems 

HF + dilution water → HF (aqueous) 

HF + KOH → KF + H2O 

3SiF4 + 4KOH → 2K2SiF6 + 2H2O + SiO2 

SiO2 + 2KOH → K2SiO3 + H2O 

4BF3 + 3KOH → 3KBF4 + B(OH)3 

• Scrubber Liquor Treatment and Regeneration/Recycle

2HF + Ca(OH)2 → CaF2 + 2H2O 

2KF + Ca(OH)2 → CaF2 + 2KOH 

Two (2) main process technologies are employed as described in the following sections: 

• DUF6 de-conversion to DUF4, i.e. the DUF4 Process 

• The FEP for producing SiF4 and BF3 by reacting DUF4 with the respective inorganic oxides 
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 Page | 3-3

3.1.2 DUF6 to DUF4 Process 

DUF6 can be converted to DUF4 by a high temperature reaction with hydrogen. The basic chemical 

equation is: 

UF6 (gaseous) + H2 (gas) →UF4 (solid) + 2HF (anhydrous) 

The DUF4 is used as a feed material to produce high-purity fluoride products such as SiF4 and BF3.

3.1.2.1 Process Flows and Operating Parameter Ranges 

The DUF6 is received from suppliers (toll de-conversion customers) in solid form contained in 14-ton 

(nominal content capacity) steel cylinders that are approved for packaging, storing and transporting the 

material. 

The DUF6 cylinder is placed in a containment-type autoclave where the contents are vaporized. Redacted

 

The DUF6 vapor is fed to a reaction vessel where it undergoes exothermic reaction to produce DUF4 and 

AHF. The DUF4 solids are continuously withdrawn from the bottom of the reaction vessel through a 

cooling screw mechanism.
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Figure 3-1 UF6 Phase Diagram 

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The sections of electrical heat tracing on piping, valves, manifolds and DUF6 surge tank are designed with 

electrical circuitry that alarms and notifies the Control Room Operator if any one section of the heat 

tracing loses electrical power or if the tracing fails open and is not heating. The configuration of the 

tracing is such to facilitate evenly distributed heating of the components and pipes. The heat tracing has a 

self-limiting temperature. Also, temperature indicators are located along the piping and components in the 

system with alarm points to notify and allow the Operator to ascertain if heating is being maintained and 

evenly distributed. Insulation of the components and pipes in the feed system minimizes any rapid loss of 

heating and assists in maintaining set temperatures and even heat distribution. 
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In the event a significant loss of heating occurs in the feed system components and piping and in the event 

the Operator does not receive alarm notification or take corrective action, the cooling and solidification of 

DUF6 in the components or piping could result and cause an operational problem. Such solidification 

could cause restrictions resulting in pressure and flow indicators reaching the administrative set point 

levels with an alarm notification to the Control Room Operator to shut down the feed systems. 

Operational controls will automatically shut off the feed valves if the Operator fails to take corrective 

action and if the pressure and flows deviate beyond the administrative action levels and reach the 

automatic shutoff set point. Solidification of the DUF6 (referred to as freeze-out) is an operating issue, but 

safety has to be considered upon resumption of heat to the freeze-out location. If the return of heating to a 

localized area is too rapid or if certain areas are heated while some adjacent areas are not, this uneven 

heating could liquefy some of the DUF6 between two (2) plugs of solidified material thereby creating a 

potential for abnormal pressure on the component or internal walls of the piping. The feed piping and 

components are code designed and pressure tested with safety margins well in excess of hydrostat 

pressure. 

Additionally, the electrical heat tracing is designed with insulated spacers to prevent direct contact with 

the component or pipe metal. The potential for localized hot spots is minimized by this design and by the 

heat tracing self-limiting temperature design and temperature indicators and alarms. For these 

aforementioned reasons, the design of electrical heat tracing with more fine control capability is used 

rather than steam tracing. In the event of a solid DUF6 restriction or blockage in the feed system, the safe 

return of heating allows for re-vaporization and remediation of the blockage either through: 1) restart of 

the feed system and reaction vessel or 2) the building Purge and Evacuation System for those local 

isolated sections of the feed systems requiring evacuation. 

In the reaction vessel during operation, the DUF4 produced from the reaction of hydrogen with DUF6 is in 

powder form and transferred to storage hoppers for use as raw material feed in the IIFP Plant for 

producing FEP products. 

Off-gases from the reaction vessel leave the cooling screw equipment and pass through a series of filters 

and carbon-bed traps to remove entrained particulates and residual traces of un-reacted DUF6, 

respectively. The off-gas flow exiting the carbon-bed trap system passes through heat exchangers where 

the by-product AHF is condensed. Residual off-gases exit the condenser equipment to a hydrogen burner 

system to remove any un-reacted hydrogen gas followed by a three-stage scrubbing system designed for 

removing trace quantities of fluorides. Off-gas flow through the plant scrubbing system is described in 

Section 3.1.7. 

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Major flows for the DUF6 conversion to DUF4 process are shown in Figure 3-2 and associated process 

parameters are provided in Table 3-1.
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Figure 3-2 DUF6 to DUF4 Process Flow Diagram 
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Rotary Calciner

Blender/

Mill

Cooling 

Conveyor

To Disposal

Vacuum Pump

To KOH 

Scrubbing

Oxide 

Hopper

To Dust 

Collectors 

Compressor

CDR 5/28/2009

Rev 0 MS

DUF4 SiO2

Heater

Evaporator

To Packaging

Product 

Storage

Primary & Secondary

Cold Traps

Filter System

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

A

1A

4A

8

9

10

Heater

Batch

5A To Scrubber

HF

Precondenser

Compressor

Figures 3-4 SiF4 Process Flow Diagram 
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 Figure 3-5 BF3 Process Flow Diagram
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Venturi

Venturi

Regenerated

KOH

Tank

Pump

Tank

DUF6 to DUF4

Process Off-Gas

APTS/REV 2/ 5/24/2011

SiF4 and BF3

Process Off-Gas

Packed Tower Coke Box

Coke Box

Packed Tower

HF from BF3 and 

SiF4 Systems

To EPP

Figure 3-6 Plant KOH Process Scrubbing System Flow Diagram 

HF from the discharge of the DUF6 to DUF4 process and from the SiF4 and BF3 pre-condensers is routed 

to one venturi. Final off-gas streams exiting the SiF4 and BF3 processes, containing some of the 

uncollected SiF4 and BF3 and trace quantities of other fluorides are routed to another venturi scrubber. 

The Plant KOH Scrubbing System vents treated gases through plant stack number 01 as described in 

Table 3-5. The three-stage KOH scrubbing system is designed for removing fluoride bearing components 

in the gas streams at approximate efficiencies of greater than 80%, 95%, and 99% for the first, second and 

third stages, respectively. The overall system removal efficiency is designed at greater than about 99.9%. 

The Plant KOH Scrubbing System stack is routinely sampled and analyzed to measure for traces of 

fluorides or uranium in the vent gas. 

3.1.8 Environmental Protection Process 

The EPP provides a means of treating two (2) types of liquids (solutions) that result from the production 

processes; potassium fluoride solutions (KOH regeneration process) and weak aqueous HF (HF 

neutralization process). Each of these materials originates from scrubbing systems designed to prevent air 

emissions. The potassium fluoride solution is a by-product of using KOH as a scrubbing medium. In the 

KOH regeneration process of the EPP, the potassium fluoride, water, and excess KOH spent solution 

from the Plant KOH Scrubbing System is reacted with a lime-slurry. Calcium fluoride and regenerated 

potassium hydroxide solution are produced. The regenerated KOH is recycled and reused in the Plant 

KOH Scrubbing System. The calcium fluoride is filtered, dried and packaged for shipment to an approved 

commercial waste burial site, to an HF producer or other potential users. 
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The other stream treated in the EPP is weak aqueous HF solutions, or water or KOH solution that may 

contain a low concentration of fluoride. Also, small spills that may occur and require clean up from spill 

control containment areas may contain weak fluoride concentrations. In this case, the spilled collected 

liquids may have too much water to send to the KOH regeneration/recycle system. The HF neutralization 

process uses lime slurry to react with weak HF to produce CaF2 and water. 

Figure 3-7 depicts the general flow of the EPP Neutralization and KOH Regeneration and Recycle 

processes. These processes are discussed below. 

Figure 3-7 Environmental Protection Process Water Treatment 

3.1.8.1 HF Neutralization 

The HF Neutralization process is designed to operate intermittently, as needed. There is a carbon steel 

lime silo which holds an inventory of hydrated lime. It is equipped with its own dust collection system. 

Lime is fed through a rotary valve to a mix tank where it is mixed with harvested water. The slurry 

generated is ~30% solids. Weak HF solution is transferred from the weak HF holding tank (rubber-lined 

and closed top) to an agitated acid reaction vessel that has a volume of about 6,000 gallons. The limeslurry from the mix tank is also transferred to the acid reaction vessel. The materials in the acid tank 

require a retention time of about one hour or greater for reaction completion. With the reaction complete, 

materials from the acid reaction vessel are transferred to a thickener tank for settling. After thickening, 

calcium fluoride and excess lime are transferred by a slurry pump from the bottom of the thickener to a 
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rotary drum vacuum filter. Solids are discharged from the filter to a dryer capable of processing excess 

water. Liquors from the rotary vacuum filter are recycled to the weak HF tank for recycling. After drying, 

the calcium fluoride is packaged suitable for sale or disposal at an appropriate off-site licensed disposal 

facility. The primary chemical reaction is: 

2HF + Ca (OH)2 →CaF2 + 2H2O 

3.1.8.2 KOH Regeneration 

Lime is fed to an agitated mix tank where it mixes with harvested water. The slurry generated is ~30% 

solids. Spent KOH solution (KF solution with weak KOH) is transferred from storage (holding) tank 

(carbon steel construction and closed top) to an agitated reaction vessel (steel-construction, flat-bottom 

and open top) that has a volume of about 6,000 gallons. The lime-slurry from the mix tank is also 

transferred to the reaction vessel. The materials in the reaction vessel tank are given a retention time of 

about one hour or greater for reaction completion. With the reaction complete, materials from the reaction 

vessel are transferred to a thickening tank for settling. Calcium fluoride and excess lime are transferred by 

a slurry pump from the bottom of the thickener to a rotary drum vacuum filter. Solids are discharged from 

the filter to a dryer capable of processing excess water. Liquors are transferred to a clarifier with a 

capacity of approximately 15,000 gallons where residual solids are allowed to settle. Regenerated KOH is 

removed (clarified overflow) from the top of the clarifier and passed through a set of filters to the 

regenerated KOH storage tank of about 3,000-5000 gallons capacity. The regenerated KOH solution is 

pumped to the Plant KOH Scrubbing System as needed for reuse by the scrubbers. Solids are transferred 

via a slurry pump from the bottom of the clarifier to the rotary drum vacuum filter and subsequently 

transferred to the dryer. The dried material is packaged and temporarily stored for sale or sent to an 

approved off-site licensed disposal facility. 

The primary chemical reaction is: 

2KF + Ca (OH)2 → CaF2 +2KOH 

3.1.9 AHF Staging Containment and Fluoride Products Trailer Loading Buildings 

. 

When AHF inventories reach a level for shipment, the AHF is loaded into an approved tank trailer staged 

in the Fluoride Products Trailer Loading Building. The tank trailer is the type approved by the DOT and 

of the design type routinely used for shipping AHF nationwide. A transfer line from the storage tanks 

enters the tank trailer side of the building. The containment building has a truck entrance door on one side 

that remains sealed, closed and controlled except for short periods when the trailer is moved in and out. 

Safety precautions are taken to prevent the trailer from accidentally contacting the fill line by the 

installation of physical barriers. 
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3.1.10 Process Vent Stacks 

There are three (3) major stacks from which treated process gases are vented to the atmosphere: 1) the 

Plant KOH Scrubbing System, 2) the DUF4 Dust Collector System and 3) the FEP Dust Collector System. 

Prior to venting, the particulate and gas process streams are filtered and/or scrubbed using multi-stage 

equipment that is configured in series to ensure effective treatment within the established safe and 

environmental regulated control limits. Additionally there are ten (10) other process related or utilities 

equipment stacks including one (1) boiler vent stack that are vented to the atmosphere. 

Table 3-4 provides a listing of the off-gas treatment equipment and corresponding design efficiencies. 

Information is presented on stack heights, estimated vent flow rates, stack size and approximate location 

is shown in Table 3-5. 

Table 3-4 Design Efficiencies for Process Vent Off-gas Treatment Equipment 

Component Design Efficiency Comments 

DUF4 dust collectors >99.5% particulates All primary, secondary and redundant units 

FEP uranium oxide >99.5% particulates All primary, secondary and redundant units 

DUF4 vacuum cleaner cyclone >80% particulates Cyclone discharges to DUF4 vacuum cleaner dust collector 

for further removal efficiency 

FEP uranium oxide vacuum cleaner 

cyclone 

>80% particulates Cyclone discharges to oxide vacuum cleaner dust collector 

for further removal efficiency 

DUF4 vacuum cleaner dust collector >99.5% particulates Discharges to inlet of DUF4 secondary dust collector 

FEP uranium oxide vacuum cleaner 

dust collector 

>99.5% particulates Discharges to inlet of FEP uranium oxide secondary dust 

collector 

DUF4 primary metal filter >95% particulates Removes entrained particulates from the DUF4 to DUF6

reaction vessel off-gas. Discharges to secondary filter for 

further removal efficiency 
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Table 3-4 Design Efficiencies for Process Vent Off-gas Treatment Equipment 

Component Design Efficiency Comments 

DUF4 secondary metal filter >95% particulates Removes entrained particulates that may pass through the 

DUF4 primary metal filter 

SiF4 primary metal filter >95% particulates Removes entrained particulates from the SiF4 rotary calciner 

off-gas. Discharges to secondary filter for further removal 

SiF4 secondary metal filter >95% particulates Removes entrained particulates that may pass through the 

SiF4 primary metal filter. 

BF3 pre-heater primary metal filter >95% particulates Removes entrained particles from the BF3 pre-heater vessel 

off-gas. Discharges to secondary filter for further removal 

efficiency 

BF3 pre-heater secondary metal 

filter 

>95% particulates Removes entrained particles that may pass through the BF3

pre-heater primary metal filter 

BF3 primary metal filter >95% particulates Removes entrained particles from the BF3 rotary calciner 

off-gas. Discharges to secondary filter for further removal 

efficiency 

BF3 secondary metal filter >95% particulates Removes entrained particles that may pass through the BF3

primary metal filter 

KOH venturi scrubber >80% gaseous and 

particulates 

Receives vent gas from DUF4 and FEP process off-gas 

system. Exit gas of venturi discharges to packed tower 

scrubber for further efficiency 

KOH packed tower scrubber >95% gaseous Second stage system. Exit gas discharges to coke box system 

for further removal efficiency 

KOH coke box scrubber >99% gaseous Discharges to atmosphere through Plant KOH Scrubbing 

System vent stack 

DUF4 off-gas primary carbon-bed 

trap 

>95% gaseous and 

particulate uranium 

Absorbs DUF6 gas and traces of DUF4 and discharges to 

secondary trap for further removal efficiency. 

DUF4 off-gas secondary carbon-bed 

trap 

>95% gaseous 

uranium 

Absorbs DUF6 trace gas that may pass through primary 

carbon bed. Discharges to tertiary carbon-bed trap for further 

removal efficiency. 

DUF4 off-gas tertiary carbon-bed 

trap 

>95% gaseous 

uranium 

Absorbs final traces of DUF6 that may pass through the 

secondary carbon-bed trap and provides added margin of 

safety in removing gaseous uranium 

DUF4 Hydrogen burner >99% hydrogen 

burned 

Gas-fired burner to destroy excess hydrogen from DUF6 to 

DUF4 reaction vessel off-gas 

FEP hood vent system emergency 

KOH scrubber 

>95% gaseous 

fluoride 

Treated gas from emergency scrubber exits to SiF4 venturi 

scrubber in the Plant KOH Scrubbing System for further and 

final treatment 

Calcium fluoride dust Collector >99.5% particulates Removes air particulates in the CaF2 storage area and process 

DUF4 transfer dust collector >99.5% particulates Allows for the transfer of particulate DUF4 from the DUF6-

to-DUF4 process to FEP consumers 

B2O3 unloading dust collector >99.5% particulates Removes particulates in the B2O3 unloading process 

Hydrated lime unloading dust 

collector 

>99.5% particulates Removes particulates in the Hydrated Lime unloading 

process 

 
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3.4 References 

ANSI, N14.12001 American National Standard for Nuclear Materials -"Uranium Hexafluoride-

 Packaging for Transport,” ANSI, 2001. 

CFR, 2011 Code of Federal Regulations Title 49 "Transportation, Hazardous Materials," 

 CFR, 2011.
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4.1.3 Likelihood Analysis 

Tables 4-3 through 4-6 specify the likelihood of the potential accident sequences that were identified that 

could have consequences that are Category 2 or 3 based on the performance criteria of 10 CFR 70.61. 

(The likelihoods indicated in the tables were derived utilizing the methods described in Section 5.2.4. 

Table 5-9 provides the definitions for the terms “unlikely” and “highly unlikely” developed in accordance 

with NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002). 

4.2 Management Measures 

Management measures are the formal methods applied to maintain IROFS at a needed level of reliability 

and availability. These methods ensure that protection and mitigation features are adequate to keep 

accidents within the bounds of acceptable risk. Management measures are applied to all structures, 

systems and components associated with the performance of any IROFS. A graded approach is 

implemented based on the level of protection needed by each IROFS to meet acceptable performance 

criteria. For instance, sole IROFS require more robust management measures since no credited IROFS 

remain to prevent unacceptable consequences. 

No management measure requirements or guidance are provided in 10 CFR Part 40 (CFR, 2009c); 

however, the program elements defined in 10 CFR 70.4 (CFR, 2009d) are followed, which are discussed 

summarily below. Detailed management measures are described in LA, Revision B Chapter 11 

“Management Measures.” At a minimum, all IROFS meet the general requirements in the following 

sections. Additional measures may be applicable to certain IROFS if exceptionally high availability and 

reliability is needed to meet performance requirements. Such additional management methods will be 

defined when specific need is identified. 

4.2.1 Configuration Management 

Configuration Management (CM) Program elements are specified in 10 CFR 70.72 (CFR, 2009e). Such a 

program is needed to establish and maintain a technical baseline for the facility based on clearly defined 

requirements. The technical baseline consists of facility design drawings, procedures, specifications and 

other technical documents including the ISA. The CM Program ensures adequate change control for the 

technical baseline. Change control is needed to assure that any facility or process changes are evaluated 

appropriately and such changes are reflected in updated drawings, procedures and other plant documents. 

CM ensures that all but “like kind” replacements of equipment and minor non-process changes receive 

review and approval from all safety, security and licensing organizations. The impacts of these changes 

are evaluated and documented by the individual organizational groups. After approval, plant 

modifications are implemented and verified to be in accordance with the revised technical baseline. All 

corresponding safety, security and licensing documentation are updated in a timely manner following 

approval of the change. 

Changes are evaluated for impact on the safety and health of workers and the public. New facilities and 

modifications to existing facilities and processes must meet certain criteria, or a license amendment is 

required. Any change that requires NRC approval will be submitted as a license amendment request and 

the change will not be implemented without prior NRC approval. Changes requiring NRC approval 

include conditions that meet the following criteria: 

(1) Changes that create new types of accident sequences that, if unmitigated or not prevented, exceed 

performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 (CFR, 2009a) and are not previously described and 

analyzed in this ISA Summary. 
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(2) Changes that use new processes, technologies or control systems that are outside the bounds of the 

plant experience and expertise, except for research and development activities that do not have an 

adverse effect on the safety of currently licensed operations as documented by a safety analysis 

(3) Changes that remove, without at least an equivalent replacement of the safety function, an IROFS 

that is listed in this ISA Summary and is necessary for compliance with the performance 

requirements of 10 CFR 70.61(CFR, 2009a) 

(4) Alters any Sole IROFS that is listed in this ISA Summary as the lone item preventing or mitigating 

an accident sequence that would otherwise exceed the performance requirements of 10 CFR 

70.61(CFR, 2009a) 

(5) Any change prohibited by 10 CFR 70.72 (CFR, 2009e), license condition, or order 

All changes not requiring NRC approval shall be submitted to the NRC annually, including a revised ISA 

Summary. 

Periodic assessments of the CM Program are conducted to determine the program's effectiveness and to 

correct deficiencies. 

4.2.2 Maintenance 

Maintenance activities include general repair and upkeep of facilities and processes along with preventive 

maintenance and testing of engineered IROFS and important process controls. Maintenance also includes 

surveillance and monitoring to identify conditions requiring corrective maintenance and to ensure that 

preventive maintenance remains effective. These activities are coordinated through safety group reviews 

and approval via safety work orders, hot work permits and radiation work permits, as needed. Any 

maintenance activities on specific systems are evaluated for their impact on other, nearby systems. 

Results of surveillance/monitoring activities related to IROFS will be evaluated by all safety disciplines 

to determine any impact on the ISA and any updates needed. 

Testing plans for IROFS and certain process controls will be developed prior to initial installation of the 

devices. Testing can include functional tests, performance tests, software checks and updates and 

instrument calibration. The frequency of such tests depends on the reliability of the equipment and the 

importance of the IROFS of meeting performance goals. At a minimum, all Active Engineered Control 

IROFS including Instrumentation and Control IROFS will be tested following maintenance and on an 

annual basis. To maintain accuracy within specified limits, Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE) will 

be properly controlled, calibrated and adjusted at specified periods in accordance with program 

procedures. PEC surveillance will be performed at regular intervals based on configuration management 

and approved procedures, consistent with the graded quality approach and commensurate with the item's 

importance to safety. 

Preventive Maintenance (PM) activities include periodic refurbishment or like kind replacement of 

IROFS at a predetermined frequency. The frequency is based on the expected life of the device along with 

the relative importance of the IROFS in meeting performance goals and the results of surveillance and 

monitoring. Generally, sole IROFS will be refurbished and/or replaced at a greater frequency. Any 

functional test and/or calibration required will be performed following these maintenance activities. The 

PM program will adjust the frequency of PM on IROFS (up or down) over time based on the condition of 

the item being maintained. 
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Corrective maintenance includes repair or like kind replacement of equipment that has failed to perform 

or is performing outside of desired safety and process parameter limits. The work order process 

mentioned above will address the safety aspects of this work. As with any maintenance, a functional test 

and/or calibration will be performed, as needed, following completion of this work. 

4.2.3 Training and Qualifications 

The IIFP Training Program will ensure job proficiency of facility personnel through effective training and 

qualification. The objective of the training shall be to ensure safe and efficient operation of the facility 

and compliance with applicable established regulations and requirements. Continuing training courses 

shall be established when applicable to ensure that personnel remain proficient. Personnel requiring 

training include all operating and maintenance employees, engineering, safety, management, supervisor, 

quality assurance, emergency preparedness, fire prevention and first-responder personnel. 

Qualification is indicated by successful completion of prescribed training, demonstration of the ability to 

perform assigned tasks and the maintenance of requirements established by regulations. Qualifications 

will also include minimum education, technical background, experience, etc., along with physical skills 

needed to perform individual tasks. 

Qualifications and training requirements are established for each functional type of work. Employees are 

provided formal classroom training along with specific on-the-job training. Workers will read, understand 

and follow formal area procedures when performing work. Additionally, workers will understand and 

obey requirements in work orders, hot work permits and RWPs along with posted limits and controls. Job 

Task Analysis is used, as needed, to supplement training when tasks associated with IROFS are involved. 

Along with job-specific training mentioned above, all employees will be given formal general employee 

training and safety training, as needed. General worker training will include site access information and 

an overview of site hazards, emergency alarms and evacuation plans. Safety training may include 

radiation worker training, hazards communication and general health and safety training. Training and 

qualification related documentation is maintained as quality records. Continuous training and 

improvement is stressed for the entire workforce. 

4.2.4 Procedures 

Procedures are used to ensure that activities involving licensed materials or IROFS are carried out in a 

safe manner and in accordance with regulatory requirements. All production work aside from routine 

custodial and office duties will be governed by approved written procedures. Additionally, all program 

requirements, including these management measures, will be implemented via procedures. Procedures are 

necessary to provide consistent and reliable performance of site-wide activities. IROFS and other safety 

related items are highlighted in work procedures, typically as “cautions” and “warnings.” 

Procedures are developed, reviewed, approved and controlled by the responsible organizations. 

Employees are trained on all procedures they follow as part of their work assignments. Work procedures 

and supplemental safety-related procedures will be located in the general work areas. Temporary work 

shall be performed under temporary work orders or RWPs. If a step of a procedure cannot be performed 

as written, work is stopped, the system is immediately placed in a safe condition and corrective actions 

are initiated in accordance with site procedures. 

Facility and process changes require procedure updates in the form of revisions. Such revisions must be in 

place before restart of the operation can commence. Changes to safety systems and safety basis 

documentation must also be incorporated into respective procedures. Employees must be retrained on the 
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revised procedures before the restart of work. Records generated during procedure use are identified and 

controlled according to the Records Management and the Document Control Program. 

4.2.5 Audits and Assessments 

Audits and inspections are periodically performed on all operations at the plant site, both for production 

and nonproduction related activities. Assessments are also routinely performed but are generally focused 

on support programs such as environmental, safety and health programs. Audits/inspections focus on 

review of certain aspects of compliance whereas assessments look more generally at program and process 

performance. Specifically, assessments are focused on ensuring that IROFS, and any items that affect the 

function of IROFS, are reliable and available to perform their intended safety functions. 

Audits/inspections and assessments are performed in accordance with program plans and/or procedures. 

Audits and independent assessments are performed by personnel independent of the operation/activity 

being audited or assessed. Management assessments are performed by management to assess the 

adequacy of the part of the plant organization for which they are responsible. The frequency of 

audits/inspections and assessments will vary based on the safety aspects of the activities performed. 

Inspections are expected to be routine and frequent. Most production areas will have a walk down and 

general visual inspection of work areas daily. Non-routine work areas may be done on a weekly basis. 

Safety organizations are expected to perform weekly inspections over various process areas. The more 

formal audits will be performed quarterly or annually and will generally focus on safety and regulatory 

compliance issues. Program or process assessments are performed as needed, based on performance 

trends and identified need. Audit and assessment results are tracked in the Corrective Action Program. 

Records of audits, inspections and assessments will be maintained as quality records. 

4.2.6 Incident Investigations 

Incidents and accidents include abnormal events that may occur during operation of the facility. Incidents 

and accidents are formally investigated by plant personnel with knowledge of the process systems 

involved, the safety areas affected and formal incident/accident investigation methodologies. When an 

incident occurs, management will form a qualified team that will determine root causes of the event and 

develop recommendations to reduce the likelihood of recurrence. Lessons learned will also be developed 

so unaffected organizations can review their operations for similar type potential incident initiators. 

Incidents/accidents are tracked and trended to identify weaknesses in types and areas of operation and to 

look for common causes of events. Corrective actions are assigned and tracked programmatically to 

ensure that timely and adequate corrections to deficiencies are incorporated. Any required plant changes 

as a result of corrective actions follow the management methods described above. Corrective actions are 

closed out in plant records when implementation is complete or adequate justification for not 

implementing the corrective action is properly documented. 

4.2.7 Records Management 

Records required to be maintained for the IIFP Facility include: 

1. Results of surveys to determine the dose from external sources and used in the assessment of 

individual dose equivalents 

2. Results of measurements and calculations used to determine individual intakes of radioactive 

material and used in the assessment of internal dose 
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3. Results of air sampling, surveys and bioassays 

4. Results of measurements and calculations used to evaluate the release of radioactive effluents to 

the environment 

5. Records of spills or other unusual occurrences involving the spread of contamination in and 

around the facility, equipment, or site 

6. As-built drawings and modifications of structures and equipment in restricted areas where 

radioactive materials are used and/or stored 

7. IROFS design specifications and maintenance records 

8. Training and qualification records 

9. Audit, assessment and inspection results 

10. Incident investigation reports. 

11. Quality Assurance (QA) records 

All records associated with the above Management Measures Program elements will be retained as 

quality assurance records. The records are systematically stored and are easily retrievable for individuals, 

groups, programs and activities. Records are categorized and handled in accordance with their relative 

importance to safety and storage requirements. All facility and process design elements and items relating 

to the environment and safety and health to workers and the public will be maintained as quality records. 

Quality assurance records are stored in authorized facilities or containers providing protection from fire 

hazards, natural disasters and other adverse environmental conditions. The Records Management 

organization is ultimately responsible for maintaining plant records, although some records retention may 

be delegated to specific organizations. 

Controlled documents are approved records identified as such in procedures which control their 

generation and revision. Changes to controlled documents are approved and released by the organization 

that performed the document's initial approval. After approval, the documents are forwarded to Document 

Control for control and distribution to the personnel on the approved distribution list. 

4.2.8 Other Quality Assurance Elements 

Other Quality Assurance elements relating to IROFS or the plant in general are specified in IIFP’s Quality 

Assurance Program Description (QAPD), in LA, Revision B Appendix A. that governs facility 

operations. Personnel performing activities covered by the QA Program shall perform work in accordance 

with approved procedures and must demonstrate suitable proficiency in their assigned tasks. Training 

programs are established for QA policies, requirements, procedures and methods. 

The QA Program (as described in the QAPD), in conjunction with the other management measures, 

ensures IROFS will be available and reliable to perform the required safety functions when needed. The 

level of QA applied to IROFS and other plant elements is based on a graded approach to meet risk and 

operation performance requirements and goals. Section 6 identifies the graded quality levels applied to 

IROFS. 
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4.3 Criticality Monitoring 

Because only depleted uranium materials will be received and processed in the IIFP Plant, criticality 

monitoring is not required. 
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4.4.8 Inspection, Testing and Maintenance 

Structures, systems and components (SSCs) are inspected, tested and maintained in accordance with the 

graded levels of the IIFP QAPD Revision B. SSCs that are determined to be IROFS have applicable 

management measures applied as discussed in IIFP LA, Revision B Chapter 11. 

Engineered IROFS will be designed to permit inspection, testing and maintenance. Inspection, testing and 

maintenance of IROFS are addressed in LA, Revision B Chapter 11. The minimum level of management 

measures applied to administrative and engineered IROFS are briefly described in Table 6-1. Application 

of minimum graded quality levels are marked in Table 6-2. In general, IROFS credited with a high level 

of risk reduction will be inspected, tested and maintained on a more frequent basis than IROFS with lower 

levels of risk reduction; however, all specified inspections, testing and maintenance will be, at a 

minimum, commensurate with required reliability and consistent with the graded approach as described in 

Section 4.2.8. The design of credited IROFS will include adequate management measures for preoperation certification, periodic testing, maintenance, calibration and inspection, for verification of safety 

function capability. 

4.4.9 Criticality Control 

Not applicable. Only depleted uranium materials will be received and processed in the IIFP Plant. 
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4.6 References 

ASCE, 2006 ASCE 7-05. "Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures," s.l. : 

 American Society of Civil Engineers, 2006. 

ASME, 2003 ASME B31. "Standards of Pressure Piping," s.l. : American Society of Mechanical 

 Engineers, 2003. 

ATS, 2011 "Medical Management Guidelines for Hydrogen Fluoride," Agency for Toxic Substances 

and Disease Registry, CAS # 7664-39-3, UN # 1052 and 1790, 2011. 

CFR, 2009a 10 CFR 70.61. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 70, "Domestic Licensing of 

 Special Nuclear Materials, Section 61, Performance Requirements." 2009. 

CFR, 2009b 10 CFR 70.64. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 70.64, "Requirements for 

 New Facilities or New Processes at Existing Facilities," 2009. 

CFR, 2009c 10 CFR Part 40. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 40, "Domestic Licensing of 

 Source Material," 2009. 

CFR, 2009d 10 CFR 70.4. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 70, "Domestic Licensing of 

 Special Nuclear Materials, Section 4, Definitions," 2009. 

CFR, 2009e 10 CFR 70.72. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 70, "Domestic Licensing of 

 Special Nuclear Materials, Section 72, Facility Changes and Change Process," 2009. 

Goode, W.D. K/GDP/SAR-65. "Application of the HGSYSTEM/UF6 Model to Simulate Atmospheric 

et al. 1995 Dispersion of UF6 Releases from Uranium Enrichment Plants," 1995. 

IEEE, IEEE-603. "IEEE Standard Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating 

Stations," Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers,2009. 

IEEE, 2003 IEEE-383." Qualifying Class 1E Electric Cables and Field Splices for Nuclear Power 

 Generating Stations," Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2003. 

NFPA, 2008a NFPA 780. "Standard for the Installation of Lightning Protection Systems," s.l. : 

 National Fire Protection Association, 2008. 

NFPA, 2008b NFPA 801. "Standard for Fire Protection for Facilities Handling Radioactive Materials," 

 National Fire Protection Association, 2008. 

NIOSH, 2011 " Skin Notation Profile for HF", National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 

 Publication No. 2011-137, 2011, 2011. 

NSA, 2009 "Fire Hazards Analysis for FEP/DUP Plant," Nuclear Safety Associates, 2009. 

NRC, 1998 NUREG/CR-6410." Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facility Accident Analysis Handbook," US 

 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1998. 

NRC, 2002 NUREG-1520. "Standard Review Plan for the Review of a License Application for a 

 Fuel Cycle Facility," US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2002. 
SA-IFP-001 Revision B IIFP Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) Summary December 28, 2011 

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5 ISA TEAM AND QUALIFICATIONS AND ISA METHODS 

This section includes description of the team, qualifications and the methods used to perform the 

Integrated Safety Analysis. 

5.1 ISA Team and Qualifications 

A single ISA team completed all aspects of the ISA activities. Team member qualifications were 

consistent with guidance provided in NUREG 1520 (NRC, 2002). The ISA team was made up of a 

diverse group of individuals with expertise in engineering, safety, safety analysis, UF6, HF and general 

uranium chemistry. The team possessed expertise in the following range of specialties, at a minimum: 

• Facility and chemical process safety 

• Health physics and radiation protection 

• Chemical, mechanical and electrical engineering 

• Plant operations and maintenance 

• Process hazards analysis 

• Safety analysis and risk assessment 

• UF6 and chemical/nuclear processing 

• Fire safety 

• Human Factors (Not part of original ISA team but will be added to team prior to the Design and 

Build Contractor beginning detailed design of IROFS SSCs) 

The ISA team members are trained, knowledgeable and experienced in a wide array of ISA methods 

including hazards identification, process hazards analysis and safety analysis and risk assessment at 

various chemical/nuclear facilities. The team leader was ultimately responsible for the methods and 

approach of the overall ISA development. A brief summary of the ISA team who participated in the ISA 

process and their corresponding experience and qualifications is provided in Table 5-1. 

Table 5-1 Experience and Qualifications of ISA Team 

ISA Team Member Experience and Qualifications

Ron Green, ISA Team Leader 20 years experience in nuclear safety analysis and risk assessment. 

Degreed Nuclear Engineer. Completed ISA Team Leader training 

with extensive experience leading ISA efforts at nuclear facilities. 

Carol Mason, Safety Analyst More than 30 years of experience in safety analysis, reliability 

analysis and risk assessment for NRC and DOE nuclear and nonnuclear facilities. ISA expertise includes identification of accident 

initiators, PHA, accident sequence development, radiological and 

non-radiological source term analysis, frequency quantification and 

application of atmospheric dose calculation codes to estimate onsite and off-site consequences. Experience with development and 

implementation of methodologies and databases for conducting 

chemical hazard analysis for hazards screening and accident 

analysis. 
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Table 5-1 Experience and Qualifications of ISA Team 

ISA Team Member Experience and Qualifications

Tammy Wheeler, Safety Analyst Certified Health Physicist with 15 years experience in radiation 

protection, safety analysis and risk assessment for NRC, DOE and 

NASA nuclear and non-nuclear facilities. Proficient in atmospheric 

dispersion modeling, radiological pathway analysis, dose 

assessment and shielding calculations. 

Mike Balmert, Safety Analyst 30 years experience in nuclear safety, criticality safety analysis and 

risk assessment. Degreed Mechanical and Nuclear Engineer. 

Knowledgeable of NRC Nuclear Material and Enrichment Facility 

operations and safety regulations. Experienced as ISA team member 

identifying and qualifying hazards, selecting IROFS and 

documenting safety analyses. 

Andy O’Connor, Fire Protection Engineer 38 years of Fire Protection experience; 30 years of commercial 

nuclear and DOE experience. Passed the National Fire Protection 

PE exam. Developed FHAs, fire protection evaluations, training 

programs and readiness assessments. 

Jim Thomas, Process Engineer More than 30 years of technical, process engineering, 

environmental, safety and health (ESH), regulatory and 

management experience in the uranium nuclear fuel cycle industry. 

Eleven (11) of those years were in uranium conversion as process 

engineer, corporate process technology manager and plant manager 

in the commercial production of uranium hexafluoride, fluorine and 

specialty fluorine chemicals. Worked 17 years in uranium 

enrichment with responsibilities for operations, management, 

maintenance and corporate manager of advanced technology 

development and engineering. Six (6) years experience as ESH and 

regulatory manager and VP. 

Donnie Chumbler 40 years in uranium enrichment with experience in technical and 

engineering evaluations, health physics management and quality 

assurance development and implementation. Certified Quality 

Manager, American Society of Quality. 

Tommy Thompson, Process Engineer More than 30 years in design, engineering and project management 

of industrial and commercial facilities and processes. Licensed 

Professional Engineer (PE). 

Gary Holland, Process Engineer More than 30 years in chemical and uranium enrichment industry 

with experiences in process and project engineering, maintenance, 

engineering design, capital and engineering cost estimating, 

procurement engineering and site selection studies. For 5 years was 

design authority for uranium enrichment advanced technology 

development. 

Specific qualifications for each ISA team member who participated in the PHA are shown in Table 5-2. 
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Table 5-2 ISA Team Members PHA Qualifications 

Team Member Role(s) 

Radiological 

Safety 

Fire Safety 

Chemical 

Process Safety 

Process 

Engineering 

Environmental 

Safety 

Human Factors 

Engineering 

Ron Green Team Leader X X X 

Carol Mason Safety Analyst, Chemical 

Process Safety X X X 

Tammy Wheeler Safety Analyst, Health 

Physics X X 

Mike Balmert Facility Safety, PHA X X 

Andy O’Connor Fire Safety X 

Jim Thomas 

Chemical, mechanical and 

electrical engineering; plant 

operations and maintenance; 

UF6 and chemical-nuclear 

processing 

 X X X 

Don Chumbler 

Quality Assurance, 

Environmental Safety, 

Radiation Protection 

X X X 

Tommy Thompson Fire Hazard Analyst X X 

Gary Holland UF6 and chemical-nuclear 

processing X X 

To Be Added Human Factors Engineering 

Professional X 

5.2 ISA Methods 

5HGDFWHG
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5.2.2 Process Hazards Analysis Method 

A Process Hazards Analysis was performed by using a “What if...” type hazards analysis methodology 

(Table 5-4). The “What if...” PHA technique was chosen because of its structured format, straightforward 

approach, and its utility for identification of potential hazards and their associated consequences. As the 

technique’s name implies, it uses questions that begin with “What if...” to identify potential upset 

conditions related to a process that result in a consequence of concern. A checklist that identifies process 

parameters and potential upset conditions was selected for this analysis as shown in Table 5-5. 

 Table 5-4 Process Hazards Analysis (“What if...”) Sample Form 

Scenario 

Number “What if...” Causes 

Failure 

Frequency 

Index 

Consequences Consequence 

Category 

Prevention 

Features 

Mitigation 

Features Comments 

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 

(1) Scenario identification number 

(2) “What if...” upset condition being analyzed 

(3) Sequence initiators for the upset condition 

(4) Judgment of the frequency of occurrence of the upset condition assuming no prevention features 

(5) Potential radiological, chemical and/or environmental consequences resulting from the upset condition 

(6) Estimate of the severity or magnitude of the event consequences assuming no mitigation features 

(7) Engineered and/or administrative features to prevent or reduce the likelihood the upset condition 

(8) Engineered and/or administrative features to mitigate the event consequences 

(9) Comments and discussions to clarify selection of likelihood and/or consequence categories 
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5.2.3 Consequence Analysis Method 

The consequence severity categories are based on the amount of hazard (energy) available for release and 

the resultant impact to on-site and off-site populations and the environment. The severity categories are 

defined in Table 5-7. Consequences within a facility assume a “normal” facility and do not rely upon any 

special design features or containment. 

Table 5-7 Consequence Severity Categories 

Category Workers Off-Site Public Environment 

Category 3 

High 

Consequences 

 Radiation Dose >100 rem 

Chemical Dose = endanger life 

Radiation Dose >25 rem 

30 mg soluble uranium intake 

Chemical Dose = long-lasting 

health effects 

Category 2 

Intermediate 

Consequences 

Radiation Dose >25 rem 

Chemical Dose = long-lasting 

health effects 

Radiation Dose >5 rem 

Chemical Dose = mild transient 

health effects 

Radiological release 

>5000 times values in 

Table 2 of 10 CFR Part 

20, Appendix B 

Category 1 

Low 

Consequences 

Accidents of lower radiological 

and chemical exposures than 

Category 2 

Accidents of lower radiological 

and chemical exposures than 

Category 2 

Radiological releases 

lower than Category 2 

Per the guidance provided in NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), three consequence severity categories are 

assigned: High Consequences, Intermediate Consequences and Low Consequences. The primary driver 

for the PHA is to screen hazards and identify and evaluate accident sequences that result in intermediate 

and high consequence events. Scenarios that meet these consequence levels must then be evaluated with 

respect to risk and the adequacy of design and administrative features to prevent occurrence of the event 

and/or limit the severity of the consequences. 

5.2.4 Likelihood Evaluation Method 

As mentioned above, the PHA screening method is based solely on the uncontrolled, unmitigated 

consequences of the upset condition. A frequency estimate is assigned based on system design and the 

analysts’ knowledge of system operation along with the expected design and administrative safety 

features. This frequency is the frequency of the upset condition alone, not the likelihood of a subsequent 

accident, which may require more failures to occur. This is done to support the more detailed accident 

sequence analysis and also to understand the likelihood of identified low consequence events. The 

frequency of occurrence is based on the criteria as defined in Table 5-8. Both frequency of occurrence and 

consequence magnitude assessment are consistent with the requirements specified in NUREG-1520 

(NRC, 2002). 
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Table 5-8 Initiating Event Failure Frequency Index Values 

Failure 

Frequency 

Index* 

Based on Evidence 

-6 External Event with frequency of <10-6/yr 

-5 External Event with frequency of >10-6/yr and <10-5/yr 

-4 No occurrences in 30 years for hundreds of similar systems in industry 

-3 No occurrences in 30 years for tens of similar systems in industry 

-2 No occurrences of this type in this facility in 30 years 

-1 A few occurrences during facility lifetime 

0 Occurs every 1 to 3 years 

1 Several occurrences per year 

2 Occurs every week or more often 

*Based on the example provided in NUREG-1520. Indices less than (more negative than) -1 should not be assigned unless the 

configuration management, auditing and other management measures are high quality. 

Accident sequence evaluation is performed on all PHA scenarios that resulted in uncontrolled 

consequences of intermediate or high severity, Consequence Category 2 and 3, respectively. Accident 

sequence evaluation results in a more detailed evaluation of hazards and a determination of risk. Risk for 

an accident is defined as the likelihood of occurrence times the magnitude of the consequence. 

Consequence levels are discussed above and are categorized in Table 5-7. Likelihood categories are based 

on criteria in 10 CFR 70.61 (CFR, 2009), which specifies the permissible likelihood of occurrence of 

accidents of differing consequences. Per 10 CFR 70.61 (CFR, 2009), high consequence accidents must be 

highly unlikely and intermediate consequence accidents must be unlikely. By default, low consequence 

accidents can be less than unlikely to occur. Table 5-9 below presents the three likelihood categories used 

to determine risk. 

Table 5-9 Likelihood Categories 

Event 

Likelihood 

Likelihood 

Category Probability of Occurrence Qualitative Description 

Not Unlikely 3 Greater than 10-4 per event per year 

Unlikely 2 Between 10-4 and 10-5 per event per 

year 

Consequence Category 2 accidents 

must be “unlikely.” 

Highly Unlikely 1 10-5 or less per event per year Consequence Category 3 accidents 

must be “highly unlikely.” 

The three (3) consequences and likelihood categories are displayed in Table 5-10 in a 3 x 3 risk index 

matrix. Multiplying the likelihood category number by the consequence category number results in an 

overall risk number for an accident. The unacceptable risk levels are highlighted with shaded areas. 

IROFS are needed for accidents that fall in this region so that an acceptable risk level is achieved. 
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Table 5-10 Risk Matrix and Risk Index Values 

Severity of Consequences 

Likelihood of Occurrence 

Likelihood Category 1 

Highly Unlikely 

(1) 

Likelihood Category 2 

Unlikely 

(2) 

Likelihood Category 3 

Not Unlikely 

(3) 

Category 3 

High Consequence 

(3) 

Acceptable Risk 

3 

Unacceptable Risk 

6 

Unacceptable Risk 

9 

Category 2 

Intermediate Consequence 

(2) 

Acceptable Risk 

2 

Acceptable Risk 

4 

Unacceptable Risk 

6 

Category 1 

Low Consequence 

(3) 

Acceptable Risk 

1 

Acceptable Risk 

2 

Acceptable Risk 

3 

The table above shows that accidents that result in risk index levels of 6 or above do not meet the 

performance criteria in 10 CFR 70.61 (CFR, 2009). Uncontrolled and unmitigated accident sequences 

with risk index values of 4 or less meet performance criteria and do not require IROFS type controls. By 

default, any accident sequence with uncontrolled and unmitigated risk index levels of 5 or above must 

have IROFS applied to lower the risk to an acceptable value. These IROFS could be applied to reduce the 

likelihood of the event by establishing preventive measures, or they could be applied as mitigation 

features to reduce the severity of the consequences. 

A simple way to ensure acceptable risk levels are always met is to establish likelihood level limits for 

high and intermediate consequence events. As mentioned before, intermediate consequence events must 

be unlikely to occur and high consequence events must be highly unlikely to occur. This is done by 

establishing probability of occurrence values to the likelihood categories in Table 5-9. Therefore, high 

consequence events require a likelihood of occurrence of no greater than 10-5 and intermediate 

consequence events require a likelihood of occurrence of no greater than 10-4 to meet the performance 

criteria specified in 10 CFR 70.61 (CFR, 2009). 

Likelihood of an accident sequence is determined by multiplying the frequency of the initiating event by 

the probability of failure of independent controls. For simplicity, this is done by using indices for 

initiating event frequencies and control failures and adding them together to get a total likelihood index. 

The frequency index for initiating events was provided previously in Table 5-8. Failure probability index 

numbers for independent controls, or IROFS, are provided in Table 5-11. These values are derived from 

NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002), and, as is consistent with this document, non-IROFS controls are credited 

with a maximum protection factor of -1. More highly credited controls require configuration 

management, auditing and other management measures to maintain the high availability and reliability 

assigned to IROFS. The index values below are given as a range, as not all controls, even the same type, 

offer the same level of availability and performance. Significant research along with engineering 

judgment was performed when assigning such numbers. Types of IROFS never exceeded their 

corresponding probability index range unless justified. Any such cases are justified in a latter portion of 

this summary document. 
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Table 5-11 Failure Probability Index Values for IROFS 

Probability 

Index* 

Probability of 

Failure on Demand Based on Type of IROFS Comments 

-6 10-6 If initiating event, no IROFS 

needed. 

-4 or -5 10-4 – 10-5

Exceptionally robust passive engineered 

control (PEC) IROFS or an inherently safe 

process, or two independent active engineered 

controls (AECs), PECs or enhanced 

administrative controls IROFS 

Rarely can be justified by 

evidence. Further, most types 

of single IROFS have been 

observed to fail. 

-3 or -4 10-3 – 10-4

A single passive engineered IROFS or an 

active engineered IROFS with high 

availability 

-2 or -3 10-2 – 10-3

A single active engineered IROFS, a single 

enhanced administrative IROFS, or an 

administrative IROFS for routine planned 

operations 

-1 or -2 10-1 – 10-2

A single administrative IROFS that must be 

performed in response to a rare unplanned 

demand 

-1 10-1

Maximum protection credit given to an nonIROFS engineered or administrative control Such controls lack the 

management measures needed 

for high availability as IROFS 

*Choosing the high (most negative number) range should generally be accompanied with a brief justification in the comment section of risk assignment 

forms. Using values outside of these ranges (more negative) requires detailed justification later in the ISA. 

The overall accident sequence likelihood is determined by summing the three individual indices discussed 

above. This gives a Likelihood Index T, with T = Initiating Event Failure Frequency (FF) Index (Table 5-

8) + Failure Probability (FP) Index for IROFS (Table 5-11). The final likelihood category is based on the 

Likelihood Index as described below in Table 5-12. 

Table 5-12 Likelihood Category Determination 

Likelihood Category Likelihood Index T (sum of index values) 

1 T ≤ -5 

2 -5 < T ≤ -4 

3 -4 < T 

Risk is determined for all accident scenarios with intermediate or high consequence levels. In order to 

meet the performance criteria specified in 10 CFR 70.61 (CFR, 2009), engineered and administrative 

controls must be established, if necessary, such that intermediate severity consequence events have 

Likelihood Category of 1 or 2 and high severity consequence events have a Likelihood Category of 1. 
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5.3 References 

CFR, 2009 10 CFR 70.61. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 70, "Domestic Licensing of 

 Special Nuclear Materials, Section 61, Performance requirements," 2009. 

NRC, 2001 NUREG-1513. "Integrated Safety Analysis Guidance Document." US Nuclear 

 Regulatory Commission, 2001. 

NRC, 2002 NUREG-1520. "Standard Review Plan for the Review of a License Application for a 

 Fuel Cycle Facility," US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2002. 
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6 LIST OF IROFS 

This section lists all of the Items Relied on for Safety designated for high-and intermediate-consequence 

accident sequences. 

6.1 Descriptive List of IROFS 

The list of IROFS that are credited as engineered and administrative controls to either prevent or mitigate 

accidents is provided in Table 6-1. The majority of the IROFS designated for this facility are preventive. 

The IROFS designated for the IIFP Facility ensure that the hazards identified for this facility result in 

potential accident sequences that are of acceptable risk, as defined in LA, Revision B Chapter 4. There are 

no IROFS that are frequently or continuously challenged. The information in the table includes the unique 

IROFS item number, the safety function and description of the IROFS, the type of IROFS control and the 

management measures required to maintain the reliability of the IROFS. 

There are four (4) types of IROFS controls that are used to maintain an acceptable risk level. These four 

(4) types are defined below. 

• Passive Engineered Control: Fixed design features or devices that rely on natural forces such as 

gravity, natural convection, etc., to maintain safe process conditions. No human action is required 

except for maintenance and inspection. 

• Active Engineered Control: A device that relies on in situ electrical, mechanical or hydraulic 

hardware that can sense process conditions and provide automatic action to maintain safe process 

conditions without human intervention. 

• Enhanced Administrative Control: A limit or control that is maintained by action of an individual 

using judgment, training and/or procedures to maintain safe process conditions but is augmented 

by visual, audible or structural aids. 

• Administrative Control (AC): A requirement that is maintained by action of an individual using 

judgment, training and/or procedures to maintain safe process conditions. 

The Table 6-1 description of each IROFS also identifies the Failure Frequency or Failure Probability 

Index Numbers. For indices that are more negative than the lower absolute value nominally assigned to 

the type of IROFS indicated from Table 5-11, a justification is provided. The reliability of an IROFS is 

proportionate to the amount of risk reduction relied upon in the Integrated Safety Analysis. Thus, the level 

of the reliability management measures applied to an IROFS is commensurate with the required 

reliability. Management measures will ensure that IROFS are designed, implemented and maintained, as 

necessary, to be available and reliable to perform their safety function when needed. The degree of 

reliability and availability of IROFS ensured by these measures are consistent with the evaluations of 

accident likelihood in the ISA. As shown in Table 6-1, as a minimum, general high-quality management 

measures are applied to all IROFS. 

The following information related to IROFS will be available onsite in the ISA documentation once final 

design is completed and approved for construction: 

• Hardware IROFS design details, such as system schematics and/or descriptive lists, sufficient to 

determine the structures, systems, components or equipment included within the hardware 

IROFS’ boundary 
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• Identification of essential utilities and support systems on which the IROFS depend to perform 

the intended safety functions 

• Operating ranges and limits for measured process variables, e.g., temperature, pressure, 

associated with IROFS 

• Basis for establishing the average vulnerable outage time to maintain acceptable IROFS 

availability 

• Safety limits and safety margins, as applicable 

Note that some engineered controls, passive and active, contain an administrative function as part of its 

control. For example, fixed cradles for storing DUF6 cylinders still rely on an Operator to properly place 

the cylinder in the cradles. In many cases such controls are assigned as enhanced administrative controls. 

In the remaining cases these IROFS were separated into two distinct IROFS, one engineered and one 

administrative. The latter case was done when the failure modes of the control were uniquely different. 

The goal in all cases is to support the best assignment of accurate failure probabilities or failure 

frequencies of the controls. 

IIFP commits to following acceptable Human Factors Engineering (HFE) guidance for administrative 

components identified in IROFS where human actions are relied upon to ensure the performance of the 

administrative controls. These IROFS will be designed in accordance with applicable guidance provided 

in NUREG-0700, “Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines,” Rev. 2, May 2002, NUREG0711, “Human Factors Engineering Program and Review Model,” Rev. 2, February 2004, and NUREG1520, “Standard Review Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility,” Rev. 1, 

Appendix E, “Human Factors Engineering for Personnel Activities”, May 2010. 
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6.2 Accident Sequences for IROFS 

Table 6-2 lists each IROFS credited in the Section 4 risk tables with reducing the likelihood of postulated 

intermediate and high consequence events to unlikely or highly unlikely levels as required by 10 CFR 

70.61 (CFR, 2009) and references the accident sequence (as found in Section 3.3) that describes the 

conditions needed for the IROFS to reliably perform its function and the effects of its failure. The 

information provided in the IROFS tables form the basis for development of procedures, postings, 

controlled equipment lists and other IROFS implementing documents. The development of management 

measures is further defined in Section 4.2. 

IROFS that prevent or mitigate an accident sequence with high consequences for which there are no other 

IROFS present are subject to higher quality assurance standards (Quality Level 1), and as such, have more 

rigorous management measures applied to them. Accident sequences that have multiple IROFS with 

either high or intermediate consequences, or accident sequences with sole IROFS with intermediate 

consequences, have a somewhat reduced quality standards (Quality Level 2) and management measures 

applied to the IROFS. Sole IROFS (both Quality Level 1 and Quality Level 2) are listed in Section 8.
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6.2 References 

CFR, 2009 10 CFR 70.61. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 70, “Domestic Licensing of 

Special Nuclear Materials, Section 61, Performance Requirements,” 2009. 

 
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7 CHEMICAL CONSEQUENCE STANDARDS 

The quantitative standards used to assess the consequence severity from chemical exposures to licensed 

materials, or chemicals produced by licensed materials before those product chemicals are separated from 

the licensed materials, are shown in Table 7-1. The “level of concern” values shown are derived from the 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs) (EPA, 2009), based 

on an exposure for up to 30 min for public exposure limits and 10 min for worker exposure limits. The 

AEGL-1, -2 and -3 values were used as the threshold concentration levels for establishing a low, 

intermediate, or high consequence as specified in 10 CFR 70.61 (CFR, 2009). When worker exposure 

times differ from the defined level-of-concern exposure times, the level-of-concern values are scaled from 

the published values using Haber’s Law based on the specific accident exposure time. 

Those chemicals that do not have AEGL values, level-of-concern values (shown in Table 7-1) are derived 

from Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPGs) (DOE, 2009). ERPG values are based on 

exposures for up to 60 min and are scaled to 30-min exposures for the public and 10-min exposures for 

workers. The ERPG 1, -2 and -3 values were used as the threshold concentration levels for establishing a 

low, intermediate, or high consequence. 

The performance requirement for high consequence is defined in 10 CFR 70.61 (CFR, 2009) as an intake 

of 30 mg or greater of uranium in soluble form by any individual located outside the controlled area. For 

workers, IIFP intends to use a soluble uranium intake performance requirement for high consequence of 

75 mg or greater. This value corresponds to the threshold for permanent renal damage consistent with a 

high consequence event to a worker as defined in 10 CFR 70.61(b) (4)(i) and has previously been 

approved by the NRC for application to processing of UF6 (NRC,2007b). The soluble uranium intake 

criteria will be applied to intakes of both UF6 and UO2F2. Other uranium materials present in the facility 

(UF4 and UO2) are not considered soluble. 
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7.1 References 

CFR, 2009 10 CFR 70.61. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 70, "Domestic Licensing of 

 Special Nuclear Materials, Section 61, Performance Requirements," 2009. 

DOE, 2009 "Emergency Response Planning Guidelines." Subcommittee on Consequence Assessment 

 and Protective Action, U.S. Department of Energy, 2009. 

EPA, 2009 "Acute Exposure Guidline Levels," US Environmental Protection Agency, 2009. 

NRC, 2007b US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC Accession Number ML072010285, 

 “Communication from Habighorst," NRC to Link, AREVA NP, Inc.” 2007. 

 
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9 DEFINITIONS OF LIKELIHOOD CATEGORIES 

IIFP uses the definitions provided in NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2002) for the likelihood terms of 

10 CFR 70.61 (CFR, 2009). These definitions and their application are described in Section 5.2.4. 

Accident sequences that do not meet the definition of “not credible” are considered credible and treated in 

accordance with 10 CFR 70.61 (CFR, 2009). An accident sequence is considered “not credible” if it has 

the qualities associated with at least one (1) of the following criteria: 

• Represent an external event for which the frequency of occurrence can conservatively be 

estimated as less than once in a million years (10-6) 

• Represent process deviations for which there is a sound argument, based on physical laws or 

sound engineering/technical data that the deviations are not possible, or are extremely unlikely 

The validity of the argument must be independent of any feature, design, or materials controlled 

by a system of safeguards or IROFS or of management measures.
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9.1 References 

CFR, 2009 10 CFR 70.61. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 70, "Domestic Licensing of 

Special Nuclear Materials, Section 61, Performance Requirements," 2009. 

NRC, 2002 NUREG-1520. "Standard Review Plan for the Review of a License Application for a 

Fuel Cycle Facility," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2002.