U.S. Nucle

Office of E

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Enforcement 

ton, DC 20555

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EN

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NFORC

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Year 2012

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Enforcement Program Annual Report

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Enforcement Program Annual Report

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Contents 

Executive Summary ...................................................................................................... v 

I. Program Overview ................................................................................................... 1 

A. Mission and Authority ........................................................................................ 1 

B. Assessment of Escalated Enforcement Actions ............................................. 4 

1. Escalated Enforcement Trends ................................................................... 6 

2. Civil Penalty Actions .................................................................................... 7 

3. Notices of Violation without Civil Penalties ............................................. 10 

4. Enforcement Program Timeliness ............................................................. 11 

5. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) ....................................................... 13 

II. Enforcement Case Work ....................................................................................... 16 

A. Significant Enforcement Actions .................................................................... 16 

B. Hearing Activities ............................................................................................. 21 

C. Orders ................................................................................................................ 21 

D. Enforcement Actions Supported by the Office of Investigations ................. 21 

E. Actions Involving Individuals and Nonlicensee Organizations .................... 22 

F. Enforcement Action Involving Discrimination ............................................... 22 

G. Use of Judgment and Discretion in Determining Appropriate 

Enforcement Sanctions ................................................................................... 22 

1. Discretion Involving Enforcement Guidance ........................................... 23 

2. Discretion Involving Special Circumstances ........................................... 23 

3. Exercise of Discretion to Issue Orders ..................................................... 24 

4. Discretion Used in Determining the Amount of a Civil Penalty .............. 24 

5. Notices of Enforcement Discretion ........................................................... 25 

H. Withdrawn Actions ........................................................................................... 27 

III. Ongoing Activities ................................................................................................. 28 

A. Enforcement Policy .......................................................................................... 28 

1. Enforcement Policy Revisions................................................................... 28 

2. Future Enforcement Policy Revision Activities........................................ 29 

B. Enforcement Guidance Memoranda ............................................................... 29 

C. Knowledge Management.................................................................................. 30 

D. Regional Accomplishments ............................................................................. 31

- TABLES - 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

iv 

Table 1: Escalated Action Trends .................................................................... 6

Table 2: Civil Penalty Information ................................................................... 8

Table 3: CY 2012—Escalated Enforcement Actions by Region 

and Program Office .......................................................................... 32

Table 4: CY 2012—Escalated Enforcement Actions by Type 

of Licensee, Nonlicensee, or Individual ......................................... 33

- FIGURES - 

Figure 1: How the NRC Regulates ..................................................................... 1

Figure 2: Escalated Enforcement by Type of Enforcement Action ................ 4

Figure 3: Escalated Enforcement by Type of Licensee ................................... 5

Figure 4: Escalated Action Trends (CY 2008—CY 2012) ................................. 7

Figure 5: Amount of Proposed Civil Penalties by Type of Licensee for 

CY 2006—2012 .................................................................................... 9

Figure 6: Percentage of Proposed Civil Penalties by Type of Licensee for 

CY 2006—2012 .................................................................................. 10

Figure 7: Escalated Enforcement Issued to Reactor Licensees ................... 11

Figure 8: Non-OI Case Timeliness, Average Number of Days ...................... 12

Figure 9: OI Case Timeliness, Average Number of Days .............................. 13

Figure 10: ADR Confirmatory Orders Issued in CY 2005—2012 ..................... 14

Figure 11: Processing Days to Issue ADR Confirmatory Orders ................... 15

- APPENDICES - 

Appendix A: Summary of Cases Involving Civil Penalties .................................A1

Appendix B: Summary of Escalated Notices of Violation Without Civil Penalties

 ...........................................................................................................B1

Appendix C: Summary of Orders ..........................................................................C1

Appendix D: Summary of Escalated Enforcement Actions against Individuals

 ...........................................................................................................D1

Appendix E: Summary of Escalated Enforcement Actions against Nonlicensees 

(Vendors, Contractors and Certificate Holders) ............................ E1
Enforcement Program Annual Report

v 

Executive Summary 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) effectively implemented the Enforcement 

Policy and Program in calendar year (CY) 2012. Regional and headquarters program offices 

continued to focus on appropriate and consistent enforcement of the agency’s regulations. 

Escalated Enforcement Action Data 

In CY 2012, the agency issued 111 escalated enforcement actions, which included 16 actions 

involving civil penalties totaling $418,700 and 95 escalated notices of violation without a civil 

penalty. The total number of escalated enforcement actions issued in CY 2012 increased by 

15 largely because of an increase in the number of cases at reactor facilities involving licensed 

operators and cases involving radioactive material distributor licensees. Although the number of 

escalated enforcement actions issued in CY 2012 involving a civil penalty is comparable to the 

number issued in CY 2011, the total monetary amount increased by approximately a factor of 

three. This is mainly because of two civil penalties issued to reactor licensees that totaled 

$280,000. Three of the 16 actions involving civil penalties, totaling $14,000, were confirmatory 

orders issued as a result of mediation sessions conducted through the agency’s Alternative 

Dispute Resolution (ADR) Program. In addition, the NRC issued 19 enforcement orders in 

CY 2012, including 7 orders prohibiting individuals from involvement in NRC-licensed activities 

and 11 orders associated with ADR mediation sessions. Although the number of escalated 

enforcement actions without civil penalties increased in CY 2012, it is consistent with the 5-year 

average. Of the 111 escalated enforcement actions issued in CY 2012, the agency withheld 

29 from the public because they involved security or safeguards violations. 

Noteworthy Program Accomplishments 

The Commission approved two separate revisions to the Enforcement Policy in CY 2012, which 

became effective on June 7, 2012, and January 28, 2013 respectively. The Office of 

Enforcement (OE) issued three Enforcement Guidance Memoranda which provide the staff 

information on the dispositioning of specific enforcement actions. In addition, OE assessed 

implementation of the agency’s enforcement program at two regional offices in CY 2012. The 

agency continued the successful use of ADR in 11 enforcement cases. The timeliness goals 

associated with processing escalated enforcement actions reported to Congress in the NRC’s 

Performance Accountability Report were met. 

Significant Cases 

In CY 2012, the agency processed several significant cases that required extensive coordination 

and cooperation between internal and external stakeholders. These significant cases included: 

(1) a Severity Level II violation and Imposition of a Civil Penalty issued to Avera McKennan 

Hospital, (2) a notice of violation associated with three Red significance determination process 

findings issued to Fort Calhoun Station, (3) notices of violation associated with Yellow 

significance determination process findings issued to Palisades Nuclear Power Plant, Salem 

Nuclear Generating Station, and Wolf Creek Nuclear Power Plant, (4) a U. S. Department of 

Justice settlement agreement issued to Pentas Controls, Inc., (5) a confirmatory order issued to 

Honeywell International, Inc., and (6) Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0350, “Oversight of 

Reactor Facilities in a Shutdown Condition due to Significant Performance and/or Operational 

Concerns,” activities at Fort Calhoun Station. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

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Enforcement Program Annual Report

1 

I. Program Overview 

A. Mission and Authority 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulates the civilian uses of 

nuclear materials in the United States to protect public health and safety, the 

environment, and the common defense and security. The agency accomplishes this 

mission through: licensing of nuclear facilities and the possession, use, and disposal 

of nuclear materials; the development and implementation of requirements governing 

licensed activities; and inspection and enforcement activities to ensure compliance 

with these requirements. 

The NRC conducts various types of inspections and investigations designed to ensure 

that the activities it licenses are conducted in strict compliance with the Commission’s 

regulations, the terms of the licenses, and other requirements. 

The NRC’s sources of enforcement authority are the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 

amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and the Energy Policy 

Act of 2005. These statutes give the NRC broad authority. The Energy Policy Act of 

2005 expanded the definition of byproduct material, placing additional byproduct 

material under the NRC’s jurisdiction including both naturally occurring and acceleratorproduced radioactive materials (NARM). The agency implements its enforcement 

authority through Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 2, “Agency 

Rules of Practice and Procedure,” Subpart B, “Procedure for Imposing Requirements by 

Order, or for Modification, Suspension, or Revocation of a License, or for Imposing Civil 

Penalties.” The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 provides the statutory 

framework for the Federal Government to use Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR).

Figure 1: How the NRC Regulates 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

2 

The NRC Enforcement Policy establishes the general principles governing the NRC’s 

Enforcement Program and specifies a process for implementing the agency’s 

enforcement authority in response to violations of NRC requirements. This statement of 

policy is predicated on the NRC’s view that compliance with NRC requirements serves a 

key role in ensuring safety, maintaining security, and protecting the environment. The 

Enforcement Policy applies to all NRC licensees, to various categories of nonlicensees, 

and to individual employees of licensed and nonlicensed firms involved in NRCregulated activities. 

The NRC enforces compliance as necessary. Enforcement actions serve as a deterrent, 

emphasize the importance of compliance with regulatory requirements, and encourage 

prompt identification and prompt, comprehensive correction of violations. In addition, 

because violations occur in a variety of activities and have varying levels of significance, 

the NRC Enforcement Policy contains graduated sanctions. 

Enforcement authority includes the use of notices of violation (NOVs), civil penalties, 

demands for information, and orders to modify, suspend, or revoke a license. The NRC 

staff may exercise discretion in determining the appropriate enforcement sanctions to be 

taken. Most violations are identified through inspections and investigations and, following 

the traditional enforcement process, are normally assigned a severity level (SL) ranging 

from SL IV for those of more than minor concern to SL I for the most significant. 

The Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) compliments the enforcement process for 

operating nuclear reactors. Under the ROP, violations are not normally assigned a 

severity level but instead are assessed through the ROP and usually referred to as 

“findings.” Under this program, the NRC determines the risk significance of inspection 

findings using the significance determination process (SDP), which assigns the colors of 

Green, White, Yellow, or Red with increasing risk significance. Findings under the ROP 

also may include licensee failures to meet self-imposed standards. As such, an ROP 

finding may or may not involve a violation of a regulatory requirement. While the ROP 

processes most violations at operating power reactors, it does not address aspects of 

some violations; such violations require the NRC to follow the traditional enforcement 

process. 

These violations include violations that resulted in actual safety or security 

consequences, violations that may affect the ability of the NRC to perform its regulatory 

oversight function, and violations that involve willfulness. In addition, while ROP findings 

are not normally subject to civil penalties, the NRC does consider civil penalties for 

violations that involve actual consequences. SL IV violations and violations associated 

with Green ROP findings are normally dispositioned as noncited violations (NCVs). 

Inspection reports or inspection records document NCVs and briefly describe the 

corrective action that the licensee has taken or plans to take, if known at the time the 

NCV is documented. Additional information about the ROP is available at 

http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/index.html. 

The Office of Enforcement (OE) develops policies (for Commission consideration) and 

programs for the enforcement of NRC requirements. In addition, OE oversees NRC 

enforcement, giving programmatic and implementation guidance to regional and 

headquarters offices that conduct or are involved in enforcement activities, and ensures 

that regional and program offices consistently implement the agency’s enforcement 

program. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

3 

The Director of OE reports directly to the Deputy Executive Director for Materials, 

Waste, Research, State, Tribal, and Compliance Programs (DEDMRT), and is 

responsible for ensuring that the DEDMRT is kept apprised of certain escalated 

actions. The DEDMRT is consulted in any case that involves novel issues; substantial 

legal, programmatic, or policy issues raised during the enforcement review process; or 

in any case in which the Director of the Office of Enforcement believes the DEDMRT’s 

involvement is warranted. OE works in partnership with NRC headquarters and 

regional offices to enforce the agency’s requirements. 

The NRC’s enforcement Web site (http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/ 

enforcement.html) presents a variety of information, such as the Enforcement Policy, 

the Enforcement Manual, and current temporary enforcement guidance contained in 

enforcement guidance memoranda (EGM). This Web site also has information about 

significant enforcement actions the NRC has issued to reactor and materials licensees, 

nonlicensees (vendors, contractors, and certificate holders), and individuals. 

Consistent with NRC practices and policies, most security-related actions and activities 

are not available on the NRC’s public Web site. The staff’s collection of enforcement 

documents includes security orders that impose compensatory security requirements 

on various licensees. 

 
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Enforcement Program Annual Report

5 

Figure 3 (below) shows the distribution of enforcement actions based on the types of 

licensees to whom the NRC issued escalated enforcement actions in CY 2012. For this 

chart, individual actions were included in the appropriate category of licensee. The 

following charts and the tables at the end of this report give further detail by identifying 

the region or program office that initiated the action, as well as the licensees, 

nonlicensees, and individuals involved.

The total number of escalated enforcement actions issued to materials licensees 

continued to decrease in CY 2012 and reflects a 29 percent decrease from the total 

number of actions issued in CY 2010. This is mainly because of a decrease in 

enforcement actions issued to gauge user licensees (a 59 percent reduction from 

CY 2010 and a 27 percent reduction from CY 2011) and appears to indicate that 

materials licensees have improved their compliance with the security and control 

requirements imposed in 2008. Escalated enforcement actions without civil penalties 

issued to materials licensees were relatively evenly dispersed among the different 

types of licensees, as shown in Table 4, which further indicates improvements in gauge 

user licensee compliance. The number of escalated enforcement actions associated 

with reactor facilities in CY 2012 increased and the actions without a civil penalty 

exceeded the number of actions issued to material licensees. This is mainly because 

of an increase of enforcement actions issued to licensed reactor individuals. The total 

number of escalated enforcement actions issued to fuel cycle facilities decreased, 

mainly due to the significant decrease in the number of enforcement actions associated 

with civil penalties. 

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Escalated NOVs w/o Civil Penalties

NOVs and Orders w/ Civil Penalties

Orders w/o Civil Penalties

Figure 3: Escalated Enforcement by Type of Licensee 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

6 

1. Escalated Enforcement Trends 

In CY 2012, the agency issued 111 escalated enforcement actions which is a 

15 percent increase from that of CY 2011. Although the 111 escalated enforcement 

actions are less than the 5-year average, they are comparable to the average number 

of enforcement actions issued between CY 2009 and CY 2011. The enforcement 

actions issued in CY 2008 were high mainly because of the implementation of the 

materials security-related increased controls requirements and subsequent inspections. 

Table 1 shows a breakdown of the number of escalated enforcement actions from 

CY 2008 to CY 2012 by type of enforcement action. Figure 4 displays this information 

in graphical form. 

Table 1: Escalated Action Trends 

CY 2012 CY 2011 CY 2010 CY 2009 CY 2008 Average 

Escalated 

NOVs 

(w/o CPs) 

79 77 84 76 94 82 

NOVs and 

Orders 

w/CPs 

16 14 24 17 28 20 

Orders 

(w/o CPs) 16 5 15 25 35 19 

Orders 

Imposing 

CPs 

0 0 1 3 0 1 

Total 111 96 124 121 157 122 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

7 

As shown in Table 1, the total number of escalated enforcement actions issued in 

CY 2012 is less than the 5-year average. The number of enforcement actions not 

associated with a civil penalty is consistent with the 5-year average. Although the 

number of enforcement actions associated with civil penalties and orders issued 

without a civil penalty are less than the 5-year average, they are comparable to the 

average over the last 4 years (CY 2008 had an abnormally high number of enforcement 

actions issued). 

2. Civil Penalty Actions

In CY 2012, the agency processed 16 enforcement actions that involved civil penalties. 

Seven of these cases involved willfulness which is defined as either deliberate 

misconduct or careless disregard. The Commission is particularly concerned with the 

identification of willful violations. The NRC’s regulatory program is based on licensees 

and their contractors, employees, and agents acting with integrity and communicating 

with candor; therefore, the agency may consider a violation involving willfulness to be 

more egregious than the underlying violation, taken alone, would have been, and it may 

increase the severity level accordingly. Three of the 16 enforcement actions were 

associated with ADR settlements following mediation sessions. 

 

94

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40

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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Escalated NOVs w/o Civil Penalties

NOVsand Orders w/Civil Penalties

Orders w/o Civil Penalties

Figure 4: Escalated Action Trends (CY 2008—CY 2012) 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

8 

Table 2: Civil Penalty Information

Table 2 compares civil penalty assessments proposed, imposed, and paid for the 

current calendar year to those of the previous 5 years and the 5-year average. When 

reviewing the information in this table, it is important to note that an enforcement action 

may include more than one violation. In addition, a civil penalty may be proposed in 

one year and paid or imposed in another year. In some cases, the NRC has approved 

a civil penalty payment plan in which a licensee is permitted to pay the civil penalty in 

regular installments. Finally, the amount of a proposed civil penalty may be reduced, 

for example, as a result of exercising discretion as part of a settlement agreement 

developed during ADR. 

The total number of civil penalties proposed in CY 2012 increased slightly from the 

number proposed in CY 2011 and is below the average number proposed over the last 

5 years. The total dollar amount of proposed civil penalties increased significantly 

(approximately by a factor of three) in CY 2012 compared to CY 2011. This is a result 

of civil penalties issued to Florida Power and Light Company and Entergy Nuclear 

Operations for violations identified at the Turkey Point and River Bend Nuclear Power 

Plants respectively, each of which were assessed a $140,000 civil penalty. No reactor 

licensee was issued a civil penalty in CY 2011. 

 

1 The NRC issues an “order imposing civil monetary penalty” when a licensee chooses not to pay a 

proposed civil penalty, unless a basis exists for withdrawal of the proposed penalty. 

CY 2012 CY 2011 CY 2010 CY 2009 CY 2008 Average 

Number of Proposed 

Civil Penalties 16 14 23 17 28 20 

Number of Orders 

that Imposed Civil 

Penalties 0 0 1 3 0 1 

Number of Civil 

Penalties Paid 14 11 21 15 29 18 

Amount of Proposed 

Civil Penalties $418,700 $146,750 $673,700 $174,000 $1,185,900 $519,810 

Amount of Imposed 

Civil Penalties1 $0 $0 $32,500 $29,250 $0 $12,350 

Amount of Civil 

Penalties Paid $412,182 $123,529 $639,480 $279,750 $1,039,850 $498,958 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

9 

The number and amount of civil penalties associated with ADR settlements decreased 

from those issued in CY 2011. Only three such civil penalties were issued in CY 2012 

compared to five in CY 2011, even though the total number of ADR cases increased 

from 7 to 11. The amount of civil penalties associated with ADR settlements decreased 

from $50,000 in CY 2011 to $14,000 in CY 2012. Although each case is unique and 

settled on its specific merits, the staff will monitor this trend in the future. 

Figure 5: Amount of Proposed Civil Penalties by Type of Licensee for 

CY 2006-2012

Figure 5 shows the dollar amount of civil penalties proposed for reactor, materials, and fuel 

facility licensees in CY 2012 and the preceding 6 years. Figure 6 shows a significant increase 

in the percentage of the total civil penalty amount issued to reactor licenses compared to fuel 

cycle and materials licensees in CY 2012. This is because of the two civil penalties issued to 

reactor licensees in CY 2012 as discussed above. The largest peaks frequently are the result of 

a single civil penalty (e.g., Indian Point Nuclear Station in 2008 and the Philadelphia VA Medical 

Center in 2010). As a consequence, a single year may not indicate a trend, an important factor 

to consider in assessing possible trends. However, the total dollar amount of civil penalties 

issued to material licensees in CY 2012 is relatively consistent with past year amounts (other 

than the aforementioned CY 2010). Likewise, the dollar amount of civil penalties issued to fuel 

facility licensees in CY 2012 is relatively consistent with past year amounts (other than CY 2010 

when three licensees were assessed a total of $192,500 in civil penalties). 

0

100,000

200,000

300,000

400,000

500,000

600,000

700,000

800,000

900,000

1,000,000

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Proposed Civil Penalty in U.S. Dollars

Calendar Year

Reactor

Fuel Facility

Materials
Enforcement Program Annual Report

10 

 

Figure 6: Percentage of Proposed Civil Penalties by Type of Licensee for 

CY 2006—2012

Appendix A to this report includes a brief description of each of the civil penalty actions 

for CY 2012. Security related issues involving NOVs with civil penalties are not 

addressed in Appendix A; however, the number of NOVs associated with security 

related issues is included in the data discussed in this report. 

3. Notices of Violation without Civil Penalties

In accordance with Section 2.3.4 of the Enforcement Policy, a civil penalty may not be 

warranted for escalated enforcement actions if certain criteria are met. For instance, 

(1) the identified violation is the first nonwillful SL III violation identified in the past 2 

years or two inspections at the licensee’s facility and the licensee took adequate 

corrective action to prevent its recurrence, or (2) this was not the first nonwillful SL III 

violation identified in the past 2 years or two inspections, but the licensee self-identified 

the violation and took adequate corrective action to prevent its recurrence. In addition, 

the agency may use enforcement discretion, when deemed appropriate, to refrain from 

proposing a civil penalty, regardless of the normal civil penalty assessment process 

described above. 

In CY 2012, the NRC issued 95 escalated NOVs without civil penalties. Of these 

violations, 21 were associated with White SDP findings under the ROP. Three 

violations were associated with Yellow SDP findings, and three violations were 

associated with Red SDP findings which is a significant increase from violations 

associated with Yellow and Red findings in CY 2011. Thirteen power reactor facility 

related SL III violations not associated with a civil penalty were issued in CY 2012 

compared to four issued in CY 2011. This is mainly due to six SLIII violations issued to 

0%

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2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

% of Total Proposed Civil Penalties

Proposed Civil Penalities 2006-2012

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Enforcement Program Annual Report

12 

In addition to the external goals, the NRC staff continues to use the additional 

timeliness measures (internal goals) for trending purposes and to provide information to 

support potential improvements to the processes. The internal goals are: 

(1) completing non-OI cases in an average NRC processing time of less than or equal 

to 120 days; and (2) completing OI cases in an average NRC processing time of less 

than or equal to 180 days. 

The NRC processing time starts on the latest of the following dates: (1) the inspection 

exit for non-OI cases; (2) the date of the OI memorandum forwarding the report to staff 

for OI related cases; (3) the date that the Department of Justice (DOJ) indicates NRC 

may proceed for cases either prosecuted or reviewed for an extended period of time by 

DOJ; or (4) the date of the Department of Labor decision that is the basis for the action. 

All OI related enforcement actions were issued in less than 330 processing days and all 

non-OI related enforcement actions were issued in less than 160 processing days. 

Therefore, the external goals for dispositioning OI and non-OI related enforcement 

actions were met in FY 2012. Figure 8 below shows that, on the average, the agency 

required 76 days to issue a non-OI related enforcement action. This is less than the 

goal of 120 processing days and continues a decreasing trend. Figure 9 shows that, on 

the average, the agency required 227 days to issue an OI related enforcement action. 

This is greater than the goal and is an increase in average processing time after a 

steady decreasing trend over the previous 3 years. The staff will examine the 

casework which resulted in the goal being exceeded to determine what corrective 

actions can be taken to improve timeliness following OI case completion. The staff will 

continue to monitor this trend in future years.

Figure 8: Non-OI Case Timeliness, Average Number of Days

106

90

90

90

79

83 86

76

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012

Average 

Days

Internal 

Metric
Enforcement Program Annual Report

13 

Figure 9: OI Case Timeliness, Average Number of Days

5. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 

The term ''postinvestigation ADR'' refers to the use of mediation after the NRC Office of 

Investigations (OI) has completed its investigation and an enforcement panel has 

concluded that pursuit of an enforcement action appears to be warranted. Under the 

NRC’s postinvestigation ADR process, mediation may be offered at three points in the 

traditional enforcement process for discrimination and other wrongdoing cases: 

(1) before a predecisional enforcement conference; (2) after the initial enforcement 

action is taken, typically the issuance of an NOV; or (3) after cases result in the 

issuance of an order imposing a civil penalty, but before a hearing request. Mediation 

is an informal and voluntary process in which a neutral mediator with no decisionmaking authority helps the parties attempt to reach an agreement. For certain 

escalated enforcement actions mediation provides an opportunity to achieve broader or 

more comprehensive corrective actions to better ensure public health and safety than 

outcomes typically achieved through the traditional enforcement process. For example, 

many times actions are taken fleetwide at reactor licensees to prevent occurrence at 

more than the site where the apparent violation occurred. 

As Figure 10 shows, the number of confirmatory orders arising from the postinvestigation 

ADR program generally stayed at the same levels of approximately 5 to 10 confirmatory 

orders per year (excluding the uncharacteristically high number in CY 2009). In CY 2012, 

the NRC participated in 11 postinvestigation ADR mediations that resulted in orders 

confirming the terms of the parties’ agreement (five reactor licensees, one reactor 

licensee contractor (a discrimination case), one licensed reactor operator, three materials 

licensees, and one individual that a materials licensee employed). 

168

171

247

224

227

195

181

227

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012

Average 

Days

Internal 

Metric
Enforcement Program Annual Report

14 

In CY 2012, the staff implemented several initiatives to enhance the postinvestigation 

ADR Program’s timeliness, transparency and overall effectiveness. Those initiatives 

included (1) holding a public meeting to solicit feedback from the program’s public 

stakeholders; (2) redesigning the program’s public Web page, thereby making more 

information available; (3) revising several program documents, such as the 

postinvestigation brochure; and, (4) issuing more internal and external guidance 

documents. Although the realization of the impact of the NRC’s ADR initiatives is more 

evolutionary than instantaneous, the timeliness data (Figure 11) reflects a positive 

trend. 

Figure 10: ADR Confirmatory Orders Issued in CY 2005—2012 

5

2

1

2

111

6

7

7

12

22

8

6

10

0

5

10

15

20

25

CY 2005 CY 2006 CY 2007 CY 2008 CY 2009 CY 2010 CY 2011 CY 2012

Wrongdoing Cases

Discrimination Cases
Enforcement Program Annual Report

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Figure 11: Processing Days to Issue ADR Confirmatory Orders

143

173

168 165 161

130

104

99

0

50

100

150

200

CY 2005 CY 2006 CY 2007 CY 2008 CY 2009 CY 2010 CY 2011 CY 2012
Enforcement Program Annual Report

16 

II. Enforcement Case Work 

A. Significant Enforcement Actions 

In CY 2012, the agency was involved in several significant enforcement actions that 

required coordination among internal and external stakeholders beyond the typical 

enforcement case and which were noteworthy in some aspects. 

 

Pentas Controls, Inc. 

 

In February 2011, the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) initiated an investigation into an 

allegation of discrimination involving Pentas Controls, Inc. (PCI). During the first 

investigation, OI initiated a second investigation in April 2011 to determine if the 

president of PCI made material false statements to OI during a deposition taken under 

oath. PCI, a nuclear vendor, refurbishes controls and power supplies and is listed as a 

safety-related basic component supplier by the Nuclear Procurement Issues 

Committee. 

The first investigation substantiated the alleged discrimination. The second 

investigation concluded that the president made material false statements to conceal 

the fact that he directed a PCI employee to switch a display from an instrument chassis 

of one nuclear power plant with the display of another nuclear power plant, and sent the 

repaired chassis with the switched display without informing either nuclear power plant 

that PCI had taken this action. The investigation also concluded that the president 

directed other employees and previous employees to: (1) provide false statements to 

OI while under oath to support his material false statements; (2) file off the serial 

number on the switched display; and (3) destroy records related to repair of the display. 

Because of the egregiousness of the president’s actions, the U. S. Department of 

Justice (DOJ) prosecuted the case in Federal court. The president pled guilty to making 

false statements to OI, a felony, and was sentenced on February 11, 2013. In 

exchange for his guilty plea, the president will serve a 5 year probation during which 

time he will complete several conditions that the NRC developed and included in the 

DOJ’s global settlement agreement. The NRC will monitor these conditions. These 

conditions were developed in CY 2012 and required extensive interaction between the 

NRC Offices of Enforcement, General Counsel, Investigations, and New Reactors 

(which provides for vendor-related inspection and enforcement), and DOJ. 

Because DOJ prosecuted this case, the NRC did not propose further enforcement 

action against the parties in accordance with the Enforcement Policy and the conditions 

of probation included in the settlement agreement. 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

17 

Honeywell International Inc. 

 

On September 30, 2011, the NRC issued Temporary Instruction (TI) 2600/015, 

“Evaluation of Licensee Strategies for the Prevention and/or Mitigation of Emergencies 

at Fuel Facilities,” to independently verify that fuel facility licensees are adequately 

prepared to prevent and/or mitigate the consequences of selected safety or licensing 

bases events and to evaluate the adequacy of those emergency prevention and/or 

mitigation strategies for dealing with the consequences of those events. The TI 

2600/015 inspections were in response to the March 2011 Tohoku-Taiheiyou-Oki 

earthquake near Honshu, Japan, which caused significant damage to the Fukushima 

Dai-ichi nuclear power station (Fukushima). 

An inspection was conducted at the Honeywell International fuel fabrication facility in 

Metropolis, IL, on May 21 - 24, 2012, in accordance with TI 2600/015. As a result of 

this inspection two apparent violations were identified involving (1) the failure to identify 

all relevant accident sequences related to credible seismic events and tornadoes that 

could result in large uranium hexafluoride (UF6) releases for which protective actions 

may be needed as required by 10 CFR 40.31(j)(3); and (2) the failure to provide 

complete and accurate information related to Honeywell Metropolis Works’ Emergency 

Response Plan (ERP) as 10 CFR 40.9(a) requires. The inspection also identified 

significant concerns related to the licensee’s UF6 and hydrogen fluoride (HF) source 

terms, used as a basis for the Honeywell ERP. The design of the process equipment in 

Honeywell’s Feed Materials Building lack seismic restraints, supports, and bracing that 

would assure process equipment integrity during a credible seismic event or tornado. 

Specifically, when the facility is operating, the amount of UF6 that could be released 

during a credible seismic event or tornado could be significantly larger than that 

assumed in the development of the facility’s ERP. 

Because the Honeywell facility had been shut down for a planned maintenance outage 

since May 9, 2012, no immediate safety concern existed. However, the NRC 

concluded that significant corrective actions were necessary to provide reasonable 

assurance of public health and safety. On July 13, 2012, a confirmatory action letter 

(CAL) was issued documenting the corrective actions necessary prior to allowing the 

facility to restart operations (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 

(ADAMS) Accession No. ML12198A109). In evaluating the appropriate enforcement 

action, the staff concluded that in lieu of issuance of an NOV and consideration of a 

civil penalty for the above apparent violations, formalizing the corrective actions 

proposed necessitated issuance of a confirmatory order, consistent with Section 3.7 of 

the NRC’s Enforcement Policy. On October 15, 2012, a confirmatory order was issued 

to Honeywell specifying the corrective actions required to be taken before the NRC 

authorized restart of operations (ADAMS Accession No. ML12289A800). This 

confirmatory order supersedes the CAL issued on July 13, 2012. 

The NRC is monitoring the licensee’s progress of the required modifications to the 

Honeywell Metropolis facility. In determining the appropriate enforcement action and 

followup activities, the NRC communicated with local governments and public 

stakeholders as well as coordinated with NRC Offices of Enforcement, General 

Counsel, Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Region II and the U. S. Geological 

Service. 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

18 

Inspection Manual Chapter 0350 Activities at Fort Calhoun Station 

In 2011, an outage at the Omaha Public Power District’s Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) 

was extended because of the Missouri River flooding that affected the site from June 

through September 2011. Performance concerns involving the recovery actions 

associated with the flood have delayed restart of the facility. These concerns include 

restoration of plant systems, security, and geotechnical and site restoration. As a result 

of the continuous performance assessment of FCS, on December 13, 2011, the NRC 

modified its regulatory oversight to Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0350 "Oversight of 

Reactor Facilities in a Shutdown Condition due to Significant Performance and/or 

Operations Concerns," rather than the usual IMC 0305, "Operating Reactor 

Assessment Program." The IMC 0350 process establishes a regulatory oversight 

framework that adheres to implementation of an oversight panel, inspection plan, 

restart checklist and a record of actions taken and technical issues resolved to provide 

adequate protection of public health and safety, and security. These actions were 

agreed to in a CAL dated September 2, 2011. On February 26, 2013, the NRC issued 

a revised CAL to confirm corrective actions that the NRC determined needed to be 

reviewed or inspected before the plant restarted. 

 

The IMC 0350 process is available on the NRC website at: http://www.nrc.gov/infofinder/reactor/fcs/special-oversight.html. The IMC 0350 Oversight Panel reviews 

apparent deficiencies, findings and violations identified during IMC 0350 inspections. 

The functions of the normal enforcement process, including the review of apparent 

escalated violations, conducting regulatory conferences, and the issuance of NOVs 

with civil penalties or orders are superseded by the authority given to the Oversight 

Panel. The panel reviews all greater-than-green issues and documents them in an 

inspection report. The significance of these findings are typically bounded by the 

Yellow finding associated with the flooding event and therefore are not characterized by 

a color significance. Since the NRC evaluates identified deficiencies, findings and 

violations under the IMC 0350 process and captures them in the restart checklist, there 

is typically no regulatory conference. The licensee always has the option to request a 

conference, present its position on an item, or dispute a deficiency, finding or violation 

under the normal process. 

The following is a summary of the significant enforcement actions processed under 

IMC 0350, in which the items are documented in an inspection report issued in 

CY 2012 and captured in the restart checklist. 

(EA-12-023) On April 10, 2012, an NOV was issued for a violation associated with 

three Red SDP findings associated with inadequate design control and corrective 

actions that contributed to a switchgear fire event. Specifically, the violation involved: 

• The failure to ensure that the new modification to the 480 Vac load center breakers 

met the design requirements as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, 

"Design Control." This resulted in the catastrophic switchgear fire caused by 

high-resistance connections within the switchgear; 

 

• Inadequate corrective actions from 2008, to prevent high resistance connections in 

load center 1B4A due to the presence of hardened grease and oxidation, as 

required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions". The 

procedure did not contain adequate guidance for torquing bolted connections or 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

19 

measuring abnormal connection temperatures due to loose electrical connections in 

the bus compartment of the switchgear; and, 

• The failure to ensure that design reviews for electrical protection and train 

separation of the 480 Vac electrical power distribution system were adequate to 

ensure that a fire in a load center would not adversely affect operation of redundant 

safety shutdown equipment as required by License Condition 3.D, "Fire Protection 

Program." 

(EA-12-095) On September 14, 2012, a violation bounded by the Yellow SDP 

finding associated with the flooding was issued for maintaining inadequate procedures, 

inadequate classification of intake structure sluice gates, and not meeting the 

requirements for the design basis flood event. Specifically, the violation involved: 

• Maintaining inadequate procedures contrary to Technical Specification 5.8.1.a and 

Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, 1978. The licensee's procedures 

were inadequate to mitigate the consequences of external flooding by: (1) failing to 

provide operators with sufficient information to ensure a transfer of power from 

offsite to an onsite emergency diesel generator prior to a loss of offsite power, 

(2) failing to identify that the class-1E powered motor operators of the six intake 

structure sluice gates were located at an elevation of 1,010 feet mean sea level, 

(3) failing to identify that three of the six sluice gate motor operators would be 

de-energized when offsite power was transferred from offsite to one onsite 

emergency diesel generator, and (4) not adequately ensuring the fuel transfer hose 

to the emergency diesel generator day tanks was staged prior to river level 

exceeding 1,004 feet mean sea level. 

• Failing to classify the six intake structure exterior sluice gates and their motor 

operators as Safety Class III as defined in the Updated Safety Analysis Report, 

Appendix N as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, “Design Control.” 

• Failing to translate design basis requirements for protection of the safety related 

raw water system during a design basis flood as required by 10 CFR 50, “Design 

Control,” Appendix B, Criterion III. Specifically, the design basis states that water 

level inside the intake cells can be controlled during a design basis flood by 

positioning the exterior sluice gates to restrict the inflow into the cells and this 

operation was not assured under all design basis conditions. 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

20 

Violations Associated with Red and Yellow Findings 

In CY 2012, the NRC issued NOVs associated with three Red SDP findings to one 

reactor licensee and three separate Yellow SDP findings to three additional reactor 

licensees. In CY 2011 the NRC issued one violation associated with a Red SDP 

finding and one violation associated with a Yellow finding. Short summaries of the 

nonsecurity cases issued in CY 2012 are listed below. 

• On April 10, 2012, an NOV associated with three Red SDP findings was issued to 

Omaha Public Power District for three violations identified at the Fort Calhoun 

Station. The Red findings involved a deficient modification, inadequate 

maintenance of the safety-related 480 Vac electrical distribution system, and a 

failure to maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program 

that resulted in a catastrophic switchgear fire. Details of the NOV are discussed in 

the IMC 0350 activities section above. 

• On February 14, 2012, an NOV associated with a Yellow SDP finding was issued to 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. as a result of an inspection at the Palisades 

Nuclear Power Plant for a violation involving the failure to ensure that the work 

performed on Electrical Bus D11-2 was prescribed by documented instructions or 

procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and accomplished in 

accordance with the instructions or procedures as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix 

B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings.” Specifically, on 

September 25, 2011, the work order instructions did not provide critical steps and 

lacked proper step progression. The work order instructions also included action 

steps which were not implemented. In addition, workers attempted to remove a 

horizontal positive bus bar in Bus D11-2, which was not a prescribed step in the 

work order instructions. As a result, these performance deficiencies caused an 

electrical fault which caused the loss of the left train 125-Volt DC safety-related 

system and loss of both preferred AC sources associated with the left train DC 

system. 

• On September 21, 2012, an NOV associated with a Yellow SDP finding was issued to 

the Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation as a result of an inspection at the 

Wolf Creek Nuclear Power Plant for a violation involving the failure to implement 

maintenance on safety-related equipment in accordance with written procedures as 

required by TS 5.4.1(a) and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 9.a. 

Specifically, although required by a work order, the licensee failed to install insulating 

sleeves on two splices associated with a startup transformer protective relay circuit. 

The startup transformer subsequently experienced a trip and lockout. The protective 

lockout caused a prolonged loss of offsite power to all Train B equipment and all 

nonsafety related buses. 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

21 

B. Hearing Activities

There were no enforcement-related proceedings held before the Atomic Safety and 

Licensing Board in CY 2012. 

C. Orders

In CY 2012, the NRC issued 19 orders to licensees, nonlicensees, and individuals. These 

orders do not include orders revoking a license issued by the Office of the Chief Financial 

Officer for lack of required payment of fees. Eleven of the 19 orders are confirmatory 

orders that were issued to confirm commitments associated with ADR settlement 

agreements. Three of these orders included a requirement to pay a civil penalty as a result 

of the settlement agreements. Two of the 11 ADR orders were issued to two individuals as 

a result of separate successful mediations sessions. One order associated with employee 

discrimination was issued to a vendor providing consulting services to a reactor licensee. 

Seven of the 19 orders were issued to individuals. One individual is prohibited from 

involvement in NRC-licensed activities until specific actions are taken to ensure reasonable 

assurance is provided for the protection of public health and safety. Orders issued to 

individuals prohibiting involvement in NRC licensed activities include: one individual for 

5 years; one individual for 3 years; one individual for 18 months; and three individuals for 

1 year. 

As shown in Table 1, the number of orders the NRC issued in CY 2012 increased from 

CY 2011 partly because of an increase in the number of cases involving individuals. 

 

Appendix C includes a brief description of the enforcement orders issued in CY 2012. 

D. Enforcement Actions Supported by the Office of Investigations

In CY 2012, OI investigations supported 33 percent of the escalated enforcement actions 

(37 of the 111). The escalated actions supported by OI investigations include the following: 

• 7 of the 15 escalated NOVs with civil penalties (47 percent) 

• 12 of the 77 escalated NOVs without civil penalties (16 percent) 

• 16 of the 19 enforcement orders (84 percent) 

The 37 enforcement actions that OI investigations supported are higher than the 

21 enforcement actions supported in CY 2011, but they are equal to the average number of 

enforcement actions OI investigations supported over the previous 5 years 

(CY 2007 – CY 2011). The percentage of enforcement actions that OI investigations 

supported (33 percent) is slightly higher than the percentage of enforcement actions that 

OI investigations supported over the previous 5-year period of CY 2007 through CY 2011 

(31 percent). 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

22 

E. Actions Involving Individuals and Nonlicensee Organizations

In CY 2012, the agency issued 18 escalated enforcement actions to licensed and 

unlicensed individuals. This number is included in the total number of escalated 

enforcement actions (NOVs and orders) that the agency issued in CY 2012. Appendix C 

summarizes the orders that were issued to individuals and Appendix D summarizes the 

NOVs issued to individuals in CY 2012. These appendices do not include individual 

enforcement actions involving security related violations. The number of escalated actions 

issued to individuals in CY 2012 is a significant increase from the seven escalated actions 

issued to individuals in CY 2011 and is comparable to the17 issued in CY 2009. 

The agency issued one escalated enforcement action to a nonlicensee organization in 

CY 2012. Appendix E summarizes this action. 

F. Enforcement Action Involving Discrimination 

In CY 2012, one case involving an allegation of discrimination was resolved using 

postinvestigation ADR. This is equivalent to the number processed in CY 2011 and 

CY 2010. On April 17, 2012, the NRC issued a confirmatory order (EA-11-254) to 

confirm commitments made as result of an ADR mediation session held on March 12, 

2012, between ABSG Consulting Inc. (ABSG) and the NRC. This confirmatory order 

arose out of an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.7, “Employee Protection,” in which the 

NRC had reached a preliminary conclusion that an ABSG was terminated on 

September 28, 2009, because the employee participated in a Commission proceeding 

before the NRC Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel. A more detailed discuss of 

this case is located in Appendix E. 

G. Use of Judgment and Discretion in Determining Appropriate 

Enforcement Sanctions

The NRC may choose to exercise discretion and either escalate or mitigate 

enforcement sanctions or otherwise refrain from taking enforcement action within its 

statutory authority. The exercise of discretion allows the NRC to determine which 

actions should be taken in a particular case, notwithstanding the guidance contained in 

the Enforcement Policy. After considering the general tenets of the Enforcement Policy 

and the safety and security significance of a violation and its surrounding 

circumstances, the NRC may exercise judgment and discretion in determining the 

severity levels of violations and the appropriate enforcement sanctions. 

In CY 2012, the NRC exercised enforcement discretion in 47 cases to address 

violations of NRC requirements. This is a 38 percent increase from the number of 

cases in CY 2011 mainly because of the increase in the use of discretion, in 

accordance with EGM-09-004, to disposition violations of the Naturally Occurring and 

Accelerator-Produced Radioactive Materials (NARM) requirements. Below is a 

discussion of the significant cases dispositioned with discretion in CY 2012. 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

23 

1. Discretion Involving Enforcement Guidance 

In 30 cases, the NRC used discretion in accordance with either the Interim 

Enforcement Policy guidance related to fire protection issues (Section 9.1 of the 

Enforcement Policy) or an enforcement guidance memorandum (EGM). 

• The NRC continued to perform fire protection inspections at power reactor sites to 

verify compliance with requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, “Fire Protection 

Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979.” 

Violations of these requirements that were identified at sites transitioning to the 

National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 (NFPA 805) and met the criteria 

as stated in the Interim Enforcement Policy, “Enforcement Discretion for Certain 

Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48)” warranted enforcement discretion and 

notices of violation were not issued. Six documented cases involved this type of 

discretion. One case involved the extension of the 3-year enforcement discretion 

period after the licensee provided adequate justification for an extension. This 

extension was issued as a confirmatory order.

• The agency dispositioned 17 violations using discretion in accordance with 

EGM-09-004, “Interim Guidance for Dispositioning Violations of Naturally Occurring 

and Accelerator-Produced Radioactive Materials (NARM) Requirements,” dated 

May 13, 2009. Enforcement discretion may be exercised for violations of the NARM 

requirements if certain criteria are met as described in EGM-09-004. 

• The NRC dispositioned five violations using discretion in accordance with 

EGM-11-004, “Interim Guidance for Dispositioning Violations of Security 

Requirements for Portable Gauges," dated April 28, 2011. Enforcement discretion 

may be exercised for violations of 10 CFR 30.34(i) if certain criteria are met as 

described in EGM-11-004. 

• The NRC dispositioned two violations using discretion in accordance with 

EGM-11-003, "Dispositioning Boiling Water Reactor Licensee Non-Compliance with 

Technical Specification Containment Requirements During Operations with a 

Potential for Draining the Reactor Vessel," dated October 4, 2011. Enforcement 

discretion may be exercised for violations of certain Technical Specification 

requirements at boiling-water reactors if certain criteria are met as described in 

EGM-11-003. 

2. Discretion Involving Special Circumstances 

Eight cases involved the use of discretion to disposition violations in accordance with 

Section 3.5 of the Enforcement Policy, “Special Circumstances.” In seven cases, the 

staff determined that the facts supported issuance of a closeout letter to the licensee 

instead of an NOV. In one case, the staff determined that the facts supported 

categorizing the violation at SL IV and not issuing a NOV and a civil penalty for a SLIII 

violation. Below is a discussion of some of the significant cases dispositioned in 

CY 2012. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

24 

• A violation of 10 CFR 34.46, “Supervision of Radiographers’ Assistants,” normally 

categorized at SL III, was dispositioned using enforcement discretion in accordance 

with Section 3.5 of the Enforcement Policy. In Prudhoe Bay, AK, two radiographer’s 

assistants conducted radiography while not under the supervision of a radiographer. 

An NRC review of the specific facts for this case identified that, among other 

considerations: (1) the violation was isolated to a single occurrence of brief duration 

and did not involve willful noncompliance; (2) the licensee’s procedure resulted in 

the identification of the incident within hours; (3) the licensee promptly notified the 

NRC of the incident, when notification was not required, and afforded the NRC an 

opportunity to review the licensee’s corrective actions; (4) the licensee took 

immediate and comprehensive corrective actions; (5) the incident posed no 

significant potential for safety or security consequences; and (6) programmatic 

weakness was not indicated. Therefore, the NRC categorized this violation at SL IV. 

• The NRC dispositioned violations at four reactor facilities in accordance with 

Section 3.5 of the Enforcement Policy for equipment that was declared inoperable 

for a period of time that exceeded the applicable technical specification limit. In 

each case, the staff concluded that although the individual issues constituted a 

violation, the reason for the equipment inoperability was not within the licensee’s 

control to detect. The NRC dispositioned a violation at a materials licensee similarly 

in accordance with Section 3.5 of the Enforcement Policy related to an unauthorized 

disposal of licensed material. Although unauthorized disposal of licensed material 

constitutes a violation, the staff concluded that the violation resulted from matters 

not reasonably within the licensee’s ability to foresee and control. 

• The NRC concluded that the merits of two cases warranted disposition of violations 

in accordance with Section 3.5 of the Enforcement Policy because of inadequate or 

lack of clear guidance. Further details are not provided because of the security 

nature of the violations. 

3. Exercise of Discretion to Issue Orders 

One case involved use of discretion to issue a confirmatory order instead of issuance of 

an NOV with a civil penalty to formalize corrective actions in accordance with Section 

3.7 of the Enforcement Policy. On October 10, 2012, a confirmatory order was issued 

to Honeywell International, Inc. to formalize the corrective actions committed to in the 

CAL issued on July 13, 2012. This confirmatory order was issued in lieu of an NOV for 

violations identified during an inspection at the Honeywell Metropolis Works facility. 

The confirmatory order supersedes CAL dated July 13, 2012. (See Appendix C for 

further details). 

4. Discretion Used in Determining the Amount of a Civil Penalty 

The staff exercised enforcement discretion, in accordance with Section 3.6 of the 

Enforcement Policy, to escalate the amount of a proposed civil penalty in two cases 

and to forego the imposition of a civil penalty in another case to ensure that the 

enforcement actions properly reflected the significance of the circumstances of the 

violations. These enforcement actions differed from the action that would have resulted 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

25 

from application of the normal civil penalty assessment process described in Section 

2.3.4 of the Enforcement Policy. In CY 2011, the staff exercised enforcement 

discretion to forego proposing a civil penalty in one case. 

• In recognition of particularly poor performance by Avera McKennan Hospital 

(Avera), the staff exercised enforcement discretion and doubled the $5,600 civil 

penalty derived from the normal civil penalty assessment process for a SL II 

violation associated with medical events (NMED 120067) that occurred on January 

16 and 17, 2012. This violation was a repeat violation resulting in radiation 

underexposures to the intended treatment site and exposures to an unintended site 

on two consecutive days. A proposed Imposition of a civil penalty in the amount of 

$11,200 was issued to Avera on October 3, 2012. (See Appendix A for further 

details). 

• In recognition of particularly poor performance by JANX Integrity Group, Inc. 

(JANX), the staff exercised enforcement discretion and doubled the $14,000 civil 

penalty derived from the normal civil penalty assessment process for two SL III 

safety violations identified as a result of a radiography inspection. Normally, a base 

civil penalty in the amount of $7,000 would be proposed for each SL III violation of 

this type. In addition, the staff exercised enforcement discretion and doubled the 

$7,000 civil penalty derived from the normal civil penalty assessment process for 

one of two security violations associated with the same event. A proposed 

Imposition of a civil penalty in the amount of $28,000 for the two safety violations 

and $21,000 for the two security violations was issued to JANX on June 25, 2012. 

(See Appendix A for further details). 

• The NRC concluded that enforcement discretion to forego proposing a civil penalty 

was appropriate in the case of a McGarvin-Moberly Construction Company repeat 

SL III violation involving inadequate control of a portable radiographic device. The 

basis of the agency’s conclusion was that the licensee took effective immediate 

corrective actions and the licensee terminated its license. Normally a base civil 

penalty in the amount of $3,500 would be proposed for a violation of this type. 

Further details are not provided because of the security nature of the violation. 

5. Notices of Enforcement Discretion 

Occasionally, circumstances may arise in which a power reactor licensee’s compliance 

with a technical specification or other license condition would require a plant transient 

or performance testing, inspection, or other system realignment that is of greater risk 

than the current specific plant conditions. In these circumstances, the NRC staff may 

choose not to enforce the applicable requirements. The staff exercises this 

enforcement discretion, designated as a notice of enforcement discretion (NOED) in 

accordance with Section 3.8 of the Enforcement Policy, only if it is clearly satisfied that 

the action is consistent with protecting the public health and safety. The staff may also 

issue NOEDs in cases involving severe weather or other natural phenomena when it 

determines that exercising this discretion will not compromise safety. NOEDs require 

justification from a licensee or certificate holder that documents the safety basis for the 

request and provides whatever other information the staff deems necessary to issue an 

NOED. The NRC issued five NOEDs in CY 2012 and denied one request for a NOED. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

26 

• NOED 12-3-001. The NRC verbally granted enforcement discretion on July 7, 2012, 

to Exelon Generation Company (Braidwood Station), which allowed the license to 

extend the 6-hour completion times for Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.9, “Ultimate 

Heat Sink - Operability,” Required Action A.1 by 18 additional hours and to increase 

the limit on the average water temperature of the ultimate heat sink (UHS) from less 

than or equal to 100 degrees Fahrenheit to less than or equal to 102 degrees 

Fahrenheit for a period of 24 hours to provide sufficient time for UHS water 

temperature to subside following a sustained period of hot weather or commence a 

plant shutdown. The condition requiring the NOED was exited on July 8, 2012. 

• NOED 12-3-002. The NRC verbally granted enforcement discretion on July 19, 

2012, to Indiana Michigan Power Company (Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant), 

which allowed the license to extend the 6-hour and 12-hour completion times for 

TS 3.3.2, “Engineering Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation,” Required 

Actions I.1 and I.2, respectively by 24 hours to complete repairs to a dump valve for 

two of four steam generator stop valves or commence a plant shutdown. 

Enforcement discretion was needed for about an hour for TS 3.3.2 Action I.1 and it 

was not needed for TS 3.3.2 Action I.2 because the plant repairs were completed 

before the completion time required for the required actions with the NOED 

extension. 

• NOED 12-2-001. The NRC verbally granted enforcement discretion on July 21, 

2012, to Carolina Power and Light Company (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), 

that allowed the licensee to extend the 72-hour completion time for TS 3.8.1.1, 

“AC Sources – Operating,” Required Action B.3, by 12 hours to restore a diesel 

generator to operable status or commence a plant shutdown. On July 22, 2012, the 

emergency diesel generator was declared operable following successful testing 

within the normal completion time and the NOED was not needed to comply with 

the existing TS requirement. 

• NOED 12-2-002. A request for enforcement discretion by the Southern Nuclear 

Company (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant) to extend the 10-day completion time 

for TS 3.8.1.B, “A/C Sources – Operating, One Diesel Generator Set Inoperable” by 

an additional 66 hours in order to restore diesel generator 1B to operable status or 

commence a plant shutdown was verbally denied on July 26, 2012. The NRC 

declined to issue the NOED because it concluded the condition would reduce the 

safety margins if the extended allowed outage time was granted. The licensee 

subsequently complied with the required actions of TS 3.8.1.B. 

• NOED 12-2-003. The NRC verbally granted enforcement discretion on August 12, 

2012, to Virginia Electric and Power Company (Surry Power Station) which allowed 

the licensee to extend the 7-day outage time for TS 3.16, “Emergency Power 

System,” by 5 additional days to restore a diesel generator to operable status or 

commence a plant shutdown. The emergency diesel generator was declared 

operable following successful testing within the NOED extended time period. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

27 

• NOED 12-4-002. The NRC verbally granted enforcement discretion on August 20, 

2012, to Union Electric Company (Callaway Plant), which allowed the licensee to 

extend the 24-hour completion time for TS 3.8.7, “Inverters – Operating,” Required 

Actions A.1, by 36 hours to restore inverter NN14 to operable status or commence 

a plant shutdown. On August 21, 2012, inverter NN14 was declared operable 

following successful testing. 

H. Withdrawn Actions 

Licensees can challenge enforcement actions for several reasons (e.g., a licensee 

might dispute the requirements, the facts of the case, the agency’s application of the 

Enforcement Policy, or the significance of the violation). Licensees may provide 

clarifying information that was not available at the time of the inspection and this may 

affect a finding of noncompliance. 

In addition, the staff has established a metric for quality of enforcement actions based 

on the number of disputed and withdrawn nonescalated enforcement actions. The goal 

is less than four withdrawn nonescalated enforcement actions in a calendar year per 

region. This metric does not include violations that are withdrawn on the basis of 

supplemental information that was not available to an inspector before the assessment 

of an enforcement sanction. In CY 2012, the agency issued approximately 1,100 

nonescalated enforcement actions to reactor, materials, and fuel facility licensees. This 

is a slight decrease in the number of nonescalated enforcement actions issued 

annually in the past 2 years. Of these actions, nine nonescalated enforcement actions 

were disputed. This is a decrease from 10 disputed violations in CY 2011 and 12 in 

CY 2010. In CY 2012, the NRC withdrew three of these disputed actions. This is a 

decrease from the four nonescalated enforcement actions withdrawn in CY 2010. The 

goal for disputed violations was not exceeded in CY 2012, which indicates that NOVs 

were prepared properly and accurately. 

In CY 2012, the agency issued 111 escalated enforcement actions to reactors, 

materials, and fuel facility licensees, none of which were disputed. 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

28 

III. Ongoing Activities 

A. Enforcement Policy 

1. Enforcement Policy Revisions 

The NRC Enforcement Policy is a living document that is periodically revised to reflect 

regulatory changes, experience, and stakeholder input. In the staff requirements 

memorandum (SRM-SECY-09-0190), “Major Revision to NRC Enforcement Policy,” 

which approved the Policy that became effective on September 30, 2010 (75 Federal 

Register (FR) 60485), the Commission directed the staff to evaluate specific topics for 

inclusion in a future policy revision. Those topics included guidance for (1) determining 

when daily civil penalties are appropriate, (2) providing credit to fuel cycle licensees 

with effective corrective action programs, and (3) reevaluating the Enforcement Policy 

related to construction activities, including cases for which discretion may be 

appropriate. 

The staff addressed SRM-SECY-09-0190 with two SECY papers: SECY-11-0155, 

“Proposed Changes to the Enforcement Policy Associated with Construction Activities”, 

dated November 1, 2011, and SECY-12-0047, “Revisions to the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission Enforcement Policy,” dated March 28, 2012. 

• On April 18, 2012, SRM-SECY-11-0155 (ADAMS Accession No. ML121090184) 

directed the staff to implement the changes proposed in SECY-11-0155 with 

minor alterations. On June 7, 2012, the resultant revised Enforcement Policy 

became effective (77 FR 33786). Changes made to the policy included, but 

were not limited to: (1) changes to clarify the current Enforcement Policy, 

(2) revisions to Section 2.3.2, “Noncited Violations,” and (3) revisions to the 

Enforcement Policy sections on enforcement discretion. 

• On November 28, 2012, SRM-SECY-12-0047 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML12333A301) directed the staff to implement the changes proposed in 

SECY-12-0047 with minor alterations. On January 28, 2013, the revised 

Enforcement Policy became effective (78 FR 5838). Some of the significant 

changes in the 2013 policy included: (1) guidance for the use of discretion when 

considering imposition of daily civil penalties, (2) clarification that a violation by 

an NRC licensee or nonlicensee may be dispositioned as a noncited violation 

provided certain criteria are satisfied and the licensee or nonlicensee has an 

approved corrective action program, (3) addition of a new section on civil 

penalties to individuals who release safeguards information, (4) guidance on 

damaging or disqualifying information about an individual’s trustworthiness and 

reliability, and (5) examples of violations and proposed severity levels for import 

and export activities. 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

29 

2. Future Enforcement Policy Revision Activities

On March 21, 2011, SRM-SECY-10-0140, “Options for Revising the Construction 

Reactor Oversight Process (cROP) Assessment Program,” (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML110800557) directed the staff to develop a construction assessment program for 

nuclear power plants that includes: (1) a regulatory framework, (2) the use of a 

construction significance determination process to determine the significance of 

findings identified during the construction inspection program, and (3) the use of a 

construction action matrix to determine the appropriate NRC response to findings. On 

January 1, 2012, the staff initiated a 12-month pilot program for the new cROP. 

EGM-11-006, “Enforcement Actions Related to the Construction Reactor Oversight 

Process,” dated December 21, 2011, provided enforcement guidance for use during the 

cROP pilot program. The guidance in this EGM will remain in effect until the results of 

the pilot program are thoroughly evaluated and the NRC issues a subsequent revision 

to the Enforcement Policy using the principles contained in this EGM. In addition, the 

staff plans to develop a construction chapter for inclusion in the Enforcement Manual. 

B. Enforcement Guidance Memoranda (EGM) 

EGMs are issued to provide guidance on the interpretation of specific provisions of the 

Enforcement Policy. A link to the full text of all publicly available EGMs appears in 

Appendix A to the NRC Enforcement Manual. Three EGMs were issued in 

CY 2012 and are summarized below. 

 February 24, 2012, EGM-12-001, “Dispositioning Noncompliances with 

Administrative Controls Technical Specifications Programmatic Requirements that 

Extend Test Frequencies and Allow Performance of Missed Tests.” The purpose of 

this EGM is to provide guidance on how to disposition licensee noncompliance with 

Section 5.0, “Administrative Controls”, Technical Specification 5.5, “Program and 

Manuals,” testing requirements. 

 December 20, 2012, EGM-11-003 (rev 1), “Dispositioning Boiling Water Reactor 

Licensee Non-Compliance with Technical Specification Containment Requirements 

During Operations with a Potential for Draining the Reactor Vessel.” The purpose 

of this EGM is to provide guidance on how to disposition licensee noncompliance 

with technical specification requirements during operations with a potential for 

draining the reactor vessel (OPDRV). 

 December 20, 2012, EGM-12-002, “Dispositioning Violations of Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission Requirements Implementing the Decommissioning Planning Rule.” 

This EGM provides guidance for the disposition of violations of NRC requirements 

for implementing the monitoring and surveillance requirements of the 

Decommissioning Planning Rule. 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

30 

C. Knowledge Management 

In CY 2012, the staff engaged in several knowledge management activities. Some of 

the ongoing activities being conducted to maintain an adequate knowledge base 

included conducting counterpart meetings, supporting training, and completing reviews 

and self assessments. 

Enforcement Counterpart Meetings 

In May 2012, regional and headquarters enforcement staff held a counterpart meeting 

to discuss specific aspects of the enforcement process, interpretation of the 

Enforcement Policy and guidance documents, and ways to improve the enforcement 

process and communication among staff. Agenda items generally focused on topics 

intended to enhance the overall general enforcement-related knowledge of the 

participants, as well as topics focused on specific aspects of the program, such as 

financial assurance regulations, reintegration of security into the ROP, and the potential 

consideration of issuing civil penalties to individuals. In addition, a few action items to 

improve the program and the program’s guidance were identified, many of which were 

completed after the meeting. The outstanding items are being tracked to completion. 

Training

OE supported members of the Leadership Potential Program and the Nuclear Safety 

Professional Development Program on rotational assignments to the office. The 

knowledge these staff members gained will improve understanding of the Enforcement 

Program in the field. In addition, OE staff members participated in rotational assignments 

in other offices (the Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental 

Management Programs (FSME), the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), and 

the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response (NSIR)). 

Headquarters and regional enforcement staff engaged in outreach opportunities to 

internal and external stakeholders on enforcement and ADR processes during CY 2012. 

Examples included: (1) a 2-day training session for the Office of International Programs 

on the NRC enforcement program, (2) program updates and discussions at regional 

counsel and Office of Investigations counterpart meetings, and (3) a presentation by the 

staff at the Annual Master Materials Licensees counterpart meeting in June 2012. In 

addition, multiple informal question and answer sessions with the staff on the revised 

Enforcement Policy were held. 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

31 

Reviews and Self Assessments 

In CY 2012, OE completed two regional enforcement assessments. In March 2012, an 

assessment was completed in Region II and in August 2012, an assessment was 

completed in Region I. A team of enforcement specialists from OE and one of the other 

regions performed the assessments. The primary purpose of these assessments was to 

ensure that the enforcement program is being consistently implemented in the regions. 

The assessments also provided the opportunity to share “best practices” between the 

regions and to enhance knowledge management of the enforcement process. The 

assessments involved the review of nonescalated enforcement actions and processes, 

which do not normally involve headquarters. The teams concluded that both Region II 

and Region I maintain strong regional enforcement programs and are effectively 

implementing the NRC Enforcement Policy largely because of the efficient and effective 

collaboration among inspectors, enforcement and allegation coordination staff, and 

regional and division management. The Region I assessment completed the initial 

assessments of all four regions. A review of the assessment program will be conducted 

in CY 2013 and program modifications, if necessary, will be incorporated during future 

assessments. 

D. Regional Accomplishments 

In CY 2012, the regions conducted both routine and focused self assessments of the 

enforcement area to ensure effective performance and to identify opportunities for 

continuous improvement. The self-assessments encompassed both the reactor and 

materials arenas, considered performance associated with development and issuance 

of nonescalated and escalated enforcement actions, and included activities that 

required a high degree of coordination with other NRC stakeholders. 

Overall, the self-assessments showed that the regions were effectively implementing 

the Enforcement Program. Recommendations were made for any deficiency identified. 

In addition to assessments, the enforcement staff trained regional technical staff, in 

part, on the revised Enforcement Policy, recent EGMs, and proper enforcement 

documentation requirements for inspectors and participated on inspector qualification 

review boards as necessary. 

Regional enforcement representatives supported agency enforcement initiatives and 

activities in the following manner: 

• participated on the Escalated Enforcement Working Group 

• provided substantive input on various enforcement program documents including 

proposed revisions to the Enforcement Policy and Enforcement Manual; draft 

EGMs, and enforcement SECY papers 

• participated in Office of the Inspector General audits of CALs and orders 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

32 

Table 3: CY 2012—Escalated Enforcement Actions by Region and Program Office 

Program Office 

Escalated 

NOVs 

(w/o Civil 

Penalty) 

Civil 

Penalties1 Orders2

Orders 

Imposing 

Civil Penalty 

TOTAL 

Region I 14 3 4 0 21 

Region II 10 2 2 0 14 

Region III 22 4 4 0 30 

Region IV 26 6 4 0 36 

OIP 4 0 0 0 4 

NSIR 3 0 0 0 3 

FSME 0 1 0 0 1 

NRR 0 0 1 0 1 

OE 0 0 1 0 1 

TOTAL 79 16 16 0 111 

 

 

1

 Includes Orders with Civil Penalties (2 for Region IV) 

2

 Does not include 2 Orders with Civil Penalties
Enforcement Program Annual Report

33 

Table 4: CY 2012—Escalated Enforcement Actions by Type of Licensee, 

Nonlicensee, or Individual

 

 

1

 Includes Orders with Civil Penalties (2 for Radiographer) 

2

 Does not include 2 Orders with Civil Penalties 

Type of Licensee 

Escalated 

NOVs 

(w/o Civil 

Penalty) 

Civil Penalty1 Orders2

Orders 

Imposing 

Civil Penalty 

TOTAL 

Operating Reactor 32 2 7 0 41 

Gauge User 8 3 0 0 11 

Radiographer 4 7 0 0 11 

Hospital 8 1 0 0 9 

Materials Distributor 8 1 0 0 9 

Unlicensed Individual 

(Materials) 3 0 5 0 8 

Licensed Individual 

(Reactor) 6 0 1 0 7 

Fuel Facility 3 1 1 0 5 

Unlicensed Individual 

(Reactor) 2 0 1 0 3 

Irradiator 2 0 0 0 2 

Nonlicensee 0 0 1 0 1 

Well Logger 0 0 0 0 0 

Unlicensed Individual 

(Fuel Facility ) 0 0 0 0 0 

Physician 0 0 0 0 0 

Pharmacy 0 0 0 0 0 

Academic 0 0 0 0 0 

UF Conversion Facility 0 0 0 0 0 

Research Reactor 0 0 0 0 0 

Mill 0 0 0 0 0 

Radiographer 

Fabricator 0 0 0 0 0 

Waste Disposal 0 0 0 0 0 

Other 3 1 0 0 4 

TOTAL 79 16 16 0 111 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

34 

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

A1 

Appendix A: Summary of Cases Involving Civil Penalties*

Civil Penalties Issued To Reactor Licensees

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (River Bend Station) EA-11-159 

On January 5, 2012, an NOV and Proposed Imposition of a Civil Penalty in the amount of 

$140,000 was issued to Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy) for a SLIII violation identified as 

a result of an NRC investigation at the River Bend Station. The investigation determined 

that on multiple occasions multiple reactor operators willfully failed to follow an Entergy 

procedure that prohibited internet access in the “At-the-Controls” area of the control room, 

except as specifically authorized by the Operations Manager. These reactor operators put 

Entergy in violation of the River Bend Station Technical Specifications. 

Florida Power and Light Company (Turkey Point Plant) EA-12-001 

On April 9, 2012, an NOV associated with a White Significance Determination Process 

(SDP) finding and a separate SL III violation with a Proposed Imposition of a Civil Penalty in 

the amount of $140,000 was issued to Florida Power and Light Company (FPL) as a result 

of an inspection at the Turkey Point Plant. The violation associated with the White SDP 

finding involved the failure to maintain the effectiveness of the Turkey Point emergency plan 

as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q) and 10 CFR 50.47(b). The SLIII violation and Proposed 

Civil Penalty involved the failure to make an eight hour report as required by 10 CFR 

50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Specifically, from December 4, 2010, to July 13, 2011, and from 

October 10 to October 28, 2011, Turkey Point personnel failed to follow and maintain the 

effectiveness of its emergency plan when portions of the Technical Support Center 

ventilation system were removed from service for maintenance, without compensatory 

measures. FPL failed to report this condition as required from December 4, 2010, to 

July 13, 2011. 

Civil Penalties Issued To Material Licensees

Avera McKennan Hospital EA-12-090 

Sioux Falls, SD 

On October 3, 2012, an NOV and Proposed Imposition of a Civil Penalty in the amount of 

$11,200 was issued to Avera McKennan Hospital for a SL II violation involving the failure to 

maintain written procedures to provide high confidence that each treatment is performed in 

accordance with the physician’s written directive as required by 10 CFR 35.41. Specifically, 

on January 16 and 17, 2012, procedures related to high dose-rate remote afterloader 

treatments failed to 1) verify a brachytherapy treatment was in accordance with the 

treatment plan and written directive as required by 10 CFR 35.41(b)(2); 2) check both 

manual and computer-generated dose calculations as required by 10 CFR 35.41(b)(3); and 

3) verify that any computer-generated dose calculations were correctly transferred into the 

consoles of therapeutic medical units as required by 10 CFR 35.41(b)(4). This violation was 

a repeat violation resulting in radiation underexposures to the intended treatment site and 

 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

A2 

exposures to an unintended site on two consecutive days. As a result of the licensee’s 

particular poor performance, the NRC used enforcement discretion in accordance with 

Section 3.6 of the Enforcement Policy to double the base civil penalty for a SLII violation. 

DBI, Inc. EA-12-058 

Casper, WY 

On October 11, 2012, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to DBI, Inc. 

to formalize commitments made as a result of an ADR mediation session held on 

September 6, 2012. The commitments were made as part of a settlement agreement 

regarding apparent violations identified during an inspection and investigation involving the 

failure to: (1) conduct a survey when approaching the radiography camera and guide tube; 

(2) have at least one other qualified individual present while performing radiography; 

(3) supervise the assistant radiographer; and (4) provide complete and accurate information 

to the Commission. DBI, Inc. agreed to a number of corrective actions, including paying a 

civil penalty of $3,500, making improvements to operating and emergency procedures, and 

conducting employee training on the importance of complying with NRC regulations 

including the elements of willfulness (careless disregard and deliberate misconduct). 

JANX Integrity Group, Inc. EA-12-008 

Parma, MI 

On June 25, 2012, an NOV and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties in the total amount of 

$49,000 was issued to JANX Integrity Group, Inc. for two SLIII safety-related violations 

($28,000) and two SLIII security-related violations ($21,000). The first SLIII safety violation 

involved the failure to ensure that whenever radiography was performed at a location other 

than a permanent radiographic installation the radiographer is accompanied by at least one 

other qualified radiographer as required by 10 CFR 34.41(a). Specifically, on July 27, 2011, 

radiographic operations were performed at a temporary job site (a location other than a 

permanent radiographic installation) located on Spy Island, Alaska with only one qualified 

radiographer present. The second SLIII safety violation involved the failure to afford the 

NRC at all reasonable times an opportunity to inspect byproduct material and the premises 

and facilities wherein byproduct material is used or stored as required by 10 CFR 30.52(a). 

Specifically, the radiography crew left the immediate work site and did not return for 

approximately two hours once the NRC inspector announced himself. Normally, the two 

safety-related SLIII violations would result in civil penalties of $14,000. However, based on 

JANX’s particularly poor performance, the NRC used enforcement discretion in accordance 

with Section 3.6 of the Enforcement Policy to double the base amount for each violation. 

The two security-related violations are not publically available and are not discussed in this 

report. 

Quality Inspection & Testing EA-11-124 

New Iberia, LA 

On August 10, 2012, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to Quality 

Inspection & Testing (QIT) to formalize commitments made as a result of an ADR mediation 

session held on June 27, 2012. The commitments were made as part of a settlement 

agreement regarding apparent violations identified during an inspection and investigation 

involving the failure to: 1) maintain control and constant surveillance of licensee material that 

is not in storage as required by 10 CFR 20.1802; 2) wear a direct reading dosimeter, alarm 

ratemeter, and personnel dosimeter while conducting radiographic operations as required by 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

A3 

10 CFR 34.47; and 3) maintain records and documents as required by 10 CFR 34.89. QIT 

agreed to a number of additional corrective actions beyond actions already taken, including: 

(1) payment of a civil penalty in the amount of $3,500; (2) issuance of a policy statement 

addressing each of the areas of violation; (3) issuance of a letter from the QIT president 

regarding compliance and communicating concerns to management; (4) enhancing their 

training program; (5) submitting a number of procedures for NRC review and approval, such 

as management oversight and reporting concerns; and (6) presenting a paper at a 

professional society meeting. 

S&R Engineering S.E, EA-11-098 

San Juan, PR 

On January 13, 2012, an NOV and Proposed Imposition of a Civil Penalty in the amount of 

$14,000 was issued to S&R Engineering (S&R) for a SL III problem involving two violations 

and two additional separate SLIII violations. The violations associated with the SL III 

problem involved: 1) the failure to comply with or respond to an NRC Order, as required by 

10 CFR 2.202(b); and 2) the failure to provided information to the NRC that was complete 

and accurate in all material respects as required by 10 CFR 30.9(a). Specifically, prior to 

January 13, 2012, S&R had not submitted an answer to the order (which was required by 

November 28, 2009), had not paid the license fee, and had not disposed of or transferred its 

licensed nuclear material to an authorized recipient. On August 3, 2010, the S&R president 

informed the NRC that S&R had transferred its portable moisture density gauge containing 

radioactive sources to another NRC licensee when S&R still possessed the gauge. The two 

additional SL III violations involved 1) the failure by S&R to afford the NRC an opportunity to 

inspect materials, activities, and records under the regulations as required by 10 CFR 

19.14(a); and 2) the failure to use a minimum of two independent controls that form tangible 

barriers to secure portable gauge from unauthorized removal, when the portable gauge was 

not under S&R’s direct control and constant surveillance as required by 10 CFR 30.34(i). 

Specifically, on August 3, 2010, S&R provided the NRC inaccurate information about the 

location of its licensed material, thereby preventing inspection of S&R’s licensed activities. 

In addition, the gauge was stored inside of its shipping case, which was located in an 

unlocked closet of the locked S&R office, thereby providing only one barrier contrary to the 

requirements of 10 CFR 30.34(i). On May 17, 2012, the NRC notified S&R that it would not 

impose the civil penalty in this case because it had appropriately transferred its gauge to an 

authorized recipient and completed all other decommissioning requirements specified in 

10 CFR 30.36. The May 17th letter also informed S&R that its NRC licensee had been 

terminated and all facilities previously used for licensed activities were released for 

unrestricted use. 

Texas Gamma Ray, LLC EA-10-102 

Pasadena, TX 

On May 15, 2012, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to Texas 

Gamma Ray, LLC (TGR) to formalize commitments made as a result of an ADR mediation 

session held on April 23, 2012. The commitments were made as part of a settlement 

agreement regarding apparent violations during an inspection and investigation involving the 

failure to: (1) meet two NRC security requirements; and (2) store radioactive material only at 

a location authorized by its license. Specifically, radioactive material was stored at a facility 

in Rock Springs, Wyoming, which was not an approved storage location. TGR agreed to a 

number of corrective actions, including paying a civil penalty of $7,000, retrieving the 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

A4 

licensed material from Wyoming and transferring it to a site in Texas authorized for storage, 

revising internal procedures, requiring the RSO’s approval for storing licensed material, and 

training all radiographers on the new procedures. 

United States Air Force (Wright Patterson Medical Center) EA-12-031 

Dayton, OH 

On June 29, 2012, an NOV and Proposed Imposition of a Civil Penalty in the amount of 

$8,500 was issued to the United States Air Force (USAF) for a SL III problem involving two 

violations. The first violation involved the failure to conduct a semiannual physical inventory 

of all sealed sources in their possession, as required by 10 CFR 35.67(g). The second 

violation involved the failure to secure from unauthorized removal or access licensed 

materials that are stored in controlled or unrestricted areas, as required by 10 CFR 20.1801. 

Specifically, between November 2, 2004 and September 30, 2011, the USAF did not include 

a sealed source, which was believed to be in storage, in its semiannual physical inventory. 

The USAF believed the source was located in the low-level radioactive waste storage room, 

which is a controlled area. However, sometime between November 2, 2004, when the last 

physical inventory occurred, and September 30th 2011, the source was lost. 

Universal Products Concepts, Inc. EA-11-222 

Chino, CA 

On January 9, 2012, an NOV and Proposed Imposition of a Civil Penalty in the amount of 

$7,000.00, was issued to Universal Product Concepts, Inc. (UPC) for a SL III problem 

involving two violations. The first violation involved the willful transfer of smoke detectors 

containing byproduct material (americium-241) to unlicensed persons without obtaining an 

NRC license as required by 10 CFR 30.3(a). The second violation involved the import of 

material into the United States without having the required license for possession of the 

material as required by 10 CFR 110.5. Specifically, from May to July 2010, UPC imported 

and transferred for sale or distribution approximately 19,423 smoke detectors containing 

byproduct material without the required NRC licenses authorizing such imports and 

transfers. 

Civil Penalties Issued To Fuel Cycle Licensees

NONE 

Orders Imposing a Civil Penalty

NONE 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

B1 

Appendix B: Summary of Escalated Notices of Violation 

Without Civil Penalties*

Notices Issued To Power Reactor Licensees

Carolina Power and Light Company EA-12-132 

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant 

On October 3, 2012, an NOV associated with a White Significance Determination 

Process (SDP) finding and a separate SLIII violation was issued to Carolina Power and 

Light Company (CP&L) as a result of an inspection at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power 

Plant. The violation associated with the White finding involved the failure to maintain 

adequate facilities and equipment to support emergency response, as required by 

10 CFR 50.54(q) and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8). The SLIII violation involved the failure to 

make an eight hour report of the occurrence of a major loss of emergency assessment 

capability, as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Specifically, between August 4, 

2009, and November 9, 2011, the licensee’s Emergency Operations Facility normal and 

emergency ventilation system was in a degraded condition, and/or removed from 

service, for extended periods of time. CP&L failed to report this condition between 

August 4, 2009, and November 9, 2011. 

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC EA-12-153 

Catawba Nuclear Station 

On October 11, 2012, an NOV associated with a White SDP finding was issued to 

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (DEC) as a result of an inspection at the Catawba Nuclear 

Station for a violation involving the failure to maintain two qualified circuits between the 

offsite transmission network and the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power System operable 

when operating in MODES 1, 2, 3 or 4 as required by Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1, 

"AC Sources - Operating. Specifically, from July 23, 2011, until November 11, 2011, 

when operating in MODE 1, one qualified circuit between the offsite transmission 

network and the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power System was inoperable, and from 

November 11, 2011, until April 4, 2012, when operating in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4, two 

qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the Onsite Essential 

Auxiliary Power System were inoperable. 

Energy Northwest EA-12-092 

Columbia Generating Station 

On October 24, 2012, an NOV was issued to Energy Northwest for two violations 

associated with two separate White SDP findings and a separate SLIII violation as a 

result of an inspection at the Columbia Generating Station. The first violation associated 

with a White SDP finding involved the failure to maintain a standard emergency action 

level scheme as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The second violation associated with 

a White SDP finding involved the failure to maintain adequate methods for assessing 

 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included
Enforcement Program Annual Report

B2

and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency 

condition as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9). The separate SLIII violation involved the 

failure to recognize that their identified inaccuracies in the dose projection system was a 

major loss of emergency assessment capability and did not report it to the NRC as 

required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. EA-11-227 

Palisades Nuclear Power Plant 

On January 3, 2012, an NOV associated with a White SDP finding was issued to 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. as a result of an inspection at the Palisades Nuclear 

Power Plant for a violation involving: 1) the failure to prescribe maintenance on the 

safety-related turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump, an activity affecting quality, by 

documented instructions of a type appropriate to the circumstances; and, 2) the failure to 

accomplish the maintenance in accordance with their procedure as required by 10 CFR 

50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings.” Specifically, on 

October 17, 2010, procedure FWS-M-6, “Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Maintenance,” 

failed to prescribe inspections of wear conditions on the knife edge and latch plate, or to 

replace the trip spring, although these inspections and replacements had been identified 

as necessary by the turbine vendor. Palisades’ personnel also failed to perform a step 

in the surveillance procedure which required lubricating a pin and instead greased the 

knife edge of the mechanical overspeed/manual trip mechanism. These deficiencies 

resulted in the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump being inoperable from October 

29, 2010 to May 11, 2011. 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. EA-11-241 

Palisades Nuclear Power Plant 

On February 14, 2012, an NOV associated with a White SDP finding was issued to 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. as a result of an inspection at the Palisades Nuclear 

Power Plant for violations of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III “Design Control” and 

Criterion XVI “Corrective Action”. Specifically, in December 2007, the licensee failed to 

verify the adequacy of the safety related service water pump (SWP) coupling design to 

confirm that the coupling material was adequate for the environment and working 

conditions for which it would be subjected. As a result, the licensee failed to identify and 

evaluate a new failure mechanism which was introduced into the system in the form of 

intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC). In addition, on August 9, 2011, the 

licensee failed to preclude repetition of a significant condition adverse to quality when a 

coupling on a SWP failed due to IGSCC. 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. EA-11-243 

Palisades Nuclear Power Plant 

On February 14, 2012, an NOV associated with a Yellow SDP finding was issued to 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc as a result of an inspection at the Palisades Nuclear 

Power Plant for a violation involving the failure to ensure that the work performed on 

Electrical Bus D11-2 was prescribed by documented instructions or procedures of a type 

appropriate to the circumstances and accomplished in accordance with the instructions 

or procedures as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V “Instructions, 

Procedures, and Drawings.” Specifically, on September 25, 2011, the work order 

instructions did not provide critical steps and lacked proper step progression. The work 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

B3 

order instructions also included action steps which were not implemented. In addition, 

workers attempted to remove a positive horizontal bus bar in Bus D11-2, which was not 

a prescribed step in the work order instructions. As a result, these performance 

deficiencies caused an electrical fault which caused the loss of the left train 125-Volt DC 

safety-related system and loss of both preferred AC sources associated with the left train 

DC system. 

NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC EA-12-106 

Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant 

On July 24, 2012, an NOV associated with a White SDP finding was issued to NextEra 

Energy Point Beach, LLC as a result of an inspection at the Point Beach Nuclear Power 

Plant for a violation involving the failure to develop and have in place guidelines for the 

choice of protective actions during an emergency that were consistent with Federal 

guidance as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). Specifically, an apparent logic error in a 

Point Beach emergency planning implementing procedure required the emergency 

director to revisit the question of impediments to evacuation after a prior decision to 

evacuate affected downwind sectors had been implemented by local authorities, 

resulting in a contradictory recommendation for sheltering being given during an 

exercise. 

NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC EA-12-093 

Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant 

On August 7, 2012, an NOV associated with a White SDP finding was issued to NextEra 

Energy Seabrook, LLC as a result of an inspection at the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant 

for a violation involving the failure to identify a performance weakness during the 

post-exercise critique as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2). Specifically, the licensee did 

not identify as a weakness that an incorrect initial Protective Action Recommendation 

(PAR) had been developed and communicated to the state response organizations. The 

initial PAR was incorrect for the exercise actual condition (i.e., no release in progress). 

Omaha Public Power District EA-12-023 

Fort Calhoun Station 

On April 10, 2012, an NOV associated with a Red SDP finding was issued to Omaha 

Public Power District for three violations identified as a result of inspections at the Fort 

Calhoun Station. The Red finding was based on deficient modification and maintenance 

of the safety-related 480 Vac electrical distribution system that resulted in a catastrophic 

switchgear fire. The violations associated with the Red finding involved 1) the failure to 

ensure design changes and modifications to safety-related breakers were controlled as 

required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, “Design Control”; 2) the failure to 

implement adequate corrective actions following the loss of electrical bus 1B3A in 2008, 

a significant condition adverse to quality, to prevent the loss of electrical bus 1B4A in 

2011 as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action” and 

(3) the failure to implement and maintain all provisions associated with train separation 

of the approved Fire Protection Program as required by License Condition 3.D. 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

B4

Pacific Gas and Electric Company EA-12-075 

Diablo Canyon Power Plant 

On May 4, 2012, an NOV was issued to Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) as a 

result of an inspection at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant for a SLIII violation involving 

the failure to provide complete and accurate information to the Commission as required 

by 10 CFR 50.9, “Completeness and Accuracy of Information.” Specifically, in its 

response to NRC Generic Letter 2003-01 dated April 22, 2005, PG&E stated that: 

(1) test results confirmed that no unfiltered control room in-leakage existed; and 

(2) tracer gas in-leakage testing was performed in the alignment that results in the 

greatest consequence to the control room operator. This information was inaccurate 

because control room ventilation testing conducted prior to PG&E’s response to Generic 

Letter 2003-01 indicated that the unfiltered in-leakage was greater than the value 

assumed in the design basis radiological analyses, and the system test was not 

performed in an alignment that resulted in the greatest consequence to the control room 

operator. 

Tennessee Valley Authority EA-12-133 

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant 

On August 13, 2012, an NOV associated with a White SDP finding was issued to the 

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) as a result of an inspection at the Browns Ferry 

Nuclear Plant for a violation involving the failure to implement the requirements of a plant 

procedure as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, 

and Drawings”. Plant procedure NPG-SPP-09.3 “Plant Modifications and Engineering 

Change Control,” required completion of an evaluation of training needs to support 

implementation of procedures developed in response to design changes. Specifically, 

on September 13, 2011, TVA issued several Safe Shutdown Instructions in support of 

Design Change Notice 69957, which installed a new three-hour fire barrier in the Intake 

Tunnel Structure, without performing an evaluation of training needs. As a result, the 

Safe Shutdown Instructions could not be satisfactorily performed by plant operators and 

staff. 

Tennessee Valley Authority EA-11-252 

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant 

On January 23, 2012, an NOV was issued to TVA as a result of an inspection at the 

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant for a SLIII violation involving the failure to provide complete 

and accurate information to the Commission as required by 10 CFR 50.9, 

“Completeness and Accuracy of Information”. Specifically, in its response to NRC 

Generic Letter 89-10, “Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance” 

testing program dated January 6, 1997, TVA stated that “Closure of valves FCV-74-52 

and FCV-74-66 is not required by plant procedures to operate the residual heat removal 

(RHR) system in the suppression pool cooling mode. Therefore, these valves have no 

‘redundant’ safety function and will not be included in the GL 89-10 program.” In a letter 

dated May 5, 2004, TVA stated that valves FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66, “are not in the 

GL 89-10 program, since the valves are normally in their safety position.” This 

information was inaccurate because the FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 valves do have a 

safety function to shut to operate the RHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode 

and should therefore have been included in Browns Ferry’s GL 89-10 MOV monitoring 

program. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

B5 

Virginia Electric and Power Company EA-12-033 

North Anna Power Station 

On May 10, 2012, an NOV associated with a White SDP finding was issued to Virginia 

Electric and Power Company as a result of an inspection at the North Anna Power 

Station for a violation involving the failure to establish and maintain maintenance 

procedures appropriate to the circumstances for the safety-related emergency diesel 

generators (EDGs) as required by Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, “Procedures.” 

Specifically, maintenance procedure 0-MCM-0701-27 did not provide adequate guidance 

for installation of the jacket water cooling inlet jumper gasket, which resulted in a faulty 

gasket installation on the Unit 2 “H” (2H) EDG in May 2010. As a result, the 2H EDG 

failed to perform its safety function when called upon on August 23, 2011. 

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation EA-12-152 

Wolf Creek Nuclear Power Plant 

On September 21, 2012, an NOV associated with a Yellow SDP finding was issued to 

the Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation as a result of an inspection at the 

Wolf Creek Nuclear Power Plant for a violation involving the failure to implement 

maintenance on safety-related equipment in accordance with written procedures as 

required by TS 5.4.1(a) and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 9.a. 

Specifically, although required by a work order, the licensee failed to install insulating 

sleeves on two splices associated with a startup transformer protective relay circuit. The 

startup transformer subsequently experienced a trip and lockout. The protective lockout 

caused prolonged loss of offsite power to all Train B equipment and all non-safety 

related buses. 

Notices Issued To Material Licensees

Advanced Material Services EA-11-276 

Auburn, AL 

On April 17, 2012, an NOV was issued to Advanced Material Services, LLC (AMS) for a 

SLIII violation involving the failure to file NRC Form 241 “Report of Proposed Activities in 

Non-Agreement States,” at least three days prior to engaging in licensed activities within 

NRC jurisdiction, as required by 10 CFR 150.20(b). Specifically, between May 12 and 

June 26, 2008, AMS, a licensee of Alabama (an Agreement state), used a portable 

nuclear gauge at temporary jobsites in Connecticut (a non-Agreement state) without 

obtaining a specific license issued by the NRC or filing a Form-241 with the NRC at least 

three days before engaging in such activity. 

American Radiolabeled Chemicals EA-12-077 

St. Louis, MO 

On June 25, 2012, an NOV was issued to American Radiolabeled Chemicals for a SLIII 

violation involving the failure to implement 10 CFR 20.1801. Specifically, on April 2, 

2012 the licensee failed to secure from unauthorized removal or limit access to licensed 

material stored in a controlled area. 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

B6

Cambridge Isotope Laboratories, Inc. EA-12-177 

Andover, MA 

On October 31, 2012, an NOV was issued to Cambridge Isotope Laboratories (CIL) for a 

SLIII violation involving the failure to file an application for a specific export license as 

required by 10 CFR 10.20 when the general export criteria described in 10 CFR 110.21 

through 110.127 did not apply. Specifically, between 2007 and 2011, CIL failed to file an 

application with the NRC for specific export licenses to export deuterium, a material 

subject to NRC licensing jurisdiction as required by 10 CFR 110.9 when exporting this 

material in excess of the quantities covered by the general license requirements of 

10 CFR 110.24. During this time, CIL exported deuterium (1) in excess of the 200 

kilogram (kg)/year limit set by 10 CFR 110.24(a) to China and Japan in the years 2010 

and 2011, and (2) in excess of the 5 kg/year limit set by 10 CFR 110.24(b) to restricted 

destinations per 10 CFR 110.29, India and Israel, in the years 2007-2011, without 

applying for and obtaining NRC specific licenses. 

The Christ Hospital . EA-12-142 

Cincinnati, OH 

On August 28, 2012, an NOV was issued to The Christ Hospital, for a SLIII violation 

involving the failure to file NRC Form 241 “Report of Proposed Activities in NonAgreement States,” at least three days prior to engaging in licensed activities within NRC 

jurisdiction, as required by 10 CFR 150.20 (b). Specifically, on multiple occasions 

between January 2009 and March 8, 2012, The Christ Hospital - Mobile, a licensee of 

Ohio (an Agreement State), possessed and used syringes containing technetium-99m at 

a temporary job site in Indiana (a non-Agreement State) without obtaining a specific 

license issued by the NRC or filing a Form-241 with the NRC at least three days before 

engaging in such activity. 

Dakota Panel . EA-11-233 

Rapid City, SD 

On February 7, 2012, an NOV was issued to Dakota Panel for a SLIII violation involving 

the failure to identifying an individual as the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) on its 

license, as required by License Condition 12. Specifically, from January 2010 until 

September 23, 2011, the licensee failed to have an individual named on its license in the 

RSO position or any qualified individual as RSO. 

Department of the Army . EA-12-014 

Redstone Arsenal, AL 

On April 5, 2012, an NOV was issued to the Department of the Army (Army), for a SLIII 

violation involving the failure to provide a radiation monitor that was equipped with 

personnel access door locks to prevent access to the radiation room of the panoramic 

irradiator at the Redstone Arsenal facility, when radiation levels were high, as required 

by 10 CFR 36.23(c). Specifically, from September 24, 1996 to February 17, 2012, the 

Army’s radiation room personnel access door was not integrated with the radiation 

monitor to prevent the door from opening when radiation levels were high. 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

B7 

Detector Electronics Corporation. EA-12-181 

Minneapolis, MN 

On October 19, 2012, an NOV was issued to Detector Electronics Corporation for a SLIII 

violation involving the failure to obtain a specific authorization to export byproduct 

material to Iraq, an embargoed country, as required by CFR 110.5. Specifically, on 

April 20, 2007, September 25, 2009, December 21, 2010, and June 24, 2011, the 

licensee exported flame detectors with electron tubes containing krypton-85 to Iraq, an 

embargoed destination and did not have a required specific authorization to export 

byproduct material to Iraq. 

Flowserve Corporation. EA-12-060 

Chesapeake, VA 

On April 30, 2012, an NOV was issued to Flowserve Corporation for a SLIII violation 

involving the failure to obtain a specific license for export of reactor components, as 

required by 10 CFR 110.20. Specifically, in March 2010, Flowserve exported two 

reactor recirculation pump seal-repair kits, components subject to NRC licensing 

jurisdiction, to Mexico without obtaining an NRC specific license. 

Gamma Irradiator Services. EA-12-088 

Benton, PA 

On July 11, 2012, an NOV was issued to Gamma Irradiator Services (GIS) for a SLIII 

violation involving the failure to limit licensed activities to Category 1 self-shielded 

irradiators, as required by Condition 9 of GIS's NRC license No. 37-30850-01. 

Specifically, on May 2, 2003, February 25, 2005, June 15, 2007, and May 19, 2009, GIS 

performed maintenance activities on a JL Shepherd Model 81-22 irradiator, which is not 

a self-shielded (Category I) irradiator but, rather, a panoramic (Category II) irradiator. 

Humboldt Scientific, Inc. EA-11-138 

Raleigh, NC 

On March 8, 2012, an NOV was issued to Humboldt Scientific, Inc. (HSI) as a result of 

an NRC investigation at its Raleigh, NC facility for a SLIII problem associated with two 

violations. The first violation involved the failure to obtain the appropriate license 

authorization to export byproduct materials to embargoed destinations as required by 

10 CFR 110.5. Specifically, on May 6, 2005, May 7, 2008, June 26, 2008, and July 31, 

2008, HSI exported americium-241 and cesium-137 byproduct materials subject to NRC 

licensing jurisdiction to the embargoed destinations of Iraq and Sudan respectively 

without a specific license. The second violation involved the failure to submit annual 

reports of americium exports as required by 10 CFR 110.54(b). Specifically, HSI failed 

to make annual reports of americium exports for calendar years 2000-2009, during 

which years americium exports were performed. 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

B8

InstroTek/CPN International, Inc. EA-11-242 

Raleigh, NC 

On March 30, 2012, an NOV was issued to InstroTek/CPN International (CPN), Inc. as a 

result of an NRC investigation at its Raleigh, NC facility for a SLIII problem associated 

with two violations. The first violation involved the failure to obtain the appropriate 

license authorization to export byproduct materials to embargoed destinations as 

required by 10 CFR 110.5. Specifically, on November 20, 2008, and May 5, 2010, CPN 

exported americium-241 and cesium-137, byproduct materials subject to NRC licensing 

jurisdiction, to the embargoed destinations of Iraq and Sudan without a specific license. 

The second violation involved the failure to submit annual reports of americium exports 

as required by 10 CFR 110.54(b). Specifically, CPN failed to make annual reports of 

americium exports for calendar years 2000-2009, during which years americium exports 

were performed. 

Lakeland Medical Center EA-12-202 

Saint Joseph, MI 

On December 6, 2012, an NOV was issued to Lakeland Medical Center for a SLIII 

violation involving the failure to ensure that a written directive to administer I-131 sodium 

iodide greater than 30 microcuries was signed by an authorized user as required by 

10 CFR 35.40(a). Specifically, on three separate occasions, one each on February 28, 

February 29, and March 20, 2012, 2-milicurie diagnostic dosages of I-131 sodium iodide 

were administered and the individual who signed the written directives was not listed as 

an authorized. 

L. E. Gregg Associates EA-12-108 

Lexington, KY 

On July 27, 2012, an NOV was issued to L.E. Gregg Associates for a SLIII violation 

involving the failure to file NRC Form 241 “Report of Proposed Activities in NonAgreement States,” at least three days prior to engaging in licensed activities within NRC 

jurisdiction, as required by 10 CFR 150.20(b). Specifically, on December 12-16, 2011, 

January 5-7, 2012, and February 21-24, 2012, L.E. Gregg Associates, a licensee of 

Kentucky (an Agreement State) used and stored a portable nuclear gauge at temporary 

jobsites in West Virginia (a non-Agreement State) without obtaining a specific license 

issued by the NRC or filing NRC Form-241 with the NRC at least three days before 

engaging in such activity. 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

B9 

neo-pet, LLC EA-12-068 

Cleveland, OH 

On June 13, 2012, an NOV was issued to neo-pet, LLC, for a SLIII violation involving the 

failure to file NRC Form 241 “Report of Proposed Activities in Non-Agreement States,” at 

least three days prior to engaging in licensed activities within NRC jurisdiction, as 

required by 10 CFR 150.20(b). Specifically, on multiple occasions between April 6, 

2010, and March 6, 2012, neo-pet, LLC, a licensee of Ohio (an Agreement State) 

possessed and used doses of fluorine-18 in Indiana (a non-Agreement State) without 

obtaining a specific license issued by the NRC or filing NRC Form-241 with the NRC at 

least three days before engaging in such activity. 

Morpho Detection, Inc. EA-11-270 

Newark, CA 

On April 10, 2012, an NOV was issued to Morpho Detection, Inc. (MDI), for a SLIII 

problem associated with two violations. The first violation involved the failure to file NRC 

Form 241, “Report of Proposed Activities in Non-Agreement States,” at least three days 

prior to engaging in licensed activities within NRC jurisdiction as required by 10 CFR 

150.20(b). Specifically, between 2007 and 2011 on multiple occasions, MDI, a licensee 

of Massachusetts (an Agreement State), engaged in activities in Connecticut, Indiana, 

Missouri and Washington, D.C. ( all non-agreement states) without obtaining a specific 

license issued by the NRC. The second violation involved the failure to store and use 

byproduct material under the requirements of an Agreement State license for a period of 

less than 180 days in a calendar year, as required by 10 CFR 150.20(b)(4). Specifically, 

MDI stored and used byproduct material in Connecticut, Indiana, Missouri and 

Washington, D.C. (all non-agreement states) for periods greater than 180 days in a 

calendar year. 

Regents of the University of Michigan EA-11-228 

Ann Arbor, MI 

On January 6, 2012, an NOV was issued to the Regents of the University of Michigan for 

a SLIII violation involving the failure to develop, implement, and maintain written 

procedures to provide high confidence that each administration was in accordance with 

the written directive as required by 10 CFR 35.41(a). In accordance with 10 CFR 

35.41(b)(2), the procedures required by 10 CFR 35.41(a) must address verifying that the 

administration is in accordance with the treatment plan, if applicable, and the written 

directive. Specifically, on March 9, 2011, the licensee administered a yttrium-90 

TheraSphereTM liver treatment, but the licensee’s procedures did not require verifying 

that the administration of byproduct material was in accordance with the applicable 

treatment plan and written directive. 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

B10

Roxar Flow Measurements, Inc. EA-09-328 

Houston, TX 

On February 2, 2012, an NOV was issued to Roxar Flow Measurement, Inc., for a SLIII 

violation involving the failure to only transfer byproduct material to persons authorized to 

receive such byproduct material as required by 10 CFR 30.41(a) and (b)(5). Specifically, 

on numerous occasions between September 2003 and August 2007, the licensee 

transferred fixed gauges containing byproduct material to persons not authorized to 

receive byproduct material under the terms of a specific license or a general license 

issued by the NRC or an Agreement State. 

St. John Macomb-Oakland Hospital EA-12-172 

Warren, MI 

On October 16, 2012, an NOV was issued to St. John Macomb-Oakland Hospital for a 

SLIII violation involving the failure to have written procedures in place that would provide 

high confidence that each high dose-rate remote afterloader (HDR) brachytherapy 

administration was in accordance with the written directive as required by 10 CFR Part 

35.41(a). Specifically, on July 9, 2012, the licensee's written procedures failed to ensure 

that the patient's endobronchial catheters were directly connected to the HDR unit such 

that the brachytherapy administration would occur in accordance with the written 

directive. 

Notices Issued To Fuel Cycle Licensees

Global Nuclear Fuels – Americas, LLC EA-12-013 

Wilmington, NC 

On April 23, 2012, an NOV was issued to Global Nuclear Fuels – Americas, LLC for a 

SLIII violation involving a significant delay in the Criticality Warning System (CWS) 

activation process which resulted in the failure of the CWS to be able to initiate an 

immediate evacuation of the facility, had an evacuation been required while special 

nuclear material operations were being conducted, as required by Safety Condition S-1 

of its license. Specifically, between May 3 and July 17, 2011, the CWS exhibited a three 

minute delay before the alarm horns would sound. No actual consequences resulted 

from this violation because there were no incidents requiring an evacuation during this 

time period. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

C1 

Appendix C: Summary of Orders*

Orders Issued To Reactor Licensees

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. EA-10-090 and EA-10-248 

James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant 

On January 26, 2012, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to Entergy 

Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy) to confirm commitments made as a result of an 

Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mediation session held on November 9, 2011. During 

three investigations at the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant the NRC discovered 

information associated with violations, the majority of which were willful, related to the 

adherence to site procedures related to radiation protection (RP). Specifically, technicians 

willfully failed to (1) test required individuals for respirator fit, as required by 10 CFR 

20.1703; (2) maintain accurate documentation of completed respirator fit tests, as required 

by 10 CFR 50.9; (3) perform and/or accurately document independent verification of Drywell 

Continuous Atmospheric Monitoring System valve positions after the valves were 

manipulated, as required by technical specifications (TS) and 10 CFR 50.9; (4) document a 

personal contamination event as required by TS; (5) perform a contamination survey prior to 

removing an item from a radiological controlled area, as required by TS; and (6) perform 

daily radiological surveys of the reactor building 326 foot elevation airlock, as required by 

10 CFR 20.1501(a). 

Entergy completed a number of corrective actions and agreed to implement additional 

corrective actions and enhancements. In consideration of Entergy’s proposed extensive 

corrective actions, and the corrective actions already completed, the NRC issued an NOV, 

associated with the violations discussed above, with no civil penalty assessed. 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. EA-11-214 

Palisades Nuclear Power Plant 

On January 25, 2012, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to Entergy to 

confirm commitments made as a result of an ADR mediation session held on December 12, 

2011. This enforcement action involved an apparent violation of a technical specification 

requirement at the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant. Specifically, an at-the-controls reactor 

operator left the at-the-controls area of the Control Room without providing a turnover to a 

qualified individual and without obtaining permission from the Control Room Supervisor. 

Although the operator left the Control Room, another qualified individual assumed the 

at-the-controls responsibility. 

Entergy completed a number of corrective actions and agreed to implement additional 

corrective actions and enhancements. In consideration of these commitments, and the 

other corrective actions already completed by Entergy, the NRC agreed to refrain from 

proposing a civil penalty and issuing an NOV in this matter. 

 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included
Enforcement Program Annual Report

C2

Indiana Michigan Power Company EA-12-005 

D. C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant 

On June 28, 2012, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to the Indiana 

Michigan Power Company to confirm commitments made as a result of an ADR mediation 

session held on May 23, 2012. This enforcement action involved two D. C. Cook 

supervisors failing to ensure that an individual, who was offsite when selected for fitness-forduty testing, was tested at the earliest reasonable and practical opportunity when both the 

donor and collectors were available as required by 10 CFR 26.4(b) and Section 31(d)(2)(v) 

of the Fitness-for-Duty program. Indiana Michigan Power Company completed a number of 

corrective actions and agreed to implement additional corrective actions and enhancements. 

In consideration of these commitments, and the corrective actions already completed by 

Indiana Michigan Power Company, the NRC agreed to refrain from proposing a civil penalty 

and issuing a NOV in this matter. 

Tennessee Valley Authority EA-12-071 

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant 

On May 18, 2012, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to the 

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), confirming TVA’s commitment to submit a license 

amendment request to transition the three units at the Browns Ferry plant to the National 

Fire Protection Association Standard 805 (NFPA 805). TVA had originally planned to submit 

its application to transition Browns Ferry on March 4, 2012. However, TVA requested a 

delay to ensure it could submit a high-quality application. Based on TVA’s commitment to 

maintain acceptable compensatory measures, and a review of TVA’s status and planned 

key activities, including the intended NFPA 805 modifications, the NRC determined that TVA 

provided adequate justification for its commitment to submit a license application by March 

29, 2013. The NRC has therefore extended TVA’s enforcement discretion until March 29, 

2013. 

Tennessee Valley Authority EA-12-021 

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 

On June 18, 2012, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to TVA to 

confirm commitments made as a result of an ADR mediation session held on May 21, 2012. 

This enforcement action is based on an apparent violation identified during an NRC 

investigation and involved two subcontractor employees at Watts Bar Unit 2 who 

deliberately falsified work order packages for primary containment penetrations which 

caused TVA to be in apparent violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, 

Procedures and Drawings”, and 10 CFR 50.9, “Completeness and Accuracy of Information.” 

TVA agreed to a number of corrective actions as part of this Confirmatory Order. In 

consideration of these corrective actions and commitments, the NRC agreed to refrain from 

proposing a civil penalty and issuing an NOV in this matter. 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

C3 

Orders Issued To Material Licensees

Three Orders involving civil penalties were issued to material licensees during 2012 and are 

discussed in Appendix A. 

Orders Issued To Fuel Cycle Licensees

Honeywell International, Inc. EA-12-157 

Metropolis, IL

On October 10, 2012, a Confirmatory Order was issued to Honeywell International, Inc. to 

formalize the corrective actions committed to in the Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) issued 

on July 13, 2012 (ML12198A109). In addition to the actions in the CAL, Honeywell 

committed to: (1) complete an evaluation of external events and their safety bases; 

(2) document the design bases for the proposed modifications; (3) develop, implement, and 

have available for inspection quality assurance measures for the modifications; 

(4) implement the modifications before seeking to resume NRC-licensed operations; 

(5) demonstrate the adequacy of the revised emergency response plan by conducting an 

onsite exercise; and, (6) submit a revised Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) Summary no later 

than six months after resuming licensed operations. This enforcement action was issued in 

lieu of a notice of violation for violations identified during an inspection at the Honeywell 

Metropolis Works facility involving: (1) the failure to identify all relevant accident sequences 

related to credible seismic events and tornadoes, that could result in large UF6 releases for 

which protective actions may be needed as required by 10 CFR 40.31(j)(3); and (2) the 

failure to provide complete and accurate information related to Honeywell Metropolis Work's 

Emergency Response Plan as required by 10 CFR 40.9(a). The NRC concluded that 

formalizing the actions proposed by Honeywell Metropolis Works necessitated the issuance 

of this Confirmatory Order, consistent with Section 3.7 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. 

This Confirmatory Order supersedes the CAL issued on July 13, 2012. 

Orders Issued To Individuals

James Chaisson IA-12-009 

On September 10, 2012, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to 

Mr. James Chaisson to formalize commitments made as a result of an ADR mediation 

session held on July 26, 2012. The commitments were made as part of a settlement 

agreement between the Mr. Chaisson and the NRC regarding apparent deliberate violations 

involving his failure to: (1) meet two NRC security requirements; and (2) store radioactive 

material only at a location authorized by its license. Mr. Chaisson agreed to a number of 

corrective actions, including: 1) refraining from engaging in NRC-licensed activities for an 

eighteen-month period from the date of this Order; 2) notifying the NRC of any employment 

with an NRC licensee for a 4-year period after the eighteen-month ban has expired; 

3) providing, for a 5 1/2-year period from the date of this Confirmatory Order and at least 

3 days prior to starting work, a copy of this Order to employers who are NRC licensees; and 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

C4

4) taking additional training. On May 15, 2012, an Order prohibiting Mr. Chaisson, a 

radiographer employed by Texas Gamma Ray (TGR), from working in NRC jurisdiction for a 

period of 3 years was issued. The May 15th Order was the result of the radiographer's lack 

of credibility and his deliberate actions which caused TGR, an NRC licensee, to be violation 

of NRC requirements. Specifically, Mr. Chaisson deliberately failed to comply with NRC 

regulations and TGR's license when he stored a radiographic exposure device at a location 

not authorized by the license from December 2009 to April 30, 2010. Subsequent to being 

issued the May 15th prohibition Order, Mr. Chaisson requested alternative dispute resolution. 

The prohibition order is superseded by the September 10th Confirmatory Order. 

Timothy M. Goold IA-12-014 

On October 10, 2012, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to 

Mr. Timothy M. Goold, former radiographer at JANX Integrity Group (JANX), Inc., to 

formalize commitments made as a result of an ADR mediation session held on August 24, 

2012. The commitments were made as part of a settlement agreement between the Mr. 

Goold and the NRC regarding apparent deliberate violations involving Mr. Goold: 

1) performing radiography without a second qualified radiographer present as required by 

10 CFR 34.41(a); and 2) avoiding an NRC inspector when the inspector tried to question 

him regarding the whereabouts of the second qualified radiographer as required by 10 CFR 

30.52(a). Mr. Goold agreed to a number of corrective actions, including: (1) refraining from 

engaging in NRC-licensed industrial radiographic operations without direct supervision and 

working in any type of supervisory position while in NRC jurisdiction; (2) notifying the NRC 

within 15 days of accepting employment with an NRC or Agreement State licensee and, on 

a weekly basis, where he will be performing radiography; and (3) taking additional training. 

On June 25, 2012, an Order prohibiting Mr. Goold from working in NRC jurisdiction for a 

period of 1 year was issued. The June 25th Order was in response to the above identified 

violations. Subsequent to being issued the June 25th prohibition Order, Mr. Goold requested 

alternative dispute resolution. The prohibition order is superseded by the October 10th

Confirmatory Order. 

Francis Guilbeau IA-11-032 

On January 5, 2012, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to Mr. Francis 

Guilbeau prohibiting involvement in NRC-licensed activities for a period of one year. As a 

former radiographer employed by Accurate NDE & Inspection, LLC (Accurate NDE), working 

in NRC jurisdiction, Mr. Guilbeau engaged in deliberate misconduct while performing 

radiographic operations on March 14 and March 15, 2010. Specifically, he deliberately 

failed to follow Accurate NDE operating procedures by attempting to retrieve a disconnected 

source without first contacting and obtaining authorization from the Radiation Safety Officer 

that, in turn, placed Accurate NDE in violation of its Louisiana State license and 10 CFR 

150.20(b)(5). Additionally, Mr. Guilbeau deliberately provided inaccurate information on a 

daily radiation report involving a dose exposure for another radiographer. These actions 

constituted two separate violations of NRC’s rule prohibiting deliberate misconduct 

10 CFR 30.10. 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

C5 

Edward G. Johnson IA-11-061 

On January 25, 2012, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to 

Mr. Edward G. Johnson, to confirm commitments made as a result of an ADR mediation 

session held on December 20, 2011. The commitments were made as part of a settlement 

agreement between Mr. Johnson and the NRC regarding an apparent violation of a 

Technical Specification requirement at the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant when he, as the 

at-the-controls reactor operator, left the at-the-controls area of the Control Room without 

providing a turnover to a qualified individual and without obtaining permission from the 

Control Room Supervisor. As part of the ADR agreement, Mr. Johnson agreed to: 

1) participate in the Entergy Remediation Plan specifically designed for him, in which he will 

be required to (a) develop a presentation and provide it to senior Palisades leadership and 

operations personnel on the event, (b) interview with senior Entergy management to assess 

his eligibility and readiness to resume licensed duties, (c) successfully complete 40 hours of 

“under instruction” watches on each shift, and, (d) participate in a simulator scenario and 

associated training that include handling stressful situations and conflict management; and, 

2) author an article in which he will discuss the incident and lessons learned, and submit it to 

the Communicator (the publication for the Professional Reactor Operator Society). In 

consideration of these commitments, the NRC agreed not to pursue additional enforcement 

action against Mr. Johnson. 

Brandon D. Neff IA-12-044 

On November 6, 2012, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to 

Mr. Brandon D. Neff prohibiting involvement in NRC-licensed activities for a period of three 

years. As a former contract supervisor at Energy Northwest’s Columbia Generating Station 

(Licensee), Mr. Neff engaged in deliberate misconduct by deliberately providing incomplete 

or inaccurate information to the licensee. Specifically, on June 2, 2011, while employed at 

Columbia Generating Station he failed to comply with NRC regulations by attempting to 

subvert a Fitness-For-Duty drug test and by signing the Licensee's Federal Drug Testing 

Custody and Control Form attesting that the specimen submitted for the drug test was not 

adulterated in any manner. 

Joseph Quintanilla IA-12-029 

On August 10, 2012, an Order prohibiting involvement in NRC-licensed activities for a period 

of one year was issued Mr. Joseph Quintanilla, a former radiographer employed by Quality 

Inspection and Testing, Inc. Mr. Quintanilla engaged in deliberate misconduct in violation of 

10 CFR 30.10. Specifically, on October 27, 2010, while performing radiographic operations 

he deliberately failed to (1) maintain control and constant surveillance of licensed material 

that is not in storage as required by 10 CFR 20.1802, and (2) wear, on the trunk of his body, 

a direct reading dosimeter, an operating alarm rate meter, and a personnel dosimeter, as 

required by 10 CFR 34.47(a). 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

C6

Jamie Sanchez IA-11-036 

On May 17, 2012, a Severity Level III NOV and an Order prohibiting involvement in 

NRC-licensed activities for a period of five years was issued to Mr. Jaime Sánchez, 

President, S&R Engineering, S.E. (S&R). This enforcement action is based on 

Mr. Sánchez’s deliberate violation of 10 CFR 30.10(a)(2) when he provided information to 

the NRC that he knew was inaccurate in some respect material to the NRC. Specifically, on 

August 3, 2010, Mr. Sánchez stated to the NRC that S&R’s licensed portable nuclear gauge 

had been transferred to another licensee and that S&R no longer possessed licensed 

material, when in fact, S&R still possessed the gauge. In addition, as the President of S&R, 

he failed to respond to NRC correspondence and communication attempts, and failed to 

address or correct the misinformation that he provided on August 3, 2010. The Order also 

requires Mr. Sánchez to notify the NRC following completion of the five year prohibition of 

his first employment involving NRC-licensed activities. (See related enforcement action 

issued to S&R Engineering discussed in Appendix B). 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

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Appendix D: Summary of Escalated Enforcement Actions 

against Individuals*

Orders

Seven Orders were issued to individuals during 2012 and are discussed in Appendix C. 

Notices of Violation 

Jay T. Barnes IA-12-003 

On April 12, 2012, an NOV was issued to Mr. Jay T. Barnes, formerly a security shift 

supervisor at Northern States Power Company’s Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant 

(Prairie Island), for a violation of 10 CFR 50.5(a)(2) associated with a SLIII violation involving 

his deliberate submittal of information to a licensee that he knew to be incomplete or 

inaccurate in some respect material to the NRC. Specifically, while employed as a security 

shift supervisor at Prairie Island, Mr. Barnes deliberately submitted a urine sample to 

Northern States Power Company that he knew was not his own taken at the time of testing 

during a random drug screen on July 23, 2010. The accuracy of fitness-for-duty test results 

is material to the NRC. 

Bradley Berg IA-12-028 

On August 10, 2012, an NOV was issued to Mr. Bradley Berg, a radiographer’s assistant, for 

a SL III violation involving 10 CFR 30.10, Deliberate misconduct while performing 

radiographic operations for Quality Inspection and Testing, Inc. Specifically, on October 27, 

2010, Mr. Berg deliberately failed to (1) maintain control and constant surveillance of 

licensed material that is not in storage, as required by 10 CFR 20.1802, and (2) wear, on the 

trunk of his body, a direct reading dosimeter, an operating alarm ratemeter, and a personnel 

dosimeter, as required by 10 CFR 34.47(a). 

Jeffery W. Coykendall IA-12-039 

On January 5, 2012, an NOV was issued to Mr. Jeffery W. Coykendall, a licensed operator 

at the River Bend Station for a SLIII violation involving 10 CFR 50.5, Deliberate misconduct. 

Mr. Coykendall deliberately violated an Entergy Nuclear Fleet Procedure which prohibits 

internet access in the At-the-Controls area of the Control Room, except as specifically 

authorized by the Operations Manager and caused the River Bend Station to be in violation 

of Technical Specifications. Specifically, Mr. Coykendall accessed the internet, for 

non-work-related purposes, while standing watch as the reactor operator “At-the-Controls” in 

the “At-the-Controls” area of the control room. 

 

 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included
Enforcement Program Annual Report

D2

Rodger T. Devlin IA-12-043 

On September 20, 2012, an NOV was issued to Mr. Rodger T Devlin, formerly a licensed 

reactor operator at the Limerick Generating Station, for a SLIII violation of 10 CFR 55.53(j). 

On July 14, 2012, Mr. Devlin participated in the Exelon Generation Company random fitness 

for duty testing program and subsequently tested positive for alcohol while working on shift 

as a reactor operator. 

Brian Kemp IA-12-036 

On October 10, 2012, an NOV was issued to Mr. Brian Kemp, formerly a Manager of Design 

Engineering at the Palisades Nuclear Plant, for a SLIII violation involving the failure to 

promptly report a legal action taken by a law enforcement authority or court of law to which 

the individual has been subject that could result in incarceration or a court order or that 

requires a court appearance, including but not limited to an arrest, an indictment, the filing of 

charges, or a conviction as required by 10 CFR 73.56(g). Specifically, on January 14, 2011, 

Mr. Kemp failed to promptly report to his supervisor that he was arrested by the Grand 

Rapids Michigan Police Department. 

Anthony K. Linton IA-12-040 

On January 5, 2012, an NOV was issued to Mr. Anthony K. Linton, a licensed operator at 

the River Bend Station for a SLIII violation involving 10 CFR 50.5, Deliberate misconduct. 

Mr. Linton deliberately violated an Entergy Nuclear Fleet Procedure which prohibits internet 

access in the At-the-Controls area of the Control Room, except as specifically authorized by 

the Operations Manager and caused the River Bend Station to be in violation of Technical 

Specifications. Specifically, Mr. Linton accessed the internet, a significant number of times 

for non-work-related purposes, while standing watch as the reactor operator “At-theControls” in the “At-the-Controls” area of the control room. 

Peter E. Reynolds IA-12-037 

On September 11, 2012, an NOV was issued to Mr. Peter E. Reynolds, a licensed reactor 

operator at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, for a SLIII violation involving 10 CFR 55.53(j) 

which prohibits the licensee from performing activities authorized by a license issued under 

10 CFR 55 while under the influence of alcohol. On May 17, 2012, Mr. Reynolds 

participated in the Tennessee Valley Authority’s random fitness for duty testing program and 

subsequently tested positive for alcohol. Specifically, Mr. Reynolds’ breath test sample met 

or exceeded the TVA administrative level of 0.02 percent and was in work status more than 

2 hours prior to the time the initial test was concluded. 

Christopher Rhoads IA-12-033 

On October 11, 2012, an NOV was issued to Mr. Christopher Rhoads, a radiographer’s 

assistant formerly employed by DBI incorporated, for a SL III violation involving 

10 CFR 30.10, Deliberate misconduct. Specifically, on July 1, 2011, while performing 

radiographic operations Mr. Rhoads deliberately failed to (1) have at least one other 

individual present who is a qualified radiographer, as required by 10 CFR 34.41 and 

(2) assure that he was supervised during his conduct of radiographic operations, as required 

by 10 CFR 34.46. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

D3 

Gerald Rinehart IA-12-055 

On January 6, 2012, an NOV was issued to Mr. Gerald Rinehart, formerly a licensed Senior 

Reactor Operator at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, for a Severity Level III violation 

involving 10 CFR 73.56(g) which requires, in part, that any individual who is maintaining 

unescorted access under this section shall promptly report to his or her supervisor any legal 

action(s) taken by a law enforcement authority or court of law to which the individual has 

been subject that could result in incarceration or a court order or that requires a court 

appearance, including but not limited to an arrest, an indictment, the filing of charges, or a 

conviction. Specifically, Mr. Rinehart failed to report to his supervisor that legal action had 

been taken against him on July 10, 2010. Mr. Rinehart did not report the legal action until 

July 21, 2010, even though his first day back to work following the legal action was on 

July 18, 2010. 

Eric L. Stone IA-12-041 

On January 5, 2012, an NOV was issued to Mr. Eric L. Stone, a licensed operator at the 

River Bend Station for a SLIII violation involving 10 CFR 50.5, Deliberate misconduct. 

Mr. Stone deliberately violated an Entergy Nuclear Fleet Procedure which prohibits internet 

access in the At-the-Controls area of the Control Room, except as specifically authorized by 

the Operations Manager and caused the River Bend Station to be in violation of Technical 

Specifications. Specifically, Mr. Stone accessed the internet, a significant number of times 

for non-work-related purposes, while standing watch as the reactor operator “At-theControls” in the “At-the-Controls” area of the control room. 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report

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Enforcement Program Annual Report

E1 

Appendix E: Summary of Escalated Enforcement Actions 

against Nonlicensees 

(Vendors, Contractors and Certificate Holders)*

Confirmatory Order 

ABSG Consulting, Inc. EA-11-254 

On April 17, 2012, a Confirmatory Order (Immediately Effective) was issued to ABSG 

Consulting Inc. (ABSG) to formalize commitments made as a result of an ADR mediation 

session held on March 12, 2012. The commitments were made as part of a settlement 

agreement regarding an apparent violation identified during an NRC investigation involving 

the circumstances leading to the termination of employment of an individual contrary to the 

requirements of 10 CFR 50.7, “Employee Protection.” Specifically, a former ABSG 

employee was terminated, in part, for participating in a Commission proceeding before the 

NRC Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel prior to his employment with ABSG. 

ABSG conducted its own internal investigation of the circumstances leading to the 

termination of the employment of the individual. The NRC recognizes that although ABSG 

did not admit to any apparent retaliation, ABSG nonetheless took several actions to 

reinforce its anti-retaliation policies. In addition, as part of the ADR settlement agreement, 

ABSG agreed to take several corrective actions involving increased management oversight 

and individual accountability including, but not limited to: (1) reinforcing through a written 

communication from the President ABSG the Company’s policy regarding employees’ right 

to raise concerns; (2) developing anti-retaliation training for all ABSG U.S. Nuclear Utilities 

Market Sector employees which shall include those items identified in 10 CFR 50.7, define 

key terms, and provide examples of discriminatory practices; (3) publishing, as part of its 

on-line newsletter, an article concerning the protections afforded by 10 CFR 50.7; and 

(4) establishing a process to conduct a secondary review of all proposed adverse actions 

(including written reprimand or above, but excluding reductions-in-force and other ordinary 

layoffs) for any of its U.S. Nuclear Utilities Market Sector employees who have engaged in 

protected activities. In consideration of these commitments, and other corrective actions 

already completed by ABSG, the NRC agreed to refrain from proposing a civil penalty and 

issuing an NOV in this matter. 

 

 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included