BACKGROUND

INVESTIGATIONS

Program Deficiencies

May Lead DEA to

Relinquish Its

Authority to OPM

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

September 1999

GAO/GGD-99-173

United States General Accounting Office General Government Division

Washington, D.C. 20548

Page 1 GAO/GGD-99-173 DEA Background Investigations

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September 7, 1999

The Honorable Frank R. Wolf

House of Representatives

The Honorable Charles S. Robb

United States Senate

To become federal employees, work for federal contractors, or gain access

to federally restricted information and areas, individuals commonly

undergo personnel background investigations to determine their suitability

for employment or access to classified national security information. The

Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is responsible for ensuring that

background investigations are adequately conducted. OPM can delegate

authority to agencies to perform background investigations, as it did for

the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), a component of the

Department of Justice (DOJ). However, as of July 1999, DEA was

considering relinquishing background investigation authority to OPM,

except for the authority to investigate the backgrounds of applicants for

DEA Special Agent positions.

As you requested, this report describes the circumstances that led DEA to

consider relinquishing its authority to conduct personnel background

investigations. It also assesses whether OPM acted in an independent and

objective manner in choosing to review DEA and its background

investigations. This latter objective came about because OPM would be

contractually obligated to use its own contractor to do DEA’s background

investigations if DEA relinquished authority. This contracting firm was

established in 1996, when OPM privatized much of its background

investigation function.1

 Most of the firm’s employees were former OPM

employees.

A series of evaluations in the 1990s critical of DEA’s background

investigations and personnel security program caused DEA to consider

relinquishing its background investigation authority. The findings of OPM’s

assessments over much of the 1990s, an assessment by DOJ in 1998, and its

own assessment in 1999 triggered DEA’s consideration of this issue. DEA’s

 

1

The U. S. Investigations Services, Inc. (USIS) was created when the OPM function was privatized.

Under OPM’s contract with USIS, OPM must order all of its requirements for background investigation

services from USIS during the term of the contract. This contract is for a term of 36 months plus two

12-month options for a total contract term of 60 months.

RESULTS IN BRIEF
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Page 2 GAO/GGD-99-173 DEA Background Investigations

relinquishment of investigation authority would be consequential because,

although the numbers varied by year, DEA and its contractor performed an

estimated 5,600 background investigations in 1998.

During the late 1990s, OPM reviewed a sample of 265 background

investigation reports prepared by DEA and its contractors and determined

that all but 1 investigation was deficient in meeting the investigative

requirements that DEA had agreed to follow. The deficiencies included, for

example, a failure to conduct searches related to foreign travel and

searches of law enforcement records. In addition, in 1992 and again in

1998, OPM reviewed DEA’s personnel security program. It identified

numerous deficiencies in 1992 that persisted in 1998.

DOJ audited DEA’s personnel security program in 1997 and found

deficiencies similar to what OPM had found in 1992 and again in 1998.

Based on the DOJ audit and the recurring findings of OPM, DOJ’s Assistant

Attorney General for Administration told the DEA Administrator in

October 1998 that he (the Assistant Attorney General) believed that DEA

should relinquish all of its background investigation authority to OPM.

In early 1999, DEA conducted its own examination of the personnel

security program, focusing on background investigations, and concluded

that DEA was not able to capably perform or oversee background

investigations. This lack of capability allowed security clearances to be

granted, regardless of whether the related background investigations were

adequate.

Budget concerns also led DEA to consider relinquishing its background

investigation authority. DEA had allowed contract investigators to perform

background investigations, even though the investigators had not gone

through required background investigations because DEA did not have

funds to finance such investigations.

As of July 1999, subsequent to its examination of the personnel security

program, DEA was considering relinquishing its authority for background

investigations to OPM, except for the authority to investigate backgrounds

of applicants for DEA Special Agent positions. DEA believed that it would

be unwise to separate the background investigation from the overall

applicant selection process by having them conducted by an independent

entity not familiar with DEA’s unique requirements for Special Agents.

Special Agents had historically conducted the background investigations

of applicants and would continue to do so, according to DEA.
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OPM appeared to us to have been objective and independent in choosing

to review DEA’s personnel security program and background

investigations. We assessed whether OPM acted objectively and

independently by examining OPM’s responsibilities for the security

program and background investigations and by examining whether OPM

treated other agencies differently from DEA. Under an executive order and

an agreement with DEA, OPM was required to review the security program

and background investigations. Given DEA’s history of deficient

background investigations, we believe OPM had a responsibility to review

the investigations often. OPM reviewed most other agencies that currently

possessed delegated authority with roughly the same frequency as DEA.

OPM was comparably critical in its assessment of other agencies’

background investigations, as it was of DEA’s.

Rather than raising a question regarding OPM’s independence and

objectivity, the evidence raises the question of why OPM did not act to

rescind DEA’s delegated authority. According to an OPM official, OPM had

made commitments at the time it privatized its investigation function that

it would not rescind delegations of authority in order to give new business

to the privatized company. The official said OPM had been sensitive to

these commitments. We have not evaluated OPM’s explanation of this

situation. However, at your request we are separately reviewing related

issues concerning OPM’s oversight function regarding background

investigations.

Except for summer employees and some contractors, the scope of DEA

background investigations was designed to assess whether individuals met

the requirements to receive a “top-secret” clearance. DEA used the results

of these background investigations to (1) help determine whether

individuals were suitable for employment and (2) provide a basis for

granting a security clearance. Employees with top-secret clearances can

have access to information classified up to and including the top-secret

level. The unauthorized disclosure of classified information can cause

irreparable damage to the national interest and loss of human life.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the investigation of a person entering or

employed by the federal government in the competitive service, or by

career appointment in the Senior Executive Service, is the responsibility of

OPM.2

 Agencies may request delegated authority from OPM to conduct or

contract out investigations of their own employees and applicants.

 

2

The competitive service includes (1) all civilian positions in the executive branch of the federal

government not specifically excepted from civil service laws, and not in the Senior Executive Service,

Background
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DEA obtained this authority from OPM in the early 1980s. The two

agencies executed a Memorandum of Understanding and Agreement,

which transferred authority to DEA and set forth the general requirements

that DEA must follow. The memorandum has been renewed periodically,

but the most recent one expired in September 1998. Nevertheless, OPM

and DEA have continued to follow it, according to officials from both

agencies.

The Memorandum of Understanding and Agreement between OPM and

DEA required DEA to follow the background investigation standards used

by OPM. These standards held that background investigations, needed to

provide employees a top-secret clearance, must meet investigation

requirements established by Executive Order 12968, “Access to Classified

Information.” This executive order directed the President’s Security Policy

Board to develop a common set of investigative standards to be used by

executive agencies for determining eligibility for access to classified

information. The President approved the standards that the Board

developed in March 1997.

DEA’s background investigations were part of its personnel security

program. DEA’s Office of Security Programs was responsible for operating

the program and, in connection with that responsibility, was to provide

policy guidance and management of background investigations. This office

was responsible for ensuring that appropriate investigations were

completed on applicants and employees as well as providing security

adjudication services for DEA. As part of these adjudication services, this

office used the results of background investigations to determine whether

individuals were suitable for employment and whether a security clearance

should be granted. In addition to DEA, OPM and DOJ both had

responsibility for overseeing the program and DEA’s background

investigations.

DEA Special Agents did the initial background investigations on applicants

for DEA Special Agent positions, which was DEA’s core occupation. DEA

usually contracted out for initial background investigations for other

employees, including Intelligence Research Specialists, Diversion

Investigators, Chemists, and Contractors, and the periodic reinvestigation

for all employees, including Special Agents. An executive order required

agencies to renew employees’ security clearances periodically, and the

 and (2) all positions in the legislative and judicial branches of the federal government and in the

government of the District of Columbia made subject to the civil service laws by statute.
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background investigations that were made for these renewals were

referred to as reinvestigations.

In fiscal year 1998, an estimated 5,583 background investigations were

conducted of DEA applicants and employees. Of that number, about 3,401

were initial background investigations and another 2,182 were

reinvestigations. Most of the investigations (about 74 percent) and all of

the reinvestigations in 1998 were done by one contractor. However, DEA

Special Agents conducted the background investigations of persons who

applied for Special Agent positions, which accounted for about 26 percent

of all initial background investigations.

Based on investigative standards implementing Executive Order 12968, a

typical background investigation for a top-secret clearance would include

major investigative components such as

• proof of birth and citizenship for subjects and their immediate family

members;

• a search of investigative files and other records held by federal agencies,

including the FBI and CIA (referred to as a national agency check);

• financial review, including a credit bureau check;

• review of state and local law enforcement and court records (referred to

as a local agency check);

• verification of recent education;

• record checks and personal testimony at places of employment;

• interviews of references including coworkers, employers, friends,

educators, neighbors, and other individuals such as an ex-spouse; and

• a personal interview with the applicant.

To identify and describe the circumstances that led DEA to consider

relinquishing its delegated authority to conduct personnel background

investigations, we interviewed cognizant officials of DEA, DOJ, and OPM.

We obtained and reviewed the Memorandum of Understanding and

Agreement between DEA and OPM regarding this authority. We obtained

and reviewed all appraisals of DEA’s personnel security program and/or

the quality of background investigations done by OPM and DOJ since 1992,

when DEA was first appraised by OPM as a separate DOJ component. We

did not review individual background investigations or DEA’s personnel

security program. We also did not determine whether any employee who

received a security clearance based on a deficient background

investigation would have been denied clearance if the investigation had

been performed according to required standards.

Scope and

Methodology
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We obtained and reviewed an internal DEA assessment of its personnel

security program. We also obtained and reviewed relevant correspondence

between DEA, DOJ, and OPM related to DEA’s security program and its

background investigations.

To assess whether OPM acted in an independent and objective manner in

choosing to review DEA’s background investigations and security

program, we applied three criteria posed in the following questions:

• What was OPM’s responsibility for reviewing background investigations

performed by DEA and/or its contractors?

• Did the frequency of OPM’s reviews seem reasonable given the state of

DEA’s background investigations and program?

• Was the frequency of OPM’s oversight activities at other agencies with

delegated authority similar or dissimilar to the frequency of OPM’s

oversight at DEA?

For this second objective, we reviewed Executive Order 10450, “Security

Requirements for Government Employment,” which among other things

specified OPM’s responsibilities for reviewing federal agencies’ personnel

security programs. We also identified all agencies, in addition to DEA, that

had received delegated authority from OPM to perform background

investigations. We compared OPM’s oversight activities—the frequency of

reviews and the results—to OPM’s oversight activities at DEA.

We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Attorney

General of the United States on behalf of DOJ and DEA. We also requested

comments from the Director, OPM. OPM’s comments are discussed near

the end of this letter and are reprinted in appendix I. DOJ orally provided

technical and clarifying comments, which we incorporated into this report.

We did our work in Washington, D.C., from May through July 1999 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

As of July 1999, DEA was considering whether to relinquish its personnelsecurity background investigation authority to OPM. It had been brought

to this point by the deficiencies found by OPM over much of the decade

and because of an assessment DOJ made in 1997. DOJ initiated discussions

with DEA in late 1998 about relinquishing its authority. Partially in

response to this initiative, DEA conducted an assessment and concluded

that it lacked the expertise and resources to capably perform or oversee all

of its background investigations.

DEA Was Considering

Relinquishing Its

Background

Investigation Authority
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Through a Memorandum of Understanding and Agreement with OPM, DEA

was required to forward all background investigation reports to OPM when

they were completed. OPM was required to review samples of reports to

determine whether investigative requirements called for by the agreement

were met. In addition to reviewing completed investigation reports, OPM

was required to assess DEA’s overall personnel security program under

which background investigations were conducted.

OPM’s reviews of background investigation reports submitted by DEA

continually found the investigations deficient. Between 1996 and 1998,

OPM reviewed a total of 265 background investigations conducted by DEA

and its contractors.3

 OPM found all but one investigation deficient (i. e., all

but one failed to fully comply with OPM investigative requirements, which

DEA agreed to follow).

Some of these background investigations contained a single deficiency

while others contained more than one deficiency. There was no readily

available tabulation of the deficiencies for all 264 investigations found

deficient and the nature of those deficiencies. However, some information

was available. The 49 DEA investigative reports that OPM found deficient

in 1998 contained 221 deficiencies. Six reports contained one deficiency,

and the remaining 43 reports contained multiple deficiencies. The types of

deficiencies OPM identified include

• not determining the nature and extent of contact between a personal

source and the subject of the investigation;

• gaps in coverage of the verification, through personal sources, of all of the

subject’s major activities, unemployment, and means of support;

• lack of or inadequate follow-up of issues admitted during the personal

interview or disclosed on the Questionnaire for National Security

Positions;

• failure to search Central Intelligence Agency files related to subject’s

foreign-born status or foreign travel;

• failure to provide information from public sources that was complete, such

as bankruptcies, financial matters, and divorce;

• neglecting to supply verification of subject’s citizenship through

Immigration and Naturalization Service searches; and

• failure to obtain appropriate verification of an individual’s name, date of

birth, and place of birth through state and local bureaus of vital statistics.

 

3

The 265 reports were randomly selected, according to an OPM official, but were not representative of

all DEA background investigations. DEA did not send all completed reports to OPM. Of the 265 reports,

OPM reviewed 145 in 1996, 70 in 1997, and 50 in 1998. DEA did not have data on the number of

investigations conducted in 1996 and 1997.

OPM Continually Found

Background Investigations

Deficient
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Generally, there is no standard for stating how serious a deficiency might

be or what type is the most serious, because the deficiencies generally are

errors of omission, such as failing to check a law enforcement record.

Ultimately, a deficiency’s seriousness depends on what type of activity

might have been found if the appropriate search had been conducted or if

a particular investigative technique had been used. Also, a seemingly less

serious deficiency may provide an investigative lead that uncovers activity

that might compromise the nation’s security interest.

OPM returned the reports that it found deficient to DEA for further work

and correction. However, in 1998, when OPM followed up on the deficient

reports that it identified in 1996 and 1997, OPM generally found that DEA

had not corrected the deficiencies. OPM also found that even though the

background investigations were deficient, DEA still granted security

clearances.

In addition to its periodic review of investigations, OPM also reviewed

DEA’s overall personnel security program in 1992 and again 6 years later in

1998. OPM found numerous deficiencies in 1992, and it found that DEA

still had not corrected most of those deficiencies in 1998. The OPM

findings include the following:

• The reinvestigation program did not effectively identify employees who

were subject to routine reinvestigations. At DEA, employees were required

to have their security clearances renewed every 5 years. Many employees

in “Critical Sensitive/Top-Secret” positions were overdue for

reinvestigation.

• DEA’s Planning and Inspection Manual provisions were insufficient

because they did not include pertinent OPM and DOJ regulatory

guidelines. The manual, among other deficiencies, failed to incorporate

administrative due process guidelines for applicants, employees, and

contract employees to appeal the denial or revocation of a security

clearance.

• Physical security safeguards for the storage and protection of investigative

files were insufficient.

• Personnel security adjudicators whose job was to decide who would be

granted security clearances needed additional training and oversight.

• DEA’s Background Investigation Handbook did not include mandatory

OPM investigative requirements.

• DEA did not forward copies of all its completed background investigations

to OPM, as required by the conditions of its delegated authority.
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In addition to OPM reviews, DEA’s security program was subject to

compliance reviews by DOJ, which was responsible for the development,

supervision, and administration of security programs within the

department. In 1997, DOJ audited the DEA program and reported the

results to DEA. Based on the results of this review and OPM’s reviews,

DOJ initiated discussions with DEA in 1998 on relinquishing its

background investigation authority to OPM.

DOJ’s audit identified deficiencies that were similar to those that OPM

identified in its review of DEA’s security program in 1992. OPM also found

the same sort of deficiencies in 1998 after the DOJ audit. The DOJ findings

identified issues and deficiencies in (1) periodic reinvestigations; (2)

background investigations; (3) due process procedures; (4) resources for

monitoring, tracking, and controlling the investigation process; (5)

adjudication (process for deciding whether security clearances should be

granted); and (6) staff competence. DOJ referred to its findings as critical

security issues and deficiencies.

In October 1998, the Assistant Attorney General for Administration wrote

to the DEA Administrator expressing his belief that DEA’s investigative

function should be relinquished to OPM but said as well that he would like

to hear the DEA Administrator’s comments. The memorandum was based

on the DOJ audit and on the recurring findings of OPM.

In that memorandum, DOJ’s Assistant Attorney General also expressed

concern with what DOJ saw as DEA’s inability to maintain an effective

overall personnel security program. This inability came about, the

memorandum stated, because resources were consumed in doing certain

functions—checking federal records and performing quality control—that

OPM performed when doing background investigations for other agencies.

OPM checked the files of various federal agencies, such as the

investigative and criminal history files of the FBI, by computer. Unlike

OPM, DEA lacked the extensive computer links to federal files and did

many file checks manually. Checking federal files were referred to as

National Agency Checks in background investigations.

In the Spring of 1999, DEA assessed its personnel security program,

concentrating on background investigations. This assessment, according to

DEA officials, was done in response to the Assistant Attorney General for

Administration’s October memorandum, subsequent meetings with DOJ

officials, and DEA’s own awareness of the condition of its personnel

security program. The assessment covered areas such as the (1) results of

reviews performed by OPM and DOJ, (2) requirements of the

DOJ Requested That DEA

Consider Relinquishing Its

Delegated Authority

DEA Conducted a SelfAssessment and Concluded

It Lacked Expertise and

Resources
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Memorandum of Understanding and Agreement with OPM, (3) efforts to

correct deficiencies with the security program and background

investigations, (4) contract with the company that currently did

background investigations for DEA, and (5) other management issues

related to background investigations.

Although its assessment noted efforts to resolve concerns raised by OPM

and DOJ, DEA identified several issues that led to the conclusion that it

did not have the capability to effectively perform or oversee background

investigations. It also concluded that some security clearances were

granted based on deficient background investigations. As of July 1999,

DEA was considering whether to relinquish its background investigation

authority to OPM.

Following are some of the issues that the assessment identified, which led

to DEA’s conclusion that it had not effectively performed or overseen

background investigations.

• DEA had historically failed to capably perform or oversee its background

investigations.

• DEA found that the majority of people working in its personnel security

unit had not been adequately trained regarding the laws, regulations,

executive orders, policies, and technical practices central to initiating, and

performing and overseeing background investigations, as well as providing

personnel security adjudicative services to DEA.

• DEA had not ensured, as required by the conditions of its delegated

authority, that each investigator performing investigations under its

delegation had been screened by an investigation that met no less than

OPM’s top-secret clearance requirements. DEA did not comply with this

requirement for its current contractor because DEA did not have funds to

finance such investigations.

• DEA had not developed or implemented an integrity follow-up program to

monitor contract investigators, as required under its delegated authority.

DEA concluded that under current circumstances without relief that OPM

would provide, it was likely that DEA would remain in violation of the

integrity follow-up program requirement.

• DEA personnel performed National Agency Checks, a requirement of each

background investigation. DEA’s costs for performing these checks was

associated with DEA’s need to conduct many of these checks manually. In

its self-assessment, DEA stated that OPM, however, had sophisticated

computer facilities that permitted it to conduct required National Agency

Checks through direct-access computer links with all the relevant
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agencies. DEA concluded that it saw no advantage to duplicate a capability

that already existed in OPM.

• DEA bears ultimate responsibility for ensuring that background

investigations performed under its delegation from OPM conform to

mandated investigative criteria. DEA had been heavily criticized for its

performance in this regard. DEA concluded that OPM has a fully qualified

and experienced quality-control staff and that it was not reasonable for

DEA to continue to attempt to duplicate this capability.

As of July 1999, DEA had not made a final decision on relinquishing its

background investigation authority. From what DEA officials told us, it

was considering retaining the authority to investigate individuals who

apply for DEA Special Agent positions but relinquishing the authority to do

all other background investigations, including periodic reinvestigations of

Special Agents. In his October 1998 memorandum, the Assistant Attorney

General for Administration said that he believed that DEA should

relinquish all authority, including the authority to investigate the

backgrounds of Special Agent applicants.

According to DEA, relinquishing all other background investigation

authority would allow DEA to redirect resources into the investigative

process for Special Agent applicants. The redirected resources would go

into increased training, policy guidance, and oversight. DEA said it

believed that it would be unwise to segregate the background investigation

from the overall Special Agent applicant selection process by having them

conducted by an independent entity not familiar with DEA’s unique

requirements for Special Agents. Special Agents did the background

investigations of applicants and would continue to do these investigations

if that authority was retained, according to DEA.

DEA would not be the first agency to relinquish background investigation

authority to OPM. According to an OPM official, five agencies have done

so: (1) the Federal Emergency Management Agency in 1991, (2) the

Department of Commerce in 1994, (3) the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration Office of Inspector General in 1994, (5) the U.S. Soldiers

and Airmens Home in 1994, and (5) the Department of Education Office of

Inspector General in 1998.
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As previously mentioned, OPM had a sole-source contract with USIS, a

firm that OPM was instrumental in creating, to do all background

investigations except those done by agencies under delegation agreements.

If DEA were to relinquish its background investigation authority to OPM,

the contract between OPM and USIS would require OPM to order this

investigative work from USIS until the contract expired. Because of the

relationship between OPM and USIS, we reviewed whether OPM acted in

an objective and independent manner in choosing to review DEA’s

background investigation reports and personnel security program. To

gauge whether OPM acted objectively and independently, we considered

OPM’s responsibilities towards the security program and the program’s

background investigations and whether OPM’s treatment of DEA differed

from its treatment of other agencies. OPM appeared to have acted in an

objective and independent manner.

OPM was required to review DEA’s personnel security program and

background investigations. This requirement was contained in the

Memorandum of Understanding and Agreement between OPM and DEA,

which provided that OPM would monitor the agreement as part of its

security program appraisal process. In addition, Executive Order 10450,

“Security Requirements for Government Employment,” required OPM to

make a continuing study of the order’s implementation. The purpose of

this continuing study is to determine whether deficiencies exist in security

programs that could harm the national interest and weaken national

security.

As already noted, OPM repeatedly found deficiencies in both the security

program and the background investigations, which DEA usually did not

correct, and DEA concluded that it could not capably perform or oversee

background investigations. Given DEA’s history of noncompliance, we

believe that it was reasonable for OPM to do reviews of DEA’s

investigations.

The frequency with which OPM reviewed DEA’s investigation program

appeared to be generally in line with the frequency with which OPM

reviewed other agencies. In addition to DEA, three other agencies—the

U.S. Marshals Service, the Small Business Administration, and the U.S.

Customs Service—possessed authority delegated from OPM to conduct

background investigations in fiscal year 1999. OPM reviewed the security

program of the U.S. Marshals Service in 1989 and 1999 (in progress as of

July 1999), the Customs Service in 1989 and 1994, and the Small Business

Administration in 1983 and 1992. In comparison, it reviewed the DEA

program in 1992 and followed up in 1998.

OPM Appeared to

Have Acted in an

Objective and

Independent Manner
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OPM reviewed a sample of the background investigation reports of the

U.S. Marshals Service and the Small Business Administration from July

1996 through April 1999, as it did for DEA. According to an OPM official,

OPM did not routinely review the background investigation reports of the

U.S. Customs Service because the Memorandum of Understanding and

Agreement delegating the investigative authority to Customs did not

include this requirement. However, one OPM review of 89 Customs

investigations, completed in 1993, found 46 percent to be deficient.

OPM was critical in its assessment of other agencies, as it was with DEA.

For the aggregate samples of background investigation reports that OPM

reviewed from July 1996 through April 1999, the rate of deficiency for the

Small Business Administration was 75 percent. It was 93 percent for those

from the U.S. Marshals Service. In comparison, the rate of deficiency for

background investigation reports from DEA, which DEA and two

contractors prepared over several years (1996 to 1999), was 98 percent.

OPM computed these percentages by dividing the total number of reports

it reviewed into the number it found deficient.

Rather than raising a question regarding DEA’s independence and

objectivity in choosing to review background investigations performed by

DEA and its contractors, the evidence raises the question of why OPM did

not act to rescind DEA’s delegated authority. According to OPM, the

Administration announced in late 1994 that OPM’s Investigative Unit was

to be privatized. The privatization occurred in July 1996. During that

period, two private investigative firms sued OPM. According to OPM, these

firms believed that OPM was going to take work away from them to

support its privatized contractor. The suits were settled when OPM agreed,

among other things, that it would not rescind delegations of authority,

such as the DEA delegation, except for unsatisfactory performance. Also

during this period, a former director of OPM testified before Congress on

its privatization plans and emphasized that OPM did not intend to rescind

any delegated authorities in order to give new business to the privatized

company. According to OPM, the agency has been sensitive to these

commitments as well as to the potential perceptions of OPM’s motivation

for rescinding any such delegation.

We have not evaluated OPM’s explanation of this situation. However, at

your request we are separately reviewing related issues concerning OPM’s

oversight function regarding background investigations.

DEA had a long history of deficiencies in its personnel security program, Conclusion including background investigations done by both contractor and agency
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employees that did not meet federal standards. Federal agency security

programs are aimed at protecting national security interests and are

predicated on thoroughly reviewing the backgrounds of federal job

applicants and employees to ensure their suitability for employment and/or

access to national security information.

Given DEA’s difficulties in ensuring the quality of its personnel

background investigations and its conclusion that it is not able to capably

perform or oversee background investigations, its consideration of

relinquishing its delegated authority is not unreasonable. Nor do OPM’s

periodic appraisals of DEA background investigations for adherence to

prescribed standards appear unreasonable. OPM has a mandated

responsibility to oversee agency security programs, including background

investigations, and appeared not to have treated DEA significantly

differently, in terms of oversight from other agencies with delegated

authority.

We received written comments on a draft of this report from the Director

of OPM and oral comments on August 17, 1999, from the Director, Audit

Liaison Office, DOJ. The OPM Director said that she was pleased that we

concluded that OPM was objective and independent in its oversight of the

DEA personnel security program. Regarding the report’s statement that the

evidence raises a question of why OPM did not rescind DEA’s delegated

authority, the Director said that OPM had worked with DEA over several

years to help it correct deficiencies that OPM had identified and that

several factors mitigated against the rescission of DEA’s authority. In

addition to the factors cited on page 13 of this report, OPM said that it

continued to work with DEA and DOJ to resolve the continuing personnel

security problems and that OPM had let a reasonable amount of time

elapse for DOJ, which is responsible for all of the department’s security

programs, to take the necessary action. In October 1998, DOJ advised DEA

to relinquish its authority. OPM’s complete comments are reprinted in

appendix I.

The DOJ Audit Liaison Director orally provided technical and clarifying

comments, which we incorporated into this report. The Audit Liaison

Director said that DOJ had no other comments.

We are sending copies of this report to Senators Daniel K. Akaka, Robert

C. Byrd, Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Thad Cochran, Susan M. Collins, Byron

L. Dorgan, Richard J. Durbin, Judd Gregg, Orrin G. Hatch, Ernest F.

Hollings, Patrick J. Leahy, Carl Levin, Joseph I. Lieberman, Charles E.

Schumer, Ted Stevens, Fred Thompson, Strom Thurmond, and George V.

Agency Comments and

our Evaluation
B-283410

Page 15 GAO/GGD-99-173 DEA Background Investigations

Voinovich and Representatives Dan Burton, John Conyers, Jr., Elijah

Cummings, Jim Kolbe, Steny H. Hoyer, Henry J. Hyde, Bill McCollum, John

L. Mica, Patsy T. Mink, David Obey, Harold Rogers, Joe Scarborough,

Robert C. Scott, Jose E. Serrano, Henry A. Waxman, and C. W. Bill Young

in their capacities as Chair or Ranking Minority Members of Senate and

House Committees and Subcommittees. We will also send copies to the

Honorable Janet Reno, Attorney General of the United States, Department

of Justice; The Honorable Janice R. Lachance, Director, Office of

Personnel Management; and Mr. Donnie R. Marshall, Acting Administrator,

Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice and other

interested parties. We will make copies of this report available to others on

request.

If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me or

Richard W. Caradine at (202) 512- 8676. Key contributors to this

assignment were John Ripper and Anthony Assia.

Michael Brostek

Associate Director, Federal Management

 and Workforce Issues
Page 16 GAO/GGD-99-173 DEA Background Investigations

Contents

1 Letter

Appendix I 18

Comments From the

Office of Personnel

Management

Abbreviations

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

DOJ Department of Justice

OPM Office of Personnel Management
Page 17 GAO/GGD-99-173 DEA Background Investigations
Appendix I

Comments From the Office of Personnel

Management

Page 18 GAO/GGD-99-173 DEA Background Investigations
Appendix I

Comments From the Office of Personnel Management

Page 19 GAO/GGD-99-173 DEA Background Investigations
Page 20 GAO/GGD-99-173 DEA Background Investigations
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