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85–796 PDF 2003

S. HRG. 108–35

THE JANUARY 27 UNMOVIC AND IAEA REPORTS

TO THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL ON INSPECTIONS IN IRAQ

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JANUARY 30, 2003

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia

JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Staff Director

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Armitage, Hon. Richard L., Deputy Secretary of State, Department of State,

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 12

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 14

Brownback, Hon. Sam, U.S. Senator from Kansas, prepared statement ............ 35

Dodd, Hon. Christopher J., U.S. Senator from Connecticut, prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 30

‘‘European Leaders In Support Of U.S.,’’ article from the Wall Street Journal,

Jan. 30, 2003, submitted by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. ............................... 65

Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, prepared statement .. 39

Hagel, Hon. Chuck, U.S. Senator from Nebraska, prepared statement ............. 60

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 4

Negroponte, Hon. John D., U.S. Permanent Representative to the United

Nations, New York, NY ....................................................................................... 16

Sununu, Hon. John E., U.S. Senator from New Hampshire, prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 73

‘‘The Security Council, 27 January 2003: An Update on Inspection,’’ a report

delivered by Dr. Hans Blix, Executive Chairman, United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, UNMOVIC, to the U.N.

Security Council ................................................................................................... 76

‘‘U.S. Had Key Role in Iraq Buildup,’’ article from The Washington Post,

Dec. 30, 2002, by Michael Dobbs, submitted by Senator Barbara Boxer ........ 43

Voinovich, Hon. George V., U.S. Senator from Ohio, prepared statement ......... 53

(III)

(1)

1 A copy of this update entitled ‘‘The Security Council, 27 January 2003: An Update on Inspection,’’ can be found on page 76.

THE JANUARY 27 UNMOVIC AND IAEA REPORTS TO THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL ON

INSPECTIONS IN IRAQ

THURSDAY, JANUARY 30, 2003

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room SD– 419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, HON. Richard G. Lugar

(chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Brownback, Enzi,

Voinovich, Alexander, Coleman, Sununu, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd,

Feingold, Boxer, Bill Nelson, and Corzine.

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing is called to order.

Today, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee meets to hear

testimony from Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, and

the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, John

Negroponte. Both are principal actors in the formulation and implementation of U.S. policy toward Iraq, and they will provide comments on U.S. reaction to the 60-day progress report on Iraq’s compliance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441.

On Monday, January 27, Mohammed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and Hans Blix,

Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification

and Inspection Commission, UNMOVIC, delivered an update to the

United Nations Security Council on their efforts to verify disarmament in Iraq.1 In Mr. Blix’ assessment, and I quote, ‘‘Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today,

of the disarmament which was demanded of it.’’

It should not come as a surprise to this committee and those who

have watched the process unfold over the last 12 years. Iraq continues to resist the United Nations’ efforts to verify its compliance

with a host of Security Council resolutions.

On November 8, 2002, the United Nations Security Council

passed Resolution 1441 requiring Iraq’s immediate, unconditional,

and active cooperation in verifying the dismantlement of the weapons of mass destruction and the programs that support them.

In my opinion, Iraq has failed to comply with these requirements

and is in material breach of these obligations. Iraq continues to

deny U–2 overflights, requested documentation, and unfettered access to weapons scientists. Furthermore, the recent discovery of

2

chemical warheads in Iraq, and Iraq’s failure to provide proof as

to the final disposition of tons of chemical and biological agents, are

clear instances of noncompliance.

It is Iraq’s responsibility to prove compliance with the resolutions

passed since the end of the Persian Gulf War. To date, Iraq has

failed to do so.

Simply stated, previous United Nations inspection reports have

listed weapons, materials, and programs of mass destruction in

Iraq. Resolution 1441 gives Iraq one final chance to destroy the

weapons and materials and stop the programs by showing evidence

of that destruction or inviting UNMOVIC inspectors to view items

previously listed and to destroy all of them with worldwide observation.

To date, Iraq has shown no required evidence, nor directed the

inspectors to the weapons and materials, even though the Security

Council voted 15 to 0 that such a monumental defiance of the

United Nations would result in grave consequences.

Now, demands are heard in our country and in other countries

that the U.N. inspectors produce, ‘‘smoking guns,’’ or dramatic pictures. The U.N. has listed the smoking guns in past reports. Iraqis

apparently persist in the notion that all these past reports are illusion; that nothing ever happened; that nothing, therefore, can be

reported; and that any consequences of such wholesale evasion are

unwarranted, are the subject of our hearing today.

The report Iraq submitted in early December on the current

state of its weapons of mass destruction programs contains no new

information and is largely a reprint of earlier documents. And still

Iraqi leaders claim they have given the United Nations full cooperation.

As Hans Blix reported to the Security Council, there are glaring

omissions and apparent violations that Iraq has failed to explain,

and he went on to point these out. Iraq has tested missiles that exceed the permitted range. Iraq has failed to prove that it destroyed

all of its anthrax stockpile. Iraq has illegally imported rocket engines and fuel. Iraq has failed to account for 6,500 chemical weapons. Iraq has failed to declare 650 kilograms of bacterial growth

medium that could be used in the development of biological weapons. Iraq has rebuilt missile production facilities that were destroyed by previous inspectors. And UNMOVIC inspectors have discovered the precursors to mustard gas.

Now, furthermore, Iraqi scientists continue to refuse to meet

with the United Nations inspectors in private. And to date, those

who have agreed to interviews have demanded that representatives

of Iraq’s monitoring directorate to be present. It is apparent that

Baghdad is working to discourage private meetings.

On numerous occasions, I have asked UNMOVIC and the IAEA

to utilize the authority that has been given to hold interviews outside of Iraq. Scientists who agree to be interviewed should be given

the opportunity to emigrate with their families. Our experience has

shown that these scientists are the best source of information on

weapons programs.

As Iraqi intransigence has become more deliberate, President

Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair of Great Britain have ordered

military forces into the region in increasing numbers. And the presVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:32 Jun 10, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 85796 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
3

ence of these military forces in the region and the insistence of

President Bush and Prime Minister Blair and others on complete

disarmament have been the catalyst behind what little cooperation

the United Nations has received to date from Iraq.

All Americans—all Americans—are hopeful that military action

against Iraq can be avoided. Iraqi actions are providing little encouragement to date. The list of outstanding Iraqi obligations and

requirements is the same today as it was when the United Nations

inspectors left in 1998, and there is little evidence that Saddam

Hussein has decided to comply or to cooperate.

Our nation will and must act when our national security interests are threatened. Iraq, armed with weapons of mass destruction

and the possibility of their transfer to terrorist organizations, is unacceptable. Saddam Hussein has launched chemical and biological

weapons against his neighbors, as well as his own people, and we

cannot permit him to maintain these weapons of mass destruction.

On November 8, the United Nations made a strong statement requiring full Iraqi compliance. Those days of hope and consensus

have waned as narrower interests have begun to peel back the Security Council’s unanimous support for Resolution 1441. This is unfortunate. The administration should continue to work to build support at the United Nations for full implementation of Resolution

1441, including the need for action in the absence of complete Iraqi

compliance.

As President Bush noted in September in his speech before the

General Assembly, ‘‘The United Nations faces a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and

enforced, or cast aside without consequences? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant,’’ end

of quote by the President.

In recent days, the administration has begun to consider the release of highly sensitive intelligence on Iraq’s weapons ambitions.

I am encouraged that Secretary Powell will visit with the Security

Council and share some of our intelligence community’s assessments of Iraq’s behavior.

I appreciate the importance, as we all do on this committee, of

safeguarding sources and methods in sharing highly classified information, but I believe those risks are now outweighed by both the

need to point the United Nations inspectors in the direction of suspect sites, and by the need to demonstrate to the Security Council

and allied governments the seriousness of our purpose.

If, after continued discussions, United Nations support is not

forthcoming, the United States must consider a different course.

We must work with like-minded nations to form what President

Bush has called the ‘‘coalition of the willing’’ committed to the disarmament of Iraq.

Now, before I recognize our distinguished witnesses, which we

welcome, I want to call upon the distinguished chairman of this

committee, who has graciously relinquished the gavel, at least for

a period of time in the topsy-turvy politics of our country. I am

grateful for his friendship, for his leadership, and I call upon him

now for his statement.

[The opening statement of Senator Lugar follows:]

4

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Today the committee meets to hear testimony from Deputy Secretary of State

Richard Armitage and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Negroponte.

Both are principal actors in the formulation and implementation of U.S. policy toward Iraq. They will provide comments on the U.S. reaction to the 60-day progress

report on Iraq’s compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441.

On Monday, January 27, Mohammed El Baradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of the United

Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) delivered

an update to the United Nations Security Council on their efforts to verify disarmament in Iraq. Mr. Blix’s assessment that, ‘‘Iraq appears not to have come to a

genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it’’

should not come as a surprise to those who have watched this process unfold over

the last twelve years. Iraq continues to resist United Nations efforts to verify its

compliance with a host of Security Council resolutions.

On November 8, 2002, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution

1441 requiring Iraq’s immediate, unconditional, and active cooperation in verifying

the dismantlement of its weapons of mass destruction and the programs that support them. ‘‘In my opinion, Iraq has failed to comply with these requirements and

is in material breach of these obligations. Iraq continues to deny U-2 overflights, requested documentation, and unfettered access to weapons scientists. Furthermore,

the recent discovery of chemical warheads in Iraq and Iraq’s failure to provide proof

as to the final disposition of tons of chemical and biological agent are clear instances

of noncompliance.’’

It is Iraq’s responsibility to prove compliance with the resolutions passed since the

end of the Persian Gulf War. To date, Baghdad has failed to do so. Simply stated,

previous United Nations inspection reports have listed weapons, materials, and programs of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Resolution 1441 gives Iraq one final

chance to destroy the weapons and materials and stop the programs by showing evidence of that destruction or inviting the UNMOVIC inspectors to view items previous listed and to destroy all of this with worldwide observation. To date, Iraq has

shown no required evidence nor directed the inspectors to the weapons and materials even though the Security Council voted 15–0 that such a monumental defiance

of the United Nations would result in grave consequences.

Demands are heard in our country and in other countries that the U.N. inspectors

produce ‘‘smoking guns’’ or dramatic pictures. The U.N. has listed the ‘‘smoking

guns’’ in past reports. Iraqi’s apparently persist in the notion that all past reports

are an illusion, that nothing ever happened, nothing can be reported, and that any

consequences of such wholesale evasion be unwarranted.

The report Iraq submitted to the United Nations in early December on the current

state of its weapons of mass destruction programs contains no new information and

is largely a reprint of earlier documents. Still Iraqi leaders claim they have given

the United Nations full cooperation. As Hans Blix reported to the Security Council,

there are glaring omissions and apparent violations that Iraq has failed to explain.

Among these omissions and violations are the following:

• Iraq has tested missiles that exceed the permitted range;

• Iraq has failed to prove that it has destroyed all of its anthrax stockpile;

• Iraq has illegally imported rocket engines and fuel;

• Iraq has failed to account for 6,500 chemical weapons;

• Iraq has failed to declare 650 kilograms of bacterial growth medium that could

be used in the development of biological weapons;

• Iraq has rebuilt missile production facilities that were destroyed by inspectors;

and

• UNMOVIC inspectors have discovered precursors to mustard gas.

Furthermore, Iraqi scientists continue to refuse to meet with United Nations inspectors in private. To date, those who have agreed to interviews have demanded

that representatives of Iraq’s Monitoring Directorate be present. It is apparent that

Baghdad is working to discourage private meetings.

On numerous occasions, I have urged UNMOVIC and the IAEA to utilize the authority it has been given to hold interviews outside of Iraq. Scientists who agree to

be interviewed should be given the opportunity to emigrate with their families. Our

experience has shown that these scientists are the best source of information on

weapons programs.

As Iraqi intransigence has become more deliberate, President Bush and British

Prime Minister Tony Blair have ordered military forces into the region in increasing

5

numbers. The presence of these military forces in the region and the insistence of

President Bush and Prime Minister Blair on complete disarmament have been the

catalyst behind what little cooperation the United Nations has received to date from

Iraq.

All Americans are hopeful that military action against Iraq can be avoided. Iraqi

actions are providing little encouragement. The list of outstanding Iraqi obligations

and requirements is the same today as it was when United Nations inspectors left

in 1998. There is little evidence that Saddam Hussein has decided to comply or cooperate.

Our nation will and must act when our national security interests are threatened.

Iraq armed with weapons of mass destruction and the possibility of their transfer

to terrorist organizations is unacceptable. Saddam Hussein has launched chemical

and biological weapons attacks against his neighbors as well as his own people. We

cannot permit him to maintain weapons of mass destruction.

On November 8 the United Nations made a strong statement requiring full Iraqi

compliance with the terms of the Resolution 1441. Those days of hope and consensus have waned as narrower interests have begun to peel back the Security

Council’s unanimous support for Resolution 1441. This is unfortunate but not unexpected. The Administration should continue to work to build support at the United

Nations for full implementation of Resolution 1441 including the need for action in

the absence of complete Iraqi compliance. As President Bush noted in September

in his speech before the General Assembly: ‘‘the United Nations [faces] a difficult

and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced,

or cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its

founding, or will it be irrelevant?’’ In recent days the Administration has begun to consider the release of highly sensitive intelligence on Iraq’s weapons ambitions. I am encouraged that Secretary of

State Powell will visit with the Security Council and share some of our Intelligence

Community’s assessments of Iraq’s behavior. I appreciate the importance of safeguarding sources and methods in sharing highly classified information, but I believe

those risks are now outweighed both by the need to point United Nations inspectors

in the direction of suspect sites and by the need to demonstrate to the Security

Council and allied governments the seriousness of our purpose.

If, after continued discussions, United Nations support is not forthcoming, the

United States must consider a different course. We must work with like-minded nations to form a ‘‘coalition of the willing’’ committed to the disarmament of Iraq.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to think I would have relinquished it voluntarily,

but I doubt whether I would have. But if it is going to be relinquished, there is no single person, in my view, in the Congress

more qualified to have that seat than you.

And I want to thank you for getting us right underway, not wasting any time. This is—as everyone has been saying in various fora,

this is a momentous moment for the United States of America, and

a great deal is at stake.

And I say to my two friends, our witnesses, that I never thought

we would get to the point where I would have trouble seeing you,

Secretary Armitage, but I will tell you, this dais keeps getting extended. I have been here a long time. At first, I walked in and

thought maybe my eyes were going bad, and then I realized we

have extended by about ten feet; the table is moved back. So either

I have been here too long, or I am going to have to get binoculars

if we keep expanding this.

And I do want the record to note that I have been calling, for

12 years, for a new microphone system in this place, and it was not

until we had a Republican chairman that it arrived.

My only regret, Mr. Chairman, is that I wish that this had happened on my watch.

Now, technically we did not organize in the middle of January.

These were put in in January, so I am going to claim credit for the

mikes. It is my one contribution to American foreign policy. That

6

is, the witnesses can hear us now, which I am not sure is a good

thing.

But anyway, let me be serious for a few moments.

As we speak, the Judiciary Committee, of which I am a member,

is meeting, and we are about to pass a bill that I have introduced

out of committee providing for the ability for 500 visas for Iraqi scientists and all their families. I would urge you, Rich, to make the

point to the administration that it would be helpful to get this out

and moving. I cannot imagine it is not helpful to you, although it

is not dispositive of what they may do, the idea that now there is

a limit of 100, we move it to 500, and the entire families of these

scientists, if they so choose, to come to the United States.

Secretary Armitage, Mr. Ambassador—Ambassador Negroponte,

I want to add my welcome to both of you. We are eager to hear

your testimony. And I cannot think of a more critical assignment

for the future standing of our country in the world than the one

facing you in the immediate weeks ahead.

You have been charged with making America’s case to the world

and building a coalition to confront and, if necessary, to forcibly

disarm Saddam Hussein. I want to commend you for your achievements to date. In absentia, your boss, Secretary Armitage, but not

the Ambassador’s boss, I want to commend, in absentia, Colin Powell. I think he is the best thing since sliced bread, and I think he

is doing an incredible job right now with both of you.

By taking the issue of Iraq’s disarmament to the Security Council and challenging the U.N. to enforce its own resolutions, as the

President did in a brilliant speech that he made—I think the most

significant speech, in my view, that he has made since he has been

President—you have made Iraq the world’s problem, not just our

own. And I cannot emphasize enough how much I agree with you

that it must remain the world’s problem, not just our own.

You have achieved an outcome that your detractors thought impossible, but, as I am going to be frank to say, I predicted you

would be able to do, and that is, you got the Security Council to

vote unanimously last fall for demanding Iraq’s disarmament. And

I predict you will be able to do it, if not unanimously, with a German abstention, in all probability, you will be able to do that again

for a second resolution—at least I hope that is going to be the outcome. And I know you are going to attempt to pursue that, although you are not committed to that position that you must get

a U.N. resolution. But clearly, clearly, clearly, it would be in our

overwhelming interest if that were able to be done.

I look forward to your analysis of the reports issued this week

by the United Nations weapons inspectors. To me, they clearly

show, they clearly show that Saddam continues to thumb his nose

at the world and is in material breach of the 1441, the most recent

U.N. resolution. They bolster the case that the United States has

made that Iraq is violating the terms of surrender. And I want to

term it in terms of ‘‘surrender.’’

I am so frustrated by some other parts of this administration of

injecting into this debate a notion relating to preemption that has

not a damn thing to do with whether or not we move against Saddam Hussein. I would hope the President and everyone else would

stop talking about a doctrine you cannot even explain—you cannot

7

even explain to the American public, you cannot explain to us—because it is confusing the rest of the world.

We are not acting, if we act, preemptively. We are enforcing a

surrender document. Saddam Hussein invaded another country.

The world responded. If this were 1930, he would have signed a

peace agreement. It is not. We have a United Nations. He signed

on to—in return for his ability to stay in power, he made a commitment to the world, several commitments. Enforcing that, if necessary, is not preemption—is not preemption—whatever the hell

that doctrine is supposed to mean.

And so I really think you—I would respectfully suggest that

when you talk about this, you not further confuse the devil out of

the rest of the world and make us sound like a bunch of cowboys,

that we are going to be out there preemptively imposing our view.

This is an enforcement of a binding international legal commitment

that a man made to save his skin and stay in power.

In the legal sense, it is clear that Iraq is in material breach, but

the court of international opinion is not a court of law. You have

to meet a higher standard of proof—not legally have to meet it, but

practically—to enhance our greater interest. We have to meet a

higher standard of proof in order to convince the Security Council

and the thousands and thousands of people out there, or millions,

who do not understand and are not ready to believe.

I am going to say something that is mildly controversial, but

since—I said it in front of 500 world leaders in the last 3 days in

Davos, every world leader in Europe and the Middle East knows

he is in material breach. They know it. Why are they not responding? We have no—with the possible exception of England—significant powerful leader in Europe today. That is not a criticism; it is

an observation. And they are unwilling, in my view, to stand up

in the face of public opinion in their communities that run from 95

percent to 70 percent against this war based upon him being in

material breach, as defined. So we have got to help them. We have

got to help them. Because they know—they know—he is in material breach.

And I sincerely hope, and I join Senator Lugar in the—the best

news I heard in the President’s speech was on the 5th, the Secretary of State is going to go lay out this case.

This is about further strengthening—there is the concern that I

hear, and I know you have to respond to—and you hear it, you will

not—I am not suggesting you should acknowledge it, but I am

going to say it—that people who are our friends, countries who are

our friends and our allies, they are talking about, ‘‘Well, you can’t

move based upon a doctrine of preemption.’’ They are asking about,

‘‘Is this about oil? Is it about further strengthening the United

States’ already predominant position as a world power?’’ Much of

this skepticism is undeserved; but none of it is unfamiliar to either

of you, given you daily contact with foreign governments.

Some may ask why it matters what other countries think. I am

sure I will get phone calls and letters saying, ‘‘What the—Biden,

what are you talking about, caring what these other countries

think? We’re America. What does it matter what they think?’’ Well,

it matters a great deal. It matters because, while we can do this

8

alone, while we are fully capable of doing this alone, we are so

much better off—so much better off—if we do it with others.

Having others with us increases our chance of success. And by

success, I mean not just taking down Saddam. That is not the

measure of success. The measure of success is, if we take him

down, if need be, we gather up and destroy the weapons of mass

destruction, and we are assured that there is a government in

place that is not likely to reconstitute the menace and threat. That

is a gigantic undertaking that exceeds merely the military operation.

And it also, if we have others with us, decreases the risk and

lowers the cost, and it invests others in the complicated matter of

the day after, or, more appropriately, in my view, the decade after.

And it does not make us a target of every terrorist and malcontent

in the world if we are not doing this alone. It matters. It matters,

in terms of our naked self-interest.

In my view, to gain international support, the administration is

going to have to have a more consistent message, that this is about

enforcing the terms of surrender between Saddam and the Security

Council. I believe—it is presumptuous of me to say—well, it is not

presumptuous; I have been here longer than most of you—it is— I believe it is important to marshal the best evidence available to

our government to demonstrate irrefutably that Iraq is not only

failing to account, but is in violation, and continues to demonstrate—and we have evidence that it demonstrates—an ability to

thwart the efforts of the inspectors.

There is a policy of deception that is underway, and the world

has to be told it. This is important to do, not only for a skeptical

international community, but, I would respectfully suggest, for all

our constituents where we live.

The best way—and I think—to do this is—I believe there is a

compelling case to make. I hope that it leads the U.N. Security

Council to pass a second resolution to disarm Iraq. And if Iraq refuses to disarm itself, I believe—otherwise, Secretary Powell and

President Bush, as they have said, the Security Council risks undermining its credibility, in a permanent sense. And I am one of

those who believes that there is great promise. The more powerful

we are, the more predominant our power, the more we need the

United Nations, in my view. Not the less we need it; the more we

need it. Because our motives, as—Mr. Ambassador, I have never,

in all my years of attending international meetings with heads of

state and Foreign Ministers, ever heard our motives questioned as

much as they are today. Not merely our judgment. We are used to

that. But they are questioning our motives. And that is corrosive.

And that is why I believe, if we are smart—and you are, clearly,

and you are doing a great job—if we are smart, we will be able to

strengthen the United Nations in the process here so our motives

are not always the thing in question.

I would hope that the resolution would make clear that Saddam,

once and for all, must choose between giving up his weapons of

mass destruction and giving up power. And I hope it would make

it clear to the world that the choice between war and peace is

Saddam’s choice, not our choice. I think this is the single best way

to avoid war.

9

My unsolicited advice—well, solicited advice—to some of the

heads of state that attended this meeting, and Foreign Ministers

was, ‘‘If you really don’t want us to go to war, join us. Join us.’’ Join us in making it clear to Saddam that we are united. We are

united in the resolve that he must give up these weapons. Absent

that, I think there is no chance we will be able to avoid war.

Mr. Chairman, last summer you and I held a series of in-depth

hearings on Iraq, and our goal was to begin a national dialog so

the American people would be better informed about the threat

Iraq poses, the options available to us, the regional considerations,

and, finally, what was going to be asked of them, the American

people. Those hearings and today’s hearings and subsequent hearings you have planned, in my view, are critical, because I believe

that no foreign policy, no matter how well conceived, can be sustained without the informed consent of the American people. And

unfortunately—and it is not a criticism; again, it is an observation—it may not be the time, but, unfortunately, there has been

not much informed consent, thus far.

In my view, the American people have a very distorted, but understandable, view of what lies ahead. The vast majority of people

in my State assume that if we go to war, Johnny’s going to come

marching home after a 3-week encounter, and it is going to be like

the first one, and that we are not going to be tied down and engaged to the tune of billions of dollars—which I support, by the

way. I am not arguing—this is not a reason not to go, if we have

to, but is a reason to explain to all of our constituents so we are

not sitting here 2 years from now, when we are trying to pass an

authorization for an additional $20 billion to maintain forces and

maintain our effort in—to maintain a stable government in Iraq to

keep that area from imploding, and we are not told on the floor,

‘‘No, you guys, that’s a foreign policy thing.’’ We really have to go

out there and take care of the Delaware River dredging, or we have

to take care of a problem in Tennessee, or we have to take care of

some other economic and pressing need, whether it relates to education or healthcare.

The American people have to know upfront what we are about

to sign them on to. The American people have yet to have a clear

explanation of why war may be the only remaining alternative and

what authority we are using to go to war and what will be expected

of them, not only winning the war, but in securing the peace.

In last summer’s hearings, we were told that we would have to

stay in Iraq in large numbers for a long time at high cost. Now,

initially the administration—the White House, not denied, but suggested it would not mean that kind of commitment. There are reports now—we were told then it would take 75,000 forces in place

for at least 3 to 5 years, some suggested as long as 10 years, and

we would be engaged in a thing that no one in this administration,

understandably, or any administration, wants to utter, a phrase,

‘‘nation building.’’

Gentlemen and ladies of this committee, understand we are

about to embark in a commitment of ‘‘nation building.’’ Our warriors will not only win and fight wars; they will be required to

build a nation, or at least reconstruct a government. And the

American people do not understand that. I am confident they are

10

willing to bear this burden if it is explained to them. They should

not be surprised when, 2 years after this war is over, they see tens

of thousands, or thousands of American forces, American troops in

Iraq, some of whom being shot at guarding oil wells, some of whom

are going to be on a border and going to end up being killed trying

to secure that border so Iranians do not think they can have part

of northern Iraq and the Kurds do not think they can move into

Kirkuk, and so on and so forth.

It is a big-deal job coming up. They should not be sandbagged by

the sudden choice down the road that requires them to choose between supporting the continued presence in Iraq and other vital

needs our country has.

It will be incumbent upon the administration in the coming days

to level with the American people about the commitment they will

be asked to make. The President has made that commitment personally to me and to many of us in the Cabinet room, and I believe

he will do it at the appropriate time if there is nothing left—no alternative left but war. They should know what the risks are, what

is coming to them, what will be the cost, how long it will take, to

the best of our knowledge, and can we afford to remove Saddam

Hussein and rebuild Iraq and pay for homeland security and all

the other things we have to deal with? Raising these questions and

others should not, in my view, be an excuse for inaction. But we

owe it to the American people to be straight-up with them.

I will conclude by saying to you, although it is a very different

circumstance—that is, the preparation to go in and respond as we

had to in World War II and what we know we are about to do

now—we are still talking about a couple of hundred-thousand

forces. And I am looking forward to the President and the administration doing what I think all Presidents must do in such circumstances, is stand up, as Franklin Roosevelt did, and forthrightly say, There will be pain. There will be cost. There will be

loss of life. And there will be—we’ll be asking of you for your treasure—the treasure, our money—in order to be able to finish a very

important job.

I strongly recommend and sincerely hope and look forward to, if

the diplomatic route is, in fact, exhausted—if it is exhausted—that

we will have that frank assessment, because the American people

will do whatever is asked of them, but they will resent keenly the

implication that we are doing this for a reason that is not real—

and I would argue al-Qaeda is one of those reasons—and, further,

implying to them that this will be essentially a costless, bloodless

undertaking. They will do what is asked of them.

I know the two men before us cannot speak, in that sense, for

the administration, but I know them to be men of integrity, intellectual and personal, and I know that they will give us straight answers to the questions we have today. I look forward to it. I believe

you can count on the support of the vast majority of this committee

in your effort to try to diplomatically solve this. And I would suggest that you will get the support of the Congress, overwhelmingly,

if all alternatives are exhausted, if, in fact, there is a leveling with

the American people and the world community what is at stake

here and what we are committing to.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

11

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.

Let me mention three things before we greet our witnesses. As

Senator Biden has noted, the table is longer. Ideally, there is more

elbow room for members and for staff.

And second, the microphones, mercifully, do work, and members

can be heard. The problem is that members will need to press the

button in front of them to make sure the microphone works, and

then, preferably, to press the button again when the statement has

been completed.

Now, third, we will have other meetings of the committee shortly. I appreciate the attendance today. Fifteen out of our 19 members are here despite conflicts. Senators have gone back and forth

to make quorums on other committees. But this is important business.

And next—yes?

Senator BOXER. Mr. Chairman, is there a message here that this

is broken already? I mean, it happened to me. I was just curious.

The CHAIRMAN. You cannot be heard.

Senator BIDEN. There is no circumstance under which Senator

Boxer will not be able to be heard, I assure you.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be remedied, yes. Relief will come.

Let me mention that we are mindful of other policy issues, and

next Tuesday we will be discussing North Korea. On Wednesday,

we will have a business meeting, and hopefully a markup of legislation on HIV/AIDS. That bill involves a very ambitious program

that the President has mentioned that members around this committee have helped formulate—Senator Kerry, Senator Frist, in

particular, and many others. And then on Thursday, we will have

Secretary Powell. He will make his initial appearance, and that

will be a highlight, as it always is.

And then we will be back to Iraq to discuss, as Senator Biden

has suggested, what happens in the months and years to follow.

What are our obligations? What sort of planning is our administration doing? I know our administration will be eager to share with

us their thoughts and how other nations and other factors may

come into this.

I will not go beyond that, except to say that a hearing on Afghanistan comes very shortly thereafter. We will see what all is going

on there now and how we may be helpful in our work.

And then, finally, in the course of this month, we will discuss the

State Department authorization bill, really one of the essential responsibilities of this committee. And I have asked all members to

be creative. This is their opportunity.

This is an opportunity, likewise, for Secretary Powell and for

you, Mr. Armitage, and for the Department, to think about robust

diplomacy for our country, all of the various forms of assistance—

economic, strategic, human rights, and so forth—that we want to

do, and to work with our President and with the Budget Committee

and with all the powers that be so that we are able to fulfill these

aims.

Senator BIDEN. And you thought I was aggressive.

The CHAIRMAN. Now let me call upon the distinguished Deputy,

Mr. Armitage, a good friend of the committee. He has been testiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:32 Jun 10, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 85796 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
12

fying here for over a generation. But this is a very important day,

and we welcome you.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD L. ARMITAGE, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON,

DC

Mr. ARMITAGE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Chairman Biden.

I was contemplating, coming up here, Senator Lugar, that you

and I have been doing this for 23 years—at least I have had the

honor of being in front of you for 23 years, with a short break. But

even in the time out of government, I was able to come up, at the

request of the committee, from time to time, and always found myself much better off for it.

I think, speaking for John and for myself, we are delighted to be

at your first meeting as you hold the gavel of chairmanship. And

I am sure the attendance here reflects the enthusiasm that Senator

Biden engendered in this committee and which you have carried

on.

Chairman Biden, I am not going to take the bait on the question

of the microphone being the only accomplishment. The fact of the

matter is, we could spend all the time allotted for this hearing talking about your accomplishments, but I would like to single one.

Last year, during your chairmanship, you held a series of public

discussions and hearings on Iraq which really broadened, opened

up the discussion to the public, as well as helped the administration to sharpen their thinking. So, look, we know the truth and are

very grateful for it.

I would just ask you, Mr. Chairman, if you will be kind enough

to put our statements, or at least my statement, in the record. I

am not going to read it. I just want to make a few comments,

which I have jotted down here.

The CHAIRMAN. With unanimous consent, that will be done.

Mr. ARMITAGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator ALLEN. You want to capitalize ‘‘Mack’’ in Mack truck.

Mr. ARMITAGE. Right, got it. Thank you.

In October of 2001, less than a teaspoon of anthrax in an envelope brought chaos to this body. Several hundred of your employees

had to undergo emergency medical treatment, the building next

door was closed, and ultimately two members of the postal service

died, and the building in which they worked has yet to reopen.

Saddam Hussein, according to UNSCOM, the special commission,

has 25,000 liters of anthrax. That is over 5 million teaspoons of anthrax. And he has yet to account for a single grain. That is why

we are so alert, to take your invitation up, Mr. Chairman, and get

up here, because we feel a sense of urgency. And from our point

of view, that is evidence of it.

Now, you are absolutely correct, we have had quite a week. Monday, Mr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei made their comments to the Security Council. On Tuesday, the Government of Great Britain announced that, in their view, what they heard constituted a further

material breach, something that we heartily concur in. Tuesday

night, the President made his, what I thought, a compelling State

of the Union Address, in which he announced that Secretary Powell

13

would, indeed, on the 5th of February, go to New York and present

some of this evidence to the Security Council.

But let me be clear. This is more than simply an appearance before the Security Council. This will be open. We are going to try

to lay this out for the world. There are some leaders, as you suggest, Chairman Biden, that do not want to lead. So we will try, as

you suggest, to make it a little easier.

Now, 12 years have gone by in which Saddam Hussein, to use

your phrase, sir, has ‘‘thumbed his nose’’ at the international community. He has thought that he could do just what he pleased, he

could have it both ways and not pay any personal price. Those days

are over. He felt that because he faced a series of resolutions that

had no teeth.

Well, in September, President Bush went to New York and made

a very strong case that we would try to get a resolution, and we

did. We got a resolution with teeth, a resolution that was backed

by a very strong vote by the House and the Senate, House Joint

Resolution 114, which authorized the use of force under certain

conditions, which are laid out in the legislation.

And these—this 1441 had two simple tests. The first was a declaration that was to be full, currently accurate, and complete. Saddam Hussein failed that test. And it had a second simple test, and

that was to cooperate, to cooperate actively, immediately, and unconditionally with the inspection regime. He failed that test.

Now, there are many in the international community who call

out that we need to give the so-called ‘‘inspectors’’ more time. And

my view is, that is the wrong question. The question to ask is—

or to contemplate—is, ‘‘How much time has Iraq already been

given?’’ From my view, 12 years and 2 months and several days

now. Inspections continue. But inspectors, as Secretary Powell

noted the other day, can grope around in the dark. This is not a

scavenger hunt. This is not hide-and-seek. They are there to verify.

And to verify, they count on cooperation.

Now, the question is not how long should be given for inspectors

to grope in the dark, but when Saddam Hussein is going to turn

on the light. And I think it is quite clear, from the President’s comments in the State of the Union, that if Saddam Hussein does not

turn on the light, the lights will be turned on, peacefully or forcibly. And you are exactly correct, it is his choice. But one thing I

am going to make clear: He has got to make that choice in a hurry.

And I think that was equally clear from the comments from the

President at the State of the Union and yesterday on his travels.

In our view, the lack of cooperation, simple cooperation, of Saddam Hussein indicates that he is intent on holding onto these

weapons for three simple reasons. He wants them to either dominate, or to intimidate, or to attack. The President said the other

evening in the State of the Union that to trust in the sanity and

restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy; neither is it an option.

So I welcome the opportunity to be here, Mr. Chairman, and look

forward to a very vigorous give-and-take with the members of this

excellent committee. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Armitage follows:]

14

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD L. ARMITAGE, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee.

In October 2001, a single letter containing one teaspoon of anthrax threw this

body into chaos. The offices next door were closed down for three months. Hundreds

of your staff were subjected to emergency medical treatment. And two postal service

employees died—the building they worked in is still not open for business.

According to the United Nations Special Commission [UNSCOM], which carried

out inspections in Iraq for the better part of a decade, Iraq possesses some 25,000

liters of anthrax. That is, for the record, more than 5 million teaspoons of anthrax.

And we have no idea where any of it is. Saddam Hussein has never accounted for

one grain of it.

This is a matter of terrible urgency. I welcome the opportunity to discuss with

you and this Committee the latest developments in the inspection process and what

those developments mean for our commitment, as a country and as part of the world

community, to see that Iraq is disarmed fully, finally and right now of all weapons

of mass destruction and terror.

This has been a dramatic week. On Monday, Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei presented their reports to the U.N. Security Council. On Tuesday afternoon, the government of the United Kingdom stated that, based on that report, Iraq was in further material breach. On Tuesday evening, President Bush was unequivocal. ‘‘We

will consult,’’ he said, ‘‘But let there be no misunderstanding. If Saddam Hussein

does not fully disarm for the safety of our people, and for the peace of the world,

we will lead a coalition to disarm him.’’

This situation has just about reached a boiling point, and the entire world is

watching. Rightfully so. This is what Monday’s report told us: since the passage of

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441, Iraq’s last chance to disarm, Iraq has refused to hand over or destroy its chemical and biological weapons; Iraq has refused

to identify the location and fate of its considerable stocks of anthrax, botulinum

toxin, VX, sarin, and mustard gas; Iraq has refused to surrender its mobile biological capabilities, which are essentially germ laboratories tucked into the back of a

Mack truck; and Iraq has refused to account for tens of thousands of empty—and

full—chemical and biological warheads. And, mind you, these are just the materials

and the weapons we know about, just some of what UNSCOM catalogued in 1999

after inspectors were kicked out of Iraq in 1998. We do not know what Saddam Hussein may have amassed in the years since.

This is not some abstract concern. This is a concrete and significant military capability—one that Saddam Hussein has shown a willingness to use. And consider that

the amount of biological agent that U.N. inspectors believe Iraq produced—the

25,000 liters of anthrax and 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin—is enough to kill tens

of thousands of people. Perhaps far more, depending on how, when and where it is

released. And consider that UNSCOM found more than just the evidence of bulk biological agents. The inspectors also found that Iraq had developed effective and efficient means for dispersing these materials: unmanned aerial vehicles, spray devices,

special munitions. We don’t know where any of it is. And the last 60 days of new

inspections have turned up no additional information that could allay any concerns

about this military capability.

On Monday, Dr. Blix came to the conclusion that ‘‘Iraq appears not to have come

to a genuine acceptance—not even today—of the disarmament, which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and

to live in peace.’’ The Department of State shares this conclusion. Iraq has failed

to cooperate actively, and without active cooperation, the peaceful disarmament of

Iraq is not going to be possible. As you have heard us say, time is running out for

the Iraqi regime to remedy this situation.

The implications are stark. For 12 years, the international community has demanded that Iraq disarm. And for 12 years, we have tried to limit the damage that

Saddam Hussein could inflict on his neighbors and on his own people. But throughout this time, Saddam Hussein has constantly tested and correctly assessed that

none of these measures has any real teeth. That he personally need not pay the

price for any of it. That he need not change any of his behaviors or give up any

of his ambitions. And so despite the international community’s effort, and the inspectors’ Herculean effort, Saddam Hussein remains a threat.

In effect, the United Nations has tolerated defiance and allowed the Iraqi regime

to retain its devastating military capability for far too long. Last fall, this situation

compelled President Bush to challenge the international community to take a stand.

And the U.N. Security Council responded by unanimously passing Resolution 1441,

a resolution that dramatically broke with the past. It included tests that have to

be passed and it had teeth.

15

With this resolution, the world put the burden of proof back where it belongs— squarely on the shoulders of Saddam Hussein. Resolution 1441 found that Iraq has

been and remains in material breach for its refusal to disarm, but the resolution

offered the Iraqi regime one last chance for a peaceful solution. The Security Council

demanded immediate, full and verifiable disarmament of Iraq, the original terms of

1991 cease-fire (UNSCR 687). The first test of compliance was set as a full, currently accurate and complete accounting of Iraq’s deadly programs. The second test

was cooperation with the inspectors, ‘‘actively, immediately, and unconditionally.’’ And both tests rested on an ironclad bottom line: Resolution 1441 warned that serious consequences would result from continued Iraqi noncompliance.

On Monday, after 60 days of inspections, the inspectors delivered bad news. Iraq

has failed each test. My colleague, Ambassador Negroponte, will speak to this in

more detail, but essentially, Iraq’s declaration was a scurrilous 12,000-page waste

of time. Not one member of the Council rose to defend it. The three-foot tall stack

of papers is—at best—recycled information with a dash of new obfuscation. As for

Iraqi cooperation, it has been neither active, immediate nor unconditional. In fact,

it has been lacking altogether. Take, for example, aerial surveillance. Because of

Iraq’s interference, the inspectors are not supported by any fixed-wing aerial surveillance at this time, which is in direct defiance of the detailed terms of Resolution

1441. Let me tell you why that is important. We know from past experience that

at times, Iraq has been tipped off as to where the inspectors are going, allowing

Iraqi officials to remove or hide documents and materials, sometimes literally going

out the back door while inspectors are knocking on the front door. Overhead surveillance would help ensure that these tactics and tricks of the past could not confound

today’s inspections.

There is no sign, not one sign, that the Iraqi regime has any intent to comply fully

with the terms of Resolution 1441, just as it has failed to comply with previous U.N.

Security Council resolutions. The international community gave Iraq one final opportunity to disarm peacefully, and that opportunity has just about run its course.

Dr. Blix told us on Monday that there has been no progress toward credible,

verifiable disarmament.

There are those who say we still need to build our case, and that Secretary Powell

will have to present convincing evidence when he appears before the Security Council on February 5th. But this is not about the United States, and what we can prove.

This is about Saddam Hussein, and what he must prove. He is the one who owes

us evidence. On Monday, Hans Blix gave us a vivid snapshot of how the situation

stands right now. Next week, Secretary Powell will give us the bigger picture, the

past record and the present realities. His presentation will include some intelligence

and information the public has never heard before, but all of it will reinforce the

message Dr. Blix conveyed.

There are those who say we need more time for inspections to ‘‘work.’’ To this I

respond that it is not a matter of how much time to give inspectors but of how much

time we have already given Iraq. And in these 12 long years, the regime has yet

to even accept disarmament in principle, according to Dr. Blix. At this point, giving

Iraq more time may well be wishful thinking. Arguing for more time is essentially

telling Saddam Hussein that the threat of ‘‘serious consequences’’ is hollow, just like

every other threat made over the past 12 years. It does none of us any good to let

Saddam Hussein think he can wear us down into his version of business as usual.

As President Bush said on Tuesday, ‘‘if this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words and all recriminations would come too late.

Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy and it is

not an option.’’

Resolution 1441 was clear. One final chance to disarm peacefully. No second

chance. That is not to say that it is too late for the Iraqi regime. I think we can

all still hope for a peaceful solution in the next days and weeks. To that end, the

United States will continue to offer the inspectors a variety of material and intelligence support. But for Iraq, the time for a peaceful outcome, an outcome where

inspectors are able to verify Iraq’s decision to disarm. That time is fast coming to

a close.

The president was clear on Tuesday. He has not yet made a decision to resort to

military action. But he has reached a decision that the international community has

an obligation to see that Iraq is disarmed. Peacefully—or forcibly, if necessary.

When all 15 members of the Security Council voted to pass U.N. Security Council

Resolution 1441, they agreed to this. They reaffirmed the authorities given in 1991

and they assumed the responsibility for putting their will behind their words. Moreover, Saddam Hussein’s defiance is not just a clear and present threat to our mutual

security and vital interests; it also challenges the relevance and credibility of the

Security Council and the world community. President Bush, Secretary Powell, other

16

administration officials and I have begun consultations with other Security Council

members, friends and allies to discuss the implications of Iraq’s choice and to consider how to best protect our interests and the interests of the international community. All states with an investment in the rule of law and international stability will

have to consider some difficult questions. Will the world acquiesce and stand down

if Iraq refuses to disarm? Will we allow our fear and reluctance to fight drive us

into confusion and inaction, even in the face of such a threat? And what will this

mean for the future, particularly in a world where Iraq is not the only nation with

ambitions for such an arsenal? We expect to have a full and frank exchange of views

in the coming weeks.

No one in this country or the international community wants war. For war is horrible. But no one wants a regime with no regard for the welfare of its own people

or the borders of its neighbors and no regard for the will of the international community to possess weapons of mass destruction. We have to face the fact that if Iraq

does not disarm peacefully, we will have to make a choice. We cannot have it both

ways. If Saddam Hussein refuses to give up his lethal capabilities we can only conclude, as the president said, that Saddam Hussein is keeping these weapons in

order to ‘‘dominate, intimidate, or attack.’’ It is our hope that the world community

will choose to stand behind Resolution 1441 and as a great coalition act with clarity

of purpose and strength of resolve to disarm Iraq and protect our peace and security.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Armitage.

It is a privilege to have our Ambassador to the United Nations,

John Negroponte, a veteran diplomat, Ambassador, and, likewise,

a good friend of the committee, who has testified frequently. But

it is very important testimony today. It is great to have you, sir,

and we appreciate your being here.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. NEGROPONTE, U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW

YORK, NY

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,

and it is a pleasure to be before the committee once again.

As the Deputy Secretary has said, Resolution 1441 presented

Iraq with the requirement to disarm and two tests, one that Iraq

would submit, and I quote, ‘‘a currently accurate, full, and complete,’’ unquote, declaration of all aspects of its WMD programs and

delivery systems; and, two, would Iraq cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and actively with UNMOVIC and the IAEA?

The presentations we heard on Monday in the Security Council

confirmed that, in spite of the urgency introduced into Resolution

1441, Iraq did not meet either test. The declaration was a fundamental test of cooperation and intent, and Iraq failed it resoundingly.

On January 27, Dr. Blix, himself, again said, ‘‘The declaration

does not’’—and I am quoting here—‘‘clarify and submit supporting

evidence regarding the many open disarmament issues.’’ ‘‘Regrettably’’—and I am continuing to quote here—‘‘the 12,000-page declaration, most of which is a reprint of earlier documents, does not

seem to contain any new evidence that would eliminate the questions or reduce their numbers,’’ end of quote.

And then the inspectors’ reports go on to raise a number of key

issues that are still unanswered and to which you referred to in

your statement, Mr. Chairman, and so has Secretary Armitage

also, so I will not repeat them in detail, but they relate to the VX,

to the Iraqi Air Force document that indicates that there are at

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answered questions about 122-millimeter chemical rocket warheads, 12 of which were just found by UNMOVIC in a bunker that

was constructed since 1998—that is to say, since the weapons inspections ended under UNSCOM. So this is evidence of continued

activity on their part after the inspectors were no longer able to operate in Iraq at the end of 1998.

Dr. Blix also said that there, of course, is particularly troublesome—that Iraq produced more than the 8,500 liters of anthrax it

admitted to and claims to have unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991. ‘‘Iraq has provided, again’’—and these are Dr. Blix’

words—‘‘no additional or convincing evidence on anthrax production and destruction.’’ They also did not declare some 650 kilograms of bacterial growth media, and deliberately deleted information about the importation of this media that Iraq had previously

provided in 1999.

There remain some significant questions about Scud missiles,

and Iraq is developing two missiles, the liquid-fuel Al Samud and

the solid-fueled Al Fatah, which UNMOVIC knows, knows for a

fact—were tested at ranges greater than 150 kilometers, the range

limit established in Resolution 687, which was the resolution that

closely followed the end of the war. Dr. Blix said—and, again, I

quote—‘‘The missiles’’—I think this is a very important quote—

‘‘The missiles might very well represent a prima facie case of proscribed systems,’’ end of quote. And in reply to a question that I

put to Dr. Blix in the Security Council yesterday afternoon, he said

he expected to make a determination in this regard quite soon.

Iraq has casting chambers for solid-fuel missiles capable of

ranges significantly greater than 150 kilometers, and has imported

other equipment, including 380 rocket engines. Dr. Blix said, again,

quote, ‘‘These items may well be for proscribed purposes,’’ end of

quote, and we definitely believe that they are.

Based on a tip, UNMOVIC discovered an intelligence tip.

UNMOVIC discovered some 3,000 official documents in a private

home that deal with such subjects as laser enrichment of uranium.

And Dr. Blix again remarked that he, and I quote, ‘‘could not help

but think,’’ unquote, that other private residences may contain

troves of such documents.

The declaration is also silent on any steps since 1998 with regard

to Iraq’s nuclear program, to mobile biological weapons labs, or, indeed, any new activities since the inspections ended. So they would

have us believe that since the inspections ended in 1998, they had

engaged in none of these proscribed activities, which is laughable,

on its face.

The inspectors acknowledge that there has been Iraqi cooperation on process, but that is not the substantive and the active cooperation that the Council requires. The resolution determined

that—and, again, I quote—‘‘Iraq shall provide UNMOVIC and the

IAEA immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access,’’ end of quote, and unimpeded movement. Instead, we see attempts to intimidate UNMOVIC by large numbers of ‘‘minders’’—

at times, as many as five minders for each inspector—as well as

so-called ‘‘spontaneous’’ demonstrations and restrictions masked by

concerns for safety.

18

Dr. Blix, himself, has told us that the presence of minders, and

I quote, ‘‘bordered on harassment,’’ end of quote, and described

some recent disturbing incidents, including official allegations that

the inspectors are spying. This is hardly the attitude of a government that wishes to cooperate with the inspection process. The

Iraqi Government now claims it cannot ensure that its citizens will

allow inspectors entrance to private property.

And Iraq has refused to allow the free and unrestricted use of

U–2s on missions, a clear violation of 1441. Inspectors must also

have immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted, and private access to all

officials and other persons whom UNMOVIC and the IAEA wish to

interview in the mode or location of UNMOVIC’s or the IAEA’s

choice.

But UNMOVIC and IAEA have not been able to obtain private

interviews. Not a single one. Even after belated assurances 2 weeks

ago that the government would encourage its citizens to accept private meetings. Inspectors have noted that they had not been provided with all the names of personnel in Iraq’s former and current

WMD programs, as required.

On the question of nuclear proliferation, the IAEA Director, General ElBaradei, informed the Council that, to date, the IAEA, and

I quote, ‘‘found no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons program since the elimination of the program in the 1990s,’’ end of quote. That said, Dr. ElBaradei was also clear that, to date,

Iraq had only provided passive support, not proactive support, to

use his words. It is well to recall, however, that, in 1991, the IAEA

was on the verge of declaring Iraq nuclear-weapons-free, when subsequent based on defector information revealed an extensive secret

nuclear weapons program, a reminder that we can never be complacent when it comes to Iraqi voracity.

The IAEA also has outstanding questions that Iraq’s declaration

failed to address. And according to Dr. ElBaradei, these include

weapons design and centrifuge development. And the IAEA has not

yet completed its evaluation of aluminum tubes.

In short, Mr. Chairman, we believe that Iraq is not disarming.

The Council’s unanimity in support of Resolution 1441 was the result of enormous diplomatic energy. There was substantial giveand-take over weeks of negotiation, because we all understood that

President Bush had transformed the debate and the importance of

the undertaking. Iraq has failed the tests set out by 1441 and is

close to squandering its final opportunity.

And I might just add, as a closing note, as the Deputy Secretary

mentioned, Council members, of course, are looking forward with

great interest to the meeting that we will be having next week

when Secretary Powell will be addressing the Council with respect

to information and intelligence we have with respect to Iraq’s noncompliance with Resolution 1441 and the programs of denial and

deception in which they are engaged in order to totally frustrate

the inspection process.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ambassador Negroponte.

Parenthetically, let me just comment, because I think it is relevant. Last Wednesday I was privileged to witness a conversation

between the President of the United States and the Secretary GenVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:32 Jun 10, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 85796 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
19

eral, Kofi Annan in which our President affirmed our strong support for the United Nations. Our prayer, really, is that the United

Nations will be more and more successful, not only in the Iraqi endeavor, but in several others that we have ahead of us on the trail.

The Secretary General understands the gravity of this situation, in

terms of the future of the United Nations and its credibility. So

that is a firm understanding, face-to-face, between two very important individuals in this world.

I would say to the committee, the Secretary General has asked

that I work with the ranking member to find a day in which the

committee might go to the United Nations. He would like to be our

host and provide a remarkable opportunity for learning and participation. I take that offer seriously, and I mention it so that we can

all think about an appropriate time.

Senator BIDEN. Would you yield on one—very, very, very briefly.

Ambassador, you thought when you left the role of being out in

other hinterlands that you would never hear the words again,

‘‘Here comes a CODEL,’’ but——

The CHAIRMAN. With that welcome intervention——

Now, let me say that we have consulted briefly on the fact that

we have many members here today. The ranking member agrees

that our procedure should be that we will move the chairman’s

question, the ranking member’s question, then Senator Hagel and

then Senator Dodd—in other words, in seniority, by both parties,

with a 7-minute limit. And with the veteran, Bertie Bowman, on

the clock.

The CHAIRMAN. For those who have not experienced Mr. Bowman, he has outlasted all of us on this committee——

The CHAIRMAN. And is a rigorous timekeeper.

And the green light will go on at the beginning of the 7-minutes;

with 1 minute to go, the yellow light, the caution signal; and the

red, the final termination, hopefully, of both the answer as well as

the question, but we will try to be liberal in interpretation.

Let me just say I have already had an opportunity to give my

views on the subject, and I will pass at this point and turn to the

distinguished ranking member for his questions.

Senator BIDEN. I have several questions, but I will just ask one,

if I may.

The administration officials, including the President on Tuesday

night, have repeatedly asserted that the Iraqi Government maintains ties with members of the al-Qaeda network. Are you able to

tell us what evidence you have to support that claim?

And as a follow-on to that, why is it that we spend, it seems, so

much time on making the assertions that are the least—or the

most difficult to prove, including the aluminum tubes, when we

have such overwhelming evidence of the failure of Iraq to comply

with the existence—or with 1441? It seems to undercut our case.

We lead with the two things that may be true, but are the most

difficult to prove, and we seem not do what you guys did here

today, very compellingly talk about VX, anthrax, things we know.

So it is a two-part question. One, what evidence, if you are able

to share with us, is there about direct connection between Saddam

and al-Qaeda? And two, what is the rationale for how we have been

20

leading thus far, and will it change with the evidence we are presenting?

Mr. ARMITAGE. Thank you, sir. On the question of al-Qaeda, in

this forum, I will say that it is clear that al-Qaeda is harbored to

some extent in Iraq, that there is a presence in Iraq. There are

other indications of some—a recent assassination of our diplomat

in Amman, Mr. Foley, that was apparently orchestrated by an alQaeda member who is resident in Baghdad.

Having said that, I am not making the case here that this is a

9/11 connection, but I will make the case that the President has

made consistently, sir, and that is that it is the thirst for the weapons of mass destruction and our belief that if Saddam Hussein can

pass them to people who will do us ill without being caught, he will

do it. That gives us so much concern. And this will be part of the

information that Secretary Powell is going to impart in some more

detail. They are busy back home right now trying to declassify as

much as possible to give him a pretty full case.

On the question of why we spend so much time on things that

are difficult to prove, I do not know. Perhaps, particularly on the

aluminum tubes, we miscalculated. Clearly, there is a difference of

opinion in the intelligence community, which we came up and

briefed forthrightly and, indeed, deliberately.

Senator BIDEN. I agree, you did.

Mr. ARMITAGE. Well, the reason we did it deliberately was to

show you we are not playing hide-the-bacon here. I believe that, as

I indicated to Senator Hagel the other day in a conversation, that

the view is shifting on this more to the side that this has a relationship to nuclear activities, rather than rocket motors. But perhaps we miscalculated. And I take your comments as a sign to, as

we used to say in the Navy, ‘‘KISS’’—‘‘Keep it simple, sailor’’—go

with your—go with your——

Senator BIDEN. Strongest case.

Mr. ARMITAGE. Yes, your strong points.

Senator BIDEN. I yield back the rest of my time, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you.

Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Welcome, Mr. Secretary and Ambassador Negroponte. I add my

appreciation to what has already been stated here this morning

from our distinguished chairman and ranking member, for your

leadership, Secretary Powell’s historic, dangerous, difficult, challenging times. And we, I believe, are all grateful that the two of

you, Secretary Powell, and his team are in the positions you are

in. So we appreciate your good work. Thank you.

There has been some discussion here this morning about the possibility of a second U.N. Security resolution. Mr. Secretary, in consultation with our U.N. Ambassador, what is the position of the

U.S. Government on a second resolution, and what would be the

prospects, in your enlightened opinion, of a second resolution? Not

is it required, but what is the position of the United States? Are

we opposed to it? And what are the prospects for the French or

someone moving, in the Security Council, on a second resolution?

Mr. ARMITAGE. Senator, thank you for your comments about Secretary Powell and his leadership. We appreciate it greatly.

21

I will start, and I think John will finish. We find a second resolution desirable, but, as you suggest, not absolutely necessary, for all

the reasons that Chairman Biden laid out, particularly the Resolution 678, which does already authorize all necessary means.

Having said that, Secretary Powell will make his presentation on

the 5th, and after that we will kind of assess the tone and tenor

of the discussions. We will let this germinate a bit with Ambassador Negroponte talking with his colleagues, and then we will

make a judgment.

Now, a second resolution could run the gamut from a resolution

that simply finds that Iraq has not complied, to the far end, authorizing all necessary means. So when we talk about a second resolution, there are any number of subsets of it.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. As Senator Biden, I think, correctly

said earlier, 1441 does not require, nor does 687 require, a second

resolution, and the Secretary said it also. There is—I think there

is going to be a lot of diplomatic activity, both now—we have got

Prime Minister Blair coming to meet with the President, then Secretary Powell’s briefing to the Council, and then I think we are

going to enter into sort of a dynamic phase of our diplomacy and

are going to have to be taking the temperature of how our colleagues on the Council about this, faced with both the determined

position of the United States on this question and a dynamic situation.

One thing I would caution against is trying to prejudge the outcome or divisions within the Council. I think we have faced, and

we have some interesting examples, during the past year or so of

situations that we have faced where the Council appeared to be divided initially, but, through the hard work and effort and the diplomacy of our President and our Secretary of State, we ultimately

were able to reach consensus.

Senator HAGEL. So the position of the U.S. Government today, if

I understand it, is not necessarily opposed to a second resolution.

We would evaluate it, based on the substance, and possibly support

a second resolution. Is that right?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I believe that—yes, it would be possible.

Senator HAGEL. Do you think it is—— Ambassador NEGROPONTE [continuing]. Yes, desirable to achieve

if that were possible.

Senator HAGEL. Do you think it is likely that we will see a second resolution proposed?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I would not want to make that prediction at this point in time. But as the Deputy Secretary said, I

think it would be desirable, and it more desirable—the more

friends one can mobilize in an enterprise of this kind, the better

off you are.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Mr. Ambassador, you have just recited a rather bleak assessment

of the inspections up to this point in the inspectors’ report. Although, as we know, Drs. ElBaradei and Blix have both suggested

that those inspections continue. Now, with that very bleak assessment, which I read into it, the U.S. Government thinks essentially

they are worthless and they have not produced anything except

22

buying time for Saddam, then why, or are we, supporting continued

resolution—continued inspections?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I do not think, Senator, that we have

written off the inspections, themselves. It is—the problem is not

the inspections; it is the attitude of Iraq.

Senator HAGEL. Are we supporting continued time for inspections?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, at the present time, we have not

taken any position to discontinue our support—or inspections.

Senator HAGEL. So essentially, the government’s position is, we

continue to support inspections.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. At the moment, we do, yes. But if I

could just complete the thought.

Senator HAGEL. Sure.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I think that the onus is on Iraq to cooperate. And if nothing else, the process thus far has demonstrated

an unwillingness on the part of Iraq to be fully and unconditionally

and immediately——

Senator HAGEL. But we are supporting continued——

Ambassador NEGROPONTE [continuing]. And proactively cooperative.

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. We are supporting continued inspections.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. At the moment, we are.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned—I think your

quote was, ‘‘Saddam Hussein must make that choice in a hurry.’’

To your point, Mr. Ambassador, what, then, would be our thinking

about if inspections go forward, which I assume they will, which

you have just said that we are not opposed to that for the moment—you also said that we will have consultations next week

based on a number of things that will be happening—but what,

then, is the timeframe? Are we going to lay down—the United

States, lay down to the Security Council a timeframe, ‘‘All right, 2

weeks, 3 weeks, we go to war’’? Where are we?

Mr. ARMITAGE. As the President said, Senator, no decision has

been made. However, he has instructed us to engage, for the next

few weeks, in intensive diplomacy to try to resolve this peacefully.

So I think the best timeframe I can give you is, this is a matter

of weeks and not months, sir.

Senator HAGEL. In consultation with the Security Council based

on facts and intelligence reports that the Secretary will lay out.

One last question before a very conservative evaluation of our

timeframe here and Bertie gavels me down. Intelligence sharing

with the inspectors, as we sharing enough, not enough, too much?

Are they getting what they need? What is important for them?

Mr. ARMITAGE. We have 108 inspectors in the field right now—

256 total, but many of them are support people. We have increased,

as they have gone forward, the amount of intelligence. I am given

to understand that they have got just about what they can handle.

They are about to graduate another 57 inspectors. So we will have

more in the field, and that would indicate to me that we ought to

be pushing more intelligence ahead.

The Secretary of State has used the phrase, ‘‘We want to flood

the zone.’’ As much as they can take, feed them, sir.

23

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

It is the intention to increase significantly the number of inspectors? Is that what I am to draw from your last response?

Mr. ARMITAGE. It is to increase the number. I would not characterize it—we are graduating—or there is graduating another class

of 57, the majority of which would available to go into the field to

add to the 108 that are already in the field inspecting. There are

another hundred-plus who are involved in support and flying, et

cetera, Senator.

Senator SARBANES. What is the difficulty that you perceive with

allowing the inspectors to continue to do their work in an intensified manner over a period of time?

Mr. ARMITAGE. I think that we agree that there ought to be intensified inspections over a period of time. Perhaps the disagreement we would have, sir, is over the amount of time. And from our

point of view, 12 years, 2 months, and several days is about enough

time. But we have not quite given up yet.

Senator SARBANES. Well, is this regime a more rigorous regime

that they are operating under now than when they went in before?

Mr. ARMITAGE. I am getting my brains behind me on this, Senator.

Senator SARBANES. Well, I think Ambassador Negroponte could

answer that question.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, I was just going to add an element to it, which is they are already, in our judgment, in material—in further material breach.

Senator SARBANES. Well, I understand that. I mean, the President keeps saying he has not made up his mind, but it seems to

me he has defined the problem in such a way that he has to go

to war, because he, in effect, has said, If the inspectors don’t find

any hidden weapons, Saddam is being extremely good at hiding

them. And if they do find them, then it just shows that he was in

violation and, therefore, has to be punished. So the problem has

been defined in such a way that it seems to me a war is the only

conclusion you can draw, other than the very remote possibility

that he will leave the country. I do not know how much weight to

give to that. But other than that, the issue has been defined in

such a way that there is no alternative but to go to war.

And yet the President keeps saying, ‘‘Well, I haven’t made up my

mind about going to war.’’ And yet we are positioning large numbers of troops and logistics and so forth in the area. It is all geared

to go to war—presumably, at some point here, he is going to turn

and say, well, now I’ve decided to go to war. But it seems to me

that decision, in effect, was made when the problem was defined

in such a way that there was no alternative.

Mr. ARMITAGE. Senator, I will answer the previous question, but

let me try to take this first. The problem was defined by Resolution

1441, which required Saddam Hussein to cooperate. He is the one

who is not cooperating. Had he made the disclosure, it was quite

24

clear we would be having a different debate. And if he makes full

disclosure tomorrow, we will be having a different debate.

On the question of moving forces, there is no question. I think,

in most people’s mind—I will defer to John’s analysis of the Council—that we would not even have UNMOVIC inspectors in Iraq

without the threat of the use of force. And I think that is generally

accepted.

Senator SARBANES. Well, I accept that proposition. But once you

succeeded in doing that, in getting the inspectors in with what I

understand is a more rigorous regime than when they were previously in Iraq, it is not quite clear to me why we then do not play

out that path.

Now, if the inspectors—first of all, does the presence of the inspectors, in your view, inhibit Saddam’s activities with respect to

weapons of mass destruction?

Mr. ARMITAGE. It occurs to me, in a State the size of California,

with 23 million people, that several hundred, if it gets to that, inspectors probably, in the most minimal way, inhibits them, as he,

I would think, has to play some hide-and-seek with us. But when

you look at the size of the problem, if we have to depend on inspectors to ferret out the information, we cannot get there from here,

Senator.

Senator SARBANES. What about several thousand inspectors?

Mr. ARMITAGE. Well, I do not know. Would I say several thousand is better than 200 or 300? At some point in time, if you are

not going to cooperate, you are not going to cooperate. And more

inspectors are not going to force the cooperation, just force more obfuscation.

Senator SARBANES. What is your definition of ‘‘cooperation’’?

Mr. ARMITAGE. The definition is not my definition, sir; it is the

definition of Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei.

Senator SARBANES. But apparently their view is that they need

and should have significant more time for their inspectors to carry

out their tasks. Is that not their view, as I understand it?

Mr. ARMITAGE. I have certainly heard Dr. ElBaradei say that,

sir, and that is his opinion. The decision rests with the Security

Council.

And John, you have talked to Hans—— Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, I think also the definition of ‘‘cooperation’’ is in the resolution, and it is quite elaborate—allowing

U–2 flights, allowing unrestricted access, and cooperating

proactively. And all of these things are things that Iraq is not

doing at the moment.

I think the fundamental difficulty is that as far as Iraq is concerned, this seems to be business as usual. It is the way they dealt

with inspections in the past.

Senator SARBANES. Do you think these inspectors are not getting

greater access than they had in the past?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. They are getting—in process—they

are getting some procedural cooperation. They are getting access to

the sites that they have asked to go to. They have gone to, I think,

some 300 sites, or 250, and most of them are sites that had previously been identified, had previously been inspected. Those, they

are getting access to. But we consider this to be just procedural.

25

As far as whether they have—moving materials, continuing to

hide materials that they had, giving access to—for example, to private interviews for scientists, the U–2 issue that we mentioned earlier.

Senator SARBANES. I understand.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. As far as we are concerned, the substantive cooperation—— Senator SARBANES. How much of the information which the administration has, in terms of its suspicions about sites and what

ought to be inspected and where the inspectors ought to go and so

forth, is being provided to the inspectors? It is my understanding

that there is a very large amount of information of that sort, but

that only a small portion of it has been given to the inspectors, in

terms of leading them to places that we think should be looked at.

Is that correct?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, as the Deputy Secretary said,

the Secretary’s instructions were to flood the zone. We have been

providing packages of intelligence information. I think it is important that it be actionable by the inspectors, but, yes, we have been

providing substantial information to them, and so have other

friendly countries.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, could I just get an answer to

that question? In the total picture of what you have, how much are

you giving to the inspectors?

Mr. ARMITAGE. I will have to supply it for the record. I do not

know the answer in percentage terms, Senator, so if you will allow,

we will supply it. I do not know it.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for supplying it for the record.

[A classified response was subsequently supplied.]

Senator SARBANES. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Chafee.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I will just followup on Senator Sarbanes’ line of questioning. It

seems as though we are arguing over how much cooperation and

obstruction is taking place in Iraq. But Hans Blix did say in his

report to the United Nations that the prompt access, open-door policy pursued so far by the Iraqis, vis-a-vis the inspectors, is an indispensable element of transparency in a process that aims at securing disarmament by peaceful means.

How do you react to him saying that?

Those are his words. He is saying he is getting prompt access

and an open-door policy.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Senator, but he also said—and here is

a quote, which I think is perhaps the most telling, ‘‘Iraq appears

not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today’’—and

that is when he was speaking on Monday—‘‘of the disarmament

that was demanded of it.’’ And he has also said on repeated occasions, ‘‘If Iraq had cooperated fully and unconditionally in 1991, we

would not be here discussing these issues today.’’ So while I think he acknowledges a certain amount of cooperation with respect to process, I believe he considers substantive cooperation to be sorely lacking.

Senator CHAFEE. Well, the decision to go to war, then, is splitting

a hair here, it seems, over cooperation or lack of it.

26

You do mention the U–2 flights. A question I have is: What prevents us from overflying Iraq with our U–2s? Is he going to shoot

them down?

Mr. ARMITAGE. As I understand it, the U–2 flights are something

that Mr. Blix has put forward as a matter of cooperation, and they

have not—he has not received satisfaction from the Iraqi authorities.

Could the United States fly that? Yes, we could fly that, sir. The

question is, I think Dr. Blix is using this to try to engender cooperation from the Iraqis. And yet again, he has been thwarted.

And with your permission, Senator, I would like to insert into

the record several of the comments that Hans Blix made in his report. He said a lot, and a lot of it is quite negative about the question of cooperation and access, et cetera.

[At the time of publication the material had not been received.]

Senator CHAFEE. Yes. Secretary Armitage, you started off your

testimony with the incident of anthrax here in the building next

door. And would you not—I think it is generally accepted that that

anthrax came domestically, within our borders—that many countries could have this so-called ‘‘weapon of mass destruction.’’ Do we

have a consistent policy toward dealing with countries that have

weapons of mass destruction?

Mr. ARMITAGE. First of all, to be clear, I did not make the allegation that Iraq had planted that letter——

Senator CHAFEE. No, I did not——

Mr. ARMITAGE [continuing]. In the building.

Senator CHAFEE [continuing]. I did not suggest that.

Mr. ARMITAGE. I was just using it to indicate, sort of, the danger

of unaccounted-for anthrax, in this case.

The question of nonproliferation policy, which I think generally

you are getting at, is one that we have been accused of having a

certain lack of consistency with. And I think, though, it is hard to

have a one-size-fits-all policy. Some of the people who are engaged

in—that manufacture some of these weapons are, in other cases,

friends of ours, and we have to use a different process to try to jawbone them or persuade them to get out of it.

So I would say that if you are looking for kind of a statement— and I do not mean to trivialize it, but almost a bumper-sticker

statement, I am incapable of giving it to you.

Senator CHAFEE. Great. Thank you very much. It seems as

though the American people believe that with the inspectors in

Iraq, there is no immediate threat. I have the feeling from my constituents that we are back to regime change. First it was regime

change, then it was disarmament, and now we are back to, ‘‘Never

mind disarmament; it’s all about regime change.’’ Not allowing the

inspectors to continue has, I think, the American people very perplexed. Can you comment?

Mr. ARMITAGE. Simply that I think that some of the facts on the

ground are changing. We had put a lot of effort, as John indicates,

into the diplomacy. We are very disappointed that the report of Dr.

Blix and Dr. ElBaradei did not give more room for optimism and

hope.

And as regards the amount of time, I must say, just from past

experience—as I indicated, I have been coming up in front of SenVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:32 Jun 10, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 85796 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
27

ator Lugar for 23 years—the one thing I do not want to have is a

hearing that is full of recriminations because we did not do something, we were waiting for a little more time or another inspector.

And that is a real thought in my mind. And I would rather suffer

tough rigorous questioning or even hostile questioning any number

of times than have the one hearing that might be full of recriminations.

Senator CHAFEE. I do not think that is—— Mr. ARMITAGE. Generally.

Senator CHAFEE [continuing]. I do not think it is appropriate to

mentioned anthrax. We could have an incident at any time.

But I think that as we look at letting the inspectors continue to

do their work, the American people are asking, ‘‘Why aren’t we allowing them additional time?’’ We understand that, with the warm

weather coming in the summer, the soldiers have to wear their protective gear. There is some kind of time table. But why not wait

a year? I think the American people are feeling, with the inspectors

in there, that there is a sense of security.

Mr. ARMITAGE. Well, clearly, Senator, we have got a difference of

opinion on this. My point of view is that the American people have

waited 12 years and several months. And if you are not going to

get the cooperation, then another year only increases the danger

for us and the possibility that we might have that hearing that I

fear and will do anything to avoid.

But it is a difference of opinion that we have, sir.

Senator CHAFEE. All right, fair enough. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And let

me, first of all, just begin by congratulating you on your chairmanship, and I am looking forward to working with you. It has been

a long time since you have been in that chair, and I remember with

great fondness your service as chairman of this committee back a

decade-and-a-half ago.

The CHAIRMAN. I remember. It will not be that long we have to

wait again.

Senator DODD. The committee did a lot of good work under your

leadership.

And let me welcome the new members, as well, to the committee.

Senator SARBANES. You did not have any gray hair in those days.

Senator DODD. No, I did not, Mr. Chairman. Neither of us did

in those days.

But let me welcome our new members, as well, both on the

Democratic and Republican side. I think you are going to enjoy this

work for the committee.

And let me thank our witnesses. I have enjoyed the relationship

with both of you over the years on a variety of different matters.

And let me also join in the comments of commending Secretary

Powell. There are a lot of us up there who are very pleased, indeed,

that he is in the position he is in and have a lot of confidence in

him.

Mr. Chairman, I would, just to begin—I think it is important

maybe to establish some—where we are, some common ground. We

can spend a lot of time here, and the news is, of course, where the

28

differences are. But I think there are, at least to some degree—I

am not speaking about unanimity here among everyone, but there

are some important points and common ground.

I think all of us, without exception, agree that Saddam Hussein

is a tyrant, that his presence on the world stage poses threats to

the world. I would argue, others may, that there are more significant threats that I would place at a higher priority: The threat of

terrorism. I would even place the issue of North Korea as a more

significant immediate threat. But nonetheless, this is a threat. And

to suggest otherwise, I think, would be wrong.

He has acquired biological, chemical weapons of mass destruction, and he has tried to accumulate nuclear weapons, as well. That

is a given. We accept that and understand that.

Most, I think, of the members of this body would also agree with

the passage of H. Res. 114, that the President has the authority— whether they voted for it or against it, I think most would agree

he has the authority. He needs to act, multilaterally or unilaterally. At least I accept that that is the case. Now, we might want

to come back and deal with it another day, but the passage of that

resolution gave him that authority.

And I think most people in the country, as well as members of

this body, applaud the President’s decision to go to the U.N. One

of the reasons that many of us supported that resolution was, in

fact, to encourage the administration to do exactly what you did in

September and exactly what you achieved in October, that it made

a great deal of sense for us to build that kind of international support to deal with this threat—well, not this threat alone, but other

threats, as well—and to how we proceeded with that was going to

make good sense.

Now, those are pretty profound points of common agreement, it

seems to me. What concerns us, I think, is the lack of information,

other than, sort of, the rhetorical suggestions of where we are, to

suggest somehow—I know you talk about 12 years, but we are talking on a framework here over the last 60 days or so, 70 days, since

the passage of certain resolutions.

We have known that Saddam Hussein was a tyrant for a long

time. He was a tyrant 12 years ago. He was a tyrant 80 days ago,

60 days ago, 50 days ago, 40 days ago. There is not anything that

has really changed in all of that, at least in most of our views. And

yet we are hearing these sort of vague suggestions about materials

and so forth. And I am not even arguing that that may be the case.

I have been sort of accepting of the notion that it exists. But the

decision to go to war is based on the conclusion that that, in fact,

is the case. And for many of us up here, we have not yet seen the

kind of data, I think, that is necessary.

And Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a suggestion to the

committee. I am glad the Secretary is going to go to the U.N. on

Thursday, I think, of next week. But I do not think it is an outrageous suggestion that he might come and talk to us in a closeddoor session here. I presume he is going to be constrained in a public forum at the United Nations that will be aired globally about

what facts and data we have.

I would certainly think it is all right for us to know since we are

going to bear the burden of this if we go to war, financially and

29

otherwise, that the elected representatives of the United States

people might have that information before the U.N. does, with all

due respect. And I wonder if it would not be a—how welcome the

suggestion would be that he might appear before us on Wednesday,

before he goes up on Thursday, in a closed-door session, if necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me respond just briefly to the Senator. I visited last evening with Senator Frist on that issue and have conveyed the thought that this would be very helpful for this committee or perhaps of all Senators. This is a judgment of the leadership, but I hope that that will come to pass, and I will forward the

suggestion again.

Senator DODD. Well, I thank you, and it would be tremendously

helpful to us to have that. You may want to comment on that if——

Mr. ARMITAGE. Well, beyond the obvious, that I am not going to

take charge of my boss’ schedule, but I want to say that he would

endorse exactly what you say, as a general matter. We owe the

body, the Senate and the House, an appearance to lay out this. I

might suggest that Secretary Powell is basically 24–7 now getting

ready for this thing next Wednesday. But the sharing of the information is something that, of course, you have every right to demand. And I would just suggest it might be the intelligence officers—or the intelligence community who might better provide that.

Secretary Powell is going to put it in context to support the comments that——

Senator DODD. Well, I do not care how it gets done. I do not care

how it gets done. I am just tired of having to hear, sort of, these

speeches being given about this. And I am one who supported this

resolution. I am not your opponent. But my people want to know

why we are going to do this, other than, sort of, speeches given

that are sort of pep-rally stuff. I want to know specifically and factually what we know. And I think my constituents do, and I know

my colleagues do. And before you go and tell the whole world about

it, I think we have a right to know what is going on here.

And that is really what the bottom of a lot of these questions are.

We want to know. And that is not a partisan comment. You would

hear that from—quietly, maybe, from the other side more than I

am saying it publicly, but we want to know.

So I appreciate, Mr. Chairman, however you can do this, but let

us do it before you go up there.

Mr. ARMITAGE. We are in violent agreement with you. I was just

trying to protect the calendar of my boss——

Senator DODD. I understand.

Mr. ARMITAGE [continuing]. For the obvious reason.

Senator DODD. Let me go back, if I can, just—I do not know how

much time I have here left, but let me go back to this question that

Senator Sarbanes raised and—about the inspectors. I—and Senator

Hagel raised it as well.

I am sort of wondering why we supported, even, the resolution

in October if you feel as though the inspection process is such a

failure or just is not producing results at all. That was only 60 days

ago we did this. This was not a year-and-a-half or 12 years ago,

this is just a few hours ago. We voted, along with 14 other members, or whatever it is, of the Security Council of the United NaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:32 Jun 10, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 85796 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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tions, endorsed this resolution, a major part of which includes the

inspections process. Sixty days later, we are denouncing it. And by

anyone’s estimation—in fact, Resolution 1441 requires that every

country share information with the inspectors. Not true? Is that

true? That there is a requirement you step up?

Mr. ARMITAGE. That’s right.

Senator DODD. Now, by public admission—and I am constrained,

I guess, here, but I am told if there is—if there are this many inspection sites and so forth, we have provided about this much information, without getting into the specific details, as a government,

in terms of our obligation of meeting the requirements of 1441 to

assist the inspection process, a very small fraction of the sites that

were available—we know are available, we have actually provided

information about. Why are we not doing a better job of that? And

if that is the case, why are we denouncing the inspection process

before it has had a chance to work?

Mr. ARMITAGE. I would take some exception, Senator Dodd, with

the characterization that we are denouncing the inspection process.

Senator DODD. Well, ‘‘denouncing’’ may be strong——

Mr. ARMITAGE. John has already indicated it is going to go

ahead.

But I do want to make one thing clear. Nowhere in 1441 or as

far as I know in the discussion about the inspections was it ever

the case that the inspectors were going to do more than to verify

disarmament. That is what they are there for. And they are not

playing cat-and-mouse and hide-and-seek.

Senator DODD. I do not disagree with that.

Mr. ARMITAGE. That is the first thing. The second thing is, I

would note that Mr. Blix said, even in his report to the Council the

other day, that even with the inspectors there, illegal procurement

activity is continuing today.

So we are not denouncing it. We will just take Dr. Blix at his

word.

Senator DODD. Well, my time is up. We will come back to this.

But I appreciate it.

[The prepared statement of Senator Dodd follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD

Today, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has convened to discuss United

States policy toward Iraq. Within the next few weeks critical decisions by President

Bush, other members of the UN Security Council, and yes by Saddam Hussein will

profoundly shape the course of history.

Clearly that means that the issue of Iraq’s disarmament is at the center of the

world stage. There is an intense domestic and international debate ongoing over

whether we should have any confidence that Iraq has fully and finally dismantled

its weapons of mass destruction and will cease all efforts henceforth to acquire additional weapons, especially nuclear weapons.

The answer with respect to our confidence levels rests in large part on the judgments we make about the effectiveness of the inspections process which was reinstituted and strengthened by United Nations Security Resolution 1441 which was

adopted unanimously by the UN Security Council on November 8.

This morning’s hearing will give our administration’s witnesses an opportunity to

present to this committee and the American people an assessment of the inspections

effort and of the likelihood that the inspections can achieve Iraq’s disarmament. We

heard on Tuesday evening in the course of the annual State of the Union address

that President Bush has concluded that ‘‘the dictator of Iraq is not disarming’’ and

that if Saddam Hussein ‘‘does not fully disarm for the safety of our people, and for

the peace of the world, we will lead a coalition to disarm him.’’

31

I want to commend the Chairman of the Committee for moving so quickly to organize this morning’s hearing on the most pressing foreign policy and national security matter confronting not only our nation but also the world community.

We are all fully aware that just three days ago United Nations (UN) weapons inspectors reported to the UN Security Council regarding Iraqi compliance or noncompliance with UN Resolution 1441. Those reports were a mixed bag—with Iraq

getting passing marks on the process of disarmament and lesser marks on proactive

cooperation with weapons inspectors. I think it is fair to say that both Mr. Blix and

Mr. ElBaradei seemed to have concluded that sufficient progress had been made to

warrant their continued inspections efforts, as did UN Secretary General Kofi

Annan and other members of the Security Council. The American public is clearly

in favor of giving the inspections process more time as well. As are a fair number

of members of Congress.

Some of the unease that we are all feeling with the administration seeming rush

to judgment on the ineffectiveness of the inspections process is rooted in its handling in the past of some key international issues. Its rooted as well in the intemperate language used by some in the administration when referring to our long time

allies. I will tell you that I have been deeply troubled by some of administration’s isolationist attitudes and unilateral actions. Our strength as a nation partly rests

on the strength of our friendships with nations around the world.

The dismissive refusals by the Administration to participate in international

agreements like the ABM Treaty, the Kyoto Protocol, and the International Criminal Court were, in my view, harmful to relations with our friends and damaging

to our overall status in the international community. Although no foreign power

should dictate our policy, the strong foundations of cooperation, friendship, and respect that we have with our friends must be maintained.

Mr. Chairman, none of us in this room have any illusions about what we are dealing with when it comes to Saddam Hussein. Throughout his despotic reign, Saddam

Hussein has played perfectly the role of a ruthless and cold-hearted dictator. To further his own menacing goals, and while enjoying a luxurious existence in his palaces, he has allowed Iraq to stagnate economically and the Iraqi people to suffer.

Time and time again, Saddam Hussein has demonstrated his utter disregard for

human life—the most poignant example occurring when he ordered the use of chemical weapons against his own people.

But, I would say respectfully that is not new. Two years ago when President Bush

took office Saddam Hussein was the same vile individual. Three months ago when

the United States and the other fourteen members of the Security Council voted to

undertake inspections, Saddam Hussein was the same vile person.

A little more than two weeks ago Secretary Powell referred to the inspections as

being in a state of infancy and said that they were just ‘‘starting to gain momentum.’’ In addition, as Secretary Powell also stated, and as Mr. Blix continues to assert, the United States only recently started providing substantial intelligence information to the UN inspectors. So why now—two weeks later is the United States so

convinced that military force is the only course of action left to address the threat

posed by Iraq?

The urgent task for the Administration is to publicly layout its case for why, notwithstanding Secretary Powell’s remarks of two weeks ago, officials seem on the

brink of concluding that the inspections process holds no hope of achieving, in a reasonable time, the disarmament of Iraq, or alternatively why the risk is so great or

so imminent that we dare not wait any longer to act.

If the administration can make that case, then I believe the Congress, the American people and all of our allies will support military action against Iraq.

I am not one who would argue that the President, today, does not have the authority to act, and act unilaterally if he so decides. But I would argue that this

would be a terrible mistake and potentially costly to America’s prestige and long

term national interests without first going the extra mile to demonstrate that our

cause is just. That is why it is so important that Administration representatives use

this opportunity today, and next week’s presentation by Secretary Powell before the

UN Security Council to make the strongest case possible.

I would respectfully say to our witnesses that the Administration has not yet

made a convincing case for why we should dispense with the inspections efforts

after only sixty days—arguably less than that as the inspections teams have only

recently gotten near full strength.

For example, evidence publicly cited by the Administration as proof of Saddam’s

continuing efforts to develop a nuclear weapons program has been called into question by the UN weapons inspectors.

I am speaking of reports last week that inspectors had tentatively concluded that

aluminum casings found in Iraq that the U.S. had alleged were a type used in the

32

uranium enrichment process, were not of sufficient quality for the production of nuclear weapons-grade material. This development strongly emphasizes the importance of thorough research, and moreover, the necessity of providing inspectors with

sufficient time to analyze their findings.

Secondly, helicopters were only recently provided to the inspectors. These helicopters are essential to the inspectors’ ability to conduct surprise investigations of

Iraqi installations—a method that significantly reduces the likelihood that Saddam

Hussein will be able to remove or conceal evidence at a given facility.

By our own admission, the United States has not done all we are called upon to

do under UN Security Resolution 1441 to provide intelligence to the inspection efforts. This opens the United States up to criticism by other members of the Council

as to whether we were ever committed to the strategy of inspections as set forth

in UN Security Resolution 1441—a resolution which the U.S. did in fact vote for.

As you know, Mr. Chairman I supported and continue to support all efforts by

the UN to dismantle Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, including the use of military force if that proves necessary. In October 2002, I supported the resolution

passed by Congress and signed into law by the President, authorizing the use of

such force against Iraq. It was my hope that the Senate resolution would help

strengthen the resolve of the UN to take action and would focus Saddam Husseins

attention on the fact that we, the international community and the American people

are united in our resolve to see that Iraq disarms.

If the United States can make the case that the inspections process isn’t working—that it won’t work in a timely manner—that the threat of inaction is endangering U.S. security—then I believe that our resolve as a nation to take the next

step in disarming of Iraq, by whatever means necessary, including by the use of

force will be strengthened. And we will weather whatever comes next.

If on the other hand the case cannot be made and the administration chooses to

act simply because it can do so by virtue of the fact that the U.S. is the world’s

only remaining superpower, then I believe we will pay a heavy price as a nation.

I do not think that we need to come to that point. I urge the President to proceed

as a great nation should—with resolve but with wisdom and patience as time permits.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, could he clarify that? When

you say ‘‘illegal procurement,’’ you mean they actually are obtaining materials? And if so, what is being done about those that are

selling the materials?

Mr. ARMITAGE. John Wolf informs me it is not a matter of selling. They are still buying and importing. Is that right, John?

Senator SARBANES. Well, someone is selling it, then.

Mr. ARMITAGE. Well, yes.

Senator SARBANES. Yes, well, is there not a regime to control

that?

Mr. ARMITAGE. Yes, sir. John is just making the point that, of

course, we try to stop it; it is an illegal procurement. They smuggle

it in, and we are trying to stop it where we can. We have had sanctions where we can, you know, identify countries, but the smuggling of it continues, even now.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, just a very brief intervention. I

appreciate your going to Senator Frist and suggesting that the Secretary be up here, and I appreciate what Senator Dodd said about

wanting to know the information, and it does not matter what

source.

I think it does matter that it be the Secretary, and I think it

matters for purposes of the show of unity here, that there is the

sense of—I think it is very much in the interest of the administration to maintain—and I know the Secretary believes this, as well—

to maintain the vast majority of us on both sides of the aisle being

in lockstep with the Secretary. And I, quite frankly, think it is

33

just—as a matter of appearance, if nothing else—it is somewhat inappropriate not to come and speak with us first.

It will engender a great deal of good will. And we can get from

the intelligence community maybe even more than we can get from

the Secretary, theoretically, but it is important that the Secretary,

himself, showing the world that this—we are together.

Anyway, I just think it would be a very useful thing across the

board, beyond the information we will learn specifically, and specifically so we are aware of the nature of the ‘‘pitch,’’ if you will,

not just the specifics of the assertions made relative to the material.

I just hope that you all will consider that.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the Senator for his comment. Obviously,

we are in agreement, and hopefully Secretary Powell will be, too.

And so we will work carefully together.

Senator Brownback.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, gentlemen.

And I want to endorse the thought of having Secretary Powell up

here. But I also want to say, on top of that, I appreciate how much

you have worked with us to date. A number of us put forward the

idea that there should be a resolution passed by Congress to the

administration. The administration—I think a number of people actually argued in the administration, ‘‘We don’t have to do that,’’ but

you did, and I think that was a wise move. A number of us argued

that you should go to the United Nations for resolution. The administration, I think—probably a number of people within—argued, ‘‘We don’t have to do that,’’ but you did. Last week, Thursday, there was a briefing of Secretary Powell and Secretary Rumsfeld with Members here of the Senate that I thought was pretty

candid. Thank you for doing that. I think this would be another

positive step.

And I think there has been a good—frankly, I think there has

been a very good movement back and forth, and communication

back and forth. We are getting down to the real tough point now,

whether you actually engage U.S. military force and other military

force, and I think that is obviously where we all get antsy and

hard-pressed.

I want to make one point about the weapons inspection, because

I have chaired the subcommittee that has dealt with this for some

period of time, and we have had a lot of hearings on Iraq over the

period since I have been in the Senate, in 1996. They have not

complied at any point in time in the past. We have models of compliance of weapons inspections that the U.N. has done, like South

Africa and Kazakhstan, where these were two countries that did

cooperate with the U.N. And they did not—there was not any hideand-seek. They said, ‘‘Come in. We don’t want these things anymore. Here is where they are. Come and get them.’’ And I think

that is the nature of the resolution we have. Now, if I am wrong

on that, correct me, but that is the nature—and we actually have

a model of that in the past.

I want to followup, Secretary Armitage, on your point about the

hearing that we do not want to have about terrorists distributing

weapons of mass destruction and using them in the United States.

34

There is an article in the New York Times today talking about

large convoys moving out of Iraq into Syria. And I guess—I am just

going to read you this instance—or report. ‘‘For instance, the Administration today was still debating the credibility of intelligence

about a Christmas time Iraqi truck convoy that some Americans

analysts say could have been transporting weapons of mass destruction or scientists to Syria where they would be safely out of

the United Nations inspectors’ view.’’ Do you have any either further illumination you could give us

about what we know about movement of weapons of mass destruction out of Iraq, if you can identify it?

Mr. ARMITAGE. I would—Senator Brownback, I would say that

there has been a debate in the administration, as I know it, in the

intelligence communities, about how much we know about other

countries perhaps receiving such things as missiles. I do not

think—particularly, I do not think we know the definitive. I saw

the report that you referred to, and I have seen other reports, and

I cannot give you a level of credibility on other reports as to whether missiles are in other countries. Those countries to whom—who

we have approached on this with our suspicions have vehemently

denied, but—that is what they have done. So I cannot comment

further.

Senator BROWNBACK. You cannot confirm or deny this report in

the New York Times today? OK.

Let me ask you about the presence of terrorists on Iraqi soil. You

identified—or you spoke some about some al-Qaeda. Again, another

New York Times article, just today, talked about the presence of

other terrorist groups in Iraq, Ansar al Islam, an extremist group.

Can you identify for this group other terrorists that are currently

operating on Iraqi soil?

Mr. ARMITAGE. I can verify that, and I can provide you that. I

do not think I want to do that publicly. I think it is part of what

the Secretary will be saying. There are other groups who have apparently either been driven or have found some ability to be harbored in Iraq. Some are around the northern part of Iraq, close to

Iran, but not associated with Iran, the group you just mentioned

and others. But with your permission, I would provide it for the

record and in a classified way.

[A classified response was subsequently received.]

Senator BROWNBACK. OK. But you can confirm this in the New

York Times today, that this group is operating on Iraqi soil?

Mr. ARMITAGE. Yes.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you.

And I—and others, you will provide to us in a—can you provide

that in a secure setting? Other terrorist groups that are operating

on Iraqi soil.

Mr. ARMITAGE. I will do so, sir.

Senator BROWNBACK. Can you provide to us, either here or in

private—do we know of any distribution of weapons of mass destruction to terrorists? I know that would be a very difficult thing

to find, but do we know or can you provide that, either here or in

a private setting?

Mr. ARMITAGE. Yes, I can. And I am not an expert in these matters, but there have been some real speculations about certain poiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:32 Jun 10, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 85796 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
35

sons and other things that were associated with some of these

groups who are in, particularly, northern Iraq. But with your permission, I will content myself with those comments only.

Senator BROWNBACK. OK. And you can provide that to us in a

private distribution? Because that, to me, has been the real issue

about Iraq. There are a lot of bad players in the world. There is

no question about that. North Korea is clearly up there, and we

have got others. But the mix here of a guy with weapons of mass

destruction, Saddam Hussein, who has used them in the past, and

terrorists on his soil that are willing to use them against us and

on our soil, is the potent mixture that I think is so poisonous and

so hard for us to even contemplate, that you have got to go at that

on an early, early basis.

And I just want to conclude by asking you about other countries

that will be supporting us, whether or not there is another U.N.

resolution, which—I would question the need for another resolution

on top of it, but I note that you have eight European leaders who

have voiced their support for U.S. on Iraq that just was out again

today. This is a Wall Street Journal article. I note today that Jordan has now said—they are even going further than they did in the

gulf war I, of allowing some positioning of U.S. forces, wherein they

had maintained a neutral position in the invasion of Kuwait. Congratulations on those. Do you have others that you can announce

to us that have joined in our coalition?

Mr. ARMITAGE. I am going to give you a numerical idea. I do not

desire to announce the names publicly, sir. But for instance, those

who have committed to full access, 21 countries are fully committed

to grant us access on routes should a military activity be required.

There are others that are under discussion. But we have got 20

countries that are fully committed and three that are partially

committed to allow basing. Overflight, 22 countries. We have got

a total of nine countries who have either fully committed or partially committed some troops. So should a military activity be required, there is more going on than one suggests.

And I have got a list that I do not want to disclose in open session. I can provide it securely. But I deliberately had it done that

way for this hearing.

[A classified response was subsequently received.]

Senator BROWNBACK. And I think it is particularly significant

about the Jordanians, who are right there in the area, and have

taken an even more aggressive stance this time than last.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Brownback follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM BROWNBACK

Once again, the United States is facing a difficult dilemma: do we enforce what

is right knowing there will likely be a price to pay for taking action in Iraq; or do

we allow those who make excuses for Saddam to prevail and wait for an actual attack? Unfortunately, that is the stark reality we face.

I am pleased we are holding this important hearing today to focus on the most

recent U.N. report on Iraq’s compliance with Resolution 1441. As we heard from

Hans Blix himself before the U.N., it is clear that Saddam has not yet accepted the

world’s demand to disarm. Yet, yesterday, Senators Kennedy and Byrd put forward

a resolution calling for more time.

Providing more time with no assurance of any different outcome only rewards the

hide-and-seek game Saddam has played for the last 12 years. The objective of 1441

36

was not to require inspectors to turn over every rock in Iraq, but rather that Saddam would declare all activities and proactively facilitate disarmament.

No one wants war. It is not an aim that anyone should pursue or support lightly.

However, failing to act in the face of evil is wrong, and usually leads to even worse

consequences down the road. Why do we refuse to learn from history which shows

us time and again the path that tyrants bent on expanding their power will take?

Despite his record of cheating, pursuing weapons of mass destruction and torturing his own people; the world community gave Saddam Hussein one last chance

to come clean with its most recent resolution—1441. And what has Saddam’s response been? Contempt, secrecy, intimidation and evasion.

There comes a time when we must face reality—and the difficult reality is that

Saddam Hussein has a demonstrated pattern of lying, developing and using weapons of mass destruction. It is not surprising that he has failed yet again to take

advantage of the last chance offered by the most recent U.N. resolution.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the Senator from Kansas.

Let me just say parenthetically, his travels in the Near East, the

Middle East, and now the Far East have been extensive, and his

report to members of the committee is really very helpful, even

with regard to the North Korean border, and I congratulate you on

that achievement.

Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. First,

let me congratulate you in——

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. Your role as chairman. I certainly enjoyed very much Senator Biden’s tenure. And I have greatly enjoyed working with both of you and admire your work.

Mr. Armitage, you began very dramatically with your testimony

with regard to the anthrax, and it, sort of, follows what Senator

Brownback was talking about. To both of you, is it your contention

that Iraq is the single most likely source of WMD transfers to

international terrorist organizations to date? And specifically,

would it be more likely than Iran, more likely than actors in Pakistan, more likely than a cash-strapped North Korea? I wonder if

both of you would respond to that.

Mr. ARMITAGE. That is an interesting question. I think in terms

of the full-up capability chemical-bio, that I would endorse the

statement that Iraq is the most likely. There are subsets. I am unaware, for instance, that Pakistan has had chemical and biological

developments. North Korea, I do not know that we have much insight into their chem and bio capability. We have got more into

their nuclear things that I have been able to discuss with you and

others in private settings. And our fear with North Korea is with

possible proliferation. We have no information about nuclear proliferation, and I have none on other WMD.

Senator FEINGOLD. But your answer seems to relate to whether

they have these things. My question is, Who is the most likely to

be involved in a trade of them, or a sale of them or distribution of

them? Is it your belief that Iraq is more likely to engage in that

kind of transaction with terrorists, or would it be fair to say that

there is a question here—— Mr. ARMITAGE. OK—— Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. That Iran, Pakistan, and perhaps North Korea may be more likely.

Mr. ARMITAGE. Of those four, I would say that Iraq is the most

likely, sir.

37

Senator FEINGOLD. For others——

Mr. ARMITAGE. But I do not want to leave you with the impression or the implication that I am not concerned with the nuclear

proliferation possibility of North Korea.

Senator FEINGOLD. What about other countries? Are there other

countries that would be, in your view, more likely than Iraq to do

this, or is Iraq the No. 1 most likely country to engage in this kind

of transaction with a terrorist organization?

Mr. ARMITAGE. I am trying to run over in my mind the varsity

and junior-varsity of those who are engaged in these activities, and

I think it is a governmental matter that my fear would be greatest

on Iraq. There are other concerns we have had. Historically, in the

Russian Federation, et cetera, of them not having full control over

their inventories. But as a governmental matter, we think the government is trying to control them, but I cannot discount the possibility of others having a rogue or off-the-books operation.

Senator FEINGOLD. I would just note this is not an academic

question or something for my own interest. The reason I ask is because we are talking about invading one of these countries on this

premise, on the basis that they are the greatest risk and have the

greatest likelihood of this connection.

Mr. Negroponte.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Without getting into the question of

assessing the risk, I would point out, from a U.N. context, the difference between Iraq and the other countries you have mentioned

is that Iraq is under 17 different United Nations resolutions, many

of which are demanding, and have been demanding, since 1991—

April 3, 1991. Resolution 687 was passed demanding that Iraq declare its WMD holdings within 15 days. And here we are 12 years

later discussing this same subject. So they are under many more

U.N. resolutions than any of these other countries are, with respect

to its WDM.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I do not question that. What I am getting at here, and I think Senator Dodd and others were, is, Is this

the entity that is most likely to help out an al-Qaeda-type operation to try to harm Americans?

And so let me follow with, What is Iraq’s proliferation track

record so far? To what extent have they proliferated?

Mr. ARMITAGE. May I ask Assistant Secretary Wolf to answer,

sir, I think—and get it once?

Senator FEINGOLD. I would be pleased.

Mr. ARMITAGE. John.

Mr. WOLF. Thank you, Senator.

I think their record as a proliferator is less than as largely a

buyer. They are buying, in all of the aspects—chemical, biological,

nuclear. They are developing long-range missiles. And as a country

under a restrictive U.N. regime, they are not only acquiring, but

they are in direct violation of a series of obligations. They harbor—

they do harbor terrorist groups, so it is not an academic matter,

and we do not know—as Secretary’s Rumsfeld says, ‘‘We don’t

know what we don’t know.’’

But here is a country in the middle of a vital region which is acquiring all of the capabilities which threaten the region and pose

38

a threat beyond the region. And that is why the U.N. has been so

assertive over the last 12 years.

Senator FEINGOLD. I understand, but it sounds like you are saying that they are—if I could continue with you—that they are less

of a proliferator than others. Is that not what you just said?

Mr. WOLF. I would say we define the threat of Iraq in a different

way. It is their ability to use those weapons against their own people, to use it against their neighbors, and potentially to use it far

beyond.

Senator FEINGOLD. I understand that, and that is terribly important, but I would like you to answer my question. Are there other

nations that are greater proliferators than Iraq of these types of

substances and weapons?

Mr. WOLF. There are other countries which proliferate.

Senator FEINGOLD. More than Iraq?

Mr. WOLF. But nobody has used these substances Senator, I

would like to say that, in Iraq’s case, they are acquiring dangerous

weapons——

Senator FEINGOLD. I understand that.

Mr. WOLF [continuing]. Which they have used against thousands

of their own people, which they have used against their neighbors,

which they have the capability to use far away. That is the threat

that we are addressing. That is the threat the U.N. has put in—

that is why the U.N. demanded its disarmament.

Senator FEINGOLD. I recognize that, and it is——

Mr. WOLF. That disarmament, they have not achieved.

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. Terribly important and has to be

dealt with, but an awful lot of the information today, an awful lot

of the argument today, and the President’s argument, is not simply

based on what Iraq will do. It is premised on what Iraq will do in

conjunction with terrorist organizations, and that appears to require proliferation, and that is why this question is so important.

Mr. ARMITAGE. But I do not gainsay the importance of the question at all, Senator, but I think that a good deal of what has to be

given to what everyone, I think, would acknowledge has been the

bloody-mindedness of Saddam Hussein. And that does weigh somewhat in this equation.

Senator SARBANES. Would the Senator yield for just one quick

question? I wanted to clarify one thing, Senator.

Secretary Armitage, you said that there were al-Qaeda terrorists

in northern Iraq, I think, earlier in response to a question. Are

they in the territory in northern Iraq that is under Saddam’s control, or are they in the territory in northern Iraq that is not under

Saddam’s control?

Mr. ARMITAGE. The ones that I referred to in northern Iraq are

not under his direct control. There are al-Qaeda in Baghdad, as we

move forward, be explaining.

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one more question?

In the State of the Union, the President seemed to suggest that

the lesson to be learned from the recent history of the Korean Peninsula is that we must stop potential proliferators before they

have the means to blackmail others. And obviously we all agree on

that. But I worry that there are, in effect, some nuances being lost

39

here and that our message to the rest of the world is starting to

sound like, ‘‘Acquire weapons and then be free from the threat of

military action, or do not acquire weapons and then perhaps be

subject to invasion.’’ The incentives are for proliferation and the

pursuit of WMD as quickly as possible under this message. How

can that possibly be in the interest of global stability and in the

interest of the security of the United States of America?

Mr. ARMITAGE. It seems to me that a nonproliferation policy,

Senator, has to have several aspects to it. Part of it is a good deal

of self-restraint. We stop people where we can. We try to persuade

them not to have weapons. We sanction them where we can. But

a good bit of the nonproliferation policy depends on enlightenment

in terms of countries—South Africa, Taiwan, others who have voluntarily given up these programs.

I do not agree, and I think the enlightened countries have come

to the conclusion that weapons of mass destruction are more trouble than they are worth. The countries who acquire these weapons

are ones who are generally basket cases, and they do it for one of

three reasons that I have tried to already illuminate—to dominate,

to intimidate, or perhaps, in the extreme, to attack.

Senator FEINGOLD. But if they have already got them, we are not

going to go in there and deal with it.

Mr. ARMITAGE. No, not so, sir. The attempt by the previous administration in the framework agreement in the North Korean situation was an attempt to deal with it. We attempted to deal with

it until we ran into the acknowledgment of the HEU program in

North Korea, and now we are going to have to take a different

tack.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, what I meant by ‘‘deal with it,’’ obviously, is to deal with it the way we are about to deal with Iraq.

Mr. ARMITAGE. Well, I cannot sit here, and will not try to sit

here, and tell you that I know that. As I said earlier, I do not think

the ‘‘one size fits all’’ approach in these things.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

I want to thank Chairman Lugar for convening this important hearing, and to

thank both of the witnesses for being here today.

This exercise is especially important because, in the wake of Congress’s vote to

authorize the President to use force in Iraq last year, our oversight role, our role

as a conduit of our constituent concerns, and the degree to which we are willing

to shoulder our fundamental constitutional responsibilities have, all been in doubt.

Over the recess, in my home State of Wisconsin, I have heard from many, many

Americans from different walks of life with different political views who all share

a sense of deep unease regarding this country’s policy toward Iraq. I think that we

all have a responsibility to listen to the American people, and to place their voices,

their questions, and their cautions at the center of Washington’s discussions about

Iraq. The stakes are too high, and the potential consequences for our constituents

are too great, for Congress to sit back and watch events unfold as they may.

I continue to believe that insisting on unilateral military action now makes sense

only if there is an imminent threat to the United States. If that is the case, then

of course the President is right—we do not have the luxury of building consensus

that is not immediately forthcoming and we must accept the costs of unilateral action. But no one has suggested that a threat is imminent. I cannot understand why

we would not devote our efforts to building and maintaining a strong international

coalition to actively pursue our shared goal of disarming Iraq. Certainly it will not

serve America’s security interests to alienate key partners in the fight against terVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:32 Jun 10, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 85796 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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rorism and to fuel the misperception that we are aggressive and hostile toward the

Muslim world. These are risks we should only take when we absolutely must.

Hans Blix was right to be straightforward in his report to the Security Council

acknowledging that Iraq has failed to take substantive steps to prove that it has

disarmed or is prepared to disarm now. But the fact that Iraq’s cooperation with

inspectors is only passive does not mean that the inspections themselves are useless. In fact, I believe that the more effective the inspections are, the more likely

it is that international consensus can be achieved regarding how to proceed in Iraq.

I am not calling for anyone to have patience with Saddam Hussein, to give the

Iraqi government the benefit of the doubt. No one disagrees with the President on

that point. But I am suggesting that allowing the inspectors to continue their work,

is in the interest of peace and security.

I know that the brave men and women of our Armed Forces will be successful

if they are called to action in Iraq. Asking questions about the wisdom of this course

reflects no lack of confidence or faith in them. But it does reflect my taking my obligation to them seriously. They trust the democratically elected government that

they serve to use their might wisely and well. We must not ignore the threat of

Iraq’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. But we must not take action—risking

American lives—that will make us less secure in the end.

I look forward to today’s testimony and discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me mention we will have another opportunity to ask Mr. Armitage about North Korea next Tuesday. He

will be back and we will be worrying about that.

Senator SARBANES. Well, we certainly hope so, yes.

Mr. ARMITAGE. Think I don’t, Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Allen.

Senator ALLEN. If I may, I had to be at another meeting. Senator

Enzi is next in line over here, I will yield to Senator Enzi.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I will come back to you, Senator

Allen.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Enzi.

Senator ENZI. I thank the Senator from Virginia, and I congratulate the chairman on the chairmanship. I do think that we have

a tremendous team, between you and Senator Biden, providing direction for this committee.

And I do want to reiterate what Senator Biden said in his opening comment, that we are not talking about preemption here, and

we should get rid of that notion. This is enforcement of a surrender

agreement. I think that is a very significant comment.

I thank the people who are testifying today. When we are discussing such an important issue, it is very comforting to have people of your capability and involvement to be here to answer some

questions for us.

This year, I have been serving, along with Senator Sarbanes,

under appointment of the President as a delegate to the United

Nations for the 57th General Assembly. And I have got to tell you,

I have been highly impressed with Ambassador Negroponte and

the rest of the team at the U.S. mission in New York. The people

of the United States should be extremely proud of the work that

they are doing in an extremely critical time.

I have been briefed by Ambassador Negroponte and the team. I

had arrangements made by them. I have been accompanied by

them, and I have gotten, particularly, to see Ambassador

Negroponte in action. And it is really reassuring to me.

I had one meeting in New York with the Geneva group, which

is the 14 countries that pay 83 percent of the dues of the United

41

Nations. It was after the President gave his speech in New York

on September 12, 2002. It was really enlightening and somewhat

reassuring to me to hear their opinions on what is happening in

the United Nations and the need for the United Nations to show

its relevance, as the President had asked.

It was interesting to be at the President’s speech. I had read the

papers the day before that had everybody in the General Assembly,

pretty well primed to think that he was going to storm in and tell

them what was going to happen. You could see the nervousness of

the delegates as we waited for the speech. When the President was

introduced, it was very noticeable that there was not any applause.

Of course, I remembered back to the previous speaker and realized

that there was no applause at the beginning of his speech or the

end of his speech, so I was not sure whether it was a United Nations tradition or not.

But as the President spoke, it was helpful to be there and watch

the body language of the delegates, because they kind of loosened

up and said, ‘‘Gee, what we’ve been reading in the papers maybe

isn’t what this guy is about.’’ And you could almost see them remembering back to the patience that he had after September 11 as

he formed a coalition before we went into Afghanistan. At the end

of his speech, there was even applause.

Then we had an opportunity to visit with a number of those delegates. And that is kind of a theme that keeps being reiterated

about the patience of the President, about the competence of his

team, and a lot of good comments about Ambassador Negroponte.

The speeches that happened following the President’s speech had

a same theme as the President’s speech, ‘‘We have to be useful, or

we have to quit.’’ And that is a message that the United Nations

really needed to have. And it is helpful, if we get the opportunity,

to be up there and watch these things as they are happening. So

I hope as others have the opportunity, that they will do that, as

well.

Now, in the way of a question, since I have not been up there

since the 16 shell casings were discovered, I am kind of curious as

to what the reaction was among other delegates regarding that,

and knowing that, although we found 16, there were still 29,984,

roughly, of those shell casings that had the capability of either

being loaded or were still loaded. Has there been a reaction to that

one very specific finding of the inspection team?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I think, generally, there was concern

about it, Senator. I think Dr. Blix has told us that they are still

doing some tests on whether any of those casings had any evidence

of those particular items having been weaponized.

But I think, more generally speaking, I would only add that

whatever else delegates at the Security Council might feel, I think

there is almost unanimous agreement, with the possible exception

of Syria, that Iraq needs to do more to proactively cooperate with

the inspectors. I think, on that, there is virtually unanimous agreement.

Senator ENZI. I know, to the people in Wyoming and other people

I have talked to in the country, that the finding of those 16 shell

casings, whether they had anything in them or not, was a realization that Iraq did not declare that they still had those items and

42

then have not shown us yet where the remains are if they did destroy the items. I am hoping that had the same kind of a reaction

at the U.N.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, correct, and also in light of the

fact that this is one of, I believe, 30,000 such munitions that are

unaccounted for. So I think another question that arises is if they

are going to be dribbled out, as Secretary Powell said a few days

ago—12, I think, were the first, and then 4 more that were found— how long is this going to take?

Senator ENZI. And it has been helpful to realize this is the size

of California, and we have 108 inspectors. I think you said 57 more

are coming.

Thank you. I would yield back my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Enzi.

Senator Boxer.

Senator BOXER. Mr. Chairman, everybody keeps saying ‘‘the size

of California.’’ Now you know how hard it is to run for the Senate

from there, and I hope that word goes out to all opposition.

Senator BIDEN. I might add, you have more people.

Senator BOXER. Yes, 35 million at the moment, and counting.

I want to say, Senator Lugar and Senator Biden, you make a

great team, and we look forward to working with you.

Secretary Armitage, I really respect you and I really think you

are particularly effective. And Ambassador, you are working so

hard every day to build the kind of coalition that we all want.

I have some disagreements, and I want to lay those out. In making the case against going to war against Iraq, the President was

very eloquent in pointing out the horrific chemicals and the various

weapons that Saddam could employ. And you, Secretary Armitage,

have made the same point, I think very eloquently. And you have

brought it home to us, because I was one of those offices that

shared the—shall we say, the ‘‘breathing apparatus’’ with Senator

Daschle. So we all know the fear that these weapons of mass destruction can bring.

I think the case is made. Saddam must disarm. Must disarm.

There is no disagreement in our country. And as I go around my

State, absolutely no disagreement. He must disarm. The question

is, What’s the best way to do it for the world and for our people

and for our young men and women in uniform and the rest? And

some of us believe, because we know it is a fact, that since more

weapons of mass destruction were destroyed by the inspectors in

the 1990’s than by our bombs—and this was put into the record

here—that this is an approach that ought to be given every opportunity to work.

Now, I want to put into the record something very unpleasant

about our policies in the past. The fact is, we all know that Saddam

Hussein has been committing human rights abuses since he formally took control of Iraq in 1979. I am sure you agree with that.

Am I correct? And even before that. He effectively took control of

the country in the 1960s. This man has been around. He has shown

how ruthless he is.

And here is the point. During the 1980s, we knew human rights

abuses were being carried out. We knew that Saddam was using

weapons against his own people. And I think it is very important

43

to face that fact and let the American people know because it is important to understand how he got these weapons, why he is such

a threat. And it is important, not only as we make our policy here,

but also as a signal to all of us. That ‘‘the enemy of my enemy is

my friend’’ sounds real good. But in practice, it can come back and

bite us pretty hard.

Today, we are concerned, Mr. Chairman, that we can have a

commercial airliner—in the United States of America, a commercial airline shot down by a stinger missile, a shoulder-fired missile.

We introduced those, and it got in the hands of the Taliban, into

the hands of al-Qaeda. What a tragedy.

So I ask unanimous consent to place into the record an article

called ‘‘U.S. Had Key Role in Iraq Buildup—Trade in Chemical

Arms Allowed Despite Their Use on Iranians and Kurds,’’ and it

was in the Washington Post December 30, 2002. May I place that

in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, without objection, so ordered.

[The article referred to follows:]

[From the Washington Post, Dec. 30, 2002]

U.S. HAD KEY ROLE IN IRAQ BUILDUP

TRADE IN CHEMICAL ARMS ALLOWED DESPITE THEIR USE ON IRANIANS, KURDS

(BY MICHAEL DOBBS)

High on the Bush administration’s list of justifications for war against Iraq are

President Saddam Hussein’s use of chemical weapons, nuclear and biological programs, and his contacts with international terrorists. What U.S. officials rarely acknowledge is that these offenses date back to a period when Hussein was seen in

Washington as a valued ally.

Among the people instrumental in tilting U.S. policy toward Baghdad during the

1980-88 Iran-Iraq war was Donald H. Rumsfeld, now defense secretary, whose December 1983 meeting with Hussein as a special presidential envoy paved the way

for normalization of U.S.-Iraqi relations. Declassified documents show that Rumsfeld traveled to Baghdad at a time when Iraq was using chemical weapons on an

‘‘almost daily’’ basis in defiance of international conventions.

The story of U.S. involvement with Saddam Hussein in the years before his 1990

attack on Kuwait—which included large-scale intelligence sharing, supply of cluster

bombs through a Chilean front company, and facilitating Iraq’s acquisition of chemical and biological precursors—is a topical example of the underside of U.S. foreign

policy. It is a world in which deals can be struck with dictators, human rights violations sometimes overlooked, and accommodations made with arms proliferators, all

on the principle that the ‘‘enemy of my enemy is my friend.’’

Throughout the 1980s, Hussein’s Iraq was the sworn enemy of Iran, then still in

the throes of an Islamic revolution. U.S. officials saw Baghdad as a bulwark against

militant Shi’ite extremism and the fall of pro-American states such as Kuwait,

Saudi Arabia, and even Jordan—a Middle East version of the ‘‘domino theory’’ in

Southeast Asia. That was enough to turn Hussein into a strategic partner and for

U.S. diplomats in Baghdad to routinely refer to Iraqi forces as ‘‘the good guys,’’ in

contrast to the Iranians, who were depicted as ‘‘the bad guys.’’

A review of thousands of declassified government documents and interviews with

former policymakers shows that U.S. intelligence and logistical support played a

crucial role in shoring up Iraqi defenses against the ‘‘human wave’’ attacks by suicidal Iranian troops. The administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush

authorized the sale to Iraq of numerous items that had both military and civilian

applications, including poisonous chemicals and deadly biological viruses, such as

anthrax and bubonic plague.

Opinions differ among Middle East experts and former government officials about

the pre-Iraqi tilt, and whether Washington could have done more to stop the flow

to Baghdad of technology for building weapons of mass destruction.

‘‘It was a horrible mistake then, but we have got it right now,’’ says Kenneth M.

Pollack, a former CIA military analyst and author of ‘‘The Threatening Storm,’’

which makes the case for war with Iraq. ‘‘My fellow [CIA] analysts and I were warnVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:32 Jun 10, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 85796 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
44

ing at the time that Hussein was a very nasty character. We were constantly fighting the State Department.’’

‘‘Fundamentally, the policy was justified,’’ argues David Newton, a former U.S.

ambassador to Baghdad, who runs an anti-Hussein radio station in Prague. ‘‘We

were concerned that Iraq should not lose the war with Iran, because that would

have threatened Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Our long-term hope was that Hussein’s

government would become less repressive and more responsible.’’

What makes present-day Hussein different from the Hussein of the 1980s, say

Middle East experts, is the mellowing of the Iranian revolution and the August 1990

invasion of Kuwait that transformed the Iraqi dictator, almost overnight, from awkward ally into mortal enemy. In addition, the United States itself has changed. As

a result of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, U.S.

policymakers take a much more alarmist view of the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

U.S. Shifts in Iran-Iraq War

When the Iran-Iraq war began in September 1980, with an Iraqi attack across the

Shatt al Arab waterway that leads to the Persian Gulf, the United States was a

bystander. The United States did not have diplomatic relations with either Baghdad

or Tehran. U.S. officials had almost as little sympathy for Hussein’s dictatorial

brand of Arab nationalism as for the Islamic fundamentalism espoused by Iran’s

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. As long as the two countries fought their way to a

stalemate, nobody in Washington was disposed to intervene.

By the summer of 1982, however, the strategic picture had changed dramatically.

After its initial gains, Iraq was on the defensive, and Iranian troops had advanced

to within a few miles of Basra, Iraq’s second largest city. U.S. intelligence information suggested the Iranians might achieve a breakthrough on the Basra front, destabilizing Kuwait, the Gulf states, and even Saudi Arabia, thereby threatening U.S.

oil supplies.

‘‘You have to understand the geostrategic context, which was very different from

where we are now,’’ said Howard Teicher, a former National Security Council official, who worked on Iraqi policy during the Reagan administration. ‘‘Realpolitik dictated that we act to prevent the situation from getting worse.’’

To prevent an Iraqi collapse, the Reagan administration supplied battlefield intelligence on Iranian troop buildups to the Iraqis, sometimes through third parties

such as Saudi Arabia. The U.S. tilt toward Iraq was enshrined in National Security

Decision Directive 114 of Nov. 26, 1983, one of the few important Reagan era foreign

policy decisions that still remains classified. According to former U.S. officials, the

directive stated that the United States would do ‘‘whatever was necessary and legal’’

to prevent Iraq from losing the war with fran.

The presidential directive was issued amid a flurry of reports that Iraqi forces

were using chemical weapons in their attempts to hold back the Iranians. In principle, Washington was strongly opposed to chemical warfare, a practice outlawed by

the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In practice, U.S. condemnation of fraqi use of chemical

weapons ranked relatively low on the scale of administration priorities, particularly

compared with the all-important goal of preventing an Iranian victory.

Thus, on Nov. 1, 1983, a senior State Department official, Jonathan T. Howe, told

Secretary of State George P. Shultz that intelligence reports showed that Iraqi

troops were resorting to ‘‘almost daily use of CW’’ against the Iranians. But the

Reagan administration had already committed itself to a large-scale diplomatic and

political overture to Baghdad, culminating in several visits by the president’s recently appointed special envoy to the Middle East, Donald H. Rumsfeld.

Secret talking points prepared for the first Rumsfeld visit to Baghdad enshrined

some of the language from NSDD 114, including the statement that the United

States would regard ‘‘any major reversal of Iraq’s fortunes as a strategic defeat for

the West.’’ When Rumsfeld finally met with Hussein on Dec. 20, he told the Iraqi

leader that Washington was ready for a resumption of full diplomatic relations, according to a State Department report of the conversation. Iraqi leaders later described themselves as ‘‘extremely pleased’’ with the Rumsfeld visit, which had ‘‘elevated U.S.-Iraqi relations to a new level.’’

In a September interview with CNN, Rumsfeld said he ‘‘cautioned’’ Hussein about

the use of chemical weapons, a claim at odds with declassified State Department

notes of his 90-minute meeting with the Iraqi leader. A Pentagon spokesman, Brian

Whitman, now says that Rumsfeld raised the issue not with Hussein, but with Iraqi

foreign minister Tariq Aziz. The State Department notes show that he mentioned

it largely in passing as one of several matters that ‘‘inhibited’’ U.S. efforts to assist

Iraq.

45

Rumsfeld has also said he had ‘‘nothing to do’’ with helping Iraq in its war against

Iran. Although former U.S. officials agree that Rumsfeld was not one of the architects of the Reagan administration’s tilt toward Iraq—he was a private citizen when

he was appointed Middle East envoy—the documents show that his visits to Baghdad led to closer U.S.-Iraqi cooperation on a wide variety of fronts. Washington was

willing to resume diplomatic relations immediately, but Hussein insisted on delaying such a step until the following year.

As part of its opening to Baghdad, the Reagan administration removed Iraq from

the State Department terrorism list in February 1982, despite heated objections

from Congress. Without such a move, Teicher says, it would have been ‘‘impossible

to take even the modest steps we were contemplating’’ to channel assistance to

Baghdad. Iraq—along with Syria, Libya and South Yemen—was one of four original

countries on the list, which was first drawn up in 1979.

Some former U.S. officials say that removing Iraq from the terrorism list provided

an incentive to Hussein to expel the Palestinian guerrilla leader Abu Nidal from

Baghdad in 1983. On the other hand, Iraq continued to play host to alleged terrorists throughout the 1980s. The most notable was Abu Abbas, leader of the Palestine

Liberation Front, who found refuge in Baghdad after being expelled from Tunis for

masterminding the 1985 hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro, which resulted

in the killing of an elderly American tourist.

Iraq Lobbies for Arms

While Rumsfeld was talking to Hussein and Aziz in Baghdad, Iraqi diplomats and

weapons merchants were fanning out across Western capitals for a diplomatic

charm offensive-cum-arms buying spree. In Washington, the key figure was the

Iraqi charge ́ d’affaires, Nizar Hamdoon, a fluent English speaker who impressed

Reagan administration officials as one of the most skillful lobbyists in town.

‘‘He arrived with a blue shirt and a white tie, straight out of the mafia,’’ recalled

Geoffrey Kemp, a Middle East specialist in the Reagan White House. ‘‘Within six

months, he was hosting suave dinner parties at his residence, which he parlayed

into a formidable lobbying effort. He was particularly effective with the American

Jewish community.’’

One of Hamdoon’s favorite props, says Kemp, was a green Islamic scarf allegedly

found on the body of an Iranian soldier. The scarf was decorated with a map of the

Middle East showing a series of arrows pointing toward Jerusalem. Hamdoon used

to ‘‘parade the scarf’’ to conferences and congressional hearings as proof that an Iranian victory over Iraq would result in ‘‘Israel becoming a victim along with the

Arabs.’’

According to a sworn court affidavit prepared by Teicher in 1995, the United

States ‘‘actively supported the Iraqi war effort by supplying the Iraqis with billions

of dollars of credits, by providing military intelligence and advice to the Iraqis, and

by closely monitoring third country arms sales to Iraq to make sure Iraq had the

military weaponry required.’’ Teicher said in the affidavit that former CIA director

William Casey used a Chilean company, Cardoen, to supply Iraq with cluster bombs

that could be used to disrupt the Iranian human wave attacks. Teicher refuses to

discuss the affidavit.

At the same time the Reagan administration was facilitating the supply of weapons and military components to Baghdad, it was attempting to cut off supplies to

Iran under ‘‘Operation Staunch.’’ Those efforts were largely successful, despite the

glaring anomaly of the 1986 Iran-contra scandal when the White House publicly admitted trading arms for hostages, in violation of the policy that the United States

was trying to impose on the rest of the world.

Although U.S. arms manufacturers were not as deeply involved as German or

British companies in selling weaponry to Iraq, the Reagan administration effectively

turned a blind eye to the export of ‘‘dual use’’ items such as chemical precursors

and steel tubes that can have military and civilian applications. According to several

former officials, the State and Commerce departments promoted trade in such items

as a way to boost U.S. exports and acquire political leverage over Hussein.

When United Nations weapons inspectors were allowed into Iraq after the 1991

Gulf War, they compiled long lists of chemicals, missile components, and computers

from American suppliers, including such household names as Union Carbide and

Honeywell, which were being used for military purposes.

A 1994 investigation by the Senate Banking Committee turned up dozens of biological agents shipped to Iraq during the mid-1980s under license from the Commerce Department, including various strains of anthrax, subsequently identified by

the Pentagon as a key component of the Iraqi biological warfare program. The Commerce Department also approved the export of insecticides to Iraq, despite widespread suspicions that they were being used for chemical warfare.

46

The fact that Iraq was using chemical weapons was hardly a secret. In February

1984, an Iraqi military spokesman effectively acknowledged their use by issuing a

chilling warning to Iran. ‘‘The invaders should know that for every harmful insect,

there is an insecticide capable of annihilating it . . . and Iraq possesses this annihilation insecticide.’’

Chemicals Kill Kurds

In late 1987, the Iraqi air force began using chemical agents against Kurdish resistance forces in northern Iraq that had formed a loose alliance with Iran, according to State Department reports. The attacks, which were part of a ‘‘scorched earth’’

strategy to eliminate rebel-controlled villages, provoked outrage on Capitol Hill and

renewed demands for sanctions against Iraq. The State Department and White

House were also outraged—but not to the point of doing anything that might seriously damage relations with Baghdad.

‘‘The U.S.-Iraqi relationship is . . . important to our long-term political and economic objectives,’’ Assistant Secretary of State Richard W. Murphy wrote in a September 1988 memorandum that addressed the chemical weapons question. ‘‘We believe that economic sanctions will be useless or counterproductive to influence the

Iraqis.’’

Bush administration spokesmen have cited Hussein’s use of chemical weapons

‘‘against his own people’’—and particularly the March 1988 attack on the Kurdish

village of Halabjah—to bolster their argument that his regime presents a ‘‘grave and

gathering danger’’ to the United States.

The Iraqis continued to use chemical weapons against the Iranians until the end

of the Iran-Iraq war. A U.S. air force intelligence officer, Rick Francona, reported

finding widespread use of Iraqi nerve gas when he toured the Al Faw peninsula in

southern Iraq in the summer of 1988, after its recapture by the Iraqi army. The

battlefield was littered with atropine injectors used by panicky Iranian troops as an

antidote against Iraqi nerve gas attacks.

Far from declining, the supply of U.S. military intelligence to Iraq actually expanded in 1988, according to a 1999 book by Francona, ‘‘Ally to Adversary: an Eyewitness Account of Iraq’s Fall from Grace.’’ Informed sources said much of the battlefield intelligence was channeled to the Iraqis by the CIA office in Baghdad.

Although U.S. export controls to Iraq were tightened up in the late 1980s, there

were still many loopholes. In December 1988, Dow Chemical sold $1.5 million of pesticides to Iraq, despite U.S. government concerns that they could be used as chemical warfare agents. An Export-Import Bank official reported in a memorandum that

he could find ‘‘no reason’’ to stop the sale, despite evidence that the pesticides were

‘‘highly toxic’’ to humans and would cause death ‘‘from asphyxiation.’’

The U.S. policy of cultivating Hussein as a moderate and reasonable Arab leader

continued right up until he invaded Kuwait in August 1990, documents show. When

the then-U.S. ambassador to Baghdad, April Glaspie, met with Hussein on July 25,

1990, a week before the Iraqi attack on Kuwait, she assured him that Bush ‘‘wanted

better and deeper relations,’’ according to an Iraqi transcript of the conversation.

‘‘President Bush is an intelligent man,’’ the ambassador told Hussein, referring to

the father of the current president. ‘‘He is not going to declare an economic war

against Iraq.’’

‘‘Everybody was wrong in their assessment of Saddam,’’ said Joe Wilson, Glaspie’s

former deputy at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, and the last U.S. official to meet

with Hussein. ‘‘Everybody in the Arab world told us that the best way to deal with

Saddam was to develop a set of economic and commercial relationships that would

have the effect of moderating his behavior. History will demonstrate that this was

a miscalculation.’’

Senator BOXER. And in my remaining time—and I am going to

sit here for another round—I assume we can have another round?

The CHAIRMAN. We will——

Senator BOXER. Good.

The CHAIRMAN [[continuing]. If the members wish to do so.

Senator BOXER. Good. I want to read a couple of things. ‘‘The Administrations of Ronald Reagan and George Bush authorized the

sale to Iraq of numerous items that had both military and civilian

application, including poisonous chemicals and deadly biological viruses, such as anthrax and bubonic plague. According to former

U.S. officials, the directive stated the U.S. would do, quote, ‘whatVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:32 Jun 10, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 85796 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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ever was necessary and legal to prevent Iraq from losing the war

with Iran.’ ’’ It goes into the fact that Donald Rumsfeld was appointed as a

special envoy to the Middle East in 1983, and it quotes, ‘‘When

Rumsfeld finally met with Hussein on December 20, 1983, he told

the Iraqi leader that Washington was ready for a resumption of full

diplomatic relations, according to a State Department report of the

conversation. Iraqi leaders later described themselves as extremely

pleased with the Rumsfeld visit, which had, quote, ‘elevated U.S./

Iraqi relations to a new level.’ As part of its opening to Baghdad,

the Reagan Administration removed Iraq from the State Department terrorism list in February 1982, despite heated objections

from Congress.’’ ‘‘When United Nations weapons inspectors were

allowed into Iraq after the 1991 gulf war, they compiled long lists

of chemicals, missile components, and computers from American

suppliers, including such household names as Union Carbide and

Honeywell, which were being used for military purposes. A 1994 investigation by the Senate Banking Committee turned up dozens of

biological agents shipped to Iraq during the mid-1980s under license from the Commerce Department, including various strains of

anthrax subsequently identified by the Pentagon as a key component of the Iraqi biological warfare program. The Commerce Department also approved the export of insecticides to Iraq despite

widespread suspicions that they were being used for chemical warfare.’’ I am—you know, reading this, I get chills at what we did and

the monster that was made even more of a monster because of our

actions. And I think there has to be a lesson here that we have to

understand and be responsible for our own actions. And we sit here

and talk about the horrors of these chemicals, many of which were

made possible by the actions of our own government, when, for

whatever reason, suddenly Saddam Hussein was not all that bad,

you know, 20 years ago.

So this line of questioning—I will finish now and just make the

comment that Saddam must disarm. He got these weapons from a

lot of places, and he is a terrible danger. But I would beg this administration to listen carefully to colleagues on both sides of the

aisle when we say that as long as the inspectors are there and they

say they are making progress—and absolutely it was a mixed report from Blix, no doubt about it—we should give the process a

chance to work, and then we will be able to develop a coalition like

we had in the first gulf war if we do this right.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Boxer.

We now come to a portion of the—yes, would you like to respond?

Mr. ARMITAGE. If Senator Boxer is going to be kind enough to

stay around, so I will respond, but I think a couple of things you

said—I am not going to argue; I just want to make a point. This

is one very important statement you made.

Thank you for your comments about my opening statement. It

was deliberate—‘‘We know where you live,’’ as they say—because

I wanted to bring it home to you and other Members.

And I saw and paid very close attention to your statement of the

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cused of being totally tone deaf in the administration. It is not the

case. We look at these things, we think about them. And I saw in

that, you said Saddam must disarm, and you also said the inspectors have to be given—or should be given more time.

The frustration that we have on that is that it is not a matter

of the inspectors. They are not, sort of, policemen. They are

verifiers. And if we do not get the cooperation, then time is not

going to be the answer. That is our view. There is a difference of

opinion.

But when you make the comment about ‘‘the enemy of my enemy

is my friend,’’ I specifically—and I think in this very chamber in

1984—gave a testimony and, in it, said that being ‘‘the enemy of

my enemy’’ is not sufficient for a relationship with the United

States. To be our—have a relationship with the United States that

is lasting and worthwhile, you have to, to some extent, share our

values.

So I know what you are saying, and I was around in the 1980s,

on both sides of the Iraq and Iran question. But the question of

‘‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’’ is not our policy and has

not been for some time, and I just wanted to make that——

Senator BOXER. Well, they should have listened to you in the

1980s. We might not be in such a situation——

Mr. ARMITAGE. Well, I was on both sides of the issue, like a lot

of people. I am not—I was not—my skirts are not totally clean on

that, either. But I want to say that the enemy of my enemy is not

necessarily our friend. They have to share our values.

Senator BOXER. That is for sure.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator BIDEN. I wish you would make the case to the U.N. like

you speak. I wish you would make the case to the U.N. like you

speak, and to the world.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Allen.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend

you for your leadership. I look forward to working with you, as well

as with Senator Biden, on this committee, and thank you for having undoubtedly one of the most important hearings on an important, pressing subject in a long time in the long history of this esteemed committee.

I will not go through my whole statement. I really do want to

hear the perspectives of Secretary Armitage and Ambassador

Negroponte.

I will just say that, in listening to this and following it for the

last year, it is very clear—it is not just last year—but it is very

clear that Saddam Hussein has proven that he is a dangerous, aggressive dictator. We saw his reaction. We saw his reaction on September 11 when the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in

northern Virginia were hit. What was his reaction? Celebration.

We have also seen—and Senator Boxer and I have worked on it

to make sure—this is before 9/11—to make sure that we understood what was going on in Israel and what they were facing. You

wonder about him and terrorism? He offers bounties or a remuneration to families who send their young daughters or young sons

off on suicide murders into Israel.

49

It would seem to me that we keep having to re-prove the same

case on stipulated facts, and they are not just facts from our intelligence. These are stipulated facts that the United Nations, the Security Council, has talked about previously. You go through all the

volumes of various biological or chemical agents and these stockpiles. And it is clear that Saddam Hussein, from time to time, will

change his tactics. At times, he will be belligerent and bellicose in

his obstructionism. More recently, he has turned into more deceitful deception in his obstructionism. The fact remains, though, he

still has these stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons.

In addition, apparently it is understood by Dr. Blix and others

that he has the missile capabilities that far exceed the range required by the United Nations—not the United States, but the

United Nations. And there are other aspects of delivery systems of

which we have concerns that I am not going to go into because they

were brought up in top-secret meetings. And there is, of course, a

concern that he could hand it off to a terrorist subcontractor who

would just love to disrupt this country and kill thousands, if not

millions, of Americans with these chemical or biological weapons.

We are not even arguing over the question of nuclear capabilities.

I would like to ask several questions here. And the reason I

wanted to find out where we were is I did not want to ask questions of these two gentlemen that have already asked before. Invariably, Senator Hagel has asked the questions, I have found, in

this committee.

Now, Ambassador Negroponte, what has been the reaction of the

other Members of the U.N. Security Council, as far as this report?

How do their assessments of the Blix January 27 report differ, if

at all, with your—I have read and followed our responses to it— what are their differences, if there are any? Because I think this

is going to be very important as we move forward in the days and

weeks to come.

And for example, do they agree—do any of them dispute the

fact—what seem to be stipulated facts that Saddam Hussein possesses these various amounts or quantities of biological and chemical agents that could be used as weapons?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Thank you very much, Senator. I

think that, as a general proposition, most of the delegations believe

that Iraq has not cooperated proactively with the inspectors. I

think they agree that the questions that Dr. Blix has raised are serious ones that Iraq needs to answer for.

I think where you will start to get a variety of perspectives from

the different countries is with respect to whether what has happened thus far—that is to say, Iraq’s incomplete and totally inadequate declaration in December and its failure to cooperate so far— is sufficient to constitute a material breach of Resolution 1441. And

there, you start hearing a divergence of views.

We have already said we consider it to be a material breach. The

British Foreign Minister and the British delegate yesterday, at our

meeting of the Council, said that they believe that Iraq is now in

further material breach. And then a number of the other delegations have been arguing for more time for the inspections. But virtually all of them have said that Iraq has got to do more to cooperate with the inspectors. And so I think they have all been critical

50

in that respect, but I would acknowledge that a number of them

have argued for more time.

Now, what their position will be as this diplomatic process

unfolds, the meeting between the President and Prime Minister

Blair at Camp David this weekend, Secretary Powell’s briefing to

the Council next week, and the diplomatic activity that is inevitably going to surround that, how their positions will evolve, I

think, remains to be seen.

Senator ALLEN. All right. So the question is, What do you do

with the material breach. But they do agree with the underlying

facts, insofar as the amount of these chemical—or that Saddam

possesses chemical and biological——

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, just to give you one

example——

Senator ALLEN [continuing]. Stockpiles?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Yes, sir. Just to give you one example,

Senator, here is a report of last night’s meeting of the Council. I

am reading from the cabled report from our Mission. And the

French delegate—and, after all, we know that France and ourselves have different—quite a few differences of perspective on this

issue—and yet I am quoting now, the French delegate said, ‘‘He

noted, however, that the effectiveness of the inspectors would be

enhanced if Iraq fully cooperated with the inspection teams. Iraq’s

record was’’—and here is a quote—‘‘was far from satisfactory,’’ unquote. That is the French point of view on this question to the Security Council.

Senator ALLEN. OK. When will Dr. Blix add into his report the

listing of the proscribed activity being violated insofar as the missile range matter? Or is that in the report? I thought there was an

insinuation that it would be.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. There is an issue as to what to do

about those missiles that have been tested beyond the 150 kilometers and also the 360, I believe, rocket motors that have been

imported illegally, which he has expressed serious concern about.

And in reply to a question that I put to him in the Council yesterday, he said that he expected to come to a decision as to what to

do about those proscribed items prior to February 14.

Senator ALLEN. OK, thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Allen.

It is a pleasure to welcome Senator Corzine, from New Jersey,

to our committee, and I ask you for your first initial burst of questions.

Senator CORZINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and to the ranking

member. It is an honor to serve with you all, and I am truly

thrilled to be here, and I look forward to having an opportunity to

delve into the depth of the issues that I think are so much deeply

on people’s minds.

You know, I would just say that I do not think there is any debate, as a number of folks have said, that we have a real villain

on our hands and a lot of—and a bad actor and that actions need

to be taken. And the question has been and continues to be how

and the timing. And I have some great concerns that we do not follow through in the direction that we are taking, which is to surVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:32 Jun 10, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 85796 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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round the bad guy with a lot of power, put inspectors on the

ground, hopefully forcefully doing their job, whether it is disarming

or verifying, as I think we have heard, or searching, and using the

intelligence, which our country has—I mean, I am confused about

the U–2 overflight, since we have satellites and enormous amounts

of ability in our intelligence area to provide some—I think it should

be shared so the inspecting process can be as complete as possible.

But what I really want to ask is about the objectives, because the

thing that confuses the people that I have to answer questions to

is, What are we doing here? Is this about regime change? Is this

about disarmament? Is it about U.N. efficacy? Is it about the imminent threat to the United States? Is it about proliferation? And

how does this fit into—what kinds of precedents are we setting for

American foreign policy as we go forward?

There has been a lot of questioning. If it is about proliferation,

what about shipments of arms that we have seen Iran send to

Israel? What about missile shipments from North Korea that we

intercept? Things that are tangible and understood by the American people.

We hear one shoe size does not fit all, but there are grave inconsistencies with a lot of these various elements of what our objectives are, and I think we need to be clearer on this, and particularly when people hear us make the case that there is imminent

threat to our homeland. And I do not understand the sort of questioning that Senator Feingold brought out with regard to proliferation, because, in fact, we may be encouraging proliferation if it is

a last resort by such a rogue regime as Saddam Hussein has in

place.

So I would love to hear some clarity about objectives, but then

translate it into, How are we going to use the example of what we

have said here to apply to the balance of how we deal in the world,

going forward, for our foreign policy.

Mr. ARMITAGE. Wow. Thank you, Senator.

I am tempted to be irreverent and say the answer to the objective is yes to all of the above. And I guess, to some extent, there

is a bit of each of it. But let me try to give it clarity. You will tell

me if I make it or not.

The previous administration and our President had a regime

change policy, and it said something like—I do not have the exact

quote with me, that ‘‘sooner or later Saddam Hussein will use these

weapons.’’ When this administration came in, we also agreed that

regime change in Iraq was the appropriate way to move forward.

I think that 9/11 changed a lot, and it certainly raised our anxiety

level to an extreme degree.

The President, then, heeding advice that he got from, among others, members of this body, decided to go to the U.N. to try to get

the international backing for a policy of disarmament, and that is

our policy. The President said, if, in fact, truly and completely, that

Iraq disarms, it will, in fact, be a changed regime. It is clear to us

now, at least thus far, that there is no cooperation. And you will

make your own judgment on whether you agree with that or not.

So right now, until the President makes a decision to use force,

this is a disarmament regime. That is what we are about and we

are trying to engage the international community on that.

52

On the question—the broader question of, ‘‘How does this fit in

to other nonproliferation regimes?’’ I think it is exactly in consonance with what we are trying to do in Korea and what will be

the subject of Tuesday’s hearing.

We are also trying to engage the international and the regional

leaders in Korea in finding a solution to the vexing question of the

North Koreans’ possible restarting of their facilities. And so it

seems to me completely consistent in both areas.

While, without giving up our own ability and the necessary authorization for a President to make a decision for whatever he feels

is necessary in self-defense, we are trying to work with the international community to lower the danger to all of us.

Senator CORZINE. In those other instances, then—North Korea

being a hypothetical example—I presume that if we were to look

at the precedent that we have with regard to Iraq, we would also

then come to Congress to ask for a use-of-force resolution, go to the

United Nations with a similar sort of request if there is not the

kind of disarmament. Is that the lesson to be learned on how we

are going to apply foreign policy lessons and examples that we are

practicing here? Which I think is very worrisome to the American

people.

Mr. ARMITAGE. Senator, I do not think we have learned a lesson

yet out of this. If—the suggestion you make about coming back to

the U.S. Congress for authorization in any situation is a very dicey

one. We have had—and I have had several discussions with Members about that.

But I want to be clear about one thing, that we understand the

absolute necessity of reporting through the Members of Congress to

the American public, and we understand who does what. And we

understand—in terms of our responsibilities—and we understand

that our Nation works best when we have the necessary tension between our executive and legislative branch. But, at the end of the

day, we come to either a compromise or a decision, and we move

forward.

That is short of saying, ‘‘Absolutely, Senator, we are coming back

for authorization,’’ because everyone up here knows I cannot say

that, and it will be situationally dependent. But everyone up here

also ought to know that everybody in this administration understands completely the need to be as closely aligned with the U.S.

Congress, and the U.S. Senate, in this case, as possible. But I cannot give you the satisfaction you would like to say, ‘‘And we’ll be

here for an authorization’’ in one situation or another.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

It is a pleasure to greet four new Republican members to our

committee. Ad seriatim, they will now ask questions. First of all,

Senator Voinovich, then Senator Alexander, then Senator Coleman.

Senator Sununu was with us earlier and may reappear as his turn

comes.

Senator Voinovich.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to just say to you I am honored to be a member of

this committee at a time that I think is probably one of the most

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national challenges with the Middle East, with Pakistan, India,

North Korea, Iraq—the list goes on.

Second, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman and the ranking member, for the courtesy that you have extended to me during

the last several years in regard to my interest in southeast Europe

and NATO expansion. You have been very, very good to me, and

I am grateful to you.

I would ask that the statement that I have prepared be made a

part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be done.

[The prepared statement of Senator Voinovich follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR GEORGE V. VOINOVICH

I would like to thank the Chairman, Senator Lugar, for convening this hearing

today to discuss the status of U.N. weapons inspections in Iraq. As we continue to

wage a global campaign against terrorism in a changed world post September 11th,

it has become increasingly clear that the threat posed by Saddam Hussein cannot

be ignored.

It is not just Saddam Hussein’s history as a neighborhood bully who has repeatedly defied the United Nations, committed egregious human rights violations

against his own people, and supported terrorists that makes him such a threat to

regional stability, but it is the nexus between the dangerous and unpredictable behavior of this despotic ruler and his possession of chemical, biological and, possibly,

nuclear weapons that causes us such grave concern.

We are talking about a man that has used chemical weapons against his own people, and would surely use these weapons or even more devastating means to satisfy

his craving for regional power, if we give him the opportunity to do so.

As President Bush warned in his address to our nation on Tuesday night, Saddam

Hussein could create deadly havoc in the Middle East by using—or even threatening

the use—of weapons of mass destruction. And he could do even more harm as we

are forced to take into consideration what is almost unthinkable in the aftermath

of the attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon: passing on these

weapons of mass destruction to terrorists who have demonstrated the willingness

and the ability to use them. As the President said, ‘‘We will do everything in our

power to make sure that that day never comes.’’

I strongly support the President’s decision to continue engaging with members of

the international community, sending Secretary of State Colin Powell to the U.N.

Security Council next Wednesday. As I remarked on the Senate floor last October,

I felt it was ‘‘. . . not only appropriate but essential that members of the United

Nations come together to confront Saddam Hussein.’’ Further, I applauded the

President for ‘‘challenging the United Nations to reaffirm its relevance by standing

up to Iraq.’’

The efforts of our President and Secretary of State were successful, as the Security Council sent a strong sign of resolve to Saddam Hussein last fall when in it

unanimously passed U.N. Resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002. Acting in unison,

fifteen countries were clear in their message, giving Iraq ‘‘a final opportunity to

comply with its disarmament obligations.’’ The members of the Security Council

called on the Iraqi regime to readmit weapons inspectors, to fully cooperate, and to

fully disclose and account for deadly agents known to be in Saddam Hussein’s arsenal at the end of the Persian Gulf War.

The members of the Security Council were also clear in the event that Saddam

Hussein should again choose to ignore the will of the United Nations, warning that

the Iraqi regime ‘‘will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations.’’

While it remains my most prayerful hope that Iraq will choose to comply with the

United Nations and disarm, the findings presented before the Security Council by

chief U.N. weapons inspectors on Monday tell all of us that the most crucial questions posed to the regime in Resolution 1441 remain unanswered. Deadly agents

with the potential to inflict mass casualties—anthrax, sarin, mustard and VX nerve

agents—remain unaccounted for. The whereabouts of thousands of warheads designed to deliver chemical weapons—with the exception of 16 found during the last

several weeks—remain unknown. Scientists have not been permitted to talk with

U.N. inspectors. Documents with information on nuclear weapons programs have

been hidden in people’s homes. The list goes on.

54

UN Resolution 1441 required a ‘‘currently accurate, full, and complete declaration

of all aspects of its programs to develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.’’ It also required this report to include precise locations of these weapons and the locations of places where research is conducted. This has not been done. The American public should know that Saddam Hussein is in material breach right now.

As his predecessors before him, President Bush must confront challenges to our

national security and act to protect Americans and our friends and allies abroad.

While it is my hope that diplomacy will prevail and Iraq will disarm, we must consider the course of action we will take in the event that it does not. As President

Bush remarked in his State of the Union address earlier this week, ‘‘We will consult. But let there be no misunderstanding: If Saddam Hussein does not fully disarm, for the safety of our people and for the peace of the world, we will lead a coalition to disarm him.’’ Our nation went to war to fight Hitler’s Germany. We went to war when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. We used military force to liberate Kuwait. At each

point, we judged our national security interests to be at stake, and we acted accordingly. Our nation is again vulnerable, open to new kinds of threats with the potential to do harm that is far greater in scope than the devastation experienced at

Pearl Harbor. Tragically, we learned this lesson on September 11, 2001. It is even

more frightening to contemplate the extent of the damage on that day had the terrorists had at their disposal chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. Without a

doubt, we cannot let Saddam Hussein continue to have weapons of mass destruction, posing a threat not only to us, but the world at large.

This hearing is an important step in our efforts to assess the challenges before

us and to determine action to confront them. I again thank the Chairman for holding this hearing to continue this dialogue. I would like to thank the witnesses, Secretary Armitage and Ambassador Negroponte, for taking time to talk with us today.

I look forward to your testimony.

Senator VOINOVICH. I would like to say that I was one of the

early supporters of the resolution that gave the President the authority to do what was necessary to enforce the U.N. resolutions in

Iraq. I recall, when it was first brought up for discussion, that I

called the White House and said I was not satisfied with the information that I had regarding the situation in Iraq and several of my

colleagues were present at a meeting with Condoleezza Rice and

with George Tenet, where we got some good information. We then

went over to the State Department, and got more information. And

I was convinced, as a result of those meetings, that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction.

I have never gotten so many letters and calls being against something as I did this resolution since I was in the Senate. And I indicated to the people that wrote to me that I had enough confidence

in this administration that they would do what the resolution required to exploit their diplomatic options. You did that.

I think it was extraordinary, Mr. Ambassador, that you were

able to get a vote out of the Security Council for a very strong Resolution 1441. And I had the pleasure of spending some personal

time with Secretary Powell when I was in Prague at the NATO

summit. And again, I was convinced of his sincerity to do everything he possibly could do, no stone unturned, to try and work this

out diplomatically. And you should be congratulated.

We now have the inspectors’ report back, and the real question

is—as I think you said, Mr. Ambassador, ‘‘The diplomatic window

appears to be closing, and the time for decisionmaking is approaching.’’ The real issue here is, Will Saddam Hussein accept disarmament?

And there is this discussion about, you know, whether we should

wait for 6 months or another year or whatever it is. And as you

said, Mr. Armitage—12 months, 2 months, and a few days, is a

55

very long time—what has been going on? He has been stiff-arming

us for a long, long time. And the questions is, Do we have any reason to believe that if we give him another 6 months of inspectors,

and you multiply them four-fold, whether it will make any difference, in terms of getting at the real issue, and that is, is this

man willing to disarm? Does he get it? Does he understand that he

has got to come clean or leave? That is the real issue here.

And we are getting to a crescendo now, and I would really like

to know. Do you think it will make any difference if we give him

6 months or a year?

Mr. ARMITAGE. I do not see a sign. I do not see one single sign

that he has gotten the message. I do not see one single sign of cooperation, Senator.

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. The only point I would add, and even

the inspectors, themselves, have said this—that even the modicum

of cooperation that they have gotten with respect to process has

been—they would attribute to the pressure that Iraq has felt as a

result of 1441 and as a result of our military buildup. And they acknowledge that publicly. But I agree fully with Secretary Armitage

that, thus far, there are no signs that he is prepared to cooperate.

Mr. ARMITAGE. If I may, Senator. And the shame of this is, we

want this disarmament to take place. We want Mr. Blix and his

colleagues to be successful, because, as was alluded to by some of

your colleagues up here, we have got other dangerous situations,

and we would like to have the international community be part of

the solution. But I do not see a sign.

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, the question I have got is this: Our allies ought to understand that Saddam Hussein has got the stuff.

And yet they say we need more proof. Now, are they asking for it

because they need to improve public relations with the people back

in their country, or is it because they just do not want to face up

to the responsibility that we may have to use force to get the job

done?

Mr. ARMITAGE. I am not sure I know all the reasons why. I think

they want to evade—some want to evade responsibility, some do

not want to step up and lead. And I do not know how we got in

this situation of having to have the, quote, ‘‘smoking gun.’’ There

was no smoking-gun reference in 1441. It was accepted that he had

evaded, obfuscated, and confused, the possession of these weapons

for 12 years. So it was up to him to disarm. But somehow as we

move forward, we have gotten in to the question of, ‘‘You’ve got to

make the case.’’ And we have gotten averted here.

Senator VOINOVICH. Are you confident that if we do have to use

force, that we are going to have some of our international brothers

and sisters with us?

Mr. ARMITAGE. I am, Senator. And without getting into the numbers, there are quite a few military liaison people in Tampa who

are—liaison with CENTCOM on just that possibility.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.

Senator Alexander.

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And first, it is

a real privilege to serve on this committee with you as chairman

and Joe as the ranking member and to look forward to working

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here in such a serious time for our country. So I look forward to

this very much. Thank you.

And I want to thank the Secretary and the Ambassador for being

here today. I appreciate the time that you have spent with us, or

the administration has.

We have been here 3 weeks, those of us who are new. And we

have had at least three meetings with Secretary Powell, including

one this morning that was a bipartisan briefing of all the new Senators. And we have had another meeting with Secretary Powell and

Secretary Rumsfeld. That was available to all the Senators. And

then we had another meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld. And that

is in the last 3 weeks. And I welcome that, and I thank you for

it. And I do think it is appropriate.

One of the advantages of being new is you get to hear what all

the others have to say before they get to you. And so here is what

I think I have heard. I hear a lot of comments—— Senator BIDEN. You will get tired of that very quickly.

Senator ALEXANDER. Oh, no, I can learn a lot that way.

But starting with Senator Biden, I think I heard a lot of common

ground. I think I heard common ground about the fact that we are

talking about enforcing a surrender document. I think I heard common ground in that we agree Saddam Hussein must disarm. I

think I heard it—and when most members said, maybe all, that

while we should be prepared to do it ourselves, we should work as

hard as we possibly can to make sure we do not ever have to do

that, that there are a hundred reasons not to go it alone in this

situation, if possible.

I heard it said by virtually everybody, this is a grave danger, and

I particularly appreciate the vividness of your—one teaspoon of anthrax brought the Senate—half the Senate offices—emptied them

out and killed five people in a post office without even opening the

envelope, I believe. And they have got enough anthrax in Iraq for

5 million teaspoons of anthrax.

And I believe we all seem to agree that the support of the American people and their understanding is absolutely essential to anything that we do, especially any sort of military action, because we

never want to have a military action unless we can see it all the

way through to the end with the full support of the American people. So there is a lot of agreement here, it seems to me.

I want to focus on a question of terminology. I think, to the extent we are losing the discussion in the court of world opinion, in

the mountains of Tennessee, where some people are doubting it, or

on the streets of Paris, it may be in the first sentence, when we

talk about ‘‘inspectors’’ and ‘‘inspections,’’ because I think those are

misnomers, in terms of what we are talking about.

When you say ‘‘inspector,’’ at least in this country, it engenders

a vision of Inspector Columbo, some detective, 108 detectives running around California looking for something that might be the size

of this glass of water [indicating]. And the question is, Do we give

them enough time to find that?

That is not really what we are doing there. We are not looking

for a suspect. I mean, Saddam Hussein is a felon. He is a convicted

felon. I mean, he did this. There is no doubt about that. We did

not say that; the United Nations said that, and they began to say

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it 12 years ago. So he is a felon. And these U.N. folks who are over

there are not really inspectors; they are more like Saddam Hussein’s parole officers or probation officers.

Now, I may not have the terminology exactly right. I even was

thinking about moonshiners a hundred years ago in the mountains

of Tennessee, you know, what they would do—they would catch

them—the revenuers would catch them, and then they would haul

them before the judge, and he would basically say to them what

we have said to—what the world has said to Saddam Hussein, ‘‘You did it. You are convicted. You have done it before. You are

a notorious criminal. Now your sentence is to tell us all about it,

destroy it, prove it, or we will come do it for you.’’ Now, that is basically what the world has said to Saddam Hussein. And it seems

to me that too much of our discussion by the second sentence is

into this business of inspectors and inspection, when we are talking

more about convicted felons and parole officers.

Now, maybe you could improve on my terminology, but I think

that first sentence is an important part of what needs to happen

in the next couple of weeks.

Mr. ARMITAGE. Senator Alexander, first of all, I—we were very

grateful—I mentioned to the chairman, you and some of your colleagues, Senator Coleman, Senator Sununu—coming down this

morning, spending some time with us. We are at a great disadvantage appearing before you, Senator Alexander. We are not sure

whether to call you Secretary Alexander, Governor, or Senator.

So it is a little trepidation for John and me to sit here in front

of you.

I would like to, sort of, add to your title. We ought to make you

press spokesman, because you were much more vivid. You gave me

credit for having a vivid description of anthrax, but you were much

more vivid and, I think, in an accurate characterization of the way

things ought to be.

I was expressing a frustration that we have somehow got perverted, because all of a sudden it was on us to prove a case that

the United Nations and the Security Council Resolution 1441 said

was on the shoulder of Saddam to prove that he was disarming. So

had we used this more vivid terminology—and I think ‘‘felon’’ and ‘‘parole officer’’ is perfect—we maybe would not be in quite this

jam. But I suspect you will see some of your comments being appropriated by others as we move forward to describe this, sir.

Senator ALEXANDER. I have one other question, if I may, Mr.

Chairman, that relates to vividness, too.

Like your teaspoon-of-anthrax comment as you began your testimony, the President said the other night that, from three Iraqi defectors, we know that Iraq, in the late 1990s, had several mobile

biological weapons labs. These are designed, he said, to produce

germ warfare agents, and can be moved from place to place to

evade inspectors. Saddam Hussein has not disclosed these facilities. He has given no evidence that he has destroyed them. Now,

that is a very vivid image to me. And I think it could be to most

people in the world. I mean, mobile biological weapons labs moving

around the desert.

Now, you have also said there are 5 million teaspoons of anthrax.

I mean, is that anthrax in those labs? Are they driving around esVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:32 Jun 10, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 85796 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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caping? I mean, that is a vivid image to me. Can you tell us any

more about those mobile biological weapons labs?

Mr. ARMITAGE. This is one of the things, sir, that we will be

speaking of in New York on Wednesday. But I just want to say

something. We would be delighted if these labs were running

around the desert. The problem is, they are parked, we believe, in

either one of the many, many, many underground facilities or in

someone’s garage. And that points to the difficulty of the parole officers finding out whether he is disarming or not.

I would be delighted if they were in the desert, because if they

were in the desert, we could take care of business. But we do not

believe that. We believe they are hidden in one of these many tunnels or underground facilities or garages.

And if Saddam Hussein has destroyed them, then he ought to

show us some—any smidgen of proof, but he has refused to do so.

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Alexander.

Secretary Armitage, let me just mention, the next questioner is

a fellow mayor.

And so—while you are adding to the titles of all the good people,

as, for instance, Senator Chafee was, in an earlier life.

Senator Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would note we

have three mayors and we had three former Governors, I hear.

And Mr. Chairman, let me first note, if I might, being honored

by being part of this committee. I would suspect that the timeliness

of this hearing is probably a mark of the vigor and role of the

chairman that this committee intends for the Foreign Relations

Committee to play in these important, serious matters confronting

us.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator COLEMAN. And so I thank you for the opportunity and

thank you for your leadership.

We have—as I have listened, as my distinguished colleague from

Tennessee has listened, there has been discussion about history,

discussion about the present, and obviously deep concern about the

future. Would it be fair to say that living in this post-9/11 world,

that the impact of 9/11 changed some of our thinking about what

does the word ‘‘threat’’ mean, that the reality of anthrax deaths in

the United States has transformed or changed the paradigm, we

are on a different track, in terms of perhaps that we are more vulnerable, perhaps—and I just—two other observations—that the

threats of the use of weapons of mass destruction by states or terrorists is of greater concern, and that the failure to account for

what we know to be the presence of weapons of mass destruction—

biological agents, delivery systems for these—is at a magnitude unprecedented for us?

Mr. ARMITAGE. Senator—mayor, it is absolutely fair to say that.

We, after 9/11, all of us, came to the conclusion that no longer were

we safe behind the continental limits imposed by our two great

oceans. And it brought forward in our minds all of our thinking

and fears about weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems, and

the other items you mentioned, sir.

59

Senator COLEMAN. To me, Mr. Secretary, it would seem that

when we look at—when we reflect on this question of time, for 12

years we let Saddam Hussein thumb his nose at the United Nations. But time is a much more serious factor right now, because

we know that, in the blink of an eye, the potential for death and

destruction right here is greater than it has ever been.

I would note that. And I want to reiterate something the distinguished ranking member noted about keeping it simple, and I

think Senator Alexander said that. It is so important. I cannot tell

you that the folks in St. Paul or St. Cloud or, you know, the streets

of Minnesota really, fully are with us right now. There was discussion—I have to ask this. Can you define ‘‘proliferation’’ for me, in

average terms?

Mr. ARMITAGE. I guess, in average terms, I would say it was an

unregulated delivery of bad items to bad people for them to accomplish bad purposes.

Senator COLEMAN. If I can followup from one of the questions

that the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin asked, he raised the

question—I guess I would ask the question, Does Iraq’s potential

to use weapons of mass destruction—their potential to distribute

weapons of mass destruction to terrorists, rather, is that tied to—

what is the relationship between that and whether they are the

No. 1 or No. 3 or No. 6 proliferator in the world?

Mr. ARMITAGE. I think it is the combination of unquestioned

thirst for these weapons combined with his history, his bloodymindedness. Where, as we have said, someone has said, he has sacrificed more than a million of his youths in his attempt to invade

Iran. He then tried to subjugate Kuwait. And he has used this

against his own people. And then there is a whole catalog of things

that he has done to his own people, not because the United

States—it is not the United States that is saying he has done these

things. Amnesty International has catalogued his rapes and torture, et cetera. And so it is the combination that makes him, for

us, so loathsome.

Senator COLEMAN. Two other points. One, and it gets to the issue

of—and maybe it is the old lawyer in me; I am a former prosecutor—but burden of proof. I think we got hung up in discussion

about smoking guns and looking for smoking guns, smoking guns

in a State the size of California. The issue here is burden of proof.

The burden of proof is on Saddam Hussein to say that what he

had, he has no more; that what he has used before, he has the capacity to use no more. And whether it is 1 month or 3 months or

6 months or 12 months, if he does not come forward right now and

say, ‘‘Here it is,’’ then that is a problem.

And what we are saying and what I am hearing is that we are

not seeing any indications that—either to us, or our allies are saying that he is coming forward and meeting his burden of proof.

The last comment, and it has to do with the issue of nuclear,

which we had a lot of discussion about for a while. It was Dr.

ElBaradei, in his report, I thought, seemed to discount that. And

yet I would like to ask—there was a report noting that 3,000 documents relating to the laser enrichment of uranium were found in

a private home, so I would suspect there are a lot of those and you

would need a lot of inspectors to check out every private home.

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Could you help me understand the relationship of those documents,

what we know, to Iraq’s potential to develop the nuclear capacity?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, I think that those are documents that are still being analyzed. But I think, in terms of—it certainly shows that there are still scientists there who have these

kinds of documents. And I think that it is a—also an example—especially, I believe I mentioned in my testimony, that these documents were found on the basis of an intelligence tip. I think it is

proof that the Iraqi regime is taking steps, in its program of denial

and deception, to disperse documents of this kind to its private citizenry to make it harder to find. So I think it fits very much into

the pattern of denial and deceit that the Government of Iraq is

pursuing as a policy.

Senator COLEMAN. And do we know whether these documents,

Mr. Ambassador, were contained in the December 7, 2002, declaration from Iraq regarding its weapons of mass destruction?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I do not know the answer to that

question, but I can certainly find out and submit it for the record.

[A classified response was subsequently received.]

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Coleman.

Let me mention that Senator Hagel and Senator Voinovich have

asked that their statements be made a part of the record. And

without objection, that will be done.

[The prepared statement of Senator Hagel follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHUCK HAGEL

The reports that Drs. Blix and ElBaradei presented to the UN Security Council

reveal that Saddam Hussein has not fulfilled his obligations to disarm, as he is required to do by UN Security Council Resolutions. His time is running out. While

the inspectors have asked for more time to complete their tasks, that time will be

of little value without the cooperation of Saddam Hussein’s government.

As we weigh our options for the next steps in Iraq, America needs the support

of the Security Council and our allies around the world, especially if force is required to disarm Saddam’s regime. We should not dismiss the concerns of our allies

and others about American intentions in launching what will likely be a pre-emptive

war against Iraq. Bridging the gap between America and our allies on the threat

from Saddam Hussein should not be a bridge too far, given the nature and practices

of Saddam’s government. Beyond any military action we might take in Iraq, the

scope of assuring a stable and hopefully democratic transition in a post-Saddam

Iraq is a heavy burden that America should not, need not, and cannot take on essentially alone. What begins in Iraq will not end in Iraq. Iraq cannot be considered

in a vacuum, or as an end game for peace in the Middle East. What we do in Iraq

has implications for our efforts in the war on terrorism, the Middle East, Central

and South Asia, and throughout the Muslim world.

I support the President’s decision to have Secretary Powell present U.S. evidence

against Saddam Hussein before the UN Security Council on February 5. The burden

remains on Saddam Hussein. But our hand is strengthened by making a strong and

credible case to the world about what we know about the Government of Iraq’s proscribed weapons programs; its concealment practices; and its links to terrorist

groups. At this critical juncture, the stakes are too high for us to hold back.

I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses today, to Secretary Powell’s testimony before our committee next week, and to the February 11th hearing on The

Future of Iraq.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will now commence a second

round of questioning for those Senators who wish to participate.

Let me start with a question raised by another Senator about the

mobile vans. Aa I have commented to my colleague, Senator Biden,

it seems to me a fairly short time ago the issue of the mobile vans

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was classified, or maybe heavily classified. It was not appearing on

lists of the U.N. or others, for that matter. In any event, the mobile

vans are now being discussed in the press, and they have been discussed here today. They are important, I think, for our understanding of the larger issue.

I would like to know how much more you can fill in for us. Many

Americans are not acquainted with biological weapons or materials

or laboratories or anything associated with this. What has been alleged with regard to Saddam Hussein is that some of the developments with the biological materials have occurred in very small

spaces and with relatively small equipment that had dual use, that

could, in fact, be broken down, put in a mobile van and literally

carted down the road a hundred miles.

Now, if there were not an inspector there in the last 15 minutes

or so, confirming the presence of this activity would be impossible.

That is the nature of chemical weapons in many ways. And as the

Secretary knows, because we have discussed this in public hearings, my experiences in Russia have confirmed for me how rapidly

you can move things, how very difficult it is, even if you are looking

at it, to know what you are looking at. I am not as gifted as the

UNMOVIC inspectors. But having looked at a lot of chemical and

biological weapons in Russia, I can attest that without cooperative

Russian experts, instructing me on what happened in various

years, and why some apparatus that is now making perfume or fertilizer was, even a week ago, making anthrax, many clues would

be impossible to comprehend.

But I would say this is the nature of the problem with regard,

at least, to biological and chemical weapons activities. And therefore, requiring inspectors to find this clearly goes beyond finding a

needle in a haystack; it is impossible. It is possible to hide it every

day, every bit of it, and literally to take it miles away where no

one will see it again.

So I think it is fair enough for our fellow citizens to say, ‘‘Show

us the beef,’’ lay it out on the table, as Adlai Stevenson did with

the Cuban Missile Crisis. But in these two instances, not only is

this virtually impossible, but the whole character of the search

changes—in the case of dual-use items, from those things that are

benign to those things that are deadly.

Now, the nuclear situation is a different one, as many have

pointed out. In this case, the allegation is not that Saddam has a

nuclear bomb or a warhead filled with nuclear material. He might.

And therefore, the traces of those things that are telltale signs, including perhaps hundreds of pages of scientists’ notes as to how

you develop a program and who was involved in it and all of that

could be very interesting, and all of that could be found, even if a

bomb is not, thank goodness. And it is to avert the bomb ever being

available that we are talking about these issues and asking—and

demanding Iraq cease and desist the effort to create such a monster.

But with regard to the mobile vans, can either of you indicate to

the committee what information is available? And are you releasing material, have you done so, or can you illuminate this subject

at all?

Mr. ARMITAGE. Thank you, Senator.

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On the direct question of the mobile vans, other than acknowledging it, and acknowledging, as I did earlier, that this is one of

the things that Secretary Powell is working, as I said, feverishly

right now to get at a sufficient level of declassification so that we

can talk more openly and show to a wider public more graphically

the existence of these. I cannot go beyond it.

But I do want to push back a little bit, sir, on the notion of the

Adlai Stevenson moment, because it gets to the question of who

has got the burden of proof. What Secretary Powell is going to attempt to do in the United Nations, and he has said he was going

to be showing some new intelligence and some new information

that has not been seen before. But he is also going to try to fill in

the blanks following up on what Mr. Blix has said when he talks

about a lack of cooperation, ‘‘Here’s what we know about it,’’ and

lay it out in, hopefully, rather graphic terms and in ways that are

extraordinarily credible for all to hear and that no one will be able

to evade the absolute conclusion about Saddam Hussein’s denial,

deception, and his absolute lack of willingness to show any sign of

a disarmament motive in his mind.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you.

And Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Let me say that I am sure—and I think this has

been a good exchange. And each of—not each; many of our colleagues said that—after the opening statements by the chairman

and myself, that there is a lot we agree on; I mean, overwhelming

agreement—which probably confuses the public at large when you

have guys like me, and even occasionally the chairman and others,

taking some issue with the administration on how they approach

this subject.

And I want to make it clear. I think the disagreements, to the

extent they exist, are based on the risk assessment as it relates to

timing. And to the extent there is disagreement, it relates to tactic,

not strategy.

I want to reiterate again, before I ask these next three questions,

short questions, is what I think the goal is. I think the goal that

we have is to separate Saddam Hussein from his weapons of mass

destruction with the greatest possible support of the world that we

can get, to reduce, in direct proportion, the risk we face in separating and, after separating, securing Iraq. That, to me, is the goal.

And so where we have disagreements, and I do have some disagreements, and I will not embarrass anyone—either one of our

witnesses. I know there are—have been significant disagreements

within the administration on these questions.

I would like to return to three points that have been raised by

some of our colleagues. Senator Voinovich, who, by the way, has a

keen interest in foreign policy—and I want to compliment him on

his deep involvement and hands-on involvement, particularly as it

relates to the Balkans and working with this committee when he

was not on the committee—he said the question is not, Will Saddam—he said the question is, Will Saddam respond if he’s given

more time?

This is a tactical difference we have. I think the question is, If

we give more time, will that markedly increase the support we get

from the rest of the world, and weigh that against the risks?

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So the question, for me, is, Will the additional time given increase the risk beyond the support we will get by allowing more

time? And so that is—I just want—I know we have a disagreement

on that, but that is where I come from on this.

So I sit down and I say, the value—not the legitimacy, not the

justness, not the equities—this guy does not deserve another tenth

of a second, but by giving him another 3 weeks, 3 months, or 6

months and not moving until the next ‘‘cold,’’ quote/unquote, season

in their—in the late fall, what is the risk of doing that relative to

the amount of support we would pick up, making our overall job,

which is going to be immense, in my view, easier? And that is a

tough question.

But I do not think the question is, If we give him more time, is

he more likely to cooperate? The more time we give him, the less

likely he is to cooperate, in my view. But the question is, Does his

failure to cooperate increase the risk in a way that outweighs the

risk of going with fewer people, less support when we go? That, to

me, is the issue.

Now, I realize that maintaining the deployment of a hundredplus-thousand forces in the region is costly. I would just raise, for— as a question to be considered—it is a heck of a lot more costly to

deploy those forces with fewer people helping us, and less commitment to mop up after it is over. Now, again, that is a tough call.

Are we going to—am I going to second-guess the President? No.

But I am going to front-end guess it. I am going to front-end guess

it. I come down on the side of suggesting that another several

months is not something that in any way appreciably increases any

risk.

The second point that I want to make is that you point out, Mr.

Secretary, Mr. Ambassador, what a bad guy Saddam is. And it is

undisputable. But there is also another piece of history we have

from the experts we have brought before this committee. Saddam

Hussein has a long history, with good reason, of oppressing

Islamicists, as well as his neighbors. The people he hates most are

the clerics. They are the ones that hate him the most, because he

is a secular leader.

If you were just going to write the profile of Osama bin Laden

and Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden would like to kill Saddam

Hussein. Osama bin Laden hates Saddam Hussein. So the idea

that there is a natural affinity here is contrary to history, recent

history, and even not-so-recent history. That does not mean, in a

crunch, he would not, in order to retaliate, adopt this slogan we

have rejected that ‘‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend.’’ But that

is the only circumstance under which there is any historical data

to suggest he might be cooperative. That, I believe, is the consensus among most experts.

The third point that I would like to make, and it was a comment

made to me by a high-ranking official of a NATO country recently

in Davos. I was making the smoking-gun argument as it not being

relevant. I said, ‘‘How do we get to that point?’’ And this very highranking person, who both of you know, said—and I am paraphrasing—I think this is a quote, but I will be precise and say I

am paraphrasing—he said, Smoking gun was invoked by us in response to the hyperbole of a gunslinger, your President. Smoking

64

gun was invoked by us in response to the hyperbole of your President—not my comment—a gunslinger.

And I do not know how many times I heard from world leaders

this past week, Who is the President to stand before us and petulantly look down and say, ‘‘I’m growing impatient.’’ You are a diplomat, Mr. Ambassador, and I do not want either one of you to

comment, except to defend the President, because I like you too

much. But if you used that language in the Security Council, even

if everyone agreed with you, you would not get agreement. You

would not get agreement.

And so I am just suggesting that it may be time for us to understand that we have sort of concurrent objectives here. The concurrent objective is, take him down with the most help we possibly can

get to maybe, maybe have a shot of putting together a more stable—with the help of the rest of the world, a more stable government that will be less destabilizing for a very important region of

the world, which is when your work really begins.

So I just really wanted to make those few points. I would invite

response if you want to. It is not necessary. But as we go forward,

no one should confuse my support for the overall objective that has

been signed on by the President of the United States of America,

but no one should assume that I will not have strong disagreements with the tactical approach the President uses to accomplish

the end, just as, I would argue—and I know for a fact, that there

has been equally, equally energetic disagreement within the administration on tactics, as well. I am not odd man out on that regard.

So at any rate, I just wanted to make that statement, and I hope

that we can get—I have a couple of questions I would like to submit for the record, if I may—I will not take any more time—that

relate specifically to the Kurds.

We just got back from Kurdistan, as you know. You accommodated that trip. I would argue, as much as I love the Kurds—and

I think Senator Hagel and I were the only two to ever address their

‘‘parliament,’’ quote/unquote—they have an overwhelming reason to

make a connection between al-Qaeda and Saddam, and I found

very little evidence of it. But they—their motivation for it is overwhelming. So we have to consider the source of some of this, as

well.

I yield the floor. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you, Senator Biden.

Normally, I would turn to this side of the aisle, but Senator Nelson has not had a first round of questioning.

Yes?

Mr. ARMITAGE. With your indulgence, sir, I am not going to respond at length, but I feel a need to respond a bit.

When you were illuminating us on what you thought our shared

objective was, I was writing it down, and it is to separate Saddam

Hussein from his weapons of mass destruction with the maximum

international support possible. Then I wrote ‘‘in the most timely

fashion possible,’’ and you have correctly identified that as one of

the, perhaps, tension points.

However, what is the President doing? He is meeting today with

Prime Minister Berlusconi.

65

Senator BIDEN. I agree.

Mr. ARMITAGE. What is he doing with Prime Minister Blair tomorrow?

Now, the question of whether it is a week, 2 weeks, 3 weeks, a

month, or whatever, these are decisions that these world leaders

will make. We also are desirous of getting the maximum international support possible. I do not think that is an insignificant

amount of numbers that I was reading off to, I think, Senator

Brownback.

Senator BIDEN. And I would hope—with your permission, Mr.

Chairman, I would ask to be submitted in the record an article

from the Wall Street Journal today by the following leaders of the

following countries—Spain, Portugal, Italy, U.K., Hungary, Poland,

Denmark, and the Czech Republic—all of whom have signed on.

All I am pointing out is, it is a call that ultimately the Chief Executive has to make. But I will not, as you would not expect, refrain from my suggestions as to what considerations should go into

him making that call. That is the only point I wish to make.

Mr. ARMITAGE. The only other point, on your historical comments

about Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein, are absolutely correct. After 9/11, a lot of things changed, including the need to be

somewhere. There were some marriages of convenience I think that

over time we will be able to show. And we have gotten a lot smarter about Osama bin Laden.

And on the comment of differences in any administration, or this

one, I think those are differences we are blessed with, because it

is only from such differences that the Chief Executive can make

the most informed discussion—or decision.

And finally, on the question of the ‘‘gunslinger’’ and ‘‘smoking

gun’’ and all that——

Senator BIDEN. It is not my comment.

Mr. ARMITAGE. Not at all, sir. Not at all. But you know, people

were saying, prior to September, that the President would never go

to the U.N., but he did. The same people that said, ‘‘He’ll never

have the patience to see this through the mosh pit,’’ if you will, ‘‘of

a Security Council discussion,’’ and he saw it through. And having

gotten the resolution, ‘‘He’ll never have the patience to let the inspectors try to do their job and let Hans Blix report,’’ all of which

has been done. So I think there is a lot—— Senator BIDEN. In large part thanks to your persuasion.

Mr. ARMITAGE. No, not at all; the President is in charge, and he

is making these decisions, sir.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Your article will be submitted and, without objection, included.

[The article referred to follows:]

[From the Wall Street Journal, Jan. 30, 2003]

EUROPEAN LEADERS IN SUPPORT OF U.S.

By Jose Maria Aznar, Jose-Manuel Durao Barroso, Silvio Berlusconi, Tony Blair,

Vaclav Havel, Peter Medgyessy, Leszek Miller and Anders Fogh Rasmussen

The real bond between the U.S. and Europe is the values we share: democracy,

individual freedom, human rights and the Rule of Law. These values crossed the

Atlantic with those who sailed from Europe to help create the United States of

America. Today they are under greater threat than ever.

66

The attacks of Sept. 11 showed just how far terrorists—the enemies of our common values—are prepared to go to destroy them. Those outrages were an attack on

all of us. In standing firm in defense of these principles, the governments and people of the U.S. and Europe have amply demonstrated the strength of their convictions. Today more than ever, the transatlantic bond is a guarantee of our freedom.

We in Europe have a relationship with the U.S. which has stood the test of time.

Thanks in large part to American bravery, generosity and farsightedness, Europe

was set free from the two forms of tyranny that devastated our continent in the

20th century: Nazism and Communism. Thanks, too, to the continued cooperation

between Europe and the U.S. we have managed to guarantee peace and freedom on

our continent. The transatlantic relationship must not become a casualty of the current Iraqi regime’s persistent attempts to threaten world security.

In today’s world, more than ever before, it is vital that we preserve that unity

and cohesion. We know that success in the day-to-day battle against terrorism and

the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction demands unwavering determination and firm international cohesion on the part of all countries for whom freedom

is precious.

The Iraqi regime and its weapons of mass destruction represent a clear threat to

world security. This danger has been explicitly recognized by the U.N. All of us are

bound by Security Council Resolution 1441, which was adopted unanimously. We

Europeans have reiterated our backing for Resolution 1441, our wish to pursue the

U.N. route, and our support for the Security Council at the Prague NATO Summit

and the Copenhagen European Council.

In doing so, we sent a clear, firm and unequivocal message that we would rid the

world of the danger posed by Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction. We

must remain united in insisting that his regime be disarmed. The solidarity, cohesion and determination of the international community are our best hope of achieving this peacefully. Our strength lies in unity.

The combination of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism is a threat of incalculable consequences. It is one at which all of us should feel concerned. Resolution 1441 is Saddam Hussein’s last chance to disarm using peaceful means. The opportunity to avoid greater confrontation rests with him. Sadly this week the U.N.

weapons inspectors have confirmed that his long-established pattern of deception,

denial and non-compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions is continuing.

Europe has no quarrel with the Iraqi people. Indeed, they are the first victims

of Iraq’s current brutal regime. Our goal is to safeguard world peace and security

by ensuring that this regime gives up its weapons of mass destruction. Our governments have a common responsibility to face this threat. Failure to do so would be

nothing less than negligent to our own citizens and to the wider world.

The U.N. Charter charges the Security Council with the task of preserving international peace and security. To do so, the Security Council must maintain its credibility by ensuring full compliance with its resolution. We cannot allow a dictator to

systematically violate those resolutions. If they are not complied with, the Security

Council will lose its credibility and world peace will suffer as a result. We are confident that the Security Council will face up to its responsibilities.

Messrs. Aznar, Durao Barroso, Berlusconi, Blair, Medgyessy, Miller and Fogh Rasmussen are, respectively, the Prime Ministers of Spain, Portugal, Italy, the UK, Hungary, Poland and Denmark Mr. Havel is the Czech President

The CHAIRMAN. And Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

I want to pick up on something that Senator Biden said a couple

of hours ago in which he talked about ‘‘nation building.’’ I went to

Bosnia to have dinner, Thanksgiving dinner, with our troops, specifically for the reason, not only to give them the ‘‘atta boys’’ that

they certainly deserve, but to understand what—folks thought that

we were going to be in Bosnia for a year, and we are there now

in the 7th year—nation building is going to be required in Afghanistan and in the aftermath of Iraq and wherever else we happen to

have to confront terrorism where there is not a stable political and

stable economic environment.

And so I would just inject this thought, and that is why I wanted

to come back to the committee. What I found in Bosnia, I was both

pleased and, at the same time, a little concerned, because it is the

67

National Guard that is performing the military duties—in this particular case, on Thanksgiving, it was a National Guard unit from

Pennsylvania. And they are there for a 6-month tour of duty.

Now, these are people that pick up from a civilian life, they leave

their employer or their own place of business and go to defend the

interests of the United States—in this particular case, Bosnia, very

important, keeping those people from slaughtering each other as

we try to implant some sense of rule of law, and hopefully it will

be successful.

Here is what concerned me, was the fact that as long as they

were there for 6 months, they are doing the mission well. But if

that 6 months suddenly got extended to a year, and then, they are

ready to come home and suddenly they are diverted to Iraq instead

of coming home, what we have got to do, as a matter of policy, is

decide—can we rely—is it fair to rely on the Guard and the Reserves, who have the expectations of a limited time of active-duty

service, or do we need, instead, to increase the active-duty military

to take over this nation building that Senator Biden was talking

about? And we are going to be confronted with this.

Now, let me tell you, a year ago, the military chiefs asked for an

increase of 60,000 active duty forces. That has since been erased

from the agenda because the administration is saying, ‘‘No, well,

we don’t need that.’’ And what I want to raise to you all and invite

any of your comments as we get around to this serious question of

nation building in many nations, Do we not have to face the fact

that we are going to have to do this with active duty and not with

calling on the Guard and the Reserves? And particularly for the

specialties that are needed, many of which are only found in the

Guard and the Reserves today.

I invite your comments.

Mr. ARMITAGE. Well, it is with great trepidation, because my reputation is already mud in the Pentagon so I will, sort of, try to

weave my way through there.

I saw Secretary Rumsfeld indicating his own dissatisfaction with

the high OPTEMPO for the Reserves, the Guard, and, as you correctly, suggest, Senator, people who come on to do their duty and

their job, but not forever, not to be away from their civilian employers, et cetera. And he is—I am sure he is looking at that, and he

is expressing a great deal of dissatisfaction with it, and we will see

how he wants to proceed.

On the question of nation building, which the chairman is going

to have a hearing on on Iraq—excuse me—well, on Iraq and Afghanistan—there are a lot of things we have to do differently. And

after the pointed-edge-of-the-spear work is done if military action

is called on, we have got to do a lot better and learn the lessons

of Bosnia, whether it is to get retired police officers and others to

fall in and do more of the job or some other way of doing business.

Now, Secretary Rumsfeld went to Chile recently and had what

I thought was an excellent suggestion, that you start, sort of, a— almost a carbonieri school in Chile for that hemisphere. I spoke

with the Deputy Foreign Minister of Argentina about it yesterday,

to actually train carbonieri, which are the people needed now in

the Bosnia region. We have got the Italians in there quite heavily,

the Spanish are in there, but they do not have many of those types

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of people. So there are a lot of things that we have to do differently,

and the international community has to do differently, as we move

forward.

Nobody, I think, has anything but a deep gratitude for the sacrifice of the Guard and the Reserves.

Senator NELSON. Mr. Ambassador, any comment?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. No, thank you.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.

Senator Chafee.

Senator CHAFEE. The hours are going on here, and I will be very

brief.

First of all, thank you for your generous use of your time in coming here. You have been very generous, and I appreciate it very

much.

And I would just comment that it seems that after the breakup

of the Berlin Wall, the United States is finding itself at the top of

the heap, and with that comes a lot of responsibility and a lot of

risk, also.

I asked the question recently in the office, ‘‘Who is second to us

militarily,’’ and everybody had a different answer. But there really

is no second. Someone said the U.K. or—who is second? There is

almost—there is no second. And so with this position we have, so

vastly superior, whether—however you might judge it, in battleships or submarines or men and women, fighting forces, jets, bombers, whatever, however you might judge it, we are vastly, vastly superior.

And I think the—our threat, as we look at the world, is going to

come from rogue nations and from terrorists. And our best hope,

as we look ahead decades from now, is to confront this threat

under the umbrella of all the civilized countries working together.

And there is a lot of justifiable criticism of the United Nations.

But now, more than ever, I think we have to work through our

good Ambassador to empower the United Nations and to listen to

them more carefully. And we are going now into a new set of inspection rules. They are different from the old rules. They are

much more strict. And they have not really been given the time to

work, I do not think. And I think many of the other civilized countries are saying the same thing, let the new inspections, much,

much stricter than the old inspection rules, work.

And as we look ahead to the—for the future in the decades to

come, our best hope from these various threats, wherever it might

be around the world, many hot spots, is under the—working together with our allies. And I think we have slowly—with our somewhat arrogant position as top of the heap—alienated some of our

friends. And all the more reason for us to go back to the Security

Council and to seek their approval as we go forward.

But once again, thank you for your time.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.

Senator Boxer.

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Again,

thanks to our witnesses.

69

And I have found this to be extremely interesting, and I hope

that you will take back some of our comments, whether you agree

with them or not, and synthesize them for the Secretary. I think

it would be really wonderful if you would do that.

I want to pick up on Senator Biden’s point about the difference

as he sees it. I see it a little differently, but I share—one of the

main differences is a question of timing. You admitted that. And

some of us believe that to have the time to buildup the type of coalition we had in the gulf war would be well worth it.

I would like to put in the record the coalition we had, it was 50 nations. They picked up $54 billion of the $61 billion of incremental

costs. I would like to put into the record the coalition we had at

that time.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be put in the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS [EXCERPT FROM]

CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

Pursuant to Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and

Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102–25)

April 1992—For Those Who Were There

INITIAL WORLD RESPONSE

The international coalition that opposed Saddam’s wrongful invasion was put together almost as swiftly, largely through the President’s decisive leadership that focused the international consensus against the aggression and galvanized the nations

of the world to act promptly and forcefully. The United States played a leading role

not only in opposing the invasion, but also in bringing together and maintaining

this unprecedented effort.

From the outset of the Gulf crisis, it was clear that American leadership was

needed. The United States was willing to assume the leading role both politically

and militarily, but did not want to be alone. America’s allies and friends understood

that. They joined the United States in the United Nations. They joined American

forces in the Gulf with soldiers, planes, ships, and equipment. They provided financial assistance to front-line states and helped with the United States’ incremental

costs. What was accomplished in terms of responsibility sharing was unprecedented.

Nearly 50 countries made a contribution. Among those, 38 countries deployed air,

sea, or ground forces. Together, they committed more than 200,000 troops, more

than 60 warships, 750 aircraft, and 1,200 tanks. They came from all parts of the

world, including Arab and Islamic countries. Their troops fought side by side with

American forces. They faced danger and mourned casualties as did the United

States. But they remained firmly committed to the Coalition.

Many countries contributed financially. They gave billions in cash to the United

States, and provided valuable in-kind assistance, including construction equipment,

computers, heavy equipment transporters, chemical detection vehicles, food, fuel,

water, airlift, and sealift. They also gave billions in economic aid to countries most

affected by the crisis.

Perhaps most remarkable was the amount of support provided by Coalition members to cover U.S. incremental costs for the war. The contributions of U.S. allies

would rank, by a considerable margin, as the world’s third largest defense budget,

after that of the United States and the former Soviet Union. Few would have imagined this level of participation.

U.S. allies provided $54 billion against the estimated $61 billion of incremental

costs. Roughly two-thirds of these commitments were from the Gulf states directly

threatened by Iraq, with the other one-third largely coming from Japan and Germany.

Senator BOXER. And the importance of the point that Senator

Biden made on it—I look at it, in addition to that, another difference that some of us have—not a majority, but I would say—I

70

bet a majority of the American people—and that is that we are putting in the administration so much of our power and our influence

and our talent to make the case for a military solution here, rather

than take that talent and that persuasion and so on and put it behind a robust, very workable inspection regime. And I think that

that is the nub of the problem of a lot of my constituents and, I

think, a lot of the people in our own country, and, I dare say, a

lot of people in the world.

And I do not expect you to have this, but I have a list of what

the inspectors achieved in the disarmament process in the last— right after the last war. And I am going to quickly run through it,

Mr. Chairman. I think it is instructive.

They destroyed the following, according to UNSCOM—48 operational long-range missiles, 14 conventional missile warheads, six

operational mobile launchers—and there will not be a test on

this—28 operational fixed launch pads, 32 fixed launch pads under

construction at the time, 30 missile chemical warheads, other missile support equipment and material, supervision of the destruction

of a variety of assembled and non-assembled super-gun components; in the chemical area, 38,537 filled and empty chemical munitions, 690 tons of chemical weapons agent, more than 3,000 tons

of precursor chemicals, 426 pieces of chemical weapons production

equipment, 91 pieces of related analytical instruments; and, in the

biological area, the entire al-Hakka, the main biological weapons

production facility, and a variety of biological weapons production

equipment and material.

The reason I take the time to read it is, that is no small feat.

That is more than was destroyed by our bombs. And we had a lot

of bombs going out there. So knowing that, and knowing, as I believe Senator Chafee said, if I am not—if I misquoted you—that it

is ever a stronger inspection regime now—I believe you said that— and that the whole world is watching, now more than ever, I would

like to see us put more of our influence and power behind that. And

I think if we were to do that—see, I think it is a winner for us,

because then if Iraq puts up her back and Saddam says, ‘‘Uh, no,

I’m not cooperating. This is a hoax, this is a fraud, and all of that,’’

the world will see it. And that is the way you take the high ground.

So this is a difference that I see, personally. And as I look at the

comments of Secretary Powell 3 weeks ago, quoted in the Washington Post, that the inspection regime was in its infancy, he said,

‘‘The inspectors are really now starting to gain momentum’’—3

weeks ago, Secretary Armitage, you said it—in part because the

United States had just begun to provide the intelligence. And that

gets to Senator Sarbanes’ points and others.

And I am flabbergasted that Ambassador Negroponte does not

really know how much we have given them of what we have. I

think you should be told that. You are our guy on the firing line.

You need to know, out of all the intelligence we have had, how

much has been turned over.

Now, we know Hans Blix says he is opening a new office, he is

training additional inspectors. ElBaradei said continuing inspections would be a valuable investment in peace, because it could

help us avoid a war. General Norman Schwarzkopf, who led the allies during the Persian Gulf War, has been quoted as saying, ‘‘It’s

71

important for us to wait and see what the inspectors come up

with,’’ and hopefully they will come up with something conclusive.

So, you know, I feel compelled to put this out there, because I

think that the reason there is a split in American public opinion— and let me tell you, should we go to war, there will not be any

split. There is no doubt in my mind. That is how we are. We are

going to pull together. We are going to do everything to make it

work with the least possible loss of life, both here and in innocent

civilians. I am convinced of that. That is why when I heard of the

possible first-use of nuclear weapons, I could not believe it, and I

hope that that is not on the table.

I want you to take back the word that, you know, you—we could

do this really right. We could have the kind of coalition Senator

Biden referred to. We can have the costs defrayed. And for the

record, I hope you would give us how many dollars people have

agreed to put forward.

And there is a report that came to us after the gulf war from the

Department of Defense saying how the contributions were so important in softening the economic blow of the war. And this is an

important consideration.

So I guess I have said my peace. I hope that it did not fall on

deaf ears. I hope that we will be briefed by Colin Powell as to why

he has changed his mind on this. Before, he wanted more inspections; now he says he has joined with others in saying, you know,

‘‘Time’s up.’’ It seems like a very rapid change of heart to me. I

am—I want to know why, and I hope you will convey our thoughts.

And we are all one nation. We are praying for a good ending

here, and I hope you will send the words back.

Thank you.

Mr. ARMITAGE. Senator, thank you very much.

The reason I indicated that I had seen your statement on the

27th of January was to try to make the point that you ended—you

began and ended with, and that is, to carry the message back. Both

as a matter of having the relationship we have with this committee

and as our duty, we have to carry these back to the Secretary and

beyond. So have no fear. Whether we agree or not, that is quite different, but the message gets carried, No. 1.

No. 2, I am one of those who—I do not want to be graded on my

biblical reference and my memory of the exact biblical citation, but

I am one who grew up with the words of Isaiah, and I think it is

2:8, in my ears, and that was where the question is asked, ‘‘Who

shall go—who shall we send, and who will go for us?’’ And the answer is, ‘‘Here I am. Send me.’’ I think there is, for better or for worse, a certain amount of that

about the United States. For a lot of reasons, we are who and what

we are. And in a very real way, it is, ‘‘Who will go for us?’’ ‘‘Here

I am. Send me.’’ It is usually referred to in the military context,

but I think as a nation. Now, how we go is a serious question.

And finally, on the question of how much good was accomplished

by the inspectors, you are right, I cannot gainsay it. And it was at

a time when the smell of cordite was still in the nostrils of the

Iraqis, and their ears were still ringing from those bombs we expended. And in the 12 years since then, I think they have—some

in the leadership have come to a different conclusion, that there

72

are not any more teeth in the international community. So I think

that is why we may have a difference of opinion about the timing— how much time to give.

But I certainly would not dispute any of the comments or the accomplishments that you outlined.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Would you indulge me for about three more minutes?

The CHAIRMAN. Of course.

Senator BIDEN. When we passed the resolution which you and I

and others helped craft here, giving the President the authority,

there was a requirement that the President submit a report. And

the report was—granted, it was a month late, but we got the report—and it was supposed to lay out what other military assistance, what other economic assistance, et cetera, that we expect

from other countries.

This is—I am going to submit a couple of questions on that, if

I may, Mr. Secretary, because I think it is a—it is not a complete

report, and you may not be able to give a complete report yet.

But what I would like to have described here is a little bit about

the—what was required in the report is the steps we are taking to

encourage others to contribute to this initial fund, and that is,

afterwards, and a few other questions, which is following on from

what Senator Boxer raised about the previous report. Under the

law, under the resolution, we need that report.

Second, we would also like to know, which will be the subject of

another hearing, is what the game plan is, to the extent there is

one, after and if—if there is a war and after the war.

The third point I would like to make is that I—this may be a

simple answer—I am revealing my ignorance here; maybe you

know off the top of your head, Mr. Ambassador—but Hans Blix’ report indicated that there were a number of illegal actions that were

uncovered, including possession of those 122 chemical rockets, possession of laboratories, a laboratory and some mustard gas, development of liquid-fuel missiles, et cetera. Is he authorized, under

1441, to destroy—confiscate and destroy that material? And if he

is, are these illegal things within the control now of UNSCOM?

Can you tell us that?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. He is authorized to destroy those materials under 1441 and preceding resolutions all the way back to

687, provided he makes a determination that they are—this is Blix’

position—that they are related to WMD programs and they are not

simply illegal arms imports. That even though they are illegal, they

are not WMD. And he——

Senator BIDEN. I see——

Ambassador NEGROPONTE [continuing]. And that is the determination he said he was going to be making within the next couple

of weeks—— Senator BIDEN. I see.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE [continuing]. With respect to those

items.

Senator BIDEN. Well, I would hope that, no matter what we do,

we could get maybe some clarification or amendment to that, beVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:32 Jun 10, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 85796 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
73

cause the idea that we are unable to destroy what he is not legally

able to do under previous resolutions, I think, is—— Ambassador NEGROPONTE [continuing]. We have been arguing

that that is what—— Senator BIDEN. Great.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE [continuing]. What should be done.

Senator BIDEN. And the last point I will make is that I agree

with you, Mr. Secretary about—you just talked about Chile. Bob

Dole and I, 7 years ago, when we put in authorizing language and

follow-on to Bosnia, proposed to, and suggested to the Defense Department how to develop that. It is clear to me, it is clear to me

it is the only alternative to boots on the ground with warriors

there.

And the last point I say to my friend from Rhode Island. I appreciate his observation about our power, relative to the rest of the

world. I may be mistaken, but I do not think I am. Our military

budget is larger than the next 15 nations combined, from the second most powerful military to the 15th most powerful. You add up

their—and I am not suggesting it should not be, but just to put it

in perspective—add up every other nation, including all our NATO

allies, all of them combined, China—you add them all up, 15, whatever they—the top 15 are, our budget is larger than all 15 combined, which I think argues for the fact that they have to take on

more responsibility, not that we should cut our budget.

But at any rate, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the witnesses very much for their indulgence.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden.

Let me mention that Senator Sununu has submitted a statement

for the record, and without objection, it will be included.

[The prepared statement of Senator Sununu follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN E. SUNUNU

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank both you and Senator Biden for holding this important hearing today and to congratulate both of you for assuming your respective

leadership positions on the committee. I would also like to acknowledge the rest of

my colleagues and tell all of you how honored I am to be serving on this committee

during these critical times. I look forward very much to working with each of you.

I have just returned from a meeting hosted this morning by Secretary of State

Colin Powell with the freshmen Senators. There, Secretary Powell, Deputy Secretary Armitage and several other senior State Department officials offered us their

thoughts and the administration’s objectives on an array of issues including the very

pressing one that brings us here this morning.

We are grateful to Deputy Secretary Armitage and Ambassador Negroponte for

coming before us today to provide us with their assessment of the reports made earlier this week by the United Nations weapons inspection team, UNMOVIC, and the

International Atomic Energy Agency to the United Nations Security Council.

UNMOVIC and the IAEA were authorized by the Security Council to monitor and

enforce Security Council Resolution 1441 and other numerous UN resolutions concerning Iraq that have been passed over the last 12 years and are still operable.

In his State of the Union Address, the President catalogued the thousands of liters of anthrax and other biological and chemical weapons that were identified as

existing in Iraq during the 1990’s—agents that Iraq has failed either to produce or

to show evidence that they have been destroyed. And, Dr. Hans Blix, Executive

Chairman of UNMOVIC, reported to the Security Council on Monday that there has

not been substantive cooperation with the efforts of the inspectors to certify that

Iraq has fully disclosed their weapons of mass destruction or can provide concrete

evidence of their destruction.

Contrary to the claims made by critics of the administration’s policy, the real

issue here is not whether the weapons inspectors have located any weapons of mass

destruction but whether Saddam Hussein has provided an accurate accounting of

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Iraq’s WMDs and whether he is committed to disarming. The burden does not lie

with UNMOVIC and IAEA to locate WMDs and demonstrate that Saddam Hussein

intends to use them to terrorize his neighbors. The UN Security Council has repeatedly—over twelve years and now through 17 resolutions—concluded that Iraq is already in possession of WMDs or at least attempting to procure WMDs, and that

Iraq’s track record under Saddam Hussein’s rule demonstrates that it is imperative

that the threat posed by Iraq’s WMDs must be eliminated.

The burden of proof is directly on Saddam Hussein’s shoulders: he must fully disclose his weapons and he must commit to destroying them. That is what the UN

Security Council requires—nothing more, nothing less. UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors were not sent to Iraq for the purpose of engaging in an open-ended search for

weapons. Iraq was required under Resolution 1441 to disclose all of its weapons before December 8, 2002, and the weapons inspectors were responsible for using the

information provided by Iraq in the December 8th declaration to verify that Iraq’s claims were truthful and complete and that the weapons would be taken from Iraq’s possession and destroyed.

Therefore, it is not surprising that perhaps the most damning aspect of Hans

Blix’s report is his assessment that there is no indication that Iraq has even begun

to accept the idea of disarmament let alone provide cooperation of substance such

as allowing independent interviews of Iraqi scientists or allowing requested surveillance flights.

Contrast Iraq’s behavior with that of South Africa or some of the former Soviet

Republics which at one time possessed nuclear weapons. In his report to the Security Council on Monday, Dr. Blix described how South Africa ‘‘welcomed inspection

as a means of creating confidence in its disarmament.’’ And the chairman is probably more knowledgeable than anyone in the room today about the dramatic and

bold steps taken by all sides in securing disarmament of those former Soviet Republics who sought to rid themselves of nuclear weapons. This is the precedent Iraq

should be expected to follow, and it is the one mandated under the resolutions the

UN has passed since 1991.

That is why the Security Council to date has been so forceful and insistent on

compliance by Iraq with the commitments made at the end of the gulf war. Eliminating the threat that Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction pose is a world problem—

not just a problem for the United States. The Security Council has demonstrated

that it understands this proposition, and if it is required to revisit this matter by

means of an additional resolution on Iraq, I am confident that the President, along

with his very effective diplomatic team, can convince the Security Council to continue to stand firm and demand Iraq’s disarmament.

I look forward to hearing Secretary Armitage’s and Ambassador Negroponte’s testimony, and I look forward to a candid discussion during the question period.

Thanks again to both of you for coming here today. And thanks again to Chairman

Lugar and Senator Biden for giving us all this opportunity to examine this urgent

and sensitive matter.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, let me just conclude by commenting that

clearly many members of the committee have argued today that

the obligation is not on the inspectors, but on the Iraqis. On the

other hand, we have heard a great deal of testimony, and in the

question-answer session from Senators today, that constituents are

deeply interested in the whole inspection process—who the inspectors are, is the regime getting better, is it large enough, what have

they achieved in the past, other questions of this sort.

This may seem like a tangent that is not worth the exploration,

but I think it is, and it is probably obvious to both of you that

much more probably needs to be written officially about the record.

Now, when that happens, I just have these two observations.

Ralph Ekeus, a very distinguished inspector from UNSCOM in another regime, has pointed out that many of the successes Senator

Boxer mentioned in the destruction of these weapons and materials

of mass destruction came after the fortuitous departure of the sonin-law of Saddam Hussein to Jordan. Now, he really did know

where things were. This was not just simply a scientist at a particular laboratory or other people we would like to interview. He

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had a pretty comprehensive view of the whole subject. And remarkably, he did detail to the inspectors of that day where a lot was,

and they promptly regained entry and destroyed it, a magnificent

amount. Now, even then, they did not know what percentage they

had, or how much else was left. Clearly, a remarkable record,

which, as Senator Boxer has said, is more than our bombs have

achieved. But we did not know often, when we were bombing,

where things were either.

Back to the inspector problem. If you have direction, if another

relative of the family leaves, conceivably there could be spectacular

results within a short period of time. Now, absent that, I am told

that 75 percent of the inspecting team are people who have had no

experience in Iraq before. That is unfortunate. Further, many of

them did not arrive for several weeks.

Even given the gravity of all that was involved in the U.N. resolution, the fact is that the U.N. inspection community did not act

particularly swiftly or aggressively in the views of many who are

spending a lot of time looking at inspectors and examining the inspection.

Many more inspectors are there now. They are getting their

ground legs. They go out each day to eight or nine places, as directed, and do baseline work. This is what the inspectors call it,

‘‘baseline’’—same thing they have done before, last time, time before—just to check to see if anything has changed. But these are

hardly breakthrough situations and unlikely to be, without, in fact,

somebody telling us where the mobile van went and where it is

today.

I note this tediously because I think you must go through it tediously. There is somehow a myth out in the country that inspection, per se, even over many weeks and months under these circumstances, might disarm Iraq. Up to the moment, there is not any

evidence, in my judgment, that that could slightly be the case, even

remotely and in a century. However, if Saddam Hussein—and

using Chairman Biden’s terminology—really sees what the issue is,

this disarmament process, that he is surrounded, we are intent, the

President has the will to go with a coalition of the willing, maybe

Saddam will change his mind. Maybe he will not. But that is the

critical factor. Or some member of his family might change his or

her mind.

Any of the above would be extremely useful, and we pray that

some breakthrough will occur for the benefit of all us, as well as

the world.

But we thank both of you very much for devoting this time. We

are still in the same calendar day that we began. And you have

been very patient and stalwart, and we thank you, and we look forward to seeing you again, Secretary Armitage, very soon.

The committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:25 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to

the call of the Chair.]

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ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

THE SECURITY COUNCIL, 27 JANUARY 2003: AN UPDATE ON INSPECTION

EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN OF UNMOVIC, DR. HANS BLIX

The governing Security Council resolutions

The resolution adopted by the Security Council on Iraq in November last year

asks UNMOVIC and the IAEA to ‘‘update’’ the Council 60 days after the resumption

of inspections. This is today. The updating, it seems, forms part of an assessment

by the Council and its Members of the results, so far, of the inspections and of their

role as a means to achieve verifiable disarmament in Iraq.

As this is an open meeting of the Council, it may be appropriate briefly to provide

some background for a better understanding of where we stand today. With your

permission, I shall do so.

I begin by recalling that inspections as a part of a disarmament process in Iraq

started in 1991, immediately after the Gulf War. They went on for eight years until

December 1998, when inspectors were withdrawn. Thereafter, for nearly four years

there were no inspections. They were resumed only at the end of November last

year.

While the fundamental aim of inspections in Iraq has always been to verify disarmament, the successive resolutions adopted by the Council over the years have varied somewhat in emphasis and approach.

In 1991, resolution 687 (1991), adopted unanimously as a part of the cease-fire

after the Gulf War, had five major elements. The three first related to disarmament.

They called for

• declarations by Iraq of its programmes of weapons of mass destruction and long

range missiles;

• verification of the declarations through UNSCOM and the IAEA;

• supervision by these organizations of the destruction or the elimination of proscribed items and programmes.

After the completion of the disarmament

• the Council would have authority to proceed to a lifting of the sanctions (economic restrictions); and

• the inspecting organizations could move to long-term ongoing monitoring and

verification.

Resolution 687 (1991), like the subsequent resolutions I shall refer to, required

cooperation by Iraq but such was often withheld or given grudgingly. Unlike South

Africa, which decided on its own to eliminate its nuclear weapons and welcomed inspection as a means of creating confidence in its disarmament, Iraq appears not to

have come to a genuine acceptance—not even today—of the disarmament, which

was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the

world and to live in peace.

As we know, the twin operation ‘‘declare and verify’’, which was prescribed in resolution 687 (1991), too often turned into a game of ‘‘hide and seek’’. Rather than

just verifying declarations and supporting evidence, the two inspecting organizations

found themselves engaged in efforts to map the weapons programmes and to search

for evidence through inspections, interviews, seminars, inquiries with suppliers and

intelligence organizations. As a result, the disarmament phase was not completed

in the short time expectecd. Sanctions remained and took a severe toll until Irag

accepted the Oil for Food Programme and the gradual development of that programme mitigated the effects of the sanctions.

The implementation of resolution 687 (1991) nevertheless brought about considerable disarmament results. It has been recognized that more weapons of mass destruction were destroyed under this resolution than were destroyed during the Gulf

War; large quantities of chemical weapons were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision before 1994. While Iraq claims—with little evidence—that it destroyed all biological weapons unilaterally in 1991, it is certain that UNSCOM destroyed large biological weapons production facilities in 1996. The large nuclear infrastructure was

destroyed and the fissionable material was removed from Iraq by the IAEA.

One of three important questions before us today is how much might remain

undeclared and intact from before 1991; and, possibly, thereafter; the second question is what, if anything, was illegally produced or procured after 1998, when the

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inspectors left; and the third question is how it can be prevented that any weapons

of mass destruction be produced or procured in the future.

In December 1999—after one year without inspections in Iraq—resolution 1284

(1999) was adopted by the Council with 4 abstentions. Supplementing the basic resolutions of 1991 and following years, it provided Iraq with a somewhat less ambitious approach: in return for ‘‘cooperation in all respects’’ for a specified period of

time, including progress in the resolution of ‘‘key remaining disannament tasks’’, it

opened the possibility, not for the lifting, but the suspension of sanctions.

For nearly three years, Iraq refused to accept any inspections by UNMOVIC. It

was only after appeals by the Secretary-General and Arab States and pressure by

the United States and other Member States, that Iraq declared on 16 September

last year that it would again accept inspections without conditions.

Resolution 1441 (2002) was adopted on 8 November last year and emphatically

reaffirmed the demand on Iraq to cooperate. It required this cooperation to be immediate, unconditional and active. The resolution contained many provisions, which we

welcome as enhancing and strengthening the inspection regime. The unanimity by

which it was adopted sent a powerful signal that the Council was of one mind in

creating a last opportunity for peaceful disarmament in Iraq through inspection.

UNMOVIC shares the sense of urgency felt by the Council to use inspection as

a path to attain, within a reasonable time, verifiable disarmament of Iraq. Under

the resolutions I have cited, it would be followed by monitoring for such time as the

Council feels would be required. The resolutions also point to a zone free of weapons

of mass destruction as the ultimate goal.

As a subsidiary body of the Council, UNMOVIC is fully aware of and appreciates

the close attention, which the Council devotes to the inspections in Iraq. While today’s ‘‘updating’’ is foreseen in resolution 1441 (2002), the Council can and does call

for additional briefings whenever it wishes. One was held on 19 January and a

futher such briefing is tentatively set for 14 February.

I turn now to the key requirement of cooperation and Iraq’s response to it. Cooperation might be said to relate to both substance and process. It would appear

from our experience so far that Iraq has decided in principle to provide cooperation

on process, notably access. A similar decision is indispensable to provide cooperation

on substance in order to bring the disarmament task to completion through the

peaceful process of inspection and to bring the monitoring task on a firm course.

An initial minor step would be to adopt the long-overdue legislation required by the

resolutions.

I shall deal first with cooperation on process.

Cooperation on process

It has regard to the procedures, mechanisms, infrastructure and practical arrangements to pursue inspections and seek verifiable disarmament. While inspection is not built on the premise of confidence but may lead to confidence if it is successful, there must nevertheless be a measure of mutual confidence from the very

beginning in running the operation of inspection.

Iraq has on the whole cooperated rather well so far with UNMOVIC in this field.

The most important point to make is that access has been provided to all sites we

have wanted to inspect and with one exception it has been prompt. We have further

had great help in building up the infrastucture of our office in Baghdad and the

field office in Mosul. Arrangements and services for our plane and our helicopters

have been good. The environment has been workable.

Our inspections have included universities, military bases, presidential sites aqd

private residences. Inspections have also taken place on Fridays, the Muslim day

of rest, on Christmas day and New Years day. These inspections have been conducted in the same manner as all other inspections. We seek to be both effective

and correct.

In this updating I am bound, however, to register some problems. Firstly, relating

to two kinds of air operations.

While we now have the technical capability to send a U–2 plane placed at our

disposal for aeriai imagery and for surveillance during inspections and have informed Iraq that we planned to do so, Iraq has refused to guarantee its safety, unless a number of conditions are fulfilled. As these conditions went beyond what is

stipulated in resolution 1441 (2002) and what was practiced by UNSCOM and Iraq

in the past, we note that Iraq is not so far complying with our request. I hope this

attitude will change.

Another air operation problem—which was solved during our recent talks in

Baghdad—concerned the use of helicopters flying into the no-fly zones. Iraq had insisted on sending helicopters of their own to accompany ours. This would have

raised a safety problem. The matter was solved by an offer on our part to take the

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accompanying Iraq minders in our helicopters to the sites, an arrangement that had

been practiced by UNSCOM in the past.

I am obliged to note some recent disturbing incidents and harassment. For instance, for some time farfetched allegations have been made publicly that questions

posed by inspectors were of intelligence character. While I might not defend every

question that inspectors might have asked, Iraq knows that they do not serve intelligence purposes and Iraq should not say so.

On a number of occasions, demonstrations have taken place in front of our offlces

and at inspection sites.

The other day, a sightseeing excursion by five inspectors to a mosque was followed

by an unwarranted public outburst. The inspectors went without any UN insignia

and were welcomed in the kind manner that is characteristic of the normal Iraqi

attitude to foreigners. They took off their shoes and were taken around. They asked

perfectly innocent questions and parted with the invitation to come again.

Shortly thereafter, we receive protests from the Iraqi authorities about an unannounced inspection and about questions not relevant to weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, they were not. Demonstrations and outbursts of this kind are unlikely

to occur in Iraq without initiative or encouagement from the authorities. We must

ask ourselves what the motives may be for these events. They do not facilitate an

already difficult job, in which we try to be effective, professional and, at the same

time, correct. Where our Iraqi counterparts have some complaint they can take it

up in a calmer and less unpleasant mariner.

Cooperation on substance

The substantive ooperation required relates above all to the obligation of Iraq to

declare all programmes of weapons of mass destruction and either to present items

and activities for elimination or else to provide evidence supporting the conclusion

that nothing proscribed remains.

Paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 (2002) states that this cooperation shall be ‘‘ac- tive’’. It is not enough to open doors. Inspection is not a game of ‘‘catch as catch can’’. Rather, as I noted, it is a process of verification for the purpose of creating

confidence. It is not built upon the premise of trust. Rather, it is designed to lead

to trust, if there is both openness to the inspectors and action to present them with

items to destroy or credible evidence about the absence of any such items.

The declaration of 7 December

On 7 December 2002, Iraq submitted a declaration of some 12,000 pages in response to paragraph 3 of resolution l441 (2002) and within the time stipulated by

the Security Council. In the flelds of missiles and biotechnology the declaration contains a good deal of new material and information covering the period from 1998

and onward. This is welcome.

One might have expected that in preparing the Declaration, Iraq would have tried

to respond to, clarify and submit supporting evidence regarding the many open disarmament issues, which the Iraqi side should be familiar with from the UNSCOM

document S/1999/94 of January 1999 and the so-called Amorim Report of March

1999 (S/1999/356). These are-questions which UNMOVIC, governments and independent commentators have often cited.

While UNMOVIC has been preparing its own list of current ‘‘unresolved disarmament issues’’ and ‘‘key remaining disarmament tasks’’ in response to requirements in resolution 1284 (1999), we find the issues listed in the two reports as unresolved, professionally justified. These reports do not contend that weapons of mass

destruction remain in Iraq, but nor do they exclude that possibility. They point to

lack of evidence and inconsistencies, which raise question marks, which must be

straightened out, if weapons dossiers are to be closed and confidence is to arise.

They deserve to be taken seriously by Iraq rather than being brushed aside as

evil machinations of UNSCOM. Regrettably, the 12,000 page declaration, most of

which is a reprint of earlier documents, does not seem to contain any new evidence

that would eliminate the questions or reduce their number. Even Iraq’s letter sent

in response to our recent discussions in Baghdad to the President of the Security

Council on 24 January does not lead us to the resolution of the issues.

I shall only give some examples of issues and questions that need to be answered

and I turn first to the sector of chemical weapons.

Chemical weapons

The nerve agent VX is one of the most toxic ever developed.

Iraq has declared that it only produced VX on a pilot scale, just a few tonnes and

that the quality was poor and the product unstable. Consequently, it was said, that

the agent was never weaponised. Iraq said that the small quantity of agent remaining after the Gulf War was unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991.

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UNMOVIC, however, has information that conflicts with this account. There are

indications that Iraq had worked on the problem of purity and stabilization and that

more had been achieved than has been declared. Indeed, even one of the documents

provided by Iraq indicates that the purity of the agent, at least in laboratory production, was higher than declared.

There are also indications that the agent was weaponised. In addition, there are

questions to be answered concerning the fate of the VX precursor chemicals, which

Iraq states were lost during bombing in the Gulf War or were unilaterally destroyed

by Iraq.

I would now like to turn to the so-called ‘‘Air Force document’’ that I have discussed with the Council before. This document was originally found by an UNSCOM

inspector in a safe in Iraqi Air Force Headquarters in 1998 and taken from her by

Iraqi minders. It gives an account of the expenditure of bombs, including chemical

bombs, by Iraq in the Iraq-Iran War. I am encouraged by the fact that Iraq has now

provided this document to UNMOVIC.

The document indicates that 13,000 chemical bombs were dropped by the Iraqi

Air Force between 1983 and 1988, while Iraq has declared that 19,500 bombs were

consumed during this period. Thus, there is a discrepancy of 6,500 bombs. The

amount of chemical agent in these bombs would be in the order of about 1,000

tonnes. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must assume that these quantities are now unaccounted for.

The discovery of a number of 122 mm chemical rocket warheads in a bunker at

a storage depot 170 km southwest of Baghdad was much publicized. This was a relatively new bunker and therefore the rockets must have been moved there in the

past few years, at a time when Iraq should not have had such munitions.

The investigation of these rockets is still proceeding. Iraq states that they were

overlooked from 1991 from a batch of some 2,000 that were stored there during the

Gulf War. That could be the case. They could also be the tip of a submerged iceberg.

The discovery of a few rockets does not resolve but rather points to the issue of several thousands of chemical rockets that are unaccounted for.

The finding of the rockets shows that Iraq needs to make more effort to ensure

that its declaration is cunently accurate. During my recent discussions in Baghdad,

Iraq declared that it would make new efforts in this regard and had set up a committee of investigation. Since then it has reported that it has found a further 4

chemical rockets at a storage depot in Al Taji.

I might further mention that inspectors have found at another site a laboratory

quantity of thiodiglycol, a mustard gas precursor.

Whilst I am addressing chemical issues, I should mention a matter, which I reported on 19 December 2002, concerning equipment at a civilian chemical plant at

Al Fallujah. Iraq has declared that it had repaired chemical processing equipment

previously destroyed under UNSCOM supervision, and had installed at Fallujah for

the production of chlorine and phenols. We have inspected this equipment and are

conducting a detailed technical evaluation of it. On completion, we will decide

whether this and other equipment that has been recovered by Iraq should be destroyed.

Biological weapons

I have mentioned the issue of anthrax to the Council on previous occasions and

I come back to it as it is an important one.

Iraq has declared that it produced about 8,500 litres of this biological warfare

agent, which it states it unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991. Iraq has provided little evidence for this production, and no convincing evidence for its destruction.

There are strong indications that Iraq produced more anthrax than it declared,

and that at least some of this was retained after the declared destruction date. It

might still exist. Either it should be found and be destroyed under UNMOVIC supervision or else convincing evidence should be produced to show that it was, indeed, destroyed in 1991.

As I reported to the Council on 19 December last year, Iraq did not declare a significant quantity, some 650 kg, of bacterial growth media, which was acknowledged

as imported in Iraq’s submission to the Amorim panel in February l999. As part of

its 7 December 2002 declaration, Iraq resubmitted the Amorim panel document, but

the table showing this particular import of media was not included. The absence of

this table would appear to be deliberate as the pages of the resubmitted document

were renumbered.

In the letter of 24 January to the President of the Council, Iraq’s Foreign Minister

stated that ‘‘all imported quantities of growth media were declared’’. This is not eviVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:32 Jun 10, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00083 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 85796 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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dence. I note that the quantity of media involved would suffice to produce, for example, about 5,000 litres of concentrated anthrax.

Missiles

I turn now to the missile sector. There remain significant questions as to whether

Iraq retained SCUD-type missiles after the Gulf War. Iraq declared the consumption of a number of SCUD missiles as targets in the development of an anti-ballistic

missile defence system during the 1980s. Yet no technical information has been produced about that programme or data on the consumption of the missiles.

There has been a range of developments in the missile field during the past four

years presented by Iraq as non-proscribed activities. We are trying to gather a clear

understanding of them through inspections and on-site discussions.

Two projects in particular stand out. They are the development of a liquid-fuelled

missile named the Al Samoud 2, and a solid propellant missile, called the Al Fatah.

Both missiles have been tested to a range in excess of the permitted range of 150

km, with the Al Samoud 2 being tested to a maximum of 183 km and the Al Fatah

to 161 km. Some of both types of missiles have already been provided to the Iraqi

Armed Forces even though it is stated that they are still undergoing development.

The Al Samoud’s diameter was increased from an earlier version to the present

760 mm. This modification was made despite a 1994 letter from the Executive

Chairman of UNSCOM directing Iraq to limit its missile diameters to less than 600

mm. Furthermore, a November 1997 letter from the Executive Chairman of

UNSCOM to Iraq prohibited the use of engines from certain surface-to-air missiles

for the use in ballistic missiles.

During my recent meeting in Baghdad, we were briefed on these two programmes.

We were told that the final range for both systems would be less than the permitted

maximum range of 150 km.

These missiles might very well represent prima facie cases of proscribed systems.

The test ranges in excess of 150 km are significant, but some further technical considerations need to be made, before we reach a conclusion on this issue. In the mean

time, we have asked Iraq to cease flight tests of both missiles.

In addition, Iraq has refurbished its missile production infrastucture. In particular, Iraq reconstituted a number of casting chambers, which had previously been

destoyed under UNSCOM supervision. They had been used in the production of

solid-fueled missiles. Whatever missile system these chambers are intended for, they

could produce motors for missiles capable of ranges significantly greater than 150

km.

Also associated with these missiles and related developments is the import, which

has been taking place during the last few years, of a number of items despite the

sanctions, including as late as December 2002. Foremost amongst these is the import of 380 rocket engines for the Al Samoud 2.

Iraq also declared the recent import of chemicals used in propellants, test instrumentation and, guidance and control systems. These items may well be for proscribed purposes. That is yet to be determined. What is clear is that they were illegally brought into Iraq, that is, Iraq or some company in Iraq, circumvented the restrictions imposed by various resolutions.

Mr. President,

I have touched upon some of the disarmament issues that remain open and that

need to be answered if dossiers are to be closed and confidence is to arise. Which

are the means at the disposal of Iraq to answer these questions? I have pointed to

some during my presentation of the issues. Let me be a little more systematic. Our

Iraqi counterparts are fond of saying that there are no proscribed items and if no

evidence is presented to the contrary they should have the benefit of the doubt, be

presumed innocent. UNMOVIC, for its part, is not presuming that there are proscribed items and activities in Iraq, but nor is it—or I think anyone else after the

inspections between 1991 and 1998—presuming the opposite, that no such items

and activities exist in Iraq. Presumptions do not solve the problem. Evidence and

full transparency may help. Let me be specific.

Find the items and activities

Information provided by Member States tells us about the movement and concealment of missiles and chemical weapons and mobile units for biological weapons production. We shall certainly follow up any credible leads given to us and report what

we might find as well as any denial of access.

So far we have reported on the recent find of a small number of empty 122 mm

warheads for chemical weapons. Iraq declared that it appointed a commission of inquiry to look for more. Fine. Why not extend the search to other items? Declare

what may be found and destroy it under our supervision?

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Find documents

When we have urged our Iraqi counterparts to present more evidence, we have

all too often met the response that there are no more documents. All existing relevant documents have been presented, we are told. All documents relating to the

biological weapons programmne were destroyed together with the weapons.

However, Iraq has all the archives of the Government and its various departments, institutions and mechanisms. It should have budgetary documents, requests

for funds and reports on how they have been used. It should also have letters of

credits and bills of lading, reports on production and losses of material.

In response to a recent UNMOVIC request for a number of specific documents,

the only new documents Iraq provided was a ledger of 193 pages which Iraq stated

included all imports from 1983 to 1990 by the Technical and Scientific Importation

Division, the importing authority for the biological weapons programme. Potentially,

it might help to clear some open issues.

The recent inspection finding in the private home of a scientist of a box of some

3,000 pages of documents, much of it relating to the laser enrichment of uranium

support a concern that has long existed that documents might be distributed to the

homes of private individuals. This interpretation is refuted by the Iraqi side, which

claims that research staff sometimes may bring home papers from their work places.

On our side, we cannot help but think that the case might not be isolated and that

such placements of documents is deliberate to make discovery difficult and to seek

to shield documents by placing them in private homes.

Any further sign of the concealment of documents would be serious. The Iraqi side

committed itself at our recent talks to encourage persons to accept access also to

private sites. There can be no sanctuaries for proscribed items, activities or documents. A denial of prompt access to any site would be a very serious matter.

Find persons to give credible information: a list of personnel

When Iraq claims that tangible evidence in the form of documents is not available, it ought at least to find individuals, engineers, scientists and managers to testify about their experience. Large weapons programmes are moved and managed by

people. Interviews with individuals who may have worked in programmes in the

past may fill blank spots in our knowledge and understanding. It could also be useful to learn that they are now employed in peaceful sectors. These were the reasons

why UNMOVIC asked for a list of such persons, in accordance with resolution 1441.

Some 400 names for all biological and chemical weapons programmes as well as

their missile programmes were provided by the Iraqi side. This can be compared to

over 3500 names of people associated with those past weapons programmes that

UNSCOM either interviewed in the 1990s or knew from documents and other

sources. At my recent meeting in Baghdad, the Iraqi side committed itself to

supplementing the list and some 80 additional names have been provided.

Allow information through credible interviews

In the past, much valuable information came from interviews. There were also

cases in which the interviewee was clearly intimidated by the presence of and interruption by Iraqi officials. This was the background of resolution 1441’s provision for

a right for UNMOVIC and the IAFA to hold private interviews ‘‘in the mode or location’’ of our choice, in Baghdad or even abroad.

To date, 11 individuals were asked for interviews in Baghdad. The replies have

invariably been that the individual will only speak at Iraq’s monitoring directorate

or, at any rate, in the presence of an Iraqi official. This could be due to a wish on

the part of the invited to have evidence that they have not said anything that the

authorities did not wish them to say. At our recent talks in Baghdad, the Iraqi side

committed itself to encourage persons to accept interviews ‘‘in private’’, that is to

say alone with us. Despite this, the pattern has not changed. However, we hope that

with further encouragement from the authorities, knowledgeable individuals will accept private interviews, in Baghdad or abroad.

UNMOVIC’s capability

Mr. President, I must not conclude this ‘‘update’’ without some notes on the growing capability of UNMOVIC.

In the past two months: UNMOVIC has built-up its capabilities in Iraq from nothing to 260 staff members from 60 countries. This includes approximately 100

UNMOVIC inspectors, 60 air operations staff, as well as security personnel, communications, translation and interpretation staff, medical support, and other services

at our Baghdad office and Mosul field offce. All serve the United Nations and report

to no one else. Furthermore, our roster of inspectors will continue to grow as our

training programme continues—even at this moment we have a training course in

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session in Vienna. At the end of that course, we shall have a roster of about 350

qualified experts from which to draw inspectors.

A team supplied by the Swiss Government is refurbishing our offices in Baghdad,

which had been empty for four years. The Government of New Zealand has contributed both a medical team and a communications team. The German Government

will contribute unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance and a group of specialists

to operate them for us within Iraq. All these contributions have been of assistance

in quickly starting up our inspections and enhancing our capabilities. So has help

from the UN in New York and from sister organizations in Baghdad.

In the past two months during which we have built-up our presence in Iraq, we

have conducted about 300 inspections to more than 230 different sites. Of these,

more than 20 were sites that had not been inspected before. By the end of December, UNMOVIC began using helicopters both for the transport of inspectors and for

actual inspection work. We now have eight helicopters. They have already proved

invaluable in helping to ‘‘freeze’’ large sites by observing the movement of traffic in

and around the area.

Setting up a field office in Mosul has facilitated rapid inspections of sites in northern Iraq. We plan to establish soon a second field office in the Basra area, where

we have already inspected a number of sites.

Mr. President,

We have now an inspection apparatus that permits us to send multiple inspection

teams every day all over Iraq, by road or by air. Let me end by simply noting that

that capability which has been built-up in a short time and which is now operating,

is at the disposal of the Security Council.

Æ