### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-16-00093- CR

Jam es Lee K nigh t, Appellant

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F TO M GREEN CO UNTY, 119 TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. B -15 -02 07- SA, H ONO RAB LE JAY K . WEATH ERB Y , JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

A jury found appellant J ames L ee Knig ht g uilty of possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, with i n t en t t o d eliver, in an amount of four g rams or more but less than 200 g rams. See Tex. Hea lth & Safety Code § 481.112(a) , (d). The trial co u rt assessed punishment a t 10 y ear s’ imprisonment, probated f or 10 y ear s. I n two issues, Knig ht c ontends that the evidenc e is insufficient to support his conviction. We will aff irm t h e t ri al co urt’s judgme nt of convic tion.

BACK GR OUND 1

Offic ers with the Tom Green C o u n ty Sheriff’ s Offic e, throug h a cooper ating individual, arr anged to purcha se an ounce of methamphetamine. The cooper ating individual told

The fac ts rec ited in this opinion are taken from the testimony and other evidenc e prese nted 1 at trial.office rs that he could obtain the drug s throug h Virg inia L ar a. L ar a, in turn, arr ang ed to purcha se

the methampheta

mine in a par

king lot in San Ang elo from Cort Ha rris (or Har rison). Offic ers wa i t i ng at the parking lot observe d a truck arr ive “at a very high rate of speed” and par

k. L ara g ot in the truck, and se vera l minutes passed. Offic ers then approa ched the vehicle and arr ested its occupa nts. Har ris was in the driver’ s seat, Knig ht was in the front passeng er seat, and L ara was in the rea r passeng er seat. The office rs found a cig are tte pack containing about 28 g rams (or one ounce) of methamphetamine i n t h e d river’ s seat and a g lass pipe in the cente r console. When arr ested, Knig ht w as we aring g loves with hard c omposite knuckles on both hands and metal knuckles undernea th the gl o v e o f h i s rig ht hand. Knig ht also had $1,345 in cash in his pocket. Knig ht was later char g ed with possession of a c ontrolled substance with intent to deliver

. He wa s tried, found g

uilty , and sente nced, a

nd this appeal followe d.

STANDARD OF REVIEW I n revie wing the s ufficie ncy of t he evidence to s u p p ort a conviction, we determine whether a rational trier of fac t could have found that the essential elements of the crime wer e proven bey ond a rea sonable doubt. Brooks v. State , 323 S.W .3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). I n making this de termination, we consider all evidenc e that the trie r of f act wa s permitted to

c o n s id e r , r e g a

r d le s s o f w h e th e r it w a s r ig h tl y o r w r o n g ly a d

mi tt e d

. Cl

a y to n v . S ta te , 2 3 5 S. W. 3 d 7 7 2 , 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Allen v. State , 249 S.W .3d 680, 688–89 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.). We view this evidenc e in the light most favor able to the verdic t. Clayton , 235 S.W .3d at 778. The jury , as the trier of fac t, is the sole judge of the cre dibilit y of t h e wi t nesses and the weig ht to be g iven to their testimony

. Id. The jury may choose to believe all, some, or none of the witnesses

2at tr i al

. Chambers v. State , 805 S.W .2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); W alker v. State , No. 03-14-00473- CR, 2016 WL 2 9 4 2398, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin May 10, 2016, pet. ref ’d) (mem. op., not desig nated for publ ication). There fore , we presume that the jury resolved any conflicting infere nces and issues of cre dibilit y in favor of the verdic t. Nowli n v. S t a te , 473 S.W .3d 312, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); W alker , 2016 WL 2942398, at *5.

DISCUSSIO N I n two issues, Knig ht contends that the evidenc e is insu fficient to support his

co n v i ct i on beca

use the evidenc e does not support the conclusion that he knew the quanti t y o f the methamphetamine or that he was criminally responsible for Har ri s ’s ac t i ons throug h the law of par ties. Under the law of parties, “[a] person is criminally responsible as a party to an offe nse if the offe nse is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both,” and “[e]ach party to an offe nse may be char g ed with the commission of the

o f f e n s e . ” T e x. Pe n a l Co d e § 7

. 0 1 ( a ) , ( b )

. “ A p e r s o n is c r im in a ll y r e s p o n s ib le f o r a n o f f e n s e c o mm it

te d by the conduct of another if

. . . acting with the intent to promot e o r as s i s t t he commission of the offe nse, h e s o l i ci t s , encour ag es, direc ts, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offe nse . . . .” Id. § 7.02(a) (2). I ntent to assist or promote may be inferr ed from the acts, words, and conduct of the defe ndant and fr o m the circ umstances in which the offe nse occur red. Roberts v. State , 319 S.W .3d 37, 49 (T ex . Ap p . — San Antonio 2010, pet. ref ’d); see Robinson v. State , No. 03-14-00407- CR, 2015 WL 4515128, at *2 (T ex . Ap p . —Austin J uly 22, 2015, pet. ref ’d) (mem. op., not desig nated f or publication) ( same).

3To be deeme d criminall y re s p o n s ible as a party , there must be evidenc e of “an

u nderstanding and common desig n to commit the offense.” Gross v. Stat e , 380 S. W

. 3 d 1 8 1 , 1 8 6 (T ex . C ri m. App. 2012). When revie wing the sufficie ncy of that evidenc e, appellate courts may consider “‘e vents occur

ring befor e, during and afte r the commission of the offe nse and may rely on actions of the defe ndant which show an understanding and common desig n to do t h e prohibited act.’ ” Guev ara v. State , 152 S.W .3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (quoting C o r d o va v. State , 698 S.W .2d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). “Ea ch fac t need not point direc tly and independe ntly
to the g uilt of the ap p el lant, as long as the cumulative eff ect of all the incriminating fac ts are

s u f f ic ie n t to s u p p o r t th e c o n v ic ti o n . ” I

d

. I n a d d it io n , “ [m ]o ti v e is a s ig n if ic a n t c ir c u ms ta n c e in d ic a ti n g g uilt,” and intent may

“be inf err ed fr om circumstantial evide nce.” Id. at 50. Acc ording to e vidence that the State prese nted at trial, Har ris arr ived at the parking l o t at a high rate of speed and car ry ing about an ounce of methamphetamine, the amount that the cooper ating individual had arr ang ed to buy

. Knig h t s at beside him, and there was a g lass meth pipe in the console betwee n them. Knig ht wore metal knuckles. He also car ried over $1,300 in cash, and this cash was arr ang ed in “drug folds,” org anize d i n incre ments corr esponding to separ ate methamphetamine transac tions. An office r testified that a pers o n selling this much methamphetamine—w orth over $1,000—would “nee d secur ity to make sure that nobody would try to steal from them” and that d ru g d ealers “also use enfor cer s and use muscle or secur ity to extort [m ore] money out of t he buy er.” The off icer further opined t hat Knight was acting as an enfor cer for Ha rris during

this transaction. Viewing this evidenc e in the light most favor able to the jury ’s verdic t, we conclude that a rea sonable jury could have conclude d that Knig ht acte d as “sec urity ” or an “enf orce r” for the 4drug transac tion betwee n Har ris and L ara . Knig ht was arme d with metal knuckles, was car ry ing cash separ ated into incre ments sug g esting that the money had come from previous drug sales, and

rema ined in the vehicle afte r L ara enter ed to pu rc h as e t he methamphetamine from Har ris as previously arr ang ed. By providing “sec urity ” for Har ris, Knig h t co m m i t t ed acts encour ag ing and aiding the illeg al transa ction. See Tex. P enal Code § 7.02( a)( 2).

Moreove r, we conclude , and Knig ht does not dispute, that the evidenc e is sufficie nt to support a finding that Har ris committed eac h element of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in an amount of four g rams or more but less than 200 g rams, the offe nse with which Knig ht was char g ed. See Tex. Hea lth & Safety Code § 481. 1 1 2 (d ). T h at is, Har ris knowing ly possessed about 28 g rams of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, with the intent to deliver it
to L ar a. Be cause Knig ht encour ag ed and aided the transac tion, he is criminally responsible for Har ris’s conduct. See Tex. Penal Code §§ 7.01(a) , (b), 7.02(a) (2). There fore , we conclude that the evidence is sufficie nt to support Knig ht’s conviction. See W ebster v. State , No. 09-07-594 CR, 2008 WL 2757048, at *3 (Tex. App.—B eaumont J uly 16, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not desig nated for publication) (holding evidenc e sufficie nt to s u p p o rt conviction for delivery of controlled substance when State prese nted evidenc e that appellant acte d as “enf orce r” during drug transac tion). Acc ording ly , we ove rrule K night’ s appellate issues. 2

CONCLUSION We affir m the judgme nt of conviction.

Be cause we conclude that the evidenc e is sufficie nt to support Knig ht’s conviction under 2 the law of parties, we need not a ddress his re maining a rg uments. 5__________________________________________ Scott K. Field, Just ice Be fore J ustices Pury ear , Pemberton, and F ield Affir med Filed: Nove mber 16, 2016 Do Not Publish

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