November 25, 2015 

The Honorable Ashton B. Carter 

Secretary of Defense 

Dear Secretary Carter: 

My office is conducting a review of the activities and expenditures of the Defense Department’s Task Force for 

Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO).1 Thus far, we have released several products, including an audit 

that found TFBSO did not devise long-term planning strategies for its $282 million investment to develop the 

mineral, oil, and gas industries in Afghanistan, calling into question the sustainability of those investments, 

and a report on the nearly $43 million spent to construct a compressed natural gas automobile filing station 

when comparable stations would have cost no more than $500,000.2 

Based on allegations we have received from former TFBSO employees and others, today I am writing to request 

information concerning TFBSO’s decision to spend nearly $150 million, amounting to nearly 20 percent of its 

budget, on private housing and private security guards for its U.S. government employees in Afghanistan, 

rather than live on U.S military bases. 

SIGAR’s preliminary review indicates that TFBSO leadership rented specially furnished, privately owned “villas”3

and hired contractors to provide 24-hour building security, food services, and bodyguards for TFBSO staff and 

visitors traveling in country. The contractors lived in TFBSO facilities, arranged transportation, and provided 

security details when TFBSO personnel traveled outside their compounds.4 If TFBSO employees had instead 

lived at DOD facilities in Afghanistan, where housing, security, and food service are routinely provided at little 

or no extra charge to DOD organizations, it appears the taxpayers would have saved tens of millions of dollars.5 

 

1 TFBSO was created by DOD in 2006 to help revive the post-invasion economy of Iraq. In 2009, TFBSO was redirected to 

Afghanistan, where its mission was to carry out projects to support economic development. From 2010 through 2014, 

Congress appropriated approximately $822 million to TFBSO for Afghanistan, of which the task force obligated 

approximately $766 million. TFBSO ceased operations in Afghanistan in December 2014 and was shut down on March 31, 

2015.

2 SIGAR 15-55-AR, Afghanistan’s Mineral, Oil, and Gas Industries: Unless U.S. Agencies Act Soon to Sustain Investments 

Made, $488 Million in Funding is at Risk, April 2015; SIGAR 16-2-SP, DOD’s Compressed Natural Gas Filling Station in 

Afghanistan: An Ill-Conceived $43 Million Project, October 2015. 

3 The term “villas” was used by TFBSO employees and in TFBSO contracting documents to refer to the residences that 

TFBSO rented in Afghanistan and is therefore the term used here. 

4 TFBSO’s main compound was in Kabul, but TFBSO also rented smaller villas in Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, and, for a short 

period, Jalalabad. Former TFBSO officials told SIGAR that the $150 million TFBSO spent on its accommodations in 

Afghanistan supported “only a handful” and “no more than 5 to 10” TFBSO staff the majority of the time. 

5 Similarly, if TFBSO employees had lived at the U.S. Embassy, TFBSO would have been charged only a pro rata share of 

housing, security, food service, and other administrative costs under the State Department’s International Cooperative 

Administrative Support Services (ICASS) system. While it is not possible to determine precisely what this might have cost, in 

FY 2014, TFBSO’s last full year of operation, the average ICASS cost per person at the U.S. Embassy was approximately 

$181,000. Therefore, SIGAR estimates that for FY 2014 a TFBSO staff of 10 would have paid approximately $1.8 million to 

live at the Embassy. 
SIGAR 16-05-SP: TFBSO Security Page 2 

It appears that TFBSO’s decision not to live on U.S. military bases in Afghanistan may have been made by Mr. 

Paul A. Brinkley, former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense and TFBSO’s first director. Mr. Brinkley has 

explained that: 

“Our goal was to get businesses running and to encourage private investors and corporations from 

outside of Afghanistan to engage in the country either as trading partners or as investors. Wherever 

possible, we avoided depending on the military. We were part of their mission . . . but we avoided living 

on military bases whenever possible. The goal was to show private companies that they could set up 

operations in Afghanistan themselves without needing military support.”6 

TFBSO contracts describe in detail the services provided by TFBSO’s contractors.7 For example: 

 TFBSO paid over $57 million from 2010 to 2014 to Triple Canopy for armed support. Services 

provided by Triple Canopy included “combat life saver qualified personnel for all security movements,” 

and “20 security teams to support operations in all areas of Afghanistan and secure movement of 

Task Force staff, senior businessmen, and guests . . . .”8 The statement of work also required the 

Contractor to provide life support services for “TFBSO personnel and/or VIP/Industry professionals 

who are guests of TFBSO.”9 

 Defense Group Incorporated (DGI) received $51 million from TFBSO between 2009 and 2011 for 

extensive security and other services. For example, DGI provided “secured [accommodations] 24 

hours a day, 7 days a week by armed guards and [a] CCTV monitoring system which can view the 

entire perimeter and surrounding area.”10 The security provided at this facility included “cameras 

monitored on a 24 hour basis from a central operations room” and required DGI to have “a security 

reaction team that [can] respond in less than five minutes to an emergency or potential threat of 

incursion of the perimeter by unauthorized personnel.”11 

 TFBSO paid the Muscogee Nation Business Enterprise (MNBE) over $40 million from 2009 to 2014 to 

provide “transportation and personal protection from terrorist or criminal attack to [TFBSO] personnel 

visiting/traveling to and from project worksites.”12 MNBE also monitored the entrance to all TFBSO 

accommodations to ensure the safety and security of TFBSO personnel and guests. 

 

6 Paul A. Brinkley, War Front to Store Front: Americans Rebuilding Trust and Hope in Nations Under Fire (New York, NY: 

Turner Publishing Company/Wiley General Trade, 2014), p. 272. Although SIGAR has contacted Mr. Brinkley in connection 

with this inquiry, he is no longer a U.S. government employee and has not cooperated with our requests for information. 

7 SIGAR has not evaluated the quality of the services provided by these contractors and is not aware of any complaints that 

the contracts were not performed as required. 

8 DOD contract number GS-07F-5499R, awarded to Triple Canopy, Statement of Work, p. 7. 

9 DOD contract number D12PS00025, awarded to Triple Canopy/Edinburgh International, Turnkey Housing Facility for Task 

Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) Afghanistan,” Dec. 23, 2011, p. 2 (verified by the Dept. of the Interior, 

Acquisition Services Directorate, Sep. 16, 2015). 

10 DOD contract number FA7014-09-F-A148, awarded to DGI, Performance Work Statement, Sep. 14, 2009, p. 20. 

11 Ibid. 

12 DOD contract number HQ0O34-13-C-0101, awarded to MNBE, Statement of Work Task Force for Business and Stability 

Operations (TFBSO) Afghanistan, Life Support in Herat, Aug. 1, 2013, p. 8. 
SIGAR 16-05-SP: TFBSO Security Page 3 

 TFBSO “made arrangements” with its “neighbors to share information about activity in the area and to 

provide immediate support if problems occurred.”13 This arrangement was supplemented by a security 

contractor who gathered and processed “all requisite intelligence/threat information to safeguard 

TFBSO personnel and guests.”14 

In addition to security services, these private contractors provided support services at TFBSO facilities. For 

example, Triple Canopy provided TFBSO personnel with queen size beds in certain rooms, a flat screen TV in 

each room that was 27 inches or larger, a DVD player in each room, a mini refrigerator in each room, and an 

“investor villa” that had “upgraded furniture” and “western-style hotel accommodations.”15 In terms of food, 

Triple Canopy was required to provide service that was “at least 3 stars,” with each meal containing at least 

two entrée choices and three side order choices, as well as three course meals for “Special Events.”16 

Similarly, over this period, MNBE provided “TFBSO Government staff, Contractor staff and guests with full life 

support services while in country, to include but not be limited to, secure accommodations (outfitted at a 3-star 

equivalent level or better), secure low profile transportation . . . VOIP [Voice Over Internet Protocol] 

communications capabilities, on-site laundry service, on-site food & meal service (with light snacks and 

water/tea/coffee/sodas available 24 hrs.), business office space to include all equipment necessary to 

conduct business operations (computers, printers, phones, scanners, desks and chairs), housekeeping, 

maintenance, grounds and cultural advisors and translators.”17 Figures 1 and 2 show the TFBSO “villas” in 

Kabul. 

 

13 Brinkley, War Front to Store Front, p. 270. 

14 DOD contract number GS-07F-5499R, Statement of Work, p. 8. 

15 DOD contract number D12PS00025, Statement of Work, supra, p. 2. 

16 Ibid, p. 7. 

17 Adam K. Marshall, Barrow & Grimm, P.C., attorneys at law for MNBE, response to SIGAR questions, June 16, 2015. 

Figure 1 - TFBSO Villa in Kabul

Source: TFBSO former employee

Figure 2 - TFBSO Villa in Kabul

Source: TFBSO former employee
SIGAR 16-05-SP: TFBSO Security Page 4 

While it is unclear what benefit the U.S. received as the result of TFBSO’s decision to rent private housing and 

hire private security contractors, rather than living on DOD military bases, or whether any cost-benefit analysis 

was conducted before the decision was made, outside consultants, in a presentation prepared at the request 

of TFBSO, hailed the “freedom of movement” enjoyed by TFBSO. For example, Boston Consulting Group (BCG) 

noted that TFBSO was “not constrained by chief-of-mission requirements”, had “no excessive red tape 

internally in securing travel arrangements”, and that personal security details were “critical for mobility in 

hostile and uncertain environments.”18 In another presentation, BCG explained that TFBSO’s “freedom of 

movement” meant that TFBSO personnel “can meet with local [private sector] leaders, officials, and investors 

in the field, not on base” and that this “enables execution of innovative and high-potential-impact projects 

requiring “in-the-field oversight and management”.19 

A draft report on TFBSO prepared by the RAND Corporation notes the importance TFBSO employees placed on 

their “freedom of movement”, but notes that TFBSO’s lack of coordination with the State Department and 

other agencies caused “friction” and observes that, “even the U.S. civilian personnel most supportive of the 

Task Force’s activities in Afghanistan reported that more active oversight on the part of the Department of 

Defense and clearer coordination with civilian authorities would have improved the efficacy of the Task 

Force.”20 

None of the foregoing consultant studies discuss the $150 million cost of TFBSO’s decision to reside in private 

residences rather than at U.S. military bases or the U.S. Embassy, and to hire private contractors to provide 

security and support services. And, none of these studies discuss whether TFBSO could have carried out its 

activities just as effectively operating from U.S. military bases or under Chief of Mission authority. 

To assist us in better understanding the basis on which this decision was made, please provide the following 

information: 

1. Did DOD or TFBSO prepare a cost-benefit analysis prior to deciding that TFBSO staff would use private 

accommodations, security, and support services in Afghanistan, as opposed to using U.S. government 

facilities and military support? If so, please provide a copy of any such cost-benefit analysis. 

2. During the period in which TFBSO operated in Afghanistan (September 2009 to December 2014), 

were DOD organizations or employees assessed charges for living on DOD facilities in Afghanistan? If 

so, what was the approximate rate per organization and employee? 

3. Was TFBSO specifically authorized by DOD or some other authority to allow its staff to reside in private 

residences in Afghanistan and to hire private security guards and private support services? If so, 

please provide a copy of that authorization. 

4. How were the “villas” used by TFBSO in Kabul selected and who selected them?

5. TFBSO documents refer to “Leadership Villas” in Kabul. How did these “Leadership Villas” differ from 

other “villas” in TFBSO’s private compound in Kabul?

6. Mr. Brinkley has stated that TFBSO brought potential private investors to Afghanistan to consider 

investing in the country. Please provide a list of all such investors and the dates on which they visited 

Afghanistan, from 2009 through 2014. 

 

18 Boston Consulting Group, TFBSO Operations Playbook, Oct. 2013, p. 33. 

19 Boston Consulting Group, TFBSO Summary Report – Private Sector Operations as Stability and Security Tool, Oct. 2013, 

p. 16. 

20 S. R. Zimmerman, D. Egel, and I. Blum, Task Force for Business and Stability Operations – Lessons from Afghanistan, 

RAND Corp. Draft Report prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, June 2015, pp. 66-67.
SIGAR 16-05-SP: TFBSO Security Page 5 

7. What was the outcome of these investor visits? Did any of the private investors that TFBSO invited to 

Afghanistan invest in Afghanistan? If so, please identify and describe all such investors, the amounts 

invested, and the businesses in which the investments were made. 

8. Did TFBSO persuade any Afghan investors to invest in businesses in Afghanistan? If so, please 

identify and describe all such investors, the amounts invested, and the businesses in which the 

investments were made. 

I am submitting this request pursuant to my authority under Public Law No. 110-181, as amended, and the 

Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. Please direct your staff to provide the information requested no 

later than December 11, 2015, to my Director of Special Projects, Mr. Jack Mitchell, at 

. Should you have any questions about this request, your staff may contact Mr. 

Mitchell by email or at .

Sincerely,

John F. Sopko 

Special Inspector General 

 for Afghanistan Reconstruction 

cc: 

Brian P. McKeon 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 
P OU CY 

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY 

OF DEFENSE 

2.tOO DEFENSE PENTAGON 

WASHINGTON. 0 C 20301 ·2 100 

The Honorable John F. Sopko 

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 

2350 Crystal Drive 

Arlington, Virginia 22202-3940 

Oear Mr. Sopko: 

FEB - 5 2016 

I am replying on behalf of the Department of Defense to your letter of November 25, 

2015, concerning the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations' (TFBSO) expenditures 

on housing and security for U.S. Government employees in Afghanistan in the years prior to 

TFBSO concluding operations in Afghanistan on December 31, 2014. The documents 

referenced below are included on the enclosed compact disk, and are for SIG AR use only, and 

not for further dissemination due to their containing information exempt from the disclosure 

requirements of the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552). These documents are being 

provided pursuant to the terms discussed in our exchange of letters of December 16, December 

23, and December 28, 2015. 

When TFBSO was established, it was specifically designed to be expeditionary in order 

to catalyze economic development and job creation in Iraq, and then Afghanistan, in support of 

the military campaigns. As you know, the task force operated under the authority of the military 

commander, rather than Chief of Mission authority. This unique status gave the task force a 

certain freedom to move around the country and engage more directly with Afghans than 

employees of the U.S. Embassy were able to do, given security concerns. 

Another manifestation of TFBSO's unique role was the use of private housing and 

private security guards for its employees in Afghanistan. The arrangement was an outgrowth of 

the unique nature of the task force's mission, and provided the flexibility the task force believed 

that it required. As I understand it, in order to promote business development, TFBSO hosted 

meetings with Afghan officials at off-hours and in locations atypical of non-military 

engagements, such as late in the evening or at a host location. The U.S. military's logistic or 

movement planning also did not factor in the nature of TFBSO's business. Therefore, to satisfy 

the irregular movement schedule to numerous locations outside forward operating bases (FOB), 

TFBSO contracted for private housing, security, and transportation logistics. The merits of this 

approach should be examined, and we welcome your review. 

In June 2011 , the outgoing Director of the task force, Paul Brinkley, issued an internal 

memo to TFBSO staff directing the closure of off-FOB housing and the relocation ofTFBSO 

personnel to International Security Assistance Force-managed compounds. It is unclear why Mr. 

Brinkley's memo was not implemented following his departure, and the Department of Defense 
is continuing to revie\\' the records to detem1ine wl1at subsequent decisions were made. A copy 

of the June 2011 memo is provided on the disk. In July 2014, Colonel Michael Philbin authored 

an After Action Review (AAR) regarding TFBSO operations. Colonel Philbin discussed the task 

force's practice regarding villas, private security, property n1anage1nent, ru1d otl1er facets of its 

operations, and makes recommendations on each. The AAR captures the task force's rationale 

for ho\v it operated at the time, and is also incltrded on tl1e enclosed disk. Wl1at follows are 

responses to your specific questions. 

1) Did DOD or TFBSO prepare a cost-benefit analysis prior to deciding that TFBSO staff 

would use private accommodations, securit)•, and support services in Afghanistan, as 

opposed to using U.S. government facilities and military support? If so, please provide 

a copy of any such cost-benefit anal)'Sis. 

Although TFBSO went through a fo1mal approval ru1d review process conducted by the US 

Anny Ce11tral Command's Coalitio11 Acquisition Revie\v Board (CARB) for tl1e private 

accom1nodatio11s and security, which included justifications for the accommodations, 

sec11rity, and support services. we are unable to find a document that specifically ru1alyzed 

the costs and benefits of using private accommodations compared to using U.S. government 

facilities ru1d military support. Please see the document entitled "TFBSO CARB 3100 final 

approved" as an example of the approval and re\'ie\V process. 

2) During the period in which TFBSO operated in Afghanistan (September 2009 to 

December 2014), were DOD organizations or employees assessed charges for li\•ing on 

DOD facilities in Afghanistan? If so, what \Yas the approximate rate per organization 

and employee? 

We are not aware of\vhether TFBSO assessed such charges. Please see the docu1nent 

"TFBSO CARB 3100 final approved," which alludes to the estimated cost per bed per day 

for staying at TFBSO private housing. 

3) Was TFBSO specifically authorized by DOD or some other authority to allow its staff to 

reside in pri\·ate residences in Afghanistan and to hire private securif)' guards and 

private support services? If so, please provide a copy of that authorization. 

Please see the response to Qtrestion 1. 

4) Ho\Y were the "villas" used by TFBSO in Kabul selected and "''ho selected them? 

TFBSO utilized housing in Afghanistan in order to implement TFBSO's economic 

revitalization initiatives. Please see docu1nent ''03-13-2009 SecDef Robert Gates TFBSO 

2009 Co11tinuation Memo." The Department of Interior Contracting Agency selected and 

awarded Life Support contracts for villas. 

5) TFBSO documents refer to ''Leadership Villas" in Kabul. How did these "Leadership 

Villas" differ from other "villas" in TFBSO's private compound in Kabul? 
The "Leadership Villa" \Vas in a separate location from the otl1er villas, and was not on the 

same compound. It is our understanding that the "Leadership Villa" operated for six months 

from April 2011-September 2011, whereas the other Kabul villa, referred to as the "Kabl1l 

Banking m1d Energy Villa," operated through the ei1d ofTFBSO's operations in Decen1ber 

2014. Please see the document entitled ·'Life Support Overview." 

6) Mr. Brinkley has stated that TFBSO brought potential private investors to Afghanistan 

to consider in\'Csting in the country. Please provide a list of all such investors and the 

dates on which they visited Afghanistan, from 2009 through 2014. 

Our initial review of the TFBSO archive has identified documentation for only one of the 

TFBSO sponsored investor trips. See docmnent "After_Action_Report_Investor_ Visit_Trip 

FINAL," To date, we have not been able to locate a list or lists cataloguing potential private 

investors in the records archive. 

7) What was the outcome of these investor trips? Did any of the private investors that 

TFBSO invited to Afghanistan invest in Afghanistan? If so, please identify and describe 

all such investors, the amounts invested, and the businesses in 'vhich the investments 

were made. 

To date, \Ve have not been able to locate a list or lists cataloguing private investment 

facilitated by TFBSO. 

8) Did TFBSO persuade any Afghan investors to invest in businesses in Afghanistan? If 

so, please identify and describe all such investors, the amounts invested, and the 

businesses in 'vhich investments were made. 

See documents "FY14 TFBSO Transition Plan_Congress," the FY13 report to Congress on 

TFBSO, FY12 report to Congress on TFBSO, and "Incubator Metrics 2012~12.'' To our 

knowledge, the task force did not maintain a list of Afgl1an i11vestors wl10 decided to invest in 

Afgl1anistan as a result ofTFBSO's work. 

In addition to the documents 1nentioned above, we have included several other files on the 

compact disk that we believe may be relevant to your review ofTFBSO's expenditures on 

housing and security. The Department remains committed to accommodating SIGAR's 

review ofTFBSO's operations. 

Sincerely, 

Brian P. McKean 

Enclosures: As Stated.