1 

 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON 

 TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES

 Public Hearing

 Monday, March 31, 2003

 Alexander Hamilton U.S. Custom House 

 Auditorium 

 One Bowling Green 

 New York, York 
 2 

 COMMISSION MEMBERS 

 Thomas H. Kean 

 Chair 

 Lee H. Hamilton 

 Vice Chair 

 Richard Ben-Veniste

 Max Cleland 

 Fred F. Fielding 

 Jamie S. Gorelick 

 Slade Gorton 

 John F. Lehman 

 Timothy J. Roemer 

 James R. Thompson

 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 

 Philip D. Zelikow 
 3 

 C O N T E N T S 

 OPENING REMARKS PAGE 

 Commissioner's Opening Statements 4

 Remarks by The Honorable Governor 

 George Pataki, State of New York 41

 Remarks by The Honorable Mayor 

 Michael Bloomberg, City of New York 65

 Raymond Kelly, New York Police Commissioner 85

 THE EXPERIENCE OF THE ATTACK

 Harry Waizer, Cantor Fitzgerald survivor 109

 David Lim, Port Authority 117

 Lee Ielpi, Fire Department of New York (retired) 134

 Brian Birdwell, United States Army 142

 Craig Sincock, United States Army (retired) 152

 REPRESENTATIVES OF THE VICTIMS 

 Stephen Push, Families of September 11 163

 Mary Fetchet, Voices of September 11 174

 Mindy Kleinberg, September 11 Advocates 187

 Allison Vadhan, Families of Flight 93 203

 THE ATTACKERS, INTELLIGENCE, AND 

 COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY 

 Abraham Sofaer, Hoover Institution 226

 Daniel Byman, Georgetown University 239

 Brian Jenkins, RAND 247

 Magnus Ranstorp, University of St. Andrews 256
 4 

 P R O C E E D I N G S 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: The official start of our 

 first public hearing is going to be an 

 extraordinarily important job, we believe, for the

 country. In my capacity as the Chairman of the 

 Commission on Terrorist Attacks in the United 

 States, I am honored and humbled to convene this 

 first public hearing.

 Since my colleagues and I were appointed

 at the turn of the year, many people from all walks 

 of life, and actually from other nations even, have 

 inquired about our work. And many offered their 

 help. What they really wanted, however, were 

 answers.

 Their questions fall into three basic 

 categories: First, they wanted to know what led to 

 the terrorist attacks upon our country September 

11th, that took the lives of almost 3,000 Americans 

 and forever changed the lives of millions of

 others. There was not a person alive that day 

 whose life was not changed in some way by September 

 11th. 
 5 

 Those who perished in those attacks or 

 those who were wounded had done nothing to warrant 

 it. They were going about their business. They 

 were doing their jobs. They were flying to see

 family or to conduct business or to spend time with 

 loved ones or going or returning from vacations. 

 They didn't personally know their 

 assassins. Those who attacked them had no 

 particular human target in mind. They just wanted

 to kill as many people as possible. They didn't 

 care who the victims were. All they had to do to 

 warrant their killing and maiming, they wanted to 

 target buildings or certain airplanes. 

 Most of whom who died or were injured were

 Americans. The deceased and survivors were of all 

 backgrounds, races, religions, creeds and even 

 nationalities. They only had one thing in common. 

 They were all at the time doing their best to keep 

 ours, the finest, strongest, most productive,

 creative, diverse and welcoming democracy that has 

 ever been created on the face of the earth, and,

 you see, that's what the terrorists sought to 
 6 

 destroy. 

 They wanted to extinguish the very 

 freedom, vitality and diversity that characterizes

 the American way of life and makes it the bastion

 of hope for so many others in the world. 

 And they sought to do this by killing 

 thousands of our people, disrupting the life 

 pattern of this country as a whole, and by 

 instilling what they hoped was fear, not only in

 our nation but in all nations that allow ideas to 

 compete freely and fairly in the open marketplace. 

 The American people want the answers to so 

 many questions around 9/11. They want to know who 

 were these people and how could they have done this

 terrible thing to so many innocent people. What 

 kind of fanaticism drove them to do this? 

 They also want to know how such a 

 dastardly attack could occur and succeed in a 

 nation as strong as ours, militarily, economically

 and technologically. They want to know what, if 

 anything, went wrong on that pacific day, what 

 evidence did those charged with safeguarding the 
 7 

 security of us all, what evidence did they have that 

 might somehow have averted this tragedy and how did 

 they use it. 

 What evidence then was available? What

 could have been done to avert this tragedy? What 

 if people had acted differently on that day and the 

 days leading up to September 11th? And finally, 

 most importantly, they want to know what can be 

 done to prevent future terrorist attacks of this

 scale and how can we make this country safer for 

 all its people. 

 In conversations I have had with family 

 members of people who perished in the attacks 

 against the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and

 in that plane crash in a small field in Somerset 

 County, Pennsylvania, they told me time and again

 that the one thing they were concerned about was to 

 make sure that their loved ones had not died in 

 vain.

 It's horrible enough to see someone you 

 love struck down in this manner. It would be even

 worse for the rest of us to do nothing to prevent 
 8 

 other families from having to endure such grief and 

 pain in the future. 

 As Chairman of the Commission, I want to 

 say that I consider this task the most important

 part of our work. We must not allow the people who 

 were struck down to simply become statistics. Each 

 represented a life that was interrupted. All had 

 families, colleagues and friends who care deeply 

 about them, all who perished had dreams that are

 now unfulfilled. All became the first casualties 

 of what has become a war against the United States, 

 declared by international terrorists. 

 The victims did not know, when they said 

 good-bye to their loved ones when they departed for

 work or the airport on that fateful morning, that 

 they would be part of such a war. They had no 

 weapons and they didn't even know the identity of 

 their enemies. 

 We will, I know, in this country construct

 memorials, and we should, to honor these people, 

 but the greatest service we can pay those who made 

 the ultimate sacrifice and those who survived the 
 9 

 blaze is to do all we can to assure that no one 

 ever again experiences the kind of anguish that 

 they endured. 

 I know there's nothing we can do on this

 Commission to bring anybody back to life, but those 

 who were taken from us on September 11th, we can 

 work to assure that no future families suffer in 

 this way, the way so many people have suffered. 

 And this is what our Commission intends to do.

 I want to say a word or two about the 

 purpose of today's hearing. In the parlance of 

 Congress, this is not an investigative hearing but 

 an informal one. Today we will not, as we'll be 

 doing in the future, be cross-examining witnesses.

 The Mayor and Governor are coming. They are coming 

 to welcome us. We will have questions for them 

 probably later, but today we will not be doing 

 that. 

 We will be doing that on, as I say, a

 number of other occasions. And some of our 

 meetings will be in public, some will not be in 

 public because of the kind of sensitive materials 
 10 

 that we will be dealing with. On those occasions, 

 we will be able to have extensive discussions with 

 many people who will be testifying today and 

 tomorrow.

 On this first day of our hearing, we will 

 be seeking to ascertain what those who feel a 

 personal stake in our deliberations think is 

 important for us to study. 

 We will hear from people who have lived

 and survived the attacks on the World Trade Center 

 and the Pentagon. We will hear from 

 representatives of families of those who died in 

 those attacks. We will hear from the governor of 

 this great state and the mayor of this great city.

 And finally, we will hear from a number of others 

 who have a particular interest in the events of 

 that terrible day. 

 Tomorrow we will hear from people who have 

 particular expertise in national terrorism, the

 kinds of actions that made the attacks on September 

 11th possible, and the kinds of measures that might 

 be taken to avoid such future events. 
 11 

 Before I turn over the floor to our Vice 

 Chairman, Lee Hamilton, I want to say a couple, two 

 additional things about what this Commission will 

 and will not attempt to do and something about the

 Commission itself. 

 As I said, our purpose is to find out why 

 things happened, how they could have happened, and 

 what we can do to prevent their ever happening 

 again. We will be following paths and we will

 follow those individual paths wherever they lead. 

 We may end up holding individual agencies, people 

 and procedures to account. 

 But our fundamental purpose will not be to 

 point fingers, it is rather to answer fully the

 questions that so many still have and, most 

 importantly, as I say, to prevent and to do 

 everything we can to make the American people safer 

 so we will not have this kind of thing ever happen 

 again.

 As we were getting ourselves organized, I 

 asked members of the Commission staff, were there 

 any precedents for what we were about to do. And I 
 12 

 came forward with two commissions. Both came into 

 being in the aftermath of other national tragedies. 

 Those who are old enough to remember the 

 bombing of Pearl Harbor and the assassination of

 President Kennedy remember those commissions well. 

 Neither fully satisfied the hopes of those that

 created them. 

 It seems there are no real precedents for 

 what we're about to attempt. To succeed, we are

 going to need the cooperation of the Congress, the 

 national administration, federal, state and local 

 law enforcement and other agencies, think tanks, 

 foundations, university professors, business, 

 industry and labor, survivors, witnesses, and

 ordinary citizens. And I thank them in advance for 

 their help. 

 Finally, about the Commission itself: We 

 were created by the United States Congress for a 

 specific purpose. I have outlined in a general way

 what we hope to do. The Commission operates in a 

 strictly nonpartisan nature. Five of us happen to 

 be registered as Republicans, five of us as 
 13 

 Democrats, but we're not going to operate as party 

 members, and the staff is not partisan. 

 All of us, in one capacity or another, 

 have served in government. None of us still do.

 None of us have any agenda but getting to the truth 

 to make ours a safer country. 

 I want in particular to single out the 

 Vice Chairman of this Commission, Lee Hamilton. I 

 have long admired Congressman Hamilton for his

 public service, in the truest sense of the word, 

 and what he has done for this country. I am very 

 honored to be able to serve with him on this 

 particular Commission. 

 Today marks the first occasion when the

 American people will have an opportunity to see who 

 we are. Each of us had our own reasons for 

 accepting the call to serve on this Commission. 

 For eight years I have had the honor to 

 serve as Governor of the State of New Jersey. I

 was born here in this great city, attended graduate 

 school at Columbia, met my wife here. I've spent 

 almost my entire life living and working around 
 14 

 this region. 

 I remember when the World Trade Center was 

 built. I must have been in it hundreds of times. 

 I appointed half the commissions to the Port

 Authority when I was Governor. I was well 

 acquainted with many of its employees and knew some 

 of those who died on September 11th as friends. 

 As a private citizen, I sat on the board 

 of a company who lost over 80 people on that

 terrible day. I delivered the eulogy at that 

 memorial service. As a university president, I 

 counseled students who were grieving on that 

 terrible day and afterwards. 

 Not far from where I live, a young pastor

 of a rural church that serves no more than two- or

 three-thousand families told the local newspaper he 

 had performed nine funeral masses on a single day. 

 I didn't lose any member of my family on that 

 particular day, but I did lose a lot of friends in

 the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and that 

 flight. 

 Adlai Stevenson said, when he learned of 
 15 

 John Kennedy's assassination, each of us who was 

 alive will carry the memory of that particular 

 death until the day of ours. That is how we feel 

 about September 11th.

 Thank you, and I will now call on 

 Congressman Lee Hamilton, the Vice Chairman of the

 Commission. 

 VICE CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Good morning, 

 Governor. Thank you for a very moving and eloquent

 statement. 

 Governor Kean is an inspired choice to 

 lead this Commission. He's the only member of the 

 Commission appointed by the President, and I 

 commend the President for his appointment. The

 other members of the Commission are appointed by 

 members of Congress. 

 I am very pleased to serve with Governor 

 Kean on this Commission, as Vice Chairman, and I 

 have appreciated already his remarkable leadership

 as I have talked with him over the phone every day 

 now for the past four or five months.

 I'm pleased and privileged to be joined by 
 16 

 my fellow Commissioners. Each bring remarkable and 

 unique experience from public service and from

 private life. They really are an exceptional 

 group, a talented group, that gives me high

 confidence that this Commission will successfully 

 complete its awesome task. Each of us believes 

 that this is as serious an undertaking as any in 

 which we have been involved. 

 The Commission exists to understand what

 happened on September 11th and to protect our 

 nation against future attack. Our mandate is to 

 look back, to learn the vital lessons of 9/11, to 

 look forward, to make recommendations that leave 

 the United States and its people safer.

 Our primary task is to answer one 

 essential question: What can we do to prevent 

 another 9/11? 

 Our mandate is breathtakingly broad. 

 After all, 9/11 was not simply a failure of a

 single person or department of government but 

 rather a systemic breakdown of our government's

 defenses, our preparedness for catastrophic 
 17 

 terrorism and our understanding of a new world in 

 which threats develop an ocean away and strike us 

 with horrifying impact within our own borders. 

 Thus, our mandate, as stated by the

 Congress and reaffirmed by the President, extends 

 to many areas of policy. We are specifically 

 mandated to scrutinize intelligence, law 

 enforcement, diplomacy, immigration and border 

 controls, the financing of terrorism, commercial

 aviation, Congressional oversight of 

 counterterrorism efforts and other areas that we, 

 as a Commission, deem relevant. 

 In all we do as a Commission, we will 

 strive to be independent, impartial, thorough, and

 nonpartisan. The Commission will provide a factual 

 record of September 11, 2001, how events developed

 and how our nation responded, from the first 

 responders at the Pentagon and the World Trade 

 Center, to the national leadership.

 As the Chairman has already said, we will 

 also seek a better understanding of the enemy. How 

 did al Qaeda emerge as a threat? How did our 
 18 

 government's counterterrorism policy evolve? What 

 have been our successes and our failures, and what 

 are the broad foreign-policy lessons of 9/11? 

 I believe this Commission can and will

 make a significant and valuable impact worthy of 

 the attention and scrutiny of the American people 

 and policymakers. 

 Much good work has already been done on 

 several issues before us. The Congressional Joint

 Inquiry into the intelligence failures of 9/11 has 

 concluded its work and many other credible sources 

 have analyzed the issues that confront this 

 Commission, but the Joint Inquiry's focus was 

 limited to intelligence and other inquiries have

 lacked the breadth of our mandate. 

 Now, some 18 months after that terrifying 

 day, we still have no comprehensive analysis of 

 9/11, no authoritative record of the many forces 

 that led to the attacks, no definitive narrative of

 the events of the day, and no set of 

 recommendations to address the wide assortment of 

 government policies and concerns related to the 
 19 

 attack. 

 Today the Commission holds the first of 

 its public hearings. The Commission is committed 

 to public hearings such as these for two reasons.

 First, we are revisiting a seismic event 

 in American history and the lives of all Americans, 

 and we are working on issues of the utmost 

 importance to their safety and security. Thus, we 

 are obligated to keep the American people as

 informed as we can of our work and our findings. 

 Second, the American people are our 

 greatest resource. The success of our inquiry 

 depends upon their intelligence, fortitude and good 

 will. We will do our best to engage Americans of

 all walks of life to complete our work. 

 Today we seek guidance from individuals 

 who can offer unique perspective and valuable 

 vision. We will hear from the survivors of the 

 attack who can relate to us the awful experience of

 that day. We will hear from the families of the 

 victims. 

 Nobody suffered a greater loss on that 
 20 

 terrible day. This loss both focuses and informs 

 our work. The families offer a solemn reminder of 

 the gravity of our inquiry. And through the 

 knowledge they have acquired in seeking answers to

 their many questions, the families also are a very 

 valuable resource. 

 We will hear from the first responders who 

 were called to duty on 9/11. Their brave and 

 extraordinarily capable example set this nation on

 a path towards recovery and their experience is 

 essential to our understanding of the events of the 

 day and our preparedness for future attacks. 

 And we will hear from public officials who 

 coordinated this city and state's response. They

 too were on the front lines in their

 decision-making and marshalling of resources. We 

 look forward to their wisdom on preventing, 

 preparing for, and responding to terrorist attacks. 

 We step into a moving stream. We operate

 in the context of the war on terror, which includes 

 operations abroad, some precautions already taken, 

 with more under consideration, and a government 
 21 

 that is reshaping itself to combat terrorism. And 

 all the while, the threat of another attack looms. 

 The urgency of our work is apparent. 

 Our staff, very ably led by Dr. Zelikow

 and Chris Kojm, represents some of the finest

 expertise in the country. We are establishing an 

 office in New York, as well as Washington. We have 

 contacted all the various agencies we will be 

 working with in the coming months.

 We have received assurances of cooperation 

 from the White House and from the Congress. We 

 have set a course, an infrastructure, to meet the 

 charge of our mandate. And we have begun to review 

 and build upon, not duplicate, the foundation of

 good work that has already been done by the Joint 

 Inquiry and many others. 

 Our time is short and much work lies 

 ahead. We have miles to go before we sleep. At 

 the end of our work, it is my hope that we will

 have helped insure the security of the American homeland. 

 What greater or more urgent task could there be 

 than understanding this national tragedy and 
 22 

 working to strengthen the safety of the American 

 people? 

 All want this Commission to succeed. With 

 the help of our witnesses today and the many more

 to follow, we will produce a record that we trust 

 will stand the tests of time, a record that 

 heightens our understanding of the challenges ahead 

 and sets our course, as a nation, toward peace and 

 stability.

 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Thank you, Congressman 

 Hamilton. Now I'd like to introduce Commissioner 

 Fred Fielding. 

 COMMISSIONER FIELDING: Thank you, Mr.

 Chairman. Good morning. 

 At the outset, let me state how honored 

 and awed I am to be a member of this Commission and 

 to have the opportunity and privilege of working 

 with the Chairman, the Vice Chairman and my fellow

 Commissioners. 

 It is a very onerous and huge task ahead 

 of us, and I can only pledge to provide all the 
 23 

 time, energy and skill I may possess to the 

 complete fulfillment of such important goals. 

 For my part, I come to this task with no 

 preconceptions as to what we may find and no

 preconceived agenda as to what we may ultimately 

 recommend. 

 I do, however, come with the anger and 

 sorrow and the despair shared by others over the acts 

 of 9/11 and over the loss we suffered to our

 national sense of domestic security and of the 

 losses, the senseless and vicious losses, of 

 friends and family and innocent people. 

 I personally lost a dear friend who was 

 also the wife of a very close and longtime

 colleague and friend of mine. I also personally 

 lost a delightful and most promising young law 

 partner, Karen Kincaide. Her presence is so sorely 

 missed at the law firm. 

 So I can't say that I am dispassionate and

 I can't say that I am totally objective about that 

 day, but we all suffered losses in various and 

 varied degrees. And that collective loss must be 
 24 

 the motivation to be sure that everything is done 

to prevent this from happening again. 

 We must not rush to judgment, to be sure, 

 but we surely must make judgments. As I see our

 mission, it is to carefully look to the past in 

 order that we can then realistically look to the 

 present and ultimately formulate credible 

 recommendations for the future. 

 We must be fair and respectful and

 impartial in our work, but we must also be thorough 

 and surgical in our pursuit of these facts. We 

 must follow facts wherever they lead. There are no 

 sacred cows in this endeavor. 

 We must be respectful to our institutions

 at every and all levels of government, but we must 

 also honor the mandate given to us to be as 

 thorough as possible in order to make the most 

 relevant findings and recommendations. 

 I don't know where the facts will lead us

 when we seek to determine and to understand not 

 only what happened on that horrible day but also 

 how it could happen and how our government entities 
 25 

 were then dealing with the threat that gave rise to 

 it. 

 And I don't know where the facts will lead 

 us as we probe the various institutions of our

 government, federal, state, executive, legislative, 

 to determine how each of these institutions was 

 poised and prepared to deal with other actions that 

 could have possibly occurred or, God forbid, 

 actions that can occur.

 Further, we must probe to see if 

 institutional oversight, pressure, or actions 

 inhibited in any way the role or the degree of 

 vigilance that was necessary. 

 To repeat the obvious, we don't know where

 these facts will lead us, but we will seek the 

 facts and have them lead us to conclusions which 

 then, and only then, can be the basis for realistic 

 recommendations that will hopefully mitigate the 

 possibility that we might again suffer the assaults

 of those who want to attack our way of life by 

 attacking and terrorizing our citizens and our 

 people in this country. 
 26 

 A word of self-imposed caution is needed. 

 Probity, skill, intelligence, good judgment—they’re

 all necessary to accomplishing our 

 responsibility and should be the hallmarks of our

 conduct in our deliberations. But most important is 

 our task of instilling in the public confidence in 

 our objectivity. 

 Critics will look to any indicia of 

 partisanship, divisiveness or disarray, and we must

 be vigilant to resist anything that leads to such a 

 conclusion. History has shown that such actions, and 

 especially things such as leaks of sensitive 

 information prematurely, create the destruction of 

 a commission's work and its vitality and,

 therefore, its credibility and its validity. 

 In today's world, I suspect no commission 

 will ever be able to satisfy everyone by its work, 

 but we must do everything we can to satisfy anyone 

 about the objective way we operate. We have to

 have a shared commitment to an effort that is not 

 only thorough but is thoroughly fair and thoroughly 

 impartial and thoroughly nonpartisan. 
 27 

 Those who attacked us on September 11th 

 wanted to usher in not a brave new world but a 

 cowardly one, a world in which terrorists who envy 

 our freedom and despise our values are willing to

 slaughter the innocent through any means at their

 disposal. 

 We have collectively learned this unwillingly, and at the cost 

of great 

 suffering, great shock and great sorrow. We now 

 have a challenge to prepare a report that will

 honor those who died on September 11th, their 

 families and friends who remain, and all the 

 Americans who are trusting us to help the President 

 and Congress to guard against any such other 

 attacks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Thank you, Commissioner. 

 Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste.

 COMMISSIONER BEN-VENISTE: Thank you, Mr. 

 Chairman, Mr. Co-Chairman, fellow Commissioners. 

 Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

 Like countless Americans, I felt the 

 searing pain, shock and horror of the brutal 

 September 11th attacks upon my fellow citizens and 
 28 

 the symbols of American greatness and power. 

 Less than two weeks before the September 

 11th attacks, I brought my family to visit the 

 World Trade Center and the Statue of Liberty. Like tens of thousands of 

others on September 

 11th, I realized, there but for the grace of God go 

 I. 

 In the intervening time since the 

 September 11th attacks, we have learned a great

 deal about what happened on that day and the events

 leading up to it. In particular, we are grateful 

 for the work of the Joint Inquiry conducted by the 

 Senate and House Intelligence Committees. 

 Congress has specifically instructed us to

 build upon the good work of the Joint Inquiry as we 

 proceed with our investigation and develop 

 recommendations for Congress and the President. 

 Yet the Joint Inquiry's full report had 

 only just last week been made available to the

 members of this Commission who have their full 

 security clearances. As of last week, most of the 

 Commissioners and most of the staff had not yet 
 29 

 received security clearances. 

 I believe the scheduling of this hearing 

 has had a salutary effect on speeding up the 

 clearance process and I am gratified that the White

 House has now promised the funds necessary to carry 

 out our work. 

 It is important that President Bush has 

 publicly supported this Commission and its goals. 

 The full cooperation of the relevant departments

 and agencies of the executive branch is essential 

 to the Commission's ability to carry out its 

 responsibilities. And the result of such 

 cooperation will be a measure of our success. 

 I am pleased that in recent weeks the

 Commission has made good progress in hiring an

 excellent staff, capable of carrying out the 

 ambitious agenda Congress has set out for us. 

 From an historical perspective, it would 

 seem that the closest precedent to our assignment

 was the Roberts Commission, created by President 

 Roosevelt immediately after the Japanese attack on 

 Pearl Harbor. The Roberts Commission failed to 
 30 

 address certain fundamental aspects of our 

 unpreparedness at Pearl Harbor and was criticized 

 by subsequent inquiries for serious omissions and 

 impaired conclusions.

 We must be thorough and diligent in our 

 work in order to get it right. We have been given 

 an historic opportunity to contribute to the public 

 good and to provide a record that will withstand 

 the test of time.

 In fulfilling our responsibilities, it is 

 imperative that we assess our vulnerability to 

 terrorist attacks, and specifically, why we were 

 unprepared for the attacks of September 11, 2001. 

 No department or agency in this

 administration, or any other, is exempted from our 

 careful review. I do not, however, interpret our 

 investigative mandate to be an invitation to engage 

 in finger-pointing or to participate in the blame 

 game. Rather, it is the essential precursor to a

 reasoned analysis of how changes and improvements 

 to our security apparatus can and should be made. 

 I have had the privilege of meeting with 
 31 

 representatives of families of citizens who died in 

 the September 11th attacks. The loss that they 

 have suffered is beyond measure, but their strength 

 and determination will continue to keep our nation

 and this Commission focused on answering the 

 questions posed by this tragedy. 

 The personal involvement of surviving 

 family members was central to the 

 creation of this Commission, and I welcome their

 continued involvement as we go forward with our 

 work. 

 Among the many challenges facing our 

 nation is the need for balance as we respond to the 

 real and ongoing threat of terrorist attacks.

 While our focus on protection of the homeland is 

 paramount, we must be ever mindful of the 

 collateral consequences of measures which may 

 threaten our vital personal and civil liberties. 

 There is no question but that we must

 factor into the equation of proper balance the 

 capacity of our adversaries to exploit the 

 protections afforded by our Constitutional 
 32 

 guarantees of freedom of religion and due process 

 of law to advance their nefarious objectives. 

 This balancing will be no easy task, but 

 it is imperative that we get it right. And I hope

 this Commission will make recommendations that 

 reflect the importance of that balancing. 

 In 1989, Justice Thurgood Marshall warned, 

 "History teaches us that grave threats to liberty 

 often come in times of urgency when Constitutional

 rights seem too extravagant to endure." 

 Similarly, in 1995, Justice Sandra Day 

 O'Connor cautioned, "It can never be too often 

 stated that the greatest threats to our 

 Constitutional freedoms come in times of crisis."

 If the acts of al Qaeda and other 

 terrorist organizations who mean us harm result in 

 a response that disproportionately curtails the 

 personal freedoms and civil liberties that define 

 our American way of life, then our enemies will

 have won a great victory without taking another 

 life. 

 In conclusion, our Commission was created 
 33 

 to operate outside the permanent structure of the 

 three branches of government. In addition to the 

 experience and judgment we can bring to bear to 

 this assignment, we can offer another critically

 important quality, our independence and 

 objectivity. 

 We can and must consider carefully the 

 actions and roles of all three branches of 

 government as they operate to respond to the threat

 of further terrorist attacks. We should offer 

 objective, neutral analysis, with no pre-set agenda 

 or allegiance to any agency or branch of government 

 or political party. No lesser standard will 

 satisfy our nation's expectation of this

 Commission. Thank you. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Thank you, Commissioner. 

 Commissioner Slade Gorton. 

 COMMISSIONER GORTON: Mr. Chairman, the 

 members of this Commission are charged by the

 Congress of the United States to produce a thorough 

 and dispassionate history of the events, the 

 individuals, the organizations and the ideas that 
 34 

 led up to 9/11, together with the immediate 

 response of American institutions to that attack. 

 I'm convinced at the same time that the 

 members of this Commission are charged by our

 consciences never to forget, never to have at any 

 place other than the forefront of our thoughts the 

 individuals whose lives were lost in this attack 

 and the far larger number of lives that were 

 devastated by that attack.

 We are charged by the Congress of the 

 United States to analyze the structural and human 

 failures that resulted in the failure of this 

 nation's defenses, adequately or at all, to 

 anticipate and to prevent this attack. We are told

 by the statute that created us to build on the work 

 of the Joint Congressional Inquiry, which has done 

 much good work but which recognized its own 

 incompleteness and inadequacy.

 I am convinced that one of the important

 aspects of this Commission's work is to examine 

 what has taken place in the 18 months since 9/11 to 

 prevent future such attacks. Have we changed our 
 35 

 ways? Is our intelligence better? Are 

 preventative measures in effect? Could we do a 

 better job in the future than they have in the 

 past?

 Beyond that, however, I agree one hundred 

 percent with our Chairman's remarks that we are to 

 come up with recommendations as to future and 

 additional changes, changes in the structure of our 

 intelligence and law- enforcement agencies, perhaps

 more difficult, a recommendation of attitudinal 

 changes with respect to the way that individuals in 

 positions of authority respond and do their 

 job. 

 And finally, I'd like to echo the remarks

 of my colleague, Mr. Ben-Veniste. The object of 

 the attack of 9/11 was a free and open society 

 which those attackers hated and wished to destroy. 

 An immense challenge before this

 Commission and before the people of the United

 States is to determine ways in which that free and 

 open society can far better prevent future such 

 attacks, with a full balance and respect for the 
 36 

 values of that free society of individual liberty 

 and openness. 

 This is in my view a huge task which I 

 approach, I trust, with due humility in the hope

 and the expectation that the 10 members of this 

 Commission will carry out this task not only 

 honorably but effectively and with a result that 

 causes the respect and the acceptance of the 

 American people.

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Thank you, Commissioner. 

 Commissioner Jamie Gorelick. 

 COMMISSIONER GORELICK: Thank you, Mr. 

 Chairman. Good morning. Thank you, Tom Kean and 

 Lee Hamilton, for your leadership of this

 Commission. 

 The first obligation of government is to 

 protect its people. And clearly our government 

 failed to do that on September 11th. As a country, 

 we have since declared war on terrorism, but as

 those schooled in the art of war know, history is 

 the best teacher. 

 And it is for that reason that our 
 37 

 military, since the Revolutionary War when George 

 Washington appointed Baron von Steuben to assess 

 how our newly formed Army could do better, our 

 military has consistently demanded, in meticulous

 detail, after-action reports of every military 

 event so that in the future our actions could be 

 informed by both our successes and our failures. 

 That principle has also been adopted in 

 our civilian agencies by act of Congress. We have

 inspectors general in every civilian agency. And they 

 know, as do their military counterparts, that our 

 consistent history is a prompt, effective and, most 

 importantly, unflinching review of our failures, 

 even, even when it is hard to accept the truth.

 Now there may not be perfect historical 

 analogies to what we undertake here today, but we 

 have a consistent history of prompt, effective and 

 unflinching reviews. We have already failed to 

 undertake this review promptly.

 The statute establishing this Commission 

 was not passed until nearly a year and a half after 

 September 11, 2001. And we have, to be sure, 
 38 

 encountered some obstacles in getting this inquiry 

 off the ground. But we are now underway, and 

 underway forcefully. 

 Whatever difficulties we encounter, I

 will dedicate myself, as I know my fellow 

 colleagues will do also, to overcoming them because 

 we have to. We must get this right. If we don't, 

 we will fail to learn from our mistakes. 

 I am a native of New York. I am a

 long-time Washingtonian. The two communities that 

 I call mine, where my children and my family and 

 friends want and need to feel safe, are the ones 

 that feel our vulnerability the most. So I come to 

 this task with a great sense of urgency, which is

 underscored by my meetings and my communications 

 with the representatives of the families of the 

 victims. 

 In my career I have dedicated myself to a 

 strong national defense, to a safe and secure

 domestic life, and to the protection of our 

 precious liberties. And I pledge to those here and 

 to those who have placed their fate in this 
 39 

 Commission's work that I will bring every ounce of 

 my energy and each of those perspectives to bear as 

 we undertake the solemn obligations of this 

 Commission's work. Thank you.

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Commissioner John Lehman. 

 COMMISSIONER LEHMAN: Thank you, Mr. 

 Chairman. Good morning. In my career I have 

 served in the Naval Forces, the National Security 

 Council Staff, the State Department, as a diplomat,

 and as Secretary of the Navy. 

 In that last tour on my watch, I lost 241 

 Marines and sailors to a state-sponsored terrorist 

 attack in Beirut. Most of those perpetrators today 

 are still recruiting and training terrorists. Both

 of those states that sponsored that attack are 

 still harboring and sponsoring terrorism. And it 

 has been a continuing dedication on my part to see 

that the lessons that should be drawn from that 

 experience are applied in government.

 So far, that has not been terribly 

 successful. But my experience in government has 

 certainly taught me one great lesson, that the 
 40 

 genius of our system is that we do learn the 

 lessons of history. It takes us more time perhaps 

 in our democratic methods than we would prefer, but

 I am a believer in the way our system, haltingly

 but inevitably, learns the lessons of history so that 

 they are not repeated. 

 I think that our Commission is the ideal 

 vehicle, the ideal catalyst, to see that the 

 lessons of 9/11 are promptly applied, to see that

 they are not repeated as, unfortunately, our 

 experience in Beirut has been repeated numerous 

 times in the intervening decade. 

 And so I think you will see a very 

 intense, a very active process in pursuing this

 investigation, in seeing that the recommendations 

 of previous commissions, the longstanding and 

 understood shortcomings in the organization of our 

 government that have been identified by a number of 

 previous commissions but never acted on, are going

 to be focused on and the new nature of the spread 

 of international terrorism is understood and 

 applied in concrete recommendations and proposals 
 41 

 that will issue from this Commission. 

 And I'm confident that the Executive 

 Branch in Congress, with the catalyst of this 

 Commission's work, will see that those proposals

 are implemented and we indeed will learn the 

 lessons of history and not repeat them. Thank you. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Thank you, Commissioner

 Lehman. We are going to interrupt the statements 

 from the Commissioners because Governor Pataki has

 arrived. Governor, we welcome you. Thank you 

 very much for coming. 

 GOVERNOR PATAKI: Good morning, Chairman 

 Kean, Vice Chairman Hamilton, and members of the 

 Commission. It's a privilege to be here before you

 this morning on behalf of the 19 million citizens of New 

 York State. I have formal comments that you have

 before you, and you're welcome to make them a part 

 of the record, but I would just like to reflect a 

 little bit on my thoughts of September 11th.

 Thank you for your efforts to make sure 

 that every step is taken to make sure that America 

 is prepared and proactive to try to make sure it 
 42 

 doesn't happen again and if there are additional 

 attacks against anyone anywhere in America, we're 

 prepared to respond appropriately. 

 Of course, when I think of September 11th,

 the first overwhelming feeling I have is a sense of 

 loss, a sense of loss of not just the hundreds of 

 brave firefighters and police officers and Port 

 Authority police officers, but also of the 

 thousands of civilians, just ordinary people who

 went to work that morning with their normal dreams 

 for a good day and a better future for themselves 

 and their families. 

 You can't help but have a tremendous 

 sense of loss when you reflect on the individuals,

 friends that I know and so many in New York whom we 

 lost on that morning. But the second thought I have 

 is one of overwhelming pride and a tremendous sense 

 of the courage of those who faced unspeakable 

 tragedy with such incredible willingness to

 sacrifice. And because of that courage, because of 

 that willingness to sacrifice, the efforts of the 

 terrorists on September 11th failed. 
 43 

 Now certainly they succeeded in bringing 

 down two towers, two symbols of American strength 

 and in the process killing thousands of innocent 

 people in a way that has broken our hearts. But

 they didn't want to break our hearts, they wanted 

 to break our spirit. They didn't want to bring 

 down towers, they wanted to bring down our 

 confidence and our freedom and our way of life. 

 And because of the way that ordinary New

 Yorkers responded with extraordinary courage, 

 instead of seeing us divided and frightened, we saw 

 us unified and inspired. 

 I can recall the morning of September 

 11th walking the streets of lower Manhattan and

 seeing in front of St. Luke's Hospital doctors and 

 nurses lined up with gurneys. Maybe they were 

 frightened because no one knew what might happen 

 next, but their fear was overcome by their courage 

 and their willingness to stand out in the streets

 of lower Manhattan in the hopes that injured people 

 would be brought that they could treat. 

 I walked the streets of lower 
 44 

 Manhattan. I will never forget turning a 

 corner and seeing more than a block of ordinary New 

 Yorkers lining the street. And they weren't lining 

 the street to catch the subway uptown or to catch a

 bus out of town. They were lined up, in the midst 

 of this fear and uncertainty, to give blood in the 

 hopes that somehow they could help New Yorkers 

 overcome this tragedy. 

 All of the superficial differences that on

 the morning of September 11th seemed so important, 

 whether it was race or religion or politics or 

 economic position, disappeared in the sense of 

 unity and the sense that we had been attacked and 

 we were going to get through this together.

 And it was with extraordinary pride that I 

 walked those streets of lower Manhattan and saw 

 how yes, our firefighters and our police officers 

 and our emergency-service workers charged into 

 those towers with no regard for their own lives to

 save others, but also with the pride of the 

 ordinary New Yorkers, who 

 responded with such courage. And since that day 
 45 

 that sense of unity and that sense of courage is 

 something I believe still is very strong here in 

 New York. 

 We are going to hear from family

 members who lost their loved ones on September 

 11th. Their courage, their strength, a year and a 

 half later, is something that still inspires me 

 and, I believe, still inspires Americans. 

 And we are going to rebuild Ground Zero in

 a way that makes it a symbol of the resurgence of 

 New York and the confidence Americans have in our 

 freedom, but at the same time, we're going to be 

 respectful and we're going to never forget that 

 almost 3,000 heroes were lost on that day. And we

 are going to make sure we have a memorial that is 

 appropriate for all time and a symbol of courage 

 and a symbol of the sacrifice those heroes made on 

 that day. 

As we watch the nightly news and now see

 the war against terror being fought in the Middle 

 East, a lot of people say that, well, perhaps 

 almost two weeks ago the first shots of that war 
 46 

 were fired. In my view, the first shots of that 

 war were fired September 11, 2001, right here in 

 New York City. 

 In my view, the heroes and the martyrs

 of September 11th were the first casualties in that 

 war, a war we're going to win. And when we win 

 that war, New York and America and the world will 

 be a safer place because of that. 

 Last week I had the privilege of being in

 Fort Drum, which is a military base in upstate New 

 York, when the 77th Regional Command U.S. Army Reserve 

 Unit was mobilized and on their way to the Middle 

 East. I had a chance to talk to them and talk 

 to their commanding general.

 The 77th has suffered six fatalities in 

 this war. They didn't suffer them in the Middle 

 East. They suffered them on September 11th when 

 firefighters, and a lawyer, one of them a very

 close friend of mine, died responding to that

 attack. And they are going over there with a 

 tremendous sense of pride and a tremendous sense of 

 mission knowing that their first casualties will 
 47 

 not occur in Iraq. They occurred on the streets of 

 New York. 

 So as we go forward, I can't help but 

 think of the President's comments when he addressed

 the people of America on the eve of the war. And 

 the President said, one of the points that has 

 stuck with me and will always stick with me, is that 

 this war against terror should be fought by our 

 soldiers and our sailors and our Marines and our

 Air Force and not by our firefighters and police 

 officers. That to me is an important lesson of 

 September 11th. 

 I am sure this Commission, as it goes about 

 its hearings and listens to so many people, will

 learn a lot of other lessons of September 11th. I 

 thank you for your service. I thank you for your 

 commitment and willingness to put in the time and 

 the effort to try to do everything we can to 

 protect the people of New York and to protect the

 people of America. 

 New York State government and I'm sure the 

 people of New York stand ready to cooperate in any 
 48 

 way we possibly can to help you on this important 

 mission. Again, let me just say that when you 

 think of September 11th, yes, we will never forget 

 the sadness and the heroes, but let's never forget

 the courage and the strength that ordinary New 

 Yorkers showed under extraordinary circumstances. 

 Thank you and God bless you. Thank you, Chairman. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Thank you, Governor.

 Thank you very much. I'd like to introduce

 Commissioner Tim Roemer. 

 COMMISSIONER ROEMER: Thank you, Mr. 

 Chairman. I'd just ask permission to have my 

 entire statement entered into the record so I can be 

 a little bit briefer than the whole statement.

 I am honored to serve with you, Mr. 

 Chairman. You bring such a good bipartisan 

 reputation to this Commission. I am honored to 

 serve with the Vice Chair, Mr. Hamilton, with whom I 

 served in Congress. And I'm honored to be

 here with the families that could have stepped away 

 in their grief and their sorrow and instead 

 participated in a process that helped bring us here 
 49 

 today with the Commission. 

 We are here today because we love 

 democracy. And in democracy, sometimes it is not 

 easy to get at the facts, to ask the tough

 questions, to make people feel uncomfortable, to 

 move paradigms and models from old ways into new 

 ways, to take on the threat of al Qaeda, who wants 

 to kill hundreds if not thousands of people and do 

 it anyplace in the world, including in the United

 States of America. 

 We are here to get at the facts. And 

 getting at the facts won't kill us, but not getting 

 at those facts might. We need to make sure that we 

 follow the clues and the evidence wherever they will

 lead. 

 Walter Lippman, a gifted and prolific 

 writer, reminded us that "A central function of 

 democracy is to allow a free people to drag 

 realities out into the sunlight and demand a full

 accounting from those who were permitted to hold 

 power." 

 As our Declaration of Independence 
 50 

 proclaims, those holding power, "Deriving their 

 powers from the consent of the governed" should be 

 accountable to their citizens. That's what we are 

 going to do on this Commission.

 New York City is the appropriate place to 

 begin this great task. Even before September 11th, 

 at 12:18, on February 26, 1993, a bomb exploded in 

 the World Trade Center, killing six people, 

 injuring 1,000 people, and causing $510 million in

 damage. On June 24, 1993, the FBI arrested eight 

 individuals for plotting to bomb a number of New 

 York City landmarks. 

 Why did it take our bureaucracies, our 

 intelligence community and our politicians so long

 to react to targets and clues and evidence that had 

 been building and building and building over time? 

 A distinguished historian, Roberta 

 Wohlstetter, wrote a superb book on Pearl Harbor. 

 And the forward by Thomas Schelling is even more

 superb, and I quote, "It would be reassuring to 

 believe that Pearl Harbor was just a colossal and 

 extraordinary blunder. In fact, blunder is too 
 51 

 specific. It was just a dramatic failure of a 

 remarkably well-informed government to call the 

 next enemy move in a Cold War crisis." 

 Today it might be some of the same words,

 a "well-intentioned but well-informed government to 

 call the next enemy move." It was not a Cold War 

 crisis and it wasn't the Japanese, but it was al 

 Qaeda and it was an enemy that had declared war on 

 the United States in 1998.

 We need our agencies, our bureaucracies, 

 our people to react with a sense of urgency, the 

 urgency that we have in the war right now in the 

 Middle East. We should have had this sense of 

 urgency years ago.

 When I have criticisms that maybe our 

 Commission got off to a slow start, when I have 

 criticisms of the White House, even reluctantly, in 

 finally coming forward with some of the funding, $9 

 million instead of $11 million, through a new

 account instead of through a supplemental 

 appropriation that should have gone through the 

 United States Congress, it is not a personal 
 52 

 criticism, it is not even a political criticism. 

 It is because of the urgency that I feel that al 

 Qaeda is coming after us again and again, and soon. 

 It is the sense of urgency that the

 country should feel, not only because of 9/11, but 

 because of the impending and direct threat of 

 terrorists that have changed their modus operandi 

 from we "will cause damage and terror but not kill 

 lots of people" to "we will terrify people and kill

 thousands of them to get their attention." 

 Let me conclude by saying, we should have 

 three objectives: a full accountability in sunlight 

 that this Commission asks the tough questions of 

 our government, asks the tough questions.

 In an unclassified finding of the Joint 

 Inquiry that I served on, we asked, were other

 governments involved in funding the terrorists. We 

 need to get to the bottom of those questions. 

 Secondly, the sense of urgency in this

 bond of the American people that we need to 

 establish. Many commissions have made countless 

 recommendations that sit on dusty shelves, going 
 53 

 nowhere. 

 These recommendations, with this sense of 

 urgency and bond with the American people, need to 

 find their way to the President's desk and be

 signed into law so that we make this country a 

 safer place and that they are not ignored at the end 

 of the day. 

 We bury today not just someone from Hell's 

 Kitchen or someone New Yorkers are proud of but

 somebody that all America is proud of and somebody 

 I served with in the United States Congress, former 

 Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan. He gives us all 

 the sense of urgency that we should have in our 

 great work ahead.

 He said in a Harvard commencement ceremony 

 last year, and I quote, "The terrorist attacks on 

 the United States of last September 11th were not 

 nuclear, but they will be." 

 That is the sense of threat, of urgency,

 of love for democracy and accountability of our 

 government that I hope this Commission will bring 

 forward in a non-partisan, bipartisan way and get 
 54 

 to the bottom of why this happened and how we make 

 the country a safer place for every single American

 in this great country that we love so much. Thank 

 you.

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Commissioner Jim Thompson. 

 COMMISSIONER THOMPSON: Mr. Chairman, 

 thank you. I too am honored to serve as a member 

 of this Commission and to serve with extraordinary 

 people who have each in their own way contributed

 much to this nation. 

 I have always believed, as Commissioner 

 Gorelick has already noted, that the first 

 obligation of government, all governments, is to 

 protect the lives and property of its citizens.

 Here is the American bargain. Each of us, 

 as individual citizens, take a portion of our 

 liberties and our lives and pass them to those whom 

 we elect or appoint as our guardians. And their 

 task is to hold our liberties and our lives in

 their hands, secure. That is an appropriate 

 bargain. 

 But on September 11th, that bargain was 
 55 

 not kept. Our government, all governments, somehow 

 failed in their duty that day. We need to know 

 why. No one who was not there nor bound by family 

 or emotional ties to the victims can completely

 understand the horror and still present shock of 

 that day. It is incomprehensible. But as 

 Americans, we are all victims of September 11th and 

 the whole nation must be satisfied when we finish 

 our work.

 I remember watching the television news as 

 I prepared to go to work that morning and saw the 

 first plane crash into the World Trade Tower. And 

 my assumption was that this was a grievous, 

 horrible accident. By the time I reached the

 street and learned of the second plane crashing 

 into the second tower, the whole world knew it was 

 no accident. 

 A number of young people worked with me at 

 our law firm. And by midmorning, when we made our

 decision to close our offices and send our people 

 home, they asked if they could go home with me.

 Nobody wanted to be alone on September 11th. One 
 56 

 young man and his wife and baby came to my house 

 because I live on the seventh floor. They live in 

 another building on the 12th floor. They felt 

 safer with me, closer to the ground.

 Several months later, when I was in New 

 York, I stopped at Ground Zero, got out of my car, 

 ran to the fence before the policeman could shoo me 

 away, peered through the barricade and looked at 

 that vast empty space. Space had replaced people

 and instruments of commerce. Others will fill that 

 space one day with buildings and memorials and 

 human life will flourish again there. 

 Our task is, to borrow a phrase, without 

 fear or favor to fill that space with the facts,

 with the truth, and with answered questions. Thank 

 you, Mr. Chairman.

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Commissioner Max Cleland. 

 COMMISSIONER CLELAND: Thank you very 

 much, Mr. Chairman.

 I am deeply moved by the emotion and the 

 dedication and the commitment of these fine 

 Americans on this panel and the wonderful Americans 
 57 

 in the audience toward finding out what happened, 

 why and making sure it never happens again. So I'm 

 honored to be among these wonderful people today. 

 Let me just say that 18 months ago, this

 city and our country suffered an attack like none 

 we had ever experienced before. On that day we 

 lost more than the thousands of innocent men and 

 women and children who perished or were grievously 

 injured. We lost more than the two great towers

 that fell, we lost our sense of safety and 

 invulnerability. 

 Almost without question, we could and 

 should have been better prepared, we know that, to 

 protect our homeland against the terrorist assault.

 As in the final report of the Joint Congressional 

 Intelligence Committee Inquiry into the 9/11 

 attacks found, "Prior to September the 11th, the 

 intelligence community was neither well organized 

 nor equipped and did not adequately adapt to meet

 the challenge posed by global terrorists focused on 

 targets within the domestic United States. These 

 problems greatly exacerbated the nation's 
 58 

 vulnerability to an increasingly dangerous and

 immediate international terrorist threat inside the 

 United States." 

 Because of this I believe the work of this

 Commission will not only affirm those intelligence 

 deficiencies but will find corresponding lapses in 

 border control, aviation security, and a host of 

 other fields. 

 As a member of the 107th Congress of the

 Senate Committee on Armed Services and Commerce and 

 Governmental Affairs, I participated in literally 

 dozens of hearings which thoroughly delved within 

 our unpreparedness for the terrorist threat. And I 

 was pleased in some small way to play a role in the

 development of the Department of Aviation and 

 Transportation Security Act of 2001, Maritime 

 Transportation and Security Act of 2001, and the 

 Homeland Security Act of 2002. 

 But I believe that this investigation will

 show that, as true of executive agencies, the Congress 

 should have been and could have been better 

 prepared and done better. It's not hard to see 
 59 

 parallels between September 11th, 2001 and 

 December 7, 1941. I am particularly sensitive to 

 such comparisons because my father was stationed in 

 Pearl Harbor after the attack. That attack had a

 profound effect on this country and on my family 

 personally. 

 As a CIA-funded study of the agency's 

 history reported, the intelligence community we had 

 in place in 2001 was in many respects a product of

 the 1941 debacle, after which our national leaders

 had concluded "that the surprise attack could have 

 been blunted if the various commanders and 

 departments had coordinated their actions and 

 shared their intelligence."

 And boy, does that have a familiar ring. 

 That was right after 1941. These sobering 

 assessments led to the adoption of the National 

 Security Act of 1947 which "attempted to implement 

 the principles of unity of command and unity of

 intelligence."

 In many ways that is what now, over 50 

 years later, we have been trying to do in the wake 
 60 

 of the 2001 disaster. But there are some important

 differences between Pearl Harbor and 9/11 which 

 also must be kept in mind as this Commission and 

 the country chart our course on where we go from

 here. As shattering a blow as December 7, 

 1941, it was a military strike, aimed at military 

 targets, ordered by the Imperial Government of 

 Japan and coming at the end of a long period of 

 tensions between the two governments.

 September the 11th, 2001 was a terrorist

 strike, aimed primarily at civilian targets, in 

 which the perpetrators were not acting for a nation 

 but for a terrorist network. It’s true that previous 

 attacks, as has been stated, by al Qaeda, including

 the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the 

 thwarted 1995 Bojinka plot in the Philippines, the 

 1990 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and 

 the 2000 attack on the USS Cole should have 

 produced, and amongst some governmental officials

 did produce, a heightened sense of urgency and 

 attention to the new terrorist threat. 

 But these attacks were all either far away 
 61 

 or of limited success or both. They were not 

 enough to shake us out of our collective sense of 

 invulnerability which was borne of the security 

 long provided us by two great oceans and friendly

 neighbors for almost 200 years, since the war of 

 1812, without significant hostile foreign assaults 

 on the continental United States, and by our more 

 recent victory in the Cold War which eliminated the 

 Soviet threat.

 Thus, the pre-9/11 attacks by al Qaeda 

 were not sufficient to make intelligence 

 bureaucracy shed their turf-consciousness and 

 their Cold War mentalities or our border-control

 agencies to overcome inertia and budget shortfalls

 or the airlines and airports to tighten security, 

 even if it meant some added inconvenience to the 

 traveling public or the executive or legislative 

 branches to prioritize homeland security above other 

 spending programs.

 None of these things happened before 9/11.

 But all of them have occurred to at least some 

 degree since then. It could and no doubt should 
 62 

 have been different. If it had been different, 

 some or all those who perished on that day would 

 still be with us. Now at the very least, we do 

 want to, for those victims and their families, make

 sure we're never again so ill prepared to defend 

 our homeland. 

 But I say that those families and the 

 sacrifices of their loved ones, that they have not 

 have died in vain. The victims themselves have

 galvanized the public, the private sector and the 

 government into action in a way which unfortunately 

 would not likely have occurred otherwise. 

 And the surviving families members, many 

 of them who are with us today, through your

 dedication, your persistence, and your untiring 

 efforts, more than any other force, are responsible 

 for this Commission, and thus have given us the 

 grave responsibility and opportunity to help 

 produce a more secure country for all of us as

 Americans. 

 However, if a false sense of 

 invulnerability and security was our downfall on 
 63 

 September the 11th, in many ways the current 

 danger, in my opinion that we will succumb to 

 what FDR called "fear itself." Continuing the 

 quote, "nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror,

which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat 

 into advance." 

 That was from 1933. President Roosevelt 

 was speaking, of course, of the fear of economic 

 insecurity wrought by the great global depression

 of the '30s, but I believe his words still ring 

 true these 70 years later as we confront "nameless, 

 unreasoning, unjustified fear," of the global 

 terrorism of the 21st century. 

 We must never again lapse into complacency

 about homeland security when the march of 

 technology has made physical boundaries and 

 international borders more and more surmountable 

 and has expanded the destructive power of weapons 

 to the point that small groups, or even

 individuals, can now inflict a degree of death and 

 destruction heretofore reserved to great armies. 

 But if we are to prevail in this struggle, 
 64 

 we must not give in to the terror of terrorism 

 which is, after all, at once both the major weapon 

 and the chief objective of al Qaeda and its allies. 

 The war against terrorism bears many

 similarities to the Cold War against 

 communism, a war in which President Kennedy called 

 on our country to "bear the burden of a long 

 twilight struggle, year in and year out, rejoicing 

 in hope, patient in tribulation, in our struggle

 against the common enemies of man, tyranny, 

 disease and war itself." 

 That is our challenge. We walk in that 

 great challenge in the last half of the 20th 

 century with firmness and strength but also with

 the patience and hope that JFK spoke of. We need a 

 similar combination to vanquish the new enemy. 

 In my judgment, that is the task to which 

 this Commission must dedicate itself, to assist the 

 country in being neither complacent nor fearful in

 maintaining a sense of safety but not false 

 invulnerability. 

 In closing, I'd just like to say a word of 
 65 

 prayer and thanks to the great men and women of the 

 Armed Forces of our country who, even as we meet 

 here today, stand in harm's way, far from home. 

 God be with them and bless them and their families.

 Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Thank you very much, 

 Commissioner. I'd now like to introduce and 

 welcome Mayor Michael Bloomberg of the City of New 

 York.

 AUDIENCE MEMBER: How about jobs and not 

 rhetoric? How about saving human rights in this 

 country? 

 MAYOR BLOOMBERG: Governor, want me to 

 start?

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Yes, please. I introduced 

 you before. I will welcome you. 

 MAYOR BLOOMBERG: Thank you very much. If 

 I need the introduction, I'm in big trouble here in 

 this city.

 Governor, members of the Commission, 

 welcome to New York City. We hope you spend a lot 

 of money and generate some sales-tax revenues while 
 66 

 you're here. We could use you. 

 Your Commission has a broad mandate, that 

 is, to look at the reasons why 9/11 happened, to 

 consider the steps the federal government should

 take to make sure attacks like that don't occur 

 again and to propose measures that would be taken 

 now to prepare us to respond to future terrorist 

 incidents. 

 Much of your work will focus on such

 important questions as how did terrorists get into 

 this country, what should we do to make our borders 

 safe, how were the terrorists allowed to learn to 

 fly airplanes in our own country, how on earth 

 could they get by airport security with the

 obviously unenforced and ineffective federal

 regulations, and how can we stop other acts of 

 terrorism in the future. These are the issues for 

 your Commission. 

 I want to focus on different but also

 important issues. I will describe our city 

 government's reaction to the attacks to the World 

 Trade Center, including our emergency response that 
 67 

 day, our recovery effort in the days and months

 immediately afterward, and what we have done since 

 in the areas of counterterrorism and preparedness. 

 Simply put, the terrorist attack on 9/11

 was one of the darkest days in New York's history. 

 It took the lives of 2,700-plus of our loved ones, 

 friends and colleagues, including more than 360 

 valiant city firefighters, police officers and 

 emergency workers.

 It revealed our vulnerability to murderous 

 plots formulated half a world away. It shattered 

 forever any illusions that our vast ocean 

 boundaries can protect us. But out of the 

 devastation came one of our finest hours, defined

 by the heroism of those who rushed into the 

 buildings to save others, the selflessness of New 

 Yorkers who supported the recovery through acts as 

 simple as lining up on West Street to say thank you 

 to our emergency workers and the resilience of New

 Yorkers who refused to stop living their lives in 

 the difficult days, weeks and months that followed 

 the attack. 
 68 

 New York City has learned, and continues 

 to learn, the lessons of 9/11. Today I want to 

 underscore the need for an effective and ongoing 

 counterterrorism partnership with the federal

 government. 

 Police Commissioner Ray Kelly and Fire 

 Commissioner Nick Scoppetta are with me today. 

 They will make statements following my testimony, 

 if you so desire, and are prepared to answer your

 questions. 

 As you know, I was not the mayor on 9/11. 

 Our administration took office the following 

 January. But the efforts of 9/11 have been a major 

 focus of our administration over the last 15

 months. We have examined the city's response to 

 9/11 thoroughly, and I can tell you that it was 

 swift, massive, heroic and extraordinarily 

 effective. 

 Within 10 minutes of the first attack at

 8:46 a.m., 50 percent of the Police Department's 

 Special Operation Units were deployed and were 

 either at or on their way to the World Trade 
 69 

 Center. By 9:00 a.m., before the second plane even 

 hit, both the Fire Department and our Emergency 

 Medical Service had command posts on the scene 

 directing rescue operations. By 9:10 a.m., less

 than half an hour after the first tower was struck, 

 100 percent of the Fire Department's rescue and 

 high-rise units had been ordered into action. 

 Police officers immediately secured the 

 perimeter around the World Trade Center and police

 emergency-service units entered the towers to 

assist in evacuations. Department of Health 

 officials started considering public-health effects 

 and began contacting area hospitals to establish 

 procedures for accepting the heavy influx of

 injured people that was anticipated.

 Sadly, those numbers did not materialize. 

 I say sadly because instead of the influx of 

 injured New Yorkers, we experienced massive 

 fatalities.

 The professionalism of our rescue efforts

 and the bravery of those who carried them out is 

 encapsulated in one statistic, some 25,000 people 
 70 

 were safely evacuated from the World Trade Center

 that morning, the most successful urban emergency 

 evacuation in modern history. 

 After the towers collapsed, the city's

 response was just as exemplary. Department of 

 Sanitation officials at the recently closed Fresh 

 Kills Landfill in Staten Island, knowing they had 

 heavy lifting and hauling equipment at hand, 

 immediately made plans to send that equipment into

 Manhattan. 

 The offices of the city's Department of 

 Design and Construction, or DDC, acted with equal 

 dispatch, obtaining equipment from some of the 

 city's major construction firms. Despite the fact

 that its command center was destroyed in the 

 attack, the city's Office of Emergency Management, 

 OEM, established a temporary command post. By the 

 evening of September 11th, lights lit up the entire 

 site while the search for survivors went on.

 Firefighters worked day and night to 

 extinguish fires that burned beneath the rubble for 

 months. The Department of Design and Construction, 
 71 

 along with the Fire Department and the Office of 

 Emergency Management, spearheaded interagency 

 coordination among city agencies and with federal 

 and state agencies and private organizations.

 In the first five days alone, almost 3,000 

 truckloads of debris were removed. Over the next 

 seven months, an average of more than 7,000 tons of 

 debris, per day, was taken from the site. Barging 

 operations were established at Hudson River Piers

 25 and 26 to transport debris from Manhattan to the 

 Fresh Kills Landfill, which was reopened to 

 accommodate the enormous tonnage of material. 

 The recovery proceeded in a manner that 

 made the search for human remains the highest

 priority. Work came to a halt any time it appeared 

 such a discovery might be made. To date, the 

 remains of 1,481 victims of that attack have been 

 identified by the Office of the Chief Medical

 Examiner, an office that has led the nation in its

 use of state-of-the-art DNA identification 

 technology. 

 The clearing of the site, which was 
 72 

 initially expected to take years, instead took 

 eight months. The work was not only accomplished 

 much faster than expected but done under budget, 

 without a single loss of life, with an injury rate

 far less than at an ordinary construction site, 

 despite the unprecedented conditions in which the 

 work was done. 

 Would you like me to wait while we finish? 

 I'd be happy to wait until we catch up, soon as we

 finish briefing, then we can continue. It's quite 

 all right. I have plenty of time, so I'd be happy 

 to do it. 

 In retrospect, there is little this city 

 could have done on 9/11 to avoid the tremendous

 loss of life that occurred so quickly after the 

 attacks. The failure of airport security doomed 

 the 2,700 poor souls who are no longer with us. 

 However, since then we have taken it upon ourselves 

 to learn everything possible from this tragedy.

 Shortly after 9/11, the consulting firm of 

 McKinsey & Company agreed to study, on a pro bono 

 basis, the response of the Police and Fire 
 73 

 Departments to the attack on the World Trade Center 

 and to make recommendations for the future. 

 These extremely valuable consultant 

 studies, which are available on the Web,

 complemented studies already underway in both these 

 departments. And many of the consultants' 

 recommendations were already in effect or were 

 being implemented when the final reports were 

 issued.

For example, at the NYPD, one of 

 Commissioner Kelly's first acts was to establish a 

 Counterterrorism Bureau and expand the department's 

 Intelligence Division. Protective and other 

 equipment issued to officers responding to possible

 terrorist incidents also was upgraded. 

 McKinsey & Company also recommended that 

 the NYPD create a comprehensive disaster-response

 plan with the means to effectuate it, measures that 

 have already be carried out. The McKinsey report

 concerning the FDNY was eloquent in its praise for 

 the heroism and sacrifice of our firefighters. 

 It also focused on four principal areas; 
 74 

 operational preparedness, planning and management, 

 communications technology and the provision of 

 counseling and support services to members of the 

 department and their families.

 Since its release, the Fire Department 

 also has appointed a Terrorist Advisory Task Force, 

 headed by former CIA director, James Woolsey. 

 Perhaps the most encouraging McKinsey

 finding was that while the city's massive response

 was taking place downtown, the rest of the city 

 remained protected with response times to 

 emergencies elsewhere in the five boroughs barely 

 impacted. 

 Other key agencies have also responded to

 the lessons of 9/11. The Department of Health has 

 enhanced its bioterrorism surveillance, developed a 

 Web-based system to communicate with medical 

 providers in our city and is building a 

 state-of-the-art bioterrorism laboratory.

 Our Office of Emergency Management has an 

 interim headquarters and is in the process of 

 building a new permanent home. It has also 
 75 

 coordinated a series of inter-agency preparedness 

 exercises which have guided our city's response to 

 the increased security needs occasioned by the 

 current war in Iraq.

 New York City, which unfortunately is one 

 of, if not the primary potential target of a 

 terrorist attack, must be prepared to both prevent 

 those attacks and to respond quickly and 

 effectively if they occur. Our administration is

 committed to doing just that. 

 We have developed an extraordinary system 

 to guard and protect this city, and every day we're 

 making those systems even more effective. We are 

 developing the most sophisticated systems possible,

 both to prevent terrorism and respond to it. 

 Some 10 days ago I met with President Bush 

 and the Homeland Security Secretary, Tom Ridge, to 

 brief them on the counterterrorism measures the 

 city has taken because of the war in Iraq. Our

 operation is known as Operation Atlas. Secretary 

 Ridge later said, "There is no city in this country 

 that does a better job of working across the board 
 76 

 to prevent terrorism than the City of New York." 

 After 9/11 President Bush pledged $20 

 billion in federal rebuilding assistance to New 

 York City and he has been as good as his word. We

 have also benefited from bipartisan support in 

 both houses of Congress on this matter, but we now 

 need additional help from the federal government to 

 meet the high costs of homeland security. 

 New York City is the nation's financial

 capital and its communications nerve center. 

 Protection for New York is protection for the 

 nation. And the key to our city's ability to 

 respond to any future terrorist attack is funding. 

 I am sure you're aware of the city's

 fiscal plight. We face a multi-billion-dollar

 budget gap for the fiscal year beginning July 1st. 

 Much of that deficit is the result of the increased 

 expenses and decreased economic activity created by 

 9/11 and its aftermath.

 I urge the Commission in the most emphatic 

 form possible to recommend to Congress that it 

 appropriate sufficient monies earmarked to the 
 77 

 cities most vulnerable to attack to help us defray 

 the extraordinary costs of protecting our citizens

 and the whole country. 

 Specifically, we have requested additional

 funds for counterterrorism training, equipment and 

 to cover the costs of our massive security 

 operations around the city in the supplemental 

 appropriation the administration sent to Congress 

 last week. The Homeland Security Fund should be

 allocated on the basis of threat analysis and risk. 

 Any other formula, for example by population, 

 defies logic and makes a mockery of the country's 

 counterterrorism efforts. 

 New York City has been targeted, let me

 remind you, four times by terrorists and the 

 federal government cannot ignore our symbolic

 value, recent history and common sense as it works 

 to increase homeland security. To argue that most 

 other cities have comparable threats is just

 ridiculous. 

 New York City, to put it into perspective,

 is estimated to receive between 8 and 11 million 
 78 

 dollars out of the 560 million dollars from the 

 last Homeland Security distribution. At some point

 politics has to give way to reality. If we 

 distributed monies to the military this way, our

 troops in Iraq would have bows and arrows to fight 

 with. 

 I want to close with some comments on 

 another problem that deserves your attention and 

 that of our policymakers. It is how to deal with

 the massive destruction and personal injuries that 

 can result from a terrorist attack. 

 New York's response to 9/11 was truly 

 extraordinary. Within hours of the collapse of the 

 World Trade Center buildings, the city government

 and private companies had equipment and personnel 

 at Ground Zero to undertake the massive recovery

 and debris-removal operations that were necessary. 

 The city and these contractors stayed there until 

 the end and did so selflessly and without a thought

 to the consequences. 

 However, in the real world there are 

 consequences, and one of those is lawsuits. The 
 79 

 city and the private contracting community are now 

 aware of the risks we took on without the benefit 

 of federal protection to cover our operations. It 

 took over a year and a special act of Congress for

 any significant insurance to become available to 

 protect the city and private contractors from such 

 lawsuits arising from the cleanup operation. 

 And the insurance provided is billions of 

 dollars less than sought in lawsuits already filed.

 Personal-injury claims regarding alleged long-term

 health damage could bankrupt our city over the next 

 20 years. Congress must give us retroactive 

 indemnification or the drag on the national economy 

 from New York's economic burden will ruin

 opportunity throughout all 50 states. 

 Knowing what we know now, it is imperative 

 that a federal indemnification plan be enacted that 

 would insure municipalities and private contractors 

 so that in the future, when we respond to a

 terrorist attack, we will be protected against the 

 inevitable lawsuits. 

 The attacks on 9/11 were attacks on the 
 80 

 United States, not just the City of New York. We 

 cannot afford the substantial risk that, in the 

 wake of another terrorist attack, a municipality or 

 state will feel it has to wait for the Army Corps

 of Engineers to do the necessary work or private 

 companies will feel they have to refuse to provide 

 assistance until and unless a statute is passed 

 giving them protection. 

 Therefore, the Commission should urge

 Congress to enact a special indemnification or

 insurance program for governmental entities and 

 their contractors who respond to such an attack to 

 insure that FEMA can and will fund significant 

 intermediate insurance coverage to such governments

 and contractors. Without Congressional action, the 

 nation will be unprepared to respond to the 

 destruction created by any future terrorist 

 attacks. 

 Despite their extraordinarily busy

 schedules and the work they're doing right now to 

 meet the heightened security concerns accompanying 

 the war in Iraq, Commissioners Kelly and Scoppetta 
 81 

 are here to answer any questions you may have. 

 Before turning over the floor to you and 

 to them I want to conclude with this thought: You 

 are charged with performing a great service to this

 nation and we all want to do what we can to

 remember those who perished on 9/11 and those who 

 so selflessly toiled for the days and weeks and 

 months thereafter. 

 We must learn the lessons of that terrible

 day and make sure that this city and other cities 

 in our nation have the communications systems, the 

 well-trained personnel and the federal assistance 

 we need to prevent and respond to such attacks in 

 the future. Thank you.

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Thank you very much for 

 your comments. We did not expect Commissioners 

 Kelly and Scoppetta -- excuse me? 

 MR. SCOPPETTA: Scoppetta. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: -- Scoppetta this morning.

 MAYOR BLOOMBERG: I thought it would be 

 easier with all of us here, since one of the keys 

 is to make sure that we have all the departments 
 82 

 cooperating, so I thought that if we all testified 

 together, it would give you a better opportunity to 

 understand just how well prepared this city was and 

 is.

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: We'd be delighted to hear. 

 I know we have a panel tomorrow at which 

 representatives from your departments are going to 

 take part. We would be delighted at this point to 

 hear Commissioner Kelly and Commissioner Scoppetta,

 any comments you would like to add to the Mayor's. 

 MR. SCOPPETTA: I think we just can answer 

 questions, Mr. Chairman. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Commissioner? 

 COMMISSIONER ROEMER: Mr. Chairman, I

 apologize, Mayor, I was asking the staff if this 

 meant that we would not have their expertise and 

 their insight and their counsel tomorrow. 

 MAYOR BLOOMBERG: Keep in mind that 

 neither were commissioners when the attacks

 occurred, or in the first three months. They're 

 really only able to testify to the city's response 

 after 9/11's aftermath, starting January 1st, when 
 83 

 they took the lessons that we learned and actually 

 tried to implement them. 

 And for the last 15 months, they have been 

 working very hard to increase this city's

 preparedness to any future attack, but certainly 

 more than that, to focus on preventing an attack. 

 People talk about first responders, these are our 

 first preventers. 

 And the city is well-served by the NYPD

 and the Fire Department, not only to prevent

 possible terrorist attacks, but if you take a look 

 at the murder rate and the deaths from fires 

 continues to decline and has precipitously in the 

 last 15 months, that's their job and they do it

 very well.

 COMMISSIONER ROEMER: But Mayor, my 

 question was, will they still be available to us 

 tomorrow at the 1:30 to 3:00 panel? 

 MAYOR BLOOMBERG: I thought I would make

 the head of the Department of Design and 

 Construction, Ken Holden, available. He's the only 

 one in the administration that was running an 
 84 

 agency then and was onsite, and he can add a lot. 

 I think if there were specific questions, 

 unfortunately, both of these guys have an awful lot 

 to do, so I thought if we all came, we could avoid

 wasting their time. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Congressman Gorelick? 

 COMMISSIONER GORELICK: Let me say this. 

 Ray Kelly is probably the best-suited person in 

 this country to talk to us about the coordination

 that is taking place in real time between our 

 localities and the various agencies of the federal 

 government. 

 I had the privilege of working with Ray 

 when he was in the federal government in various

 capacities, and I know that he's deeply involved 

 with our federal agencies. I would find it 

 enormously helpful if we could have a session with 

 you at some later point to talk in detail about how 

 it is working for you in the city.

 I would love to hear a general statement 

 now, but to Commissioner Roemer's point, I think we 

 could learn a great deal from you, if you would 
 85 

 make yourself available to us, I know you're 

 incredibly busy, but if you could make yourself 

 available to us, give us a sense of how the various 

 elements of the federal government are relating to

 each other and to you. 

 MR. KELLY: Sure, we can do that in the 

 future. 

 COMMISSIONER GORELICK: But if you could 

 characterize it now, I think it would be helpful

 just to get us started and locate it, if you would. 

 MR. KELLY: I think there's no question 

 that state and local and federal agencies are 

 working more closely now than ever before. We have 

 an excellent working relationship, that is the NYPD

 does with both the FBI and the CIA, and also the state's 

 Office of Public Security that is involved. We're 

 much closer now than ever before. We have a 

 free flow of information. 

 I don't think there's any question in my

 mind that we're not getting information certainly 

 relevant to New York City on an immediate basis. 

 Internally in the city, I think we're working much 
 86 

 closer. Commissioner Scoppetta and I and the staff 

 of the Fire and Police Department work closely 

 together. 

 We now have executives assigned to each

 other's headquarters. We make available our 

 helicopter assets to fire chiefs to survey the 

 scene of major events or major fires. We are now 

 able to communicate on a city-wide basis, an 

 interagency-communication net that exists. I think

 it certainly needs further development. 

 Commissioner Scoppetta can give you more specific 

 information about their communications systems. 

 So just, you know, in a nutshell, there's 

 much more communication, much more coordination

 than there has ever been before. Are there 

 occasional hiccups? Yeah, but nothing really of 

 significance. So I don't know how I can say it 

 more directly. 

 We're getting the information that we

 think we need. We, for instance, have increased 

 our Joint Terrorism Task Force component. On 

 September 11, 2001, there were 17 investigators 
 87 

 from the NYPD, on the Joint Terrorism Task Force, 

 there are now over a hundred and they are working with 

 the FBI literally throughout the world. 

 The CIA has been very forthcoming with

 information, as well. We have brought onboard 

General Frank Libutti, retired, a Marine Corps 

 Lieutenant General, to head our Counterterrorism 

 Bureau, and in that bureau is our Joint Terrorist 

 Task Force component.

 We have also brought onboard David Cohen,

 former Deputy Director and Director of Operations 

 for the CIA. Commissioner Cohen is in charge of 

 the Intelligence Division. He has really done a 

 remarkable job pulling that together. We have our

 own Arabic speakers, Urdu, Pashtu, Hindi speakers 

 that we've brought together, and again, in that 

 construct, we work closely with the federal 

 government, as well. 

 COMMISSIONER GORELICK: As we proceed, I

 think it would be enormously helpful if we could 

 sit down with you and your team as we --

 MAYOR BLOOMBERG: I thought tomorrow we'd 
 88 

 deliver a statement from both the Police 

 Commissioner and the Fire Commissioner, a written 

 statement, so that you can start going in that 

 direction. And as you get more information and

 formulate specific questions, we'd be happy to

 answer questions. 

 COMMISSIONER GORELICK: Thank you, Mayor. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Commissioner Hamilton? 

 VICE CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Mayor, I am very

 grateful to you and your colleagues for coming this 

 morning. And what especially I appreciated about 

 your statement was the specific recommendations you 

 made. 

 Our task as a Commission, at the end of

 the day, will be to make recommendations to 

 policymakers to prevent such attacks occurring 

 again. And while you're here -- and I hope without 

 taking advantage of you -- I would like to get from 

 you what several recommendations you think are most

 important for this Commission to make with regard 

 to the prevention of future attacks. 

 MAYOR BLOOMBERG: Well, funding for the 
 89 

 people on the ground is perhaps the most important 

 thing that Congress could do. In the end, it is 

 the cop on the beat, it is the firefighter in the 

 truck that does the work.

 We can talk about policies, we can fund 

 studies, but you need to get those people that do 

 the work to be well trained, to have the equipment 

 they need and to be fairly compensated. And you 

 will only do that if you direct the monies to where

 the need is.

 It is laughable, and tragically laughable, 

 to think that a tiny city in another state is under 

 the same kind of threat that New York City is or 

 that if an attack were -- let us pray not -- but if

 an attack were to take place that it would have the 

 same kind of effect on the entire country. 

 VICE CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: My point was 

 prevention, your point is protection. Your point 

 is very, very important and very valuable. And I

 think your experience in New York City can teach us 

 an awful lot about how we respond to terrorism and 

 how we can protect against terrorism, but is there 
 90 

 anything that comes out of the New York City 

 experience that can guide us with regard to the 

 prevention of terrorism? 

 MAYOR BLOOMBERG: We have a thousand of

 our police officers on intelligence. The New York 

 City Police Department has its own police officers 

 in major cities around the world so that we get 

 intelligence. What you see under Operation Atlas, a 

 group of heavily armed men and women in police

 uniforms all of a sudden show up and then go 

 someplace else totally unexpected, that is a 

 preventive thing. 

 VICE CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Are you 

 comfortable with the amount of intelligence you get

 from the federal government? Is there good 

 coordination with our intelligence agencies at the 

 federal level and your intelligence agencies? 

 MAYOR BLOOMBERG: As the Commissioner 

 said, that in terms of information that references

 New York, Commissioner Kelly is comfortable that we 

 get it virtually instantly. The problem with 

 intelligence is there's so much and it tends to be 
 91 

 so unspecific that there isn't a direct answer to 

 your question. 

 Only in retrospect can you look back and 

 say whether or not you had too few assets deployed.

 We will never know whether we had too many, but we 

 have an obligation to prevent, to protect, and if 

 need be respond to the public, not just terrorism 

 from terrorists, terrorism from criminals. 

 There's lots of different things that all

 of our security agencies, law-enforcement agencies, 

 Fire Department, medical people, have to 

 respond to every day. Not everything is caused by 

 terrorists. 

 I think we're going in the right

 direction. We have a commitment to provide the 

 level of security that we believe is adequate. It 

 is not as much as we would like. I'd love to have 

 a firehouse on every corner. We can't afford that.

 I'd love to have a police officer stationed in the

 lobby of every building. We can't afford that. We 

 have to deal with the economic realities of the 

 world. 
 92 

 Having said that, we will provide the 

 level that our senior management in police and fire 

 think is appropriate to make this city safe. And 

 the consequences of doing that are that we will

 have to, unfortunately, not do many of the other 

 things that the people of this city and this 

 country need, due to the limited resources. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Commissioner Ben-Veniste?

 COMMISSIONER BEN-VENISTE: Mayor

 Bloomberg, I thank you for your pledge of full 

 cooperation, and we will certainly take you up on 

 it. I would like to congratulate you on your 

 selection of my old friend and colleague, Nick 

 Scoppetta, to be Fire Commissioner. And I see Ray

 Kelly, who I have had the privilege of meeting with 

 in the past. 

 MAYOR BLOOMBERG: Let me also point out 

 that we have our Corporation Counsel here, so out 

 of the four of us up here, three are lawyers.

 COMMISSIONER BEN-VENISTE: Not a bad 

 thing. 

 MAYOR BLOOMBERG: It depends. 
 93 

 COMMISSIONER BEN-VENISTE: Let me ask Nick 

 Scoppetta this question, and one we will continue 

 to think about, and that is the relationship of the 

 federal and state and local systems working

 together. 

 Traditionally, there has been a criticism 

 that federal agencies and particularly our domestic 

 law-enforcement agencies, the FBI, has treated state 

 and local authorities in a manner involving a

 one-way street of information. Many criticisms 

 have been laid to that situation. 

 And let me ask both Commissioner Scoppetta 

 and Commissioner Kelly whether, in the post-9/11

 environment, you see any improvement in the flow of

 information from the federal government to the 

 state and city authorities. 

 MR. SCOPPETTA: I think Commissioner Kelly 

 is in a better position to address that question. 

 And I'd like to start by saying that we rely

 heavily on the Police Department, and I in 

 particular rely heavily on my contacts with 

 Commissioner Kelly, which are frequent and 
 94 

 continuous. And there has been more than one 

 occasion when he has called me directly to discuss 

 a piece of intelligence that we then jointly acted 

 on.

 I will say that I think I have never seen 

 better cooperation and coordination between the 

 various city agencies that might be called upon to 

 first responders and, in particular, fire and 

 police. We have done four joint exercises

 together. 

 We have, as Commissioner Kelly mentioned, 

 executive liaisons at each other's headquarters 

 that report there every day. We have a high-level

 working committee, our chief of the department, our

 chief of operations and their counterparts in the 

 Police Department meet on a regular basis. 

 And so there is a lot of coordination and 

 cooperation and joint planning with police and 

 fire, which is the thing that concerns me

 primarily. And the relationship with the FBI and 

 the other law-enforcement and intelligence 

 communities on the federal level is one that Ray 
 95 

 Kelly has I think a very good relationship with. 

 And we rely heavily on police intelligence. 

 MR. KELLY: I have been in law enforcement 

 a long time, both on the federal and the local

 level. And clearly there were some issues in the 

 past with the flow of information. 

 I can tell you that has changed 

 significantly in the aftermath of September 11th. 

 I think the Patriot Act also has changed it. So

 there were some restrictions placed on the federal 

 agencies restricting them from talking to other 

 agencies, and indeed talking to local agencies. That 

 has changed. 

 There is a palpable difference in their

approach to doing business. They want to get that 

 information out. They are getting it out. Again, 

 we're commingled, you might say, on the Joint 

 Terrorism Task Force level, as never before, with a 

 number of investigators that we have assigned over

 there. 

 So in terms of the flow of information, it 

 is much, much different, much better than it was 
 96 

 prior to September 11th. 

 MAYOR BLOOMBERG: But let me also add that 

 it is not just police and fire with this kind of 

 terrorism that you saw on 9/11. Our Office of

 Emergency Management, our Department of Health and 

 Mental Hygiene, our Medical Examiner's Office, our 

 Department of Environmental Protection, all of 

 those agencies meet virtually every day, have 

 contacts, either in person or over the phone.

 The threat to this country and the threat 

 to this city of an attack on our water supply or a 

 bioterrorism threat or a chemical threat, those are 

 the kinds of agencies that would have to recognize 

 threats, occurrences, when they take place, which

 is not easy to do. 

 You don't just wake up and say, oh, we 

 have a bioterrorism threat or an attack. It's over 

 a period of time that you build information to say, 

 hey, we must have been attacked days ago. That's

 the way bioterrorism works. And it is having scientists, researchers, 

 personnel on the ground that look and have their 
 97 

 eyes and ears open and exercise common sense and 

 have the interdisciplinary as well as interagency 

 coordination. I just cannot tell you the amount of 

 research that is done every day to make sure the

 city stays safe. And it's not just looking for the 

 kinds of acts that are obvious once they take 

 place. 

 COMMISSIONER BEN-VENISTE: Let me follow 

 up in one way. And I'm gratified to hear

 Commissioner Kelly's statement with respect to 

 cooperation from the FBI and other 

 intelligence-gathering agencies of the federal 

 government. 

 Are there specific areas where you feel

 improvement still needs to be made? 

 MR. KELLY: I think it's something that 

 has to be worked on every day. You have to be 

 aware of it and be conscious of it every day. We 

 don't want agencies to fall back into old habits. And I

 think that it is very important at the top, 

 certainly here in this city, we have a great 

 working relationship with the Assistant Director of 
 98 

 the FBI, Kevin Donovan.

 It's something that you have to focus on 

 and use. You just can't let that slip. So I can't 

 think of a particular area where we would want to

 say we need more information in that area. 

I think it's general approach. People 

 want that information to go forward. Quite 

 frankly, they don't want to be caught holding onto 

 information that should be disseminated. So people

 now see it in their interest to move that 

 information forward. 

 COMMISSIONER BEN-VENISTE: I appreciate 

 that. And we look forward to you continuing to 

 think about these issues and to advise us of where

 we may be helpful in making recommendations for 

 even further cooperation. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: We'd better move on 

 because we have two more Commissioners with 

 questions. I know we're going to deal with this

 subject more tomorrow. Commissioner Thompson and 

 Commissioner Roemer. 

 COMMISSIONER THOMPSON: I'd be interested, 
 99 

 Mr. Chairman, in hearing from either Commissioner 

 about their opportunity, if one has presented 

 itself -- I know that they have been 

 extraordinarily busy with their New York duties --

 in passing on to their peers in law enforcement and 

 firefighting across the United States and other 

 large metropolitan areas the lessons that these 

 departments have learned, or if they have not yet 

 had that opportunity, whether they plan to do that

 in the future. 

 MR. SCOPPETTA: A lot of our people have 

 spent a lot of time since 9/11 traveling to other 

 jurisdictions, talking about our experience, 

 talking about the lessons we have learned. And in

 fact, when we had the McKinsey study done of our 

 response on 9/11, the McKinsey people and our 

 senior chiefs traveled across the country, both 

 talking about our experience and trying to learn 

 something from other jurisdictions. That was

 extremely useful. So there's been a lot of that. 

 MR. KELLY: We have done some of that, but 

 quite frankly, our focus is right here in New York. 
 100 

 There's an opportunity cost when you take your 

 senior leadership and maybe send them to other 

 jurisdictions. I think people are welcome to come 

 here to New York.

 I think the Mayor proposed that perhaps 

 even there is a possibility for us to maybe have some lessons 

 given and perhaps some money can come our way as a 

 result of that, but quite frankly, we are focused 

 on New York and protecting this city. So we

 haven't done as much of that, I guess, as we could 

 have. 

 MAYOR BLOOMBERG: I did volunteer to the 

 President and to Secretary Ridge, that we would be 

 happy, financing and time being available, to share

 lessons which we learned here with other 

 municipalities. Keep in mind that New York, 

 because of its size and density, is somewhat 

 different than any other city, even the other very 

 large cities.

 To put it in perspective, our police 

 department is bigger than the police departments of 

 the next four largest cities in this country 
 101 

 combined. So we have a different problem.

 Forty percent of our population was born 

 outside of the United States. There is roughly 140 

 different languages spoken here in New York City.

 So when another city might look for somebody that 

 speaks a language, we probably have a hundred 

 people in the Police Department that speak that 

 language. 

 We have a service where you can call 24

 hours a day, seven days a week, to interact with 

 municipal government. We have identified 170 

 different languages that we could take your 

 question in and give you a response. 

 I will say that when we had the terrible

 tragedy of 9/11, this country responded to help New 

 York in ways that New Yorkers will forever remember 

 and forever be grateful. And I said to the 

 President and to Secretary Ridge, if we can find 

 the funding and the time, perhaps there are some

 ways that we can, in a small measure, by helping 

 the rest of this country, say thank you for their 

 outpouring of support back then. 
 102 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Thank you. 

 MR. KELLY: I just want to add one thing, 

 I'm sorry, Governor. We do have an excellent 

 working relationship with the senior staff of the

 Chicago Police Department. They did visit here 

 with us and we have sent representatives there. So 

 I know you might have particular interest in 

 Illinois. I wanted to emphasize that. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Congressman Roemer.

 COMMISSIONER ROEMER: Commissioner Kelly, 

 you not only hit right away on one of the 

 Governor's concerns, you hit absolutely on the mark 

 in your two minutes what the United States Congress 

 looked at for 12 months in the Joint Inquiry with

 regard to what are the two key issues to make sure 

 the federal government is sharing information with 

 local Police Departments and Fire Departments and 

 intelligence agencies. 

 The two key issues that we found, and I

 wish you would comment on them, are one, how do we make 

 sure the people in your department get clearances. 

 The Governor of Virginia, Jim Gilmore, eloquently 
 103 

 complained to Congress that he wasn't even cleared, 

 as a governor, to get certain information. And how 

 do you then make sure that you get the information 

 to you and your top people.

 The second issue is, as you again hit on 

 and I wish you'd be a little bit more explicit 

 about some ways we can improve this, is 

 actionable intelligence. How do we improve the 

 specifics of that information to you the first

 time, if not the second time, to give you the right 

 information that can help you prevent some kind of 

 terrorist attack from taking place? 

 MR. KELLY: I think the granting of 

 clearances is a real issue. It is still an issue

 and it obviously has to be handled on the federal 

 level. There has been some give in the granting of 

 interim clearances, but it just has to be speeded 

 up. 

 And we are on the receiving end of that.

 I think the Mayor and I have had some discussions 

 about that. The background checks are extensive. 

 There's some archaic regulations. 
 104 

 I myself have not been, I've gone through 

 the nomination process twice. And when I was in 

 the federal government, I moved from one job to the 

 other requiring another clearance process. That

 whole thing had to be done again, even though I was 

 sitting in an office. I was an Undersecretary 

 moving to the Commissioner position. I had to go 

 through the whole process again. It simply did not 

 make sense. So I think that we just need give

 in that regard. 

 As far as actionable intelligence, the 

 problems, it just doesn't come in a neat package. 

 It's not specific. We're not getting it as a 

 nation with great specificity. It's not coming to

 us with specificity. We're getting bits and pieces 

 and it's difficult for our intelligence agencies. 

 And we work with them. It's difficult to put it 

 together. There's no easy answer.

 And you know, we can go back 30 years and

 all of these discussions that we've had about 

 over-reliance on technology versus human 

 intelligence, but that's what we're faced with now, 
 105 

 that's what we get on a national level, that's what 

 comes down to us on the local level. 

 MAYOR BLOOMBERG: Let me add to that. One 

 of the surest ways to let the terrorists attack us

 again is for all of us to stay home, seal ourselves 

 in, and let our economy and our lives fall apart 

 because of a perceived threat. 

 America is a country that for 225 years 

 has been willing to stand up, run risks, fight to

 make sure that we stay a democratic country and to 

 try to help the rest of the world. And we have not 

 gone back and hidden ourselves at home. We have to 

 say, turn it over to the professionals and go about 

 our business.

 And this constant reaction to ill-defined

 terrorist threats can only damage our economy and 

 prevent us from responding later on when a real 

 threat does occur. And we have to be very careful 

 that we don't go in the other direction in the

 interest of being able to show that we had X number 

 of threats and we responded here, here and here. 

 The fact of the matter is, the public has 
 106 

 to go on. This is, by and large, let us pray, 

 totally, it is a safe country. And we have 

 professionals certainly in this city, and I think, 

 although I have a little less experience at the

 state and federal level, to prevent terrorist 

 attacks in the future, let us all pray. In the 

 meantime, we have to go about our business and our 

 lives. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: The last question,

 Secretary Lehman. 

 COMMISSIONER LEHMAN: Yes, thank you for 

 your statement. I would really like to request at 

 a subsequent opportunity that we get the city 

 government's best recommendations with regard to a

 problem that was highlighted in the Joint Committee 

 investigations and became a major criticism of the 

 FBI in particular, and that is the dominance of the

 law-enforcement and prosecutorial approach to 

 terrorist issues and the obstacle that that becomes

 in the sharing of intelligence, which may be 

 evidentiary, and becomes protected as soon as an 

 investigation gets going, and how you, at your 
 107 

 level, can come up with procedures to insure that 

 there is full sharing among all the offices in your 

 government, as well as the federal government, even 

 at the expense of perhaps weakening the evidentiary

 sanctity of a prosecution. That would be very 

 valuable to us in the future. 

 MR. KELLY: I agree. I think that is an 

 excellent point. I think it's an issue of culture. 

 We need that change, again, in the FBI, and

 obviously the Department of Justice, That's their 

 business, the prosecution. We are now forced to 

 be in the preventive mode where we have to focus on 

 stopping another event, preventing another event, 

 rather than doing a retrospective examination of

 one of these horrific events. 

 It takes a lot of focus and a real 

 culture change in those agencies. I think that Director Mueller is 

 doing an excellent job in that regard, but it is a

 heavy lift, and he understands it. I've had these 

 conversations. 

 COMMISSIONER LEHMAN: Do you think you 
 108 

 have the right balance in the NYPD? 

 MR. KELLY: I think we have it in the 

 department more so than perhaps on the federal 

 level because I think we're literally at Ground

 Zero. There is much more of an awareness of the 

 need for prevention than perhaps on the federal 

 level. It's something we have to focus on, as 

 well. 

 MAYOR BLOOMBERG: And evidentiary

 considerations are not just for criminal 

 prosecution. We live in a litigious society, and 

 we have to continue day in and day out and pay the 

 bills. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Mayor, I want to thank you

 very much, Commissioner Kelly, Commissioner 

 Scoppetta, Counsel, thank you for your time very, 

 very much today. I appreciate it. 

 I now ask the panel of Mr. Waizer, David 

 Lim, Lee Ielpi, Brian Birdwell and Craig Sincock,

 please. All right. Are we ready to get started 

 again? We are running behind, which I apologize 

 for. We did not expect the Commissioners from New 
 109 

 York but thought it was wrong, since they made 

 themselves available, they are an important part of 

 this, and I thought it was wrong not to ask them 

 questions when they offered to accept questions.

 Mr. Waizer, do you want to start in? 

 MR. WAIZER: Governor Kean, members of the 

 Commission, thank you for asking me to speak before 

 you today. My experience of 9/11 differs from 

 yours and that of the general public. As this

 nation and much of the world watched in shock and 

 horror on 9/11, as events unfolded at the World 

 Trade Center, at the Pentagon and in the air over 

 the farmlands of Pennsylvania, I was otherwise 

 engaged, battling for my life. If hearing my

 personal story can help this Commission fulfill its 

 important task, I will gladly tell it. 

 On September 11th, at approximately 8:46 

 in the morning, I was in an elevator, somewhere 

 between the 78th and 101st floor, in Tower 1 of the

 World Trade Center. I had left my wife, Karen, and 

 our three children, Katie then age 13, Joshua 12, 

 and Jodi 10, at about 7:15 that morning and I was 
 110 

 on my way to my offices on the 104th floor where I 

 was employed as Vice President and Tax Counsel in 

 charge of national and international tax matters 

 for Cantor Fitzgerald.

 The elevator was ascending when, suddenly, 

 I felt it rocked by an explosion, and then felt it 

 plummeting. Orange, streaming sparks were apparent 

 through the gaps in the doors at the sides of the 

 elevator as the elevator scraped the walls of the

 shaft. The elevator burst into flame. I began to 

 beat at the flames, burning my hands, arms and legs 

 in the process. The flames went out, but I was hit 

 in the face and neck by a separate fireball that 

 came through the gap in the side of the elevator

 doors. The elevator came to a stop on the 78th 

 floor, the doors opened, and I jumped out. 

 I began the long walk down 78 flights in 

 the fire stairwell. I walked, focused on my single 

 mission: to get to the streets and find an

 ambulance. I knew I was seriously hurt. The

 stairwell was filled with people calmly walking 

 down, with no apparent sense of the magnitude of 
 111 

 what had just occurred. I was shouting out to 

 people in the stairwell, telling them I was burned, 

 asking them to step aside so that I could get down 

 more quickly. Faces turned towards me, sometimes

 with apparent annoyance at this intrusion on the 

 orderly evacuation process. I saw the look on many 

 of those faces turn to sympathy or horror as they 

 saw me. At one point I noticed a large flap of 

 skin hanging on my arm. I did not look any

 further. 

 Somewhere on the way down, I believe 

 around the 50th floor, I met a man who appeared to 

 be either a firefighter or Emergency Medical 

 Technician walking up. He stopped, turned around,

 and walked in front of me, leading me down. We 

 made it to the lobby and walked two blocks to find 

 an empty ambulance, which took me to the Burn 

 Center at New York Presbyterian Hospital. I stayed 

 conscious only long enough to give them my name and

my wife's phone number. 

 I have no memories after that for some six 

 or seven weeks; I spent that period in a state of 
 112 

 induced coma, but I can offer a secondhand account 

 of some of the more important personal events. I 

 was triaged at the hospital, where they took my 

 clothes, wallet, watch and glasses, none of which I

 ever saw again. They began to cut off my wedding

 band from my badly burned fingers, but a 

 sympathetic nurse used an entire jar of lubricant 

 to remove it intact and saved it for my wife. 

 Karen has worn that ring on a chain around her neck

 since then, saving it for the day when I can wear 

 it on my finger again. 

 As the world watched with horror as the 

 events of that morning unfolded, Karen began 

 receiving phone calls from friends and relatives.

 She tried to call me and waited, with fading hope, 

 for me to call her. Friends and family gathered at 

 my home to offer hope and, if the worst happened, 

 comfort. My two older children, having heard of 

 the attack called home and were allowed to return

 home. My 10 year old daughter remained in school, 

 unaware. At 12:30 the nurse was finally able to 

 call Karen, who took the call in our kitchen and 
 113 

 passed the news on to the others that I was alive. 

 Screams and tears of joy filled that room. But as 

 one nightmare ended for her, another was to begin. 

 Karen had no idea how seriously I had been

 injured. She was unable to reach me at the 

 hospital until almost 8 o'clock that evening. When 

 Karen first saw me that night, I was not 

 recognizable. My head was swollen almost 

 basketball size, the rest of my body had similarly

 swelled and my features were either covered by 

 bandages or so blackened and distorted as to be 

 unidentifiable. It was only the ring that gave her 

 any comfort that the swollen, misshapen body lying 

 in that hospital bed was in fact her husband.

 The doctors explained to Karen the nature 

 and severity of my injuries. I was particularly at 

 risk because the fireball in my face had seared my

 windpipe and lungs and I had inhaled a large amount 

 of jet fuel, leaving me particularly prone to

 life-threatening infections. I have since been 

 told that my chances of survival at that moment 

 were roughly five percent. 
 114 

 That night began a seven-week

 roller-coaster ride for Karen, friends and family. 

 I would appear to be recovering one day and be 

 diagnosed with a highly dangerous infection the

 next. I underwent multiple surgeries to graft new 

 skin on my hands, arms, face and neck, suffered a 

 blood clot, a seizure, a partial lung collapse and 

 a series of blood and lung infections. 

 Karen's mother moved up from Delaware into

 our home to take care of our three children. 

 Members of our local and our synagogue communities 

 delivered dinner to our home and drove our children 

 to their various activities. Friends and family 

 accompanied Karen to the hospital every day. Mine

 was not just a personal struggle, it was shared by 

 family and community. 

 After five months of hospitalization, 

 multiple surgeries, a year and a half, and 

 counting, of painful, sometimes grueling, therapy,

 I am here today to bear witness. My injuries have 

 left me with lung damage, chronic pain in my right

 elbow, my left knee, my back, damage to my vocal 
 115 

 cords and the prognosis for the nerve and tendon 

 damage in my hands is still uncertain. But I can 

 enjoy various activities, play with my children, 

 and enjoy my time spent with my wife, with my

 friends and family. 

 I am one of the handful of lucky ones. 

 Just blocks away from here lay the unrecovered 

 remains of many friends and colleagues, some dear 

 friends. They can no longer speak for themselves

 and I am left with the unchosen, unhappy task of 

 trying to speak for them. I do this with no 

 particular moral authority, but neither I nor they 

 have a choice. 

 I have no rage about what happened on

 9/11, only a deep sadness for the many innocent, 

 worthy lives lost and the loved ones who lost so 

 much that day. There have always been madmen, 

 perhaps there always will be. They must be 

 stopped, but with the cold detachment reserved by a

 surgeon for removing a cancer. They are not worthy 

 of my rage. Neither do I feel anger at those who 

 arguably could have foreseen, and thereby 
 116 

 prevented, the tragedies. If there were mistakes, 

 they were the mistakes of complacency, a 

 complacency in which we all shared. 

 This Commission cannot turn back the hands

 of time. There's nothing to be gained by asserting 

 blame, by pointing fingers. The dead will remain 

 dead despite this Commission's best efforts and 

 intentions. But it is my hope that this Commission 

 can learn and teach us from its scrutiny of the

 past, and if the findings of this Commission can 

 prevent even one future 9/11, if they can forestall 

 even one plan of Osama bin Laden, prevent even one 

 more act of madness and horror, I and the rest of 

 this nation will owe the Commission our gratitude,

 and I will be proud of the small part I was allowed 

 to play today. 

 I do have one concern I would like to 

 voice. I have no political experience, but I do 

 have experience as an informed citizen. It tells

 me that commissions such as this are usually formed

 by men and women of good will, have committed, 

 intelligent members and staff possessed of good 
 117 

 will, and eventually produce reports that are read 

 carefully and seriously by others of good will. 

 Yet the findings of such commissions are often 

 ignored in the end. Compassion and concern are

 often spread thin, and other important issues 

 become priorities after the glare of the public 

 spotlight fades. 

 My fear is that the work of this 

 Commission will have a similar fate. My hope is

 that by speaking to you today, by putting a human 

 face on the tragedy that was 9/11, by attempting to 

 speak, however inadequately, for those who no 

 longer have voices, I can help further the cause of 

 this Commission and this nation, to help build a

 safer, more secure tomorrow for all of us, and that 

 doing so will help bring peace for us and our 

 children. Thank you. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Mr. Waizer, thank you for 

 your eloquence, sir. Mr. David Lim, of the Port

 Authority. 

MR. LIM: I would first like to say, that 

 was one of the most moving statements I have ever 
 118 

 heard. And it makes what I have to say, I guess, 

 pale in comparison.

 I would like to thank the Commission, 

 Governor Kean, for allowing me to speak before you

 today in regards to my personal experience on 9/11. 

 As Mr. Waizer said, if what I can tell you will 

 help you in any way, find a cause to prevent future 

 happening of events such as this, speaking from a 

 police officer's point of view, will be greatly

 appreciated. 

 I saw, I saw a great number of my 

 brethren, 37 Port Authority police officers were 

 killed that day. Port Authority police only had 

 1,100 police officers at that time. And therein

 lies my responsibility, the same as Mr. Waizer's, I 

 have to speak now for those who can no longer 

 speak. 

 I guess that's where it lies heaviest for 

 me. These men and women, like myself, were just

 doing our jobs that day, something we do every day. 

 And only recently, I guess, it's appreciated, 

 unfortunately, through our great loss. 
 119 

 Someone asked why the Port Authority 

 police were in the World Trade Center, with the

 exception of Governor Kean, of course. The Port 

 Authority police are in the World Trade Center

 because the Port Authority of New York and New 

 Jersey built the World Trade Center. They built it 

 back in the '70s and from the first time they dug 

 the first hole, there was a Port Authority police 

 officer present to provide security for that area.

 When I first became a police officer, that 

 was back in 1980, I'll be perfectly honest, I 

 didn't know a lot of Port Authority police. I 

 wanted to be a police officer. I wanted to serve 

 the public. So I learned.

 I learned that the Port Authority police 

 were responsible for most of the 

 public-transportation facilities in the bi-state

 area, which of course includes tunnels, bridges, 

 airports, areas which obviously need security but

 post-9/11 have now become the most highlighted 

 areas in this area, in this theater of terrorism. 

 But I digress. 
 120 

 I wanted to say a lot of things today 

 about the Port Authority, but I think, I guess, I 

 said enough about that. And I'm going to tell you 

 about what happened to me that day. When I tell

 you this, I want you to remember what I tell you is 

 not the story of just David Lim, it's the story of

 every police officer, firefighter, EMS, civilians 

 that were helping out that day. 

 As the governor, Governor Pataki, said to

 you earlier, it was a day that we all came 

 together. We, everybody, pulled together to help 

 every else. You will understand that as I tell my 

 story. 

 I myself have been a Port Authority police

 officer for 23 years, the greater part of that at 

 the World Trade Center Command until I got into the 

 Canine Unit and have been doing that for the last 

 six years. And that's where my story begins. 

 I was working on 9/11, like I do every

 day, with my partner, Sirius, my explosive-detector

 canine, checking trucks coming into the World Trade 

 Center. This was considered vital, considering 
 121 

 what happened in '93. We did this every day with a 

 great feeling that we were accomplishing a very 

 necessary job. 

 The Trade Center itself, I can speak to

 the security. We had delta barriers and all kinds 

 of security situations set up to prevent future 

 terrorist attacks after '93. On that day I had 

 just finished up searching a multitude of trucks 

 with my partner and I had retired to my office to

 do my paperwork and have a little breakfast. 

 8:45 a.m. all that changed. I was in the 

 basement of Number 2 World Trade Center, yet I felt 

 the shock of the first plane hitting Tower 1. And 

 that could give you at least a start of the idea of

 the power of that hit, if I was in the basement of 

 the other building. I secured my partner in his 

 kennel, told him that I had to go help the people 

-- he was a bomb dog, not a search-and-rescue dog 

-- and I figured he'd be safe there while I went to

 assist. Unfortunately, that was the last time I 

 saw him. 

 I went over to Tower Number 1 to the 
 122 

 mezzanine level by the plaza by the sound stage 

 where they would have summertime shows. I was 

 assisting people out of the A staircase as they 

 were coming out of the building. At this point the

 debris was already falling onto the plaza. 

 Somebody screamed that a body was outside on the 

 plaza. I went over to investigate. And sure 

 enough, was the first body that I had seen. 

 It's not something that I'm going to

 describe here, there's no point. It's just 

 something that I will never forget for the rest of 

 my life. Here, as a police officer, at that point 

 I guess 21-and-a-half-years, was what I thought was 

 the most important thing, I had a body, a DOA. I

 had a lot of procedures to follow. And I went to 

 call it in on the radio. 

 And just as I did that, another body fell 

 about 10 feet away from that one. And all of a 

 sudden, what I thought was the most important thing

 to take care of, this body, became inconsequential 

 in the fact that obviously things were going to get 

 a lot worse than this one body that I had seen. 
 123 

 I took it upon myself at that point to 

 start heading up into the building to assist before 

 people would start jumping out of the building. I 

 started going up the stairs and I saw a lot of

 frightened faces. People were asking me what was 

 going on. At that point I already heard about the 

 airplane, but I lowered my radio to prevent people 

 from getting too scared. 

 I kept on going up, telling people to keep

 going down, down is good. I remember running into 

 people similar to Mr. Waizer that were burned, 

 asking for help. What I did was I assigned those 

 people to people that were healthy to 

 help get them down. I felt the greater good was

 for me to get to a higher point to try to assist 

 those people upstairs. 

 I got to the 27th floor and I saw a man in 

 a wheelchair waiting with his friend. I remember

 this because it's very important. I went up to him

 and he said he was waiting for the crowd to clear 

 and then he would go down. Coming up another 

 staircase, the B staircase, was the Fire Department 
 124 

 who said that they would take care of the gentleman 

 and that if I wanted, to proceed up. 

 Well, I tell you, I went into the 

 staircase that they came out of and, as you'll

 hear, it was very important. As I went to that 

 staircase, there were more people coming down. 

 There were some clogs of people, but generally they 

 were calm and they were not too frightened. At 

 this point it was still rather early, but they were

 going down orderly. 

 I got up to the 44th floor, Tower 1, the 

 sky lobby. I had made that my goal based on the 

 fact that there are express elevators that are 

 situated on that floor. My fear was that people

 coming from the middle floors would get onto those 

 elevators and try to take the quicker way down. 

 I have learned from my training in ESU 

 that an elevator is probably not one of the better 

 places to be. And I apologize for that, you know,

 it's just you didn't know, obviously, you know, at 

 the time. I'm talking about post-emergency.

 And sure enough, just as I was starting to 
 125 

 get the people down, I felt another collision on 

 the left side. Looking out the window I saw this 

 rain of fire coming down and it blew out the 

 windows on the 44th floor. Fortunately, I was

 right in the middle, I was not burned, but I was 

 knocked to the ground by the concussion. I grabbed 

 whatever people I had left. 

 And at this point, as you say, I knew we 

 were under attack. I thought it was an accident,

 there was no reason to think otherwise at that 

 point. A horrible accident, something we actually 

 had trained for, I remember, in the '80s in case 

 something like that would happen. But as I started 

 going down and taking the people with me, I could

 see the fear in their eyes growing. 

 The building now was starting to shake and 

 was not the stablest, you know, in other words, it 

 was not very stable. I'll just leave it at that. 

 As we were going down, I was clearing the floors,

 getting people that were left behind that were 

 waiting. Most of them were either handicapped, 

 elderly, had someone coming with disabilities, but at 
 126 

 this point there was no more waiting. We had to 

 go. 

 So I proceeded to gather them, right, and 

 start going, start heading down. We got to about the

 35th floor, in that general area. I don't remember 

 specifically when I felt the building shaking. I 

 thought for sure that my building was collapsing. 

 It shook and it stopped. 

 Then I heard on the radio something I will

 never forget, it was from our police desk over at 5 

 World Trade Center. And the transmission said, 

 "Tower 2 is down, all units evacuate Tower 1." I 

 couldn't believe it. What do you mean, Tower 2 is 

 down? I mean, it's the World Trade Center. Each

 building, 1,477 feet, can withstand anything. But 

 it also raised in my mind if that building can 

 fall, so can mine. 

 And now the people I was with were very 

 upset, of course. I just told them, we have to

 keep going. And we started heading down again. On 

 the 21st floor I ran into three of my supervisors, 

 Chief Romito, Captain Mazza and Lieutenant Cirri.
 127 

 They were assisting a gentleman who has having 

 difficulty walking and breathing. They were making 

 a stretcher out of a soda push cart. 

 I told the chief about the other building

 going down and that this collapse was imminent. So 

 he gathered the gentleman, one arm over his 

 shoulder, Lieutenant Cirri grabbed the other arm, 

 and we proceeded to take him down the building with 

 Captain Mazza, myself and our people. We went

 down. 

 As we were going down, and now we were 

 starting to lose power in the building, the lights 

 were going on and off. We had some emergency lighting in 

 the staircase and after '93, they'd painted stripes

 and they glow and it was very eerie watching the

 stairs as they lit up. I concentrated on the task 

 at hand, which was to get the people out of the 

 building. 

 I got down to the fifth floor and I saw,

 that is where I met Josephine Harris and Ladder

 Company 6, Ladder Company 6, a fire company out of 

 Chinatown. Josephine Harris, who is a Port 
 128 

 Authority employee, had walked down 72 flights, and 

 she had a bad leg problem and she could go no 

 further. 

 Captain Jonas, of Ladder 6, was attempting

 to find a chair to put her in to help carry her 

 down. I told the captain it was too late. And 

 following my chief's lead, I grabbed Josephine by 

 one arm, Firefighter Tommy Falco grabbed the other 

 arm, with Billy Butler right behind us, we started

 going down. 

 I remember my captain, Captain Mazza, 

 telling me to leave and let the Fire Department 

 handle that and to go with her. And I just said, 

 I'm helping out, just go ahead. Well, one more

 flight down was as far as we got and the building 

 started coming down. I knew that was it because 

 the other building was already gone. The memory of 

 that is very sharp in my mind, something I'll never 

 forget. People always ask me, of course, but this,

 I knew it was coming down. 

 All I could think of is, well, if I could 

 protect Josephine from the debris. So me and Tommy 
 129 

 were covering her and it started coming. And you 

 could feel the wind of pushing down as they were 

 compressing through the building, you could hear 

 the sound. It was like an on-rushing locomotive or

 an avalanche. You could almost feel the sound of 

 the floors pancaking on top of each other as they 

 were collapsing. As we all know, they collapsed 

 straight down. 

 Actually, one of the firefighters, Matty,

 actually blew right by us as he went down. I 

 didn't even know that until afterwards. And they 

 just kept coming and coming. And I guess my final 

 thoughts were about my family. I thought about my 

 wife, my kids. Excuse me. I hoped they would

 think well of me for what I did. I was very 

 fortunate. When the debris stopped falling --

 excuse me. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Just take your time. 

 MR. LIM -- first I thought I had died. I

 heard nothing, I saw nothing. But then I heard a 

 voice, I heard a voice, the voice of Captain Jonas, 

 my new friend. The voice was, "Who's here?" And I 
 130 

 heard a fireman that was in the stairwell with us 

 shouting out the names of companies. I remember 

 saying, "Lim, Port Authority police." 

 We couldn't see each other. It was

 totally black. We couldn't breathe. We had to try 

 to breathe through our shirts, but we were fairly, 

 in fairly good shape. We were alive. And we were 

 very grateful for that. 

 I hoped then that Captain Jonas and the

 men of Ladder 6 and there were other fire companies

 below us, of course, there was a total of 12 

 firefighters, Josephine and myself in that 

 stairwell. And for five hours, we fought to get 

 out of there. When I say we fought, we fought as a

 team. 

 There were times you may have heard in New 

 York that firefighters and police officers sometimes 

 don't get along. Well, we changed all that. 

 Between their actions and my expertise, after

 working almost 20 years in the building, we did 

 manage eventually to work our way out. 

 We also managed to get ahold of our 
 131 

 families, I was fortunate to have a couple of cell 

 phones, and managed to get through to let them know 

 that we were okay. And that was probably one of 

 the hardest moments for me was trying to explain to

 my wife that I might not get out of there. But 

 she's strong, a good cop's wife, she understood, I 

 was doing my job. 

 We ended up going up to get out through 

 the sixth floor stair, top of the staircase. We

 had started smelling jet fuel in the staircase,

 unburned jet fuel, and the fear of fire had caused 

 us to work even harder to get out. We saw a light 

 over the sixth-floor staircase and our first 

 thought was that the floor had power in it and it was

 virtually, or at least partially, intact, we could 

 make our stand there. 

 We felt we would be there for a lot longer 

 than five hours. As it turns out, as that light 

 got brighter, it turned out to be the sun. We were

 virtually standing on top of what was left of the 

 World Trade Center. When I say that, you have to 

 picture a straw in a pancake. We were in that 
 132 

 straw. 

 By all the engineers and everybody else 

 that tried to figure this out, there's no reason 

 why I should be sitting here talking to you right

 now. It was just a small sliver of staircase from 

 the sixth floor down to the first floor, damaged, 

 though still enough to keep us alive, that 

 preserved our lives. 

 We finally got through on the radio to

 Ladder Company 43 and they managed to come and 

 throw us ropes. We managed to climb down onto the 

 debris field in order to exit. They sent two of 

 their officers to stand by with Josephine for a 

 basket in order to carry her out.

 Then came the trek to get out of Ground 

 Zero. And that in itself was treacherous. One of 

 our party had a concussion, Mikey Meldrom, so I was 

 helping him. And the field was still on fire. 

 There were things that we saw that, like I said, there is

 no need to repeat. 

 So we attempted to exit actually through, 

 ironically enough, the U.S. Customs House over at 
 133 

 Six World Trade Center, but then we saw fire and we 

 heard what we thought was gunfire. And I guess in 

 my moment of stress, I thought we were under attack 

 and these guys had landed on the beach. And all I

 could think of was, well, I've got 46 rounds, I'll 

 take 'em. 

 But as it turned out, it was just ammunition 

 going off. But you still couldn't go out that way. 

 We ended up going out by One World Trade Center and

 exiting on West Street. We finally got out, I 

 think it was around 3:30 or so and we were beaten, 

 but we were alive, virtually with minor injuries. 

 Myself, I was taken to the hospital with a 

 concussion and some leg and back injuries which I

 have recovered from. But I guess it's the mental 

 injuries that I still suffer at times. Yes, I 

 still have some nightmares, I still have trouble, 

 as you can see, talking about this at times, but I 

 think it's important that we as a people move on.

 One of the questions that I'm usually 

 asked when I do speak about this is why don't I 

 retire. I'm a 20-plus man, I can retire any time.
 134 

 And my answer is that I will retire at a time of my 

 choosing, not at the choosing of some knucklehead 

 from Afghanistan. No way is he going to determine 

 when this cop is going to quit.

 I just again want to thank you for 

 allowing me to speak here. And I know, I know it's 

 obviously not quite as important as all the people 

 that we lost. I grieve for all those that I knew 

 that day, I grieve for those that I will never

 know, but I also grieve for the best partner I ever 

 had. Thank you very much. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Thank you. Mr. Ielpi? 

 MR. IELPI: Good morning. Before I start, 

 let me say two things. One, I'm not used to

 reading, I'd rather talk candidly, but I'm going to 

 have to read for time. And two, some of the things 

 I'm going to say are going to be sensitive to some 

 of the families that might be listening, so I'd 

 like to let them know ahead of time.

 I come to you today as an ambassador for 

 the dead and on behalf of the many others who 

 toiled at Ground Zero to recover the victims of the 
 135 

 terrorist attack. My son Jonathan, a member of 

 Squad Company 288 at the New York City Fire 

 Department, was killed in the South Tower. 

 I am a retired firefighter and a grieving

 father. I bring no political agenda to this 

 hearing. The only baggage I bear is a broken heart 

 and a resolve that the terrible events of September 

 11th not be repeated. 

 Ten minutes is a very short time to

 summarize even one day of the horror and loss that 

 filled Ground Zero. It is far too short to describe 

 nine months of picking though rubble and debris, to 

 find torsos, fingers, arms, bones and legs. Far too 

 short to convey one year and seven months of

 missing my son and looking into the sorrowful eyes 

 of his mother, his siblings, his wife, his 

 children. I can only summarize. I cannot 

 summarize an eternity, I can only share with you 

 some of the images of Ground Zero that I will carry

 with me forever. 

 That morning when I arrived at the Trade 

 Center site, I got there about half an hour, within 
 136 

 a half an hour after the South Tower had come down. 

 I saw my first fatality, a New York City 

 firefighter laying by his apparatus. I continued 

 down the block. I got down to West and Vessey

 where the walkway spanned the West Side Highway. 

 It had collapsed onto a number of fire vehicles. 

 We were able to crawl underneath of these vehicles 

 and start a search. 

 We were able to turn off some of the

 engines that were still running. All of the souls 

 that ran underneath of this walkway to find shelter 

 were dead. My primary reason, of course, was to 

 find my son. My ultimate reason was to find my 

 son. I continued searching with a lot of my

 friends that I had met. I had been a firefighter 

 for some 26 years and I know a lot of people on the 

 job. 

 The searching continued in and out of 

 voids, under and around spaces, and over and above,

 only to find death. We found no life. After the 

 first bunch of hours at the site, for the remainder

 of those nine months, we were to find nobody alive. 
 137 

 We were only going to find death. 

 I continued that day in searching. It 

 became quite obvious as we progressed that it was 

 going to be a difficult day for my family. The

 following days were much the same. I spent the 

 better part of nine months at that site searching. 

 I met a lot of wonderful people that came 

 from across this country to assist us. I cannot 

 begin to tell you how wonderful it was to see and

 talk and listen to these people. These were men 

 and women that came to serve us, to serve us food, 

 to listen to us, to cry with us, to not say 

 anything to us. 

 We worked with operating engineers, we

 worked with carpenters, we worked with iron 

 workers, we worked with police, we worked with 

 fire. I worked with a number of fathers who came 

 to look for their sons. I brought a picture along 

 with me that I will leave here. Many of these

 fathers that came did not find their sons. 

 On December 11th, three months to the day, 

 I had left the site, I was home, it was about 11:30 
 138 

 at night, I got a phone call. It was Paul Ferro, 

 who was the Deputy Chief at the site. He was 

 working the night tour. When I heard his voice, I 

 knew what it was. Paul said, Lee, we have your

 son. I said okay, Paul, I'll be right there. 

 I got my son Brendan, who is also a 

 firefighter, we hopped in a car. We had a fire 

 vehicle at our disposal. We headed back to the 

 site. At about 1:30 in the morning, my son Brendan

 and I started our descent down into the site. And 

 this is within the slurry-wall area, bathtub, 

 otherwise known as, about 35 to 40 feet below 

 level. 

 Over on the side was a stokes basket, and

 my son was in it. He was covered with an American 

 flag. Paul Ferro came over to me and he put his 

 hands on my shoulder and he said, Lee, he's all 

 there. That meant something to me. And I will 

 explain it later.

 I went over to my son. I knelt down. I 

 spoke to him. I still had to feel him from head to 

 toe to satisfy my own curiosity. Then with the 
 139 

 help of my son Brendan and some of the men from 

 Squad 288, we picked up my son and we carried him 

 up the hill. We placed him in an ambulance and my 

 son Brendan and I rode with him to the morgue. We

 were able to bring home our son in one piece and we 

 put him to bed at home where he belonged. 

 We have a chart here, if I could just show 

 it for a second. The work that continued at the 

 site went on for almost nine months. The New York

 City Fire Department used the GPS system to mark 

 every remain that was found. This map, you can see 

 the vast majority of remains, those are the towers. 

 Those towers sit within the slurry-wall

 area. That area goes down six stories deep. Every

 dot there represents a body part. We could not 

 represent all of them because we went from grade 

 level down to six stories below, so one dot may 

 represent 5, 10, 15, 20 body parts. Thank you. I 

 will leave that with you also.

 We meet with the -- I belong to the 

 Coalition of 9/11 Families. We meet with the 

 Medical Examiner's Office every three weeks. I'll 
 140 

 give you just a couple of quick figures here. 

 Between Shanksville of course, Pennsylvania, and 

 the Pentagon, we know that some 3,000 lives were 

 taken that day. At the World Trade Center site,

 2,792 souls were murdered that day, 19,934 body 

 parts were retrieved in nine months. 

 To date, 6,438 of those remains have been 

 identified. To date, 13,447 of those remains still 

 are unidentified and remain at the Medical

 Examiner's Office. Fourteen hundred and seveny seven families have been 

 notified that their loved ones were found. 1,312 

 have not. Out of 2,792 souls lost at the World 

 Trade Center, there were only 292 whole bodies. 

 There will never be any more than 292 whole bodies.

 My son was one of those whole bodies. 

 One night after all the recovery work was 

 over, I was at the site, six stories below grade at 

 bedrock, for a small tribute. There were many of 

 them. Afterwards, as I was ready to leave, I

 realized that no one was working. As I started to 

 walk that long walk to the ramp that led out to 

 street level, a Port Authority cop that I know 
 141 

 drove by and said, "Would you like a ride up the 

 hill?" I said, "No, I think I would like to walk." 

 He understood and he left. 

 I had never been down there where there

 was this fire. I walked over to where they found 

 my son. I cannot describe the overwhelming feeling 

 of warmth and sadness as I stood there. And I 

 could hear people talking. It was a very powerful 

 feeling. Now I guess I'm going to try to help you

 hear those voices too. 

 We cannot change what happened on 

 September 11th, but it must not be forgotten and it 

 must never happen again. America's guardians 

 failed us on 9/11. You are now the guardians of

 that legacy of that horrible day. Each of you 

 personally, not merely as a member of a commission, 

 now bear responsibility to see that the lessons you 

 learn at these hearings are remembered, and more 

 importantly, acted on.

 I urge you not to fail the past or the 

 future. And I thank you for the time. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Thank you very much.
 142 

 Colonel Birdwell? 

 COLONEL BIRDWELL: Good morning, Governor 

 Kean, members of the Commission. Thank you for 

 affording me this opportunity to share with you my

 experiences from the events of September 11th. 

 It's also my distinct honor to be a representative 

 of those in our national defense, the Pentagon and 

 those currently serving overseas right now. 

 First let me establish where I was located

 inside the Pentagon at the moment of impact of 

 American Airlines Flight 77. You have a slide 

 inside your packet that I provided that gives you 

 that layout. Inside the attached slide, you'll see 

 the impact point on the E-ring, the outermost ring

 of the building. To the left of the collapsed 

 structure, my office window is circled in yellow. 

 The top right-hand portion of the slide is 

 called the corridor. The corridors are the spokes 

 of the building that connect the rings to one

 another. The rectangular tan box designated with a 

 red X at the top of the building shows the location 

 of the elevators within the corridor. 
 143 

 As I stepped out of the men's restroom 

 inside corridor 4 on the second floor to return to 

 my office, I was passing in front of those 

 elevators at the moment of impact, in fact moving

 toward the point of impact. The arrow originating 

 from my circled office window indicates the window 

 I was facing at the time of impact, approximately 

 15 to 20 yards behind that window inside the 

 corridor.

 As you can see from the slide, I had just 

 crossed the path of the plane in going to the 

 restroom and was just seconds from being in the 

 direct path of the plane at the time of the impact. 

 When an 80-ton airliner traveling at over 300 miles

 an hour with over 10,000 gallons of petroleum jet-A

 slams into a building 15 to 20 yards from you, 

 you may also discern that I sit here at the 

 miraculous hand of Christ. 

 In surviving the concussion and being

 conscious through it, the blast, the fire, the 

 smoke, I am able to provide for you a glimpse of 

 the ghastly, firey death that many died in that 
 144 

 day. By virtue of surviving my injuries, I can 

 provide you the great detail of the emotional and 

 physical trauma of the critically injured. 

 As a husband and father, I can share with

 you the physical and emotional strain of my wife 

 Mel and my son Matt as I experienced throughout my 

 hospitalization and continued recovery. Let me 

 share with you a little bit of that experience of 

 my wife.

 I too would offer the same thing that Lee 

 offered as well, to the family members in the room 

 today. At the moment of impact I went, in an 

 instant, from a well-lit corridor that I had 

 traversed many times to an earthly hell of fire,

 choking black smoke, physical and emotional pain 

 and the disorientation, all of which seemed to last 

 an eternity. 

 First was the physical pain of the fire. 

 My body was burned with 60 to 65 percent total body

 surface burn area on my back, legs, face, neck, 

 arms, hands, with approximately 40 percent of my 

 burns being third degree. Portions of my face and 
 145 

 each entire arm required complete grafting of skin 

 from those portions of my body that could donate 

 such skin. The heat, smoke and fuel vapor within 

 my lungs inflicted a serious inhalation injury on

 me, as well. Second, I was disoriented and unable 

 to navigate my way out of the building due to the 

 loss of lighting, combined with the smoke that was 

 pouring out of the building. 

 I cannot put into words, there are none

 sufficient in the English language, to describe for 

 you the abject terror and panic that I experienced, 

 not only facing such grievous, life-threatening

 injuries, but at the same time the inability to 

 escape them. Third, I knew I was facing the

 finality of my life. I thought about how I had 

 said good-bye to my wife Mel that morning, and my 

 son Matt, and how it would be my last. 

 In moments immediately after impact, I 

 reacted normally with the survival instincts of

 trying to save myself. I attempted to get to my 

 feet but was unable to do so, given the concussion 

 and blast of the explosion and the subsequent 
 146 

 vacuum that had to be filled and the damage that 

 had on my sense of balance. After an undetermined 

 amount of time, I eventually accepted my death and 

 collapsed to the floor and waited for whatever that

 feeling is of the soul departing your body. By 

 God's grace, I never felt that feeling. 

 Instead, I could feel liquid running down 

 my face, but it wasn't blood, it was cold. In fact 

 it was water. I had collapsed into one of the

 functioning sprinkler systems inside the Pentagon. 

 That water was able to douse the flames on and 

 around me and I was eventually evacuated for 

 treatment at Georgetown University Hospital. 

 In my written remarks, I wanted to pause

 and move on in the interests of time, but let me 

 share just a little bit of that with you, if I may, 

 Governor. With your permission, let me just share 

 that with you. 

 Inside corridor 4 on the second floor,

 there are portions that were still under 

 renovation, portions that were, on my right side, 

 that were plywooded up, still under construction.
 147 

 Portions on my left were badge-access doors that, 

 even though my badge was burned beyond recognition 

 at that point, even if it had functioned, I did not 

 have access to those areas. The corridor to the

 A-ring, which is the innermost circle, the 

 innermost ring of the Pentagon, the fire doors had 

 already closed. I was only operating with 

 emergency lights and the will to survive and God's 

 grace am I still being alive.

 As I moved, actually staggered, it was not 

 a walk, it was not calm, I was not able to run, I 

 got down to about B-ring where Bill McKennan and 

 Roy Wallace stepped out of the B-ring doors to see if 

 there were any survivors inside the hallway. I was

 the only one there. Pieces of my skin were still 

 hanging off of me, pants burned, portions of my 

 polyester pants had melted to me. It's not a 

 description I wish to go into in greater detail 

 because Roy was already rather descriptive of it

 for me already. 

 They and two other gentlemen carried me to 

 the A-ring through one of the passages that they 
 148 

 had within their area, took me to Redskins Snack 

 Bar. You may be familiar with that, Secretary 

 Lehman. At that point I was laid down for triage 

 with five other seriously injured people. I was

 the first one evacuated. 

 Fortunately, I had a great Air Force 

 doctor, Dr. Baxter, give me a shot of morphine in 

 my foot and then in the other foot gave me the IV 

bag. My feet were the only portion of my body that

 they could determine was not seriously injured. I 

 was immediately evacuated by ambulance inside the 

 Pentagon up to North Parking, from North Parking 

 taken to Georgetown University Hospital by a Ford 

 Expedition.

 Inside Georgetown University, I had yet 

 another seminal moment. Major John Collison had 

 accompanied me to Georgetown. I knew that when Dr. 

 Williams, the attending physician there, told me 

 they were soon to place me under general anesthesia

 and intubate me that he was going to do the best he 

 could to save my life. But I also knew that I was 

 facing, in being under anesthesia, that my last 
 149 

 words were maybe those that I now speak. 

 I asked John to take the wedding ring off 

 my finger. It removed skin, it removed muscle, it 

 removed other tissue, but I don't recall it

 hurting. I don't know if that was because of the 

 morphine that I received from Dr. Baxter or because 

 I was more concerned with the manner of my death 

 and how my life or my death was going to give 

 witness to those on the medical staff.

 John took the ring off. I looked at the 

 hospital chaplain and asked to say a prayer, a 

 prayer of salvation, actually, rather, sovereignty 

 of God in my life, not of salvation. We said that 

 prayer. And after that prayer I had the peace of

 God's concern in my life and his sovereignty in my 

 life to look at Dr. Williams and say, let's get on 

 with it, resting in his sovereignty. 

 I was fortunate, as you can imagine, to be 

 sitting here with you today. I was evacuated to

 Washington Hospital Center Burn Unit by ambulance, 

 or by air ambulance, after the FAA had opened air 

 space inside Washington D.C. That evening I was 
 150 

 admitted where I would spend the next three-plus

 months enduring 30 surgeries, 24 days on a 

 respirator, 26 days in intensive care, nearly 90 

 days breathing through a trache, numerous tank

 sessions of sterile debridement in a solution of 

 water, iodine and chlorine -- and I can tell you 

 that is, short of being a prisoner of war, probably 

 the most horrific, painful experience you can 

 endure -- three days of maggots to eat the dead

 tissue off my arms, to sterilize the infection, to 

 give me live tissue, living tissue, that the 

 doctors could then graft on top of, daily physical 

 therapy to the point of requiring a morphine 

 derivative, Dilaudid, prior to each session, in

 addition to the scheduled pain medications. 

 The physical environment was agonizing, 

 but the emotional pain was probably far worse. 

 Seeing the anguish my wife was enduring on my 

 behalf, the separation she endured from Matt and to

 complicate that emotional pain was my inability to 

 communicate with her for a good portion of my 

 hospitalization, and that physical incapacitation 
 151 

 combined with the pain medications that I was 

 receiving. 

 Mel and Matt had already overcome the 

 immediate torment of those first few moments and

 hours of watching the attacks. Mel had previously 

 accompanied me to my office when we made the move 

 from one part of the building to the other. She 

 knew that my office overlooked the helipad and in 

 watching the local news coverage, saw the helipad

 and the row of windows overlooking it with fire

 coming out of them. 

 Mel and Matt eventually learned that I was 

 alive and were quite overjoyed at that. The 

 greatest challenges ahead were dealing with the

 medical setbacks that are indicative of not knowing 

 if I would survive. In our visits together, 

 especially Matt's, the overtone was always, is this 

 my last chance to speak with Dad alive. 

 By virtue of the hand of the Lord, an

 outstanding group of medical professionals, the 

 presence of my church and the presence of the U.S. 

 Army family, I sit here before you enjoying the 
 152 

 remainder of my life. I trust that you will keep 

 my life and those of other citizens of this great 

 nation in mind as you go about the business of 

 determining how we can improve our processes to

 combat terrorism. 

I look forward to answering any questions 

 that you may have about my family's experience. 

 Again, thank you for the honor to be here with you 

 today.

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Mr. Sincock? 

 DR. SINCOCK: Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, 

 I'm Dr. Craig Sincock of Woodbridge, Virginia. To 

 me, it is an honor to come to you today as a 

 citizen, an Army officer of 34 years, and as a

 surviving spouse of September 11, 2001. 

 Before I proceed into the things that I 

 had written down, this gentleman right beside me, 

 Brian Birdwell, is the only survivor out of my 

 wife's office. He is now my dearest friend. He's

 like a brother to me. 

 The Pentagon was my building and it was my 

 wife's building too, my wife, Cheryle. I was first 
 153 

 stationed there in 1985, brand new W-2 with the 

 Army. My wife came in 1987, working as an Army 

 civil servant. Both of us went to work there, 

 usually together, from those years until the events

 of 9/11. I worked in just about every corridor and 

 most of the floors of that building. I met 

 countless thousands of people, both military and 

 civilian. Most of those people I consider as 

 friends.

 My wife made several promotions through 

 the years as an Army civil servant. She was 

 excited about where she worked, who she worked for, 

 and the fact that she was doing her small part to 

 make the system work better.

 On the day her world ended, Cheryle got up 

 at 3:00 a.m., got dressed, and drove herself to 

 work at 4:30. My last recollection of her was 

 standing in our bedroom combing her hair. We said 

 good-bye and I told her I would call her later to

 see if she wanted to come home early. This was one 

 of those days when her illnesses made her very 

 sick, but being sick never stopped her from work, 
 154 

 from her duty. 

 I followed her to work about a half hour 

 later. This was our normal schedule for almost 15 

 years. And although I was on leave, I went to work

 anyway. The belief was, year-end use-or-lose type 

 of leave in the military, but that did not mean I 

 did not do my job. And I credit my wife, Cheryle, 

 with showing me that side of the work ethic. 

 I called Cheryle at about 8:30. She

 sounded like she was hurting. In fact, she told me 

 her head was just pounding. That meant usually 

 that her blood pressure was elevated, but true to 

 her form, she said no to going home at that time. 

 I told her I had been invited to participate in a

 meeting in Rosslyn and I should be back in the 

 early afternoon. That was the last time I talked 

 to my wife. I know I told her I loved her and for 

 that I'm ever so grateful. 

 When the plane hit the Pentagon an hour

 later, I felt the shudder two miles away in 

 Rosslyn. When I looked out the window and saw the 

 first plume of smoke go up, I simultaneously heard 
 155 

 the TV announcer in a back room say that the south 

 parking lot of the Pentagon had been hit by an 

 airplane. 

 My heart stopped because I just knew that

 was where Cheryle worked and something told me she 

 was in danger. I ran the two miles back to the 

 Pentagon, through Arlington Cemetery. I spent that 

 entire day, until 11:30 that night, working, 

 praying, and hoping at the side of the building we

 called home. It was not until the next morning 

 that I got the official word from the Army that my 

 wife Cheryle, my bride of almost 25 years, was on 

 the missing list. 

 That is what happened to Cheryle and 183

 others that day. What has happened to the families 

 and friends since that day is another story. I 

 like to think of 9/11 as an event and what we do 

 now as the journey after the event. Every once in 

 awhile, someone or something will take us back to

 that day. Those are the triggers from the event. 

 We hope that as time goes by, the triggers become 

 less in frequency and their results less in depth. 
 156 

 This is the reason I said yes to coming 

 before you today. What you do here, the results 

 you obtain and the recommendations you send 

 forward, will, I sincerely hope, lessen those

 triggers for all of us. 

 I found early on in my grieving process 

 that to hold onto anger brought on resentment. And 

 with resentment came sleepless nights, foggy days, 

 and bad memories. So you won't hear anger from me.

 I won't talk about what people should have done, 

 for that would be to try to place blame somewhere. 

 That may be part of what you end up doing, but it 

 is not part of my responsibility.

 I will however, give you some personal

 observations. 

 I watched that day as everyone with any 

 authority tried to take charge of something, take 

 charge of anything, but no one was really in

 charge. No matter how many times the scenario of a

 plane crashing into the Pentagon during takeoff or 

 landing at National Airport had been practiced, 

 no one was prepared for this attack. 
 157 

 I know many of these in the Defense Protective 

 Service and there's not one of them that I would 

 fault for not doing their job and then some that 

 day. I know many of the building support personnel

 and they too are above reproach and blame. I've 

 worked for many of the top-level and mid-level

 managers of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine 

 Corps. Each one of them and their subordinates did 

 what their training and their instincts directed

 them to do. Some of them died trying. 

 If there is anything to blame, it is our 

 systems, our bureaucracies and our inflexibility 

 towards change. That is normal for bureaucracies 

 and large systems. That is what happened on 9/11.

 Those who are used to change, are trained to 

 respond to events demanding instant change, are the 

 police, fire and rescue. Bureaucrats do not like 

 change, in fact they fear it, for their programs 

 may go away and with it their very existence.

 So when these same bureaucrats tried to 

 respond to 9/11 events, they were not prepared for

 it, but we should not blame them for that because 
 158 

 we may have made them what they are. We do this 

 with our antiquated programming, budgeting and 

 execution methods. We do this by outsourcing 

 almost everything we do until we make our

 government managers policy makers rather than 

 decision makers. 

 We cannot fault our fine nonprofit 

 organizations and the multitude of companies that 

 responded to the needs starting within many hours

 of the tragedy. These people brought everything 

 they could think of, provided every service they 

 could, and extended themselves, usually at a loss 

 of profit. But within months of the event, the 

 attitude of these same people, not all of them to

 be sure, but a lot of them, went back to the way 

 they had been before 9/11. They did what so many 

 of our own citizens did. They reverted to what was 

 comfortable and known. This is one of the prime 

 laws of systems thinking, which I happen to have a

 doctorate in, that tells us that a system always 

 reverts to where it is comfortable. That's where 

 bureaucracies go, back to being comfortable. 
 159 

 Some of the organizations that responded 

 had gone through similar incidents and responses 

 like this before. Some of them already had 

 response models they could modify quickly. But the

 vast majority of responders did not have a clue 

 because this was so much bigger, so much different 

 than anything they had ever seen before. And now 

 almost a year and a half has gone by and we still 

 don't have any more models of crisis response than

 we had before. 

 I'm certain that some bureaucrats have 

 probably worked on a few of those and spent several millions 

 of dollars of public funds to try to get a model 

 going, but I suspect that when push comes to shove,

 God forbid, those models will have become

 shelfware. For until our bureaucracies start to 

 train themselves on how to change, on how to be 

 flexible and pliable, they will never be in a 

 position to respond properly to events such as

 9/11. 

 I trust that what you do here will be 

 guided by finding answers, not placing blame. I 
 160 

 trust that you will search out the truth, no matter 

 where it leads, and pass that truth to those who 

 can make changes that matter. I trust that you 

 will do the next right thing.

 As you call your witnesses and try to find 

 out what happened and why, please try to remember

 that those who were at the sites that day, those 

 who lost loved ones and friends, those who were 

 injured, are still going through their private and

 individualized trauma and grief processes. Some 

 may be angry, many may be depressed, some may be 

 distraught and others may have their own agendas. 

 Try to understand that each of these people will 

 try to do their best given the circumstances that

 befell them. 

 You are now part of their healing process. 

 I know you will do right by them and right by our 

 great country, the United States of America. 

 Thank you once again for the honor of

 being here, and God bless.

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Thank you all very much. 

 You're an extraordinary group of people. And I 
 161 

 thank you all so much for being here today. 

 Senator Gorton has a question. 

 COMMISSIONER GORTON: Mr. Waizer, was 

 there anyone else on that elevator?

 MR. WAIZER: There was another woman, a 

 black, middle-aged woman, who I have tried to 

 identify. I think I know who she was. And if it's 

 who I think it was, she died in the hospital. She 

 didn't make it down to another ambulance. But I

 have never be able to confirm that. 

 COMMISSIONER GORTON: I was going to have 

 a question for Mr. Lim, Mr. Chairman, but he 

 answered it. He went back to work. And I just 

 wanted to say that that was a great thing to do.

 You really deserve our admiration, not only for

 what you did on that day but you're back to work 

 right now. 

 MR. LIM: There's a great need for 

 bomb-dog handlers right now.

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Thank you. Any other 

 questions from the Commission? 

 COMMISSIONER GORELICK: I'd just like to 
 162 

 make a comment. When we were deciding what to do 

 for our first hearing, we considered many different 

 alternatives. And clearly we wanted to hear from 

 the families of the victims. We also wanted to

 hear firsthand from people who had experienced the 

 tragedy themselves for two reasons. One, we knew it 

 would motivate us. And it has. We will 

 collectively keep your stories with us as we go on 

 this journey. And two, you have given us some

 challenges to live up to. As you said, you are 

 speaking for so many others. And we have heard 

 you. Thank you. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Yes, Senator? 

 COMMISSIONER CLELAND: Mr. Chairman, come

 April 8th, I will celebrate 35 years after my 

 tremendous trauma and challenges, grieving all 

 that, physical loss and pain and suffering. 

 And this is an extraordinary story. The 

 nation needed to hear it. We needed to hear it.

 We love you. We appreciate you. And we hope that 

 God continues to strengthen you in your struggle. 

 Thank you. 
 163 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Thank you very much. The 

 next panel, Stephen Push, Mary Fetchet, Mindy 

 Kleinberg, Allison Vadhan. 

 (Recess)

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: We will call the session 

 back to order. I'd like to introduce, first of 

 all, Stephen Push from the Families of September 

 11. 

 MR. PUSH: Governor Kean, Congressman

 Hamilton, and the other members of the Commission, 

 thank you for inviting me to offer my views about 

 the Commission as it starts its investigation of 

 the worst terrorist attack in American history. 

 And thank you all for taking on this assignment.

 You're doing a tremendous service for your country. 

 You have an extremely important task 

 before you. What is at stake is nothing less than 

 the legitimacy of the United States government. 

 The primary function of government is to provide

 for the common defense. If the government cannot 

 do that effectively, everything else it does is of 

 little value. 
 164 

 I would like to explain to you what it was 

 that brought me before you today. I don't claim to 

 speak for all the 9/11 families, but I believe that 

 many of them have similar views concerning the need

 for this Commission. 

 When my wife, Lisa Raines, was murdered 

 aboard American Airlines Flight 77, I was 

 immediately cast into a spiral of shock, disbelief, 

 and grief. Within two weeks, however, my strongest

 emotion was anger. And I think I probably differ 

 substantially from Mr. Waizer and Dr. Sincock in 

 that. In fact, actually, anger is an inadequate 

 word to describe what I felt. What I felt was a 

 rage so intense it was like no emotion I had ever

 felt before. But I haven't let go of this anger. 

 I've tried to pour it into working to see that 

 something like this never happens again. 

 Initially my rage was directed at the 

 hijackers. Why did they do this? What did they

 expect to accomplish? What had Lisa done to them? 

 But as I read the newspapers and spent night after 

 sleepless night watching cable news networks and 
 165 

 searching books and the Web for information about 

 terrorism, I also became angry at my government, 

 the government that was supposed to protect Lisa 

 but that, as I eventually learned, had failed her

 and the other 3,000-plus victims of 9/11. 

 I learned, for instance, that two of the 

 hijackers on Lisa's plane were known to the CIA. 

 In fact, the CIA even knew that one of them had a 

 multiple-entry visa to come into the country. They

 knew that they were associated, I found out a 

 little later on that they were associated with the 

 people who bombed the Cole, the USS Cole, knew that 

 they had attended a terrorism conference in Kuala 

 Lumpur. Nevertheless, they were allowed to enter

 the country, to live here for months and to board 

 the plane using their own names. 

 I also learned that, for 14 years prior to 

 9/11, the Government Accounting Office repeatedly 

 documented the ineffectiveness of the aviation

 security system, but during that 14-year period, 

 nothing was done to correct the problems. 

 I realized that al Qaeda had first 
 166 

 attacked America in 1993, declared war on America a 

 few years later, and mounted a series of 

 increasingly daring and deadly attacks. While all 

 of this was happening, the Clinton administration

 took only ineffectual steps against al Qaeda. And 

 after all of these clear signs that we were at war 

 with a ruthless enemy, the new Bush administration 

 put counterterrorism on the back burner until 

 September 11th.

 I am now convinced that this tragedy did 

 not have to happen. 9/11 was foreseeable. And it 

 could have been prevented. But even if you don't 

 accept my word on that, I think everyone must admit 

 that at the very least 9/11 exposed serious

 problems with our counterterrorism and 

 national-security procedures. 

 I'm not advocating conspiracy theories. I 

 personally don't believe that anyone in the 

 government had specific knowledge of what would

 happen on 9/11. If only it were that simple, we 

 could then easily correct the problem by 

 investigating and punishing those responsible. 
 167 

 But I fear that what we're up against is 

 far more insidious. There has been a failure of 

 leadership in this country that cuts across decades 

 and political parties. Too many politicians put

 reelection above national security. Too many 

 government managers favor process over results and 

 careerism over service. 

 I'm not maligning the many brave men and 

 women who protect us. I have great respect and

 gratitude to those in the military and the 

 intelligence agencies and for the many others who 

 have dedicated their lives to public service, but 

 in too many cases, they have been poorly led. 

 I'd like to make a comment about something

 that Mr. Ben-Veniste and one of the witnesses said 

 about not pointing fingers. I think this 

 Commission should point fingers. I'm not 

 suggesting that you find scapegoats, someone to 

 hang out to dry, but there were people, people in

 responsible positions, who failed us on 9/11. They 

 didn't just fail us once; 9/11 occurred because 

 they were failing us over a long period of time.
 168 

 Some of these people are still in responsible 

 positions in the government. Perhaps they 

 shouldn't be. And that's one of the things I think 

 you need to look at and think about.

 I also hope that you will, in conducting 

 your investigation, talk to some of the rank and 

 file in the agencies that you will be looking at. 

 I notice that you have some people from the Fire 

 Department and the Police Department speaking

 tomorrow. I don't know what level they're at, but 

 you should speak to some of the rank and file in 

 those departments and see if what the leaders

 are telling you squares with what the rank and file 

 are telling you.

 The same goes for the federal agencies. 

 I'm in touch with a number of former and current 

 employees of the Federal Aviation Administration 

 and the new Transportation Security Administration 

 who have horror stories to tell about our aviation

 security. And I'd like you to listen to them. 

 Maybe not everything they say is legitimate, but 

 there is a lot there for you to look at that
 169 

 requires serious consideration. 

 I'd also like to say something about what 

 Mr. Waizer said about these commissions coming to 

 naught in the end. If I have anything to say about

 it, that's not going to happen. Your report is not 

 the end of the process, it's the beginning. 

 And I think I can speak for some of the 

 other families who are here today, we're not going 

 away. We're going to see that your recommendations

 are translated into legislation, that the 

 legislation is translated into effective action by 

 the agencies. 

 Since 9/11, there have been some important 

 successes in the war on terrorism. Afghanistan has

 been liberated, al Qaeda has been disrupted, and 

 many of al Qaeda's leaders have been captured. 

 But there have been far too many failures,

 as well. For example, despite the expensive and 

 highly publicized creation of the Transportation

 Security Administration, aviation security is still 

 little better than it was on 9/11. 

 Just last month, an investigative 
 170 

 journalist was able to defeat the carry-on-bag

 screening process at a major American airport 10 

 out of 10 times. This is a year and a half after 

 9/11, months after the TSA has taken over

 responsibility for all the airports, an 

 investigative journalist can carry unallowed items 

 through security a hundred percent of the time at a 

 major American airport. 

 And this is not just one incident. I just

 mentioned this one because it happened long after 

 TSA had taken over. But I just this weekend 

 watched a compilation tape of stories that were

 done by national and local television stations over 

 the period starting before 9/11 and continuing

 throughout the period when TSA was training and 

 hiring and taking over, right up until last month. 

 And in every single one of those instances, they 

 were able to defeat the system between 50 and 100 

 percent of the time. I will provide you with a

 copy of that tape. It's sickening. 

 The TSA's response to this latest story,

 to this latest appalling failure rate, was to 
 171 

 assert that "proper screening procedures were 

 followed." I'm sure the families of the next 

 hijack victims will take great comfort in knowing 

 that "procedures were followed."

 These ineffectual reforms of 

 transportation security focus almost exclusively on 

 addressing past attacks. And this seems to be a 

 recurring theme in the government. Let's respond 

 to the last attack. Richard Reid uses a shoe bomb,

 so let's check everybody's shoes. Well, the 

 terrorists are probably a little smarter than that 

 and probably the next time it's not going to be 

 shoes. 

 But most of what's been done by the TSA so

 far responds to the threats that became evident on 

 9/11 and the Pan Am 103 bombing over Lockerbie. 

 Little has been done to address other 

 aviation-security issues, and these issues are well 

 known. Little has been done to address threats to

 other modes of transportation. 

 We have to do much more than prevent a 

 repeat of prior terrorist attacks. We need people 
 172 

 in government who know how to anticipate new 

 tactics and develop methods to defeat them. Even 

more important, we need to understand and change 

 the causes of terrorism. This will require a major

 change in the government's mindset. 

 I urge you to look beyond al Qaeda and 

 beyond 9/11 and examine the underlying problems 

 that this country has not fully faced and has done 

 little to address. I urge you to ask the tough

 questions and offer tough solutions. 

 For example, what changes need to be made 

 in our foreign policy, including -- no, not 

 including -- especially in our relations with 

 so-called friends such as Saudi Arabia?

 Does the new Department of Homeland 

 Security really make America safer or has the 

 government just reshuffled the boxes on the 

 organizational chart? 

 Can we obtain useful counterterrorism

 intelligence from an intelligence community made up 

 of 14 different agencies when no one is in charge 

 of the entire operation? 
 173 

 Can the FBI, an agency steeped in a 

 law-enforcement culture transform itself into a 

 counterterrorism agency, or do we need to create an 

 agency similar to Britain's MI-5?

 Are political campaign contributions from 

 the airlines undermining Congressional oversight of 

 aviation security? 

 These are just a few of the questions you 

 are going to need to answer. The list of questions

 is too long for this brief testimony. I know that 

 other 9/11 families and many other people have 

 provided you or can provide you with far more 

 comprehensive lists. 

 The families, the 9/11 families, aren't

 asking these questions for our own benefit. We 

 have already been irreparably damaged. Our loved 

 ones have already paid the ultimate price. We ask 

 these questions for all Americans, for all people 

 who may be the next victims of terrorism, for

 future generations. 

 Thank you again for inviting me to 

 testify. And good luck in your search for the 
 174 

 truth. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Thank you. Mary Fetchet, 

 who is from Voices of 9/11. 

 MS. FETCHET: Good afternoon. My name is

 Mary Fetchet. I tragically lost my son Brad in the 

 most devastating attack on our country, the attacks 

 on the World Trade Center. I am Co-Chair of Voices 

 of September 11th and a member of the family

 steering committee for the 9/11 Independent

 Commission. I'm honored to be here today and want 

 to thank Governor Kean, Mr. Hamilton, and all the 

 commissioners for the opportunity to discuss my 

 expectations for the 9/11 Commission. 

 I want to express to all of you my very

 deep concern about the slow progress of the 

 Commission and stress the urgency we feel as 

 precious time is being wasted. I also want to 

 impress on you the importance of the Commission's 

 investigation in answering our mounting questions.

 Your investigation will help identify the 

 systemic problems within and amongst government 

 agencies that contributed to the success of the 
 175 

 terrorists in carrying out this horrific attack on 

 our country. 

 It will also set a framework for the 

 necessary changes to insure national security. The

 responsibility of the success of this investigation 

 rests on your shoulders. We have waited far too 

 long for this Commission to get up and running. 

 As a mother who lost her child, it is my 

 moral obligation to speak on behalf of my son and

 all those that died on September 11th. They 

 deserve answers to how and why they were 

 senselessly murdered in their own country, nearly

 3,000 innocent citizens at work and traveling on 

 American aircraft. I also speak on behalf of my

 family and other families who are searching for 

 answers to how and why their loved ones died on 

 September 11th. We deserve answers to the long 

 list of questions we have. 

 Most importantly, I am here as a citizen,

 like you and the rest of the nation, who continues 

 to feel unprotected at these volatile times. For

 the sake of our children, we feel a great sense of 
 176 

 urgency. What were the failures? Who was 

 accountable? 

 As I speak about my son, I would like to 

 share with you a picture which I took this morning

 from his 15-year-old brother's bedroom. Brad was 

 24 years' old and the oldest of our three sons. He 

 worked at Keefe, Bruyette and Woods as an equity 

 trader on the 89th floor of Tower 2. Brad was an 

 understated, athletic, handsome young man, as you

 can see from the picture, with a sparkle in his 

 eyes and a wonderful smile. Much like the 3,000 

 other innocent victims, he was hard working and 

 dedicated to his family and friends. 

 Brad was planning to become engaged to his

 girlfriend of three years, Brooke. When Brad died, 

 my husband and I lost a son and our dreams for his 

 future, a wedding, a daughter-in-law and 

 grandchildren. His younger brothers have lost a 

 friend, a coach, a mentor, a confidant and a

 companion. 

 It is incomprehensible that the 

 devastation was so great that our families are 
 177 

 being notified of minute body parts, such as a 

 finger, a jaw or a vertebra, or worse, nothing at 

 all. We have been notified three times of Brad's 

 limited remains and have had a memorial service and

 a burial. We will wait until the notification 

 process ends before we have a final burial. It may 

 continue for years. 

 On September 11th, Brad called my husband 

 at work shortly after the first plane hit Tower 1.

 Like other times when there was an emergency in the 

 building, he wanted to reassure us that he was 

 okay. He was shaken because he had seen someone, 

 quote, "drop from the 91st floor, all the way 

 down." He knew a plane hit Tower 1, but wasn't

 aware it was a commercial jet. 

 The Port Authority directed my son's 

 company to stay put in their office, quote, "that 

 the building is safe and secure." My husband asked 

 Brad to call me at home and here's the recording of

 his call left on my message machine at home around 

 9 o'clock a.m.:

 "Hey Mom, it's Brad. I just wanted to 
 178 

 call and let you know, I'm sure that you've heard, 

 or maybe you haven't heard, that a plane crashed 

 into World Trade Center One. We're fine, we're in 

 World Trade Center Two. I'm obviously alive and

 well over here, but it's obviously a pretty scary 

 experience. I saw a guy fall out of probably the 

 91st story all the way down. So you're welcome to 

 give a call here. I think we'll be here all day. 

 I'm not sure if the firm is going to shut down for

 the day or what. Give me a call back later. I 

 called Dad to let him know. Love you." 

 Brad always tried to be strong so I would 

 not worry. Although he wasn't aware his life was 

 in danger, I can hear the fear in his voice. I

 never had the opportunity to return his call, to 

 say good-bye and tell him I love him. 

 Brad made two calls to his girlfriend, the 

 last after the second plane hit Tower 2. The 

 message was brief. Sirens were sounding in the

 background and he was franticly trying to escape 

 the building. Other families received similar 

 calls from their loved ones after the building was 
 179 

 hit. 

 These individuals knew they were going to 

 die. They were trapped above the fire, asphyxiated 

 or injured, and unable to escape. They died a

 horrendous death. 

 So I ask you, if the house next door to 

 your home was hit by a plane or on fire, would you 

 direct your family to remain in your home? How is 

 it that people would be directed to remain in a

 110-story building supposedly, quote, "safe and 

 secure," when its twin tower is billowing in smoke, 

 and people are jumping to their death to avoid a 

 high-rise fire? How is it is that Brad was unaware 

 of the dangerous situation he was in 15 minutes

 after the first plane hit Tower 1? Precious time

 was wasted. 

 Unlike Brad's situation, Rick Rescorla, 

 Director of Security for Morgan Stanley, directed 

 his employees to leave the building, to disregard

 the Port Authority's commands to evacuees to,

 quote, "return up to their offices." 

 How is it that they were receiving such 
 180 

 conflicting information which ultimately, 

 senselessly, cost my son's life and the lives of 

 600 others in Building 2? What lessons were 

 learned after the bombing in 1993? Were there

 evacuation policies in place? Were they followed? 

 No one in Building 2 should be dead today. What 

 were the failures and who is accountable? 

 Furthermore, what communications existed 

 to warn city authorities and the Port Authority

 that hijacked commercial aircraft appeared headed 

 for their targets? More specifically, what was New 

 York City and the Port Authority told about the 

 findings of the Joint FBI and NYPD Terrorist Task 

 Force?

 What were the breakdowns in communication 

 between the control towers, the FAA, NORAD, and 

 other government agencies? On a larger scale, what 

 were the CIA, the FBI, the INS and the military 

 doing to protect our country? What were the

 systemic failures? Who should be held accountable? 

 September 11th has repeatedly been 

 referred to as a wake-up call. Our president said 
 181 

 on September 27, 2001, "We have awakened to a new 

 danger, but our resolve is great." As late as May 

 16, 2002, Condoleeza Rice stated that, "I don't 

 think anybody could have predicted that these

 people would take an airplane and slam it into the 

 World Trade Center, take another one and slam it 

 into the Pentagon; that they would try to use an 

 airplane as a missile, a hijacked airplane as a 

 missile."

 But September 11th should not have been a 

 wake-up call. Nor was it a new danger. September 

 11th should have been predictable. The loss of 

 life in the 1993 bombing and the continued threats, 

 specifically on the World Trade Center and other

 New York City landmarks, should have been the 

 wake-up call. 

 In fact, Eleanor Hill from the Joint 

 Intelligence Committee concludes, "There was 

 considerable historical evidence that international

 terrorists had planned and were, in fact, capable 

 of conducting major terrorist strikes within the 

 United States." 
 182 

 Despite increased chatter and the CIA 

 Director, George Tenet, issuing a declaration of 

 war on al Qaeda on December 4, 1998, the FBI and 

 CIA failed to communicate or coordinate their

 efforts in providing national security. How could 

 this be that the two intelligence agencies 

 responsible for our safety are not coordinating 

 their efforts to protect our citizens? How could 

 this happen and who is accountable?

 The Hart-Rudman Commission released on 

 February 2001 also predicted a terrorist attack of 

 great magnitude and loss of life on our own soil. 

 This report both identified the increasing threat 

 of terrorism and was also a blueprint for the

 development of homeland security, which, if 

 implemented, could have prevented September 11th. 

 However, their recommendations to address these 

 threats were never implemented. The report sat on 

 a shelf.

 It is also important to note that two 

 earlier presidential commissions on airline safety, 

 security and antiterrorism were established 
 183 

 following airline disasters, the Pan Am Flight 103 

 and the TWA Flight 800. However, these commissions 

 were bogged down by lobbying from the aviation 

 industry. Timetables were delayed, and financial

 expenditures were given priority over the safety of 

 human lives. 

 During this time what steps did the 

 aviation community take amidst the growing threat, 

 one which centered on using aircraft as bombs and

 American cities as targets? If an effective 

 security system was in place, how did box cutters 

 get through security? What were the failures and 

 who is accountable? 

 Thankfully, we live in a country with

 freedom of speech. Yet our elected officials with 

 oversight have neglected to implement prior 

 commissions' important recommendations to improve 

 airline and national security. We have a strong 

 military support, yet they were not able to protect

 us within our own borders. 

 We have sophisticated intelligence 

 agencies that, for reasons unknown to the public, 
 184 

 are territorial and have been proven to be 

 ineffective, at least as far as protecting American 

 lives. Our nation is technologically advanced, yet 

 the technology is not protecting the skyways of

 America. 

 Before September 11th, I assumed we were

 safe and secure living in the United States, that 

 the threat of terrorism was outside our country, 

 that government officials and other agencies were

 competent, responsible individuals, coordinating 

 their efforts and acting in our best interests. I 

 found out the hard way that I was naive, that my 

 assumptions were wrong. 

 Unfortunately, the threat of terrorism

 exists in our country. The building that Brad 

 worked in was unsafe and an identified target. And 

 government agencies with the responsibility to 

 protect us have major systemic problems 

 communicating.

 For 18 months our family has been denied 

the truth that a thorough investigation would 

 reveal. As a family member, I am frustrated to 
 185 

 have suffered the loss of a son and yet to be 

 required to spend time away from my family and 

 fight for the establishment of a commission that 

 should have been in place on the day of the tragic

 events. 

 Following a recent mining disaster and 

 tragic Columbian aircraft explosion, commissions 

 were established immediately, with substantial 

 funding. It is now 18 months later. We're at war

 with heightened alert. Yet the Commission has had 

 a slow start. A quest for the truth has to begin 

 at the top, with the support of the administration, 

 to require all government agencies to provide 

 necessary documents and act in full cooperation

 with the Commission. 

 Security for all Commissioners and staff 

 should be expedited. Necessary funds should be 

 allocated for a Commission of this magnitude. The 

 findings of this Commission are of utmost

 importance to developing an effective Homeland 

 Security Department. 

 I found a journal my son began writing at 
 186 

 age 21. On the first page he wrote a quote which 

 best describes how he lived his life: "You can tell 

 the character of a man by what he does for the man 

 who can offer him nothing."

 I challenge you, the Commissioners, the 

 staff, and all those involved with the success of 

 this Commission to approach this important inquiry 

 with the same manner that Brad approached life, to 

 approach it with an open mind and with integrity,

 above all, with a sense of urgency and a full 

 commitment to the time and energy that will be 

 necessary to do a complete and thorough job. 

 It is your moral and legal obligation to 

 insure that no stone is unturned. Most

 importantly, each Commissioner must recuse 

 themselves in areas that they have a conflict of 

 interest. Our nation deserves this Commission to 

 be different. We want to prevent other families 

 from suffering the loss we have had to endure. We

 want you to answer our questions, identify systemic 

 failures, and resolve problems. 

 Despite the cost, we want recommendations 
 187 

 that are implemented and we want accountability.

 We want to know that changes are being made so our 

 families can feel safe living in this country. 

 Ultimately, you are accountable for the success of

 this Commission. 

 In closing, I would like to offer my 

 sincerest condolences to the families of the brave 

 soldiers who perished in Iraq. I understand their 

 grief. May God bless my son and all those who died

 as a result of September 11th and may their spirit 

 grant you the strength and wisdom as you proceed 

 with this important contribution for the sake of 

 our nation. Thank you. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Thank you very much.

 Mindy Kleinberg from September 11th Advocates.

 MS. KLEINBERG: My name is Mindy 

 Kleinberg. My husband Alan, 39 years old, was 

 killed in the World Trade Center on September 11th, 

 2001. As I testify here today about the 9/11

 attacks, I will begin by saying that my thoughts 

 are very much with the men and women who are 

 involved in armed conflict overseas and their 
 188 

 families who wait patiently for them to return. 

 This war is being fought on two fronts, 

 overseas as well as here on our shores. This means 

 that we are all soldiers in this fight against

 terrorism. As the threat of terrorism mounts here 

 in the United States, the need to address the 

 failures of September 11th is more important than 

 ever. It is an essential part of lessons learned. 

 As such, this commission has an extremely

 important task before it. I'm here today to ask 

 you, the Commissioners, to help us understand how 

 this could have happened. Help us understand where 

 the breakdown was in our nation's defense 

 capabilities.

Where we were on the morning of September 

 11th. On the morning of September 11th my 

 three-year-old son, Sam, and I walked Jacob, 10, 

 and Lauren, seven, to the bus stop at about 8:40 

 a.m. It was the fourth day of a new school year

 and you could still feel everyone's excitement. It 

 was such a beautiful day that Sam and I literally 

 skipped home, oblivious to what was happening in 
 189 

 New York. 

 At around 8:55 I was confirming play-date

 plans for Sam when a friend said, "I can't believe 

 what I'm watching on TV, a plane has just hit the

 World Trade Center." For some reason it didn't 

 register with me until a few minutes later, I asked 

 her calmly, "What building did you say? Oh, that's 

 Alan's building, I have to call you back." 

 There was no answer when I tried to reach

 him at the office. By now my house started filling 

 with people -- his mother, my parents, our sisters 

 and friends. The seriousness of the situation was 

 beginning to register. We spent the rest of the 

 day calling hospitals and the Red Cross and

 anyplace else we could think of to see if we could 

 find him. I will never forget thinking all day 

 long, "How am I going to tell Jacob and Lauren that 

 their father was missing?" 

 They came home to a house filled with

 people but no Daddy. How were they going to be 

 able to wait calmly for his return? What if he was 

 really hurt? This was their hero, their king, 
 190 

 their best friend, their father. The thoughts of 

 that day replay over and over in our heads, always 

 wishing for a different outcome. 

 We are trying to learn to live with the

 pain. We will never forget where we were or how we 

 felt on September 11th. But where was our 

 government, its agencies and institutions prior to 

 and on the morning of September 11th? 

 The theory of luck. With regard to the

 9/11 attacks, it has been said that the 

 intelligence agencies have to be right 100 percent 

 of the time and the terrorists only have to get 

 lucky once. This explanation for the devastating

 attacks of September 11th, simple on its face, is

 wrong in its value, because the 9/11 terrorists 

 were not just lucky once, they were lucky over and 

 over again. Allow me to illustrate. 

 The SEC. The terrorists' lucky streak 

 began the week before September 11th with the

 Securities and Exchange Commission, or SEC. The 

 SEC, in concert with the United States intelligence 

 agencies, has sophisticated software programs that 
 191 

 are used in real time to watch both domestic and 

 overseas markets to seek out trends that may 

 indicate a present or future crime. 

 In the week prior to September 11th both

 the SEC and U.S. intelligence agencies ignored one 

 major stock-market indicator, one that could have 

 yielded valuable information with regard to the 

 September 11th attacks. On the Chicago Board 

 Options Exchange during the week before September

 11th, put options were purchased on American and 

 United Airlines, the two airlines involved in the 

 attacks. The investors who placed these orders 

 were gambling that in the short term, the stock 

 prices of both airlines would plummet.

 Never before on the Chicago Exchange were 

 such large amounts of United and American Airlines 

 options traded. These investors netted a profit of 

 several million dollars after the September 11th 

 attacks. Interestingly, the names of the investors

 remain undisclosed and the millions remain 

 unclaimed in the Chicago Exchange account. 

 Why were these aberrant trades not 
 192 

 discovered prior to 9/11? Who were the individuals 

 who placed these trades? Have they been 

 investigated? Who was responsible for monitoring 

 these activities? Have those individuals been held

 responsible for their inaction? 

 The INS. Prior to 9/11, our United States 

 intelligence agencies should have stopped the 19 

 terrorists from entering this country for 

 intelligence reasons alone. However, their failure

 to do so in 19 instances does not negate the luck 

 involved for the terrorists when it comes to their

 visa applications and our Immigration and 

 Naturalization Service, or INS. 

 With regard to the INS, the terrorists got

 lucky 15 individual times because 15 of the 19 

 hijackers' visas should have been unquestionably 

 denied. 

 Most of the 19 hijackers were young, 

 unmarried, unemployed males. They were, in short,

 the classic overstay candidates. A seasoned former 

 Consular Officer stated in National Review 

 Magazine, "Single, idle young adults with no 
 193 

 specific destination in the United States rarely 

 get visas absent compelling circumstances." 

 Yet these 19 young, single, unemployed, 

 "classic overstay candidates still received their

 visas." I am holding in my hand some of the 

 applications of the terrorists who killed my 

 husband. All of these forms are incomplete and 

 incorrect. 

 Some of the terrorists listed their means

 of support as simply "student" failing to then list 

 the name and address of any school or institution. 

 Others, when asked about their means of support for 

 their stay in the United States wrote "myself" and 

 provided no further documentation. Some of the

 terrorists listed their destination as simply 

 "hotel" or "California" or "New York". One even 

 listed his destination as "no". 

 Had the INS or the State Department 

 followed the law, at least 15 of the hijackers

 would have been denied visas and would not have 

 been in the United States on September 11, 2001. 

 Help us to understand how something as 
 194 

 simple as reviewing forms for completeness could 

 have been missed at least 15 times. How many more 

 lucky terrorists gained unfettered access into this 

 country? With no one being held accountable, how

 do we know that this still isn't happening? 

 On the morning of September 11th, the 

 terrorists' luck commenced with airline and airport 

 security. When the 19 hijackers went to purchase 

 their tickets and to receive their boarding passes,

 nine were singled out and questioned through a 

 screening process. Luckily for those nine 

 terrorists, they passed the screening process and 

 were allowed to continue on with their mission. 

 But the terrorists' luck did not end at

 the ticket counter, it accompanied them through 

 airport security, as well, because how else would 

 the hijackers get specifically contraband items 

 such as box cutters, pepper spray, or, according to 

 one FAA executive summary, a gun, on those planes?

 Finally, sadly for us, years of GAO 

 recommendations to secure cockpit doors were 

 ignored making it all too easy for the hijackers to 
 195 

 gain access to the flight controls and carry out 

 their suicide missions. 

 The FAA and NORAD. Prior to 9/11, FAA and 

 Department of Defense manuals gave clear,

 comprehensive instructions on how to handle 

 everything from minor emergencies to full-blown

 hijackings. These protocols were in place and were 

 practiced regularly for a good reason -- with 

 heavily trafficked airspace, airliners without

 radio and transponder contact are collisions 

 waiting to happen. 

 These protocols dictate that in the event 

 of an emergency, the FAA is to notify NORAD. Once 

 that notification takes place, it is then the

 responsibility of NORAD to scramble fighter jets to 

 intercept the errant plane. It is a matter of 

 routine procedure for fighter jets to intercept 

 commercial airliners in order to regain contact 

 with the pilot. In fact, between June 2000 and

 September 2001, fighter jets were scrambled 67 

 times. 

 If that weren't enough protection, on 
 196 

 September 11th, NEADS, or the Northeast Air Defense 

 System department of NORAD, was several days into a 

 semi-annual exercise known as Vigilant Guardian. 

 This meant that our Northeast Air Defense System

 was fully staffed. In short, key officers were 

manning the operation battle center, fighter jets 

 were cocked, loaded, and carrying extra gas on 

 board. Lucky for the terrorists none of that 

 mattered on September 11th.

 Let me use Flight 11 as an example. 

 American Airlines Flight 11 departed Boston Logan 

 Airport at 7:45 a.m. The last routine 

 communication between ground control and the plane 

 occurred at 8:13 a.m. Between 8:13 and 8:20,

 Flight 11 became unresponsive to ground control. 

 Additionally, radar indicated that the plane had 

 deviated from its assigned path of flight. Soon 

 thereafter, transponder contact was lost. 

 Two Flight 11 airline attendants had

 separately called American Airlines reporting a 

 hijacking, the presence of weapons and the 

 inflictions of injuries upon passengers and crew.
 197 

 At this point it would seem abundantly clear that 

 Flight 11 was an emergency. 

 And yet, according to NORAD's official 

 timeline, NORAD was not contacted until 20 minutes

 later at 8:40 a.m. Tragically, the fighter jets

 were not deployed until 8:52 a.m., a full 32 

 minutes after loss of contact with Flight 11. 

 Why was there a delay in the FAA notifying 

 NORAD? Why was there a delay in NORAD's scrambling

 fighter jets? How is this possible when NEADS was 

 fully staffed with planes at the ready, monitoring 

 our airspace? 

 Flights 175, 77 and 93 all had this same 

 repeat pattern of delays in notification and delays

 in scrambling fighter jets, delays that are 

 unimaginable considering a plane had, by this time, 

 already hit the World Trade Center. Even more 

 baffling for us is the fact that fighter jets were 

 not scrambled from the closest Air Force bases.

 For example, for the flight that hit the 

 Pentagon, the jets were scrambled from Langley Air 

 Force, in Hampton, Virginia rather than Andrews Air 
 198 

 Force Base right outside D.C. As a result, 

 Washington skies remained wholly unprotected on the 

 morning of September 11th. 

 At 9:41 a.m., one hour and 21 minutes

 after the first plane was hijack confirmed by 

 NORAD, Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon. The 

 fighter jets were still miles away. Why? 

 So the hijackers' luck had continued. On 

 September 11th both the FAA and NORAD deviated from

 standard emergency operating procedures. Who were 

 the people that delayed the notification? Have 

 they been questioned? 

 In addition, the interceptor planes or 

 fighter jets did not fly at their maximum speed.

 Had the belatedly scrambled fighter jets flown at 

 their maximum speed of engagement, they would have 

 reached New York City and the Pentagon within 

 moments of their deployment, intercepted the 

 hijacked airliners before they could have hit their

 targets, and undoubtedly saved lives. 

 The leadership. The acting Joint Chief of 

 Staff on September 11th was General Richard B.
 199 

 Myers. On the morning of September 11th, he was 

 having a routine meeting. The acting Joint Chief 

 of Staff stated that he saw a TV report about a 

 plane hitting the World Trade Center but thought it

 was a small plane or something like that. 

 So, he went ahead with his meeting. 

 "Meanwhile, the second World Trade Center was hit 

 by another jet. Nobody informed us of that," 

 Myers said. By the time he came out of this

 meeting, the Pentagon had been hit. 

 Whose responsibility was it to relay this 

 emergency to the Joint Chief of Staff? Have they 

 been held accountable for this error? Surely this 

 represents a breakdown in protocol.

 The Secretary of Defense was at his desk 

 doing paperwork when Flight 77 crashed into the 

 Pentagon. As reported, Secretary Rumsfeld felt the 

 building shake, went outside, saw the damage and 

 started helping the injured onto stretchers. After

 aiding the victims, the Secretary then went to the 

 War Room. 

 How is it possible that the National 
 200 

 Military Command Center, located in the Pentagon 

 and in contact with law enforcement and air-traffic

 controllers from 8:46 a.m., did not communicate to 

 the Secretary of Defense, also at the Pentagon,

 about the other hijacked planes, especially the one 

 headed to Washington? How is it that the Secretary 

 of Defense could have remained at his desk until 

 the crash? Whose responsibility is it to relay 

 emergency situations to him?

 At 6:15 a.m. on the morning of September 

 11th, my husband Alan left for work. He drove in 

 to New York City and was at his desk and working at 

 his NASDAQ security-trading position with Cantor 

 Fitzgerald, in Tower 1 of the World Trade Center,

 by 7:30 a.m. 

 In contrast, on that morning President 

 Bush was scheduled to read to elementary-school

 children. Before the President walked into the 

 classroom, NORAD had sufficient information that

 the plane that hit the World Trade Center was 

 hijacked. At that time they also had knowledge 

 that two other commercial airliners in the air were 
 201 

 also hijacked. 

 It would seem that a national emergency 

 was in progress, yet the President was allowed to 

 enter a classroom full of young children and listen

 to students read. 

 Why didn't the Secret Service inform him 

 of this national emergency? When is the President 

 supposed to be notified of everything the agencies

 know? Why was the President permitted by the

 Secret Service to remain in the Sarasota elementary 

 school? Was this Secret Service protocol? 

 In the case of a national emergency, 

 seconds of indecision could cost thousands of 

 lives. And it is precisely for that reason that

 our government has a whole network of adjuncts and 

 advisors to ensure that these top officials are 

 among the first to be informed and not the last. 

 Where were these individuals who did not 

 properly inform these top officials? Where was the

 breakdown in communication? Was it luck? Is it 

 luck that aberrant stock trades were not monitored? 

 Is it luck when 15 visas are awarded based on 
 202 

 incomplete forms? Is it luck when airline security 

 screeners allow hijackers to board planes with box 

 cutters and pepper spray? Is it luck when 

 emergency FAA and NORAD protocols are not followed?

 Is it luck when a national emergency is not 

 reported to top government officials on a timely 

 basis? 

 To me luck is something that happens once. 

 When you have this repeated pattern of broken

 protocols, broken laws, broken communication, one 

 cannot still call it luck. If at some point we 

 don't look to hold the individuals accountable for 

 not doing their jobs properly, then how can we ever 

 expect for terrorists to not get lucky again?

 And that is why I'm here with all of you 

 today, because we must find the answers as to what 

 happened that day so as to ensure that another 

 September 11th can never happen again. 

 Commissioners, I implore you to answer our

 questions. You are the generals in the terrorism 

 fight on our shores. In answering our questions, 

 you have the ability to make this nation a safer 
 203 

 place and, in turn, minimize the damage if there is 

 another terrorist attack. And if there is another 

 attack, the next time our systems will be in place 

 and working and luck will not be an issue. Thank

 you. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Is Allison Vadhan here 

 yet? She's on the way and she has a statement and 

 we will put her on after the break. 

 SPEAKER: She's here now, she's right

 upstairs. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Here she is. All right. 

 You picked your timing very well. Are you all 

 right to go on right now? 

 MS. VADHAN: I'm all right, yes.

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Okay. 

 MS. VADHAN: Thank you. I apologize. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Thank you very much. 

 Allison Vadhan, Families of Flight 93. 

 MS. VADHAN: Members of the Commission,

 Mr. Kean, honored guests, my name is Allison Vadhan 

 and I lost my very young 65-year-old mother, 

 Kristin White Gould, on United Flight 93, the plane 
 204 

 that crashed in Shanksville, Pennsylvania while the 

 passengers and crew tried to overcome the 

 hijackers. 

 I'd like to thank the Commission for

 inviting me to speak today. I've always had a 

 strong inner faith and I still believe that God 

 doesn't give us what we can't handle. Being here 

 today and your hearing my voice and our voices in 

 place of our loved ones is a privilege.

 My mother, a graduate from Cornell 

 University and a medical journalist, preferred to 

 spend her vacation time visiting ancient cities to 

 learn about ancient civilizations. Before I knew 

 that she was flying that day, I had already

 witnessed the second tower of the World Trade 

 Center explode into an orange fireball and I saw 

 with my own eyes the great black mushroom cloud 

 rise above the New York City skyline, not far from 

 my own home.

 I'm sure most Americans today remember the 

 sinking feeling when it was obvious that not only 

 the World Trade Center had come under terrorist 
 205 

 attacks but that there were other planes in trouble 

-- along with fires and explosions in Washington. 

 And then there was news about a plane down in 

 Pennsylvania. Before the day was over, we all knew

 that this was war. 

 By the Christmas holidays, we faced the 

 anthrax attacks, the attempted bombing of the plane 

 from Paris to Miami, which was averted to Boston, 

 by Richard Reid, the discovery of an American, John

 Walker Lind, who was captured as a Taliban rebel in 

 Afghanistan. How many other plans were there? It 

 felt like each day could be the next day for an 

 attack. 

 Most of us would turn on the TV first

 thing in the morning to see if the world had 

 changed overnight. Finally, it seemed crystal 

 clear to citizens, as well as governments, that the

 U.S. is a prized target for al Qaeda. And this 

 could possibly happen again and again and again,

 whether they actually hit or just miss. 

 I'm concerned not only about my own three 

 children and if the U.S. will be as strong as it 
 206 

 has been in the 20th century. I'm also concerned 

 about what's already been taught to children in 

 Madrassa schools this year, last year, five years 

 ago.

 Six days after my mother was killed, our 

 family traveled to Shanksville, Pennsylvania for 

 the memorial services for the families of Flight 

 93. After the services I went back to my hotel 

 room for some quiet time and when I turned on the

 TV, a reporter in Pakistan was interviewing 8- and 

 10-year-old boys at school. Their computer screen 

 savers bounced pictures of Osama bin Laden. We

 have discovered that there is another generation 

 being trained and raised to become terrorists when

 they grow up. 

 I can tell you that forgetting and trying 

 to move on is a survival mechanism and it is part 

 of human nature. The pain of trying to envision 

 what my mother might have been going through and

 experienced on that plane is so great that it's 

 almost only normal to try to forget about it and 

 think about something else. But trying to forget 
 207 

 is an indulgence for any American who saw what we 

 saw. 

 Al Qaeda and similar cells around the 

 world are training their young ones. If Americans

 don't prepare for this next generation, we have 

 only ourselves in this room to hold accountable. 

 I'm concerned about civil liberties as an 

 excuse for not taking action to prevent terrorism. 

 I'm concerned about how many untold cases there are

 of federal and local agencies not being able to 

 properly investigate a potential terrorist. At the 

 time FBI investigators could not obtain a criminal 

 search warrant to inspect the laptop computer of 

 Zacharias Moussaoui because supervisors in

 Washington D.C. thought there was no probable 

 cause. 

 Now that we know our laws for

 investigating are outdated and no longer 

 appropriate, I'm concerned that we will choose not

 to fix them in the name of protecting civil 

 liberties, rather than protecting the lives of 

 American civilians. 
 208 

 President Bush effectively made us aware 

 that we are fighting a new kind of war. And if the 

 battlefield is here at home, waged by specific 

 groups from specific areas around the world, in the

 name of a specific religion, I'm concerned that 

 avoiding racial profiling will supersede preventing 

 further terrorism. And the enemy knows this. 

 Terrorism is similar to the guerilla 

 warfare we hear about going on in Iraq: Militants

 pose themselves as ordinary citizens and immigrants 

 here in the United States. They appear so clean 

 cut, they could fit in on any golf course. And 

 they do this to remain undetected until they carry 

 out their terrorist goals. If we're lucky, they're

 dressed in their customary dress, they're wearing 

 their traditional non-Western clothing. 

 As long as we allow groups to be protected 

 from racial profiling, how can we win this new war? 

 And after seeing those little boys in the Madrassa

 schools which are sponsored by Osama bin Laden and 

 the like, our children and grandchildren will, with 

 no uncertainly, face a very dangerous existence, 
 209 

 especially if we try to forget and move on. 

 The people who died on September 11th were 

 the first casualties in this new war. It is our 

 responsibility not to let them die in vain. I hope

 we learn from our mistakes and prevent our children 

 from having to deal with the problems that their 

 parents and grandparents could have and should have 

 addressed with action and resolve. 

 Thank you for inviting me and other

 families to speak today. I believe that we all 

 share the same goal in making our country and our 

 world a safer place. I hope the outcome of the 

 independent Commission is to learn from the past so 

 that history will not repeat itself. Thank you.

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Thank you all very much. 

 This is an extraordinary panel and you have given 

 us a tremendous charge. I might say, in addition 

 to the fact of all the questions that you have 

 given us that we must answer to our satisfaction

 and the satisfaction of the American people, in 

 addition the families' group, I didn't realize this 

 was appointed somewhat late, but there wouldn't be 
 210 

 a Commission if it was not for the work of the 

 victims and the families. And we're all very, very 

 aware of that. 

 I also want to say, as Chairman, that

 every single time that this Commission has asked 

 the families to help in any way in the execution of 

 our mission, they have been there, from setting out 

 the mission to helping us get an adequate budget. 

 I just want to say to you all, as

 representatives of the families, thank you very, 

 very much, and we look forward to working with you 

 in the future. 

 At this point, if I could recognize 

 Senator Cleland.

 COMMISSIONER CLELAND: Thank you very

 much, Mr. Chairman. Miss Kleinberg has referred to 

 a meeting of the new Chairman 

 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was having, at that 

 moment of 9/11. He was having that meeting with me.

 I was on the Armed Services Committee. And we were 

 talking about America's defenses at the moment. 

 My understanding of that is at the very 
 211 

 moment that we were talking about that, the aide, a 

 lieutenant colonel, was receiving a call from the 

 Pentagon. Basically the message was, as I 

 understand it, New York hit, Washington next.

 And that scared one of my secretaries so 

 badly about that moment that the Chairman and I 

 rolled in and watched the second plane hit. And we 

 left the office immediately, but it was ironic that 

 we were talking about defending the country at that

 very moment. I just wanted to add that for the 

 record. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Thank you, Senator. 

 Senator Gorton? 

 COMMISSIONER GORTON: Mr. Push, with the

 exception of some of your co-sufferers from this

 tragedy, I doubt that anyone in the course of the 

 last 18 months has spent more time or thought on 

 this entire matter than you have. 

 And in your written and oral testimony,

 you have several questions that you think it 

 necessary for us to answer. I'd like to know 

 whether or not you have formed any tentative 
 212 

 answers to those questions that you'd like to share 

 with us. And let me just do one of them. 

 Do you have any strong and informed views 

 on whether or not the FBI can be an appropriate

 counterterrorism agency or whether or not we should 

 have a separate British-type MI-5?

 MR. PUSH: It is my opinion that we should 

 have a separate MI-5 type of organization. It

 appears to me that the whole culture of the FBI is 

 antithetical to the skills that are needed in 

 counterterrorism. The reward system is geared 

 towards people who solve cases rather than prevent 

 terrorist attacks.

 And I realize that the director of the FBI 

 is attempting to change that culture, but we 

 haven't got the luxury of time. And I think we 

 should try a different model. Would you like me to 

 mention my views on these others?

 COMMISSIONER GORTON: If you'd like to do 

 so. I may comment. 

 MR. PUSH: Sure. 
 213 

 COMMISSIONER GORTON: I have a friend who 

 is a United States Attorney in one of the districts 

 in Washington who has said to me, not at all 

 facetiously, recently, that he can't get the FBI to

 investigate bank robberies anymore because they're 

 all looking for, spies and they may very 

 well be inconsistent charges.

 MR. PUSH: As far as foreign policy, I 

 think we have to take, I realize that now that

 we're at war with Iraq is not the right moment to 

 reevaluate our relationship with Saudi Arabia, but 

 I think that we need to reevaluate our 

 relationships with the Middle East. 

 I think too many governments, particularly

 Saudi Arabia, but I think this applies to other 

 Middle Eastern governments as well, who play a 

 double game, who pretend to be our allies while 

 secretly, or sometimes not so secretly, turning a 

 blind eye to their citizens, funding terrorism,

 even the governments themselves setting up 

 newspapers that are blatantly anti-American,

 anti-Semitic, schools and mosques that provide 
 214 

 hatred and violence. 

 And I think that we need to use the full 

 weight of our -- military action 

 like in Iraq will not always be appropriate, but I

 think we should use the full weight of our foreign 

 policy, whether it be diplomatic or through foreign 

 aid or whatever to pressure these governments to 

 change until -- I believe that we'll never be safe 

 from Islamic extremism until the Arab Muslim

 countries begin to experience democracy. 

 In the case of the Homeland Security 

 Department, I believe that it was done more to 

 appease the American public than to make 

 fundamental change. I think just

 throwing a lot of agencies together under a single 

 department in and of itself does not in itself 

 provide a more secure environment. We really have 

 to rethink. And one of the things I've mentioned 

 about people who are still in responsible

 positions, it's my understanding that the managers 

 who are responsible for the poor performance of 

 aviation security under the FAA have been 
 215 

 transferred to responsible positions in the TSA 

 and/or to contractors who work for the TSA. So we 

 changed the label it's operating under, we haven't 

 changed the fundamental problem.

 In the case of the 14 agencies, I support 

 the recommendation of the Joint 9/11 Inquiry to 

 have a Director of National Intelligence. I spent 

 most of my time in the private sector. You would 

 never even dream in the private sector having 14

 different departments in a company doing the same 

 thing, and nobody is in charge.

 And as far as political campaign 

 contributions having an effect on aviation 

 security, I suspect they have. The airlines have

 always gotten a pass from the government. I know 

 that they make the case that they're absolutely 

 vital to the national interest, and I believe they 

 are, but I believe they're in trouble not because 

 of regulatory requirements but because of poor

 management. 

 And I think that they have, they seem to 

 have plenty of money to spend on political campaign 
 216 

 contributions and on lawyers and they, before 9/11 

 and after 9/11, they seem to have successfully 

 evaded many of the requirements that the government 

 has tried to place on them.

 And I think that, and this is a broader 

 issue, I'm picking on the airline industry because 

 they're the industry that I think had played a key 

 role in responsibility for 9/11, but this is just 

 the tip of the iceberg, I think, and maybe this is

 too broad for this Commission to get into, but I 

 think the whole political campaign contribution

 system in this country is warping the political 

 process. And the problems with the airline 

 industry are just one example of it.

 COMMISSIONER FIELDING: Thank you, Mr. 

 Chairman. Just a general statement, if I may, 

 thanking this panel. Your stories are very 

 compelling, your advice is good and sound, and 

 obviously you have strengthened our resolve.

 I know I speak for all of us, you're 

 obviously one of our best assets. Please, stay 

 with us, please keep giving us guidance, please 
 217 

 keep us direct. Thank you. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Senator Gorelick? 

 COMMISSIONER GORELICK: Yes, I might just 

 follow up on that. I was very impressed with what

 both Mary Fetchet and Mindy Kleinberg had to say in 

 terms of the body of acknowledge that you have 

 brought to bear on this issue. 

 And I was struck by the fact that 

 laypeople, with no powers of subpoena, with no

 access to inside information of any sort, could put 

 together a very powerful set of questions and set 

 of facts that are a roadmap for us. And I would 

 just ask you to briefly describe by what process 

 you have developed the factual basis that you have

 laid before us today because it is really quite 

 striking. 

 MS. KLEINBERG: Hours and hours and hours 

 of reading articles, and you know, over the 

 Internet, we e-mailed each other articles.

 Somewhere in October we became obsessed with 

 everything that was September 11th. 

 It started with, you know, any article 
 218 

 that had anything to do with September 11th we 

 started to pass back and forth. And then, you 

 know, if they had something to do with let's say 

 INS, we started to look up information about the

 INS. So it's literally 18 months of doing nothing 

 but grieving and reading. 

 COMMISSIONER GORELICK: Thank you for the 

 reading part, motivated by the grieving, I'm sure. 

 MS. FETCHET: I think initially we were

 all just numb. And we were like the general 

 public. And I said to my friends, in fact, you 

 might read an article and say, gee, that's sort of 

 odd, they gave visas to the terrorists. And you 

 know, that's unusual or that's, you know.

 So I think that as we progressed, our 

 curiosity took over. And we started reading and 

 really not only putting the articles together but 

 also connecting the dots. And you see, I mean, 

 they had more than enough information to really, if

 not minimize, completely prevent this from 

 happening. 

 And the problem is, these agencies are not 
 219 

 communicating. They don't have protocol that they

 have in place or they're not following it. So it's 

 just, I think our curiosity took over and we 

 started drawing conclusions to reading this

 information. 

 COMMISSIONER GORELICK: Thank you. 

 MS. FETCHET. But we're turning it over to 

 you now because we're tired. Now it's your job. 

 MR. PUSH: And we want to see lots of

 subpoenas. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Congressman Roemer? 

 COMMISSIONER ROEMER: Thank you, Mr. 

 Chairman. 

 Having served in Congress and as a member

 of the Joint Inquiry, I cannot thank all of you 

 enough and the people in the audience enough for 

 your participation in making sure that the Joint 

 Inquiry continued to dig hard and dig deep and get 

 at the facts and put out the starting point for the

 Commission. 

 Many of you could have taken your grief 

 and your sorrow and your pain and gone to the 
 220 

 sidelines. Instead, just as we see today the 

 pictures out there of your wife or your son or your 

 loved one, you came to every single public hearing 

 that we had on the Joint Inquiry.

 And the members of that Joint Inquiry 

 looked out in the audience and saw those faces 

 every single day. And that had a huge impact on 

 that committee, that bipartisan committee of 

 Senators and Congressmen, trying to do their job

 harder and harder and more effectively every day. 

 You were instrumental in the creation of 

 the Commission. It would not have happened 

 legislatively, getting through the House and 

 Senate, if it had not been for you. At a time when

 many Americans don't even take the opportunity to 

 cast a ballot, you folks went out and made the 

 legislative system work. You can take great pride 

 in that. 

 I hope you will stay involved in this

 Commission's work. And I hope that you will stay 

 involved in helping us implement recommendations of 

 the Commission. That will be one of the most 
 221 

 difficult parts we get to. 

 And along those lines, Steve, if you want 

 to, I just want to ask you a very quick question. 

 Maybe you don't answer it today, maybe you answer

 it in six months. And Steve, you may have 

 partially answered it, but maybe you can all take a 

 quick try at it. 

 What two recommendations would you like to 

 see us pass at the end of the day to make the

 country a safer place against this fluid, dynamic, 

 very lethal threat of al Qaeda and terrorists? 

 Steve, I will call on you first. You may 

 have mentioned two of them, the creation of the 

 Director of National Intelligence and an MI-5.

 MR. PUSH: Yes, actually I think if I had 

 to pick only two, I would say the Director of 

 National Intelligence and a change in our 

 relationship to the Middle East, both. I mentioned 

 Saudi Arabia, but also I think we have to reexamine

 our policy towards Israel, as well. 

 I support Israel, but we've turned a blind 

 eye to the expansion of settlements in the West 
 222 

 Bank and all of these things are interconnected. 

 I'm not a blame-America-first advocate. This was 

 the fault of the hijackers, and the hijackers were 

 the fault of a dysfunctional society in the Arab

 Muslim countries. 

 Unfortunately, we can't just pin the blame 

 on them because they're killing us. So we have to 

 do whatever we can, use whatever leverage we have 

 to force changes there that will stop them from

 continuing to create young people who hate us more 

 than they love life itself.

 We can build a wall around America, and we 

 will never be able to protect ourselves as long as 

 there are people like that in the world.

 MS. FETCHET: I think the two areas I 

 would like to see changes in would be the FBI and 

 the CIA working together. To me it's inexcusable 

 that you have two agencies that are supposed to be 

 protecting our citizens. And they have cultures

 and territorial wars and they're not communicating 

 or coordinating their efforts. 

 I think the second thing is immigration.
 223 

 I think we really do not know who is living in this 

 country. I was amazed to hear -- the learning 

 curve for all of us has been beyond straight up --

 but when I sat in the Joint Intelligence hearings

 and I heard that the watch list only goes one way, 

 that doesn't make sense to me. And I can't 

 understand how we're not monitoring people coming 

 and going. So I think those are the two areas. 

 And one other thing I'd like to include is

 just to mention how thankful we are for the work 

 that the Joint Intelligence Committee did. They 

 really, worked hard. I 

 would like you to follow some of their 

 recommendations.

 They were very frustrated with people not 

showing up for testimony, people not complying with 

 subpoenas, and so, I've forgotten who mentioned it 

 to us, but they said subpoena early and often, and 

 that's another recommendation that I would have, is

 make that list and get started. 

 MS. KLEINBERG: You know, I agree with 

 Mary and Steve. I also think that there's a part 
 224 

 about accountability that we, as citizens, we can't 

 hold the Director of Central Intelligence 

 accountable or the people that work for him or the 

 FBI, we're not in charge of hiring or firing them.

 And there's no way, there's no report 

 card, you know, it's a matter of national security. 

 So Congressional oversight becomes extremely 

 important. And you know, our ability to, as 

 Americans, to get the story out so that we know

 who's accountable and we know that we could use our 

 votes to ensure this accountability. That's one of 

 them. 

 And the other is, I think there should be 

 full disclosure for public officials of any of

 their business interests. You know, we have talked 

 a lot about conflicts on this Commission. And you 

 know, the onus is on you to rise above those 

 conflicts. 

 And I'm sure that you will be able to do

 that when it is this important of a job, but I 

 think, you know, it's another area that has to be 

 looked at that when we put people into office, 
 225 

 whether it's a Congressman or a Senator or a 

 President, we have to take a look at what their 

 business interests are so that there are no 

 conflicts there either.

 MS. VADHAN: Again, I'll just reiterate 

 what I have said in my statement. I think we need 

 to take a good look at the laws, how we investigate 

 possible suspects, how we investigate, how we keep 

 track of immigrants, and also take a look at, take

 a good hard look at what we do know about September

 11th and the people who were involved with 

 conspiring the terrorist attacks and finding out 

 why we decided to stop investigating or stop 

 following one of the hijackers in the middle of the

 year, right before September 11th, we just decided 

 to stop following him. 

 We had been on his tail for over a year, 

 and for some unknown reason, we just don't know, we 

 decided to stop watching him. And we didn't hear

 about him until he ended up on the plane, on Flight 

 93 that crashed in Pennsylvania. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Are there anymore 
 226 

 questions from the Commissioners? If not, you are 

 extraordinary people. Thank you so very much for 

 your testimony. I believe we're running late, not 

 unexpectedly, but I would ask, therefore, if we

 could hold our break to 45 minutes. Let's catch 

 our 15 minutes that way, if we could be back here 

 in 45 minutes. Thank you all very much. 

 (45-minute recess) 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Thank you all very, very

 much for coming. I'd like to start by introducing 

 Dr. Sofaer, from Hoover Institution. Institute, 

 right? 

 DR. SOFAER: Institution. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Institution. It's

 Institution, all right. Thank you very much, sir, 

 for coming here today. 

 DR. SOFAER: Delighted to be here, Mr. 

 Chairman. It's a privilege, Mr. Chairman and 

 members of this Commission, to testify concerning

 the prevention of terrorist acts against the United 

 States. My experience in this field is based on 

 service as a federal prosecutor with one of the 
 227 

 Commissioners here, Mr. Ben-Veniste, as a federal 

 judge, as legal advisor to the Department of State 

 and another Commissioner participated in making me 

 legal advisor, Fred Fielding, and as a scholar in

 the area of national security. 

 And I am honored to say, Mr. Chairman, 

 that I serve with many in the federal government, 

 with many of the people who are sitting here as 

 Commissioners and I am privileged to be with you

 again. 

 This Commission has the formidable task of 

 explaining the terrorist acts of September 11th and 

 providing recommendations help to prevent such 

 attacks in the future. The cost of those attacks

 is staggering, as you know: 2,819 lives at the 

 World Trade Center, including 343 firefighters and 

 paramedics, 23 New York City policemen, 124 killed 

 at the Pentagon, 271 people who died in the crashes 

 of the airplanes involved and the economic

 consequences of it are tremendous and still haven't 

 been figured out. We know that New York City, this 

 great city, lost 146,000 jobs. 
 228 

 Those who were murdered on September 11th 

 remain in our minds and hearts. We owe it to them 

 to ask ourselves, what are the lessons of their 

 terrible deaths, have we made the changes to permit

 us to say they did not die in vain.

 The long process of introspection began 

 immediately after the attacks and continues. This 

 Commission will find no shortage of ideas as to how 

 America can defend itself more effectively,

 including better intelligence, reorganization of 

 agencies, enhanced technologies, better 

 diplomacy and accountability. These are all 

 important subjects which the Commission must 

 address.

 My testimony, Mr. Chairman, though, will 

 focus on what I regard as most significant, the 

 failure to use force to prevent the terrorist acts 

 of 9/11 from happening. It is now the strategic 

 policy of the United States to use force

 preemptively to prevent terrorists and their 

 states' supporters from attacking this country. 

 Until 9/11, however, the use of force was 
 229 

 not seriously pursued. When President Clinton 

 promised to bring terrorists to justice, he meant 

 that he would investigate them, try to capture 

 them, and when that was possible, see that they

 were tried, convicted and sent to prison. 

 Preventing terrorist attacks became a game 

 in which national-security experts, the FBI, 

 prosecutors and intelligence personnel attempted to 

 learn where and when attacks were to occur before

 they actually happened so they could do their best 

 to prevent it. 

 For many years prior to 9/11, I spoke out 

 as forcefully as I could against this approach to 

 fighting terrorism. My position was not original,

 Mr. Chairman. It reflected the views of Secretary 

 of State George Shultz, and the views of his boss, 

 Ronald Reagan. 

 He proposed in 1983 that the United States 

 should adopt a policy of active defense against

 terror. “Fighting terrorism will not be a clean or 

 pleasant contest,” he said, “but we have no choice. 

 We must reach a consensus in this country that our 
 230 

 responses should go beyond passive measures, 

 passive defense, to consider means of active 

 prevention, preemption and retaliation. Our goal 

 must be to prevent and deter future terrorist

 attacks.”

 By the end of the Reagan administration, 

 the Shultz Doctrine had become national policy as 

 reflected by the bombing of Libya in 1987 for 

 arranging terrorist attacks on America.

 Mr. Chairman, you know, and certainly 

 Co-Chairman Hamilton knows, that nothing stays the 

 same in Washington D.C. After the first President 

 Bush took over, the bombing of Pan Am 103 was 

 treated as a criminal matter and eventually

 resolved after years of legal and diplomatic 

 maneuvering with the conviction of a single Libyan 

 intelligence operative. 

 Osama bin Laden fashioned his strategy on 

 the basis of this passive policy. He became

 convinced the U.S. could be forced to leave Muslim 

 countries and abandon Israel if he launched attacks 

 that shed American blood. Nothing that happened 
 231 

 prior to September 11th gave bin Laden reason to 

 doubt his assumptions. 

 Al Qaeda was responsible for several 

 successful attacks on U.S. targets prior to

 September 11th, as the Commission knows. And 

 throughout this onslaught, we responded precisely 

 as bin Laden anticipated. 

 In early 1993, al Qaeda operatives began 

 training Somali fighters to attack UN forces, and

 in October that year, they participated in attacks 

 that killed 18 marines. We had boisterously 

 arranged to have the UN Security Council issue a 

 warrant for the arrest of Mohamed Aidid, but after 

 suffering these 18 deaths, we withdrew from

 Somalia. 

 On February 26, 1993, a car bomb exploded 

 under the World Trade Center, killing eight people 

 and injuring over a thousand. We convicted most of 

 the perpetrators, but we left the organization from

 which they came unscathed. 

 On June 26, 1996, car bombs killed 19 

 Americans in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, and injured 
 232 

 another 200. The U.S. suspected bin Laden and al 

 Qaeda. All we did, however, was open a criminal 

 investigation. Bin Laden was not intimidated. On 

 October 12th that year, he issued a declaration of

 war against the U.S., calling on Muslims to "fight 

 jihad and cleanse the land from these Crusader 

 occupiers." 

 In November of 1996, bombings in Riyadh 

 and at the Khobar Towers barracks killed another 19

 American servicemen and injured 109. Bin Laden 

 called those attacks "praiseworthy terrorism," and 

 he promised more would follow. Once again, we sent 

 in the FBI. 

 In February 1998, bin Laden put his war

 into the form of a religious order, declaring the 

 "killing of Americans and their civilian and 

 military allies is a religious duty for each and 

 every Muslim." 

 And then August that same year, al Qaeda

 terrorists car-bombed the U.S. embassies in Kenya 

 and Tanzania, killing 224 people and injuring about 

 5,000. The U.S. launched a single ineffectual 
 233 

 missile strike on an al Qaeda camp in Afghanistan, 

 on one of those big old mountains, and on a 

 pharmaceutical plant in Sudan. 

 When it came to legal action, though, we

 pulled out the stops; we indicted bin Laden on 224 

 counts of murder. Characteristically, he failed to 

 show up for his trial. We settled for prosecuting 

 four al Qaeda operatives, after which prosecutors 

 triumphantly declared that they would continue to

 investigate al Qaeda until bin Laden and his 

 cohorts were all brought to justice. 

 This so terrified bin Laden that he told 

 Time Magazine, "The U.S. knows that I have attacked 

 it, by the grace of God, for more than 10 years

 now," in other words, why are they making such a 

 big deal out of this? 

 On October 12, 2000, a suicide boat 

 bombing of the USS Cole in Aden harbor killed 17 

 American sailors and injured 40, in addition to

 causing over $100 million of damage. We knew it, 

 it was al Qaeda's work, but the Clinton 

 administration did not bother to engage even in a 
 234 

 symbolic use of force, not even that one salvo of 

 missiles this time. Instead, it launched once 

 again a massive invasion of aggressive FBI agents, 

 incidentally, none of whom could speak Arabic.

 At the turn of the millennium, we had some 

 very good luck. An attack plan for the Los Angeles 

 Airport was aborted when the perpetrator panicked 

 on his way into the U.S. from Canada. 

 U.S. officials knew that bin Laden would

 strike again. They worried intensively, not about 

 whether an attack was coming, over where and when. 

 As the attack began on September 11th, the 

 President's advisors were sitting around a table in 

 the White House, worrying. They knew immediately

 that the attack for which they were waiting was 

 underway. 

 Given these events, it is small surprise 

 that after the attacks of September 11th, bin Laden 

 was triumphant. He was a hero. His strategy had

 worked. The U.S. had not stopped him. 

 Now we have heard many claims by former 

 and present officials in an attempt to explain why 
 235 

 they could not have prevented the 9/11 attacks. 

 The accumulating evidence undermines these claims. 

 But these excuses are, in any event, beside the 

 point. And that is the fundamental point of my

 testimony to this Commission. They are beside the 

 point. 

 The fact is that well before September 

 11th, the FBI, the intelligence community, the 

 Terrorism Czar, and everyone to whom they reported

 all knew that additional attacks by al Qaeda were 

 being planned and would certainly be attempted. 

 They simply failed to do before September 11th what 

 was done immediately thereafter. 

 The horrors of that day finally galvanized

 the nation into action. Now President Bush has 

 adopted three principles to guide U.S. policy: 

 First, that serious terrorist attacks should be 

 treated as acts of war, not merely as crimes; 

 second, that states are responsible for terrorism

 from within their borders; and third, that we must 

 preempt attacks where possible. 

 These principles are strategically 
 236 

 necessary, morally sound, and legally defensible. 

 This Commission should confirm the need to adopt 

 active measures of defense. Where grave threats 

 are present, state responsibility exists and the

 need for the use of preemptive force is 

 demonstrable, even if not imminent. 

 The notion that criminal prosecution could 

 bring a terrorist group like al Qaeda to justice is 

 absurd. And the UN Security Council has now

 authoritatively established the responsibilities of 

 states in this regard in its Resolution 1373. 

 As for preemption, the Commission should 

 consider carefully the implications of a position 

 that would preclude the U.S. from acting in its

 self defense merely because a real, terrible, and 

 certain threat was not also imminent. The 

 Commission should reject any standard of law that 

 would unreasonably restrict the President from 

 performing his or her obligation to protect the

 United States. 

 The need for preemptive actions stems 

 ultimately from the conditions in modern life. We 
 237 

 are a target-rich country, huge, virtually 

 impossible to defend effectively. Every potential 

 type of weapon can be used against us, from the 

 most conventional to the most modern and

 unconventional. We are vulnerable. Our entire 

 infrastructure is vulnerable and will be for many 

 years to come. 

 The area of intelligence is no less 

 subject to this reality. Many improvements should

 be made to enhance capacities, but it is illusory 

 to believe that intelligence, even combined with 

 all presently conceivable advances in technology, 

 will enable us to know in advance of all the 

 attacks we will have to foil through passive

 measures to achieve an adequate level of security. 

 We must, therefore, be able, when 

 necessary, to resort to active measures, and 

 necessity must be determined on the basis of all 

 relevant factors, not just imminence.

 No national-security policy against 

 terrorism can be regarded as sound if it fails to 

 include preemptive actions as an essential element.
 238 

 Nor should the Commission underestimate the 

 importance of preemption. 

 The historical record indicates that many 

 terrorist acts, attacks on the U.S., can be

 anticipated. The most recent attacks were by al 

 Qaeda, a single organization responsible for most 

 of the attacks I have listed for you, led by a man 

 who announced his intentions to kill Americans, in 

 advance, and who demonstrated his capacity to do so

 over and over again before he was finally stopped. 

 Other groups likely to attack us are also 

 well known, indeed, this panel has on it some of 

 the world's experts on those groups. It is true 

 that any war carries risks and the war on terrorism

 is no exception. But the risks of using force must 

 always be weighed against the risk of inaction. 

 The Commission should keep in mind the 

 utterly helpless posture into which our 

 national security officials placed themselves and

 the damage to which they exposed the nation by 

 failing to treat, as a proper part of their

 authority and indeed of their responsibility, the 
 239 

 use of force against so well-established and 

 determined an enemy as al Qaeda. 

 Ultimately, we owe the dead, the living, 

 and the unborn a world of freedom and tolerance.

 When all else fails, we must fight to preserve and, 

 in due course, extend those values. Freedom and 

 tolerance are not merely Western or American 

 ideals. They are enshrined in the UN Charter, 

 freely subscribed to by all Member States. To

 allow their subordination to any ideology or 

 religion, however deeply felt, would undo the 

 principles upon which the future of this nation and 

 of humanity rests. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Thank you very much.

 Professor Dan Byman, who's got a class to teach, 

 somebody who works for a university who understands 

 very, very clearly is a top priority. He's from 

 Georgetown University. Thank you, sir, for coming. 

 And when you have to leave, we will certainly

 understand that. 

 PROFESSOR BYMAN: Thank you very much, Mr. 

 Chairman. Governor Kean, Vice Chairman Hamilton, 
 240 

 Commissioners and Commission staff, representatives 

 of the victims and survivors of the attack. I am 

 very grateful and honored to be here today speaking 

 to you.

 In my testimony today I am going to 

 concentrate, in the interests of brevity, on key 

 intelligence and policy issues that proved a 

 problem before September 11th. The CIA has been 

 roundly criticized, as have other intelligence

 agencies, for their performance in 

 counterterrorism. They particularly have been 

 faulted for not stopping the attacks of September 

 11th. 

 A closer scrutiny of the factual

 background, however, suggests there was no single 

 action, no simple step, that, had it been taken, 

 would have stopped the attack. More broadly, the 

 intelligence community, and I would say 

 particularly the CIA, did well in providing

 strategic warning of the al Qaeda threat. 

 Policymakers from both parties have 

 confirmed that the intelligence community informed 
 241 

 them of the identity of the foe, the scale of its 

 ambitions and its lethality before September 11th. 

 Nevertheless, it is clear that the intelligence 

 community could have done much better.

 In my judgment, many of the problems the 

 intelligence community faced in meeting the 

 challenge al Qaeda stemmed from broader structural

 issues, and I will discuss three today. 

 One issue was a large gap that existed

 between the gathering of intelligence domestically 

 by the FBI and the overseas focus of the rest of 

 the intelligence community. As a result of this 

 gap, there was lack of sharing of information 

 between those tracking radicals at home and those

 tracking radicals abroad. 

 There was little attempt to marry up this 

 privileged information that only the FBI held with 

 broader CIA information and vice versa. And the 

 working-level analysts and operatives often did not

 know information was available, let alone its 

 content. 

 Because of these problems, it is 
 242 

 unfortunate but reasonable to conclude that the 

 threat to the U.S. homeland received less attention 

 than the coverage of al Qaeda's activities 

 overseas.

 A second structural problem was that there 

 was no firm control of the intelligence community, 

 and as a result, prioritization was exceptionally 

 difficult. The CIA had responsibilities for 

 supporting more fighting in Iraq and the Balkans,

 monitoring China and other rivals and so on. For 

 the FBI, dead-beat dads, drug money, infrastructure 

 protection, all competed for resources with 

 counterterrorism. There was no single plan that 

 everyone followed and because everything was

 declared to be a priority, nothing really was. 

 A third structural problem was that before 

 September 11th, the FBI was not properly oriented 

 for counterterrorism. The Bureau often failed to 

 collect relevant information and the information

 collected often was not disseminated outside of the 

 FBI and many times within the FBI. Few people in 

 the FBI with counterterrorism responsibilities knew 
 243 

 about al Qaeda. What knowledge that existed was 

 primarily confined to the New York field office. 

 The FBI culture fostered these problems. 

 Before September 11th, the FBI was

 primarily a law-enforcement agency and it was 

 probably the world's best. But law enforcement 

 focuses on prosecuting cases, not on understanding 

 a broader network. Law enforcement emphasizes 

 gathering specific evidence, not collecting and

 sharing all possibly relevant information. 

 As a result of these problems, the FBI not 

 only was not conscious of al Qaeda activities in 

 the United States but also didn't know the depth of 

 its own ignorance; it didn't know what it didn't

 know. But concentrating attention solely on the

 intelligence community misses the broader context 

 of counterterrorism. 

 A broader review of the U.S. Government's 

 performance in both the Clinton and the Bush

 administrations before September 11th suggests 

 several deep flaws and problems. As a result of 

 these, the intelligence community's successful 
 244 

 strategic warning of the al Qaeda threat was not

 met with the proper response. 

 One policy problem was very carefully and 

 well discussed by my colleague here at the table,

 Mr. Sofaer. I will simply add my endorsement to 

 his remarks that the use of force was not properly 

 considered as an option before September 11th. 

 A second problem was that U.S. policy left 

 the issue of terrorist sanctuary unresolved. In

 Afghanistan, al Qaeda was essentially allowed to build 

 to an army of like-minded radicals outside the 

 reach of the United States. But even more 

 troubling, al Qaeda enjoyed a permissive 

 environment in the West, including in the United

 States. It was allowed to recruit, raise money, 

 train and plot with relatively little interference 

 throughout much of the world. 

 A third policy flaw was the limited 

 defensive measures against terrorism in the United

 States. Almost 20 years ago, the Inman Commission 

 investigated the bombings of the U.S. and Marine 

 barracks in Lebanon. And they concluded, "If 
 245 

 determined well-trained and funded teams are 

 seeking to do damage, they will eventually 

 succeed." 

 Over 10 years later, the Cole Commission,

 investigating the 1998 embassy bombings, came to 

 pretty much the same conclusion, "We cannot count 

 on having intelligence to warn us of such

 attacks." 

 But despite the finding that intelligence is

 likely to be lacking, when facing a skilled 

 adversary and the intelligence community's 

 strategic warning of the al Qaeda threat, very few 

 defensive measures were initiated in the United 

 States before September 11th.

 Now the problems I have briefly described 

 are problems in a pre-9/11 world. And much has 

 changed since September 11th. Since the attack, 

 funding for intelligence and counterterrorism in 

 particular has increased dramatically. Both

 policymakers and the intelligence community are 

 intensely focused on terrorism and there have been 

 numerous bureaucratic changes to fight terrorism, 
 246 

 particularly in the FBI. 

 In its work, I hope the Commission not 

 only evaluates what went wrong on September 11th 

 but also the quality of changes that we have taken

 since then as a nation to prevent the recurrence of 

 these attacks. 

 Mr. Chairman, the work that you and your 

 fellow commissioners are doing is essential if we 

 are to ensure the security of Americans and triumph

 over the threat of terrorism. And I am confident 

 that the Commission's work will enable our country 

 to better meet future challenges and prevent a 

 recurrence of the nightmare of September 11th. 

 But I must conclude on a pessimistic note.

 Al Qaeda is simply too skilled an adversary to 

 expect uninterrupted success. The United States 

 and every nation should recognize that any 

 improvements that occur will reduce the frequency 

 of attacks, will reduce the lethality of attacks,

 but will not end them completely. Thank you very 

 much. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Thank you very much. Our 
 247 

 next speaker we have is Mr. Brian Jenkins, from the 

 Rand Corporation. 

 MR. JENKINS: Thank you very much, Mr. 

 Chairman. The written remarks that I submitted to

 the Commission, which I believe are in your 

 briefing books, address the nature of the current 

 terrorist threat, the goals of our counterterrorist 

 strategy and the role of intelligence in dealing 

 with terrorism.

 Subsequently, I was asked by members of 

 your staff if, in my comments this afternoon, I 

 could specifically address the topics of al Qaeda's 

 mindset, their purpose in attacking the World Trade 

 Center, and how this attack has profoundly affected

 our society. 

 The members of this panel were chatting 

 just before we convened here about the necessity to 

 change our vocabulary when it came to the 

 description of al Qaeda. This is not some

 organization which we simply can depict in a chart 

 on the wall and draw Xs through its key figures. 

 Al Qaeda is more than an organization, it 
 248 

 is a global network of relationships. It is one 

 among a galaxy of like-minded terrorist 

 enterprises. It is a system, a process for 

 transforming the discontents of Islam into a

 violent expression of jihad. 

 Al Qaeda also reflects a mindset, a 

 mindset that really transcends the specific members 

 that we may label as members of al Qaeda. Its 

 members believe, as others, that Islam is on the

 defensive. 

 Indeed, they believe that Islam's very 

 existence is threatened, not simply by the presence 

 of our troops in Saudi Arabia or our support for 

 Israel, but by the secular nature of our society,

 by our vast commercial and cultural power, by the 

 destructive effects they see in globalization, by 

 their own marginalization in the world, in their 

 own societies, in the countries to which they and 

 their parents have migrated.

 They really operate and are instructed in 

 a very harrowing, apocalyptic vision of death and 

 destruction, one that is informed by an conflated 
 249 

 history of centuries, from the Crusades, to the 

 sacking of Baghdad by the Mongol armies, to the 

 latest headlines on CNN. To respond to this, to 

 battle their way to what they regard as the age of

 the tyrants and to achieve this utopian restoration 

 of the Caliphate, God commands that they mount an 

 aggressive attack and places no limits on its 

 violence. Only violence, cataclasmic violence, can 

 change that reality, defend Islam, and drive them

 into this new age. 

 Therefore, it is absolutely consistent 

 that al Qaeda, as we see from the intelligence 

 reports, is determined to acquire and use weapons 

 of mass destruction, is determined to carry out

 events on the scale of a 9/11. Fortunately, for 

 the time being, its capabilities in the area of 

 chemical or biological weapons trail its 

 ambitions, but it's certainly something that we 

 have to take as a presumption going forward.

 Now what did these people hope to 

 accomplish by attacking the World Trade Center? As 

 a consequence of its sheer size, its soaring 
 250 

 height, its prominence on the New York skyline, the 

 World Trade Center was an obvious terrorist target 

 almost from the moment its construction was 

 completed. Both terrorists and terrorism's

 analysts saw this. 

 The size also meant mass casualties. To 

 terrorists who in the 1990s seemed increasingly 

 intent upon large-scale violence, toppling the 

 towers could bring fatalities in the tens of

 thousands, which we now know was the terrorists'

 intent. 

 Symbolically, the World Trade Center 

 represented America's economic might, our ambition 

 to extend our brand of free commerce throughout the

 world, the physical expression of globalization,

 even before the term was coined. Bringing down the 

 World Trade Center, in their mind, would challenge 

 American authority and would demonstrate the power 

 of the attackers.

 Of course having been attacked

 unsuccessfully in 1993, that only increased the 

 possibility that it would be attacked again. We 
 251 

 recognized this immediately after the '93 bombing. 

 In contemplating all possible forms of attack, we 

 even included among the theoretical scenarios a 

 plane crashing into the building.

 Now there wasn't a hell of a lot we could 

 do about that with protective measures other than 

 to recommend that there be the opportunity for 

 swift evacuation of the towers, and fortunately, a 

 lot of people did get out on September 11th.

 Officials in charge of the property also

 recognized that another major terrorist attack, 

 even if unsuccessful, would ruin its commercial 

 future. And I want to return to this point in 

 light of current concerns about the ruinous

 economic consequences of another 9/11-scale attack 

 in the United States. 

 Al Qaeda's leadership also, in attacking 

 the World Trade Center, hoped by such an attack to 

 provoke an American retaliation. A feeble American

response like that described by my colleague here, 

 like that in 1998, would only confirm, in their 

 eyes, our impotence. On the other hand, an 
 252 

 indiscriminate massive response could be portrayed 

 by them as an assault on Islam and might provoke a 

 huge backlash that would also advantage al Qaeda. 

 Now destruction of the World Trade Center

 obviated concerns about the commercial viability of 

 the property itself, but the 9/11 attack did have 

 cascading effects, devastating cascading effects, 

 on the American economy. 

 Abe correctly points out, calculating the

 costs of 9/11 is tricky business, but in addition 

 to the lives lost, the damage to property, the 

 insured business-interruption losses amount to 

 perhaps $50 billion, total losses in revenue into 

 the hundreds of billions, increased security costs

 at the federal level, tens of billions. 

 State and local governments are being 

 crushed by the incremental security costs. 

 Corporate security costs have increased by an 

 average of 40 to 50 percent, insurance premiums up

 by 30 percent. Borders and ports slowed down just-

 in-time deliveries, inventories increased at a cost. We have 

 spent the last three decades exploiting new 
 253 

 technology and new management techniques to remove 

 friction from the economy. We have spent the last 

 18-and-a-half months putting friction back in. 

 Now all of this imposes a cost, making

 terrorism an effective mode of economic warfare. 

 Now I doubt that the terrorists were aware of this 

 on September 11th, but they cannot help but to 

 have observed these effects in the 18-and-a-half

 months since. And that poses a challenge to us.

 We cannot rely in our strategy of homeland 

 security on a gates-and-guards approach. We must 

 design security that is effective and efficient. 

We must build critical infrastructure that is 

 strong and resilient, able to suffer damage and

 continue to function. Above all, we must abandon 

 unrealistic expectations of total security and 

 instead adopt a more realistic acceptance of risk. 

 We must not allow terrorist attacks or fears of 

 terrorist attack to shut us down.

 Now building a more effective defense is 

 going to require intelligence. And let me just 

 make a final comment on intelligence. There has 
 254 

 been a great deal of debate in the federal 

 government about how we should reorganize to 

 improve our intelligence collection and analysis 

 here in the United States. We've talked about

 restructuring the FBI, we've talked about creating 

 a domestic intelligence-collection service, 

 patterned after the British MI-5.

 In my own view, we can do a lot more by 

 taking advantage of local-level intelligence

 collection, and I think that might even be better 

 than creating another federal entity. 

 There's great potential at the local 

 level. Local police departments know their 

 territory, they are recruited locally, they often

 have a composition that better reflects the local 

 ethnic mix, they have often more native fluency, 

 foreign-language capabilities. Unlike federal 

 officers, they don't rotate from city to city every 

 three or four years.

 To take as an example, you heard from the 

 New York Police Department this morning. The NYPD 

 is one of the most effective departments in the 
 255 

 country. They have devoted a thousand of their 

 officers to intelligence collection, about 

 two-and-a-half percent of their total strength. If 

 police departments across the country were to

 dedicate a similar portion of their strength to 

 intelligence collection, we would have a national 

 intelligence capability of 15,000 to 18,000 

 officers. 

 Now in order to make it work on a national

 basis, they would need better training, they would 

 need a common curriculum, they would need some 

 better technology, and, above all, they would have 

 to be linked so that the results of their 

 investigations could be shared across

 jurisdictional lines. 

 They're ready to go. We don't have to 

 wait several years to create another entity in 

 Washington. We don't even have to build a new 

 building. So I think that in looking at

 intelligence solutions, we might want to look to 

 our local capabilities before we look to another 

 Washington solution. Thank you. 
 256 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Dr. Ranstorp is from the 

 University of St. Andrews. 

 DR. RANSTORP: Thank you much, honored 

 members of this panel, this Commission, members of

 the Senate, members of Congress, ladies and 

 gentlemen and honored guests. I am honored to be 

 here. 

 I am not going to go into the 

 introspective of what happened on 9/11, but

 hopefully, I can contribute to some future 

 prescription, looking at it from the outside, 

 looking at U.S. terrorism policy in a global 

 perspective. 

 I applaud the introspective and noble

 purpose of this Commission. We must understand our 

 historic shortcomings to better order our future 

 steps in security. To no one is this quest more 

 important or heartfelt than the families and 

 friends of those fallen on September the 11th, some

 of whom are assembled here today. 

 Now while nothing will compensate them for 

 their loss, the search for some semblance of 
 257 

 justice lies not only in assessing the intelligence 

 and policy failures. And let me say that it's not 

 just in the context of the United States, but also 

 there were not only intelligence failures but also

 intelligence failures in terms of policy failures 

 that contributed even on the outside of the United 

 States and that contributed to this over the past. 

 But we also must look towards the future

 to ensure that September the 11th will never

 again be repeated. Let me emphasize something 

 that has been echoed here before. There is no plan 

 that is absolutely watertight. There is no one 

 overarching solution that will defeat terrorism. 

 We can say with certainty that what Osama bin Laden

 and al Qaeda set in motion on September the 11th is 

 likely to reoccur in different places under 

 different circumstances in the future. 

 Much of our future success lies in knowing 

 our adversary. Let me echo what Brian Jenkins

 said, in our conception of al Qaeda -- and that's 

 something I spent a lot of time on in my written 

contribution to this Commission -- how it adapts, 
 258 

 and in prescribing countermeasures which would 

 stand the rigors of an ever-changing global 

 context. 

 Now we have deconstructed in myriad ways

 our intelligence failures and have offered some 

 potential solutions in addressing these and in 

 breaking down the bureaucratic barriers. Today, 

 unlike before September the 11th, there is an 

 unprecedented U.S.-led coalition, including -- and

 me emphasize this -- including over 90 countries 

 overtly and covertly that have degraded the 

 capabilities of al Qaeda. 

 For instance, a number of those 

 responsible for the planning of September the 11th

 attacks and other terrorist operations are in U.S. 

 custody, including the mastermind of al Qaeda's 

 planning, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. 

 Now the response of the United States to 

 al Qaeda has been focused and highly successful,

 both visibly and otherwise. And I laude President 

 Bush's 4D approach to fighting terror, to defeat, 

 to deny, to diminish and to defend, and I believe 
 259 

 this strategy strikes the requisite balance of 

 offence and defense. And let me stress the 

 necessity of offence to counter terrorism with a 

 global reach.

 Further, the recent establishment of the 

 Terrorist Threat Integration Center is a powerful 

 testament to the progressive strategy of the 

 administration and sends a commanding signal to 

 terrorists and their supporters that the United

 States will continue to bring to bear the full 

 measure of its intelligence capabilities to thwart 

 future plans. 

 Now my expertise as a foreign scholar of 

 Islam, militant Islamic movements and terrorism

 lies not in assessing or critiquing the structures 

 or responses of the U.S. intelligence community, 

 the counterterrorism bodies, or other institutional

 bureaucracies, or in pinpointing the precise 

 shortcomings that led to September the 11th, 2001.

 There are those better equipped to address the 

 panel. 

 What I can do is possibly think about this 
 260 

 in more of a global perspective in highlighting not 

 only challenges but also possibly a roadmap toward 

 the future, in order to preempt, to prevent another 

 attack upon the interests of the United States, at

 home or abroad. 

 Now it is essential that the United States 

 in this global war on terrorism continues to craft 

 and to evolve comprehensive new strategies and 

 tactics that balance a changing adversary with a

 rapidly changing global environment. It is 

 absolutely necessary not just to take a defensive 

 approach but also think globally. And the United 

 States is doing that at this moment. 

 Counterterrorism policy has never been,

 will never be in the future, divorced from other 

 strands of foreign policy, regional initiatives, or 

 fail to take into account, for example, the nuances 

 and the significance of the Israeli-Palestinian

 crisis.

 Yet, as Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson 

 indicated, even the resolution of this 

 Israeli-Palestinian conflict will not bring an end 
 261 

 to the systemic problems inherent to the global 

 landscape that foment terrorism and enable 

 organizations such as al Qaeda to thrive and to 

 flourish.

 Countering al Qaeda depends upon 

 understanding its true character, as well as the 

 environment in which violent jihadism operates. 

 Only then can prescriptive solutions be applied and 

 the flow of capabilities and the threat-based

 intelligence be translated into building effective 

 countermeasures within a strategic framework. 

 Now Brian Jenkins offered, I would say, a 

 way in which one should look at al Qaeda, not as a 

 static phenomenon. It is not a static

 organization. It exists on a number of different 

 levels. We have to think about what comes after al 

 Qaeda, post-al Qaeda, and the systemic environment

 is very difficult in producing, potentially, future 

 generations that will follow the message of bin

 Laden and al Qaeda. 

 Let me go deep down into some of the 

 prescriptions and highlighting some of these 
 262 

 prescriptions I think are important. The first 

 one, not only understanding the threat, we have to 

 continuously reevaluate the threat itself in 

 adjusting our response not only internally but also

 globally. 

 Another issue we need to counter with 

 great urgency is the issue of identity theft. Not 

 only is this a problem within the United States but

 also has been the basic building blocks for al

 Qaeda to function without philanthropic donations, 

 without official donations on a large scale. And 

 we need to work harder on this issue because if 

 there is one common theme that we see, it's the 

 issue of identity theft. And we saw some of those

 9/11 hijackers utilizing that in order to not only 

 gain entry into the United States but also to 

 garner requisite resources. 

 The second issue I want to highlight is 

 countering terrorism finance. Now more resources

 need to be expended in a more coordinated fashion 

 on the financial front in the war against 

 terrorism. 
 263 

 Now beyond the existing goal and efforts 

 to deny terrorist groups access to the 

 international system, to impair their ability to 

 fundraise in different theaters of operations and

 also, of course, to expose and incapacitate the 

 financial networks used by terrorists, more focused 

 global coordination is needed. 

 We need better trained, we need 

 multilingual financial analysts, and accountants

 are crucial. Closer knit multi-agency

 coordination is vital to monitor the changing means 

 and contours of terrorist finance and how it flows 

 as they provide vital -- and I would take this sort 

 of as a measure from the European perspective, if

 one can't follow the contours of the organization, 

 a good way is to follow how the finance flows in, 

 understand how it's structuring, how it's changing, 

 how it's adapting to the security measures. 

 However, it is a simple and true reality that

 terrorist finances flow far quicker in the 

 international financial system than any one 

 law-enforcement agency can react to. 
 264 

 Operationally, linking funds in one 

 country with a terrorist crime in another is 

 extremely difficult to prove in a court of law, let 

 alone tracking the money in today's international

 financial system. We have to focus and we have to 

 look at the nexus not only between terrorism but 

 also between organized crime. 

 There are numerous black holes that we 

 need to address, numerous areas of sustained areas

 of lawlessness that fuel and that feed the ability 

 of terrorism to garner resources and operational 

 capacity. And I can think of not only areas

 continuing in the Middle East, even in Eastern 

 Europe, the former Soviet Union, but also in

 America's own back yard in Latin America. 

 Apart from that, we also need to 

 understand how al Qaeda works, not only as an 

 organization but also in assessing their 

 terrorist-attack mode, understanding the

 psychological makeup of the terrorist and 

 decision-making procedures and how do they 

 identify, how do they gather intelligence of 
 265 

 potential targets, how do they select peculiar 

 attack modes. 

 And that is urgently needed. We need to 

 centrally collate lessons learnt from intelligence

 gathering, from interrogations, from military 

 manuals and from identifying weaknesses in our own 

 critical infrastructure. 

 Now instituting protection of our nuclear 

 power stations, providing protection and security

 of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear 

 weapons against attack and theft, while also of 

 course overall improving our response and 

 resilience towards the use of these weapons, is 

 absolutely critical.

 Insufficient degrees of physical 

 protection, security of chemical and biological 

 facilities in the former Soviet Union and 

 elsewhere, coupled with the availability of 

 freelance scientific expertise, increases the

 spectre of catastrophic terrorism. 

 Now even if al Qaeda may be far away, or 

 may be close to the using or succeeding in using 
 266 

 what I call a CBRN attack, it is very clear that 

 the media also will play a critical role in 

 allaying the broader psychological effects for the 

 public, with or without major fatalities.

 It is still questionable whether there are 

 sufficient contingency plans in coordinating public 

 information between the public contingency offices 

 in any country and major media outlets, yet the 

 framework for this type of coordination will be

 absolutely critical in mitigating the effects of 

 such an attack, both in terms of dissemination of 

 public advice but also in ensuring infrastructure 

 and societal economic continuity. 

 Let me finish off by saying that the new

 terrorism represented by September the 11th 

 presents special and new urgent challenges to the 

 West and international community, especially not 

 only to the United States, but to Europe. In 

 Europe right now there is a feeling that there's a

 question of not if but rather when terrorism 

 globalization and weapons of mass destruction may 

 be fused into one, an attack will be imminent. 
 267 

 The fundamental first step but also 

 critical step is building on lessons learnt, on 

 cross-border cooperation, in looking at U.S. 

 counterterrorism in a global arena. And we have to

 understand the changing nature of the threat 

 itself. The United States has made significant 

 inroads in readdressing weaknesses inside the 

 United States but also outside, not only overtly 

 but also covertly, in building a tremendous

 multilateral intelligence cooperation with many 

 different countries. 

 But the simple lesson is that the United

 States, if it wants to protect itself for the long 

 term, cannot do this alone. It needs allies. It

 needs multilateral cooperation. This is not a war 

 on terrorism, it's a ceaseless struggle that goes 

 beyond any administration that will and should 

 remain at the heart of protecting the homeland 

 nationally and its interests abroad.

 More than ever it is critically necessary 

 to prevent, coming back to what my fellow panel 

 members had mentioned before, not only to prevent 
 268 

 but also to preempt, beyond U.S. borders, 

 terrorist cells, otherwise, September the 11th may 

 repeat itself with potentially higher levels of 

 lethality.

 Now as a testimony of the great strength 

 of New York City and the American people to 

 overcome but never to forget, we owe it to the 

 victims, their families and the country to be ever 

 vigilant in the face of evil, not only from the

 U.S. perspective but also with those allies that 

 responded to the tragic events of September the 

 11th. Thank you very much. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Thank you very much, Dr. 

 Ranstorp. Are there any questions from the

 Commission? Senator Lehman? 

 COMMISSIONER LEHMAN: I would like to ask 

 Professor Sofaer, the first part of your testimony 

 I found very compelling with regard to the vision 

 that stretched over a number of administrations

 where prosecution and bringing the terrorists to 

 justice, and I believe Reagan used that term

 numerous times as well, superseded and dominated 
 269 

 the sharing of information at the expense of that 

 prosecution, as I think you pointed out or in some 

 of the previous testimony, the Joint Investigation, 

 the CIA, sometimes DIA, sometimes learned important

 intelligence only by reading the trial transcripts 

 of some of the 93 perpetrators. 

 As a former prosecutor and distinguished 

 legal advisor, could you get a little more specific 

 of how could we establish a procedure or a process

 within the government to bring that a little more 

 back into balance so if it was necessary to perhaps 

 sacrifice a conviction in order to prevent a 

 disaster that that balance can be made on a 

 common-sense basis.

 DR. SOFAER: With pleasure. I think what 

 the present government and the present Department 

 of Homeland Security has been trying to do, 

 Congress is trying to do right now, is overcome 

 those barriers. Once you adopt the criminal-law

 model as your primary model, of course it has to be 

 part of any effort to prosecute criminals, but once 

 you adopt it as your primary model, a number of 
 270 

 very complicated things happen. Evidence that a 

 national-security strategist might think is very 

 important is treated as unimportant by someone who 

 wants to make a case. He's always thinking about

 whether the evidence is admissible in a courtroom. 

 I mean, there are so many points like this 

 that support what you have just said, Secretary 

 Lehman. In general, what you have to do is 

 subordinate the interests in criminal prosecution

 to the interests in protecting the country. And I 

 would think that that's a no-brainer.

 We subordinate the interests of criminal 

 prosecution to Congressional investigations because 

 our public needs to know things and our legislators

 need to know things. I would think that it would 

 follow from that premise that we would subordinate 

 the interests of criminal prosecution to the 

 interests of protecting the country. 

 And that needs to be done institutionally.

 You need to have a body of some kind in Washington, 

 a counterterrorism center of some sort, that's 

 capable of doing that. And I must say, I don't 
271

 think that the combination of the CIA and the FBI 

 is that body. Frankly, it's the first evidence 

 I've ever seen of them cooperating effectively, and 

 that is in precluding the development of an

 independent intelligence operation that would in 

 fact lead to the protection of the American people. 

 I have the highest regard for both 

 agencies, but to think that that is going to solve 

 the problem is a terrible mistake. And I think the

 President was sold a bill of goods. I hope he 

 changes his mind and reconsiders and helps to give the Department of 

Homeland Security 

 this authority to create a real counter-balance to 

 the interests of two agencies that have utterly

 failed to cooperate and will continue to fail to 

 cooperate because they have radically different 

 agendas, and the underlying issues, as you pointed 

 out, aren't changing. 

 So you need to have, as you said, a

 different institutional structure that puts in 

 place this notion of the nation's security as 

 preeminent. I do want to say that I think Attorney 
 272 

 General Ashcroft has made the protection of America 

 his chief priority but that still the agencies 

 under him are still geared to achieving 

 predominantly other things.

 COMMISSIONER LEHMAN: And it's not just 

 the federal. I think we would very much appreciate 

 on the Commission your giving further thought, in 

 your career combining policy with the 

 prosecutorial, to perhaps give us some

 recommendations down the road for specific ways to 

 do this. 

 This is not just a federal problem. If a 

 New York cop who speaks Farsi picks up a piece of 

 intelligence and is involved in a case, the

 district attorney can put it under seal and it's 

 gone into the mole hole until that case is 

 resolved. 

 And saying we're going to put national 

 security ahead of prosecutions. It's all fine, it's

 motherhood, but if we don't have specific 

 procedures and changes to recommend, then it's just 

 so much hot air. 
 273 

 DR. SOFAER: Can I get a little help from 

 the Rand Institution? I mean, I'd like an office 

 there and a little bit of an opportunity to consult 

 with some of the experts. That's a wonderful

 subject and I'm very serious in suggesting that it 

 will take some, several talented people to put 

 together a detailed plan of the kind you're talking 

 about. 

 COMMISSIONER LEHMAN: That leads right

 into another theme that all three of you have 

 touched on, and that is the sharing of 

 intelligence. And all through the post-9/11

 period, some people have pointed to MI-5 as a 

 better way of dealing with this contradiction

 between law enforcement and intelligence.

 I would be interested if each of you could 

 tell the Commission, either now or later, after 

 further reflection, what other examples, in your 

 experience, in Europe and elsewhere in the world,

 where they're getting it right and we're getting it 

 wrong in the handling of counterterrorism, not just 

 intelligence, but across the board. 
 274 

 DR. RANSTORP: Could I comment on this? 

 COMMISSIONER LEHMAN: Yes. 

 DR. RANSTORP: I think there's a great 

 sort of reflection of what went wrong in 9/11 from

 the U.S. perspective, but let's make one thing very 

 clear. This was not just a U.S. problem, this was 

 a problem that we had in Germany. I mean, the 

 German intelligence had these cells under 

 investigation, dating back to 1998.

 However, the legislation was not up to 

 speed in what kind of adversary we were facing. 

 The same with Britain. I mean, the only country 

 that I can think of that has had it right is a 

 country, France, which have had very much

 less-restricted laws in terms of dealing with the 

 problem of Islamic radicalism, but that is of 

 course at the expense of civil liberties. 

 So when we look at this issue, we cannot 

 just look at it from the U.S. perspective, we have

 to look at it from a global perspective, 

 particularly with our European allies who 

 constituted part of this coalition, but also 
 275 

 front-line defense. 

 It's no accident, first of all, that 15 of 

 the hijackers were from Saudi Arabia, given al 

 Qaeda and bin Laden's desire to create the

 response, vis-a-vis United States and Saudi, nor is 

 it an accident that they stationed themselves in 

 Germany having analyzed, having probed, having 

 known exactly where the weakness is. 

 We know that from the interrogations. We

 know that from having the benefit of the doubt of 

 the interrogations, the evidence that we had in the 

 past that we're dealing with an exceptionally savvy 

 adversary who would know and understand our 

 weaknesses.

 And therefore, I would be hesitant to sort 

 of try to import a model like MI-5 into the United 

 States. Rather, we have to rely, and we're doing 

 that now, we're getting things right in terms of 

 counterterrorism cooperation not only between the

 United States and European allies, but more 

 importantly, with friendly Arab allies who have 

 provided invaluable information and assistance in 
 276

 not only understanding al Qaeda but also what may 

 come after al Qaeda. 

 And therefore, I think that my 

 recommendation, as a foreigner to this country, and

 having looked at this problem for a long time, is 

 that we have to not only look at this problem from 

 a U.S. perspective in trying to get the modalities 

 right in terms of the structure, but also looking 

 at how can we overcome the intelligence-sharing

 issues that, despite September the 11th, still 

 plagues some of the cooperation, even among our 

 most valued allies, in other words, the 

 prioritization of intelligence. 

 MR. JENKINS: Mr. Secretary, I'd like to

 take you up on your offer to have an opportunity to 

 reflect on that more, but let me just make a couple 

 of comments which are perhaps sobering comments. 

 First of all, if you ask people, you know, 

 should we have something like an MI-5, a lot of

 people will say, yes, and then you ask what is it, 

 and they haven't the vaguest idea. So there's some 

 mystique about this notion. The fact is, most of 
 277 

 the Western European nations, many of the nations 

 around the world, do have more than one 

 intelligence service. They do divide their 

 responsibilities.

 The British have MI-5 and MI-6. The 

 Germans have their intelligence service, the Bundes 

 Criminal Amt, the Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutz, 

 to deal with different aspects of intelligence. 

 The French divide it. The Italians divide it.

 That is a common feature for very, very good, good 

 reason. 

 The problem of intelligence, of sharing 

 among intelligence agencies, is chronic. Creating 

 another entity may be a solution, but it doesn't

 automatically mean that intelligence will be 

 shared. Instead of having two rival agencies, we 

 can create three and four rival agencies. Simply 

 sharing information, to most intelligence services, is 

 an unnatural act.

 The third point I'd like to make is that I 

 am willing to concede that we can learn a great 

 deal from the intelligence services of the European 
 278 

 countries, many of whom have dealt with terrorist 

 threats on their turf longer than we have dealt 

 with it here. At the same time, we have to keep in 

 mind again the realities.

 It took the British 15, 20 years to 

 effectively penetrate the IRA. There were still 

 surprises. Large bombs went off in the heart of 

 London. That's dealing with an adversary that 

 speaks roughly the same language, and not something

 headquartered in distant Afghanistan. So we want 

 to be careful about that. 

 Final point, and it relates to something 

 that Magnus had said which I think is important. 

 We do have to figure out how to create capability

 at an international level. We have achieved since 

 September 11th an unprecedented degree of 

 cooperation among intelligence services of a number 

 of countries in going after al Qaeda.

 What we have to figure out how to do now

 is how to institutionalize that and to create 

 permanent machinery and procedures that will allow 

 us to orchestrate -- and I use the word orchestrate 
 279 

 here -- traditional law enforcement, intelligence 

 collection, responses, whether in the form of 

 arrest, special operations, or application of 

 military force, and to do that across the globe in

 a very, very effective way, since this is the type 

 of adversary we're going to be dealing with. 

 DR. SOFAER: Could I just add one thing, 

 Mr. Secretary, and that is that I hope you did pay 

 a little bit of attention to what I said, where we

 can drive ourselves nuts trying to come up with 

 different ways to figure out everything about 

 everybody that might attack us, when and where 

 they're going to do it. 

 The fact of the matter is that we have

 excellent strategic intelligence. And Dan Byman is 

 absolutely right about that. We knew who was going 

 to attack us, we knew where he was, we knew he 

 could do it. And we knew he wanted to do it and 

 was determined to do it. And how much more do you

 need to know before you actually do something to 

 stop an enemy? 

 I hope that you won't be offended that I 
 280 

 repeat that. I just think that there is a tendency 

 among us all, we're all civilized people, we all 

 sort of tend to get drawn into this game of trying 

 to manipulate things around so somehow we can make

 the world safe without raising a hand in violence 

 or anger, but ultimately -- and that's the right 

 attitude -- but ultimately, when it's pretty clear 

 you're not going to talk someone out of wanting to 

 kill you that you have to do something about him.

 And when I hear stuff about the Middle 

 East and Israel and stuff, I just, obviously I have 

 always been, I've worked hard on Israel peace 

 issues. When I was in the department, Chairman 

 Hamilton, you remember that we worked together on

 many things involving Iran and we showed our good 

 will in many ways to these countries, but can you 

 imagine that a peace treaty between Israel and the 

 Palestinians would be anything but anathema to 

 these people, these people who hate us?

 The last thing they want is a peace 

 treaty between Israel and the Palestinians. They 

 would be determined to destroy it, to tear it down. 
 281 

 Go read what Islamic jihad says. They're our next 

 enemy, Islamic jihad. And I'm telling you, they 

 have told us they want to kill us. They have 

 already started doing it.

 And we have to pay attention to these few 

 organizations that are around the world who are 

determined to attack us for the reasons that these 

 gentlemen have so brilliantly articulated. 

 COMMISSIONER LEHMAN: That leads into

 another question, Professor Ranstorp. You're a 

 well-known expert on Hizbollah, for instance, and 

 other groups. As Mr. Jenkins has so well 

 elucidated, this, what we call al Qaeda, is really 

 a set of or an archipelago of groups, some that

 will last a short time, some a long time. 

 Hizbollah has lasted a very long time. 

 How would you describe the relationship 

 today between Hizbollah, Hamas, the group that just 

 got hit up in northern Iraq, and these other parts

 of the archipelago and how much should we focus on 

 them, as well as the core of al Qaeda? 

 DR. RANSTORP: Mr. Secretary, a very good 
 282 

 question. It's a very broad question. I think we 

 have to understand that al Qaeda is one of three 

 things, first of all, before I address the issue of 

 Hizbollah.

 First of all, at the higher level, we're 

 talking about an organization that have command and 

 control structure. It's very organized. We have 

 made major dents into the organization. We 

 understand it.

 The second level, which is probably the 

 largest level, we have those working in the service 

 of al Qaeda, those concerted groups who are 

 operating on a national level, trying to confront 

 not just the United States but also their own

 regimes and trying to effect regime changes. 

 Thirdly, we have those that are inspired 

 or are sympathetic to the means and modes of al 

 Qaeda. In terms of the cooperation between the two 

 groups, there's very little corporation, there has

 been some. 

 In terms of Hizbollah itself, I would 

 recommend to divorce Hizbollah as a movement and 
 283 

 those individuals who have been part of Hizbollah's 

 past, who I would more characterize as half Iranian 

 intelligence agents and half Hizbollah operatives, 

 who are standing with one foot in Iran and one foot

 in Hizbollah, who the United States is pursuing 

 with extraordinary vigor. 

 The movement itself knows it may be on the 

 sort of third phase on the war against terrorism. 

 It's exceptionally sensitive to that issue. It is

 of course bounded up into the U.S.-Iranian dynamic 

 in terms of its relationship, but it is of course 

 an organization with global reach. 

 I mean, it's an organization just like al 

 Qaeda, if one disturbs the bee hive, they may come

 back at us. We have to treat this issue with 

 extraordinary care. Otherwise, we may be in for 

 possibly retaliation from the organization. 

 In terms of other organizations, of course 

 there are other ones in Lebanon, not just Hizbollah

 elements but also we have an organization called 

Asbat al-Ansar. And certainly there were connections 

 between Asbat al-Ansar in Ein-el-Helweh, a refugee 
 284

 camp, with Ansa al-Islam, and connections also to 

 the assassination of Lawrence Foley in Jordan. So 

 there were these loose connections that are more 

 based on logistical aspects than any common

 ideology. So we have to treat this on a 

 case-by-case basis. 

 I wouldn't say that there is a 

 full-fledged cooperation between Hizbollah and al 

 Qaeda. They have different goals. They may focus

 in on the Israeli-Palestinian issue as a mobilizing 

 tool, but certainly we should treat them as 

 separate. And Hizbollah certainly knows that they 

 may be the next face in the U.S. war on terrorism. 

 And they are very sensitive to that issue.

 COMMISSIONER LEHMAN: Do they have any 

 current plans or operations that you're aware of 

 targeted in the United States? 

 DR. RANSTORP: I would say this, that 

 there are, there have been, according to my

 assessment, according to my contacts and support, 

 that should there be a confrontation between the 

 United States and Iran, they could cause some 
 285 

 damage inside the U.S. mainland. 

 COMMISSIONER LEHMAN: That raises a very 

 interesting dimension also that Mr. Jenkins had 

 raised, the fact that this is a kind of a

 missionary organization and that it depends on 

 interrelationships and sponsors and sanctuaries. 

 What would your judgment be if we were 

 truly effective in draining the financial swamp, I 

 mean cutting off principally the Saudi money that

 flows through various channels and through the 

 various foundation networks, if we were successful 

 in doing what Mr. Push had recommended so 

 eloquently earlier and really putting the heat on 

 those sources that like to have it both ways, would

 that dry up al Qaeda and other groups, related 

 groups? 

 MR. JENKINS: Going after finances is 

 useful, to the extent that it can reduce some of 

 the resources that are available to these

 organizations, that is of benefit. It is also, 

 quite separate from how much money you can dry up, 

 it is a source of useful intelligence itself, that 
 286 

 is, it tells us a great deal about connections 

 between various entities, so it has a separate 

 utility. 

 In terms of being able, however, to dry it

 up enough to halt terrorist activities, that, I 

 must say, I'm somewhat skeptical of. To be sure, 

 the cash flow of organizations like al Qaeda was 

 significant, but a lot of that 

 money was used to support the Taliban, a lot of it

 was used to support the training camps and 

 infrastructure in Afghanistan itself, which they no 

 longer have. 

 Can we squeeze it down enough to reduce 

 money to support actual terrorist operations? That

 I'm less certain about because that, you know, 

 we're talking about estimates of the cost of 

 September 11th on the terrorists' side, we're 

 probably something in the area of a half a million. 

 A terrorist operation, major large-scale terrorist

 operation, we're talking about something in the 

 hundreds of thousands. 

 Given the volume of money sloshing around 
 287 

 the world in legitimate and illegitimate channels, 

 through formal and informal structures, the notion 

 that we can squeeze it down into the 

 hundreds-of-thousands-of-dollars level, I'm not so

 sure we can do that. 

 So we can put a dent in these 

 organizations, we can make the support that they 

 provide for some of these more radical movements, 

 proselytization activities, support for some of

 these madrassas, we can do that. Can we deny the 

 money necessary to buy the bombs, to recruit the 

 people to carry out these attacks? I'm a lot less 

 certain about that. 

 DR. SOFAER: I'm not sure we can close the

 madrassas down. I mean, do you think about how we 

 would ever have the ability to close madrassas down 

 in western Pakistan? 

 COMMISSIONER LEHMAN: Money talks. 

 DR. SOFAER: Money talks, yeah, but I

 don't know how this country could go along and 

 convince the government of Pakistan to do that when 

 the people of Pakistan want those madrassas. 
 288 

 COMMISSIONER LEHMAN: But are they not 

 supported by the Saudis financially? 

 DR. SOFAER: I'm sure. I'm sure they are. 

 I'm sure they are.

 COMMISSIONER LEHMAN: Is there nothing we 

 can do there? 

 DR. SOFAER: Oh, we can do plenty, I just 

 think there's a limit. 

 DR. RANSTORP: Mr. Secretary, if I may

 add, beyond the philanthropic aspects of this, let 

 me say that I have looked into every single arrest 

 in Europe and beyond. The common feature is what I 

 outlined as the number-one issue, and that was, 

 every time you catch an al Qaeda suspect or al

 Qaeda operative, you will have 15 to 20 different 

 identities. 

 Through these, he can easily, with or 

 without Saudi or other financing, be able to garner 

 the requisite resources, the building blocks of

 being able to launch terrorism through credit-card

 fraud, bank fraud. And that's an issue what we 

 need to tackle with great urgency if we're going to 
 289 

 be able to find these individuals, to weed them 

 out, and to put a stop to this preemptively. 

 DR. SOFAER: It isn't, Mr. Secretary, if I 

 may say, it isn't the teaching of Islam that we

 should be trying to prevent or inhibit. It's the 

 teaching of one type of Islam, the Wahhabi type 

 brand of Islam. So if we can modify our effort and 

 narrow it and target it to those uses of funds that 

 threaten us as human beings and appeal to Muslims

 in the world and say, ‘stop teaching your children 

 to kill us,’ that is really what we want you to do. 

 Teach Islam, go ahead, but that branch of 

 Islam, if we can narrow it, then we might succeed 

 because if the Islamic world sees this as an effort

 to squeeze the financing of Islamic institutions, 

 we will never get anywhere. 

 COMMISSIONER LEHMAN: One last question. 

 How close is al Qaeda to having usable weapons of 

 mass destruction? I'd like to hear it from all of

 you. 

 DR. RANSTORP: Well, I was asked by CNN, 

 when they found the terrorist tapes, to come and 
 290 

 analyze them, the so-called dog tapes, it was 

 visual representation of the fact that they were on 

 their way to using chemical agents. 

 I think al Qaeda is very close to, and

 particularly in two spheres, number one, the ricin 

 arrests we have had in Europe, we have had them for 

 about a year and a half, I mean, we have known 

 about this issue for a year and a half, over a year 

 and a half, since 9/11.

 And it's not a weapon of mass destruction, 

 it's a weapon of mass disruption. It would have 

 huge economic consequences, psychological 

 contingent of fear. 

 Perhaps more worrying is al Qaeda and al

 Qaeda elements in the former Soviet Union are 

 searching for radiological material. And you have 

 those two elements. On the one hand, chemical 

 agents, that there's a program, an active program 

 to try to acquire them and to also possibly deploy

 them. On the other hand, you have a lot of 

 radiological material. 

 And in many ways I think the prevailing 
 291 

 view in Europe among security officials that I have 

 spoken to is that it is not a question of if but 

 rather when that they are deployed, perhaps not in

 the United States, but possibly in Europe.

 MR. JENKINS: Depending on how you define 

 weapons of mass destruction, in fact they have 

 them, I mean, we know that they have chemical 

 capabilities and biological capabilities. The 

 construction of a radiological dispersal device

 takes nothing more than some source of 

 radioactivity, which is readily available in 

 society, and some explosive or other means of 

 dispersing it. 

 If we're talking about using those on a

 scale that would create mass destruction, mass 

 casualties, then they're probably far, far from 

 that, but as Magnus points out, the issue here is 

 not the body count but rather the effects. We 

 should perhaps be talking about weapons of mass

 effect.

 That is, if we go back to the incident in 

 Tokyo and the attack involving nerve gas in Tokyo 
 292 

 subways, 12 people died in that attack, 5,500 were

 treated at hospital as a consequence of that. Of 

 those 5,500, 1,200 were actually exposed to the 

 chemical. The other 4,700 were illnesses brought

 about by anxiety, I mean real heart attacks, real 

 respiratory problems, asthmatic attacks, 

 psychosomatic attacks. And that's something that 

 we would have to expect. 

 Simply by mentioning the words biological

 or nerve gas or radioactivity in the same sentence 

 with terrorism is going to get us some real effects 

 here. So the issue is not whether they can carry 

 out the terrorist equivalent of a Chernobyl or a 

 Bhopal, but rather simply how they could use these

 in order to create a tremendous amount of fear, 

 alarm, national panic, and economic disruption. 

 I mean, we remember from our own 

 experience, which is not al Qaeda connected, but 

 with the anthrax letters that we experienced in the

 fall of September 2001, five people were killed, 

 but we closed down a portion of a Senate office 

 building for months while we tried to get things 
 293

 down to the ‘manageable number of spores,’ I think 

 was one of the quotes. 

 If we talk about a major transportation 

 system or a major commercial property, I'm not

 quite sure what the public reaction would be to the 

 manageable number of spores. It's going to have 

 tremendous psychological consequences, not just 

 biochemical. 

 DR. SOFAER: I would just add one remark,

 one comment to what my colleagues have said, Mr. 

 Secretary, Mr. Chairman, and that is that you 

 should not consider the potential of al Qaeda or 

 terrorist groups to use these weapons on their own. 

 You have to take into account the potential of

 cooperation with a state. 

 We have on the record, in the last year 

 and a half or so, two statements that I consider 

 highly significant. One is by former Prime 

 Minister Rafsanjani where he suggests that a

 nuclear device in Tel Aviv would put an end to 

 Israel, whereas a nuclear device in the Arab world 

 would simply take some casualties and they'd get 
 294 

 over it and move on. 

 And another statement and most recently 

 made by the former Head of Intelligence of 

 Pakistan, General al Haq, where he said essentially

 the same thing, we could use a nuclear device and

 put an end to Israel. 

 Most of this, both these comments were 

 directed at Israel, but clearly the option is 

 always there of going to a terrorist group if you

 are hostile to the United States or any other 

 western country, including Israel, and having them 

 do your dirty work and providing the terrorist with 

 the ability to do that. Indeed, that is probably 

 the ultimate fear that we have to confront.

 MR. JENKINS: I'm going to take exception 

 to the comments of my colleague on that point. I 

 am not absolutely convinced that national 

 governments, even those we may identify as rogue 

 states, are so ready to put weapons of mass

 destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, things 

 that have signatures, in the hands of groups they 

 do not absolutely control. They would bear the 
 295 

 consequences. 

 And indeed, I think this is, however, the 

 point where probably Abe and I would find common 

 ground on this, that we can affect this by policy.

 We can ensure that people well understand that we 

 will take appropriate action to deal with that, 

 whether it's action after the fact or whether it's 

 action before the fact, that will be treated, that 

 the notion that this can be done with some

 successful degree of subterfuge through some 

 terrorist operative and that that will necessarily 

 fool us or deter us from going back to the source, 

 I think in wake of the headlines we're looking at, 

 as we speak, that becomes a fairly credible

 argument. So as I say, we affect that by our 

 policy. 

 DR. RANSTORP: Mr. Secretary, may I sort 

 of continue beyond the state using those types of 

 weapons. What concerns security and policy-makers

 in thinking about al Qaeda for the future is 

 possibly not so much what is happening right now --

 because we have a very good handle on that, there's 
 296 

 an unprecedented coordination among 90 countries --

 it's the potential for al Qaeda or post-al Qaeda to 

 become an incubator of specific states, I’m

 thinking particularly about the consequences of,

 for example, Pakistan. 

 We've got al Qaeda eventually taking over, 

 post-Al Qaeda taking over other structures like 

 Saudi. So al Qaeda is very patient. What 

 represents al Qaeda is very patient, thinking about

 strategy over the long term. 

 I think we equally have to craft 

 strategies. They are thinking about these issues 

 over the long term. It is not going to be easy 

 decades ahead, but I hope we will be able to

 prevent another catastrophe that we had like here 

 in New York City. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Congressman Roemer? 

 COMMISSIONER ROEMER: Well, in his usual 

 fashion, Secretary Lehman has thoroughly delved

 into a host of the very important topics here. And 

 let me just merely try to follow up on a couple of 

 them while we have your very helpful expertise and 
 297 

 counsel and insight before us. 

 With respect to the body count and the 

 number of people that terrorists are willing to 

 take, kill, especially as we reflect back on

 September 11th, let me read a quote: 

 "Terrorists want a lot of people watching 

 and a lot of people listening and not a lot of 

 people dead." 

 I read that not to embarrass anybody, not

 to, you know, try to throw that around at all. 

 It's a quote from 1975. It's a quote from one of 

 the panelists. And it is very, very perceptive in 

 showing how much terrorists have changed. And Mr. 

 Jenkins and I talked a little about that before the

 hearing. It has been a monumental change in what 

 terrorists can do with what they have access to do 

 and what they are willing to do. 

 Mr. Jenkins, you said that back in 1975. 

 It was very accurate back then. Why do you think

 it has changed to such a degree today? 

 MR. JENKINS: Well, I am the culprit. And 

 I believed it then. And in fact I think for many 
 298 

 of the groups, even groups that we would label 

 terrorists today, that that still applies. That is 

 so long as an enterprise thinks in terms of a 

 political ideology or a political agenda, that's

 what we were talking about in the 1970s when I 

 wrote that, so long as there's a sense of political 

 agenda, then there's a sense of political 

 constituency. 

 And that imposes constraints that we

 recognized in the 1970s that terrorists, using 

 primitive weapons that we knew they had, weapons of 

 explosives, weapons of fire, could kill a lot more 

 people than they did. And yet they didn't do so, 

 not because of some technological ceiling, it had

 to be because of some self-imposed constraint. And 

 over a period of time, through interrogation of 

 terrorists and interviews in prisons, through trial 

 testimony, we learned what those constraints were. 

 They worried about group cohesion, not all

 of whose members might have the same stomach for 

 violence. They worried about their perceived 

 constituents. They always imagine themselves to 
 299 

 have legions of supporters. They wanted to provoke 

 public alarm but not to provoke so much backlash 

 that would change the rules and threaten their own

 survival.

 And therefore, terrorists have a notion of 

 some kind of a red line, some type of a line beyond 

 which the violence would be counter-productive.

 Now those constraints were not universal and they 

 were not immutable. And over a period of time,

 they changed. And they changed in part because, as 

 terrorism became commonplace, there was a built-in

 requirement to escalate. 

 Hijacking airliners may get you a headline 

 in 1971. When you're up to the 150th hijacking,

 you're page 5 news. So they had to escalate. But 

 I think the real change, the qualitative change 

 that came about, that was referred to as a 

 so-called new terrorism in the late '80s and 1990s 

 was the decline of ideology as a driving force for

 political violence, and increasingly, either ethnic 

 hatreds or religious fanaticism. 

 Now if one believes that instructions to 
 300 

 act, instructions to kill, are handed down from 

 God, however that God may communicate with an 

 individual, then you really don't worry about the 

 constraints of conventional morality, you don't

 worry about constituents on this planet. They are 

 infidels or pagans or nonbelievers who will burn in 

 hell anyway. 

 And it is that, the fundamental change in 

 the quality of terrorist violence, so that by the

 1990s, large-scale indiscriminate violence was 

 becoming increasingly the reality of contemporary 

 terrorism. 

 Now projecting that is scary because what 

 it means, if the willingness is there because of

 technological advance, that power, power I mean 

 crudely, simply is the capacity to kill, to 

 destroy, to disrupt, to alarm, to oblige us to

 divert vast resources to security, that that is 

 descending into the hand of smaller and smaller

 groups whose grievances, real or imaginary, it's 

 not always going to be possible to satisfy. 

 Putting that another way, the bands of 
 301 

 fanatics, irreconcilables, lunatics that have 

 existed throughout history, are becoming in our age 

 an increasingly potent force to be reckoned with. 

 And how we, as a society, as a democratic society,

 are going to successfully cope with that and remain 

 a democratic society to me is one of the major 

 challenges of this century. 

 COMMISSIONER ROEMER: So your argument is, 

 quite simply, constraints are coming off, the

 technology is going up, and we can't afford even a 

 single mistake, given that these terrorist groups 

 could get access to the kind of weaponry that their 

 ambition already has them seeking to get. 

 MR. JENKINS: Exactly.

 COMMISSIONER ROEMER: You talked a little 

 bit, you talked a little bit in your testimony 

 about how we got it so wrong throughout the 1990s 

 in calculating the enemy. Al Qaeda's vision, al 

 Qaeda's organizational capabilities, al Qaeda's

 money and fundraising. 

 The Clinton administration didn't get it 

 right, they got it wrong in a lot of ways. The 
 302 

 Bush administration didn't get it right, they got 

 it wrong in a lot of ways. The Europeans, the same 

 thing. 

 I can't help but recall the words from one

 of the counterterrorism chiefs in the Joint Inquiry 

 hearings of the FBI who said he was 98 percent 

 certain in 2000 that the attack would come from 

 overseas and be overseas and it wouldn't be in the 

 United States. We not only got it wrong, there was

 no hand-off to get it right domestically. And if 

 you might comment on how we do get it right in the 

 future. 

 Mr. Jenkins, you talked a little bit about 

 an intriguing proposal, with 15,000 to 18,000 local

 sheriffs and police officers that could help us get 

 it right at the local level. 

 Could you flush that out a bit more and 

 talk a little bit more in detail about that, and 

 would that replace what the Bush administration has

 proposed a T-TIC center [Terrorist Threat Investigation Center] here, or 

work with 

 them; how would that work together as a fusion 

 center in getting information out to the local 
 303 

 people? 

 MR. JENKINS: That is simply one among 

many proposals. It's a rough-and-ready response. 

 We're talking about needing a lot more collection

 capability on the streets. And that is one 

 approach to getting it. I'd say it probably gets 

 us there faster than the creation of a new federal 

 agency and the deployment of additional federal 

 agencies, but by itself, it's not going to work.

 Here we have to really address a broad 

 variety of proposals, some of which have been

 discussed in this panel. Part of the problem, as 

 has been mentioned, in terms of the FBI's 

 unwillingness to share information relating to

 investigations that might ultimately result in 

 prosecution, that itself reflects a trajectory in 

 our domestic-intelligence capabilities over the 

 years. 

 In the 1960s, much more of the FBI's

 counter-intelligence efforts in what we would call 

 terrorist-related crimes was aimed at prevention, 

 but because of abuses that were recognized in the 
 304 

 1970s, we imposed new rules, new constraints, that 

 basically said at the federal level, and these were 

 repeated at the state and local level, we don't 

 want intelligence in the prevention business

 anymore. We want you in the prosecution business, 

 that the prevention business is just too intrusive 

 in a free society. So we imposed new guidelines in 

 the bureau, at the state level. These were 

 repeated by police commissions throughout the

 country. 

 By the beginning of the '80s, it was 

recognized that perhaps some of these constraints 

 were having a serious impact on 

 intelligence-collection capabilities, and so they

 were relaxed somewhat, began to swing a little bit 

 the other way, but really there was at the same 

 time, there was a perceived decline in the 

 terrorist threat domestically in this country. And 

 so in fact, because they were difficult to manage,

 because they were politically risky, because they 

 were in some cases costly to operate, we continued 

 to dismantle domestic-intelligence capabilities. 
 305 

 That reversed somewhat in the 1990s as we 

 began to perceive a more serious threat again, but 

 we really didn't rebuild the capabilities. And it 

 wasn't until September 11th that we recognized we

 had a failure of intelligence in terms of looking 

 at this. When I say, "failure," I want to put that 

 in quotes. I am not one who believes that if we 

 had had just a little better intelligence 

 collection, we could have connected the dots, as

 the phrase goes. This is very, very tough.

 When you read the last page of a mystery 

 novel first and then read the novel, all of the 

 clues are obvious. Going forward, it's a lot more 

 complicated than that. But we probably can do it

 better. Now that we have pushed back into the 

 prevention business, then that should allow us to 

 more easily share some of this information across 

 lines without some of the constraints imposed by 

 prosecution, which was the real constraint. So

 sharing has to be made better. 

 The analysis does have to get there and 

 does have to get better. We also have to keep in 
 306 

 mind that we can't judge intelligence solely on the 

 basis of identifying and preventing an attack. Of 

 course we're going to do that, but intelligence is 

 also aimed at disrupting your opponent's capability

 to operate.

 We don't know how many attacks we may have 

 thwarted since September 11th. It's a good many. 

 And we can identify some clearly, but there may be 

 many more that were aborted because of increased

 security or because of good intelligence that we 

 will find out about years from now when we catch 

 more of these people and interrogate them. 

 Better sharing, better analysis, better 

 mechanisms across national frontiers, to work more

 closely with our allies, take advantage of this 

 unprecedented cooperation I mentioned before. 

 When we can get a good flow of information 

 from the streets of our cities across to, whether

 it is an investigating magistrate in France or an

 intelligence operative in the Middle East, and 

 begin to assemble that kind of information and 

 analyze it and repackage it and send it back out to 
 307 

 users, whether it's a policeman on the beat or a 

 judge in Italy or a Special Forces Team in 

 Afghanistan, then we will be getting close to the 

 kind of capability we need to deal with this kind

 of problem. That's going to take a couple, a few 

 years. 

 COMMISSIONER ROEMER: More than a few 

 years, I would suspect. Several years. Professor, 

 you talked a little bit about the problems of

 communication and information sharing between the 

 CIA and the FBI. The Joint Inquiry's findings 

 agree very much with those systemic and endemic and 

 ongoing problems. 

 How do you fix it? Do you create more

 agencies to do it and more stove-piping? How do we 

 get either those agencies to talk to one another 

 and share information or do you create this new 

 Terrorist Threat Integration Center? Where do you 

 put it, Homeland Security or outside of it? How do

 they communicate with the local people? Give me 

 some tangible suggestions here. 

 DR. SOFAER: You're really in good shape.
 308 

 Your Executive Director happens to be the former 

 Executive Director of the Markle Commission, a 

 Commission Task Force Report on this very subject. 

 And he was the principal author, Philip Zelikow was

 the principal author of that report. 

 And that report does a lot to move policy 

 in the right direction on those issues. They're 

 very complicated. And the Markle Commission is 

 continuing its work and trying to develop a sort of

 a distributed intelligence framework where you have 

 less top-down evaluation, the kind of thing that 

 Brian had suggested earlier with the New York City 

 police force and the other local police forces, but 

 on an intelligence, computer-based intelligence

 system. 

 I think it's very, very complicated and 

 important that it be done, but I think that's the 

 way it's got to be done, through experts. We've 

 got people in the room, I'm privileged to be on

 that task force, who I don't even understand when 

 they start talking about distributed networks and 

 all these other things.
 309 

 And they clearly have a handle on how to 

 use information and also how to control your 

 seeking of information so that you maintain civil 

 liberties. They have a handle on those issues that

 is really highly sophisticated at this stage in the 

 private sector. And that's where we really have to 

 turn to them and ask them to guide us in these 

 very, very complicated issues. 

 But don't forget, Congressman, that when

 you know who your enemy is and he's killed you a 

 few times, you can sort of skip the dots on a 

 particular incident and go take him out before he

 comes back and kills our people again. Don't 

 forget that.

 COMMISSIONER ROEMER: There has to be an 

 offensive and a defensive strategy. 

 DR. SOFAER: Absolutely. That's right. I 

 think that it is very hard to keep, it's so hard to 

 keep the attention of commissions and government

 officials away from this process of examination, 

 this going deeper and deeper into intelligence, 

 trying to figure out things. 
 310 

 There is a certain point at which that you 

 have figured it out, you know what the issue is and 

 who the enemy is. And when you get to that point, 

 when you can indict someone twice, he had been

 indicted twice before 9/11, when you can do that, 

 my God, you've waited around too long. You already 

 solved the problem, you know who your enemy was. 

 You know he is going to come kill you. 

 I think this is an important point not

 just for this case but for other cases. There 

 aren't that many big terrorist groups in the world. 

 There are some. And you have got here, with Brian 

 and Magnus, we've got here really two of the great 

 experts on this. Magnus has written the work on

 Hizbollah. I mean, no one knows more about 

 Hizbollah in the world, I don't think, than Magnus.

 And the fact of the matter is, there's 

 Hizbollah, there's Islamic jihad, you know, you can 

 make a list. It's not that long a list. And part

 of what you should do to keep America safe is focus 

 on those people who say they hate us and they want 

 to kill us, because those are the guys who are 
 311 

 going to do it, Mr. Secretary. 

 COMMISSIONER ROEMER: Magnus, let me draw 

 you in here and ask for your international insight 

 into this.

 You mentioned earlier about al Qaeda and 

 other terrorist organizations, but specifically, I 

 believe your words were that al Qaeda is dispersed 

 from Afghanistan, but they're still an organization 

 that has tentacles in a host of different places

 and are very much able to attack us from where 

 they're going, whether that be in Indonesia or 

 Malaysia or other parts of the world. 

 Can you draw this out a little bit more 

 clearly for us in terms of how we expect they have

 dispersed, where they are, and how this 90-country

 international coalition continues to focus on this 

 international law on terrorism and what are the two 

 or three most effective ways to do that? 

 DR. RANSTORP: Well, let me say that from

 the American people's point of view, they can rest 

 assured, from the international perspective of what 

 I see, Europe, Europe's contribution, we have 500 
 312 

 people in custody in Europe in many, many different 

 countries, we have thwarted many plots, and that 

 is that we are getting things right. 

 Fortunately, unfortunately, 9/11 was the

 wake-up call for that. It was a tremendous secret 

 war of intelligence hunters out there trying to 

 learn as much as possible about al Qaeda, about how 

 al Qaeda is changing from different regions. 

 And of course, it is very difficult. It

 is not affected by the war against Iraq, rather, 

 those are institutional linkages that are already, 

 it's not affected in terms of the sharing and 

 cooperation between a number of countries. 

 There have been some countries that have

 been tremendously helpful. Among them, of course, 

 Pakistan, but also Jordan, particularly Jordan's 

 role in contributing, and not only protecting 

 itself and its royal family, but also in 

 illuminating our understanding of how the al Qaeda

 network works, alongside the Egyptians and other, 

 shall we say, coalition partners. So we are 

 getting things right, but there are also of course 
 313 

 tremendous challenges because they do exist. 

 Al Qaeda's network has a presence in over 

 98 different countries around the world. It has a 

 global reach. One of the areas we have not tackled

 very much is in America's own back yard, Latin 

 America. We know that there has been some al Qaeda 

 presence there. 

 Of course, there are other problems there 

 as well. There's a sort of al Qaeda elements,

 other Islamic extremist elements who are not only 

 dispersed in Latin America but of course the world. 

 It's a tremendously difficult issue. 

 And I think one of the issues and one of 

 the things that I put in my recommendation is that

 we should coordinate our response, particularly 

 because terrorism is fusing together with organized 

 crime and even ordinary crime, that we should put 

 together our efforts, particularly within the U.S. 

 structures, of the war on terrorism as well as the

 war on drugs, because as we speak right now, we 

 dealt with Afghanistan, it was a huge blow for al 

 Qaeda. 
 314 

 The issue of reconstruction in Afghanistan 

 is still a major issue. As we speak, there are 

 Taliban and al Qaeda suspects flooding back into 

 Afghanistan or using a large portion of the

 country. It's a lawless zone. It's a blind spot 

 in this war of terrorism. 

 And it's not just Afghanistan, it's not 

 just in certain portions of Iran, it's not just the 

 fact that Iran has facilitated al Qaeda transit out

 of that area. There are large proportions in the 

 world where we do not have effective central 

 authority, where the authority does not have the 

 capability. And the United States have been not 

 only hunting down al Qaeda cells but also providing

 antiterrorism assistance. 

 The United States is the only country with 

 global intelligence reach on a tremendous level. 

 And I think that, you know, we may want to sort of 

 do an inventory of how we can do things better, but

 I think that we have gone a long way of ensuring 

 that al Qaeda will at lease not strike with ease 

 against the American homeland or against U.S. 
 315 

 citizens abroad. 

 COMMISSIONER ROEMER: You mentioned the 

 need for central authority. I think a half a dozen 

 commissions throughout the 1990s have recommended

 the creation of a Director of National 

 Intelligence, somebody with centralized power and 

 authority within the intelligence community that 

 has the responsibility for a budget, that can 

 implement policy and, if they declare a war on

 terrorism or al Qaeda, they have the resources to 

 marshal the intelligence community forward to get 

 it done. 

 Six or seven commissions have recommended

 it. We are probably moving in the other direction,

 in reality, from accomplishing that. 

 Do you have views on whether or not, 

 Professor, should we create a DNI, Mr. Jenkins, Mr. 

 Ranstorp? 

 DR. SOFAER: I'm not sure we should, Mr.

 Congressman. I think that our reluctance to be 

 strong and act positively, actively in our self 

 defense leads us sometimes to overwork on the 
 316 

 passive measures to the point that we do create 

 real threats to our civil liberties. 

 I think that an active defense would 

 facilitate, in fact, less reliance on internal

 control of our own citizens. And so I worry about 

 setting up institutions in this country that would 

 change the nature of our life. 

 COMMISSIONER ROEMER: Mr. Jenkins? 

 MR. JENKINS: First of all, I thought at

 one time we had created someone that was supposed 

 to be in charge of the intelligence community and 

 it didn't quite work out that way. 

 There's a tendency, by the way, to try to 

 approach a particularly gnarly problem like this

 one by the creation of some sort of a czar. This 

 is a recurring theme in our governmental approach. 

 I'm not sure. I'm not going to make a powerful 

 argument against it, but I'm not automatically 

 convinced that it provides an answer that simply a

 new organization or a new head of organization gets 

 us there. 

 There are rather procedural issues, there 
 317 

 are issues of imperative, there are issues of 

 incentives that I think we have to address quite 

 apart from the issue of government reorganization. 

 The fact is, my own view is that we do

 have the basic building blocks now to do this 

 thing. We are making progress. We do have to 

 improve and we will improve as we go along. Every 

 time we create another entity, that may expand our 

 capabilities in one sense, but at the same time, it

 becomes a distraction. 

 I mean, I'm not going to argue against the 

 creation of a Homeland Security Department. 

 Bringing together is a good idea, but at the same 

 time, how it is going to function, how it is

 actually going to integrate them in this major 

 post-merger environment now that has been created, 

 and effectively operate, that becomes, that almost 

 tends to slow you down somewhat in terms of dealing 

 with the actual process that we want to deal with.

 So as I say, I'm not going to argue against it, but 

 I'm not sure an Intelligence Czar or a 

 Counterterrorist Czar is automatically going to get 
 318 

 us there. 

 I do think, and this is a cultural 

 problem, it's not a government-organizational

 problem, that we, being a very pragmatic nation,

 that we like to view things in terms of finite 

 achievement -- there's a problem, we identify the 

 problem, we solve the problem, move on to the next 

 problem -- and that we are so desperate for closure 

 after September 11th that we're looking for some

 way, organizationally, that we can put the lid on 

 this thing and say we have now solved that, we are 

 now moving on. 

 Instead what I think our message is here, 

 and I'm not putting words in the mouths of my

 colleagues here, but that this is an open-ended

 thing we're engaged in here. Our pursuit of al 

 Qaeda itself must be unrelenting. If it takes us 

 two years, if it takes us 20 years, this enterprise 

 must be destroyed to reduce its capabilities to

 attack us and also as a lesson to other 

 organizations around the world, that if you do 

 this, this will be the response of the United 
 319 

 States and we will spend the rest of our lives 

 hunting you down. 

 At the same time, where we can 

 appropriately use the term "war", and I think

 language needs to be precise here, where we can 

 appropriately use the term "war" for dealing with 

 an al Qaeda or its successors, that we're also 

 simultaneously engaged in an effort to improve the 

 security of our homeland against catastrophes like

 9/11. 

 And as I pointed out here, that's going to 

 take certain kinds of strategies, both intelligence 

 strategies, response strategies, infrastructure, 

 the way we do security, to do it in a way that

 doesn't cripple our own economy, that doesn't 

 create some sort of a neo-medieval society where we 

 spend the rest of our lives living under the 

 kitchen table. 

 At the same time, another court of our

 activity must be to combat terrorism. Now here the 

 verb is important. Combat implies an enduring 

 task. We're going to do the things that we can 
 320 

 internationally to improve the exchange of 

 intelligence, to improve travel documentation, to 

 improve border security, aviation security, all of 

 the things, financial controls, all of the things

 that we can do to make the environment 

 operationally more difficult for the terrorists, 

 whatever group they belong to. 

 We are doing all these things 

 simultaneously, some we will succeed. Ultimately,

 we will destroy al Qaeda. These other tasks that 

 we're talking about, these are tasks that are going 

 to take years, probably decades. 

 And there will be other commissions to 

 follow this one that will be examining and making

 useful contributions to improve things along the 

 way. But the notion that we can come up to some 

 moment and say, we have won, the terrorists have 

 lost, probably not in my lifetime. 

 COMMISSIONER ROEMER: Sir?

 DR. RANSTORP: I think Brian echoed 

 exactly my sentiment in terms of looking at this as 

 a ceaseless struggle. I think there is, from the 
 321 

 outside, I have to preface my comments as being an 

 outsider, a foreigner to the United States, that 

 there's an over-tendency to look at trying to 

 hermetically seal the U.S. or immunize itself from

 a future attack. 

 It's important that we do the work that 

 has been done so far in terms of homeland security, 

 in terms of the possibility of centralizing

 intelligence, in making intelligence flow, not just

 from the top between different agencies but also, 

 as Brian said earlier, more importantly, the front 

 line of defense, the local law-enforcement

 officers, the police, equipping them with the right 

 equipment.

 I think, thinking back, and I was in the 

 United States in 1998 on the day on which President 

 Clinton ordered air strikes against Afghanistan and 

 instituted some protective measures, in part to try 

 to protect the U.S. against what I would call

 catastrophic terrorism, but I would have to say 

 this, that we have to balance our protective 

 measures, our defensive measures, with more 
 322 

 aggressive preemptive action. 

 I mean, logic would prevail that once they 

 start moving towards the target, we've already lost 

 half the battle. And therefore, we have to work on

 multilateral cooperation, we have to work on making 

 it as difficult as possible, we have to create the 

 sense of insecurity for the adversary, for al 

 Qaeda, so that they're not able to plan 

 undisturbed, but they also have to worry about

 their own security and the fact that they may 

 become apprehended by the U.S. in the future. 

 Therefore, I think, you know, we have gone 

 a long way towards getting it right. A lot of the 

 measures we don't see because they're occurring in

 the quiet, occurring in the intelligence sphere. 

 Therefore, you know, on the one hand, we're 

 creating different structures and trying to 

 centralize different decisions, pooling 

 intelligence and intelligence analysis, but there's

 a tremendous force, an unseen force out there that 

 are hunting these people down, that will seek 

 justice, no matter how long it will take. 
 323 

 And that goes not only for al Qaeda but 

 also for those forces that killed the U.S. Marines 

 in '93. 

 COMMISSIONER ROEMER: At the end of the

 day, this Commission will be about some 

 recommendations. And what I am hearing very 

 clearly from you is that part of those 

 recommendations might be in fact communicating to 

 the American people that this war, this combatting

 terrorism, as Mr. Jenkins says, one needs the sense 

 of urgency that we have when our troops go into 

 Afghanistan or Iraq, and secondly, that this is 

 long-term, almost ceaseless struggle, that will 

 take a lot of time, that despite the

 recommendations that this Commission makes in May 

 of 2004, al Qaeda may be out there in 2014. I see 

 you nodding.

 MR. JENKINS: If not al Qaeda, the son of 

 al Qaeda or the grandson of al Qaeda or some other

 enterprise. 

 Look, we have been dealing with terrorism, 

 fortunately not at the scale of 9/11, for many, 
 324 

 many years. And it's not because of an absence of 

 intelligent people who have been addressing this 

 topic, it's because this is a very, very big

 challenge. This thing is going to go on. It's not

 simply going to be a matter of how we can 

 reorganize our intelligence collection or how many 

 National Guardsmen we can deploy or how much 

 concrete we can pour around every identifiable 

 piece of critical infrastructure we have in this

 country. 

 Ultimately, it is going to be our own 

 sense of urgency, our own tenacity, our own 

 determination, our own courage, to a certain 

 extent, our own stoicism about accepting that there

 are going to be some failures, there are going to 

 be some losses, and in the process -- and I think 

 this is very, very important because it's long-term

 and because we are America -- our own continuing 

 commitment to the values for which this country

 stands. 

 It's not something that we can simply 

 reorganize, toss the values, forget the rules, and
 325 

 go off and blast away and fix things up and come 

 back and restore the old rules and say we'll go 

 back to whatever normality was on September 10, 

 2001. We don't get to go back. It is a different

 world. It is a long-term contest. And so we 

 better do it in a way that we can maintain the 

 sense of values. 

 I'm not saying we don't change the rules. 

 We can change rules. Every country that has dealt

 with terrorism has been obliged to change the rules 

 of detention, of intelligence gathering, of trial 

 procedures, but the countries of Europe that have 

 done this, they have done this as democracies and 

 remained democracies.

 We can do the same, but we cannot, we 

 cannot violate fundamentally those rules and 

 maintain the support we will need domestically and 

 internationally for what promises to be a long-term

 struggle.

 DR. SOFAER: I would agree with all that, 

 Mr. Congressman. I just want to say that I think 

 this Commission should make it clear that the duty 
 326 

 to protect and defend the American people includes, 

 very explicitly, the duty to go out and stop a 

 known enemy that has killed Americans from doing it 

 again, that that duty is a clear, precise duty.

 You're not supposed to sit in Washington 

 with a bunch of experts trying to make dots and 

 connect ideas to figure out when someone is going 

 to kill you and where he's going to do it if you 

 know there's someone out there that is determined

 to do it and capable of doing it and you know where 

 he is. 

 So this Commission should, I think, make 

 it clear that presidents don't have the option of 

 sitting back and playing that game, that part of

 fighting terrorism is that when you know there's an 

 enemy who rises up to kill you, and the words that 

 should be familiar to all of us in all three of our 

 religions, that you rise up and kill him first. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: I'm going to interrupt

 this shortly because we have already kept our panel 

 more than we expected. 

 COMMISSIONER ROEMER: Thank you for your 
 327 

 patience. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Do you have anymore 

 questions? 

 COMMISSIONER ROEMER: No, I'm all done.

 Thank you very much. I want to thank the panel, 

 too. You've been terrific. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Senator, you have a 

 question? 

 COMMISSIONER CLELAND: Mr. Jenkins, all of

 you, you've been eloquent to a fault. Thank you 

 very much. 

 Mr. Jenkins, right at the end of your 

 incredible, wonderful presentation, you talked 

 about, in effect, defeating al Qaeda, that is a

 specific goal, they did rise up to kill us and did, 

 and they declared war on us. And I couldn't agree 

 more. Then you went to combatting terrorism. 

 What that reminded me of was an experience 

 I had in Malaya, or now it's Malaysia. I was in

 Vietnam, '67, '68, fighting guerillas, terrorists, 

 suicide bombers and the like, took a little R & R 

 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and read a book called 
 328 

 The Long, Long War. It was about the British 

 experience in combatting guerrillas, terrorists, 

 suicide bombers. And one of the things they 

 learned was that the terrorist doesn't lose, he

wins. The terrorist doesn't lose, he wins. 

 So for those who came after us, you're 

 exactly right, and that's specific. We know who 

 did it and we must kill or capture them or else 

 they will do it again. What little I know about al

 Qaeda, that is true. Within the combating of

 terrorism, doing what you can in terms of strategic 

 offensive abroad, strategic defensive at home, that 

 is the long, long war. 

What I want to pose to you is a couple of

 problems with this. One of the problems is that in 

 terms of stirring up the bee hive, Mr. Ranstorp, 

 your point about the Hizbollah, it seems to me that 

 Osama bin Laden deliberately has stirred up the bee 

 hive to create an overreaction by Western

 democracies, particularly America, so that we would 

 then trigger more recruits for his jihad. 

 In his declaration of war, for instance, 
 329 

 bin Laden states that the stationing of American 

 forces on the soil of the Arabian Peninsula 

 constitutes the greatest aggression committed 

 against the Muslims since the death of the prophet

 Mohammed in AD 632. Well, we don't believe that, 

 but that's his rhetoric. 

 The point being, is it your understanding, 

 Mr. Jenkins, that to the extent to which we 

 increase our footprint on Arab soil, Muslim soil,

 and appear to be the Crusaders of old trying to 

 take over Islamic lands, which fulfills his 

 rhetoric, that as we do that, we stand in 

 difficulty or difficult trouble, or potentially 

 potential trouble of creating really a backlash

 against us and more terrorist activity? 

 Talk to me a little bit about it. We 

 created an air base in Saudi Arabia and one in 

 Iraq. We have a presence in the Middle East in 

 many, many ways. Talk to me a little bit about the

 potential dangers that you see about increasing 

 what -- another article is called the Pax Americana 

 in the Middle East -- and how that could possibly 
 330 

 generate a greater terrorist threat ultimately in 

 terms of a backlash against us. 

 MR. JENKINS: This is not easy because

 this is a balance and, as you know, policy is

 always a matter of trade-offs. To not respond 

 forcefully to the events of September 11th, to me, 

 would have been unimaginable. In responding, 

 whether it's responding to September 11th or 

 whether it's what we are currently engaged in in

 Iraq, clearly unavoidably, does raise risks. It 

 raises risks that our opponents will be able to 

 exploit these, we know they will, in order to 

 increase their recruiting. 

 So the challenge for us becomes can we

 respond forcibly and effectively in a way without 

 signalling a desire for dominion, a desire for 

 Imperialist rule, a desire, communicating the 

 desire that we wish to remake the world in our, in 

 our image or in anything that suggests that we're

 opposed to a religion. Now that is hard to do. 

 I'm not sure that there's a single formulaic answer

 to that specific question. 
 331 

 By the way, the question to our opponents 

 would be unimaginable, it would be utterly bizarre 

 because while we may say that we're not engaged in 

 a war on Islam, correctly so in that we're not

 interested in dominion and that we make separations 

 between what people believe and how they behave and 

 we respond to how they behave to us, these 

 bifurcations of a spiritual world of belief, of 

 political developments, are completely foreign to

 them. This is all of a single piece. So can we 

 operate in this territory and do it. 

 In Afghanistan, although we're not home 

 yet in Afghanistan, in Afghanistan we were 

 successful. We used military force, we destroyed

 al Qaeda bases. And there was no uprising of 

 Islam. There was no worldwide surge in terrorism 

 against us as a consequence, as a consequence of 

 this. 

 Now, as I say, we're not there yet. And

 one of the things that we also have to figure out 

 how to do to ensure, and I think a mistake made the 

 first time around in dealing with Afghanistan is 
 332 

 that probably, without being Imperialists, we can't 

 afford to leave too many black holes on the planet, 

 can't afford to have too many badlands where these 

 type of things can find a petri dish they need to

 grow and survive. 

 So we're going to have to actively go out 

 and, in one way or another, not always with Special 

 Forces or smart bombs or other applications of 

 military force, we're going to find out how to

 address some of these. 

 That doesn't mean straying off into what 

 to me is illusions about addressing root causes. 

 It is not demonstrable that there's any causal 

 relationship between poverty and terrorism. We

 will address, we will address poverty in the world, 

 we will address lack of education, we will address 

 political oppression because it's the right thing 

 to do, not because we have any illusions that it is 

 going to end terrorism.

 As I say, in doing so, we run these risks, 

 but I think we have to take these one at a time and 

 get them right. 
 333 

 COMMISSIONER CLELAND: Mr. Ranstorp? 

 DR. RANSTORP: Connecting with what Brian 

 said, I think the environment is such that we're 

 moving towards greater complexity. I mean,

 unfortunately, if you look at the Middle East, for 

 example, U.S. economists have estimated it will 

 take economic growth rate five times that of the 

 United States to get the region on an even keel. 

 There's been a youth explosion. There's

 been demographic growth. There's no link between 

 poverty and terrorism, yet it's that environment 

 which so easily lends itself to certain radical 

 nodes of radical Islam. I think that we have, 

 following 9/11, we addressed many of those issues.

 We are aware of them. 

 We do not have the capability of reaching 

 into so-called black spots. We're simply not 

 perhaps developing our own capabilities, but we're 

 outsourcing this. This is not just the United

 States' problem, this is a Western problem, not 

 just a U.S. problem, but also a European problem. 

 And therefore, we're working hand in hand in trying 
 334 

 to alleviate this. 

 But we have tremendous challenges. I 

 think one of the issues particularly we have to 

 grapple with is the global feeling of

 anti-Americanism, in using public diplomacy to much 

 greater effect, in thinking ahead about tactics and 

 strategies, explaining better to the world why 

 American is doing what it is doing. 

 And you can see that's happening now as an

 integral part of the war against Iraq. In the war 

 against the hearts and minds and the war against 

 Islamic extremism, it's very difficult to do, but 

 it has to be done at some level. It has to be, it 

 has to be confronted.

 I have spent 15 years working, mapping 

 Islamic extremists. And let me say that one of the 

 issues where it is both the strength and the 

 weakness which we have to tackle with greater 

 ingenuity and innovation is the issue of their

 legitimacy. We have to tackle at the root heart 

 their legitimacy. And there are many ways one can 

 do that, but it will take a greater ingenuity. It 
 335 

 has to take greater effort. And it is not going to 

 be an easy road ahead. 

 COMMISSIONER CLELAND: Thank you, Mr. 

 Chairman. CHAIRMAN KEAN: Thank you. Mr.

 Commissioner Ben-Veniste.

 COMMISSIONER BEN-VENISTE: I know it's 

getting late. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: This is going to be the 

 last question, just to let these people go.

 COMMISSIONER BEN-VENISTE: Also a biblical 

 expression. Both Judge Sofaer and Mr. Jenkins have 

 commented on the concept of creating a new domestic 

 intelligence agency from different perspectives. 

 Judge Sofaer, you have mentioned that you

 opposed it, and one of the reasons that you stated 

 was because of the greater threat to civil 

 liberties. And Mr. Jenkins said that he thought 

 that the basic building blocks to do the work were 

 there.

 And perhaps that ties into the 

 extraordinary presentation of Miss Kleinberg 

 earlier this morning. She talked about all of the 
 336 

 things that were missed by our intelligence 

 agencies that could have, in fact, on the basis of 

 information in hand, had they been working 

 cooperatively and done the work that was expected

 of them, could have identified at least some of the 

 terrorists involved in 9/11. 

 I wonder whether you would each expand 

 upon that because one of the major objectives I 

 think we have in making our ultimate

 recommendations will be related to whether a new 

 system of domestic intelligence should be 

 instituted or whether in fact we can make do with 

 what we have with significant improvement. 

 DR. SOFAER: I think the latter. I think

 we can make do with what we have with significant 

 improvements. I think we ought to use DHS more 

 than going back to the FBI and CIA. I think that 

 we're not going to make much progress if we rely on 

 those agencies exclusively.

 I think the list of failures and 

 opportunities that the Joint Committee has put 

 together with Miss Hill, her report has been very 
 337 

 impressive. And I can't imagine that the 

 Commission needs to spend a lot of time building on 

 that record. 

 I mean, it's just clear that we lost, we

 missed a lot of opportunities. And I think we can 

 do a lot to correct that if we don't rely 

 exclusively on the same agencies that missed those 

 opportunities, incidentally, without any 

 accountability whatsoever. There's be no

 accountability whatsoever for those missed 

 opportunities. 

 MR. JENKINS: Again, I think we could have 

 done it better prior to September 11th. I'm not 

 sure that that would have prevented the September

 11th attack. I just don't know that. Putting 

 aside the issue of whether could have or could not 

 have identified the attack coming, how do we 

 approach this, how do we approach it now. 

 I notice that you used the word, can we

 make the system better. I think you said system. 

 COMMISSIONER BEN-VENISTE: That supposes a 

 fact that perhaps is not yet in evidence. 
 338 

 MR. JENKINS: That is, my point is that I 

 think there's a key word there that we want to 

 focus on, can we make this into a system and how do 

 we achieve that. It's not a question of can we

 create another entity or not create another entity. 

 That, to me, is a tactical question, it's a 

 how-you-get-there question. 

 The root, how do we create a system out of 

 the capabilities that we have now and that we can

 reasonably create? We can enhance those 

 capabilities. There's a variety of ways we can do 

 that, one of which I have indicated already, but 

 how do we procedurally, what is the machinery for 

 creating a system?

 If that requires a new entity, then so be 

 it. I'm not convinced that it does yet, but I am 

 persuaded that we need to do something to bring 

 about a system. 

 COMMISSIONER BEN-VENISTE: Mr. Ranstorp,

 do you care to comment? 

 DR. RANSTORP: No, I totally agree that 

 there has to be an integrated system. I think 
 339 

 we're on our way there. I think though within, 

 this is the European experience, within bearing in 

 mind civil liberties, I think that cannot be the 

 casualty of any system. I think protecting and

 preserving them is something that we all cherish. 

 CHAIRMAN KEAN: Dr. Sofaer, Mr. Jenkins, 

 Mr. Ranstorp, thank you very, very much for the 

 enlightening discussion. We are adjourned until 

 9:00 tomorrow morning.

 (Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m., the proceedings 

 were recessed, to reconvene at 9:00 a.m., Tuesday, 

 April 1, 2003.)