Functional Bureau Strategy 

Bureau of 

Conflict and 

Stabilization Operations 

FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

Approved: May 4, 2020 
 

 

 

 

 

 

FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

Table of Contents 

1. Executive Statement......................................................................................3 

2. Bureau Strategic Framework...........................................................................7 

3. Bureau Goals and Objectives...........................................................................8 

4. Cross-Cutting Management Objectives............................................................19 

Approved: May 4, 2020 

FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

2 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

1. Executive Statement 

The mission of the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) is to anticipate, 

prevent, and respond to conflict that undermines U.S. national interests. This mission supports 

Administration priorities articulated in the National Security Strategy (NSS), such as pursuing 

threats to the U.S. homeland and people at their source, preserving peace through strength, 

assuring civilian security, and expanding burden sharing. 

CSO takes a strategic approach to prevention and stabilization assistance. The bureau prioritizes 

U.S. national security interests by judiciously using U.S. taxpayer dollars and realizing effective 

and measurable outcomes. This approach builds upon recent whole-of-government initiatives 

such as the Global Fragility Act (2019); the Strategic Prevention Project (2019); the Elie Wiesel 

Act (2018); the Stabilization Assistance Review (2018); Department of Defense Directive 

3000.05 (2018); and the U.S. National Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security (2019). 

Our bureau priorities also reflect global conflict trends. Violent conflict is at its highest levels in 

decades and has become more complex, protracted, and virulent across the globe. It involves a 

range of non-state armed groups, and regional and international actors targeting fragile states. 

These states are fertile ground for great power competition, terrorist groups, and organized 

narco-crime. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia capitalize on fragile states by 

gaining strategic access, exploiting weakness, and shaping future political outcomes against U.S. 

interests. Malign state actors such as Iran and North Korea also use fragile states to advance 

their interests by instigating political instability through proxies and hybrid threats. 

Violent conflict undermines stability and economic prosperity. In parts of Africa, Afghanistan, 

Libya, Syria, Yemen, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, violent conflict has fueled internal 

displacements and mass migration that destabilizes neighboring states. Russian aggression 

against and occupation of parts of Ukraine and Georgia threatens European security. PRC 

malign actions in the Indo-Pacific, including the South China Sea, disrupt free trade and fuel 

regional instability. 

Effectively addressing these threats to U.S. national interests requires an agile team and targeted 

assistance. CSO deploys stabilization advisors and harnesses data analytics to inform and 

execute U.S. policy, strategy, and programs on conflict prevention and stabilization. Our 

expertise focuses on three lines of effort that address different components of the conflict cycle: 

strategic prevention, conflict resolution, and security sector stabilization. These efforts include 

programs that provide early warning for violent conflict and potential mass atrocities; offer 

technical support to peace process negotiations; encourage defections, de-radicalization, and reintegration of ex-combatants; and prevent the recruitment and radicalization of potential 

terrorists. CSO ensures that its programs are rigorously monitored and evaluated based on 

metrics of success. 

Approved: May 4, 2020 

FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

3 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

    

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

2. Bureau Strategic Framework 

Mission: To anticipate, prevent, and respond to conflict that undermines U.S. national 

interests. 

Bureau Goal 1. Deploy Stabilization Advisors to execute U.S. policy, strategy, and 

programs on conflict prevention and stabilization. 

Objective 1.1: Deploy stabilization advisors to key regional missions and Geographic 

Combatant Commands to coordinate, plan, and allocate resources in strategically important 

conflict-prone regions. 

Objective 1.2: Deploy stabilization advisors as TDY rapid response to provide short-term 

technical support in line with CSO’s lines of effort. 

Bureau Goal 2. Harness data analytics to anticipate sources of violent conflict and 

instability, and enable agile foreign policy decision making. 

Objective 2.1: Strengthen CSO’s Instability Monitoring and Analysis Platform’s (IMAP) 

role as a primary Department and interagency hub for forecasting, tracking, and 

understanding global instability and conflict trends, and using data-driven analysis to inform 

foreign policy decision-making on conflict prevention and stabilization. 

Objective 2.2: Incorporate rigorous, evidence-based analysis of conflict dynamics into 

program design, monitoring, and evaluation both within CSO and in support of other 

Bureaus. 

Bureau Goal 3. Develop policy initiatives and targeted programming to prevent violent 

conflict and help stabilize conflict-prone regions of U.S. national priority. 

Objective 3.1: Design, implement, monitor, and evaluate programs pursuant to CSO’s three 

lines of efforts (LOEs): strategic prevention, conflict resolution, and security sector 

stabilization, with outcomes clearly linked to U.S. policy objectives. 

Objective 3.2: Build and lead coalitions that coordinate conflict prevention and stabilization 

programs, policies, and resources. 

Objective 3.3: Convene and lead working groups in the Department to coordinate legislation 

and policies related to state fragility, conflict prevention, atrocity early warning, and 

stabilization. 

Cross-cutting Management Objectives: 

Management Objective 1: Recruit and retain a highly trained and diverse workforce available 

for timely worldwide TDYs or deployment, often in rapid response. 

Management Objective 2: Meet the growing demand for CSO’s advanced analytics and 

programs by hiring necessary staff and enhancing technological capabilities. 

Approved: May 4, 2020 

FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

4 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

3. Goals and Objectives 

Bureau Goal 1. Deploy Stabilization Advisors to execute U.S. policy, strategy, 

and programs on conflict prevention and stabilization. 

a. Description. 

CSO deploys stabilization advisors to posts and Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) to 

help prevent violent conflict and stabilize conflict-prone regions. Stabilization advisors also 

provide a “surge” capability to other posts upon request. Their main responsibilities are to 

conduct targeted programing, engagements, and deep-dive analyses along three lines of effort: 

strategic prevention, conflict resolution, and security sector stabilization. Advisors activities 

include providing early warning for violent conflict and potential atrocities; giving technical 

support to peace process negotiations; supporting the defection, de-radicalization, and reintegration of ex-combatants; and preventing the recruitment and radicalization of vulnerable 

populations to terrorism. 

Bureau Objective 1.1: Deploy stabilization advisors to key regional missions and 

Geographic Combatant Commands to coordinate, plan, and allocate resources in 

strategically important conflict-prone regions. 

a. Justification and Linkages. 

CSO’s Stabilization Advisors support NSS Pillar III’s Priority Actions (p. 33) by enabling 

fieldwork beyond the confines of diplomatic facilities. At embassies, CSO’s stabilization 

advisors employ their expertise to prevent violent conflict and help stabilize conflict-prone 

regions by collaborating with national and local governments, civil society, and like-minded 

partner embassies. At GCCs and subordinate units, they advance civ-mil coordination through 

analysis, planning, training, and joint operations for conflict prevention and stabilization. These 

activities support implementation of the Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR), DoD Directive 

3000.05 on stabilization, and the forthcoming Global Fragility Strategy. Temporarily deployed 

staff manage CSO’s and other U.S. government funded targeted programs, support embassies’ 

diplomatic engagements, and monitor and evaluate programs. 

b. Risk Considerations. 

Absence of CSO stabilization advisors in priority countries undermines CSO’s mission and 

ability to prevent violent conflict and build resilience in support of Strategic Objective 1.4 of the 

Department of State and USAID Joint Strategic Plan (JSP SO 1.4), and engage civil society in 

prevention and stabilization in those priority countries (JSP SO 3.3). 

Bureau Objective 1.2: Deploy stabilization advisors as TDY rapid response to provide 

short-term technical support in line with CSO’s lines of effort. 

a. Justification and Linkages 

Approved: May 4, 2020 

FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

5 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

CSO deploys its personnel temporarily to help missions and posts address instability, violent 

conflict, or malign influence from the PRC, Russia, Iran, or North Korea. This effort aligns with 

JSP SO 1.3 to counter these threats, and focuses on CSO’s three LOEs that advance strategic 

prevention, conflict resolution, and security sector stabilization. By deploying stabilization 

advisors during the early stages of conflict, or before malign influences can tip into instability or 

violent conflict, CSO can realize NSS Pillar I and protect the American people and its friends 

and neighbors. 

b. Risk Considerations 

Failure to deploy stabilization advisors in a timely manner can undermine strategic prevention, 

increase violence, cost additional resources, and risk the security of the American people. This 

failure also threatens the ability to defeat threats in priority countries (JSP SO 1.3). 

Bureau Goal 2. Harness data analytics to anticipate sources of violent conflict 

and instability, and enable agile foreign policy decision making. 

a. Description. 

Bureau Objective 2.1: Strengthen CSO’s Instability Monitoring and Analysis Platform’s 

(IMAP) role as a primary Department and interagency hub for forecasting, tracking, and 

understanding global instability and conflict trends, and using data-driven analysis to 

inform foreign policy decision-making on conflict prevention and stabilization. 

a. Justification and Linkages. 

Data-driven analysis supports effective diplomacy by tailoring data from the information-rich 

open-source environment, as called for in NSS Pillar III (p. 33). CSO’s IMAP provides the 

Department regular access to updated global, regional, national, and subnational conflict trends 

that are critical to conflict prevention and stabilization efforts. Its products include early warning 

assessments of potential atrocities and violent conflict across the globe, deep-dive analyses of 

fragility, instability, and conflict, and interactive conflict story maps. IMAP supports efforts to 

Data-driven analysis is the cornerstone of competitive diplomacy and information statecraft, two 

key priorities identified in NSS Pillar III (pp. 33-34). CSO’s data-driven analysis forecasts 

global conflict trends, identifies causes of state fragility, violence, and potential atrocities, and 

provides a nuanced understanding of sub-national conflict. This capability is essential to 

creating targeted programs, strengthening diplomatic engagements, and developing investments. 

CSO also aims to adapt and improve existing methodological approaches, including the use of 

machine learning and artificial intelligence, and enhance analytical collaborations with partners 

and allies. This effort will enable CSO to identify and anticipate conflict through data sharing, 

methodological collaboration, and integration of qualitative field assessments with analytics. 

“upgrade our diplomatic capabilities” by making more efficient use of limited resources through 

interactive tools, and synthesizing multi-domain information to support competitive diplomacy 

(JSP Performance Goal (PG) 1.3.1). IMAP connects CSO’s data-analytics to the needs of the 

Department and interagency, and to related activities such as the Global Engagement Center 

GEC-IQ data analytics platform. 

Approved: May 4, 2020 

FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

6 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

b. Risk Considerations. 

Without technological and analytical infrastructure, CSO cannot deliver timely products that help 

the Department make agile foreign policy decisions. It would also result in missed opportunities 

to anticipate, prevent, and respond to conflict. Failure to diagnose conflict dynamics means that 

policy and programmatic interventions are more likely to fail or exacerbate instability. 

Bureau Objective 2.2: Incorporate rigorous, evidence-based analysis of conflict dynamics 

into program design, monitoring, and evaluation both within CSO and in support of other 

Bureaus. 

a. Justification and Linkages. 

CSO must evaluate viability and efficacy throughout the programming process in alignment with 

JSP PG 4.1.1. CSO tests new technologies and pilots best practices, such as implementing 

conflict documentation and analysis platforms. This unique civilian monitoring mission 

improves State’s information statecraft in line with the NSS Pillar III (p. 34). 

b. Risk Considerations. 

Without an understanding of the role of analytics in assessment, diplomats may fail to address 

the root causes of conflict and achieve desired policy goals. Failure to enable diplomats to 

effectively understand the underlying causes of conflict may result in policy failure and the 

spread of malign influence in a country or region. 

Bureau Goal 3. Develop policy initiatives and targeted programming to 

prevent violent conflict and help stabilize conflict-prone regions of U.S. 

national priority. 

a. Description. 

CSO’s targeted programing focuses on three LOEs: strategic prevention, conflict resolution, and 

security sector stabilization. These LOEs support Administration priorities as articulated in the 

National Security Strategy (NSS) and key legislation, such as the Global Fragility Act (2019) 

and the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act (2018). CSO programs provide 

early warning for violent conflict and potential mass atrocities; offer technical support to peace 

process negotiations; encourage defections and re-integration of combatants; and prevent the 

recruitment and radicalization of potential terrorists. CSO employs staff with diverse academic 

expertise and on-the-ground experience to design, implement, and support these programs. The 

bureau also helps prevent and respond to specific conflict risks through deep-dive analyses, 

table-top exercises, and co-leadership of Department-wide task forces focused on issues such as 

the SAR and the Global Fragility Act. CSO collaborates with a wide range of domestic and 

international institutions in support of these objectives. It leads the Council on Conflict 

Prevention and Stabilization (CCPS) and co-leads the Stabilization Leaders Forum (SLF) and the 

International Atrocity Prevention Working Group (IAPWG). CSO also serves as the Secretariat 

for the NSC-led Atrocity Early Warning Task Force. 

Approved: May 4, 2020 

FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

7 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

Bureau Objective 3.1: Design, implement, monitor, and evaluate programs pursuant to 

CSO’s three lines of efforts (LOEs): strategic prevention, conflict resolution, and security 

sector stabilization, with outcomes clearly linked to U.S. policy objectives. 

a. Justification and Linkages. 

CSO designs, implements, monitors, and evaluates programs related to its three LOEs, assuring 

they support U.S. policy objectives. It conducts targeted analyses, provides strategic advice and 

real-time diagnostics, builds networks, and contributes to diplomatic efforts to improve the 

implementation of U.S. foreign policy and assistance. It also designs, monitors, and evaluates 

programs with a prevention or stabilization component for regional and functional bureaus. 

Taken together, these capabilities allow CSO to support senior decision-makers and diplomats in 

preventing violent conflict and stabilizing conflict-affected areas of priority U.S. national 

interest. They also position CSO to quickly develop effective responses to external shocks to 

fragile states – such as the 2020 Coronavirus crisis – that can undermine stabilization efforts and 

potentially trigger renewed conflict. For example, in support of JSP SO 1.4, CSO collaborates 

with the Bureau of Counterterrorism by providing research, analysis, monitoring, and evaluation 

of CVE programs to reduce the radicalization and recruitment of violent extremists and terrorists. 

b. Risk Considerations. 

Failure to realize this objective threatens resilience within priority countries, undermining JSP 

SO 1.4 efforts to address authoritarianism, the re-emergence of great power competition, and the 

rise of hostile non-state actors. This increases the possibility for malign actors to meddle with 

fragile governments, leverage and exploit resources against the population, and fuel and instigate 

extremism. Failure in this objective also risks CSO’s ability to support JSP SO 3.3 initiatives to 

engage civil society in stabilizing at-risk communities. If CSO programs cannot provide a 

“benefit” to paramilitary, militia or non-state armed actors, though they are frequently part of the 

“locally legitimate authorities” incorporated into peace negotiations and defection programming, 

CSO’s impact on strategic prevention and security sector stabilization could be limited. 

Bureau Objective 3.2: Build and lead coalitions that coordinate conflict prevention and 

stabilization programs, policies, and resources. 

a. Justification and Linkages. 

CSO collaborates with a wide range of partners and institutions on state fragility, preventing 

violent conflict, atrocity early warning, and stabilization in support of NSS Pillar IV (p. 40). 

CSO’s Council on Conflict Prevention and Stabilization (CCPS) and Stabilization Leaders 

Forum (SLF) represent key domestic and international partnerships that enhance burden sharing 

and harmonize strategies in support of JSP SO 3.2. CSO also collaborates with domestic and 

international partners to host conferences, security dialogues, and UN General Assembly events, 

as outlined in JSP SO 3.2 and NSS Pillars III Information Statecraft and IV Leadership in 

Political and Security Bodies. Additionally, CSO seeks dedicated dialogues with the UN, the 

European Union, the World Bank, and regional development banks to enhance coordinated 

approaches and investment in conflict-affected areas (JSP SO 3.2). CSO leads the U.S. 

government’s participation in the seven-member International Atrocity Prevention Working 

Group (IAPWG). At an operational level, CSO engages international donor countries to 

mobilize resources, building on best practices for risk-mitigation, local government support, 

Approved: May 4, 2020 

FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

8 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

accountability, and monitoring. CSO coordinates closely with the Bureau of Global Public 

Affairs and the Global Engagement Center on outreach. 

b. Risk Considerations. 

Without these key reciprocal partnerships, the United States may not be able to achieve the full 

potential of strategic prevention, conflict resolution and security sector stabilization. Absence of 

coordination risks duplication of efforts, programming gaps, and inefficient use of taxpayer 

dollars that can result in increased instability, violence against civilians, and corrupt governance. 

Ultimately, this may result in openings for malign outside influence (JSP SO 3.3). 

Bureau Objective 3.3: Convene and lead working groups in the Department to coordinate 

legislation and policies related to state fragility, conflict prevention, atrocity early warning, 

and stabilization. 

a. Justification and Linkages. 

CSO plays important roles in shaping and implementing U.S. foreign policy relevant to conflict 

prevention and stabilization, in collaboration with USAID and DoD, supporting JSP SO 1.3. 

CSO co-leads with the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources (F), the Department task 

forces to implement the Global Fragility Act of 2019 (GFA) and the SAR. The GFA effort 

requires developing a 10-year Global Fragility Strategy and effectively programming the $200 

million authorized annually for the Prevention and Stabilization Fund, alongside strategic-level 

monitoring and evaluation, and diplomatic efforts. SAR implementation includes monitoring 

and evaluating eleven country-specific SAR annexes. Other CSO-led initiatives include the Elie 

Wiesel Atrocity and Genocide Prevention Act (2018), where CSO serves as the Secretariat for 

the National Security Council-led interagency Atrocity Early Warning Task Force, and 

supporting the 2019 Women, Peace and Security Strategy. 

b. Risk Considerations. 

Implementing the GFA will require effective, coordinated action among Department and 

interagency stakeholders in spite of restrictions imposed by the Coronavirus crisis. Realizing 

this objective may be limited without well-develop and sustained relationships among all actors. 

Approved: May 4, 2020 

FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

9 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

4. Cross-cutting Management Objectives 

Management Objective 1: Recruit and retain a highly trained and diverse workforce 

available for timely worldwide TDYs or deployment, often in rapid response. 

a. Justification and Linkages. 

Maintaining relationships through diplomacy and statecraft is an essential obligation according 

to NSS Pillar III (p. 33). A well-led, trained, and diverse workforce that maintains strong 

relationships with key counterparts ensures the high level of performance, leadership, 

engagement, and accountability needed to execute CSO’s mission, as required by JSP SO 4.3. 

Recruiting highly qualified staff further allows for a broader outreach to recruit, based on 

established relationships. 

a. Risk Considerations. 

Failing to recruit and retain the proper level of highly trained staff, and to develop critical skills, 

would reduce the ability of CSO to support the mission of the Department and implement its 

duties under NSS Pillar III, to preserve peace through strength. 

Management Objective 2: Meet the growing demand for CSO’s advanced analytics and 

programs by hiring necessary staff and enhancing technological capabilities. 

a. Justification and Linkages. 

Departmental and interagency demand for CSO’s products and expertise is increasing, requiring 

additional resources. The Bureau must be fully resourced to provide data-driven approaches and 

strengthen partner governments and civil society to fulfill JSP PG 1.2.3. As JSP SO 4.2 states, 

our dispersed staff require technological tools to work from anywhere at any time. Without 

budget growth for new equipment and software, CSO cannot effectively support the JSP SO 1.4 

requirement to build enduring security partnerships, collectively deter aggression, and help allies 

sustain favorable regional balances, nor can it degrade terrorism threats, as in JSP SO 1.1. 

b. Risk Considerations. 

A lack of funding/resources for technology, such as modern communication tools, IT hardware, 

and technical software, would seriously hinder CSO staff in the effective and timely analysis of 

conflict prevention and stabilization. Without additional funding, the ability to support field 

efforts in CSOs three lines of effort will be eroded and weakened. 

Approved: May 4, 2020 

FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

10