- STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR
COALITION WARFARE  1941-1942**by    Maurice Matloff    and    Edwin M. Snell**
   
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY  UNITED STATES ARMYWASHINGTON, D. C., 1990       
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 53-61477
    First Printed 1980  For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office  Washington D. C. 20402      Foreword
 
This volume is a study of the evolution of American strategy before and      during the first year of American participation in World War II. It is the      story of planning by the War Department during that early and significant      period in which the foundations of the strategy for the conduct of the war      were established. The authors not only present the problems of the Chief      of Staff of the U. S. Army and of his principal plans and operations      officers, but also emphasize joint and combined problems-the      reconciliation of the Army views on strategy with those of the Navy and      the integration of American and British views and their adjustment to the      military policies of other associated powers, notably the Soviet Union.
 
It may seem to the reader that controversy and differences of opinion      are stressed and that agreement and co-operative endeavor are slighted.      Since planners are occupied with unsettled problems, their work      necessarily involves differences of opinion. It is only when all sides of      an issue are forcefully presented and the various solutions thereof      closely scrutinized that the final plan has any validity. The reader must      bear in mind that the differences related herein are those among comrades      in arms who in the end always made the adjustments required of the members      of a team engaged in a common enterprise. The execution of strategic      decisions-the end result of debates, negotiations, and compromises set      forth in the book-is narrated in the combat volumes of this series.
 
Mr. Maurice Matloff and Mr. Edwin M. Snell collaborated in writing this      volume. Mr. Snell was formerly an instructor in English at Harvard      University and Mr. Matloff an instructor in History at Brooklyn College.      Mr. Snell served in the Army and Mr. Matloff in the Army Air Forces during      World War II. Both joined the Operations Division historical project of      the War Department General Staff in 1946. Mr. Matloff is now the Chief,      Strategic Plans Section, Office of the Chief of Military History,      Department of the Army.
 

Washington, D. C.              June 1952

 ORLANDO WARD              Maj. Gen., U. S. A.               Chief of Military History
 
 
vii
**Preface**
 
This volume is a contribution to the study of national planning in the      field of military strategy. National planning in this field extends from      the simple statement of risks and choices to the full analysis of an      immense undertaking. Strategic decisions are rarely made and military      operations are rarely conducted precisely in the terms worked out by the      planning staffs in the national capital. But the planning, which may at      times seem superficial and futile even to the staffs, is the principal      instrument by which political leadership arrives at an accommodation      between the compulsions of politics and the realities of war, exercises      control over military operations, and allocates the means necessary to      support them.
 
This volume is the history of plans affecting the missions and      dispositions of the U. S. Army during the early part of World War II, when      it was quite uncertain how the military      planning of the United States would be brought into keeping with the      requirements of a world-wide war between two coalitions. The volume deals      briefly with the joint war plans of the Army and Navy up to the fall of      1938, when the planners first explicitly took into account the possibility      that the United States might be drawn into a war of this kind. From the      fall of 1938, it follows the story of plans, as they directly concerned      the Army, until the beginning of 1943. From that point in World War II,      conveniently marked by the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, the role      of the Army in strategic planning changed; it will be the subject of      further treatment in this series.
 
The purpose of this volume is to increase and organize the information      available for the study of national strategic      planning. Much of what has been written about the United States in World      War II contains information about strategy. Some of it has been      exceedingly useful in writing this volume. But the information      is generally given in passing, in accounts of great decisions or      particular military operations. Anyone that writes on the subject of      strategic planning itself is. venturing into territory generally familiar      only to a few professional officers, and to them mainly through oral      tradition and their own experience. Most of the choices the authors of      this volume have had to make in research and writing they have therefore      resolved, sometimes reluctantly, in favor of readers in need of organized      information on the subject-specifically staff officers, civil officials,      diplomatic historians, and political scientists.
 
The present volume is a product of co-operative effort. It is an      outgrowth of a study of the history of the Operations Division of the War      Department General Staff, undertaken in 1946 by a group of associated      historians, organized
ix
by Dr. Ray S. Cline. The Operations Division represented the Chief of      Staff of the U. S. Army in national and international planning for      military operations in World War II, and the history of the plans and      operations is interwoven with the history of that division. Dr. Cline      undertook to write the history of the division itself, ,in a volume      published in this series, with the title: Washington Command Post: The      Operations Division. The study of the plans and their execution, continued      and amplified by his former associates, became the basis of the present      work.
 
The text of this volume was drafted in two main sections, one tracing      the conflicts in plans for the employment of U. S. Army forces, from      their appearance to their first resolution in 1942 (Snell), and the other      dealing with the primary effects of the resolution of these conflicts on      plans for carrying the war to the enemy (Matloff). In the process the      authors drew on each other's ideas, basic research, and writing. Each of      the author worked at length on the volume as a whole, one in the course      of original planning and composition (Snell), and the other in the course      of final preparation and revision (Matloff). The text as it stands      represents a joint responsibility.
 
The present volume owes a great deal to Dr. Cline, and to Lt. Col.      Darrie H. Richards, who worked on the project as associate historian for      more than two years. Both contributed in many ways to the general stock of      ideas and information that the authors had in      mind in undertaking this volume and left the authors several fully      documented studies in manuscript. This volume draws on Dr. Cline's studies      of staff work on strategy in the early months of the war, and the authors      have made extensive use of a narrative by Colonel Richards that follows      the history of strategy in the Pacific into midwar.
 
In writing and rewriting the text, the authors had the help of Mrs.      Evelyn Cooper, who assembled and analyzed much of the statistical      information used, and of Mrs. Helen McShane Bailey, who drafted or      reviewed for- the author countless passages and references. Nearly every      page in the volume bears some mark of Mrs. Bailey's wide knowledge and      exact understanding of the records kept by the War Department.
 
Various people helped to smooth the way for the preparation of the      volume. Miss Alice M. Miller initiated the authors and their colleagues,      as she had for years been initiating staff officers, in the mysteries of      interservice and international planning. For      making it possible to use great numbers of important documents at their      convenience, the authors wish to thank Mr. Joseph Russell, Mrs. Mary      Margaret Gansz Greathouse, Mr. Robert Greathouse, and Mrs. Clayde Hillyer      Christian, and Mr. Israel Wice and his assistants. Miss Grace Waibel      made a preliminary survey of records for one part of the volume. Credit      for maintaining a correct text of the manuscript through repeated      revisions is due to a series of secretaries, Mr. William Oswald, Mr.      Martin Chudy, Miss Marcelle Raczkowski, Mrs. Virginia Bosse. and Mrs. Ella      May Ablahat.
x
The authors are greatly obliged to several other members of the Office      of the Chief of Military History to Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Chief      Historian of the Office and the first and most attentive critic of this      volume, who suggested a great mane improvements; to Cols. John M. Kemper,      Allison R. Hartman, and Edward M. Harris, who early interested themselves      in this work; to Cols. Thomas J. Sands and George G. O'Connor. who were      helpful in the final stages of the work; to Dr. Stetson Conn, Acting Chief      Historian in the summer of 1949 during Dr. Greenfield's absence, and Dr.      Louis Morton (Acting Deputy Chief Historian),      who encouraged this work; and to Drs. Richard M. Leighton and Robert W.      Coakley, for their special knowledge. Dr. Conn gave many valuable suggestions      in the final revision of the manuscript.
 
We are also obliged to Miss Mary Ann Bacon, who gave the volume a      thoughtful and watchful final editing. The      pictures were selected by Capt. Kenneth E. Hunter; the outline maps were      prepared by Mr. Wsevolod Aglaimoff. Copy editing was done by Mr. Ronald      Sher, indexing by Mrs. Bailey, and the painstaking      job of final typing for the printer by Mrs. Ablahat and Miss Norma F:.      Faust.
 
The authors are also obliged to those others that read all or parts of      the text in manuscript-to Capt. Tracy B. Kittredge, USNR, and Lt. Grace      Persons Haves, USN, of the Historical Section of the Joint Chiefs of      Staff: to Dr. Wesley F. Craven of Princeton University, co-editor of the      series, THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II; to Professors William I..      Langer and Samuel Eliot Morison of Harvard University; to Brig. Gen.      Frank N. Roberts, Cols. William W. Bessell, Jr., and George A. Lincoln,      and Lt. Col. William H. Balmier; and to other officers that figured, some      of them conspicuously, in the events recounted in the pages that follow.
 

Washington, D. C. 14 December 1951

    MAURICE MATLOFF   EDWIN M. SNELL  
xi
-  **Contents**    ***Chapter   ****** Page*****I. THE WAR          PLANS** 1*The Study of War with Japan* 1*Alternatives in a World War* 4*Allied Operations in the Pacific* 8 **II. GERMAN VICTORIES AND AMERICAN PLANS MAY 1940 JANUARY          1941**    11*Planning for the Worst* 12*The Planners Overruled* 13*British Strategy, and American Planning* 21 **III. BRITISH-AMERICAN PLANS: JANUARY-NOVEMBER          1941** 32*The Terms of Reference* 32*The Washington Conversations* 34*Rainbow: 5* 43*The First Difficulties over Troop Movements* 48*Introduction to Grand Strategy* 51 **IV. THE SHOWDOWN WITH JAPAN: AUGUST -DECEMBER 1941** 63*The Singapore Conversations* 65*Reinforcement of the Philippines* 67*Aid to China versus Reinforcement of the Philippines* 73*Military Collaboration with the British in the Far          East * 75*Reaction to Pearl Harbor* 78*Decision to Establish a Base in Australia* 87 **V. THE FIRST FULL DRESS DEBATE OVER STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT: DECEMBER          1941 JANUARY 1942** 97*Grand Strategy* 99*The Northwest Africa Project* 102*'The Planners Estimates of the Forces Required* 105*The Report of the Shipping Experts* 107*The Relief of British Troops in Iceland and          Ireland* 108*The Northwest Africa Project Considered as a Military          Operation* 111*Reinforcement of the Southwest Pacific* 114 **VI. ARMY DEPLOYMENT AND THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN: DECEMBER 1941-MARCH          1942** 120*Allied Strategy Against Japan* 120*The ABDA Command* 123*Loss of Malaya, Fall of Singapore, and Ground Force          Dispositions* 126*The Decision to Send the 41st Division to          Australia* 128*The Isolation of Java and Air Force Dispositions* 131*Air Commitments in Asia* 138*The Siberia Project* 142 **VII. ARMY DEPLOYMENT IN THE PACIFIC AND GRAND STRATEGY:          JANUARY-MARCH 1942** 147*Army Deployment in the Atlantic: January-February          1942* 147*Deployment Hawaii-Australia: January March 1942* 148*The Question of Additional Commitments* 154*The Eisenhower Studies* 156*Joint Study of Priorities for Deployment* 159*JCS Decision on Deployment Policy* 161*Strategic Deployment in the Pacific* 162*Strategic Responsibility and Command in the          Pacific* 164 **VIII. THE PRINCIPLE OF CONCENTRATION IN          THE BRITISH          ISLES** 174*The Cancellation of Super-Gymnast* 175*The Washington Studies* 177*The Bolero Plan* 190 **IX. PRIOR CLAIMS VERSUS BOLERO: APRIL 1942** 198*The Defense of the Middle East* 198*Anglo-American Collaboration and the Support of          China* 202*The Soviet Lend-Lease Program* 205*The Immediate Reinforcement of the Pacific* 210 **X. DECISIONS IN FAVOR OF A "SECOND FRONT": MAY          1942** 217*The Pacific Theater versus Bolero* 217*The President's Review of Strategy* 221*Deadline in the Pacific* 222*The Role of the United States in the Middle East* 226*The Question of Support for General Stilwell* 227*The Second Soviet Protocol and the Second Front* 229 **XI. FUTURE PLANS AND CURRENT OPERATIONS:          JUNE 1942** 233*The Revival of Gymnast* 234*American Commitments to the Middle East* 244*Consequences of the Battle of Midway* 256 **XII. THE ELIMINATION OF THE ALTERNATIVES: JULY-AUGUST          1942** 266*The Pacific Alternative* 267*The Eastern Front and the Alternatives* 273*The President on the Alternatives* 273*Roundup or Torch: CCS 94* 279*The Decision To Invade French North Africa* 282*The Time and The Place* 284 **XIII. THE INTERPRETATION OF CCS 94: AUGUST 1942** 294*The "Final" Decision on Torch* 294*CCS 94 and the Arcadia Statement of Grand Strategy* 295*The Middle East* 297*The Pacific* 298 **XIV. COUNTING THE COSTS OF TORCH: AUGUST-NOVEMBER          1942** 307*The Order of Priorities for Shipping* 308*Allotment and Preparation of Ground Troops* 313*Provision of Air Units* 318*Effects on Plans for a Cross-Channel Operation* 322 **XV. BRITISH AND AMERICAN PLANS AND SOVIET          EXPECTATIONS** 328*The Caucasus Project* 329*The Persian Gulf Service Command* 336*Air Collaboration in Alaska and Siberia* 339*Soviet Plane Requirements* 346*Conclusion* 348 **XVI. STRATEGIC INVENTORY: DECEMBER 1942** 350*Growth of the U S Army* 350*Expansion of the Army Overseas* 353*Distribution of Aircraft and Shipping*360 **XVII. AFTER TORCH** 363*The War Against Germany* 363*The War Against Japan* 367*British-American World Strategy for 1943* 376*The Future of Planning* 382 **Appendix****A Outline Plan for the Invasion of Western Europe-Marshall          Memorandum   ** 383**B War Department Draft of Instructions for London          Conference** 384**C Timing of TORCH** 386**D Monthly Distribution of Total Army Strength in Continental United          States and Overseas, from November 1941 Through December          1942** 387**E Geographic Distribution of Army Strength in Overseas Theaters-Early-          December 1942** 389**F Shipment of Divisions-1942** 392**G Dead-Weight Tonnage of Vessels under Army Control in Pacific and          Atlantic Areas from November 1941 through December          1942** 396 **BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE AND GUIDE TO FOOTNOTES** 397 **GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS** 400 **GLOSSARY OF CODE NAMES** 405
  -  
  -  
  Illustrations

  Aboard the H M S Prince of Wales during the Atlantic Conference 54Members of the War Department General         Staff and the War Plans Division, November 1941 77Draft Memorandum for the President 89The Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War 110Chief of War Plans Division and His Deputies, January 1942 116War Plans Division, March 1942 167General Marshall and War Department Chiefs 184Memorandum from the President, 6 May 1942 220Churchill at Parachute Troop Demonstration, June 1942 241Alternate Sets of Suggestions, in the President's Handwriting 274The Combined and the U S Joint Chiefs of                 Staff, October 1942 340Maj. Gen T T Handy and Other Planners of the Operations Division 381
  All pictures in this volume are from Department of Defense files

  -  
  Charts

  ***No   ****** Inside back cover***1    U S Army Overseas Deployment, 17 October 19412    Areas of Strategic Responsibility and U S Army Overseas Deployment 2    April 19423    U S Army Overseas Deployment and Theater Boundaries, 31 December 1942  Page created 10 January 2002

   
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