Generic Environmental 

Impact Statement for 

License Renewal of 

Nuclear Plants

Public Comments

Final Report

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

NUREG-1437, Volume 2

Revision 1
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Generic Environmental 

Impact Statement for 

License Renewal of 

Nuclear Plants

Public Comments

Final Report

Manuscript Completed: May 2013

Date Published: June 2013

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

 

NUREG-1437, Volume 2

Revision 1

 iii NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Cover Sheet 

Responsible Agency: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation 

Title: Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants

(NUREG-1437) Volumes 1, 2, and 3, Revision 1 

For additional information or copies of this Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement for 

License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, contact: 

Division of License Renewal 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 

Mail Stop O-11F1 

11555 Rockville Pike 

Rockville, Maryland 20852 

Phone: 1-800-368-5642, extension 1183 

Fax: (301) 415-2002 

Email: LRGEISUpdate@nrc.gov 

Abstract 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations allow for the renewal of commercial 

nuclear power plant operating licenses. To support the license renewal environmental review 

process, the NRC published the Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal 

of Nuclear Plants (GEIS) in 1996. The proposed action considered in the GEIS is the renewal 

of nuclear power plant operating licenses.

Since publication of the GEIS, approximately 40 plant sites (70 reactor units) have applied for 

license renewal and undergone environmental reviews, the results of which were published as 

supplements to the 1996 GEIS. This GEIS revision reviews and reevaluates the issues and 

findings of the 1996 GEIS. Lessons learned and knowledge gained during previous license 

renewal reviews provide a significant source of new information for this assessment. In 

addition, new research, findings, public comments, and other information were considered in 

evaluating the significance of impacts associated with license renewal.

The intent of the GEIS is to determine which issues would result in the same impact at all 

nuclear power plants and which issues could result in different levels of impact at different 

plants and thus require a plant-specific analysis for impact determinations. The GEIS revision 

identifies 78 environmental impact issues for consideration in license renewal environmental 

reviews, 59 of which have been determined to be generic to all plant sites. The GEIS also 

evaluates a full range of alternatives to the proposed action. For most impact areas, the 

proposed action would have impacts that would be similar to or less than impacts of the 

alternatives, in large part because most alternatives would require new power plant 

construction, whereas the proposed action would not.
NUREG-1437, Revision 1 iv 

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement 

This NUREG contains information collection requirements that are subject to the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995 (44 USC 3501 et seq.). These information collections were approved by 

the Office of Management and Budget, approval numbers 3150-0021. 

Public Protection Notification 

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for 

information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a 

currently valid OMB control number.
 v NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Contents 

COVER SHEET/ABSTRACT .......................................................................................... iii 

TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................. v 

LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... xv 

LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ xix 

ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS, AND CHEMICAL NOMENCLATURE ........................ xxvii 

ABBREVIATED POWER PLANT NAMES ...................................................................... xxxv 

UNITS OF MEASURES .................................................................................................. xxxvi 

CONVERSIONS ............................................................................................................. xxxix

SUMMARY ...................................................................................................................... S-1 

 S.1 Purpose and Need for the Proposed Action ................................................... S-3 

 S.2 Development of the Revised Generic Environmental Impact Statement ........ S-4 

 S.3 Impact Definitions and Categories .................................................................. S-6 

 S.4 Affected Environment ..................................................................................... S-7 

 S.5 Impacts from Continued Operations and Refurbishment Activities 

 Associated with License Renewal .................................................................. S-8 

 S.6 Comparison of Alternatives ............................................................................. S-20 

1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1-1 

 1.1 Purpose of the GEIS ....................................................................................... 1-2 

 1.2 Description of the Proposed Action ................................................................ 1-3 

 1.3 Purpose and Need for the Proposed Action ................................................... 1-3 

 1.4 Alternatives to the Proposed Action ................................................................ 1-4 

 1.5 Analytical Approach Used in the GEIS ........................................................... 1-4 

 1.5.1 Objectives ....................................................................................... 1-4 

 1.5.2 Methodology ................................................................................... 1-5 

 1.5.2.1 Defining Environmental Issues ........................................ 1-5 

 1.5.2.2 Collecting Information ...................................................... 1-5 

 1.5.2.3 Determining Significance Levels for Issues ..................... 1-5 

 1.6 Scope of the GEIS Revision ........................................................................... 1-7 

 1.7 Decisions to Be Supported by the GEIS ......................................................... 1-7 

 1.7.1 Changes to Plant Cooling Systems ................................................ 1-9 

 1.7.2 Disposition of Spent Nuclear Fuel .................................................. 1-10 

 1.7.3 Emergency Preparedness .............................................................. 1-13 

 1.7.4 Safeguards and Security ................................................................ 1-15 
Contents 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 vi 

 1.7.5 Need for Power ............................................................................... 1-15 

 1.7.6 Seismicity and Flooding .................................................................. 1-16 

 1.8 Implementation of the Rule ............................................................................. 1-16 

 1.8.1 General Requirements ................................................................... 1-16 

 1.8.2 Applicant’s Environmental Report .................................................. 1-17 

 1.8.3 NRC’s SEIS .................................................................................... 1-17 

 1.8.4 Public Scoping and Public Comments ............................................ 1-18 

 1.8.5 NRC’s Draft SEIS ........................................................................... 1-18 

 1.8.6 NRC’s Final SEIS ........................................................................... 1-18 

 1.9 Public Comments on the Draft GEIS .............................................................. 1-19 

 1.10 Changes from the Draft GEIS ......................................................................... 1-34 

 1.10.1 General Overview Rule-Related Changes ..................................... 1-34 

 1.10.2 Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Climate Change ......................... 1-36 

 1.10.3 Miscellaneous Revisions and Editorial Changes ............................ 1-36 

 1.11 Lessons Learned ............................................................................................ 1-37 

 1.12 New Organization of the GEIS ........................................................................ 1-37 

 1.13 References ..................................................................................................... 1-38 

2 ALTERNATIVES INCLUDING THE PROPOSED ACTION ...................................... 2-1 

 2.1 Proposed Action ............................................................................................. 2-2 

 2.1.1 Plant Operations during the License Renewal Term ...................... 2-2 

 2.1.2 Refurbishment and Other Activities Associated with License 

 Renewal .......................................................................................... 2-4 

 2.1.3 Termination of Nuclear Power Plant Operations and 

 Decommissioning after the License Renewal Term ....................... 2-4 

 2.1.4 Impacts of the Proposed Action ...................................................... 2-6 

 2.2 No-Action Alternative ...................................................................................... 2-17 

 2.3 Replacement Power Alternatives .................................................................... 2-18 

 2.3.1 Fossil Fuel Alternatives .................................................................. 2-20 

 2.3.2 New Nuclear Power Plant Alternatives ........................................... 2-21 

 2.3.3 Renewable Energy Alternatives ..................................................... 2-21 

 2.3.3.1 Hydroelectric Energy ........................................................ 2-23 

 2.3.3.2 Geothermal Energy .......................................................... 2-24 

 2.3.3.3 Wind Energy .................................................................... 2-25 

 2.3.3.4 Biomass Energy ............................................................... 2-26 

 2.3.3.5 Solar Power ..................................................................... 2-28 

 2.3.3.6 Ocean Wave and Current Energy .................................... 2-30 

 2.3.4 Non-Generation Alternatives .......................................................... 2-30 

 2.3.4.1 Purchased Power ............................................................. 2-30 

 2.3.4.2 Conservation and Energy Efficiency Measures ............... 2-32 
Contents 

 vii NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

 2.4 Comparison of Alternatives ............................................................................. 2-33 

 2.5 References ..................................................................................................... 2-40 

3 AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT .................................................................................... 3-1 

 3.1 Description of Nuclear Power Plant Facilities and Operations ....................... 3-1 

 3.1.1 External Appearance and Settings ................................................. 3-1 

 3.1.2 Nuclear Reactor Systems ............................................................... 3-4 

 3.1.3 Cooling Water Systems .................................................................. 3-12 

 3.1.4 Radioactive Waste Management Systems ..................................... 3-18 

 3.1.4.1 Liquid Radioactive Waste ................................................ 3-18 

 3.1.4.2 Gaseous Radioactive Waste ............................................ 3-19 

 3.1.4.3 Solid Radioactive Waste .................................................. 3-20 

 3.1.5 Nonradioactive Waste Management Systems ................................ 3-21 

 3.1.6 Utility and Transportation Infrastructure ......................................... 3-22 

 3.1.6.1 Electricity .......................................................................... 3-22 

 3.1.6.2 Fuel .................................................................................. 3-23 

 3.1.6.3 Water ............................................................................... 3-23 

 3.1.6.4 Transportation Systems ................................................... 3-23 

 3.1.6.5 Power Transmission Systems .......................................... 3-24 

 3.1.7 Nuclear Power Plant Operations and Maintenance ........................ 3-25 

 3.2 Land Use and Visual Resources .................................................................... 3-26 

 3.2.1 Land Use ........................................................................................ 3-26 

 3.2.2 Visual Resources ............................................................................ 3-29 

 3.3 Meteorology, Air Quality, and Noise ............................................................... 3-30 

 3.3.1 Meteorology and Climatology ......................................................... 3-30 

 3.3.2 Air Quality ....................................................................................... 3-35 

 3.3.3 Noise .............................................................................................. 3-48 

 3.4 Geologic Environment .................................................................................... 3-49 

 3.5 Water Resources ............................................................................................ 3-52 

 3.5.1 Surface Water Resources .............................................................. 3-55 

 3.5.1.1 Surface Water Use ........................................................... 3-55 

 3.5.1.2 Surface Water Quality ...................................................... 3-57 

 3.5.1.3 Hydrologic Changes and Flooding ................................... 3-60 

 3.5.2 Groundwater Resources ................................................................. 3-62 

 3.6 Ecological Resources ..................................................................................... 3-63 

 3.6.1 Terrestrial Resources ..................................................................... 3-63 

 3.6.1.1 Upland Vegetation and Habitats ...................................... 3-63 

 3.6.1.2 Floodplain and Wetland Vegetation and Habitats ............ 3-65 

 3.6.1.3 Wildlife ............................................................................. 3-66 

 3.6.2 Aquatic Resources ......................................................................... 3-68 
Contents 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 viii 

 3.6.2.1 Description of Aquatic Resources near Nuclear 

 Power Plants .................................................................... 3-68 

 3.6.2.2 Overview of the Effects of Existing Nuclear Plant 

 Operations on Aquatic Resources ................................... 3-74 

 3.6.3 Special Status Species and Habitats .............................................. 3-76 

 3.6.3.1 Terrestrial Threatened, Endangered, and Protected 

 Species ............................................................................ 3-78 

 3.6.3.2 Aquatic Threatened, Endangered, and Protected 

 Species, Marine Mammals, and Essential Fish 

 Habitat .............................................................................. 3-79 

 3.7 Historic and Cultural Resources ..................................................................... 3-83 

 3.7.1 National Historic Preservation Act and NEPA ................................ 3-83 

 3.7.2 Historic and Cultural Resources ..................................................... 3-85 

 3.8 Socioeconomics .............................................................................................. 3-86 

 3.8.1 Power Plant Employment and Expenditures .................................. 3-87 

 3.8.2 Regional Economic Characteristics ................................................ 3-88 

 3.8.2.1 Rural Economies .............................................................. 3-88 

 3.8.2.2 Semi-Urban Economies ................................................... 3-91 

 3.8.3 Demographic Characteristics ......................................................... 3-93 

 3.8.4 Housing and Community Services ................................................. 3-94 

 3.8.5 Tax Revenues ................................................................................ 3-95 

 3.8.6 Local Transportation ....................................................................... 3-96 

 3.9 Human Health ................................................................................................. 3-97 

 3.9.1 Radiological Exposure and Risk ..................................................... 3-97 

 3.9.1.1 Regulatory Requirements ................................................ 3-97 

 3.9.1.2 Occupational Radiological Exposures ............................. 3-101 

 3.9.1.3 Public Radiological Exposures ......................................... 3-120 

 3.9.1.4 Risk Estimates from Radiation Exposure ......................... 3-135 

 3.9.1.5 Conclusion ....................................................................... 3-136 

 3.9.2 Chemical Hazards .......................................................................... 3-136 

 3.9.3 Microbiological Hazards ................................................................. 3-138 

 3.9.3.1 Background Information on Microorganisms of 

 Concern ........................................................................... 3-139 

 3.9.3.2 Studies of Microorganisms in Cooling Towers ................. 3-140 

 3.9.3.3 Microbiological Hazards to Plant Workers ....................... 3-141 

 3.9.3.4 Microbiological Hazards to the Public .............................. 3-142 

 3.9.4 Electromagnetic Fields ................................................................... 3-143 

 3.9.5 Other Hazards ................................................................................ 3-144 

 3.9.5.1 Occupational Hazards ...................................................... 3-144 

 3.9.5.2 Shock Hazard .................................................................. 3-145 

 3.10 Environmental Justice ..................................................................................... 3-148 
Contents 

 ix NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

 3.11 Waste Management and Pollution Prevention ................................................ 3-151 

 3.11.1 Radioactive Waste .......................................................................... 3-151 

 3.11.1.1 Low-Level Radioactive Waste .......................................... 3-151 

 3.11.1.2 Spent Nuclear Fuel .......................................................... 3-154 

 3.11.2 Hazardous Waste ........................................................................... 3-158 

 3.11.3 Mixed Waste ................................................................................... 3-159 

 3.11.4 Nonradioactive, Nonhazardous Waste ........................................... 3-159 

 3.11.5 Pollution Prevention and Waste Minimization ................................ 3-160 

 3.12 References ..................................................................................................... 3-160 

4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES AND MITIGATING ACTIONS .................... 4-1

 4.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 4-1

 4.1.1 Environmental Consequences of the Proposed Action .................. 4-2

 4.1.2 Environmental Consequences of Continued Operations and 

 Refurbishment Activities during the License Renewal Term .......... 4-3

 4.1.3 Environmental Consequences of the No-Action Alternative ........... 4-4

 4.1.4 Environmental Consequences of Replacement 

 Power Alternatives .......................................................................... 4-4

 4.1.5 Environmental Consequences of Terminating Nuclear 

 Power Plant Operations and Decommissioning ............................. 4-5

 4.2 Land Use and Visual Resources .................................................................... 4-6

 4.2.1 Environmental Consequences of the Proposed Action— 

 Continued Operations and Refurbishment Activities ...................... 4-6

 4.2.1.1 Land Use .......................................................................... 4-6

 4.2.1.2 Visual Resources ............................................................. 4-9

 4.2.2 Environmental Consequences of Alternatives to the Proposed 

 Action.............................................................................................. 4-10

 4.2.2.1 Fossil Energy Alternatives ............................................... 4-11

 4.2.2.2 New Nuclear Alternatives ................................................. 4-11

 4.2.2.3 Renewable Alternatives ................................................... 4-11

 4.3 Air Quality and Noise ...................................................................................... 4-13

 4.3.1 Environmental Consequences of the Proposed Action— 

 Continued Operations and Refurbishment Activities ...................... 4-13

 4.3.1.1 Air Quality ........................................................................ 4-14

 4.3.1.2 Noise ................................................................................ 4-19

 4.3.2 Environmental Consequences of Alternatives to the 

 Proposed Action ............................................................................. 4-20

 4.3.2.1 Fossil Energy Alternatives ............................................... 4-20

 4.3.2.2 New Nuclear Alternatives ................................................. 4-21

 4.3.2.3 Renewable Alternatives ................................................... 4-26
Contents 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 x 

 4.4 Geologic Environment .................................................................................... 4-29

 4.4.1 Environmental Consequences of the Proposed Action— 

 Continued Operations and Refurbishment Activities ...................... 4-29

 4.4.2 Environmental Consequences of Alternatives to the Proposed 

 Action.............................................................................................. 4-30

 4.4.2.1 Fossil Energy Alternatives ............................................... 4-31

 4.4.2.2 New Nuclear Alternatives ................................................. 4-31

 4.4.2.3 Renewable Alternatives ................................................... 4-31

 4.5 Water Resources ............................................................................................ 4-32

 4.5.1 Environmental Consequences of the Proposed Action— 

 Continued Operations and Refurbishment Activities ...................... 4-32

 4.5.1.1 Surface Water Resources ................................................ 4-32 

 4.5.1.2 Groundwater Resources .................................................. 4-44

 4.5.2 Environmental Consequences of Alternatives to the Proposed 

 Action.............................................................................................. 4-54

 4.5.2.1 Fossil Energy Alternatives ............................................... 4-55

 4.5.2.2 New Nuclear Alternatives ................................................. 4-56

 4.5.2.3 Renewable Alternatives ................................................... 4-56

 4.6 Ecological Resources ..................................................................................... 4-57

 4.6.1 Environmental Consequences of the Proposed Action— 

 Continued Operations and Refurbishment ..................................... 4-57

 4.6.1.1 Terrestrial Resources ....................................................... 4-58

 4.6.1.2 Aquatic Resources ........................................................... 4-84

 4.6.1.3 Special Status Species and Habitats ............................... 4-115

 4.6.2 Environmental Consequences of Alternatives to the Proposed 

 Action.............................................................................................. 4-119

 4.6.2.1 Fossil Energy Alternatives ............................................... 4-119

 4.6.2.2 New Nuclear Alternatives ................................................. 4-120

 4.6.2.3 Renewable Alternatives ................................................... 4-121

 4.7 Historic and Cultural Resources ..................................................................... 4-122

 4.7.1 Environmental Consequences of the Proposed Action— 

 Continued Operations and Refurbishment ..................................... 4-122

 4.7.2 Environmental Consequences of Alternatives to the Proposed 

 Action.............................................................................................. 4-124

 4.7.2.1 Fossil Fuel Alternatives .................................................... 4-124

 4.7.2.2 New Nuclear Alternatives ................................................. 4-125 

 4.7.2.3 Renewable Alternatives ................................................... 4-125

 4.8 Socioeconomics .............................................................................................. 4-126

 4.8.1 Environmental Consequences of the Proposed Action— 

 Continued Operations and Refurbishment Activities ...................... 4-126

 4.8.1.1 Employment and Income, Recreation, and Tourism ........ 4-127
Contents 

 xi NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

 4.8.1.2 Tax Revenues .................................................................. 4-128

 4.8.1.3 Community Services and Education ................................ 4-129

 4.8.1.4 Population and Housing ................................................... 4-130

 4.8.1.5 Transportation .................................................................. 4-131

 4.8.2 Environmental Consequences of Alternatives to the Proposed 

 Action.............................................................................................. 4-132

 4.8.2.1 Fossil Fuel Alternatives .................................................... 4-133

 4.8.2.2 New Nuclear Alternatives ................................................. 4-133

 4.8.2.3 Renewable Alternatives ................................................... 4-134

 4.9 Human Health ................................................................................................. 4-135

 4.9.1 Environmental Consequences of the Proposed Action— 

 Continued Operations and Refurbishment Activities ...................... 4-135

 4.9.1.1 Environmental Consequences of Normal Operating 

 Conditions ........................................................................ 4-135

 4.9.1.2 Environmental Consequences of Postulated 

 Accidents ......................................................................... 4-158

 4.9.2 Environmental Consequences of Alternatives to the Proposed 

 Action.............................................................................................. 4-162

 4.9.2.1 Fossil Energy Alternatives ............................................... 4-163

 4.9.2.2 New Nuclear Alternatives ................................................. 4-164

 4.9.2.3 Renewable Alternatives ................................................... 4-165

 4.10 Environmental Justice ..................................................................................... 4-167

 4.10.1 Environmental Consequences of the Proposed Action— 

 Continued Operations and Refurbishment Activities ...................... 4-167

 4.10.2 Environmental Consequences of Alternatives to the Proposed 

 Action.............................................................................................. 4-169

 4.11 Waste Management and Pollution Prevention ................................................ 4-170

 4.11.1 Environmental Consequences of the Proposed Action— 

 Continued Operations and Refurbishment Activities ...................... 4-170

 4.11.1.1 Low-Level Radioactive Waste Storage and Disposal ...... 4-171

 4.11.1.2 Onsite Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel ............................. 4-172

 4.11.1.3 Offsite Radiological Impacts of Spent Nuclear Fuel 

 and High-Level Waste Disposal ....................................... 4-175

 4.11.1.4 Mixed Waste Storage and Disposal ................................. 4-178

 4.11.1.5 Nonradioactive Waste Storage and Disposal .................. 4-179

 4.11.2 Environmental Consequences of Alternatives to the Proposed 

 Action.............................................................................................. 4-179

 4.11.2.1 Fossil Fuel Alternatives .................................................... 4-180

 4.11.2.2 New Nuclear Alternatives ................................................. 4-180

 4.11.2.3 Renewable Alternatives ................................................... 4-181

 4.12 Impacts Common to All Alternatives ............................................................... 4-182
Contents 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 xii 

 4.12.1 Environmental Consequences of Fuel Cycles ................................ 4-183

 4.12.1.1 Uranium Fuel Cycle ......................................................... 4-183

 4.12.1.2 Replacement Power Alternative Fuel Cycles ................... 4-197

 4.12.2 Environmental Consequences of Terminating Power 

 Plant Operations and Decommissioning ........................................ 4-200

 4.12.2.1 Termination of Operations and Decommissioning 

 of Existing Nuclear Power Plants ..................................... 4-201

 4.12.2.2 Termination of Power Plant Operations and 

 Decommissioning of Replacement Power Plants ............ 4-224

 4.12.3 Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Climate Change ......................... 4-229

 4.12.3.1 Greenhouse Gas Emissions ............................................ 4-229

 4.12.3.2 Climate Change Impacts .................................................. 4-237

 4.13 Cumulative Impacts of the Proposed Action ................................................... 4-243

 4.13.1 Air Quality ....................................................................................... 4-245

 4.13.2 Noise .............................................................................................. 4-245

 4.13.3 Geology and Soils .......................................................................... 4-245

 4.13.4 Surface Water Resources .............................................................. 4-245

 4.13.5 Groundwater Resources ................................................................. 4-246

 4.13.6 Ecological Resources ..................................................................... 4-246

 4.13.7 Historic and Cultural Resources ..................................................... 4-247

 4.13.8 Socioeconomics ............................................................................. 4-247

 4.13.9 Human Health ................................................................................. 4-248

 4.13.10 Environmental Justice .................................................................... 4-248

 4.13.11 Waste Management and Pollution Prevention ............................... 4-248

 4.13.12 Global Climate Change .................................................................. 4-249

 4.14 Resource Commitments Associated with the Proposed Action ...................... 4-249

 4.14.1 Unavoidable Adverse Environmental Impacts ................................ 4-249

 4.14.2 Relationship between Short-Term Use of the Environment and 

 Long-Term Productivity .................................................................. 4-251

 4.14.3 Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitment of Resources ............... 4-252

 4.15 References ..................................................................................................... 4-254

5 LIST OF PREPARES ................................................................................................ 5-1 

6 DISTRIBUTION LIST ................................................................................................ 6-1 

7 GLOSSARY .............................................................................................................. 7-1 
Contents 

 xiii NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

APPENDIX A COMMENTS RECEIVED ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW .......... A-1 

APPENDIX B COMPARISON OF ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND FINDINGS IN 

 THIS GEIS REVISION TO THE ISSUES AND FINDINGS IN TABLE 

 B-1 OF 10 CFR PART 51 ........................................................................ B-1 

APPENDIX C GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND ENVIRONMENTAL SETTINGS 

OF DOMESTIC NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS ........................................ C-1

APPENDIX D TECHNICAL SUPPORT FOR GEIS ANALYSES .................................... D-1 

APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF POSTULATED ACCIDENTS .............. E-1 

APPENDIX F LAWS, REGUATIONS, AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS ....................... F-1 

 xv NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Figures

3.1-1 Operating Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States ................. 3-5 

3.1-2 Pressurized Water Reactor .............................................................................. 3-11 

3.1-3 Boiling Water Reactor ...................................................................................... 3-12 

3.1-4 Schematic Diagrams of Nuclear Power Plant Cooling Systems ...................... 3-16 

3.3-1 Distribution of Tornado Strikes with Intensities of F2 or More over the 

 Contiguous United States by One Degree of Latitude and Longitude 

 Boxes ............................................................................................................... 3-33 

3.3-2 Expected Maximum Tornado Wind Speed with a Probability of One in 

 100,000 of Occurring over the Contiguous United States by Two Degrees 

 of Latitude and Longitude Boxes ..................................................................... 3-34 

3.3-3 Locations of Operating Nuclear Plants Relative to EPA-Designated 

 8-Hour Ozone Nonattainment and Maintenance Areas, as of 

 August 30, 2011............................................................................................... 3-38 

3.3-4 Locations of Operating Nuclear Plants Relative to EPA-Designated PM10 

 Nonattainment and Maintenance Areas, as of August 30, 2011 ..................... 3-39 

3.3-5 Locations of Operating Nuclear Plants Relative to EPA-Designated PM2.5 

 Nonattainment and Maintenance Areas, as of August 30, 2011 ..................... 3-40 

3.3-6 Locations of Operating Nuclear Plants Relative to EPA-Designated SO2 

 Nonattainment and Maintenance Areas, as of August 30, 2011 ..................... 3-41 

3.3-7 Locations of Operating Nuclear Plants Relative to EPA-Designated NO2 

 Nonattainment and Maintenance Areas, as of August 30, 2011 ..................... 3-42 

3.3-8 Locations of Operating Nuclear Plants Relative to EPA-Designated 

 CO Nonattainment and Maintenance Areas, as of August 30, 2011 ............... 3-43 

3.3-9 Locations of Operating Nuclear Plants Relative to EPA-Designated 

 Pb Nonattainment and Maintenance Areas, as of August 30, 2011 ................ 3-44 
Figures 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 xvi 

3.9-1 Average, Median, and Extreme Values of the Annual Collective Dose per 

 Reactor from 1992 to 2005 .............................................................................. 3-107 

3.9-2 Collective Dose Distribution for All Commercial U.S. Reactors by Dose 

 Range for 2001 through 2005 .......................................................................... 3-120 

3.11-1 Typical Dry Cask Storage Systems ................................................................. 3-156 

3.11-2 Locations of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Licensed 

 by the NRC ...................................................................................................... 3-157 

D.2-1 Average Annual Maximum Temperatures over the Continental 

 United States ................................................................................................... D-3

D.2-2 Average Annual Minimum Temperatures over the Continental 

 United States ................................................................................................... D-4

D.2-3 Average Annual Precipitation over the Continental United States ................... D-5

D.2-4 Percent of Average Monthly Precipitation over the Past 5 Years vs. the 

 Past 30 Years .................................................................................................. D-6

D.5-1 Level I Ecoregions of the United States ........................................................... D-14

D.10-1 Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle Coal Power Plant with 

 GE Gasifier without CO2 Capture .......................................................................... D-45

D.10-2 IGCC Coal Power Plant with GE Gasifier with CO2 Capture ........................... D-46

D.10-3 IGCC Coal Power Plant with Shell Gasifier without CO2 Capture ................... D-47

D.10-4 IGCC Coal Power Plant with Shell Gasifier with CO2 Capture ........................ D-48

D.10-5 IGCC Coal Power Plant with Conoco-Phillips Gasifier without CO2 

 Capture ............................................................................................................ D-49

D.10-6 IGCC Coal Power Plant with Conoco-Phillips Gasifier with CO2 Capture ....... D-50

D.10-7 Subcritical Pulverized Coal Power Plant without CO2 Capture ........................ D-51

D.10-8 Subcritical Pulverized Coal Power Plant with CO2 Capture ............................. D-52 
Figures 

 xvii NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

D.10-9 Supercritical Pulverized Coal Power Plant without CO2 Capture .................... D-53

D.10-10 Supercritical Pulverized Coal Power Plant with CO2 Capture ......................... D-54

D.10-11 Natural Gas IGCC Power Plant without CO2 Capture ..................................... D-55

D.10-12 Natural Gas IGCC Power Plant with CO2 Capture .......................................... D-56

D.10-13 Geothermal Hydrothermal Flashed Steam Power Plant Schematic ................ D-57

D.10-14 Geothermal Hydrothermal Binary Power Plant Schematic .............................. D-58

D.10-15 Geothermal Hot Dry Rock Power Plant Schematic ......................................... D-59

D.10-16 Geothermal Resources in the 48 Contiguous United States ........................... D-60

D.10-17 Wind Resources in Onshore and Offshore Areas of the 48 Contiguous 

 United States ................................................................................................... D-61

D.10-18 Biomass Resources in the 48 Contiguous United States ................................ D-62

D.10-19 Direct-Fire Biomass Power Plant Schematic ................................................... D-63

D.10-20 Biomass-Coal Co-Fire Power Plant Schematic ............................................... D-64

D.10-21 Biomass Gasification Power Plant Schematic ................................................. D-65

D.10-22 Landfills Currently Enrolled in and Candidate Landfills for Landfill 

 Gas-to-Energy Programs ................................................................................. D-66

D.10-23 Solar Thermal Power Trough Power Plant Schematic .................................... D-67

D.10-24 Solar Photovoltaic Fixed Flat Plate Power Plant Schematic ............................ D-68

D.10-25 Solar Photovoltaic Flat Plate with Concentrating Mirror Power Plant 

 Schematic ........................................................................................................ D-68

D.10-26 Solar Radiation Intensity in the 48 Contiguous United States ......................... D-69 

 xix NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Tables 

2.1-1 Summary of Impacts Associated with License Renewal under the 

 Proposed Action .............................................................................................. 2-6 

2.4-1 Environmental Impacts of Construction under the Proposed Action 

 and Alternatives ............................................................................................... 2-34 

2.4-2 Environmental Impacts of Operations under the Proposed Action 

 and Alternatives ............................................................................................... 2-35 

2.4-3 Impacts of Postulated Accidents under the Proposed Action and 

 Alternatives ...................................................................................................... 2-36 

2.4-4 Impacts of Termination of Nuclear Power Plant Operations and 

 Decommissioning under the Proposed Action and Alternatives ...................... 2-37 

2.4-5 Impacts of the Fuel Cycle under the Proposed Action and Alternatives .......... 2-38 

3.1-1 Characteristics of Operating U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants ............ 3-6 

3.1-2 Types of Cooling Systems Used at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power 

 Plants ............................................................................................................... 3-13 

3.2-1 Land Cover within a 5-Mile Radius of U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power 

 Plants ............................................................................................................... 3-28 

3.3-1 Fujita Tornado Intensity Scale ......................................................................... 3-32 

3.3-2 National Ambient Air Quality Standards .......................................................... 3-37 

3.5-1 Overall Condenser Cooling Water Flow Rate and Consumptive Water 

 Loss Rate per 1,000 MWe ............................................................................... 3-55 

3.6-1 Factors That Influence the Impacts of Nuclear Power Plant Operation on 

 Aquatic Resources ........................................................................................... 3-76 

3.6-2 Number of Endangered Species Act-Listed Species That Could Occur 

 near Operating Nuclear Power Plants ............................................................. 3-78 
Tables 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 xx 

3.6-3 Operating Nuclear Power Plants for Which Essential Fish Habitat May 

 Be a Consideration .......................................................................................... 3-82 

3.8-1 State Employment, Expenditures, and Tax Revenues at 11 Nuclear 

 Plants from 2003 through 2006 ....................................................................... 3-87 

3.8-2 Plant and Regional Employment and Earnings in Rural Locations ................. 3-89 

3.8-3 Local Economic Impacts of Plant Operations in Rural Locations .................... 3-90 

3.8-4 State Economic Impacts of Plant Operations in Rural Locations .................... 3-90 

3.8-5 Plant and Regional Employment and Earnings in Semi-Urban Locations ....... 3-92 

3.8-6 Local Economic Impacts of Plant Operations in Semi-Urban Locations .......... 3-92 

3.8-7 State Economic Impacts of Plant Operations in Semi-Urban Locations .......... 3-93 

3.8-8 Population Classification of Regions around Selected Nuclear Power 

 Plants ............................................................................................................... 3-94 

3.8-9 State and Local Tax Revenues Generated at Eight Nuclear Power 

 Plants ............................................................................................................... 3-96 

3.9-1 Occupational Dose Limits for Adults Established by 10 CFR Part 20 ............. 3-98 

3.9-2 Design Objectives and Annual Standards on Doses to the General 

 Public from Nuclear Power Plants ................................................................... 3-100 

3.9-3 Occupational Whole-Body Dose Data at U.S. Commercial Nuclear 

 Power Plants.................................................................................................... 3-102 

3.9-4 Annual Average Occupational Dose for U.S. Commercial Nuclear 

 Power Plants.................................................................................................... 3-103 

3.9-5 Collective and Individual Worker Doses at BWRs from 2003 through 2005 .... 3-104 

3.9-6 Collective and Individual Worker Doses at PWRs from 2003 through 2005 .... 3-105 

3.9-7 Annual Collective Dose and Annual Occupational Dose for Different 

 Commercial Nuclear Power Plants from 1993 through 2005 ........................... 3-108 
Tables 

 xxi NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

3.9-8 Annual Collective Dose for Commercial Nuclear Power Plants from 

 1993 through 2005 .......................................................................................... 3-111 

3.9-9 Annual Average Measurable Occupational Doses at Commercial 

 Nuclear Power Plant Sites from 1993 through 2005 ........................................ 3-114 

3.9-10 Annual Collective Occupational Dose per Plant for Commercial Nuclear 

 Power Plants.................................................................................................... 3-117 

3.9-11 Annual Individual Occupational Dose for Commercial Nuclear Power 

 Plants ............................................................................................................... 3-118 

3.9-12 Number of Workers at BWRs and PWRs Who Received Whole-Body 

 Doses within Specified Ranges during 2005 ................................................... 3-119 

3.9-13 Collective and Average CEDE for Commercial U.S. Nuclear Power Plant 

 Sites in 2005 .................................................................................................... 3-121 

3.9-14 Doses from Gaseous Effluent Releases for 2004 through 2006 ..................... 3-126 

3.9-15 Dose from Liquid Effluent Releases for 2004 through 2006 ............................ 3-128 

3.9-16 Total Effective Dose Equivalent to the Maximally Exposed Individual 

 for 2004 through 2006 ..................................................................................... 3-129 

3.9-17 Average Annual Effective Dose Equivalent of Ionizing Radiation to a 

 Member of the U.S. Population for 2006 ......................................................... 3-130 

3.9-18 Inadvertent Releases of Radioactive Liquids at Nuclear Power Plants ........... 3-131 

3.9-19 Dose from Inadvertent Releases of Radioactive Liquids at Nuclear Power 

 Plants ............................................................................................................... 3-133 

3.9-20 Nominal Probability Coefficients Used in ICRP ............................................... 3-135 

3.9-21 Number and Rate of Fatal Occupational Injuries by Industry Sector 

 in 2005 ............................................................................................................. 3-146 

3.9-22 Employment and Incidence Rate of Nonfatal Occupational Injuries and 

 Illnesses in Different Utilities in 2005 ............................................................... 3-147 
Tables 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 xxii 

3.9-23 Number and Rate of Fatal Occupational Injuries for Selected Occupations 

 in 2005 ............................................................................................................. 3-147 

3.11-1 Solid Low-Level Radioactive Waste Shipped Offsite per Reactor from 

 10 Power Plant Sites in 2006 ........................................................................... 3-155 

4.3-1 Projected Air Quality Impacts for Selected Power Production 

 Technologies Burning Various Ranks of Coal ................................................. 4-22

4.3-2 Performance and Cost Data for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Power Plants That Are 

 Likely Alternatives to Retired Nuclear Reactors .............................................. 4-24

4.5-1 Raw Water Usage Estimates for Fossil Fuel Electric Power Technologies ..... 4-55

4.6-1 Estimated Radiation Dose Rates to Terrestrial Ecological Receptors 

 from Radionuclides Measured in Water, Sediment, and Soils at 

 U.S. Nuclear Power Plants .............................................................................. 4-64

4.6-2 Contaminants Evaluated in Cooling Systems at Selected Power Plants ......... 4-66

4.6-3 Estimated Annual Bird Collision Mortality in the United States ........................ 4-71

4.6-4 Fish Species Commonly Impinged or Entrained at Power Plants ................... 4-86

4.6-5 Estimated Radiation Dose Rates to Aquatic Animals from Radionuclides 

 Measured in Water and Sediments at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants .................. 4-107

4.9-1 Additional Collective Occupational Dose for Different Actions under 

 Typical and Conservative Scenarios during the License Renewal Term ......... 4-137

4.9-2 Radioactive Effluent Releases for Three Nuclear Power Plants That 

 Recently Replaced Steam Generators ............................................................ 4-142

4.9-3 Dose to the Maximally Exposed Individual from Gaseous and Liquid 

 Effluent Releases for Three Nuclear Power Plants That Recently Replaced 

 Steam Generators ........................................................................................... 4-143

4.9-4 Magnetic Fields at Different Distances from Household Appliances ............... 4-155

4.9-5 Summary of Issues Covered in Appendix E .................................................... 4-161 
Tables 

 xxiii NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

4.12-1 Table S-3 Taken from 10 CFR 51.51 on Uranium Fuel Cycle 

 Environmental Data ......................................................................................... 4-186

4.12-2 Table S-4 Taken from 10 CFR 51.52 on the Environmental Impact of 

 Transporting Fuel and Waste to and from One Light-Water-Cooled 

 Nuclear Power Reactor .................................................................................... 4-191

4.12-3 Population Doses from Uranium Fuel Cycle Facilities Normalized to 

 One Reference Reactor Year .......................................................................... 4-195 

4.12-4 Nuclear Greenhouse Gas Emissions Compared to Coal ................................ 4-232

4.12-5 Nuclear Greenhouse Gas Emissions Compared to Natural Gas ..................... 4-233

4.12-6 Nuclear Greenhouse Gas Emissions Compared to 

 Renewable Energy Sources ............................................................................ 4-234

A-1 Individuals Providing Comments on the Draft Revised GEIS .......................... A-4

B-1 Environmental Issues and Findings in This GEIS Revision Compared 

 to the Issues and Findings in Table B-1 of 10 CFR Part 51 ............................ B-2

D.2-1 National Ambient Air Quality Standards .......................................................... D-8

D.5-1 Level I Ecoregions and Corresponding Level III Ecoregions That Occur 

 in the Vicinity of U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants ................................ D-12 

D.5-2 Ecoregions in the Vicinity of Operating Nuclear Power Plants ........................ D-15 

D.5-3 Percent of Area Occupied by Wetland and Deepwater Habitats Within 

 5 Miles of Operating Nuclear Power Plants ..................................................... D-19 

D.7-1 Definition of Local Areas and Regions at 11 Nuclear Plants ........................... D-25 

D.8-1 Quality Factors and Absorbed Dose Equivalencies ......................................... D-32 

D.8-2 Organ Dose Weighting Factors ....................................................................... D-33 

D.8-3 Nominal Probability Coefficients for Stochastic Effects ................................... D-34 
Tables 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 xxiv 

D.8-4 Estimates of Lifetime Attributable Risk of Incidence and Mortality for All 

 Solid Cancers and for Leukemia in the BEIR VII Report ................................. D-36 

D.8-5 Comparison of BEIR VII Lifetime Cancer Mortality Estimates with Those 

 from Other Reports .......................................................................................... D-37

E-1 PWR Internal Event Comparison ..................................................................... E-12

E-2 BWR Internal Event Comparison ..................................................................... E-13

E-3 Comparisons with Other Risk Information ....................................................... E-14 

E-4 PWR Internal, Fire, and Seismic Event CDF Comparison ............................... E-18

E-5 BWR Internal, Fire, and Seismic Event CDF Comparison ............................... E-19

E-6 NUREG-1150 and NUREG/CR-5305 Fire and Seismic CDFs ........................ E-19

E-7 Catawba and McGuire Results for Internal and External Events ..................... E-21

E-8 Impacts of Accidents Caused by Fire Events .................................................. E-22

E-9 Impacts of Accidents Caused by Fire Events .................................................. E-22

E-10 Impacts of Accidents Caused by Fire Events .................................................. E-23

E-11 Impacts of Accidents Caused by Seismic Events ............................................ E-23

E-12 NUREG-0773 and NUREG/CR-6295 Large Source Terms ............................ E-25

E-13 NUREG-0773 and NUREG/CR-6295 Large Source Terms ............................ E-26

E-14 Changes in LERF for Extended Power Uprates >10 Percent .......................... E-28

E-15 LOCA Consequences as a Function of Fuel Burnup ....................................... E-30 

E-16 Airborne Impacts of Low Power and Shutdown Accidents .............................. E-33

E-17 Airborne Impacts of Low Power and Shutdown Accidents .............................. E-33

E-18 Impacts of Accidents at SFPs from NUREG-1738 .......................................... E-37 
Tables 

 xxv NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

E-19 Summary of Conclusions ................................................................................. E-47

F.6-1 State Environmental Requirements ................................................................. F-16 

F.6-2 Federal, State, and Local Permits and Other Requirements ........................... F-19 

 xxvii NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Chemical Nomenclature 

ABWR advanced boiling water reactor 

AC alternating current 

ACRS Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards 

ACS American Cancer Society 

ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 

AEA Atomic Energy Act 

AEC U.S. Atomic Energy Commission 

AGNIR Advisory Group on Non-ionizing Radiation 

AIRFA American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 

ALARA as low as is reasonably achievable 

ALI annual limit on intake 

APE Area of Potential Effect 

ALWR advanced light water reactor 

ASLB Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 

ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers 

AWEA American Wind Energy Association 

BEIR Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (National Research Council 

Committee) 

BLM U.S. Bureau of Land Management 

BLS U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 

BMPs best management practices 

BPA Bonneville Power Administration 

BWR boiling water reactor 

BOEMRE Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement 

CAA Clean Air Act 

CADHS California Department of Health Services 

CCS carbon capture and storage 

CCW coal combustion waste 

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

CDF core damage frequency 

CdTe cadmium telluride 

CEC California Energy Commission 

CEDE committed effective dose equivalent 
Notation 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 xxviii 

CEG Constellation Energy Group 

CEQ Council on Environmental Quality 

CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 

CF capacity factor 

CFR Code of Federal Regulations 

CGEC California Geothermal Energy Collaborative 

CH4 methane 

CHP combined heat and power 

CIGS copper-indium-gallium-selenide 

CLB current licensing basis 

CO carbon monoxide 

CO2 carbon dioxide 

COL combined operating license 

CSP concentrating solar power 

CWA Clean Water Act 

CZMA Coastal Zone Management Act 

DC direct current 

DDREF dose and dose rate effectiveness factor 

DNC Dominion Nuclear Connecticut 

DNI direct normal insolation 

DOD U.S. Department of Defense 

DOE U.S. Department of Energy 

DOL U.S. Department of Labor 

DSM demand-side management 

EA environmental assessment 

EAB exclusion area boundary 

ECRR European Committee on Radiation Risk 

EEI Edison Electric Institute 

EERE Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy 

EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone 

EF enhanced Fujita (scale) 

EFH essential fish habitat 

EGS engineered geothermal systems 

EI exposure index 

EIA Energy Information Administration 

EIML Environmental Incorporated Midwest Laboratory 

EIS environmental impact statement 

EJ environmental justice 

ELF-EMF extremely low frequency-electromagnetic field 
Notation 

 xxix NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

EMF electromagnetic field 

EMF-RAPID Electric and Magnetic Fields Research and Public Information 

Dissemination (Program) 

EP emergency planning 

EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

EPAct Energy Policy Act of 2005 

EPCRA Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 

EPRI Electric Power Research Institute 

ER environmental report 

ERCOT Electric Reliability Council of Texas 

ERO Electric Reliability Organization 

ESA Endangered Species Act 

ESP early site permit 

Exelon Exelon Generating Company LLC 

F Fujita (scale) 

FAA Federal Aviation Administration 

FCC Federal Communications Commission 

FDOH Florida Department of Health 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 

FES final environmental statement 

FGD flue gas desulfurization 

FICN Federal Interagency Committee on Noise 

FIFRA Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 

FPL Florida Power & Light Company 

FR Federal Register 

FRCC Florida Reliability Coordinating Council 

FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report 

FS U.S. Forest Service 

GALL Generic Aging Lessons Learned 

GAO U.S. General Accounting Office (now U.S. Government Accountability 

Office) 

GCRP U.S. Global Change Research Program 

GDC General Design Criterion 

GEA Geothermal Energy Association 

GEIS generic environmental impact statement 

GHG greenhouse gas 

GIS geographic information system 

GNEP Global Nuclear Energy Partnership 
Notation 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 xxx 

GSMFC Gulf States Marine Fisheries Commission 

GTCC greater than Class C 

HAP hazardous air pollutant 

HAPC habitat area of particular concern 

HAWT horizontal axis wind turbine 

HCCP Harvard Center for Cancer Prevention 

HDR hot dry rock 

HFC hydrofluorocarbon 

HCFC hydrochlorofluorocarbon 

HHV higher heating value 

HLW high-level (radioactive) waste 

HVAC heating, ventilation, and air conditioning 

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 

IARC International Agency for Research on Cancer 

ICM Interim Compensatory Measure 

ICRP International Commission on Radiological Protection 

IDPH Illinois Department of Public Health 

IDNR Idaho Department of Natural Resources 

IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers 

IGCC integrated gasification combined cycle 

IMP Indiana Michigan Power 

INIRC International Non-Ionizing Radiation Commission 

IPE Individual Plant Examination 

IPEEE Individual Plant Examination of External Events 

IRPA International Radiation Protection Association 

ISFSI independent spent fuel storage installation 

ISI in-service inspection 

IWSA Integrated Waste Services Association 

LERF large early release frequency 

LET linear energy transfer 

LFG landfill gas 

LLAP Legionella-like amoebal pathogen 

LLD lower limit of detection 

LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

LLW low-level (radioactive) waste 

LLRWPA Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act 

LLTF Lessons Learned Task Force 

LLWPAA Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act Amendments 
Notation 

 xxxi NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

LOA letter of authorization 

LOEL lowest observed effects level 

LWR light water reactor 

MACCS MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System 

MACT maximum achievable control technology 

MCAQD Maricopa County Air Quality Department 

MCL maximum contaminant level 

MEI maximally exposed individual 

MMPA Marine Mammal Protection Act 

MMS Minerals Management Service 

MSFCMA Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act 

MSW municipal solid waste 

MTBE methyl tertiary butyl ether 

NAAQS National Ambient Air Quality Standards 

NaCl sodium chloride (salt) 

NAICS North American Industry Classification System 

NAGPRA Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act 

NaNO3 sodium nitrate 

NAS National Academy of Sciences 

National Register National Register of Historic Places 

NCDC National Climatic Data Center 

NCRP National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements 

NEI Nuclear Energy Institute 

NEPA National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 

NERC North American Electric Reliability Corporation 

NESC National Electrical Safety Code 

NETL National Energy Technology Laboratory 

NGCC natural gas combined cycle 

NGL natural gas liquids 

NHPA National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 

(NH4)SO4 ammonium sulfate 

NIEHS National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences 

NIH National Institutes of Health 

NJDEP New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 

NMC Nuclear Management Company 

NMFS National Marine Fisheries Service 

NO nitrogen oxide 

N2O nitrous oxide 

NO2 nitrogen dioxide 
Notation 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 xxxii 

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

NORM naturally occurring radioactive material 

NOS National Oceanic Service 

NOx nitrogen oxides 

NPCC Northeast Power Coordinating Council 

NPDES National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 

NPP nuclear power plant 

NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

NREL National Renewable Energy Laboratory 

NRPB National Radiological Protection Board 

NSPS New Source Performance Standards 

NWI National Waste Initiative; National Wetland Inventory 

NWPA National Waste Policy Act 

NYSDEC New York State Department of Environmental Conservation 

NYSDOL New York State Department of Labor 

O3 ozone 

OCS Outer Continental Shelf 

ODCM Offsite Dose Calculation Manual 

OPPD Omaha Public Power District 

OTA Office of Technology Assessment 

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration 

PAH polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon 

PARS Publicly Available Record System 

Pb lead 

PC pulverized coal 

PCB polychlorinated biphenyl 

PDR Public Document Room 

PEIS programmatic environmental impact statement 

PFC perfluorocarbon 

PI performance indicator 

PILOT payments in lieu of tax 

PM particulate matter 

PM2.5 particulate matter with a mean aerodynamic diameter of 2.5 μm or less 

PM10 particulate matter with a mean aerodynamic diameter of 10 μm or less 

POTW publicly owned treatment works 

PPE personal protective equipment 

PRA probabilistic risk assessment 

PSD prevention of significant deterioration 

PTC production tax credit 
Notation 

 xxxiii NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

PURPA Public Utility Regulatory Act of 1978 

PV photovoltaic 

PVC photovoltaic cell 

PWR pressurized water reactor 

RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 

RD&D research, development, and demonstration 

RDF refuse-derived fuel 

REMP Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program 

RER radiological effluent release 

RERR radiological effluent release report 

RES Renewable Energy Standard 

RFC Reliability First Corporation 

ROP Reactor Oversight Program 

ROW right-of-way 

RPS Renewable Portfolio Standards 

RNA ribonucleic acid 

RRC Regional Reliability Council 

RRY reference reactor year 

SAAQS State Ambient Air Quality Standards 

SAMA severe accident mitigation alternative 

SAMDA severe accident mitigation design alternative 

SCE Southern California Edison 

SCR selective catalytic reduction 

SDWA Safe Drinking Water Act 

SEIS supplemental environmental impact statement 

SER safety evaluation report 

SFP spent fuel pool 

SHPO State Historic Preservation Office or Officer 

SIP State implementation plan 

SMITTR surveillance, monitoring, inspection, testing, trending, and recordkeeping 

SNYPSC State of New York Public Service Commission 

SO2 sulfur dioxide 

SOARCA state-of-the-art reactor consequence analysis 

SPAR standardized plant analysis risk 

SPDES State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 

SPP Southwest Power Pool 

SRM Staff Requirements Memorandum 

SSCs systems, structures, and components 
Notation 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 xxxiv 

Stat. Statutes at Large 

STG steam turbine generator 

TCEQ Texas Commission on Environmental Quality 

TDS total dissolved solids 

TEDE total effective dose equivalent 

TESS threatened and endangered species system 

THPO Tribal Historic Preservation Officer 

TLD thermoluminescence dosimeter 

TSCA Toxic Substances Control Act 

TSS total suspended solids 

TTU Texas Tech University 

TVA Tennessee Valley Authority 

TXU TXU Generation Company 

UCB upper confidence bound 

UCS Union of Concerned Scientists 

UF6 uranium hexafluoride 

UNSCEAR United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation 

UO2 uranium dioxide 

U3O8 triuranium octaoxide 

USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

USC United States Code 

USCB U.S. Census Bureau 

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture 

USFWS U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 

USGS U.S. Geological Survey 

VOC volatile organic compound 

WCNOC Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation 

WCS Waste Control Specialists LLC 

WEC wave energy capture 

WGA Western Governors’ Association 

WHO World Health Organization 
Notation 

 xxxv NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Shortened Nuclear Power Plant Names Used in This Report 

Arkansas Arkansas Nuclear One 

Beaver Valley Beaver Valley Power Station 

Braidwood Braidwood Station 

Browns Ferry Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant 

Brunswick Brunswick Steam Electric Plant 

Byron Byron Station 

Callaway Callaway Plant 

Calvert Cliffs Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant 

Catawba Catawba Nuclear Station 

Clinton Clinton Power Station 

Columbia Columbia Generating Station 

Comanche Peak Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station 

Cooper Cooper Nuclear Station 

Crystal River Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant 

Cook Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant 

Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station 

Diablo Canyon Diablo Canyon Power Plant 

Dresden Dresden Nuclear Power Station 

Arnold Duane Arnold Energy Center 

Farley Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant 

Fermi Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant 

FitzPatrick James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant 

Fort Calhoun Fort Calhoun Station 

Ginna R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 

Grand Gulf Grand Gulf Nuclear Station 

Harris Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant 

Hatch Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant 

Hope Creek Hope Creek Generating Station 

Indian Point Indian Point Energy Center 

Kewaunee Kewaunee Power Station 

LaSalle LaSalle County Station 

Limerick Limerick Generating Station 

McGuire McGuire Nuclear Station 

Millstone Millstone Power Station 

Monticello Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant 

Nine Mile Point Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station 

North Anna North Anna Power Station 

Oconee Oconee Nuclear Station 

Oyster Creek Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station 
Notation 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 xxxvi 

Palisades Palisades Nuclear Plant 

Palo Verde Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station 

Peach Bottom Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station 

Perry Perry Nuclear Power Plant 

Pilgrim Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 

Point Beach Point Beach Nuclear Plant 

Prairie Island Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant 

Quad Cities Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station 

River Bend River Bend Station 

Robinson H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant 

St. Lucie St. Lucie Nuclear Plant 

Salem Salem Nuclear Generating Station 

San Onofre San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station 

Seabrook Seabrook Station 

Sequoyah Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 

South Texas South Texas Project Electric Generating Station 

Summer Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station 

Surry Surry Power Station 

Susquehanna Susquehanna Steam Electric Station 

Three Mile Island Three Mile Island, Unit 1 

Turkey Point Turkey Point Nuclear Plant 

Vermont Yankee Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station 

Vogtle Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 

Waterford Waterford Steam Electric Station 

Watts Bar Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 

Wolf Creek Wolf Creek Generating Station 

Units of Measure

ac acre(s) 

bbl barrel(s) 

Btu British thermal unit(s) 

°C degree(s) Celsius 

cm centimeter(s) 

d day(s) 

dB decibel(s) 
Notation 

 xxxvii NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

°F degree(s) Fahrenheit 

ft foot (feet) 

ft2

 square foot (feet) 

ft3

 cubic foot (feet) 

gal gallon(s) 

gpd gallon(s) per day 

gpm gallon(s) per minute 

Gy gray(s) 

ha hectare(s) 

hr hour(s) 

Hz hertz 

in. inch(es) 

kg kilogram(s) 

km kilometer(s) 

kV kilovolt(s) 

kW kilowatt(s) 

kWh kilowatt-hour(s) 

L liter(s) 

lb pound(s) 

m meter(s) 

m2

 square meter(s) 

m3

 cubic meter(s) 

mA milliampere(s) 

mg milligram(s) 

mG milligauss 

mGy milligray(s) 

MHz megahertz 

mi mile(s) 

min minute(s) 

mL milliliter(s) 

MMBtu million Btu 

MPa megapascal(s) 

mph mile(s) per hour 

mrad milliard(s) 

mrem millirem(s) 
Notation 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 xxxviii 

mSv millisievert(s) 

mT milliTesla(s) 

MT metric tonne(s) 

MTHM metric tonne(s) of heavy metal 

MTU metric tonne(s) of uranium 

MW megawatt(s) 

MWe or 

MW(e) megawatt(s) electric 

MW(t) megawatt(s) thermal 

MWh megawatt-hour(s) 

pCi picocurie(s) 

ppm part(s) per million 

ppmv parts per million by volume 

ppt part(s) per thousand 

psi pound(s) per square inch 

rad radian 

rem roentgen-equivalent-man 

s second(s) 

scf standard cubic foot (feet) 

Sv sievert(s) 

T tesla(s) 

TPY ton(s) per year 

V volt(s) 

yr year(s) 

μCi microcurie(s) 

μGy microgray(s) 

μm micrometer(s) 

μT microtesla(s) 
Notation 

 xxxix NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Conversion Table 

Multiply By To Obtain 

To Convert English to Metric Equivalents

acres 0.4047 hectares (ha) 

cubic feet (ft3

) 0.02832 cubic meters (m3) 

cubic yards (yd3

) 0.7646 cubic meters (m3) 

curies (Ci) 3.7  1010 becquerels (Bq) 

degrees Fahrenheit (F) -32 0.5555 degrees Celsius (C) 

feet (ft) 0.3048 meters (m) 

gallons (gal) 3.785 liters (L) 

gallons (gal) 0.003785 cubic meters (m3

) 

inches (in.) 2.540 centimeters (cm) 

miles (mi) 1.609 kilometers (km) 

pounds (lb) 0.4536 kilograms (kg) 

rads 0.01 grays (Gy) 

rems 0.01 sieverts (Sv) 

short tons (tons) 907.2 kilograms (kg) 

short tons (tons) 0.9072 metric tons (t) 

square feet (ft2

) 0.09290 square meters (m2) 

square yards (yd2

) 0.8361 square meters (m2) 

square miles (mi2

) 2.590 square kilometers (km2) 

yards (yd) 0.9144 meters (m) 

 

To Convert Metric to English Equivalents

becquerels (Bq) 2.7  10-11 curies (Ci) 

centimeters (cm) 0.3937 inches (in.) 

cubic meters (m3

) 35.31 cubic feet (ft3) 

cubic meters (m3

) 1.308 cubic yards (yd3) 

cubic meters (m3

) 264.2 gallons (gal) 

degrees Celsius (C) +17.78 1.8 degrees Fahrenheit (F) 

grays (Gy) 100 rads 

hectares (ha) 2.471 acres 

kilograms (kg) 2.205 pounds (lb) 

kilograms (kg) 0.001102 short tons (tons) 

kilometers (km) 0.6214 miles (mi) 

liters (L) 0.2642 gallons (gal) 

meters (m) 3.281 feet (ft) 

meters (m) 1.094 yards (yd) 

metric tons (t) 1.102 short tons (tons) 

sieverts (Sv) 100 rems 

square kilometers (km2

) 0.3861 square miles (mi2) 

square meters (m2

) 10.76 square feet (ft2) 

square meters (m2

) 1.196 square yards (yd2) 

Appendix A 

Comments Received on the Environmental Review 

Appendix A 

 A-1 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Appendix A 

Comments Received on the Environmental Review 

A.1 Public Scoping 

On June 3, 2003 (68 FR 33209), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued, for 

public comment, a Notice of Intent to prepare an update of the Generic Environmental Impact 

Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants (GEIS), NUREG–1437. In accordance with 

10 CFR 51.26, the NRC conducted scoping meetings and collected comments from the public 

for the GEIS update. 

The NRC conducted public scoping meetings in each of the four NRC regions for the License 

Renewal GEIS update. The public scoping meetings were held in Atlanta, Georgia; Chicago, 

Illinois; Anaheim, California; and Boston, Massachusetts. The NRC issued public scoping 

meeting summaries on August 12 and 13, 2003. The official transcripts from the public scoping 

meetings, written comments, and meeting summaries are available electronically 

for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR) or from the NRC’s Agencywide 

Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) under package Accession Numbers 

ML032170942, ML032260339, ML032260715, and ML032170934. The scoping period for the 

GEIS update closed on September 17, 2003, but the Commission subsequently reopened it 

from October 3, 2005, to December 30, 2005 (70 FR 57628). 

The NRC staff and its contractor reviewed the transcripts from the public meetings and all 

written materials received during the public comment periods. All comments were considered. 

The NRC staff prepared a scoping summary report for the GEIS update, which listed the 

comments received and the NRC responses thereto. 

In accordance with 10 CFR 51.29(b), this report has been made publicly available at the PDR, 

located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852, or from 

ADAMS. The ADAMS Public Electronic Reading Room is accessible through the NRC’s public 

website, www.nrc.gov. The Accession Number for the scoping summary report is 

ML082960910. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-2 

A.2 Public Comments Received on the Draft Revised GEIS 

The NRC distributed the Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of 

Nuclear Plants, Draft Report for Comment (NUREG-1437, Revision 1, referred to as the draft 

revised Generic Environmental Impact Statement [GEIS]), along with the associated proposed 

rulemaking amending the NRC regulations at 10 CFR Part 51 (74 FR 38117), to Federal, State, 

and local government agencies; American Indian Tribes; environmental interest groups; and 

members of the public who requested copies of the draft. As part of the process to solicit public 

comments on the draft revised GEIS, the NRC: 

• Placed a copy of the draft revised GEIS into the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s 

(NRC’s) Public Electronic Reading Room and on its license renewal Web site; 

• Sent requested copies of the draft revised GEIS to members of the public and 

environmental interest groups, representatives of American Indian Tribes, and Federal, 

State, and local government agencies; 

• Published a notice of availability of the draft revised GEIS in the Federal Register on 

July 31, 2009 (74 FR 38239); 

• Published a notice of an extension to the comment period from 75 to 165 days, which 

ended the comment period on January 12, 2010 (74 FR 51522); 

• Issued public announcements, such as advertisements in local newspapers and 

postings in public places, of the availability of the draft revised GEIS; 

• Announced and held public meetings in (1) Atlanta, Georgia, on September 15, 2009; 

(2) Newton, Massachusetts, on September 17, 2009; (3) Oak Brook, Illinois, on 

September 24, 2009; (4) Rockville, Maryland, on October 1, 2009; (5) Pismo Beach, 

California, on October 20, 2009; and (6) Dana Point, California, on October 22, 2009, to 

receive public comments on the draft revised GEIS; 

• Issued public service announcements and press releases announcing the issuance of 

the draft revised GEIS, the public meetings, and instructions on how to comment on the 

draft revised GEIS; and 

• Established several methods for the submittal of comments on the draft revised GEIS, 

including an email address to receive comments through the Internet. 
Appendix A 

 A-3 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

During the public comment period on the draft revised GEIS, the NRC received a total of 24 

comment letters, emails, and Web submissions in addition to comments received during the 

public meetings.(a)

 The NRC reviewed public meeting transcripts and comment letters, which 

have been incorporated by reference in this GEIS. The public meeting transcripts and comment 

letters have also been made available online in ADAMS as part of the NRC’s Public Document 

Room. 

Table A-2 identifies the individuals and representatives of environmental and public interest 

groups providing comments and the Commenter Identification Number associated with each 

person’s set(s) of comments. Accession numbers indicate the location of the written comments 

in ADAMS. 

The NRC categorized and consolidated specific comments according to issue topic. Comments 

expressing similar concerns were grouped to capture the common issues. Comments fall into 

one of the following general groups: 

• Comments that were actually questions and introduced no new information. 

• Comments that were related to support or opposition to renewing nuclear power plant 

operating licenses, opposed to nuclear power in general, or make general statements 

about the license renewal process. These comments may make only a general 

statement regarding environmental impact issues. In addition, they provide no new 

information and/or do not pertain to 10 CFR Part 51. 

• Comments about an environmental impact issue in the GEIS that provide no new 

information that would require evaluation during the review. 

• Comments about an environmental impact issue in the GEIS that provide new 

information that would require evaluation during the review. 

• Comments that raise an environmental impact issue that was not addressed in the 

GEIS. 

• Comments regarding alternatives to the proposed action or nuclear power. 

• Comments outside the regulatory scope of license renewal (not related to 10 CFR 

Parts 51). 

 

(a) The NRC received 32 comment submissions on the proposed rule and supporting documents. 

Twenty four contained comments on the draft revised GEIS. A comment submission contains one or 

more comments. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-4 

A.2.1 Comments and Responses 

The following pages summarize the comments and suggestions received on the draft revised 

GEIS and discuss their disposition. Parenthetical numbers after each comment refer to the 

Commenter Identification and the comment number. Comments can be tracked to the 

commenter and the source document through the Commenter Identification listed in Table A-2. 

Table A-1. Individuals Providing Comments on the Draft Revised GEIS(a)

Commenter

Identification(b)

Commenter 

Name Affiliation (if stated) 

Comment Source and ADAMS 

Accession Number 

AGA-NEI Ralph Andersen Nuclear Energy Institute Atlanta, GA, Public Meeting 

ML092810007 

NMA-NEI John Snooks Nuclear Energy Institute Newton, MA, Public Meeting 

ML092931681 

NMA-PW Mary Lampert Pilgrim Watch Newton, MA, Public Meeting 

ML092931681 

OBIL-Entergy Rick Buckley Entergy Nuclear Oak Brook, IL, Public Meeting 

ML092931545 

OBIL-NEI Nancy Ranek Nuclear Energy Institute 

Industry Task Force 

(Exelon Generation) 

Oak Brook, IL, Public Meeting 

ML092931545 

RMD-NEI1 Ralph Andersen Nuclear Energy Institute Rockville, MD, Public Meeting 

ML092931678 

PBCA-Nelson David Nelson Private Citizen Pismo Beach, CA, Public Meeting 

ML093070174 

PBCA-SLOMFP1 Jane Swanson San Luis Obispo Mothers 

for Peace 

Pismo Beach, CA, Public Meeting 

ML093070174 

PBCA-Cochran June Cochran Private Citizen Pismo Beach, CA, Public Meeting 

ML093070174 

PBCA-Schumann Klaus Schumann Private Citizen Pismo Beach, CA, Public Meeting 

ML093070174 

PBCA-SLOMFP2 June von Ruden San Luis Obispo Mothers 

for Peace 

Pismo Beach, CA, Public Meeting 

ML093070174 

PBCA-Pinard Peg Pinard Private Citizen 

(Former County Supervisor 

and Mayor, San Luis 

Obispo, CA) 

Pismo Beach, CA, Public Meeting 

ML093070174 

PBCA-A4NR David Weisman Alliance for Nuclear 

Responsibility 

Pismo Beach, CA, Public Meeting 

ML093070174 

PBCA-Campbell Bruce Campbell Private Citizen Pismo Beach, CA, Public Meeting 

ML093070174 
Appendix A 

 A-5 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Table A-2. (cont.) 

Commenter

Identification 

Commenter 

Name Affiliation (if stated) 

Comment Source and ADAMS 

Accession Number 

PBCA- Sierra Andrew Christie Sierra Club Pismo Beach, CA, Public Meeting 

ML093070174 

PBCA-Groot Henrietta Groot Private Citizen 

(Affiliated with Sierra Club, 

ECO, SLO, Mothers for 

Peace, Alliance for Nuclear 

Responsibility, and 

Committee for Unity with 

Nature of the Pacific) 

Pismo Beach, CA, Public Meeting 

ML093070174 

PBCA-Biesek Jack Biesek Private Citizen Pismo Beach, CA, Public Meeting 

ML093070174 

DPCA-PRWS Dale Engelhardt Permanent RAD Waste 

Solutions 

Dana Point, CA, Public Meeting 

ML093100505 

DPCA-UNASFV Dorothy Boberg United Nations Association 

of the San Fernando Valley 

Dana Point, CA, Public Meeting 

ML093100505 

DPCA-CREED1 Billie Pinnick 

Lovmark 

Coalition for Responsible 

and Ethical Environmental 

Decisions 

Dana Point, CA, Public Meeting 

ML093100505 

DPCA-CREED2 Craig Beauchamp 68th AD, Coalition for 

Responsible and Ethical 

Environmental Decisions 

Dana Point, CA, Public Meeting 

ML093100505 

DPCA-Scott Frank R. Scott Private Citizen Dana Point, CA, Public Meeting 

ML093100505 

DPCA-A4NR Nancy Casady Alliance for Nuclear 

Responsibility 

Dana Point, CA, Public Meeting 

ML093100505 

DPCA-Costa Byron Costa Private Citizen Dana Point, CA, Public Meeting 

ML093100505 

DPCA-CREED3 Steve Netherby Coalition for Responsible 

and Ethical Environmental 

Decisions 

Dana Point, CA, Public Meeting 

ML093100505 

DPCA-Nader Tim Nader Private Citizen 

(Former Mayor, Chula 

Vista, CA) 

Dana Point, CA, Public Meeting 

ML093100505 

DPCA-SHoffman Sharon Hoffman Private Citizen Dana Point, CA, Public Meeting 

ML093100505 

DPCA-AHoffman Ace Hoffman Private Citizen Dana Point, CA, Public Meeting 

ML093100505 

DPCA-SCG Gary Headrick San Clemente Green Dana Point, CA, Public Meeting 

ML093100505 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-6 

Table A-2. (cont.) 

Commenter

Identification 

Commenter 

Name Affiliation (if stated) 

Comment Source and ADAMS 

Accession Number 

DPCA-Exelby Sandy Exelby Private Citizen 

(Member of the League of 

Women Voters) 

Dana Point, CA, Public Meeting 

ML093100505 

DPCA-Collamer Jerry Collamer Private Citizen Dana Point, CA, Public Meeting 

ML093100505 

DPCA-A4NR1 Rochelle Becker Alliance for Nuclear 

Responsibility 

Dana Point, CA, Public Meeting 

ML093100505 

DPCA-A4NR2 David Weisman Alliance for Nuclear 

Responsibility 

Dana Point, CA, Public Meeting 

ML093100505 

DPCA-PHDCA Ruth Hult Richter Patrick Henry Democratic 

Club of America 

Dana Point, CA, Public Meeting 

ML093100505 

DPCA-Pack Marion Pack Private Citizen Dana Point, CA, Public Meeting 

ML093100505 

DPCA-CREED4 Lyn Harris Coalition for Responsible 

and Ethical Environmental 

Decisions 

Dana Point, CA, Public Meeting 

ML093100505 

Mack-1 Eleanor T. Mack Private Citizen Email 

ML092170082 

EPA-3 

EPA-3(1) 

Susan E. Bromm U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency 

Letter with attachment 

ML092890603 

Sierra-4 Andrew Christie Sierra Club Letter 

ML093430240 

DWM-5 Kathryn Barnes Don’t Waste Michigan Email 

ML100120408 

PW-6 

PW-6(1) 

Mary Lampert Pilgrim Watch Web submission 

ML100130210 

NEI1-7(4) Ralph L. Andersen Nuclear Energy Institute Letter with attachment 

ML102110089 

PIIC-8 Philip R. Mahowald Prairie Island Indian 

Community 

Email with attachment 

ML100150044 

CEC-9 

CEC-9(1) 

James Boyd California Energy 

Commission 

Email with attachment 

ML100150045 

CT AG-10 Richard Blumenthal Connecticut Office of the 

Attorney General 

Email with attachment 

ML100150046 

A4NR-11 Rochelle Becker Alliance for Nuclear 

Responsibility 

Email with attachment 

ML100150047 

NYS DEC-12 Joan Matthews New York State Email with attachment 
Appendix A 

 A-7 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Table A-2. (cont.) 

Commenter

Identification 

Commenter 

Name Affiliation (if stated) 

Comment Source and ADAMS 

Accession Number 

Department of 

Environmental 

Conservation 

ML100150083 

SLOMFP-13 Jill ZamEk 

Jane Swanson 

San Luis Obispo Mothers 

for Peace 

Email with attachment 

ML100150145 

NYS AG-14 Janice Dean New York State Office of 

the Attorney General 

Email with attachment 

ML100150111 

Shaw-15 Sally Shaw Private Citizen Web submission 

ML100190372 

Exelon-17 Michael P. Gallagher Exelon Generation 

Company, LLC 

Letter with attachment 

ML100250023 

NY DOS-18 Jeffrey Zappieri New York State 

Department of State 

Letter 

ML100221838 

BIA-19 Diane K. Rosen U.S. Department of the 

Interior Bureau of Indian 

Affairs 

Letter with attachment 

ML100261276 

Riverkeeper-20 Phillip Musegaas 

Deborah Brancato 

Riverkeeper, Inc Letter with attachment 

ML100250236 

Anon1-21 Anonymous–1 Hand delivered at 

Pismo Beach, CA, Public Meeting 

ML102240369 

Denneen-22 Bill Denneen Private Citizen Hand delivered at 

Pismo Beach, CA, Public Meeting 

ML102240369 

Schumann-27 Klaus Schumann Private Citizen Hand delivered at 

Pismo Beach, CA, Public Meeting 

ML102240658 

Hoffman-30 Ace Hoffman Private Citizen Hand delivered at 

Dana Point, CA, Public Meeting 

ML102250150 

ML102250153 

Campbell-31 Bruce Campbell Private Citizen Email 

ML102280563 

TVA-32 R.M. Krich Tennessee Valley Authority Letter 

ML100150043 

(a) Specific comments pertaining to a comment document submission or public meeting are given NRC-assigned sequential 

comment numbers following the Commenter Identification (e.g., CEC-9-1, where “1” represents the first comment of the ninth 

comment submission from the California Energy Commission (CEC) and NMA-PW-4, where “4” represents the fourth verbal 

comment at the Newton, MA, public meeting, and it was made by Mary Lampert of Pilgrim Watch (PW). The NRC-assigned 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-8 

Table A-2. (cont.) 

Commenter

Identification 

Commenter 

Name Affiliation (if stated) 

Comment Source and ADAMS 

Accession Number 

sequential comment number is noted in the right margin of the annotated document submissions (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML12095A189) and public meeting transcripts (ADAMS Accession No. ML12095A179). 

(b) Commenter Identifications beginning in “AGA,” “NMA,” “OBIL,” “RMD,” “PBCA,” or “DPCA” indicate that comments were 

provided at the Atlanta, Newton, Oak Brook, Rockville, Pismo Beach, or Dana Point public meetings, respectively. For those 

Commenter Identifications ending in “- #,” the # represents the document submission number. For those Commenter 

Identifications ending in “- #(#),” the first # represents the document submission number, and the second # represents the 

attachment number for that document.
Appendix A 

 A-9 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

A single response may address several similar comments to avoid unnecessary duplication. 

Comments are grouped by category as follows: 

A.2.1.1 Comments in Opposition to Renewing Nuclear Power Plant Operating Licenses 

and Opposed to Nuclear Power in General 

A.2.1.2 Comments Concerning Land Use and Visual Impacts 

A.2.1.3 Comments Concerning Air Quality, Meteorology, and Climatology 

A.2.1.4 Comments Concerning Geology and Soils 

A.2.1.5 Comments Concerning Water Quality, Hydrology, and Use 

A.2.1.6 Comments Concerning Ecology: Aquatic Ecology, Terrestrial Ecology, 

Threatened and Endangered Species 

A.2.1.7 Comments Concerning Historic and Cultural Resources 

A.2.1.8 Comments Concerning Socioeconomics 

A.2.1.9 Comments Concerning Human Health 

A.2.1.10 Comments Concerning Uranium Fuel Cycle and Waste Management 

A.2.1.11 Comments Concerning Cumulative Impacts 

A.2.1.12 Comments Concerning Alternatives to Nuclear Power 

A.2.1.13 Comments Concerning Postulated Accidents 

A.2.1.14 Comments Concerning Decommissioning 

A.2.1.15 Comments Concerning the License Renewal Process 

A.2.1.16 Comments Concerning Issues Outside the Scope of License Renewal: 

Safeguards and Security; Emergency Preparedness; Need for Power; Aging 

Management; and Other Issues 

A.2.1.17 Editorial Comments 

A.2.1.18 Miscellaneous Comments 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-10 

A.2.1.1 Comments in Opposition to Renewing Nuclear Power Plant Operating Licenses 

and Opposed to Nuclear Power in General 

Comment: And I am asking tonight after these 24 or 25 years of working so hard with 

everybody on trying to visualize and actualize our state's Energy Action Plan and our state's law 

that says we won't have any more until they have a proven disposal, I think that I've come to the 

point where we have to say as Helen Caldicott told us when we said how can we protect 

ourselves? She said stop creating plutonium. So, that's mine, too. (DPCA-CREED4-48) 

Comment: To give Southern California Edison permission to rebuild its San Onofre plant 

piecemeal starting with the steam generators probably is not against the law, but surely is 

against the will of the people who support the law about no nuclear power plants. 

Please read my article on the table there. I noticed that many of you have looked at all of the

materials over here and I gathered a lot of them, but also look at the table over here which 

represents citizen groups who have information to give you. (DPCA-UNASFV-4) 

Comment: No license extensions -- especially for more unique facilities such as Diablo Canyon 

and San Onofre who have many unique features including seismic setting and various work 

related to seeking to have it withstand major quakes (though it is insufficient). (Campbell-31-23) 

Comment: It is my belief that nuclear industry is dangerous and should be phased out and 

replaced with safe, renewable technologies///wind, water, solar. (DWM-5-2)

Response: These comments express general opposition to nuclear power and renewing 

nuclear power plant operating licenses. No changes were made to the GEIS in response to 

these comments.

A.2.1.2 Comments Concerning Land Use and Visual Impacts 

Comment: I don't think too many people are annoyed about the architecture of the local 

nuclear plant, to be honest. And so those are just a few thoughts, there will be many thoughts 

in writing. (NMA-PW-16) 

Response: The comment apparently refers to a general lack of concern by the public with 

regard to the visual aesthetics of a nuclear power plant. Although this view may be held by 

many, visual aesthetics is typically evaluated in environmental impact statements, including 

those prepared by the NRC. No change to the GEIS was made in response to this comment.
Appendix A 

 A-11 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Comment: Page 4-6, lines 26 to 40: Text in lines 26 to 29 on page 4-6 reads as follows: 

Land use impact issues evaluated for the revised GEIS include: (1) the impacts of 

continued plant operations and refurbishment activities on onsite land use; (2) the 

impacts of continued plant operations and refurbishment activities on offsite land 

use; and (3) the impacts of transmission line ROWs on offsite land use. 

Consistent with item (1) in the above-quoted statement from lines 26 through 29 on page 4-6 of 

the draft updated GEIS, the impacts of refurbishment activities should be, but is not, discussed 

in the subsection titled “Impacts on Onsite Land Use,” which appears in lines 31 to 40 on 

page 4-6. (NEI1-7(4)-79) 

Response: Section 4.2.1.1 of the GEIS has been revised to clarify that refurbishment activities 

have not permanently changed onsite land use conditions.

Comment: Page 4-7, lines 22 to 27: Text in lines 22 to 27 on page 4-7 reads as follows: 

For plants that have the potential to impact a coastal zone or coastal watershed, as 

defined by each State participating in the National Coastal Zone Management 

Program, licensees must certify that the proposed activity is consistent with the 

State Coastal Zone Management Program. Licensees must coordinate with the 

State agency that manages the State Coastal Zone Management Program with 

regard to the compatibility certification process for Federal projects within coastal 

zones. 

Consider changing the paragraph in lines 22 through 27 on page 4-7 of the draft updated GEIS 

as follows to better explain how compliance with the Coastal Zone Management Act assures 

that impacts of license renewal will be small (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = 

addition): 

For plants that have the potential to impact a coastal zone or coastal watershed, as defined by 

each State participating in the National Coastal Zone Management Program, licensees

applicants for license renewal must certify submit to the affected State a certification that the 

proposed activitylicense renewal, which involves action by a Federal agency, is consistent with 

the State’s Coastal Zone Management Program. Licensees Applicants also must coordinate 

with the State agencyagencies that manages the State Coastal Zone Management Programs 

with regard to the compatibility certification process for Federal projects within coastal zonesto 

obtain determinations by the States that the proposed nuclear plant license renewal would be 

consistent with such programs. Consistency with State Coastal Zone Management Programs 

assures that land use impacts in State coastal zones will be small. (NEI1-7(4)-80) 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-12 

Response: Section 4.2.1.1 of the GEIS has been revised, as suggested, to clarify the CZMA 

process.

Comment: Page 4-7, lines 33 to 41: Text in lines 35 to 41 on page 4-7 is titled “Impacts of 

Transmission Line ROWs on Offsite Land Use” and reads as follows: 

Operational activities during the license renewal term would be similar to those occurring 

during the current license term and would not affect offsite land use in transmission line 

ROWs beyond what has already been affected. Certain land use activity in the ROW is 

usually restricted. Land cover is generally managed through a variety of maintenance 

procedures so that vegetation growth and building construction do not interfere with power 

line operation and access. Land use within ROWs is limited to activities that do not 

endanger power line operation; these include recreation, off-road vehicle use, grazing, 

agricultural cultivation, ... 

On page 3-3 in lines 38 and 39, the draft updated GEIS states that “only those transmission 

lines that connect the plant to the switchyard are considered within the scope of [the updated 

GEIS] review.” On page 3-24 in lines 6 to 11, the draft updated GEIS states that “Powertransmission systems associated with nuclear power plants and considered within the scope of 

this review consist of switching stations (or substations) usually located on the plant site and the 

transmission lines that connect the plant to those substations. These systems are required to 

transfer power from the plant to the utility’s network of power lines in its service area (the 

regional electrical distribution grid).” In addition, on page 3-24 the draft updated GEIS states 

that “in most cases, the transmission lines originating at the power plant substations are no 

longer owned or managed by the nuclear power plant licensees.” Consider modifying the text in 

lines 35 through 41 on page 4-7 as follows for consistency with the above-quoted statements 

regarding the scope of the GEIS update with respect to transmission lines (strikethrough font = 

deletion; italics font = addition): 

As was previously discussed in section 3.1.6.5, in most cases, transmission lines originating at 

the power plant substations are no longer owned or managed by the nuclear power plant 

licensees. Accordingly, power-transmission systems associated with nuclear power plants and 

considered within the scope of this review consist of switching stations (or substations) usually 

located on the plant site and the transmission lines that connect the plant to those substations. 

These systems are required to transfer power from the plant to the utility’s network of power 

lines in its service area (the regional electrical distribution grid). Operational activities in offsite 

transmission line ROWs during the license renewal term, if any offsite ROWs fall within this 

scope of review, would be similar to those occurring during the current license term and would 

not affect offsite land use in transmission line ROWs beyond what has already been affected. 

Certain land use activity in the ROW is usually restricted. Land cover is generally managed 

through a variety of maintenance procedures so that vegetation growth and building 
Appendix A 

 A-13 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

construction do not interfere with power line operation and access. Land use within ROWs is 

limited to activities that do not endanger power line operation; these include recreation, off-road 

vehicle use, grazing, agricultural cultivation, ... (NEI1-7(4)-81) 

Response: Section 4.2.1.1 of the GEIS has been revised to clarify what transmission lines are 

within the scope of the license renewal environmental review.

Comment: The State of New York disputes the new characterization of offsite land use impacts 

in the Proposed GElS as Category 1. See Proposed GElS at 2-6 (Table 2.1-1), 4-7. The 1996 

GElS properly characterized impacts on offsite land use as a Category 2 issue that required a 

site-specific analysis by a license renewal applicant. However, relying on "license renewal 

reviews" subsequent to the 1996 GElS, the Proposed GElS concludes that "the impact of 

continued plant operations during the license renewal term and refurbishment on offsite use 

would be small at all plants," and therefore "is a Category 1 issue.” Id. at 4-7. 

Category 1 issues are those that meet all of the following criteria: 

(1) The environmental impacts associated with the issue were determined to apply either to all 

plants or, for some issues, to plants having a specific type of cooling system or other specified 

plant or site characteristics. 

(2) A single significance level (i.e., small, moderate, or large) was assigned to the impacts 

(except for collective offsite radiological impacts from the fuel cycle and from the disposal of 

high-level waste and spent fuel). 

(3) The mitigation of adverse impacts associated with the issue was considered in the analysis, 

and it was determined that additional plant-specific mitigation measures would probably not be. 

Sufficiently beneficial to warrant implementation. 

Proposed GEIS at 4-2 – 4-3. Absent "new and significant" information, applicants need not 

analyze plant-specific impacts of Category 1 issues. Id. at 4-3. The Proposed GElS thus would 

absolve individual license renewal applicants from having to analyze the impact of license 

renewal or non-renewal on offsite lands near their facilities. 

In arriving at this determination, the Proposed GElS identified only two categories of potential 

impacts on offsite land use: plant-related population changes and changes to tax revenues. 

See Proposed GElS at 4-7. No other potential impacts were identified or analyzed. See id. 

Looking only at these two potential impacts, and looking only at data purportedly derived, but 

not identified, from post-1996 license renewal reviews, the Proposed GElS concludes that "all 

plants" would experience the same impacts. See id.
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-14 

But the Proposed GElS fails to identify the impact of the no-action alternative on offsite land use 

as an issue. That is, the Proposed GElS requires no analysis of the impact on land values in 

the vicinity of a nuclear facility if a license renewal application were denied. This analysis 

should be required. The impact of all types of power plants on property values has been 

established in peer-reviewed journals. See, e.g., The Effect of Electric Utility Power Plant 

Location on Area Property Value, Blomquist, G., Land Economics, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Feb. 1974) at 

97-100. After adjusting for other factors, including property size and the demographic 

composition of the neighborhood, Blomquist found "a clear and statistically significant impact" of 

electric generating facilities on property values. See Potential Impacts of Indian Point 

Relicensing on Property Values, Stephen C. Sheppard, Ph.D. (Williams College, Economics) 

(2007) at 2 (attached as Ex. E) (ML073400193)("Sheppard Report"). 

A subsequent study determined that the impact on property values of nuclear power plants was, 

if anything, "larger" than the impact of fossil-fueled facilities Id. at 3 (citing An Interregional 

Hedonic Analysis of Noxious Facility Impacts on Local Wages and Property Values, Clark, D., 

and Nieves, L., Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 27 (1994) at 

235-253). Using data covering the entire country, and evaluating the impacts of 21 nuclear 

power plants, 39 coal-fired, and 53 gas- or oil-fired generating facilities, Clark and Nieves found 

impacts to offsite land uses "to a reasonable and professional accepted degree of scientific 

certainty from all types of power plant," and that the impact from nuclear generating facilities "is 

more than 3 times the impact of coal fired plants and more than 4 times the impact of gas and 

oil fired generating facilities." Sheppard Report at 3.6 

The Proposed GElS also improperly assumes that all impacts on offsite land use of an operating 

power plant are positive. See generally Proposed GEIS § 3.8 (socioeconomics) (nuclear 

facilities contribute to stable communities, provide jobs, employees occupy high cost housing, 

and facilities contribute to tax base). Conversely, the Proposed GElS improperly assumes that 

virtually all impacts on offsite land use of the termination of operations would be negative. See, 

e.g., id. 4-204 - 4-205 (socioeconomic impacts of license termination would be bad with possible 

exception of impacts on traffic); id. at 4-192 (predicting that termination would result in loss of 

property tax revenue). As set forth in the Sheppard Report, and published literature, however, 

this is error. Indeed, the Proposed GElS itself acknowledges that license termination would 

eliminate cooling tower drift, effluent discharges, and radionuclide emissions. Proposed GEIS 

at 4-199. Similarly, licensee termination would end cooling withdrawals and discharges, thus 

improving any nearby aquatic communities. See id. at 4-199 - 4-201. Inexplicably, however, 

the Proposed GElS does not predict the potential impact on land use values of these important 

hedonic factors (nor does it require applicants to analyze them). 

[

6

 Unlike other studies, Clark and Nieves properly separated the impacts of the plants themselves from the 

employment or income-generating impacts of power plants. "This must be done to isolate the pure impact of the 

power plant that would be observed if the facility is completely replaced with an alternative use that is also capable of 
Appendix A 

 A-15 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

generating employment and income." Sheppard Report at 3. By contrast, a subsequent study done by Clark and 

3 others, including William Metz (see-GEIS at 3-28, 3-29, 3-164), inappropriately combined the discrete impacts of 

(1) job accessibility with (2) disamenity and nuisance associated with proximity to a nuclear power plants. 

"Combining these two impacts would be an appropriate technique for estimating the impact of the nuclear power plant 

ONLY in the case where the counter-factual being evaluated was complete removal and abandonment of the land." 

Sheppard Report at 3 (emphasis omitted).] 

A license renewal applicant must analyze all potential impacts of the no-action alternative on 

offsite land use and must specifically address the impact of non-renewal on nearby property 

values. The kind of analysis necessary to determine the impact on surrounding real property of 

license renewal or non-renewal could not be done generically but would, instead, depend upon 

a site-specific analysis. Plainly, the impact of a facility in a rural area would be different than 

one in a semi-urban area, a fact the Proposed GElS acknowledges. See Proposed GElS at 

S-14 (changes in plant operations would have a greater impact in rural than semi-urban 

neighborhoods); id. at 4-204 - 4-205 (comparing socioeconomic consequences of license 

termination of plants in semi-urban areas to those in rural areas). 

If the presence of the nuclear power generating plant has a significant impact on property 

values, then it logically follows that extending the license will have a significant impact on 

property which in turn will affect land use by affecting the decisions made by thousands of 

property owners and developers. Whether this significant impact exists is a scientifically 

testable question. 

Sheppard Report at 2. Because the Proposed GEIS ignores the need to analyze the full 

panoply of impacts of license renewal or non-renewal on adjacent land values, it improperly 

categorizes offsite land use impacts as Category 1. Because Category 1 issues must share a 

single significance level offsite land use must be a Category 2 issue. See Proposed GEIS at 

4-3 (“Category 2 issues are those that do not meet one or more of the criteria of Category 1 and 

for which, therefore, an additional plant specific review is required”); see id. (Category 1 issues 

must share a single significance level). (NYS AG-14-9) 

Comment: Finally, the Proposed GEIS also improperly determines that offsite land use impacts 

would be uniformly “small.” See Proposed GEIS at S-6, 2-6 (Table 2.1-1), 4-6. 

The NRC's standard of significance for impacts uses the Council on Environmental Quality 

(CEQ) terminology for “significantly” (40 CFR 1508.27), which requires consideration of both 

“context” and “intensity.” The NRC used the CEQ terminology to establish three significance 

levels: small, moderate, and large. The definitions of the three significance levels, which are 

presented in the footnotes to Table B-1 of 10 C.F.R. Part 51, Subpart A, Appendix B, follow: 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-16 

• Small impact: Environmental effects are not detectable or are so minor that they will 

neither destabilize nor noticeably alter any important attribute of the resource. For the 

purposes of assessing radiological impacts, the Commission has concluded that those 

impacts do not exceed permissible level in the Commission's regulations are considered 

small. 

• Moderate impact: Environmental effects are sufficient to alter noticeably, but not to 

destabilize, important attributes of the resource. 

• Large impact: Environmental effects are clearly noticeable and are sufficient to destabilize 

important attributes of the resource. 

Proposed GEIS at S-4 – S-5. 

Again, however, the Proposed GEIS focuses only on the impacts of plant-related population 

changes and tax revenue changes. Id. at 4-7. (“The NRC has not identified any information or 

situations, including low population areas or population and tax revenue changes resulting from 

license renewal that would alter the conclusion that impacts would be small for all nuclear power 

plants”). But “there is clear scientific evidence that the presence of nuclear generating plants 

can reduce the value of property in the area around the plant.” Potential Impacts of Indian Point 

Relicensing on Property Values, Stephen C. Sheppard, Ph.D. (Williams College, Economics) 

(2007) at 4. And, although there are differences in properly done studies “about how far the 

impact might extend, and about the magnitude of the impact,” all properly done studies, 

“indicate the potential for a significant, not a small, impact.” Id. Indeed, the Proposed GEIS 

itself acknowledges the possibility of a significant offsite land use impact. Describing a land use 

study done and relied upon for the 1996 GEIS, the Proposed GEIS describes impacts that were 

“small at two sites, moderate at four sites, and significant at one site depending on the local 

jurisdiction's ability to provide the public services necessary to support substantial industrial 

development.” Id. at 3-29. Offsite land use “impacts at the Wolf Creek plant in Kansas were 

determined to be potentially significant if the plant was shut down.” Id. The looming property 

tax crisis was averted. See Proposed GEIS at 3-129. But the fact that the crisis was averted 

does not alter the fact that the Wolf Creek facility had a significant impact on offsite land use. 

And it does not matter that the “significant” impact was not ultimately adverse. 

The Proposed GElS's decision to characterize all potential impacts on offsite land use as “small” 

is unsupported by both the relevant scientific studies and the proposed GEIS itself. See 

Impacts of Indian Point Relicensing on Property Values at 2-4 (electric generating facilities have 

a clear and statistically significant impact on residential property values, particularly on 

properties within a 2 mile radius) Sheppard, S. C., 2007); see also Proposed GEIS at 3-29 (case 

study of land use changes in host communities indicated that potential impacts included 

moderate and significant impacts). As the ASLB in the Indian Point relicensing proceeding
Appendix A 

 A-17 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

properly found, a license renewal applicant must “consider the impact on real estate values that 

would be caused by license renewal or non-renewal.” Order, Matter of Entergy Nuclear 

Operations, Inc. at 82-83 (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3) (ASLBP No. 07-858-

03-LR-BD01) (Jul. 31, 2008) at 83. (NYS AG-14-11) 

Response: The commenter makes the following main points: (1) The revised GEIS has 

improperly classified offsite land use as a Category 1 issue and, at the same time, has 

improperly assigned an impact level of SMALL. (2) By only focusing on plant-related population 

changes and changes to tax revenues in the offsite land use issue, the revised GEIS fails to 

include the impact to land and property values in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant if a license 

renewal application were denied (that is, the no-action alternative). 

In both the 1996 GEIS and the revised GEIS, the offsite land use issue(s)(b)

 consider the 

environmental impacts of license renewal on the use of offsite land (e.g., use for agricultural, 

residential, commercial, or industrial purposes), not on the value of such land. The issue is 

whether continued nuclear power plant operations and refurbishment activities during the 

license renewal term would cause offsite land use to change. For example, would nuclear 

power plant operations during the license renewal term or refurbishment cause agricultural land 

to be converted to residential use for housing or commercial use for retail services? Based on 

overly conservative estimates of the impacts from refurbishment, the 1996 GEIS assessed that 

offsite land use impacts could range from SMALL to LARGE. As explained in the revised GEIS, 

completed environmental reviews have subsequently shown that the impact of continued 

operations during the license renewal term and refurbishment has had little or no effect on 

offsite land use. The 1996 GEIS described the potential for population and tax revenue 

changes to alter offsite land use. As demonstrated in plant-specific license renewal 

environmental reviews conducted since the issuance of the 1996 GEIS, these population and 

tax revenue changes simply have not come to fruition. 

Members of the public, environmental interest groups, industry representatives, and other 

Federal, state, and local governmental agencies assisted the NRC in identifying 92 license 

renewal environmental (NEPA) issues during the preparation of the 1996 GEIS (see Section 1.5 

of the 1996 GEIS). Offsite land use impacts during the license renewal term and from 

refurbishment were identified from public comments and workshop discussions as two separate 

Category 2 issues needing to be addressed in plant-specific SEISs. Besides tax-revenue and 

population-driven impacts, no other issues associated with offsite land use impacts were 

identified during this vetting process. 

 

(b) The 1996 GEIS had two offsite land use issues, one for refurbishment and the other for continuing 

operations. Both issues were classified as Category 2. The revised GEIS combined these two 

issues into one and reclassified the issue to Category 1. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-18 

Land and property values are not part of the offsite land use issue. Therefore, the NRC 

interprets the comment as a request to consider the impacts of license renewal on land and 

property values as a separate socioeconomic issue in the revised GEIS, which is the topic of 

discussion for the remainder of this response. The proposed federal action is renewal of a 

nuclear power plant’s operating license. Accordingly, the question is whether the NRC’s license 

renewal decision will affect offsite land and property values, and if so, will the impact be 

significant. In this regard, the commenter asserts that the revised GEIS analysis should 

consider the impact on land and property values resulting from the denial of a license renewal 

application. For the reasons set forth below, the NRC concludes that any impacts on land and 

property values resulting from a decision on a license renewal application will be negligible, for 

the approval of a license renewal decision, and remote and speculative, for the denial of a 

license renewal application. Therefore, the NRC disagrees with the comment for the reasons 

set forth below. 

For this GEIS revision, the NRC re-evaluated the 92 environmental issues to determine if the 

findings from the 1996 GEIS remain valid. In doing so, the NRC considered the need to modify, 

add to, group, or delete any issue. During two public scoping periods in 2003 and 2005, the 

impact of continued nuclear plant operations and refurbishment on land and property values 

was not identified as an issue needing to be addressed either in site-specific license renewal 

environmental reviews or generically. Thus, the impacts of license renewal to offsite land and 

property values were never raised during the scoping processes for the 1996 GEIS and for the 

current GEIS revision, either as part of the offsite land use issue or as a separate 

socioeconomic issue. Additionally, the NRC has conducted over 40 license renewal 

environmental reviews since the issuance of the 1996 GEIS, and in only one matter thus far, the 

presently ongoing Indian Point proceeding, has the issue of offsite land and property value 

impacts been raised.(c)

 In that case, the issue was raised by the commenter, who is an 

intervenor in the Indian Point proceeding. Thus, the NRC has determined that the impact of 

license renewal on offsite land and property values is not controversial nor does it appear to be 

a matter of broad public concern. 

Moreover, the scoping process is not just about discovering what issues should be included in 

the scope of an EIS; it is also intended to unearth issues that should not be included. As stated 

in 10 CFR 51.29(a)(3), scoping should “[i]dentify and eliminate from detailed study issues which 

are peripheral or are not significant...” In accordance with this provision, the NRC has 

determined that, for the reasons stated in the preceding paragraph, impacts on land and 

property values will not be evaluated as an issue in the GEIS. 

 

(c) The Indian Point nuclear power plant is located in Buchanan, New York. 
Appendix A 

 A-19 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

The commenter refers to three studies for the proposition that power plants, particularly nuclear 

power plants, have a negative impact on nearby property values. Two of the three studies cited 

by the commenter, the Blomquist study(d)

 and the Clark and Nieves study,(e) do not consider the 

impacts resulting from the approval or disapproval of a plant’s license renewal application. The 

Blomquist study, which was published in 1974, “estimated the total impact on residential 

property values of one amenity factor, a power plant.”(f)

 The study focused on one relatively 

small coal burning power plant, the Winnetka Power Plant in Winnetka, Illinois (a suburb of 

Chicago). (g)

 The data relied upon by the study was taken from the 1970 census.(h) The 

Blomquist study concluded, based upon this case study of the Winnetka Power Plant, that 

power plants have a negative impact on the values of surrounding properties. 

The second study cited by the commenter, the Clark and Nieves study, which was published in 

1994, concerned a variety of “noxious facilities” and the negative impact of such facilities on 

residential property values, specifically, a value the study defined as “housing rent.”(i)

 In addition 

to nuclear power plants, the study considered several other classes of “noxious facilities” (e.g., 

coal-fired electric generating plants, gas- and oil-fired electric generating plants, military 

chemical weapons storage sites slated for decommissioning, chemical or radioactive hazardous 

waste sites, petrochemical refineries, and liquefied natural gas storage facilities).(j)

 Although 

published in 1994, the study selected specific sites using data from the 1980 census.(k)

 In 

addition, the study used other data to construct “a data set that provides details of wage and 

housing values, as well as the locational features of those markets. All of the data are for 1976-

1980.”(l)

 The study’s authors found that nuclear plants “have a relatively strong negative 

influence on local economies,” and that this finding was “inconsistent with results of authors who 

have applied an intracity modeling approach to data for relatively small local areas . . . and 

found little significant effect.”(m)

 

 

(d) G. Blomquist, “The Effect of Electric Utility Power Plant Location on Area Property Value,” Land 

Economics, Vol. 50, No. 1, 97-100 (February 1974). 

(e) D. Clark and L. Nieves, “An Interregional Hedonic Analysis of Noxious Facility Impacts on Local 

Wages and Property Values,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 27, 235-

253 (1994). 

(f) Blomquist at 97. 

(g) Id. 

(h) Id. 

(i) Clark and Nieves at 243 (“The annual housing rent . . . component of housing value is derived from 

the owner’s estimate of the market value of the residence”). As part of its analysis, the study also 

looked at wages. Clark and Nieves at 240-244, and 248. 

(j) Id. at 238. 

(k) Id. at 239. 

(l) Id. at 240. 

(m) Id. at 250. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-20 

Both the Blomquist study and the Clark and Nieves study analyze the impact of an existing plant 

on residential property values; neither study considers the impacts on commercial or industrial 

property values. Both studies predate the NRC’s first license renewal decision in March 2000 

(extension of the operating license for the Calvert Cliffs plant, located in Lusby, MD, to 2034 (for 

Unit 1) and 2036 (for Unit 2)). In the case of the Clark and Nieves study, the data relied upon is 

at least 20 years earlier, and in the case of Blomquist, at least 30 years earlier, than this first 

license renewal decision. The Blomquist study does not analyze nuclear power plants at all, 

and the Clark and Nieves study only analyzes nuclear power plants amongst a series of other 

“noxious facilities.” Neither study addresses the license renewal decision, which is the agency 

action being evaluated in the revised GEIS. 

The third study cited by the commenter was prepared by Stephen C. Sheppard, Ph.D., one of 

the commenter’s expert witnesses in the Indian Point license renewal proceeding (“Sheppard 

study”).(n)

 The Sheppard study focuses exclusively on the license renewal decision for the 

Indian Point plant and its analysis is limited to census block groups immediately surrounding 

that plant. Thus, the Sheppard study does not purport to analyze the impacts of license renewal 

on offsite land and property values for any other nuclear power plant or for nuclear power plants 

in general. The Sheppard study relies upon data from the 2000 census.(o)

 The Sheppard study, 

like the other two studies cited by the commenter, only analyzes residential property values.(p)

 

After referring to the Blomquist and the Clark and Nieves studies, as well as brief references to 

a few other studies, the Sheppard study discusses the no-action alternative (i.e., the denial of 

the license renewal application). The Sheppard study states that following the decommissioning 

of Indian Point, “the highest and best alternative use of the site where the nuclear power plant is 

located would certainly NOT be abandonment, but rather a combination of attractive riverfront 

development that would be likely to include employment and other attractive locations.”(q)

 

Following a brief analysis, the Sheppard study concludes that residential property values would 

increase following removal of “the impacts of the Indian Point Nuclear plant.”(r)

 

The term of an initial operating license is 40 years, and a utility may not submit a license 

renewal application earlier than 20 years before the expiration of the operating license 

(10 CFR 54.17(c)). The decision will either extend the term of the operating license or not. The 

NRC license renewal decision does not authorize any major new construction, significant 

ground-disturbing activities or any other physical changes to the existing power plant; a license 

renewal decision will not result in the footprint of the plant either increasing or decreasing. And, 

as described further below, a denial of the license renewal application will, in all likelihood, result 

 

(n) S. Sheppard, “Potential Impacts of Indian Point Relicensing on Property Values,” (2007). 

(o) Sheppard at 4. 

(p) Sheppard at 4, 6. 

(q) Sheppard at 3 (emphasis in the original). 

(r) Sheppard at 6. 
Appendix A 

 A-21 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

in no discernible change to the physical plant and have little, if any, impact on land and property 

values. 

In particular, the NRC disagrees with the commenter’s logic, based upon the Sheppard study, 

that “[i]f the presence of the nuclear power generating plant has a significant impact on property 

values, then it logically follows that extending the license will have a significant impact on 

property which in turn will affect land use by affecting the decisions made by thousands of 

property owners and developers.”(s)

 The NRC has concluded that any impact to offsite land and 

property values, either negative or positive, would have occurred when the nuclear power plant 

received its construction permit and operating license. The nuclear plant would have been in 

existence, and operating, for a minimum of twenty years prior to the submission of a license 

renewal application. If the NRC approves the request for license renewal, the incremental effect 

of an additional 20 years of reactor operations and related refurbishment activities on offsite 

land and property values would be negligible compared to any impacts that may have already 

occurred when the plant was first sited, built, and commenced operation. If the NRC denies the 

request for license renewal, any effect on property values would be remote and speculative—as 

described below, the effect will be so far removed in time from the license renewal decision as 

to render any attempt to measure the impact speculative. 

The commenter asserts that if the NRC decides to not renew the operating license (the noaction alternative), the negative impacts to land and property values would come to an end. 

The NRC, however, does not consider this a likely or immediate occurrence. Following the 

expiration of the operating license, the nuclear power plant would then go into 

decommissioning. The decommissioning of nuclear facilities typically takes many years, so any 

nuclear power plant site would remain in existence for an extended period of time after ceasing 

operations. The impacts of terminating nuclear power plant operations and decommissioning 

are discussed in the revised GEIS in Section 4.12.2.1 (additional information related to the 

environmental impacts of decommissioning can be found in NUREG-0586, “Final Generic 

Environmental Impact Statement on Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities: Regarding the 

Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Reactors.”) Moreover, given that there is currently no longterm disposal site for the storage of spent nuclear fuel, it is probable that spent nuclear fuel and 

possibly other radioactive materials would remain at the nuclear power plant site for an 

extended period of time after cessation of operations. 

Further, if the NRC does not renew the operating license, it is likely that the nuclear plant site 

would remain an industrial site. In this regard, the utility already owns, or holds by long-term 

lease, the land upon which the power plant is situated. The physical infrastructure already 

exists (including turbines, generators, electrical transfer stations, cooling towers, intake and 

discharge structures, and other industrial improvements or equipment) and is already connected 

 

(s) Sheppard at 2. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-22 

to the regional electrical grid. Moreover, the utility holds a host of Federal, State, and local 

permits allowing it to operate and has a trained workforce. The demand for electric power will 

also continue to exist. With this substantial investment in place, and the continuing demand for 

electricity, a power plant owner/operator may very well opt to continue to generate electricity at 

the site using another type of fuel (e.g., a coal or natural gas-fired power plant), unless the site 

is re-zoned.(t)

 Thus, the NRC considers it likely that the site will remain a “brownfield” industrial 

site for many years following the termination of reactor operations, either as the site of a 

decommissioned nuclear power plant alone, or as a decommissioned nuclear power plant 

together with an operating non-nuclear power plant. 

Given the likelihood that the plant would remain a “brownfield” site for many years, the NRC 

concludes that any impacts on offsite land and property values as a result of a change from 

operating to decommissioning status or from a nuclear power plant to another type of power 

plant would be negligible compared to those impacts that may have occurred when the plant 

was constructed and commenced operation. Further, any attempt to estimate when the site 

would convert from a “brownfield” site to a site more acceptable to the commenter (again, the 

Sheppard study suggested, for the Indian Point plant, a “combination of attractive riverfront 

development that would be likely to include employment and other attractive locations”) and the 

impacts on offsite land and property values as a result of such conversion would be both remote 

(in time) and speculative. 

Also, as discussed above, the impacts of license renewal on offsite land and property values 

have only been raised by this commenter; the issue does not appear to be one of broad public 

concern or controversy (a possible criterion for inclusion of an issue in an EIS) and, under the 

NRC’s scoping regulation (10 CFR 51.29), the issue can be excluded from the GEIS. The 

primary support relied upon by the commenter, the Sheppard study, focuses exclusively on one 

nuclear power plant, Indian Point. The focus of the GEIS is to identify and address the 

consequences of the proposed action (license renewal) that are common to all nuclear power 

plants and are thus dispositioned generically as Category 1 issues. If new and significant 

information concerning the impacts of license renewal on offsite land and property values arises 

during the scoping process for any site-specific license renewal environmental review or in a 

public comment made on a draft SEIS, the NRC will consider and evaluate such new and 

significant information. Any offsite land use impact issues under the no-action alternative 

(i.e., not renewing the operating license) would be addressed in an individual plant-specific 

SEIS. For the reasons set forth above, impacts on offsite land and property values do not 

warrant consideration in the GEIS. 

 

(t) Any re-zoning action by the local zoning authority would only become effective after the plant was 

fully decommissioned. In addition, if the re-zoning action is opposed by the plant owner/operator, the 

re-zoning action may be considered a taking, thus requiring payment to the plant owner/operator of 

the fair market value of the property. 
Appendix A 

 A-23 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

No changes were made to the revised GEIS in response to this comment.

Comment: The proposed GEIS also ignores the impact on offsite property values of increasing 

amounts of stored spent fuel generated by a facility as to which an extended license is sought. 

The impact on surrounding property values is ignored even though the proposed GEIS 

acknowledges that onsite storage will be necessary and will exceed original design capacity. 

The Waste Confidence Findings and their related regulations at 10 C.F.R. § 51.23, "leave the 

onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel during the term of plant operation as the only option at the 

time of license renewal ....Until a permanent high-level waste repository is operational, the spent 

nuclear fuel will be safely stored either onsite or at offsite interim storage facilities (NRC 2006)." 

Proposed GEIS at 1-7. "Given the delays in the opening of the repository [for spent nuclear 

fuel], it is likely that power plants would have to expand their spent fuel storage capacity beyond 

their original design" capacity. Proposed GEIS at 4-226. Moreover, "[t]he most significant 

irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources related to nuclear power plant operations 

during the license renewal term would be ... the land used to dispose of wastes, including the 

spent nuclear fuel generated during the license renewal term." Proposed GEIS at 4-231. 

The Proposed GEIS itself thus acknowledges that some facilities will indefinitely continue to 

store spent nuclear fuel onsite during and after any license renewal term. See also Proposed 

GEIS at 4-165 - 4-168. Yet the Proposed GEIS does not require license renewal applicants to 

analyze the site-specific offsite land use impacts of this increased onsite storage. See id. This 

omission is inconsistent with the Proposed GElS's concession that "[u]navoidable adverse 

impacts would vary among plants and would depend on the specific characteristics of each 

plant and its interaction with the environment. These unavoidable adverse impacts would need 

to be evaluated in plant-specific SElSs." Proposed GEIS at 4-288. Indeed, the Proposed GEIS 

acknowledges that the storage issues at each facility will differ, see id. at 4-166 ("interim storage 

needs vary among the plants, with older units likely to lose pool storage capacity sooner than 

new ones”) yet nonetheless concludes that "the issue remains a Category 1 issue.” id. at 4-168. 

Minimally, license renewal applicants must analyze the impact on offsite land uses, including 

property values, of the increased and indefinite storage of spent nuclear fuel generated during 

the license renewal term. Applicants should address the impacts to property values in the areas 

surrounding the stored spent fuel, whether the spent fuel is stored in spent fuel pools or in 

onsite dry cask storage areas. This critical issue cannot be overlooked and cannot be analyzed 

generically. The Waste Confidence Rule does not relieve license renewal applicants of the 

need to analyze the impact on offsite land use of the undisputed increase in the indefinite 

storage of spent nuclear fuel at facilities located in a wide variety of settings (where impacts can 

be expected to differ greatly). (NYS AG-14-10) 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-24 

Response: The commenter expressed concern over possible impacts to offsite land use and 

land and property values as a result of the onsite storage of spent fuel. While this comment 

refers only to spent nuclear fuel, the commenter is essentially making the same argument 

presented in NYS AG-14-9 and NYS AG-14-11 with regard to the impacts on offsite land use 

and land and property values from a license renewal decision (see the NRC response to the 

NYS AG-14-9 and NYS AG-14-11 comments). 

The commenter also expressed concern about the “increased and indefinite storage of spent 

nuclear fuel generated during the license renewal term.” 

The NRC is committed to ensuring that both spent nuclear fuel and low-level radioactive wastes 

are managed to prevent health impacts to the public. Spent nuclear fuel is currently stored at 

reactor sites in the spent fuel pools and/or in independent spent fuel storage installations 

(ISFSIs). This practice is expected to continue until DOE is ready to take possession of the 

spent nuclear fuel. At this time, it is uncertain when this will happen. 

Interim storage needs vary among plants, with older units having less available pool storage 

capacity than newer ones. However, given the uncertainty as to when a geologic repository will 

open and lack of other options, it is likely that some sort of expanded spent fuel storage capacity 

beyond the original design capacity will be needed at all nuclear power plants. 

For spent nuclear fuel, the Waste Confidence Decision and Rule represented the Commission’s 

generic determination that spent nuclear fuel can continue to be stored safely and without 

significant environmental impacts for a period of time after the end of the licensed life for 

operation of a nuclear power plant (after the permanent shutdown of the power reactor and 

expiration of the plant’s operating license). This generic determination, codified in 10 CFR 

51.23(a), meant that the NRC did not need to consider the storage of spent nuclear fuel after 

the end of a reactor’s licensed life for operation in the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 

documents that support its reactor and spent-fuel storage license application reviews. 

On December 23, 2010, the Commission published a revision of the Waste Confidence 

Decision and Rule to reflect information gained based on experience in the storage of spent 

nuclear fuel and the increased uncertainty in the siting and construction of a permanent geologic 

repository for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste. In response to the 2010 

Waste Confidence Decision and Rule, the states of New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, and 

Vermont, and several other parties challenged the Commission’s NEPA analysis in the decision, 

which provided the regulatory basis for the rule. On June 8, 2012, the United States Court of 

Appeals, in New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d 471 (D.C. Cir. 2012), vacated the NRC’s Waste 

Confidence Decision and Rule, after finding that it did not comply with NEPA. 
Appendix A 

 A-25 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

 

In response to the court’s ruling, the Commission issued CLI-12-16 on August 7, 2012, in which 

the Commission determined that it would not issue licenses that rely upon the Waste 

Confidence Decision and Rule until the issues identified in the court’s decision are appropriately 

addressed by the Commission. CLI-12-16 provided, however, that the decision not to issue 

licenses only applied to final license issuance; all licensing reviews and proceedings should 

continue to move forward. In SRM-COMSECY-12-0016, dated September 6, 2012, the 

Commission directed the NRC staff to proceed with a rulemaking that includes the development 

of a generic EIS to support a revised Waste Confidence Decision and Rule and to publish both 

the EIS and the revised Waste Confidence Decision and Rule in the Federal Register within 

24 months (by September 6, 2014). The Commission indicated that both the EIS and the 

revised Waste Confidence Decision and Rule should build on the information already 

documented in various NRC studies and reports, including the existing environmental 

assessment that the NRC developed as part of the 2010 Waste Confidence Decision and Rule. 

The Commission directed that any additional analyses should focus on the issues identified in 

the D.C. Circuit’s decision. The Commission also directed that the NRC staff provide ample 

opportunity for public comment on both the draft EIS and the proposed Waste Confidence 

Decision and Rule. 

In accordance with CLI-12-16, the NRC will not approve any site-specific license renewal 

applications until the deficiencies identified in the D.C. Circuit’s decision have been resolved. 

Two license renewal issues that rely, wholly or in part, upon the Waste Confidence Decision and 

Rule are the “onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel” and “offsite radiological impacts of spent 

nuclear fuel and high-level waste disposal.” Both of these issues were classified as Category 1 

in the 1996 GEIS and the 10 CFR Part 51 final rule that was promulgated in 1996 (61 FR 

28467, June 5, 1996), which codified the findings of the 1996 GEIS into 10 CFR Part 51, 

Subpart A, Appendix B, Table B-1. The draft revised GEIS that was published for public 

comment in 2009 (74 FR 38239, July 31, 2009) and the concomitant proposed rule (74 FR 

38117, July 31, 2009) continued the Category 1 classification for both of these issues. As part 

of the NRC’s response to the New York v. NRC decision, the NRC has revised these two issues 

accordingly. 

Specifically, the NRC has revised the Category 1 issue, “Onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel,” 

to narrow the period of onsite storage to the license renewal term. In both the 1996 GEIS and 

rule and the 2009 draft revised GEIS and proposed rule, the NRC relied upon the Waste 

Confidence Decision and Rule to make a generic finding that spent nuclear fuel could be stored 

safely onsite with no more than a small environmental impact for the term of the extended 

license (from approval of the license renewal application to the expiration of the operating 

license) plus a 30 year period following the permanent shutdown of the power reactor and 

expiration of the operating license. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-26 

The Waste Confidence Decision and Rule provided the basis for the 30 year period following 

the permanent shutdown of the reactor and expiration of the operating license. The 2010 Waste 

Confidence Decision and Rule extended this post-reactor shutdown onsite storage period from 

30 years to 60 years. Given the New York v. NRC decision, and pending the issuance of a 

generic EIS and revised Waste Confidence Decision and Rule (as directed by SRM-COMSECY12-0016), the period of onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel following the permanent shutdown of 

the power reactor and expiration of the operating license is now excluded from this GEIS issue. 

This issue now only covers the onsite storage of spent fuel during the license renewal term. 

Similarly, the NRC has revised the Category 1 issue, “Offsite radiological impacts of spent 

nuclear fuel and high-level waste disposal.” This issue pertains to the long-term disposal of 

spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste, including possible disposal in a deep geologic 

repository. Although the Waste Confidence Decision and Rule did not assess the impacts 

associated with disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste in a repository, it did reflect 

the Commission’s confidence, at the time, in the technical feasibility of a repository and when 

that repository could have been expected to become available. Without the analysis in the 

Waste Confidence Decision, the NRC cannot assess how long the spent fuel will need to be 

stored onsite. Therefore, the NRC has reclassified this issue from a Category 1 issue with no 

assigned impact level to an uncategorized issue with an impact level of uncertain. 

Upon issuance of the revised Waste Confidence Decision and Rule and its supporting generic 

EIS, the NRC will make any necessary conforming amendments to its regulations in 10 CFR 

Part 51 and supplement the GEIS as necessary. As referenced previously, the Commission will 

not approve any license renewal application for an operating nuclear power plant until the 

issues identified in the New York v. NRC court’s decision are appropriately addressed by the 

Commission. 

Comment: Of the issues identified in the DGEIS as "small", DOS recommends that the 

following should be elevated to the moderate or large category and be required to be addressed 

in detail in a site-specific SEIS. 

Aesthetic impacts: Large scale alterations may occur as a result of nuclear power plant relicensure. For facilities that are proposed to be significantly altered, aesthetic impacts should be 

considered in a SEIS. (NY DOS-18-2) 

Response: To date, there have been no significant alterations of nuclear power plant facilities 

associated with license renewal that would result in a MODERATE or LARGE impact to 

aesthetics. Such a modification would be considered new and significant information and would 

be evaluated in the plant-specific supplemental environmental impact statement (SEIS). No 

change was made to the GEIS in response to this comment.
Appendix A 

 A-27 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

A.2.1.3 Comments Concerning Air Quality, Meteorology, and Climatology 

Comment: Then I'm very interested in meteorology that is discussed, I thought in a positive 

way, starting at 330, 331, etcetera. Those are the pages, I didn't write down the names of the 

chapters. Affected environment. 

In fact, I was talking to the meteorologist who was expert witness for Pilgrim Watch and for the 

New York and he was saying have you seen anything in there? It started to look good because 

they did mention the revision to Reg. Guide 1.23 that mentions complex environments, that 

sounded good, but then it didn’t go anywhere, it wasn’t hooked into anything. It wasn't hooked 

into SAMA, it wasn't hooked into plume models, it wasn't hooked into anything. 

Then you start yapping about tornados. I went what? Where did this come from? There are 

three pages of where tornados have occurred, as opposed to discussing okay, what's this 

mean? Complex sites, what is a complex site? Therefore, what plume models should be being 

used, should only be allowed to be used at these sites in the environmental impact statement, 

as opposed to talking about tornados. You know, you could have been talking about the latest 

movie or something, you know? That made no sense to me and I think, quite clearly, what is 

important, when you are talking about the environment, is air dispersion and dispersion through 

water. (NMA-PW-15) 

Response: The section referred to in the comment discusses the affected environment of 

commercial nuclear power plant sites. It is not a discussion on how to choose models or which 

models to apply to various situations. Responses to comments on plume models appear in 

Section A.2.1.13 of the GEIS. 

Section 3.3.1 to which the comment refers lays out the requirements for characterizing the 

climate and meteorology including the monitoring requirements in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.23 

(NRC 2007). Tornados are an important consideration at reactor sites due to their potential for 

damaging structures. Complex sites are defined in the text by example as coastal areas, hills of 

significant grade, or valleys. No changes were made to the GEIS in response to this comment. 

Comment: Air quality impacts of continued operations and refurbishment activities: 

Section 4.3 in the draft updated GEIS (p. 4-12 to 4-16) discusses the environmental 

consequences of both continued operations and refurbishment activities on air quality at nuclear 

power plants. Continued operations are addressed on pages 4-13 and 4-14, with the following 

conclusion [emphasis added]: 

Thus, although there is the potential for some air quality impacts to occur as a 

result of equipment and cooling tower operations, even in the worst-case situation 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-28 

(Hope Creek), the impacts would be considered small, at least in part because 

licensees would be required to operate within State permit requirements. On the 

basis of these considerations, the NRC concludes that the impact of continued

operations during the license renewal term on air quality would be small for all

plants, and would be a Category 1 issue. 

Refurbishment activities are addressed on pages 4-14 through 4-16, with the following 

conclusion [emphasis added]: 

In the 1996 GEIS, the NRC concluded that the impacts from plant refurbishment associated with 

license renewal on air quality could range from small to large, although these impacts were 

expected to be small for most plants. Air quality impacts resulting from construction vehicle, 

equipment, and fugitive dust emissions could be small or moderate depending on project and 

plant-specific details. On the basis of these considerations, the NRC concludes that the impact 

of refurbishment activities on air quality during the license renewal term would be small for most 

plants, but could be MODERATE for plants located in or near air quality nonattainment or 

maintenance areas, depending on the nature of the planned activity. The impacts would be 

temporary and cease once projects were completed. Therefore, the impact on air quality from 

refurbishment activities remains a Category 2 issue.

NRC summarized the above-quoted conclusions in the column labeled “Finding” for the entry in 

the row labeled “Air quality (non-attainment and maintenance areas)” in Table B-1 of 

Appendix B to the draft updated GEIS (pages B-3 and B-4) as follows: 

Small, moderate, or large impact (Category 2). Air quality impacts of continued operations and 

refurbishment activities associated with the license renewal term are expected to be small. 

However, emissions during these activities could be a cause for concern at locations in or near 

air quality nonattainment or maintenance areas. The significance of the impact cannot be 

determined without considering the compliance status of each site and the activities that could 

occur. These impacts would be short-lived and cease after projects were completed. 

Emissions from testing emergency diesel generators and fire pumps and from routine 

operations of boilers used for space heating would not be a concern, even for those plants 

located in or adjacent to nonattainment areas. Although particulate emissions from cooling 

towers may be a concern for a very limited number of plants located in States that regulate such 

emissions, the impacts in even these worst-case situations have been small. 

Given the conclusions quoted above from Section 4.3 in the draft updated GEIS (Volume 1), 

industry believes that the “Finding” quoted above from Table B-1 of Appendix B to the draft 

updated GEIS (Volume 2) for the issue labeled “Air quality (non-attainment and maintenance 

areas)” is incorrect. Accordingly, the finding should be revised and the issue should be 
Appendix A 

 A-29 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

categorized as “Category 1” instead of “Category 2” for the reasons discussed in the paragraphs 

below. 

On pages 4-13 and 4-14 the draft updated GEIS explains that the impact of continued plant 

operations during the license renewal term on air quality was not identified as an issue in the 

1996 GEIS. Accordingly, the draft updated GEIS provides an evaluation of this impact and 

concludes that, although there is the potential for some air quality impacts to occur as a result of 

equipment and cooling tower operations, even in an upper bound situation (Hope Creek), the 

impacts are small, in no small part because licensees are required to operate within State 

permit requirements. On the basis of these considerations, the draft updated GEIS concludes 

that the impact of continued operations during the license renewal term on air quality would be 

small for all plants. 

The air emissions impact of refurbishment activities is discussed on pages 4-14 to 4-16 of the 

draft updated GEIS. This discussion mentions no example of refurbishment activities that could 

cause large impacts. According to the discussion, emissions from construction equipment and 

fugitive dust emissions from ground clearing and grading activities would cause small impacts in 

most cases, but in a few cases (e.g., building demolition, debris removal, and new construction) 

could cause moderate impacts that would be of concern in geographical areas with poor or 

marginal air quality. For this reason, the draft updated GEIS concludes that the impact of 

refurbishment activities on air quality would be a Category 2 issue, although such impacts would 

be temporary and would cease once a refurbishment project is completed. 

Table B-1 of Appendix B to the draft updated GEIS (Volume 2) for the issue labeled “Air quality 

(non-attainment and maintenance areas)” reports the combined impact of continued plant 

operations and refurbishment activities as “small, moderate, or large,” which is not consistent 

with the conclusions of the analyses presented on pages 4-13 through 4-16, as the two 

paragraphs above clearly demonstrate. Furthermore, Table B-1 of Appendix B relies on the 

incorrect impact characterization to categorize the issue labeled “Air quality (nonattainment and 

maintenance areas)” as “Category 2”. The following paragraphs demonstrate that the updated 

GEIS should be changed to conclude that the combined impact on air quality in non-attainment 

and maintenance areas of continued plant operations and refurbishment activities is small and 

that the “Air quality (non-attainment and maintenance areas)” issue is “Category 1.” 

Because the draft updated GEIS already concludes that the impact of continued operations 

during the license renewal term on air quality would be small for all plants, this discussion 

focuses on the analysis of air quality impact from refurbishment activities. According to the draft 

updated GEIS, potential sources of air quality impacts during refurbishment activities are (1) 

fugitive dust from site excavation and grading and (2) emissions from motorized equipment, 

construction vehicles, and workers’ vehicles. The draft updated GEIS also states that, with 

application of adequate controls or mitigation measures and best practices, the air quality 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-30 

impacts from these air pollution sources would be small and of relatively short duration. 

Industry agrees with these statements, which are supported by lessons learned as stated in 

Section 1.10 of the draft updated GEIS and knowledge gained from refurbishment activities 

associated with license renewal applications filed since the 1996 GEIS was published. For 

example, air quality impacts from refurbishment activities at Beaver Valley (Supplement 36), 

Three Mile Island (Supplement 37) and Indian Point (Supplement 38) (all of which are located in 

nonattainment counties as shown in Appendix D, Table D.2-2, in the draft updated GEIS 

(Volume 2)) were determined to be small. These cases present evidence that use of 

appropriate best management practices (staggered work shifts, construction site and haul road 

wetting, and carpooling) would adequately mitigate the impact of refurbishment emissions. 

Furthermore, nuclear power plant licensees must conduct reviews of applicable requirements 

for new or modified state and local emissions permits prior to initiating refurbishment activities. 

Construction permits would be obtained where required by applicable regulations and State 

Implementation Plans (SIPs), which ensure protection of human health and the environment. 

These permits include conditions and limits, as needed to further mitigate the impact from 

emissions of concern in geographical areas with poor or marginal air quality. These measures 

assure that the impact of refurbishment emissions at any nuclear power plant seeking license 

renewal from the NRC would be small. 

Since the impact from continued plant operations and the impact from refurbishment activities 

would both be small for most nuclear power plants and (2) if needed, state and/or local permits 

would impose conditions to further mitigate the impact from emissions of concern during the 

short duration of refurbishment activities at particular plants, the NRC should modify the finding 

for the issue labeled “Air quality (non-attainment and maintenance areas)” in Table B-1 of 

Appendix B in the draft updated GEIS to read as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics 

font = addition): 

Small, moderate, or large impact (Category 21). Air quality impacts of 

refurbishment activities associated with the license renewal term would be shortlived and cease after refurbishment projects have been completed. Such 

impacts are expected to be small. However, emissions during these activities 

could be a cause for concern at At locations in or near air quality nonattainment 

or maintenance areas, the implementation of best management practices and the 

issuance of new or modified conditions in state and local emissions permits that 

would further mitigate impacts from refurbishment emissions would assure 

conformance to the applicable State Implementation Plans. The significance of 

the impact cannot be determined without considering the compliance status of 

each site and the activities that could occur. These impacts would be short-lived

and cease after projects were completed.
Appendix A 

 A-31 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Emissions from testing emergency diesel generators and fire pumps and from 

routine operations of boilers used for space heating would not be a concern, 

even for those plants located in or adjacent to nonattainment areas. Although 

particulate emissions from cooling towers may be a concern for a very limited 

number of plants located in States that regulate such emissions, the impacts in 

even these worst-case situations have been small. 

The updated GEIS should be changed throughout (e.g., Volume 1: Summary, Chapter 2, and 

Chapter 4), to reflect this change in Volume 2: Appendix B, Table B-1. (NEI1-7(4)-1) 

Response: The NRC agrees with the commenter and has revised Section 4.3.1.1 of the draft 

revised GEIS to indicate that impacts on air quality would be SMALL for all plants and therefore 

a Category 1 issue. As presented in the revised GEIS, operating experience has shown that the 

potential impact from emergency generators and boilers on air quality would be expected to be 

SMALL for all plants and, given the infrequency and short duration of maintenance testing, 

would not be an air quality concern even at those plants located in or adjacent to nonattainment 

areas. Likewise, recent analysis has shown that the worst-case emissions related to cooling 

tower drift droplets and particulate emissions at operating plants were SMALL. Further, air 

quality impacts resulting from construction vehicle, equipment, and fugitive dust emissions 

associated with refurbishment would be SMALL for most plants, but they could be cause for 

concern for plants located in or near air quality nonattainment or maintenance areas. However, 

the impacts would be temporary and would cease once projects were completed, and operating 

experience has shown that refurbishment activities have not required the large numbers of 

workers and the months of time analyzed in the 1996 GEIS, nor have such activities resulted in 

exceedances in the de minimis thresholds for criteria pollutants in nonattainment and 

maintenance areas. 

Comment: Page 4-17, lines 7 to 17: Text in lines 7 to 17 on page 4-17 reads as follows: 

Impacts on crop production that may have been caused by transmission line interference with 

aerial spraying have been reported by one field study of cotton, rice, and soybean fields crossed 

by a 500-kV line in eastern Arkansas (Parsch and Norman 1986). This study hypothesized that 

crop yields could be reduced either by electromagnetic fields (EMFs) or by inadequate aerial 

spraying directly under the power lines. Only cotton yields were found to be reduced; 15 

percent less lint was produced under the lines than 150 ft from the lines. The resulting loss of 

income from cotton was estimated as $85.25 per year for an 1100-ft (335-m) span of the lines, 

based on a 15 percent yield reduction and an average lint yield of 480 lb/acre. The field 

sampling and statistical analyses were extensive; the observed yield reduction appeared to be 

real rather than a sampling error. However, the study could not determine whether the EMF or 

line interference with aerial spraying caused the yield reduction. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-32 

The above-quoted text, which appears in lines 7 to 17 on page 4-17 of the draft updated GEIS, 

is located within a subsection titled “Air Quality Effects on [sic] Transmission Lines.” It is not 

clear how this text, which describes a study of the effects of aerial crop spraying and/or 

electromagnetic fields on crop yield under transmission lines, is related to the effects of 

transmission lines on air quality, which is the topic of the subsection. Consider deleting all text 

in lines 7 to 17 on page 4-17. (NEI1-7(4)-87) 

Response: Since this discussion concerns the impact of transmission line ROWs on offsite 

land use, this paragraph has been removed from the discussion of “Air Quality Effects of 

Transmission Lines” in Section 4.3.1.1, and added to the discussion of “Impacts of Transmission 

Line ROWs on Offsite Land Use” in Section 4.2.1.1. 

Comment: Page 7-23, lines 10 to 14: Text in lines 10 to 14 on page 7-23 reads as follows: 

Greenhouse gases: Those gases, such as water vapor, carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, methane, 

hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride, that are 

transparent to solar (short-wave) radiation but opaque to long-wave (infrared) radiation, thus 

preventing long-wave radiant energy from leaving the earth’s atmosphere. The net effect is a 

trapping of absorbed radiation and a tendency to warm the planet’s surface. 

Because the primary focus of discussions of greenhouse gases in the draft updated GEIS is on 

anthropogenic greenhouse gases and the need to control emissions of such gases to slow 

global climate change, consider deleting “water vapor,” from the list of example greenhouse 

gases in the “Greenhouse gases” definition. Although water vapor is a naturally occurring 

greenhouse gas, emission of water vapor from electric power plants and other industrial 

facilities has not been identified as an environmental concern. (NEI1-7(4)-110) 

Response: The definition of greenhouse gases in Section 7 (Glossary) of the GEIS has been 

modified in response to this comment by deleting the words “water vapor” and adding the 

following statement for clarity: “While also a product of industrial activities, carbon dioxide, 

nitrous oxide, methane, ozone, and water vapor are naturally occurring greenhouse gases.”

Comment: A4NR [Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility] et al recommends that the GElS should 

include scoping and analysis of the effects of climate change on reactor operations for the 

duration of the relicensed period. The past decade has provided ample evidence of reactors 

both domestically and internationally whose operations have been curtailed and whose reliability 

has been diminished by droughts, high ambient cooling water temperatures, unanticipated ice 

flows and other climate disturbances. Both NASA and NOAA predict an increase in these 

events during the coming decades and the Obama administration is considering adding the 

impacts of such exigencies to NEPA. The NRC would do well to follow the lead of the 

administration on this issue. (A4NR-11-38) 
Appendix A 

 A-33 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Response: NRC follows closely the scientific debate regarding climate change, and has 

developed guidance related to the topic for its reviews of applications for combined licenses for 

new nuclear plants. Climate change and its possible effects on nuclear power plant operations 

are discussed in the GEIS under the issues “Surface Water Use Conflicts (Plants with OnceThrough Cooling Systems)” and “Surface Water Use Conflicts (Plants with Cooling Ponds or 

Cooling Towers Using Makeup Water from a River)” in Section 4.5.1.1 of the GEIS. In addition, 

a new section specific to climate change has been added as Section 4.12.3.2 (Climate Change 

Impacts) and under Section 4.13 (Cumulative Impacts) of the GEIS.

A.2.1.4 Comments Concerning Geology and Soils 

Comment: Page S-6, lines 11 to 17: Text in lines 11 to 17 on page S-6 reads as follows: 

The NRC described the affected environment in terms of the following resource 

areas and activities: (1) land use and visual resources; (2) meteorology, air quality, 

and noise; (3) soils, geology, and seismology; (4) hydrology (surface water and 

groundwater); (5) ecology (terrestrial and aquatic resources; threatened, 

endangered, and protected species and essential fish habitat); (6) historic and 

cultural resources; (7) socioeconomics; (8) human health; (9) environmental 

justice; and (10) waste management and pollution prevention. The affected 

environments of the operating plant sites represent diverse environmental 

conditions.

The above-quoted paragraph, which appears in lines 11 to 17 on page S-6, indicates that one 

resource area described as part of the affected environment by the NRC in the draft updated 

GEIS (item (3)) consists of “soils, geology, and seismology.” The NRC is encouraged to delete 

the reference to seismology in line 13 on page S-6, and in the following other locations 

throughout the draft updated GEIS: 

• Page vii, Table of Contents, section 3.4 (delete “Seismology” for the section title) 

• Page 1-17, line 22, section 1.11, 3rd paragraph, item (3) (delete the word 

“seismology”)Page 3-1, lines 4 to 25, text box containing “Contents of Chapter 3”, 2nd

bullet, 3rd sub-bullet (delete the word “seismology”) 

• Page 3-49, line 14, section 3.4, title (delete “Seismology” for the section title) 

• Page 3-50, lines 15 to 25 (delete the paragraph in lines 15 to 25) 

• Page 4-28, lines 27 to 30 (delete the paragraph in lines 27 to 30) 

These deletions are appropriate because seismology is not an environmental resource that 

could be affected by continued nuclear power plant operation and refurbishment activities, or for 

which environmental mitigation measures, such as avoidance, could be implemented. While the 

NRC correctly acknowledges that nuclear power plants are constructed according to the seismic 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-34 

specifications in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix S, the draft updated GEIS does not provide 

adequate justification for this issue to be considered under NEPA in the context of license 

renewal. If seismic conditions at a nuclear power plant site are found to have changed since its 

initial site selection and licensing, then the licensee may need to review the design basis of the 

plant to ensure that nuclear safety margins are maintained. This review would occur as part of 

routine plant operation programs under 10 CFR [Part] 50. However, this issue should not justify 

environmental review under NEPA during license renewal for an existing plant. Accordingly, if 

consideration of seismology is warranted during license renewal, the NRC is encouraged to 

address the issue as a plant nuclear safety issue, rather than as an environmental issue. 

If the NRC is concerned about the environmental and human health effects of radioactive 

material releases that may occur as a result of seismic activity, such effects have already been 

evaluated, independent of cause, and determined to be SMALL for Category 1 issues related to 

aquatic organisms, low-level waste management storage, offsite impacts of spent fuel and highlevel waste disposal, mixed waste storage and disposal, and the uranium fuel cycle. The NEPA 

review for all of these issues was documented in the 1996 GEIS. (NEI1-7(4)-7) 

Comment: Page S-6: For purposes of the evaluation in this GElS revision, the "affected 

environment" is the environment currently existing around operating commercial nuclear power 

plants. Current conditions in the affected environment are the result of past construction and 

operations at the plants. The NRC has considered the effects of these past and ongoing 

impacts and how they have shaped the environment. The NRC evaluated impacts of license 

renewal that are incremental to existing conditions. These existing conditions serve as the 

baseline for the evaluation and include the effects of past and present actions at the plants. 

The NRC described the affected environment in terms of the following resource areas and 

activities: (1) land use and visual resources; (2) meteorology, air quality, and noise; (3) soils,

geology, and seismology; (4) hydrology (surface water and groundwater); ...the affected 

environments of the operating plant sites represent diverse environmental conditions.” 

HOWEVER, on the following page of the GElS, when listing this item specifically, it makes NO 

mention of seismic issues at all, while continuing to consider "Geology and Soils" as one topic. 

(A4NR-11-33) 

Comment: Page 4-28, lines 27 to 30: Text in lines 27 to 30 on page 4-28 reads as follows: 

As discussed in Section 3.4, nuclear power plants are constructed according to seismic 

specifications in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix S. Spent fuel pools are designed with reinforced 

concrete, allowing them to remain operable through the largest earthquake that has occurred or 

is expected to occur in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant. 
Appendix A 

 A-35 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

The NRC is encouraged to delete the paragraph in lines 27 to 30 on page 4-28 because it is 

more precisely an issue for current plant operation and is not directly related to plant 

refurbishment and operations during the extended term of operation resulting from license 

renewal. Furthermore, seismology is not a resource that is impacted by such activities. 

(NEI1-7(4)-13) 

Comment: Page S-5: Category 1 issues are those that meet all of the following criteria: 

(1) The environmental impacts associated with the issue have been determined to apply 

either to all plants or, for some issues, to plants having a specific type of cooling system 

or other specified plant or site characteristics; 

(2) A single significance level (i.e., small, moderate, or large) has been assigned to the 

impacts (except for collective offsite radiological impacts from the fuel cycle and from 

high-level waste and spent fuel); 

(3) Mitigation of adverse impacts associated with the issue has been considered in the 

analysis, and it has been determined that additional plant-specific mitigation measures 

would probably not be sufficiently beneficial to warrant implementation. 

For issues that meet the three Category 1 criteria, no additional plant-specific analysis is 

required in future SEISs unless new and significant information is identified. 

A4NR, et al, find the above descriptions for criteria constituting a Category 1 issue to be 

inconsistent and incomplete. For example, as cited below in S.4, the NRC lists item 3 as 

follows: (3) soils, geology, and seismology which seem inclusive of seismology. (A4NR-11-32) 

Comment: Page S-7 & S–8: Impacts on geology and soils would be small at all plants if best 

management practices were employed to reduce erosion. This is a Category 1 issue. July 

2009 S-7 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

And yet, on page 2-7 it mentions geology and soils without including "seismic" while making the 

blanket statement that "Geology and Soils" is a generic category 1 issue. 

Geology and Soils − Impacts of nuclear plants on geology and soils Small impact (Category 1). 

Impacts on geology and soils would be small at all nuclear plants if best management practices 

were employed to reduce erosion associated with continued operations and refurbishment. July 

2009 2-7 NUREG-1437, Rev 1 

The NRC must clarify the subcategories of item (3) Geology and soils. It includes seismic 

issues, or it does not; seismic issues (standing alone as an issue) are deemed to be category 1, 

or as we maintain, must be deemed category 2 and therefore site specific. This confusing mix 

of usage of the terms "Geology and Soils" is either meant to obfuscate or minimize the impacts 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-36 

of seismic issues on continued nuclear plant operations. This is certainly the case in California, 

where new USGS information has revealed a previously undisclosed and unstudied fault 

1800 feet from the Diablo Canyon Power Plant. As previously indicated in these comments, the 

cautionary tale of the 2007 Japanese earthquake at the Kashiwazaka-Kariwa plant must be 

heeded by the NRC. In the case of the San Onofre plant, also singled out for special attention 

in the one paragraph dealing with seismic issues in detail (3-50) there have been no new or 

updated seismic studies since the plant was licensed. In the case of Diablo Canyon, the NRC 

has relied on the utility's own internal seismic study program, and not subjected their results to 

analysis from independent or outside consultants. 

All seismic issues be moved to Category 2 and require consultation from the USGS as well as 

independent seismic studies apart from the utility at all facilities with seismic concerns. 

(A4NR-11-34) 

Comment: I share the concern, and I guess I have to repeat this. When you put seismic 

issues under geology and soils, rather than try to look like it's simplifying anything, it really looks 

like you're burying it. 

And if there's one item for every plant, that needs to be looked at individually, it has got to be 

seismic. I mean, you've got what was supposed to be, you know, built to the utmost of seismic 

capability, suffering from an earthquake. 

We have that situation here. It needs to be called out, it needs to be looked at, and it needs to 

be updated by you, not just PG&E. We have a credibility issue here, when the party who's 

asking for the permit is the one who provides you with the information. 

So we need to see that as a separate category and have you be updating it constantly as 

information becomes available. (PBCA-Pinard-14) 

Comment: The Proposed GEIS contains a wholly inadequate discussion of seismic issues that 

could affect power reactors and associated systems, structures, and components, such as 

aging pipes, spent fuel pools, cooling structures, stacks, and concrete containment. Although 

the document spans 600 pages it contains only the most passing reference to seismic issues. 

Proposed GEIS at p. 3-50 (lines 15-25). This cursory reference contains no recognition that 

older plants and components were constructed before the advent of modern seismic building 

regulations nor does it recognize that seismic understanding and hazard analysis has expanded 

and improved over the last two decades. 

The full extent of the Proposed GElS's discussion of seismic issues follows: 
Appendix A 

 A-37 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Nuclear power plants are constructed according to seismic specifications in 10 CFR Part 50, 

Appendix S. Their spent fuel pools are designed with reinforced concrete, allowing them to 

remain operable through the largest earthquake that has occurred or is expected to occur in the 

area. The U.S. Geological Survey (Frankel et al. 2005) mapped seismic hazards across the 

United States. In terms of the peak horizontal acceleration with a 10 percent probability of 

exceedance in 50 years, most nuclear power plants are located in seismically low-hazard areas, 

with peak accelerations of 0 to 8 percent of gravity. However, the two California plants − Diablo 

Canyon and San Onofre − are in locations with peak acceleration of 25 to 30 percent of gravity. 

These plants have been designed to safely withstand the seismic effects associated with 

earthquakes with epicenters at various locations and at various depths, magnitudes, and ground 

accelerations (AEC 1973; Southern California Edison 2007). 

Id. The first two sentences also appear later in the document. Id. at 4-28 (lines 27-30).11

[

11 The USGS reference is to Frankel, A.D., M.D. Petersen, C.S. Mueller, KM. Haller, R.L. Wheeler, E.V. 

Leyendecker, R.L. Wesson, S.C. Harmsen, C.H. Cramer, D.M. Perkins, and KS. Rukstales. 2005. Scientific 

Investigations Map 2883, Seismic-Hazard Maps for the Conterminous United States. Proposed GEIS at p. 3-161 

(citing U.S. Geological Survey. Available URL: http://pubs. usgs.gov/sim/2005/2883/ (accessed October 3,2007)). 

According to USGS, the referenced seismic hazard maps were published four years ago in 2005 and were based on 

work dating back to 2002 and earlier Frankel, A, Petersen, M., Mueller, C., Haller, K., Wheeler, R, Leyendecker, E.V., 

Wesson, R., Harmsen, S., Cramer, C., M.,Perkins, D., and Rukstales, K., 2002, Documentation for the 2002 Update 

of the National Seismic-Hazard Maps: See U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 02-420, 39 p. 

(http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2002/ofr-02-420D.] 

Indian Point Unit 1 and its systems, structures, and components − such as pipes, building walls 

and roofs, and cooling water, ventilation, and electric systems − were built at a time when there 

were no meaningful AEC seismic regulations and the understanding of regional seismic 

conditions was quite rudimentary. Although NRC revoked the operating license for the Indian 

Point Unit 1 power reactor in 1980, many of Unit l's system, structures, and components were 

conjoined to Unit 2 and Unit 3 and are still in use today. These aging Unit 1 systems, 

structures, and components that were built to inferior seismic specifications, and Unit 2 and 

Unit 3's continued reliance on these systems today poses a significant safety question. 

Updated hazard assessments by the United States Geological Survey and a recent study 

published in the Bulletin Of The Seismological Society Of America that reports the discovery of 

a new and near-by seismic feature further underscore this safety concern. 

The absence of any discussion or recognition that knowledge of intraplate and interplate 

seismicity has changed since the 1950s and 1960s when some the components and reactors 

were manufactures, installed, or constructed or that the most recent USGS seismic hazard 

analyses for existing reactor locations east of the Rocky Mountains reflects a higher hazard than 

that which was anticipated when those reactors were initially constructed and licensed 

constitutes a fundamental flaw in the environmental impact statement. This omission coupled 

with Staffs preference not to subject renewal applications to seismic reviews based on up-to-
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-38 

date seismic information impedes any contribution or participation by the public in this important 

aspect of the inquiry of whether or not to permit the facility to operate beyond its 40-year 

license. The minimalist mention of the issue in the Proposed GEIS makes it likely that the 

License Renewal Application itself, the associated Environmental Report, and Staffs sitespecific EIS will not analyze the issue in any meaningful manner. This omission and the 

exclusion of analysis can be seen in the response to the Indian Point license renewal 

applications.l2

[

12 The probability of the occurrence of a severe seismic event is directly tied to the time period involved. Thus, by 

extending the license to operate a nuclear plant by an additional 20 years, the risk of a severe seismic event 

occurring during the operating life of the plant is increased by 50%, making the issue one that is appropriate for 

consideration in the license renewal proceeding.] 

The commenter also requested that the GEIS expressly direct applicants to: 

• provide a thorough discussion of the facility's current seismic profile in the Environmental 

Report; and 

• examine the facility's current seismic hazard through the Significant Accident Mitigation 

Alternative (SAMA) program that came about as a result of the Third Circuit's Limerick 

Ecology v. NRC decision. 

In short, given the Commission's commitment to "protecting people and the environment," the 

Commission should insist on and welcome a searching inquiry in to seismic risks posed by the 

extended operation of each power reactor facility. 

The commenter further stated that it is imperative that the GEIS now under development 

acknowledge that older systems, structures and components should be subjected to close 

scrutiny with respect to seismic hazards and risks. 

The commenter concluded by stating that: “On a broader level, as NRC is aware, USGS has 

informed the Commission that reactor sites located in the central and eastern United States 

have a higher seismic hazard than previously recognized. NRC should take this opportunity to 

modify the proposed GEIS and revamp its approach to such hazards to ensure that a thorough 

and transparent review takes place at this important juncture.” (NYS AG-14-14) 

Comment: In past license renewal proceedings, the NRC has excluded an examination of 

seismic hazards, plant security, emergency preparedness, environmental review of spent fuel 

storage and analysis of spent fuel storage options from the scope of NRC's license renewal 

review. The NRC's Office of Inspector General completed an audit of the license renewal 

process in September 2007 and concluded that NRC staff should improve their analyses and 

audits (OIG-07-A~15). An important means for improving the NRC's license renewal process 

would be to revise the license renewal review to allow important site-specific issues to be 

reexamined during this review. For example, new and significant information that has arisen 
Appendix A 

 A-39 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

since a plant originally received its operating license should be examined during license renewal 

reviews. 

The discovery, announced to the public in 2008, of a new Shoreline Fault near Diablo Canyon is 

an example of new and significant seismic information that should be reviewed (Category 2 

issues) during Diablo Canyon's license renewal review. The USGS and PG&E are conducting 

additional seismic research in the vicinity of Diablo Canyon and the Energy Commission has 

recommended additional tsunami and seismic research at both Diablo Canyon and SONGS. 

The NRC and the USGS are beginning in January 2010 an independent assessment of Diablo 

Canyon's seismic research program. New and significant seismic research information resulting 

from these studies must be considered in Diablo Canyon's license renewal review. Seismic 

issues, particularly when new and significant seismic research information is available, should 

be considered Category 2, site-specific issues to be examined during license renewal reviews 

for these plants. (CEC-9(1)-11) 

Comment: I wish to make some comments regarding geology and soils. I note on page 2-7 

that it is claimed that there is merely a "small impact" on geology and soils at all nuclear power 

facilities "if best management practices were employed to reduce erosion associated with 

continued operations and refurbishment" Excuse me, but seeing that "Geology and Soils" is the 

category, one must look at the effects not only of the nuclear power facility on Geology and 

Soils, but must also examine the effect of geology I soils I seismic setting on the nuclear power 

facility. Also, if one seriously examined potential effects on the nuclear power facility by shifting 

geology, soils, and seismic setting, then one would realize that this could result in a major 

accident which then would bring much larger than a "small" impact to the soils of such a facility 

due to serious radiological contamination from the nuclear power facility. 

The NRC may well cling to their claim that there is just a small impact from geology and soils, 

but seeing that seismicity was ignored, and seeing that the effect of the geological setting on the 

nuclear facilities was ignored, clearly "Geology and Soils" (including seismic setting) need 

considerably more study and are site-specific, thus calling for a "Category 2" determination. 

How can parts of the document consider and label "Geology and Soils" as a "Category 1" issue 

when the first three full sentences on page 3-50 of the GEIS says, "However, within each 

province, the local geology may differ significantly from the regional conditions. The geologic 

setting of each plant is therefore a site-specific function of the local geology rather than the 

physiographic province in which it is located. Plants are located in a wide variety of settings, 

including uplands along rivers, glaciated till plains, Great Lakes shorelines, and coastal sites."(?) 

The first sentence in the next paragraph says, "The geologic resources in the vicinity of each 

nuclear power plant vary with the location." (Campbell-31-7) 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-40 

Comment: It can be noted, for example, that under the one seemingly innoxious category of 

soils and geology, seismic is also in soils and geology. How would one relegate seismic issues 

to a generic category when you have plants sitting on as diverse seismic backgrounds as Indian 

Point's fault on the Hudson River or the New Madrid fault that runs through the lower Midwest to 

the southeast. Not to mention, of course, our differing faults here on the Pacific Coast. 

So, the idea that in one -- in fact, you notice this and Rochelle and I have been through most of 

the 600-page document enough to give you a word count. The seismic paragraph consists of 

152 words out of the 600 pages. 

And given that we now know at the Diablo Canyon and PG&E has announced that there is a 

new earthquake fault, it would seem that evolving science, and one who lives in California one 

always hears that seismology is constantly an evolving science, would require the inability to 

consider this a generic impact. 

So, what I bring up is this. While there may be many questions and many considerations for 

failure or flaws in the Generic Environmental Impact Statement, the fact is the residents of 

California can make it a moot point. You needn't concern yourself in a sense beyond a certain 

point and here's why. As Ms. Becker alluded, in the current process, the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission has not denied a single application for relicensing nor has any state that has 

brought particular contentions whether it was State of New Jersey's Department of 

Environmental Protection at Oyster Creek or those in New England or now the State of New 

York has filed. None of them have ever been -- have prevailed. No State has ever prevailed in 

an attempt to stop a license renewal at great cost to taxpayers whose money funds the attorney 

generals and those who must pursue these things. (DPCA-A4NR2-39) 

Comment: Also the seismic setting of California nuclear facilities. So of course out here is 

basically the largest subsidiary of the San Andreas Fault, the Hosgri into the San Simeon, into 

the San Gorgonio, and then meeting the San Andreas Fault off the San Francisco area, San 

Francisco-Marin area. And then the Hosgri already had a 7.3 to 7.5 quake, November 24th, 

1927, west of Lompoc. 

And there's also splays from the Hosgri fault, even before this latest seismic information which I 

haven't researched yet. And then San Onofre has the Cristianitos Fault which runs beneath the 

reactor, a few miles offshore is the Newport-Inglewood Fault, the largest Southern California 

coastal area fault, which was responsible for the Long Beach quake of 1933, and in the last few 

months, there was a four point something quake in the Lenox area of Los Angeles County, 

along the Newport-Inglewood Fault. 

I don't trust PG&E to do mapping of the seismic situation. I don't trust the NRC to do it. I 

actually didn't trust Sandia Labs, who is right next to Lawrence Livermore Labs. However, they 
Appendix A 

 A-41 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

did a reactor accident consequence study, and it came out in late 1982, and for Diablo, as I 

recall, the statistic was that something like 10,300, or 400 deaths in the first year, in worst-case 

reactor accident consequences with the worst weather patterns, predicted about a little over 

10,000 deaths in the first year, some eventual deaths from cancer, and I believe it was 

$158 million property damage. 

Of course since then the -- what's the population grown? maybe by three times in the 

immediate area, especially the five cities into Santa Maria. And obviously property went way up 

in value, even though it's gone down some in the last couple years. 

And so these are -- anyway, seismic is not generic. However, fine, let's have thorough seismic 

studies of all nuclear reactors. Remember the New Madrid Fault, sort of in the Mississippi River 

area, had a massive quake back in the mid 1800's, and the highest concentration of nuclear 

reactors in the country is in Illinois. So let's do study, not -- how can you study seismicity 

generically? Ah! If you want to study seismicity generically, at the dawn of winter solstice, 

2012, it's the end of the Mayan calendar, and apparently there will be a total solar eclipse at 

dawn, with the sun, moon, Earth, and the galactic center, meaning the black hole, all in a line. 

Do you want to be San Luis Obispo county at that point? I sure won’t be. 

Let's see. So anyway, we need really independent researchers to do seismic studies at all 

nuclear facilities in the country, especially in California. (PBCA-Campbell-31) 

Comment: Someone needs to point out that we are failing. We're failing on many levels. Let 

me give you your report card to the nuclear industry, the NRC, and nuclear technology, in 

general. 

Earthquake geology. You get an F. You misjudged the Hosgri Fault, the other faults that are in 

the immediate area, as a threat to our lives. (PBCA-Biesek-41) 

Comment: In the interest of protecting public safety and the environment, ensuring plant 

reliability, and lowering electricity costs to California consumers, we reiterate many of the 

concerns and recommendations that we expressed in our September 17, 2003, comments on 

the NRC's' revision of its GElS for License Renewal of Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG-1437). 

In light of the well-documented seismic hazards at both the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant 

and the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) in California, it is a major 

shortcoming that the Draft GEIS’ discussion of seismic safety is limited to only one paragraph 

(See p. 3-5, GEIS). We strongly urge the NRC to consider seismic Issues as Category 2 sitespecific Issues that should be addressed in plant license renewal reviews. The impacts from 

the 2007 earthquake on the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant in Japan highlight the 

importance of site-specific reviews of seismic safety. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-42 

The discovery in the late 1960's of the Hosgri Fault − an active major offshore fault near Diablo 

Canyon in California − while the plant was under construction led to years of investigations and 

hearings as well as revised plant design and seismic retrofits. This discovery was one of the 

main causes of construction delays that resulted in Diablo Canyon Unit 1 not becoming 

operational until 1984─15 years after work began at the site. The USGS' discovery of a new 

fault in 2008 near Diablo Canyon reinforces the need for updating seismic research information 

for the site and for a site-specific reexamination of seismic issues during license renewal 

reviews. (CEC-9-1) 

Comment: Seismic Risks: The draft GEIS’ discussion of seismic hazards at nuclear power 

plants is completely inadequate. The discussion is limited to only one short paragraph. It 

places seismic issues under the broader heading of "Geology and Soils" and considers it a 

generic, Category 1 issue (p. 3-50, GEIS). Seismic issues should be considered plant-specific 

Category 2 issues, particularly at seismically active reactor sites such as Diablo Canyon and 

SONGS. In addition, seismic issues must be considered plant-specific Category 2 issues at 

Diablo Canyon in light of the newly discovered active Shoreline Fault, which has raised 

questions about the seismic hazard at the reactor site. The NRC concluded that Diablo Canyon 

and SONGS "have been designed to safely withstand the seismic effects associated with 

earthquakes with epicenters at various locations and at various depths, magnitudes, and ground 

accelerations (p. 3-50). However, support for this conclusion is based upon an outdated report 

(1973) by the Atomic Energy Commission and a Southern California Edison report (2007). 

Both of California's operating nuclear power plants are located in highly seismically active areas 

on the Pacific Coast. The discovery in the late 1960s of a major offshore fault − the Hosgri 

Fault − located 4.5 kilometers west of Diablo Canyon, resulted in years of investigations and 

hearings and the redesign and seismic retrofit of Diablo Canyon − an effort that resulted in 

Unit 1 not becoming operational until 1984, about 15 years after work at the site began. In 1984 

the NRC made a condition of the operating license for Diablo Canyon that, "PG&E shall develop 

and implement a State-of-the-Art Program to revalidate the seismic design bases used for 

Diablo Canyon.”1

 In November 2008, PG&E and USGS announced the discovery of a 

previously unidentified offshore fault – the Shoreline Fault − approximately one kilometer west 

of Diablo Canyon that has a capacity to generate a magnitude 6.5 earthquake. PG&E is 

working with the USGS to study earthquake hazards along the coastline in central and northern 

California, including near Diablo Canyon. The NRC and the USGS will conduct an independent 

review of PG&E's Long-Term Seismic Program (LTSP) program in 2010. Seismologic and 

geologic data that have become available since SONGS was built indicate that this plant site 

could experience larger and more frequent earthquakes than had been anticipated when the 

plant was designed.2

[

1

 Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units I and 2, Dockets 

Nos. 50-275 and 50-323, NUREG-0675, Supplement No. 27, July 1984, p. 8.] 
Appendix A 

 A-43 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

[

2

 2008 Integrated Energy Policy Report, p. 7, at http://www.energy.ca.gov/ab1632/documents/index.html] 

In 2008, the Energy Commission, as directed by California Assembly Bill 1632 (Blakeslee, 

Chapter 722, Statutes of 2006), completed a comprehensive assessment of the vulnerability of 

Diablo Canyon and SONGS to a major disruption due to a seismic event and plant aging.3

 AB 

1632 further directed the Energy Commission to assess the impacts of such a disruption on 

system reliability, public safety and the economy and assess the costs and impacts from nuclear 

waste accumulating at these plants. This assessment included a major consultant study by an 

interdisciplinary study team, public hearings, and review of academic, scientific and government 

reports and data provided by California's nuclear plant owners. To assist with this seismic 

vulnerability assessment, the Energy Commission formed a Seismic Vulnerability Advisory 

Team made up of seismic safety experts from California's Seismic Safety Commission, 

Geological Survey and Coastal Commission. This major study resulted in a number of 

recommendations by the Energy Commission including that PG&E and SCE should conduct 

advanced seismic hazard and vulnerability studies at Diablo Canyon and SONGS, including 

using three-dimensional geophysical seismic reflection mapping and other advanced techniques 

to explore fault zones near Diablo Canyon. 

[

3 An Assessment of California's Nuclear Power Plants: AB 1632 Report, November 200B (CEC-100-2008-2009-009-

CMF) and AB 1632 Assessment of California's Operating Nuclear Plants which can be obtained from the Energy 

Commission's website at http://www.enerqv.ca.qov/ab1632/documents/index.html.

Seismic events can cause major problems for nuclear power plants, as demonstrated by the 

July 2007 earthquake in Japan. The largest nuclear power plant in the world − the 

Kashiwazaka-Kariwa nuclear plant − remains in partial shutdown over 2.5 years following this 

earthquake. This earthquake magnitude exceeded values used for the plant design, and the 

resulting damage has necessitated costly plant repairs and large expenses to purchase 

replacement power during the plant's outage. (CEC-9(1)-1) 

Comment: We have, tonight, I am just going to talk about three brief topics in general which we 

would like the staff to consider, the first is seismology. We feel that seismology should be 

removed from consideration in the GEIS. Seismology we feel is a condition of the site, it is 

unaffected by continued operation of the plant. Instead, seismology continues to be and is 

adequately covered by rule as a safety issue. (NMA-NEI-1) 

Comment: Earthquake Risks Should be Category 2: It is contrary to current NRC regulations 

to license a nuclear facility next to an active, major earthquake fault. The NRC "grandfathered" 

the license for Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, buying into PG&E's excuse that it was 

unaware of the Hosgri Fault when it first invested billions of ratepayer dollars to building the 

plant, beginning in the late 1960's. The Hosgri Fault comes within 3.5 miles of the plant. The 

NRC is prohibited by its own regulations from taking into account corporate profits rather than 

public safety, but that is exactly what it did. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-44 

The Draft GElS gives little attention given to seismology in the Draft GElS except to reassure 

the public that the two California plants "have been designed to safely withstand the seismic 

effects associated with earthquakes..." (3-50, lines 23,24) 

The newly-discovered Shoreline Fault, less than one mile offshore of the Diablo site, has not 

been thoroughly studied yet, but it clearly exacerbates an already precarious situation. Clearly, 

in the case of Diablo Canyon − and perhaps other plants − the impact of previously unknown 

seismological conditions has the potential to be quite large, and the issue should be placed in 

Category 2. The NRC implicitly acknowledges that it is not able to analyze earthquake risks 

generically in Appendix E, where it states that earthquake risks for the Diablo Canyon and San 

Onofre nuclear power plants were excluded from consideration of the risks of a spent fuel pool 

fire. Page E-33. (SLOMFP-13-15) 

Comment: So safe accommodation as the NRC claims. At Songs and Diablo, the earthquake 

and tsunami dangers are completely different from any other plant, obviously. 

(PBCA-Schumann-9) 

Comment: The NRC should not even consider renewing an operating license if new 

earthquake faults have been discovered during the current operating period of the license. 

Since quakes are often sudden and come with no warning, thus the seismic settings are not 

"gradual and predictable" and should clearly be deemed Category 2. (Campbell-31-21) 

Comment: Page 3-50: Nuclear power plants are constructed according to seismic 

specifications in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix S. Their spent fuel pools are designed with 

reinforced concrete, allowing them to remain operable through the largest earthquake that has 

occurred or is expected to occur in the area. The U.S. Geological Survey (Frankel et al. 2005) 

mapped seismic hazards across the United States. In terms of the peak horizontal acceleration 

with a 10 percent probability of exceedance in 50 years, most nuclear power plants are located 

in seismically low-hazard areas, with peak accelerations of 0 to 8 percent of gravity. However, 

the two California plants − Diablo Canyon and San Onofre − are in locations with peak 

acceleration of 25 to 30 percent of gravity. These plants have been designed to safely 

withstand the seismic effects associated with earthquakes with epicenters at various locations 

and at various depths, magnitudes, and ground accelerations (AEC 1973; Southern California 

Edison 2007). 

We are amazed that seismic issues which could impact safety margins at reactor sites, not only 

in California, but ranging from Indian Point in New York to sites along the New Madrid Fault 

from Missouri through Tennessee to South Carolina, have been limited to one paragraph, only 

153 words, in the NRC's 602 page draft GElS. 
Appendix A 

 A-45 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

The NRC has placed seismic issues under the broader heading of "Geology and Soils: Small 

Impact, Category 1". The NRC should not allow any seismic issues to be deemed Category 1. 

The NRC should not accept applications from utilities that have disclosed new active 

earthquake faults within the past decade. The NRC should not allow any applications from 

utilities until state mandated studies on the implications of new seismic studies are reviewed, 

adopted and implemented. 

In Section 1.1 Purpose of GElS (page 1-2) states "(3) Changes in the environment around 

nuclear power plants are gradual and predictable." This is clearly not the case with seismic 

events that are conversely both sudden and unpredictable. The most recent case in point is the 

July 2007 Kashiwazaka-Kariwa nuclear plant shutdown due to the earthquake in Niigata 

Prefecture. This devastating event exceeded all the predictions for ground motion that the 

Japanese nuclear safety agencies had predicted, as well as the design basis for the plant, and 

has resulted in a loss of generation for over two years from the world's largest nuclear power 

plant. (A4NR-11-22) 

Comment: Aging reactors with colocated high-level, above-ground radioactive waste facilities, 

within two and a half miles from two major active faults, should be a clear indication that license 

renewal recommendations should be to deny an additional 20 years [see identifier 

PBCA-Cochran-6 for the comment on radioactive waste], and certainly seismic should come up 

to stage two, or Category 2 concern. 

And where is the NRC's man -- and the NRC's mandate is the expertise to evaluate the 

environmental impacts of alternative sources, granted. PG&E always gives seismic data, and 

we don't hear it from other independent sources. 

We hope that the NRC will put into effect some of their "go to" independent agencies to find out 

some of the seismic problems. 

Right now, the PG&E is going to try to get ratepayers to pay for 3-D mapping, the newest 

technology, and seismic technology, and we're hoping that the NRC will make their own studies 

and get independent people to come up with those studies. 

And I should have been organized. I apologize. And considering -- this is my last comment. 

Considering this long timeframe to relicense, PG&E should wait for seismic and safety reports, 

since if you, as the NRC, a public agency, knows that something may be dangerous, and we do 

have a new fault there, and several faults that might be underground that we don't about yet, 

that you know something might be dangerous, it would be a dereliction of duty not to fully 

investigate with independent sources. (PBCA-Cochran-7) 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-46 

Comment: The tsunami hazards at Diablo Canyon and SONGS must also be reexamined 

during license renewal reviews. Currently available tsunami studies for both plants are at least 

10 years old and do not take advantage of modern tools and recent studies that could improve 

the quality of the assessments such as new data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration, new probabilistic hazard assessments, and inundation modeling.4

 The 

December 26, 2004, Great Sumatran earthquake that resulted in widespread and catastrophic 

tsunami impacts and loss of life around the Indian Ocean caused the automatic shut-down of 

the Kalpakkam nuclear power plant on the east coast of India, which was restarted six days 

later.5

 In light of the new and significant seismic information that is available for plant sites since 

the original operating licenses were issued, the seismic and tsunami hazards for nuclear power 

plants should be examined as Category 2 site-specific issues during license renewal reviews. 

[

4

 Ed42008 IEPR, p. 9 (see above).] 

[

5

 Volcanic and Tectonic Hazard Assessment for Nuclear Facilities Edited by C. B. Connor, N. A. Chapman and L. J. 

Connor, Cambridge University Press, 978-0-521-88797, p. 4.] (CEC-9(1)-2) 

Comment: But, I'm really more frightened about the safety factor because I don't think there's a 

way to make it safe and nobody's proven to me that there is a way to make it safe. I think we 

live under the law of accident and let's say we have an 8.5 shaker. At that plant, I think, 

according to what I heard last time, that plant really isn't equipped to even test the seismic 

responsibility to that place because of the nature of the way it's constructed. I heard that from 

an engineer. (DPCA-Collamer-33) 

Comment: So, we haven't come up with the solutions to these problems [see identifier 

DPCA-Pack-43 for the comment on these problems] and we're adding new ones and the new 

one that I would particularly like to address today is the containment structure of San Onofre. 

That particular containment structure was built specifically because we live in an area that is 

sensitive to earthquakes. It sits about three miles off the Newport/Inglewood fault and so, to try 

to make it safer, the structure containing the reactor was beefed up tremendously. It has about 

ten feet of concrete, steel and rebar and I just don 't understand how you could cut a 28 by 

28 foot hole through a containment structure like that, take out the generator, put in a new 

generator and close it back up and have the same type of integrity that you had in the first 

place. It can't be done. 

So, we've added to the issues of evacuation planning and safety and what do we do with the 

waste. Now, how do we make a containment structure the same level of integrity that it was 

before. (DPCA-Pack-44) 

Comment: So, I was sitting in the chair here and the train went by over here and my chair was 

rumbling and I think that plant is closer to the railroad tracks than the train that's running by here 
Appendix A 

 A-47 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

and then I keep remembering that they don't have really a way of testing the seismic 

responsibility of this mega-boiler sitting on sand. (DPCA-Collamer-35) 

Response: Seismology is the study of earthquakes and the earth's structure, and relevant 

information on seismology is appropriate for inclusion in a description of the geology of the 

affected environment. Seismicity relates to the likelihood and risk of earthquakes (i.e., the 

seismic hazard). Although impacts to geology and soils are considered a Category 1 issue, that 

issue does not include a consideration of seismic hazard and impacts on plant operation and 

safety. Seismic hazard is assessed in the site-specific safety review, where appropriate, that is 

performed for license renewals, rather than in the environmental review. Further, the NRC 

requires all licensees to take into account changes in seismic hazard in order to maintain safe 

operating conditions at all nuclear power plants. When new seismic hazard information 

becomes available, the NRC evaluates the new information to determine if any changes are 

needed at existing plants. This reactor oversight process, which includes seismic safety, is 

separate from license renewal. Thus, the topics of seismicity and seismic hazard are not 

included within the Category 1 issue of geology and soils, as inferred by the commenters, but is 

rather considered outside of the scope of the environmental review. Sections 3.4 and 4.4.1 of 

the GEIS have been revised to eliminate confusion related to the treatment of seismic issues in 

the GEIS. Section 3.4 has specifically been revised to include a discussion of the original 

design and site selection considerations with respect to geologic and seismic criteria for 

U.S. nuclear power plants. A brief description of the seismic setting is retained in Section 3.4 of 

the GEIS only as it relates to the geologic affected environment. 

With respect to report OIG-07-A-15 issued by the NRC’s Office of Inspector General (OIG), the 

OIG completed this audit of the license renewal safety review process in 2007. As a result, the 

OIG made eight recommendations related to how the NRC conducts its safety reviews for 

license renewal. The NRC successfully closed all these recommendations in under three years, 

resulting in improvements to many areas of the license renewal program. No recommendations 

were made relative to license renewal environmental reviews as a result of the OIG’s audit. 

Where comment SLOMFP-13-15 references the exclusion of Diablo Canyon and San Onofre 

from an analysis of spent fuel pool fire risk, it is important to note that the report being discussed 

in Appendix E, NUREG-1738, “Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at 

Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,” was based on updated seismic hazard information for 

plants east of the Rocky Mountains. Although data for plants west of the Rocky Mountains, 

including Diablo Canyon, San Onofre, and Columbia was not specifically analyzed, nothing in 

NUREG-1738 undermines the conclusion in the 1996 GEIS that the impacts of SFP severe 

accidents will be comparable to reactor severe accidents for all facilities. The text in Appendix E 

was updated to clarify that seismic hazard information for plants east of the Rocky Mountains 

were considered for NUREG-1738.
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-48 

Comment: It is ironic that some portions of the documents acknowledge "diverse 

environmental conditions" (page S-6) and shifting biological communities, yet there are 

unsupported claims acting like all environments at and around nuclear power facilities are very 

stable, unchanging, and predictable. You can't have it both ways even if you have some 

lawyers instructing you what to say in some portions so that the document's conclusions may 

have a better chance of being validated in a courtroom. 

For instance, page S-6 of the GEIS says, "The affected environments of the operating plant 

sites represent diverse environmental conditions." And on page S-7 (under the heading 

"S.5 Impacts from Continued Operations and Refurbishment Activities Associated with License 

Renewal"), it says under "Geology and Soils" that "Impacts on geology and soils would be small 

at all plants if best management practices were employed to reduce erosion.” This is a 

Category 1 issue." 

I note that it says on page 3-49, "Soils and subsoils at nuclear plant sites also vary in terms of 

their geotechnical properties relative to site construction projects and their hydraulic properties 

relative to the movement of infiltration, groundwater, and contaminants." It goes on to say that 

certain nuclear sites must be protected from erosion including along riverbanks and along 

coastlines. Thus, more reason to consider such issues a Category 2. (Campbell-31-8) 

Response: Section 3.4, Geologic Environment, of the revised GEIS describes the range of 

geologic and soil conditions at existing nuclear power plant sites, as well as the range of 

possible geologic hazards including erosional processes. Although geology and soils may vary 

greatly both locally and regionally, pertinent issues such as erosion potential and control, soil 

properties and geotechnical design, and hydraulic parameters were assessed and, if necessary, 

addressed during site design and construction. Moreover, the NRC evaluates new information 

that could affect the safety of operating nuclear power plants, such as severe erosion, on an 

ongoing basis to determine if any changes are needed at existing plants. This ongoing reactor 

oversight process is separate and distinct from the NRC’s consideration of the license renewal 

application, which is a discrete event. If the license renewal application is approved, this 

ongoing reactor oversight process will continue throughout the period of extended operation. 

The impact of continued operations and refurbishment activities during the license renewal term 

on geologic and soil resources would consist of soil disturbance for various projects, as 

identified in Section 4.4.1 of the GEIS. To date, plant-specific license renewal environmental 

reviews conducted by the NRC have not identified any significant impact issues related to 

geology and soils from continued operations and refurbishment and, thus, the “geology and 

soils” issue is classified as Category 1. If, during future license renewal environmental reviews, 

new and significant information is identified, that information would be evaluated, and the results 

of the evaluation would be presented in the SEIS. No changes were made to the GEIS in 

response to this comment.
Appendix A 

 A-49 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Comment: Page 3 – 49: Soils and subsoils at nuclear plant sites also vary in terms of their 

geotechnical properties relative to site construction projects and their hydraulic properties 

relative to the movement of infiltration, groundwater, and contaminants. Depending on the 

nuclear plant's location and design, riverbanks or coastlines may need to be protected to 

prevent erosion, especially at water intake or discharge structures. 

Recent USGS and state studies have disclosed increasing erosion, especially at San Onofre 

Beach (SONGS site) at an average rate of close to 2 meters per year.3

[

3

 (source: "Rates and trends of coastal change in California and the regional behavior of the beach and cliff system." 

Hapke, Reid and Richmond in THE JOURNAL OF COASTAL RESEARCH)] 

All erosions studies (post 2000) must be included in SEIS and not decided in any way that 

would prevent erosion issues from being heard if SCE files for a license renewal for SONGS. 

(A4NR-11-21) 

Comment: Besides some points regarding Geology and Soils being mentioned earlier, I also 

want to mention my concern in regard to the beach erosion at the San Onofre facility. Certainly, 

significant recent erosion at that site certainly makes not only that, but adds to the importance of 

examining many other components of the facility (including big demolition and construction jobs 

related to steam generator replacement). Since the plan is to replace steam generators at 

Diablo Canyon and at San Onofre in this general time frame under the older operating license, 

how many other steam generator replacements should we expect during the "life/half-life" of the 

facility operation at those facilities? (Campbell-31-19) 

Response: The impact of nuclear power plant operations and refurbishment on geologic and 

soil resources, including potential erosion, is considered a Category 1 issue, which does not 

require a site-specific analysis during an environmental review unless there is new and 

significant information that would indicate impacts could be greater than SMALL. To date, plantspecific license renewal environmental reviews conducted by the NRC have not identified any 

significant impacts related to geology and soils from continued operations and reburbishment 

activities, as described in Section 4.4.1 of the revised GEIS. However, as part of license 

renewal environmental reviews, changes in plant operating parameters or new and significant 

information pertinent to an evaluation of impacts are considered during preparation of plantspecific supplements to the GEIS. Data are reviewed in part for information that could change 

the conclusion in the GEIS with regard to an issue. In the case of coastal erosion, this might 

include a license renewal applicant proposing to undertake shoreline protection projects in 

support of license renewal. In a similar manner, if significant erosion at or near SONGS, or any 

other nuclear power plant, is attributable to the plant, it would be incorporated in a license 

renewal evaluation. Thus, even though this issue is considered Category 1, there are 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-50 

mechanisms in place to conduct a full site-specific review if new and significant information 

warrants such a review. 

In addition, the impact of erosion on the power plant would be considered in the safety review 

for the license renewal, rather than in the environmental review. The NRC also evaluates new 

information that could affect the safety of operating nuclear power plants, such as erosion, on 

an ongoing basis to determine if any changes are needed at existing plants. This ongoing 

reactor oversight process is separate and distinct from the license renewal process. If the 

license renewal application is approved, this ongoing reactor oversight process will continue 

throughout the period of extended operation. 

No changes have been made to the GEIS in response to these comments.

Comment: Page 4-28, lines 23 to 25: Text in lines 23 to 25 on page 4-28 reads as follows: 

In addition, the Farmland Protection Policy Act requires Federal Agencies to take into 

account agency actions affecting the preservation of farmland. 

Although the above-quoted statement is accurate and the Farmland Protection Policy Act 

(FPPA) could apply in some circumstances to development of renewable energy resources (as 

an alternative to the proposed action), the FPPA does not generally apply to private 

construction, even if such construction is subject to federal permitting and licensing activities 

(e.g., license renewal of nuclear power plants) (see Farmland Protection Act Fact Sheet at 

http://www.farmlandinfo.org/documents/29480/FPPA_8-06.pdf and Section 2(c)(4) of the Act). 

Consider deleting the quoted text in lines 23 to 25 on page 4-28 of the draft updated GEIS. 

(NEI1-7(4)-88) 

Response: The Staff agrees that the FPPA does not generally apply to private construction. 

However, for clarity and completeness, Section 4.4.1 of the GEIS has been revised to note that 

while the FPPA could apply in some circumstances at nuclear power plant sites 

(e.g., development of renewable energy resources as an alternative to license renewal, other 

projects completed with Federal assistance including funding), it does not apply to the NRC 

issuing or renewing the operating license of nuclear power plants located on private or nonFederal lands. Nevertheless, consideration of the presence of important farmland soils in the 

GEIS is consistent with NRC’s resource-based approach to NEPA compliance and helps to 

ensure that NRC has integrated its NEPA process with all other consultation and environmental 

review requirements. 

Comment: Page 4-28, lines 38 and 39 and Page 4-29, lines 1 to 29: Text in lines 38 and 39 on 

page 4-28 and lines 1 to 29 on page 4-29 contains sections 4.4.2 (Environmental 
Appendix A 

 A-51 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Consequences of Alternatives to the Proposed Action) and 4.4.2.1 (Renewable Alternatives), 

which address the impacts on geology and soils of alternatives to the proposed action. 

Consider adding text in Section 4.4.2 on pages 4-28 and 4-29 explaining why impacts on 

geology and soils from construction and operation of the fossil-fueled alternative and the new 

nuclear alternative are not discussed. (NEI1-7(4)-89) 

Response: Section 4.4.2 of the GEIS has been revised to include an expanded summary 

discussion, which indicates that the impacts of construction for all alternatives (including fossil 

energy, new nuclear, and renewable alternatives) would be similar.

A.2.1.5 Comments Concerning Water Quality, Hydrology, and Use 

Comment: I notice that page S-9 mentions "unlined" cooling ponds. What percentage of 

nuclear power facilities in the USA have unlined cooling ponds? Would not unlined ponds leak 

and infiltrate more than lined ponds? I call for this issue to be a Category 2 issue since there 

obviously are different kinds of soil, varying infiltration rates, and differing groundwater situations 

at each nuclear power facility. What is involved with "groundwater protection programs" if at 

least some of them fail to even take the basic precaution of lining the cooling ponds for the hot 

spent nuclear fuel? Is the spent nuclear fuel too "hot" to allow a liner to last very long, so the 

industry figures why bother? (Campbell-31-6) 

Response: As described in Section 4.5.1.2 (Groundwater Quality Degradation for Plants Using 

Cooling Ponds in Salt Marches, and Groundwater Quality Degradation for Plants Using Cooling 

Ponds at Inland Sites), all of the large cooling ponds are unlined. However, they do not receive 

spent nuclear fuel as suggested by the commenter, but rather cooling water that does not come 

into contact with nuclear fuel. In the case of salt marshes, any infiltrated water is not expected 

to degrade groundwater quality; therefore, the issue is considered Category 1. In the case of 

inland sites, the issue is considered Category 2 because of the variation in site-specific factors 

such as pond water quality, hydrogeology, and water well locations. No changes were made to 

the GEIS in response to this comment.

Comment: Also, in this age of depleting water supplies, the massive amount of water needed 

to cool reactors and cool cooling ponds, that needs to be considered, both generically and 

individually, for the nuclear power facilities around the nation. (PBCA-Campbell-33) 

Comment: Of the issues identified in the DGEIS as "small", DOS recommends that the 

following should be elevated to the moderate or large category and be required to be addressed 

in detail in a site-specific SEIS. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-52 

Water use conflicts: Water use conflicts may be exacerbated by continual water withdrawals at 

a nuclear facility, especially given population increases in the vicinity of existing facilities. 

(NY DOS-18-5) 

Response: As described in revised Section 4.5.1.1, surface water use for cooling purposes is 

addressed in three issues. For two issues (Surface Water Use and Quality [Non-Cooling 

System Impacts] and Surface Water Use Conflicts [Plants with Once-Through Cooling 

Systems]), the Category 1 designation is considered appropriate because, as presented in the 

GEIS, the NRC review of available information determined that the impacts would be SMALL for 

all plants (the first issue) and for plants with once-through cooling systems (the second issue). 

For non-cooling system-related impacts, NRC’s finding is predicated on the fact that licensees 

are expected to use best management practices during the license renewal term for both 

continuing operations and refurbishment activities including those to minimize soil erosion and 

implementation of spill prevention and control plans. For the second Category 1 issue, license 

renewal environmental reviews conducted since issuance of the 1996 GEIS have found that 

surface water use conflicts continue to be SMALL in association with plants with once-through 

cooling systems because they return most of their withdrawn water to the same surface water 

body. The third issue (Surface Water Use Conflicts [Plants with Cooling Ponds or Cooling 

Towers Using Makeup Water from a River]) was considered Category 2 because plants with 

these types of cooling systems return less water to the source water body, and, therefore, under 

certain circumstances, operations could result in MODERATE impacts. It should be noted that 

for these and all other impact issues, new and significant information can be used to reach a 

different conclusion than that presented in the GEIS. As noted in Section 4.5.1.1 of the GEIS, 

increased temperature and decreased rainfall resulting from climate change could adversely 

affect water availability. Such changes could be considered new and significant information 

and, if so, would be evaluated in plant-specific reviews. No changes were made to the GEIS in 

response to these comments.

Comment: Global Warming: The Draft defines global warming in the Glossary; but most 

important, NRC fails to consider its impact on nuclear reactor operations during an extended 

license. It properly should be considered on a site specific, Category 2, basis in license 

renewal. 

Global phenomena can be anticipated to produce localized effects dependent on site specific 

conditions. For example, power plants that cool directly with seawater would be affected by 

increased severity of storms and increased salinity in sea water affecting corrosion. Erosion 

and/or submergence of shorelines could place some buried components underwater, impacting 

corrosion in buried components and thereby an increase in potential leaks of radioactivity 

offsite. Increased severity of flooding or storm surge would also have the potential flood at 

grade or below grade structures and components including, but not limited to pump houses, 
Appendix A 

 A-53 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

reactor building basements, spent fuel pools, buried components associated with the following 

systems − service water, condensate storage, fuel oil, station blackout diesel generator, and fire 

protection systems. 

Increased ocean, lake, [and] river water temperatures would magnify the effect of cooling water 

discharge on the biotic community. Warmer average temperatures would, varied by sitespecific conditions, result in increased localized humidity and increased incidences of 

atmospheric temperature inversions. Changes in degree and incidence of these phenomena 

may result in increasing the dose from radiological releases radiation to the public and should 

be analyzed on a site specific basis. 

Early warnings at the dawn of commercial nuclear development posited just such scenarios: "A 

gently seeping nuclear reactor can put its radioactive poison under a stable inversion layer and 

concentrate it onto a few hundred square miles in a truly deadly fashion...By being careful and 

also by good luck, we have so far avoided all serious nuclear accidents." Dr. Edward Teller, 

Journal of Petroleum Technology: Issue 2 May 1965. (PW-6-18) 

Response: The commenter expresses concerns related to the effects of climate change on 

operations and operational safety at nuclear power plants. The NRC’s environmental review is 

confined to analyzing the effects on the environment of continued operation of nuclear power 

plants through the period of extended operation. It should be noted that the effects of climate 

change on the safe design and operation of a nuclear power plant would be evaluated as part of 

NRC’s safety review of license renewals, rather than as part of the environmental review. 

As described in Section 4.5.1.1, climate change is considered in the discussion of two issues 

(Surface Water Use Conflicts [Plants with Once-Through Cooling Systems], and Surface Water 

Use Conflicts [Plants with Cooling Ponds or Cooling Towers Using Makeup Water from a 

River]). The former issue is considered Category 1, while the latter issue is considered 

Category 2, partly because of the potential for climate change to affect operations of cooling 

tower systems that have higher consumptive water use compared to once-through systems. 

Regardless, a new section (GHG Emissions and Climate Change [Chapter 4, Section 4.12.3.2]), 

has been added to this revised final GEIS summarizing the potential cumulative environmental 

impacts of GHG emissions and global climate change. The NRC has and will also continue to 

include within each SEIS a plant-specific analysis of any impacts caused by GHG emissions 

over the course of the license renewal term as well as any impacts caused by potential climate 

change upon the affected resources during the license renewal term. No changes were made 

to the GEIS in response to this comment.
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-54 

Comment: Groundwater and soil contamination: Finding in Table B-1 of Appendix B in the draft 

updated GEIS (Volume 2) for the issue labeled “Groundwater and soil contamination” reads as 

follows: 

Small or moderate impact (Category 2). Industrial practices involving the use of solvents, 

hydrocarbons, heavy metals, or other chemicals and unlined wastewater lagoons have the 

potential to contaminate site groundwater, soil, and subsoil. Contamination is subject to Stateand U.S. Environmental Protection Agency regulated cleanup and monitoring programs. 

Section 4.5.1.2 in the draft updated GEIS (pages 4-45 and 4-46) discusses the environmental 

consequences of groundwater and soil chemical contamination during continued operations and 

refurbishment activities at nuclear power plants. This is an issue that was not evaluated in the 

1996 GEIS. 

For the reasons discussed in the following paragraphs, Industry suggests that the “Finding” 

quoted above from Table B-1 of Appendix B to the draft updated GEIS (Volume 2) for the issue 

labeled “Groundwater and soil contamination” should be revised and the categorization changed 

from “Category 2” to “Category 1.” 

Industry believes that the impacts from releases of contaminants to soil and groundwater can be 

adequately and appropriately considered through a generic analysis of contaminant releases 

from safety and non-safety related structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and chemical 

and waste storage systems. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), Clean 

Water Act (CWA), Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), Toxic 

Substances Control Act (TSCA), and Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 

and Liability Act (CERCLA) govern use, storage, disposal, release, and/or cleanup of solvents, 

hydrocarbons, and other potentially hazardous materials. The federal and State regulations 

implementing these laws protect groundwater, surface water, human health and the 

environment by imposing standards for hazardous materials management, including monitoring 

for spills and releases, reporting of monitoring results, and corrective action. The applicability of 

these regulatory protections to nuclear plants is independent of whether the nuclear plants are 

granted license renewals, and releases of hazardous materials will be addressed and 

remediated when they occur, regardless of whether the NRC grants a renewed operating 

license. Thus, this impact issue is similar to plant decommissioning, where the NRC has noted 

that the impacts of decommissioning would occur regardless of license renewal. Appropriate 

environmental and health and safety reviews would occur under NRC, EPA, and State 

regulations, as necessary. Furthermore, best management practices would be used to reduce 

the probability of events that could affect groundwater quality during the current and extended 

license terms. 
Appendix A 

 A-55 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

On the basis of the considerations mentioned above, Industry encourages NRC to change its 

review conclusion about impacts from the issue of “Groundwater and Soil Contamination” from 

“small to moderate” to “small,” and to reclassify this issue from Category 2 to Category 1 in the 

updated GEIS, Appendix B, Table B-1. Also, the draft updated GEIS should be changed 

throughout (i.e., Volumes 1 and 2) to reflect the changes. (NEI1-7(4)-2) 

Response: The presentation of groundwater impacts in Section 4.5.1.2 of the revised GEIS 

has been modified to better clarify the issues associated with license renewal. In making these 

revisions, the NRC has combined two issues, “groundwater use and quality” and “groundwater 

and soil contamination,” into a single Category 1 issue named “groundwater contamination and 

use.” The new consolidated Category 1 issue evaluates the impacts of the industrial use of 

solvents, hydrocarbons, heavy metals, or other chemicals on groundwater, soil, and subsoil at 

nuclear power plant sites during the license renewal term, including the use of wastewater 

disposal ponds or lagoons. Based on previous plant-specific reviews, groundwater and soil 

contamination problems have occurred at some operating plants. These situations have 

required regulatory involvement by State agencies during both monitoring and remediation 

phases. In some cases, remediation has taken place in the form of excavation and recovery 

wells. In these instances, all contamination was either remediated with no further action 

required by regulatory agencies or has been confined to the plant site with remediation 

continuing. Nevertheless, the number of occurrences of such problems can be minimized by 

means of proper material storage and handling, secondary containment, and leak detection 

equipment. In addition, nuclear plants have their own program for handling chemicals, waste, 

and other hazardous and toxic materials in accordance with Federal and State regulations and 

permits and are generally required to employ best management practices to prevent releases to 

the environment. Continued implementation of such programs and procedures such as Spill 

Prevention, Control, and Countermeasure Plans and spill and contingency plans including best 

management practices (e.g., good housekeeping of the plant site, preventive maintenance, 

routine inspections, etc.) would reduce the likelihood of any inadvertent releases to soils and/or 

groundwater. 

Comment: So that gets to the severe accident mitigation analysis, then I was particularly 

interested not only in the SAMA but I was interested in what you had to say about groundwater 

because one of the contentions I have that's still alive and well at Pilgrim has to do with the 

aging contention of the insufficiency of the aging management program for our buried pipes and 

tanks with radioactive contamination. [See identifier NMA-PW-13 for the comment on SAMA.] 

So I was very pleased to see that you are considering that as a contention [too] and pleased 

also to see that Chairman Yaczko [sic] is taking this issue seemingly seriously. 

However, in reading the text that is in this draft, I found insulting and disconcerting because, 

again, the implication was relax and be happy, the focus being on tritium. Why just on tritium? 

You know there are other bad guys that are being released. Look at Indian Point, it's a good 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-56 

example. To give the confidence, and then you listed only a few of the reactor sites that have 

experienced leaks, not certainly all that have, nor is there an honest caveat saying well these 

are the leaks we know about because, get the connection guys, we haven't required monitoring 

wells, except if the water on site is potable, potable, that you can drink it. I only know it in 

French. 

And anyway, the point of it is that obviously we don't know how many leaks are out there 

because no one is testing for it. What, do you expect the licensee to be out there with 

tablespoons and sampling? Of course not. And so, and then you go on in your text about the 

NEI voluntary program, which was a total cave, as far as I’m concerned, by the NRC. You don't 

leave public safety up to industry's voluntary initiatives. 

In the Pilgrim adjudication, my expert witness, Arnold Gutterson, spent considerable time going 

through Entergy's NEI voluntary program, pointing out all the holes and problems with it, that it 

gives absolutely no confidence. And so unless you go the step further and have what initially 

the NRC staff, before it was politically compromised out, had recommended a requirement for 

cathodic detection for buried components and then go further with monitoring wells, go further 

with a more regular inspection program and a required baseline before, you know, right at the 

time of license application, you haven't got any assurance for the public. 

But if you don't know anything and you just read what's in the draft, it's don't worry about it, it's 

all taken care of. There is going to be a voluntary program, just worry about tritium and it's fine, 

there's never been a problem, and I don’t think that should be the role of our public safeguard. 

NRC is supposedly working for the public. I hate to be harsh about it, but I think it's true. 

(NMA-PW-14) 

Response: As described in Section 4.5.1.1, “Radionuclides Released to Groundwater” is 

discussed in the GEIS as a new Category 2 issue. The emphasis in the text is on tritium 

because tritium, in the form of tritiated water, is as mobile as the groundwater in an aquifer. In 

contrast, other radionuclides are generally immobile because of sorption to aquifer materials. 

However, the issue relates to all radionuclides released to groundwater, and is not restricted to 

tritium only. 

Tritium has become an important issue at operating power plants. As described in 

Section 4.5.1.2, the NRC has evaluated the tritium issue and determined that tritiated 

groundwater has generally remained onsite. The only example of offsite tritium had an activity 

concentration above background but well below the EPA’s drinking water standard. 

As a Category 2 issue, a site-specific analysis of groundwater monitoring data is required in the 

environmental reviews of license renewal. No changes were made to the GEIS in response to 

this comment. 
Appendix A 

 A-57 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Comment: Inadequate Assessment of Inadvertent Radioactive Releases to the Environment: 

The Revised GElS acknowledges the problem encountered at various nuclear power plants 

across the country over the past several years of unplanned releases of radionuclides to the 

environment. Given this ongoing issue, it is critical that the license renewal environmental 

review process address all relevant concerns posed by such releases. Unfortunately, the 

NRC's proposed revisions to the 1996 GElS do not go far enough toward ensuring that the 

environmental impacts of such releases will be analyzed in a comprehensive manner. 

A History of Inadvertent Radioactive Releases to the Environment: Unplanned releases of 

radionuclides to the environment have become ubiquitous at nuclear power plants across the 

United States. To date, leaks from varying plant systems have occurred at 29 plants in the 

United States, nearly a third of the United States' operating fleet. Riverkeeper has compiled 

documentation related to these leaks, attached hereto as Exhibit A, for your consideration in this 

rulemaking proceeding. 

It is imperative that the update to the 1996 GElS fully address any and all relevant concerns. 

Unfortunately, as discussed below, the Revised GElS as proposed would not ensure a 

comprehensive review of this issue. (Riverkeeper-20-3) 

Comment: Inadequate Assessment of Inadvertent Radioactive Releases to the Environment: 

The Revised GElS acknowledges the problem encountered at various nuclear power plants 

across the country over the past several years of unplanned releases of radionuclides to the 

environment. Given this ongoing issue, it is critical that the license renewal environmental 

review process address all relevant concerns posed by such releases. Unfortunately, the 

NRC's proposed revisions to the 1996 GElS do not go far enough toward ensuring that the 

environmental impacts of such releases will be analyzed in a comprehensive manner. 

Revised Assessment of Groundwater Resources: The NRC proposes to add a new Category 2 

issue to address radionuclides released to groundwater.7

 It is in this portion of the Revised 

GElS that the NRC recognizes the reality of inadvertent releases of radionuclides: "There is a 

growing concern about radionuclides detected in groundwater at nuclear power plants. These 

releases have occurred as leaks in at least 14 plants.”8

 However, as discussed in more detail 

below, it is apparent that the Revised GElS would not require consideration of the environmental 

impacts of such releases in relation to other "resources areas," i.e. aquatic ecology, terrestrial 

resources, and threatened/endangered species. Providing for such a narrow assessment 

related only to impacts to groundwater would lead to a narrow and incomplete analysis of the 

impacts of such releases to the environment. As discussed below, the NRC must require a 

comprehensive site-specific analysis of the impacts of accidental releases on all relevant 

environmental media. This is the only way to ensure a thorough assessment and accurate 

conclusions as to significance of such inadvertent contamination. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-58 

[

7 See Revised GElS at 4-46 to 4-47; Revised GElS Appendices at B-12.] 

[

8 See Revised GElS at 4-46; see also Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 38122.]

The newly proposed Category 2 issue to address radionuclide releases to groundwater is 

problematic for other reasons as well. While the Proposed Rule implies a focus on an 

assessment of public health impacts, the Revised GElS and associated guidance documents 

notably fail to provide concrete direction to ensure adequate analysis related to such impacts. 

Instead, the Draft Revised SRP and Draft Reg. Guide 4015 provide vague directives, mostly 

emphasizing assessment of groundwater monitoring systems.9

 The Revised GElS even 

appears to largely dismiss public health concerns, stating that "[t]he NRC does not consider 

these tritium releases to be a health risk to the public or onsite workers in any of these 

[previously reported] cases because the tritiated groundwater is expected to remain onsite.”10 

The NRC should provide more specific guidance to ensure that licensees and the NRC 

accurately assess all reasonably foreseeable impacts to public health at particular plants. 

[

9 See Draft Revised SRP at 4.4.6-1 to 4.4.6-3; Draft Reg. Guide 4015 at 31-32.] 

[

10 Revised GElS at 4-47.]

For example, at Indian Point, licensee/license renewal applicant, Entergy Nuclear Operations, 

Inc., (hereinafter "Entergy") acknowledges groundwater contamination that is slowly leaching 

through the underlying bedrock to the Hudson River,11 contrary to the NRC's blanket conclusion 

stating that groundwater contamination has remained onsite. Currently, there is [a] proposed 

project that would site a desalination plant in Rockland County, New York, across and slightly 

downstream from Indian Point, which would withdraw Hudson River water for drinking water.12 

Far from speculative, this proposal is currently in the planning, environmental review, and 

permitting stages.13 Accordingly, an appropriate assessment of the impacts of radionuclide 

releases from the Indian Point facility should include impacts to the public from use of 

contaminated drinking water. Unfortunately, in the Indian Point relicensing proceeding, the NRC 

Staff’s site-specific Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement14 was completely 

devoid of assessment of the impacts of license renewal on drinking water quality in regard to the 

use of the Hudson River as a source of drinking water via the desalination plant.15 Thus, in the 

instant rulemaking, the NRC must provide clear direction so that any reasonably foreseeable 

radionuclide exposure to the public, such as through anticipated drinking water sources, will be 

assessed. 

[

11 See Groundwater Investigation Executive Summary (Indian Point Energy Center, Buchanan, N.Y., Jan. 2008), at 

2-4, available at http://jic.semo.state.ny.us/Resources/ExecutiveSummary%20GW%20final.pdf.] 

[

12 See generally Riverkeeper's IP DSEIS Comments at 22-25.] 

[

13 See generally id.] 

[

14 Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, Supplement 38, Regarding 

Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3, Draft Report for Comment, Main Report (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission December 2008) ("Indian Point Draft Supplemental EIS"), available at, 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1437/supplement38/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).] 
Appendix A 

 A-59 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

[

15 See Indian Point Draft Supplemental EIS at §§ 2.2.7, 4.3. (Riverkeeper-20-4) 

Comment: Inadequate Assessment of Inadvertent Radioactive Releases to the Environment: 

The Revised GElS acknowledges the problem encountered at various nuclear power plants 

across the country over the past several years of unplanned releases of radionuclides to the 

environment. Given this ongoing issue, it is critical that the license renewal environmental 

review process address all relevant concerns posed by such releases. Unfortunately, the 

NRC's proposed revisions to the 1996 GElS do not go far enough toward ensuring that the 

environmental impacts of such releases will be analyzed in a comprehensive manner. 

Revised Assessment of Threatened/Endangered Species: The Revised GElS would expand 

the scope of an existing Category 2 issue related to threatened or endangered species to 

include "essential fish habitats.”27 Riverkeeper believes this addition is an improvement to this 

assessment. Riverkeeper further commends the NRC for recognizing that releases of 

radionuclides to the environment have the potential to impact threatened, endangered, and 

protected aquatic species, and essential fish habitats. In particular, the Revised GElS 

acknowledges that terrestrial and aquatic threatened, endangered, and protected species, and 

essential fish habitats could be affected by, inter alia, "exposure to radionuclides.”28

[

27 See Revised GElS at 4-71 to 4-77; Revised GElS Appendices at B-24.] 

[

28 Revised GElS at 3-73, 4-111, 4-112.]

While this explicit recognition is a departure from the 1996 GElS, Riverkeeper remains 

apprehensive that licensees and the NRC Staff would continue to fail to fully address the 

impacts of inadvertent radioactive releases to the environment on threatened, endangered, and 

protected species, and essential fish habitats, since there is no explicit requirement that such 

impacts be evaluated. For example, the Draft Revised SRP simply requires that site-specific 

supplemental environmental impact statements present a "list of adverse impacts to listed and 

proposed threatened or endangered species or critical habitats from continued operations 

during the renewal term and refurbishment.”29 Given the discussion in the Revised GElS 

recognizing potential impacts from radionuclides, license renewal applicants and NRC Staff 

assessments of this issue should ostensibly include adverse impacts caused by radionuclide 

contamination, both from normal operations as well as inadvertent releases. However, with the 

noted history of accidental radioactive contamination at nuclear power plants, and the tendency 

to evade full review of this issue, as evidenced from the discussion above, a more explicit 

requirement is preferable.30

[

29 Draft Revised SRP at 4.5.5-5.] 

[

30 In the newly required essential fish habitat assessment under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 

Management Act, "adverse impact" is defined as including "direct or indirect physical, chemical, or biological 

alterations of the waters or substrate and loss of, or injury to, benthic organisms, prey species and their habitat, and 

other ecosystem components, if such modifications reduce the quality and/or quantity of EFH." Draft Revised SRP at 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-60 

4.5.5-2. This would ostensibly cover accidental radionuclide contamination, but once again, an overt requirement in 

light of the ongoing problem is preferable.] 

Failure to specifically require this analysis will lead to inadequate environmental reviews of this 

issue. For example, in the Indian Point license renewal proceeding, Entergy's Environmental 

Report and the NRC Staff’s Indian Point Draft Supplemental EIS lack any assessment of the 

potential effects on threatened or endangered species caused by groundwater contamination at 

the facility. Despite leakage of extensive amounts of highly toxic radionuclides from the IP1 and 

IP2 spent fuel pools, including strontium-90 and tritium, into the groundwater around the plant, 

the environmental review documents completed by the license renewal applicant and the NRC 

Staff at no point assesses the effects of such contamination on the Hudson River's federally 

listed shortnose sturgeon, or candidate species, Atlantic sturgeon.31 This is particularly 

concerning due to the known dangers of exposure to these radioactive substances: 

strontium-90 imitates calcium by concentrating in fish bones and shells of clams and blue crab; 

clams are a major part of the diet of sturgeon found in the Hudson River. Therefore, concern 

that Hudson River sturgeon are being exposed to elevated levels of such dangerous 

substances, is wholly warranted. It is, therefore clear that the environmental review in the 

Indian Point relicensing case was lacking in this regard. The NRC must, therefore, explicitly 

require consideration of radionuclide contamination to avoid such deficient assessments in the 

future. 

[

31 See Indian Point Draft Supplemental EIS at 4-49 to 4-53] (Riverkeeper-20-7) 

Comment: Inadequate Assessment of Inadvertent Radioactive Releases to the Environment: 

The Revised GElS acknowledges the problem encountered at various nuclear power plants 

across the country over the past several years of unplanned releases of radionuclides to the 

environment. Given this ongoing issue, it is critical that the license renewal environmental 

review process address all relevant concerns posed by such releases. Unfortunately, the 

NRC's proposed revisions to the 1996 GElS do not go far enough toward ensuring that the 

environmental impacts of such releases will be analyzed in a comprehensive manner. 

Need for a Comprehensive Framework to Assess Inadvertent Radionuclide Releases: As 

discerned from the discussion above, it is evident that the Revised GElS will not ensure a 

complete evaluation of the environmental impacts of inadvertent radionuclide releases from 

nuclear power plant facilities. NRC must implement a comprehensive framework to ensure that 

all aspects of such contamination are properly assessed. At a minimum, NRC must ensure that 

the impacts of unintended radionuclide releases on groundwater, aquatic ecology, terrestrial 

resources, and threatened, endangered, and protected species, and essential fish habitats, are 

all Category 2 issues, with specific requirements for appropriate assessment, as indicated 

above. 
Appendix A 

 A-61 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

However, preferably, the NRC should put all of these issues under one umbrella issue, to 

ensure that an all-inclusive review occurs. Indeed, separating all of the individual environmental 

effects of accidental radioactive contamination does a disservice to the environmental review 

process by disallowing a look at the overall, collective impacts of this issue. 

Notably, the NRC's proposed method of analyzing radionuclide contamination as articulated 

throughout the Revised GElS would lead to inconsistencies in the review process. For example, 

the NRC would apparently require a Category 2 site-specific assessment of radionuclide impact 

to threatened, endangered, and protected species, and essential fish habitats, however, makes 

a generic Category 1 determination with respect to the impacts of radionuclides on aquatic 

organisms. Thus, for example, while the impacts of radioactive contamination to certain 

federally listed fish species would require extra analysis, the impacts to the majority of fish 

species would be categorically dismissed as small. This makes no sense, and, in fact, only 

serves to prove that Category 2 analysis is warranted in relation to effects on aquatic resources 

from inadvertent radioactive contamination. 

Furthermore, instead of a comprehensive review, the NRC's Revised GElS envisions a narrow 

assessment of inadvertent releases that would essentially focus on impacts to groundwater and 

associated public exposure pathways. To the contrary, NEPA requires a broader evaluation of 

environmental impacts beyond mere public health concerns.33 The significance of any 

radiological release is governed by the CEQ regulation defining "significantly"; this definition, 

requires consideration of the context of the action and intensity or severity of the impacts.34 

Accordingly, in order to accurately evaluate the significance of inadvertent radiological release, 

license renewal applicants and the NRC Staff must fully assess all of the impacts to the 

surrounding natural environment. Thus, the need for a comprehensive site-specific review of 

impacts to all relevant environmental media is apparent. 

[

33 See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Counsel, 490 U.S. 360, 374 (1989).] 

[

34 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (requiring analysis often different factors).] 

For example, in the Indian Point license renewal proceeding, Entergy and the NRC Staff’s 

environmental analysis of the leaks from the Indian Point spent fuel pools was seriously 

deficient. In that proceeding, the relevant environmental analyses focused solely on radiological 

doses to humans from the proclaimed "only" exposure pathway, i.e., consumption of aquatic 

foods.35 By determining that the leaks did not exceed public radiation dose limits via 

consumption of aquatic foods, the NRC Staff concluded that the leaks did not have a significant 

impact on "plant workers, the public, or the environment.”36 In their reviews, Entergy and the 

NRC Staff did not perform any analysis of the impacts of the contamination to the Hudson River 

ecosystem. In particular, Entergy's Environmental Report and the NRC Staff’s Indian Point 

Draft Supplemental EIS failed to determine if toxic radionuclides including strontium-90 and 

cesium-137 are bioaccumulating in the environment; there was no analysis of the contamination 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-62 

to Hudson River fish or shellfish despite sampling showing elevated levels of such radionuclides 

in fish; there was no assessment of the effects of the contamination to the nearby essential fish 

habitat and ecologically critical area of Haverstraw Bay; and, as discussed above, there was no 

assessment of the potential effects of the leaking on the Hudson River's federally listed 

endangered species, including the short-nosed sturgeon.37

[

35 Indian Point Draft Supplemental EIS § 2.2.7, at 2-107 to 2-108; § 4.3, § 4.5, § 4.7. In addition to incorrectly relying 

on dose limits as a sole measurement of the impacts from the leaks, the NRC Staff’s assessment of dose limits was 

also fundamentally flawed since it did not take into consideration the proposed desalination plant, discussed above, 

that is likely to result in a direct drinking water pathway.] 

[

36 Indian Point Draft Supplemental EIS §§ 4.3, 4.5, 4.7 (emphasis added).] 

[

37 See generally id.] 

If the Revised GElS is implemented as proposed, such an inadequate review would continue to 

be acceptable, since no site-specific review of impacts of radionuclides on terrestrial/aquatic/ 

endangered, etc resources would be required. It is, thus, clear that the Revised GElS must be 

adjusted to provide for a comprehensive review of impacts of radionuclide releases on all 

relevant resources. (Riverkeeper-20-9) 

Comment: 5. Radionuclides Released to Groundwater: NRC incorrectly assigns "small to 

moderate impact" from radionuclides released to groundwater. We are pleased that NRC 

properly designated it as a Category 2 issue. 

a. Impacts - Mischaracterized To Be or Small to Moderate Impact: NRC bases this 

determination on inadequate information; blind faith in the sufficiency of industry’s proposed 

voluntary initiatives; and a wrong assessment of the adequacy of NRC's aging management 

program. 

(1) Impact Based Inadequate Information: Neither NRC, the licensee, state/local governments 

nor the public knows exactly what has leaked to groundwater or unmonitored offsite into 

adjacent water bodies. This is because, for example: NRC does not require monitoring wells 

onsite unless the ground water is used for drinking. Radiation detection capabilities used by 

industry are based on 1970's technology. NRC does not define the magnitude of spills that 

must be reported nor do they define "significant contamination" that needs to be recorded after 

the cleanup process. There is no requirement that this information must be submitted to the 

NRC. Although 10CFR50.75 (g) discusses the requirement for records of any remaining 

residual contamination, there are no regulatory requirements which require remediation while 

the power plant is operating. 

This was made clear by NRC in a report The NRC's Groundwater Contamination (Tritium) at 

Nuclear Plants-Task Force − Final Report, Sept 1, 2006. 
Appendix A 

 A-63 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

In the Executive Summary they say: 

Leakage that enters the ground below the plant may be undetected because 

there are generally no NRC requirements to monitor the groundwater onsite for 

radioactive contamination. 

Contamination in groundwater onsite may migrate offsite undetected. 

And further in the report that, 

...many of the release events reviewed occurred over an extended period of time 

and the use of current source term data may not reflect actual conditions at the 

time of release. p.13 

"the NRC should develop guidance to the industry for detecting, evaluating, and 

monitoring releases from operating facilities via unmonitored pathways." P. 15 

 [The Branch Technical Division]...does not require ground water monitoring 

within the licensee's site for general detection and monitoring purposes. Ground 

water monitoring within the licensee's site is only required if the ground water is 

tapped for drinking or irrigation purposes. P. 18 

The radiation detection capabilities specified in the BTP are the 1970's state-ofthe-art for routine environmental measurements in Laboratories. More sensitive 

radiation detection capability exists today, but there is no regulatory requirement 

for the plants to have this equipment. The guidance primarily focuses on gamma 

isotopic analysis of environmental material and on tritium in water samples. 

There are minimal requirements for analyzing environmental samples for betaand alpha-emitting radionuclides. P.18 

The regulatory guidance provides built in flexibility in the scope of the REMP. 

It...allows licensees to reduce the scope of and frequency of the sampling 

program, without the NRC approval, on historical data. ..if a licensee's 

environmental samples have not detected licensed radioactive material in several 

years, then the licensee typically reduces the scope and sample frequency of the 

associated environmental pathway. NRC inspections have observed reductions 

in the scope and frequency of licensee programs... P.19 

No specific regulatory requirements for licensees to conduct routine onsite 

environmental surveys and monitoring for potential abnormal spills and leaks of 

radioactive liquids. However, 10CFR 50.72(g) [sic] requires that licensees keep 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-64 

records of information important to the safe and effective decommissioning of the 

facility. These records include information about known spills [key word 

"known"]. 

The rule does not define the magnitude of the spills and the leaks that need to be 

documented by the licensee. Also the rule does not define "significant 

contamination" that needs to be recorded after the cleanup process. There is no 

requirement that this information must be submitted to the NRC. However, the 

records are available for review by NRC inspectors. 

Although 10CFR50.75(g) discusses the requirement for records of any remaining 

residual contamination, there are no regulatory requirements which require 

remediation while the power plant is operating. A licensee's decision to 

remediate contamination before the plant is decommissioned is typically based 

on several factors, including ALARA considerations for potential worker and 

public dose, cost, feasibility, disposal options, and external stakeholder 

considerations. P.19 (PW-6-14) 

Comment: Inadequate Assessment of Inadvertent Radioactive Releases to the Environment:

The Revised GElS acknowledges the problem encountered at various nuclear power plants 

across the country over the past several years of unplanned releases of radionuclides to the 

environment. Given this ongoing issue, it is critical that the license renewal environmental 

review process address all relevant concerns posed by such releases. Unfortunately, the 

NRC's proposed revisions to the 1996 GElS do not go far enough toward ensuring that the 

environmental impacts of such releases will be analyzed in a comprehensive manner. 

Need for a Comprehensive Framework to Assess Inadvertent Radionuclide Releases: 

Moreover, any complete assessment of inadvertent radioactive releases to the environment 

must specifically include an analysis of the cumulative impact of such contamination. For 

example, in the Indian Point relicensing proceeding, neither Entergy nor the NRC Staff 

performed any evaluation of the cumulative long-term effects of the contaminated groundwater 

plumes at Indian Point. The NRC Staff cited Entergy's removal of spent fuel from the IP1 pool 

as evidence that impacts from the contamination would be minimized.38 Entergy made further 

claims that leaking is no longer active at the facility, a claim that is dubious at best, as explained 

in Riverkeeper's Petition for Hearing. However, the extensive leakage that has emanated from 

the Indian Point spent fuel pools to date is still in the groundwater and will continue to slowly 

leach into the Hudson River.39 Whether leaking is active or not, it is undisputed that there has 

never been an assessment of the environmental impacts of this contamination. Current and 

future accidental radioactive releases from the plant will only add to the existing plumes. For 

example, an underground pipe leak at the facility in February 2009 resulted in over 

100,000 gallons of tritiated water being released directly into the waterway.40 It is, therefore, 
Appendix A 

 A-65 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

imperative that the NRC specifically require an evaluation of the cumulative environmental 

impacts of inadvertent radioactive releases at nuclear power plant sites. 

[

38 Id. § 4.3, at 4-36.] 

[

39 For example, in the months leading up to the completion of draining of the pool at Indian Point Unit 1, Entergy 

reported it was leaking around 70 gallons per day, contributing thousands and thousands of additional gallons of 

polluted water into the groundwater and eventually the Hudson River.] 

[

40 See Annie Correal, Indian Pt. Broken Pipe Spurs Safety Worries, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 27, 2009).] 

In contrast, the Revised GElS's new Category 2 issue requiring analysis of cumulative impacts41

would not necessarily require such an assessment. The Revised GElS explains that an 

"analysis of cumulative impacts focuses on the resources that could be affected by the 

incremental impacts from continued operations of the nuclear plant" and that "[p]ast and present 

actions include all actions up to and including the time of the license renewal application.”42 And 

yet, despite the fact that repeated inadvertent releases of radionuclides can have an 

incremental impact on the surrounding environment, this new Category 2 issue does not 

explicitly require consideration of this issue. Other than stating that the cumulative impacts on 

terrestrial and aquatic resources would include habitat degradation,43 the Revised GElS does 

not provide any specific guidance that would ensure consideration of the cumulative impact of 

radioactive contamination. This failure precisely highlights the problem with breaking down this 

issue into various sections of the Revised GElS. 

[

41 See Revised GElS at 4-220 to 4-227.] 

[

42 See id. at 4-220, 4-221.] 

[

43 See id. at 4-223, 4-224.] 

Only with an all-inclusive review of the environmental impacts of unplanned radioactive 

contamination will the NRC ever be able to come to an accurate conclusion as to the degree of 

the overall impact. Accordingly, the NRC must require site-specific assessment of accidental 

releases on all pertinent environmental media, including terrestrial animals and plants, soils, 

river sediments, aquatic biota, and endangered/threatened/protected resources, as well as the 

cumulative impacts thereto. 

In light of the foregoing, it is also clear that the range of impacts, when taking into account all of 

the potential environmental consequences of inadvertent radiological release, could be 

anywhere from SMALL to LARGE.

44 Given the long history of widespread contamination at 

nuclear power plant sites across the country, along with the fact that license renewal 

proceedings involve continually aging facilities, it is reasonably foreseeable that additional 

tritium leakage will occur at aging, relicensed plants during their twenty year term of extended 

operation, and that such leakage could result in "LARGE" impacts to the environment. Indeed, 

the NRC has offered no support for its assertion that current and future impacts will only be 

SMALL or MODERATE, beyond simply relying on its belief that the incidences of tritium leakage 

that have occurred thus far have had no health impacts and minimal environmental impacts, at 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-66 

least according to the NRC's assessment. Riverkeeper strongly disagrees with this assertion, 

as evidenced by the arguments put forth in our intervention petition, environmental scoping 

comments, and comments to the Draft Supplemental EIS in the Indian Point relicensing 

proceeding.45 Therefore, the NRC should find that impacts on all media, as explained above, 

from inadvertent radiological releases to groundwater could be "SMALL, MODERATE OR 

LARGE.” 

[

44 Thus, the NRC's proposed range of impacts in relation to the new Category 2 issue related to radionuclide release 

to groundwater, of "small to moderate," is unfounded, (see Revised GElS at 2-9; Revised GElS Appendices at B-12), 

and the conclusion of "small" impact in relation to the two Category 1 issues related to radionuclide impact on 

terrestrial and aquatic resources, is also unsupported (see Revised GElS at 2-9, 2-11; Revised GElS Appendices at 

B-12, B-22).]

[

45 See Riverkeeper Exhibits B, C, D.] (Riverkeeper-20-10) 

Response: The NRC agrees that inadvertent releases of radionuclides to groundwater are a 

concern and as such, the NRC has included as a new Category 2 (site-specific) issue, 

“Radionuclides released to groundwater,” in the GEIS (see Section 4.1.5.2). The issue is 

discussed in detail, including the conclusions of the NRC task force report mentioned by one of 

the commenters, in Section 3.9.1.3 of the GEIS. Additionally, the GEIS contains discussions on 

two new Category 1 radiological issues, “Exposure of terrestrial organisms to radionuclides” 

(discussed in Section 4.6.1.1) and “Exposure of aquatic organisms to radionuclides” (discussed 

in Section 4.6.1.2), as well as a discussion of radiological impacts to human health 

(Section 4.9.1.1.1). 

However, the staff does not agree that it performed a narrowly focused and segmented review 

of radiological issues associated with the operations of nuclear power reactors. The NRC has 

an ongoing, comprehensive regulatory framework for the protection of plant workers, the public, 

and the environment from radioactive material that is not limited to the environmental review 

performed as part of the license renewal process. NRC’s review and enforcement of 

radiological monitoring and reporting requirements apply at all times and are independent of the 

license renewal environmental review aspects that are the subject of this final rule. Radioactive 

gaseous and liquid effluent releases, routine and inadvertent, from nuclear power plant 

operations and refurbishment associated with license renewal are addressed under the issue 

“Radiation Exposures to the Public” (see the GEIS, Sections 3.9.1.3, 3.9.1.4, and 4.9.1.1.1). 

Radiation doses to members of the public from the current operations of nuclear power plants 

have been examined in the 1996 GEIS and the revised GEIS from a variety of perspectives (i.e., 

releases of radioactive gaseous and liquid effluents, radiation from radioactive waste storage 

buildings, radiological impacts from refueling and maintenance activities, and inadvertent leaks 

of radioactive liquids), and the impacts were found to be within dose standards specified in NRC 

regulations at 10 CFR Part 20 and Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50, as well as the EPA 

regulations at 40 CFR Part 190. No aspect of future operation or refurbishment associated with 

license renewal has been identified that would substantially alter this situation. 
Appendix A 

 A-67 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

The NRC expects its licensees to continue to comply with its radiation protection standards at all 

times, including any extended period of operation resulting from license renewal. Therefore, 

NRC concludes that the impact from radioactive effluents during continued operations and 

refurbishment activities to plant workers, the public, and aquatic and terrestrial biota would be 

appropriately monitored and controlled. 

In addition to NRC’s requirements to monitor radioactive effluents (routine and inadvertent) 

discharged into the environment, each nuclear power plant is required to have a radiological 

environmental monitoring program (REMP). The REMP quantifies the environmental impacts 

associated with radioactive effluent releases from the plant. The REMP monitors the 

environment over time, starting before the plant operates to establish background radiation 

levels and throughout its operating lifetime to monitor radioactivity in the local environment. The 

REMP provides a mechanism for determining the levels of radioactivity in the environment to 

ensure that any accumulation of radionuclides released into the environment will not become 

significant as a result of plant operations. The REMP also measures radioactivity from other 

nuclear facilities that may be in the area (i.e., other nuclear power plants, hospitals using 

radioactive material, research facilities or any other facility licensed to use radioactive material). 

Thus, the REMP monitors the cumulative impacts from all sources of radioactivity in the vicinity 

of the power plant. 

To obtain information on radioactivity around the plant, samples of environmental media (e.g., 

surface water, groundwater, drinking water, air, milk, locally grown crops, locally produced food 

products, river, ocean, or lake sediment, and fish and other aquatic biota) are collected from 

areas surrounding the plant for analysis to measure the amount of radioactivity, if any, in the 

samples. The media samples reflect the radiation exposure pathways (i.e., inhalation, 

ingestion, and physical location near the plant) to the public from radioactive effluents released 

by the nuclear power plant and from background radiation (i.e., cosmic sources, naturally 

occurring radioactive material, including radon and global fallout). The NRC has standards for 

the amount of radioactivity in the sample media, which, if exceeded, must be reported to the 

NRC and the licensee must conduct an investigation. The REMP supplements the radioactive 

effluent monitoring program by verifying that measurable concentrations of radioactive materials 

and levels of radiation in the environment are not higher than expected when compared against 

data on the amount of radioactive effluent discharged. As part of its license renewal 

environmental review, the staff reviews several years of REMP reports to look for adverse data 

or evidence of a buildup of radioactivity in the environment. The results of the staff’s review are 

discussed in each plant-specific SEIS. 

The new Category 2 issue “Radionuclides released to groundwater” was added to evaluate the 

potential impact of inadvertent discharges of radioactive liquids from plant systems into 

groundwater. The issue is relevant to license renewal because all commercial nuclear power 

plants have spent fuel pools, liquid storage tanks, and piping that contain and transport 

radioactive liquids. Over time, these systems and piping have a potential to degrade and 

release radioactive liquids that could migrate into the groundwater. The NRC has investigated 

cases where radioactive liquids have been inadvertently released into the groundwater in an 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-68 

uncontrolled manner. Regarding the magnitude of impact, the NRC based its determination of 

SMALL to MODERATE impact on its review of radiological data from nuclear power plants that 

had inadvertent releases of radioactive liquids. Even though the NRC expects impacts for all 

plants to be within this range, a conclusion of MODERATE impact would not be precluded for a 

future license renewal review if it is based on new and significant information that supports such 

a conclusion. 

For this new Category 2 issue, the license renewal applicant is required to provide information 

and an evaluation of the potential impacts from radioactive liquids released to groundwater. In 

each SEIS for license renewal, the staff will perform an independent review of this issue and 

include a discussion of the potential impacts as well as the cumulative impacts associated with 

the issue. Additionally, as discussed above, NRC regulations in 10 CFR Part 20 require the 

residual radioactivity from these inadvertent releases to be evaluated by the licensee for any 

potential hazard. 

 

For all Category 2 issues, the NRC provides appropriate guidance to an applicant for license 

renewal regarding what information, data, and analysis should be submitted in their 

Environmental Report in the revised Regulatory Guide 4.2, Supplement 1, “Preparation of 

Environmental Reports for Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal Applications.” 

For the Category 1 issue, “Exposure of aquatic organisms to radionuclides,” the GEIS evaluated 

the potential impacts to aquatic organisms from routine radioactive effluents and concluded that 

the impacts were SMALL for all nuclear power plants. As a Category 1 issue, an applicant does 

not have to evaluate the potential impacts to aquatic organisms from radionuclides except if it 

identifies new and significant information that would result in impacts beyond those discussed in 

the GEIS. Therefore, unless the applicant’s site-specific assessment of threatened, 

endangered, or protected fish species finds information that radioactive effluents are 

significantly impacting a protected species; no site-specific radiological assessment is required 

to be submitted by the applicant in its Environmental Report. However, as part of the license 

renewal process, the staff will perform an independent evaluation of all Category 1 issues to 

look for new and significant information that would require a more detailed evaluation of a 

particular issue. Regardless of whether or not new and significant information is found, the staff 

will include a discussion of Category 1 issues in the SEIS. 

No changes have been made to the GEIS in response to these comments. 

Comment: Radionuclides released to groundwater; Finding in Table B-1 of Appendix B in the 

draft updated GEIS (Volume 2) for the issue labeled “Radionuclides released to groundwater” 

reads as follows: 
Appendix A 

 A-69 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Small or moderate impact (Category 2). Underground system leaks of process water have 

been discovered in recent years at several plants. Groundwater protection programs have 

been established at all operating nuclear power plants. 

The issue of “Radionuclides released to groundwater” was not addressed in the 1996 GEIS, but 

was added to the draft updated GEIS based on industry events in which an unplanned or 

unmonitored release of radioactive liquids to the environment has resulted in low but detectable 

levels of radionuclides in groundwater. In all but one instance, the contamination remained onsite, and all of the events were well below regulatory limits. None of the inadvertent releases 

presented an impact on public health, safety, or the environment. Industry submits that 

sufficient data are available to classify the issue of radionuclides released to groundwater as 

Category 1. This is supported by the following statement from the NRC’s Liquid Release 

Lessons Learned Task Force Final Report issued on Sept. 1. 2006: “Although there have been 

a number of industry events where radioactive liquid was released to the environment in an 

unplanned and unmonitored fashion, based on the data available, the task force did not identify 

any instances where the health of the public was impacted.” 

Industry suggests that the issue labeled “Radionuclides released to groundwater” in Table B-1 

of Appendix B in the draft updated GEIS (Volume 2) be re-categorized from “Category 2” to 

“Category 1”and that the above-quoted issue description be changed in Table B-1 of Appendix 

B in the updated GEIS to read as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

Small or moderate impact (Category 21). Underground system leaks of process water have 

been discovered in recent years at several plants. Groundwater protection programs have been 

established at all operating nuclear power plants. 

Information supporting this suggested change is provided in the paragraphs below. 

As a result of the industry events, the nuclear industry voluntarily implemented the industry-wide 

Ground Water Protection Initiative (Industry Ground Water Protection Initiative – Final Guidance 

Document: NEI 07-07 [Final], 2007 to ensure timely detection and effective response to 

situations involving inadvertent radiological releases to groundwater and to enhance licensee 

communications with their stakeholders about these situations. The early detection of 

contamination, typically through on-site monitoring wells, allows licensees to take actions as 

necessary to prevent the off-site migration of licensed radioactive material. This voluntary 

initiative assists the industry in implementing programs for early detection and allows the 

industry to effectively mitigate releases once they occur to be protective of drinking water 

supplies and associated human health. The NRC is in the process of reviewing licensees’ 

implementation of the Industry Ground Water Protection Initiative as part of their radiation 

protection program oversight (refer to NRC Inspection Manual – Temporary Instruction 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-70 

2515/173). On-site groundwater monitoring data are reported to the NRC in either the Annual 

Radioactive Effluent Release or Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Reports. 

Considering the information presented above, it is recommended that the revised GEIS develop 

a generic impact analysis based on the following: 

• Impacts of radioactive material releases to groundwater can be adequately and appropriately 

addressed for all nuclear power plants in the updated GEIS by describing the process by 

which an inadvertent release of radiological material to groundwater is already being dealt 

with at all nuclear plants through the licensee’s implementation of the Industry Ground Water 

Protection Initiative and ongoing Offsite Dose Calculation Manual updates, Annual 

Radioactive Effluent Release Reports, Annual Radiological Environmental Operating 

Reports, and NRC oversight. Licensee implementation programs include periodic reviews of 

the site’s potential vulnerability for an inadvertent leak to occur due to equipment failure or 

human error, an understanding of the site’s hydrology and geology, early detection through 

ground water monitoring, and reporting of the data to the NRC 

• For those instances when a release of radioactive material to groundwater does occur at a 

nuclear power plant, a site-specific assessment is performed in accordance with the plant’s 

groundwater protection program. Such assessments address site-specific conditions, 

including site-specific contaminants and potential receptors, and necessary actions to 

prevent off-site migration. Accordingly, the generic impact analysis should acknowledge 

that, regardless of whether the NRC renews licenses for nuclear power plants, existing 

regulations and performance standards already ensure that the environmental impacts are 

assessed in the event of a radioactive material spill or leak to groundwater or soil. Examples 

of such existing regulations and standards are listed below: 

 1. NEI 07-07 (Industry Groundwater Protection Initiative) guidance document. 

 2. Revisions to Regulatory Guide 4.1 (Radiological Environmental Monitoring Programs) 

 3. NRC Inspection Manual – Temporary Instruction 2515/173 

 4. Revisions to Regulatory Guide 4.21 (Minimization of Contamination and Radioactive 

 Waste Generation: Life-Cycle Planning 

 5. Revisions to Regulatory Guide 1.21 (Measuring, Evaluating and Reporting Radioactive 

 Material in Liquid and Gaseous Effluents and Solid Waste 

 6. EPRI Report 1016099 “Groundwater Protection Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plants” 

 2008 

The above-described level of controls now imposed on an unplanned or unmonitored release of 

radionuclides to the environment from nuclear power plants and the NRC’s regulatory oversight 

justifies a conclusion that impacts from the issue “Radionuclides released to groundwater” 

would be SMALL, and that the issue designation should be changed from “Category 2” to 

“Category 1.” These changes would be consistent with the NRC’s approach of designating 
Appendix A 

 A-71 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

other issues that are generically evaluated in the updated GEIS and found to have small 

impacts as a result of monitoring and regulatory controls as “Category 1”. Examples include 

storage and disposal of low-level radiological waste, spent fuel, high-level waste, and mixed 

waste. For these issues, the GEIS relies on regulatory controls and permissible levels, which 

are outlined in regulations and implemented by the nuclear industry through operational 

monitoring programs, to conclude that impacts associated with each issue would be SMALL for 

all plants, and hence, that the issues are classified as “Category 1.” 

The updated GEIS should be changed throughout (i.e., Volumes 1 and 2) to reflect the abovesuggested modification in Table B-1 of Appendix B. (NEI1-7(4)-3) 

Response: This new Category 2 issue has been added to the GEIS and the rule to evaluate 

the potential contamination and degradation of groundwater resources resulting from 

inadvertent discharges of radionuclides into groundwater from nuclear power plants. Within the 

past several years, there have been numerous events at power reactor sites that involved 

unknown, uncontrolled, and unmonitored releases of radionuclides into the groundwater. The 

number of these events and the high level of public controversy have made this issue one that 

the NRC believes needs a “hard look” as required by NEPA. 

The issue is relevant to license renewal because all commercial nuclear power plants routinely 

release radioactive gaseous and liquid effluents into the environment under controlled 

conditions in accordance with NRC radiation protection standards. These radioactive releases 

are planned, monitored, documented, and released into the environment at designated 

discharge points. However, within the past several years there have been numerous events at 

power reactor sites that involved unknown, uncontrolled, and unmonitored release of radioactive 

liquids into the groundwater. NRC regulations in 10 CFR Part 20 and in 10 CFR Part 50 limit 

the amount of radioactive material, from all sources at a nuclear power plant, released into the 

environment to levels that are as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA). The regulations are 

designed to protect the public and the environment. 

The majority of the inadvertent liquid release events involved tritium, which is a radioactive 

isotope of hydrogen. However, other radioactive isotopes, such as cesium and strontium, have 

also been identified. The types of events include; leakage from spent fuel pools, buried piping, 

and failure of pressure relief valves on a liquid effluent discharge line. 

Another aspect encountered by the NRC due to the inadvertent releases was the high level of 

concern from the public, even at the very low radiation levels caused by the events. There has 

also been significant media coverage and demands by State and local government officials and 

members of Congress for the NRC to take action to stop these events. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-72 

NEI comments that this new issue is not needed because the nuclear power industry has 

committed to follow NEI 07-07, Industry Ground Water Protection Initiative – Final Guidance 

Document. The industry’s groundwater protection initiative, as stated in NEI 07-07, is an 

industry-initiated program designed to help each plant improve management of situations 

involving inadvertent radiological releases that migrate into groundwater and to improve 

communication with external stakeholders to enhance trust and confidence with local 

communities, States, the NRC, and the public. The program is not an NRC-required program 

and the guidance in the document is not subject to regulatory enforcement. The NRC reviews 

each plant’s groundwater protection program for consistency with the guidance in NEI 07-07. 

The Temporary Instruction 2515/173 was a “one time” review of each plant’s implementation of 

the guidance in NEI 07-07. The temporary instruction does not constitute a continuing, periodic 

inspection of the program that verifies compliance with NRC regulations on radioactive effluents. 

For example, an NRC Inspection Report (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Preliminary 

Results of Inspection Related To Vermont Yankee Ground Water Program And Recent Onsite 

Ground Water Contamination, dated April 16, 2010. ADAMS Accession No. ML101060419) 

stated that the plant had not fully implemented the guidance in NEI 07-07. Since adherence to 

NEI 07-07 is not a regulatory requirement, no enforcement action was taken against Vermont 

Yankee. 

The monitoring data collected by each plant for the groundwater protection program is not 

required by regulation to be included in the annual reports cited in the comment. The exception 

to this is if a radioactive release was evaluated as a radioactive effluent that had the potential to 

cause a radiation dose to a plant worker or a member of the public. 

NRC Regulatory Guides provide guidance to licensees on an acceptable method that complies 

with NRC regulations. However, a Regulatory Guide is not a regulation that requires 

compliance. 

The referenced EPRI document is a good example of industry working to craft its own guidance 

and programs to solve a problem, but as with NEI 07-07 it is not a regulatory requirement. 

The NRC cannot rely on a voluntary initiative or industry guidance as a basis to ensure that the 

nuclear power industry will monitor and have adequate information available for the NRC to 

determine whether the issue does or does not have an adverse impact on ground water 

resources. 

On the basis of the information and experience with these leaks, the NRC concludes that the 

impact on ground water quality from the release of radionuclides could be small or moderate, 

depending on the magnitude of the leak, radionuclides involved, and the response time of plant 

personnel to identify and stop the leak in a timely fashion. Since the leaks are not planned and 
Appendix A 

 A-73 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

there are currently no NRC regulations that would require the timely identification and 

termination of a leak, there is no information available to the NRC that would enable it to make a 

generic assessment. Therefore, a site-specific evaluation in the Environmental Report is 

needed for each application for license renewal. Thus, the issue remains a Category 2 issue. 

No changes were made to the GEIS as a result of this comment. 

Comment: 5. Radionuclides Released to Groundwater: NRC incorrectly assigns "small to 

moderate impact" from radionuclides released to groundwater. We are pleased that NRC 

properly designated it as a Category 2 issue. 

a. Impacts - Mischaracterized To Be or Small to Moderate Impact: NRC bases this 

determination on inadequate information; blind faith in the sufficiency of industry’s proposed 

voluntary initiatives; and a wrong assessment of the adequacy of NRC's aging management 

program. 

(2) Draft's Misguided Faith − Adequacy Industry's Voluntary Groundwater Protection 

Initiatives: NRC in response to the recent proliferation of leaks from reactors decided to allow 

industry to self regulate instead of imposing enforceable requirements − regulations. Voluntary 

programs are not enforceable and do not provide the protection the public deserves; neither do 

they assure that NRC's rules that prohibit unmonitored radioactive releases offsite will be 

followed. 

The weaknesses identified by Pilgrim Watch in Entergy's Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection 

Program and Monitoring Program provide an example.12

[

12 Docket 50-293: Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, April 2008 − Adams Accession Number ML081070329; Pilgrim 

Watch Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, June 2009 − Adams Accession Number ML081650345; Pilgrim 

Watch Petition for Review of LBP-06-848 − Adams Accession Number ML083240599] 

• Section 5.0, subsection [I] at page 7 acknowledges right at the beginning that "The risk of a 

failure caused by corrosion, directly or indirectly, is probably the most common hazard 

associated with buried piping and tanks." 

• Steps required in building a risk assessment tool are discussed in Section 5.0, subsection [2] 

on page 7. However the program fails in that it does not require a complete baseline review. 

There is no indication that the entire component is supposed to be examined; instead escape 

batches are provided to the licensee − such as [at 2a] "the size of each section shall reflect 

practical considerations of operation, maintenance, and cost of data gathering with respect to 

the benefit of increased accuracy." Any program worth its salt would require a thorough 

baseline inspection along the entire length of the pipe. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-74 

• Subsection [4] categorizes the piping into high, medium and low impact. High impact 

components require prompt attention. The Board agrees that they should require prompt 

attention however Entergy's definition of "prompt" allows considerable delay − high impact 

buried sections shall be examined within 9 months of issuance of the procedure; and no date 

is given when the procedure shall be initiated. 

• Buried piping and tanks having high risk are specified as having an initial inspection period of 

5 years with a re-inspection interval of 8 years. The time interval is too long 

• The Table does not tell how much of the component will be inspected. 

• There is no requirement to shorten a subsequent inspection based upon the degree of 

corrosion discovered at the time of the prior inspection. 

• Absent from this procedure is the prudent and practical guidance to conduct the inspection 

provisions of this procedure when opportunities present themselves, regardless of the 

inspection intervals in Table 4. For example, if a section of buried piping categorized as 

having "Low" inspection priority is excavated for other reasons, this excavation procedure 

should direct/require workers to take advantage of the opportunity and perform inspections – 

corrosion is neither linear nor constant across the component's length. 

• In subsection [5], the determination of inspection locations may also consider the "ease of 

access to inspection point." However, ease of location and lack of corrosion do not 

necessarily go together. A component that is difficult to access may never been inspected – 

all the more reason that it should be inspected now. 

• Section 5.6, Parameters to be Inspected, page 13, lists: external coatings and wrapping 

condition; pipe wall thickness degradation; tank plate thickness degradation; and cathodic 

protection system performance, if applicable. The attributes that must be considered in 

tabulating risk are too narrow. They include: (a) soil resistivity measurement; (b) drainage 

risk weight; (c) material risk weight; (d) cathodic protection/coating risk weight. 

• The list in Section 5.6 should be expanded to include, for example, the age of the 

component's parts; the number of high risk corrosion areas in component such as welds, 

dead spots etc; counterfeit or substandard part not replaced. The list is silent on internal 

corrosion even though corrosion from the inside can bring about a failure. 

• Section 5.6 also is silent on the size of the sample required, its location, and the rational for 

the sampling protocol − if, in fact, a sample is taken and not an inspection of the entire 

component. Section 5.7, on page 13, provides vague remarks about acceptance criteria for 

any degradation of external coating, wrapping and pipe wall or tank plate thickness. It says 
Appendix A 

 A-75 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

that they should be based on current plant procedures; and if not covered by plant 

procedures then new procedures need to be developed before the inspections. The pass/fail 

grade should be clearly defined. For example what precisely constitutes an "unacceptable" 

from an "acceptable" degraded external wrapping? The NRC's Lessons Learned Task Force 

was very specific that "significant" and other such descriptions need definition. 

• Section 5.8, Corrective Actions, page 14, says that "a condition report (CR) shall be written if 

acceptance criteria are not met. Any and all inspections should generate a written condition 

report regardless of what is or is not found to maintain a permanent paper trail of all 

inspections. The Section also says that corrective actions may include engineering 

valuations, scheduled inspections, and change of coating or replacement of corrosion 

susceptible components, and those components that do not meet acceptance criteria shall be 

dispositioned by engineering. [Emphasis added]. This provides no assurance to public 

safety for the following reasons. 

a. The corrective actions may include engineering valuations, scheduled inspections, and 

change of coating or replacement of corrosion susceptible components; but they also "may not." 

These should be required. 

b. The licensee's own engineering department will deal with it; but there is no clear definition of 

how they will deal with it. There should be layers of supervision and that the NRC should have 

an oversight role in this program? 

c. Who sees the Condition Reports − or to put it another way, where are the reports kept, who 

has access to those reports, do they have to be sent to the NRC and if so under what conditions 

and time schedule? A more basic issue is that Condition Reports are unlikely to be written or, if 

they are written, to actually say anything as explained directly below. 

• Section 5.12 Inspection Methods and Technologies/Techniques, subsection [1] on page 15 

specifies steps to be taken for Visual Inspections of buried piping and tanks. Step (g) directs 

the workers: "A CR [condition report] shall be initiated if the acceptance criteria are not met." 

A review of steps (a) through (f) reveal a lack of objective, or even subjective, acceptance 

criteria that could trigger a condition report. 

a. When opportunities arise, buried sections of piping and tanks "should be examined to 

quantify deposit accumulation...and those results documented." As long as exposed piping is 

examined and damage chronicled, the acceptance criteria are met – no condition report. 

b. "Look for signs of damaged coatings or wrapping defects" − as long as workers look the 

acceptance criteria are met. Only not looking would fail to meet the acceptance criterion and 

trigger a condition report. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-76 

c. "The interior of piping may be examined by divers, remote cameras, robots or moles, when 

appropriate:" The combination of "may" and "when appropriate" means the acceptance criterion 

is met when examinations are performed or not. 

d. "Use holiday tester to check excavated areas of piping for coating defects:" When coating 

defects are found for exposed area of piping using a holiday tester, the acceptance criteria is 

met and no condition report is written. 

e. If visual inspection reveals coatings or wrappings are not intact, further inspection of piping 

for signs of pitting, MIC, etc. is required; and if the additional inspection is performed and the 

acceptance criterion is satisfied then no condition report is warranted whether damage is found 

or not. 

f. Inspect below grade concrete for indication of cracking and loss of material. As long as the 

inspection is performed, the acceptance criterion is satisfied whether damage is found or not. 

• Section 5.12 subsection [2] on page 16 specifies the steps to be. taken for Non-Destructive 

Testing of buried piping and tanks. No steps direct workers to initiate condition report(s) 

regardless of how extensive the piping and/or tank damage is identified. 

• Section 5.9 Preventive Measures, at 14, “...the existing cathodic protection system may be 

updated or a new Cathodic Protection system may be installed. Pilgrim Watch has explained 

that cathodic protection should be installed. The emphasis should be on prevention not 

waiting to discover failures before acting. 

In summary, reasonable assurance is not provided by this new program. Ground Water 

Programs need real commitments. (PW-6-15) 

Comment: 5. Radionuclides Released to Groundwater: NRC incorrectly assigns "small to 

moderate impact" from radionuclides released to groundwater. We are pleased that NRC 

properly designated it as a Category 2 issue. 

a. Impacts - Mischaracterized To Be or Small to Moderate Impact: NRC bases this 

determination on inadequate information; blind faith in the sufficiency of industry’s proposed 

voluntary initiatives; and a wrong assessment of the adequacy of NRC's aging management 

program. 

(3) Draft's Misguided Assessment − Adequacy Aging Management Program in License 

Renewal: The Draft incorrectly assumes that the aging management program for buried pipes 

and tanks and the day-today maintenance programs provide reasonable assurance that the 
Appendix A 

 A-77 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

impact will be small to moderate. This is misguided and fully explained in Pilgrim Watch's filings 

on Contention I in Entergy's License Renewal Application adjudication. Please refer to those 

documents in NRC's Adams collection.13

[

13 Ibid.] 

The Aging Management Program: The Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program include (a) 

preventive measures to mitigate corrosion and (b) inspections to manage the effects of 

corrosion on the pressure-retaining capability of buried carbon steel, stainless steel, and 

titanium components. Preventive measures are in accordance with standard industry practice 

for maintaining external coatings and wrappings. Buried components are inspected when 

excavated during maintenance. If trending within the corrective action program identifies 

susceptible locations, the areas with a history of corrosion problems are evaluated for the need 

for additional inspection, alternate coating, or replacement. A focused inspection will be 

performed within the first 10 years of the period of extended operation, unless an opportunistic 

inspection (or an inspection via a method that allows assessment of pipe condition without 

excavation) occurs within this ten-year period. 

Neither the Aging Management Program for buried pipes and tanks, nor the inspections and 

tests performed as part of routine maintenance, and operation, provide reasonable assurance 

that the effects of aging will be managed such that the buried pipes within scope and under 

consideration will perform their intended functions consistent with the current licensing basis for 

the period of extended operation. They are not sufficient. Therefore in order to protect public 

safety, the aging management program must be enhanced or supplemented with a more robust 

inspection system, cathodic protection, a base line inspection prior to license extension, and an 

effective monitoring well program or any licensee's Application denied. 

Day-to-Day maintenance procedures quite obviously are ineffective; if they were effective the 

proliferation of leaks known to have occurred would not have happened. For example, the 

water chemistry program is a mitigation program and does not provide detection for aging 

effects. More frequent complete inspections as part of the overall program are the only effective 

assurance that defects created by aging components will be uncovered. Tritium leaks at 

reactors across the country belie the effectiveness of water chemistry alone to prevent leaks. 

(PW-6-16) 

Response: The emphases of these comments are on impacts related to leaking or corroding 

components, which are aging management issues. Aging management is considered outside of 

the regulatory scope of license renewal environmental reviews because it concerns safety and 

thus is considered in license renewal safety reviews. Current operational inspections ensure 

proper maintenance of leaks, corrosion, or embrittlement concerns. The license renewal 

inspection program, which is a separate programmatic action from current operational 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-78 

inspections and the license renewal environmental review, ensures that the applicant has 

demonstrated that adequate aging management practices are in place for those components 

that will be in operation during the period of extended operation resulting from license renewal. 

The impact of radionuclides released to groundwater, as presented in Section 4.1.5.2 of the 

GEIS, is a new Category 2 issue, requiring plant-specific reviews of sampling data and 

monitoring programs as part of a license renewal environmental review. No change has been 

made to the GEIS as a result of these comments.

Comment: Groundwater: We are pleased that the NRC has elevated radionuclides released to 

groundwater to Category 2. The revised GEIS recognizes that "there is a growing concern 

about radionuclides detected in groundwater at nuclear power plants" (page 4-46, line 27) and 

that "tritium is the most mobile radionuclide in soil and water." In finalizing its justification for 

elevating this issue to Category 2, the revised GEIS states, "On the basis of occurrence at 

several nuclear plants, the impact of radionuclide releases to groundwater quality could be small 

to moderate, depending on the occurrence and frequency of leaks and the ability to respond to 

leaks in a timely fashion" (page 4-47, line 33). The Federal Register notice states "this issue is 

relevant to license renewal because virtually all commercial nuclear power plants routinely 

release radioactive gaseous and liquid materials into the environment" (page 38122). 

Moving forward, this is wonderful news for those communities whose groundwater is impacted 

by nuclear power plants whose licenses are yet to be renewed. But what does this say for 

power plants whose renewal applications are either pending or already approved? Will the NRC 

take a retrospective look at this issue to assure communities that this issue was not overlooked 

because of bad timing? 

In the case of PINGP, there have been documented levels of tritium in the groundwater (equal 

to the levels cited in the revised GEIS for the Byron plant) that are due to operational problems 

or leaks. For instance, tritium was detected in the Community's drinking water in the late 

1980s/1990s and in wells around the PINGP at above normal background levels. Although the 

detected levels were below the EPA standard of 20,000 pico curies per liter (pCi/L), the range 

detected (1,300 − 1500 pCi/L) was above what was detected in other wells (300 − 400 pCi/L). 

Tritium is still detected in observation wells. Community members are concerned with the 

history of leakage of tritium from PINGP for which no adequate explanation has yet been given. 

Even though the Radiological Environmental Monitoring ("REMP") Reports state that the tritium 

results are far below the EPA drinking water standard, the Community is concerned about how 

the tritium is getting into the groundwater, why the concentration of detected tritium fluctuates so 

dramatically, and what is the best way to monitor the leakage to ascertain the source of the 

leakage, determine precisely whether, how and to what extent the tritium migrates adjacent 

lands, and to ensure that the levels of tritium do not exceed the EPA standards over time. 

According to the 2006, 2007, and 2008 REMP, tritium results for PINGP onsite well P-10 have 

been relatively high (3773 pCi/L (2006), 2258 pCi/L (2007), and 2060 pCi/L (2008)) compared 
Appendix A 

 A-79 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

with the two off-site indicator locations 2 miles away (ranging between <19 pCi/L and 59 pCi/L) 

and 13 miles away (ranging between <19 and 46 pCi/L). Although dramatic fluctuations in the 

tritium results were also observed each year, as of yet no explanation has been given for these 

fluctuations. 

We recommend that this issue be evaluated, retrospectively, for all the plants that have either 

been relicensed or have pending applications. (PIIC-8-6) 

Response: As described in Section 4.1.5.2 of the GEIS, there have been numerous 

inadvertent releases of radioactive liquids to the environment. The NRC agrees that inadvertent 

liquid radioactive releases to groundwater are a concern; therefore, they are included as a new 

Category 2 (site-specific) issue in the GEIS. 

The information cited by the commenter about the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant was 

reviewed by the staff during the preparation of a supplemental environmental impact statement 

(SEIS) for the plant’s license renewal. Based on its review, the staff concluded, in the final 

SEIS, that the radiation dose to man from radioactive effluents was within NRC regulations and 

therefore, the impact to human health was SMALL. 

The NRC will not conduct a retrospective review of nuclear power plants whose licenses were 

renewed. Such a review is not necessary because the NRC conducts individual plant 

inspections as part of the Reactor Oversight Process to ensure each nuclear power plant 

complies with NRC regulations on radioactive discharges (routine and inadvertent) and is 

appropriately monitoring the environment for radioactivity. The inspection looks at the potential 

impacts from radioactive effluent releases to ensure they are within the dose limits to members 

of the public and that radioactive material from the plant is not building up in the environment 

beyond what was evaluated at the time the plant was originally licensed. The inspection also 

reviews each plant’s groundwater protection program to ensure it is effectively monitoring the 

groundwater that would most likely receive any radioactive liquid from a leaking pipe or 

component. It is through the inspection process that the NRC ensures continuous protection of 

the public from radioactive effluents. No change was made to the GEIS in response to this 

comment. 

Comment: Of the issues identified in the DGEIS as "small", DOS recommends that the 

following should be elevated to the moderate or large category and be required to be addressed 

in detail in a site-specific SEIS. 

Surface-water use and quality: Re-Iicensure of a nuclear facility may perpetuate surface-water 

use and quality impacts that were not considered during, or new data may have become 

available since the original licensing of the facility. Re-Iicensure may also result in altered 

operating parameters that may affect water use or quality. (NY DOS-18-3) 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-80 

Response: The cited Category 1 issue has been renamed, “Surface water use and quality 

(non-cooling system impacts),” for clarity in this revised final GEIS. As described in 

Section 4.5.1.1 of the GEIS, this issue encompasses non-cooling system-related impacts 

associated with continued operations and reburbishment activities, including associated 

construction, on surface water use and quality. As discussed in the revised GEIS, the NRC’s 

conclusion that this issue is generic to all plants (Category 1) and has a SMALL level of impact 

is based upon licensees’ use of best management practices and adherence to spill control and 

prevention plans. Many of the best management practices employed by licensees and the spill 

prevention and control plans are required by EPA-issued or CWA-delegated State-issued 

permits or by applicable regulation. In addition, previous license renewal environmental reviews 

have shown that both refurbishment associated with license renewal and continued operations 

during the license renewal term have had negligible effects on surface water use and quality. 

As with all Category 1 conclusions, the site-specific license renewal environmental review 

determines whether there is new and significant information that would change the conclusion in 

the GEIS. New and significant information of in-scope environmental impacts would be 

considered in plant-specific SEISs. The details of how the NRC addresses new and significant 

information are discussed in response to comment CEC-9(1)-10. 

Comment: I note on page 3-50 of the GEIS under the headings "3.5 Hydrology 3.5.1 Surface 

Water" that is admitted that, "An exception is the Palo Verde plant in Arizona, which relies on 

treated municipal wastewater for cooling." I call for the Palo Verde nuclear power facility to be 

considered non-generic due to this admitted uniqueness in the kind of water used for cooling the 

reactors. Seeing that the City of Phoenix adds hydrofluosilicic acid to its water supplies, and 

there are associated damages to metal pipes from years of being exposed to this corrosive 

substance, such impacts need to be seriously assessed even during this operating license 

period, and certainly must be considered carefully before any consideration of an operating 

license extension for that large facility. (Campbell-31-18) 

Response: The adequacy of aging management programs, including the evaluation of water 

chemistry, is considered in the safety review of license renewal applications and is, therefore, 

outside of the regulatory scope of the license renewal environmental review. Current 

operational inspections ensure proper maintenance of leaks, corrosion, or embrittlement 

concerns. The license renewal safety review (which includes an inspection program), ensures 

that the applicant has adequate aging management practices in place for components that will 

be in operation under the proposed renewed license. No change was made to the GEIS in 

response to this comment.

Comment: The following discussions on EPA's area of expertise would benefit from further 

elaboration or correction in the final GElS: 

 
Appendix A 

 A-81 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Page 3-53, Lines 4-6: States − "High surface water temperature at the intake does not 

represent an impact on the environment but rather an effect of the natural conditions on 

operations." High surface water temperature at the intake means that the discharge at the 

facility will also be higher and therefore may cause increased environmental impacts on aquatic 

organisms and terrestrial organisms that depend on those aquatic resources. (EPA-3(1)-3) 

Response: The section referenced in the comment (Section 3.5.1.1) discusses impacts on 

surface water use during plant operations. The suggested change relates to impacts to the 

environment from releasing heated cooling system water during periods of the year when the 

receiving water body was at higher temperatures. As described in Section 3.5.1.2, thermal 

discharges are regulated by a power plant’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System

(NPDES) permit, which typically specifies limits on discharge temperature and/or the difference 

in temperature between intake and discharge. Seasonal limits may be included that would limit 

discharges of heated effluent at certain temperatures. No change was made to the GEIS as a 

result of this comment.

Comment: The following discussions on EPA's area of expertise would benefit from further 

elaboration or correction in the final GElS: 

Page 3-53, the Clean Water Act text box should read as follows: 

 "Section 402 authorizes the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit 

program that controls water pollution by regulating point sources that discharge pollutants into 

waters of the United States." 

"Section 316(a) allows for a variance from thermal discharge standards in an NPDES permit if 

the variance is more stringent than necessary to assure the propagation of a balanced, 

indigenous population. The alternate thermal effluent limitation is only good for the term of the 

NPDES permit (5 years), and the facility must reapply each permit term for the permitting 

authorities review and approval" 

"Section 316(b) requires that the location, design, construction, and. capacity of cooling water 

intake structures reflect the best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental 

impact," (EPA-3(1)-2) 

Comment: The following discussions on EPA's area of expertise would benefit from further 

elaboration or correction in the final GElS: 

Page 3-53, Line 10: States − "Discharges from the circulating cooling water system account for 

the largest volumes of water and usually the greatest potential impacts on water quality and 

aquatic systems, although other systems may contribute heat and chemical contaminants to the 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-82 

effluent." We recommend striking "circulating" because this paragraph discusses cooling 

systems in general and use of the term "circulating" implies a closed-cycle system. (EPA-3(1)-4) 

Comment: D. The Draft Generic EIS Fails to Adequately Assess Aquatic Impacts in Specific 

Key Areas: Numerous specific statements in the draft revised Generic EIS need to be 

addressed by the NRC. These include the NRC’s portrayal of the Clean Water Act section 

316(b) Phase III rules, the viability of acoustic deterrent systems at plants in Belgium and New 

York, the role of the consultation process under the federal Endangered Species Act, and the 

environmental consequences, of alternatives to license renewal. 

1. Clean Water Act Section 316(b) − Phase III Rules 

The NRC’s Statement: Phase III applies to existing manufacturing facilities with a design intake 

flow of at least 50 million gpd (189 million L/d) and new offshore and coastal oil and gas 

extraction facilities designed for withdrawing at least 2 million gpd (7.6 million L/d). Draft 

Generic EIS, p. 3-54, lines 13-16. 

The NYSDEC’s Response: This statement is incorrect or at least misleading. The Final Phase 

III rule applies only to new oil and gas extraction facilities. Existing manufacturing facilities 

using 50 MGD or more are still decided on a case-by-case, best professional judgment basis: 

This rule establishes categorical section 316(b) requirements for intake structures at new 

offshore oil and gas extraction facilities that have a design intake flow threshold of greater than 

2 million gallons per day and that withdraw at least 25 percent of the water exclusively for 

cooling purposes. For existing Phase III facilities, EPA determined that uniform national 

standards are not the most effective way at this time to address cooling water intake structures 

at these facilities. Instead, EPA believes that it is better to continue to rely upon the existing 

National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) program, which implements section 

316(b) for existing facilities not covered under the Phase II rule on a case-by-case, best 

professional judgment basis. 71 Fed. Reg. 35006 (June 16, 2006) (emphasis added). 

This NRC statement is also irrelevant to the license renewal of nuclear power plants since no 

EPA rule covers existing nuclear power facilities. (NYS DEC-12-6) 

Response: For accuracy, Section 3.1.5.2 of the GEIS was modified in response to these 

comments to more accurately represent the EPA’s authority to regulate discharges under the 

CWA.

Comment: Of the issues identified in the DGEIS as "small", DOS recommends that the 

following should be elevated to the moderate or large category and be required to be addressed 

in detail in a site-specific SEIS. 
Appendix A 

 A-83 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Altered current patterns at intake and discharge structures: Re-licensure may result in altered 

operating parameters or perpetuate effects that were not considered during the original 

licensing of a nuclear facility. (NY DOS-18-4) 

Response: On the basis of the evaluation presented in Section 4.5.1.1 of the GEIS, the issue 

of altered current patterns at intake and discharge structures is identified as a Category 1 issue 

because impacts are considered to be SMALL for all plants. No new information has been 

identified in plant-specific SEISs prepared since the 1996 GEIS or associated studies that would 

change this conclusion. However, if new and significant information is identified during plantspecific environmental reviews of license renewals that would call into question this conclusion, 

a full evaluation would be performed and presented in the plant-specific supplement to the 

GEIS. The details of how the NRC addresses new and significant information are discussed in 

response to comment CEC 9(1)-10. No change was made to the GEIS in response to this 

comment.

Comment: Of the issues identified in the DGEIS as "small", DOS recommends that the 

following should be elevated to the moderate or large category and be required to be addressed 

in detail in a site-specific SEIS. 

Groundwater use and quality: Aging facility infrastructure may contribute to groundwater quality

impacts that may not have been present during the original licensing of the facility. 

(NY DOS-18-6) 

Comment: Non-Radiological Contamination the Environment: The Revised GElS would create 

a new Category 2 issue requiring assessment of non-radiological groundwater and soil 

contamination resulting from general industrial practices.46 Riverkeeper supports inclusion of 

this new issue, however, urges the NRC to specifically require that in the course of the 

assessment of this issue, licensees provide detailed, publicly available inventories of any and all 

spills, leaks, and other releases that contributed to any such soil and groundwater 

contamination. Such a requirement would ensure a more complete evaluation of such 

contamination. [

46 See Revised GElS at 4-45 to 4-46.] (Riverkeeper-20-11) 

Response: The revised GEIS consolidates the issues of “Groundwater Use and Quality” and 

“Groundwater and Soil Contamination” into the single issue of “Groundwater Contamination and 

Use (non-cooling system impacts).” The consolidated issue is classified as Category 1 with an 

impact level of SMALL. The focus of this issue is the potential impacts to groundwater, as well 

as to soil and subsoil, caused by nuclear power plant licensees employing industrial practices 

common to all industrial sites. Specifically, the consolidated issue is concerned with impacts 

from spills and other non-radioactive contaminant releases. This issue does not concern 

impacts to groundwater caused by systems unique to a nuclear power plant (e.g., the plant’s 

cooling system). 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-84 

As described in the revised GEIS, the new consolidated Category 1 issue evaluates the impacts 

of the industrial use of solvents, hydrocarbons, heavy metals, or other chemicals on 

groundwater, soil, and subsoil at nuclear power plant sites during the license renewal term, 

including the use of wastewater disposal ponds or lagoons. In consideration of public 

comments and further evaluation by the NRC, the NRC determined that potential effects on 

groundwater and soil quality from common industrial practices can be addressed generically 

(i.e., Category 1) as such industrial practices are common to industrial facilities and not unique 

to nuclear power plants. The NRC expects that each licensee will comply with all applicable 

Federal, State, and local permits that the licensee must obtain to operate its plant, including 

those that are required by the Clean Water Act and its implementing regulations. For example, 

licensees must obtain and comply with National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits 

and prepare associated pollution and spill prevention response plans. As described in the 

revised GEIS, operational experience has shown that non-radioactive contamination of 

groundwater at or near nuclear power plant sites, caused by spills and other releases originating 

from the site, has been remediated to the point where no further action was required by the 

applicable regulatory agency, or that the contamination has been confined to the plant site with 

continuing remediation in place. However, as discussed in Sections 1.8.4 and 1.8.6 of the 

GEIS, if new and significant information is identified during plant-specific environmental reviews 

of license renewals that would call into question this conclusion, a full evaluation would be 

performed and presented in the plant-specific supplement to the GEIS. No change was made 

to the GEIS in response to these comments.

A.2.1.6 Comments Concerning Ecology: Aquatic Ecology, Terrestrial Ecology, 

Threatened and Endangered Species 

Aquatic Ecology 

Comment: Of the issues identified in the DGEIS as "small", DOS recommends that the 

following should be elevated to the moderate or large category and be required to be addressed 

in detail in a site-specific SEIS. 

Effects of cooling water discharge, gas super-saturation, and eutrophication: Altered operating 

parameters or new information not available during the original licensing of a nuclear facility 

warrant further consideration of the effects of cooling water discharge in a SEIS. (NY DOS-18-7) 

Response: The NRC classified impacts from cooling water discharge on dissolved oxygen 

levels, gas supersaturation, and eutrophication as Category 1 issues in the GEIS on the basis of 

a review of past studies, operating experience, and the findings of license renewal 

environmental reviews that have been conducted to date. The NRC would consider any 

changes in plant operating parameters or other new and significant information pertinent to an 

evaluation of these impacts during preparation of plant-specific supplements to the GEIS. Thus, 
Appendix A 

 A-85 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

even though this issue is classified as Category 1, mechanisms are in place to conduct a full 

site-specific review if new and significant information warrants such a review. 

Finally, the NRC notes that the commenter stated that “new information not available during the 

original licensing . . . warrant[s] further consideration of the effects of cooling water discharge in 

a SEIS.” Under NRC regulation 10 CFR Part 51.53(c)(3)(iv), information must also be 

significant, in addition to being new, to warrant being addressed in the plant-specific SEIS.(u)

The NRC made no changes to the GEIS in response to this comment.

Comment: B. The Draft Generic EIS Fails to Provide Key Guidance for Addressing Impacts to 

Aquatic Resources in the Development of Supplemental EISs for Individual Nuclear Power 

Plants that Are or Will Undergo License Renewal: One of the NRC’s stated purposes of the 

draft revised Generic EIS is to "defin[e] the number and scope of impacts that need to be 

addressed in plant-specific EISs." Draft GElS, p. iii (emphasis added). In the Summary of the 

draft revised Generic EIS, the NRC states the following: 

The GElS is intended to improve the efficiency of the license renewal process by 

(1) providing an evaluation of the types of environmental impacts that may occur 

from renewing commercial nuclear power plant operating licenses, (2) identifying 

and assessing impacts that are expected to be generic (the same or similar) at all 

nuclear plants (or plants with specified plant or site characteristics), and 

(3) defining the number and scope of environmental impact issues that need to be 

addressed in plant specific EISs. Draft Generic EIS, p. S-1 (emphasis added). 

In our view, the draft revised Generic EIS does not adequately define the scope of 

environmental impacts to aquatic resources that should be addressed in the plant-specific EISs. 

 

Although the NRC has correctly determined that aquatic impacts caused by the operation of 

cooling water intake systems using a "once-through" system will need to be addressed in plantspecific EISs (a Category 2 issue), it has included little about the scope or breadth of the 

analyses that will be required. The conclusion of Section 4.6.1.2 is simply that the NRC will 

perform facility specific impact assessments for nuclear power facilities that use a once-through 

cooling water system. Thus, the NRC does not provide much-needed details in the draft revised 

Generic EIS to indicate: 

 

(u) 10 CFR 51.53(c)(3)(iv) (“The environmental report must contain any new and significant information 

regarding the environmental impacts of license renewal of which the applicant is aware”); see also 

NRC Reg. Guide 4.2, Supp. 1 (NRC 2000) (“New and significant information may also be identified by 

other parties and the NRC in the scoping and public comment process”). 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-86 

• how it will make this assessment; 

• the data that it will require from the licensee; 

• the type of analysis that it will conduct; and 

• what it will require if an impact is determined to be moderate or large. 

The lack of these details makes this section of the draft useless as a· guidance document for 

NRC staff to use in making these very important and complex impact assessments. 

Additionally, the draft makes little, if any, changes to required assessments and mitigation of 

impacts caused by the cooling water intake systems at nuclear power facilities. 

The NRC briefly discusses "[v]arious methods that have been used to reduce impingement" 

(Draft Generic EIS, p. 4-83). This discussion is extremely brief and misleading given that there 

has been over three decades of technology development and application. Many mitigative 

technologies are not mentioned, while the stated effectiveness of others is overemphasized. 

For example, as discussed in more detail below, the NRC makes statements on the 

effectiveness of sound deterrent systems that exaggerate the actual effectiveness of that 

technology. 

The draft revised Generic EIS also contains no discussion of the impact reductions associated 

with a number of other mitigative technologies: wedgewire screens, barrier nets, and most 

importantly, closed cycle cooling. The NRC then states in Section 4.6.2 that the few mitigative 

alternatives that are discussed will cause the following impacts: "fugitive dust; impingement and 

entrainment of fish and other aquatic organisms; heated effluent from cooling water discharge 

and blowdown; ... boiler blowdowns; ... cooling tower drift (fogging and ice); salt deposition; 

maintenance of transmission line ROWs; bird collisions; and wildlife avoidance behavior due to 

operational activities and noise" Draft Generic EIS, p. 4-114. Therefore, the NRC has effectively 

developed an excuse for doing nothing if aquatic impacts are determined to be moderate to 

large. According to the draft Generic EIS, mitigating these impacts would only result in 

additional moderate to large impacts. However, the Generic EIS must provide a context for the 

impact and identify appropriate ways to minimize or mitigate impacts that are moderate to large. 

(NYS DEC-12-4) 

Comment: C. In the Draft Generic EIS; the NRC Perpetuates and Compounds the Flaws in Its 

Assessment of Impacts on Aquatic Resources in the License Renewal for Indian Point: Having 

participated in the license renewal process for Indian Point Units 2 & 3, the NYSDEC is 

concerned with (1) the environmental impacts from the extended operation of those plants, 

(2) the NRC's failure to adequately assess the environmental impacts at those plants, and 

(3) whether future license renewal proceedings conducted under the revised Generic EIS would 

follow what is being done for the license renewal of Indian Point Units 2 & 3. In the Indian Point 

license renewal proceeding, the NRC released a draft Supplemental EIS (specific to Indian 

Point). The NYSDEC identified flaws in the NRC s approach for the aquatic impact assessment 
Appendix A 

 A-87 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

for Indian Point Units 2 & 3, and the State conveyed its concerns in its comments to the draft 

Supplemental EIS. Those comments are attached to this document as Attachment A.

The impacts to aquatic resources from the once-through cooling systems at Indian Point are 

well known. In the license renewal proceeding, NYSDEC submitted expert declarations in 

support of its contentions detailing the impacts to aquatic resources with New York State's 

Notice of Intention to Participate and Petition to Intervene (November 30, 2007). New York's 

submission included the declarations of Roy A. Jacobson, Jr. (dated November 29, 2007) and 

David W. Dilks, Ph.D. (dated November 28, 2007). These declarations are attached to this 

document as Attachments B and C, respectively. The issues raised in these declarations are 

very relevant to the Generic EIS. Although they detail the significant and persistent adverse 

impacts from once-through cooling at Indian Point, they tell the unfortunate story for once 

through cooling water intake systems nationwide. This unfortunate story is summarized below: 

Summary of Impingement and Entrainment Contention - Indian Point License Renewal: The 

operation of Indian Point consumes and returns approximately 2.5 billion gallons of Hudson 

River water each day. The River is an important estuarine ecosystem, and this operation has 

significant adverse impacts to the fish that call the Hudson home. Large fish are "impinged" on 

screens at the water intake where they are severely stressed and then suffocated. Smaller fish 

are "entrained" in the water intake − pulled through the operating plant and killed. This 

relentless process has continued relatively unabated for almost 40 years, and the applicant now 

seeks 20 more years. This must not continue because the environmental costs are too high. 

The NRC must fully consider the alternative of closed cycle cooling to mitigate these significant 

adverse impacts in this license renewal proceeding. 

Summary of Heat Shock/Thermal Contention − Indian Point License Renewal: Indian Point's 

40-year-old design uses massive quantities of Hudson River water when operating, and this 

system returns significantly heated water back to the river. The Hudson River would be a far 

more productive estuarine ecosystem if the heat shock/thermal impacts from Indian Point could 

be mitigated. Tens of millions of fish are impacted − from behavioral and growth impacts to 

fatalities. These impacts cannot be mitigated and they violate the requirements of the Clean 

Water Act. The State of New York contends that these impacts must be fully analyzed and 

addressed in this license renewal proceeding. 

Summary of Endangered Species Contention − Indian Point License Renewal: The 

Endangered Species Act became the law of the United States to stop the disappearance of 

species in jeopardy of extinction. The NRC must implement and follow this important legal 

obligation in the license renewal application process. Operation of Indian Point impinges 

shortnose sturgeon − an endangered species − and impinges and entrains the Atlantic 

sturgeon, a candidate threatened species under the Act. The applicant argues that Indian Point 

does not jeopardize these fish. The State of New York contends that there are serious 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-88 

questions about the applicant's views. The Endangered Species Act and common sense 

dictate that a full and thorough analysis is needed before the NRC makes a decision that could 

determine the fate of the sturgeon in the Hudson. 

Despite the extensive analysis submitted into the NRC record regarding the Indian Point license 

renewal, NYSDEC is dismayed and concerned that the NRC perpetuates and compounds its 

prior flaws in the draft revised Generic EIS here. Specifically, the draft revised Generic EIS 

does not account for the flaws identified by the NYSDEC in the Indian Point plant specific draft 

Supplemental EIS, which can be replicated for any number of plants throughout the country. 

Included among the flaws in the NRC's environmental review for Indian Point in the draft 

Supplemental EIS that the NYSDEC identified are the following: 

• The impingement data that Entergy provided to the NRC for Indian Point were 

erroneous. Nevertheless, the NRC conducted analyses and based its impact 

assessment on these erroneous data. This error was discovered by New York State and 

the National Marine Fisheries Service after the draft Supplemental EIS for the relicensing of Indian Point Units 2 & 3 was released for public comment. The NRC will 

now need to reevaluate these impacts with the corrected data, which may lead to a 

delay in completing the Supplemental EIS for Indian Point Units 2 & 3. 

• Some of the results of the impact assessment made by the NRC are contrary to the 

conclusions made by New York State biologists and many fisheries biologists familiar 

with the Hudson River estuary. For example, the NRC concluded that the re-licensing of 

Indian Point Units 2 & 3 will result in a large impact on bluefish populations. However, 

very few adult bluefish are impinged, and few, if any, bluefish eggs and larvae have 

been entrained by Indian Point Units 2 & 3. If adult bluefish are impinged, survival off 

the Ristroph-type traveling screens is high, on the order of 85 percent. In addition, 

bluefish stocks have been increasing in recent years. 

• The NRC recommended illegal restoration activities to offset the Clean Water Act 

Section 316(b) impacts. This is contrary to what the NRC states in the draft revised 

Generic EIS that all Clean Water Act Section 316(b) issues will be handled by the EPA 

and not the NRC. See Draft Generic EIS, p. 4-86, fn "a". 

• The NRC could not make final adverse impact assessments on several of the fish 

species it considered due to the lack of adequate information. Specifically, the adverse 

impacts to Atlantic sturgeon, shortnose sturgeon, Atlantic menhaden, gizzard shad, and 

blue crab could not be determined. Therefore, the NRC has no idea what the impact to 

these species will be if the licenses for Indian Point Units 2 & 3 are renewed for another 

20 years because it did not obtain adequate data and information from the licensee. 
Appendix A 

 A-89 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

• One of the species that the NRC did not have enough information on was the shortnose 

sturgeon − a federally listed endangered species. The NRC was aware that the licensee 

would be required to address Endangered Species Act issues, and the NRC appears to 

have known that Entergy had no recent data to ensure that an adequate assessment of 

the impacts on this species was made. The NRC never took the initiative to require the 

licensee to collect adequate data even though both the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 

and the National Marine Fisheries Service requested this information early on. 

Recommendations: In the context of the NRC's draft Supplemental EIS on the license renewal 

of Indian Point Units 2 & 3, additional information is required for the Generic EIS to meet the 

requirements of NEPA. Specifically, the NRC must incorporate the following information into the 

final Generic EIS: 

• The NRC should specify the information on aquatic resources that it will require the 

licensees to provide. 

• The NRC should list the specific aquatic species data required for both listed and nonlisted aquatic species. 

• Data need to be collected during appropriate times of the year and be recent enough to 

account for biological changes that have occurred over time in many aquatic systems 

throughout the country. 

• The NRC should also address quality assurance and quality control to avoid repeating 

the errors that occurred with the impact assessment at Indian Point Units 2 & 3. 

• The NRC must provide details about the types of analyses that NRC staff will undertake 

to make impact assessments and what the NRC will require of a licensee if any impacts 

are determined to be “moderate” or "large." 

• To address potential thermal impacts caused by the thermal discharge of nuclear plants 

operating once-though cooling water systems, licensees should be required to undertake 

a thermal study to accurately estimate the potential species-specific thermal impacts. 

Many of these nuclear facilities have received power uprates since they were originally 

licensed, and some water bodies have warmed. Thermal studies conducted 10, 20, or 

more years ago obviously could not have accounted for these changes. 

Lastly, given our experience with the NRC’s handling of the Indian Point license renewal 

proceeding, we question why the NRC goes through the trouble to make any facility-specific 

assessment of impingement and entrainment impacts on non-listed species given the statement 

in footnote "a” on page 4-86. NRC staff is spending a significant amount of time and resources 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-90 

conducting fish population impact analyses to determine impacts that the NRC has a history of 

not addressing during the license renewal process. This is particularly egregious in the case of 

Indian Point Units 2 & 3 where erroneous data were used. The NRC then shirks its duty under 

NEPA and other relevant law when it determines that its action will likely lead to a moderate or 

large impact on an aquatic resource and then proceeds to renew the license without requiring 

the mitigation or minimization of the impact that the NRC identified. 

For example, with Indian Point Units 2&3, the NRC has identified several moderate to large 

impacts but then indicated that these impacts will be minimized or avoided through the New 

York State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (SPDES) permit program. However, the 

licensee has challenged the draft SPDES permit requiring the minimization of these impacts 

claiming that no such impact exists. Therefore, by challenging New York State, the licensee is 

in fact disagreeing with the NRC findings and is delaying or avoiding any mitigation for the 

aquatic impacts identified by the NRC. This delay provides the necessary cover for the NRC −

enabling it to continue with a license renewal proceeding without ever having to confront the 

necessary issues on impacts to aquatic resources. In the end, however, simply deferring to the 

agencies responsible for the issuance of permits and approvals does not satisfy the NRC’s legal 

obligations mandated under NEPA. (NYS DEC-12-5) 

Response: Guidance regarding how to prepare site-specific supplements to the GEIS, 

including how to perform and document the assessment, is provided in NUREG-1555, 

Supplement 1 (NRC 2013a). Guidance for the Preparation of Environmental Reports to support 

license renewal, including what type of data are required, is identified in Regulatory Guide 4.2, 

Supplement 1 (NRC 2013b). Revisions to these two documents were prepared concurrently 

with the GEIS and were made available for public review. Although examples of some potential 

mitigation measures are presented in the GEIS, identification and discussion of the many 

mitigation measures that could be applied to address potential impacts to aquatic resources is 

beyond the scope of the GEIS. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is a procedural 

law and does not grant the NRC the authority to take action, but rather, directs Federal agencies 

to assess the impact of an action on the environment, consider alternatives to the proposed 

action, and propose mitigation of impacts. Prevention and elimination of environmental impact 

are the responsibilities of regulatory agencies charged with management and protection of 

specific resources. The EPA or the delegated State, not the NRC, regulates thermal discharges 

through NPDES permits and Clean Water Act regulations. Power plants cannot operate without 

valid NPDES permits. The NRC made no changes to the GEIS in response to these comments.

Comment: I'm a little concerned about some of these Category 1 designations. The one, in 

particular, that jumps out at me off of -- I'm looking at Appendix B here -- you have the thermal 

plume as a Category 1 issue, and that, to me, is a big mistake. To put all the plants together 

and make it a generic issue is wrong. Diablo Canyon is a great example of thermal plume 

"gone mad." I mean, thermal plume out there hasn't really been looked at the degree that it 
Appendix A 

 A-91 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

should be looked at, and now you're going to put it in a Category 1. That makes it generic, so 

that we can just write it off as if everything's okay. Everything's not okay and it should be a 

Category 2 item. (PBCA-Nelson-1) 

Response: Thermal impacts on aquatic organisms is considered a Category 2 issue for plants 

with once-through cooling or cooling ponds and is considered a Category 1 issue for plants with 

cooling towers. The reason for the difference is that cooling towers transfer much of the heat 

produced by the power plant to the atmosphere rather than to surface water bodies, which 

greatly reduces thermal impacts on aquatic resources. Also, the designation of an issue as a 

Category 1 issue does not mean that potential impacts are not considered. The NRC considers 

changes in plant operating parameters or new and significant information pertinent to an 

evaluation of impacts during preparation of site-specific supplements to the GEIS. The NRC 

made no changes to the GEIS in response to this comment. 

Comment: The draft GElS states - "Thermal impacts on aquatic organisms are expected to be 

small at nuclear plants with cooling towers. Thermal effects associated with plants that use 

cooling towers are small because of the reduced amount of heated discharge from these types 

of systems." This has been designated as a Category 1 issue. EPA's Region 7 has identified 

periods where the ambient water temperatures have exceeded water quality standards without 

any added discharge of thermal effluent from power plants. For example in August 2002, the 

temperature of the Missouri River exceeded its water quality standard for six days in a row. In 

ambient conditions like this, any discharge of heat could have large impacts, whether a facility is 

using closed-cycle or once-through cooling. A single significance level is not representative of 

the impacts here, as the impacts may be small, moderate, or large. (EPA-3-2) 

Response: As described in the comment, under extreme ambient conditions a plant would 

likely have to either decrease its operating capacity or cease operations altogether in order not 

to exceed NPDES operating limits. Section 1.5.2 of the GEIS lists the three criteria under which 

an issue would be considered as Category 1. For issues that do not meet all three Category 1 

criteria, then NRC considers the issue a Category 2 issue, and a plant-specific analysis is 

required for that issue. On the basis of a review of the past studies, recent operating 

experience, and license renewal environmental assessments conducted to date, the NRC 

determined that these three criteria apply to the issue of thermal impacts on aquatic organisms 

at nuclear plants with cooling towers. 

In the commenter’s example, ambient water temperatures that exceed water quality criteria 

relevant to plant operations would be new information. The NRC would also consider such 

information significant because it can affect NRC’s level of impact. The NRC considers such 

new and significant information reason for additional plant-specific analysis. In addition, 

releases of cooling water require an NPDES permit issued by the EPA or the State that sets 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-92 

limits for thermal discharges, and power plants cannot operate without valid NPDES permits. 

NRC made no changes to the GEIS in response to this comment. 

Comment: [Regarding questions by the public about the NRC’s definition and disposition of 

“new and significant information” in generic, Category 1 issues and the conditions under which 

the NRC would address a Category 1 issue in a SEIS.] Now since I started, you know, not 

believing in this, I've been really involved in the "once through cooling" issue, which is another 

huge issue, and again, as I go through this document, these are Category 1 problems. These 

aren't Category 1. These are Category 2, especially here, in California. They use the cooling 

water source of the Pacific Ocean for Diablo. That's generic. 

They're using my water from Morro Bay estuary, that goes through a water pyramid, that leaves 

the bay and goes right into their reactors, along with Morro Bay reactor, doing huge cumulative 

impacts, that have never been studied, and these impacts -- because it's so expensive. 

(PBCA—Nelson-26) 

Response: As indicated in Table 4.6.1.2-3 of the GEIS, thermal impacts and impingement and 

entrainment of organisms are identified as Category 2 issues for plants with once-through 

cooling systems, such as the Diablo Canyon plant. The NRC assesses both the direct and 

indirect impacts of power plant operation as well as the cumulative effects caused by an 

aggregate of past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions as part of its assessment 

of site-specific, Category 2 issues. The GEIS provides an overview of cumulative impacts on 

aquatic resources in Section 4.1.3.8, and SEISs provide more specific cumulative impacts 

assessments on a plant-by-plant basis. The NRC made no changes to the GEIS in response to 

this comment.

Comment: You should look at all the data that they put in, and I'm specifically talking about the 

thermal impact of Diablo Canyon on the ground that it's pouring out on. 

They originally said it was going to destroy three-quarters of a mile. Now, years ago, the Water 

Board brought a cease and desist order up against Diablo, but of course it was just a big bluff, 

and never went past a draft. But the draft was made, it was presented to the board. They were 

going to make a big land deal, but then, all of a sudden, they were going to change a generator, 

so they made a land deal with the Coastal Commission instead, so the Water Board was "left 

out to hang." 

And they never did anything, even though they know the problems, and this document's not 

taking these problems into consideration. They made promises when they built the plant, they 

broke so many promises along the way, and as it was pointed out, all you guys do is just keep 

changing the rules, and you're not taking into consideration the long-term effects that this plant's 

having on this county. (PBCA-Nelson-28) 
Appendix A 

 A-93 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Response: NEPA directs Federal agencies to assess the impact of an action on the 

environment, consider alternatives to the action, and propose mitigation of impacts. Prevention 

and elimination of environmental impacts are the responsibilities of regulatory agencies charged 

with management and protection of specific resources. The EPA or the delegated State, not the 

NRC, regulates thermal discharges through NPDES permits and Clean Water Act regulations. 

Power plants cannot operate without valid NPDES permits. The NRC is currently preparing a 

supplement to the GEIS for renewal of the Diablo Canyon plant license. If NRC staff identifies 

new and significant information that demonstrates an increased impact on the aquatic 

environment as a result of continued station operation, the California Energy Commission will 

likely take that information under consideration as part of the NPDES permitting process when 

determining if any modifications to the cooling system are necessary to protect the affected 

resources. The NRC made no changes to the GEIS in response to this comment.

Comment: Thermal impacts on aquatic organisms (plants with once-through cooling systems 

or cooling ponds): Finding in Table B-1 of Appendix B in the draft updated GEIS (Volume 2) for 

the issue labeled “Thermal impacts on aquatic organisms (plants with once-through cooling 

systems or cooling ponds” reads as follows: 

Small, moderate, or large impact (Category 2). Most of the effects associated with thermal 

discharges are localized and are not expected to affect overall stability of populations or 

resources. The magnitude of impacts, however, would depend on site-specific thermal plume 

characteristics and the nature of aquatic resources in the area. 

This issue is a consolidation of five issues that were previously analyzed in the 1996 GEIS. The 

1996 GEIS concluded that four of the five issues would have small impacts and be Category 1. 

The fifth issue, “Heat shock (plants with once-through and cooling-pond heat dissipation 

systems),” was said to have small, moderate, or large impact, depending on sites-specific 

conditions, and was classified as a Category 2 issue. 

For the reasons more fully discussed in the paragraphs below, Industry requests that the issue 

labeled “Thermal impacts on aquatic organisms (plants with once-through cooling systems or 

cooling ponds)” in Table B-1 of Appendix B in the draft updated GEIS (Volume 2) be recategorized from “Category 2” to “Category 1”and that the above-quoted issue description be 

changed in Table B-1 of Appendix B in the draft updated GEIS to read as follows (strikethrough

font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

Small, moderate, or large impact (Category 21). Most of the effects associated with thermal 

discharges are localized and are not expected to affect overall stability of populations or 

resources. The magnitude of impacts, however, would depend on site specific thermal plume 

characteristics and the nature of aquatic resources in the area. Heat shock effects would be 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-94 

mitigated to assure small impact at all sites through permits issued by state regulators under the 

Clean Water Act and state laws. 

Section 4.6.1.2 provides analysis of various factors of potential impacts related to thermal 

discharges from different cooling systems (pages 4-88 through 4-96). The draft updated GEIS 

provides analyses on cold shock (for all plants), thermal plume barrier to migrating fish (for all 

plants), distribution of aquatic organisms (for all plants), premature emergence of aquatic 

insects (for all plants). The draft updated GEIS concludes in Section 4.6.1.2 on page 4-91 (lines 

26 - 30) that the impacts of thermal discharges are a Category 2 issue because the magnitude 

of the impact would depend on plant-specific characteristics of the cooling system and 

characteristics of the aquatic resource. Yet, the draft updated GEIS states the lessons learned 

from more than 30 Environmental Reports, and NRC’s Supplemental Environmental Impact 

Statements for license renewal, show small impacts related to heat shock in all cases. As 

discussed below and in the draft updated GEIS, these plant-specific characteristics have been 

evaluated and are managed to assure that thermal impacts from nuclear plants are SMALL. 

The draft updated GEIS (page 4-88, lines 36-38) cites York et al. (2005)1 as the basis to assert 

that the thermal discharges from the San Onofre and Diablo Canyon plants in California have 

had significant impacts on aquatic habitats. The draft updated GEIS concludes without any 

plant-specific data or further analysis, that since neither of these plants has requested renewal 

of their operating licenses as of this date2

, “...thermal discharges could be a concern ...” 

(emphasis added) and, ultimately, that there may be plants with specific characteristics that 

require this issue to be classified as Category 2. In fact, the York et al. study specifically states 

on page 66 of Appendix A of the report that Southern California Edison (SCE) meets the 

thermal requirements of its NPDES permits for environmental limits. Consistent with the NRC’s 

conclusion that the impacts attributable to radioactive releases below regulatory limits are small, 

the fact that SCE is complying with the thermal limits in its NPDES permits impacts supports the 

draft updated GEIS statement (page 4-88, lines 25-26) that the impacts are SMALL and that 

thermal discharge on aquatic organisms should be classified as a Category 1 issue. 

[

1

 Editorial note: the reference in the draft updated GEIS is incorrect. The reference should be 

http://www.energy.ca.gov/2005 publications/CEC-700-2005-013/] 

[

2

 PG&E submitted its license renewal application on November 23, 2009 for Diablo Canyon Power Plant.] 

SCE owns and operates the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) power plant 

located on the Pacific Coast in northern San Diego County. SONGS consists of two active units, 

each discharging approximately 1,200 million gallons per day of slightly heated seawater to the 

Pacific Ocean. The two active units employ once-through cooling water systems, withdrawing 

cooling water from the Pacific Ocean through each unit’s approximately 3200 feet long intake 

conduit and discharging it to the ocean through separate (unit-specific) discharge conduits that 

are just beneath the ocean substrate. The Unit 2 discharge conduit is approximately 8400 feet 
Appendix A 

 A-95 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

(2500 meters) long in approximately 45 feet (15 meters) depth and the Unit 3 discharge conduit 

is approximately 6100 feet (1800 meters) long in about 35 feet (12 meters) depth. The last 

(farthest offshore) 2500 feet (762 meters) of each discharge conduit, is equipped with 63 

diffuser ports, evenly spaced at 40 foot intervals, and angled away from the ocean floor to 

minimize thermal impacts on the marine environment. The diffusers are placed such that 

sensitive near shore marine habitat, especially intertidal and shallow subtidal habitat, will not be 

affected by the warm water from the discharge. [SWRCB 1999]3

[

3

 SWRCB (State Water Resources Control Board) 1999. California State Water Resources Control Board Resolution 

No. 99 – 028, Approval Of The San Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board's Adoption Of An Exception To The 

California State Thermal Plan (Thermal Plan) For San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS). April 14, 1999] 

Independent monitoring by the Marine Review Committee under the auspices of the California 

Coastal Commission and by SCE during start-up of Units 2 and 3 showed the highest 

temperature detected in the environment to be approximately 4 degrees Fahrenheit above 

ambient temperatures at 1000 feet from the discharge structure. 

The Thermal Plan and the SONGS current discharge permits require that the effluent from 

SONGS Units 2 and 3 may not exceed the receiving water temperature by more than 25°F. In 

May 1997, the San Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board (SDRWQCB) granted SCE an 

exception to a 20°F receiving water temperature limitation that would allow discharges from 

Units 2 and 3 to exceed the receiving water temperature by no more than 25° F. [SWRCB 1999] 

In its April 1999 resolution on the request, the (California) State Water Resources Control Board 

determined that “SCE has provided information which demonstrates that the proposed limitation 

will protect and maintain balanced indigenous communities in the vicinity of the SONGS 

discharges based on a number of considerations: 

• There is no evidence of adverse impacts caused by the thermal component of the 

discharge. 

• Effects due to the proposed increase in temperature will be minimal because the 

discharge structures are designed and placed such that sensitive near shore marine 

habitat, especially intertidal and shallow subtidal habitat, will not be affected by heat from 

the discharge. Further, thermal plume modeling of the new discharge conditions as 

reported in SDRWQCB's Initial Study shows clearly that permit requirements will not be 

violated as a result of the requested permit modification, and that thermal impacts on the 

sensitive kelp bed environment will be insignificant.” [SWRCB 1999] 

The Regional Water Quality Control Board, San Diego Region concluded, and continues to 

conclude, that SCE meets NPDES limits for thermal impacts in the marine environment. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-96 

As such, there has been no measurable impact due to thermal discharges and the state agency 

has not required any mitigation measures. 

The purpose of the Clean Water Act (CWA) is to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, 

and biological integrity of the Nation's water" as already stated by the NRC on page F-4 

(lines 12 – 14) of the Draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS). As part of the 

implementation of the CWA, the EPA established a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 

System (NPDES) permitting program as described in 40 CFR Part 122 to ensure that the 

discharge of pollutants such as chlorine, metals, biocides, and thermal heat are regulated to 

ensure that the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation’s water is maintained. 

Permit conditions are based on two criteria: The State’s water quality standards set minimum 

standards for the ambient quality of water in surface water bodies, and technological standards, 

such as “best available technology (BAT)”to create a floor of technology that must be applied to 

any discharge of a certain industrial type. In regard to thermal heat, effluent limitations are 

established by the permitting agency based either on state and/or water body specific water 

quality standards or on limitations that the agency has determined that will assure measures 

necessary for the protection and propagation of a balanced, indigenous population of shellfish, 

fish and wildlife in and on the body of water into which the discharge is made (“balanced 

indigenous population”). When determining thermal limitations that will be protective of the 

plant-specific surface waters, CORMIX modeling studies, specific-site information, or other 

related thermal monitoring studies are used by the permitting agency for discharge specific 

evaluation. 

Pursuant to federal regulation, NPDES permits may not allow a discharge that causes or 

contributes to a violation in water quality standards or that, in the case of a thermal discharge, 

impairs the balanced indigenous population. It should be noted that permitting agencies 

evaluate thermal heat discharges associated with all nuclear plant facilities (once through 

cooling, closed-cycle cooling and cooling ponds) during the initial permitting cycle and on a fiveyear renewal basis thereafter. Discharge specific evaluations are developed during each 

renewal cycle to establish effluent limitations that assure the protection and propagation of a 

balanced, indigenous community of shellfish, fish and wildlife in and on the body of water into 

which the discharge is made. For example, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, a closed-cycle cooling 

plant, was required to conduct extensive thermal monitoring studies during the operational 

phase and is currently required to conduct a thermal monitoring study during each permit 

renewal cycle to ensure that the thermal discharge does not impact the physical, chemical or 

biological integrity of the Mississippi River. 

In addition, as stated in Section 1.7.1 of the draft updated GEIS, the NRC properly defers to the 

EPA or the State for setting effluent and operational parameters in plant-specific NPDES 

permits to meet water quality standards that have been established to be protective of the 
Appendix A 

 A-97 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

aquatic environment and its beneficial uses. Language consistent with this statement also 

appears in the Environmental Protection Plans for new and existing nuclear plants. 

Industry submits that the statements in the GEIS that are discussed above along with other EIS 

references cited below demonstrate that the NPDES permitting program and oversight from the 

NPDES permitting agencies ensures that impacts from thermal and other effluents from nuclear 

plants seeking license renewal will be SMALL and that the issue should be categorized as 

Category 1. 

• Page 3-132 (Lines 3 - 6): Impacts of chemical discharges to human health are 

considered to be small if the discharges of chemicals to water bodies are within effluent 

limitations designed to ensure protection of water quality and if ongoing discharges have 

not resulted in adverse effects on aquatic biota. 

• Page 4-35: (Lines 37 - 41): Because of State regulatory involvement, and because 

regulatory and resource agencies have not found significant problems with outfall 

monitoring, the impacts from the discharge of chlorine and other biocides and minor 

spills of sanitary wastes and chemicals during license renewal and refurbishment were 

considered to be small for all plants and designated as Category 1 issues in the 1996 

GElS. 

• Page 4-142 (Lines 12 - 13): Discharges of sanitary wastes are regulated by NPDES 

permit, and discharges that do not violate the permit limits are considered to be of small 

significance. 

• Page 4-221 (Lines 18 - 22): For some resource areas (e.g., water and aquatic 

resources), the contributions of ongoing actions within a region on cumulative impacts 

are regulated and monitored through a permitting process (e.g., NPDES) under State or 

Federal authority. In these cases, it may be assumed that cumulative impacts are 

managed as long as these actions (facilities) are in compliance with their respective 

permits. 

• Page A-12 (Lines 36 – 40): The amount of the water discharged by each individual plant 

and the chemical levels in that water are determined by individual States through the 

National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permitting program, not the NRC. The 

licensee is required by the NRC to operate in compliance with all its permits, therefore 

minimizing the impacts to the environment. 

For the four Category 1 issues in the 1996 GEIS — “Cold shock (for all plants),” “Thermal plume 

barrier to migrating fish (for all plants),” “Distribution of aquatic organisms (for all plants),” and 

“Premature emergence of aquatic insects (for all plants)”— that have been consolidated with 

“Heat shock (plants with once-through and cooling pond heat dissipation systems)” in the draft 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-98 

updated GEIS to form the issue of “Thermal impacts on aquatic organisms (plants with oncethrough and cooling pond heat dissipation systems)”, there is inadequate justification in the 

GEIS to require site-specific analyses in supplemental EISs. These issues should continue to 

be resolved generically for all plants as Category 1 issues. 

In conclusion, the NPDES permitting process established under the Clean Water Act requires 

that the permitting agency issue a permit that assures the protection and propagation of a 

balanced, indigenous community of shellfish, fish and wildlife in and on the body of water into 

which the discharge is made. Therefore, the issue of thermal impacts on aquatic organisms 

(plants with once-through cooling systems or cooling ponds) should be classified as Category 1, 

consistent with the criteria discussed on page S-5 of the Draft updated GEIS: 

• Environmental impacts associated with the thermal issue apply to all plants. 

• A single significance level (SMALL) can be assigned to the impacts. 

• Mitigation of adverse impacts associated with the thermal issue, if needed, would be 

placed in the NPDES Permit and re-evaluated every five years during the permit renewal 

cycle by the permitting agency. 

The draft updated GEIS should be changed throughout (i.e., Volumes 1 and 2) to reflect the 

above-suggested modification in Table B-1 of Appendix B. (NEI1-7(4)-6) 

Comment: Page 4-88, lines 32 to page 4-91, line 2: Text from page 4-88, line 32 through 

page 4-89, line 2 the NRC is encouraged to modify the text to read as follows (strikethrough font 

= deletion; italics font = addition): 

In the 1996 GEIS, the NRC determined that for plants with a once-through cooling system or 

cooling ponds, the effects of thermal discharge on aquatic biota (primarily due to heat shock) 

was small at many plants. However, because the effects were considered moderate or large at 

a few nuclear plants, heat shock was considered a Category 2 issue that required a site-specific 

assessment before license renewal. The potential for thermal discharge effect is considered to 

be greatest at plants with once-through cooling systems (NRC 1996), primarily because of the 

higher discharge temperatures and larger thermal plume area. 

The potential impacts of thermal discharges during the 20-year license renewal term were 

evaluated by reviewing published site ERs, license renewal SEISs, and the scientific literature. 

For all of these plants, it was determined that the impacts of thermal discharges during the 

license renewal term were small. However, according to York et al. (2005), thermal discharges 

from the Diablo Canyon and San Onofre plants (located along the California coast) have had 

significant impacts on aquatic habitats. (Both of these plants employ once-through cooling 

systems and have not yet been reviewed for license renewal.) Thus, While thermal discharges 

could be a concern during the license renewal term for plants with once-through cooling 
Appendix A 

 A-99 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

systems, especially for plants located in areas where restoration efforts are underway to 

increase fish populations or reestablish migratory fish species or where thermal discharge 

plumes could encompass otherwise high-quality habitats, no new environmental impacts are 

anticipated. 

In the 1996 GEIS, the NRC considered the impacts of heat shock on aquatic biota during the 

license renewal term to be small, moderate, or large at plants with once-through cooling or 

cooling ponds (i.e., a Category 2 issue), and it considered the impacts of cold shock, 

interference with fish migration, distribution of aquatic organisms, and premature emergence of 

aquatic insects to be small for all plants (i.e., Category 1). No new information that would alter 

those conclusions was identified in tThe NRC’s review of the plant-specific SEISs prepared to 

date and or in the literature show the impacts to be small. 

Thermal discharges are regulated for each plant under the Clean Water Act. The NRC requires 

nuclear power plants to operate in compliance with all of its permits, thereby minimizing adverse 

impacts to the environment and on workers and the public. It is anticipated that all plants will 

continue to operate in compliance with all applicable permits. On the basis of these 

considerations, the NRC concludes that the impact of thermal discharges on aquatic organisms 

at nuclear plants with once-through cooling systems or cooling ponds over the license renewal 

term would be managed and regulated in accordance with the requirements imposed under the 

CWA. As a result, thermal impacts on aquatic organisms would be could be small, moderate, or 

large, and is considered a Category 21 issue. The magnitude of the impact would depend on 

plant-specific characteristics of the cooling system (including location and type of discharge 

structure, discharge velocities and volume, and three-dimensional characteristics of the thermal 

plume) and characteristics of the aquatic resource (including the species present and their 

physiology, habitat, population distribution, status, management objectives, and life history). 

(NEI1-7(4)-19) 

Comment: Aquatic Resource Impacts (Thermal) In the proposed rule and the proposed GEIS 

revision, NRC continues to utilize a plant's use of a "once-through cooling system or cooling 

pond" as the sole criterion for determining whether the plant's thermal impact would be a 

Category 2 issue. TVA believes that the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 

(NPDES) permitting authority's determination that the thermal limits under which the plant 

discharges its effluent are sufficient to maintain a "balanced indigenous population of fish, 

shellfish and wildlife" (i.e., the "BIP standard" under Section 316(a) of the Clean Water Act) in 

the receiving waterbody is a much better index of the magnitude of any thermal impacts. 

Accordingly, we suggest that the thermal impact of a plant that uses a once-through cooling 

system be considered a Category 2 issue unless the plant operates under NPDES permit 

limitations that ensure that the "BIP standard" is met. For example, the existence of a valid 

Clean Water Act Section 316(a) determination at the time of license renewal should be a 

sufficient basis to downgrade the aquatic impact to a Category 1 issue. (TVA-32-3)
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-100 

Response: The NRC disagrees with these comments. A requirement to be a generic or 

Category 1 issue is a common level of impact at all plants. The common level of impact cannot 

be assumed because of the difference between the definition of impact (“BIP standard”) for 

those plants requiring a 316(a) variance under the CWA and the NRC’s definitions of impact 

levels for the purposes of NEPA. For example, a discharge that maintains “a balanced 

population of fish, shellfish and wildlife” may or may not cause observable affects to aquatic 

resources and so could satisfy the NRC’s definitions of either “MODERATE” or “SMALL” levels 

of impact, respectively. Further, although NPDES permitting may be sufficient to restrict and 

mitigate the potential thermal effects of operations so that impacts satisfy NRC’s definition of 

“SMALL,” not all plants undergoing license renewal have had recent reviews of their NPDES 

permits, and many site-specific operational, physical, and biological aspects could influence 

impacts. Consequently, NRC considers it important that up-to-date evaluations of the extent of 

thermal changes in the aquatic environment be made and that current and historic information 

be reviewed to evaluate the level of effects to aquatic resources from license renewal. On this 

basis, the NRC has classified the issue of thermal impacts on aquatic organisms for plants with 

once-through cooling systems or cooling ponds as Category 2, which requires site-specific 

evaluations in license renewal SEISs. The NRC made no changes to the GEIS in response to 

these comments.

Comment: These categories are just unfair. To put most of the aquatic issues under a one, 

generic, well, they're happening and they don't have any big problems. That's because they 

don't study them. When they turned Morro Bay -- or Diablo Canyon on, they killed all our 

abalone, and all they took responsibility for was the abalone. 

But that's an example of the cumulative effects of this power plant. They didn't go and look at 

what else they killed. They just killed the big obvious things. The abalone. Our fishing industry 

has collapsed here. Two billion gallons of water a day to cool a power plant. 

We need stuff in here that takes into account, when this plant was opened, the studies that they 

used to open it, the projections they made to the effects to the environment that should be 

considered, first and foremost. (PBCA-Nelson-27) 

Response: When many of the nuclear power plants were first licensed, cumulative impact 

assessment was in its infancy. As described in Section 4.13 of the GEIS, cumulative impact 

analyses are now conducted that consider the impacts of past, present, and reasonably 

foreseeable actions on resources of concern. No changes were made to the GEIS in response 

to this comment.

Comment: Referring to page 2-11 of the document, it discusses “eutrophication” and says 

something about “satisfactory mitigation,” and the term mitigation is used elsewhere as a 

panacea, that takes care of whatever the problem was. Mitigation is a very complex issue. It is 
Appendix A 

 A-101 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

not a given, how you mitigate for a problem, and I've certainly learned that in connection with 

working on "once through cooling" problems. 

The question of how you mitigate for the enormous damage that the "once through cooling" 

does in a plant like Diablo, the billions of gallons of water that go into the plant and kill billions of 

fish larvae, fish eggs, invertebrate organisms. How you mitigate for that is something that has 

been very much debated and still is not--nobody can agree on that, and it's also a legal matter, 

actually. 

So please, stop using mitigation so glibly, as a safe concept. (PBCA-Groot-37) 

Response: The NRC staff agrees that mitigation is often complex in both concept and practice. 

To comply with NEPA, NRC evaluates the effects of continued operations of a nuclear power 

plant over the 20-year license renewal period. The actual requirements for mitigation are 

determined among the licensee and Federal or State agencies with jurisdiction over the affected 

resource. For example, the NPDES permit issued by the EPA or delegated State agency would 

contain any compliance actions required to mitigate the impacts of impingement or entrainment. 

As a Federal agency, the NRC consults with other Federal agencies regarding the mitigation of 

impacts regulated by Federal laws. For example, the NRC is involved in consultations required 

by the Endangered Species Act among others. The NRC made no changes to the GEIS in 

response to this comment.

Comment: I note the admission on page S-13 that nuclear reactor shutdowns (and I conclude 

that would also be valid for facilities who fail to get an extension of their operating license) would 

result in "short-term reductions in entrainment and impingement rates and thermal plume 

characteristics." Since there are differing species around every site (including around the intake 

and discharge areas), then clearly there must be site-specific (yes, Category 2) examinations of 

the impact of all facilities on the mix of species in the vicinity − not just if there are listed 

threatened or endangered species in the area. Also, global climate change combined with 

ongoing shift in biological communities and with effects from intake and discharge must be 

predicted for each nuclear power facility in a site-specific manner (thus Category 2). This 

further makes a mockery out of the claim made in the documents that there is assured 

environmental stability around all nuclear power facilities. 

Nuisance organisms were mentioned in the document. Do some of these nuisance organisms 

thrive due to the thermal discharge plumes at nuclear power facilities, do some thrive on 

impinged and entrained organisms, and how would global climate change affect such organisms 

combined with these other factors? This series of questions requires site-specific analyses. 

(Campbell-31-10)
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-102 

Response: The NRC classifies impingement, entrainment, and thermal impacts as Category 2 

issues for plants with once-through cooling systems, due to the individual nature of oncethrough cooling systems, and the different species around each site. Due to the relatively 

smaller impacts resulting from reduced water withdrawal from, and heat rejection to, surface 

waters, the NRC classified impingement, entrainment, and thermal impacts as SMALL for plants 

with cooling towers or cooling ponds and categorized those issues as generic, or Category 1. 

NRC considers new and significant site-specific information on this issue as it arises. Although 

global climate change affects the aquatic resources that power plant operation can also affect, 

climate change is not a direct or indirect effect of plant operation. The NRC discusses climate 

change as part of cumulative impacts, which is a site-specific, Category 2 issue. Lastly, the 

NRC does not assume “environmental stability around all nuclear plant facilities” but rather 

examines the question of resource stability as part of classifying site-specific impacts as 

SMALL, MODERATE, or LARGE. 

The NRC has reviewed the question of nuisance organisms living in thermal discharges at 

nuclear plants in GEIS Section “4.6.1.2 Aquatic Resources,” and has found this not to be a 

problem in plants examined so far. As a result, this issue is considered generic, and hence, a 

Category 1 issue. In its reviews of license renewal applications, NRC looks for new and 

significant information on this issue as it does for other Category 1 issues. The NRC made no 

changes to the GEIS as a result of this comment. 

Comment: Inadequate Assessment of Inadvertent Radioactive Releases to the Environment: 

The Revised GElS acknowledges the problem encountered at various nuclear power plants 

across the country over the past several years of unplanned releases of radionuclides to the 

environment. Given this ongoing issue, it is critical that the license renewal environmental 

review process address all relevant concerns posed by such releases. Unfortunately, the 

NRC's proposed revisions to the 1996 GElS do not go far enough toward ensuring that the 

environmental impacts of such releases will be analyzed in a comprehensive manner. 

Revised Assessment of Aquatic Resources: The NRC proposes to add a new issue to address 

"Exposure of Aquatic Organisms to Radionuclides.”16 While analysis of such impacts is 

important and necessary, unfortunately, the NRC has misguidedly chosen to label this a 

Category 1 issue, making a generic determination that such impacts will always be small.17 

[

16 Revised GElS at 4-98 to 4-100; Revised GElS Appendices at B-22.] 

[

17 Revised GElS at 4-98 to 4-100; Revised GElS Appendices at B-22.]

This is problematic because the NRC's consideration of this issue is limited to the impact of 

radionuclides on aquatic organisms from normal operations.

18 Normal operations, by definition, 

do not include accidental releases of radionuclides from a facility. As such, the NRC's analysis 

here on its face excludes consideration of the impacts to aquatic biota from inadvertent 
Appendix A 

 A-103 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

releases, despite the earlier recognition that this has been a problem.19 Instead, the NRC relies 

on past Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program reports of 15 nuclear power plants to 

conclude that "normal operations of these facilities would not result in negative effects on 

aquatic biota.”20

[

18 See Revised GElS at 4-98 ("The potential impacts of radio nuclides on aquatic organisms from normal operations 

of a nuclear power plant during the license renewal term were not identified as an issue in the 1996 GElS"). 

(emphasis added); id. at 4-99 ("Thus, it is anticipated that normal operations of these facilities would not result in 

negative effects on aquatic biota") (emphasis added).] 

[

19 Revised GElS at 4-46 ("There is a growing concern about radionuclides detected in groundwater at nuclear power 

plants. These releases have occurred as leaks in at least 14 plants.")] 

[

20 Id. at 4-99.] 

With the noted history of accidental releases at the nation's nuclear power plants, it is absolutely 

necessary to specifically consider such releases when evaluating impacts to aquatic resources. 

Given the nature of this ongoing problem, and the likelihood of future unplanned releases, this is 

simply not an issue that is appropriate for one generic determination at this time. Instead, the 

NRC should make this a Category 2 issue and require licensees and NRC Staff to specifically 

consider the impacts of any known inadvertent releases to the environment on aquatic biota at 

the time of license renewal. This would ensure a full assessment of any impacts to aquatic 

resources, including nearby critical ecosystems, which are not otherwise specifically 

encompassed by the Revised GElS's generic analysis. 

 

For example, the Indian Point nuclear power plant is adjacent to the ecologically critical area of 

Haverstraw Bay. Haverstraw Bay is a New York State designated Essential Fish Habitat and 

Significant Coastal Fish and Wildlife Habitat.21 Despite the considerable amount of inadvertent 

radionuclide releases from Indian Point over the past few decades, Entergy and the NRC Staff 

have consistently refused to assess the impacts to the Hudson River ecosystem in the Indian 

Point license renewal proceeding.22 Under the proposed changes to the 1996 GElS, sitespecific impacts of unplanned radionuclide releases on aquatic biota would continue to evade 

assessment. This is utterly illogical, and completely inconsistent with the NRC's recognition that 

inadvertent releases are an ongoing issue. 

[

21 See Coastal Fish & Wildlife Habitat Rating Form, 

http://www.nyswaterrronts.com/downloads/pdfs/sig_hab/hudsonriver/Haverstraw_Bay.pdf·(last accessed Jan. 12, 

2010).] 

[

22 See Entergy, Inc., License Renewal Application, Appendix E: Applicant's Environmental Report, Operating 

License Renewal Stage, Indian Point Energy Center (ER), available at, 

http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications/indian-point.html; Indian Point Draft 

Supplemental EIS at §§ 2.2.7,4.3.] 

[

23 See Revised GElS at 4-55 to 4-58; Revised GElS Appendices at B-12.] (Riverkeeper-20-5) 

Response: The NRC does not agree that this issue should be classified as Category 2. As 

identified in the comment, the issue of potential radiological impacts on aquatic resources from 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-104 

the current routine operation of nuclear power facilities was evaluated in the GEIS using 

monitoring data for water and sediment using a sample size of 15 facilities. This analysis 

included monitoring data from each plant’s radiological environmental monitoring program 

(REMP), which represents a range of radionuclides and concentrations found in the 

environment near each facility. The revised GEIS calculated the dose rates to aquatic biota 

using a dose evaluation model that used the site-specific radionuclide concentration in water 

and sediments reported in the REMP reports. The estimated doses to aquatic organisms from 

the radioactive material present in the environment were less than 0.2 rad/d (0.002 Gy/d) for all 

of these facilities, which is considerably less than the protective guideline value of 1 rad/d 

(0.01 Gy/d). Based on this evaluation and each nuclear power plant’s expected continued 

compliance with NRC’s radiation protection requirements in 10 CFR Parts 20 and 50, this issue 

has been classified as Category 1. 

The designation of this issue as Category 1 does not imply that potential impacts would not be 

considered in plant-specific environmental reviews. Changes in plant operating parameters or 

new information pertinent to the evaluation of impacts would be considered by the NRC during 

preparation of plant-specific supplements to the GEIS. Thus, even though this issue is 

considered to be Category 1, there are mechanisms in place to conduct a site-specific review, 

as required by 10 CFR Part 51.53(c)(iv), if new and significant information is identified by the 

license renewal applicant or independently by the NRC that shows the potential impacts are 

outside the bounding conditions evaluated in the revised GEIS. 

As discussed in the revised GEIS, the issue, “radionuclides released to groundwater” is 

classified as Category 2 because of the lack of any beforehand information available for 

evaluation of potential impacts. It is not possible to predict when, where, how much, and what 

type of radioactive material would be released from an inadvertent release, and whether the 

radioactive material reaches the aquatic environment. Therefore, as proposed in 

10 CFR Part 51.53 (c)(3)(ii)(P), inadvertent radioactive releases to groundwater will be 

evaluated on a site-specific basis. For this same reason, the NRC did not attempt to evaluate 

the impact on aquatic biota from a theoretical inadvertent release because the radiological data 

would be an assumption and not have a valid technical basis. 

Radiological releases, either normal permitted discharges in accordance with NRC regulations 

or inadvertent releases, are governed by NRC’s regulations and are part of the NRC’s 

inspection program. To ensure that nuclear power plants are operated safely, the NRC licenses 

the plants to operate, licenses the plant operators, and establishes license conditions for the 

safe operation of each plant. Every NRC-licensed nuclear power plant must comply with all 

health, safety, and environmental requirements contained within its license as well as complying 

with all other Federal, State, and local requirements for continued operation. The NRC provides 

continuous oversight of the plant through its Reactor Oversight Process to verify that it is being 

operated in accordance with NRC regulations. This oversight includes having full-time NRC 
Appendix A 

 A-105 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

inspectors located at the plant and periodic safety inspections conducted by NRC inspectors 

based in an NRC Regional Office. The inspections look at a plant’s compliance with NRC’s 

regulations that include the following: plant safety, radiation protection of plant workers and 

members of the public, radioactive effluent releases, radiological environmental monitoring, 

emergency preparedness, radioactive waste storage and transportation, quality assurance, and 

training. The NRC has authority to take whatever action is necessary to protect public health 

and safety. As part of the proposed revised license renewal process, the NRC’s environmental 

review will examine the applicant’s radioactive effluent releases, the radiological environmental 

monitoring data, and the groundwater protection program to determine the potential impact to 

human health, aquatic and terrestrial biota, and groundwater resources. 

No changes were made to the GEIS in response to this comment. 

Comment: Then the effects of dredging on aquatic organisms, on page 2-11. It talks about 

getting permits from the Army Corps of Engineers and state environmental agencies, and other 

regulatory agencies. This is the same mess that Peg Pinard was talking about. 

You know, who is in charge there? Who is going to be responsible? Who is going to figure out 

how to do these things? Certainly not a good candidate for Category 1. That is a very complex 

issue, again, that needs a lot of looking at. (PBCA-Groot-38) 

Response: Under the Clean Water Act (CWA) and its amendments, licensees are required to 

obtain a permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) before any dredging can be 

done in a water body regulated by the CWA. Thus, in response to the comment, the USACE is 

responsible for conducting the requisite NEPA analysis for the proposed dredging action. 

Dredging, which the NRC did not analyze in the original GEIS, is addressed in detail in 

Section 4.6.1.2 of the revised GEIS. The NRC’s review of available information found that 

previous plant-specific ERs and SEISs classified the impact levels of these dredging activities 

on populations or communities of aquatic organisms as “SMALL” at all plants where they 

occurred in part because maintenance dredging for nuclear power plant operations occurred 

infrequently, was of relatively short duration, and affected relatively small areas. Based on this 

information, the NRC concluded that the impact of dredging on aquatic resources would be 

“SMALL” for all nuclear plants and is a Category 1 issue. The NRC made no changes to the 

GEIS in response to this comment. 

Comment: Vol. 1, Page 3-63, lines 23 to 34: Text in lines 23 to 34 on page 3-63 reads as 

follows: 

Species composition and ecological conditions within riverine environments are 

largely determined by the geographic area, gradient of the river bed, velocity of 

the current, and source of nutrients and organic matter at the base of the food 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-106 

chain. Thus, ecological communities in rivers become altered if the river is 

impounded, with the degree of alteration depending on the degree to which 

various physical and chemical conditions are affected. Environmental threats to 

rivers include depletion of water, dams that alter flow and temperature 

characteristics and can block the upstream or downstream movement of aquatic 

organisms, chemical pollution, and the introduction of nonnative species. For 

example, the USFWS was concerned that a pond created by damming Oyster 

Creek to supply a source of water for fighting fires at the Oyster Creek plant in 

New Jersey could impede the movement of migratory species, such as the 

American shad (Alosa sapidissima) or American eel (Anguilla rostrata) (NRC 

2007c). 

Respectfully, Exelon submits that the statements made by the USFWS during public scoping for 

the environmental review of license renewal for the Oyster Creek plant were speculative, as 

demonstrated by the NRC's review of the concern in the final NUREG-1437, Supplement 28 

(Sec. 4.7, page 4-51). Accordingly, Exelon urges the NRC to delete the last sentence in the 

paragraph in lines 23 to 34 on page 3-63 of the draft updated GElS because, although a 

concern was raised, the Oyster Creek fire pond dam is not an instructive example of the 

environmental threats being described. (Exelon-17-3) 

Response: The NRC agrees with this comment and has changed Section 3.6.2.1.1 of the 

GEIS.

Comment: Page 3-69, lines 1 and 2: Text in the heading for Section 3.6.2.2 on lines 1 and 2 

on page 3-69 reads as follows: 

3.6.2.2 Overview of the Effects of Existing Nuclear Plant Operations and 

Transmission Lines on Aquatic Resources. 

Because the text in Section 3.6.2.2 does not mention transmission line effects, delete the words 

“and Transmission Lines” from the title of Section 3.6.2.2 in lines 1 and 2 on page 3-69. 

(NEI1-7(4)-57) 

Response: The NRC agrees with the comment and has deleted the phrase “and Transmission 

Lines” from the title of Section 3.6.2.2.

Comment: Page 3-62, lines 9 to 11: Text on lines 9 to 11 on page 3-62 reads as follows: 

The water bodies in the vicinity of the power plants contain a complex assemblage of habitats 

and species that may be affected by a plant’s cooling system and by maintenance of the 

transmission line ROWs. 
Appendix A 

 A-107 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Because offsite transmission line ROW maintenance will no longer be considered a component 

of nuclear power plant operations during the license renewal term, unless as indicated on page 

3-24 (lines 13 to 25) the transmission line’s continued use during the license renewal term 

would be contingent on license renewal, consider deleting the words “and by maintenance of 

the transmission line ROWs” on lines 10 and 11. (NEI1-7(4)-56) 

Comment: Page 4-78, lines 12 to 15: Text in lines 12 to 15 on page 4-78 reads as follows: 

Continued operations of the nuclear power plants during the 20-year license renewal term 

includes the operation of the cooling system (once-through, cooling ponds, or cooling towers), 

transmission line ROW maintenance, releases of gaseous and liquid effluents, facility 

maintenance, and refurbishment-related construction activities. 

The NRC is encouraged to delete the words “transmission line ROW maintenance” in line 14 on 

page 4-78 because such words appear to be inconsistent with statements on pp. 3-3 (lines 35 – 

41) and 3-24 (lines 20 – 21) regarding the scope of the GEIS update with respect to 

transmission lines. Unless NRC is aware of a nuclear power plant site where aquatic organisms 

are located onsite beneath the transmission lines that run from the turbine generator building to 

the onsite switching station, the issue of transmission line maintenance impacts on aquatic 

resources does not exist. (NEI1-7(4)-18) 

Comment: Page 4-104, line 23 to page 4-106, line 3: Text from page 4-104, line 23 through 

page 4-106, line 3 contains a subsection titled “Impacts of Transmission Line ROW 

Maintenance on Aquatic Resources,” which discusses the impacts on aquatic resources from 

transmission line ROW maintenance. 

The NRC is encouraged to delete the subsection titled “Impacts of Transmission Line ROW 

Maintenance on Aquatic Resources” located from page 4-104, line 23 through page 4-106, line 

3 because the issue of transmission line ROW maintenance impacts on aquatic resources 

appears to be inconsistent with statements on pp. 3-3 (lines 35 – 41) and 3-24 (lines 20 – 21) 

regarding the scope of the GEIS update with respect to transmission lines. 

Unless NRC is aware of a nuclear power plant site where aquatic organisms are located onsite 

beneath the transmission lines that run from the turbine generator building to the onsite 

switching station, the issue of transmission line maintenance impacts on aquatic resources 

during the term of a renewed nuclear power plant license does not exist. If this discussion is 

retained, its scope should be confined to impacts within the transmission line ROWs that run 

from the turbine generator building to the onsite switching station. (NEI1-7(4)-20) 

 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-108 

Comment: Secondly, we would like to support the staff's conclusion regarding transmission 

lines, as far as what is considered in scope. Subsequently to 1996 GEIS, and with deregulation, 

we feel that the staff's position on transmission lines now more accurately reflects the present 

situation with utilities. (NMA-NEI-2) 

Comment: Page 3-73, General: Text in Section 3.6.3 on page 3-72 describes how many 

species (plants and animals) occurring near nuclear power plants are either listed as threatened 

or endangered or are candidates for listing. 

To better clarify the scope of the draft updated GEIS regarding assessment of impacts from 

operation and maintenance of transmission lines associated with nuclear power plants, consider 

inserting a new paragraph on page 3-72 that would read as follows (strikethrough font = 

deletion; italics font = addition): 

It should be noted that offsite transmission line ROW maintenance will no longer be considered 

a component of nuclear power plant operations during the license renewal term, unless (as 

indicated on page 3-24, lines 13 to 25) a transmission line’s continued use during the license 

renewal term would be contingent on license renewal. For this reason, only the 59 known 

occurrences of listed species on nuclear power plant sites, and possibly a few additional 

species along transmission line ROWs of very short length near some plant sites, would be 

within the affected environment. (NEI1-7(4)-58) 

Comment: Page 3-73, lines 8 to 10: Text in lines 8 to 13 on page 3-73 reads as follows: 

Nuclear plants known to support listed terrestrial species on the site or along 

transmission line ROWs generally maintain monitoring programs to identify 

changes in populations or report impacts to the USFWS and State agencies. 

Factors that could affect listed terrestrial species include construction-related 

habitat loss, cooling tower drift, operation and maintenance of cooling systems, 

transmission line ROW maintenance, avian collisions with cooling towers and 

transmission lines, exposure to radionuclides, and site operations and 

maintenance. 

To better clarify the scope of the draft updated GEIS regarding assessment of impacts from 

operation and maintenance of transmission lines associated with nuclear power plants, as 

indicated on page 3-24 (lines 13 to 25) in the draft updated GEIS, consider modifying the 

sentence in lines 8 to 10 on page 3-73 to read as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics 

font = addition): 

The owners of Nnuclear plants known to support listed terrestrial species on the site or along 

transmission line ROWs generally maintain monitoring programs to identify changes in 
Appendix A 

 A-109 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

populations or report impacts to the USFWS and State agencies. Factors that could affect listed 

terrestrial species include construction-related habitat loss, cooling tower drift, operation and 

maintenance of cooling systems, transmission line ROW maintenance, avian collisions with 

cooling towers and transmission lines, exposure to radionuclides, and site operations and 

maintenance. (NEI1-7(4)-59) 

Comment: Page 3-73, lines 28 to 40 and Page 3-74, lines 1 to 5: Text in lines 28 to 40 on 

page 3-73 and lines 1 to 5 on page 3-74 describes the potential effects of transmission line 

ROW maintenance activities on plant species listed or proposed for listing as threatened or 

endangered. 

Consider deleting lines 28 through 40 on page 3-73 and lines 1 to 5 on page 3-74 because, as 

indicated on page 3-24 (lines 13 to 25) in the draft updated GEIS, transmission line ROW 

maintenance will no longer be considered a component of nuclear power plant operations 

during the license renewal term, unless a transmission line’s continued use during the license 

renewal term would be contingent on license renewal. In addition, as written, the text in 

lines 28 through 40 on page 3-73 and lines 1 to 5 on page 3-74 fails to recognize that the 

owners of many nuclear power plants no longer own and control off-site transmission line 

ROWs. (NEI1-7(4)-60) 

Response: The NRC disagrees with the changes suggested by the commenters. The NRC’s 

review has concluded that the environmental impacts of in-scope transmission line right-of-way 

maintenance activities would likely be SMALL, short term, and localized over the license 

renewal term, as detailed in the revised GEIS. Thus, it is a Category 1 issue. Impacts on 

terrestrial and aquatic resources from such maintenance activities could occur as a result of the 

direct disturbance of habitats, soil erosion, changes in water quality (from sedimentation and 

thermal effects), or inadvertent releases of chemical contaminants from herbicide use 

throughout the license renewal term. The NRC believes that some level of impact associated 

with these activities is likely and, therefore, reasonably foreseeable and warrants examination. 

As a result, the NRC has determined that such impacts should be evaluated in its SEISs with 

consideration of any new and significant information that could change the conclusion in the 

GEIS with regard to this issue. Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.6.5 of the revised GEIS define the extent 

of in-scope transmission lines subject to license renewal environmental reviews. The NRC 

made no changes to the GEIS as a result of these comments.

Comment: Page 3-54, lines 7 to 25: Text describes the Clean Water Act (CWA) controls on 

impingement and entrainment at cooling water intake structures. 

The discussion of impingement and entrainment controls on page 3-54, lines 7 to 25, is not 

obviously related to the CWA thermal effluent controls, although it now appears in the draft 

updated GEIS Section 3.5.1.2.1 entitled “Thermal Effluents.” Consider moving it to a new, 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-110 

separate section entitled “Control of Impingement and Entrainment” and amend the discussion 

to recognize that impingement and entrainment are regulated under the NPDES permit. 

(NEI1-7(4)-46) 

Response: The NRC agrees with this comment. For clarity and to address interrelated Clean 

Water Act 316 requirements, the section cited by the commenter has been revised and 

reorganized into an unnumbered subsection under Section 3.5.1.2 in the revised GEIS titled, 

“Thermal Effluents and Withdrawal of Cooling Water from Surface Water Bodies.” 

Comment: Aquatic Resource Impacts (Impingement and Entrainment) In the proposed rule 

and the proposed GEIS revision, the NRC continues to utilize a plant's use of a "once-through 

cooling system or cooling pond" as the sole criterion for determining whether the plant's 

entrainment and impingement impact would be a Category 2 issue. TVA believes that the 

NPDES permitting authority's determination that the design and location of a plant's cooling 

water intake structure reflects "best technology available" (BTA) to minimize "adverse 

environmental impacts," is a much better index of the magnitude of any entrainment and 

impingement impacts.· Accordingly, we suggest that the entrainment and impingement impacts 

of a plant that uses a once-through cooling system be considered a Class 2 issue unless the 

plant operates under NPDES permit limitations that require the use of BTA to minimize such 

impacts. For example, the existence of a valid BTA determination under Clean Water Act 

Section 316(b), at the time of license renewal, should be a sufficient basis to downgrade the 

aquatic impact to a Category 1 issue. (TVA-32-4) 

Response: The NRC disagrees with this comment. A requirement to be a generic or 

Category 1 issue is a common level of impact at all plants. The common level of impact cannot 

be assumed because BTA is a technology-based standard under the CWA and the NRC’s 

definitions of impact levels for the purposes of NEPA are based on the response of aquatic 

resources. Further, although NPDES permitting may be sufficient to restrict and mitigate the 

potential impingement and entrainment effects of operations so that impacts satisfy NRC’s 

definition of “SMALL,” not all plants undergoing license renewal have had recent reviews of their 

NPDES permits, and many site-specific operational, physical, and biological aspects could 

influence impacts. Consequently, NRC considers it important that up-to-date evaluations of 

impingement and entrainment be made and that current and historic information be reviewed to 

evaluate the level of effects to aquatic resources from license renewal. On these bases, the 

NRC has classified the issue of impingement and entrainment impacts on aquatic organisms for 

plants with once-through cooling systems or cooling ponds as Category 2, which requires sitespecific evaluations in license renewal SEISs. The NRC made no changes to the GEIS in 

response to this comment.

Comment: The draft GElS indicates that "impacts of impingement and entrainment of aquatic 

organisms are expected to be small at plants with cooling towers. Impingement and 
Appendix A 

 A-111 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

entrainment rates are low at plants that use closed-cycle cooling with cooling towers because 

the rates and volumes of water withdrawal needed for makeup are minimized." Therefore it has 

been determined that this is a Category 1 issue. Based on EPA's experience the rates and 

volumes of water withdrawal for makeup and subsequent blowdown are often optimized more 

for water conditioning chemicals and any biocide use and not to minimize water withdraws. 

Large facilities with closed-cycle cooling may still be making what are considered large 

withdrawals from a waterbody, which could result in large impacts. A single significance level is 

not representative of the impacts here, as the impacts may be small, moderate, or large. 

(EPA-3-1) 

Comment: Page 4-87, Comment on Lines 28-32: 

This section states “... Because the volume of water withdrawn by a power plant is minimized 

when a closed-cycle cooling system is employed, the impacts to aquatic organisms from 

impingement and entrainment would be smaller than the impacts from impingement and 

entrainment that would occur if a once-through cooling system was employed instead." It has 

been EPA's experience that the volume of water withdrawn by a power plant is not automatically 

minimized by the use of a closed-cycle cooling system, a facility needs to make an effort to 

require minimization of make-up and blowdown (which may be more expensive). Furthermore, 

the rates and volumes of water withdrawal for makeup and subsequent blowdown are often 

optimized more for chemical use and not to minimize water withdraws. Large facilities with 

closed-cycle cooling may still be making what are considered large withdrawals from a 

waterbody, which could result in large impacts. Thus, all impingement and entrainment of 

aquatic organisms should be a Category 2 issue. A single significance level is not 

representative of the impacts here, as the impacts may be small, moderate, or large. 

(EPA-3(1)-21) 

Response: The NRC classified impingement and entrainment at plants with cooling towers 

operated in closed-cycle mode to be generic, or Category 1, issue not only because the amount 

of water withdrawn from water bodies is smaller than for plants with once-through cooling 

systems but also because reviews of past studies and license renewal SEISs reported no 

reductions in populations of aquatic biota attributable to impingement and entrainment for 

existing nuclear power plants with cooling towers operating in closed-cycle mode. Even so, the 

NRC looks for new and significant information about Category 1 issues at each plant when 

preparing each SEIS for proposed license renewal and performs site-specific assessments for 

Category 1 issues where it finds such information warrants. The NRC made no changes to the 

GEIS in response to these comments.

Comment: Aquatic Ecology Impacts Are Important and Should be Addressed: Degradation of 

the marine environment due to impingement and entrainment of aquatic organisms, and to 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-112 

thermal changes, have been long-standing problems in the waters in Diablo Cove. These 

waters are also prime fishing habitat, and the industry is an important one in the area. 

Pacific Gas & Electric Company has been cited by the California Regional Water Quality Control 

Board for violations to its water permit, and the Company has been forced to take mitigation 

measures. SLOMFP is concerned about the cumulative impacts on the marine environment of 

continued operation of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant. It is in agreement with the Draft GElS that 

Aquatic Resources and the effects of thermal discharges for once-through cooling systems are 

potentially large impacts that require plant-specific, Category 2 analysis. (SLOMFP-13-16) 

Response: As identified in the comment, thermal impacts and impingement and entrainment 

are considered Category 2 issues for plants with once-through cooling (or cooling ponds) and 

require evaluation in plant-specific SEISs. The NRC made no changes to the GEIS in response 

to this comment.

Comment: D. The Draft Generic EIS Fails to Adequately Assess Aquatic Impacts in Specific 

Key Areas: Numerous specific statements in the draft revised Generic EIS need to be 

addressed by the NRC. These include the NRC’s portrayal of the Clean Water Act section 

316(b) Phase III rules, the viability of acoustic deterrent systems at plants in Belgium and New 

York, the role of the consultation process under the federal Endangered Species Act, and the 

environmental consequences, of alternatives to license renewal. 

2. Acoustic Deterrent System at Plant in Belgium: As illustrated in this and in the following 

point, the NRC also greatly exaggerates the effectiveness of sound deterrent systems as a 

mitigation measure for impingement. 

The NRC's Statement: At the Doel nuclear power plant on the Scheldt Estuary in Belgium, an 

acoustic deterrent system decreased total impingement of estuarine fishes by about 60 percent. 

Draft Generic EIS, p. 4-83, lines 19-20. 

The NYSDEC's Response: The NRC is wrongly applying the narrow results of the experience 

at the plant in Belgium. Sonic deterrent systems have only been demonstrated to be effective 

on clupeids, and in fact, the two species impinged at the Belgium facility are clupeids. The NRC 

has no basis to state that the use of a sonic deterrent system reduced the impingement of 

"estuarine fishes" by about 60 percent − one would interpret this to mean that sonic deterrent 

technology is effective on all estuarine fish species, which is not supported by the data. The 

NRC needs to be more accurate in presenting "facts" and should only present information on 

fish species found in the United States and nuclear facilities they regulate. We also note that 

one of the species at issue in the Belgium plant (Sprattus sprattus) is a European species not 

found in United States waters. (NYS DEC-12-7) 
Appendix A 

 A-113 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Comment: D. The Draft Generic EIS Fails to Adequately Assess Aquatic Impacts in Specific 

Key Areas: Numerous specific statements in the draft revised Generic EIS need to be 

addressed by the NRC. These include the NRC’s portrayal of the Clean Water Act section 

316(b) Phase III rules, the viability of acoustic deterrent systems at plants in Belgium and New 

York, the role of the consultation process under the federal Endangered Species Act, and the 

environmental consequences, of alternatives to license renewal. 

3. Sound Deterrent System at Fitzpatrick:

The NRC's Statement: At the Fitzpatrick plant in New York, the sound deterrent system 

reduced the density of fishes near the intake by as much as 96 percent (Ross et al. 1993). Draft 

GElS, p. 4-83, lines 27-28. 

The NYSDEC’s Response: The NRC repeats the mistake it made with its reference to the plant 

in Belgium. This statement is misleading and overstates the results of the sound deterrent 

system at another plant. When these studies were conducted in May 1991 at J.A. Fitzpatrick 

Nuclear Power Plant in New York State, alewives comprised a majority of the impingement 

mortality at the plant. As the Department stated in the previous comment, sonic deterrent 

systems are only effective on clupeids. By stating that this system has shown a "96 percent 

reduction in density" again leads one to believe that all fish species are affected by this 

technology. Moreover, although alewives still make up a portion of the impingement mortality, 

the alewife population on Lake Ontario has crashed in recent years. See Mills et aI., 2003. 

Can. T. of Fish. Aquat. Sci. 60:471-490. Thus, NYSDEC would not expect to see those prior 

results replicated with the current population. 

In fact, the sonic deterrent system fails to affect many other fish species impinged at Fitzpatrick. 

Recent impingement studies (2006-2007) have demonstrated that over 200,000 fish are 

impinged annually at Fitzpatrick. These are mostly three-spine stickleback that do not respond 

to the sonic deterrent system. In sum, with a functional sonic deterrent system, yearly 

impingement mortality of alewife should be reduced by 86 percent, but it does not follow that a 

sonic deterrent system will reduce the impingement mortality of other fish species. 

(NYS DEC-12-8) 

Response: In order to clarify the statements on the effectiveness of sound deterrent systems, 

the paragraphs on sound deterrent in Section 4.6.1.2 have been deleted and replaced by a 

sentence that sound has been most effective at plants that primarily impinge clupeids. A 

sentence has also been added to indicate that most deflection methods have had variable 

effectiveness.
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-114 

Terrestrial Ecology 

Comment: Page 4-69, lines 14 to 28: Text in lines 14 to 28 reads as follows: 

The potential range of impact levels at plants with cooling ponds or cooling towers using 

makeup water from a small river with low flow applying for license renewal in the future cannot 

be determined at this time. The NRC concludes that the impact of water use conflicts with 

riparian communities is a plant-specific Category 2 issue. 

The above-quoted statement appears to conflict with the following statement on page 4-63 

(lines 16 – 18) in the draft updated GEIS: 

On the basis of these considerations, the NRC concludes that the impact of continued operation 

of the cooling systems on terrestrial resources would be small for all nuclear plants and is 

considered a Category 1 issue. 

The NRC is encouraged to revise the potential impact classification of water use on terrestrial 

riparian habitats to Category 1 for the following reasons. The analysis presented in support of 

the conclusion on page 4-63 classifying the impact of cooling systems (including cooling ponds) 

on terrestrial resources as Category 1 is appropriate for discussion of impacts on page 4-69. As 

noted in lines 1 – 4 on page 4-63, restrictions typically exist on water consumption that may 

require reduction in plant operation which would mitigate impact on riparian and aquatic biota. 

As noted, impacts would be temporary. (NEI1-7(4)-16) 

Response: The NRC revised Section 4.6.1.1 of the revised GEIS to better differentiate the 

issues of “Cooling System Impacts on Terrestrial Resources” and “Water Use Conflicts with 

Terrestrial Resources.” Specifically, the NRC modified the issue “Cooling System Impacts on 

Terrestrial Resources” to state that it is applicable to plants with once-through cooling systems 

and cooling ponds, typically with low levels of consumptive use, and the issue “Water Use 

Conflicts with Terrestrial Resources” to state that it is applicable to plants with cooling ponds or 

cooling towers, typically with high levels of consumptive use and using makeup water from a 

river. The water use conflicts issue will remain Category 2 due to the possibility of a 

MODERATE impact level determination at some plants, such as the Wolf Creek findings 

described in Section 4.6.1.1 of the GEIS. As described in Section 4.5.1.1, the impact of water 

use conflicts could vary among nuclear plants and would depend on factors such as plantspecific design characteristics affecting consumptive water use, the characteristics of the water 

body serving as the source for makeup water, and the amount of competing use for that water. 

Comment: Page 3-61, lines 29 to 32: Text in lines 29 to 32 on page 3-61 reads as follows: 

Cooling system intakes can create an impingement hazard for waterfowl, and water demands 

for cooling can create water-use conflicts with wildlife. At the Nine Mile Point plant in New York, 
Appendix A 

 A-115 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

for example, approximately 100 greater scaup (Aythya marila) ducks were impinged at the 

cooling water intake structure in 2000 (NRC 2006d). 

A reference or additional information should be provided to support the statement in lines 

29 and 30 that “water demands for cooling can create water-use conflicts with wildlife”. The 

Nine Mile Point example does not suggest a water-use conflict resulting from cooling water 

demand. (NEI1-7(4)-12) 

Response: The NRC agrees with the comment. The NRC modified the text of Section 3.6.1.3 

of the GEIS in response to the comment to better explain how water demands for cooling can 

create water-use conflicts with wildlife.

Comment: Page 3-60, lines 30 to 32: Text on lines 30 to 32 reads as follows: 

At the Nine Mile Point plant in New York, for example, approximately 100 greater scaup 

(Aythya marila) and lesser scaup (Aythya affinis) ducks were impinged at the cooling water 

intake structure in 2000 (NRC 2006d). 

To better describe the situation that led to the impingement event at Nine Mile Point, change the 

text to read as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

At the Nine Mile Point plant in New York, for example, approximately 100 greater scaup (Aythya 

marila) and lesser scaup (Aythya affinis) ducks were impinged at the cooling water intake 

structure in 2000 while feeding on zebra mussels during reverse flow conditions for deicing of 

the intake structure (NRC 2006d). As a result of this incident, the Nine Mile Point intake 

structures now undergo annual cleaning to remove zebra mussels (the food source), and 

reverse flow conditions are scheduled during periods when diving duck feeding is limited 

(NRC 2006d). (NEI1-7(4)-55) 

Response: The NRC staff agrees with the proposed changes and has modified the text of 

Section 3.6.1.3 of the GEIS in accordance with this comment.

Comment: Avian Mortality: The Prairie Island Indian Community believes that avian mortality 

should be a site-specific issue (Category 2), as there are many factors, including migration 

routes and the location of the transmission lines, relative to migratory pathways or corridors, bird 

species composition, that will be unique for each site. 

The 1996 GEIS contained that general statement that "no relatively high collision mortality is 

known to occur along transmission lines associated with nuclear power plants in the 

United States, other than the Prairie Island Plant in Minnesota." Since no new plants have been 

constructed since the 1996 GEIS was issued, we can only conclude that this issue may be 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-116 

unique for the Prairie Island site. It can't possibly be generic to all plants if it is occurring at one 

plant. This statement or any mention of the Prairie Island site is not in the revised GEIS. 

In the 1970s, Northern States Power commissioned a five-year study to determine whether the 

transmission lines coming from the PINGP had any impact on migratory birds using the 

Mississippi River (the PINGP is on the river). The Mississippi River is recognized as a Globally 

Important Bird Area and Migratory "Flyway" for birds. The Mississippi flyway is heavily utilized 

because it is uninterrupted by mountains or hills that would interfere with the movements of 

migrating birds. The Upper Mississippi River and associated ecosystem is very important to 

birds that are year-round residents and those who are migratory. About 40 percent of all North 

American waterfowl use the river as a migratory flyway, and 326 species of birds (about 1/3 of 

all species in North America) use the river corridor as a flyway in their spring and fall migrations. 

The Mississippi River is a well-known migration corridor for millions of waterfowl, including 

dabbling ducks, canvasbacks, and scaup that pass through this flyway annually. 

The five-year study documented that 453 bird carcasses, representing 53 species, were found 

along portions of the transmission lines from the PINGP. Sixty-four percent of those carcasses 

were found along the east-west portions of the transmission lines, which are perpendicular to 

the Mississippi River or the migration pathway. The report, summarizing the five-year study, 

concluded with the statement that "the best way to reduce bird kills is to locate transmission 

lines parallel to bird migration corridors to as great a degree as possible, since locating them 

perpendicular to the line of migration results in many more birds being killed." 

This issue is not generic, can have many factors, and should be evaluated on a site-specific 

basis. (PIIC-8-8) 

Response: Based on its review of existing information, including the license renewal review for 

the Prairie Island plant in Minnesota (NRC 2009), the NRC concluded that the impacts of bird 

collisions with transmission lines would be SMALL for all plants. The Prairie Island SEIS 

indicated that the impacts of bird collisions with Prairie Island transmission lines are SMALL due 

to several factors: (1) placement of marking devices on lines in areas with a known history of 

avian collisions; (2) the development of an Avian Protection Plan for Minnesota by Xcel Energy 

based on its Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 

(FWS) to ensure compliance with the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and Bald and Golden Eagle 

Protection Act; (3) semiannual reports on avian injury and mortality along Xcel Energy 

transmission lines, begun in 2002 under the MOU, report only one incident, a dead cormorant; 

and (4) Xcel Energy established Avian Protection Standards in 2006. Another important 

consideration is that the scope of the transmission line review for future license renewals will be 

limited to those transmission lines currently needed to connect the plant to the first substation of 

the regional electric grid. As noted in Section 3.1.6.5 of the GEIS, in-scope transmission lines 

include only those lines that would not continue to operate if a plant’s license was not renewed. 
Appendix A 

 A-117 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Using this criterion, in-scope transmission lines are those lines that connect the plant to the first 

substation of the regional electric grid. This substation is frequently, but not always, located on 

the plant property. Section 4.6.1.1 of the GEIS notes that the length of transmission lines 

associated with nuclear plants is considerably less than the total length of transmission lines 

estimated within the United States. Therefore, transmission lines associated with nuclear power 

plants are likely responsible for only a small fraction of total bird collision mortality. It should be 

noted that for this and other Category 1 issues, a complete review of the issue would be 

required if new and significant information indicates that impacts could be MODERATE or 

LARGE. No changes were made to the GEIS in response to this comment.

Comment: Inadequate Assessment of Inadvertent Radioactive Releases to the Environment: 

The Revised GElS acknowledges the problem encountered at various nuclear power plants 

across the country over the past several years of unplanned releases of radionuclides to the 

environment. Given this ongoing issue, it is critical that the license renewal environmental 

review process address all relevant concerns posed by such releases. Unfortunately, the 

NRC's proposed revisions to the 1996 GElS do not go far enough toward ensuring that the 

environmental impacts of such releases will be analyzed in a comprehensive manner. 

Revised Assessment of Terrestrial Resources: The NRC also proposes a new Category 1 issue 

to address "Exposure of Terrestrial Organisms to Radionuclides.”23 While the intention of this 

new issue is admirable, it suffers from the same problems articulated above. In particular, this 

issue, once again, only applies to radioactive releases from normal operations.24 Based on this 

assumption, the NRC made a generic determination that impacts to terrestrial resources are 

small.25

However, it is necessary for the NRC to require consideration of radioactive releases that are 

not part of the normal course of operation.26 This would be the only way [to] ensure an 

accurate· and complete assessment of impacts to terrestrial biota. Accordingly, the NRC should 

make this a Category 2 issue and require licensees and the NRC Staff to look at radionuclide 

impact to terrestrial resources on a site-specific basis. 

[

23 See Revised GElS at 4-55 to 4-58; Revised GElS Appendices at B-12.] 

[

24 See Revised GElS at 4-55 ("Releases into terrestrial environments often result from deposition of small amounts 

of radionuclide particulates released from power plant vents during normal operations") (emphasis added); id. at 4-58 

("[T]he NRC concludes that the impact of routine radionuclide releases from past and current operations on terrestrial 

biota would be small at all nuclear power plants and ·would not be expected to appreciably change during the 

renewal period") (emphasis added).] 

[

25 See Revised GElS at 4-58; Revised GElS Appendices at B-12.] (Riverkeeper-20-6) 

Response: The NRC does not agree that the revised GEIS has an inadequate discussion of 

the impacts from radioactive effluents. One of the purposes of the GEIS is to evaluate the 

various potential environmental impacts associated with the expected normal operation of a 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-118 

nuclear power plant for an additional 20 years. Accordingly, the revised GEIS evaluates the 

potential impacts to human health and to two new issues (aquatic and terrestrial biota) using 

radioactive effluent release data from nuclear power plants operating at normal conditions. The 

1996 GEIS and the revised GEIS evaluate the potential consequences from routine operations 

with a focus on the impacts to human health, for which the NRC has specific regulatory dose 

limits. The NRC does not have regulations in place for the protection of biota from radiation. As 

discussed in the revised GEIS, the NRC uses protection standards from national and 

international scientific organizations to make its NEPA determination. However, while the two 

biota issues are proposed to be generic issues classified as Category 1, if NRC’s review of the 

impacts to biota from radioactive effluents is outside the bounding conditions used in the GEIS, 

the issue will be treated as “new and significant” and a site-specific evaluation will be performed 

and reported in the SEIS. 

The revised GEIS’s discussion of inadvertent radiological releases is not a generic evaluation of 

the potential environmental impacts from such releases. This is because such releases are 

site-specific and must be evaluated individually. Accordingly, the NRC has proposed that 

evaluation of radionuclides released into groundwater be a Category 2 issue, requiring an 

applicant to provide a site-specific evaluation of inadvertent releases into groundwater. If an 

inadvertent or abnormal radioactive release were to exceed NRC regulations and result in an 

impact to a Category 1 issue (i.e., human health or terrestrial and aquatic biota) beyond the 

impacts evaluated by the GEIS, then the issue would have to be fully evaluated to account for 

the new and significant information, as required by 10 CFR Part 51.53(c)(iv), and included in the 

applicant’s environmental report. Therefore, the revised GEIS’s evaluation of the potential 

impacts to terrestrial and aquatic biota using routine radioactive effluent data from nuclear 

power plants and the resultant classification of the issues as Category 1 is appropriate. 

No changes have been made to the GEIS in response to these comments. 

Comment: Page 3-58, line 33 to page 3-59, line 5: Text from line 33 on page 3-58 through line 

5 on page 3-59 discusses the effects on vegetation and habitats of placing and maintaining 

transmission line ROWs in undeveloped areas. 

In light of the discussion on page 3-24, lines 13 through 25, which indicates that after the GEIS 

has been updated the scope of assessment in license renewal SEISs will no longer include 

transmission lines that would remain in place and energized regardless of the decision on 

license renewal, the NRC is encouraged to consider whether the paragraph addressing 

transmission line ROWs (on pages 3-58 and 3-59) remains relevant, and the paragraph should 

be either modified to clarify its relevance or deleted. (NEI1-7(4)-11) 
Appendix A 

 A-119 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Comment: Page 4-68, lines 31 to 36: Text in lines 31 to 36 on page 4-68 reads as follows: 

There are no reports of relatively high [bird] collision mortality occurring at the transmission lines 

associated with nuclear power plants in the United States. The length of transmission lines 

associated with nuclear plants is considerably less than the total 500,000 mi (800,000 km) of 

transmission lines estimated within the United States (Manville 2005). Therefore, transmission 

lines associated with nuclear power plants are likely responsible for only a small fraction of total 

bird collision mortality. 

On page 3-3 in lines 38 and 39, the draft updated GEIS states that “only those transmission 

lines that connect the plant to the switchyard are considered within the scope of [the updated 

GEIS] review.” On page 3-24 in lines 6 to 11, the draft updated GEIS states that “Powertransmission systems associated with nuclear power plants and considered within the scope of 

this review consist of switching stations (or substations) usually located on the plant site and the 

transmission lines that connect the plant to those substations. These systems are required to 

transfer power from the plant to the utility’s network of power lines in its service area (the 

regional electrical distribution grid).” In addition, on page 3-24 the draft updated GEIS states 

that “in most cases, the transmission lines originating at the power plant substations are no 

longer owned or managed by the nuclear power plant licensees.” Based on these limitations of 

the scope of impacts from transmission lines to be considered in the draft updated GEIS, the 

NRC is encouraged to modify the text in lines 31 through 36 on page 4-68 to read as follows 

(strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

There are no reports of relatively high collision mortality occurring at the transmission lines 

associated with nuclear power plants in the United States. The length of transmission lines 

associated with nuclear plants is considerably less than the total 500,000 mi (800,000 km) of 

transmission lines estimated within the United States (Manville 2005). This is particularly true 

considering, as was previously discussed in section 3.1.6.5, that power-transmission systems 

associated with nuclear power plants and considered within the scope of this review are limited 

to switching stations (or substations) usually located on the plant site and the transmission lines 

that connect the plant to those substations. Therefore, the transmission lines associated with 

nuclear power plants for the purpose of this review are likely responsible for only a smalltiny 

fraction of total bird collision mortality. (NEI1-7(4)-14) 

Response: Sections 3.6.1.1 and 4.6.1.1 of the GEIS have been updated to provide clarification 

of the scope of the power transmission system analysis. 

Comment: Page 4-75, line 29 to page 4-77, line 37: Text from page 4-75, line 29 through 

page 4- 77, line 37 contains subsections titled “Honeybees” and “Wildlife and Livestock,” which 

respectively discuss the effects of EMF on honey bees and on wildlife and livestock located 

within or very near transmission line rights-of-way. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-120 

The NRC is encouraged to delete the subsections titled “Honeybees” and “Wildlife and 

Livestock” because these discussions appear to be inconsistent with statements on pp. 3-3 

(lines 35 – 41) and 3-24 (lines 20 – 21) regarding the scope of the GEIS update with respect to 

transmission lines. Unless NRC is aware of a nuclear power plant site where honeybees, 

wildlife, and/or livestock are located onsite beneath the transmission lines that run from the 

turbine generator building to the onsite switching station, these issues do not exist in the context 

of license renewal. The “Conclusion” subsection on pages 4-77 and 4-78 should also be 

modified to reflect the deletions. (NEI1-7(4)-17) 

Response: The subsections titled “Honeybees” and “Wildlife and Livestock” will be retained, 

because the first substation is not always located on plant property. However, NRC revised 

Section 4.6.1.1 of the GEIS to clarify that the analysis considers only those transmission lines 

that connect the facility to the first substation of the regional electric grid. 

Threatened and Endangered Species

Comment: In the proposed rule and the proposed GEIS revision, the NRC continues to classify 

this as a Category 2 issue regardless of the incremental impact of the license renewal activities 

on threatened, endangered, and protected species and essential fish habitat. TVA recommends 

that activities associated with license renewal should be considered a Category 2 issue only if 

the proponent determines such activities could adversely affect federally listed species or 

designated critical habitat, in which case these activities would be subject to the formal 

consultation requirements under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, and to the 

requirement that a plant-specific analysis be included in the licensee's environmental report. 

(TVA-32-5) 

Response: The NRC agrees with the commenter’s assertion that in the majority of cases, the 

incremental effects of license renewal does not adversely affect Federally listed species or 

essential fish habitat. Because Federal agencies, and not license renewal applicants, must 

comply with Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, however, the NRC, and not license 

renewal applicants, must make a determination as to whether license renewal would be likely to 

jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered or threatened species, or destroy or 

adversely modify any designated critical habitat. Similarly, Federal agencies, and not license 

renewal applicants, must comply with the requirements for EFH Consultation under the 

Magnuson-Stevens Act. Therefore, the NRC must make a site-specific determination based on 

its independent evaluation of impacts to protected species and habitats from the license renewal 

regardless of the conclusions of the applicant. This will remain a Category 2 issue. The NRC 

made no changes to the GEIS in response to this comment. 
Appendix A 

 A-121 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Comment: D. The Draft Generic EIS Fails to Adequately Assess Aquatic Impacts in Specific 

Key Areas: Numerous specific statements in the draft revised Generic EIS need to be 

addressed by the NRC. These include the NRC’s portrayal of the Clean Water Act section 

316(b) Phase III rules, the viability of acoustic deterrent systems at plants in Belgium and New 

York, the role of the consultation process under the federal Endangered Species Act, and the 

environmental consequences, of alternatives to license renewal. 

4. Endangered Species Act Consultation Process: The NRC's Statement: 

Prior to license renewal, the NRC should consult with the USFWS and NMFS to determine the 

presence of and possible impacts on any ESA-listed aquatic species....The NRC should also 

contact the NMFS for license renewal applications for plants located in areas that may contain 

EFH for Federally managed marine or anadromous fisheries or for plants that may have an 

effect on protected marine mammals. Draft Generic EIS, p. 4-113, lines 18, 21-23. 

The NYSDEC’s Response: By using the word "should" in this statement, the draft revised 

Generic EIS makes the consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National 

Marine Fisheries Service on Endangered Species Act and Essential Fish Habitat issues appear 

to be precatory and discretionary. Consultation is mandatory under the Endangered Species 

Act, and the text must reflect this. NYSDEC recommends the following changes as necessary 

to address this significant oversight: 

• Change the sentence on line 18 to read as follows: "Prior to license renewal, the NRC shall 

consult with the USFWS and NMFS to determine the presence of and possible impacts on any 

ESA-listed aquatic species." 

 

• Change the sentence on lines 21-23 to read as follows: "The NRC shall also contact the 

NMFS for license renewal applications for plants located in areas that may contain EFH for 

Federally managed marine or anadromous fisheries or for plants that may have an effect on 

protected marine mammals." (NYS DEC-12-9) 

Response: The NRC consults with the FWS and NMFS regarding threatened and endangered 

species and essential fish habitat for all license renewals to determine if these resources could 

be affected by license renewal. The NRC revised Section 4.6.1.3 of the GEIS to better describe 

this consultation.
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-122 

A.2.1.7 Comments Concerning Historic and Cultural Resources 

Comment: Page S-14: Historic and Cultural Resources: Please use the term "historic 

properties". Those are the only resources of concern under Section 106 of the National Historic 

Preservation Act. Also include Tribal Historic Preservation Officers and "recognized" Native 

American Tribes as consulting parties as well as others listed in 36 CFR 800.2. (BIA-19-1) 

Response: The term “historic properties” is used when discussing Section 106 compliance 

activities and “historic and cultural resources” is used when generically referencing the 

resource. The NRC considers historic and cultural resources as an all-inclusive term that 

includes prehistoric, historic, and cultural properties. In addition, while NHPA requires agencies 

to take into account the effects of their undertakings on historic properties, NEPA requires the 

consideration of the cultural environment; thus the issue is termed “Historic and Cultural 

Resources” (see NEPA Statute Sec. 101 42 USC § 4331(b) 4). No changes were made to the 

GEIS in response to the first part of the comment. However, Sections 3.7.1 and 4.7.1.of the 

GEIS have been revised to clarify the role of Tribes and consulting parties under 

36 CFR Part 800.2 in the Section 106 process in response to the second part of the comment. 

Since there are no commercial nuclear power plants located on Tribal lands, Tribal 

representatives rather than THPOs are consulted.

Comment: Table 2.1-1. Summary of Impacts Associated with License Renewal Under the 

Proposed Action. Page 2-12, Historic and Cultural Resources. Again, please focus on historic 

properties and consulting parties identified in 36 CFR 800.2. It is not known what the impacts of 

refurbishment would be, since not all cultural resources identified within an Area of Potential 

Effect (APE) have been evaluated for the National Register of Historic Places. (BIA-19-2) 

Response: The term “historic properties” is used when discussing Section 106 compliance 

activities and “historic and cultural resources” is used when generically referencing the 

resource. The NRC considers historic and cultural resources as an all-inclusive term that 

includes prehistoric, historic, and cultural properties. Impacts from continued operations and 

refurbishment on historic and cultural resources are addressed in nuclear plant-specific license 

renewal environmental reviews. This is why impacts to historic and cultural resources are a 

Category 2 issue. No changes were made to the GEIS in response to this comment.

Comment: Describe existing conditions in Area of Potential Effect (APE). (BIA-19-3) 

Response: The Area of Potential Effect (APE) typically encompasses the nuclear power plant 

site, its immediate environs including viewshed, and in-scope transmission lines. The APE may 

extend beyond the nuclear plant site and transmission lines when these activities may affect 

historic properties. This determination is made irrespective of land ownership or control. 
Appendix A 

 A-123 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Existing conditions in the APE are described in nuclear plant-specific license renewal 

environmental reviews. No changes were made to the GEIS in response to this comment.

Comment: Page 3-78, paragraph 1: Please use the recognized term historic properties, not 

historic and cultural resources. Cite the definition of historic property as it is written in 36 CFR 

800.16(I). (BIA-19-4) 

Response: The term “historic properties” is used when discussing Section 106 compliance 

activities and “historic and cultural resources” is used when generically referencing the 

resource. The NRC considers historic and cultural resources as an all-inclusive term that 

includes prehistoric, historic, and cultural properties. In addition, while NHPA requires agencies 

to take into account the effects of their undertakings on historic properties, NEPA requires the 

consideration of the cultural environment; thus the issue is termed “Historic and Cultural 

Resources” (see NEPA Statute Sec. 101 42 USC § 4331(b) 4). No changes were made to the 

GEIS in response to the first part of the comment. The text in Section 3.7 of the GEIS has been 

revised to reflect the definition of historic property per 36 CFR Part 800.16(I)(1) in response to 

the second part of the comment.

Comment: Page 3-78, Box with Definitions: What are the sources for these definitions? They 

are not used in compliance language. Consider using: District, Site, Building, Structure and 

Object as they are defined in National Register Bulletin 15, and Traditional Cultural Property as 

defined in National Register Bulletin 38. (BIA-19-5) 

Response: The definition of Traditional Cultural Properties in the text box referred to in this 

comment has been revised to reflect the definition used in National Park Service (NPS) 

Bulletin 38: “Guidelines for Evaluating and Documenting traditional Cultural Properties.”

Comment: Page 3-78, lines 2-11: The "designated applicant" has no authority to make a 

determination of eligibility or effect. The federal agency official can only delegate that authority 

to a federal, state or tribal government official (36CFR 800.2(a)) (BIA-19-6) 

Comment: Historic and Cultural Resources: Historic and cultural resources are discussed on 

pages 3-78 to 3-80 in Chapter 3 (Affected Environment) and pages 4-116 to 4-119 in Chapter 4 

(Environmental Consequences and Mitigating Actions). Chapter 3 mentions State Historic 

Preservation Offices, but fails to mention Tribal Historic Preservation Offices (THPO), which 

have responsibilities similar to the SHPO's and should be consulted with as part of the 

development of the license renewal SEIS. 

The process for determining whether a historic or cultural resource is eligible for listing on the 

National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) should be clarified. On page 3-79 of the revised 

GEIS, it is stated, "The lead Federal agency or the designated applicant must determine if 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-124 

historic and cultural resources eligible for listing on the NRHP are present." Is not clear whether 

the "designated applicant" is the applicant for license renewal (i.e., the utility owning or 

operating the plant) or the owner of the historic or cultural resource that may be impacted by 

license renewal. This should be clarified. As well, we do not believe that it should be up to the 

utility owning or operating the power plant to determine whether a property or resource is 

eligible for listing on the NRHP. This should be done by or in concert with the SHPO and/or a 

THPO (if appropriate). 

Although both chapters 3 and 4 mention that impacts to historic and cultural resources must be 

"mitigated," there does not seem to be any instruction as to whether mitigation would be 

required or just suggested. (PIIC-8-7) 

Response: Eligibility of historic properties for listing on the NRHP is determined by applying 

the NRHP criteria in consultation with the appropriate SHPO, Indian Tribes, and other interested 

parties. The license renewal applicant, and other consulting parties, can provide information to 

the Federal agency that can be used to make these determinations. 

Based on its limited statutory authority, NRC cannot impose mitigation measures that are not 

related to public health and safety from radiological hazards or common defense and security. 

Mitigation measures can be implemented to avoid, minimize, or mitigate any adverse effects to 

historic properties. Any mitigation would be discussed in plant-specific supplements to the 

GEIS. Sections 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 of the GEIS have been revised in response to these comments.

Comment: Page 3-78, lines 19-24: The complete definition of an undertaking is also found in 

36 CFR 800.16(y). (BIA-19-7) 

Response: The text of Section 3.7.1 of the GEIS has been modified to include citation 36 CFR 

800.16(y).

Comment: Page 3-78, lines 31-36: The act also established the Tribal Historic Preservation 

Offices that should also be mentioned beside the SHPO and the Advisory Council. (BIA-19-8) 

Response: Since there are no commercial nuclear power plants located on Tribal lands, Tribal 

representatives rather than THPOs are consulted. The text in Section 3.7.1 of the GEIS has 

been modified in response to this comment to explain the role of consulting parties per 

36 CFR 800.2.

Comment: Page 3-78, line 38: Please use historic properties, since this term is used more 

frequently. The average reader may think that all sites would be of concern and not just those 

eligible for the National Register. Also see page 3-79, lines 1; also see pages 35-36; page 4-

116, line 26; page 4-117, lines 1, 3-5, 7-8, 10-11, 14, 25-26, 28, 30-32, 34; page 4-118, 
Appendix A 

 A-125 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

lines 2-4, 6-7, 12, 14, 17, 19, 21-22, 26, 30, 32; 38-39; page 4-119, lines 2, 12, 14-15, 20, 

23-24, 29, 34; page 4-120, lines 3, 7-8, 10, 17-18, 22-23, 27, 32; page 4-204, lines 14, 21, 25, 

28-29; page 4-225, lines 4 and 7; Page 7-28, line 26; Volume 2 page D41, lines 20,23,35,38; 

page D-42, lines 2, 8-9, 11-12, 21,29. (BIA-19-9) 

Response: The term “historic properties” is used when discussing Section 106 compliance 

activities and “historic and cultural resources” is used when generically referencing the 

resource. The NRC considers historic and cultural resources as an all-inclusive term that 

includes prehistoric, historic, and cultural properties. In addition, while NHPA requires agencies 

to take into account the effects of their undertakings on historic properties, NEPA requires the 

consideration of the cultural environment, thus the issue is termed “Historic and Cultural 

Resources” (see NEPA Statute Sec. 101 42 USC § 4331(b) 4). No changes were made to the 

GEIS in response to the comment.

Comment: Pages 3-78, line 38-40 to page 3-79, lines 1-11: Rewrite paragraph to be more in 

line with the 36 CFR 800 process (generally §800.3 to §800.6). Do you want to define what a 

generic APE might consist of for any particular plant? (BIA-19-10) 

Response: The text in Section 3.7.1 of the GEIS has been modified in response to this 

comment. The revised text provides a generic definition of the APE for any nuclear power plant 

to assist the reader in understanding the 36 CFR Part 800 process.

Comment: Page 3-80, lines 1-40: Change the title, eliminate the first two paragraphs and 

revise the last two paragraphs of this section and discuss the types of National Register 

classifications that could be found in the APEs. Insert the revised last two paragraphs after the 

classifications. (BIA-19-11) 

Response: Section 3.7.2 of the GEIS provides a description of the types of historic and cultural 

resources that are commonly found at nuclear power plant sites. Section 3.7.2 provides a 

contextual overview for the regional setting for most plants. Most historic and cultural resources 

on plant sites are unknown. As a result, historic and cultural resources are a Category 2 issue 

that can only be addressed at the plant-specific environmental reviews. Site-specific 

information is needed for the NRC to access the potential impact to historic and cultural 

resources and make determinations that are required under the NHPA. No changes were made 

to the GEIS in response to this comment.

Comment: [In Section 4.7,] analyze all potential adverse effects to historic properties. Identify 

possible mitigation measures to adverse effects. (BIA-19-12) 

Response: In Section 4.7 of the GEIS, Historic and Cultural Resources is a Category 2 issue, 

which means that impacts are determined in plant-specific environmental reviews. Historic and 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-126 

cultural resources are different at each nuclear power plant site. Any mitigation would be 

addressed in plant-specific supplements to the GEIS. No changes were made to the GEIS in 

response to this comment. 

Comment: Page 4-117, lines 19 to 22: Text in lines 19 to 22 on page 4-117 reads as follows: 

Only one impact issue is evaluated: 

• Impact of continued operations and refurbishment activities on historic and cultural resources 

located onsite and in transmission line rights-of-way. 

The NRC is encouraged to delete the words “and in transmission line rights-of-way” in line 22 on 

page 4-117. These words appear to be inconsistent with statements on pages 3-3 (lines 35 – 

41) and 3-24 (lines 20 – 21) regarding the scope of the GEIS update with respect to 

transmission lines. According to pages 3-3 (lines 35 – 41) and 3-24 (lines 20 – 21), the 

evaluation in the draft updated GEIS of impacts of transmission line maintenance on historic or 

cultural resources should be limited to such resources located onsite beneath the transmission 

lines that run from the turbine generator building to the onsite switching station. 

(NEI1-7(4)-22) 

Response: Although the scope of the transmission line review in the GEIS revision has been 

reduced from that in the 1996 GEIS, the issue remains a Category 2 issue, and, as such, would 

require a site-specific evaluation. As discussed in Section 3.1.6.5 of the GEIS, in-scope 

transmission lines are those that connect the nuclear power plant to the first substation where 

electricity is fed into the regional electric grid and power lines that feed the nuclear power plant 

from the grid during outages. The text in Section 4.7.1 of the GEIS has been modified to clarify 

that these statements only refer to in-scope transmission lines. Since portions of the 

transmission lines are within scope, a review of potential effects on historic properties is 

warranted.

Comment: Page 4-118, lines 16 to 23: Text in lines 16 through 23 on page 4-118 reads as 

follows: 

Under Section 106 of the NHPA, the NRC must take into account the effect of the undertaking 

on any historic and cultural resources included or eligible for inclusion in the National Register. 

Therefore, to assess the impact of continued operations on these resources, all historic and 

cultural resources that could be affected must be known at the time of license renewal. To 

achieve this objective, field investigations should be performed on the entire plant site. The 

eligibility of a historic and cultural resource for listing on the National Register should be 

determined, and a process for considering these resources should be developed before 

renewing the license.” [emphasis added] 
Appendix A 

 A-127 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

The underlined text in the above-quoted text is not consistent with the Advisory Council on 

Historic Preservation’s (ACHP) Section 106 Archaeology Guidance (available online at 

www.achp.gov/archguide). Based on the ACHP guide, it is NOT necessary for the NRC to 

require field investigations of the “entire plant site,” which frequently includes undeveloped 

areas on which no refurbishment or operations activities are planned during the period of 

extended operation. Accordingly, the NRC is encouraged to delete the above-quoted text in 

lines 16 to 23 on page 4-118. (NEI1-7(4)-23) 

Response: Section 4.7.1 has been revised in response to this comment and to indicate that 

the APE is the Area of Potential Effect for plant-specific evaluations of the effects of license 

renewal on historic and cultural resources.

Comment: Page 4-119, lines 15 to 17: Text in lines 15 through 17 on page 4-119 reads as 

follows: 

For activities connected to license renewal, the resources in the transmission line ROWs must 

be identified. The means for considering the effects of transmission line maintenance on these 

resources should be determined before renewal of the license.”

Consideration should be given to revising the above-quoted sentences in light of the statements 

on pp. 3-3 (lines 35 – 41) and 3-24 (lines 20 – 21) regarding the scope of the GEIS update with 

respect to transmission lines. If a transmission line ROW not owned by the license renewal 

applicant is at issue, it would be inappropriate for the license renewal schedule to be 

jeopardized because the ROW owner failed to cooperate in determining a means for 

considering the effects of transmission line maintenance on cultural and archaeological 

resources within the ROW. (NEI1-7(4)-24) 

Response: As discussed in Section 3.1.6.5 of the GEIS, in-scope transmission lines are those 

that connect the nuclear power plant to the first substation where electricity is fed into the 

regional electric grid and power lines that feed the nuclear power plant from the grid during 

outages. The text in Section 4.7.1 of the GEIS has been modified to clarify that these 

statements only refer to in-scope transmission lines.

Comment: Page 4-119, line 40 to page 4-120, line 33: Text from line 40 on page 4-119 to line 

33 on page 4-120 discusses the impacts on historic and cultural resources of constructing 

alternative energy power plants in lieu of renewing the license for a nuclear power plant. 

The introductory text for Section 4.7.2 on pages 4-119 and 4-120 should explain why impacts on 

historic and cultural resources are not evaluated for the fossil energy and new nuclear plant 

alternatives to the proposed action. Also, an explanation should be provided as to why impacts 

on historic and cultural resources of construction and operation of biomass, solar thermal, and 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-128 

solar photovoltaic power plants are not addressed in Section 4.7.2.1 on page 4-120. 

(NEI1-7(4)-25) 

Response: The impacts from the construction of all replacement power facilities (including both 

power plants and renewable power facilities) are generically discussed in Section 4.7.2. The 

text in Section 4.7.2 has been revised to clarify the generic impacts from constructing and 

operating replacement power facilities on historic and cultural resources. These impacts are 

discussed in greater detail in plant-specific environmental reviews.

Comment: Pages 4-116 to 4-119: The APE should be presented in the Affected Environment. 

Discuss Assessment and Resolution of Adverse Effects (§800.5 and §800.6). (BIA-19-14) 

Response: Section 3.7.1 of the GEIS has been revised to include a description of the license 

renewal APE. Since impacts to historic and cultural resources is Category 2, the assessment 

and resolution of any adverse effects on historic properties are addressed in plant-specific 

SEISs.

 

Comment: Page 4-118, lines 18-23: It is impossible to know "all" the historic and cultural 

resources that could be affected by future undertakings. It should be a staged approach where 

sites are evaluated as they are found. This impossible standard should not hold up a license 

renewal. (BIA-19-16) 

Response: In accordance with the provisions of the NHPA, the NRC is required to make a 

reasonable effort to identify historic properties included in or eligible for inclusion on the NRHP 

in the Area of Potential Effect (APE). Since many existing nuclear power plants were not 

surveyed for historic and cultural resources prior to construction, a survey of previously 

disturbed areas of the nuclear power plant site should be conducted by qualified professionals 

to effectively determine if these areas could potentially contain historic and cultural resources. 

Continued operations during the license renewal term and refurbishment activities at a nuclear 

power plant can also affect historic and cultural resources through ground-disturbing activities 

associated with plant operations and ongoing maintenance. 

Historic and Cultural Resources is a Category 2 issue, which means that impacts to historic and 

cultural resources are determined in plant-specific environmental reviews. Plant-specific 

cultural resources protection procedures are used by licensees to identify and protect historic 

and cultural resources during plant operations. These procedures also ensure resources are 

considered prior to any ground disturbance during future plant operations and maintenance 

activities. The text in Section 4.7 has been revised in response to this comment.

Comment: Pages 4-119 to 4-120: Environmental Consequences of Alternatives to the 

Proposed Action. 
Appendix A 

 A-129 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Hydroelectric Energy Sources. Erosion can affect streamside cultural resource sites. 

Wind. Above ground structures could be visually impacted. (BIA-19-17) 

Response: Section 4.7.2 of the GEIS has been modified in response to this comment to better 

capture the potential effects of alternatives on historic properties.

Comment: Page 4-204, lines 16-26: Isn't some of this information more cumulative than 

resulting from termination of plant operations? (BIA-19-18) 

Response: The commenter is referring to GEIS Section 4.12.2.1, which discusses the 

environmental consequences of delaying the termination of nuclear power plant operations and 

decommissioning because of license renewal. The environmental consequences of 

decommissioning itself would be addressed in a separate environmental NEPA review. After 

termination, the majority of impacts associated with plant operations would cease with reactor 

shutdown; however, some environmental impacts would remain unchanged, while others would 

continue at reduced or altered levels. Delaying the termination of nuclear power plant 

operations and eventual decommissioning because of a renewed operating license would not 

affect historic and cultural resources. These impacts could be considered cumulative; however, 

a brief discussion of generic cumulative impacts is presented in Section 4.13.9. As explained in 

the GEIS, Cumulative Impacts is a Category 2 issue, which is discussed in greater detail in 

plant-specific supplements to the GEIS. No changes were made to the GEIS in response to this 

comment. 

Comment: Page 4-225: Cumulative effects are based on past, present and reasonably 

foreseeable actions upon the resource. (BIA-19-19) 

Response: The definition of cumulative impacts, consistent with the comment, is presented in 

the introduction to Section 4.13. No changes were made to the GEIS in response to this 

comment.

Comment: Pages D41-D42: What is a Region of Influence? Please distinguish between nonsignificant resources and historic properties. (BIA-19-23)

Response: As explained in Chapter 7 (Glossary), the Region of Influence is the area occupied 

by affected resources and the distances at which impacts associated with license renewal may 

occur. It is the physical area that bounds the environmental, sociological, economic, or cultural 

feature of interest for the purpose of analysis. NRC does not use the term “non-significant 

resources” in the GEIS or Appendix D. No changes were made to the GEIS in response to this 

comment.
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-130 

A.2.1.8 Comments Concerning Socioeconomics 

Comment: Socioeconomics: Population and housing impacts would be small for all plants. 

Regional population and housing availability and value would not change during the license 

renewal term unless significant changes in plant employment would occur. With no increase in 

employment expected during the license renewal term, population and housing availability and 

values would not be affected by continued power plant operations. Any changes in population 

and housing availability and value due to changes in the workforce at the plant would have a 

greater effect on sparsely populated areas than areas with higher density populations. This is a 

Category 1 issue. July 2009 S-15 NUREG-1437, Revision 1. 

Housing issues around nuclear power plants cannot be considered Category 1 issues, 

especially in light of the ongoing national financial crisis involving the plummeting real estate 

market and the wide fluctuations in home prices and dwindling new construction. While there 

may be no anticipated increase in the number of workers at the plant during a relicense period, 

there may be a significant difference in the age and status of those workers. Although the NRC 

continues to fail to track the demographics of an aging and retiring nuclear workforce, at least 

one utility, Southern California Edison, is concerned enough to have included in their 

proceedings before the California Public Utilities Commission, a request for ratepayer funding to 

enhance hiring bonuses and housing allowances to allow for the increased cost of housing near 

the SONGS reactor in order to accommodate new workers to replace retiring workers. They 

had to justify in a public hearing the problems of attracting replacement workers to an area of 

high housing costs. It cannot be assumed, as the NRC statement quotes above indicates, that 

"Any changes in population and housing availability and value due to changes in the workforce 

at the plant would have a greater effect on sparsely populated areas than areas with higher 

density populations" because the area surrounding SONGS is second only to Indian Point in 

New York in terms of population, with a surrounding population of over 12 million people. In this 

case, SONGS would merit a site specific look at housing economics in Category 2. 

A4NR, et al, recommend that "Population and housing" impacts be removed from Category 1 

and placed in Category 2 for site specific analysis. (A4NR-11-35) 

Response: Although higher housing prices or fluctuations in housing prices in the regions 

surrounding nuclear power plants may be an issue for utilities that might have to recruit 

replacement workers over the license renewal term, the purpose of the GEIS is to evaluate any 

potential impact of continuing plant operations on the housing market. Since employment levels 

at nuclear power plants are not expected to change during the license renewal terms at any of 

the reactor sites, there would be no change in demand for permanent housing associated with 

continued reactor operations. Therefore, there would be no MODERATE or LARGE impacts on 

local and regional housing markets because of the renewed operating license. 
Appendix A 

 A-131 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

In addition, changes in housing prices and the affordability of houses in the region surrounding 

any nuclear power plant are difficult to predict, and it is not possible to determine how general 

trends in housing prices and affordability would be differentially impacted by license renewal. 

Median housing prices and the availability of housing in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant are 

currently described as part of the affected environment in plant-specific environmental reviews. 

Therefore, no change in the Category 1 designation for the issue of population and housing is 

warranted in the GEIS and no changes were made to the GEIS in response to this comment. 

Comment: Page 3-86, lines 20 to 22: Text in lines 20 to 22 on page 3-86 reads as follows: 

Among the 11 plants located in semi-urban economies shown in Table 3.8.5, none provided 

1 percent or more of regional employment, while average plant earnings at most plants 

(particularly Millstone and Indian Point) were higher than the regional average. 

Because Table 3.8-5 contains only four plants, modify the sentence in lines 20 through 22 on 

page 3-86 to read as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

Among the 11 plants listed in Table 3.8-1, the four shown in Table 3.8-5 are located in semiurban economies shown in Table 3.8-5,. None of these four plants provided 1 percent or more 

of regional employment, and while average plant earnings at mostthese plants (particularly 

Millstone and Indian Point) were higher than the regional average. (NEI1-7(4)-62) 

Response: The NRC agrees with the suggested changes, and Section 3.8.2.2 of the GEIS has 

been revised in response to this comment.

A.2.1.9 Comments Concerning Human Health 

Comment: Electric Shock Hazards: Finding in Table B-1 of Appendix B in the draft updated 

GEIS (Volume 2) for the issue labeled “Electric shock hazards” reads as follows: 

Small, moderate, or large impact (Category 2). Electrical shock potential is of small significance 

for transmission lines that are operated in adherence with the National Electrical Safety Code 

(NESC). Without a review of each nuclear plant transmission line conformance with NESC 

criteria, it is not possible to determine the significance of the electrical shock potential. 

On page 3-3 in lines 38 and 39, the draft updated GEIS states that “only those transmission 

lines that connect the plant to the switchyard are considered within the scope of [the draft 

updated GEIS] review.” On page 3-24 in lines 6 to 11, the draft updated GEIS states that 

“Power-transmission systems associated with nuclear power plants and considered within the 

scope of this review consist of switching stations (or substations) usually located on the plant 

site and the transmission lines that connect the plant to those substations. These systems are 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-132 

required to transfer power from the plant to the utility’s network of power lines in its service area 

(the regional electrical distribution grid).” In addition, on page 3-24 the draft updated GEIS 

states that “in most cases, the transmission lines originating at the power plant substations are 

no longer owned or managed by the nuclear power plant licensees.” Based on these limitations 

of the scope of impacts from transmission lines to be considered in the updated GEIS, the NRC 

should modify the above-quoted text in Table B-1 of Appendix B in the draft updated GEIS 

(Volume 2) for the issue labeled “Electric shock hazards” to read as follows (strikethrough font = 

deletion; italics font = addition): 

Small, moderate, or large impact (Category 2). Electrical shock potential is of small significance 

for transmission lines that are operated in adherence with the National Electrical Safety Code 

(NESC). Without a review of each nuclear plant transmission line conformance with NESC 

criteria for each transmission line that connects a particular nuclear power plant to the switching 

station required to transfer power from the plant to the offsite network of power lines, it is not 

possible to determine the significance of the electrical shock potential for those transmission 

lines. 

The draft updated GEIS should be changed throughout (i.e., Volumes 1 and 2) to reflect the 

above-suggested modification in Table B-1 of Appendix B. (NEI1-7(4)-5) 

Response: Table B–1 was modified to clarify that the findings for “Electric shock hazards” 

apply only to those transmission lines that are “in-scope” for license renewal. Sections 3.1.1 

and 3.1.6.5 of the revised GEIS define the extent of in-scope transmission lines subject to 

license renewal environmental reviews.

Comment: A commenter submitted two 2006 Internet articles on tritium leaks into the 

groundwater at San Onofre (and related human health concerns) and a Nukewatch Fact Sheet 

entitled, “Groundwater Contamination by U.S. Reactors,” that discusses radionuclide 

groundwater contamination events occurring at several nuclear power plants and tritium 

hazards. (Anon2-23-5, Anon2-23-7, Anon2-23-8) 

Comment: Groundwater wells must be installed and tested for tritium and other radioactive 

isotopes, as many aging reactors are now at the eleventh hour revealing their inability to contain 

radioactive water, and recent science has shown that Tritium and exposure to other 

radioisotopes poses a far greater risk to the health [of] women, children and the fetus than the 

previous GEIS indicated. Thus all tables in the GElS dealing with latent and early mortality must 

be re-calculated and new, more stringent standards must be set based on the maximally 

exposed individual, not Reference Man. Thorough health studies comparing local with regional 

cancer rates, autoimmune illnesses, Down’s Syndrome and other non-lethal genetic mutations, 

and the miscarriage rate in the vicinity of [nuclear power plants] must be conducted to make 

proper use of the 40 years of data we now should have access to. (Shaw-15-5)
Appendix A 

 A-133 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Response: The NRC’s mission is to protect the public health and safety and the environment 

from the effects of radiation from nuclear reactors, materials, and waste facilities. The NRC’s 

regulatory limits for radiological protection are set to protect workers and the public from the 

harmful health effects (i.e., cancer and other biological impacts) of radiation on humans. The 

limits are based on the recommendations of standards-setting organizations. Radiation 

standards reflect extensive scientific study by national and international organizations. The 

NRC actively participates and monitors the work of these organizations to keep current on the 

latest trends in radiation protection. If the NRC determines that there is a need to revise its 

radiation protection regulations, it will initiate a rulemaking. The models recognized by the NRC 

for use by nuclear power reactors to calculate dose incorporate conservative assumptions and 

account for differences in gender and age to ensure that workers and members of the public are 

adequately protected from radiation. 

Although radiation may cause cancers at high doses, currently there are no reputable 

scientifically conclusive data that unequivocally establish the occurrence of cancer following 

exposure to low doses (i.e., below about 10 rem [0.1 Sv]). However, radiation protection 

experts conservatively assume that any amount of radiation may pose some risk of causing 

cancer or a severe hereditary effect and that the risk is higher for higher radiation exposures. 

Therefore, a linear, no-threshold, dose response relationship is used to describe the relationship 

between radiation dose and adverse impacts such as incidents of cancer. Simply stated, any 

increase in dose, no matter how small, results in an incremental increase in health risk. This 

theory is accepted by the NRC as a conservative model for estimating health risks from 

radiation exposure, recognizing that the model probably overestimates those risks. Based on 

this theory, the NRC conservatively establishes limits for radioactive effluents and radiation 

exposures for workers and members of the public. While the public dose limit in 10 CFR 

Part 20 is 100 mrem (1 mSv) for all facilities licensed by the NRC, the NRC has imposed 

additional constraints on nuclear power reactors. Each nuclear power reactor has enforceable 

license conditions that limit the total annual whole body dose to a member of the public outside 

the facility to 25 mrem (0.25 mSv). The amount of radioactive material released from nuclear 

power facilities is well measured, well monitored, and known to be very small. The doses of 

radiation that are received by members of the public as a result of exposure to nuclear power 

facilities are so low (i.e., less than a few millirem) that resulting cancers attributed to the 

radiation have not been observed and would not be expected. 

Radiation doses to members of the public from the current operations of nuclear power plants 

have been examined in the 1996 GEIS and the revised GEIS from a variety of perspectives 

(i.e., releases of radioactive gaseous and liquid effluents, radiation from radioactive waste 

storage buildings, radiological impacts from refueling and maintenance activities, and 

inadvertent leaks of radioactive liquids), and the impacts were found to be within dose standards 

specified in NRC’s 10 CFR Part 20 and Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50, as well as EPA’s 40 CFR 

Part 190. Radiation doses are calculated for the maximally exposed individual (MEI) (that is, 

the real or hypothetical individual potentially subject to maximum exposure). The doses are 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-134 

calculated by using site-specific radioactive effluent release data where available. For those 

cases in which site-specific data are not readily available, conservative (overestimated) 

assumptions are used to estimate dose. Public doses are expected to remain within dose 

standards. Because there is no reason to expect that radioactive effluents will increase during 

the license renewal term, doses from continued operation are expected to be within regulatory 

standards. 

In addition to NRC’s requirements to monitor radioactive effluents (routine and inadvertent) 

discharged into the environment, each nuclear power plant is required to have a radiological 

environmental monitoring program (REMP). The REMP quantifies the environmental impacts 

associated with radioactive effluent releases from the plant. The REMP monitors the 

environment over time, starting before the plant operates to establish background radiation 

levels and throughout its operating lifetime to monitor radioactivity in the local environment. The 

REMP provides a mechanism for determining the levels of radioactivity in the environment to 

ensure that any accumulation of radionuclides released into the environment will not become 

significant as a result of plant operations. The REMP also measures radioactivity from other 

nuclear facilities that may be in the area (i.e., other nuclear power plants, hospitals using 

radioactive material, research facilities or any other facility licensed to use radioactive material). 

Thus, the REMP monitors the cumulative impacts from all sources of radioactivity in the vicinity 

of the power plant. To obtain information on radioactivity around the plant, samples of 

environmental media (e.g., surface water; groundwater; drinking water; air; milk; locally grown 

crops; locally produced food products; river, ocean, or lake sediment; and fish and other aquatic 

biota) are collected from areas surrounding the plant for analysis to measure the amount of 

radioactivity, if any, in the samples. The media samples reflect the radiation exposure pathways 

(i.e., inhalation, ingestion, and physical location near the plant) to the public from radioactive 

effluents released by the nuclear power plant and from background radiation (i.e., cosmic 

sources, naturally occurring radioactive material, including radon and global fallout). The NRC 

has standards for the amount of radioactivity in the sample media, which, if exceeded, must be 

reported to the NRC and the licensee must conduct an investigation. The REMP supplements 

the radioactive effluent monitoring program by verifying that measurable concentrations of 

radioactive materials and levels of radiation in the environment are not higher than expected 

when compared against data on the amount of radioactive effluent discharged. As part of its 

license renewal environmental review, the staff reviews several years of REMP reports to look 

for adverse data or evidence of a buildup of radioactivity in the environment. The results of the 

staff’s review are discussed in each plant-specific SEIS. In addition to the REMP, the nuclear 

power industry responded to the multiple events involving the inadvertent releases of 

radioactive liquids from plant systems and buried piping by committing to the NRC to have sitespecific groundwater protection programs (see Sections 3.5.2 and 3.9.1.3 in the revised GEIS 

for additional information). Each site-specific groundwater protection program was developed 

based on an assessment of plant systems, components, buried piping, and site hydrology. The 

program is designed to provide early indication of a leak of radioactive liquid from a plant 
Appendix A 

 A-135 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

system or buried pipe in order for plant personnel to take corrective action. Typically, plants 

have installed a series of groundwater monitoring wells near the plant systems, components, 

and buried piping containing radioactive liquids. The NRC monitors the effectiveness of the 

industry’s groundwater protection program as part of its routine radiological inspection program 

at all nuclear power plants. 

Although a number of studies of cancer incidence in the vicinity of nuclear power facilities have 

been conducted, there are no studies to date that are accepted by the scientific community and 

show a correlation between radiation dose from nuclear power facilities and cancer incidence in 

the general public. The following is a listing of radiation health studies that the NRC recognizes: 

• In 1990, at the request of Congress, the National Cancer Institute conducted a study of 

cancer mortality rates around 52 nuclear power plants and 10 other nuclear facilities. 

The study covered the period from 1950 to 1984, and evaluated the change in mortality 

rates before and during facility operations. The study concluded there was no evidence 

that nuclear facilities may be linked causally with excess deaths from leukemia or from 

other cancers in populations living nearby. 

• In June 2000, investigators from the University of Pittsburgh found no link between 

radiation released during the 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island power plant and 

cancer deaths among nearby residents. Their study followed 32,000 people who lived 

within 5 miles (8 kilometers) of the plant at the time of the accident. 

• The American Cancer Society in 2000 concluded that although reports about cancer 

clusters in some communities have raised public concern, studies show that clusters do 

not occur more often near nuclear plants than they do by chance elsewhere in the 

population. Likewise, there is no evidence that links strontium-90 with increases in 

breast cancer, prostate cancer, or childhood cancer rates. Radiation emissions from 

nuclear power plants are closely controlled and involve negligible levels of exposure for 

nearby communities. 

• In 2000, the Illinois Public Health Department compared childhood cancer statistics for 

counties with nuclear power plants to similar counties without nuclear plants and found 

no statistically significant difference. 

• The Connecticut Academy of Sciences and Engineering, in January 2001, issued a 

report on a study around the Haddam Neck nuclear power plant in Connecticut and 

concluded radiation emissions were so low as to be negligible and found no meaningful 

associations to the cancers studied. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-136 

 In 2001, the Florida Bureau of Environmental Epidemiology reviewed claims that there 

are striking increases in cancer rates in southeastern Florida counties caused by 

increased radiation exposures from nuclear power plants. However, using the same 

data to reconstruct the calculations on which the claims were based, Florida officials 

were not able to identify unusually high rates of cancers in these counties compared with 

the rest of the State of Florida and the nation. 

On April 7, 2010, the NRC announced that it asked the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to 

perform a state-of-the-art study on cancer risk for populations surrounding nuclear power 

facilities (ADAMS Accession No. ML100970142). The NAS has a broad range of medical and 

scientific experts who can provide the best available analysis of the complex issues involved in 

discussing cancer risk and commercial nuclear power plants. The NAS is a nongovernmental 

organization chartered by the U.S. Congress to advise the nation on issues of science, 

technology, and medicine. Through the National Research Council and Institute of Medicine, it 

carries out studies independently of the Government, using processes designed to promote 

transparency, objectivity, and technical rigor. More information on its methods for performing 

studies is available at http://www.nationalacademies.org/studycommitteprocess.pdf. 

The NAS study will update the 1990 U.S. National Institutes of Health National Cancer Institute 

(NCI) report, “Cancer in Populations Living Near Nuclear Facilities” (NCI 1990). The study’s 

objectives are to: (1) evaluate whether cancer risk is different for populations living near nuclear 

power facilities; (2) include cancer occurrence; (3) develop an approach to assess cancer risk in 

geographic areas that are smaller than the county level; and (4) evaluate the study results in the 

context of offsite doses from normal reactor operations. The study began in the summer of 

2010 and is expected to be completed within four years. The revised GEIS contains a 

discussion on the NRC’s sponsorship of this follow-up to the 1990 NCI study. 

No changes have been made to the GEIS in response to this comment. 

Comment: Page 2-6 to 2-16: Summary of Impacts Associated with License Renewal Under 

the Proposed Action: Issue Impact (Category 1 - small) 

A4NR, et al, agrees with the comments filed by Pilgrim Watch (PW), "issues improperly listed as 

Category 1 include: Solid Waste Management; Emergency Planning; Human Health, Radiation 

− exposures to the public & occupational workers and impact from chemicals; Postulated 

Accidents; Termination of Nuclear Power Plant Operations and Decommissioning." As one 

example, Human Health; Radiation exposures to the public; Radiation exposures to 

occupational workers are listed as category 1. And yet the NRC has stated in its own fact 

sheet: Update to the Report "Cancer in Populations Living Near Nuclear Facilities" 

(http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/nuclear-facilities) that the agency does not 

expect to have a draft of this report available until 2011, with a completed report to appear later. 
Appendix A 

 A-137 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Such assumptions about Human Health and Radiation Exposures should not be made until 

such time as this report has been peer reviewed and made available for public comment. 

(A4NR-11-18) 

Response: The NRC does not agree that it incorrectly classified the issues cited in the 

comment as Category 1. The basis for NRC’s categorization of the environmental impacts as 

Category 1 or Category 2 is explained in Section 1.5 of the revised GEIS, and each issue is 

appropriately evaluated in the GEIS. The issues cited by the commenter were evaluated using 

technical information and data relevant to the issues and, based on the information, the staff 

made a conclusion on the appropriate classification and impact. The commenter has provided 

no information to support its assertion that the NRC incorrectly classified the cited issues. The 

NRC fact sheet cited by the commenter refers to a study being conducted, at NRC’s request, by 

the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to study cancer risk in populations living near nuclear 

power facilities. The NAS study will update a 1990 U.S. National Institutes of Health National 

Cancer Institute report, “Cancer in Populations Living Near Nuclear Facilities,” that concluded 

there was no evidence that nuclear facilities may be linked causally with excess deaths from 

leukemia or from other cancers in populations living nearby. With regard to health impacts of 

occupational and public exposure, the NRC must make decisions and judgments based on 

currently available information and, as discussed in the revised GEIS in Section 3.9.1.3, “Public 

Radiological Exposures,” Section 4.9, “Human Health,” and Appendix D.8, “Human Health,” the 

currently available information supports the Category 1 designation for occupational and public 

radiation exposures. As new information on particular issues becomes available, it will be 

appropriately considered and addressed. 

To the extent that the commenter states agreement with a similar comment from Pilgrim Watch 

(PW-6-3), the NRC does not agree with the commenter that it has misinterpreted the BEIR VII 

report and incorrectly classified the impacts to human health from radiation exposure as 

Category 1. The NRC staff performed a thorough review of the BEIR VII report issued in 2005. 

As reported to the Commission in SECY-05-0202,(v)

 the staff stated “...that the findings 

presented in the National Academies BEIR VII report contribute to our understanding of the 

health risks from exposure to ionizing radiation. The major conclusion is that current scientific 

evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that there is a linear, no-threshold dose response 

relationship between exposure to ionizing radiation and the development of cancer in humans. 

This conclusion is consistent with the system of radiological protection that the NRC uses to 

develop its regulations. Therefore, the NRC’s regulations continue to be adequately protective 

of public health and safety and the environment. Consequently, none of the findings in the 

BEIR VII report warrant initiating any immediate change to NRC regulations or Federal 

Guidance.” 

 

(v) SECY-05-0202 can be accessed at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0526/ML052640532.pdf. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-138 

Further, in 2007, the NRC denied a petition for rulemaking (PRM-51-11; see ADAMS Accession 

No. ML061770056) which asked the NRC to reconcile its Generic Environmental Impact 

Statement for nuclear power plant operating license renewal applications with the radiological 

findings in the BEIR VII report. In denying the petition, the Commission, in SECY-07-0155, 

stated, “The Commission has approved the staff’s recommendation to deny the subject petition 

for rulemaking, PRM-51-11. The Commission agrees that the NRC’s existing regulations 

continue to be protective of public health and safety and the environment and that none of the 

findings in the BEIR VII report warrant initiating any immediate change to NRC regulations or 

guidance.” 

Based on the above, the NRC’s protection standards are adequately protective of public health 

and safety and the environment. Accordingly, the GEIS has appropriately assessed the 

radiological impacts to human health as SMALL for this Category 1 issue. 

No change has been made to the GEIS as a result of this comment. 

Comment: Health Impacts Should Be Designated Category 2, Site-Specific: Health impacts 

are site specific due to: history of operations, such as the use of bad fuel and above normal 

releases, as was the case at Pilgrim NPS; demographic characteristics of past and projected 

population, an increase for example in population groups most susceptible to radiation such as 

children, women, the elderly; meteorology, for example gravity drainage or plumes over water 

that can carry radiation to more distant yet heavily populated areas; evidence of radiation-linked 

diseases in the affected community; proximity to other toxic emitters that could act 

synergistically with radiation enhancing its impact, a cumulative impact. 

In sum, any Petitioner in a license renewal proceeding deserves the opportunity to show any 

new and significant information that demonstrates that the off-site radiological consequences of 

another twenty years of operations may be greater than previously thought − evidence that the 

particular affected population is more susceptible to more radiation-linked damage than was 

contemplated when the plant was licensed. (PW-6-6) 

Response: Not all human health issues are considered generic (Category 1). The radiological 

impacts on human health (both to the public and to plant workers) and noise are considered 

generic (Category 1) issues. However, the impacts of microbiological organisms on public 

health, under certain facility configurations, and electric shock hazards are considered to be 

site-specific (Category 2) issues. With regard to the human health conclusions that are 

considered Category 1, as with all Category 1 conclusions, the review evaluates each 

application and the site to determine if there is new and significant information that would 

change the conclusion in the GEIS. New and significant information of in-scope environmental 

impacts would be considered in a plant-specific SEIS. The details of how the NRC addresses 
Appendix A 

 A-139 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

new and significant information are discussed in response to comment CEC 9(1)-10. No 

change was made to the GEIS as a result of this comment. 

Comment: I wonder how often the water is tested and how many other nuclear plants are on 

sites so close to swimming. Maybe somebody -- after the meeting, maybe somebody can tell 

me that it's common to put nuclear plants close to where people swim. (DPCA-Exelby-30) 

Comment: All nuclear facilities vent radioactive isotopes to the public. HEPA filters were 

originally designed in the 1940s for cleaning the air of radioactive particles but they only achieve 

a 99.97% success rate (by definition). 3 particles in 10,000 may not sound like a lot, and might 

have been good enough for The Manhattan Project, but when you are releasing billions of 

billions of particles every day INTO the filters, it means you are letting a lot of children die in 

your community DESPITE the filters. And HEPA filters don't work for isolating tritium (a lot more 

H3 could be removed, but not that way) nor do they do anything to stop the release of the noble 

gases, which flow right through them. The legal limit for releases of tritium each year by each 

reactor at San Onofre is about one thirtieth of a teaspoon. Tritium is extremely hazardous, and 

even this seemingly small amount is way, way too much. And besides, whenever they release 

more than a thirtieth of a teaspoon, the NRC gives them two special dispensations: One not to 

say anything, and one not to do anything. (Hoffman-30-2) 

Response: The commenter is correct that nuclear power plants release radioactive material 

into the environment. However, the radioactive releases are controlled and monitored, and the 

types and quantities are required to be within the limits imposed by NRC regulations. 

All nuclear plants were licensed with the expectation that they would release some radioactive 

material to both the air and water during normal operation. NRC regulations require that 

radioactive gaseous and liquid releases from nuclear power plants be monitored and must 

meet radiation dose-based limits specified in 10 CFR Part 20, the “as low as is reasonably 

achievable” (ALARA) dose criteria in Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50, and the EPA’s radiation 

protection standards in 40 CFR Part 190. These regulations limit the radiation dose that 

members of the public might receive from radioactive material released by nuclear plants. 

Nuclear power plants are required to submit an annual report to the NRC on the types and 

amounts of radioactive gaseous and liquid effluents released into the environment each year. 

The annual radioactive effluent release reports submitted to the NRC are available to the public 

through the NRC’s ADAMS electronic reading room on the NRC Web site (www.nrc.gov). 

The NRC provides continuous oversight of each plant under the NRC’s inspection and 

enforcement programs. The NRC’s Reactor Oversight Process integrates the NRC’s 

inspection, assessment, and enforcement programs. The operating reactor assessment 

program evaluates the overall safety performance of operating commercial nuclear reactors and 

communicates those results to licensee management, members of the public, and other 

government agencies. The assessment program collects information from inspections and 

performance indicators in order to enable the NRC to arrive at objective conclusions about a 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-140 

licensee’s safety performance. Based on this assessment information, the NRC determines the 

appropriate level of agency response, including supplemental inspection and pertinent 

regulatory actions ranging from management meetings up to and including orders for plant 

shutdown. The NRC conducts follow-up actions, as applicable, to ensure that the corrective 

actions designed to address performance weaknesses are effective. 

Tritium is one of the radionuclides released from nuclear power plants. Tritium is a weakly 

radioactive isotope of hydrogen with a half-life of 12.5 years that decays by emitting a 

low-energy beta particle (or electron). Tritium is produced in nuclear reactors, but also occurs 

naturally in the environment due to cosmic rays interacting with atmospheric gases. The most 

common form of tritium is in water, since both tritium and nonradioactive hydrogen react in the 

same way with oxygen to produce water. Tritiated water is colorless and odorless. Tritium can 

also be found in such everyday self-illuminating devices as watches and exit signs. As 

previously discussed, nuclear power plants control the amount of radioactive effluents released 

in accordance with NRC regulations. 

 

The commenter’s assertion that the NRC gives nuclear power plants “two special dispensations: 

One not to say anything, and one not to do anything” is false and without basis. As discussed 

above, the NRC has radiation safety requirements for the protection of the public and an 

inspection program to ensure nuclear power plants comply with those requirements. 

No changes were made to the GEIS in response to this comment. 

Comment: During a given year, what percentage of the time does a nuclear reactor operate? I 

used to hear nuclear reactors were shut down close to half the time, though have heard they 

might be operating a greater percentage of the time in recent years (of course not including 

those reactors involved in the throes of steam generator or other replacement of major nuclear 

power facility components). So, let us use perhaps 40% (or analyze another figure while giving 

supporting evidence that it is valid) of the time that nuclear reactors are shut down in a given 

year. So if it operates for 60% of the time in a year, then it operates for about 219 days. One 

can calculate how many minutes in a 24-hour period (I come out with 1440) and then multiply 

that amount by 219 (I come out with 315,360 minutes). Even though wind and heat rising and 

other factors can result in different measurements as far as radioactive emissions within a given 

minute, but generally I think that is fairly trustworthy to consider a minute as a useful unit to get 

a good idea of the range of measurements of radioactive emissions in a given day -- meaning it 

would likely be difficult to hide a certain burp or other larger emission if one measured 

radioactivity every minute. With the aforementioned in mind, about how many measurements in 

regard to radioactive emissions does the average or median nuclear power facility submit to the 

NRC every year? If a given measurement fairly accurately reflects the amounts of radioactive 

emissions in a given minute, what percentage of minutes during the time a reactor is operating 

during a year is indicated by those submitted measurements? What kinds of rays/radiation and 

which radionuclides are usually measured for? Are certain kinds measured more for in the air, 

while tritium is measured more relating to water and water infiltration and migration? 
Appendix A 

 A-141 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Seeing that it is likely the utility rather than NRC (let alone an independent entity) who takes 

such measurements of radioactive emissions, and seeing that in some situations (such as with 

the "sweetheart" rate deal which Pacific Gas and Electric got from former California Attorney 

General Van de Kamp) a utility and its private investors make more money the larger 

percentage the time that the reactor operates. This would tempt some to avoid some repairs in 

order to maximize profit, and hope that a certain strained component will last until the planned 

replacement of a couple of other components in the future. Thus, due to that profit motive, a 

number of utilities are untrustworthy because they are under pressure to maximize profit for 

their investors. How will the NRC assure that public (and worker) health and safety is respected 

when the main goal is to make money for investors and the well-paid executives (some of whom 

having their substantial stock options? (Campbell-31-5) 

Comment: Please define for me clean air if a nuclear containment wall leaks? How much can 

we clean up? Why bother with sure a devastating invention of fuels? (Mack-1-1) 

Response: NRC’s statutory mission is to ensure public health and safety and to protect the 

environment. The profitability of licensees is not a factor for NRC in determining the actions 

licensees must take to assure protection of the workers, the public, and the environment from 

harmful effects of radiation. 

Nuclear power reactors routinely release radioactive gaseous and liquid effluents into the 

environment. These effluents contain radioactive material that gives off alpha and beta particles 

and gamma rays. Tritium is present in both gaseous and liquid effluents. The NRC requires 

these effluents to be monitored and controlled in accordance with its radiation protection 

standards in 10 CFR Part 20. Each nuclear power plant has radiation monitoring instruments 

and procedures to control the release of these radioactive effluents. If radiation measurements 

exceed preset limits, alarms warn plant personnel of the problem in order to take action. Each 

nuclear power plant operator must submit an annual radioactive effluent release report to the 

NRC summarizing the types and quantities of radioactive materials released into the 

environment. Based on the type and amount of radioactivity released, the dose to a member of 

the public is calculated. Radiation doses to members of the public from the current operations 

of nuclear power plants have been examined in the 1996 GEIS and the revised GEIS from a 

variety of perspectives (i.e., releases of radioactive gaseous and liquid effluents, radiation from 

radioactive waste storage buildings, radiological impacts from refueling and maintenance 

activities, and inadvertent leaks of radioactive liquids), and the impacts were found to be within 

dose standards specified in NRC’s 10 CFR Part 20 and Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50, as well 

as EPA’s 40 CFR Part 190. Radiation doses are calculated for the maximally exposed 

individual (MEI) (that is, the real or hypothetical individual potentially subject to maximum 

exposure). Because there is no reason to expect that radioactive effluents will increase during 

the license renewal term, doses from continued operation are expected to be within regulatory 

standards. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-142 

In addition to NRC’s requirements to monitor radioactive effluents (routine and inadvertent) 

discharged into the environment, each nuclear power plant is required to have a radiological 

environmental monitoring program (REMP). The REMP quantifies the environmental impacts 

associated with radioactive effluent releases from the plant. The REMP monitors the 

environment over time, starting before the plant operates to establish background radiation 

levels and throughout its operating lifetime to monitor radioactivity in the local environment. The 

REMP provides a mechanism for determining the levels of radioactivity in the environment to 

ensure that any accumulation of radionuclides released into the environment will not become 

significant as a result of plant operations. The REMP also measures radioactivity from other 

nuclear facilities that may be in the area (i.e., other nuclear power plants, hospitals using 

radioactive material, research facilities, or any other facility licensed to use radioactive material). 

Thus, the REMP monitors the cumulative impacts from all sources of radioactivity in the vicinity 

of the power plant. To obtain information on radioactivity around the plant, samples of 

environmental media (e.g., surface water; groundwater; drinking water; air; milk; locally grown 

crops; locally produced food products; river, ocean, or lake sediment; and fish and other aquatic 

biota) are collected from areas surrounding the plant for analysis to measure the amount of 

radioactivity, if any, in the samples. The media samples reflect the radiation exposure pathways 

(i.e., inhalation, ingestion, and physical location near the plant) to the public from radioactive 

effluents released by the nuclear power plant and from background radiation (i.e., cosmic 

sources, naturally occurring radioactive material, including radon and global fallout). The NRC 

has standards for the amount of radioactivity in the sample media, which, if exceeded, must be 

reported to the NRC and the licensee must conduct an investigation. The REMP supplements 

the radioactive effluent monitoring program by verifying that measurable concentrations of 

radioactive materials and levels of radiation in the environment are not higher than expected 

when compared against data on the amount of radioactive effluent discharged. As part of its 

license renewal environmental review, the staff reviews several years of REMP reports to look 

for adverse data or evidence of a buildup of radioactivity in the environment. The results of the 

staff’s review are discussed in each plant-specific SEIS. 

No changes have been made to the GEIS in response to this comment. 

Comment: Human Health: Since the GEIS was published in 1996, a number of studies have 

reported elevated rates and/or risks for cancer experienced by populations residing proximal to 

nuclear facilities. Many of these studies were completed subsequent to the release of the 1996 

GEIS and should have been included in the analysis for the revised GEIS. These studies, we 

believe, support a finding that human health impacts from radiation should be a Category 2, or 

site-specific impact. 

In particular, elevated rates of leukemia have been observed among populations in England 

(Gardner et al., 1987), Spain (Silva-Mato et al., 2003) and Germany (Hoffmann et al., 2007; 

Spix et al., 2008; Kaatsch P, Spix C, Schulze-Rath R, et al., 2008). 
Appendix A 

 A-143 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

The most recent of the above studies involving populations residing in the vicinity of 16 German 

nuclear power plants (the KiKK study) are among the methodologically strongest studies that 

have to date been completed (BFS 2007). 

The KiKK study included all 16 large reactor locations where 20 nuclear power plants in 

Germany were in operation during the 24-year period of study (1980 - 2003). 

 

The distance between the children's homes and the power plants was precisely determined to 

[be] within 25 meters (or approximately 82 feet). The main questions posed by the study were: 

"Do children under five years of age more frequently develop cancer when living near a nuclear 

power plant?" and "is there a negative distance trend?" (In other words: is the risk greater the 

nearer the child lives to the plant?) The results showed not only a 60% increase in the cancer 

rate and a 117% increase in leukemia in infants within the 5 km radius (or approximately 

3 miles), but also a significant increase in the risk of cancer and leukemia the closer one lived to 

the nuclear power plant. 

In the second part of the study, which covered a shorter period of time and a selection of 

diagnoses (leukemia, lymphomas and tumors of the central nervous system), it was tested 

whether other risk factors (confounders) could have had any appreciable effect on the main 

result of the study - the negative distance trend. This proved not to be the case for any of the 

studied risk factors. The proximity of residence to the nuclear power plant remains the only 

plausible explanation at this time. 

Recently, results were also reported for a comprehensive meta-analysis (Baker and Hoel, 2007) 

concerning leukemia in children living near nuclear power plants contained in 17 international 

studies carried out in Germany, Spain, France, Japan and North America during the period 

between 1984 and 1999. Distance dependent increased risks of 14% - 21% for leukemia in 

children under nine years of age were observed. When age was expanded to include the 

population up to 25 years of age, an increased probability of morbidity of 7-10% and increased 

mortality of 2-18% were observed. 

Taken together, these studies are consistent with the hypothesis that children who live near 

nuclear power plants develop cancer and leukemia more frequently that those living further 

away. If emissions have been correctly measured by monitoring the areas surrounding nuclear 

installations, as has been claimed by both the plant operators and the regulatory authorities, 

then either the currently accepted calculation models for determining radiation exposure of local 

residents are incorrect, or the biological effects of incorporated radionuclides have been badly 

underestimated, at least for young children and embryos (human fetuses). 

The indications over many years that there are increased levels of morbidity near to nuclear 

power plants are given added support by results of the KiKK study. The possibility of an 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-144 

increased risk for older children and adults living near nuclear power plants cannot be ruled out. 

It is important to point out that the radiation health standards established by BEIR VII are 

consistent with the above research findings regarding both cancer and non-cancer health 

outcomes given any level of low dose exposures. Furthermore, the BEIR VII committee also 

concludes "that the current scientific evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that there is a 

linear, no-threshold dose-response relationship between exposure to ionizing radiation and the 

development of cancer in humans." In other words, there exists general consensus on the 

radiation health risks by exposure and living near nuclear power plants. Consequently, the most 

effective mitigation of such risks will rely on either 1) avoiding the area surrounding the plant, or 

2) reducing the nuclear energy operational level, or 3) implementing risk management options 

based on the mechanistic understanding of cancer or non-cancer epidemiology. 

A number of studies have observed that risk of leukemia for children under the age of 5 

increases with decreasing distance of residence from nuclear power plants in Germany, the 

United Kingdom and in the United States (Hoffman, et al., 2007 and Kaatsch, et al., 2007). 

The KiKK and USC studies are among the strongest methodologically speaking and utilize 

state-of-the-art epidemiological methods. 

The methodology of modeling the continuous distance variables is adequate. Models applied in 

the studies show good adaptation to the collected data. The models permit an assessment of 

the incidence risks associated with distance of the home to the nearest nuclear power plant site. 

The risk to contract childhood cancer and leukemia significantly and continuously increases with 

increasing vicinity of the home to a nuclear power plant. The studies are the methodically most 

elaborate and comprehensive investigation of this interrelation worldwide. The association 

between vicinity of the home and increased risk of leukemia has been observed repeatedly in 

well-designed studies in Germany, the USA and UK. 

The causal role of ionizing radiation in these studies remains to be investigated using state-ofthe-art genomic, molecular and cellular diagnostics and testing technologies that have only 

recently become available for medical and healthcare research. The estimated exposures are 

far below those levels that are known to be leukemogenic or carcinogenic. Some of the 

associations are ecologic in nature, individual dosimetry is lacking and potentially important 

confounders such as competing risks (exposure and disease), length of residence, etc., are not 

measured. These factors can and should be further examined in a site-specific (Category 2) 

analysis for license renewals. (PIIC-8-5) 

Comment: I object to the document citing industry studies which apparently conclude that 

there is no increase in cancers in the vicinity of nuclear power facilities. Please specify the 
Appendix A 

 A-145 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

methodologies related to the study, and inform the public as to whether any such studies have 

been peer- reviewed. (Campbell-31-2) 

Comment: The very same month that the GEIS documents came out, an article came out 

authored by Rudi H. Nussbaum in the Journal of Occupational Environmental Health July -

September 2009 (the article was called "Childhood Leukemia and Cancers Near German 

Nuclear Reactors: Significance, Context, and Ramifications of Recent Studies") which reviewed 

the results of a very thorough study with superior study design which was commissioned by the 

German government called the Epidemiological Study on Childhood Cancer in the Vicinity of 

Nuclear Power Plants. This article can be found at: 

http://www.nirs.org/radiation/radhealth/kikkcommentary0709ijoeh.pdf

The last paragraph of the article on this study concluded that, "The KiKK study points out the 

need for a critical reexamination of uncertainties, flaws, and inappropriate generalizations in 

fundamental assumptions and models on which current radiation safety standards and 

regulations are based. A US government-sponsored case-control study, similar in design to the 

German KiKK study, would provide invaluable additional data for a sound scientific basis for 

such a reexamination since there are only minor design variations between US and German 

nuclear reactors. The KiKK study's ramifications add to the urgency of a policy debate 

regarding the high toll exacted in public health for nuclear power production.” (Campbell-31-3) 

Comment: Will the NRC review this German government-commissioned report, as well as 

other reports in cancers and leukemias in the vicinity of nuclear power reactors, and include 

them in their risk assessments and other analyses in the final documents on generic matters, 

and will they be considered at all in more site-specific Category 2 situations? (Campbell-31-4) 

Comment: A commenter submitted an Internet article asserting that childhood leukemia 

mortality rates around U.S. nuclear power plants have been significantly higher than the national 

average in the past two decades. The article cited the study, “Childhood Leukemia Near 

Nuclear Installations” (authors Joseph Mangano and Janette Sherman), as the basis for this 

assertion. The commenter submitted an additional Internet article pertaining to a 1994 law suit 

filed against Southern California Edison by a nuclear power plant worker suffering from cancer 

that he alleges he contracted because of his exposure to radiation at San Onofre. A third 

Internet article submitted by the commenter focused on cancer rates near San Onofre. 

(Anon2-23-2, Anon2-23-3, Anon2-23-6) 

Response: The NRC has asked NAS to perform a state-of-the-art study on cancer risk for 

populations surrounding nuclear power facilities. The NRC is aware that, as a part of its review, 

NAS will consider the German KiKK study in its deliberations on the potential human health 

effects of radiation from nuclear power plants. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-146 

The NAS has a broad range of medical and scientific experts that can provide the best available 

analysis of the complex issues involved in discussing cancer risk and commercial nuclear power 

plants. The NAS is a nongovernmental organization chartered by the U.S. Congress to advise 

the nation on issues of science, technology, and medicine. Through the National Research 

Council and Institute of Medicine, it carries out studies independently of the government using 

processes designed to promote transparency, objectivity, and technical rigor. More information 

on its methods for performing studies is available at http://www.nationalacademies.org/ 

studycommitteprocess.pdf. 

The NAS study will update the 1990 U.S. National Institutes of Health National Cancer Institute 

(NCI) report, “Cancer in Populations Living Near Nuclear Facilities” (NCI 1990), which 

concluded there was no evidence that nuclear facilities may be linked causally with excess 

death from leukemia or from other cancers in populations living nearby. The study’s objectives 

are as follows: 

• Evaluate whether cancer risk is different for populations living near nuclear power 

facilities. 

• Include cancer occurrence. 

• Develop an approach to assess cancer risk in geographic areas that are smaller than the 

county level. 

• Evaluate the study results in the context of offsite doses from normal reactor operations. 

The study began in the summer of 2010 and is expected to be completed within four years. 

Section 3.9.1.3 of the GEIS has been updated to include a discussion on NRC’s sponsorship of 

this follow-up study to the 1990 NCI study. 

The NRC's mission is to protect the public health and safety and the environment from the 

effects of radiation from nuclear reactors, materials, and waste facilities. The NRC's regulatory 

limits for radiological protection are set to protect workers and the public from the harmful health 

effects of radiation on humans. The limits are based on the recommendations of standardssetting organizations. Radiation standards reflect extensive scientific study by national and 

international organizations (International Commission on Radiological Protection [ICRP], 

National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements [NCRP], and the National 

Academy of Sciences [NAS]) and are conservative to ensure that the public and workers at 

nuclear power plants are protected. 
Appendix A 

 A-147 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Health effects from exposure to radiation are dose-dependent, ranging from no effect at all to 

death. Above certain doses, radiation can be responsible for inducing diseases such as 

leukemia, breast cancer, and lung cancer. Very high (hundreds of times higher than a rem), 

short-term doses of radiation have been known to cause prompt (or early, also called “acute”) 

effects, such as vomiting and diarrhea, skin burns, cataracts, and even death. 

Although radiation may cause cancers at high dose rates and high doses, currently there are no 

reputable scientifically conclusive data that unequivocally establish the occurrence of cancer 

following exposure to low dose rates and doses below about 0.1 Sv (10 rem). However, 

radiation protection experts conservatively assume that any amount of radiation may pose some 

risk of causing cancer or a severe hereditary effect and that the risk is higher for higher radiation 

exposures. Therefore, a linear, no-threshold dose response relationship is used to describe the 

relationship between radiation dose and adverse impacts such as incidents of cancer. Simply 

stated, any increase in dose, no matter how small, results in an incremental increase in health 

risk. This theory is accepted by the NRC as a conservative model for estimating health risks 

from radiation exposure, recognizing that the model probably over-estimates those risks. Based 

on this theory, the NRC conservatively establishes limits for radioactive effluents and radiation 

exposures for workers and members of the public, as found in 10 CFR Part 20, and 10 CFR 

Part 50, Appendix I. 

The amount of radioactive material released from nuclear power facilities is well measured, well 

monitored, and known to be very small. The doses of radiation that are received by members of 

the public as a result of exposure to nuclear power facilities are so low that resulting cancers 

have not been observed and would not be expected. Although a number of studies of cancer 

incidence in the vicinity of nuclear power facilities have been conducted, there are no studies to 

date that are accepted by the scientific community that show a correlation between radiation 

dose from nuclear power facilities and cancer incidence in the general public. 

No changes have been made to the GEIS in response to these comments. 

Comment: 1. HUMAN HEALTH: NRC incorrectly assigns "small impact" and Category 1 

designation to radiation exposures to the public and occupational works at 3-130, contrary to 

their own definitions, provided in footnote 1. 

[

1

 July 2009, S-5, NUREG-1437, Rev.1: NRC defines in the Draft small impact as, "Environmental effects are not 

detectable or are so minor that they will neither destabilize nor noticeably alter any important attribute of the resource. 

For the purposes of assessing radiological impacts, the Commission has concluded that those impacts do not exceed 

permissible level in the Commission's regulations are considered small.” Moderate impact as, "Environmental effects 

are sufficient to alter noticeably, but not to destabilize, important attributes of the resource." Large impact as, 

"Environmental effects are clearly noticeable and are sufficient to destabilize important attributes of the resource."] 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-148 

a. Health Impacts Are Mischaracterized By NRC To Be Of Small Impact: NRC incorrectly 

found health impacts to be small or "so minor" by: 

• Misrepresenting the National Academy of Science BEIR VII Report and "cherry picking" 

current research to avoid acknowledging new and significant research on radiation 

health effects; and... 

(1) Misrepresenting BEIR VII: NRC explains on the basis of a selective NRC staff analysis of 

BEIR VII (NRC 2005b) (ADAMS accession number ML052640532) that, the NRC completed a 

review of the BEIR VII report and documented its findings in the Commission paper SECY -05-

0202, "Staff Review of the National Academies Study of the Health Risks from Exposure to Low 

Levels of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR VII)," dated October 29, 2005 (NRC 2005b) (ADAMS 

accession number ML052640532). In this paper, the NRC concluded that the findings presented 

in the BEIR VII report agree with the NRC's current understanding of the health risks from 

exposure to ionizing radiation. The NRC agreed with the BEIR VII report's major conclusion that 

current scientific evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that there is a linear, no-threshold 

dose response relationship between exposure to ionizing radiation and the development of 

cancer in humans. This conclusion is consistent with the process the NRC uses to develop its 

standards of radiological protection. Therefore, the NRC's regulations continue to be 

adequately protective of public health and safety and the environment. 

NRC arrives at the absurd conclusion that "NRC's regulations continue to be adequately 

protective of public health and safety and the environment" by avoiding discussing BEIR VII's 

principle and relevant findings (new and significant information); if they had, there is no way that 

there could be a determination that "NRC's regulations continue to be adequately protective of 

public health and safety" − that the significance of radiation exposure is "small." What did BEIR 

VII actually say? 

• BEIR VII concludes that if 100,000 people were each exposed to 10,000 millirem (1100) 

people would get a cancer from the radiation and half of them would die. This is above 

and beyond the number who would have gotten cancer in the absence of the additional 

radiation. NRC may think that is a small effect; the families of the cancer victims might 

think differently. 

• The BEIR VII report reaffirmed the conclusion of the prior report that every exposure to 

radiation produces a corresponding increase in cancer risk. The average risks to the 

population are estimated to be 10 to 15 percent higher than the reference value now 

used for radiation protection of the general population (565 cancer fatalities per million 

rem exposure in BEIR VII compared to 500 typically cited in the literature on radiation 

protection). While this average risk is in the general range of uncertainties and values 

reported previously, it indicates an increase of mortality risk overall. 
Appendix A 

 A-149 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

• BEIR VII found cancer incidence risk is considerably greater − a point ignored by NRC. 

BEIR VII found cancer incidence risks to be about a third higher than previously 

presumed in the previous BEIR reports and by agencies such as NRC. Federal 

Guidance Report 13, prepared with support from NRC, had previously set the cancer 

incidence risk at 8.76 cancers per 10,000 person-rem. BEIR VII sets it at 11.4. 

• Workers: NRC permits doses to workers of 5 rem/per year. A worker who received that 

dose every year he or she worked, never going over the limit, would receive a dose of 

250 /rem. NRC's own risk figures say 1 in 8 workers so exposed would die from cancer 

induced by that dose. BEIR VII says ~twice that number ─ ~1 in 4 ─ would get cancer 

from that exposure. NRC may say risks of 1 in 4 or 1 in 8 are small; hard to say so with 

a straight face to the quarter of workers who would get cancer from exposure to the 

"permissible" dose. Unions should demand hazard pay. 

• The Draft ignores BEIR VII's analysis of the effects on women and young children. In 

1990, the NAS estimated that the risks of dying from cancer due to exposure to radiation 

were about five percent higher for women than for men. In BEIR VII, the cancer 

mortality risks for females are 37.5 percent higher. The risks for all solid tumors, like 

lung, breast, and kidney, liver, and other solid tumors added together are almost 

50 percent greater for women than men, though there are a few specific cancers, 

including leukemia, for which the risk estimates for men are higher." (Summary 

estimates are in Table ES-1 on page 28 of the BEIR VII report prepublication copy, on 

the Web at http://books.nap.edu/books/030909156X/html/28.html.) 

• The BEIR VII report estimates that the differential risk for children is even greater. For 

instance, the same radiation in the first year of life for boys produces three to four times 

the cancer risk as exposure between the ages of 20 and 50. Female infants have 

almost double the risk as male infants. (Table 12 D-1 and D-2, on pages 550-551 of the 

prepublication copy of the report, on the Web starting at 

http://books.nap.edu/books/030909156X/html/550.html). 

• While the report states there is no direct evidence of harm to human offspring from 

exposure of parents to radiation, the committee noted that such harm has been found in 

animal experiments and that there is "no reason to believe that humans would be 

immune to this sort of harm." (Page 20, prepublication copy). 

• BEIR VII also noted that relatively high levels of radiation exposure increase risk of heart 

disease and stroke, though it did not give specific risk estimates. The committee also 

noted children born to parents that have been exposed to radiation could be affected by 

those exposures and study was warranted. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-150 

• In sum, cancer mortality and incidence risk has indeed gone up and there is greater 

recognition that health effects, other than cancer, must be considered. Therefore 

"NRC's regulations (do not) continue to be adequately protective of public health and 

safety and the environment" and the impact cannot be considered "small." 

• Further BEIR VII was published prior to more recent studies that demonstrate radiation 

is far more dangerous than that assumed by the National Academies. These studies 

were ignored by NRC in the Draft GElS. (PW-6-3) 

Comment: 1. HUMAN HEALTH 

a. Health Impacts Are Mischaracterized By NRC To Be Of Small Impact

NRC incorrectly found health impacts to be small or "so minor" by: 

• Misrepresenting the National Academy of Science BEIR VII Report and "cherry picking" 

current research to avoid acknowledging new and significant research on radiation 

health effects; and... 

(2) Health Research Cited in Draft - Problems: Methodologically Flawed & NRC Avoided New & 

Significant Research 

(a) County statistical studies cited in the Draft included: NCI 1990; Florida Department of 

Health, 2001; Illinois Department of Health 2000 & 2006. Each study compared cancer rates in 

counties with nuclear reactors to those without nuclear reactors and concluded that there was 

no impact from the reactors. Obviously the studies were flawed because, for example, they 

assumed that: counties with reactors and counties without were comparable in all other 

respects; reactors were located dead center in the county and not closer to the county line so 

that in fact it impacted an adjacent county more; and that the expected impact affected the 

whole county and not pockets closer to the reactor. Despite these obvious methodological 

weaknesses, apparently these studies gave the "right answer" for NRC Staff to decide to 

include them in the Draft.

(b) Significant Studies that concluded an impact from exposure were not mentioned in the Draft 

where NRC is obligated in its rulemaking to review pertinent new information. For example: 

• Elizabeth Cardis, "Risk of cancer risk after low doses of ionizing radiation: retrospective 

cohort study in 15 countries." British Medical Journal (2005) 331:77. Cardis published 

the largest study of occupational radiation exposures ever conducted. It found, by 

examining nuclear workers in 15 nations, cancer induction per unit dose is about 6 times 

higher than currently assumed by EPA and NRC; and similar findings recently were 
Appendix A 

 A-151 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

reported in the Techa River cohort (Krestina et al (2005).3 Both studies give similar 

values for low dose, protracted exposure, namely (1) cancer death per Sievert 

(100 rem). In the United States a series of other occupational studies, including several 

from the Department of Energy's Santa Susana Field Laboratory, Oak Ridge, and 

Hanford nuclear facilities, suggest current agency risk estimates may be low by as much 

as an order of magnitude. 

[

3

 Krestinina LY, Preston DL, Ostroumova EV, Degteva MO, Ron E, Vyushkova OV, et al. 2005. Protracted 

radiation exposure and cancer mortality in the Techa River cohort. Radiation Research 164(5): 602-611.] 

• Kaatsch P, Spix C, Schulze-Rath R, et aI., Leukaemia in young children living in the 

vicinity of German nuclear power plants, Int. J Cancer. 2008; 1220:721-726. A 

government-sponsored study of childhood cancer in the proximity of 16 German 

commercial nuclear power plants (German acronym KiKK) found that children < 5 years 

living < 5 km from the plants had twice the risk for contracting leukemia as those residing 

> 5 km. The study was very large: it examined 593 under-fives with leukaemia and 

1766 controls. The study was consistent with other European childhood leukemia 

studies and radiation exposure.4

[

4

 Baker PJ, Hoel DG. Meta-analysis of standardized incidence and mortality rates of childhood leukemia in 

proximity to nuclear facilities. Eur J Cancer Care. 2007; 16:355-363; Fairlie I. J Radiol Protect. 2007; 27: 

157-168; CERRlE. Report of the Committee Examining the Radiation Risks of Internal Emitters. Chilton: 

Health Protection Agency, 2004. www.cerrie.org

Guizard, Boutou O, Pottier D, et al. The incidence of childhood leukaemia around the La Hague nuclear 

waste reprocessing plant (France): a survey for the years 1978-1998. J Epidem Comm Health. 2001; 

55(7): 469-480] 

• Southeastern Massachusetts Health Study [published in the Archives of Environmental 

Health, Vol. 51, p.266, July-August 1996] found a four-fold increase in adult leukemia the 

closer one lived or worked to the Pilgrim NPS. (PW-6-4) 

Comment: Now we can get down to human health that should be a category two issue just 

because, in this, I'm sorry, when I read those two books, see this is why I have glasses, I went 

up to 2.5 actually but when I read through them, I said, you know, who wrote this? This is a PR 

piece for the industry. This is, you know, relax, be happy everybody, we are the friend atom. 

You do mention that you did read BEIR 7, but I guess it didn't say the right things because you 

blew it off as, oh well, that essentially said the same thing as BEIR 5. 

Well I don't know, I must have read a funny BEIR 7, but it said three times more damaging were 

the effects than they had decided in BEIR 5. That sounded significant to me. It also talked 

about the increased damage to women, small children. It also talked about, hey, let's just not 

talk about cancer, let's get into research that is looking at other diseases, not just cancer and 

birth defects and reproductive disorders, let's add the heart and a few other things. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-152 

Well it's clear, and it's very clear, that there has been new and significant information by --. I 

always thought the National Academy of Sciences were a reputable group, they weren't raving 

anti-nuclear people, to the best of my knowledge, and the fact that that information is not being 

considered, there is something wrong with that. And there is something wrong in not then going 

further, hey, are there demographic characteristics around some sites that would fit into a great 

susceptibility, number two? (NMA-PW-10) 

Response: The NRC does not agree with the comments that it has misinterpreted the BEIR VII 

report and incorrectly classified the impacts to human health from radiation exposure. The NRC 

staff performed a thorough review of the BEIR VII report issued in 2005. As reported to the 

Commission in SECY-05-0202,(w)

 the staff stated “...that the findings presented in the National 

Academies BEIR VII report contribute to our understanding of the health risks from exposure to 

ionizing radiation. The major conclusion is that current scientific evidence is consistent with the 

hypothesis that there is a linear, no-threshold dose response relationship between exposure to 

ionizing radiation and the development of cancer in humans. This conclusion is consistent with 

the system of radiological protection that the NRC uses to develop its regulations. Therefore, 

the NRC’s regulations continue to be adequately protective of public health and safety and the 

environment. Consequently, none of the findings in the BEIR VII report warrant initiating any 

immediate change to NRC regulations or Federal Guidance.” 

Further, in 2007, the NRC denied a petition for rulemaking (PRM-51-11; see ADAMS Accession 

No. ML061770056) which asked the NRC to reconcile the 1996 GEIS with the radiological 

findings in the BEIR VII report. In denying the petition, the Commission, in its staff requirements 

memorandum, SRM-SECY-07-0155,(x)

 stated, “The Commission has approved the staff’s 

recommendation to deny the subject petition for rulemaking, PRM-51-11. The Commission 

agrees that the NRC’s existing regulations continue to be protective of public health and safety 

and the environment and that none of the findings in the BEIR VII report warrant initiating any 

immediate change to NRC regulations or guidance.” 

Based on the above, the NRC asserts that its radiation protection standards are adequately 

protective of public health and safety and the environment. Accordingly, the GEIS has 

appropriately assessed the radiological impacts to human health as SMALL for this Category 1 

issue. 

The NRC’s mission is to protect the public health and safety and the environment from the 

effects of radiation from nuclear reactors, materials, and waste facilities. The NRC’s regulatory 

limits for radiological protection are set to protect workers and the public from the harmful health 

effects (i.e., cancer and other biological impacts) of radiation on humans. The limits are based 

on the recommendations of standards-setting organizations. Radiation standards reflect 

extensive scientific study by national and international organizations (International Commission 

 

(w) SECY-05-0202 can be accessed at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0526/ML052640532.pdf. 

(x) SRM-SECY-07-0155 can be accessed at: 

 http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/srm/2007/2007-0155srm.pdf. 
Appendix A 

 A-153 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

on Radiological Protection [ICRP], National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements 

[NCRP], and the National Academy of Sciences [NAS]) and are conservative to ensure that the 

public and workers at nuclear power plants are protected. The NRC actively participates and 

monitors the work of these organizations as well as some of the radiation health studies 

conducted in the United States and internationally to keep current on the latest trends in 

radiation protection. The GEIS did not review the studies cited in the Pilgrim Watch comment. 

The 1996 GEIS and the revised GEIS contain thorough and comprehensive discussions on 

NRC’s radiation protection requirements and the potential risks to plant workers and members 

of the public from exposure to radiation from nuclear power plants during the period of license 

renewal. Based on its evaluation, the GEIS concluded that the impacts were SMALL.

In 2009, the Commission, in its staff requirements memorandum, SRM-SECY-08-0197,(y)

directed the staff to engage stakeholders and interested parties to initiate development of the 

technical basis for possible revision of the NRC’s radiation protection regulations, as appropriate 

and where scientifically justified, to achieve greater alignment with the 2007 recommendations 

of the ICRP contained in ICRP Publication 103. In SRM-SECY-08-0197, the Commission 

stated that it agreed “with the staff and the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) 

that the current NRC regulatory framework continues to provide adequate protection of the 

health and safety of workers, the public, and the environment. From a safety regulation 

perspective, ICRP Publication 103 proposes measures that go beyond what is needed to 

provide for adequate protection. This point should be emphasized when engaging stakeholders 

and interested parties, and thereby focus the discussion on discerning the benefits and burdens 

associated with revising the radiation protection regulatory framework.”

In conclusion, the current NRC regulatory framework continues to provide adequate protection 

of the health and safety of workers, and the public. Accordingly, the GEIS has appropriately 

assessed the radiological impacts to human health as SMALL for this Category 1 issue. 

No changes have been made to the GEIS in response to these comments. 

Comment: Page 3-140, lines 16 to 18: Text in lines 16 to 18 on page 3-140 reads as follows: 

For purposes of evaluating the impacts of license renewal, the transmission lines of concern are 

those lines that currently connect the nuclear plant to the regional electrical distribution grid and 

that would remain energized only if the plant’s operating license was renewed. 

 

(y) SRM-SECY-08-0197 can be accessed at: 

 http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/srm/2008/2008-0197srm.pdf. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-154 

On page 3-3 in lines 38 and 39, the draft updated GEIS states that “only those transmission 

lines that connect the plant to the switchyard are considered within the scope of [the updated 

GEIS] review.” On page 3-24 in lines 6 to 11, the draft updated GEIS states “Powertransmission systems associated with nuclear power plants and considered within the scope of 

this review consist of switching stations (or substations) usually located on the plant site and the 

transmission lines that connect the plant to those substations. These systems are required to 

transfer power from the plant to the utility’s network of power lines in its service area (the 

regional electrical distribution grid).” Consistent with the observation on page 3-24 that “in most 

cases, the transmission lines originating at the power plant substations are no longer owned or 

managed by the nuclear power plant licensees,” consider modifying the sentence in lines 16 

through 18 on page 3-140 as follows for consistency with the above-quoted statements 

regarding the scope of the GEIS update with respect to transmission lines (strikethrough font = 

deletion; italics font = addition): 

For purposes of evaluating the impacts of license renewal, the transmission lines of concern are 

those lines that (1) would only remain energized if NRC renewed the nuclear plant’s operating 

license and (2) currently connect the nuclear plant to the switchyard where the electric voltage is 

stepped up and fed into the regional electrical distribution grid and that would remain energized 

only if the plant’s operating license was renewed. (NEI1-7(4)-71) 

Comment: Page 3-143, lines 14 to 21: Text in lines 14 to 21 on page 3-143 reads as follows: 

With respect to shock safety issues and license renewal, three points must be made. First, in 

the licensing process for the earlier licensed nuclear plants, the issue of electrical shock safety 

was not addressed. Second, some plants that received operating licenses with a stated 

transmission line voltage may have chosen to upgrade the line voltage for reasons of efficiency, 

possibly without reanalysis of induction effects. Third, since the initial NEPA review for those 

utilities that evaluated potential shock situations under the provision of the NESC, land use may 

have changed, resulting in the need for a reevaluation of this issue. Electrical shock potential is 

minimized for transmission lines that are operated in adherence with the NESC.

Consider amending the paragraph quoted above (lines 14 through 21 on page 3-143 of the draft 

updated GEIS) because the information it presents is not consistent with statements on pp. 3-3 

(lines 35 to 41) and 3-24 (lines 20 to 21) in the draft updated GEIS regarding the scope of 

environmental review for transmission lines during the license renewal process for nuclear 

power plants. (NEI1-7(4)-72) 

Comment: Page 4-152, lines 4 to 19: Text in lines 16 to 19 on page 4-152 reads as follows: 

Without a review of the conformance of each nuclear plant’s transmission lines with NESC 

criteria, it is not possible to determine the significance of the electrical shock potential 
Appendix A 

 A-155 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

generically; it could be small, moderate, or large. The impact of this hazard is a 

Category 2 issue. 

The information provided in lines 4 to 19 on page 4-152 should be expanded to explain the 

scope of the GEIS update with respect to transmission lines, as presented on pp. 3-3 (lines 35 – 

41) and 3-24 (lines 20 – 21). (NEI1-7(4)-27) 

Response: The text of Sections 3.9.5.2 and 4.9.1.1 of the GEIS have been modified in 

response to these comments to make the discussion of transmission line scoping consistent 

with other sections of the GEIS.

Comment: Page 4-142, lines 6 to 9: Text in lines 6 to 9 on page 4-142 reads as follows: 

Major changes in the operation of the cooling system are not expected during the license 

renewal term, so no change in the effects of biocide discharges on the quality of the receiving 

water is anticipated. Any such changes would require a separate NEPA review that would 

include an examination of human health effects. 

Clarification is needed regarding the above-quoted statement that a separate NEPA review for 

human health effects would be required if major changes were made in the operation of the 

cooling system at a nuclear power plant. It is not clear why NRC staff believes that a NEPA 

review would be necessary for this type of operational change. It should be noted that changes 

in chemicals, including biocides, used on site that are subsequently discharged to the 

environment would require modification to the site’s NPDES permit. The NPDES permitting 

process involves a review of the environmental impacts. (NEI1-7(4)-26) 

Response: The commenter is correct that clarification is needed. While major changes in 

cooling water system operations (e.g., those affecting the plant’s licensing basis and triggering a 

license amendment) would certainly require a separate NEPA review, other changes such as 

proposed use of different cooling water treatment chemicals may not. Additionally, proposed 

changes in the use of cooling water treatment chemicals would separately require review and 

possible modification of the plant’s NPDES permit by the permit-issuing authority, including 

review of possible health effects. Section 4.9.1.1.2 of this GEIS has been revised to make this 

distinction. 

Comment: EMFs: Health impacts from electromagnetic fields are discussed on pages 4-146 

to 4-150. The issue remains a "NA" Category. The statement, "Because of inconclusive 

scientific evidence, the chronic effects of EMF are considered uncertain, and currently, no 

generic conclusion on human health impacts is possible" leads us to think that the NRC will err 

on the side of caution and continue to evaluate this issue on a site-specific basis. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-156 

The statement on line 26 of page 4-150, that "If the NRC finds that the appropriate Federal 

health agencies have reached a consensus that there are adverse health effects, all future 

license renewal applicants will have to address the health effects in the license renewal 

process," however, seems to suggest that the NRC has already determined that there are no 

health impacts from EMF's. 

Since there is no scientific consensus on whether human health is compromised, there is NO 

assurance that there are NO adverse health effects (i.e., chronic health effects, increased risks 

to cancer). In fact, the United States EPA's Office of Radiation and Indoor Air offers only two 

recommendations for people who want to protect themselves from possible risks from power 

lines to reduce their exposure: "[i]ncreasing the distance between you and the source" and 

"[l]imiting the time spent around the source." (See "Electric and Magnetic Field (EMF) Radiation 

from Power Lines," available at www.epa.gov/radtown/power-lines.html). This does not seem to 

be a viable solution for the public. 

We recommend that the scope of every SEIS include a discussion of specific health impacts to 

members of the public resulting from exposure to electromagnetic energy and radiation 

emanating from the transmission lines. (PIIC-8-9) 

Response: The potential effects of electromagnetic fields (EMFs) are discussed in 

Section 4.9.1.1. The GEIS discusses the results from several health studies managed by the 

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences 

(NIEHS). The NIEHS released a report that concluded that the health risk from exposures from 

low-level electromagnetic fields is weak. Further, NIEHS expressed an opinion that such a 

weak finding is insufficient to warrant aggressive regulatory concern. The GEIS concludes that 

because of inconclusive scientific evidence, the chronic effects of EMF are considered 

uncertain, and currently no generic conclusion on human health effects is possible. The NRC 

will continue to monitor the research initiatives—both those within the national EMF program 

and others internationally—to evaluate the potential carcinogenicity of EMF as well as other 

progress in the EMF study disciplines. If the NRC finds that the appropriate Federal health 

agencies have reached a consensus on the potential human health effects from exposure to 

EMF, the NRC will revise the GEIS to include the new information and determine what to 

require of all future license renewal applicants. No changes were made to the GEIS in 

response to this comment. 

Comment: a. Health Impacts Are Mischaracterized By NRC To Be Of Small Impact 

NRC incorrectly found health impacts to be small or "so minor" by: 

• Incorrectly assuming that reported releases are accurate and reliable. NRC assumed 

that monitoring releases into the air and water on site and environmental sampling offsite 
Appendix A 

 A-157 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

is "state-of-the art" and provides an accurate record of what is released in order to 

determine that impacts do not exceed permissible level in the Commission’s regulations 

and are therefore small: 

(3) Monitoring Releases Into The Air And Water Onsite And Environmental Sampling Offsite –

Unreliable So That Health Impact Cannot Be Determined By Applicant’s Emission Data: Neither 

the NRC, licensee nor the public knows for certain what is released into the air and water from 

reactors to say, as the Draft incorrectly does say, that releases are within limits and therefore 

have no negative impacts. The NRC knows what we say is true. For example, in the Liquid 

Radioactive Release Lessons Learned Task Force Final Report, September 1, 20065

 NRC says 

that, 

[

5

 Liquid Radioactive -:Release Lessons Learned Task Force Final Report, September 1, 2006, NRC 

http ://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/grndwtr-contam-tritium.html] 

“[The Branch Technical Division]...does not require ground water monitoring within the 

licensee's site for general detection and monitoring purposes. Ground water monitoring within 

the licensee's site is only required if the ground water is tapped for drinking or irrigation 

purposes.” P. 18 [Emphasis added] 

“The radiation detection capabilities specified in the [branch technical position] are the 1970's 

state-of-the-art for routine environmental measurements in Laboratories. More sensitive 

radiation detection capability exists today, but there is no regulatory requirement for the plants 

to have this equipment. The guidance primarily focuses on gamma isotopic analysis of 

environmental material and on tritium in water samples. There are minimal requirements for 

analyzing environmental samples for beta- and alpha-emitting radionuclides.” P. 18 [Emphasis 

added] 

“The regulatory guidance provides built in flexibility in the scope of the REMP. It...allows 

licensees to reduce the scope of and frequency of the sampling program, without the NRC 

approval, on historical data.... if a licensee's environmental samples have not detected licensed 

radioactive material in several years, then the licensee typically reduces the scope and sample 

frequency of the associated environmental pathway. NRC inspections have observed 

reductions in the scope and frequency of licensee programs...” p.19 [Emphasis added] 

Reactors are not required to have real-time combination radiation/meteorological monitoring 

stations (measuring high and low let alpha and beta, in addition to gamma) located in 

appropriate offsite communities, placed according to meteorological studies, and computer 

linked to the NRC, state Departments of Public Health, and available on line to the public. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-158 

Only with such a requirement would there be "reasonable assurance" that releases were within 

allowable limits; and would there be real and reliable data to look backwards to determine a link 

between any evidence of pockets of radiation-linked disease and the reactor. 

Only with real-time monitors, as described, would NRC then be qualified to determine the 

impact of releases. (PW-6-5) 

Response: The NRC does not agree with the comment. The comment refers to 

recommendations made by the NRC staff in the Liquid Radioactive Release Lessons Learned 

Task Force Final Report, dated September 1, 2006 (ADAMS Accession No. ML062650312). It 

is important to note that the task force’s review was focused on the unplanned and unmonitored 

or inadvertent releases of radioactive liquids into the groundwater from plant systems, 

components, and buried piping, not the well-established routinely monitored effluent pathways 

from each nuclear power plant.

As stated in the task force report: “The most significant conclusion of the task force regarded 

public health impacts. Although there have been a number of industry events where radioactive 

liquid was released to the environment in an unplanned and unmonitored fashion, based on the 

data available, the task force did not identify any instances where the health of the public was 

impacted.” 

Additionally, the task force concluded, “There is an extensive list of NRC regulations which 

provide a framework to ensure that the public health is protected from the release to the 

environment of licensed radioactive material. This regulatory framework has generally been 

successful in limiting public radiation doses to below the ALARA guidelines (less than 3 mrem 

per year due to liquid releases).” 

The recommendations contained in the task force report cited by the commenter were designed 

to focus the staff’s evaluation of its regulatory guidance for potential improvements in 

radioactive effluent and environmental monitoring to address the inadvertent releases of 

radioactive liquids into the groundwater. 

The NRC’s safety regulations are based on the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and 

require a finding of reasonable assurance that the activities authorized by an operating license 

can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and those activities 

will be conducted in compliance with the NRC’s regulations. 

The NRC provides continuous oversight of each plant under the NRC’s inspection and 

enforcement programs. The NRC’s Reactor Oversight Process integrates the NRC’s 

inspection, assessment, and enforcement programs. The operating reactor assessment 

program evaluates the overall safety performance, including the release of radioactive effluents, 
Appendix A 

 A-159 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

of operating commercial nuclear reactors and communicates those results to licensee 

management, members of the public, and other government agencies. The assessment 

program collects information from inspections and performance indicators in order to enable the 

agency to arrive at objective conclusions about a licensee’s safety performance. Based on this 

assessment information, the NRC determines the appropriate level of agency response, 

including supplemental inspection and pertinent regulatory actions ranging from management 

meetings up to and including orders for plant shutdown. The NRC conducts follow-up actions, 

as applicable, to ensure that the corrective actions designed to address performance 

weaknesses were effective. 

The NRC has requirements to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety through 

design, construction, operation, maintenance, modification, and quality assurance measures. 

Consistent with that purpose, enforcement actions have been used as a deterrent to emphasize 

the importance of compliance with these requirements and to encourage prompt identification 

and prompt, comprehensive correction of violations. The NRC enforcement program supports 

the overall safety mission in protecting the public health and safety and the environment. The 

enforcement program: (1) assesses the significance of individual inspection findings and 

events, (2) formulates the appropriate agency response to these findings and events, 

(3) emphasizes good performance and compliance, (4) provides incentives for performance 

improvement, and (5) provides public notification of the NRC’s views on licensees’ performance 

and actions. 

Radiological monitoring and inadvertent liquid radioactive releases are discussed in 

Section 3.9.1.3 of the revised GEIS. Each nuclear power plant is responsible for the control and 

monitoring of its radioactive effluent releases in accordance with NRC requirements. In 

accordance with NRC regulation, 10 CFR Part 50.36a, each plant is required to report on an 

annual basis the types and quantities of radioactive material released from its facility. This 

information, as well as each plant’s radioactive effluent control program (i.e., plant equipment, 

operating procedures, personnel and training records), is reviewed by NRC personnel during 

the periodic radiation protection inspections. The NRC considers this process adequate to 

ensure radioactive effluents are appropriately controlled. 

Based on the above, the NRC asserts that its radiation protection standards are adequately 

protective of public health and safety and the environment. Accordingly, the GEIS has 

appropriately assessed the radiological impacts to human health as SMALL for this Category 1 

issue. 

No change was made to the GEIS in response to this comment. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-160 

Comment: Does the NRC recognize the conclusion by Dr. John Gofman first made in the 

1960s which declared that there is no safe level of radiation? If not, why not? Thus, even if no 

emissions exceeded "design basis", would not his scientific conclusion indicate that there would 

be deleterious impacts from exposure to radiation even if it is within some formal or legal 

radiation emission level? (Campbell-31-11) 

Response: The NRC’s mission is to protect public health and safety and the environment from 

the effects of radiation from nuclear reactors, materials, and waste facilities. The NRC’s 

regulatory limits for radiological protection are set to protect workers and the public from the 

harmful health effects of radiation on humans. The limits are based on the recommendations of 

standards-setting organizations. Radiation standards reflect extensive scientific study by 

national and international organizations (International Commission on Radiological Protection 

[ICRP], National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements [NCRP], and the NAS) and 

are conservative to ensure that the public and workers at nuclear power plants are protected. 

Health effects from exposure to radiation are dose-dependent, ranging from no effect at all to 

death. Although radiation may cause cancers at high doses, currently there are no reputable 

scientifically conclusive data that unequivocally establish the occurrence of cancer following 

exposure to low doses below about 0.1 Sv (10 rem). However, radiation protection experts 

conservatively assume that any amount of radiation may pose some risk of causing cancer or a 

severe hereditary effect and that the risk is higher for higher radiation exposures. Therefore, a 

linear, no-threshold dose response relationship is used to describe the relationship between 

radiation dose and adverse impacts such as incidents of cancer. Simply stated, any increase in 

dose, no matter how small, results in an incremental increase in health risk. This theory is 

accepted by the NRC as a conservative model for estimating health risks from radiation 

exposure, recognizing that the model probably overestimates those risks. Based on this theory, 

the NRC conservatively establishes radiation dose limits, in 10 CFR Part 20 and 10 CFR 

Part 50, Appendix I, to ensure adequate protection of workers and members of the public. 

A recent report by the National Research Council (2006), BEIR VII Phase II, “Health Risks from 

Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation,” supports the linear, no-threshold dose risk 

model. This model suggests that the risk of cancer proceeds in a linear fashion at lower doses 

without a threshold and that the smallest dose has the potential to cause a small increase in risk 

to humans. As previously discussed, the NRC accepts and uses the linear, no-threshold dose 

model for its radiation protection standards. The BEIR VII report is discussed in Section 3.9.1.4 

of the revised GEIS. 

NRC provides oversight of all licensed commercial nuclear reactors to ensure that the dose to 

members of the public from radioactive releases is within the established limits. NRC 

regulations require that radioactive gaseous and liquid releases from nuclear power plants be 

monitored and must meet radiation dose-based limits specified in 10 CFR Part 20, the “as low 
Appendix A 

 A-161 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

as is reasonably achievable” (ALARA) dose criteria in Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50, and the 

EPA’s radiation protection standards in 40 CFR Part 190. These regulations limit the radiation 

dose that members of the public might receive from radioactive material released by nuclear 

plants. Nuclear power plants are required to submit an annual report to the NRC on the types 

and amounts of radioactive gaseous and liquid effluents released into the environment each 

year. The annual radioactive effluent release reports submitted to the NRC are available to the 

public through the NRC’s ADAMS electronic reading room on the NRC website (www.nrc.gov). 

No change was made to the GEIS in response to this comment.

A.2.1.10 Comments Concerning Uranium Fuel Cycle and Waste Management 

Comment: The law in California forbids the building of new nuclear power plants until such 

time as there exists a Federal Government repository for high-level nuclear waste. There is no 

repository at the present time and there is no program at this time to find a repository for nuclear 

waste. (DPCA-UNASFV-3) 

Response: The proposed action described in the GEIS does not involve building new plants, 

but rather renewal of licenses for existing plants. For license renewal actions, the Commission 

is aware that a high-level nuclear waste repository may not be available. As an interim measure 

to the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and other high-level nuclear waste in a repository, the 

Commission has considered the storage of spent nuclear fuel on reactor sites where it is 

generated. The impacts associated with onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel are discussed in 

Section 4.11.1 of the GEIS. Onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel during the license renewal 

term is a Category 1 issue. No changes were made to the GEIS in response to this comment. 

Comment: For many, many years, I was the Director of the Alliance for Survival here in 

Orange County and I testified in front of the NRC and Edison at a number of different hearings 

over the years and in many ways, this is deja vu. It could have been what is going on here 

today 25 years ago, 20 years ago, 15 years ago. We were discussing the same thing. What 

can we do with the waste? How do we take care of the waste? We still don't have the answer. 

(DPCA-Pack-42) 

Response: Current practices in waste management at existing nuclear power plants are 

discussed in Section 3.11 of the GEIS. Environmental consequences and mitigation actions for 

waste management that are associated with license renewal are discussed in Sections 4.11 and 

4.12 of the GEIS. As discussed in the aforementioned sections, there are feasible methods for 

managing all waste types generated at the reactor sites and at associated nuclear fuel cycle 

facilities. No changes were made to the GEIS in response to this comment.
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-162 

Comment: So I'm concerned about nuclear power and its poor track record, and the 

abominable idea of long-term storage of nuclear waste on our pristine coast, turning it into a 

biohazard dump and a terrorist target. (PBCA-Biesek-40) 

Comment: You also made the assumption that things have been a certain way, and so there’s 

the, kind of the assumption that it's sort of okay then. It's not okay. There were things that were 

done, that were not right when they were done. And I'll give you, for example, very clearly, the 

area where the dry cask storage is at Diablo Nuclear Power – Power -- Diablo Nuclear Power 

Plant. Sorry. I still get nervous, so bear with me. 

When that came up, we heard time and time again how safe it was, that this site was 

determined to be safe. Of course this is post 9/11, and you've got your dry casks sitting in full 

view of the ocean. 

Now there's not too many people who are going to "buy" that that would be where you would put 

it, if you had your choice, with all the other acreage that's available. 

So the question has to be asked, and was asked, and totally ignored -- Why was it put there? 

The reason? That was the left-over piece from when the plant was initially [sited]. So it was 

covered in the full EIR and PG&E did not want to spend the money to do a full-blown EIR on a 

other part that was not covered, initially. 

That's how you got the safety, was because that was the little corner that was left over from the 

original footprint. That does not define safety for any of us. (PBCA-Pinard-16) 

Comment: Deal with it or do NOT produce it. Storage on site is NOT properly dealing with it. 

Finding spot for N-waste. 

 

To the Editor: 

I was arrested in front of Diablo Canyon Power Plant in 1978 because they did not know what 

they were going to do with their nuclear waste. 

Nipomo is downwind of Diablo. I do not consider storage on site next to two earthquake faults 

an intelligent answer. 

I suggest these casks of the nuclear waste be placed in the backyards of NRC and Diablo. This 

will disperse the problem and give the big shots a chance to actually solve the problem they 

created by permitting Diablo to exist. (Denneen-22-1) 
Appendix A 

 A-163 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Response: The NRC addressed the safety and environmental aspects of the dry cask spent 

fuel storage facility at Diablo Canyon, including a potential terrorist attack, during its review and 

licensing of Diablo Canyon’s ISFSI facility. The impacts associated with onsite storage of spent 

nuclear fuel at nuclear power plant sites during the license renewal term are discussed in 

Section 4.11.1.2 of the GEIS. 

Storage of spent fuel at public places as suggested by one of the commenters is not a feasible 

option. No change was made to the GEIS as a result of this comment. 

Comment: Incidentally, this, this -- Peg was talking about how the dry casks are not [very] 

safe, the storage area for the dry casks is not very safe. The only thing I wanted to add to that, 

Peg, is that they're also right under the high-power lines, which sometimes spark, you know. 

(PBCA-Groot-39) 

Response: ISFSIs that use dry casks for storage of spent fuel must comply with NRC’s safety 

requirements in 10 CFR Part 72, “Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent 

Nuclear Fuel, High-Level Radioactive Waste, and Reactor-Related Greater Than Class C 

Waste.” As such, appropriate safety concerns for ISFSIs are addressed in the regulation and 

must be followed by the licensee. Subpart H, “Physical Protection,” of 10 CFR Part 72 

addresses the physical protection requirements for the physical security and safeguards of the 

ISFSI. In addition, Subpart E, “Siting Evaluation Factors,” requires a licensee to investigate and 

assess site characteristics that may affect the safety or environmental impact of the ISFSI. 

Specifically, the ISFSI must be examined with respect to the frequency and the severity of 

external natural and man-induced events that could affect the safe operation of the ISFSI. 

Thus, if an ISFSI were to be built under electric transmission lines, the licensee’s evaluation 

would have to include the potential impact to the storage casks from the power lines to ensure 

that it would not affect the safe operation of the ISFSI. No change was made to the GEIS in 

response to this comment.

Comment: Just one quick example, cost. We ask what does it cost? We've heard that the 

League. They were asked the question by the Energy Commission. Predict for us please the 

future of the uranium fuel cycle in terms of cost and availability and PG&E provided a five-page 

detailed footnoted researched answer of various factors which concluded they predict a global 

problem In uranium supply and cost by the year 2015. 

Edison's answer was much simpler. It was less than -- well, it was only one sentence. We see 

no foreseeable problem in the future. 

Okay. Now, you have the two major default utilities in the state providing completely 

diametrically opposed answers to the State's Energy Commission. The State Energy 

Commission has now the cold fact before them and said explain. (DPCA-A4NR2-40)
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-164 

Comment: Availability of Uranium Fuel Should Be Addressed: Optimistic projections of the 

availability of uranium fuel supplies show that resource running out in about 2020 − BEFORE 

the period at stake in the possible Diablo license extensions. [See December 1, 2009 

publication of an article by Brian Wang titled "Uranium Supplies are Likely to be Adequate until 

2020," available at www.theoildrum.com/]. If this is true, all nuclear plants in the country will be 

affected. SLOMFP advocates that the industry apply its considerable resources toward 

establishing renewable sources of energy. (SLOMFP-13-4) 

Response: Uranium is an element found in soils and rocks around the world. Its availability is 

more of an economic consideration for the licensees than is physical availability. The NRC does 

not consider the economic factors affecting the licensees in making its licensing decisions 

regarding license renewal. No changes were made to the GEIS in response to this comment.

Comment: Someone needs to point out that we are failing. We're failing on many levels. Let 

me give you your report card to the nuclear industry, the NRC, and nuclear technology, in 

general. 

Stewardship of the land. Building a nuclear power plant that is not sustainable is outright 

ludicrous. We are, in essence, benefiting from this power, here, in 2009, and leaving it up to 

umpteen future generations to maintain our waste until the year 5009, 10009, 12,009. This is 

unprecedented in the history of mankind, and I do not think we have the right to steal from future 

generations and expect them to maintain our hazardous wastes. (PBCA-Biesek-44) 

Response: The NRC is committed to ensuring that both spent nuclear fuel and low-level 

radioactive wastes are managed to prevent health impacts to the public. Spent nuclear fuel is 

currently stored at reactor sites in the spent fuel pools and/or in independent spent fuel storage 

installations (ISFSIs). This practice is expected to continue until DOE is ready to take 

possession of the spent nuclear fuel. At this time, it is uncertain when this will happen. 

Interim storage needs vary among plants, with older units having less available pool storage 

capacity than newer ones. However, given the uncertainty as to when a geologic repository will 

open and lack of other options, it is likely that some sort of expanded spent fuel storage capacity 

beyond the original design capacity will be needed at all nuclear power plants. The impacts 

associated with onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel during the license renewal term are 

discussed in Section 4.11.1.2 of the GEIS. 

No change was made to the GEIS in response to this comment.

Comment: The same goes for low level waste [see identifier NMA-PW-8 for the related 

comment]. Why should that be a category two issue? Because, number one, not every reactor 

site is in a state that's a member of a compact. Massachusetts is not a member of a compact. 
Appendix A 

 A-165 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

There is no room at the inn in Barnwell for us, so we will be storing that on a receding coastline 

overlooking Cape Cod Bay, number one. 

Number two, as pointed out by R.J. Machagianni's group, the Institute of Environment and 

Energy Research, that low level waste, there is nothing low about it. It is categorized low simply 

because of where it comes from, not because of the toxicity or the longevity of the waste, and 

so each reactor site has a unique geographic location, if you will, which could make it more or 

less susceptible to environmental concerns. There would be a different amount of waste that 

would be required to be on site and to then blow it off as well we have rules that determine 

whether it is safely stored or not then gets you down to another layer up to these rules that don't 

even make any sense anyway. 

There should be an opportunity to adjudicate these issues, which you have not allowed, again, 

based upon new and significant information. (NMA-PW-9) 

Comment: Solid Waste Management: The impacts on low-level waste (LLW) storage and 

disposal are expected to be small at all nuclear plants. The comprehensive regulatory controls 

that are in place and the low public doses being achieved at reactors ensure that the 

radiological impacts on the environment would remain small during the term of a renewed 

license. This is a category 1 issue. 1 July 2009 S-17 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

With the closure of the Barnwell LLW facility in South Carolina and the availability of other low 

level waste disposal limited to those reactors already in contractual compacts, the volume of 

LLW accumulating and stored at reactor sites could grow beyond the anticipated design 

strategies. Regardless of whether the NRC or the nuclear utilities had hoped for or wished for 

more LLW storage facilities to be available at this time on a national level, they have failed to 

materialize, and the communities in which this waste will be stored may find the quantities 

growing beyond the initial plan. Therefore, these should be moved to Category 2 site specific 

issues. (A4NR-11-36) 

Comment: The impact of on site storage of "low level radioactive waste" such as septic sludge, 

radioactive sand and soils, and other contaminants must be evaluated and open to public 

comment. (Shaw-15-3) 

Comment: Inadequate Assessment of Nuclear Waste Storage Impacts - Low-Level Waste 

Storage and Disposal: The Revised GElS recognizes that the Barnwell disposal facility in South 

Carolina has stopped accepting waste from States that are not part of the Atlantic compact as of 

July 2008.96 The Revised GElS further acknowledges the difficulty this poses to the 36 States 

who now have limited options for disposal of low-level waste. And yet, the NRC proposes to 

once again generically dispose of this as Category 1 issue. However, in light of the closure of 

the aforementioned disposal facility, it should be incumbent on licensees to perform a site-
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-166 

specific assessment of the environmental impacts of the accumulating volumes of low-level 

waste, which may now have to remain onsite on a long-term basis. Accordingly this should be 

re-categorized as a Category 2 issue. 

[

96 Revised GElS at 4-165.] (Riverkeeper-20-16) 

Comment: I object to the dismissal in the documents of the impacts from "low-level" 

radioactive waste. The documents must admit that so-called "low-level" waste sometimes has 

as hot and long-lived waste as "high-level" waste because if high-level waste is spilled, it is my 

recollection that it and the materials involved with cleanup are then declared "low-level" 

radioactive waste. (Campbell-31-9) 

Comment: So-called "low-level" waste, such as the old steam generators, and the old pumps, 

pipes, valves, etc., which are being swapped out at the same time as the steam generator 

replacement project is going on, will be irradiating people, and will get into our children's braces 

eventually. 

No reactor should ever be restarted. Period. Shut them ALL down and dismantle / 

decommission them. All other choices are folly. (Hoffman-30-3) 

Comment: SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT [S-17]: NRC incorrectly assigns "small impact" 

and a Category 1 designation to solid waste management, low level waste storage and disposal 

and onsite storage of spent fuel. 

Low-Level Waste Storage & Disposal: NRC assigns a "small impact" and a Category 1 

designation to Low-Level Waste Storage and disposal, Table 2.1-1. We disagree. (a) There is 

nothing low about so-called "low-level waste." Radioactive waste is characterized according to 

where it comes from, not according to its toxicity and longevity; therefore it can indeed impact 

public health and safety. Low dose concentration does not equate with low dose exposure; 

especially if the material is ingested or inhaled.6

 (b) Sites vary on whether or not the state in 

which the site is located has access to an off-site storage facility; site specific geography and 

acreage; and potential impact of climate change (increased frequency and severity of storms 

and eroding coast lines) and terrorism. All of the foregoing factors are site specific and new and 

significant information. Petitioners should be allowed to bring these forward as Category 2 

issues. 

[

6

 High-Level Dollars Low-Level Sense, A Critique Of Present Policy For The Management Of Long-Lived Radioactive 

Waste And Discussion Of An Alternative Approach, Arjun Makhijani, Scott Saleska, A Report of the Institute for 

Energy and Environmental Research, 1992.] (PW-6-7) 

Response: Representative quantities of low-level waste (LLW) generated at the licensed 

reactor facilities and a general description of management practices for LLW are discussed in 
Appendix A 

 A-167 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Section 3.11.1.1 of the GEIS. Low-level radioactive waste includes items that have become 

contaminated with radioactive material or have become radioactive through exposure to neutron 

radiation. This waste is typically contaminated protective shoe covers and clothing, wiping rags, 

mops, filters, reactor water treatment residues, equipment and tools, and laboratory glassware. 

The more radioactive wastes are typically found in the water treatment residues, piping that 

contained reactor coolant, and small gauges containing radioactive material. The NRC’s waste 

classification system for low-level radioactive waste is based on the waste’s potential hazards, 

and has specified disposal and waste form requirements for each of the general classes of 

waste: Class A, Class B, and Class C waste. Although the classification of waste can be 

complex, Class A waste generally contains lower concentrations of long half-lived radioactive 

material than Class B and C wastes.

The impacts associated with LLW storage and disposal are discussed in Section 4.11.1.1. It is 

stated that the operators of nuclear plants are able to ship their Class A LLW to one of the 

currently operating LLW disposal facilities. The two operating LLW disposal facilities that can 

accept Class B and C LLW; in Barnwell, South Carolina, and Richland, Washington, are not 

accepting waste from States that are not in their low-level radioactive waste compact. 

Therefore, some of the reactors currently do not have an available disposal facility for their 

Class B and C LLW. However, Waste Control Specialists LLC (WCS), which has been licensed 

by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), is considering whether it should 

open its facility to some or all of waste generators in States outside of its Compact for disposal 

of their Class A, B, and C wastes. In addition, the industry is investigating alternate disposal 

pathways for Class B and C LLW to include (1) compaction and storage at offsite vendor 

locations until disposal is secured, and (2) blending of waste types in order to reduce its 

classification to Class A waste with subsequent disposal at available disposal sites. 

The NRC anticipates that licensees that do not currently have a disposal pathway would 

temporarily store Class B and C LLW onsite until offsite storage locations are available. Several 

operating nuclear power plants have successfully increased onsite storage capacity in the past 

in accordance with existing NRC regulations. This extended waste storage onsite resulted in no 

significant increase in dose to workers or the public. In addition, the NRC issued information for 

extended onsite interim storage of LLW in two Regulatory Issue Summaries 2008-12 and 2008-

32 (NRC 2008a,b). Examples of considerations included storing waste in a manner that 

minimizes potential exposure to workers which may require adding shielding and storing waste 

in packaging compatible with the waste composition (e.g., chemical and thermal properties). 

The NRC concludes that the radiological impacts from LLW storage would be SMALL and fall 

within current regulatory requirements. There should be no significant issues or environmental 

impacts associated with interim storage of LLW generated by nuclear power plants. Interim 

storage facilities would be used until these wastes could be safely shipped to licensed disposal 

facilities. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-168 

As a Category 1 issue, an applicant for license renewal does not have to evaluate the potential 

impacts from the storage of LLW except if it identifies new and significant information that would 

result in impacts beyond those discussed in the GEIS. Therefore, unless the applicant’s 

assessment finds new and significant information related to LLW, no site-specific radiological 

assessment is required to be submitted by the applicant in its Environmental Report. However, 

as part of the license renewal process, the staff will perform an independent evaluation of all 

Category 1 issues to look for new and significant information that would require a more detailed 

evaluation of a particular issue. Regardless of whether or not new and significant information is 

found, the staff will include a discussion of the issues in the SEIS. 

No changes were made to the GEIS in response to this comment. 

Comment: I do represent CREED, but I also represent my neighbors and myself and we live 

along the beach just south of the pier in San Clemente. So, a lot of our concerns are just 

nervous concerns all the time. 

They said I could probably have one question. So, my neighbors asked me, they couldn't come 

tonight, if we could find out about the spent fuel pool at San Onofre and how they're doing it in 

any of the nuclear plants that are in the planning that we're checking on. Because we 

understand from our research that this is a very dangerous part with terrorism and I know I'm 

reaching a subject that's bad, but it's one that's always in our mind. So, if there's someone here 

who's knowledgeable and could tell us. For instance, is the pool at San Onofre covered and 

how secure is it? Could something come in and cause it to be our explosion instead of the 

actual plant? And that's the extent of my question. (DPCA-CREED1-6) 

Comment: And so, because they can't, they haven't been able to, I shouldn't say can't, we 

never say can't, they feel that -- it isn't a feeling. It's a conviction and it was expressed to me 

tonight by one of the gentlemen here that they are convinced that the Federal Government will 

find a way to take care of the waste. 

And it's not just repository. Several people said repository. Our state law says disposal. 

Proven disposal and you all know the difference between what we have now repository on our 

beach or disposal which is something that we don't have to think about anymore. It's finished. 

(DPCA-CREED4-46) 

Comment: Congress charges the NRC with protecting public safety, not with ensuring industry 

profits. Therefore, no license renewal should be approved by the NRC until and unless a plan is 

implemented to safely and permanently store fuel-related radioactive waste, plus the additional 

waste which would be generated during extended licensing periods. 
Appendix A 

 A-169 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Aging reactors with collocated high-level, above-ground radioactive waste facilities, within two 

and a half miles from two major active faults, should be a clear indication that license renewal 

recommendations should be to deny an additional 20 years, and certainly seismic should come 

up to stage two, or Category 2 concern [see identifier PBCA-Cochran-7 for the comment on 

seismic]. (PBCA-Cochran-6) 

Comment: I also am concerned about the storage of waste. We hear about the seismic 

activity that the generating plant can withstand, but how about the storage areas? Are they 

vulnerable? I mean how much can they take? I know in the last year we had a couple of minor 

4.0s off of our coast between here and San Clemente Island, but I'd like to know more about 

that. (DPCA-Exelby-29) 

Comment: Someone needs to point out that we are failing. We're failing on many levels. Let 

me give you your report card to the nuclear industry, the NRC, and nuclear technology, in 

general. 

Long-term storage plan. F. In 1977, we were promised, in writing, that the radioactive nuclear 

waste would be restored in a repository, a safe site outside of California, to be provided by the 

U.S. Government, and that Diablo was only going to temporarily hold these wastes. 

This idea, alone, negates any license possibility for Diablo, in my humble opinion. Fool me 

once, shame on me. Fool me twice, ask George Bush. (PBCA-Biesek-42) 

Comment: Well, we still do not have a way of disposing of the waste and San Onofre's Units 1 

and or excuse me, Units 2 and 3 initially were licensed to 2013 and 2014 and so, if it's not a 

violation of the spirit -- I'd say the letter of the law, it certainly is a violation of the spirit of the law 

in that now these reactors are going to be operating past that time to at least 2022 and certainly 

Edison is concerning on further into the future. (DPCA-Pack-45) 

Comment: My main problem, and what I want to address in my comment, is that you have 

made on-site storage of spent nuclear fuel in a small impact Category 1, category, you know, 

and the way I read it, you explain it, saying the expected increase in the volume of spent fuel 

from an additional 20 years of operation can be safely accommodated on site with small 

environmental effects through dry or pool storage at all plants. 

If a permanent repository, or mountaintop retrievable storage is not available, well, so far we 

always heard Yucca Mountain was the goal for PG&E. That looks less and less, the chance 

that we'll get it there. 

Now I cannot see how this is a generic issue. I mean, the NRC's argument for generic is a 

simple one. First, as stated, it can be safely accommodated, and because it's safe you can 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-170 

make it a generic issue. That doesn't make that much sense to me. If the NRC predetermines 

that prolonged outside storage is safe at all plants, then there's almost no point to take public 

input on it. 

By allowing the utilities to fill the pools way beyond the original licensed capacity, the NRC has 

allowed a doubling of possibilities for nuclear catastrophe. A meltdown, as we always had to 

worry about, but now also about a pool fire. Actually, the possibility of a pool fire has been not 

recognized by the NRC until the year of 2000. (PBCA-Schumann-8) 

Comment: Onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel 

Small impact (Category 1). 

The expected increase in the volume of spent fuel from an additional 20 years of operation can 

be safely accommodated onsite with small environmental effects through dry or pool storage at 

all plants, if a permanent repository or monitored retrievable storage is not available. 

I cannot see how this could be a "Generic Issue". The NRC's argument for "generic" is circular. 

The issue is: what is safe at what plant. If the NRC predetermines that prolonged on-site 

storage is safe at all plants, then there is no point to take public input. By allowing the utilities to 

fill the pools way beyond the original licensed capacity, the NRC has allowed a doubling of 

possibilities for nuclear catastrophe, i.e. a meltdown and a pool fire. [NOTE: Until the year 

2000, the NRC did not even officially recognize the possibility of such spent fuel pool fire]. 

1. Safe accommodation. 

At SONGS and Diablo, the earthquake and tsunami dangers are completely different from any 

other plant. The same is true for terrorist aspects for any plant, because of location and/or 

design [see Finding 3D National Academy of Sciences Report (NAS)on terrorism aspects for 

Spent Fuel Pools, 2005. Quote: "The potential vulnerabilities of spent fuel pools to terrorist 

attacks are plant-design specific. Therefore, specific vulnerabilities can only be understood by 

examining the characteristics of spent fuel storage at each plant". 

Furthermore, another 20 years of exposure to intense radiation and heat will likely cause further 

"embrittlement" of components, such as pool racking and/or fuel cladding. The g-forces 

generated in earthquakes depend largely on the strength of the quake and the, distance from 

the epicenter. This aspect alone could require very different mitigation measures at different 

plants. For instance, the dry casks at Diablo are bolted to the storage pads but not, to my 

knowledge, at any other plant. Accordingly, the "safe accommodation" of spent fuel storage onsite depends on different mitigation measures at each site and must therefore be evaluated in a 

site-specific EIS. 
Appendix A 

 A-171 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

2. Small environmental impact. 

A pool fire or breach of a dry cask are not "small environmental impacts". In fact, some of the 

NRC's own studies identify a pool fire as potentially having "comparable consequences" to a 

reactor meltdown. The NAS report finds, that a pool fire is possible and that such a fire could 

result in releasing large amounts of radiation to the environment, hardly a small impact. 

Moreover, the NAS report suggests a host of possible mitigation measures, depending on "site 

by site" evaluations. Such measures could include lower pool density, reconfiguration of SFA's 

in the pool racking, additional sprinkler systems etc., all depending on different conditions at 

each plant (NAS Report Finding 3D, page 6). Even more important, conditions may change. 

Another fault was just recently discovered near Diablo, terrorists might get access to new, more 

destructive weapons, etc. (Anon2-23-1) 

Comment: Even more important, condition may also change, as we just experienced here at 

Diablo. Another fault was just recently discovered here. You know, terrorists might get access 

to more destructive weapons, and so on. 

So I would really urge you to make this issue of on-site spent fuel storage for prolonged periods 

of time, take it out of the Category 1 issues and make it a site-specific one. Thank you very 

much. (PBCA-Schumann-12) 

Comment: The other thing that the NRC has come forward saying, many times, and I 

personally have problems with, is when I spoke with NRC representatives, when I was a 

supervisor, regarding the casks, I said, Is this the best cask that's available? 

I knew if I said, Is this the safest that we could make? somebody would say, hey, we can't ever 

afford the safest we can make. So I'm "politically real" in that. Is this the best cask that's 

available? And the answer was no; it's adequate. I don't think from a national security 

standpoint, we can say adequate is okay anymore. 

We need to make sure that we are protecting people in the best available manner. 

(PBCA-Pinard-18) 

Comment: I'm here as a citizen of Morro Bay, and as a citizen of the county. I came here in 

1979, and I marched on Avila to try to stop it from being opened, and some of my concerns then 

-- I was kind of naive --was nuclear waste. I was told, then, that there would be no nuclear 

waste stored in our country. That was a huge guarantee back then. 

A lot of people went along with it because they were going to have a solution to this. Now in this 

Environmental Impact Statement here, you're not really taking that into consideration again. I 

mean, we don't have a place to put this stuff. (PBCA-Nelson-25) 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-172 

Comment: We know there is something wrong, fundamentally wrong with this process, so what 

should be on the table? [See identifier NMA-PW-7 for the commenter’s introduction to this 

comment.] Well let's start out with solid waste management. It is clear that there are site 

specific issues going on, irrespective of this foolishness of the nuclear waste confidence job that 

was done on this. We have the National Academy of Sciences that pointed out the difference 

between the GE Mark 1 and Mark 2, such as the Pilgrim and the Oyster Creek and Vermont. 

There were, what, 32 of them where it's all stored in a densely packed pool in the attic of the 

reactor. 

That's a very different situation than, let's say, for Seabrook or some of the Indian Points where 

it's adjacent, not that that's a beautiful situation either, but the spent fuel pool is not in the attic of 

the main reactor building outside primary containment, it's in an adjacent building. But again, 

the mountains of information to say that, oh, everything will be stored on site, there's another 

rule coming up for even longer for these casks than previously believed. This obviously needs a 

site specific review because each site is different for its capability to handle being a dump site, 

which is what nobody in these communities expected it to be, and each reactor sites has a 

different capability to store and how much is being stored, whether it's densely packed or not. 

Again, a mountain of independent research that is totally disregarded by the NRC, so how can 

there be any respect? (NMA-PW-8) 

Comment: I would say for the nuclear waste, confidence, which we call a confidence job, 

update, it's the same thing, that it's a cherry picking here and there, the ignoring of the 

mountains of expert witness testimony provided by the California Attorney General, 

Massachusetts Attorney General, New York Attorney General, and so what does this mean? 

What it means is that we have to, I don't know, how many cookies can I bake, you know, to pay 

for this? Or our states that are strapped, they have to go to federal circuit court to find any 

relief. (NMA-PW-6) 

Comment: Spent Nuclear Fuel And Yucca Mountain National Waste Repository: As noted 

above, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, as amended in 1987, designated Yucca Mountain, 

Nevada as the nation's nuclear waste repository. Over the last 20 years approximately 

$14 billion has been spent to study and develop the site by the Department of Energy ("DOE"). 

DOE submitted an application to the NRC for a license to operate the repository. Secretary of 

Energy Dr. Steven Chu has publicly stated that "Yucca Mountain as a repository is off the table. 

.... The NRC is saying that the dry cask storage at current sites would be safe for many 

decades, so that gives us lime to figure out what we should do for a long-term strategy.”3

 On 

July 30, 2009, Senator Harry Reid announced that DOE and the federal administration will 

terminate all funding related to license review in the 2011 budget and that the only future 

funding will be that necessary to conclude the project.4 
Appendix A 

 A-173 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

[

3

 Technology Review, May 14,2009, http://www.technologyreview.com/business/22651/?nlid=2027] 

[

4

 Reid Announces Yucca Mountain License Application Funds To Be Eliminated in Budget, July 30, 2009, 

http://reid.senate.gov/newsroom/073009 yucca.cfm

Yucca Mountain has no reasonable chance of opening in the foreseeable future and most likely 

will never open. Even if it ever did open, it would probably already be too small for all of the 

waste it was to accommodate. Department of Energy ("DOE") facilities have accumulated 

approximately 13,000 tons of waste, and civilian power reactors have generated an additional 

58,000 tons. The Report to the President and the Congress by the Secretary of Energy on the 

Need for a Second Repository, December 2008, p.5. As civilian reactors add about 2,000 tons 

annually, current estimates are that by the time the last existing reactor finishes its period of 

licensed operation, total waste generated by the current fleet of reactors will total between 

109,300 and 130,000 tons, depending on how many reactors are granted license extensions. 

Id. Yucca Mountain, even if it opened tomorrow, is statutorily limited to hold only 77,000 tons of 

waste. See National Waste Policy Act of 1982, Public Law 97-425, 42 U.S.C. 10101 et seq., 

§ 114(d). In fact, the head of DOE's civilian nuclear waste program told Congress that by 2010 

− this year − the amount of waste produced by the country's 104 nuclear power plants plus 

defense waste will already exceed the total allowable storage capacity for Yucca Mountain. See 

The Report to the President and the Congress by the Secretary of Energy on the Need for a 

Second Repository, December 2008, p. 2. (CT AG-10-2) 

Comment: Of the issues identified in the DGEIS as "small", DOS recommends that the 

following should be elevated to the moderate or large category and be required to be addressed 

in detail in a site-specific SEIS. 

Onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel: Onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel was not considered 

during the original licensing of many nuclear facilities. Continued operation of a nuclear facility 

may exhaust space available for onsite storage and increase environmental risk attributable to 

onsite spent fuel storage. As such, onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel should be considered in 

a SEIS. (NY DOS-18-8) 

Comment: Spent Fuel: According to the revised GEIS, spent fuel remains a Category 1 issue 

and will not be evaluated in the SEIS. The revised GEIS cites the current Waste Confidence 

Rule and the Yucca Mountain License Application as evidence that waste can safely be stored 

onsite and that a repository will be available someday. 

As we mentioned in our introductory comments, the PINGP has a site-specific ISFSI, which will 

eventually store 98 dry casks indefinitely. Based on recent events, we have no assurance that 

the spent fuel from the PINGP will ever move beyond the borders of the ISFSI. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-174 

In the last year we heard prominent politicians declare that Yucca Mountain was dead. The fact 

that funding for the Yucca Mountain project has all but ceased supports this position. Revisions 

to the Waste Confidence rule seem to be stalled due to the uncertainty of the National 

Repository at Yucca Mountain. 

The section on spent fuel in the revised GEIS must be revised to reflect the current reality: that 

there will be no mined-geologic repository anytime soon and spent fuel will remain on-site 

indefinitely. Given that the current Administration seems to be starting the process anew, it is 

uncertain how long it will take to identify a new pathway forward. It is certain that new "solution" 

is sure to have political and societal objections that will take years to address and spent nuclear 

fuel will be stranded on-site indefinitely. (PIIC-8-11) 

Comment: Waste Management and Pollution Prevention Discussion is Inadequate: In Section 

4.11, waste management is improperly labeled a Category 1 issue; SLOMFP insists that it is a 

large impact site-specific Category 2 issue. 

Like all U.S. nuclear power plants, the Diablo Canyon facility includes the storage of all the highlevel radioactive wastes generated by its reactors since it began operation. Currently, most of 

the spent fuel is stored in over-crowded pools. A small portion has been transferred to a few of 

the dry casks. To add another 20 years' worth of high level wastes at a seismically active site 

would significantly add to the safety and security problems at Diablo. 

Furthermore, the Draft GElS continues to promote the myth that Yucca Mountain will be 

available to accept high level waste from nuclear facilities. (4-166, lines 4-10) 4-167 in the GElS 

provides a litany of totally unjustified "reasonable assurance" that spent fuel can be safely 

stored on-site until the DOE provides a long-term waste storage facility. These assurances 

amount to wishful thinking and nothing more. Optimistic assumptions are not an acceptable 

basis for allowing the continued generation of high-level wastes that will need to be stored in 

isolation from the biosphere for many thousands of years. No known human civilization has 

remained intact for even a fraction of the length of time radioactive wastes will remain toxic. A 

more realistic assumption is that there is no way to assure adequate safeguarding of nuclear 

wastes. (SLOMFP-13-12) 

Comment: Inadequate Assessment of Nuclear Waste Storage Impacts—Onsite Storage of 

Spent Nuclear Fuel: The Revised GElS continues to hide behind the generic determination of 

no significant environmental impact in 10 C.F.R. § 51.23(b), stemming from the NRC's Waste 

Confidence Decision, to avoid requiring site-specific review of onsite nuclear waste storage 

impacts.97 This is highly problematic for numerous reasons. 

[97 See id. at 1-9 to 1-10, 4-165 to 4-168.] 
Appendix A 

 A-175 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

To begin with, a pending proposal, which the Revised GElS acknowledges, to update the NRC's 

Waste Confidence Decision, if finalized, would extend the finding of no significant impact an 

additional 30 years.98 A concomitant proposed rule change, would omit any reference to how 

long spent fuel can safely be stored in "temporary" on- or off-site facilities, arid simply state that 

such waste can be so temporarily stored without significant impact "until a disposal facility can 

reasonably be expected to be available.”99 Given the status of the Yucca Mountain proposal 

and lack of a clear long-term disposal solution, it is reasonably foreseeable that spent nuclear 

fuel and high level waste will have to remain onsite indefinitely. If the proposed rule changes 

are implemented, the NRC's generic finding of no significant impact would essentially be 

extended to some indefinable point in the future. Foregoing any analysis of impacts of decades 

and decades of spent nuclear waste storage because of the NRC's "waste confidence" is, thus, 

improper. 

[

98 Waste Confidence Decision Update, 73 Fed. Reg 59,551, 59551,59563-59569 (Oct. 9, 2008) ("WCD Update").] 

[

99 Proposed Rule on the Consideration of Environmental Impacts of Temporary Storage of Spent Fuel After 

Cessation of Reactor Operation, 73 Fed. Reg. 59547,59551 (Oct. 9, 2008).] 

The NRC's reasonable assurance of safe interim storage, first instituted over a quarter of a 

century ago and never supported by an environmental assessment or environmental impact 

statement under NEPA,100 simply does not hold up given current knowledge and circumstances. 

Most blatantly, the NRC's generic assurance of benign spent fuel pool storage is completely 

undermined by the evidence of leaks at reactors across the United States.101 For example, at 

Indian Point, the Unit 1 pool began leaking as early as the 1990s, and the leaks from Unit 2 

were discovered in 2005.102 With spent fuel pool degradation already at nuclear plants, it is 

patently absurd to rely on the generic no impact finding to project the long-term integrity of the 

pools for decades into the future. Given this circumstance, a generic finding about the impacts 

of pool storage is simply not appropriate, and a site-specific review should be performed at the 

license renewal juncture. 

[

100 Final Waste Confidence Decision, 49 Fed. Reg. 34658 ("[T]he Commission finds that NEPA does not require an 

EIS to support the [temporary storage] finding"); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (explaining that environmental 

assessments under NEPA should provide sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether to prepare an EIS 

or a FONSI).] 

[

101 See Liquid Radioactive Release Lessons Learned Task Force Final Report, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, at 5-6 (September 1, 2006) (hereinafter "Radioactive Release Task Force Report").] 

[

102 See Entergy's Environmental Report, at 5-4; Groundwater Investigation Executive Summary (Indian Point Energy 

Center, Buchanan, N.Y., Jan. 2008), available at 

http://jic.semo.state.ny.us/Resources/ExecutiveSummary%20GW%20final.pdf; see also Riverkeeper’s Exhibit A.] 

The NRC's Waste Confidence Decision also fosters unbridled assurance in the safety of dry 

cask storage, yet this is also questionable. It is far from clear what environmental impacts will 

result f dry casks remain loaded with spent fuel beyond their design life.103 In light of the fact 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-176 

that these casks will remain on the banks of the Hudson River indefinitely into the future, the 

NRC Staff must perform a site specific assessment of impacts of such long-term storage. 

[

103 See Riverkeeper's Scoping Comments at 9-10.] 

The NRC's generic finding of no significant impact also flies in the face of new information about 

the risks of accidents at on-site nuclear waste storage facilities. Numerous reports and studies 

show that fuel storage pools are potentially susceptible to fire and radiological release from 

natural phenomena.104 As discussed above, the environmental impacts of a fire in a spent fuel 

pool may be severe, extending over a geographic area larger than a state's legal boundaries 

and continuing for decades.105

[

104 See, e.g., NUREG-1738, Final Technical Study of 1 Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk and Decommissioning 

Nuclear Power Plants (NRC: January 2001); National Academy of Sciences Committee on the Safety and Security of 

Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage, Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage (The 

National Academies Press: 2006); Gordon Thompson, Risks and Risk-Reducing Options Associated with Pool 

Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel at the Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plants (May 25, 2006); Jan Beyea, 

Report to the Massachusetts Attorney General on the Potential Consequences of a Spent-fuel Pool Fire at the Pilgrim 

or Vermont Yankee Nuclear Plant (May 25, 2006).] 

[

105 See generally, Thompson Report.] 

Despite such ominous potential consequences, the Revised GElS would continue to completely 

ignore the vulnerability of stored spent fuel to natural phenomenon, such as earthquakes. For 

example, recent new information from seismologists at Columbia University's Lamont-Doherty 

Earth Observatory, who published a study in August 2008 on earthquakes in the greater New 

York City Area, indicates that Indian Point sits on a previously unidentified intersection of two 

active seismic zones.106 Indeed, several recent earthquakes in New Jersey right near the 

Ramapo fault, which runs directly underneath Indian Point, starkly demonstrate the active 

nature of the seismic areas around the facility.107 The Columbia study further found that historic 

activity of earthquakes of a magnitude more than 5 has been higher in southeastern New York 

than in many other areas of the central and eastern United States, and that the fault lengths and 

stresses suggest magnitude 6 or 7 quakes (which would be 10 and 100 times bigger than 

magnitude 5, respectively) are “quite possible.”108

[

106 See Lynn R. Sykes, John G. Armbruster, Won-Young Kim, & Leonardo Seeber, Observations and Tectonic 

Setting of Historic and Instrumentally Located Earthquakes in the Greater New York City-Philadelphia Area, Bulletin 

of the Seismological' Society of America, Vol. 98, No.4, pp. 1696-1719 (August 2008) ("2008 Columbia Earthquake 

Study").] 

[

107 See, e.g., Lawrence Ragonese, Morris County Shows Signs of Stress: Four Quakes, The Star-Ledger (Feb. 18, 

2009), available at, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/02/morris_county_shows_sign_of_st.html.] 

[

108 2008 Columbia Study; see also Robert Roy Britt, Large Earthquakes Could Strike New York City (Aug. 21, 2008),

available at http://www.livescience.com/environment/080821-new-york-earthguakes.html.] 

Yet, due to the categorical exclusion of nuclear waste storage impacts, the Revised GElS would 

not require consideration of such information. This is notwithstanding the new issue in the 
Appendix A 

 A-177 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Revised GElS related to new seismological information,109 which would ostensibly not extend to 

impacts to nuclear waste in light of NRC's reliance on the Waste Confidence Rule. There is no 

certainty whatsoever that the dry casks or spent fuel pools at plants like Indian Point are 

designed so as to be able to withstand such natural occurrences in light of the new seismic 

information. The existence of such new information highlights why a generic determination of 

environmental safety for long-term on-site storage of spent fuel is totally inappropriate. 

[

109 See Revised GElS at 3-49 to 3-50.] 

The NRC Staff also relies upon the NRC's generic safety determination to further justify its 

refusal to consider the risks to spent fuel storage from intentional acts of sabotage.110 However, 

the likelihood and seriousness of such risks necessitates a thorough review of the impacts of 

long-term storage of spent fuel at Indian Point. As discussed above, future terrorist attacks at 

Indian Point remain reasonably foreseeable, and such risks must be fully assessed in the 

licensing proceeding. 

[

110 See Waste Confidence Decision Update, 73 Fed. Reg. 59551.] 

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the NRC's generic determination cannot form the basis 

for continued exclusion of this issue in all future license renewal proceedings. Based on the 

changed landscape, NRC must make this a Category 2 issue and require site-specific analysis 

of the impacts of long-term on-site storage. (Riverkeeper-20-17) 

Comment: Inadequate Assessment of Nuclear Waste Storage Impacts—Offsite Radiological 

Impacts of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Waste Disposal: The Revised GElS continues to 

review the offsite radiological impacts from spent nuclear fuel and high level waste disposal in 

relation to the use of Yucca Mountain as the future long-term geologic repository. This flies in 

the face of recent indications that Yucca is no longer a viable option. Indeed, there is no dispute 

that the current Administration has brought the axe down on the Yucca project. Most recent 

accounts indicate that the U.S. Department of Energy intends to stop pursuing a license for the 

Yucca repository by this December.111 Even the NRC Commissioner's have acknowledged the 

current plan to eliminate the Yucca Mountain Project.112

[

111 See, e.g., Keith Rogers, Yucca Mountain: Memo casts doubt on license for Yucca repository, LAS VEGAS 

REVIEW-JOURNAL (Nov. 10, 2009), http://www.lyrj.com/news/memo-casts-doubt-on-Iicense-for-yucca-repository69639342.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2009).] 

[

112 See Notation Vote of Commissioner Klein, SECY-09-0090 − Final Update of the Commission's Waste Confidence 

Decision (September 16,2009), available at, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/commission/cvr/2009/2009-0090vtr-dek.pdf; Notation Vote of Commissioner Svinicki, SECY -09-0090 −

Final Update of the Commission's Waste Confidence Decision (September 24, 2009), available at, http://www 

.nrc.govIreading-rm/doc-coIIections/commission/cvr/2 009/2009-0090vtr-kIs.pdf ("Svinicki Vote on WCD").] 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-178 

It is, thus, curious, that a document that will serve as a generic environmental impact statement 

for decades to come would continue to rely upon this eventuality. Indeed, the Revised GElS 

explicitly relies upon dose limits from documents filed in connection with the Department of 

Energy's Yucca Application.113 In addition to misguidedly relying upon a pending application, 

such information was developed specifically in relation to Yucca, and is therefore essentially 

unusable in light of the aforementioned circumstances. 

Given the uncertainly of long-term disposal of nuclear waste, and the likelihood of essentially 

indefinite on-site storage, it makes far more sense to perform a site specific review to discern 

the offsite impacts of this waste at particular plants. While the NRC will undoubtedly claim that 

they are relying in good faith on the Department of Energy's pending application which has not 

been withdrawn yet, the NRC must not "shut...[their] ears to the din of current debate" as 

Commissioner Svinicki has articulated.114

[

113 See Proposed Rule at 38127.] 

[

114 Svinicki Vote on WCD at 3.] (Riverkeeper-20-18) 

 

Comment: 2. Solid Waste Management [S-17]: NRC incorrectly assigns "small impact" and a 

Category 1 designation to solid waste management, low level waste storage and disposal and 

onsite storage of spent fuel. 

b. Onsite Storage of Spent Fuel: NRC assigns a "small impact" and a Category 1 designation 

to onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel, Table 2.1-1. 

(1) Impact Potentially Large Under Severe Accident Situations: The Draft incorrectly 

determined that the impact was small. There would be nothing small about the potential impact 

on the environment from a spent fuel pool fire in a densely packed spent fuel pool. 

NRC's Waste Confidence Rule: The Draft justifies determining "small impact" by reference to 

NRC's Updated Waste Confidence Rule. However NRC's rule is based upon documents that 

the public cannot see because of "safeguards." This places the public in an Alice in 

Wonderland situation. It contradicts Chairman Jaczko's September 24, 2009 warning that NRC 

"is strengthened by public involvement and input, and by (NRC) being open and transparent 

about what we do and why." (PW-6-9) 

Comment: Beyond the complete failure of the Revised GElS to address the issue of increased 

SNF resulting from relicensing, the document is based upon a fundamental error – a continuing 

assumption that there will be a national repository for off-site disposal of spent fuel. As long ago 

as 1979, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in State of 

Minnesota v. NRC, 602 F.2d 412, 413-14 (D.C. Cir. 1979), questioned whether there would be 

offsite storage available for SNF from certain power stations after license termination. 
Appendix A 

 A-179 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Intervenors in that case argued that any expansion of on-site storage could occur only after 

analysis of environmental implications. 

NRC staff believed that NEPA did not require the preparation of an environmental impact 

statement, because any modifications as to where and how SNF would be stored would not 

"significantly affect the quality of the human environment," See Atomic Safety and Licensing 

Appeal Board. ld. at 414-15. The D.C. Circuit found that the Commission's "implicit" policy 

conclusion that a "reasonable assurance that methods of safe permanent disposal of high-level 

wastes can be available when they are needed" was unsupported by the record and remanded 

the issue to the Commission to undertake a record-based rulemaking proceeding to establish a 

supportable policy. Id. at417. The result was the 1984 Waste Confidence Decision which 

established several findings necessary to permit the continued licensing of nuclear power plants 

in the absence of an existing national storage repository. The key findings were that the 

Commission found reasonable assurance that one or more mined geologic repositories for 

commercial SNF will be available by the years 2007-2009, and that sufficient repository capacity 

will be available within 30 years beyond the expiration of any reactor operating license to 

dispose of existing commercial SNF originating in such reactor and generated up to that time. 

The Commission also found reasonable assurance that SNF will be managed in a safe manner 

until sufficient repository capacity is available to assure the safe disposal of all SNF. 49 Fed. 

Reg. 34658 (Aug. 31, 1984). After making these findings, NRC amended its regulations to say 

that the environmental impacts of onsite SNF storage are not properly part of a relicensing 

proceeding. (10 C.F.R. § 51.23(a)). 

Yucca Mountain did not open by 2007. As long ago as 1990, NRC amended the Waste 

Confidence Rule findings to reflect later dates of availability of the national repository. The NRC 

added that it found "reasonable assurance that at least one geologic repository will be available 

within the first quarter of the twenty-first century, and sufficient repository capacity will be 

available within 30 years beyond the licensed life for operation (which may include the term of a 

revised or renewed license)...." 55 Fed. Reg. 38474 (Sept. 18, 1990). NRC also amended the 

Rule to read: "The Commission finds reasonable assurance that, if necessary, spent fuel 

generated in any reactor can be stored safely and without significant environmental impacts for 

at least 30 years beyond the licensed life for operation (which may include the term of a revised 

or renewed license) of that reactor at its spent fuel storage basin, or at either onsite or offsite 

[dry cask storage facilities]." Id. See 55 Fed. Reg. 38472 (Sept. 18, 1990). 

NRC is currently seeking to amend the Rule to give itself more time. NRC claims that it finds 

reasonable assurance to expect that sufficient mined geologic repository capacity can be 

available within 50-60 years beyond the licensed life for operation (which may include the term 

of a revised or renewed license) of any reactor to dispose of the commercial high-level nuclear 

waste and spent fuel originating in such reactor and generated up to that time. 73 Fed. Reg. at 

59551. The Commission also seeks to amend the Rule also to read that "The Commission finds 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-180 

reasonable assurance that, if necessary, spent fuel generated in any reactor can be stored 

safely without significant environmental impacts for at least 60 years beyond the licensed life for 

operation (which may include the term of a revised or renewed license) of that reactor in a 

combination of storage in its spent fuel storage basin and either onsite or offsite independent 

spent fuel storage installations. 73 Fed. Reg. at 59551. 

The NRC has also published a separate alternative proposed rule which would amend 

10 C.F.R. § 51.23(a) to say that if necessary, spent fuel generated in any reactor can be stored 

safely and without significant environmental impacts beyond the licensed life for operation 

(which may include the term of a revised or renewed license) of that reactor at its spent fuel 

storage basin or at either onsite or offsite independent spent fuel storage installations. 73 Fed. 

Reg. 59547 (Oct. 9, 2008). 

Therefore, NRC's position has been for decades that onsite spent fuel storage is a temporary 

situation and that the fuel must be relocated to a safe, secure federal facility. This point is, in 

fact, the basis for NRC's original Waste Confidence Rule which, in turn, is the basis for all of 

NRC's assumptions regarding SNF in the original GElS of 1996 and the current Revised GElS. 

Because the federal government has unequivocally terminated the Yucca Mountain project, 

there is no federal repository under consideration and no plan for an alternative. Spent fuel has 

nowhere to go and will accumulate indefinitely at the 100 plus nuclear power stations around the 

country. The NRC's fundamental SNF premise underlying all assumptions in the Revised GElS 

is now demonstrably false. Consequently, the Revised GElS is flawed from its inception and 

clearly violates NEPA. 

In sum, no national repository is under construction; or even in planning. Thus NRC must 

assume that all SNF will accumulate at existing nuclear power stations and evaluate the 

environmental impacts of 20 years of additional amounting quantities of spent nuclear fuel −

along with all of the existing fuel which is not going to Yucca Mountain or anywhere else − in the 

Revised GElS. (CT AG-10-6) 

Comment: Accumulation of At-Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel: Twenty additional years of plant 

operation would generate additional nuclear wastes of all classes (low, medium and high-level 

wastes), which would result in additional impacts from waste· management, storage, transport 

and disposal. The long-term risk of at-reactor storage and accumulation of spent fuel on 

California's seismically active coastline should be reevaluated during license renewal reviews 

given the uncertainties regarding when a permanent repository or offsite interim storage facility 

will become available. The Obama Administration has ordered most activities to cease relating 

to the licensing of the Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Repository. The uncertainties 

surrounding U.S. nuclear waste disposal policies and the federal high-level waste management 

program means that nuclear reactor operators, including Pacific Gas and Electric Company 

(PG&E) and Southern California Edison (SCE), can no longer count on transferring spent fuel to 
Appendix A 

 A-181 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

a federal nuclear waste repository in the near or medium-term future. As a result, the utilities 

must continue indefinitely to store spent nuclear fuel at the reactor sites. For California, this 

means that about 6,700 assemblies of spent fuel (approximately 2,600 metric tons of uranium) 

that are currently being stored at operating and decommissioned nuclear plants in-state, as well 

as the anticipated generation of spent fuel, will remain at these sites for the foreseeable future. 

The potential economic and environmental impacts from the long-term storage of nuclear 

wastes at reactors, including low, medium, and high-level wastes, should be evaluated as a 

Category 2 issue on a plant-by-plant basis. (CEC-9(1)-3) 

Comment: Regarding global warming – nuclear waste cannot be helpful in solving the 

problem. As citizens of this country – what are we saying to future generations – leaving all this 

waste for them to deal with. We/you the NRC do not know the effects of the radiation 50, 100, 

150...years from. No need to worry about it. Not our problem? Until we have a solution to 

nuclear waste we should not produce it. (Anon1-21-1) 

Response: The NRC is committed to ensuring that both spent nuclear fuel and low-level 

radioactive wastes are managed to prevent health impacts to the public. Spent nuclear fuel is 

currently stored at reactor sites in the spent fuel pools and/or in independent spent fuel storage 

installations (ISFSIs). This practice is expected to continue until DOE is ready to take 

possession of the spent nuclear fuel. At this time, it is uncertain when this will happen. 

Interim storage needs vary among plants, with older units having less available pool storage 

capacity than newer ones. However, given the uncertainty as to when a geologic repository will 

open and the lack of other options, it is likely that some sort of expanded spent fuel storage 

capacity beyond the original design capacity will be needed at all nuclear power plants. 

On March 3, 2010, DOE submitted a motion to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board to 

withdraw its application for a permanent geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. In 

light of the uncertainty surrounding the use of Yucca Mountain, if another repository for spent 

nuclear fuel is proposed, an environmental impact statement would be prepared. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-182 

For spent nuclear fuel, the Waste Confidence Decision and Rule represented the Commission’s 

generic determination that spent nuclear fuel can continue to be stored safely and without 

significant environmental impacts for a period of time after the end of the licensed life for 

operation of a nuclear power plant (after the permanent shutdown of the power reactor and 

expiration of the plant’s operating license). This generic determination, codified in 10 CFR 

51.23(a), meant that the NRC did not need to consider the storage of spent nuclear fuel after 

the end of a reactor’s licensed life for operation in the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 

documents that support its reactor and spent-fuel storage license application reviews. 

On December 23, 2010, the Commission published a revision of the Waste Confidence 

Decision and Rule to reflect information gained based on experience in the storage of spent 

nuclear fuel and the increased uncertainty in the siting and construction of a permanent geologic 

repository for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste. In response to the 2010 

Waste Confidence Decision and Rule, the states of New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, and 

Vermont, and several other parties challenged the Commission’s NEPA analysis in the decision, 

which provided the regulatory basis for the rule. On June 8, 2012, the United States Court of 

Appeals, in New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d 471 (D.C. Cir. 2012), vacated the NRC’s Waste 

Confidence Decision and Rule, after finding that it did not comply with NEPA.

In response to the court’s ruling, the Commission issued CLI-12-16 on August 7, 2012, in which 

the Commission determined that it would not issue licenses that rely upon the Waste 

Confidence Decision and Rule until the issues identified in the court’s decision are appropriately 

addressed by the Commission. CLI-12-16 provided, however, that the decision not to issue 

licenses only applied to final license issuance; all licensing reviews and proceedings should 

continue to move forward. In SRM-COMSECY-12-0016, dated September 6, 2012, the 

Commission directed the NRC staff to proceed with a rulemaking that includes the development 

of a generic EIS to support a revised Waste Confidence Decision and Rule and to publish both 

the EIS and the revised Waste Confidence Decision and Rule in the Federal Register within 

24 months (by September 6, 2014). The Commission indicated that both the EIS and the 

revised Waste Confidence Decision and Rule should build on the information already 

documented in various NRC studies and reports, including the existing environmental 

assessment that the NRC developed as part of the 2010 Waste Confidence Decision and Rule. 

The Commission directed that any additional analyses should focus on the issues identified in 

the D.C. Circuit’s decision. The Commission also directed that the NRC staff provide ample 

opportunity for public comment on both the draft EIS and the proposed Waste Confidence 

Decision and Rule. 

In accordance with CLI-12-16, the NRC will not approve any site-specific license renewal 

applications until the deficiencies identified in the D.C. Circuit’s decision have been resolved. 

Two license renewal issues that rely, wholly or in part, upon the Waste Confidence Decision and 
Appendix A 

 A-183 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Rule are the “onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel” and “offsite radiological impacts of spent 

nuclear fuel and high-level waste disposal.” Both of these issues were classified as Category 1 

in the 1996 GEIS and the 10 CFR Part 51 final rule that was promulgated in 1996 (61 FR 

28467, June 5, 1996), which codified the findings of the 1996 GEIS into 10 CFR Part 51, 

Subpart A, Appendix B, Table B-1. The draft revised GEIS that was published for public 

comment in 2009 (74 FR 38239, July 31, 2009) and the concomitant proposed rule (74 FR 

38117, July 31, 2009) continued the Category 1 classification for both of these issues. As part 

of the NRC’s response to the New York v. NRC decision, the NRC has revised these two issues 

accordingly. 

Specifically, the NRC has revised the Category 1 issue, “Onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel,” 

to narrow the period of onsite storage to the license renewal term. In both the 1996 GEIS and 

rule and the 2009 draft revised GEIS and proposed rule, the NRC relied upon the Waste 

Confidence Decision and Rule to make a generic finding that spent nuclear fuel could be stored 

safely onsite with no more than a small environmental impact for the term of the extended 

license (from approval of the license renewal application to the expiration of the operating 

license) plus a 30 year period following the permanent shutdown of the power reactor and 

expiration of the operating license. 

The Waste Confidence Decision and Rule provided the basis for the 30 year period following 

the permanent shutdown of the reactor and expiration of the operating license. The 2010 Waste 

Confidence Decision and Rule extended this post-reactor shutdown onsite storage period from 

30 years to 60 years. Given the New York v. NRC decision, and pending the issuance of a 

generic EIS and revised Waste Confidence Decision and Rule (as directed by SRM-COMSECY12-0016), the period of onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel following the permanent shutdown of 

the power reactor and expiration of the operating license is now excluded from this GEIS issue. 

This issue now only covers the onsite storage of spent fuel during the license renewal term. 

Similarly, the NRC has revised the Category 1 issue, “Offsite radiological impacts of spent 

nuclear fuel and high-level waste disposal.” This issue pertains to the long-term disposal of 

spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste, including possible disposal in a deep geologic 

repository. Although the Waste Confidence Decision and Rule did not assess the impacts 

associated with disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste in a repository, it did reflect 

the Commission’s confidence, at the time, in the technical feasibility of a repository and when 

that repository could have been expected to become available. Without the analysis in the 

Waste Confidence Decision, the NRC cannot assess how long the spent fuel will need to be 

stored onsite. Therefore, the NRC has reclassified this issue from a Category 1 issue with no 

assigned impact level to an uncategorized issue with an impact level of uncertain. 

Upon issuance of the revised Waste Confidence Decision and Rule and its supporting generic 

EIS, the NRC will make any necessary conforming amendments to its regulations in 10 CFR 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-184 

Part 51 and supplement the GEIS as necessary. As referenced previously, the Commission will 

not approve any license renewal application for an operating nuclear power plant until the 

issues identified in the New York v. NRC court’s decision are appropriately addressed by the 

Commission. 

Comment: 2. Solid Waste Management [S-17]: NRC incorrectly assigns "small impact" and a 

Category 1 designation to solid waste management, low level waste storage and disposal and 

onsite storage of spent fuel. 

b. Onsite Storage of Spent Fuel: NRC assigns a "small impact" and a Category 1 designation 

to onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel, Table 2.1-1. 

(2) On-site storage of spent fuel is a Category 2 issue:

• The NRC has never performed an EIS that addresses the potential for, and impacts of, 

the onset of exothermic oxidation reactions in a spent fuel pool. NUREG 1437 § 6.4.6 

simply states "Inadvertent criticality and acute occupational exposure are remote risks of 

dense-racking (DOEIRW-0220)." Yet, in a report published in October 2000 and issued 

in January 2001, the NRC Staff has conceded that if the water in any densely packed 

spent nuclear fuel pool is lost, even a year and longer after discharge, the fuel will heat 

up to the point where its zircoloy cladding will melt and then catch fire.9

 As stated 

previously, the resulting fire will not be able to be extinguished by water and has the 

potential of significantly contaminating hundreds of miles downwind. Spent Fuel Heatup 

Following Loss of Water During Storage, Allen Benjamin et al. (Sandia National 

Laboratory, NUREG/CR The risk of fire is increased because the spent fuel is densely 

packed NUREG/CR-0649, SAND77-1371, 1979), fig.14. 

[

9

 A technical study of spent fuel accident risk, performed for the NRC by Sandia Lab, clearly stated that a 

catastrophic meltdown in the spent fuel pool of a nuclear power plant could cause fatal, radiation-induced cancer in 

25,000 people as far as 500 miles from the site. NUREG-1738 Technical Study of Spent Fuel Accident Risk at 

Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants (2001).] 

• In 2001, the NRC staff summarized the conclusions of its most recent analysis of the 

potential consequences of a loss-of-coolant accident in a spent fuel pool as follows: 

[I]t was not feasible, without numerous constraints, to establish a generic 

decay heat level (and therefore a decay time) beyond which a zirconium fire 

is physically impossible. Heat removal is very sensitive to...factors such as 

fuel assembly geometry and SFP (spent fuel pool) rack 

configuration...(which) are plant specific and...subject to unpredictable 

changes after an earthquake or cask drop that drains the pool. Therefore, 

since a non-negligible decay heat source lasts many years and since 

configurations ensuring sufficient air flow for cooling cannot be assured, the 
Appendix A 

 A-185 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

possibility of reaching the zirconium ignition temperature cannot be 

precluded on a generic basis. ld. at 18. (Emphasis added) 

• Reactors differ in design, layout and physical protection features affecting the safety of 

onsite storage in spent fuel pools. For example, GE Mark I reactor's spent fuel pool are 

located outside primary containment in the attic of the reactor. This is more susceptible 

to acts of malice than reactors designed with the pool separate from the main reactor 

building. 

• The NRC has demonstrated that it considers terrorist attacks on nuclear plants are 

foreseeable threats that must be addressed; the Pilgrim spent fuel pool, for example, is 

particularly vulnerable to attack from the air. 

• The use and probable effectiveness of mitigation varies from site to site − requiring site 

specific analysis. 

• Reactor sites differ in topography and demography making the risk of onsite storage of 

spent fuel site specific. (PW-6-11) 

Comment: Section 1.7.2 of the Revised GElS expressly states that NRC "will not make a 

decision or any recommendation on the basis of the information presented in this GElS 

regarding the disposition of” SNF. This section continues that the agency's rules "leave[] the 

onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel during the term of plant operation as the only option at the 

time of license renewal." ld. While acknowledging that the NWPA mandates that the federal 

government is responsible for high level nuclear waste, the Revised GElS only states that the 

"NRC is confident that there will eventually be a licensed high-level waste repository." Id. The 

Revised GElS thus concludes that SNF "will be safely stored either onsite or' at offsite interim 

storage facilities." Id. 

This approach is inconsistent with NEPA. The purpose of an environmental review is to allow 

decision makers to know and understand the full range of potential impacts to public health and 

safety and the environment from a proposed action. This critical goal cannot be achieved if 

major impacts are ignored. 

Specifically, the Revised GEIS states it documents the means used by the NRC “to evaluate the 

environmental consequences of renewing the licenses of commercial nuclear power plants and 

operating the plants for an additional 20 years....” Revised GEIS, S-3. The Revised GElS then 

lists a series of important potential environmental impacts to land use, air quality, surface water, 

groundwater, and threatened and endangered species. Revised GElS, pp. S-6 through S-11. 

Nowhere does the Revised GEIS describe the potential impact to these resources from a fire or 

other incident at a spent fuel pool. This failing alone is a violation of NEPA because the 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-186 

Revised GEIS fully recognizes that relicensing will result in materially increased storage of SNF 

onsite at each nuclear power station, but fails to address the environmental consequences of 

that additional storage. (CT AG-10-5) 

Response: Impacts associated with potential severe accidents at spent fuel pools during the 

license renewal term are discussed in Section 4.9.1.2 and Appendix E of the GEIS. The 

impacts associated with onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel are discussed in Section 4.11.1.2 of 

the GEIS. The conclusion reached by the Commission is that the environmental impacts from 

accidents at spent fuel pools (SFPs) can be comparable to those from reactor accidents at full 

power. Subsequent analyses performed and mitigative measures employed since 2001 have 

further lowered the risk of this class of accidents. In addition, even the conservative estimates 

from NRC technical reports are much less than the impacts from full power reactor accidents, as 

estimated in the 1996 GEIS. Terrorism is outside the scope of the GEIS. However, the NRC 

believes that the consequences of terrorist-initiated events would be comparable to or bounded 

by the severe accidents considered in the GEIS. 

The issue of an accident involving, or a terrorist attack upon, the spent fuel pool was specifically 

addressed by the NRC in two Petitions for Rulemaking (PRM): PRM-51-10 and PRM-51-12, 

submitted by the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the Attorney 

General of California, respectively. The details of the petitions and the NRC’s evaluations of 

those petitions are available to the public through the ADAMS electronic reading room (at 

www.NRC.gov using ADAMS accession number ML081890124) and in the Federal 

e-Rulemaking Portal (http://www.regulations.gov, Docket ID [NRC-2006-0022] (PRM-51-10), 

and [NRC-2007-0019] (PRM-51-12); also at 73 FR 46204 (August 8, 2008). The Petitioners 

requested that the NRC initiate a rulemaking concerning the environmental impacts of the highdensity storage of spent nuclear fuel in spent fuel pools (SFPs). The Petitioners asserted that 

‘‘new and significant information’’ shows that the NRC incorrectly characterized the 

environmental impacts of high-density spent fuel storage as ‘‘insignificant’’ in the 1996 GEIS for 

the renewal of nuclear power plant licenses. Specifically, the Petitioners asserted that spent 

fuel stored in high-density SFPs is more vulnerable to a zirconium fire than the NRC concluded 

in its NEPA analysis. 

In August 2008, the Commission denied the petitions,( z)

 stating: 

Based upon its review of the petitions, the NRC has determined that the studies 

upon which the Petitioners rely do not constitute new and significant information. 

The NRC has further determined that its findings related to the storage of spent 

 

(z) The NRC decision to deny the two rulemaking petitions was upheld by the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Second Circuit. New York v. the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 589 F.3d 551 (2nd

Cir. 2009). 
Appendix A 

 A-187 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

nuclear fuel in pools, as set forth in NUREG-1437 and in Table B-1, of 

Appendix B to Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, remain valid. Thus, the NRC has 

met and continues to meet its obligations under NEPA. For the reasons 

discussed previously, the Commission denies PRM-51-10 and PRM-51-12. 

Based on the NRC’s evaluation (see Section 4.11.1.2 of the GEIS), onsite storage of spent 

nuclear fuel is a Category 1 issue. 

Based on the continued validity of conclusions from the 1996 GEIS, and as affirmed by the 

Commission in its denial of PRM-51-10 and PRM-51-12, the NRC concludes that the onsite 

storage of spent fuel is properly classified as Category 1. 

No changes were made to the GEIS in response to these comments. 

Comment: The following principles are based on the urgent need to protect the-public from the 

threats posed by the current vulnerable storage of commercial irradiated fuel. The United 

States does not currently have a national policy for the permanent storage of high-level nuclear 

waste. The Obama administration has determined that the Yucca Mountain site, which has 

been mired in bad science and mismanagement, is not an option for geologic storage of nuclear 

waste. Unfortunately, reprocessing proponents have used this opportunity to promote 

reprocessing as the solution for managing our nuclear waste. Contrary to their claims, however, 

reprocessing is extremely expensive, highly polluting, and a proliferation threat, and will actually 

complicate-the management of irradiated fuel. Nor will reprocessing obviate-the need for, or 

"save space" in, a geologic repository. The United States has a unique opportunity to reevaluate our nuclear waste management plan. We can make wise decisions about 

safeguarding radioactive waste or go down the risky, costly, and proliferation prone path 

towards reprocessing. 

The undersigned organizations' support for improving the protection of radioactive waste stored 

at reactor sites is a matter of security and is in no way an indication that we support nuclear 

power and the generation of more nuclear waste. 

 Require a low-density, open-frame layout for fuel pools: Fuel pools were originally 

designed for temporary storage of a limited number of irradiated fuel assemblies in a low 

density, open frame, configuration. As the amount of waste generated has increased 

beyond the designed capacity, the pools :have been reorganized so that the 

concentration of fuel in the pools is nearly the same as that in operating reactor cores. If 

water is lost from a densely packed pool as the result of an attack or an accident, cooling 

by ambient air would likely be insufficient to prevent a fire, resulting in the release of 

large quantities of radioactivity to the environment. A low density, open-frame 

arrangement within fuel pools could allow enough air circulation to keep the fuel from 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-188 

catching fire. In order to achieve and maintain this arrangement within the pools, 

irradiated, fuel must be transferred from the pools to dry storage within five years of 

being discharged from the reactor. 

 Establish hardened on-site storage (HOSS): Irradiated fuel must be stored as safely as 

possible as close to the. site-of generation as possible. Waste moved from fuel pools 

must be safeguarded in hardened, on-site storage (HOSS) facilities. Transporting waste 

to interim away-from-reactor storage should not be done unless the reactor site is 

unsuitable for a HOSS facility and the move increases the safety and security of the 

waste. HOSS facilities must not be regarded as a permanent waste solution, and thus 

should not be constructed deep underground. The waste, must be retrievable, and realtime radiation and heat monitoring at the HOSS facility must be implemented for early 

detection of radiation releases and overheating. The overall objective of HOSS should 

be that the amount of releases projected in even severe attacks should be low enough 

that the storage system would be unattractive as a terrorist target. Design criteria that 

would correspond to the overall objective must include: 

- Resistance to severe attacks such as a direct hit by high-explosive or deeply 

penetrating weapons and munitions or a direct hit by a large aircraft loaded with fuel 

or a small aircraft loaded with fuel and/or explosives, without major releases. 

- Placement of individual canisters that makes detection difficult 'from outside the site 

boundary. 

 Protect fuel pools: Irradiated fuel must be kept in pools for several years before it can be 

stored in a dry facility. The pools must -be protected to withstand an attack by air, land, 

or water from a force at least equal in size and coordination to-the 9/11 attacks. The 

security improvements must be approved by-a panel of experts independent of the 

nuclear industry and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

 Require periodic review of HOSS, facilities and fuel pools: An annual report consisting 

of the review of each HOSS facility and fuel pool should be prepared with meaningful 

participation from public stakeholders, regulators, and utility managers at each site The 

report must be made publicly available and may include recommendations for actions to 

be taken. 

 Dedicate funding to local and state governments to independently monitor the sites: 

Funding for monitoring the HOSS facilities at each site must be provided to affected local 

and state governments. The affected public must have the right to fully participate. 
Appendix A 

 A-189 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

 Prohibit reprocessing: The-reprocessing of irradiated fuel has not-solved the nuclear 

waste problem in any country, and actually exacerbates it by creating numerous 

additional waste streams that must-be managed. In-addition to-being expensive and 

polluting, reprocessing also increases nuclear weapons proliferation threats. 

(Schumann-27-1) 

Response: As discussed in Sections 4.11.1 and 4.9.1.2 of the GEIS, the NRC has evaluated 

the impacts associated with onsite storage of spent fuel, including the impacts of potential 

severe accidents in spent fuel pools. The conclusions reached by the Commission are that 

such storage could be accomplished safely and without significant environmental impact. 

Onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel during the license renewal term is a Category 1 issue. 

The impacts associated with transportation and disposal of spent nuclear fuel are discussed in 

Sections 4.12.1.1 and 4.11.1, respectively. The impacts associated with transportation are 

considered to be SMALL and are designated as a Category 1 issue 

If the NRC were to receive an application to build and operate a reprocessing facility in the 

United States, the NRC would conduct the appropriate safety and environmental reviews and 

would make sure that the facility would be built and operated in accordance with established 

rules and regulations. 

No changes were made to the GEIS in response to this comment. 

Comment: Page 1−9 to 1–12: Decisions outside the regulatory scope of license renewal that 

cannot be made on the basis of the final GElS analysis. These decisions include the following 

five issues: 

1. Changes to Plant Cooling Systems (EPA and state of California decisions) 

2. Disposition of Spent Nuclear Fuel − The NRC will not make a decision or any 

recommendations on the basis of the information presented in this GElS regarding the 

disposition of spent nuclear fuel at nuclear power plants. The NRC's Waste Confidence Rule 

(10 CFR 51.23) leaves the onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel during the term of plant 

operation as the only option at the time of license renewal. Within the context of a license 

renewal environmental review, the NRC concluded that the storage of spent nuclear fuel can be 

accomplished safely and without significant environmental impacts.

If the ultimate disposition of spent nuclear fuel are ongoing and outside the regulatory scope of 

this GElS, will this issue be allowed to be reviewed as a Category 2 site-specific issue? If the 

resolution of this issue is being decided in another NRC forum, will NGO, county and/or state 

oversight be allowed to review this resolution and reopen license renewal proceedings if they 

believe the economy or reliability of state energy generation will be challenged? 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-190 

As California's reactors are located on seismically active and/or eroding coastal zones, A4NR 

seeks assurance this issue will be heavily weighed in an open and transparent proceeding. It is 

one thing to "grandfather in" the "temporary" storage of radioactive waste generated during the 

original licensed period of operation of the reactors; no such "grandfathering" can escape 

updated and separate review for a license period for which the NRC and the Federal 

government had predicted and guaranteed off-site storage of the waste. If such assurance 

cannot be guaranteed, then A4NR recommends that any California utilities applications for 

license renewal be stayed, until the same conditions requiring the permanent disposition of 

high-level radioactive waste as outlined in California Public Resource Code section 25524 are 

met. (A4NR-11-5) 

Comment: The U.S. Senate defunded the Yucca Mountain project in the 2009 Energy Budget, 

and the project fairs no better under the position of the current administration-as reported by the 

Bloomberg news (February 26, 2009): 

 

Obama and Energy Secretary Steven Chu "have been emphatic that nuclear waste storage at 

Yucca Mountain is not an option, period," said department spokeswoman Stephanie Mueller. 

The federal budget plan Obama released today "clearly reflects that commitment," she said. 

Therefore, the public questions any NRC approvals of license renewals if storage of high-level 

waste is to remain on site indefinitely. The criteria for siting a permanent high-level radioactive 

waste facility should also be applied to "temporary" onsite storage. The utilities, the state, and 

the public never anticipated onsite storage, nor were contentions allowed to address the criteria 

for waste storage based on the NRC's high-level radioactive permanent waste storage rules and 

regulations. Instead the NRC assured the public that the onsite dry cask storage would be 

"temporary". No definition for "temporary" exists in the record of these proceedings. However, 

A4NR believes that the up to a hundred year timeframe oft mentioned by the industry must meet 

the same criteria for a permanent site and should therefore be investigated. 

 

The NRC is confident that there will eventually be a licensed high-level waste repository. If the 

site near Yucca Mountain is eventually found to be unsuitable, alternative sites will be 

considered. Until a permanent high-level waste repository is operational. the spent nuclear fuel 

will be safely stored either onsite or at offsite interim storage facilities (NRC 2006). 

 

As the public and the state have waited over four decades for a permanent high-level 

radioactive waste repository and in 2010 we appear to be back at square one, on what does the 

NRC base its confidence in the eventuality of a licensed high-level radioactive waste repository? 

Please be specific. (A4NR-11-6) 

 

Response: The impacts associated with onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel, waste 

management, and pollution prevention activities at nuclear power plant sites are discussed in 
Appendix A 

 A-191 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Section 4.11.1 of the GEIS. The waste types considered include low-level radioactive waste, 

spent nuclear fuel, mixed waste, and nonradiological waste. All of the issues considered with 

respect to onsite storage and handling of these waste types during the license renewal term are 

considered to be Category 1 issues. 

 

The Commission is aware that the Yucca Mountain repository may not be available. As an 

alternative, the Commission has considered the storage of spent nuclear fuel on reactor sites 

where it is generated. 

The NRC is committed to ensuring that both spent nuclear fuel and low-level radioactive wastes 

are managed to prevent health impacts to the public. Spent nuclear fuel is currently stored at 

reactor sites in the spent fuel pools and/or in independent spent fuel storage installations 

(ISFSIs). This practice is expected to continue until DOE is ready to take possession of the 

spent nuclear fuel. At this time, it is uncertain when this will happen. 

Interim storage needs vary among plants, with older units having less available pool storage 

capacity than newer ones. However, given the uncertainty as to when a geologic repository will 

open and lack of other options, it is likely that some sort of expanded spent fuel storage capacity 

beyond the original design capacity will be needed at all nuclear power plants. 

On March 3, 2010, DOE submitted a motion to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board to 

withdraw its application for a permanent geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. In 

light of the uncertainty surrounding the use of Yucca Mountain, if another repository for spent 

nuclear fuel is proposed, an environmental impact statement would be prepared. 

For spent nuclear fuel, the Waste Confidence Decision and Rule represented the Commission’s 

generic determination that spent nuclear fuel can continue to be stored safely and without 

significant environmental impacts for a period of time after the end of the licensed life for 

operation of a nuclear power plant (after the permanent shutdown of the power reactor and 

expiration of the plant’s operating license). This generic determination, codified in 10 CFR 

51.23(a), meant that the NRC did not need to consider the storage of spent nuclear fuel after 

the end of a reactor’s licensed life for operation in the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 

documents that support its reactor and spent-fuel storage license application reviews. 

On December 23, 2010, the Commission published a revision of the Waste Confidence 

Decision and Rule to reflect information gained based on experience in the storage of spent 

nuclear fuel and the increased uncertainty in the siting and construction of a permanent geologic 

repository for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste. In response to the 2010 

Waste Confidence Decision and Rule, the states of New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, and 

Vermont, and several other parties challenged the Commission’s NEPA analysis in the decision, 

which provided the regulatory basis for the rule. On June 8, 2012, the United States Court of 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-192 

Appeals, in New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d 471 (D.C. Cir. 2012), vacated the NRC’s Waste 

Confidence Decision and Rule, after finding that it did not comply with NEPA. 

In response to the court’s ruling, the Commission issued CLI-12-16 on August 7, 2012, in which 

the Commission determined that it would not issue licenses that rely upon the Waste 

Confidence Decision and Rule until the issues identified in the court’s decision are appropriately 

addressed by the Commission. CLI-12-16 provided, however, that the decision not to issue 

licenses only applied to final license issuance; all licensing reviews and proceedings should 

continue to move forward. In SRM-COMSECY-12-0016, dated September 6, 2012, the 

Commission directed the NRC staff to proceed with a rulemaking that includes the development 

of a generic EIS to support a revised Waste Confidence Decision and Rule and to publish both 

the EIS and the revised Waste Confidence Decision and Rule in the Federal Register within 

24 months (by September 6, 2014). The Commission indicated that both the EIS and the 

revised Waste Confidence Decision and Rule should build on the information already 

documented in various NRC studies and reports, including the existing environmental 

assessment that the NRC developed as part of the 2010 Waste Confidence Decision and Rule. 

The Commission directed that any additional analyses should focus on the issues identified in 

the D.C. Circuit’s decision. The Commission also directed that the NRC staff provide ample 

opportunity for public comment on both the draft EIS and the proposed Waste Confidence 

Decision and Rule. 

In accordance with CLI-12-16, the NRC will not approve any site-specific license renewal 

applications until the deficiencies identified in the D.C. Circuit’s decision have been resolved. 

Two license renewal issues that rely, wholly or in part, upon the Waste Confidence Decision and 

Rule are the “onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel” and “offsite radiological impacts of spent 

nuclear fuel and high-level waste disposal.” Both of these issues were classified as Category 1 

in the 1996 GEIS and the 10 CFR Part 51 final rule that was promulgated in 1996 (61 FR 

28467, June 5, 1996), which codified the findings of the 1996 GEIS into 10 CFR Part 51, 

Subpart A, Appendix B, Table B-1. The draft revised GEIS that was published for public 

comment in 2009 (74 FR 38239, July 31, 2009) and the concomitant proposed rule (74 FR 

38117, July 31, 2009) continued the Category 1 classification for both of these issues. As part 

of the NRC’s response to the New York v. NRC decision, the NRC has revised these two issues 

accordingly. 

Specifically, the NRC has revised the Category 1 issue, “Onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel,” 

to narrow the period of onsite storage to the license renewal term. In both the 1996 GEIS and 

rule and the 2009 draft revised GEIS and proposed rule, the NRC relied upon the Waste 

Confidence Decision and Rule to make a generic finding that spent nuclear fuel could be stored 

safely onsite with no more than a small environmental impact for the term of the extended 

license (from approval of the license renewal application to the expiration of the operating 
Appendix A 

 A-193 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

license) plus a 30 year period following the permanent shutdown of the power reactor and 

expiration of the operating license. 

The Waste Confidence Decision and Rule provided the basis for the 30 year period following 

the permanent shutdown of the reactor and expiration of the operating license. The 2010 Waste 

Confidence Decision and Rule extended this post-reactor shutdown onsite storage period from 

30 years to 60 years. Given the New York v. NRC decision, and pending the issuance of a 

generic EIS and revised Waste Confidence Decision and Rule (as directed by SRM-COMSECY12-0016), the period of onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel following the permanent shutdown of 

the power reactor and expiration of the operating license is now excluded from this GEIS issue. 

This issue now only covers the onsite storage of spent fuel during the license renewal term. 

Similarly, the NRC has revised the Category 1 issue, “Offsite radiological impacts of spent 

nuclear fuel and high-level waste disposal.” This issue pertains to the long-term disposal of 

spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste, including possible disposal in a deep geologic 

repository. Although the Waste Confidence Decision and Rule did not assess the impacts 

associated with disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste in a repository, it did reflect 

the Commission’s confidence, at the time, in the technical feasibility of a repository and when 

that repository could have been expected to become available. Without the analysis in the 

Waste Confidence Decision, the NRC cannot assess how long the spent fuel will need to be 

stored onsite. Therefore, the NRC has reclassified this issue from a Category 1 issue with no 

assigned impact level to an uncategorized issue with an impact level of uncertain. 

Upon issuance of the revised Waste Confidence Decision and Rule and its supporting generic 

EIS, the NRC will make any necessary conforming amendments to its regulations in 10 CFR 

Part 51 and supplement the GEIS as necessary. As referenced previously, the Commission will 

not approve any license renewal application for an operating nuclear power plant until the 

issues identified in the New York v. NRC court’s decision are appropriately addressed by the 

Commission. 

Comment: As California has learned that at least one new major-active fault now exists 

1800 feet from Diablo Canyon and that the coastline at San Onofre beach is eroding at 

increased rates within the last year, it is the state and not the NRC who should determine if 

continued production of highly radioactive waste during a license renewal ─ and for an indefinite 

and undefined period of storage ─ will impact the state's economy and its grid reliability. 

(A4NR-11-7) 

Response: The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (as amended) gives NRC the authority to issue 

licenses for commercial power reactors. The license is based on adherence of the licensee to 

operate the plant in accordance with the NRC regulations contained in the Code of Federal 

Regulations, Title 10. The NRC regulations allow the renewal of these licenses for up to an 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-194 

additional 20 years depending on the outcome of NRC’s assessment to determine whether the 

nuclear facility can continue to operate safely during the 20-year period of extended operation. 

Issues related to seismicity and coastline erosion are considered as part of the safety evaluation 

NRC conducts for license renewals. Issues related to the State’s economy and its grid reliability 

are not within NRC jurisdictional authority.

No changes were made to the GEIS in response to this comment. 

Comment: Scenarios for transport of nuclear waste include trucks on our major highways, 

trains, and barges. Seven million Californians live within one mile of proposed routes, and none 

of these modes can be protected from terrorist strikes or accidents. In California alone there 

were 1,880 tractor-trailer accidents between 1994 and 2000 and 4,264 train wrecks from 1990 

to 2001. These statistics represent a fraction of the accidents across our nation, and the 

tragedy of just one accident involving nuclear waste would be devastating. 

As recently as July 8, 2003, California requested a halt to medium-waste shipments of nuclear 

materials. This action was taken to protect California residents and "first responders" from the 

inherent dangers of nuclear waste spills arising from accidents and/or sabotage − and 

supported by California’s Senator Feinstein.5

 Nuclear power plant license renewals increase 

the necessity of a greater number of shipments and thus the odds of such a lethal accident. 

[

5 AP] 

To quote from the Los Angeles scenario of the Environmental Working Group: "Given the 

unanimous agreement that train or truck accidents are inevitable during the tens of thousands of 

radioactive waste shipment to Yucca Mountain, we believe people have a right to know what 

would happen if one of those accidents led to a release of radioactive materials in their town. 

...The number of people exposed to unsafe doses of radiation is entirely dependent on the 

timing and location of the accident or attack.”6

 

[

6

 What if...A nuclear waste accident scenario in Los Angeles, Ca Richard Wiles, James R. Cox, June 27, 2002 

www.mapscience.org] 

The NRC must consider the full consequences of high-level radioactive waste transportation 

before it can determine the GElS of nuclear power plant license renewals. 

While the 2009 draft GElS mentions transport issues in several sections, it does not address the 

eventual transport of additional "spent" fuel that will be produced during the license renewal 

period. It is clear this issue cannot be discussed until there is a permanent repository accepting 

radioactive waste. And yet, a recent notice by the NRC of the transport of spent fuel from the 

Pilgrim Plant, Massachusetts, to the GE Vallecitos plant in California creates questions that 
Appendix A 

 A-195 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

must be discussed in any future license renewal cases.7 Where will current radioactive material 

be stored and where does the NRC and the utility anticipate storing radioactive waste produced 

during the renewal period? 

[

7 Enclosure 1 Page 1 of 3 OFFICE OF NUCLEAR SECURITY AND INCIDENT RESPONSE DIVISION OF 

SECURITY POLICY DECEMBER 2009 IRRADIATED REACTOR FUEL ROUTE SUMMARY (233) PILGRIM 

NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, PLYMOUTH, MA TO GE ALLECITOS, SUNOL, CA]

Until a permanent storage facility is in operation and transport routes have been resolved no 

license renewals should be approved by the NRC. In addition, no license renewal applications 

should be allowed to be filed by the state of California until the economic impacts of transport 

routes are addressed and resolved in a public forum. (A4NR-11-28) 

Response: The impacts associated with transporting fresh fuel and spent fuel and radioactive 

waste from a light water reactor are contained in Table S-4 in 10 CFR Part 51.52. Every 

environmental report prepared for the construction permit stage of a commercial nuclear power 

plant must contain a statement concerning the transport of fuel and radioactive waste to and 

from the reactor. Table S-4 forms the basis for such a statement. A discussion of the values in 

Table S-4 and how they may change during the license renewal term was included in 

Section 6.3 of the 1996 GEIS. 

 

In 1999, the NRC issued an addendum to the 1996 GEIS in which the agency evaluated the 

applicability of Table S-4 to future license renewal proceedings. In the addendum, the NRC 

evaluated the impacts of shipping more highly enriched fresh fuel and higher-burnup spent fuel. 

The NRC concluded that the values in Table S-4 would be bounding. At this time, the 

conditions evaluated in the addendum have not changed, and no new conditions have been 

introduced that would alter the conclusions in the addendum. Accordingly, the NRC has 

determined that the transportation of nuclear fuel is generic to all nuclear power plants and is a 

Category 1 issue. 

Additionally, the impacts of transporting spent nuclear fuel from reactor sites to the proposed 

repository at Yucca Mountain are addressed in U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Final and 

Supplemental Environmental Impact Statements for a “Geologic Repository for the Disposal of 

Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, 

Nevada” (DOE 2002, 2008). The Yucca Mountain FEIS (DOE 2002) and Repository SEIS 

(DOE 2008) provide estimates of State-specific transportation impacts and representative 

transportation routes for 44 States and the District of Columbia. DOE identified representative 

highway routes in accordance with U.S. Department of Transportation routing regulations 

(49 CFR Part 397, Subpart D), which require the use of preferred routes (Interstate System 

highway, beltway or bypass, or State or Tribal designated alternate) that reduce time in transit. 

Since it will be many years before shipments could begin, DOE cannot determine the exact 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-196 

routes that would be used for shipments to Yucca Mountain. Construction and modification of 

highways may require changes to preferred routes, and States and Tribes may designate 

alternate preferred highway routes in the interim. 

However, on March 3, 2010, DOE submitted a motion to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 

to withdraw its application for a permanent geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. In 

light of the uncertainty surrounding the use of Yucca Mountain, if another repository for spent 

nuclear fuel is proposed, an environmental impact statement would be prepared. 

The NRC has conducted several studies to evaluate the risks associated with the transportation 

of radioactive material. The NRC issued the Final Environmental Statement on the 

Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes, NUREG-0170 (NRC 1977), 

which was published in 1977 to support the 10 CFR Part 71, “Packaging and Transportation of 

Radioactive Material” rulemaking. Based on the NRC staff’s recommendations in NUREG0170, the Commission concluded that the transportation regulations are adequate to protect the 

public from the risks associated with the transportation of radioactive materials, including spent 

nuclear fuel. The NRC sponsored another study in the 1980s titled Shipping Container 

Response to Severe Highway and Railway Accident Conditions, NUREG/CR-4829 (Fischer 

et al. 1987), also known as the “Modal Study.” Based on the results of NUREG/CR-4829, the 

NRC concluded that NUREG-0170 overestimated spent fuel accident risks by about a factor of 

three. In the 1990s, the NRC initiated a spent fuel study titled Reexamination of Spent Fuel 

Shipment Risk Estimates, NUREG/CR-6672, which was published in 2000 (Sprung et al. 2000). 

NUREG/CR-6672 focused on the risks of a modern spent fuel transport campaign from reactor 

sites to possible interim storage sites and/or permanent geologic repositories. This study 

concluded that accident risks were much less than those estimated in NUREG-0170 and that 

more than 99.99 percent of transportation accidents are not severe enough to cause a release 

of radioactive material from a NRC-certified spent fuel cask. While very severe accidents could 

cause cask damage, the studies show that releases of material would be small and pose little 

risk to the local population/public. The most severe accidents might cause greater releases, but 

their likelihood is so remote that the NRC considers the risk to public health to be low. 

The NRC has also sponsored studies to analyze the consequences of specific accident 

scenarios on rail and truck transportation casks carrying spent fuel. For example, the NRC 

undertook an investigation of a July 2001 accident that involved a freight train carrying 

hazardous materials that derailed and caught fire while passing through the Howard Street 

railroad tunnel in downtown Baltimore, Maryland, to determine the possible regulatory 

implications of this particular event for the transportation of spent fuel by railroad. The NRC 

assembled a team of experts from the National Institute of Standards (PNNL) to determine the 

thermal conditions that existed in the Howard Street tunnel fire and to analyze the effects of this 

fire on various spent fuel transportation cask designs. The NRC concluded that the spent fuel 

transportation casks analyzed would withstand a fire with thermal conditions similar to those that 
Appendix A 

 A-197 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

existed in the Baltimore tunnel fire event. No release of radioactive materials would result from 

exposure of the casks analyzed to such an event. 

The NRC has already considered and addressed the issue of transportation of spent nuclear 

fuel in the revised GEIS and the comments do not present any significant new information that 

would warrant a change to the final revised GEIS. 

Comment: Of the issues identified in the DGEIS as "small", DOS recommends that the 

following should be elevated to the moderate or large category and be required to be addressed 

in detail in a site-specific SEIS. 

Offsite radiological impacts: Aging infrastructure may exacerbate offsite impacts attributable to 

radiological influences. Differing physical characteristics of nuclear facility sites warrant 

consideration of offsite radiological impacts in a SEIS. (NY DOS-18-9) 

Response: The radiological impacts from nuclear fuel cycle facilities are discussed in Sections 

4.11.1 and 4.12.1.1 of GEIS 

In its evaluation, the NRC considered typical facilities and made conservative assumptions to 

account for the differing age and condition of various facilities that make up the nuclear fuel 

cycle. 

The comment raises aging infrastructure as a factor in potentially exacerbating offsite 

radiological impacts. The aging management of plant systems, structures, and components is 

considered during the license renewal safety review, which is governed by 10 CFR Part 54. As 

such, it is outside the scope of the environmental review for license renewal. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-198 

No changes were made to the GEIS in response to this comment. 

Comment: Table S-3 is Grossly Outdated and Inadequate to Support License Renewal 

Decisions: In the License Renewal GElS, the NRC proposes to continue to rely on a generic 

determination, codified in Table S-3, that the human health impacts of disposing of the 

radioactive waste generated by that plant are insignificant. Table S-3 is now over 30 years old, 

and has become grossly outdated. See attached Comments of the Institute for Energy and 

Environmental Research (lEER) on the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Proposed Waste 

Confidence Rule Update and Proposed Rule Regarding Environmental Impacts of Temporary 

Spent Fuel Storage (February 6, 2009).

(Attachment 4). As discussed in lEER's comments, the findings of Table S-3 are severely 

outdated, and the table significantly underestimates the human health impacts of the uranium 

fuel cycle, including the impacts of disposing of spent fuel, greater than Class C waste, and low 

level radioactive waste. 

For example, the assumptions on which Table S-3 depends include the assumption that spent 

fuel will be disposed of in a bedded salt repository. But in its Proposed Waste Confidence 

Decision, the NRC itself states that salt repositories are now considered suitable only for 

reprocessed high-level waste and not for spent fuel disposal. 73 Fed. Reg. 59547, 59555 

(October 9, 2008). As discussed in lEER's Comments, all other repository types are now 

considered likely to have radioactive releases after the repository has been sealed. The 

hypothesis that releases from spent fuel disposal could be zero has therefore been discredited. 

Indeed, there are plausible circumstances in which releases could exceed the requirements of 

safe disposal as defined by radiation protection standards. In order to ensure that its licensing 

decisions for nuclear power plants comply with NEPA by fully addressing the environmental 

impacts of the radioactive waste they will generate, the NRC must completely overhaul 

Table S-3 and integrate it with a more comprehensive analysis of all of the environmental 

impacts and costs of the licensing of nuclear power plants, including the impacts and costs of 

the plants themselves and the wastes they will generate. See lEER Comments. 

Table S-3 also erroneously concludes that it is conservative to assume gaseous releases of 

certain radionuclides, notably I-129, from reprocessing prior to sealing of a repository rather 

than to assume their release into water after disposal of spent fuel. See lEER Comments. 

Finally, Table S-3 contains no discussion of the environmental impacts of the disposal of 

depleted uranium tails, which are potentially significant. See attached Institute for Energy and 

Environmental Research, Comments on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Rulemaking 

Regarding the "Safe Disposal of Unique Waste Streams Including Significant Quantities of 

Depleted Uranium (October 30, 2009). (SLOMFP-13-6) 
Appendix A 

 A-199 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Response: Environmental impacts associated with the uranium fuel cycle as they apply to 

license renewal are discussed in Section 4.12.1 of the GEIS. The discussion encompasses the 

applicability and adequacy of Table S-3 in 10 CFR Part 51.51. Among the issues discussed are 

the impacts associated with the management and disposal of depleted uranium hexafluoride 

(UF6) tails. The conclusion is that Table S-3 is still applicable and the impacts discussed therein 

are bounding for the purposes of discussing the impacts associated with the uranium fuel cycle 

as they apply to license renewal. No changes were made to the GEIS in response to this 

comment.

A.2.1.11 Comments Concerning Cumulative Impacts 

Comment: Finally, the cumulative impacts. I learned tonight that cumulative impacts are being 

classified as a category 2 impact. In other words, that the cumulative impacts will be looked at 

on a case-by-case basis in each relicensing. In some degree, that's reassuring, but I think it 

needs to at least be acknowledged that there's a difference between the impact of relicensing 

one nuclear power plant and the cumulative impact of hundreds of nuclear power plants. 

We have certain individuals in Congress right now who are proposing that we build what I at 

least think of as a hundred new targets of opportunity for terrorists throughout our country as an 

energy plan. Anyone of those doesn't present the same potential as the cumulative impact of all 

of them and so, I think it needs to be clearly stated that cumulative impacts will be considered in 

each relicensing process. (DPCA-Nader-22) 

Response: For plant-specific supplements to the GEIS, the cumulative impacts analysis would 

evaluate the cumulative effects of actions, including the continued operation of the nuclear 

power plant over the license renewal term, within a defined region of influence near the plant. 

Given the distance between most operating plants that would be considered for license renewal, 

it is unlikely that the impacts of these plants would affect the same resources and therefore 

result in cumulative effects. An area where cumulative effects may be possible relate to the 

uranium fuel cycle. Impacts related to the collective effects of the uranium fuel cycle 

(e.g., offsite radiological and transportation impacts) are evaluated in Section 4.12.1 of the GEIS 

(see also Section 3.9 for a discussion of collective and occupational doses for U.S. commercial 

nuclear power plants). It should also be noted that environmental monitoring programs at 

individual power plants are performed in accordance with 10 CFR Parts 20 and 50 to ensure 

that radiological doses to the public and sensitive resources remain within applicable regulatory 

limits. These monitoring programs measure total dose and therefore account for any cumulative 

dose resulting from power plants that are in relatively close proximity to each other. With regard 

to the issue of security, risk from terrorist acts against nuclear power plants, and emergency 

preparedness, these issues are considered outside of the regulatory scope of license renewal 

environmental reviews, but are considered by the NRC under different programs. Cumulative 

effects are discussed in more detail in Section 4.13 of the GEIS. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-200 

No changes were made to the GEIS as a result of this comment.

Comment: I'm actually employed by Exelon Generation Company but I am here this evening 

speaking on behalf of the Nuclear Energy Institute which is also known as NEI. 

NEI is a policy organization of the Nuclear Energy & Technologies Industry, and participates in 

both national and global policy making process. In July of 2009, NEI constituted an ad hoc task 

force consisting of representatives from 14 of its member organizations to review and prepare 

comments on NRC's draft updated GElS and the accompanying proposed rule making draft 

regulatory guide and standard review plan. It is as a member of NEI's task force that I am here 

now. 

Now, moving to my comments of which there are basically two, these are directed to the draft 

updated GElS only since other representatives on the NEI task force have already addressed at 

other public meetings the proposed rule making as well as additional comments on the GElS. 

First, the draft updated GElS observes that during the period of extended operation for a nuclear 

plant, certain issues could contribute to cumulative impacts, and that such issues would require 

plant-specific analysis as part of the license renewal review. 

Industry is concerned about the methods and the scope NRC intends to apply in implementing 

site-specific cumulative impacts assessments. For example, in some currently ongoing reviews 

of license renewal applications, NRC appears to be pursuing assessments of cumulative 

impacts on aquatic resources that duplicate the environmental reviews conducted by other 

regulatory agencies under authority of the Clean Water Act. Industry believes this approach is 

inappropriate and would noticeably increase the length of license renewal reports and the 

burden of preparing them without improving the efficiency of the regulatory process. 

Accordingly, industry encourages NRC to adopt an approach for implementing site specific 

cumulative assessments for renewal of nuclear plant operating licenses that avoids duplicating 

environmental reviews performed by other agencies under federal legal authority. We suggest 

that the GEIS and site-specific GElS's acknowledge that the outcomes of environmental reviews 

performed by other regulatory agencies under federal legal authority will be protective of the 

environment and focus on whether license renewal applicants are complying with the technical 

process requirements of the other agencies. (OBIL-NEI-7) 

Response: In the cumulative impact assessments presented in plant-specific supplements to 

the GEIS, the NRC would rely on best available information with regard to the past, present, and 

reasonably foreseeable impacts of other actions on the environment. In performing the 

assessment, the NRC would rely on the findings of environmental reviews conducted by other 

regulatory agencies to the extent practicable. As stated in the introduction to Section 4.13 of the 

GEIS, for some resource areas (e.g., water and aquatic resources), the contributions of ongoing 
Appendix A 

 A-201 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

actions within a region on cumulative impacts are regulated and monitored through a permitting 

process (e.g., NPDES) under State or Federal authority. In these cases, it may be assumed 

that cumulative impacts are managed as long as these actions (facilities) are in compliance with 

their respective permits. However, as required by NEPA and the NRC’s own regulations,(aa)

 the 

NRC is obligated to perform its own assessment of the impacts of the proposed action, including 

any cumulative impacts. If the NRC determines that license renewal would result in a change in 

impact level (i.e., from SMALL to MODERATE, or MODERATE to LARGE), the NRC may 

recommend mitigation measures to ensure that such impacts are avoided, minimized, or 

compensated. No changes were made to the GEIS in response to this comment.

Comment: [H]ave there been site specific studies of already health damage linked to radiation, 

such as at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant? [See identifier NMA-PW-10 for the prior, related 

comment.] That would be relevant to making it a category two issue. And you talk about 

cumulative effects. Well, to my mind, that's a back door in because we know there is a 

synergistic effect between radiation and other toxins, each enhancing one another's mischief, if 

you will. So if you happen to have the misfortune of being near a nuke, near a chemical plant, 

near maybe a coal plant, probably your odds are greater for coming, for being effected, your 

health being affected, than if you are by a nuclear power plant in the middle of a corn field 

someplace. 

Now that's just not my speculation, there's a mountain of research on the synergistic effects of 

various toxins and, hence, that would make it a site specific issue. And so to call it a category 

one, one can only do that if you are ignoring or just cherry picking and say this is what we want 

to believe because it's good really for our industry, but it's not honest and I think the public 

knows that. There have been cases of it being brought up in adjudication hearings going 

forward. (NMA-PW-11) 

Response: As stated in Section 4.13 of the GEIS, cumulative impacts are considered a 

Category 2 issue that requires a plant-specific review of the effects of license renewal. As a 

result, human health issues related to exposures to radiological and chemical hazards, referred 

to by the commenter, would be evaluated on a plant-specific basis. Section 4.13.11 addresses 

these types of impacts. No changes were made to the GEIS in response to this comment.

Comment: Actually, this is a question regarding cumulative impacts. My best thinking is in the 

shower and this morning, while thinking about this, I came up with a good one. Is this an 

opportunity or did you intend it for an opportunity, watch NEI run, to consider this as a mouse 

hole for health impacts? That we know, for example, that the radiations effects are cumulative, 

right? So the more you've been nailed by a few millirem, it adds up, right? And we know there 

 

(aa) See 10 CFR 51.71(d). 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-202 

is a synergistic effect of radiation and other toxins, so this is all a cumulative impact which would 

seem to fit neatly into that category. 

The genius thought this morning, in my small mind, by myself, nobody else thought it was 

genius because I hadn't shared it yet, was the impact of global climate change. So this is really 

looking at it from another direction, but then it swings back around again, that there would be a 

cumulative impact. I mean Al Gore, everybody is, true, everybody is talking about climate 

change, it's no longer a fantasy of Texans' imagination, right? So what are the potential 

consequences on a coastal environment, reactors that are on a coast? 

Well I've been thinking about that because we noticed that the tides are far greater where we 

are and we noticed that the coastlines are eroding. We noticed that there's an increased salinity 

in the ocean and I was fixated on buried pipes and corrosion because of this endless 

adjudication process and so therefore what would be the impact, for example, on increased 

salinity of buried pipes that were built originally not to be under water that we can project may 

be under water, on corrosion and then more leaking out into the environment would be an 

example. 

Also, we have been told and we have seen the increased frequency and violence of storms, 

Northeast storms, etcetera, that's another impact to be considered, not for the storms that were 

analyzed 40 years ago or are seen today but for what is projected in the future. Then you look 

at reactors that are on lakes, well we know some, it was some in Georgia, they couldn't operate 

because the lakes went dry and who were dependent upon once through cooling mechanisms, 

what is that impact? 

But reverse it, the impact on the environment, that then the reactor that's located on the lake, 

okay, in an area that's subject more to droughts, etcetera, which we see in our country, and has 

once through cooling, is now the water pig taking water that is already in scarce demand for the 

community's needs, so that would be an environmental impact caused from the cumulative 

effects of global warming. This was a very clever shower I had this morning. But is this what 

you had in mind for the cumulative impacts? (NMA-PW-21) 

Comment: A commenter submitted a Sierra Club newspaper article that briefly discusses the 

the amounts of fossil fuel energy needed to produce the nuclear energy fuel cycle for one 

1000 megawatt nuclear reactor. The article concludes by saying that to cope with global 

warming, we must forgo building nuclear power plants and shift to conservation and alternative, 

renewable energies sources (e.g., wind, solar, and hydroelectric power). (Anon2-23-9) 

Response: Like other Federal agencies, the NRC is developing guidance to evaluate the 

effects of greenhouse gas emissions and global climate change in the environmental review for 

new reactors and license renewal. Changes in climate have the potential to affect air and water 
Appendix A 

 A-203 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

resources, ecological resources, and human health, and should be taken into account when 

evaluating cumulative impacts over the license renewal term. A new section summarizing the 

potential cumulative impacts of global climate change has been added to Section 4.13 of the 

GEIS (climate change is also discussed in Section 4.12.3.2). It should be noted that the effects 

of climate change on the safe design and operation of a nuclear power plant would be evaluated 

as part of NRC’s safety review of license renewals, rather than as part of the environmental 

review.

Comment: Page 2-16, Table 2.1-1 (Cumulative Impacts): In the Table 2.1-1 column labeled 

“Impact,” the entry for the “Cumulative Impacts” issue reads as follows: 

(Category 2). Cumulative impacts of license renewal must be considered on a plant-specific 

basis. Impacts would depend on regional resource characteristics, the resource-specific impacts 

of license renewal, and the cumulative significance of other factors affecting the resource. 

An applicant for license renewal of a nuclear power plant would not have access to all 

information necessary about other projects (over which the applicant has no control) in the 

vicinity to support an assessment of cumulative impacts of license renewal. Accordingly, the 

NRC is encouraged to change the scope described in Table 2.1-1 of the “Cumulative Impacts” 

issue such that any assessment of cumulative impacts in the license renewal environmental 

report would be limited to projects that are within the applicant’s control (e.g., new nuclear 

generating units to be owned by the same applicant and placed on or near the site of the unit[s] 

for which license renewal is being sought). (NEI1-7(4)-10) 

Comment: Page 4-220, line 6 to page 4-227, line 14: Text from page 4-220, line 6 through 

page 4-227, line 14 explains the requirement for analysis of cumulative impacts by a federal 

agency under NEPA, and discusses influences that would affect the magnitude of cumulative 

impacts for each environmental resource. 

Industry understands that NEPA requires federal agencies to assess cumulative impacts from 

their actions in combination with other past, present, and foreseeable future actions. 

Notwithstanding, an applicant for license renewal of a nuclear power plant would not have 

access to all information necessary about other projects (over which the applicant has no 

control) in the vicinity to support an assessment of cumulative impacts of license renewal. 

Accordingly, the NRC is encouraged to limit the scope described in section 4.13 (Cumulative 

Impacts) in the draft updated GEIS of the cumulative impacts issue such that any assessment of 

cumulative impacts in a license renewal environmental report would be limited to projects that 

are within the applicant’s control (e.g., new nuclear generating units to be owned by the same 

applicant and placed on or near the site of the unit[s] for which license renewal is being sought). 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-204 

Clarification is also needed on the definition of “reasonably foreseeable future actions” related to 

cumulative impacts. Cumulative impact evaluation should have limits. The discussions on 

cumulative impact evaluations throughout the draft updated GEIS should clarify that such 

evaluations need not consider impacts caused by any of the following future events, whether or 

not they are reasonably foreseeable: 

1. Potential alterations due to climate change or global warming – e.g., drought, flooding, or 

other as yet unpredictable weather related phenomena; or acts of God; (in these cases, the 

use of the resource during the extended license period by the plant is not the instigator of 

the stress on the resource, and potential impacts would occur regardless of license renewal) 

2. acts of war or terrorism, 

3. indiscriminate use of a resource – e.g., an assumption of uncontrolled or unregulated use 

of a resource. Example: a plant with no demonstrable existing impact on an existing 

resource should not be required to evaluate cumulative impacts under the assumption that 

future unregulated use of the resource could cause adverse impact to the resource. 

4. If the resource is controlled by local, state, or federal, or tribal resource regulations, and 

no demonstrable impact to an existing resource exists, no further cumulative impacts should 

be required. 

5. If local, state, federal or tribal regulations do not apply to the resource: 

a. if the existing cumulative impacts do not destabilize the resource, no further 

cumulative impact evaluation should be required 

b. if there are no known plans to utilize the resource that would cause demonstrable 

adverse impacts that would destabilize the resource, no further evaluation of cumulative 

impacts should be required 

c. if there are known future plans to utilize the resource that are likely to cause 

demonstrable adverse impacts that would destabilize the resource, and NRC denial of a 

renewed license would have little impact to restore the resource, no further cumulative 

impact should be required 

6. If there are known future plans to utilize the resource that are likely to cause 

demonstrable adverse impacts that would destabilize the resource, and the adverse impact 

is directly or indirectly attributable to local, state, federal or tribal regulation, no further 

cumulative impact should be required (e.g., EPA 316(b) regulations or similar state or tribal 

regulations that would require retrofit of cooling towers that causes increased consumption 

of water from a small river or other water body). In this case, the NEPA evaluation of the 

agencies rulemaking should bear the responsibility for evaluating the environmental and 
Appendix A 

 A-205 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

health and safety and other impacts on the resource(s) subject to the regulation. 

(NEI1-7(4)-28) 

Response: Cumulative impact is, by definition, the impact on the environment resulting from 

the incremental impact of a proposed Federal action in combination with other past, present, 

and reasonably foreseeable future actions, regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) 

or person undertakes such other actions (40 CFR Part 1508.7). The cumulative impacts 

assessment, therefore, must consider relevant past, present, and future actions, including those 

outside of the applicant’s or NRC’s control. Relevant past and present actions are those with 

identifiable present effects, and relevant future actions are those that are reasonably 

foreseeable (e.g., planned) occurring within the defined regions of influence and time frame of 

the proposed action. 

As described in the introduction to Section 4.13 of the GEIS, reasonably foreseeable future 

actions to be considered as part of the cumulative impacts analysis should include actions that 

are ongoing (and will continue into the future); are funded for future implementation; are 

included in firm, near-term plans and within the region of influence; or generally have a high 

probability of being implemented. Neither Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) nor NRC 

regulations require a catalogue or exhaustive list and analysis of all actions within the region of 

influence. The NRC does not seek to impose an unwarranted burden on applicants and does 

not intend that applicants’ cumulative impacts analyses be exhaustive and/or that they cover 

speculative actions of which the applicant could not be expected to have knowledge. The NRC 

is not adopting the express list of items set forth in the comment to define what is or what is not 

a reasonably foreseeable future action. The NRC, in determining what action constitutes a 

reasonably foreseeable action, will be governed by the standard described above. The NRC 

agrees with the commenter, however, to the extent that acts of war or terrorism should not be 

considered reasonably foreseeable events in the context of the license renewal environmental 

review. 

The NRC continues to be responsible for evaluating cumulative impacts in its SEISs for license 

renewal, and already requests that applicants for license renewal provide information on past, 

present, and reasonably foreseeable actions in the vicinity of their nuclear power plants, to the 

extent it is known by applicants. This requirement has not changed. However, the NRC also 

believes that applicants would be best equipped to identify projects and proposals and would be 

most knowledgeable of information pertaining to past, present, and future activities in the 

immediate vicinity of their nuclear plants. Trends such as global climate change should be 

considered, since these changes have the potential to affect air and water resources, ecological 

resources, and human health over the license renewal term. The NRC has and will also 

continue to include within each SEIS a plant-specific analysis of any impacts caused by 

greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions over the course of the license renewal term, as well as any 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-206 

impacts caused by potential climate change upon the affected resources during the license 

renewal term. 

No changes were made to the revised GEIS as a result of these comments. 

Comment: Vol. 1, Page 4-221, lines 24 to 27: Text in lines 24 to 27 0n page 4-221 reads as 

follows: 

Several recent environmental analyses for license renewal applications have found that 

overall cumulative impacts in the region of influence of the power plant were significant 

(e.g., the Oyster Creek plant in New Jersey and the Susquehanna plant in 

Pennsylvania). 

Exelon questions the NRC’s characterization of the overall cumulative impacts of the Oyster 

Creek Nuclear Generating Station as “significant,” which is undefined terminology. In Section 

4.8.6 of the Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Power 

Plants Supplement 28: Regarding Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (NRC2007b), the 

NRC concludes that overall cumulative impacts ranged from SMALL to MODERATE for the 

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. Accordingly, Exelon suggests that it would be clearer 

and more consistent with NRC’s approach to impact characterization in NEPA documents if the 

above-quoted sentence in lines 24 to 27 on page 4-221 in the draft GEIS were changed to read 

as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

Several recent environmental analyses for license renewal application found that overall 

cumulative impacts in the region of influence of the power plant were significant ranged from 

SMALL to MODERATE (e.g., the Oyster Creek plant in New Jersey and the Susquehanna plant 

in Pennsylvania). (Exelon-17-12) 

Response: The NRC agrees that the use of the term “significant” does not provide the proper 

context for previous findings. The discussion in the draft revised GElS stated that license 

renewal could cause “a significant contribution to cumulative impacts...” Generally, there would 

be no contributory effect from the continued operation of the nuclear power plant during the 

license renewal term on environmental conditions in the region beyond what is currently being 

experienced. Therefore, the only cumulative contributory effects would come from the other 

planned activities in the region independent of continued reactor operations. As discussed in 

Section 4.13 of the revised GElS, the NRC has determined that cumulative impacts is a 

Category 2 issue requiring a plant-specific review. In response to this comment, Section 4.13 of 

the revised GElS provides further clarification as to why cumulative impacts is a Category 2 

issue.
Appendix A 

 A-207 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Comment: Cumulative Impacts Must be Addressed: SLOMFP agrees with the License 

Renewal GElS Section 4.13 that the issue of cumulative impacts is a vital one, classified as 

Category 2, and it must be examined in and across all resource areas. SLOMFP is particularly 

concerned with the consequences of cumulative impacts on the degraded marine environment, 

human health, and waste management. (SLOMFP-13-13) 

Response: The comment expresses concern regarding the consequences of cumulative 

impacts. As discussed in Section 4.13 of the GEIS, the NRC has identified cumulative impacts 

as a Category 2 issue, which will require a plant-specific review. No changes were made to the 

GEIS in response to this comment.

Comment: Cumulative Impacts: The cumulative impacts section of the draft GEIS, 4.13.12, 

does not discuss the obligation of an agency, in this case the NRC, to evaluate the cumulative 

impacts of the many individual environmental impacts on a low-income or minority population. 

The NRC is required to consider the overall cumulative impacts that can be expected if the 

individual impacts are allowed to accumulate. See Fritiofson v. Alexander, 772 F.2d 1225 (5th

Cir. 1985). In the environmental justice context, the NRC must analyze the cumulative impact of 

the many impacts identified in a Supplemental EIS on an individual license renewal application 

on the low-income or minority populations. 

The draft GEIS identifies many categories of impacts as Category 1. However, there is no 

discussion of what is required if a Category 1 issue is implicated by a Category 2 issue. For 

example, if it can be shown that endangered avian endangered species (Category 2) are being 

killed by transmission lines or cooling towers (Category 1), than the assumption should be that 

these types of Category 2 impacts must be evaluated on a site-specific basis. If health effects 

from radiation (Category 1) can be shown to pose a special impact on a minority or low-income 

population (Category 2), than those impacts must be evaluated on a site-specific basis. In other 

words, the Category 2 issue overrides the Category 1 designation. (PIIC-8-4) 

Response: The introduction to Section 4.13 of the GEIS provides a definition of cumulative 

impacts and the goal of a cumulative impacts analysis. This text clearly states that the analysis 

takes into account all actions, however minor, and whether or not those actions are under the 

jurisdiction of the action agency (in this case, the NRC). It is the intent of the GEIS to present 

an overview analysis of cumulative impacts for the full range of potential impact areas including 

environmental justice (discussed in Section 4.13.12). As described in the GEIS (Table 2.1-1 

and Section 4.13), cumulative impacts are considered a Category 2 issue, and would require a 

site-specific analysis. The commenter is correct in the assertion that Category 2 issues, such 

as threatened and endangered species and environmental justice, require evaluation of all 

factors affecting that issue, including those that might normally be considered as Category 1 

issues (e.g., human health effects or transmission lines). No changes were made to the GEIS 

in response to this comment. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-208 

Comment: Please carefully examine the implications for public health and safety (and how it 

would impact risk assessment safety margins) of doing such major reconstruction (some 

varieties of which have never been done before as at San Onofre) during the current license, 

and then have at least one more major reconstruction if the facility is to achieve the ridiculous 

time frame foreseen by consideration of a multiple decade operating license extension. Another 

point to factor in when doing site-specific or any cumulative effects analysis is the combination 

of differing kinds of facilities, aging impacts on the facilities, technical glitches and human error, 

all combined with the major component replacement and reconstruction at the facilities. Such 

examinations clearly must take place under Category 2 in future NRC documents. (Campbell31-20) 

Response: Section 4.13.11 addresses the cumulative impacts on public health in terms of 

exposures to radiological, chemical, and microbiological hazards as a result of environmental 

accumulations of constituents released by various facilities within the region of influence. 

Because the impacts of such exposures are considered Category 2 issues under the GEIS, they 

would be evaluated on a plant-specific basis (as stated in the introduction to Section 4.13 of the 

GEIS). Safety issues such as those related to the aging of plant facilities, however, would be 

evaluated as part of the NRC’s safety review process. No changes were made to the GEIS in 

response to this comment. 

A.2.1.12 Comments Concerning Alternatives to Nuclear Power 

Comment: I'm an environmentalist. I'm a naturalist. I believe that there should be more 

approaches to more environmentally friendly means to produce electricity. Of course, I'm not 

going to reinvent the wheel and I'm sure very few people care about how the direction of our 

production of electricity is going to be in the future. (DPCA-Costa-16) 

Comment: I'm a little mixed on really what is the science. Is it more helpful to have a nuclear 

power plant to produce electricity versus a coal plant versus I like the hydro. I'm not sure how to 

say it. The one at -- I think it's Hoover Dam. 

So, I think we have the means to produce electricity in different fashions. So, I would like to 

personally see if it's a great environmental concern to shut down the majority of them. But, 

we’ve already had too much chemicals in our atmosphere as is it. (DPCA-Costa-18) 

Comment: Taking a quick look at this book, I'm sure we've all read it since it came out a few 

hours ago. When we go over to the renewable energy section and I don't know where these 

guys get off acting like experts. That's what really bothers me in that section.

Let's see. Large dams diminished due to increased public concerns over flooding, habitat 

alteration and loss. Okay. Well, there's public concerns about nuclear power, too, but that 
Appendix A 

 A-209 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

hasn't had any affect. It says large dam -- hydroelectric facilities can provide 10,000 megawatts. 

That's ten nuclear reactors worth of energy, but you might have to divert because fish and so, 

therefore, let's go with the reactors. 

Okay. Geothermal. Geothermal can provide 23,000 megawatts according to current technology. 

However, it's located far away and we'd have to build transmission lines and we're building 

transmission lines to get to Palo Verde just so that San Onofre has a backup nuclear reactor. I 

think we can build transmission lines if we need to. 

Let's talk about wind turbines. They have visual resource degradation. They're ugly. San 

Onofre isn't, but they are. Okay. Yes, it's bird collisions, shipping lane interference, noise. You 

know, it's too bad nuclear reactor radiation doesn't make a little sound when it decays. It does 

on a Geiger counter, but too bad it's doesn't actually make that sound because then we'd be 

hearing it constantly and maybe we'd start to fear it. 

Let's see. Photovoltaic systems aren't going to work because they've only been used in small 

appliances in homes and remote locations. Not a chance. Okay. 

It says here that according to California there's no significant health effects from solar. Although 

you've managed to list the hazardous chemicals including arsine, phosphine, saline. I can't 

pronounce all of these. Sulfur hexafluoride. Moliptinam hexafluoride. Tungsten hexafluoride 

and you know what? I bet you can't find all the chemicals that are used to make nuclear fuel 

listed in here, but all the ones used to make solar and how bad they are, that's listed. 

Okay. And ocean wave technology is in its infancy. So, therefore, it can't work. Well, they said 

that once about nuclear power and it wasn't all that long ago and guess what? It still doesn't 

work. So that’s not a reason not to give it a chance. Okay. (DPCA-AHoffman-26) 

Comment: Now, the fact is we can have many comments about issues that we find deficient 

with the revised GElS. They could range from, as was brought up in San Luis Obispo yesterday 

as well, inadequacy of thorough evaluation of alternative forms of energy which is glossed over 

very haphazardly. This has been noted. (DPCA-A4NR2-38) 

Comment: We wish to bring to your attention several statements from the alternatives analysis 

in the Generic EIS: 

"Presently, energy extracted from wind cannot be stored." And: "To serve as a source of 

commercial power, photovoltaic systems and concentrating solar power systems would need to 

work in conjunction with energy storage systems such as batteries." 

Both of these assertions need to be revised and corrected in light of current technology. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-210 

The Generic EIS should note: 

− In April of this year, as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, the Vice 

President outlined plans for the Dept of Energy to distribute more than $3.3 billion in smart grid 

technology development grants and an additional $615 million for smart grid storage. 

− Xcel Energy has begun testing battery-storage technology that captures wind energy and 

moves it to the grid when needed. S&C Electric Company has developed a Smart Grid Storage 

Management System, an automatic controller that provides the ability to store energy in a 

battery storage system, and to control the discharge of power when required. 

− Grid Storage Technologies has developed a utility scale zinc/air battery 

technology with a rated power capacity of I MW and 6 hours of energy storage with 

low maintenance cost. 

− Grid support energy storage is currently a $2.4 billion market, growing at a rate of more 

than 3% per year. (Sierra-4-1) 

Comment: I'm the director of the San Luis Obispo chapter of the Sierra Club, representing the 

Sierra Club's members in San Luis Obispo County. I would like to thank them, and all the other 

activists, residents, and the NRC for relocating these meetings in California reactor 

communities. 

We noted, with interest, several statements from the alternatives analysis in the generic EIS. 

Quote. "Presently, energy extracted from wind cannot be stored." End quote. And quote. "To 

serve as a source of commercial power, photovoltaic systems and concentrating solar power 

systems would need to work in conjunction with energy storage systems such as batteries," end 

quote, implying that this is an insurmountable barrier to be addressed in a distant misty future. 

This is the wrong frame in which to analyze a decision on whether to permit an action that will 

have ramifications in a 20 year timeframe. The generic EIS should note the following. Excel 

Energy has begun testing battery storage technology that captures wind energy and moves it to 

the grid, when needed. 

SNC Electric Company's SmartGrid Storage Management System provides the ability to store 

energy in a battery storage system, and control the discharge of power, when required. 

Grid Storage Technologies has developed a utility scale zinc-air battery technology with a rated 

power capacity of 1 megawatt with six hours of energy storage, with low maintenance cost. 

In April, as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, the vice personal 

representative outlined plans for the Department of Energy to distribute more than $3.3 billion in 
Appendix A 

 A-211 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

smart grid technology development grants, and then an additional $615 million for smart grid 

storage. 

Grid support energy storage, as an industry is currently a $2.4 billion market and is growing at 

more than 3 percent per year. 

We also note this statement in your analysis of alternative energy sources. 

Quote. "Historically, photovoltaic systems have not been used for commercial power generation 

but have been used in power appliance -- or rather -- used to power appliances in homes in 

remote locations that cannot be easily connected to the transmission grid." End quote. 

We direct the NRC's attention to the nation of Germany, which is number one in the world in 

solar PV power generation because it has a feed-in tariff for renewable electricity, which 

requires utilities to pay consumers a guaranteed right for solar power they feed into the grid, 

which resulted in Germans installing about 1300 megawatts of new PV capacity in 2007, up 

from 850 megawatts in 2006. Market analysts expect solar power to supply 25 percent of 

Germany's electricity demand by 2050. 

Closer to home, on October 11th, Governor Schwarzenegger signed two bills into law, one 

requiring California utilities to buy power from a larger pool of small solar generators for abovemarket prices, increasing market access for small-scale producers of solar power, and the other 

requiring utilities to pay homeowners for excess energy they generate from their wind turbines 

or solar panels over the course of a year. 

California homeowners previously received a credit for extra energy they sent back to the grid, 

i.e., watching your meter spin backwards. 

We are surprised to find that the NRC apparently has not heard about any of this. We wish to 

assure you that neither California nor Germany consists primarily of homes in remote locations 

that cannot be easily connected to the transmission grid. 

Your version of photovoltaic solar power appears to be about 25 years out of date, in view of 

which we concur with the Alliance For Nuclear Responsibility, the Department of Energy, not the 

NRC, should be tasked with the analysis of renewable energy sources and future options, when 

evaluating alternatives to the relicensing of nuclear power plants and their environmental 

impacts. Thank you. (PBCA-Sierra-35) 

Comment: We also note the following statement from your analysis of alternative energy 

sources: 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-212 

"Historically, photovoltaic systems have not been used for commercial power generation, 

but have been used to power appliances and homes in remote locations that cannot be 

easily connected to the transmission grid." 

And here we note the use of the past-tense. "Historically," all fuel was derived from the burning 

of wood. In the present, we direct the NRC's attention to the nation of Germany, the world's 

premier market for PV solar power generation, because it has a feed-in tariff for renewable 

electricity, requiring utilities to pay customers a guaranteed rate for solar power they feed into 

the grid, a policy which resulted in Germans installing about 1,300 megawatts of new PV 

capacity in 2007, up from 850 megawatts in 2006. In 2008, Spain added 2,500 megawatts of 

PV to its installed base of solar power. As capacity has risen, installed PV system costs have 

been cut in half. Market analysts expect solar power to supply 25 percent of Germany's 

electricity demand by 2050. 

 

On October 11th, 2009, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed two bills into law −

one that increases market access for small-scale solar power producers, and one that requires 

utilities to pay for the excess power that owners of rooftop solar panels and backyard wind 

turbines feed back into the grid. California homeowners with solar panels currently receive a 

credit for extra energy sent to the grid. This legislation is likely to result in a significant increase 

in solar PV in California in the next few years. 

We are surprised to find that the NRC is evidently unaware of all of the above. We assure you 

that neither California nor Germany consists primarily of "homes in remote locations that cannot 

be easily connected to the transmission grid." The GElS's version of wind and solar power and 

renewable energy storage technology is cursory, severely out of date or wholly lacking, and of 

no use in an alternatives analysis that should evaluate the viability of nuclear power plants over 

a 20-year period that will be marked by increasing costs and scarcity of nuclear fuel and 

increasing costs of plant maintenance and repair, simultaneously with smart grid and renewable 

energy storage technologies coming on line as the price of solar and wind power continues to 

drop, all pointing toward the potential commercial obsolescence of nuclear power within the 

relicensed period. 

For the above reasons, we strongly suggest that the Department of Energy, not the NRC, be 

tasked with the analysis of renewable energy sources as alternatives to the relicensing of 

nuclear power plants. (Sierra-4-2) 

Comment: Page S-2: A full range of power generation alternatives are evaluated in the GElS, 

including fossil fuel, new nuclear, and renewable energy sources. Conservation and power 

purchasing are also considered as alternatives to license renewal, because they represent other 

options for electric system planners. 
Appendix A 

 A-213 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

As previously noted by A4NR, with regard to the NRC's inaccurate evaluation of Compressed 

Air Energy Storage (as one example) the NRC's information on renewable energy is out of date 

and incomplete. 

A4NR, et al, recommend that data and statistics on the use and availability of alternative and 

renewable energy by evaluated by the DOE. (A4NR-11-30) 

Comment: Page 2−17 Alternative Energy Sources: The NRC evaluated the environmental 

impacts of energy sources that may serve as alternatives to license renewal. Alternative energy 

sources included a variety of fossil fuel, new nuclear, renewable energy, and other alternatives 

such as conservation and energy efficiency as well as purchased power. 

Where in the NRC's mandate is the expertise to evaluate the environmental impacts of 

alternative sources granted? One example is found on page 2-22 where the NRC writes: 

"Presently, energy extracted from wind cannot be stored." Presently, there are two 

Compressed Air Energy Storage systems operating in the world, one in Alabama and the other 

in Huntorf, Germany. In addition, PG&E-operators of Diablo Canyon-are currently applying to 

the Department of Energy for a $25 million Smart Grid stimulus funding grant, under the 

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, for a large compressed air energy storage (CAES) 

project. 

Given these lapses in the NRC's understanding of current alternative energy technologies, it 

seems that the analysis of alternatives should solely be under Department of Energy and state 

jurisdiction. 

The NRC should request up-to-date information from the DOE and states as to amount of new 

MW's created by all energy sources in past decade. The NRC should also include the cost per 

kWh of all new energy sources (year by year) in the past decade and estimates for new MW 

that will generate electricity in the next decade. Finally, the NRC should also request up-to-date 

information from the DOE relating to the reduction in energy use and increase in efficiency 

programs that have reduced energy use. (A4NR-11-20) 

Response: Under NEPA, the NRC has the obligation to consider reasonable alternatives to the 

proposed action of renewing the license for a nuclear reactor. As stated in the comments, there 

are many ways to produce electricity, and the nation’s energy security is best ensured with an 

energy portfolio that is made up of many different generating technologies. Alternatives that are 

capable of meeting the purpose of the proposed action, for example, future system generating 

needs, as such needs may be determined by State, utility, system, and, where authorized, 

Federal (other than NRC) decisionmakers, are considered. However, many circumstantial 

factors must be considered and evaluated before the NRC can conclude that a particular 

electricity generation technology would be a reasonable alternative to license renewal. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-214 

Capacity, reliability, and location of the alternative technology relative to the load centers that 

are currently being served by the reactor, as well as the configuration and uncommitted capacity 

of the existing transmission infrastructure between that alternative technology and those load 

centers are principal considerations. To be considered a reasonable alternative, a technology 

must be commercially viable on a utility scale and operational prior to the expiration of the 

reactor’s operating license or expected to become commercially viable on a utility scale and 

operational prior to the expiration of the reactor’s operating license. Included in the 

technologies that are evaluated are energy technologies that are considered by most to be 

“environmentally friendly,” including renewable energy technologies. For renewable energy 

technologies, additional considerations regarding the existence, quality, constancy, accessibility, 

capacity, and reliability of the renewable resource are equally important considerations, in 

addition to the condition of the interconnecting transmission systems. For example, 

concentrated solar power (CSP) facilities may be a feasible alternative for a nuclear reactor 

located close to the high-value solar resource zones in the desert Southwest, but those same 

facilities would not be feasible replacements for a nuclear reactor located on the East Coast. 

Once those evaluations are completed, the environmental impacts of technically feasible 

alternatives are evaluated to determine if any are environmentally superior to license renewal. 

In developing its alternatives analysis, the NRC relied on published reports on each of the 

alternative energy technologies being considered. Importantly, the NRC’s analysis of alternative 

energy technologies must remain focused on the purpose of the proposed action: to meet future 

system generating needs, as such needs may be determined by State, utility, system, and, 

where authorized, Federal (other than NRC) decisionmakers. The descriptions of energy 

technologies contained in the published draft revised GEIS were accurate representations of the 

commercially available technologies at the time the draft revised GEIS was published. The 

NRC acknowledges that, especially for rapidly evolving renewable energy technologies and 

energy storage technologies, the descriptions contained in the GEIS can go quickly out of date. 

Therefore, the NRC is taking the opportunity to update the revised GEIS prior to final 

publication. However, because energy technologies continue to evolve, the analyses presented 

here are simply a starting point for NRC’s site-specific analysis of alternatives, which are 

presented in plant-specific SEISs. In the SEISs, alternative technologies will be evaluated on a 

site-specific basis for reliability (as a baseload power source), availability, resource 

requirements, environmental impact, and existing transmission infrastructure that would connect 

that alternative with the load centers being served by the reactor. Only after all such factors are 

considered can conclusions be made regarding acceptable alternatives. The GEIS facilitates 

that alternative analysis by providing future NRC review teams with empirical evidence of the 

performance, environmental impacts, and resource demands and impacts of those potential 

energy alternatives current as of the time the updated GEIS was prepared. Since an 

alternatives analysis is required under NEPA, a site-specific analysis of alternatives will be 

performed, taking into account any new and significant information that has developed since the 

preparation of the revised GEIS. 
Appendix A 

 A-215 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Where the comments suggest that the DOE should play a role in the NRC’s alternatives 

analysis, it is important to note that the DOE’s mission is to direct and fund energy technology 

research and promote its development and incorporation into energy portfolios; however, the 

NRC’s mission is fundamentally different, as described above. 

While all of the examples offered by the commenters offer possibilities for energy production in 

the future, their schedules for commercialization cannot be determined with any certainty at this 

time. In addition, ongoing tests may in some cases reveal significant limitations to their eventual 

wholesale implementation. Because technology initiatives of the type suggested by the 

commenters are evolving rapidly, it is not possible for the GEIS to represent NRC’s final position 

on their value and applicability as alternatives to license renewal. The GEIS identifies the 

principal energy technologies currently under development and relies on the NRC review team 

conducting the alternatives analysis for future site-specific license renewal reviews to 

incorporate those technologies into their alternative analyses, taking into account their current 

state and schedule of development as well as other circumstantial factors that would impact 

their implementation. 

Many people are concerned about how their electricity is produced, and that concern is reflected 

in State and regional energy policies that encourage and incentivize the development of 

renewable energy technologies that are less environmentally intrusive than conventional means 

of baseload power generation. The expected growth in solar energy generation in California 

reflects California’s energy policy, just as Germany’s investment in photovoltaics is a reflection 

of that country’s energy policy. The NRC has no authority to set energy policy on a national or 

State level, or to impose energy tariffs or the energy priorities of other countries, but it does 

have an obligation to incorporate considerations of existing regulations and policies into its 

evaluation of energy alternatives. However, that incorporation is more appropriately made in 

the context of individual license renewal reviews, rather than in the generic baseline evaluations 

contained in the GEIS. As with the renewable energy technologies themselves, energy policies 

are evolving rapidly. While the NRC acknowledges that legislation, technological 

advancements, and public policy can underlie a fundamental paradigm shift in energy portfolio 

development and maintenance, the NRC cannot place a high degree of reliance on the 

anticipated changes. Instead, the NRC tasks its review teams to evaluate the status of energy 

technologies during future plant-specific reviews, and to reflect their assessments of those local 

conditions in future site-specific SEISs. NRC’s responsibility under NEPA is to objectively 

evaluate those alternatives within the context of those newly formulated energy policies in order 

to determine whether any alternative is environmentally superior to the proposed action of 

license renewal. 

Section 2.3.4 of the revised GEIS was revised to include updated information relevant to 

renewable energy alternatives, including an expanded discussion on energy storage 

technologies. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-216 

Comment: And I have a couple of thoughts to put forward. One thought to the NRC is our 

company just recently got the only -- were granted the only patent for the permanent elimination 

of nuclear waste and it would not require any storage outside in ponds or anything like that and 

I'd like the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to really consider this when they go over this. 

Secondly, there's a lot of misconception by a lot of people about how dangerous living near a 

nuclear plant is and yes, it's got radiation, but what's interesting was a plant back in, and I can't 

remember the name of it, back in I believe Pennsylvania. People got a little uptight about 

nuclear power and so, they said we want to go back to a coal - fired plant. 

So, while they were building the coal-fired plant, they still operated the nuke because they still 

needed the power and as they started testing the coal-fired plant, now this is 30 miles away 

from the nuke, the radiation alarms, the emergency level of radiation alarms started going off in 

the nuke and it drove the inspectors crazy looking for the leaks until they found out it was 

coming from the coal-fired plant. 

Coal when it's burnt emits 4.5 parts per million radio-nuclides from coal, normal coal. Clean 

coal, that's a misnomer, 1.8 parts per million and oil, like we have out here, 1.39 parts per 

million; natural gas .18 parts per million and there are even trace elements from wind power and 

solar power which is interesting and nuclear emits nothing because it is a reaction. It's not a 

burning. Anything that burns emits trace elements of radiation and this goes on 24 hours a day, 

seven days a week. So, it's really something you have to consider. (DPCA-PRWS-1) 

Response: The environmental impacts of coal-fired electricity generation, including the release 

of criteria and hazardous air pollutants and radioactive species, are discussed in the resourcespecific assessments presented in Chapter 4 of the GEIS. To provide a quantification of the air 

quality impacts, the GEIS analyzed the coal burning technology most likely to be selected in the 

future, a pulverized coal boiler generating supercritical steam and equipped with pollution 

control devices expected to be required to meet national air pollution requirements. To 

complete this analysis, the NRC also specified a coal source and analyzed the impacts of this 

representative coal-fired facility with and without carbon capture and sequestration capabilities 

that may be required by future regulations. However, each of the engineering specifications on 

which the NRC analysis is based is subject to change based on the existence of a more likely 

and more readily available coal source in the geographic area under consideration, 

advancements in coal cleaning and coal burning technologies occurring after publication of the 

GEIS, as well as the existence of State or local air pollution regulations and State energy 

policies. The introduction of those unique site-specific factors are the responsibility of the NRC 

review team conducting the alternatives analysis for future site-specific license renewal reviews. 

No changes were made to the GEIS as a result of this comment.
Appendix A 

 A-217 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Comment: Evaluation of Energy Alternatives: The draft GElS states, "alternatives for 

replacement power are generally the same from plant to plant. Applications to date have 

indicated that the environmental impacts of license renewal are small and less than the 

environmental impacts of alternatives for replacement power” (GEIS, p. A-38). However, the 

types of replacement power available and environmental impacts differ substantially from region 

to region. The environmental impacts included in GElS analyses are incomplete in that they 

have not considered the full lifecycle impacts of power production options. (For example, 

nuclear power lifecycle impacts include impacts from uranium mining, fuel enrichment, plant 

operation, plant decommissioning and nuclear waste storage, transportation and disposal.) The 

lifecycle impacts for different energy alternatives in comparison to nuclear power production 

should be included in the revised draft GElS. 

The draft GElS should be revised to require regional or site-specific lifecycle evaluations of 

nuclear power and alternative electricity sources, including wind, solar, biomass, geothermal, 

and energy efficiency. For example, the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy 

estimates that a comprehensive energy efficiency program could reduce energy demand by 

18% in 2010 and 33% in 2020. In addition, in some regions base load renewable resources or 

a combination of intermittent renewable resources and gas-fired generation or energy storage 

could replace large quantities of nuclear power. Evaluations of the environmental impacts of 

these power options should include "cradle-to-grave" or lifecycle environmental impacts. 

A share of the nuclear energy generation in California could be more or less easily replaced with 

alternative resources, depending upon the location. For example, geothermal reserves located 

in Nevada and the Coachella and Imperial Valleys in California could be tapped to yield base 

load energy currently provided by the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, and augmented 

by solar resources. A portion of the energy generated from Diablo Canyon could be replaced by 

renewable resources located across the breadth of Central California, augmented by 

dispatchable gas-fired and continuous renewable, such as geothermal and biomass resources. 

The latter, capable of cycling up and down, unlike Diablo Canyon, would facilitate the integration 

of the intermittent resources that are expected to largely contribute to meeting the state's 

renewable energy goals. (CEC-9(1)-8) 

Response: The site- or region-specific evaluation of alternative energy sources advocated by 

the commenter is the responsibility of the NRC review team conducting an environmental 

assessment of each license renewal request and would be presented in the site-specific SEIS. 

Indeed, regional differences exist with respect to the value, availability, feasibility, and costeffectiveness of alternative sources of power. State legislative actions, adopted energy policies, 

and regulations introduce additional priorities for consideration of alternative sources of 

baseload power. However, beyond acknowledgement of the existence of these differing 

circumstantial factors, the GEIS is intended to provide a reference condition for each alternative 

to license renewal that can be reasonably expected to satisfy the objective behind license 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-218 

renewal, specifically the provision of baseload power in an amount equivalent to the capacity of 

the reactor(s) under review for license renewal. It is then incumbent on each NRC review team 

considering a license renewal application to evaluate each potentially available alternative 

technology in the appropriate State or regional context, factoring in all relevant factors that 

enhance the selection of some technologies while discouraging or even preempting the 

application of other alternatives. The objective of the GEIS is to provide a baseline of 

environmental impacts known to be associated with each potential energy alternative, 

regardless of where they are installed, and to alert the NRC review teams of the need to 

adequately consider the rapidly occurring technological advancements and political 

circumstances surrounding some alternative energy technologies in their reviews. In doing so, 

the GEIS provides the NRC review teams for future license renewal applications with a basis 

from which to pursue an evaluation of alternatives such as suggested by the commenter. 

While Section 2.3.4 of the GEIS has been updated to clearly describe the above approach, the 

fundamental approach to providing information for use by NRC review teams has not been 

changed.

Comment: Page 4-10, lines 9 to 14: Text in lines 9 to 14 on page 4-10 is labeled 

“Construction – ...” 

Although the text in lines 9 to 14 on page 4-10 of the draft updated GEIS is labeled 

“Construction – ...” it appears to address both construction and operations impacts. Consider 

creating a separate paragraph labeled “Operations – ...” Also, consider mentioning coal 

storage, in addition to coal delivery and waste storage, as an activity that would consume more 

land at a coal plant than at a gas-fired plant. Finally, consider mentioning the visual effects of 

coal storage piles as a significant difference between coal-fired and gas-fired plants. This is 

also a significant difference between coal-fired plants and nuclear plants. (NEI1-7(4)-83) 

Response: Changes were made to Section 4.2.2.1 to clearly indicate that impacts from both 

construction and operation would be occurring for fossil fuel alternatives. Section 4.2.2.1 should 

be read in combination with the introductory paragraphs provided above in Section 4.2.2 for a 

more detailed discussion of expected impacted from both construction and operation phases of 

any alternative technology.

Comment: Page 4-114, lines 9 to 34: Text in lines 9 to 34 on page 4-114 introduces the 

discussion in section 4.6.2 of the environmental consequences for terrestrial and aquatic 

ecology of alternatives to license renewal of nuclear power plants. Subsequent subsections 

4.6.2.1 and 4.6.2.2 discuss specific impacts of alternatives to nuclear plant license renewal that 

involve fossil energy and renewable energy technologies, respectively. 
Appendix A 

 A-219 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

For consistency with other sections in Chapter 4, consider adding introductory text in 

Section 4.6.2 (lines 9 to 34 on page 4-114) explaining why impacts on terrestrial and aquatic 

ecology are not evaluated for the new nuclear plant alternative to the proposed action. 

Alternatively, consider adding a new subsection to address the impacts of a new nuclear plant 

alternative. (NEI1-7(4)-105) 

Response: Section 4.6.2 has been revised. Construction-related impacts are presumed to be 

qualitatively the same for all power plant technologies and are therefore discussed only in the 

opening paragraphs of Section 4.6.2. Subsections that follow concentrate on operation-related 

impacts unique to those alternative energy technologies and especially make comparisons to a 

nuclear plant. A new subsection, Section 4.6.2.2, has been added to Section 4.6.2 of the GEIS 

that discusses the impacts to ecology of a new nuclear plant alternative.

Comment: D. The Draft Generic EIS Fails to Adequately Assess Aquatic Impacts in Specific 

Key Areas: Numerous specific statements in the draft revised Generic EIS need to be 

addressed by the NRC. These include the NRC’s portrayal of the Clean Water Act section 

316(b) Phase III rules, the viability of acoustic deterrent systems at plants in Belgium and New 

York, the role of the consultation process under the federal Endangered Species Act, and the 

environmental consequences, of alternatives to license renewal. 

5. Environmental Consequences of Alternatives to the Proposed Action:

The NRC's Statement: In Section 4.6.2, the NRC states that any alternative to license renewal 

of an existing facility would likely have a greater environmental impact than simply renewing the 

license of an existing facility. Draft Generic EIS, p. 4-114. 

The NYSDEC's Response: The basis for this NRC conclusion is not explained. Indeed, it is 

contradicted by other sections of the draft revised Generic EIS. For example, in Section 4.6.1.2, 

the NRC states that the operation of a cooling water intake system may cause moderate to 

large impacts on aquatic organisms: [T]he NRC concludes that the impingement and 

entrainment of aquatic organisms over the license renewal term at nuclear plants with once 

through cooling or cooling ponds could be small, moderate, or large and is considered a 

Category 2 issue. Draft Generic EIS, p. 4-86. Emphasis added.

The NRC fails to discuss, assess, or analyze potential benefits to aquatic resources by known 

and readily identifiable alternatives to the extension of licenses for existing nuclear generating 

facilities. By not renewing the license of a facility that uses a once-through cooling system, 

entrainment and impingement would no longer occur at that facility, which means that this 

impact would be significantly lessened. Similarly, such impacts would be significantly lessened 

if, by not renewing the license of an existing facility, a new power plant must be constructed with 

a closed-cycle cooling system, which the NRC has determined would be a Category 1 issue 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-220 

(closed-cycle cooling systems result in a small impact to aquatic resources). Moreover, 

impingement and entrainment impacts are not exclusively Clean Water Act Section 316(b) 

issues. The NRC can consider other alternatives than simply not renewing an operating 

license, such as requiring closed-cycle cooling or other mitigative technologies to minimize 

Endangered Species Act and Essential Fish Habitat impacts. 

In 1991, New York State made the following comment to the NRC on the 1996 Draft 

Generic EIS: [T]he NRC [should] include consideration of current standards of mitigative 

technologies in the GElS in that if nuclear plants are to be operating for an additional 20 years, 

then these license-extended plants should have their intake and discharge configuration 

reviewed as if they were a new facility. [S]ince many licensed and operating nuclear power 

plants received their condenser cooling system approval prior to the advent of new 

technologies...the best available technology...may be different given the additional 20 years of 

plant life. Thus, system retrofits may be appropriate for mitigation of the [moderate to large] 

impacts. 

The point raised by New York State in 1991 is just as valid as the points NYSDEC is raising in 

these comments in 2010. In conclusion, the NRC analysis presents a false choice. The result 

is that a viable and well-identified option − closed cycle cooling − is summarily dismissed 

instead of being discussed as part of a license renewal option. This approach does not meet 

NEPA requirements to adequately assess environmental impacts in the Generic EIS. 

(NYS DEC-12-10) 

Response: NRC’s authority does not extend to requiring operating nuclear plants to replace or 

modify their cooling systems to reduce impacts. That authority is held by the State or the EPA 

in their implementation of the provisions of the Clean Water Act (CWA). Contrary to the 

assertion made in the comment, Section 4.6.2 does not state that any alternative to license 

renewal of an existing facility would likely have a greater environmental impact than simply 

renewing the license of an existing facility. Rather, Section 4.6.2 states that there are potential 

ecological impacts of alternatives to the proposed action without specifying whether those 

impacts would be greater or less than the proposed action. The relative magnitude of impacts 

of generation alternatives to nuclear power generation would be dependent on the type and 

location of a specific proposed facility, the technologies to be employed by a facility, the size of 

the area that would be affected by development and operations, and the specific ecological 

characteristics of the area being considered for development. Text has been added to the 

section to clarify that the potential impacts of alternatives to the proposed action could be 

greater or less than renewing the license for an existing facility, depending on these factors.
Appendix A 

 A-221 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Comment: Page 4-114, lines 37 to 40: Text in lines 37 to 40 on page 4-114 reads as follows: 

Operations – Operational impacts include acid precipitation. EPA estimates acid emission rates 

from coal-fired power plants could range from: IGCC, 0.004 to 0.30 lb/MWh; subcritical PC 

0.018 to 0.088 lb/MWh; supercritical PC, 0.017 to 0.082 lb/MWh; ultra-supercritical PC, 0.015 to 

0.074 lb/MWh. 

The NRC is encouraged to add information to this section indicating that operations at a fossil 

energy facility would have essentially the same or greater potential impact on ecological 

resources as operation of a nuclear facility. Furthermore, the above-quoted estimates of acid 

rain emissions from various types of fossil energy facilities are not themselves impacts. The 

NRC is encouraged to add a discussion of the impacts of such acid rain emissions. 

(NEI1-7(4)-21) 

Response: Section 4.6.2.1 has been expanded to address other activities that are likely to 

occur at coal-fired plants. However, EPA estimates of emission rates for criteria pollutants have 

been removed. Because the emissions of criteria pollutants would be dependent on myriad 

factors, including fuel type, firing conditions, and pollution control equipment of the fossil fuel 

alternative, any estimates in the GEIS of acid rain–related impacts would be speculative, and 

references to that potential impact have been removed. It remains for the NRC review team to 

estimate the likely parameters of emissions and dispersion factors for a fossil fuel alternative 

being considered in a license renewal analysis and, from that, provide estimates of possible 

impact.

Comment: Page 4-128, lines 3 and 4: Text in lines 3 and 4 on page 4-128 reads as follows: 

Operation – The existence of the nuclear power plant could have a negative effect on recreation 

and tourism. 

Because, without a supporting reference citation, characterizing the nature of the effects of a 

nuclear power plant on recreation and tourism is speculative, consider changing the text in lines 

3 and 4 on page 4-128 to read as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

Operation - The existence of the nuclear power plant could potentially affect have an negative 

effect on recreation and tourism. (NEI1-7(4)-106) 

Response: The discussion in Section 4.8.2.2 of the GEIS was expanded to note that impacts 

to recreation would occur. The effect was not characterized, but instead is expected to be 

dependent on the perceptions individuals have regarding nuclear energy.
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-222 

A.2.1.13 Comments Concerning Postulated Accidents 

Comment: 6. Affected Environment (S 4): 3.3.1 Meteorology and Climatology (3-30 TO 

3-31): NRC's Draft discusses the importance of meteorology. In the Draft they say that the 

NRC requires that basic meteorological information be available for use in assessing (1) the 

environmental effects of radiological and non-radiological emissions and effluents resulting the 

construction or operation of a nuclear power plant and (2) the benefits of design alternatives. 

Plume Modeling Misrepresented − Implications: The Draft makes clear that NRC does not have 

an accurate understanding of plume modeling and as a result the Draft incorrectly assigns 

significance levels to certain issues (examples: health effects, emergency planning, SAMA) and 

incorrectly determined whether some issues are generic, Category 1 or site specific, Category 2 

− all contrary to their own definitions of significance levels and criteria for category designation. 

The Draft says that, "The most recent update to NRC Regulatory Guide 1.23, which covers 

meteorological monitoring programs for nuclear power plants, provides new guidance for onsite 

meteorological measurements at stationary licensed power reactors. The guidance covers the 

siting of instruments to provide representative measures at plant sites, the accuracy and range 

of specified measured parameters, and special considerations for plants located near influences 

of complex terrain (e.g., coastal areas, hills of significant grade or valleys), among other criteria 

and specifications.” 

This "positive spin" is misleading. What they fail to provide is an analysis of improvements that 

must be required to provide accurate plume modeling. 

Onsite fixed Meteorological Towers: The Draft says that, "Onsite meteorological conditions at 

commercial nuclear power plants are monitored at primary fixed meteorological towers with 

instrumentation at two levels (e.g., 10 and 60 m), and, if necessary, one additional higher level 

on the tower to better represent dispersion of elevated releases from stacks. A secondary 

onsite tower is typical at many installations as a backup if primary tower measures fail." 

What NRC does not tell you is that the onsite tower is insufficient. It tells where the plume is 

going onsite but not what may happen to it once it goes offsite. The simple fact is that 

measurements from a single 220' high anemometer will not provide sufficient information to 

project how an accidental release of a hazardous material would travel. For example: For 

cases at sites located adjacent to large bodies of water when the sea breeze is just developing 

and for cases when the onshore component winds do not reach entirely from the ground to the 

anemometer height, the occurrence of a sea breeze would not be identified. The anemometer 

would likely indicate an offshore wind indication. Further as PW demonstrated in Pilgrim's 

License Renewal process that basing wind direction on the single on-site meteorological tower 
Appendix A 

 A-223 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

data ignores shifting wind patterns away from the Pilgrim Plant including temporary stagnations, 

re-circulations, and wind flow reversals that produce a different plume trajectory. 

Variability of Weather Conditions: The Draft says that, "Weather conditions at each of the plants 

can be quite variable depending on the year, season, time of day, and site-specific conditions, 

such as whether the site is near coastal zones or located in or near terrain with complex 

features (e.g., steep slopes, ravines, valleys)." 

However NRC then fails to do anything with it. 

No mention is made of the importance of requiring the use of advanced variable trajectory 

plume models (instead of straight-line Gaussian plume models) and requiring real-time data 

from properly placed met towers offsite in surrounding communities. Instead the Draft goes off 

on an irrelevant tangent about "climate zones and historical tornado events," complete with 

maps. There is no tie to plume modeling, location of meteorological towers, computational 

modeling − MACCS2 or WINMAC that incorporates ATMOS. 

The Meteorological references provide, at 3.12, are paltry and show that NRC has not done due 

diligence in their review. It fails to include for example references to NRC, DOE, EPA, NAS −

see references provided in Appendix A. (PW-6-17) 

Comment: As previously discussed, NRC's NEPA regulations now require facilities, such as 

Indian Point, to conduct a severe accident mitigation alternatives analysis if NRC Staff has not 

previously considered such an analysis. 10 C.F.R. § 51. 53(c)(3)(ii)(L). Given the importance of 

such an analysis to the citizens residing near the facility, it is critical that this SAMA analysis be 

accurate and transparent. The State of New York has concerns that the typical SAMA analysis 

does not account for the various site specific characteristics at Indian Point, such as the site's 

population distribution, meteorology patterns, and complex topography. 

The proposed GElS contains a new section entitled "Meteorology and Climatology" which sets 

forth NRC's requirement that "basic meteorological information" be available to "determine 

dispersion conditions in the vicinity of the plant for assessment of safety and environmental 

factors.” Proposed GElS at 3-30. As the NRC explains, "these data are used with air dispersion 

models to protect public health, safety and property during plant operations." Id.

The Proposed GElS further explains that the NRC has recently updated its Regulatory Guide 

1.23 for onsite meteorological monitoring − a guide that covers instrument siting, accuracy and 

range of specified measured parameters, and "special considerations for plants located near 

influences of complex terrain (e.g. coastal areas, hills of significant grade or valleys)." 

(emphasis added) Id. at 3-30 −31. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-224 

The State of New York agrees that nuclear power plants located in complex terrain, such as 

Indian Point, should perform on site meteorological monitoring that will measure the effects of 

complex terrain on wind direction, velocity and other factors relevant to the dispersion of a 

radioactive plume during an accident. 

However, the collection of such "complex terrain" meteorological measurements is only relevant 

if these data are then used in an air dispersion model which itself is capable of incorporating the 

effects of complex terrain in its projection of the dispersion and concentration of a radioactive 

plume. Accurate air dispersion modeling is critical to an accurate SAMA analysis for Indian 

Point because it is sited in an area in which the population density within the 10 and 50 mile 

EPZs varies substantially, from sparsely populated semi-rural areas to the densely populated 

environs of New York City. Therefore, different directional dispersions of a radioactive plume 

can cause substantially different human exposures. 

Unfortunately, in its air dispersion modeling in the NEPA process and elsewhere, NRC has 

consistently used a simple straight-line Gaussian plume model, which the scientific community, 

the Environmental Protection Agency staff, and even NRC staff have acknowledged is not 

appropriate for air dispersion modeling for reactors in complex terrain (e.g., hilly, mountainous, 

or otherwise non-uniform terrain) such as the terrain surrounding Indian Point, which has many 

peaks and valleys. See NUREG-1437, Vol. 1, Supp. 38, Regarding Indian Point Nuclear 

Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3 (Dec. 2008) at 2-2.1 for a description of the terrain surrounding 

Indian Point. In the Indian Point license renewal proceeding, the State challenged the NRC's 

acceptance of Entergy's use of a straight line Gaussian plume model known as ATMOS in its 

SAMA analysis and that contention was admitted by the Licensing Board. Attached hereto are 

two declarations of Bruce A. Egan, executed November 27, 2007 (Ex. B)(ML092610911) and 

August 28, 2009 (Ex. C) ("Egan 2009 Decl.")(ML092610916),2

 submitted by the State of New 

York in support of its contention, which explain the inadequacy of such straight line Gaussian 

models in complex terrain and set forth the similar conclusion of the U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency, the U.S. Department of Energy and the NRC (in contexts other than the 

SAMA analysis required for license renewal). See, e.g., Egan 2009 Decl. at ¶¶ 54-57, 59.3

[

2

 Because of their length and size, the attachments to the Declaration of Bruce Egan are not attached but are 

incorporated herein. They can be found at ML092610910, ML092610912, ML092640223, ML092640221, 

ML091050257, ML092640169, ML092640173, ML092640170, ML092640171, ML092640172, ML092640174, 

ML092640175, ML092640177, and ML092640178.] 

[

3

 Dr. Egan has a Master of Science Degree in Engineering in Applied Physics, and a Master of Science and a 

Doctorate in Environmental Health Sciences, all from Harvard University. He has over 30 years experience as a 

manager and environmental scientist on projects involving the development and application of atmospheric 

dispersion models to complex topographies.] 

 
Appendix A 

 A-225 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

As Dr. Egan explains, there are several effects of the terrain at Indian Point on air flow, which 

cannot be accounted for by the ATMOS air dispersion model, a module within the MACCS2 

accident consequence code. In the case of high terrain features across the river from Indian 

Point, air flow from the east will either turn and pass along the side of the mountain or rise over 

the mountain, depending upon atmospheric stability conditions. Egan 2009 Decl. at ¶ 39. 

Therefore, a radioactive plume released from Indian Point and embedded in the air flow will not 

take the straight line trajectory across the river valley that would be predicted by the ATMOS 

model. Id. Under the more stable atmospheric conditions associated with greater ground level 

impacts, the plume is likely to be turned down the overall river valley as it cannot pass through 

the terrain. Id.

A second effect of mountainous terrain on sources located in river valleys, such as Indian Point, 

is the creation of drainage flows by the presence of the valley side walls. Egan 2009 Decl. at ¶ 

40. For example, at night when the earth's surface cools by radiating its heat upward, the air in 

contact with the surface cools. Because it is heavier than other air at that elevation, it flows, 

under the forces of gravity down the valley slopes toward the base of the valley. Id. In the 

absence of other influences, the pooling of the heavier air at the low point of the valley crosssection causes that air to tend to flow downriver, following the valley contours. Id. 

Meteorological models that incorporate the effects of topography will simulate the phenomenon 

of valley sidewalls tending to channel air within the confines of the valley flows to follow the 

valley contours. Egan 2009 Decl. ¶ 41. Nighttime drainage flows in river valleys will tend to 

stay in river valleys and flow in the same direction as the river itself. Id. 

A straight line Gaussian plume model cannot account for these phenomena, which could cause 

a night time radionuclide release to travel downriver toward the most populous areas in the 

fifty mile radius around Indian Point, including New York City and its surrounding suburbs. See 

Egan 2009 Decl. ¶¶ 39-42. The reasons that the straight line Gaussian model does not 

accurately predict air dispersion in complex terrain are fundamentally related to these multiple 

effects that the presence of high terrain has on altering the air flow. 

Virtually all competent independent experts, including federal agencies that rely upon air 

dispersion modeling results to carry out their functions, acknowledge that the Gaussian plume 

model is unsuitable for measuring air dispersion at sites that have complex terrain. See Egan 

2009 Decl., ¶¶ 48-57. These agencies and experts advocate for the use of alternate, more 

appropriate plume models such as CalPUFF or Calmet. See Egan 2009 Decl., ¶ 30.

Notwithstanding this overwhelming consensus of scientific opinion, the NRC continues to rely on 

an outmoded straight-line Gaussian plume model to conduct the SAMA analysis which may 

underestimate the costs of an accident to which the cost of a mitigation measure will be 

compared. For example, Entergy is only required to consider measures to mitigate the 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-226 

likelihood or severity of a severe accident, if the costs of the accident outweigh the cost of the 

mitigation measure. NEI 05-01 Rev. A, Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives Analysis −

Guidance Document at pages 1-3.4

 Human exposure to radiation is one cost of a severe 

accident, and is computed based on a cost of $2,000 per person rem of exposure. Id. at 16. 

For the human exposure cost to be accurately estimated, the air dispersion model must be able 

to account for the complex terrain features surrounding the plant so that the numbers of people 

exposed can be accurately projected. ATMOS, the air dispersion model embedded in the 

MACCS2 accident consequence code, is a simple straight-line Gaussian plume model which 

cannot accurately predict the path of a radioactive plume emitted during a severe accident. 

[

4

 This guidance document from the Nuclear Energy Institute was endorsed by NRC Staff in LR-ISG -2006 - 03 at 

pages 1-3.]

In sum, although the State agrees with the NRC that on-site meteorological measurements 

should contain "special considerations for plants located near influences of complex terrain 

(e.g., coastal areas, hills of significant grade or valleys)," those measurements are only 

meaningful if the NRC uses them in more sophisticated air dispersion models that can 

incorporate the effects of complex terrain on the dispersion of a radioactive plume released 

during a severe accident at Indian Point. The State of New York thus seeks a modification of 

the draft GElS to require the use of more sophisticated air dispersion models that can accurately 

account for the cost of human exposure to radiation in cases where the local terrain warrants 

use of such sophisticated models. (NYS AG-14-7) 

Comment: Appendix A: NRC, DOE, EPA, The National Research Council of the National 

Academies, State Officials, Nuclear Trade Groups, & Air Dispersion Modeling Community Agree 

That Straight Line Gaussian Plume Models Cannot Account For the Effects of Complex Terrain 

on the Dispersion of Pollutants from A Source. 

NRC: Since the 1970s, the USNRC has historically documented advanced modeling technique 

concepts and potential need for multiple meteorological towers appropriately located in offsite 

communities, especially in coastal site regions. But ignored implementing its' own advice. 

In 2009, the NRC made a presentation to the National Radiological Emergency Planning 

Conference22 concluded that the straight-line Gaussian plume models cannot accurately predict 

dispersion in a complex terrain and are therefore scientifically defective for that purpose 

[ADAMS − ML091050226, ML091050257, and ML091050269 (page references used here refer 

to the portion attached, Part 2, ML091050257).] 

[

22 Ibid] 
Appendix A 

 A-227 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Most reactors, if not all, are located in complex terrains. In the presentation, NRC said that the 

"most limiting aspect" of the basic Gaussian Model, is its "inability to evaluate spatial and 

temporal differences in model inputs" [Slide 28]. Spatial refers to the ability to represent impacts 

on the plume after releases from the site e.g., plume bending to follow a river valley or sea 

breeze circulation. Temporal refers to the ability of the model to reflect data changes over time, 

e.g., change in release rate and meteorology [Slide 4]. 

Because the basic Gaussian model is non-spatial, it cannot account for the effect of terrain on 

the trajectory of the plume − that is, the plume is assumed to travel in a straight line regardless 

of the surrounding terrain. Therefore, it cannot, for .example, '''curve' a plume around 

mountains or follow a river valley." NRC 2009 Presentation, Slide 33. However, many reactors 

are located near mountains or along river valleys. Further it cannot account for transport and 

diffusion in coastal sites subject to the sea breeze. Sea breeze also applies to any other large 

bodies of water. The sea breeze causes the plume to change direction caused by differences in 

temperature of the air above the water versus that above the land after sunrise. If the regional 

wind flow is light, a circulation will be established between the two air masses. At night, the land 

cools faster, and a reverse circulation (weak) may occur [Slide 43]. Turbulence causes the 

plume to be drawn to ground level [Slide 44]. 

 

The presentation goes on to say that, "Additional meteorological towers may be necessary to 

adequately model sea breeze sites" [Slide 40]. 

Significantly, the NRC 2009 Presentation then discussed the methods of more advanced 

models that can address terrain impact on plume transport, including models in which emissions 

from a source are released as a series of puffs, each of which can be carried separately by the 

wind, (NRC 2009 Presentation Slides 35, 36). This modeling method is similar to CALPUFF. 

Licensees are not required, however, to use these models in order to more accurately predict 

where the plume will travel to base protective action recommendations. 

The NRC recognized as early as 1977 that complex terrain presented special problems that a 

model must address if the air dispersion analysis is to be accurate.23 For example: NRC, 

Regulatory Guide 1.111, Methods for Estimating Atmospheric Transport and Dispersion of 

Gaseous Effluents in Routine Releases from Light-Water-Cooled Reactors (July 1977) (Draft for 

Comment) says that, "Geographic features such as hills, valleys, and large bodies of water 

greatly influence dispersion and airflow patterns. Surface roughness, including vegetative 

cover, affects the degree of turbulent mixing." (Emphasis added). 

[

23 Ibid]
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-228 

This is not new information; knowledge of the inappropriateness of straight-line Gaussian plume 

in at complex sites goes back a long way within NRC. For example:

1972: NRC Regulatory Guide 123 (Safety Guide 23) On Site Meteorological Programs 1972, 

states that, "at some sites, due to complex flow patterns in non-uniform terrain, additional wind 

and temperature instrumentation and more comprehensive programs may be necessary." 

1977: NRC began to question the feasibility of using straight line Gaussian plume models for 

complex terrain. See U.S.NRC, 1977, Draft for Comment Reg. Guide 1.111 at 1c (pages 1.111-

9 to 1.111-10) 

1983: In January 1983, NRC Guidance [ NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 "Clarification of TMI 

Action Plan Requirements," January 1983 Regulatory Guide 1.97- Application to Emergency 

Response Facilities; 6.1 Requirements], suggested that changes in on-site meteorological 

monitoring systems would be warranted if they have not provided a reliable indication of 

monitoring conditions that are representative within the 10-mile plume exposure EPZ. 

1996: The NRC acknowledged the inadequacy of simple straight-line Gaussian plume models 

to predict air transport and dispersion of a pollutant released from a source in a complex terrain 

when it issued RTM-96, Response Technical Manual, which contains simple methods for 

estimating possible consequences of various radiological accidents. In the glossary of that 

document, the NRC's definition of "Gaussian plume dispersion model" states that such models 

have important limitations, including the inability to "deal well with complex terrain." 

NUREG/BR-0150, Vol. 1 Rev.4, Section Q; ADAMS Accession Number ML062560259. 

2004: A NRC research paper, Comparison of Average Transport and Dispersion Among a 

Gaussian, A Two- Dimensional and a Three-Dimensional Model, Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory, October, 2004 at 2. ("Livermore Report") had an important caveat added to the 

Report's summary about the scientific reliability of the use of a straight-line Gaussian model in 

complex terrains: "...[T]his study was performed in an area with smooth or favorable terrain and 

persistent winds although with structure in the form of low-level nocturnal jets and severe 

storms. In regions with complex terrain, particularly if the surface wind direction changes with 

height, caution should be used. Livermore Report at 72. (emphasis added) 

2005: In December, 2005, as part of a cooperative program between the governments of the 

United States and Russia to improve the safety of nuclear power plants designed and built by 

the former Soviet Union, the NRC issued a Procedures Guide for a Probabilistic Risk, related to 

a Russian Nuclear Power Station. The Guide, prepared by the Brookhaven National Laboratory 

and NRC staff, explained that atmospheric transport of released material is carried out 

assuming Gaussian plume dispersion, which is "generally valid for flat terrain." However, the 

Guide the caveat that in "specific cases of plant location, such as, for example, a mountainous 
Appendix A 

 A-229 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

area or a valley, more detailed dispersion models may have to be considered." Kalinin VVER1OOO Nuclear power Station Unit 1 PRA, Procedures Guide for a Probabilistic Risk 

Assessment, NUREG/CR- 6572, Rev. 1 at 3-114; excerpt attached as Exhibit 8, full report 

available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/contract/cr6572. 

2007: NRC revised their Regulatory Guide 1.23, Meteorological Monitoring Programs for 

Nuclear Power Plants. On page 11, the section entitled Special Considerations for Complex 

Terrain Sites says that: 

At some sites, because of complex flow patterns in nonuniform terrain, additional wind and 

temperature instrumentation and more comprehensive programs may be necessary. For 

example, the representation of circulation for a hill-valley complex or a site near a large body of 

water may need additional measuring points to determine airflow patterns and spatial variations 

of atmospheric stability. Occasionally, the unique diffusion characteristics of a particular site 

may also warrant the use of special meteorological instrumentation and/or studies. The plant's 

operational meteorological monitoring program should provide an adequate basis for 

atmospheric transport and diffusion estimates within the plume exposure emergency planning 

zone [i.e., within approximately 16 kilometers (10 miles)].24

[

24 For example, if the comparison of the primary and supplemental meteorological systems indicates convergence in 

a lake breeze setting, then a "keyhole" protective action recommendation (e.g., evacuating a 2-mile radius)] 

These excerpts from Regulatory Guide 1.23 demonstrate that the NRC recognizes there are 

certain sites, such as those located along river valleys (like Indian Point and Vermont Yankee) 

and those located in coastal areas (like Pilgrim and Seabrook) that multiple meteorological data 

input sources are needed for appropriate air dispersion modeling. Not simply one or two 

meteorological towers onsite. Since, for the reasons discussed above, the straight-line 

Gaussian plume model is incapable of handling complex flow patterns and meteorological data 

input from multiple locations, Regulatory Guide 1.23 demonstrates NRC's recognition that it 

should not be used at any site with complex terrain. (PW-6(1)-1) 

Comment: Appendix A: NRC, DOE, EPA, The National Research Council of the National 

Academies, State Officials, Nuclear Trade Groups, & Air Dispersion Modeling Community Agree 

That Straight Line Gaussian Plume Models Cannot Account For the Effects of Complex Terrain 

on the Dispersion of Pollutants from A Source. 

EPA: Likewise, EPA recognized the need for complex models. For example: EPA's 2005 

Guideline on Air Quality Models says in Section 7.2.8 Inhomogenous Local Winds that: 

In very rugged hilly or mountainous terrain, along coastlines, or near large land use variations, 

the characterization of the winds is a balance of various forces, such that the assumptions of 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-230 

steady-state straight line transport both in time and space are inappropriate. (Fed. Reg., 

1/09/05). 

EPA goes on to say that, "In special cases described, refined trajectory air quality models can 

be applied in a case-by-case basis for air quality estimates for such complex non-steady-state 

meteorological conditions." This EPA Guideline also references an EPA 2000 report, 

Meteorological Monitoring Guidance for Regulatory Model Applications, EPA-454/R-99-005, 

February 2000. Section 3.4 of this Guidance for coastal Locations, discusses the need for 

multiple inland meteorological monitoring sites, with the monitored parameters dictated by the 

data input needs of particular air quality models. EPA concludes that a report prepared for 

NRC25 provides a detailed discussion of considerations for conducting meteorological 

measurement programs at coastal sites, reactors on large bodies of water. Most important, 

EPA's November 2005 Modeling Guideline (Appendix A to Appendix W) lists EPA's "preferred 

models" and the use of straight line Gaussian plume model, called ATMOS, is not listed. 

Sections 6.1 and 6.2.3 discuss that the Gaussian model is not capable of modeling beyond 

50 km (32 miles) and the basis for EPA to recommend CALPUFF, a non − straight line model.26

[

25 Raynor, G.S.P. Michael, and S. SetnuRaman, 1979, Recommendations for Meteorological Measurement 

Programs and Atmospheric Diffusion Prediction Methods for Use at Coastal Nuclear Reactor Sites. NUREG/CR0936. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC.] 

[

26 http://www.epa.gov/scram001/lguidance/guide/appw_05.pdf] 

(PW-6(1)-2) 

 

Comment: Appendix A: NRC, DOE, EPA, The National Research Council of the National 

Academies, State Officials, Nuclear Trade Groups, & Air Dispersion Modeling Community Agree 

That Straight Line Gaussian Plume Models Cannot Account For the Effects of Complex Terrain 

on the Dispersion of Pollutants from A Source 

DOE: DOE, too, recognizes the limitations of the straight-line Gaussian plume model. They say 

for example that Gaussian models are inherently flat-earth models, and perform best over 

regions of transport where there is minimal variation in terrain. Because of this, there is inherent 

conservatism (and simplicity) if the environs have a significant nearby buildings, tall vegetation, 

or grade variations not taken into account in the dispersion parameterization.27

[

27 the MACCS2 Guidance Report June 2004 Final Report, page 3-8:3.2 Phenomenological Regimes of Applicability] 

(PW-6(1)-3) 

Comment: Appendix A: NRC, DOE, EPA, The National Research Council of the National 

Academies, State Officials, Nuclear Trade Groups, & Air Dispersion Modeling Community Agree 

That Straight Line Gaussian Plume Models Cannot Account For the Effects of Complex Terrain 

on the Dispersion of Pollutants from A Source. 
Appendix A 

 A-231 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

National Research Council: Tracking and Predicting The Atmospheric Dispersion of Hazardous 

Material Releases Implications for Homeland Security, Committee on the Atmospheric 

Dispersion of Hazardous Material Releases Board on Atmospheric Sciences and Climate 

Division on Earth and Life Studies, National Research Council of the National Academies, 2003. 

This report provides the recent history of dispersion model development. It summarizes the 

findings of the National Academies workshop by the same title that had the purpose of 

examining "how meteorological observations and dispersion models can be used by emergency 

managers in the context of an atmospheric release of hazardous chemical, biological or nuclear 

(C/B/N) agents". The workshop participants included atmospheric scientists from academia, 

government laboratories and the private sector as well as emergency management officials and 

first responders, and experts in related fields. 

The report discusses how the analytical Gaussian models were used in the 1960s and tested 

against limited field experiments in flat terrain areas performed in earlier decades. 

In the 1970s the US passed the Clean Air Act which required the use of dispersion models to 

estimate the air quality impacts of emissions sources for comparison to regulatory limits. This 

resulted in the development and testing of advanced models for applications in complex terrain 

settings such as in mountainous or coastal areas. In the 1980s, further advances were made 

with Lagrangian puff models and with Eulerian grid models. Gaussian models moved beyond 

the simple use of sets of dispersion coefficients to incorporate Monin-Obukhov and other 

boundary layer similarity measures which are the basis of contemporary EPA models used for 

both short range and long range transport applications. Helped enormously by advances in 

computer technologies, in the 1990s, significant advances were made in numerical weather 

prediction models and also further improve dispersion models through the incorporation of field 

experiment results and improved boundary layer parameterization. The decade starting with the 

year 2000 has seen improved resolution of meteorological models such as MM5 and the routine 

linkage of meteorological models with transport and dispersion models as exemplified by the 

real time forecasts of detailed fine grid weather conditions available to the public at Olympic 

events. Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) models which involve very fine grid numerical 

simulations of turbulence and fluid flow began to see applications in atmospheric dispersion 

studies. The next decade will see routine application of CFD techniques to complex flows 

associated with emergency response needs. 

The nuclear industry does not show evidence of keeping up with these technological advances. 

For use in modeling air quality concentrations, the NRC uses straight-line Gaussian dispersion 

algorithms that date back to the 1960s. Complex flow situations such as those associated with 

flow around high terrain features or that would incorporate sea breeze circulations are not 

simulated. For emergency response applications, the NRC does not seem to require any 

advanced modeling to be installed at nuclear power plants. The agency research groups have 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-232 

access to advanced simulation models but how these might be used for training purposes or for 

real time emergency response purposes is not apparent in the literature. 

According to the report: 

Emergency responders have a number of observational and modeling needs that are not well 

satisfied by existing services. Although it may never be possible to provide a "perfect" 

atmospheric dispersion prediction for any hazardous release, the committee believes that with 

more effective application of available tools and development of new technologies and 

capabilities, the atmospheric science community could play a larger role in addressing this 

critical national security concern. 

A copy of the Executive Summary and selected sections are attached (Appendix A). 

(PW-6(1)-4) 

Comment: Appendix A: NRC, DOE, EPA, The National Research Council of the National 

Academies, State Officials, Nuclear Trade Groups, & Air Dispersion Modeling Community Agree 

That Straight Line Gaussian Plume Models Cannot Account For the Effects of Complex Terrain 

on the Dispersion of Pollutants from A Source. 

Nuclear Utility Groups: Nuclear utility Meteorological Data Users Group (NUMUG): At the 1994 

American Nuclear Society Topical Meeting Environmental Transport and Dosimetry Aug 31-

Sept 3, 1993, Charleston, SC, a paper' titled An Atmospheric Dispersion Model for Emergency 

Response, K. Jerry Allwine (Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington) NUMUG 1994 

said in its introduction that: 

Predicting the dispersion of accidental releases of material to the atmosphere in regions of 

nonuniform terrain can be very challenging. Wind patterns can be highly variable in time and 

space, because of the synoptic influences, the influences of nonhomogenous surfaces (sea 

breeze, heat inland), and terrain-induced processes such as slope flows, channeling, blocking, 

mountain-valley winds, stagnations, layered flows. During the nighttime terrain effects can 

dominate the atmospheric motion, especially near the surface. Consequently, an important 

component of any emergency response model is the wind model which must reasonably 

represent the winds in complex terrain using a limited number of input wind observations that 

are generally not of sufficient coverage to completely define the winds in the modeling domain. 

(PW-6(1)-5) 

Comment: Then you can get, for example, to SAMA. We read here that mitigation has to be 

considered. No problem, but where are you going to address the fact or are we going to have to 

do it through the adjudication, then go to the district courts, of, hey, using the [MACCS] or the 

[MACCS] as to the computer code is not okay, licensees. DOE has recognized that, that the 

[MACCS2], which is the current computer code that is used in these SAMA analyses and 
Appendix A 

 A-233 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

license applications, underestimates consequence and, hence, DOE insisted that it revised to 

Sand, whatever David Jann called it, Sand, whatever it was, Sandia, whatever, the numbers are 

there. I can't remember them. There was a nine in it, but it it's my petition for review, for 

example, and it's also in the New York Attorney General's, what have you. 

So if they are allowed to use a computer code that is knowingly underestimates, according to 

DOE, according to the user guide, etcetera, etcetera, it's David Shannon who wrote this thing, 

something is wrong. Also, it is wrong, what is embedded, what is the plume model that's 

embedded in the [MACCS] and the [MACCS2]? It's [ATMOS], the straight line Gaussian plume 

model. And so if the NRC persists in kowtowing to the industry and allowing these, this to go 

on, how can we be, how can the public, how can the state governments have any confidence? I 

don't think they can. (NMA-PW-13) 

Response: Questions regarding the adequacy of straight-line, or Gaussian, atmospheric 

dispersion models have been studied in detail. This included a detailed code comparison 

completed in 2004 with the objective of determining if the average atmospheric transport and 

dispersion results from codes such as MACCS2 are sufficiently accurate that more complex 

models are not required. In that study, documented in NUREG/CR-6853, “Comparison of 

Average Transport and Dispersion Among a Gaussian, a Two-Dimensional, and a ThreeDimensional Model,” results from the MACCS2 code were directly compared to those from the 

LODI (Lagrangian Operational Dispersion Integrator) code. 

LODI is a state-of-the-art, three-dimensional (3D) advection dispersion code that uses a 

Lagrangian stochastic Monte Carlo method. LODI is coupled to ADAPT (Atmospheric Data 

Assimilation and Parameterization Technique), which provides time-varying, 3D fields of mean 

winds, turbulence, pressure, temperature, and precipitation based on observed meteorology. 

LODI is an element of the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) emergency 

response modeling system at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), which is a 

national support and resource center for planning, real-time assessment, emergency response, 

and detailed studies of incidents involving the spread of hazardous material accidentally or 

intentionally released into the atmosphere. 

As discussed in NUREG/CR-6853, this comparison shows that MACCS2 provides results 

consistent with those from the more complex plume models at distances up to 100 miles 

(161 kilometers). This is well beyond the 50-mile (80-kilometer) radius considered in the SAMA 

analysis. The MACCS2 predictions for average, time-integrated, ground-level air concentrations 

(which directly relate to inhalation and cloudshine doses), and for average deposition (which 

directly relates to groundshine and ingestion pathway doses) were very comparable (i.e., less 

than a factor of two) to predictions made by the state-of-the-art NARAC codes, ADAPT/LODI, at 

all distances. The direct comparison to the state-of-the-art NARAC codes demonstrates that 

straight-line air dispersion modeling is well within its range of validity when used to perform 

SAMA analyses. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-234 

Regarding whether Gaussian plume modeling is appropriate for air dispersion modeling for 

reactors in complex terrain, the Gaussian plume model provides further conservatism under 

variable terrain conditions. Specifically, when variable terrain features such as river 

embankments or mountains intervene between a source and an observation point, these 

features would tend to disperse and dilute the plume as it is forced to move around obstacles. 

The plume model conservatively estimates that the plume travels in a straight line over or 

through the obstacles, thereby resulting in larger accumulated radiological doses and higher 

estimates of economic consequences in areas farther from the plant. 

 

No change will be made to the GEIS based on these comments. 

Comment: Solid Waste Management [S-17]: NRC incorrectly assigns "small impact" and a 

Category 1 designation to solid waste management, low level waste storage and disposal and 

onsite storage of spent fuel. 

b. Onsite Storage of Spent Fuel: NRC assigns a "small impact" and a Category 1 designation 

to onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel, Table 2.1-1. We disagree and reference the filings on 

record submitted by Pilgrim Watch, the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office and New York 

State in the License Renewal Applications of Entergy in Pilgrim, Vermont Yankees and Indian 

Point's adjudications respectively; and the filings on record as comments to NRC's. Proposed 

Waste Confidence Decision by Pilgrim Watch; Texans For A Sound Energy Policy; Attorney 

Generals of New York, Vermont and Massachusetts7

. 

[

7

 Texans For A Sound Energy Policy And Commenters On Proposed Waste Confidence Decision Update And 

Proposed Rule Regarding Consideration Of Environmental Impacts Of Temporary Storage Of Reactor Operations 

Prepared By Ms, Diane Curran, Esq; New York Attorney General's Office, 02,06,09, comment 26; and Comment of 

The Offices of the Attorneys General of the States of New York and Vermont and the Commonwealth of 

Massachusetts on Waste Confidence Decision Update and Consideration of Environmental Impacts of Temporary 

Storage of Spent Fuel After Cessation of Reactor Operation 2009/02/06, Comment (21) (2) Reactors vary − GE mark 

I BWR's for example are considerably more vulnerable to acts of malice.] 

(1) Impact Potentially Large Under Severe Accident Situations: The Draft incorrectly 

determined that the impact was small. There would be nothing small about the potential impact 

on the environment from a spent fuel pool fire in a densely packed spent fuel pool. For 

example: The Massachusetts Attorney General's Request for a Hearing and Petition for Leave 

to Intervene With Respect to Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc.’s Application for Renewal of. the 

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plants License Renewal Application (May 2006) estimated the costs of 

latent cancers following the release of one isotope, C-137, from Pilgrim's pool. It said that, 

 
Appendix A 

 A-235 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Estimates of Costs and Latent Cancers Following Releases of Cesium-137 

From Pilgrim's Spent-Fuel Pool'

 10% release C-137 100% release C-137 

Cost (billions) $105-$175 billion $342-$488 Billion 

Latent Cancers 8,000 24,000 

[

8

 The Massachusetts Attorney General's Request for a Hearing and Petition for Leave to Intervene With respect to 

Entergy Nuclear Operations lnc.’s Application for Renewal of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plants Operating License 

and Petition for Backfit Order Requiring New Design features to Protect Against Spent Fuel Pool Accidents. Docket 

No, 50-293, May 26, 2006 includes a Report to The Massachusetts Attorney General On The Potential 

Consequences Of A Spent Fuel Pool Fire At The Pilgrim Or Vermont Yankee Nuclear Plant, Jan Beyea, PhD., May 

25, 2006.] 

It is sobering for a comparison to look at the impact of the Chernobyl accident, 1986, to help 

understand the potential impact from an accident from a spent fuel pool fire. Sheep remain 

contaminated in Wales; reindeer are still contaminated in Lapland from an accident that 

occurred more than 20 years ago. Chernobyl was bad, no doubt, but certainly not worst case. 

The 1986 Chernobyl accident released 2,403,000 curies of C-137; whereas Pilgrim's core, for 

example, during license extension will have 5,130,000 curies of C-137 [Beyea Declaration, 

Chernobyl; and LR, Pilgrim CS-137 figures]; and at Pilgrim the inventory of long-lived 

radionuclides, such as Cesium-137, in the spent fuel pool is eight times that in the reactor core. 

Therefore, [t]he Draft's Table 4.9.1.2-1 Conclusions, Consideration of Spent Fuel Pool 

Accidents (Section E.3.7) are foolish. It says that, "...it is concluded that the environmental 

impacts from accidents at spent fuel pools (SFPs) (as quantified in NUREG-1738) can be 

comparable to those from reactor accidents at full power (as estimated in NUREG-1150). 

Subsequent analyses performed, and mitigative measures employed since 2001 have further 

lowered the risk of this class of accidents. In addition, even the conservative estimates from 

NUREG-1738 are much less than the impacts from full power reactor accidents as estimated in 

the 1996 GElS." 

The NRC Draft misleads once again by totally avoiding an important fact brought forward in 

NUREG-1738, Technical Study a/Spent Fuel Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power 

Plants (2001), of spent fuel pool accident risk, performed for NRC by Sandia. It clearly stated 

that a catastrophic meltdown in the spent fuel pool of a nuclear plant could cause 25,000 fatal 

radiation induced cancers as far out as 500 miles from the site. An especially important fact is 

that in Sandia's Millstone analysis, they assumed that 95% of the population around Millstone 1 

evacuated in a timely fashion. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-236 

Spent Fuel Pool Fire Accompanied by a Reactor Accident

Also ignored in the Draft's analysis is a spent fuel pool fire accompanied by a reactor accident – 

credible "reasonably foreseeable" events that have "catastrophic consequences.” At typical US 

nuclear power plants the spent-fuel pool may be located outside but immediately adjacent to the 

reactor's containment and share some essential support systems with the reactor; or the pool 

may be inside the main reactor building and again share some essential support systems with 

the reactor. Thus, it is important to consider potential interactions between the pool and the 

reactor in the context of accidents. There could be at least three types of interaction. First, a 

pool fire and a core-damage accident could occur together, with a common cause. For 

example, a severe earthquake could cause leakage of water from the pool, while also damaging 

the reactor and its supporting systems to such an extent that a core-damage accident occurs. 

Second, the high radiation field produced by a pool fire could initiate or exacerbate an accident 

at the reactor by precluding the presence and functioning of operating personnel. Third, the 

high radiation field produced by a core-damage accident could initiate or exacerbate a pool fire, 

again by precluding the presence and functioning of operating personnel. Many core-damage 

sequences would involve the interruption of cooling to the pool, which would call for the 

presence of personnel to provide makeup water or spray cooling of exposed fuel. The third type 

of interaction was considered in a license amendment proceeding in regard to expansion of 

spent-fuel-pool capacity at the Harris nuclear power plant. 

Environmental impacts that must be considered in an EIS include those which are "reasonably 

foreseeable" and have "catastrophic consequences, even if their probability of occurrence is 

low." 40 CFR §1502.22(b)(1). Spent fuel pool fires as explained in Pilgrim Watch's and the 

Massachusetts and New York Attorney General's Motions to Intervene and subsequent appeals 

and referenced comments to, NRC's Waste Confidence Rule Update are "reasonably 

foreseeable" and have "catastrophic consequences." (PW-6-8) 

Comment: I also take offense, I mean, calling a small environmental impact. A pool fire or 

breach of a cask are not small environmental impacts. In fact, some of the NRC's own studies 

identify a pool fire as potentially having comparable consequences to reactor meltdown. 

 

The NAS, the Academy report, finds that a pool fire is possible and that such a fire could result 

in releasing large amounts of radiation to the environment is hardly a small impact. 

 

Moreover, the NRC -- the Academy report suggests a host of possible mitigation measures, 

depending on site by site evaluations. Such measures could include lower pool density, 

reconfiguration of assemblies in the pool racking, additional sprinkler system, and so on, all 

depending on different conditions at each plant. That's the Academy report finding 3-D, page 

six. (PBCA-Schumann-11) 
Appendix A 

 A-237 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Comment: I believe that there was not an effort to get a range of studies and perspectives in 

regard to reactor accident consequence scenarios. Does the NRC consider the Sandia Labs 

1982 reactor accident consequence study, including the worst-case reactor consequences 

which were hidden from public view until released by Representative Markey? Has there been 

as thorough an assessment of U.S. nuclear reactors and potential accident consequences since 

this 1982 study? If so, which studies are they, and have they been peer-reviewed? If not, why 

ignore this very basic information mentioned in the Sandia study -- unless it is too disturbing and 

might interfere with the NRC's promotion of the nuclear power industry? 

 

It seems apparent that the accident probability figures in this document are, shall we say, 

wishful thinking. Seeing that lawyer-types are reminding writers that of course we have to act 

like we are abiding by pertinent regulations, yet real-life on-the-ground experience indicates that 

we are not living in a fail-safe world, while every year in the USA more than a thousand 

incidents or violations of safety requirements are reported to the NRC. Aging of whatever living 

being or whatever piece of equipment can have serious consequences which are not addressed 

in the least in the GEIS. (Campbell-31-17) 

Comment: 3. Postulated Accidents: The NRC staff incorrectly has concluded that the 

environmental impacts of design-basis accidents are of small significance for all plants and are 

designated Category 1. Severe accidents absurdly are designated "Small impact" also that 

includes the probability-weighted consequences of atmospheric releases, fallout onto open 

bodies of water, releases to groundwater, and societal and economic impacts from severe 

accidents are small for all plants. However, alternatives to mitigate severe accidents must be 

considered for all plants that have not considered such alternatives. 

a. Small Impact: The impact of postulated accidents incorrectly is categorized as "small." The 

Draft arrives at this absurd conclusion as a result of the following: 

(1) NRC allowing Applicant's to use computational codes that minimize impact – MACCS/ 

MACCS2 or WinMACCS. All three incorporate ATMOS, an inappropriate plume distribution 

model for complex sites (sites located on coastal areas, river valleys, hilly or mountain terrain). 

ATMOS incorrectly assumes the plume will travel in a straight line and thereby narrows the true 

area of true impact. 

( 2) NRC and Applicants assume a best case scenario; underestimate release; and base dose 

response on outdated science. 

(3) NRC and Applicants minimize or ignore a host of costs in their calculations from evacuation 

time estimates, clean-up costs (discussed for example in SAND96-0957, Appendix E at 11 and 

from lessons learned from Chernobyl), health costs, to economic costs. David Chanin author of 

the code said, "If you want to discuss economic costs...the 'cost model' of MACCS2 is not worth 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-238 

anyone's time. My sincere advice is to not waste anyone's time (and money) in trying to make 

any sense of it." (and) "I have spent many hours pondering how MACCS2 could be used to 

calculate economic costs and concluded it was impossible.10” 

[

10 www.chaninconsulting.com] 

(4) NRC and Applicants ignore spent fuel fires; and ignore the spread of an accident from/ 

between the spent fuel pool and reactor. See Pilgrim Watch's filings regarding SAMA, 

Contention 3, in Pilgrim's License Renewal Application and New York State's filings regarding 

SAMA in Indian Point's License Renewal Application. 

Examples: 

(a) Computer Code & Meteorological Model: NRC and Applicants use the MELCOR Accident 

Consequence Code System (MACCS), MACCS2 or most recent WinMACCS computer code in 

SAMAs. 

• Meteorological Model in the computer code − ATMOS inappropriate: The codes 

incorporate ATMOS, the straight-line Gaussian Plume model − both the computer code 

and ATMOS underestimate consequence. Severe Accident Mitigation Analysis is 

required for license renewal and licensing of new reactors; they must be required to 

use site appropriate computer codes and plume distribution models. DOE recognized 

the deficiencies in the MACCS/ MACCS2 model and updated with SAND96-0957; NRC 

refused to do likewise. 

Variable trajectory plume distribution models are appropriate for complex sites such as 

in coastal locations and sites along river valleys and in hilly terrain. Current computer 

technology and capability make using these models practical. NRC, DOE, EPA, The 

National Research Council of the National Academies, State Officials, nuclear trade 

groups, & air dispersion modeling community agree that the straight line Gaussian 

plume model cannot account for the effects of complex terrain on the dispersion of 

pollutants from a source; therefore NRC must require that variable models, not straightline Gaussian models, are used in performing SAMA analyses so that consequences are 

not distorted and minimized. (See attachment A). 

• Computer Codes used were designed as research codes not licensing codes: MACCS2 

calculations are used by NRC as a basis of recent commercial reactor license-renewal 

decisions involving SAMA cost/benefit analysis of severe accident risks. However as 

explained by David Chanin, the author of the code in a paper written for the Energy 

Facilities Contractor Operating Group Safety Analysis Working Group Annual 
Appendix A 

 A-239 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Workshop, April 29-May 5, 2005, Santa Fe,. NM, The Development of MACCS2: 

Lessons Learned,11

[

11 Chanin, D.l. (2005), "The Development of MACCS2: Lessons Learned," [written for:] EFCOG Safety 

Analysis Annual Workshop Proceedings, Santa Fe, NM, April 29−May 5, 2005. Full text available on 

http://chaninconsulting.com/index.php?resume] 

MACCS2 was never intended or advertised as appropriate for use as a licensing code; instead it 

was developed as a research code. MACCS (and its successor MACCS2) were not developed 

according to the very strict 18-point QA requirements of NQA-113 as is required for SARs... 

Rather, both MACCS and MACCS2 were developed following the less rigorous researchfocused QA guidelines of ANSI/ANS 10.4 

 

On p. 1-7 of the MACCS2 User's Guide, there is a strong warning for analysts who choose to 

use it for such purposes: When MACCS2 is used for authorization basis studies, it is very 

important to carefully review the code's phenomenological models and input parameter values 

to ensure that they conform to applicable guidance and are appropriate for the accident 

scenario being modeled. The identification of deficiencies in these areas could bring into 

question the safety basis of the facility. If errors are later found in authorization basis 

calculations, an Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) could be raised, and continued operation of 

the facility would then require a demonstration that the facility's safety basis was adequate. 

Because license renewal is in fact a licensing decision as licensing code should be required −

even if it necessitates NRC funding the development of such a code. 

(b) Assumption "best case" scenario & ignoring onsite storage spent fuel: Potential Impact Far 

From Small: As said in the forgoing, it is sobering for a comparison to look at the impact of the 

Chernobyl accident, 1986, to help understand the potential impact from postulated accidents. 

Sheep remain contaminated in Wales and reindeer are still contaminated in Lapland from an 

accident 20 years ago. Chernobyl was bad, no doubt, but certainly not worst case. The 1986 

Chernobyl accident released 2,403,000 curies of C-137; whereas Pilgrim's core, for example, 

during license extension will have 5,130,000 curies of C-137 [Beyea Decl, Chernobyl; and LR, 

Pilgrim CS-137 figures]; and at Pilgrim the inventory of long-lived radionuclides, such as 

Cesium-137, in the spent fuel pool is eight times that in the reactor core. (PW-6-12) 

Comment: Page 2-33, Table 2.43, column labeled “Proposed Action: Describes the impacts of 

postulated accidents associated with the proposed action as follows: 

Postulated accidents associated with continued operations under the license renewal term 

include design-basis accident and severe accidents. The impacts presented take into 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-240 

consideration the low probability of an accident occurring. Design-basis accidents have a small 

impact. Severe accidents could have moderate or large consequences. 

The last sentence in the above-quoted text (i.e., “Severe accidents could have moderate or 

large consequences”) is not consistent with Table 2.1-1 on page 2-14 (row titled “Severe 

accidents”), which summarizes the impacts from postulated severe accidents associated with 

the proposed action as follows: 

Small impact (Category 2). The probability-weighted consequences of atmospheric releases, 

fallout onto open bodies of water, releases to groundwater, and societal and economic impacts 

from severe accidents are small for all plants. However, alternatives to mitigate severe 

accidents must be considered for all plants that have not considered such alternatives. 

The sentence stating that “Severe accidents could have moderate or large consequences” also 

is not consistent with the analyses of severe accident impacts as reported on page 4-154 (lines 

10 to 12) in the draft updated GEIS and on page E-44 (lines 4 to 6) in Appendix E to the draft 

updated GEIS. 

Based on the information provided above, consider modifying the sentence describing the 

impacts of severe accidents associated with the proposed action in Table 2.4.3 to read as 

follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

Severe accidents could have moderate or large consequencesThe consequences from severe 

accidents would be small. (NEI1-7(4)-32) 

Comment: In 1989, the United Stated Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected NRC's ad 

hoc policy of examining severe accidents and instead ordered NRC to carefully evaluate the 

environmental impacts that could result from severe accidents and the means to mitigate such 

impacts in order to comply with NEPA. Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. NRC, 869 F.2d 719 (3rd 

Cir. 1989). The Third Circuit noted that NRC did not find that risks from a severe accident were 

remote and speculative, and held that NRC's severe accident policy did not represent the 

requisite careful consideration of the environmental consequences required under NEPA. 

869 F.2d at 723. As a result, NRC regulations now require applicants and NRC Staff to conduct 

a severe accident mitigation alternatives (SAMA) analysis. 10 C.F.R. §51.53(c)(3)(ii)(L). 

Those regulations, however, limit the obligation to conduct a SAMA analysis to those plants 

where a SAMA analysis previously has not been considered for the plant during its initial 

licensing (i.e., in the wake of the Limerick decision). In light of new analyses and insights about 

mitigation measures, changing population patterns, and economic variations over time, a SAMA 

analysis should be performed when a reactor applies for a renewed operating license, 

regardless of whether the facility went through a SAMA review twenty years before. It is 
Appendix A 

 A-241 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

unrealistic to expect that a SAMA analysis performed, for example, in 1990 would suffice for a 

facility seeking a renewed operating license in 2010 or 2030. (NYS AG-14-6) 

Comment: Follow-up from the NRC 2003 GElS − the following additional comments 

were submitted by the one member of the public who attended the meeting in Anaheim, 

California − and remain unresolved. 

RISK ASSESSMENTS

The NRC must improve its risk assessment guidelines for nuclear power plant renewals. An 

integral component of the GElS for nuclear license renewal is the evaluation of consequences 

and correction of flaws in calculating accident probabilities. Nuclear plant risk assessments are 

not valuable because potential accident consequences are not evaluated. They merely 

examine accident probabilities − only half of the risk equation. Consequences are potentially so 

catastrophic that they must be considered. 

Moreover, the accident probability calculations are seriously flawed. They rely on assumptions 

that contradict actual operating experience. The risk assessments assume nuclear plants 

always conform to safety requirements, yet each year more than a thousand violations are 

reported. Plants are assumed to have no design problems even though hundreds are reported 

every year. Aging is assumed to result in no damage, despite evidence to the contrary. 

Reactor pressure vessels are assumed to be fail-proof, even though embrittlement forced the 

Yankee Rowe nuclear plant to shut down. The risk assessments assume that plant workers are 

far less likely to make mistakes than actual operating experience demonstrates. The risk 

assessments consider only the threat from damage to the reactor core despite the fact that 

irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pools represents an equally serious health hazard. The results 

from these unrealistic calculations are, therefore, overly optimistic. 

Risk assessment analyzes health impacts by calculating impacts from exposure to a healthy 30-

year- old "reference man" weighing 179 pounds. However, there are no age, sex, and weight 

requirements to allow residences near a reactor. The very young, old, and disabled also live in 

the community and may be impacted. The results from these unrealistic calculations are overly 

optimistic. 

Furthermore, the NRC requires plant owners to perform the calculations, but it fails to establish 

minimum standards for the accident probability calculations. Thus, the reported probabilities 

vary widely for virtually identical nuclear plant designs indicating that self-assessment is 

inaccurate. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-242 

Any risk assessment must also include human error and terrorism/sabotage in order to have 

any real-life validity. For example, a 1987 study found that human error contributed to 74% of 

all incidents at nuclear power plants. 

The NRC did not mention "Risk Assessment" of nuclear reactors anywhere in the 2009 draft 

GElS. This omission reinforces the public's opinion that their 2003 input was not valued and 

questions the NRC's commitment to incorporating public comment in the final revision of the 

GElS for license renewal. (A4NR-11-27) 

Comment: Spent Fuel Storage Should Be Classified as Category 2: In the License Renewal 

GElS, the NRC admits for the first time that the environmental impacts of a spent fuel pool fire 

are comparable to the impacts of a severe reactor accident, i.e., that they may be significant. 

See Vol. 1 page 4-156 ("it is concluded that the environmental impacts from accidents at spent 

fuel pools (SPFs) (as quantified in NUREG-1738) can be comparable to those from reactor 

accidents at power.") Yet, although the License Renewal GElS treats severe accidents as 

Category 2 environmental impacts (i.e., subject to review in individual license renewal 

proceedings), it continues to treat spent fuel pool fires as Class 1 impacts, as it did in the 1996 

License Renewal GElS. 

In order to rationalize its Category 1 designation of pool fires, the NRC resorts to omitting 

relevant information, misrepresenting previous studies, and neglecting to establish procedures 

that would give interested members of the public a fair chance to test the validity of its 

assertions. The following are just a few examples of the NRC's distortions and lack of candor: 

• The NRC distorts the impacts of a pool fire by restricting its impact analysis in 

Table E-18 on immediate and latent fatalities and ignoring the dominant environmental 

impact of a pool fire: land contamination. The principal impact of a pool fire – 

regardless of whether it is caused intentionally or by accident – is not death and illness 

through inhalation doses, but land contamination. See the attached report by Dr. 

Gordon R. Thompson, Assessing Risks of Potential Malicious Actions at Commercial 

Facilities: The Case of a Proposed Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation at the 

Diablo Canyon Site at 15 (June 27, 2007) (Attachment 1 ).3

 A pool fire at a nuclear 

power plant could contaminate thousands of square miles of land, causing widespread 

illness and costing billions of dollars in clean-up costs. Id. See also Dr. Gordon R. 

Thompson, Environmental Impacts of Storing Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level 

Waste from Commercial Nuclear Reactors: A Critique of NRC's Waste Confidence 

Decision and Environmental Impact Determination (February 6, 2009) (Attachment 2). 

[

3

 SLOMFP presented Dr. Thompson's report and supporting declaration to the NRC Commissioners in 

2007, in San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace's Contentions and Request for a Hearing Regarding Diablo 

Canyon Environmental Assessment Supplement (June 28, 2007).] 

 
Appendix A 

 A-243 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

For the NRC to exclude contamination effects from an analysis of the significance of the 

impacts of a pool fire is absurd and shows a disturbing lack of scientific integrity. 

• The NRC also distorts NUREG-1738 by claiming that its results are conservative when 

applied to operating plants, because a plant in its decommissioning phase has “fewer 

protective features." GElS p. E-34. In fact, NUREG-1738 explicitly acknowledges that it 

is not conservative for operating plants, and that the study was limited to the question of 

whether emergency planning measures should be required for nuclear power plants that 

had entered their decommissioning phases. As the Staff discussed in the report: 

The staff found that the event sequences important to risk at decommissioning 

plants are limited to large earthquakes and cask drops. For emergency planning 

(EP) assessments this is an important difference relative to operating plants 

where typically a large number of different sequences make significant 

contributions to risk.

NUREG-1738 at ix (emphasis added). Thus, in characterizing NUREG-1738 as 

"conservative" with respect to operating plants, the NRC completely ignores the fact that 

a range of severe reactor accidents may contribute to the potential for a pool fire. See 

also the attached report by Dr. Gordon R. Thompson entitled Risks and Risk- Reducing 

Options Associated with Pool Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel at the Pilgrim and 

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plants at 19 (May 25, 2006) (Attachment 3) (severe 

reactor accident could initiate or exacerbate a pool-fire scenario).4 

[

4

 Dr. Thompson's report and supporting declaration were submitted to the NRC by the Commonwealth of 

Massachusetts in May 2006 in support of its requests for hearings in the license renewal proceedings for the 

Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee nuclear power plants. The Commonwealth also submitted Dr. Thompson's 

report in support of its August 25, 2006, petition for rulemaking regarding the environmental impacts of spent 

fuel pool storage.] 

• At page 4-156, the NRC states that analyses conducted and mitigative measures 

employed subsequent to NUREG-1738 (2001) have "lowered the risk" of spent fuel pool 

fires. But the NRC fails to mention that these analyses and mitigative measures were all 

plant-specific. NRC, Denial of Rulemaking Petition, 73 Fed. Reg. 46204, 46208, 46 212 

(Aug. 8, 2008) Therefore, under the specific terms of the NRC's regulations for 

implementation of NEPA in license renewal cases, the NRC may not include spent fuel 

pool fires in Category 1. See 10 C.F.R. Part 51, Appendix B, Table B-1, footnote 2 

paragraph 3 (an impact may be classified as Category 1 only if “[m]itigative of adverse 

impacts associated with the issue has been considered in the analysis, and it has been 

determined that additional plant-specific mitigation measures are likely not to be 

sufficiently beneficial to warrant implementation.” 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-244 

• The NRC also fails to acknowledge that the analyses and mitigative measures described 

above are discussed in classified and safeguards documents which must be provided to 

interested parties who satisfy the NRC's procedural requirements for safeguards access 

and/or security clearances. 42 U.S.C. § 2231 “[I]n the case of agency proceedings or 

actions which involve Restricted Data, defense information, safeguards information 

protected from disclosure under the authority of section 2167 of this title or information 

protected from dissemination under the authority of section 2168 of this title, the 

Commission shall provide by regulation for such parallel procedures as will effectively 

safeguard and prevent disclosure of Restricted Data, defense information, such 

safeguards information, or information protected from dissemination under the authority 

of section 2168 of this title to unauthorized persons with minimum impairment of the 

procedural rights which would be available if Restricted Data, defense information, such 

safeguards information, or information protected from dissemination under the authority 

of section 2168 of this title were not involved.") The NRC recently recognized this legal 

obligation in the hearing notice for the proposed issuance of a uranium enrichment 

license. Notice of Receipt of Application for License; Notice of Consideration of 

Issuance of License; Notice of Hearing and Commission Order and Order Imposing 

Procedures for Access to Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information and 

Safeguards Information for Contention Preparation; In the Matter of Areva Enrichment 

Services, LLC (Eagle Rock Enrichment Facility, 74 Fed. Reg. 38052 (July 30, 2009). 

Here, where the NRC relies heavily on classified and safeguards documents for its 

conclusion that the environmental impacts of spent fuel pool fires are insignificant, its 

failure to establish procedures for access by authorized parties to relevant information 

starkly violates Section 2231 of the Atomic Energy Act. (SLOMFP-13-5) 

Comment: Inadequate Assessment of the Environmental Consequences of Severe Accidents: 

Inadequate Consideration of Spent Fuel Pool Accidents: The Revised GElS recognizes that 

severe accident analyses in the 1996 GElS "were limited to consideration of reactor accidents 

caused by internal events.”65 Proclaiming an understanding that accident risk has naturally 

evolved since issuance of the 1996 GElS, the Revised GElS identifies new sources of 

postulated severe accidents, including an explicit recognition of spent fuel pool accidents.66

[

65 Revised GElS at 4-153.] 

[

66 See id. at 4-153 to 4-154; Revised GElS Appendices at E-32 ("The 1996 GElS did not include an explicit 

assessment of the environmental impacts of accidents at the spent fuel pools (SFPs) located at each reactor site. ").] 

However, while this recognition is commendable, the Revised GElS goes on to draw erroneous 

conclusions about the potential consequences of spent fuel pool accidents. After weighing new 

information said to decrease estimated environmental impact against new information (including 

spent fuel pool accidents) said to increase estimated impacts, the Revised GElS concludes "that 
Appendix A 

 A-245 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

the reduction in environmental impacts from the use of new information outweighs any 

increases resulting from new considerations. As a result, the findings in the 1996 GElS remain 

valid.”67 In particular regard to spent fuel pool accidents, the Revised GElS concludes that "the 

environmental impacts from accidents at spent fuel pools...can be comparable to those from 

reactor accidents at full power... Subsequent analyses performed, and mitigative measures 

employed since 2001 have further lowered the risk of this class of accidents.”68 Accordingly, the 

NRC continues to exclude spent fuel pool accidents from site-specific analysis, including Severe 

Accident Mitigation Alternatives (SAMAs) related to spent fuel pool accidents.69

[

67 Revised GElS at 4-154.] 

[

68 Id. at 4-156.] 

[

69 See id. at 4-154 ("[T]he impacts from reactor accidents at full power (including internal and external events) should 

continue to be considered in assessing Sever Accident Mitigation Alternatives (SAMAs). The impacts of all other new 

information do not contribute sufficiently to the environmental impacts to warrant their inclusion in the SAMA analysis, 

since the likelihood of finding cost-effective plant improvements is small.") (emphasis added).] 

The NRC's revised assessment here continues to ignore relevant information about the risk of 

spent fuel pool accidents, which undermines the NRC's continued conclusion that the impact of 

releases to the environment from severe accidents will always be "smaIl.”70

[

70 See Revised GElS Appendices at B-33.] 

While initially, it was assumed that stored spent fuel generally did not pose significant risks, with 

the introduction of high-density, closed-form storage racks into spent fuel pools beginning in the 

1970s, this understanding is no longer valid.7l The closed-form configuration of the high density 

racks can create a major problem if water is lost from a spent fuel pool, including disastrous 

pool fires.72 Studies conducted after the issuance of the 1996 License Renewal GElS contradict 

previous studies that had asserted that complete drainage of spent fuel pools was the most 

severe case and that aged fuel would not burn.73 These later studies establish that if the water 

level in a fuel storage pool dropped to the point where the tops of the fuel assemblies are 

uncovered, the fuel would [burn] regardless of its age, and resulting fires can be catastrophic.74

[

71 See Thompson Report at 18-27.] 

[

72 Id.]

[

73 See Waste Confidence Rule, 55 Fed. Reg. 38474, 38481 (Sept. 18, 1990).] 

[

74 NUREG-1738, Final Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants 

(January 2001); 2006 NAS Study at 53-54. The Revised GElS improperly attempts to underplay the findings of 

NUREG-1738 at various turns. See, e.g., Revised GElS Appendices at E-34 (''the impact analysis contained in 

NUREG-1738 is considered conservative"); id. at E-35 ("low ruthenium source term is...viewed as the more accurate 

representation. Therefore, the risk and environmental impact from fires in SFPs as analyzed in NUREG-1738 are 

expected to be comparable to or lower than those from reactor accidents and are bounded by the 1996 GElS."); id at 

E-36 ("Based on the more rigorous accident progression analyses, the recent mitigation enhancements, and NRC 

site evaluations of every SFP in the United States, the risk of an SFP zirconium fire initiation is expected to be less 

than reported in NUREG-1738").] 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-246 

Furthermore, the Revised GElS acknowledges that mitigative measures have been taken to 

reduce the risk of spent fuel pool fires. However, the existence of such measures at particular 

nuclear power plant sites completely contradicts the NRC's end conclusion that spent fuel pool 

accidents do not warrant site-specific consideration.75

[

75 See generally Riverkeeper's IP DSEIS Comments at 26-33.] 

Accordingly, the NRC conclusion that that all consequences from severe accidents, including 

those involving spent fuel pools, are "small for all plants," is without proper foundation. The 

impacts of severe accidents from spent fuel pool accidents should be addressed in a sitespecific manner, with the appropriate potential range of impact being SMALL to LARGE. 

In any event, it is crucial that NRC require consideration of spent fuel pool accidents in licensee 

and NRC Staff SAMA analyses. Failure to do so will lead to highly inaccurate results.76 For 

example, in the Indian Point relicensing proceeding, in the first step of the SAMA analysis 

(establishing the baseline of severe accidents) neither Entergy nor the NRC Staff considered 

the contribution to severe accident costs by fire in either of the spent fuel pools at IP2 or IP3.77 

No SAMAs that would avoid or mitigate such costs were identified.78 However, if the costs of 

pool fires were considered, the value of SAMAs would be significant. Even using unrealistically 

low probability estimates in NUREG-1353, Regulatory Analysis for the Resolution of Generic 

Issue 82, Beyond Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools (1982), the offsite cost risk of a 

pool fire is substantially higher than the offsite cost risk of an Early High release from a coredamage accident.79 The present value of cost risk for a conventional pool accident at Indian 

Point (i.e., an accident not caused by intentional attack), using the unrealistically low probability 

assumptions in NUREG-1353, is $27.7 million, a significant sum.80 If more realistic assumptions 

about the likelihood of a pool fire were used, the cost would be considerably higher.81 

Moreover, the present value of cost risks ("PVCR") for a spent fuel pool fire would increase 

substantially (i.e., from $27.7 million to $38.7 million) if the discount rate were changed from 7% 

to 3%, a more appropriate rate for an analysis of the benefits of measures to prevent or mitigate 

radiological accidents that Entergy used to test the sensitivity of its SAMA analysis.82 If the 

discount rate were dropped to zero, a rate that is justified in light of the catastrophic nature of 

the consequences involved, the PVCR for a spent fuel pool fire would be even higher -- $51.5 

million.83

[

76 See generally Thompson Report.] 

[

77 See Indian Point Draft Supplemental EIS § 5.2; Entergy's Environmental Report at § 4.21.] 

[

78 Indian Point Draft Supplemental EIS § 5.2] 

[

79 Thompson Report at 28] 

[

80 Id. at 49 and Table 7-7.] 

[

81 Id. at 51.] 

[

82 Id. at 51-52.] 

[

83 Id. at 52.]
Appendix A 

 A-247 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Given the potential costs involved, it is essential that such risks are assessed in licensee SAMA 

analyses. (Riverkeeper-20-14) 

Comment: Moreover, NRC has mitigated the risks from spent fuel pools on a site-specific 

basis - that is, mitigating them like Category 2 issues − despite classifying them as Category 1 

and failing to disclose the impacts and thus subject the NRC's mitigation measures to public 

comment as required by NEPA. 

 

In 2008, the NRC denied a petition for rulemaking brought by California and Massachusetts 

which sought a rulemaking revising the GEIS and regulations on the grounds that mitigation 

measures the NRC had implemented at every plant had minimized the risk of a radiation 

release from a spent fuel pool. See NRC Rulemaking Denial (Aug. 1, 2008), 73 Fed. Reg. 

46204 (Aug. 8, 2008). NRC's decision relied on recently implemented "mitigation measures" 

that would decrease the risk of a spent-fuel pool fire, but the only specific mitigation measure it 

discussed was a "coolant makeup and spray capability system" that would cool spent fuel in the 

event of a drop in the water level of a pool. NRC Rulemaking Denial at 22. It also stated that, 

"in cases where [spent fuel pool] water levels cannot be maintained, leakage control strategies 

would be considered." Id. NRC indicated that it has issued license amendments and safety 

evaluations incorporating these strategies into all operating nuclear power plants, but the 

decision does not discuss the effectiveness of those measures or even the extent to which they 

are actually in use at plants.9

 Id. In fact, not all plants implemented the same mitigation 

measures, and some plants were not required to implement all of the recommended measures. 

See Safety Evaluation by The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Related to Order No. Ea-02-

026 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3 Docket 

Nos. 50-247 and 50-286 (July 7, 2007) at pp. 1-4 (emphasis added) appended to a letter from 

NRC Staff to Entergy of the same date (ML071920020)(explaining that mitigating strategies 

related to the safety of the Indian Point Unit 2 spent fuel pool were not required due to being 

"screened out."). 

 

[

9 Despite the evidence submitted by the States showing that increased dry-cask storage would allow lower-density 

racking in spent fuel pools and thereby reduce the risk of fires in pools, NRC's discussion of mitigation measures did 

not mention that measure. See Alvarez et al., "Reducing the Hazards" at 27, 2006 Thompson Report at 32, NAS 

Report at 68-71.] 

 

In 1996, NRC found that the environmental impacts of spent-fuel pools could be considered 

generically. The 1996 generic EIS, and the regulations based on that EIS, found that those 

impacts were not significant and designated them as Category 1 generic impacts on the ground 

that they did not require consideration of any plant-specific measures and would not be affected 

by any future mitigation measures. NUREG 1437 at 6-85 - 6-86. As a result, NRC does not 

consider those impacts in a plant-specific supplemental EIS when a plant's license is renewed. 

10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(2). 

 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-248 

But when the States asked NRC to reconsider its conclusion that the pools have no significant 

impacts, NRC relied on the existence of plant-specific measures. NRC cannot have it both 

ways: if, as NRC contends, measures that are plant-specific and were adopted since 1996 

affect the environmental impacts of spent-fuel pools, then the impacts of spent-fuel pools should 

be treated as Category 2 plant-specific impacts and addressed in plant-specific EISs. NRC 

should remedy that inconsistency in this rulemaking. 

 

NRC's administrative rulings confirm that it is treating the impacts of spent-fuel pools 

inconsistently. In Massachusetts v. United States, Massachusetts argued that NRC was 

required to consider new information regarding the environmental impacts of spent-fuel pools in 

proceedings to renew the licenses for the Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee nuclear power plants. 

522 F.3d at 122-23. The First Circuit accepted NRC's claim that it was not required to consider 

that information in plant-specific license renewal proceedings, because the environmental 

impacts of spent-fuel pools are covered by NRC's 1996 generic EIS and regulations. Id. at 126-

27. NRC argued, and the court agreed, that Massachusetts could challenge the generic EIS, 

and the regulations based on it, in a petition for a generic rule making. Id. at 127. But after 

avoiding a plant-specific environmental analysis of spent-fuel pools in the Pilgrim and Vermont 

Yankee licensing proceedings, NRC then relied on plant-specific security and mitigation 

measures to deny the States’ request to modify the generic EIS and regulations. The security 

measures − e.g., vehicle barriers, fences, and intrusion detection systems − and mitigation 

measures − coolant makeup and spray capability systems and leakage control strategies − on 

which NRC relied to deny the rulemaking petitions are necessarily plant-specific. Moreover, 

both NRC staff, in NUREG-1738, and the NAS found that the risk of a spent-fuel pool fire 

depends on plant-specific design factors, such as the configuration of the storage racks in a 

pool, and cannot be assessed on a generic basis. If, as NRC found in its decision here and 

NRC staff and the NAS have also found, plant-specific mitigation and security measures are 

relevant to the environmental impacts of spent-fuel pools, then those impacts are a Category 2 

issue requiring analysis on a plant-specific basis when a plant's license is renewed. NRC's 

reliance on those plant-specific measures to deny the States' petitions is contrary to its own 

determination that the environmental impacts of spent-fuel pools are generic. It is also contrary 

to its determination in 1996 that those impacts would not be affected by any future mitigation 

measures.10 

 

[

10 To the extent that security concerns underlie the NRC's decision not to disclose the impacts or mitigation 

measures required to be disclosed by NEPA, this reason is without merit; the provisions of 10 C.F.R. section 2.900 

et. seq. allow for consideration of such information in a secure proceeding.] 

 

Indeed, by taking into account plant-specific measures, NRC has effectively revised its 

regulations − without the rulemaking process required by the Administrative Procedure Act, 

5 U.S.C. § 553 − and redesignated the impacts as Category 2. NRC's determination that it can 

continue to treat the environmental impacts of spent-fuel pools as generic even though it admits 
Appendix A 

 A-249 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

that those impacts are affected by plant-specific issues precludes full consideration of those 

impacts, in violation of NEPA. For example, under NRC's reasoning, it will never have to 

consider the effectiveness of a particular plant's coolant makeup and spray capability system in 

preventing spent-fuel pool fires at that plant, even though NRC relied on that mitigation measure 

to make its generic no-impact determination. Where, as here, NRC's generic process does not 

resolve plant-specific concerns, NEPA requires it to consider those concerns in a plant-specific 

proceeding. See Minnesota v. NRC, 602 F.2d 412, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("The question is 

whether there has been an NRC disposition in generic proceedings that is adequate to dispose 

of the objections to the licensing amendments"). NRC's determination also prevents the public 

and other governmental bodies from receiving information about the plant-specific 

matters−design issues and security and mitigation measures − that affect the risk of fires in 

spent-fuel pools. That is contrary to NEPA's core purpose of ensuring that relevant information 

about the environmental consequences of an agency's action is made available to other 

governmental bodies and the public. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 

490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989); see also Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 768-69 

(2004); Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at 97. It also conflicts with NEPA's goal of giving other 

government agencies "adequate notice of the expected consequences [of an agency's action] 

and the opportunity to plan and implement corrective measures in a timely manner." See 

Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350. The one-sided process employed by NRC precludes the States −

which NRC expects to play a large role in responding to the environmental impacts of a spentfuel pool fire − from meaningful participation in identifying and exploring those impacts. And it 

denies the States and the public the right to a hearing on those matters when a plant's license is 

renewed, in violation of the Atomic Energy Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A) 

 

In short, in light of NRC's own recognition that the risk of spent-fuel fires is affected by plantspecific issues and by measures that it has taken since it issued its 1996 generic EIS, NRC 

should reconsider its 1996 generic determination that spent-fuel pools have no significant 

environmental impacts, and change spent-fuel pool impacts from a Category 1 to a Category 2 

issue here. (NYS AG-14-13) 

 

Comment: The Revised GEIS inexplicably and insupportably asserts that high density fuel 

storage pools pose no significant environmental risk. See, Revised GEIS, p. S-17. This claim is 

completely refuted by a report by the National Academy of Sciences, the NRC's own technical 

staff and independent experts. See Jan Beyea, Report to the Massachusetts Attorney General 

on the Potential Consequences of a Spent-fuel Pool Fire at the Pilgrim or Vermont Yankee 

Nuclear Plant (May 25, 2006). This report showed that fuel storage pools are susceptible to fire 

and radiological release from a wide range of conditions, including natural phenomena, operator 

error, equipment failure, or intentional attack. The environmental impacts of a fire in a spent fuel 

pool may be severe, extending over a geographic area larger than one state's boundaries and 

continuing for decades. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-250 

In the October, 2000, study referred to above, the NRC admitted that: 

 

"the risk analysis in this study did not evaluate the potential consequences of a sabotage event 

that could directly cause off-site fission product dispersion, for example, a vehicle bomb driven 

into or otherwise significantly damaging the SFP [Spent Fuel Pool]... ”9

 

Accordingly, the environmental evaluation must study the consequences to human health and 

safety and the environment from any incident, including an accident or attack on the 

accumulated stored fuel in a storage system, because those possibilities pose obvious risks that 

were not discussed in the original 1996 GElS and have been explicitly excluded in the Revised 

GEIS. Until this evaluation is complete, the requirements of NEPA have not been met. 

 

[

9

 NRC Report February, 2001, NUREG -1738, at 4-15. This report is respectfully incorporated by reference.] 

(CT AG-10-4) 

Comment: Solid Waste Management [S-17]: NRC incorrectly assigns "small impact" and a 

Category 1 designation to solid waste management, low level waste storage and disposal and 

onsite storage of spent fuel. 

b. Onsite Storage of Spent Fuel: NRC assigns a "small impact" and a Category 1 designation 

to onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel, Table 2.1-1. 

(1) Impact Potentially Large Under Severe Accident Situations: The Draft incorrectly 

determined that the impact was small. There would be nothing small about the potential impact 

on the environment from a spent fuel pool fire in a densely packed spent fuel pool. 

Last the Draft should look to the 1996 GElS and appreciate that there is a big difference 

between onsite storage of spent fuel under normal operations (considered now in the GElS, 

Section 6) and in severe accidents (GElS, Section 5). GElS, Section 5, deals specifically with 

severe accidents. A straightforward reading finds nothing in it to exclude spent fuel − pools 

currently have the largest inventory of radioactive material at reactor sites and hence the 

potential for the most severe consequences. Severe accidents are defined in Section 5 

because of their severe consequences, and are "severe" regardless of whether they originate 

from the core or the spent fuel pool. This Draft document should be revised to say likewise. 

(PW-6-10) 

Comment: Although the proposed GEIS does add analysis of radionuclides released to 

groundwater as a Class 2 issue which the State of New York supports (see Point A above), it 

continues to classify the on-site storage of spent nuclear fuel during the license renewal term as 

a Class 1 issue. On-site storage of spent nuclear fuel during the license renewal term should be 

classified as a class 2 issue because (1) new information which came to light after the 1996 
Appendix A 

 A-251 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

GEIS shows that the spent fuel stored in a pool can catch fire, either by accident or due to 

sabotage, and release significant amounts of radiation to the surrounding area resulting in sitespecific impacts, and (2) NRC has mitigated the impacts of the risks of such storage on a sitespecific basis.7

[

7

 The Second Circuit recently addressed this issue in State of New York v. United States Nuclear Reg. Comm'n, 08-

3903-ag(L), slip op. (2d Cir., Dec. 21, 2009). However, the NRC represented to the Second Circuit that the States 

would have an additional opportunity to raise their concerns regarding spent fuel pools during the comment period for 

the Proposed GEIS. See Brief of Federal Respondents, State of New York v. United States Nuclear Reg. Comm'n, 

08-3903-ag(L) (Aug. 3, 2009), at 48.] 

The commenter provided supporting information which in the commenter’s opinion, “shows 

clearly that the risk of spent fuel pool fire is greater than contemplated in the 1996 GEIS and 

that it deserves site-specific analysis.” (NYS AG-14-12) 

Comment: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's ("NRC") proposed revisions to the generic 

environmental impact statement for license renewal of nuclear power plants released July 31, 

2009 ("Revised GElS" or "Statement") are completely inadequate and unacceptable. This 

Statement is required to thoroughly consider environmental impacts common to all nuclear 

power stations that may be caused or threatened by extending the current licenses at operating 

nuclear plants for twenty additional years. The GElS is required by law to identify and evaluate 

all reasonably foreseeable potential environmental impacts resulting from the proposed 

government action, but it fails to meet those basic legal requirements. 

 

NRC − inexcusably - has completely and specifically ignored three significant environmental 

impacts of relicensing nuclear power plants: 1) the continued and increased storage of spent 

nuclear fuel onsite because the federal government no longer has any plan or proposal for the 

permanent storage of high level reactor waste; 2) the threat of terrorist attacks on nuclear 

facilities; and 3) emergency response and evacuation of the facilities and surrounding areas. As 

a result, NRC's environmental impact statement is so unrealistic that it is useless. 

 

NRC must thoroughly and accurately reevaluate the impacts resulting from a fire, accident or 

attack on any relicensed facility, and especially on stored spent nuclear fuel on-site ("SNF"), as 

those risks will be profoundly increased by the continued operation of nuclear power stations 

and the permanent termination of the Yucca Mountain waste storage project. NRC must also 

consider the impact of any accident or attack at a relicensed nuclear power station in the 

context of realistic and effective evacuation plans. Finally, the revised generic environmental 

impact statement must clearly identify and acknowledge the potential impacts from a terrorist 

attack on natural resources and the environment. (CT AG-10-1) 

Comment: The NRC has failed to provide a thorough and accurate analysis of all relevant 

potential impacts and has failed to take a "hard look" at the adverse impacts of this project. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-252 

Foremost among the critical risks are the problems resulting from an additional 20 years 

accumulation of spent nuclear fuel without any plans for a federal repository, the need to ensure 

practical and workable evacuation plans, and the failure to address the environmental 

consequences of a terrorist attack. The Revised GElS is fundamentally incomplete and thus the 

NRC must provide the missing analyses regarding impacts to natural resources and evaluate 

the long-term impact to these resources from these identifiable risks. NRC must readdress 

these issues in a satisfactory environmental impact statement before proceeding. (CT AG-10-

10) 

Comment: Most of the accumulated spent fuel is still in water-filled storage pools located next 

to nuclear reactors but almost always outside the reactors’ protective containment domes. The 

danger created by these high-density storage pools in the event of an accident or terrorist attack 

is obvious. The two operating reactors at the Indian Point nuclear power station, for example, 

are located in one of the most densely populated areas of the country, an area which includes 

not only New York City and much of southern New York and northern New Jersey, but also 

much of the State of Connecticut, within its potential exposure zone. 

 

NRC has never properly evaluated the environmental consequences of an accident or attack at 

a spent fuel storage area and it must do so now in the Revised GEIS. Section 1.7.2 of the 

Revised GEIS, however, states that "[t]he NRC will not make a decision or any recommendation 

on the basis of the information presented in this GEIS regarding the disposition of” SNF. 

The facts, as developed over the last several decades, clearly contradict NRC’s assumption that 

SNF storage is safe. In fact, an accident or attack on a SNF pool could result in a loss of 

coolant and subsequent fire releasing deadly amounts of radiological material and toxic fumes. 

An NRC report issued in October 2000 described in detail what can occur if there is a loss of 

coolant in a fuel pool: 

 

This reaction of zirconium and air, or zirconium and steam is exothermic (i.e., produces heat). 

The energy released from the reaction, combined with the fuel's decay energy, can cause the 

reaction to become self-sustaining and ignite the zirconium. The increase in heat from the 

oxidation reaction can also raise the temperature in adjacent fuel assemblies and propagate the 

oxidation reaction. The zirconium fire would result in a significant release of the spent fuel 

fission products which would be dispersed from the reactor site in the thermal plume from the 

zirconium fire. Consequence assessments have shown that a zirconium fire could have 

significant latent health effects and resulted (sic) in numbers of early fatalities.5

 

[

5 NRC Report October, 2000 at 3-1 (internal citation omitted).] 

A Department of Energy report indicates that such a fire would release considerable amounts of 

cesium-137, an isotope that accounted for most of the offsite radiation exposure from the 1986 
Appendix A 

 A-253 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Chernobyl accident.6 Another report, authored by NRC, concludes that, in the event of a pool 

fire, approximately 100 percent of the pool's inventory of cesium would be released to the 

atmosphere.7 

 

[

6 See US Department of Energy, Health and Environmental Consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant 

Accident, DOE/ER-0332 (Washington. DC: DOE. June 1987).] 

[

7 See V L Sailor et al. Severe Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools in Support of Generic Safety Issue 82. NUREG/CR4982 (Washington, DC: NRC, July 1987).] 

 

The emission of radioactive particles from a spent fuel pool accident would lead to horrific 

consequences. The NRC study stated that human fatalities within the first year of such an 

event "can be as large as for a severe reactor accident even if fuel has decayed several years."8 

The radioactive fallout from this type of release could also make uninhabitable (tens of 

thousands of acres of land. 

[

8 See NRC Report October, 2000 at 3-34.] (CT AG-10-3) 

Response: The issues of spent fuel storage and the environmental impacts of a spent fuel pool 

accident are separate and distinct issues that are evaluated separately in the GEIS. The 1996 

GEIS and the draft revised GEIS reflected a thorough evaluation of the environmental impacts 

associated with solid waste management, low-level radioactive waste storage, and onsite 

storage of spent nuclear fuel. Based on NRC’s safety requirements in these areas and the low 

amounts of radiation exposure received by members of the public from the operation of power 

reactors and management of radioactive waste, including the onsite storage of spent nuclear 

fuel during the license renewal term, the revised GEIS confirms the 1996 GEIS’s Category 1 

classification and finding of SMALL impact. The NRC has concluded that the comprehensive 

regulatory controls (10 CFR Parts 20 and 50) that are in place will ensure continued compliance 

with NRC radiation protection standards, and that the resulting radiological impacts on the 

environment will remain small during the term of a renewed license. 

The NRC is committed to ensuring that both spent nuclear fuel and low-level radioactive wastes 

are managed to prevent health impacts to the public. Spent nuclear fuel is currently stored at 

reactor sites in the spent fuel pools and/or in independent spent fuel storage installations 

(ISFSIs). This practice is expected to continue until DOE is ready to take possession of the 

spent nuclear fuel. At this time, it is uncertain when this will happen. 

Interim storage needs vary among plants, with older units having less available pool storage 

capacity than newer ones. However, given the uncertainty as to when a geologic repository will 

open and the lack of other options, it is likely that some sort of expanded spent fuel storage 

capacity beyond the original design capacity will be needed at all nuclear power plants. 

On March 3, 2010, DOE submitted a motion to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board to 

withdraw its application for a permanent geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. In 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-254 

light of the uncertainty surrounding the use of Yucca Mountain, if another repository for spent 

nuclear fuel is proposed, an environmental impact statement would be prepared. 

For spent nuclear fuel, the Waste Confidence Decision and Rule represented the Commission’s 

generic determination that spent nuclear fuel can continue to be stored safely and without 

significant environmental impacts for a period of time after the end of the licensed life for the 

operation of a nuclear power plant (after the permanent shutdown of the power reactor and 

expiration of the plant’s operating license). This generic determination, codified in 10 CFR 

51.23(a), meant that the NRC did not need to consider the storage of spent nuclear fuel after 

the end of a reactor’s licensed life for operation in the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 

documents that support its reactor and spent-fuel storage license application reviews. 

On December 23, 2010, the Commission published a revision of the Waste Confidence 

Decision and Rule to reflect information gained based on experience in the storage of spent 

nuclear fuel and the increased uncertainty in the siting and construction of a permanent geologic 

repository for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste. In response to the 2010 

Waste Confidence Decision and Rule, the states of New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, and 

Vermont, and several other parties challenged the Commission’s NEPA analysis in the decision, 

which provided the regulatory basis for the rule. On June 8, 2012, the United States Court of 

Appeals, in New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d 471 (D.C. Cir. 2012), vacated the NRC’s Waste 

Confidence Decision and Rule, after finding that it did not comply with NEPA. 

 

In response to the court’s ruling, the Commission issued CLI-12-16 on August 7, 2012, in which 

the Commission determined that it would not issue licenses that rely upon the Waste 

Confidence Decision and Rule until the issues identified in the court’s decision are appropriately 

addressed by the Commission. CLI-12-16 provided, however, that the decision not to issue 

licenses only applied to final license issuance; all licensing reviews and proceedings should 

continue to move forward. In SRM-COMSECY-12-0016, dated September 6, 2012, the 

Commission directed the NRC staff to proceed with a rulemaking that includes the development 

of a generic EIS to support a revised Waste Confidence Decision and Rule and to publish both 

the EIS and the revised Waste Confidence Decision and Rule in the Federal Register within 

24 months (by September 6, 2014). The Commission indicated that both the EIS and the 

revised Waste Confidence Decision and Rule should build on the information already 

documented in various NRC studies and reports, including the existing environmental 

assessment that the NRC developed as part of the 2010 Waste Confidence Decision and Rule. 

The Commission directed that any additional analyses should focus on the issues identified in 

the D.C. Circuit’s decision. The Commission also directed that the NRC staff provide ample 

opportunity for public comment on both the draft EIS and the proposed Waste Confidence 

Decision and Rule. 

In accordance with CLI-12-16, the NRC will not approve any site-specific license renewal 

applications until the deficiencies identified in the D.C. Circuit’s decision have been resolved. 
Appendix A 

 A-255 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Two license renewal issues that rely, wholly or in part, upon the Waste Confidence Decision and 

Rule are the “onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel” and “offsite radiological impacts of spent 

nuclear fuel and high-level waste disposal.” Both of these issues were classified as Category 1 

in the 1996 GEIS and the 10 CFR Part 51 final rule that was promulgated in 1996 (61 FR 

28467, June 5, 1996), which codified the findings of the 1996 GEIS into 10 CFR Part 51, 

Subpart A, Appendix B, Table B-1. The draft revised GEIS that was published for public 

comment in 2009 (74 FR 38239, July 31, 2009) and the concomitant proposed rule (74 FR 

38117, July 31, 2009) continued the Category 1 classification for both of these issues. As part 

of the NRC’s response to the New York v. NRC decision, the NRC has revised these two issues 

accordingly. 

Specifically, the NRC has revised rule the Category 1 issue, “Onsite storage of spent nuclear 

fuel,” to narrow the period of onsite storage to the license renewal term. In both the 1996 GEIS 

and rule and the 2009 draft revised GEIS and proposed rule, the NRC relied upon the Waste 

Confidence Decision and Rule to make a generic finding that spent nuclear fuel could be stored 

safely onsite with no more than a small environmental impact for the term of the extended 

license (from approval of the license renewal application to the expiration of the operating 

license) plus a 30 year period following the permanent shutdown of the power reactor and 

expiration of the operating license. 

The Waste Confidence Decision and Rule provided the basis for the 30 year period following 

the permanent shutdown of the reactor and expiration of the operating license. The 2010 Waste 

Confidence Decision and Rule extended this post-reactor shutdown onsite storage period from 

30 years to 60 years. Given the New York v. NRC decision, and pending the issuance of a 

generic EIS and revised Waste Confidence Decision and Rule (as directed by SRM-COMSECY12-0016), the period of onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel following the permanent shutdown of 

the power reactor and expiration of the operating license is now excluded from this GEIS issue. 

As revised in the rule and GEIS, this issue now only covers the onsite storage of spent fuel 

during the license renewal term. 

Similarly, theNRC has revised the Category 1 issue, “Offsite radiological impacts of spent 

nuclear fuel and high-level waste disposal.” This issue pertains to the long-term disposal of 

spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste, including possible disposal in a deep geologic 

repository. Although the Waste Confidence Decision and Rule did not assess the impacts 

associated with disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste in a repository, it did reflect 

the Commission’s confidence, at the time, in the technical feasibility of a repository and when 

that repository could have been expected to become available. Without the analysis in the 

Waste Confidence Decision, the NRC cannot assess how long the spent fuel will need to be 

stored onsite. Therefore, the NRC has reclassified this issue from a Category 1 issue with no 

assigned impact level to an uncategorized issue with an impact level of uncertain. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-256 

Upon issuance of the revised Waste Confidence Decision and Rule and its supporting generic 

EIS, the NRC will make any necessary conforming amendments to its regulations in 10 CFR 

Part 51 and supplement the GEIS as necessary. As referenced previously, the Commission will 

not approve any license renewal application for an operating nuclear power plant until the 

issues identified in the New York v. NRC court’s decision are appropriately addressed by the 

Commission. 

In addition, the issue of a spent fuel pool (SFP) fire was specifically addressed by the NRC in its 

denial of two Petitions for Rulemaking (PRM): PRM 51-10 and PRM 51-12, submitted by the 

Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the Attorney General of 

California, respectively (73 FR 46204; August 8, 2008). The Petitioners requested that the NRC 

initiate a rulemaking concerning the environmental impacts of the high-density storage of spent 

nuclear fuel in SFPs. Specifically, the Petitioners challenged the Category 1, small level of 

impact finding of the 1996 GEIS regarding the onsite storage of spent fuel. The Petitioners 

asserted that ‘‘new and significant information’’ showed that the NRC incorrectly characterized 

the environmental impacts of high-density spent fuel storage. In particular, the Petitioners 

asserted that spent fuel stored in high-density SFPs is more vulnerable to a zirconium fire than 

the NRC concluded in the 1996 GEIS. 

In evaluating the petitions, the Commission considered several studies, all of which showed that 

the risk of a spent fuel fire was low. The Commission also noted that it had ordered each plant 

to take certain physical security and mitigative measures to prevent SFP fires subsequent to the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The Commission has ordered that these security and 

mitigative measures, which may vary from plant to plant, be put in place at all plants (thus, the 

basis of the generic Category 1 finding). In its denial of the rulemaking petitions, the 

Commission determined that the information presented by the Petitioners was not “new and 

significant information” and that the probability of a SFP fire was very low (73 FR at 46207-10). 

In conclusion, the Commission stated that: 

“Based upon its review of the petitions, the NRC has determined that the studies 

upon which the Petitioners rely do not constitute new and significant information. 

The NRC has further determined that its findings related to the storage of spent 

nuclear fuel in pools, as set forth in NUREG-1437 and in Table B-1, of Appendix 

B to Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, remain valid. Thus, the NRC has met[,] and 

continues to meet[,] its obligations under NEPA. For the reasons discussed 

previously, the Commission denies PRM-51-10 and PRM-51-12” (73 FR at 

46212). 

The Commission’s denial of PRM-51-10 and PRM-51-12 was upheld by United States Court of 

Appeals for the Second Circuit. New York v. the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 589 F.3d 551 

(2nd Cir. 2009). 
Appendix A 

 A-257 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Design Basis Accidents

The environmental and health impacts of design basis accidents (DBAs), including those that 

involve spent fuel, are evaluated during the initial licensing process, and the ability of the plant 

to withstand these accidents is demonstrated to be acceptable before issuance of an operating 

license. The results of these evaluations are found in licensing documentation such as the 

applicant’s final safety analysis report, the NRC’s safety evaluation report, the final 

environmental statement (FES), and Section 5.1 of the plant-specific SEIS for license renewal. 

The Commission has determined that the environmental impacts of DBAs are of SMALL 

significance for all plants because the plants were designed to successfully withstand these 

accidents. As part of the license renewal process, the NRC looks for any new and significant 

information during its independent review of the license renewal applicant’s environmental 

report, during its site visit, the scoping process, and evaluation of other available information. 

Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives

Regarding severe accident mitigation alternatives (SAMA) reviews, the primary function of the 

review is to perform an assessment of the applicant’s evaluation of alternatives to mitigate 

severe accidents. Severe nuclear accidents are those that are more severe than design basis 

accidents because they could result in substantial damage to the reactor core, regardless of 

offsite consequences. In the GEIS for license renewal, the NRC assessed the impacts of 

severe accidents using the results of existing analyses and site-specific information to 

conservatively predict the environmental impacts of severe accidents for each plant during the 

renewal period. Based on information in the GEIS, the Commission found the following: 

The probability weighted consequences of atmospheric releases, fallout onto open 

bodies of water, releases to groundwater, and societal and economic impacts from 

severe accidents are small for all plants. However, alternatives to mitigate severe 

accidents must be considered for all plants that have not considered such alternatives. 

Therefore, the Commission has designated mitigation of severe accidents as a Category 2 issue 

in 10 CFR Part 51, Subpart A, Appendix B, Table B-1. Chapter 5 in each plant-specific SEIS 

presents the NRC’s evaluation of the applicant’s alternatives to mitigate severe accidents. 

For each license renewal application where a SAMA analysis is performed by the applicant, the 

NRC reviews and evaluates the SAMA information to ensure that the range of changes 

(e.g., hardware modifications, changes to plant procedures, and changes to the training 

program) that could improve severe accident safety performance was identified and evaluated. 

While the SAMA evaluation contains population radiation dose information, the values are used 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-258 

to show the relative percent of the dose resulting from the various containment failure modes 

that were evaluated. The purpose of the SAMA is not to evaluate the human health impacts, 

but rather to evaluate a range of mitigation actions that may reduce the risk of a severe accident 

and are cost-effective. 

Emergency Preparedness/Terrorist Attacks

Emergency preparedness programs are required at all nuclear power plants and require 

specified levels of protection from each licensee regardless of plant design, construction, or 

license date. Requirements related to emergency planning are in the regulations at 

10 CFR Part 50.47 and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. These requirements apply to all 

operating licenses and will continue to apply to facilities with renewed licenses. The NRC has 

regulations in place to ensure that existing emergency preparedness plans are updated 

throughout the life of all plants. For example, nuclear power plant operators are required to 

update their evacuation time estimates after every U.S. Census, or when changes in population 

would increase the estimate by either 25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is less. Additionally, 

the NRC assesses the capabilities of the nuclear power plant operator to protect the public by 

requiring the performance of a full-scale exercise—that includes the participation of various 

Federal, State, and local government agencies—at least once every two years. These 

exercises are performed in order to maintain the skills of the emergency responders and to 

identify and correct weaknesses. Therefore, the NRC, in 10 CFR Part 50.47, has determined 

that there is no need for a special review of emergency preparedness issues in the 

environmental review for license renewal or an evaluation of the issue in the GEIS. 

The GEIS does not include an evaluation of the threat of terrorist attacks on nuclear facilities. 

Both security and emergency preparedness matters are outside the scope of the GEIS and are 

handled by the NRC on an ongoing basis, not just when the licensee applies to renew its 

operating license. In this regard, security measures are a part of the current operating license 

basis for every nuclear power plant licensed by the NRC. In addition, the NRC works with the 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security and other entities to ensure that security around nuclear 

power plants is well coordinated and that responders are prepared if a significant event occurs. 

While the GEIS does not contain an evaluation of the potential threat from terrorist attacks, the 

GEIS does discuss the issue in Appendix E to the GEIS as follows: 

Although the threat of sabotage events cannot be accurately quantified, the Commission 

believes that acts of sabotage are not reasonably expected. Nonetheless, if such events 

were to occur, the Commission would expect that resultant core damage and 

radiological release would be no worse than those expected from internally initiated 

events. 
Appendix A 

 A-259 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Further, the GEIS states: 

As such, malevolent acts remain speculative and beyond the scope of a National 

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review. NEPA requires that there be a “reasonably 

close casual relationship” between the Federal agency action and the environmental 

consequences. The environmental impact of a terrorist attack is too far removed from 

the natural, or expected, consequences of a license renewal action to warrant 

consideration under NEPA. However, as noted above [in Appendix E], in the event of a 

terrorist attack, the consequences of such an attack would be no worse than a severe 

accident, which has already been analyzed. 

Gaussian Plume Modeling

Questions regarding the adequacy of straight-line, or Gaussian, atmospheric dispersion models 

have been studied in detail. This included a detailed code comparison completed in 2004 with 

the objective of determining if the average atmospheric transport and dispersion results from 

codes such as MACCS2 are sufficiently accurate that more complex models are not required. 

In that study, documented in NUREG/CR-6853, “Comparison of Average Transport and 

Dispersion Among a Gaussian, a Two-Dimensional, and a Three-Dimensional Model,” results 

from the MACCS2 code were directly compared to those from the LODI (Lagrangian 

Operational Dispersion Integrator) code. 

LODI is a state-of-the-art, three-dimensional (3D) advection dispersion code that uses a 

Lagrangian stochastic Monte Carlo method. LODI is coupled to ADAPT (Atmospheric Data 

Assimilation and Parameterization Technique), which provides time-varying, 3D fields of mean 

winds, turbulence, pressure, temperature, and precipitation based on observed meteorology. 

LODI is an element of the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) emergency 

response modeling system at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), which is a 

national support and resource center for planning, real-time assessment, emergency response, 

and detailed studies of incidents involving the spread of hazardous material accidentally or 

intentionally released into the atmosphere. 

As discussed in NUREG/CR-6853, this comparison shows that MACCS2 provides results 

consistent with those from the more complex plume models at distances up to 100 miles 

(161 kilometers). This is well beyond the 50-mile (80-kilometer) radius considered in the SAMA 

analysis. The MACCS2 predictions for average, time-integrated, ground-level air concentrations 

(which directly relates to inhalation and cloudshine doses), and for average deposition (which 

directly relates to groundshine and ingestion pathway doses) were very comparable (i.e., less 

than a factor of two) to predictions made by the state-of-the-art NARAC codes, ADAPT/LODI, at 

all distances. The direct comparison to the state-of-the-art NARAC codes demonstrates that 

straight-line air dispersion modeling is well within its range of validity when used to perform 

SAMA analyses. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-260 

Regarding whether Gaussian plume modeling is appropriate for air dispersion modeling for 

reactors in complex terrain, the Gaussian plume model provides further conservatism under 

variable terrain conditions. Specifically, when variable terrain features such as river 

embankments or mountains intervene between a source and an observation point, these 

features would tend to disperse and dilute the plume as it is forced to move around obstacles. 

The plume model conservatively estimates that the plume travels in a straight line over or 

through the obstacle, thereby resulting in larger accumulated radiological doses and higher 

estimates of economic consequences in areas farther from the plant. 

The NRC has already fully considered and addressed the issue of accidents in the GEIS and 

each plant-specific SEIS, and the comments do not present any significant new information or 

arguments that would warrant a change to the final GEIS.

A.2.1.14 Comments Concerning Decommissioning 

Comment: Obviously, the nuclear industry wants a new generation of nuclear reactors funded 

with unlimited loan guarantees from the taxpayer, and want relicensing of current nuclear 

facilities far into the future before they ever consider decommissioning nuclear power facilities. 

There'll obviously be no funds to decommission when that comes around. (PBCA-Campbell-30) 

Comment: Page S -19 Termination of Nuclear Power Plant Operations and Decommissioning: 

Termination of plant operations and decommissioning would occur eventually regardless of 

license renewal. The additional 20-year period of operation under the license renewal term 

would not affect the impacts of shutdown and decommissioning on any resource or at any plant. 

This is a Category 1 issue. July 2009 S-19 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

A4NR, et al, is concerned that the additional 20 year extension of operation could impact the 

decommissioning activities [at] the plant. Because of the unpredicted and unanticipated 

financial crisis, suppositions and expectations of the status and security of decommissioning 

funds have been sharply reduced. If inadequate funding is present at the decommissioning 

stage of plant life, then money needed for certain facets of restoration of the environment may 

not be available for mitigation, cleanup or remediation. If the activities needed involved potential 

cleanup of contaminated offsite groundwater, for example, the lack of funds to execute this 

action would be detrimental. 
Appendix A 

 A-261 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

The following Associated Press story from January 5, 2010, which references the NRC, should 

provide enough of a cautionary warning to merit attention to this issue: 

NEW ORLEANS (The Associated Press) − Jan 5 − By ALAN SAYRE AP Business Writer 

Two Louisiana power utilities owned by Entergy Corp. are short $235.5 million for the projected 

costs of eventually closing two nuclear generating plants − and the power provider wants slight 

increases in customer rates to close the gap. 

According to a Tuesday filing with the Louisiana Public Service Commission, Entergy Louisiana 

said it needs an additional $68.2 million to meet the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission's 

demand for a $400.2 million decommissioning fund for the Waterford 3 plant at Taft. 

Entergy Gulf States Louisiana said it needs an additional $167.3 million for an NRC required 

fund of $378.8 million for the eventual closing of the River Bend nuclear plant at St. Francisville. 

That utility owns 70 percent of River Bend. 

The filing requests that Entergy Louisiana customers pay $10.3 million toward the Waterford 

fund annually, up from the current $2.2 million. Entergy Gulf States Louisiana customers, who 

don't currently contribute to the decommissioning fund, would pay $9.67 million a year. 

Entergy spokesman Philip Allison said Tuesday that if the PSC agrees with the utilities, Entergy 

Gulf States' residential customers would pay an additional 84 cents per 1,000 kilowatt hours, 

while Entergy Louisiana's residential customers would pay an additional 41 cents per 

1,000 kilowatt hours. 

The NRC determines how much a utility needs for each eventual nuclear plant closure based on 

a complicated formula. 

"This is to put us into federal compliance," Allison said. "It's not something we came up with." 

The PSC is expected to discuss the filing on Jan. 13. 

The filing said the two funds are now short of what the NRC wants partially because of the fall in 

financial markets, where the money had been placed in hopes of growing the funds through 

investment returns. 

A4NR, et al, therefore recommend that the financial status of each utility's decommissioning 

fund be examined on an individual basis under Category 2, and not assumed to be generic. 

Different utilities will have different levels of investment strategies for securing their 

decommissioning funds, and world financial markets are too volatile to assume that a "one size 

fits all" answer will apply to each and every nuclear utility. (A4NR-11-37)
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-262 

Comment: 4. Termination of Nuclear Power Plant Operations and Decommissioning: The 

Draft wrongly argues that, "...termination of plant operations and decommissioning would occur 

eventually regardless of license renewal. The additional 20-year period of operation under the 

license renewal term would not affect the impacts of shutdown and decommissioning on any 

resource or at any plant." This is designated as "small impact" Category 1 issue. 

a. Decommissioning Mischaracterized By NRC as Small Impact: As any plant ages, it is more 

likely to develop operating failures such as increasing the likelihood, magnitude and frequency 

of leaks into the ground water. There already have been a noticeable increase in leakage as 

plants approach 40 years old, and there are no signs that this trend will abate. Thus 

decommissioning costs are not static, are site specific, and are likely to increase dramatically 

with the increased probability of significant cleanup of groundwater radioactive plumes. 

b. Decommissioning - Category 2 Issue, not Category 1: Decommissioning activities cannot be 

relegated to Category 1. Recent disclosures of inadequate capital in decommissioning funds at 

a large number of reactor sites, as well as wide fluctuations in the reported fiscal health of 

certain decommissioning funds should be fair game for Petitioners as a Category 2 issue. 

Failure of the licensee to possess adequate capital at the time of decommissioning could impact 

safety margins and place an undue burden on ratepayers or taxpayers. As currently argued in 

Vermont regarding ENVY, the decommissioning fund should be fully funded before the license 

renewal application is approved. (PW-6-13) 

Comment: It appears that one key reason for the big push for relicensing of nuclear reactor 

operating licenses is that it would further delay the very expensive decommissioning process. 

Decommissioning should be a Category 2 issue because of the differing components of various 

"hotness" at different facilities, and also due to the often battered shape which a number of 

decommissioning funds find themselves since the economic collapse of two autumns ago. 

Seeing that a number of utilities decided to play the casino game of the stock market, thus the 

investors of those utilities (who would reap advantage from profitable investments) need to 

make up the funds lost by bad investments of those decommissioning funds! And one cannot 

assume that the federal government (with its massive debt) will be able to afford 

decommissioning scores of plants that the utilities just can't seem to afford to take apart and 

somewhat decontaminate, and a number of taxpayers don't have much extra to make up some 

of the gap in funding for decontamination. Plus, transportation routes to needing-to-be-identified 

facilities (for everything from spent fuel to mixed waste to low-level waste to other trash) must 

be clearly specified for each kind of radioactive or mixed waste. (Campbell-31-14) 

Comment: With the increase in the recycling of radioactive metal in the past decade or decade 

and a half, the GEIS must indicate how many components of nuclear power facilities would be 

eligible to be recycled and thus allowed in zippers, fenceposts, bicycles, etc. 
Appendix A 

 A-263 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

The GEIS should give us an update regarding technologies involved with decommissioning − for 

instance, is there still difficulty cutting reactor vessel steel? Is it easier to cut reactor vessel 

steel on embrittled reactors? What problems are associated with embrittled reactors in terms of 

safety during operation, and what challenges do embrittled reactors and reactor vessels pose 

during the decommissioning process? 

I disagree with the contention that assured the reader of these documents that of course 

decommissioning of nuclear reactors will take place. Given the economic situation these days, 

and seeing that a number of companies pocket lots of funds on one hand while spinning off 

some company on the other hand that would likely be responsible for funding decommissioning 

of their reactors, how can one conclude there will be the funding, the will, the technology, and 

the expertise at a given point of time in the future to decommission nuclear power facilities? 

Thus, I conclude that decommissioning is not assured in the least unless it is done in the 

foreseeable fairly near future time frame with a stable and sufficient decommissioning fund from 

which the utility can draw funds to accomplish the decommissioning. (Campbell-31-15) 

Comment: The impacts of decommissioning are described in the Generic Environmental 

Impact Statement on Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities: Regarding the Decommissioning 

of Nuclear Power Reactors, NUREG-0586 (NRC 2002a). 

 

Decommissioning activities cannot be relegated to Category 1. Recent disclosures of 

inadequate capital in decommissioning funds at a large number of reactor sites, as well as wide 

fluctuations in the reported fiscal health of certain decommissioning funds should be addressed 

in the GElS. Failure of the utility to possess adequate capital at the time of decommissioning 

could impact safety margins of the process and the availability of funds for problem mitigations 

─ both known and unknown. If not, then each SEIS should include a review of status of 

decommissioning funds and deny renewals until inadequate funds are brought up to an 

adequate level. In times of great fiscal uncertainty, there is no reason to put additional financial 

burdens on either ratepayers or taxpayers. (A4NR-11-17) 

Comment: Inadequate Assessment of Inadvertent Radioactive Releases to the Environment: 

The Revised GElS acknowledges the problem encountered at various nuclear power plants 

across the country over the past several years of unplanned releases of radionuclides to the 

environment. Given this ongoing issue, it is critical that the license renewal environmental 

review process address all relevant concerns posed by such releases. Unfortunately, the 

NRC's proposed revisions to the 1996 GElS do not go far enough toward ensuring that the 

environmental impacts of such releases will be analyzed in a comprehensive manner. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-264 

Assessment of Decommissioning Impacts: The Revised GElS proposes to make a generic 

Category 1 determination as to impacts of relicensing on decommissioning.32 However, this 

appears to be inconsistent with the NRC's recognition of the problem of radioactive 

contamination. Based on the discussion above, past, current, and future inadvertent releases 

will undoubtedly have an impact on water quality, ecological resources, and aquatic resources 

at the time of decommissioning. Accordingly, it is necessary to require site-specific analysis of 

the impacts of any unplanned leaks in regard to this issue as well. 

[

32 See Proposed Rule at 38128; Revised GElS Appendices at B-40.] (Riverkeeper-20-8) 

Response: The generic environmental impacts of decommissioning are addressed in the “Final 

Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities: Regarding 

the Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Reactors” (NUREG-0586). The GEIS for license 

renewal considers only the incremental environmental issues associated with decommissioning 

that would result from continued plant operation during the renewal term and are thus 

significantly more limited in scope. The revised GEIS reviewed the potential impacts from 

decommissioning to environmental issues such as land use, visual resources, air quality, noise, 

geology, hydrology, ecology, historic and cultural resources, human health, environmental 

justice, and waste management. Based on the evaluation of the issues, the revised GEIS 

concluded in Section 4.12.2 that decommissioning is a Category 1 issue with a SMALL impact. 

The commenter’s concerns about recycling of decommissioned materials or technical difficulties 

in cutting reactor vessel steel are beyond the scope of the license renewal GEIS. The technical 

issues associated with decommissioning are addressed in NRC’s technical document on 

decommissioning, NUREG-0586. An operational issue such as control of radioactive material is 

addressed in NRC radiation protections regulation, 10 CFR Part 20, and would be addressed by 

the NRC’s inspection program. The NRC does not have a regulation that allows for the 

recycling of radioactive material into consumer products during routine plant operation or during 

decommissioning. 

Several commenters expressed concerns about the ability of licensees to pay for 

decommissioning. NRC regulations in 10 CFR Part 50 require each power reactor licensee to 

provide reasonable assurance that funds will be available for decommissioning and prescribes 

acceptable methods for providing financial assurance and the minimum dollar amounts, 

adjusted annually, to demonstrate such reasonable assurance. See 10 CFR 50.33(k) and 

50.75. Since the NRC’s financial assurance regulations are current licensing issues applicable 

on a generic basis to power reactor licensees and are not unique to license renewal applicants, 

decommissioning funding is outside the regulatory scope of the license renewal environmental 

review. No change was made to the GEIS as a result of these comments. 
Appendix A 

 A-265 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Comment: Page 2-5, lines 1 to 4: Text in lines 1 to 4 on page 2-5 reads as follows: 

The NRC has developed regulations and guidance for the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, 

including nuclear power plants. These regulations are found in Subpart E to 10 CFR Part 20 

and the guidance document Consolidated NMSS Decommissioning Guidance, NUREG-1757 

(NRC 2002b). 

Certain aspects of the license termination process for nuclear power plants are governed by 

10 CFR 50.82, which is not cited as a reference in lines 1 to 4 on page 2-5. The NRC is 

encouraged to add this reference to the text in lines 1 to 4 to read as follows (strikethrough font 

= deletion; italics font = addition): 

The NRC has developed regulations and guidance for the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, 

including nuclear power plants. These regulations are found in 10 CFR 50.82 (Termination of 

License), Subpart E to 10 CFR Part 20 (Radiological Criteria for License Termination), and the 

guidance document Consolidated NMSS Decommissioning Guidance, NUREG-1757 

(NRC 2002b). (NEI1-7(4)-8)

Comment: Page 2-5, lines 19 to 24: Text in lines 19 to 24 on page 2-5 describes the process 

by which the licensee completes decommissioning and the NRC terminates or amends the 

license, depending on the intended use of the site.

According to 10 CFR 50.82 (a)(3), the licensee may not take more than 60 years to complete 

decommissioning. Based on this, the NRC is encouraged to change the text in lines 19 and 20 

on page 2-5 to read as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

At the completion of decommissioning, which may take up to 60 years to complete 

(10 CFR 50.82(a)(3)), the licensee conducts a final status survey to demonstrate compliance 

with criteria established in the decommissioning plan. (NEI1-7(4)-9) 

Response: The NRC agrees with these comments, and Section 2.1.3 of the GEIS has been 

revised as suggested.

Comment: Page 4-5, lines 30 and 31: Text in lines 30 and 31 on page 4-5 reads as follows: 

All operating nuclear power plants will terminate operations and be decommissioned at some 

point after the end of their operating licenses or after a decision is made to cease operations. 

License renewal would potentially delay this eventuality for an additional 20 years beyond the 

current license period. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-266 

To better clarify the requirement for decommissioning of a nuclear power plant and the effect of 

license renewal on the timing of decommissioning, consider changing the text in lines 30 and 31 

on page 4-5 to read as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

Unless the NRC approves a longer time, each All operating nuclear power plantsplant will 

complete decommissioning within 60 years of permanent cessation of operations terminate 

operations and be decommissioned at some point after the end of their operating licenses or 

after a decision is made to cease operations. License renewal would potentially delay this 

eventuality permanent cessation of operations for 20 years beyond the end of the current 

license period term. (NEI1-7(4)-78) 

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The suggested revisions to Section 4.1.5 

of the GEIS would not clarify the description of decommissioning that is in the GEIS. The intent 

of the referenced text is to indicate that decommissioning could be delayed by 20 years when a 

plant is granted renewal of its license. 

No changes to the revised GEIS were made as a result of this comment.

A.2.1.15 Comments Concerning the License Renewal Process 

Comment: I looked -- I just want to say I looked at this Appendix B and there are a number of 

questions that I asked and my general comment on it is that many of the issues in here are 

considered to be small impact and small impact according to their publicity here is 

environmental effects are not detectible or are so minor that they will neither de-stabilize nor 

noticeably alter any important attribute of the resource. For the purposes of assessing 

radiological impacts, the Commission has concluded that these impacts do not exceed 

permissible levels in the Commission's regulations and are considered small. 

But, when you read the Appendix B, judge for yourself whether you think some of these things 

are small. I don't think so. (DPCA-UNASFV-5) 

Response: This comment is too general for a specific response. Please refer to the GEIS for 

specific discussions on the magnitude of specific impacts. No change was made to the GEIS as 

a result of this comment.

Comment: I just leave with one comment: I think the materials themselves are very well 

organized and very accessible to someone who is reviewing them to develop comments, and so 

I offer that appreciation for facilitating the public review process. (AGA-NEI-4) 

Response: The NRC acknowledges the comment. No change was made to the GEIS in 

response to this comment. 
Appendix A 

 A-267 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Comment: Page S-1: The GElS is intended to improve the efficiency of the license renewal 

process by (1) providing an evaluation of the types of environmental impacts that may occur 

from renewing commercial nuclear power plant operating licenses, (2) identifying and assessing 

impacts that are expected to be generic (the same or similar) at all nuclear plants (or plants with 

specified plant or site characteristics), and (3) defining the number and scope of environmental 

impact issues that need to be addressed in plant-specific EISs. 

A4NR, et al, would like to know how the NRC defines "efficiency" in the above statement. Is this 

an efficiency of time, money, or workforce labor? Is it meant to increase efficiency for the 

agency, the utility, or the stakeholder? Given the fact that for individual reactors in communities 

across the United States, the NRC has written hundreds − if not thousands − of individual 

waivers, amendments and exemptions, there is very little that can be said to be similar about 

the aging reactors that face relicensing. Defining − and narrowing − the scope of plant-specific 

issues may produce an efficiency for the utility or the agency, but not necessarily for the 

ratepayers, or stakeholders. 

A4NR, et al, recommends that the NRC define what it means by "efficiency" achievable through 

the GElS, and place that efficiency into quantifiable and measurable units of time, money or 

effort. (A4NR-11-29) 

Response: The NRC has not attempted to quantify the efficiencies gained through the GEIS. 

The GEIS was developed to establish an effective environmental assessment process for 

license renewal. The GEIS is used to avoid duplication and allow the NRC to focus specifically 

on those issues that are important for a particular plant (i.e., unique to that plant or exceptional 

in size and scope for those issues ordinarily assumed to be similar for all plants) in the SEIS. 

Section 1.7 of the GEIS has been modified to explain the concept of tiering. 

Comment: There are some previous Category 2 issues that the NRC based on the experience 

and insights gained from license renewal processes have been reclassified as Category 1 

issues. 

You know, clearly we'll look at those and provide our comments. I would expect and hope that 

in most cases we would be supportive of those changes that have been made, but we also 

believe that there are some additional issues currently listed as Category 2 that would be good 

candidates for consideration as Category 1 issues. 

The key here is that especially if we're afforded the extra time in development of comments, it 

would certainly give us the opportunity to provide a much more robust basis for those types of 

comments. We believe that would greatly facilitate the comment review process, so we're 

looking forward to that. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-268 

An example of a type of issue that we think might be amenable to that, for instance, would be 

thermal impacts on aquatic organisms. And, again, I would defer to us completing our review 

and developing much more detailed comments, but we have actually identified a handful of 

issues that, at least at first blush, we think we would have a good shot at providing a good 

strong basis for why they might be considered for reclassifying as Category 1. (AGA-NEI-2) 

Comment: The next comment that I would like to make goes to the issue of -- a couple of 

issues that have been introduced or have been carried over that we want to evaluate further 

with the idea that they might actually be able to [be] deleted in their entirety. 

The basis that we want to evaluate for those types of comments quite simply goes to the issue 

of whether the potential impacts actually change in any way in terms of magnitude or 

occurrence as a function of a license renewal decision. 

Put differently, are they directly germane to the action of approving a license renewal, or are 

they impacts that will occur at that same magnitude irrespective of whether a license is renewed 

or not? 

An example of that would be the nonradiological groundwater and soil contamination issue. 

Looking at the way that it's framed and, again, subject to a lot more evaluation on our part, you 

know, the question we would ask is does the decision really have any effect on the impact? 

And, you know, we will take a look at potentially making the case that if it doesn't, that it actually 

need not be part of the license renewal Environmental Impact Statement. (AGA-NEI-3) 

Response: In general, as stated in the GEIS, an issue is considered Category 1 (generic) if the 

analysis reported in the GEIS has shown the following: 

(1) The environmental impacts associated with the issue have been determined to apply either 

to all plants or, for some issues, to plants having a specific type of cooling system or other 

specified plant or site characteristics; 

(2) A single significance level (i.e., SMALL, MODERATE, or LARGE) has been assigned to the 

impacts (except for collective offsite radiological impacts from the fuel cycle and from high-level 

waste and spent fuel); and 

(3) Mitigation of adverse impacts associated with the issue has been considered in the analysis, 

and it has been determined that additional plant-specific mitigation measures are not likely to be 

sufficiently beneficial to warrant implementation. 
Appendix A 

 A-269 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

The generic analysis of an issue may be adopted in each plant-specific review. 

An issue is considered Category 2 (site-specific) if the analysis reported in the GEIS has shown 

that one or more of the criteria of Category 1 cannot be met, and, therefore, additional plantspecific review is required. 

If all three Category 1 criteria apply to a particular issue, then the generic analysis presented in 

this GEIS is relied upon by the NRC in evaluating license renewals and plant-specific SEISs, 

provided there is no new and significant information requiring further analysis. For issues that 

do not meet all three Category 1 criteria, then the issue is considered a Category 2 issue, and a 

plant-specific analysis is required for that issue. 

No changes were made to the GEIS as a result of these comments. 

Comment: Page 2-6 to 2-16: Summary of Impacts Associated with License Renewal Under 

the Proposed Action: Issue Impact (Category 1 - small) 

With only a few months, or less, of experience at actual aging reactors that are now operating 

beyond their original licenses under NRC approval of renewal, we believe there is no factual, 

much less operational history, to assure the public that the above issues will have "small" 

impacts. In addition, there is no assurance that the states will not be left with large ratepayer 

expenses if the GElS impact predictions prove to be unreliable. 

All issues should remain Category 2 until at least one reactor of each major design (PWR, 

BWR) has operated an additional ten of the twenty years of NRC approved license renewals. At 

that point a detailed analysis based on operating experience would provide factual information 

on which to determine whether foreseeable impacts will be "small, moderate, and/or large." For 

example, ten years ago: 

1. Neither the utilities, the states, nor the NRC, believed that Yucca Mountain funding 

would be consistently cut and that both executive administration and congressional 

support for the project would disappear. 

2. Terrorists' plans that targeted U.S. reactors were unknown and unthinkable. Today we 

have American saboteurs rumored to have planned to destroy reactors in Pakistan.2

[

2

 http://www.dailytimes.com .pk/default.asp?page=2009%5C12%5C26%5Cstory 26-12-2009 pg7 18]

In 2003, the following comment was submitted from one member of the public who attended the 

GElS meeting in California: 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-270 

As a condition of re-licensing, the GElS for nuclear plant license renewals must require that the 

licensee: 

• has the means to resist an attack on the reactor building, its support structures, and its 

spent fuel storage − from air, land and water by a team of well-equipped terrorists; 

• be required to pass tests and mock-attack drills which would demonstrate the adequacy 

of its security. These tests should be required every two years and include mock-attacks 

testing when the licensee is refueling. 

Another reason for requiring an observation period of ten years following the start of a 20 year 

license renewal is that, as indicated earlier in our comments, there have been over 200 license 

amendments, temporary orders, and waivers for Diablo Canyon and over 400 of the same 

changes for SONGS-making it difficult to determine a baseline for operational performance and 

stability of performance. This "shakedown" period of 10 years will allow the NRC to trend 

whether this need for amendments and waivers is increasing or decreasing with license 

renewal. 

Emergency planning would need to take into account radioactive releases due to possible 

attack and shifts in populations near reactor sites so that responses could be planned and 

funded accordingly. 

While the country's need for power has increased, the country's use of power has decreased 

according to the latest statistics from the Energy Information Agency (document DOE/EIA-0226 

(2009/09). Another report released Sept 23, 2009 by the ACEEE looks at energy efficiency 

programs from recent years in 14 states, with utility costs ranging from $0.016 to $0.033 per 

kWh and an average cost of $0.025 per kWh. ACEEE gathered data on energy efficiency 

program costs in 14 states * California, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, 

New Mexico, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin. 

The six natural gas efficiency programs covered in the report also saved energy cost-effectively 

* spending $0.27 to $0.55 per therm, with an average of $0.37 per therm, less than a third of the 

average residential retail price seen over the past five years. 

(http://aceee.org/pubs/u092.pdf?CFID=4116977&CFTOKEN=88188721) 

Coupled with the creation of increasingly efficient technology and economically viable 

alternatives signifies that decision making on power generation over a decade in advance is 

unrealistic and irresponsible. 

Large components designed to last the full design life of reactors (steam generators, turbine 

rotors, reactor vessel heads, etc) have been or are currently being replaced at most reactor 

sites. Granting a license renewal ten years before licenses expire provide little economic 
Appendix A 

 A-271 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

assurance that ratepayers will not need to replace them again, as there is no established track 

record for the performance of this second generation of components. 

Each of the above generic issues should result in the solicitation of public and utility comments, 

be reviewed, and implemented before any further license renewals are considered. A4NR, et 

al, will recommend that applications for license renewals in California be withheld until the 

above issues, including seismic design adequacy are resolved. (A4NR-11-19) 

Response: The commenter suggested that all environmental issues should remain Category 2 

(site specific) until at least one reactor of each major design (PWR, BWR) has operated an 

additional ten of the twenty years of NRC approved license renewals. At that point, a detailed 

analysis based on operating experience would provide factual information on which to 

determine whether foreseeable impacts will be “SMALL, MODERATE, and/or LARGE.” 

The NRC does not agree that there needs to be considerable additional operating experience 

before reasonable generic judgments about the likely environmental impacts of issues can be 

made. Facilities seeking license renewal have typically operated for more than 20 years before 

the filing of their renewal applications. Thus the NRC and other affected stakeholders at all 

levels have had decades to gain a better understanding of the environmental equilibrium and 

impacts of plant operations. The NRC has determined that having at least 20 years of operating 

experience at each power reactor facility is sufficient for the NRC to assess the environmental 

issues and impacts at the site and make informed generic judgments on the impacts of many 

environmental issues. As discussed in the corresponding sections of this appendix, many of the 

issues raised by the commenter: security, the need for power, and emergency preparedness 

are outside the scope of the license renewal environmental review. 

The GEIS and its characterization of environmental issues as either Category 1 (generic) or 

Category 2 (site specific) were developed to establish an effective environmental review 

process for license renewal. They are used to avoid duplication and allow the NRC to focus 

specifically on those issues that are important for a particular plant (i.e., unique to that plant or 

exceptional in size and scope for those issues ordinarily assumed to be similar for all plants) in 

the SEIS. Category 1 issues are termed “generic” issues because the conclusions related to 

their environmental impacts were found to be common to all plants (or, in some cases, to plants 

having specific characteristics such as a particular type of cooling system). For Category 1 

issues, a single level of significance is common to all plants, mitigation was considered, and the 

NRC determined that mitigation was not likely to result in a benefit. Issues that were resolved 

generically are not reevaluated in the SEIS because the conclusions reached would be the 

same as in the GEIS, unless new and significant information is identified that would lead the 

NRC to reevaluate the GEIS’s conclusions. More information on new and significant information 

is provided in response to Comment CEC-9(1)-10. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-272 

Category 2 issues are those that require a site-specific review. For each of the Category 2 

issues applicable to the site under review, the NRC evaluates site-specific data provided by the 

applicant, other Federal and State agencies, and Tribal and local governments, as well as 

publicly available scientific information and information from members of the public. From this 

data, the NRC makes a site-specific evaluation of the particular issues and presents its 

analyses and conclusions in the SEIS for the facility. 

An example of an environmental issue that can be addressed generically involves the discharge 

of chlorine and other biocides that are regulated by the NPDES permit of each nuclear power 

facility. Regulatory concern about toxic effects of chlorine and its combination products and 

operating experience with control of biofouling organisms, such as mussels or clams, have led 

many facilities to eliminate the use of chlorine or reduce the amount used to below the levels 

that were originally anticipated in the environmental statements issued for construction or 

operation. Because of these refinements, water quality impacts from biocides were not a 

concern for regulatory and resource agencies, provided that an applicant remained in 

compliance with the limits in the NPDES permit. Based on publicly available scientific 

information, operational monitoring reports, consultations with licensees and regulatory 

agencies, and comments on the draft revised GEIS, water quality effects from the discharge of 

chlorine and other biocides are thus considered to be of small significance for all facilities. 

The methodology used in the GEIS for categorizing issues as generic or site-specific is an 

appropriate and effective use of the concept of tiering that was promulgated by the President’s 

CEQ in its 1978 regulations that implemented the requirements of NEPA. The CEQ has stated 

that its intent in formalizing the tiering concept was to encourage agencies “to eliminate 

repetitive discussions and to focus on the actual issues ripe for decisions at each level of 

environmental review.” 

No change was made to the GEIS as a result of this comment.

Comment: The industry would like to commend NRC in the efforts associated with the 

revisions to the 10 CFR Part 51 rule and the regulatory documents that support the NEPA 

process, not only to make the license renewal process more efficient for the applicants but also 

to make it more transparent for those agencies and the public through the NRC interface during 

this process. The resource approach taken was an excellent idea. It makes the GElS good 

reading material as compared to the 1996 version. It's more user friendly so I really commend 

you guys on that. (OBIL-Entergy-1) 

Comment: Also, I would like to express appreciation of the restructuring that NRC did along 

the lines of the resource areas, which was described earlier, and the notion of putting together a 

separate section on environmental consequences that allows one to easily understand the 

potential impacts associated with license renewal as well as, ideally, the potential benefits. The -
Appendix A 

 A-273 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

- I think it makes it much easier and more accessible to members of the public. I will comment 

that I asked my wife to take a shot. She's my best critic and reviewer. She took a look at it and 

-- and she liked it. And so, for what it's worth, one member of the public appreciates the work 

that you put into that. (RMD-NEI1-2) 

Comment: The Scope of the GEIS is Improperly Narrow: The revised GElS has neatly 

packaged the environmental issues by resource area, but there are numerous instances when 

these areas overlap; i.e. seismology and human health (as a result of an accident during an 

earthquake), waste management and human health (as a result of an accident involving high 

level waste storage), ecology, hydrology, and socioeconomics (the effects of damage to the 

marine environment on the local fishermen). (SLOMFP-13-8) 

Comment: The Scope of the GEIS is Improperly Narrow: The separation and restriction of 

environmental issues by resource area is arbitrary and ineffective. (SLOMFP-13-10)

Response: The NRC believes that dividing the environmental issues into resource areas 

allows for a clear and focused discussion of the impacts. While there may be some overlap 

between resource areas, this approach ensures that all relevant environmental impacts 

associated with license renewal are appropriately addressed consistent with the requirements of 

NEPA and 10 CFR Part 51. This approach has been successfully applied to more than 

40 SEISs to date and is typical of how EIS analyses are conducted. No change was made to 

the GEIS as a result of this comment.

Comment: Page 1-6: determining the significance of environmental impacts associated with 

an issue. The introduction to the GElS on 1-6 states the following: 

• The environmental impacts associated with the issue have been determined to apply 

either to all plants or, for some issues, to plants having a specific type of cooling system or 

other specified plant or site characteristics; 

• A single significance level (i.e., small, moderate, or large) has been assigned to the 

impacts (except for collective offsite radiological impacts from the fuel cycle and from highlevel waste and spent fuel); and 

• Mitigation of adverse impacts associated with the issue has been considered in the 

analysis, and it has been determined that additional plant-specific mitigation measures 

would probably not be sufficiently beneficial to warrant implementation. 

The NRC states that the generic analysis of an issue may be adopted in each plant-specific 

review. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-274 

What are the criteria for challenging the generic analysis of an issue in a plant-specific review? 

Please describe or list any license renewal applications where the generic analysis of an issue 

has been challenged, and also identify any successful challenges for such issues applied to 

reactors the NRC has approved for relicensing. 

Please provide a list of every issue that has been accepted for a Category 2 plant-specific 

review in a license renewal proceeding. Doing so will give the public a better idea of the scope 

of input the NRC is open to considering. (A4NR-11-2) 

Response: The NRC makes a concerted effort to identify and evaluate any new information 

associated with Category 1 issues during plant-specific environmental reviews. The applicant’s 

environmental report (ER), public comments, and any other data records are reviewed and 

evaluated for any new information about Category 1 issues that could change the conclusions in 

the GEIS. If new information is discovered that could change the conclusion in the GEIS, the 

NRC staff then notifies the Commission and conducts a plant-specific impact analysis to 

determine the significance of the issue. See the response to Comment CEC-9(1)-10 for 

additional discussion about the definition of “new and significant information.” 

Although a number of new environmental issues have been raised during plant-specific license 

renewal reviews and evaluated by the NRC in plant-specific SEISs, to date these issues were 

not considered significant and did not invalidate any of the conclusions in the GEIS. Two 

examples of issues that were accepted for Category 2 plant-specific review follow. 

During the scoping meetings for the Calvert Cliffs license renewal environmental review, a 

member of the public raised the issue of extremophiles, which are microbiological organisms 

that live in high-radiation and high-temperature environments. The NRC evaluated this issue 

and determined that, while it was new information, it was not considered significant because 

extremophiles would not be able to survive and compete with the indigenous microbiota of the 

relatively cold waters of Chesapeake Bay, once cooling water was discharged from the Calvert 

Cliffs facility. 

Another issue was identified by the NRC during the environmental review of the North Anna 

license renewal. The NRC identified a potential issue related to the nuisance species water 

hyacinth (Hydrilla verticillata), a submerged aquatic macrophyte (large plant) that inhabits many 

freshwater rivers, lakes, and ponds in North America. Although higher water temperatures can 

increase the growing season of water hyacinths, it was concluded that the issue was not 

significant because grass carp appeared to be effectively controlling the growth and biomass of 

the water hyacinth. 

In both of these examples, new information was considered and the results of the environmental 

impact analyses were published in each plant-specific SEIS. The NRC believes that this 
Appendix A 

 A-275 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

process of considering and evaluating new information ensures the possible inclusion of new 

issues in plant-specific license renewal reviews. These two examples demonstrate that the 

NRC considers new environmental issues during plant-specific environmental reviews. Public 

comments on the draft revised GEIS are discussed in Section 1.9. 

Comment: Page 1−14 to 1−15 Public scoping and comments on SEIS: In both the scoping 

and the public comment process, the NRC will consider comments and will determine whether 

these comments provide any information that is new and significant compared with that 

previously considered in the GElS. If the comments are determined to provide new and 

significant information that could change the conclusions in the GElS, these comments will be 

considered and addressed in the SEIS. 

The GElS should clearly explain the criteria the public will be required to follow to meet the 

NRC's standard of "new and significant information that could change the conclusions in the 

GElS." Without knowledge of these criteria, the public may be falsely assured that conclusions 

in the GElS will be reopened as new and significant information comes to light. There is ample 

evidence that the public and the states have brought forth new and significant information that 

the NRC has refused to admit in the SEIS. For example: (08-3903-ag(L) 08-4833-ag(CON); 

O8-5571-ag(CON) United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit THE STATE OF NEW 

YORK; RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF 

CONNECTICUT; AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS.) (A4NR-11-11) 

Comment: Public Comment Process: The NRC has stated they will consider public comments 

based on whether these comments provide any information that is new and significant 

compared with that previously considered in the GElS. If the comments provide new and 

significant information that could change the conclusions in the GElS, NRC will consider and 

address the comments in the SEIS. The NRC should clearly explain in the GElS what criteria 

are used to determine what is considered to be "new and significant information." In prior 

license renewal proceedings, state representatives and members of the public have provided 

new and significant information related to seismic, emergency response, population 

demographics, the potential impacts particularly in largely populated areas from acts of 

sabotage or a terrorist attack, and other issues related to license renewal, and yet the NRC has 

found those issues to be non-admissible contentions. It is unclear why the NRC excludes from 

license renewal proceedings site-specific issues that clearly affect the safety and costs of the 

continued operation of a nuclear power plant. (CEC-9(1)-10) 

Response: New information can be identified from a number of sources, including the 

applicant, NRC review activities, other agencies, or public comments. The NRC defines the 

terms “new and significant” information in Supplement 1 to NRC Regulatory Guide 4.2, 

“Preparation of Supplemental Environmental Reports for Applications to Renew Nuclear Power 

Plant Operating Licenses” (NRC 2013b). 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-276 

‘‘New and significant’’ information is defined as follows: 

(1) Information that identifies a significant environmental issue that was not considered in 

NRC (1996) and, consequently, not codified in Appendix B to Subpart A of 

10 CFR Part 51 or 

(2) Information that was not considered in the analyses summarized in NRC (1996) and that 

leads to an impact finding different from that codified in 10 CFR Part 51. 

Further, a significant environmental issue includes, but is not limited to, any new activity or 

aspect associated with the nuclear power plant that can act upon the environment in a manner 

or in intensity and/or scope (context) not previously recognized. 

As discussed in Sections 1.8.4 and 1.8.6 of the GEIS, if new and significant information is 

revealed, then it is first analyzed to determine whether it is within the scope of the license 

renewal evaluation. If the information is in scope and was not addressed in the GEIS or in 

10 CFR Part 51, then the NRC evaluates the significance of the information by calling upon 

experts from within the NRC, its contractors, or other recognized institutions. If the new 

information is considered to be significant and it is relevant only to a particular site, then the 

NRC will perform a site-specific analysis and include its determination as to any environmental 

impacts arising from this new and significant information in the SEIS for the particular site. If the 

new and significant information appears to be relevant to other sites as well, then the NRC will 

consider the issue in future SEISs and include it as a candidate for evaluation in the periodic 

update of the GEIS and possible amendment to the rule. It is important to emphasize that only 

issues determined to be within the scope of license renewal are considered in this fashion. 

It would not be appropriate to discuss in this forum why particular contentions may have been 

ruled inadmissible by an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB). However, decisions of the 

ASLB panel contain the Board’s reasoning and are a matter of public record available 

electronically through the NRC’s ADAMS system. No change was made to the GEIS as a result 

of this comment. 

Comment: And I could go into more specifics on this document, but, you know, it's just wrong, 

and nuclear power is wrong. It can’t be proven that it’s cost-effective. I mean, so many costs 

are zeroed out when you figure it out. 

This is the kind of bookkeeping we had with the economic downturn that we just experienced. 

We saw it come apart. The NRC's keeping it together, pretty much, as far as money and 

momentum toward the power. But it can't be proven to be environmental, and in your first 

pages, the part that David read about, you know, the state having jurisdiction, in that same 
Appendix A 

 A-277 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

argument, that the NRC is just continuing this because -- excuse me -- you guys are employed 

by this industry, and you have to take it serious. 

And this document does not take it serious, because as you jump over the appendixes in these, 

it's so confusing, to ask the public to comment on this. 

I happen to be immersed in "once through cooling" debate for ten years, so I get to read these 

documents. So they come pretty easy to me, to drift through, but most people aren't going to be 

able to read this. And you're missing the whole bottom line to this, which is what did they say 

when they built it and what is the effect now, before you go and start putting generic labels on 

everything. You better know what the problems are. 

And from what I've read in this document, you don't know what the problems are, because the 

Category 1 problems that you're listing should be Category 2, and they should be individual. 

So from that standpoint, you guys need a lot more work, and this document is nothing more 

than a whole bunch of "watering down" of rules, lots of loopholes that corporations can use to 

not do what they're supposed to do, because they don't have to because it's all generic, and 

we're destroying it, so let's just keep destroying it. 

So to ask the public to feed into a document that's so bad is wrong, to begin with. So I would 

just say just stop at the beginning, where it says that you're supposed to be watching out for the 

environment, and just put an end to this. This is ridiculous. (PBCA-Nelson-29) 

Response: This comment expresses general opposition to nuclear power. The NRC does not 

play a role in determining whether or not a facility operator will seek a renewed license. The 

decision to seek a license renewal rests entirely with nuclear power facility owners. Similarly, 

the need for the power supplied by a facility is a determination that is made by other energyplanning decisionmakers, such as State, utility, and, where authorized, Federal agencies (other 

than NRC). Although a licensee must renew its license to operate a reactor beyond the term of 

the existing license, the possession of a renewed license is just one of a number of conditions 

that must be met to continue operation. Once a license is renewed, other factors and entities 

such as State regulatory agencies and the owners of the nuclear power facility will ultimately 

decide whether the facility will continue to operate. This final decision will be based on 

economics, energy reliability goals, and other objectives over which the other entities may have 

jurisdiction. In addition, the applicant must comply with all applicable Federal, State, and local 

permit requirements. 

The GEIS and its characterization of environmental issues as either Category 1 (generic) or 

Category 2 (site specific) were developed to establish an effective environmental evaluation 

process for license renewal. They are used to avoid duplication and allow the NRC to focus 

specifically on those issues that are important for a particular plant (i.e., unique to that plant or 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-278 

exceptional in size and scope for those issues ordinarily assumed to be similar for all plants) in 

the SEIS. During the environmental reviews of license renewals, the NRC makes a concerted 

effort to determine whether any new and significant information exists that would change the 

generic conclusions for Category 1 issues. New and significant information requires analysis in 

the site-specific SEIS. See the response to comments A4NR-11-19 and CEC-9(1)-10 for more 

information about the categorization of impacts and new and significant information. 

No change was made to the GEIS as a result of this comment. 

Comment: The NRC's draft GElS NUREG-1437 glosses over a myriad of environmental 

impacts at aging reactors and incorrectly categorizes many issues as generic (category 1). 

A4NR fails to understand how close to 60 reactors have attained license renewals from the 

NRC absent complete and open site-specific issues relating to: current rulemaking proceedings 

(onsite storage, security, emergency planning, etc.), seismic updates, decommissioning 

shortfalls, hundreds of changes and amendments to original design criteria, lack of a permanent 

storage facility offsite, unresolved water impacts, changes in population surrounding aging 

reactors and other issues. 

The administration has called for greater transparency from our governmental agencies, yet this 

proposed Revision actually reduces the openness and thoroughness of proceeding that are 

proposed to ensure safe operations during the license renewal period. A4NR, et al, 

recommends the NRC incorporate all public input into the final GElS and implement all 

suggestions. (A4NR-11-39) 

Response: The commenters conclude that the NRC has incorrectly characterized many issues 

as generic rather than site-specific. The NRC’s response to the issues listed, many of which are 

outside the scope of the environmental review, are addressed in the responses to more specific 

comments from these and other commenters elsewhere in Section A.2 of the GEIS. No change 

was made to the GEIS as a result of this comment.

Comment: The first area, I would say, regard how the determination is made whether it's a 

category one or category two issue. It is clear that NEPA requires that new and significant 

information be considered. However, what is considered new and significant by the NRC, who 

is making the call, hopefully just by themselves is making the call, if it is consistent with 

preexisting truths at the NRC, then it is considered new and significant. However, if it is 

contrary to preexisting truths, then it is off the table or, better still, NRC claims that the newer 

and more significant information is safeguards. Therefore, we can't see it. 

And the example would be, for example, security, that the references are, I believe, to two 

Sandia reports, I think that's the way it's referred, and one was redacted, I think down to a page, 

so it really said nothing. And so, in other words, what NRC is telling state officials, what they 
Appendix A 

 A-279 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

are telling some members of Congress, who certainly have clearance, is in the public, that we 

are children, we are two year olds that we are to trust you. And therefore the security, 

everything is fine and we have relied on these studies but, you see, we can't tell you or show 

you these studies so you can have an independent review, so trust us. That is not acceptable. 

(NMA-PW-5) 

Response: The NRC defines the terms “new and significant” information in Regulatory 

Guide 4.2S1, “Preparation of Environmental Reports for Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal 

Applications,” which is publically available through the NRC’s Web-based ADAMS. The 

response to comment CEC-9(1)-10 describes in more detail how the NRC defines and 

addresses new and significant information in the context of license renewal. While it is unclear 

exactly which Sandia reports the commenter is referring to, the reports referenced likely 

contained sensitive, security-related information that would not be available to the general 

public. Only those with the appropriate security clearance and a need-to-know can view such 

information. 

No change was made to the GEIS in response to this comment. 

Comment: According to the California Energy Commission, Southern California Edison plans 

to file for a SONGS license renewal application in late 2012. PG&E expected to file one in 

2010. Today, as I was waiting for my car battery to be recharged because I had a dead battery, 

I got an e-mail saying that PG&E has filed with the PUC to be reimbursed to start its license 

renewal application process 

On page 52 of the GEIS, it states "The purpose and need for the NRC’s proposed action is to 

provide an option to continue plant operations beyond the current licensing term to meet future 

system generation needs.” 

These needs and ultimately the decision to operate a nuclear reactor under a renewed 

operating license are to be determined by state utility system and where authorized Federal 

other than the NRC decision makers. State regulatory agencies, system operators, power plant 

owners and in some cases other Federal agencies ultimately decide whether the plant should 

continue to operate. 

Yet, the GElS process will not be completed and adopted before PG&E and perhaps SCE's 

anticipated filing date for license renewal applications. Therefore, how is the public assured that 

the GElS revisions much less the public's comments will be thoroughly considered before the 

NRC considers a license renewal application for Diablo Canyon or San Onofre? 

This question is especially relevant as the NRC has already licensed over 50 reactors without 

the benefit of the input from the public on GElS revisions. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-280 

It is, therefore, vital that the PUC, the Energy Commission and the state legislature agree and 

require, not recommend, that all cost benefit and risk studies resulting from the state's analysis 

be completed, adopted and implemented and the GElS process be completed and approved 

before any repair funding for the license renewal for California's reactors be allowed. 

(DPCA-A4NR1-36) 

Response: Any applications for license renewal received before the effective date of the final 

rule will be processed under the current rule and the 1996 GEIS. However, the NRC will 

consider any new and significant information relevant to a particular license renewal proceeding 

during its site-specific review, regardless of the status of the revised GEIS. See the response to 

Comment CEC-9(1)-10 for additional details on how new and significant information is 

addressed. The commenter’s recommendation that the State take certain actions before 

permitting funding of license renewal is beyond NRC’s jurisdiction. No change was made to the 

GEIS as a result of this comment.

Comment: C. Timing License Renewal Application: The NRC allows a licensee to apply for a 

license extension too early − when simply one-half the original license is completed. (PW-6-29) 

Comment: There is the issue of when people are applying for their license. We know that we 

live in an age where things improve, imperfections come to light, and we have the ability to do 

something better. It doesn't feel like that when you have an agency applying for a permit ten 

and twenty years in advance. It doesn't read as credible or as being anything other than if we 

can lock you into what we're going to be accountable for now, then if anything comes up later, 

we can say, sorry, we already got our license. 

So as you come up with guidelines, you have got to make sure that no matter when anybody 

applies for a license, that it includes everything that is up to date as of the time that license 

comes into effect, not just is issued, but comes into effect. (PBCA-Pinard-15) 

Comment: And the application process, to allow an application when a licensee is halfway 

through their original license makes economic sense, obviously to the energy companies, but it 

makes absolutely no sense to even suggest that halfway through the original license you can do 

an environmental impact statement or make any judgment whether this reactor can go 20 years 

after 20 years, that's ridiculous. (NMA-PW-20) 
Appendix A 

 A-281 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Response: The NRC has determined that 20 years of operating experience is sufficient to 

assess aging and environmental issues at the site. The licensee is required to meet all 

applicable Federal, State, and local environmental requirements throughout the operational 

period, including any period of extended operation. Therefore, publication of the SEIS up to 

20 years prior to the expiration date of the original operating license does not preclude the need 

for ongoing environmental compliance activities. Moreover, the NRC may impose additional 

environmental or safety requirements as part of its ongoing mandate to protect public health and 

safety, the common defense and security, and the environment on power plant licensees, as 

necessary, whether or not they have applied for or received a renewed license. No change was 

made to the GEIS as a result of this comment. 

Comment: The very first sentence of the Summary (page S-1) says that, "The Atomic Energy 

Act of 1954 authorizes the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to issue commercial 

nuclear power plant operating licenses for up to 40 years and permits the renewal of licenses 

upon expiration." Does anything in this sentence imply that a renewal of an operating license 

can be granted before the expiration of the current license? I believe not! Thus, it appears that 

there would be a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to grant or even consider an 

extension of an operating license before expiration. (Campbell-31-12)

Response: The NRC does not agree with the commenter that it is a violation of the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954 for the NRC to grant or even consider an extension of an operating license 

before expiration. In accordance with Section 103 of the Atomic Energy Act (42 USC 2133), 

10 CFR Part 50.51 allows for the renewal of nuclear power plant operating licenses. NRC 

regulations provide that, absent an exemption from the NRC, an applicant may submit an 

application for license renewal at least 5 years before and not earlier than 20 years before 

license expiration. See 10 CFR Part 2.109(b) and 10 CFR Part 54.17(c). The NRC has 

determined that 20 years of operating experience is sufficient to assess aging and 

environmental issues at the site. Major considerations for seeking license renewal so far in 

advance of the expiration date of the current license are that it takes about 10 years to design 

and construct major new generating facilities and long lead times are required by energyplanning decision makers. The licensee is required to meet all applicable Federal, State, and 

local environmental requirements throughout the operational period. Therefore, publication of 

the SEIS up to 20 years prior to the expiration of the original operating license does not 

preclude the need for ongoing environmental compliance activities. No change will be made to 

the GEIS as a result of this comment. 

Comment: I note that page S-2 says that, "While the NRC staff considers a wide range of 

alternatives to license renewal, THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE WITHIN NRC'S DECISIONMAKING AUTHORITY IS NOT TO RENEW IT." Why go through this extensive paperwork 

process if the only alternative within the NRC's decision-making authority is not to renew an 

operating license? The sentence in the document (preceding the quote above in this 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-282 

paragraph) said that, "The NRC also cannot ensure that environmentally preferable energy 

alternatives are used in the future." While the NRC cannot choose what kind of energy will be 

used, it can eliminate one of the worst energy alternatives as far as impact to the environment 

by eliminating the option for license extension of these old dangerous nuclear power facilities. 

Page S-2 also mentions that "the decision to operate a nuclear power plant under a renewed 

operating license are to be determined by State, utility, system, and where authorized, Federal 

(other than NRC) decision makers." Would the NRC hold off on issuance of an operating 

license extension (or even consideration of a utility's application papers for such a license 

extension) if a state has called for additional studies and precautions to take place before any 

consideration of an extension of an operating license (as is the case with the Diablo Canyon 

facility and state mandated seismic studies)? (Campbell-31-16) 

Response: The NRC was established to regulate the civilian use of nuclear material. The 

decision on the need for power and type of power generation technology to serve that need is 

not a decision that the NRC has the authority to make. Such needs may be determined by 

other energy-planning decisionmakers, such as State, utility, and, where authorized, Federal 

agencies (other than NRC). By law, the NRC only has the authority to grant or deny a license 

for a nuclear power plant. The NRC makes a decision to renew or not to renew a license based 

on public health and safety and common defense and security considerations. A State or other 

entity requesting additional studies or precautions would not in and of itself cause the NRC to 

stop reviewing a license renewal or deny an application. No change will be made to the GEIS 

as a result of this comment. 

Comment: And the main reason I'm here tonight is to address the streamlining process of the 

environmental impact report and the impression I have is that it might result in fewer 

opportunities like this for the public to participate and I think that's a huge part of the process 

that we need to encourage and even if I may not be accurate about that assumption, I would still 

-- my comment is to promote even greater participation with the public, get more feedback from 

alternatives and other opinions and do far more public outreach so a larger number than tonight 

by hundreds could enjoy the process, participate in it and become better educated on a very 

important topic. 

Because I think this environmental process should include consideration of the alternatives, fair 

and honest open debate about how we're going to really address global concerns that are a 

result of climate change in the short time we have to figure this all out. We have to have very 

honest realistic solutions and I'm not saying whether we're pro or against anything. I think all 

options should be on the table and we have some serious issues to deal with and I just am here 

tonight especially to encourage the public input and consider all these things that we heard 

tonight. Very important topics and ideas and suggestions, concerns. 
Appendix A 

 A-283 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

We just need more people participating in that. So, that's what I'm here to encourage. 

(DPCA-SCG-27) 

Comment: Need for the NRC to Hold License Renewal Hearings Near Reactor Communities: 

Communities located near operating power plants should be provided an opportunity to 

comment on the scope of the issues to be considered during the license renewal reviews. The 

NRC should conduct public meetings in communities close to nuclear power plants where plant 

owners have applied for license renewal. Meetings should be held both during the day and the 

evening to accommodate the work schedules for members of the public. (CEC-9(1)-9) 

Comment: We also strongly urge the NRC to hold license renewal hearings, including issue 

scoping and identification hearings, in the vicinity of the plants where plant owners have applied 

for license extensions. (CEC-9(1)-12) 

Response: The NRC acknowledges the comments and agrees that public participation and 

input are necessary and important. It is important to note that the revised GEIS and the 

associated rulemaking will not restrict or limit opportunities for public participation during sitespecific license renewal reviews. It is NRC practice to hold at least two sets of public meetings 

on plant-specific SEISs in the vicinity of the reactor site that is the subject of a license renewal 

application. These meetings occur at important stages of the environmental review of the 

application. 

The first set of meetings occur in the vicinity of the nuclear power plant after the license renewal 

application is received and provides the public an opportunity to provide its insights on the 

scope of the plant-specific SEIS. Typically, one meeting is in the afternoon and the other during 

the evening in an attempt to reach as many members of the public as possible. The meeting 

purpose, times, and locations are commonly advertised in local papers and on the radio to 

ensure that interested members of the public are aware of the public scoping meetings. 

Transcripts of the meetings are made available to the public after the meetings are conducted. 

After the comments have been received, they are evaluated and considered in the preparation 

of the site-specific analysis, as appropriate. Comments that are considered outside the scope 

of the environmental review are addressed in the Scoping Summary Report issued prior to the 

draft SEIS. The comments considered to be in scope are listed in Appendix A of the draft SEIS, 

along with the discussion about whether the comments were further evaluated as part of the 

analysis during the preparation of the draft SEIS. 

The second set of public meetings occurs after issuance of the draft SEIS and is also held in the 

vicinity of the nuclear power plant requesting license renewal. The purpose of these meetings, 

also typically consisting of an afternoon and evening session, are to present an overview of the 

draft SEIS and to obtain comments from the public and other interested stakeholders related to 

the draft. Transcripts of these public meetings are made available after the meetings are 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-284 

conducted. Every comment received is considered and, if appropriate, incorporated into the 

final document. All of the comments on the draft SEIS are listed in Appendix A of the final SEIS, 

along with the discussion about whether the comments were within the scope of license renewal 

and, if appropriate, where changes to the text of the final SEIS were made in response to the 

comments. 

No changes were made to the GEIS in response to these comments.

Comment: Oh, by the way, I should also mention one thing that is very, very relevant. The fact 

that I have a video camera here tonight, that my career is as a documentary film producer, is in 

no way a reflection that this is an undertaking I took on my own. I am highly disappointed that 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission did not do what they have done for a very long time, which 

is have [AGP Video, Inc.] videotape these events, so that our entire community can share in 

them and review them, at their convenience, or on the Internet. (PBCA-Weisman-24) 

Response: The commenter is correct that the six public meetings the NRC held around the 

country during September and October 2009 on the draft revised GEIS were not videotaped. 

The meetings were transcribed, and the transcripts are publicly available through the NRC’s 

ADAMS from NRC’s Web site at http://www.nrc.gov. The meeting locations and ADAMS 

accession numbers are as follows: Atlanta, Georgia (ML09281007); Newton, Massachusetts 

(ML092931681); Oakbrook, Illinois (ML092931545); Rockville, Maryland (ML092931678); Pismo 

Beach, California (ML093070174); and Dana Point, California (ML093100505). The NRC 

values the opinion of the commenter regarding the usefulness of videotaping public meetings 

and will consider that suggestion when planning future public meetings. No change was made 

to the GEIS as a result of this comment.

Comment: First of all, I'd like to express appreciation for the NRC's process that they've 

undertaken in proposing the -- the new regulation and the supporting guidance documents. I 

think having the public meetings at locations around the country is -- is productive. I -- I don't 

think NRC should necessarily evaluate, in retrospect, the -- what the level of participation is, 

necessarily, at those meetings. I think it's more important that you're reaching out and providing 

the opportunity. And I commend the agency for that. (RMD-NEI1-1) 

Response: The NRC acknowledges the comment, and has taken a number of steps to obtain 

broad public participation in the GEIS review process. No change was made to the GEIS is 

response to this comment.

Comment: Page S-3: In a Notice of Intent published in the Federal Register on June 3, 2003, 

the NRC notified the public of its plan to revise the GElS and to give people an opportunity to 

participate in the environmental scoping process. This step was the initial opportunity for public 

participation in the GElS revision. In July 2003, the NRC held public scoping meetings in four 
Appendix A 

 A-285 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

locations (one in each of the four NRC regions) − Atlanta, Georgia; Oak Lawn, Illinois; Anaheim, 

California; and Boston, Massachusetts. 

As indicated earlier, A4NR, et al, finds the NRC's attempt at soliciting public input to the process 

woefully inadequate. As indicated earlier, the NRC held a meeting in 2003 in Anaheim, 

California, at which only ONE member of the public was present. In this most recent attempt at 

soliciting comments, the NRC attempted to hold one meeting in California for all of Region IV. 

The NRC offered a conference call as an alternative, but California had learned from New 

York's NRC conference call where "The committee discussed a number of hot-button issues 

dogging the plant, including contaminated water seeping into the Hudson river, aging pipes and 

the integrity of Indian Point's future plans. But the powwow was nearly inaudible over the 

phone. NRC officials apologized for the glitch and said a meeting transcript would be available 

in about a week" and reinforced its demand that the meeting be held where the impacted 

community lives. 

This NRC's effort to hold the meeting over 100 miles away and/or to offer a conference was 

rebuffed by the public and their representatives, and as a result, the NRC will now schedule 

meetings in each of California's affected reactor communities. 

A4NR recommends that the NRC hold public meetings within a one-hour drive of any affected 

reactor community, and that telephone or internet "bridge" be disallowed because of the 

numerous technical challenges and failures evident in this system. (A4NR-11-31) 

Comment: I'm speaking on behalf of a public interest group, Pilgrim Watch. We are in the 

process of the adjudication process for the Pilgrim Nuclear Plant and so I might be speaking a 

little bit from lessons learned. 

And I want to make a point in regard to that, that I think in the future that your public meetings, 

such as these, would be best to be held beside reactors that have not yet applied for license 

renewal. That would be more beneficial for them. 

It is beneficial, obviously, to speak to people like myself, who have been through the mill or are 

in the process for the lessons that we have learned, but I think it would be most important for 

you to plan your next meetings, and you don't necessarily, I would think, have to restrict them to 

four, to the sites that are coming up. I have not studied this with a fine tooth comb because it 

seems the NRC has been busy enhancing many rule changes, so I have been actually focusing 

on emergency planning and some other ones. However, my interest is with this. (NMA-PW-4) 

Comment: Section 2 – Procedural Issues: A. Public Involvement & Input Restricted –

Recommended: The Honorable Gregory Jaczko's said in a speech entitled, "A Regulator's 

Perspective on New Nuclear Reactor License Applications," September 24, 2009 that, “NRC is 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-286 

built upon a solid foundation of a talented workforce dedicated to the safety and security mission 

of the agency, and guided by sound safety regulations. This solid foundation is strengthened by 

public involvement and input, and by our being open and transparent about what we do and 

why. I am confident that we can successfully meet these challenges in an effective way, with 

safety at the heart of our decisions. “[Emphasis added] 

1. Stakeholder Scoping Sessions − Number, Location & Lack Public Outreach Stakeholder 

Meetings: Public involvement and input at the stakeholder regional meetings is 

restricted and limited by the location of the meetings and minimal to non-existent public 

notification. In order for there to be meaningful participation, it seems obvious. that 

meetings should be located convenient to residents near reactor sites due to apply for 

license renewal and advertised in the local media; not located simply near reactor sites 

that have already applied for license renewal. For example on September 17, 2009 the 

regional GElS Stakeholder meeting was held in Newton Massachusetts, just outside 

Boston. However, the remaining reactors to apply for license renewal in this region are 

located in Pennsylvania and New Hampshire. (PW-6-21) 

Comment: During the ensuing 75-day public comment period, public meetings will be held in 

each of the four NRC regions. 

As stated in the introduction to these comments, the NRC is not specific about the locations and 

frequency of meetings in each of the four NRC regions. For example, Region IV covers nearly 

half the mainland United States, and one meeting would be wholly inadequate to meet the 

needs of the stakeholders and public. The NRC should commit to holding public meetings in 

each reactor community where the utility has given notice of intent to file for relicensing, and 

should include on its service list of notification all relevant state agencies with oversight for 

utilities, power generation and public safety. (A4NR-11-12) 

Comment: In 2003, the Executive Director of Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility-then 

representing another San Luis Obispo, California organization-was the only member of the 

public to attend the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) initial west coast meeting 

opportunity for public participation in the Generic Environmental Impact Statement Revision held 

in California. It should seem obvious to most governmental agencies that when only one 

member of the public attends (in a state with a population of 36 million) there is a cause to doubt 

that public believed their participation was welcomed (or accessible, or convenient). It should 

have raised questions about the NRC's ability to notify the public of meetings and opportunities 

for participation

Comments provided that evening in 2003 included a very important point which the NRC has 

again failed to seriously consider in the scheduling of meetings for public comments on its latest 

GElS revision ─ the need to hold the meetings near the reactor communities. Here they would 
Appendix A 

 A-287 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

find the citizens─the "stakeholders" whom the NRC refers to in its publications─with the most 

valid concerns about continued operation of aging reactors and the ongoing creation and onsite 

storage of highly radioactive waste on our state's fragile coast. In fact, it was clear from the 

sign-in sheets at GElS meetings held in 2009 that the insistence by California's elected 

representatives that meetings be held near reactor sites resulted in the only meetings where 

more that two members of the "public" were in attendance. A4NR, et al, continues to question 

sincerity of the NRC's commitment to openness and transparency when the local public has to 

turn to its elected officials in order for the NRC to schedule meetings in affected communities. 

When the NRC scheduled of public meetings on the GElS Revision over a hundred miles from 

either Diablo Canyon, SONGS or any other reactor community, it remains difficult for the public 

to believe the NRC considers our input valuable. The locations chosen by the NRC signaled to 

the public, to those who live within the "fallout zones" of these and many other reactor facilitiesand to their elected representatives ─ that their input was neither encouraged nor valued. Lack 

of recognition that the public can and should provide valuable insight into the NRC's oversight 

process continues. The NRC's inability to listen to the public in 2003 resulted in wasted time 

and resources and shadowed the public's perception of the purported "openness" and 

transparency of the NRC's current license renewal revisions. (A4NR-11-1) 

Comment: The process should be open and transparent to the public and the press. The 

public should be allowed ample time to comment on all issues and town meetings, annual 

assessments etc. should be publically announced weeks in advance and accessible, to 

precipitate larger public attendance and education. (DWM-5-3) 

Response: The NRC encouraged and welcomed members of the public, environmental 

interest groups, and representatives of local, State, Tribal, and Federal government agencies to 

participate in the scoping and public comment process for the GEIS revision. Revised GEIS, 

Volume 2, Appendix A, describes the public comment process in detail and summarizes the 

comments received and NRC’s response to public comments on scoping and the draft revised 

GEIS. The initial scoping period for the GEIS revision began on June 3, 2003, and ended on 

September 17, 2003. Public scoping meetings were held in each of the four NRC regions 

during this time period in July 2003. The scoping period was subsequently reopened from 

September 27, 2005 until December 30, 2005. Members of the public and other environmental 

interest group stakeholders were able to submit scoping comments by mail, e-mail, or in person 

at NRC Headquarters during the entire time of the two scoping periods. 

Following publication of the draft revised GEIS and the proposed rule, the NRC again 

encouraged members of the public, environmental interest groups, and representatives of local, 

State, Tribal, and Federal government agencies to submit comments during a 75-day public 

comment period from July 31, 2009, until October 14, 2009 (74 FR 38117). In response to 

requests from three stakeholders, the NRC extended the comment period for an additional 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-288 

90 days until January 12, 2010 (74 FR 51522). During this time, the NRC also held six public 

meetings. Meetings were again held in each of the four NRC regions. Originally, the NRC had 

only one meeting planned in California (Region IV), but changed the location and added another 

meeting to accommodate the requests from various stakeholders. The California meetings 

were held in Pismo Beach, California (near the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant), and Dana Point, 

California (near the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station). The other meetings were held in 

Atlanta, Georgia (Region II); Newton, Massachusetts (Region I); and Oak Brook, Illinois 

(Region III). The sixth, a Webinar meeting, was held at NRC Headquarters in Rockville, 

Maryland. Open phone lines were also provided at all of the public meetings. Section 1.9 of the 

revised GEIS describes the public comment process and briefly summarizes major issues 

raised during the public comment period on the draft revised GEIS. 

See the response to comments DCPA-SCG-27, CEC-9(1)-9, and CEC-9(1)-12 for a description 

of NRC public meeting practices for site-specific license renewal environmental reviews. 

Comment: I'd also recommend that public hearings be held on all waste transportation routes 

if, in fact, the waste is moved and that those hearings are held in each jurisdiction affected by 

such travel, that we have radiation release data available on the internet in real time, that we 

require owners of nuclear power plants to set aside sufficient money to cover the cost of 

decommissioning, that we require public service announcements to made on radio and TV 

directing the public to evacuation and other significant nuclear incident safety information and 

finally, that we put a moratorium on relicensing until there is a permanent high-level waste 

disposal site. (DPCA-A4NR-15) 

Response: The recommendations of the commenter are outside the scope of license renewal. 

The NRC has determined that issues concerning the ultimate disposition of spent nuclear fuel 

are ongoing and outside the regulatory scope of this rulemaking and the GEIS. See the 

response to Comment CEC-9(1)-3. Therefore, there is no basis for a moratorium on license 

renewal. 

With regard to decommissioning funding, NRC regulations in 10 CFR Part 50 require each 

power reactor licensee to provide reasonable assurance that funds will be available for 

decommissioning and prescribes acceptable methods for providing financial assurance and the 

minimum dollar amounts, adjusted annually, to demonstrate such reasonable assurance. See 

10 CFR Parts 50.33(k) and 50.75. Decommissioning funding is out of scope for the license 

renewal environmental review.

Finally, as explained more fully in response to Comment PW-6-19, emergency preparedness is 

outside the scope of license renewal. No change was made to the GEIS as a result of this 

comment. 
Appendix A 

 A-289 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Comment: And so you have, in the security, for example, that, oh, it's category one but we will 

consider it if a circuit court, such as the 9th, says that it has to have an environmental review, 

let's say in California. But because maybe the New Jersey DEP didn't have the case that, trust 

me, New York Attorney General's Office has, well the 3rd Circuit Court said something else, so 

take it off the table there. It's a piecemeal approach. 

We know there is something wrong, fundamentally wrong with this process, so what should be 

on the table? (NMA-PW-7) 

Comment: For the foregoing reasons, Riverkeeper respectfully submits that the Revised GElS 

for license renewal of nuclear power plants is inadequate and incomplete. The environmental 

review based on the Revised GElS would fail to provide for a comprehensive review which is 

necessary to comply with NEPA. (Riverkeeper-20-19) 

Comment: The draft revised Generic EIS needs substantial revision if it is going to meet 

NEPA's requirements. Even given the clear mandate under federal law, the analysis in the draft 

revised Generic EIS is illusory. This key step in the license renewal review falls short of what it 

should achieve. Instead, numerous issues that have been repeatedly raised by the State of 

New York remain unaddressed. Statements submitted by the State of New York in 1991 in the 

original Generic EIS process regarding upgrading technologies to reduce and mitigate 

environmental impacts at nuclear generating facilities are even more relevant in 2010. 

Unfortunately, they are going as unheeded now as they were twenty years ago. As the record 

demonstrates, the NRC has narrowly drafted regulations, processes, and procedures that do 

not address key environmental issues in meaningful ways. (NYS DEC-12-1)

Comment: NEPA requires more of the NRC than the agency is providing in the license renewal 

process for nuclear power plants. The NRC's approach for reviewing license renewal 

applications from aging nuclear power plants − many with once-through cooling water intake 

systems that have never undergone environmental review because they pre-dated NEPA −

does not achieve the goal of adequately assessing and mitigating environmental impacts as 

NEPA mandates. The NRC claims that the revised Generic EIS will provide guidance for 

assessing impacts in Supplemental EISs, which are conducted on a site-specific basis for each 

plant. As demonstrated above, however, this document hardly provides that guidance. The 

NYSDEC knows that the guidance is sorely needed, given the State's experience in the NRC's 

license renewal proceeding for Indian Point. The demonstrated inadequate draft Supplemental 

EIS for Indian Point should serve to instruct the NRC in crafting the revised Generic EIS. In that 

way, the data errors and the analytical failures abundant in the Indian Point license renewal 

proceeding will not be replicated nationwide. (NYS DEC-12-12)
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-290 

Comment: As an overview, the Draft is a second rate job and the research analysis performed 

to support conclusions is third rate; thereby confidence in the NRC and this process is 

undermined. (PW-6-1) 

Comment: Pilgrim Watch contends that the Draft incorrectly determined contrary to NRC's own 

definition of "small impact" that the environmental impact of some issues was "small" when it 

clearly should have been "moderate to large1

;" and wrongly categorized several issues as 

Category 1 instead of Category 22

 These include, for example: human health; solid waste 

management, onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel and low-level waste storage and disposal; 

postulated and severe accidents; radionuclides released to groundwater; and decommissioning. 

[

1

 July 2009, S-5, NUREG-1437, Rev.1: NRC defines in the Draft small impact as, "Environmental effects are not 

detectable or are so minor that they will neither destabilize nor noticeably alter any important attribute of the resource. 

For the purposes of assessing radiological impacts, the Commission has concluded that those impacts do not exceed 

permissible level in the Commission's regulations are considered small.” Moderate impact as, "Environmental effects 

are sufficient to alter noticeably, but not to destabilize, important attributes of the resource." Large impact as, 

"Environmental effects are clearly noticeable and are sufficient to destabilize important attributes of the resource."] 

[

2

 Ibid: The draft says that Category I issues are those that meet all of the following criteria: (1) The environmental 

impacts associated with the issue have been determined to apply either to all plants or, for some issues, to plants 

having a specific type of cooling system or other specified plant or site characteristics; (2) A single significance level 

(i.e., small, moderate, or large) has been assigned to the impacts (except for collective offsite radiological impacts 

from the fuel cycle and from high-level waste and spent fuel); (3) Mitigation of adverse impacts associated with the 

issue has been considered in the analysis, and it has been determined that additional plant-specific mitigation 

measures would probably not be sufficiently beneficial to warrant implementation. For issues that meet the three 

Category 1 criteria, no additional plant-specific analysis is required in future SEISs unless new and significant 

information is identified. Category 2 issues are those that do not meet one or more of the criteria of Category 1, and, 

therefore, require additional plant-specific review.]

NRC justified their conclusions of a "small impact" and Category 1 designation by: (1) totally 

ignoring or mischaracterizing new and significant information that provided contrary evidence or 

"Inconvenient Truths" (example, NRC's mischaracterization of meteorology, climatology and 

BEIR VII); (2) referencing guidance or industry practices, without demonstrating that they, in 

fact, provide "reasonable assurance" (example, SAMA and Applicant's use of outdated 

computer code and uses ATMOS); and (3) referencing "safeguard" information unavailable for 

independent scrutiny (example on site storage spent fuel, NRC's Updated Waste Confidence 

Rule). 

Further, and of considerable importance, NRC incorrectly determined that emergency planning 

and security were outside the scope of review. They both have a potentially large impact and 

are site specific. (PW-6-2) 

Response: These comments make only general statements regarding environmental impact 

issues, express their general opposition to the GEIS, and/or provide no new information. As 

such, no change was be made to the GEIS in response to these comments. In addition, the 

categorization of impacts as Category 1 (generic) or Category 2 (site-specific) and significance 
Appendix A 

 A-291 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

levels are discussed in the response to Comment AGA-NEI-2 and are presented in 

Section 1.5.2 of the GEIS. Emergency preparedness and security are outside the scope of the 

license renewal environmental review but are addressed as part of NRC’s regulatory oversight 

program for all operating reactors.

Comment: The Scope of the GElS Is Improperly Narrow: In a shell game of regulation, the 

NRC claims in Section 1.6 that some issues are adequately addressed elsewhere − by other 

agencies and/or proceedings − or dealt with on an ongoing basis. In its plan to review nuclear 

plants generically, the NRC has effectively excluded from its consideration environmental issues 

that have major impacts on public safety: 

• Disposition of Spent Nuclear Fuel 

• Emergency Preparedness 

• Safeguards and Security 

Additional excluded issues that would not stand up to scrutiny include: 

• Changes to Plant Cooling Systems 

• Need for Power 

The NRC acknowledges unresolved problems, but excludes them from consideration in the 

GElS. Examples include the following: 

• Aging: " ...operational safety issues and safety issues related to aging are considered outside 

the scope for the environmental review..." (1-8, lines 7,8) 

• Security: “Security issues such as safeguards planning are not tied to a license renewal 

action..." (1-12, line 25) 

• High-level waste storage: “The NRC is confident that there will eventually be a licensed highlevel waste repository." (1-9, line 31) (SLOMFP-13-7) 

Comment: The Scope of the GElS Is Improperly Narrow: SLOMFP objects to the elimination 

of critical issues in the determination of license renewal action and to the failure to acknowledge 

and assess the interactive and cumulative effects of overlapping issues. (SLOMFP-13-11) 

Response: The issues identified by the commenters are considered outside the scope, or, in 

some cases, generic for the environmental review of a license renewal. These include, for 

example, the onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel during the license renewal term, emergency 

preparedness, safeguards and security, and need for power. The reasons for excluding these 

issues are discussed in GEIS Section 1.7 and in the NRC’s response to specific comments 

raising these issues elsewhere in this appendix. It should be noted that aging management, 

while outside the environmental review of a license renewal, is considered during the safety 

review of a license renewal. The need for power is considered in the environmental review of 

proposals to initially construct new nuclear power reactors. Changes to plant cooling systems, 

to the extent they involve safety-related issues, would be considered in NRC safety reviews; 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-292 

however, the NRC will not make a decision or any recommendations to mitigate adverse 

impacts of cooling system operations, as they fall under the jurisdiction of State or other Federal 

agencies. Human health impacts of onsite spent fuel storage continue to be well within 

regulatory limits (as set forth in 10 CFR Parts 20 and 72), and the radiological impacts of onsite 

storage continue to meet the standard for a conclusion of SMALL impact. Nonradiological 

environmental impacts continue to be SMALL. The overall conclusion for onsite storage of 

spent nuclear fuel during the license renewal term is that the environmental impacts will be 

SMALL for each plant. Additionally, impacts associated with potential severe accidents, 

including those at spent fuel pools, during the license renewal term are discussed in 

Section 4.9.1.2 and Appendix E of the GEIS. 

With regard to malevolent acts or sabotage, it is the NRC’s position that malevolent acts or 

sabotage are speculative and beyond the scope of a NEPA review and are, therefore, outside 

the scope of the GEIS. The NRC believes that the consequences of events initiated by 

malevolent acts or sabotage would be comparable to or bounded by the severe accidents 

considered in the GEIS. At present, however, the NRC will consider malevolent acts or 

sabotage as part of a license renewal environmental review for plants located within the 

jurisdictional area of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, as a result of the Ninth 

Circuit decision in San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 449 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2006). 

For additional discussion, see Appendix E, Section E.3, of the revised GEIS. 

The other issues, emergency preparedness, and safeguards and security (which includes 

preventing malevolent acts or sabotage), are considered part of the NRC’s ongoing regulatory 

and safety oversight of all civilian nuclear power plants, whether their owners are seeking 

license renewal or not. No change was made to the GEIS as a result of these comments. 

Comment: The draft revised Generic EIS misses critical and well known environmental issues 

and effectively precludes their review. For example, the NRC mentions in this draft Generic EIS 

that impingement and entrainment impacts from cooling water intake systems will be fully 

assessed in a site-specific Supplemental EIS. As a participating party in the license renewal 

proceeding for Indian Point Units 2 & 3, it is clear to the NYSDEC that this is not true in that 

proceeding. Therefore, the NYSDEC has concluded that the woeful experience with that sitespecific Supplemental EIS provides a compelling need for the NRC to set out more guidelines in 

the revised Generic EIS. Not only has New York State had to deal with such a stale Generic 

EIS, but, as demonstrated below, the NRC has drafted a site-specific Supplemental EIS in the 

Indian Point license renewal proceeding based upon faulty data and analyses. This result must 

be corrected for the Indian Point license renewal process, and importantly, not be allowed to be 

repeated at other plants because the revised Generic EIS is so deficient. 

Thus, NYSDEC advances a novel proposition − the Indian Point Supplemental EIS should 

inform the NRC to provide more guidance in the Generic EIS for the preparation of site specific 
Appendix A 

 A-293 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Supplemental EISs. If the NRC takes such a step, and heeds the comments of New York State 

from both 1991 and now, a more meaningful review of critical environmental issues can be 

possible for the license renewal applications for nuclear generating facilities. That meaningful 

review will also comply with NEPA. (NYS DEC-12-3) 

Response: With respect to in-scope environmental issues, the overall environmental license 

renewal process, including the GEIS, the SEIS, the guidance provided in the ESRP 

(NRC 2013a) and NRC (2013b), as well as the potential hearing process, is utilized for the basis 

for consideration of all important environmental impacts and is consistent with NEPA and 

10 CFR Part 51. 

The ESRP provides guidance to the NRC implementation of the provisions of 10 CFR Part 51. 

It provides guidance by listing the acceptance criteria and describing the environmental review 

procedures for each environmental resource area, including evaluating new and significant 

information and potential mitigation factors, if necessary. The NRC uses this review plan to 

prepare site-specific supplements to the GEIS. Use of the ESRP in the environmental review 

process ensures the consideration and review of all relevant environmental issues; ensures 

consideration of other Federal, State, regional, local, and affected Native American Tribal 

environmental issues; ensures the standardization of analytical and evaluation procedures for 

the review of each environmental issue; and ensures concentration on review of the potential 

environmental impacts of significance. 

With regard to using the Indian Point SEIS as a model for the revised GEIS, lessons learned 

and knowledge gained during all previous license renewal reviews provided significant sources 

of new information for this assessment. Since 1996, more than 40 site-specific supplements to 

the GEIS have been prepared. In addition, new research, findings, and other information were 

considered when the significance of impacts associated with license renewal was being 

evaluated. 

Comment: A. The Draft Generic EIS Avoids Thorough Analysis of the Environmental Impacts 

for License Renewals of Nuclear Power Plants in the United States: The publication of this draft 

Generic EIS illustrates the significant procedural and substantive hurdles that the NRC has put 

in the way of public review and participation in the license renewal proceedings of nuclear 

generating facilities. The State of New York has participated in the license renewal proceeding 

for Indian Point Units 2 & 3, and yet fundamental environmental issues have not been 

adequately addressed in that forum. With the release of the revised Generic EIS, those issues 

will not be analyzed, addressed, or reviewed for Indian Point or any other facility. The process 

demonstrates that in whatever forum an interested party raises an issue, the NRC claims that it 

is never the proper forum. The review process, although ostensibly open to all, in reality is a 

carefully constructed "shell game." Parties attempting to participate in the reviews have to know 

what they need to know before they need to know it. The NRC process on license renewal 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-294 

effectively deprives the public from meaningfully participating in the consideration of 

environmental issues in what is mandated by law to be a comprehensive environmental review 

process. When there are Significant impacts to waterways, such as the Hudson River, and 

alternatives such as closed-cycle cooling technology are available, the NRC's failure to consider 

those alternatives means that the environmental impacts will never be adequately considered 

for operation of the nuclear facility. 

The NRC has established a two-part environmental review process for the license renewal of 

nuclear power plants in the United States. The Generic EIS is intended to address 

environmental impacts that are common to numerous plants. In addition to this Generic EIS, a 

Supplemental EIS process for individual plants is intended to address environmental impacts at 

specific facilities. In practice, however, a thorough and comprehensive review of issues is 

thwarted by this two-part process because they are out of sync with each other. 

The draft revision at issue here is for the 14-year-old Generic EIS. Parties engaged in license 

renewal proceedings, and who have gone through the" contentions" process seeking a hearing 

on the already-filed license renewal applications, must deal with the woefully outdated Generic 

EIS that was originally published in 1996. The NRCs regulations require the Generic EIS to be 

reviewed on a ten-year cycle, and updated if necessary. Many years later, the NRC has 

published a draft revision. But yet again, the NRC fails to fully analyze key issues, and punts 

many key issues to other parts of the process, having precluded the possibility of the issue 

being addressed in the NEPA review. Public review is further complicated by the fact that the 

"record" available to interested parties seeking a hearing on a particular license renewal 

proceeding is incomplete when “contentions" are required to be filed. Moreover, the 

Supplemental EIS when published many, many months after the NRC’s imposed deadline to file 

contentions almost ensures that the "missing" pieces of the record will also not be considered in 

the proceeding. These factors collude to complicate consideration of important issues, which is 

especially true for impacts on aquatic resources. (NYS DEC-12-2) 

Response: The comment takes issue with the environmental review and hearing process 

associated with license renewals. The NRC believes it has established a comprehensive, fair, 

and transparent review process with numerous opportunities for public input as described more 

fully in Section 1.9 of the revised GEIS. The NRC disagrees with the commenter’s assertion 

that there is never a proper forum to raise an issue; however, issues such as requiring the 

installation of a closed-cycle cooling system are outside the statutory authority of the NRC and 

are, therefore, not addressed. 

No change was made to the GEIS as a result of this comment. 
Appendix A 

 A-295 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Comment: A good first step in fulfilling your moral and legal responsibilities is to require a 

rigorous on-site specific review of environmental health, economic and safety impacts of 

SONGS generating license extension application. (DPCA-CREED3-19) 

Response: NRC’s review of an application for license renewal, including any potential 

application from SONGS, has four components: a safety review, an environmental review, 

inspections, and an independent review by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards 

(ACRS). 

The NRC performs a safety review of the information provided in the application (as 

supplemented with additional information provided by the applicant at the NRC’s request). The 

results of the safety review are documented in a publicly available safety evaluation report. 

The NRC publishes the results of the license renewal environmental review in a publicly 

available plant-specific draft SEIS, and the public is invited to comment. Then, after considering 

all public comments, the NRC issues the final SEIS. 

Teams of inspectors with experience in nuclear plant safety visit the site and verify that the 

applicant has implemented its aging management plans as committed to in the application. The 

results of plant inspections conducted as part of license renewal are documented in inspection 

reports and are made publicly available. The results are also included in the safety evaluation 

report. (These inspections are in addition to NRC’s ongoing regulatory oversight program for all 

operating reactors, which also includes inspections.) 

The ACRS is an independent panel of experts that advises the Commission on matters related 

to nuclear safety. The ACRS reviews the applicant’s safety analysis report, the NRC’s safety 

evaluation report, and the results of the onsite inspections and makes its recommendation to the 

Commission regarding issuance of the renewed license. 

No change was made to the GEIS as a result of this comment. 

Comment: Page 1-7: The GElS introduction states "Scoping also identifies and eliminates 

from detailed study issues that are not significant or have been covered by a prior 

environmental review. Having a defined scope for the environmental review allows the NRC to 

concentrate on the essential issues of actions being considered rather than on issues that may 

have been or are being evaluated in different regulatory review processes, such as the safety 

review (NRC 2006)." 

If there are issues involved in a site-specific relicensing proceeding that "may have been or are 

being evaluated in different regulatory review processes, such as the safety review (NRC 2006)" 

is the NRC required to update the evaluation or resolve the "different regulatory review 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-296 

processes" before approving a license renewal? If not, under what NRC criteria can the public 

and/or the state challenge issues that "may have been or are being evaluated in different 

regulatory review processes"? Please provide any examples of NGO or state challenges that 

were successful after issues were evaluated in "different regulatory review processes"? 

(A4NR-11-3) 

Response: For each license renewal, two reviews are required: an environmental review and 

a safety review. These reviews are conducted independently and in parallel by the NRC. If 

there is an issue in one of those reviews that is determined to have an impact in the other 

review, both of those evaluations must take that issue into account before a decision to grant a 

renewed license will be made. For example, if during the course of the safety review a plant 

modification is required to address an aging management concern, the plant-specific SEIS may 

need to address the environmental impacts associated with that modification. Absent new and 

significant information, issues that were considered under different regulatory review processes, 

such as in rulemakings or other generic environmental review statements, would not have to be 

reevaluated in the license renewal proceeding. 

Any person whose interest may be affected by a license renewal proceeding and who desires to 

participate as a party in that proceeding may petition to intervene by filing a petition in 

accordance with 10 CFR 2.309. Similarly, in accordance with 10 CFR 2.802, any interested 

person may petition the NRC to issue, amend, or rescind any NRC regulation. 

No change was made to the GEIS as a result of this comment. 

Comment: Page 1-8: Actions subject to NRC approval for license renewal are limited to 

continued nuclear power plant operation consistent with the plant design and operating 

conditions for the current operating license and to the performance of specific activities and 

programs necessary accordance with 10 CFR Part 54.17. 

As there have been over 200 license amendments, temporary orders, and waivers, etc. for 

Diablo Canyon and over 400 of the same changes for SONGS, the public asks which plant 

design criteria is assumed as the baseline in the GElS, and if there are any "temporary orders" 

in place at the time of license renewal application, must they be resolved into a "permanent" 

form before any consideration of their impact on extended operation and the license renewal 

process can continue? For example, onsite storage of radioactive waste was never considered 

when nuclear plants were licensed. When the local community asked that seismic issues be 

addressed in the onsite storage proceedings (known to the industry and NRC as ISFSI's) the 

NRC denied that contention and directed the local community to reopen the original licensing 

proceedings, even though a new active offshore fault was discovered in 2008 - making it the 

second active fault discovered after the original permits were granted. (A4NR-11-4) 
Appendix A 

 A-297 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Response: The NRC’s safety review of a specific license renewal is used to determine whether 

there is reasonable assurance that activities authorized by the renewed license will continue to 

be conducted in accordance with the current licensing basis (CLB). The CLB is the particular 

set of NRC requirements applicable to a licensed operating nuclear power facility. 

The CLB includes the applicant’s written regulatory commitments for ensuring compliance with 

and operation within the applicable NRC requirements and the plant-specific design basis. 

Documents in the CLB include: 

• NRC regulations contained in applicable parts of Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (specifically Parts 2, 19, 20, 21, 26, 30, 40, 50, 51, 54, 55, 70, 72, 73, and 

100) and associated appendices

• NRC orders

• safety and environmental license conditions

• technical specifications and environmental protection plans

• exemptions

• plant-specific design information, as documented in the most recent Final Safety 

Analysis Report (FSAR) 

• NRC environmental reviews (EISs, supplements, and environmental assessments) 

• the licensee’s commitments remaining in effect that were made in docketed licensing 

correspondence, such as responses to NRC bulletins, generic letters and enforcement 

actions, NRC safety evaluations, or licensee event reports. 

The CLB changes as documents such as the FSAR or the technical specifications are revised 

or as the licensee’s regulatory commitments change. As a result, the NRC requires that each 

year after submittal of the license renewal and at least three months before scheduled 

completion of the NRC review, the applicant submit an amendment to the renewal application 

that identifies any change to the CLB of the facility that would materially affect the contents of 

the license renewal. 

The NRC is committed to ensuring that both spent nuclear fuel and low-level radioactive wastes 

are managed to prevent health impacts to the public. Spent nuclear fuel is currently stored at 

reactor sites in the spent fuel pools and/or in independent spent fuel storage installations 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-298 

(ISFSIs). This practice is expected to continue until DOE is ready to take possession of the 

spent nuclear fuel. At this time, it is uncertain when this will happen. 

Interim storage needs vary among plants, with older units having less available pool storage 

capacity than newer ones. However, given the uncertainty as to when a geologic repository will 

open and the lack of other options, it is likely that some sort of expanded spent fuel storage 

capacity beyond the original design capacity will be needed at all nuclear power plants. 

On March 3, 2010, DOE submitted a motion to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board to 

withdraw its application for a permanent geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. In 

light of the uncertainty surrounding the use of Yucca Mountain, if another repository for spent 

nuclear fuel is proposed, an environmental impact statement would be prepared. 

For spent nuclear fuel, the Waste Confidence Decision and Rule represented the Commission’s 

generic determination that spent nuclear fuel can continue to be stored safely and without 

significant environmental impacts for a period of time after the end of the licensed life for 

operation of a nuclear power plant (after the permanent shutdown of the power reactor and 

expiration of the plant’s operating license). This generic determination, codified in 10 CFR 

51.23(a), meant that the NRC did not need to consider the storage of spent nuclear fuel after 

the end of a reactor’s licensed life for operation in the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 

documents that support its reactor and spent-fuel storage license application reviews. 

On December 23, 2010, the Commission published a revision of the Waste Confidence 

Decision and Rule to reflect information gained based on experience in the storage of spent 

nuclear fuel and the increased uncertainty in the siting and construction of a permanent geologic 

repository for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste. In response to the 2010 

Waste Confidence Decision and Rule, the states of New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, and 

Vermont, and several other parties challenged the Commission’s NEPA analysis in the decision, 

which provided the regulatory basis for the rule. On June 8, 2012, the United States Court of 

Appeals, in New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d 471 (D.C. Cir. 2012), vacated the NRC’s Waste 

Confidence Decision and Rule, after finding that it did not comply with NEPA. 

 

In response to the court’s ruling, the Commission issued CLI-12-16 on August 7, 2012, in which 

the Commission determined that it would not issue licenses that rely upon the Waste 

Confidence Decision and Rule until the issues identified in the court’s decision are appropriately 

addressed by the Commission. CLI-12-16 provided, however, that the decision not to issue 

licenses only applied to final license issuance; all licensing reviews and proceedings should 

continue to move forward. In SRM-COMSECY-12-0016, dated September 6, 2012, the 

Commission directed the NRC staff to proceed with a rulemaking that includes the development 

of a generic EIS to support a revised Waste Confidence Decision and Rule and to publish both 

the EIS and the revised Waste Confidence Decision and Rule in the Federal Register within 
Appendix A 

 A-299 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

24 months (by September 6, 2014). The Commission indicated that both the EIS and the 

revised Waste Confidence Decision and Rule should build on the information already 

documented in various NRC studies and reports, including the existing environmental 

assessment that the NRC developed as part of the 2010 Waste Confidence Decision and Rule. 

The Commission directed that any additional analyses should focus on the issues identified in 

the D.C. Circuit’s decision. The Commission also directed that the NRC staff provide ample 

opportunity for public comment on both the draft EIS and the proposed Waste Confidence 

Decision and Rule. 

In accordance with CLI-12-16, the NRC will not approve any site-specific license renewal 

applications until the deficiencies identified in the D.C. Circuit’s decision have been resolved. 

Two license renewal issues that rely, wholly or in part, upon the Waste Confidence Decision and 

Rule are the “onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel” and “offsite radiological impacts of spent 

nuclear fuel and high-level waste disposal.” Both of these issues were classified as Category 1 

in the 1996 GEIS and the 10 CFR Part 51 final rule that was promulgated in 1996 (61 FR 

28467, June 5, 1996), which codified the findings of the 1996 GEIS into 10 CFR Part 51, 

Subpart A, Appendix B, Table B-1. The draft revised GEIS that was published for public 

comment in 2009 (74 FR 38239, July 31, 2009) and the concomitant proposed rule (74 FR 

38117, July 31, 2009) continued the Category 1 classification for both of these issues. As part 

of the NRC’s response to the New York v. NRC decision, the NRC has revised these two issues 

accordingly. 

Specifically, the NRC has revised the Category 1 issue, “Onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel,” 

to narrow the period of onsite storage to the license renewal term. In both the 1996 GEIS and 

rule and the 2009 draft revised GEIS and proposed rule, the NRC relied upon the Waste 

Confidence Decision and Rule to make a generic finding that spent nuclear fuel could be stored 

safely onsite with no more than a small environmental impact for the term of the extended 

license (from approval of the license renewal application to the expiration of the operating 

license) plus a 30 year period following the permanent shutdown of the power reactor and 

expiration of the operating license. 

The Waste Confidence Decision and Rule provided the basis for the 30 year period following 

the permanent shutdown of the reactor and expiration of the operating license. The 2010 Waste 

Confidence Decision and Rule extended this post-reactor shutdown onsite storage period from 

30 years to 60 years. Given the New York v. NRC decision, and pending the issuance of a 

generic EIS and revised Waste Confidence Decision and Rule (as directed by SRM-COMSECY12-0016), the period of onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel following the permanent shutdown of 

the power reactor and expiration of the operating license is now excluded from this GEIS issue. 

This issue now only covers the onsite storage of spent fuel during the license renewal term. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-300 

Similarly, the NRC has revised the Category 1 issue, “Offsite radiological impacts of spent 

nuclear fuel and high-level waste disposal.” This issue pertains to the long-term disposal of 

spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste, including possible disposal in a deep geologic 

repository. Although the Waste Confidence Decision and Rule did not assess the impacts 

associated with disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste in a repository, it did reflect 

the Commission’s confidence, at the time, in the technical feasibility of a repository and when 

that repository could have been expected to become available. Without the analysis in the 

Waste Confidence Decision, the NRC cannot assess how long the spent fuel will need to be 

stored onsite. Therefore, the NRC has reclassified this issue from a Category 1 issue with no 

assigned impact level to an uncategorized issue with an impact level of uncertain. 

Upon issuance of the revised Waste Confidence Decision and Rule and its supporting generic 

EIS, the NRC will make any necessary conforming amendments to its regulations in 10 CFR 

Part 51 and supplement the GEIS as necessary. As referenced previously, the Commission will 

not approve any license renewal application for an operating nuclear power plant until the 

issues identified in the New York v. NRC court’s decision are appropriately addressed by the 

Commission. 

No change was made to the GEIS as a result of this comment 

Comment: Operation and Maintenance Deficiencies Should be Addressed in the GElS: 

Recent NRC inspection reports on Diablo Canyon (August, 2009) indicate that PG&E is not 

meeting industry standards in its identification and resolutions of problems at the plant. In late 

October, 2009, it was discovered that for 18 months the plant was run with defective control of 

some of the valves relied upon to flood the Unit 2 reactor with essential cooling water in the 

event of a serious accident or sabotage. An NRC report on its findings has not yet been made 

available. 

SLOMFP contends that a plant's mechanical and personnel history provide critical predictive 

information which the NRC must consider before extending the life of a nuclear facility. Yet, 

there is no resource area in the Draft GElS that explores the plant's operation and maintenance 

record. This must be a Category 2 issue. (SLOMFP-13-2) 

Comment: The Scope of the GEIS is Improperly Narrow: There are also limitations to the 

categories. What about a maintenance category? Where does the NRC look at maintenance 

history at each plant and analyze negative trends? (SLOMFP-13-9) 

Response: The NRC’s safety review of license renewals considers the applicant’s operating 

experience, including potential maintenance and corrective action issues, in assessing the 

applicant’s capability to adequately manage the effects of aging during the period of extended 
Appendix A 

 A-301 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

operation. Ongoing NRC safety inspections also review operational and maintenance issues at 

each plant. Thus, an applicant’s general operational history and maintenance record is outside 

the scope of the environmental review of license renewal, as it is covered in the safety review of 

license renewal. However, past operational and maintenance events at nuclear power plants 

having environmental impacts, such as fish kills or spills, would be addressed in the GEIS to the 

extent applicable to a given resource area. Should the magnitude of the environmental impacts 

of a past event at a particular site constitute new and significant information that would change 

the conclusion in the GEIS, the impacts would be addressed in a plant-specific SEIS. The 

response to Comment CEC 9(1)-10 discusses “new and significant information” in more detail. 

No change was made to the GEIS in response to this comment.

Comment: Section 2 – Procedural Issues: A. Public Involvement & Input Restricted –

Recommended: The Honorable Gregory Jaczko's said in a speech entitled, "A Regulator's 

Perspective on New Nuclear Reactor License Applications," September 24, 2009 that, “NRC is 

built upon a solid foundation of a talented workforce dedicated to the safety and security mission 

of the agency, and guided by sound safety regulations. This solid foundation is strengthened by 

public involvement and input, and by our being open and transparent about what we do and 

why. I am confident that we can successfully meet these challenges in an effective way, with 

safety at the heart of our decisions.” [Emphasis added] 

3. NRC Staff: The adjudication technically is between two parties, the Applicant and the 

Petitioner. 

Problem: The NRC Legal and Technical Staff in most, if not in all license renewal adjudications, 

take an active role similar to the two parties − filing motions, replies, etc. In most, if not all, 

cases to date the NRC has taken the side of the Applicant so that the Petitioner is placed at an 

unfair disadvantage – two parties against one. To make matters worse, the NRC Staff are not 

subject to discovery or required to provide complete disclosures and the ASLB relies upon the 

NRC legal staff to interpret or explain what the regulations mean. 

Solution: The NRC Staff, just as any other outside party, should simply be allowed to file amicus 

briefs, as appropriate. (PW-6-23) 

Comment: A4NR, et al, has reviewed the comments filed by Pilgrim Watch (PW) and supports 

all solutions proffered by PW. In addition, we have elaborated on certain PW comments and 

solutions below: 

Problem: The NRC Legal and Technical Staff take an active role in all respects similar to the 

two parties - filing motions, replies, etc. In [virtually all] cases to date, the NRC has taken the 

side of the Applicant, so that the Petitioner is placed at an unfair disadvantage − 2 to 1. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-302 

PW Solution: The NRC Staff and any others should simply be allowed to file amicus briefs, as 

appropriate. 

A4NR supports PW's solution. The public is often perplexed as to why the NRC's mandate "to 

protect public health and safety" manifests itself as the NRC pursuing every avenue to 

accommodate utility concerns. The public who provides insightful questions and expert 

information rarely, if ever, prevails in an NRC proceeding. In California the result has been 

costly proceedings (during licensing on seismic design adequacy, and during onsite waste 

storage security) where the public has prevailed in that the NRC was eventually directed to 

address their concerns. Yet the bottom line is that the NRC’s determination to reinforce−rather 

than question − utility filings, and deny participation, hearings, experts, cross-examination and 

compensation to an informed public is not in the interest of democracy. (A4NR-11-25) 

Comment: A4NR, et al, has reviewed the comments filed by Pilgrim Watch (PW) and supports 

all solutions proffered by PW. In addition, we have elaborated on certain PW comments and 

solutions below: 

Problem: Petitioners noted internal inconsistencies in the regulations − one section contradicts 

another. 

PW Solution: The regulations need to be updated to resolve inconsistencies and go out to 

comment before becoming finalized. 

Example: The licensee is required to have an aging management program for components 

within scope. The question is how the aging management is judged. In Pilgrim's license 

renewal adjudication the adequacy of the Aging Management Program was judged simply on 

whether it provides "reasonable assurance" that the components will perform the functions 

outlined in 10 C.F.R. § 54.4(a)(1)-(3) - that is whether the components would function in a 

design base failure; or whether the standard also is to assure that the Current Licensing Basis 

(CLB) will be maintained throughout the renewal period based upon 10 C.F.R § 54.21 and 10 

C.F.R § 54.29. Because there is a conflict in the regulations, inevitably the District Court of 

Appeals will have to decide - placing a burden on the parties. 

A4NR, et al, fully support PW solution. As California's utilities have begun to apply for license 

renewals, A4NR will request that PW's solution be adopted and implemented before the state 

allows utilities to file. Absent this solution, the state faces exposure to the economic impacts 

from challenging possible regulatory discrepancies. In the decades since California's reactors 

were licensed, state agencies have had to use precious resources to challenge NRC decisions 

due to inconsistencies or inadequacies of NRC regulations, and a continuation of this policy is 

irresponsible. (A4NR-11-26) 
Appendix A 

 A-303 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Response: The changes suggested by the commenters are beyond the scope of the GEIS 

revision and the related 10 CFR Part 51 rulemaking. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.802, any 

interested person may petition the NRC to issue, amend, or recind any NRC regulation. 

No change was made to the GEIS as a result of these comments.

Comment: Section 2 – Procedural Issues: A. Public Involvement & Input Restricted –

Recommended: The Honorable Gregory Jaczko's said in a speech entitled, "A Regulator's 

Perspective on New Nuclear Reactor License Applications," September 24, 2009 that, “NRC is 

built upon a solid foundation of a talented workforce dedicated to the safety and security mission 

of the agency, and guided by sound safety regulations. This solid foundation is strengthened by 

public involvement and input, and by our being open and transparent about what we do and 

why. I am confident that we can successfully meet these challenges in an effective way, with 

safety at the heart of our decisions. “[Emphasis added] 

6. Consistency: NRC changes the rules of the game during the adjudication process so that 

with the ground constantly shifting the Petitioner is placed in a losing situation. Consistency is 

required for public confidence. 

Example: Docket 50-293, Pilgrim Watch, Contention 1: 

The ASLB on October 16, 2006 accepted Pilgrim Watch's Motion to Intervene on Contention 1 

and 3. Pilgrim Watch's Contention 1, as amended by the Board, stated, "The Aging 

Management program proposed in the Pilgrim Application for license renewal is inadequate with 

regard to aging management of buried pipes and tanks that contain radioactively contaminated 

water, because it does not provide for monitoring wells that would detect leakage.18" 

[

18 Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Standing and Contentions of Petitioners Massachusetts Attorney General and 

Pilgrim Watch), LBP-06-23, 64 N.R.C. 257 (2006)] 

Mid-stream, on October 17, 2007, December 19, 2007 and January 11, 2008, the ASLB 

considerably narrowed the original order saying that: the only issue remaining before this 

Licensing Board regarding Contention 1 is "...whether Pilgrim's existing AMPs have elements 

that provide appropriate assurance as required under relevant NRC regulations that the buried 

pipes and tanks will not develop leaks so great as to cause those pipes and tanks to be unable 

to perform their intended safety functions.19

[

19 Memorandum and Order, LBP-07-12, 66 N.R.C. (October 17, 2007) (Summary Disposition Order); Order Revising 

Schedule for Evidentiary hearing and Responding to Pilgrim Watch's December 14 and 15 Motions, LBP-06-848-02 

N.R.C. (December 19, 2007); Order Denying Pilgrim watch's Motion for Reconsideration, LBP-06-848-02 NRC 

(January II, 2008)] 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-304 

Further safety function was narrowly re-defined by the ASLB to the only thing that matters about 

such pipes and tanks is leaks that are so great as to permit a design base failure. The effect of 

the interlocutory decisions was to prevent Petitioner from including within scope a number of the 

key ways in which the Aging Management Program (AMP) did not provide reasonable 

assurance that radioactive or other leakage from buried pipes and tanks would comply with the 

current licensing basis ("CLB") during license renewal − the point. As a result, the adjudicatory 

process failed to consider the standard set by the CLB, the standard against which the AMP 

must be evaluated, and therefore the public has no assurance, reasonable or otherwise, 

whether the CLB will be maintained over the license renewal period. The ground constantly 

shifted. Again consistency is required for public confidence in the process. (PW-6-26) 

Response: The commenter expresseds disagreement with an Atomic Safety and Licensing 

Board’s (ASLB) disposition of a safety issue admitted into the license renewal hearing for the 

Pilgrim Plant. License renewal safety issues in general, and matters that are or were before the 

NRC’s ASLB, are outside the scope of the GEIS.

No change was made to the GEIS in response to this comment. 

Comment: The Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility would like to see a written agreement 

between Federal and state agencies and the legislature that all studies to determine if continued 

operation of California's aging reactors especially in light of recent seismic and erosion reports 

be completed, adopted and implemented before any consideration of extending licenses for San 

Onofre or Diablo Canyon. 

Absent this written agreement, the public’s participation in the process will be viewed as a 

mockery of the democratic process. (DPCA-A4NR1-37) 

Response: The NRC will consider any license renewal that is submitted in accordance with its 

regulations in 10 CFR Part 51 and 10 CFR Part 54. Although a licensee must renew its license 

to operate a reactor beyond the term of the existing license, the possession of a renewed 

license is just one of a number of conditions that must be met to continue operation. Once a 

license is renewed, other factors and entities such as State regulatory agencies and the owners 

of the nuclear power facility will ultimately decide whether the facility will continue to operate. 

This final decision will be based on economics, energy reliability goals, and other objectives 

over which the other entities may have jurisdiction. The fact that a State or other entity is 

engaged in energy resource planning activities or studying issues relevant to continued 

operation of the plant would not in and of itself cause the NRC to defer its own decision on 

whether an applicant meets NRC’s requirements for a renewed license. No change was made 

to the GEIS in response to this comment.
Appendix A 

 A-305 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Comment: If the NRC renews the operating license, the decision on whether or not to continue 

nuclear plant operations will be made by the licensee and State or other Federal (non-NRC) 

decision makers. This decision would be based on economics, increased energy efficiency 

production and use, conservation, reliable generation and distribution of electric power, 

improved fuel diversity, and environmental objectives. 

A4NR, et al, requests that the NRC clarify whether the decision to continue operations is a state 

issue. And if so, how can the NRC be entertaining PG&E's application while the state has 

recommended and mandated studies that would provide a factual basis on which to determine if 

an [additional] 20 years of operation and the resultant production of highly radioactive waste will 

be in the best interest of California's resource planning and future economical generation. 

(A4NR-11-13) 

Response: The NRC makes the decision to grant or deny a license renewal based on whether 

the applicant has demonstrated that the environmental and safety requirements in the NRC’s 

regulations can be met during the period of extended operation. However, other agencies are in 

a position to specify conditions or reject permits that are required by the applicant for operation, 

such as the NPDES permit, which is administered either by a State or the U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency. 

Although a licensee must renew its license to operate a reactor beyond the term of the existing 

license, the possession of a renewed license is just one of a number of conditions that must be 

met to continue operation. This is because the NRC does not have a role in the energyplanning decisions of State regulators and licensee officials. Once a license is renewed, other 

factors and entities such as State regulatory agencies and the owners of the nuclear power 

facility will ultimately decide whether the facility will continue to operate. This final decision will 

be based on economics, energy reliability goals, and other objectives over which the other 

entities may have jurisdiction. Moreover, given the absence of the NRC’s authority in the 

general area of energy planning, the NRC’s identification of a superior alternative does not 

guarantee that such an alternative will be used. 

From the perspective of the applicant and the State regulatory authority, the purpose of 

renewing a license is to maintain the availability of the nuclear facility to meet energy 

requirements beyond the current term of the facility’s license. Economic considerations have a 

significant influence on the decision to continue operation. For example, the need for power, an 

issue outside the scope of NRC’s decision on license renewal, could be an important factor to 

State regulators in deciding whether the plant should continue to operate. However, the fact 

that a State or other entity is engaged in energy resource planning activities would not in and of 

itself cause the NRC to defer its own decision about whether an applicant met NRC’s safety 

requirements for a renewed license. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-306 

No change was made to the GEIS as a result of this comment. 

Comment: I'm affiliated with the Sierra Club, ECO SLO, Mothers For Peace, Alliance For 

Nuclear Responsibility, and the Committee For Unity With Nature of the Pacific Yearly Meeting 

of Quakers. 

California law prohibits the licensing of new nuclear plants because there is no safe method for 

storing the waste. I contend that relicensing therefore is illegal, and an attempt at circumventing 

California law. 

If we can't have newer, better designed plants, we certainly should not have these "old 

clunkers." All right. Relicensing this far in advance, anyway, is kind of ludicrous, and we're 

talking about doing it before the facts are in. What kind of thinking is that? 

The GEIS talks about the fact that site-specific issues need to be identified by the plant 

operators. How can that be? It should be that the site-specific issues, in other words, the 

problems are the responsibility of NRC. (PBCA-Groot-36) 

Response: The NRC makes the decision to grant or deny a license renewal based on whether 

the applicant has demonstrated that the environmental and safety requirements in the NRC’s 

regulations can be met during the period of extended operation. However, other agencies are in 

a position to specify conditions or reject permits that are required by the applicant for operation, 

such as the NPDES permit, which is administered either by a State or the U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency. Although a licensee must renew its license to operate a reactor beyond the 

term of the existing license, the possession of a renewed license is just one of a number of 

conditions that must be met to continue operation. Once a license is renewed, other factors and 

entities such as State regulatory agencies and the owners of the nuclear power facility will 

ultimately decide whether the facility will continue to operate. With regard to the timing of 

license renewal, the NRC has determined that 20 years of operating experience is sufficient to 

assess aging and environmental issues at the site; therefore, an applicant may apply for a 

renewed license up to 20 years prior to the expiration of their current license. 

The NRC issued guidance to license renewal applicants (RG 4.2, Supplement 1) that called for 

the applicant to provide such information in its environmental report, a part of the license 

renewal. This is just a starting point, however. During the site-specific scoping process and the 

environmental review, the NRC is independently looking for any information from other sources, 

such as scientific studies, operating experience at other plants, and comments from other 

agencies, the public, and other stakeholders, that could demonstrate that there are unique 

characteristics related to the facility or the environment surrounding the facility that would lead 

to the conclusion that the generic determination for a particular issue is not valid for a specific 
Appendix A 

 A-307 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

site. The NRC discusses and evaluates potential new and significant information in the SEIS. 

No change was made to the GEIS as a result of this comment.

Comment: We also, and I understand it would not, I assume it would not be appropriate at this 

point to talk about what I would consider procedural issues, such things as you talk about 

reasonable assurance often. I mean that's a buzz word throughout the NRC. I think it's one of, 

maybe the language, the first words you learn when you join the group or something, I don't 

know. 

But that's a real problem with this because nowhere is it defined. We know reasonable 

assurance requires proof, but what level of proof? The NRC never says. And so, for example, 

if the bridge over in Minneapolis is rebuilt and they say well we have reasonable assurance at a 

level of 51 percent that this bridge isn't going to fall down in the next two months, versus well, 

you know, we have evidence that meets a standard of proof of, oh, 90 percent, then I think you 

would feel a little different going over that bridge. 

But the NRC, although they do say, you know, technically, that it's a two-step process, what 

they fail to do is state what level of proof is required. Technical judgment, certainly that doesn't 

mean anything. Beauty is in the eye of the beholder, that's all [they] say. I'm sure the technical 

judgment of NEI is very different than the technical judgment of my experts. So I think until the 

NRC faces this issue, as has been faced in some other court cases where they came up with 95 

percent, in medical cases, that you're saying, it’s mumbo jumbo, you’re not saying anything. 

(NMA-PW-17) 

Comment: A4NR, et al, has reviewed the comments filed by Pilgrim Watch (PW) and supports 

all solutions proffered by PW. In addition, we have elaborated on certain PW comments and 

solutions below: 

A4NR, et al, concurs with PW concerns relating to 'Reasonable Assurance." It has been the 

NRC's disingenuous treatment of public and state intervenors concerns relating to license 

renewal that prompted the formation of our organization. The NRC's decisions have economic 

and reliability impacts that are the sole jurisdiction of the states. Each time the NRC denies 

participation, ignores contentions, or rules against their own established rules, the public and 

the states must expend resources to protect their interests. All issues that could impact 

economic and reliable operation should be up to the states, which will ultimately pay for the 

impacts of the NRC's determination of "Reasonable Assurance" if "Sound technical judgment" is 

not related to a defined level of assurance backed up with verification − a clear preponderance 

of facts that the defined level of assurance will be met. 

The NRC should create "Reasonable Assurance" where "Sound technical judgment" is related 

to a defined level of assurance back-up with verification − a clear preponderance of facts that 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-308 

the defined level of assurance will be met. Absent the creation of this definition, A4NR will 

recommend that it is not in the best interest of economic and reliable energy planning to allow 

utilities to file license renewal applications. (A4NR-11-23)

Comment: B. Reasonable Assurance Standard: The Draft uses the term "reasonable 

assurance" throughout the document yet, like the NRC in other, contexts, the Draft never 

bothers to define exactly what "reasonable assurance" is supposed to mean.20 We appreciate 

that there is a burden to prove "reasonable assurance" with a "clear preponderance" of the 

evidence [North Anna Envtl., Coalition v. NRC, 533 F. 2d 655,667-68 (D.C. Cir. 1976)]. It is a 

two-step process. It is necessary for NRC to define what level of assurance is "reasonable 

assurance." For example is it 51%, 99%, or some place in between? Absent a standard, the 

term "reasonable assurance" has no meaning.21 For an analogy if the public were told that 

there was "reasonable assurance" that evidence showed that the rebuilt levees in New Orleans 

had a 51% probability to withhold water in a storm they would feel far less confident than if they 

were told that there was "reasonable assurance" from the evidence that there was a >90% 

chance that they would hold. 

[

20 See Draft pages 69, 134, 453 and 455 where it refers to the NRC having “reasonable assurance" regarding 

emergency planning; dose commitments from gaseous radioactive waste; low level waste issues; and spent fuel 

issues.] 

[

21 See: Pilgrim Watch Petition for Review of LBP-06·848, at 7, Adams Accession Number ML083240599; Pilgrim 

Watch Reply to Entergy's Answer in Opposition to Pilgrim Watch's Petition for Review, December 2008, at 2, Adams 

Accession Number ML083440445. Pilgrim Watch's Reply to Entergy stated that, "Reasonable Assurance: The 

fundamental dispute is whether reasonable assurance has been shown when the standard for "reasonable 

assurance" has not been defined. Entergy referred to cases saying that reasonable assurance is "sound technical 

judgment applied on a case-by-case basis" and "compliance with Commission regulations." However, what 

assurance must that "sound technical judgment" prove? "Sound technical judgment” that there is a 51% chance that 

the Minneapolis Bridge won't collapse during the next rush hour would not provide “reasonable assurance." "Sound 

technical judgment," that there is less than a 5% likelihood of the bridge collapsing, or of Pilgrim's buried pipes 

leaking during the license renewal term, might do so, if supported by a clear preponderance of the evidence. And as 

Judge Young said, the preponderance of the evidence does not define what level of assurance is "reasonable." 

(Concurring Opinion, LBP-06-848-02, p.55) "Sound technical judgment" must be related to a defined level of 

assurance and backed up with verification − a clear preponderance of facts that the defined level of assurance will be 

met. PW does not disagree that reasonable assurance "is not susceptible to a formalistic quantification or 

mechanistic application." But the potential consequences of a nuclear power plant failure are severe, and the Board 

did not define what level of assurance of on-going compliance with the CLB is required for that "assurance" to be 

considered "reasonable."] (PW-6-28) 
Appendix A 

 A-309 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Response: Before a renewed license can be issued, the NRC must find, among other things, 

that there is reasonable assurance that the activities authorized by the renewed license will 

continue to be conducted in accordance with the Commission’s regulations. Neither the Atomic 

Energy Act nor the NRC’s regulations define the term “reasonable assurance.” However, NRC 

case law (ASLB and Commission decisions) in the context of license renewal hearings have 

indicated that an applicant must demonstrate that it satisfies the “reasonable assurance 

standard.” 

No change was made to the GEIS as a result of this comment.

Comment: Do you want me to say anything about finances or have I just said enough? Should 

we all go home? 

Because I have some other real important procedural things maybe you might think about, one 

is participation with finances, that it seems that a certain percent of monies goes to Yucca 

Mountain, for example, or, you know, what have you. Well why not a percent, a very small 

percent, going into a kitty so those who are accepted into the adjudication process and meet a 

poverty level, that was me, could dip into it? 

And I think it certainly would be, leave a better taste in the mouth of the Atomic Safety Licensing 

Board that you have a fairer presentation because I, for example, had to pay for everything out 

of my own pocket, and I'm not the only person who is doing stuff like this. And it does not even 

begin, when it's the Lampert back pocket versus Pillsbury, the NRC staff, Entergy, I don't call 

that a fair fight because I am very limited in the witnesses that I can hire, etcetera, etcetera, and 

I think this is reasonable. 

I know the Canadian Government is doing things of this sort and it's been done in some states 

with the chemical industry and it's something you all ought to be thinking about. I also find a two 

to one fight unfair, that the NRC staff and sometimes, and I guess in a few of the adjudications 

on license renewal, has not said anything, but typically they have been on the side of the 

applicant. I do not understand why the NRC staff, just like anybody else, would simply be 

allowed to file amicus briefs and that's the end of it. I think that's something to consider. 

(NMA-PW-18) 

Comment: Section 2 – Procedural Issues: A. Public Involvement & Input Restricted –

Recommended: The Honorable Gregory Jaczko's said in a speech entitled, "A Regulator's 

Perspective on New Nuclear Reactor License Applications," September 24, 2009 that, “NRC is 

built upon a solid foundation of a talented workforce dedicated to the safety and security mission 

of the agency, and guided by sound safety regulations. This solid foundation is strengthened by 

public involvement and input, and by our being open and transparent about what we do and 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-310 

why. I am confident that we can successfully meet these challenges in an effective way, with 

safety at the heart of our decisions. [Emphasis added] 

2. Participation, Finances: In order to fulfill the Chairman's goals to assure "public 

involvement and input," lack of financial resources should not be an impediment for those 

accepted into the license renewal adjudication process to participate. 

Problem: The expense of litigation (filings, including copying and mailing; witness fees; and 

legal fees) make it impossible for many, if not most, individual members of the public, public 

interest groups and local governments to participate in the process; or if they are able to take 

part in the process, to severely limit them in their ability to obtain the number and quality of 

expert witnesses required to put forward their case. Although rules say that, Where an 

intervenor would call a witness but for the Intervenor's financial inability to do so, the Licensing 

Board may call the witness as a Board witness and authorize NRC payment of the usual 

witness fees and expenses. The decision to take such action is a matter of Licensing Board 

discretion which should be exercised with circumspection. If the Board calls such a witness as 

its own, it should limit cross-examination to the scope of the direct examination", Consumers 

Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units I & 2),-ALAB-382, 5 NRC 603, 607-08 (1977). (Emphasis 

added). 

The rule does not solve the problem. Because: (1) there are often sizeable expenses beyond 

witnesses − filing/copying fees and legal fees; and (2) "The decision to take such action is a 

matter of Licensing Board discretion which should be exercised with circumspection." This 

leaves it entirely up to the Board who at that point in the proceedings are not fully informed 

about the issue to be able to properly determine what is and what is not important for them to 

hear. 

We know that "While NEPA does not require agencies to select particular options, it is intended 

to "foster both informed decision making and informed public participation, and thus to ensure 

the agency does not act upon incomplete information, only to regret its decision after it is too 

late to correct" (citing Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLl-98-3, 

47 NRC 77, 88 (1998). 

Solution: The NRC should establish a "kitty" for Petitioners to draw upon for incurred expenses 

and establish guidelines for determining qualifications for assistance and amounts made 

available. (PW-6-22) 

Comment: A4NR, et al, has reviewed the comments filed by Pilgrim Watch (PW) and supports 

all solutions proffered by PW. In addition, we have elaborated on certain PW comments and 

solutions below: 
Appendix A 

 A-311 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Another issue in PW comments with which A4NR is in full agreement: The problem of filing 

contentions in the relicensing procedure is that there are expenses beyond witnesses – filing/ 

copying fees and legal fees − and the sentence that "The decision to take such action is a 

matter of Licensing Board discretion which should be exercised with circumspection." So that it 

is not a real solution to the problem but it, in and of itself, indicates recognition that there is a 

problem. 

The NRC should assess all licensees to establish a "kitty" for Petitioners accepted into the 

adjudicatory process and who meet a pre-determined qualifying financial level. 

A4NR has provided California specific corroboration of financial challenges for the public: 

California example of the problem as cited by PW: In the case of the proceedings to store 

highly radioactive waste in casks onsite at Diablo Canyon, the NRC denied several important 

issues. One, the adequacy of security at the proposed waste storage facility, was challenged by 

San Luis Obispo residents at a cost of close to $100,000. The federal circuit court ruled in the 

intervenors favor, but a timely and costly process was involved before partial reimbursement 

was granted. 

The community was unable to simultaneously afford a challenge to the NRC's denial of its 

contention on seismic adequacy of the proposed storage site. Since that time the United State's 

Geological Survey has disclosed another major active earthquake fault, 1800 feet offshore and 

California legislators have mandated that further studies be initiated. This issue was also 

discussed on page 11 of A4NR comments. 

A4NR, et al, additional solution: For over three decades the California Public Utilities 

Commission (CPUC) has provided intervenor funding for those organizations representing 

ratepayers who make a significant difference to the record. This process encourages public 

participation, rewards those who have provided valuable insights and creates a more open, 

transparent and inclusive record and an extra layer of economic protection for utility customers. 

The NRC would benefit from templating the CPUC intervenor compensation process.4

 The 

CPUC's Public Participation page begins with the following quote from Margaret Mead "Never 

doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. In fact, it's the 

only thing that ever has." We believe this is also the position of the Obama administration and 

the NRC would benefit from Ms. Mead's mindset. 

[

4

 http://docs.cpus.ca.gov/published/REPORT/46182.htm#P319 12731] (A4NR-11-24) 

Response: The comments suggest that the NRC should assess licensees a fee or otherwise 

create a fund to compensate intervenors who participate in contested license renewal 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-312 

proceedings. The changes to the regulations and hearing procedures suggested by the 

commenters are beyond the scope of the Part 51 rulemaking and the GEIS revision. 

No change was made to the GEIS as a result of these comments. 

Comment: I think it's also important, well as I already started out with category one and 

category two, that basic issue there [see identifier NMA-PW-5 for the comment on this issue]. 

And what else? Hearings, I think all hearings should allow cross examination because the luck 

of the draw in who you get from the Atomic Safety Licensing Board, on how many questions will 

be asked to which party's witnesses, and whether the questions will be leading or not leading, 

and I'm not really, I don’t mean to say anything against the board that I have, I'm not saying this, 

but I've talked to some other people and it is only reasonable that there should be allowance for 

cross examination and that the attorneys representing either party should not have to have duct 

tape over their mouths when they are there. That strikes me as not a reasonable procedure. 

(NMA-PW-19) 

Comment: Section 2 – Procedural Issues: A. Public Involvement & Input Restricted –

Recommended: The Honorable Gregory Jaczko's said in a speech entitled, "A Regulator's 

Perspective on New Nuclear Reactor License Applications," September 24, 2009 that, “NRC is 

built upon a solid foundation of a talented workforce dedicated to the safety and security mission 

of the agency, and guided by sound safety regulations. This solid foundation is strengthened by 

public involvement and input, and by our being open and transparent about what we do and 

why. I am confident that we can successfully meet these challenges in an effective way, with 

safety at the heart of our decisions. “[Emphasis added] 

4. Hearings: Problem: During the so-called "informal hearings," the ASLB alone asks the 

party's expert(s) questions − obviously limiting the Intervenor's participation and input. This can 

present a problem because, again, the ASLB is not fully versed in the subject and may limit the 

discussion and risk acting upon incomplete or incorrect information. 

Solution: Allow cross examination, and opening and closing statements at all hearings. 

(PW-6-24) 

Response: The changes suggested by the commenters are beyond the scope of the GEIS 

revision and the related Part 51 rulemaking. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.802, any interested 

person may petition the NRC to issue, amend, or recind any NRC regulation. 

No change was made to the GEIS as a result of this comment. 

Comment: Unavoidable Adverse Impacts Should Not Be Accepted: In Section 14.14.1, 

Unavoidable Adverse Impacts are specified and simply accepted. The Draft GElS reasons that 
Appendix A 

 A-313 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

if an adverse impact can't be dealt with, the conclusion is that it is to be accepted. SLOMFP 

reasons that since there are so many generic unavoidable adverse impacts, license renewals 

should automatically be ruled out as too hazardous to the environment and the public to be 

acceptable. (SLOMFP-13-14) 

Response: As stated in Section 4.14.1 of the GEIS, the impacts of continued nuclear plant 

operations and refurbishment that are anticipated to occur are discussed for each resource area 

in Sections 4.1 through 4.11 of the GEIS. Some of these impacts cannot be avoided because 

they are inherently associated with nuclear plant operations and cannot be fully mitigated. 

Unavoidable adverse impacts would vary among plants and would depend on the specific 

characteristics of each plant and its interaction with the environment. These unavoidable 

adverse impacts would need to be evaluated in plant-specific SEISs. However, the key point is 

that it is the magnitude of the unavoidable adverse impacts of refurbishment and continued 

operations, not the fact that there will be unavoidable impacts, that may determine, in part, 

whether a renewed license will be issued. No change was made to the GEIS in response to this 

comment. 

Comment: Mitigation: Although Chapter 4 is titled Environmental Consequences and 

Mitigating Actions, we see nothing that requires any license renewal applicant to do anything to 

mitigate identified impacts. Throughout the revised GEIS there are numerous mentions of 

mitigation or mitigating strategies, however, we are left wondering who is responsible for 

implementing the mitigation. If the NRC identifies an impact as MODERATE or LARGE, who is 

responsible for mitigating or lessening the impact? The SEIS cannot simply identify possible 

mitigation and identify no party responsible for its implementation. The public expects and 

demands that all impacts be mitigated and that the applicant (i.e., the utility making the money 

while impacting public resources) be held responsible and accountable. (PIIC-8-10) 

Response: In plant-specific SEISs, the NRC evaluates the impacts of license renewal using 

information provided by the licensee in its environmental report and information gathered from 

various agencies, experts, and the public. On the basis of this evaluation, the NRC may 

suggest mitigation to reduce impacts. However, the NRC can only require a licensee to mitigate 

impacts of those actions that are within NRC’s jurisdictional authority, i.e., safety-related actions. 

Other mitigation requirements may be imposed by those Federal and State agencies that have 

jurisdiction over affected resources. These mitigation requirements are often prerequisites for 

obtaining permits from these agencies. The NRC will not grant a renewed license unless the 

licensee has obtained all necessary permits for operations. No change was made to the GEIS 

in response to this comment.

Comment: NRC's draft says that they based their decision on whether to change the 

categorization of issues in the 1996 GElS on "new research, findings, and other 

information...considered in evaluating the significance of impacts associated with license 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-314 

renewal." The purpose of their evaluation was, "to determine if the findings presented in the 

1996 GElS remain valid, in doing so, the NRC considered the need to modify, add to, or delete 

any of the 92 issues in the 1996 GElS." (Summary, S·2, Scope of the Generic Environmental 

Impact Statement, lines 25-28) 

PW Comment: It sounds well and good; but the "Devil is in the details." Reading NRC's 

statement carefully, it is clear that they committed to nothing. As their statement reads, they 

simply could have considered only a handful of articles. Clearly, we believe that NRC is 

responsible to base updates on all available current scientific information and it is evident that 

they did not do so. In fact it seems clear that research and documents containing "Inconvenient 

Truths" either were avoided or totally misrepresented. 

Example: (1) Meteorology (Draft 3.3 Meteorology, Air Quality and Noise M3.12 References): 

The references for meteorology include simply NRC Reg. Guide 1.23, Rev 1 (March). Absent 

are all the new significant documents on plume modeling of complex sites from NRC, DOE, 

EPA, National Oceanic, and Meteorology Scientists published studies referenced, for example, 

in State Of New York's Motion For Summary Disposition On Use Of Straight Line Gaussian Air 

Dispersion Model For The Environmental Impact Analysis Of Significant Radiological Accidents 

At Indian Point And NYS Contention 16/16A, (DPR-26, DPR-64) August 28, 2009 and 

accompanying Declaration Of Bruce A. Egan, Sc.D., 18 forward and PW's Brief in Response to 

CLI-09-11, (Docket No. 50-292-LR, ASLPB No. 06-848-02-LR), June 25, 2009. (2) Health: 

absent, for example, is the German Governments KlKK case control study of infant leukemia 

around nuclear reactors. (PW-6-30) 

Response: With regard to the atmospheric modeling studies referenced by the commenter, the 

issue of atmospheric dispersion models used in SAMA analyses has been studied in detail. 

This included a detailed code comparison completed in 2004 with the objective of determining if 

the average atmospheric transport and dispersion results from so-called straight-line codes 

such as MACCS2 are sufficiently accurate that more complex models are not required. In that 

study, documented in NUREG/CR-6853, “Comparison of Average Transport and Dispersion 

Among a Gaussian, a Two-Dimensional, and a Three-Dimensional Model,” results from the 

MACCS2 code were directly compared to those from the LODI (Lagrangian Operational 

Dispersion Integrator) code. 

As discussed in NUREG/CR-6853, this comparison shows that MACCS2 provides results 

consistent with those from the more complex plume models at distances up to 100 miles 

(161 kilometers). This is well beyond the 50-mile (80-kilometer) radius considered in the SAMA 

analysis. The MACCS2 predictions for average, time-integrated, ground-level air concentrations 

(which directly relate to inhalation and cloudshine doses), and for average deposition (which 

directly relates to groundshine and ingestion pathway doses) were very comparable (i.e., less 

than a factor of two) to predictions made by the state-of-the-art NARAC codes, ADAPT/LODI, at 
Appendix A 

 A-315 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

all distances. The direct comparison to the state-of-the-art NARAC codes demonstrates that 

straight-line air dispersion modeling is well within its range of validity when used to perform 

SAMA analyses. 

With regard to the health study cited by the commenter, the NRC’s mission is to protect public 

health and safety and the environment from the effects of radiation from nuclear reactors, 

materials, and waste facilities. The NRC’s regulatory limits for radiological protection are set to 

protect workers and the public from the harmful health effects (i.e., cancer and other biological 

impacts) of radiation on humans. The limits are based on the recommendations of standardssetting organizations. Radiation standards reflect extensive scientific study by national and 

international organizations (International Commission on Radiological Protection [ICRP], 

National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements [NCRP], and the National 

Academy of Sciences [NAS]) and are conservative to ensure that the public and workers at 

nuclear power plants are protected. The NRC actively participates and monitors the work of 

these organizations as well as some of the radiation health studies conducted in the United 

States and internationally to keep current on the latest trends in radiation protection. The NRC 

did not review the study cited. The revised GEIS used existing NRC regulations, programs, and 

guidance (i.e., Regulatory Guides, Technical Specifications, effluent controls, REMP, 

inspection) as a basis to assess the potential impacts to human health and other environmental 

issues. Therefore, the validity of NRC’s radiation protection standards and associated guidance 

is not within the scope of this rulemaking. If the NRC determines that there is a need to revise 

its radiation protection regulations, it will initiate a rulemaking. The rulemaking will be conducted 

in an open and collaborative manner that will include stakeholder participation. 

No changes were made to the GEIS as a result of this comment.

Comment: Page 2-4: Refurbishment and Other Activities Associated with License Renewal. 

In the 1996 GElS, the NRC assumed that licensees would need to conduct major refurbishment 

activities to ensure the safe and economic operation of nuclear plants beyond the current 

license term. Activities included replacement and repair of major components and systems, 

upgrades, and equipment. Replacement of many systems, structures, and components 

included steam generators and pressurizers for PWRs and recirculation piping systems for 

BWRs. It was assumed that many plants would also undertake construction projects to replace 

or improve infrastructure. Such projects could include construction of new parking lots, roads, 

storage buildings, structures, and other facilities. 

The 1996 GElS sent a clear signal to the nuclear industry to begin replacing components that 

may need to be replaced before a license renewal could be granted. The result was swift −

applications for ratepayer funded replacement projects of large components that were designed 

to last the full original license term were filed sometimes as little as halfway through the original 

license term. Hence, the current GElS draft statement that "Most nuclear plants have not 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-316 

identified any refurbishment activities associated with license renewal" resulted from the GElS 

1996 "clear signal." 

Yet the GEIS 1996 signal provided no assurance that these same parts will not need to be 

replaced again to ensure safe operations during license renewal periods. Thus, the NRC will be 

deciding license renewals based on the condition of components that had proven to be not as 

robust as initially promised and with no assurance replacements will last any longer. (A4NR-11-

14) 

Response: The NRC disagrees with the commenter’s assertion that the 1996 GEIS sent a 

“clear signal” to replace components prior to applying for license renewal. Licensees are 

responsible for maintaining operational safety and maintaining or replacing equipment as 

necessary to remain in compliance with applicable NRC requirements and the requirements of 

other Federal, State, and local authorities whether or not they seek license renewal. The timing 

of refurbishment activities is determined by need, not by the timing of the license renewal 

schedule. Thus, it is possible that some components that were replaced before submittal of a 

license renewal could require replacement again after the license was renewed at some time 

during the period of extended operation. To date, while several license renewal reviews have 

included refurbishment activities (and were addressed in the SEIS), most have not. However, 

even if not included in a license renewal, refurbishment activities requiring NRC approval would 

still receive an appropriate NEPA review under 10 CFR Part 51. No change was made to the 

GEIS as a result of this comment. 

Comment: The draft GElS states that "Detailed analyses have not been performed for 

refurbishment actions in this GElS revision. Instead, the impacts of typical activities during the 

license renewal term, including any refurbishment activities, are addressed for each resource 

area...” 

The lack of a detailed analysis appears to be due to an absence of actual data on the operation 

of reactors beyond original licenses. The original 40-year license for Oyster Creek expired this 

year (2009). This spring, the NRC approved a very vigorously contested license renewal at 

Oyster Creek. Since we are barely 6 months into the operation of a relicensed reactor, there is 

lack of actual information on the continued need for refurbishment actions and other impacts of 

an additional twenty years of operation. In the months following Oyster Creek's relicense 

period, the reactor exceeded the number of unplanned shutdowns allowed by the NRC, 

including one incident barely weeks into the relicense period when Oyster Creek went into cold 

shutdown on April 25, after one of the plant's two transformers failed. The transformer that 

failed was a 30-year-old replacement that Exelon installed in February to replace another 

transformer that caught on fire on February 2. Plant operators declared an unusual event after 

the fire. 
Appendix A 

 A-317 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

As another example, on October 5, 2009 it was disclosed that "in addition to Oyster Creek, 

affected plants [faulty clasps on spent fuel storage casks] include Millstone Power Station in 

Connecticut (relicensed 11/05), Susquehanna in Pennsylvania, Ginna in New York (relicensed 

5/04), Brunswick in North Carolina (relicensed 6/06) and Cooper Nuclear Station in Nebraska. 

As dry cask storage is being imposed at all reactor sites it would appear that this is an issue that 

either must be resolved in GElS proceedings and/or relegated to a Category 2 proceeding and 

mitigated to ensure that radioactive waste is being stored as safely as possible. 

Therefore A4NR, et al, recommends all issues that the public and/or state question should be 

allowed in SEIS proceedings, even if the GElS unilaterally deems issues to be "small". 

(A4NR-11-15) 

Response: Refurbishment actions at nuclear power plants would continue to be addressed in 

plant-specific environmental reviews. The lack of detailed analysis is not due to the absence of 

actual data on the operation of reactors beyond the original license. It is because these 

refurbishment actions would vary at each nuclear plant. As explained in Section 2.1.2 in the 

GEIS, refurbishment activities (e.g., steam generator and vessel head replacement) have 

already taken place during the current operating license term at a number of nuclear plants, and 

impacts have been accounted for in annual site evaluation reports, environmental operating 

reports, and radiological environmental monitoring program reports. These activities have been 

conducted for economic, reliability, or efficiency reasons during refueling or maintenance 

outages, and very few applications have identified any refurbishment activities associated with 

license renewal. The NRC acknowledged in the 1996 GEIS that licensees may undertake 

refurbishment activities for reasons of safety, economics, reliability, or efficiency. Section 2.1.2 

of the GEIS has been revised to better explain this situation. 

As stated in Section 1.2 of the GEIS, the proposed action is the renewal of commercial nuclear 

power plant operating licenses. For NRC to determine whether the license should be renewed, 

an applicant is required to perform certain analyses to demonstrate that it can effectively 

manage the effects of aging and continue safe operations beyond its current licensing period, 

and to provide sufficient information for the NRC to determine whether continued operation of 

the nuclear plant during the renewal term would endanger public safety or the environment. 

These analyses include an assessment of the effects of potential age-related degradation on 

certain long-lived, passive systems, structures, and components. In the 1996 GEIS, the 

incremental aging management activities implemented to allow operation of a nuclear power 

plant beyond the original 40-year license term were assumed to fall under one of two broad 

categories: (1) surveillance, monitoring, inspection, testing, trending, and recordkeeping actions, 

most of which are repeated at regular intervals, and (2) major refurbishment actions, which 

usually occur infrequently and possibly only once in the life of the plant for any given item. The 

NRC finds that the discussion of environmental impacts from refurbishment activities in the 1996 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-318 

GEIS are valid and conservative and describe impacts that are likely greater than—or at least 

equal to—the actual impacts from those activities during the license renewal term. 

With respect to the commenter’s recommendation, and regardless of the conclusions in the 

GEIS, the NRC is required by regulation (see 10 CFR Part 51.71(b) and 

10 CFR Part 51.91(a)(1)) to address major points of view and all substantive comments and 

issues, that are within the scope of license renewal environmental review, raised by members 

of the public, environmental interest groups, and representatives of local, State, Tribal, and 

Federal government agencies during scoping and public comment periods on draft plantspecific SEISs. 

Comment: Another part of the problem is that no matter how many people say we are not 

relicensing San Onofre, we are -- we are -- they are rebuilding it from the inside out and 

corporations do not invest money to do that unless they have every intention of continuing to 

operate and if they were actually rebuilding everything from the inside out, that would be terrible, 

but it would be better than what they're doing. Because what they are doing is rebuilding what 

they can see is broken. What about all the parts they cannot see? (DPCA-SHoffman-24) 

Response: Refurbishment activities are physical activities or changes to the facility or site that 

are undertaken to prepare a nuclear power facility for continued operation. These activities, 

which occur as needed, include enhanced inspection, surveillance, testing, maintenance and 

repair, replacement, and modification of plant systems, structures, and components. For some 

facilities, replacement of large components of the nuclear steam supply system (e.g., steam 

generator or pressurizer) may be necessary; repair or replacement of pumps, pipes, control rod 

systems, electronic circuitry, electrical and plumbing systems, or motors may be necessary as 

well. 

Not many facilities are expected to need refurbishment activities in connection with license 

renewal. Many applicants anticipate that they will replace components and conduct additional 

inspection activities within the bounds of normal facility component replacement and inspection. 

Few of the applications received to date have identified major facility refurbishment activities or 

modifications necessary to support the continued operation of the facility beyond the end of the 

existing operating license. 

As part of the license renewal safety review, the applicant must confirm whether the design 

assumptions made during the plant’s initial licensing about the length of time the plant would be 

operated will continue to be valid throughout the period of extended operation or whether aging 

effects will be adequately managed. The applicant must demonstrate that the effects of aging 

will be managed in such a way that the intended functions of “passive” or “long-lived” structures 

and components (such as the reactor vessel, reactor coolant system, piping, steam generators, 

pressurizer, pump casings, and valves) will be maintained during extended operation. For 
Appendix A 

 A-319 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

active components (such as motors, diesel generators, cooling fans, batteries, relays, and 

switches) surveillance and maintenance programs will continue throughout the period of 

extended operation. 

If additional aging management activities are needed, the applicant may be required to establish 

new monitoring programs or increase inspections. For instance, applicants should specify 

activities that need to be performed (such as activities related to water chemistry and 

inspections) to prevent and mitigate age-related degradation. These activities increase the 

likelihood that the program is effective in minimizing degradation and that a component is 

replaced if specified thresholds are exceeded. 

Plant maintenance activities not associated with license renewal are outside the scope of the 

environmental review for license renewal. The NRC provides continuous oversight of nuclear 

power plants through its Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) to verify that they are being operated 

and maintained in accordance with NRC regulations. This oversight includes having full-time 

NRC inspectors located at the plant and periodic safety inspections conducted by NRC 

inspectors based in an NRC Regional Office. The inspections look at a plant’s compliance with 

NRC’s regulations, which include the following: plant safety (routine and accident scenarios), 

radiation protection of plant workers and members of the public, radioactive effluent releases, 

radiological environmental monitoring, emergency preparedness, radioactive waste storage and 

transportation, quality assurance, and training. The NRC has full authority to take whatever 

action is necessary to protect public health and safety. 

No change was made to the GEIS as a result of this comment.

Comment: Trust Responsibility of the Federal Government; The GEIS was written in 1996, at 

a time when most federal agencies had well-developed and well-implemented Indian policies; 

the GEIS did not include any discussion of Indian tribes or how the NRC would work with Indian 

tribes to resolve or address any issues arising from power plant relicensing. It is quite 

disappointing that the revised GEIS does not recognize or mention tribes or tribal sovereignty. 

Federally-recognized Indian Tribes are governments, with unique legal and political standing 

and rights. Tribal governments are not State governments and are not local governments. 

Indian tribes enjoy a Government-to-Government relationship with all Federal Government 

agencies, which includes the NRC. There should be some recognition of this status in the 

revised GEIS and a statement that the NRC will endeavor to work with tribes on a governmentto-government basis to try and address, and resolve any issues resulting from power plant 

license renewals. (PIIC-8-1) 

Response: While it is acknowledged in the GEIS that Federally recognized Tribes are key 

stakeholders, the role that Federally recognized Tribes play in the license renewal process is 

not as clear as it could be. Sections 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 of the GEIS have been modified in 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-320 

response to this comment to clearly emphasize the NRC’s responsibility to consult with 

Federally recognized Tribes during the license renewal process.

A.2.1.16 Comments Concerning Issues Outside the Scope of License Renewal: 

Safeguards and Security; Emergency Preparedness; Need for Power; Aging 

Management; and Other Issues 

Safeguards and Security 

Comment: Plant Safety Culture: Concerns about safety culture problems at SONGS have 

increased in recent years and are well-documented. The NRC noted that the license renewal 

environmental review is confined to environmental matters relevant to the extended period of 

operation requested by the applicant and that safety and security matters are considered 

outside the scope of the license renewal review (GElS, p. A-95). Investigations of the Columbia 

Space Shuttle disaster (2003) an[d] the Challenger Space Shuttle (1986) disaster disclosed 

major deficiencies in risk and safety assessments and management practices for these shuttle 

programs [that] developed over time. In its Response to Comments in the GElS, Vol. 2, p. A-84 

to A-85, the NRC staff noted improvements in the NRC's inspection and assessment 

procedures following the Davis-Besse reactor head degradation and NRC's enhanced Reactor 

Oversight Program to more fully address licensee safety culture. However, we strongly believe 

that a plant's safety culture merits reexamination during license renewal reviews, similar to the 

need for a reexamination of aging plant hardware. Therefore, a plant's safety culture should be 

included as a Category 2 issue for review on a site-specific basis. A plant's safety culture 

should be included in the assessment of the adequacy of the licensee's aging management 

plans and should be reevaluated on a plant-specific basis during license renewal reviews. 

(CEC-9(1)-7) 

Response: Following an event at the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant where the licensee 

determined that the causes that led to the event were indicative of a weak safety culture, NRC 

lessons learned pointed toward the need for additional NRC efforts to evaluate a licensee’s 

safety culture (SECY-04-0111 and SECY-05-0187). As part of this effort, the NRC reviewed the 

agency’s Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) to determine how it can be enhanced to more fully 

address safety culture. The NRC issued SECY-06-0122, dated May 24, 2006, which describes 

the safety culture initiative activities and the outcomes of those activities, including the changes 

made to the ROP to more fully address safety culture. The ROP safety culture changes were 

made to: (1) provide opportunities for the NRC to identify safety culture weaknesses and to 

encourage licensees to take appropriate actions before the plant experiences significant 

performance degradation, (2) provide criteria for considering when to request licensees to 

perform a safety culture assessment, and (3) provide guidance on how the NRC should 

evaluate a licensee’s safety culture assessment and how to perform an independent NRC 

assessment of a licensee’s safety culture. 
Appendix A 

 A-321 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

In response to a Commission Action Memoranda (NRC 2008c) issued February 25, 2008, the 

NRC expanded the Commission’s safety culture policy to address the unique aspects of 

security. As a result of those changes, the Commission issued a revised policy statement on 

June 14, 2011 (76 FR 34773). 

As safety culture is an issue covered under a current regulatory process, it is outside the scope 

of license renewal and, therefore, outside the scope of the GEIS. No changes were made to the 

GEIS as a result of this comment.

Comment: We need increased security around San Onofre because to take up what Berty was 

saying, the nuclear power plant is more vulnerable and more exposed right now to potential 

terrorist activities and I know that we pooh-pooh this and we stick our head in the sands, but 

Homeland Security after 9/11 designated the nuclear power plants as being prime targets. This 

facility is now open and exposed and more vulnerable than ever before. So, we -- you know, 

part of this whole re-licensing issue must take a look at the fact that nuclear power plants are 

potential targets for terrorists. (DPCA-CREED2-8) 

Comment: One other point I know that one of the original targets of 9/11 was San Onofre. So, 

I mean it's just like Craig was saying. It's vulnerable. It is potentially not protected. It's a very 

unsafe situation just from the standpoint of national security. (DPCA-Scott-12) 

Comment: Secondly, I'm concerned and this has been alluded to by a couple of the other 

people commenting tonight and I won't lie and claim that on a series of lunch breaks at my day 

job I was able to thoroughly read and memorize the entire 600-plus page document, but in 

reading over that document, I didn't see any mention of terrorism or national security 

implications of this technology. It would seem to me that a Generic Environmental Impact 

Statement that is intended to apply to every relicensing of a nuclear plant in America should be 

considering at a threshold level the potential for terrorist targeting of these plants as well as the 

nuclear proliferation implications at a time when we are seeing rogue regimes around the world 

obtaining nuclear weapons and terrorist organizations including al-Qaeda so far we hope being 

caught again and again attempting to obtain nuclear material which is ultimately obtained 

through the civilian commercial nuclear industry. 

I think that the impact of proliferating this technology and participating in an international regime 

which makes this material more readily available with each plant that we license or relicense to 

these groups that are a threat to our national security that possibility -- and the environmental 

implications of that possibility because such a terrorist attack will clearly have severe 

environmental repercussions wherever it occurs and in a wide region around wherever it occurs, 

that potential really does need to be addressed in the environmental impact statement. (DPCANader-21) 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-322 

Comment: And the more of these meetings that I've gone to and listened to the experts talk 

and now, I become very conscious about nuclear power and I read about it everywhere in the 

world and all the plants and America is -- the thing that I know is that it's absolutely deadly and I 

don't think there's any protecting that plant down there. I mean I can walk right up to the wall 

every day and I just don't see even the Marines. I know in France they're going crazy. They're 

putting anti-aircraft guns and stuff around their plants because the whole country is powered by 

nukes and they're pretty frightened about the whole tourist activity. [Note: The second to last 

word, “tourist” was likely a transcription error and should have been “terrorist.”] 

(DPCA-Collamer-32) 

Comment: A sampling of issues with the potential for very large environmental impacts, that 

should be studied on a site-specific basis includes -- I have a short list of just four here. 

So these are things that we think should be somewhere on that B list, and in Category 2 or 3. 

One issue is terrorist attacks on vulnerable spent fuel pools. Environmental effects of a terrorist 

attack on spent fuel pools. That's not anywhere in there. 

Neither are the environmental effects of terrorist attacks on dry casks. The NRC agrees with the 

Departments of Homeland Security, and the Department of Energy, that nuclear facilities are, by 

definition, targets of terrorists. 

But the spent fuel pools at all these 104 plants were designed and built long before the age of 

terrorism, and they are not protected, adequately, by attack from air or other means. 

So to ignore that vulnerable component when deciding what issues need Environmental Impact 

Statements, site-specific, seems irresponsible to us. 

Similarly, the environmental impacts of sabotage from within a nuclear power plant, should 

terrorists gain entry, or infiltrate the workforce, is not among those to be assessed under either 

the generic or the site-specific rules. So these we see as omissions of very important matters. 

(PBCA-SLOMFP1-2) 

Comment: And as a condition of relicensing the GEIS for nuclear power, license renewals 

should require that the licensee has the means to resist an attack on the reactor building, its 

supporting structure, and its spent fuel storage, from air, land and water, by a team of wellequipped terrorists; be prepared to pass tests and mock attack drills, which would demonstrate 

the adequacy of security; and many other aspects. (PBCA-Cochran-5) 
Appendix A 

 A-323 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Comment: So safe accommodation as the NRC claims. At [SONGS] and Diablo, the 

earthquake and tsunami dangers are completely different from any other plant, obviously [See 

identifier PBCA-Schumann-8 for the response to this comment. The comment is repeated here 

to preserve the commenter’s continuity of thought.] But the same is true for terrorist aspects for 

any plant because of location and/or design of the plants. 

And I want to quote from the report of the National Academy of Sciences from 2005, which 

addressed the issue of terrorism at -- and the meaning for spent fuel pools. And I quote here 

from that report. 

It says: "The potential vulnerabilities of spent fuel pools to terrorist attacks are plant design 

specific. Therefore, specific vulnerabilities can only be understood by examining the 

characteristics of spent fuel storage at each plant." End of quote. 

 

Furthermore, another 20 years of exposure to intense radiation and heat will likely cause further 

embrittlement of components such as pool racking and/or fuel cladding. 

The G force that's generated in earthquakes depends largely on the strength of the quake and 

the distance from the epicenter. 

So this aspect alone would require very different mitigation measures at different plants. 

Accordingly, the safe accommodations of spent fuel storage on site depends on the different 

mitigation measures at each site and be evaluated at site-specific, the EIS. 

(PBCA-Schumann-10) 

Comment: And then as far as fending off terrorists at nuclear facilities -- anyway, the 

Honorable Dan Hirsch is the expert on this. You like that name, I be[t]. And I believe I heard 

something like the only scenario the NRC considered is if two or three people were armed and 

working together, or something. 

There couldn't be four people getting together to pull any stunt now, could there? 

(PBCA-Campbell-32) 

Comment: Safeguards and Security: The NRC states that security issues are not tied to a 

license renewal action but are considered to be issues that need to be dealt with constantly as 

part of the current license (GEIS, p. 1-12). However, extending a plant's license to allow it to 

operate an additional 20 years changes the security threat by adding large quantities of spent 

fuel to the reactor site. These additional quantities of spent fuel could pose a richer and more 

attractive target for potential terrorists. License renewal results in a far greater accumulation of 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-324 

spent fuel being stored at a reactor than was originally envisioned when the plants were first 

licensed. 

The revised GElS should recognize the increased potential for terrorist attacks on nuclear power 

plants and spent fuel storage facilities, including air attacks similar to those that occurred on 

Sept. 11, 2001. It should also recognize that plants located in densely populated areas or along 

major routes may be more attractive targets for such attacks than more remotely located plants. 

Until it can be proven that the nation's nuclear power plants, including control rooms and spent 

fuel storage areas, can withstand terrorist attacks or that nuclear plant operators can prevent 

them, environmental impact reviews for license renewal should include meaningful site-specific 

analyses of the potential risks and environmental impacts from large-scale terrorist attacks, 

taking into consideration the potentially affected population (i.e., residents, businesses, and 

workers) and available transport routes. Therefore, the potential impacts from sabotage or a 

terrorist attack on a plant should be considered Category 2, site-specific issues and should be 

included during a plant's license renewal environmental impact review. Although some of the 

security information pertaining to nuclear power plants must remain "safeguarded" information, 

sufficient information should be provided to the public during the license renewal review 

regarding whether all reasonable efforts are being made to minimize the risks and 

consequences of a potential terrorist attack. (CEC-9(1)-4) 

Comment: Failure to Evaluate Terrorist Attacks: As noted above, the Atomic Energy Act, 42 

U.S.C. § 2011 et seq., requires the NRC to ensure that nuclear power plants are secure against 

sabotage and other deliberate attacks. Specifically, the NRC must determine that the operation 

of a facility is "in accord with the common defense and security and will provide adequate 

protection to the health and safety of the public." 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a). 

The federal government has acknowledged that there is a continuing and credible threat of 

terrorist attacks.13 As President Obama recently said: "We are at war."14 The attempted 

destruction of an airliner on December 25, 2009, reminds us that terrorist groups can and will 

continue to plan attacks on the country's vital interests.15 

[

13 Obama Details New Policies in Response to Terror Threat, New York Times, Jan. 8, 2010. 

//www.nytimes.com/2010/01/08/us/politics/08terror.html?hp] 

[

14Obama: "We are at war." New York Times, Jan. 7, 2010. 

http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/07/obama-review-revealed-significant-nationaI-security-shortcomings/]

[

l5Obama says AI Qaeda in Yemen Planned Bombing Plot and He Vows Revenge. New York Times, Jan. 3, 2010. 

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/03/us/politics/03] 

The Revised GElS fails to address the real concerns raised by a potential terrorist attack on a 

nuclear power station. The Revised GEIS treats the threat of terrorism exactly as it does 

emergency evacuation and accumulation of spent nuclear fuel. It ignores it. Section 1.7.4 of 

the Revised GElS states that the "NRC requires that nuclear power plants be both safe and 
Appendix A 

 A-325 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

secure." The Revised GElS then concludes that "Security issues ... are not tied to a license 

renewal action...." Id. Because security is deemed by the NRC to be independent of license 

renewal, "decisions and recommendations concerning safeguards and security at nuclear power 

stations are ongoing and outside the regulatory scope of this GElS." Id. 

This approach is illogical and inconsistent with NEPA. The purpose of an environmental review 

is to allow decision makers to know and understand the full range of potential impacts to public 

health and safety and the environment from a proposed action. Ignoring major impacts is a flat 

violation of federal law. 

Clearly, since September 11, 2001, there has been a heightened awareness that nuclear 

facilities are at risk of terrorist attacks. Such an attack might target the reactor containment 

building of a nuclear generating facility, but it might also target potentially more vulnerable 

targets, such as the spent fuel pools, that have considerably less structural protection. As noted 

in a Princeton University study, a successful terrorist attack on a spent fuel storage pool at a 

large nuclear reactor could have consequences "significantly worse that Chernobyl.”16

[

16 Reducing the Hazards from Stored Spent Power-Rector Fuel in the United States, Science and Global Security, 

11:1-51, 2003, p. 2] 

NRC cannot maintain that a terrorist attack on a nuclear power station is not a foreseeable risk. 

In fact, NRC itself has long recognized that nuclear power stations are potentially vulnerable to 

attack. As early as 1977, the agency's published design basis threat ("DBT") regulation 

explicitly acknowledged the possibility of attack. Final Rule, Requirements for the Physical 

Protection of Nuclear Power Reactors, 42 Fed. Reg. 10836 (Feb. 24, 1977).17 In 1994, the DBT 

rule was amended to include vehicle based bomb threats. Final Rule, Protection Against 

Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants, 59 Fed. Reg. 38889 (Aug. 1, 1994). 

Further, in 2002, the NRC itself ordered nuclear plant operators "to develop specific guidance 

and strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling 

capabilities using existing or readily available resources (equipment or personnel) that could be 

effectively implemented under the circumstances associated with loss of large areas of the plant 

due to explosions or fire, including those that an aircraft impact might create." Letter from J. 

Boska, NRC, to M. Balduzzi, Entergy Operations (July 11, 2007).18 In fact, one emergency drill 

at the Indian Point assumed that the facility was attacked by terrorists using a hijacked 737 

airplane.19 Clearly, NRC cannot maintain that a terrorist attack is not foreseeable when the 

agency itself has foreseen it. 

[

17 Similarly, the NRC's 1979 environmental impact statement including a section dealing with possible sabotage 

attacks.] 

[

18 ML071920023.] 

[

19 Final Exercise Report Indian Point, Oct. 24, 2004 (ML050190165) Appendix 4.]
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-326 

Other federal agencies have publicly warned of the dangers of terrorist attacks on nuclear 

power stations. For example, on November 15, 2002, the FBI sent a bulletin to law enforcement 

agencies, warning them that Al-Qaeda's "highest priority targets remain within the aviation, 

petroleum, and nuclear sectors.”20 The 9/11 Commission's report revealed that Khalid Sheikh 

Mohammad, the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, originally planned to hijack additional aircraft to 

crash into targets on both coasts, including nuclear power plants. The 9/11 Commission 

Report, at 154. As late as July 2001, the terrorists were considering attacking a specific nuclear 

facility in New York, which one of the pilots "had seen during familiarization flights near New 

York." ld. at 245. 

[

20 Text of FBI Terror Warning, CBSNews.com (Nov. 15, 2002), 

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/11/15/attack/main529501] 

In addition, on September 4, 2003, the United States General Accounting Office ("GAO") issued 

a report noting that the nation's commercial nuclear power plants are possible terrorist targets 

and criticizing the NRC's oversight and regulation of nuclear power plant security. GAO, 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Oversight of Security at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants 

Needs to Be Strengthened, GAO-03-752 (2003). The GAO weighed in again in 2006 in a 

separate report stating that, "[a]ccording to the [NRC]..., there continues to be a general credible 

threat of a terrorist attack on the nation's commercial nuclear power plants, in particular by al 

Qaeda and like-minded Islamic terrorist groups." Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Nat'l 

Security, Emerging Threats, & Int'I Relations, House Comm. on Gov't Reform, Nuclear Power 

Plants Have Upgraded Security, But the NRC Needs to Improve Its Process for Revising the 

DBT, GAO- 06-555T, at 1 (2006). 

In 2005, the National Academy of Sciences released a report from a study it conducted at the 

request of Congress, with the sponsorship of the NRC and the Department of Homeland 

Security, of the security risks posed by the storage of spent fuel at nuclear plant sites. See Nat'l 

Acad. of Scis., Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage; Public Report 

(2006) [hereinafter NAS Study]. Based upon information provided by the NRC, the National 

Academy of Sciences judged that "attacks with civilian aircraft remain a credible threat." Id, at 

30 It noted that terrorists might choose to attack spent fuel pools because they are "less well 

protected structurally than reactor cores" and "typically contain inventories of medium- and longlived radionuclides that are several times greater than those contained in individual reactor 

cores," Id. at 36. The National Academy of Sciences concluded that the storage pools are 

susceptible to fire and radiological release from a wide range of conditions, including intentional 

attacks with large civilian aircraft, Id, at 49, 57. According to a report prepared for Congress by 

the Government Accountability Office, the nation's nuclear power plants remain vulnerable to a 

terrorist attack. 21

[

21 Nuclear Power Plants Efforts Made to Upgrade Security, but the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Design Basis 

Threat Process Should Be Improved, March 2006, GAO-06-388.] 
Appendix A 

 A-327 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

The threat of attack or sabotage to the nation's nuclear power stations is real and present. 

Terrorists are still attempting to create a "dirty bomb" or otherwise cause a deliberate release of 

radioactive material. On October 28, 2008, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), addressed the United Nations General Assembly 

and warned the world about nuclear terror: “The possibility of terrorists obtaining nuclear or 

other radioactive material remains a grave threat.”22 Dr. ElBaradei also warned of "the potential 

of terrorists targeting nuclear facilities.“23 He stated that the "safety and security of nuclear 

material is a legitimate concern of all States" and that “[t]he willingness of terrorists to commit 

suicide to achieve their evil makes the nuclear terrorism threat far more likely than it was before 

September 11."24 

[

22 World At Risk − The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and 

Terrorism, Graham & Talent (December 2008), http://www.preventwmd.gov, at 43.] 

[

23 International Atomic Energy Agency, Calculating the New Global Nuclear Terrorism Threat 

(November 1, 2001) available at 

www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/P_release/2001/nt_Pressrelease.shtml.] 

[

24 Id.] 

In December 2008, the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism (the 

"WMD Commission") reported: "Terrorist organizations are intent on acquiring nuclear weapons 

or...material....“25 On September 10, 2008, New York City Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly 

testified to the WMD Commission that: 

Everything we know about al Qaeda tells us that they will try to hit us again, 

possibly the next time with a weapon of mass destruction. We must do 

everything in our power to stop them before it's too late.26 

[

25 Id. at 43-44.] 

[

26 Id. at 112.] 

It is clear that the threat of terrorism is very real and the possibility of an attack or sabotage 

needs to be considered in any NEPA analysis. 

An environmental impact statement, at a minimum, must contain an analysis of all relevant 

potential environmental impacts. "NEPA was created to ensure that agencies will base 

decisions on detailed information regarding significant environmental impacts and that 

information will be available to a wide variety of concerned public and private actors. Morongo 

Band of Mission Indians v. Federal Aviation Administration, 161 F.3d 569,575 (9th Cir. 1998)." 

Mississippi River Basin Alliance v. Westphal, 230 F.3d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 2000). As the Ninth 

Circuit stated: 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-328 

When we consider the purposes that NEPA was designed by Congress to serve, 

what was done here is inadequate. Congress wanted each federal agency 

spearheading a major federal project to put on the table, for the deciding 

agency's and for the public's view, a sufficiently detailed statement of 

environmental impacts and alternatives so as to permit informed decision 

making. The purpose of NEPA is to require disclosure of relevant environmental 

considerations that were given a "hard look" by the agency, and thereby to permit 

informed public comment on proposed action... 

Lands Council v. Powell, 379 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2004). 

NEPA mandates a full analysis of foreseeable impacts. Terrorism is a foreseeable threat to 

nuclear power facilities and related infrastructure. The Revised GElS fails to contain the 

required impact analysis regarding continued accumulation of spent nuclear fuel, emergency 

evacuations, and the risk of terrorism. Therefore, important data is lacking in this GElS and, 

until it is made available, this environmental impact document is incomplete. (CT AG-10-9) 

Comment: Environmental Impacts of Attacks Should be Considered: All nuclear facilities have 

been identified as targets of terrorists by the NRC, as well as Homeland Security and other 

federal agencies. Yet this issue is excluded from consideration in the GElS. 

Furthermore, the obvious fact that a failure of security − i.e. a successful terrorist attack − has 

the potential for catastrophic consequences for the environment and human health is ignored. 

SLOMFP is currently pursuing a legal challenge of the NRC in the Ninth Circuit of the U.S. Court 

of Appeals. The NRC violated both NEPA and a June, 2006 ruling by the Ninth Circuit Court in 

favor of SLOMFP when the regulators excluded from consideration credible attack scenarios on 

the dry casks at Diablo Canyon that could have devastating environmental impacts. Under 

NEPA, environmental impacts that are "reasonably foreseeable" and have "catastrophic 

consequences, even if their probability of occurrence is low" must be taken into account. The 

GElS does not take into account the principles of this ruling by the second-highest court in the 

nation. 

SLOMFP demands the NRC include acts of sabotage or terrorism in its Draft GElS as Category 

2, a large impact with site-specific needs and requirements. (SLOMFP-13-17) 

Comment: B. Draft Incorrectly Determined That Emergency Planning & Safeguards are 

Outside Review in License Renewal: 
Appendix A 

 A-329 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

 2. SAFEGUARDS & SECURITY:

a. Security Belongs in Scope: The Draft says that safeguards and security shall not be looked 

at in license renewal unless a District Court of Appeals in that state has ruled otherwise. This is 

wrong for several reasons: 

It runs counter to Chairman Jaczko's call for public involvement and input. Because unless the 

public at a particular site has considerable financial resources to hire an experienced attorney 

and funds for expert witnesses, the case is unlikely to be brought before the court; or if it is 

brought forward it is unlikely to be successful. Courts give deference to agencies and defer to 

its analysis unless it is without substantial basis in fact. However NRC relies on "studies" that 

are subject to safeguards so that it is not possible to show by independent analysis that the 

analysis lacks substantial evidence when the petitioner cannot see that evidence −Alice in 

Wonderland. 

We know that the 911 Commission and NRC are aware that reactors are on the terrorist's hit list 

and if they were successful the consequences could be catastrophic. [See the Massachusetts 

Motion to Intervene in Pilgrim and [Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee] ENVY's License Renewal 

Application and the NYS Attorney General's Motion to Intervene in Indian Point's License 

Renewal Application expert testimony by Dr. Gordon Thompson]. The environmental impacts 

that must be considered in an EIS include those which are "reasonably foreseeable" and have 

"catastrophic consequences, even if their probability of occurrence is low..." 40 CFR § 

1502.22(b)(1). 

The fact that the likelihood of an impact may not be easily quantifiable is not an excuse for 

failing to address it in an EIS. NRC regulations require that "to the extent that there are 

important qualitative considerations or factors that cannot be quantified, these considerations or 

factors will be discussed in qualitative terms" 10 CFR § 51.71. 

b. Security - a Category 2 Issue: Reactors vary in both vulnerability and their attractiveness as 

targets. For example: 

Vulnerability: GE Mark I reactors' spent fuel pools are located outside primary containment, in 

the attic of the reactors with a thin roof overhead. Therefore they are especially vulnerable to 

acts of malice. NUREG 1738 says that containments in BWR Mark I reactors provide no 

substantial barrier to aircraft penetration from a mid-weight commercial aircraft; they did not 

model larger aircraft or smaller aircraft with explosives. We know, for example, that penetration 

of the containment is a step beyond penetration of the spent fuel pool that is outside primary 

containment. Also NUREG 1738 looked at Vermont Yankee's susceptibility to a severe earth 

 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-330 

quake and said that in a strong quake it would be subject to seismic fragility. The damage from 

explosives is due from shock waves, comparable to a seismic event. NUREG 1738 went further 

and said as a result of a heavy seismic shock, the bottom of the spent fuel pool could fall out. It 

is a logical extension to predict the same could occur from explosives. 

Attractiveness: Reactors near large population centers, such as Indian Point and Diablo 

Canyon, are especially attractive targets due to the potential devastation that a successful 

attack could cause. Likewise symbolic targets would have appeal, such as Pilgrim − located in 

America's Hometown − and TMI. Therefore, this is not a generic issue, all reactors cannot be 

treated the same. (PW-6-20)

Comment: Section 2 – Procedural Issues: A. Public Involvement & Input Restricted –

Recommended: The Honorable Gregory Jaczko's said in a speech entitled, "A Regulator's 

Perspective on New Nuclear Reactor License Applications," September 24, 2009 that, “NRC is 

built upon a solid foundation of a talented workforce dedicated to the safety and security mission 

of the agency, and guided by sound safety regulations. This solid foundation is strengthened by 

public involvement and input, and by our being open and transparent about what we do and 

why. I am confident that we can successfully meet these challenges in an effective way, with 

safety at the heart of our decisions. “[Emphasis added] 

7. Safeguards & Security: The Draft says that safeguards and security shall not be looked 

at in license renewal unless a District Court of Appeals in that state has ruled otherwise. 

Problem: (1) Unless the public or government agency/department at a particular site 

has the financial resources to hire an experienced attorney and funds for expert 

witnesses, the case is unlikely to be brought before the court; or if it is appealed, to be 

successful. This runs counter to Chairman Jaczko's call for public involvement and 

input. (2) Safeguards and security are not issues that are necessarily limited to a District 

Court's jurisdiction. The National Academy of Sciences and Attorney Generals of 

Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut and California have demonstrated that the 

consequences, for example, of an attack on a spent fuel pool could be devastating for 

hundreds of miles and to our nation's economy as a whole. Solution: Fairness dictates 

that safeguards and security should be looked at in license renewal as a Category 2 

issue. (PW-6-27) 

Comment: Inadequate Assessment of the Environmental Consequences of Severe Accidents: 

Continued Failure to Specifically Address the Risk of Intentional Acts of Sabotage: The Revised 

GElS maintains that "the risk of a successful terrorist attack (i.e., one that results in a zirconium 

fire) is very low.”84 Notably, the NRC continues to rely upon Sandia National Lab studies that 

are classified as "sensitive security related" and, thus, not available to the public, to support its 

conclusion that environmental consequence of a terrorist attack would be adequately 

mitigated.85 Accordingly, NRC folds this issue into its generic determination that the impact of 
Appendix A 

 A-331 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

severe accidents is "small," and would continue to not require any site specific analysis, 

including SAMAs related to terrorist attacks. 

[

84 Revised GElS Appendices at E-35.] 

[

85 See id. at E-36.] 

However, ample evidence undermines the NRC's conclusions here. Firstly, the Revised GElS 

downplays the potential risk of terrorist attack on nuclear power plants. Numerous reports 

indicate that nuclear power plants remain likely targets of terrorist attacks. The 

9/11 Commission Report revealed that the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks had originally 

planned to hijack additional aircrafts to crash into targets, including nuclear power plants, but 

wrongly believed the plants were heavily defended.86 This report indicates that the terrorists 

were considering attacking a specific nuclear facility in New York which one of the pilots had 

seen during a familiarization flight near New York.87 This was likely Indian Point, especially 

given the fact that almost 20 million people live within 50 miles of the facility.88 In the years 

since the 9/11 attacks, the federal government, including the NRC, has repeatedly recognized 

that there is a credible threat of intentional attacks on nuclear power plants.89 Notably, existing 

nuclear power plants in the United States were built between the 1950s and the 1980s and were 

not intended to be able to withstand the impact of aircraft crashes or explosive forces, thus, 

making success of a potential terrorist attack a credible possibility.90

[

86 Nat'l Comm'n on Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S., The 9/11 Commission Report (2004), at 154 ("9/11 Commission 

Report").] 

[

87 9/11 Commission Report at 245.] 

[

88 See, e.g., Witt Report at 4, 81-82.] 

[

89 See, e.g.,; Wide-Ranging New Terror Alerts, CBS News.com (May 26, 2002), available at, 

http://cbsnews.com/stories/2002/05/24/attack/main510054.shtml (discussing heightened alert of the U.S.'s nuclear 

power plants as a result of information gained by the intelligence community); FBI Warns of Nuke Plant Danger, CBS 

News.com (May 1, 2003), available at, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/09/04/attack/main57I556.shtml 

(discussing FBI warning to nuclear plant operators to remain vigilant about suspicious activity that could signal a 

potential terrorist attack); General Accounting Office, Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Oversight of Security at 

Commercial Nuclear Power Plants Needs to be Strengthened, GAO-03-752 (2003) (noting that U.S. nuclear power 

plants are possible terrorist target, and criticizing the NRC's oversight of plant security); FBI's 4th Warning, CBS 

News.com (July 2, 2004) (discussing FBI warning of recent intelligence showing AI-Qaeda interest in attacking 

nuclear plants).] 

[

90 In re All Nuclear Power Reactor Licensees, DD-02-04 (Nov. 1, 2002), available at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/doc-collections/petitions-2-206/directors-decision/2002/mI022890031.pdf; NRC: Nuclear Power Plants Not 

Protected Against Air Crashes, Associated Press (Mar. 28, 2002).] 

Furthermore, as discussed above, the Revised GElS continues to underplay the severity of 

consequences of spent fuel pool fires that could result from an intentional attack. For example, 

at Indian Point, the impacts of terrorist attack would be far ranging. Such impacts are explained 

in a report prepared on behalf of Riverkeeper in connection with Riverkeeper's Petition for 

Hearing in the Indian Point relicensing proceeding by Edwin Lyman, entitled, Chernobyl on the 

Hudson? The Health & Economic Impacts of a Terrorist Attack at the Indian Point Nuclear 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-332 

Power Plant. This report is attached hereto in support of the comments made herein, for your 

consideration in the instant rulemaking proceeding, as Exhibit G. 

Once again, the existence of mitigation measures which have been implemented to reduce the 

risk of intentional attack only highlight the fact that a comprehensive site-specific assessment as 

part of the NEPA process has never been performed, and is greatly needed here.91 The 

inadequate assessment of intentional attack on nuclear power plants, thus, further erodes the 

NRC's basis for concluding that the consequences from severe accidents are categorically 

"small for all plants." 

[

91 See generally Riverkeeper's IP DSEIS Comments at 26-33.] 

Additionally, it is crucial that NRC require consideration of intentional attack in licensee and 

NRC Staff SAMA analyses. Failure to do so will once again lead to highly inaccurate results.92 

For example, in the Indian Point relicensing proceeding, in the first step the SAMA analysis 

(i.e., establishing the baseline of severe accidents), Entergy and the NRC Staff did not consider 

the contribution to severe accident costs made by such intentional attacks at Indian Point. 93 

The present value of cost risks for an attack at an Indian Point reactor and its pool exceeds half 

a billion dollars, which would warrant significant expenditures on SAMAs.94 The present value 

of cost risks for an attack on a reactor alone are also significant − $62 million to $73 million.95 

However, relevant SAMAs with a value of this magnitude were not considered. 

[

92 See generally Thompson Report.] 

[

93 Indian Point Draft Supplemental EIS § 5,2; Entergy's Environmental Report at § 4.21.] 

[

94 See Thompson Report at 45-46, Table 7-7, Section 9.] 

[

95 Id. at 49.]

It is, thus, clear that the failure to consider the risk of intentional attack renders the required 

SAMA analysis highly inaccurate. (Riverkeeper-20-15) 

Comment: The security issue for these categories, they're not really clearly listed as to where 

security falls, and whenever they talk about security the paper, they always talk about the plant, 

they're not talking about the spent fuel pools, and cesium fires from the spent fuel pools is a 

very real danger, especially as you have allowed them to compromise the safety distance with 

double racking, and I understand there's a proposal for triple racking. (PBCA-Pinard-20) 

Response: The NRC disagrees with the commenters that security issues at nuclear facilities, 

including SAMAs relating to terrorist-initiated events, should be addressed in the revised GEIS. 

Security-related issues are addressed as a current operating issue, rather than a license 

renewal issue. As a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC conducted a 

comprehensive review of the agency’s security program and made further enhancements to 

security at a wide range of NRC-regulated facilities. These enhancements included significant 
Appendix A 

 A-333 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

reinforcement of the defense capabilities for nuclear facilities, better control of sensitive 

information, enhancements in emergency preparedness to further strengthen NRC’s nuclear 

facility security program, and implementation of mitigating strategies to deal with postulated 

events potentially causing loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fires, including 

those that an aircraft impact might create. 

The NRC routinely assesses threats and other information provided by a variety of Federal 

agencies and sources. The NRC also ensures that licensees meet appropriate security-level 

requirements. The NRC will continue to focus on prevention of terrorist acts for all nuclear 

facilities and will not focus on site-specific evaluations of speculative environmental impacts 

resulting from terrorist acts. While these are legitimate matters of concern, the NRC will 

continue to address them through the ongoing regulatory process as a current and generic 

regulatory issue that affects all nuclear facilities and many of the activities conducted at nuclear 

facilities. The issue of security and risk from malevolent acts at nuclear power facilities is not 

unique to facilities that have requested a renewal of their licenses. 

With regard to malovelent acts or sabotage, it is the NRC’s position that malevolent acts or 

sabotage are speculative and beyond the scope of a NEPA review and are, therefore, outside 

the scope of the GEIS. The NRC believes that the consequences of events initiated by 

malevolent acts or sabotage would be comparable to or bounded by the severe accidents 

considered in the GEIS. At present, however, the NRC will consider malevolent acts or 

sabotage as part of a license renewal environmental review for plants located within the 

jurisdictional area of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, as a result of the Ninth 

Circuit decision in San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 449 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2006). 

For additional discussion, see Appendix E, Section E.3, of the revised GEIS. 

Comments relating to spent fuel pools are addressed in Section A.2.1.10 of this appendix. 

Comments relating to emergency preparedness are addressed later in this section. 

No change was made to the GEIS as a result of these comments. 

Comment: The NRC should adopt in the GElS the same rules and regulations regarding 

safeguards and security as were adopted by the Commission for newly proposed reactor 

designs and sites. If the new reactor safety and security standards are deemed necessary to 

protect human health and the environment, then such standards should be applied retroactively 

to any reactor that will continue to operate beyond its original license, or the licensee must 

demonstrate how the existing reactor meets those newer standards. The very fact that the NRC 

has a newer and more stringent standard for reactor safety going forward is a tacit admission 

that those of the past must be somehow inadequate. (A4NR-11-9) 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-334 

Comment: I am a member of Mothers For Peace. But Jane speaks for us. I'm speaking as an 

individual 

l who lives within a very short distance of the plant, and I wanted to go over some things that I 

noticed also. 

The NRC should adopt in the GElS the same rules and regulations regarding safeguards and 

security as were adopted by the Commission for the new proposed reactor designs and sites. 

If the new reactor standards are deemed necessary to protect human health and the 

environment, then such standards should be applied, retroactively, to any reactor that will 

continue to operate beyond its original license, or the licensee must demonstrate how the 

existing reactor meets those newer standards. 

We should not have lesser standards because our plant was built 20 years ago. The very fact 

that the NRC has a newer and more stringent standard for nuclear safety, going forward, is a 

tacit admission that those of the past must somehow be inadequate. Otherwise, I would 

assume they would not have put those into being. (PBCA-Cochran-3) 

Comment: I’m a Down-Winder because I live in La Jolla and we are requesting that when the 

standards are looked at all existing plants be subject to the same standards as all new plants. 

Because if new plants have to meet standards, it would make sense that those were the 

standards that were in place to protect public health. So, all existing plants should meet those 

standards. (DPCA-A4NR-14) 

Response: With regard to applying the standards for new nuclear power plants to those that 

have already been built, the NRC believes that its safeguards and security requirements for 

operating licenses are comprehensive and robust to assure continued safe operation. The safe 

operation of nuclear power plants, which includes security-related issues, is not limited to 

license renewal but is dealt with on an ongoing basis as a part of the current operating licenses. 

Safety and security inspections are and will be conducted throughout the operating life of the 

plant, whether during the original or renewed operating license term. If issues are discovered at 

a nuclear power plant, they are addressed immediately, and any necessary changes are 

incorporated into the current operating license. As such, the regulatory safety oversight at 

operating reactors is ongoing and outside the regulatory scope of license renewal. No change 

was made to the GEIS as a result of these comments. 

Emergency Preparedness 

Comment: My basic comment right now although I have – there are many issues of concern, 

but one of the issues that I'm particularly focusing on right now is the fact that nowhere do I see 

a change or an increase in a discussion on public preparedness and evacuation. 
Appendix A 

 A-335 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Three years ago, Chris Shays' committee in Congress had a hearing whereby the NRC stated 

that their responsibility was the nuclear power plant. FEMA who was also present, their 

responsibility was the disaster relief and clean up. 

Shays mandated that FEMA do evacuation feasibility studies specifically for Indian Point, I think 

it was Turkey Point in Florida or in New York I guess and then one in Florida and San Onofre. 

Those of you, and I use to live in San Clemente, know that there is no evacuation from San 

Clemente. How in the -- you know, how on earth could they build a nuclear power plant in an 

area where there is no feasible evacuation in the event of any incident. 

A number of us have been working trying to comment or contact our elected officials because 

we’ve discovered that unless you live in San Clemente or possibly San Juan Capistrano you do 

not know what to do in the event of a nuclear incident. This is a fault in the licensing standards 

that there is not a component that extends the emergency planning preparedness beyond a tenmile radius given the current population status. 

A comment was made by River Keepers that was put forth to the NRC taking a look at Indian 

Point because it's ten miles from New York or 30 miles from New York City. 

I don't know how many people were here when they had the fire in San Onofre, but the ash 

went to Mission Viejo, Laguna Woods, Laguna Hills, Laguna Beach and that's way beyond the 

ten-mile radius. 

So, to set an artificial limit of the emergency protection zone to ten miles is a flaw in the system 

and I think that when they start the licensing and licensing renewal practice, they have to do a 

much more realistic evacuation planning. To not be able to have an evacuation plan is totally 

unacceptable and would be reason to halt the current retrofitting of the steam generator at San 

Onofre right now until some sort of public preparedness is created. 

We've sent this memo to a number of our state legislators and I'm going to read it because I 

don't see Carla Mays or Erin Moran here to read this document. It won't take long. 

"We are calling for the project to be halted until there are safety fairs training, iodine pill 

distribution, mailers, PSAs in the media on the current Songs project and nuclear preparedness. 

There needs to be an increase in funding of the agencies specifically for this task and a 

mandate for immediate implementation." 

I talked to Donna Buxton who is head of the Orange County Emergency Operations Center. 

She's very frustrated that they have no resources to do any public training, get out the 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-336 

information on a potential nuclear accident. I'm hoping to address this to the Orange County 

Board of Supervisors. 

It is critical that we have an educated public in the event of an accident. Wholesale panic would 

be -- would create a disaster worse than Katrina. 

 

It's important that this education and community preparedness be extended beyond just Orange 

County and San Diego County but also to Riverside County, San Bernardino County and Los 

Angeles. (DPCA-CREED2-7)

Comment: We would like to see more public participation and more public hearings before any 

extension of the licensing period especially for San Onofre given the fact that there is little or no 

community education, public preparedness and I'm not talking about the first responders. I'm 

talking about you, me and the rest of the citizens so that they know what to do. 

Whether our schools are prepared. Do they have the iodine pills at the various schools? Do 

they have the transportation set up? Do the school buses know what -- you know, do the 

schools know what to do with the children in the event of an incident? 

I think probably only in San Clemente and San Juan Capistrano, but what about Mission Viejo, 

Laguna Hills, Laguna Niguel and beyond. 

There should also be radiation detectors in public buildings at least within a 50-mile radius. We 

don't know. There needs to be some sort of detection that expands outside of just the nuclear 

power plant for public safety. (DPCA-CREED2-9)

Comment: If you're going to take a periphery of public evacuation, in other words, how much 

area should you consider, should the NRC consider for the public being evacuated, I would see 

Three Mile Island. In other words, how much land was involved? Was that a hundred mile 

periphery? Et cetera. Et cetera. And then the other one is Chernobyl. Those would be the two 

that I would definitely look at. 

And it wouldn't -- like Craig said, it wouldn't just be ten miles. It would be a lot more than that. I 

mean Chernobyl is, as you know, a very notorious situation. (DPCA-Scott-13) 

Comment: A lot of people have an agenda here and I’m well aware of that and I’m not too 

naïve, but basically there's a few concerns of mine and I already mentioned a few of them, but 

safety is the biggest one and I went to a previous meeting and there were no evacuation plans 

in place. There were safety like plans. As people have commented, there were no like drills 

and I don't know if that's going to change. Hopefully, after this meeting, that would be great. 
Appendix A 

 A-337 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

But, since I live in Southern California, I'm concerned about this region although I'm concerned 

about other parts of the region. (DPCA-Costa-17) 

Comment: It doesn't particularly reassure me either to know that the Federal Government's 

zone of responsibility is only ten or 15 miles from the plant or to know that within that zone of 

responsibility, the Federal Government would take responsibility for evacuation or for 

emergency response. 

And my first comment on the draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement is that the more 

realistic impacts of an accident no matter how unexpected that accident might be -- accidents by 

definition are unexpected. If you expected them, they wouldn't be accidents. Right? No matter 

how unexpected that accident might be, the impacts to be reviewed and considered need to 

include the impacts outside of your ten or I5-mile zone. 

The ones that -- a more realistic reading of history shows us -- in the case of Chernobyl, I 

believe it was about 1200 miles away. I realize that Chernobyl was a somewhat different 

technology. It was the Soviet Union which we hope had laxer and less accountable standards 

than America, but it does illustrate what can happen if something goes unexpectedly wrong with 

this technology and I don't think it's adequate or sufficiently reassuring to simply dismiss it by 

saying that we don't expect it to happen. (DPCA-Nader-20)

Comment: So, let me share some things that have happened in these meetings. About five 

years ago, there was a NRC hearing and there was a representative from FEMA at that hearing. 

There's been a lot of talk about evacuation tonight. So, I asked the gentleman from FEMA to 

please explain to me how he would evacuate at 5:00 on a Friday before a holiday and his 

answer was that's not a fair question. I think that's a really fair question because accidents as 

the eloquent gentleman before me just pointed out are accidents. We do not know when they 

will happen and the idea that we could evacuate the area around San Onofre is ludicrous. 

Could never be done. 

It couldn't be done on a Wednesday morning at 10:00. Because as soon as anybody got wind 

of the problem, the roads would be a parking lot and not just in the immediate area of San 

Onofre. All the way to San Diego. All the way to Los Angeles. All the way to Las Vegas. So, 

evacuation is just one part of the problem. (DPCA-SHoffman-23)

Comment: Naturally, I'm concerned about the evacuation. The fact that the only way you can 

go south out of here is down one road is frightening because of our -- because of Camp 

Pendleton and the only way I know of to get out of here going the other is Pacific Coast 

Highway or the same freeway and I know what it's like. I commuted to Irvine for many years 

when I taught there and I can tell you that one accident of moderate severity and maybe no 

injuries can tie up that freeway for hours and I have made the mistake more than once of getting 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-338 

off thinking I could do better. I probably don't need to tell you what happens because you 

probably have the same problem. (DPCA-Exelby-31) 

Comment: Now, about public safety and the citizens of San Clemente knowing about this, that 

has been explained in detail, but the public's never there. I'm usually -- me and about four other 

citizens are the only ones in the room and everybody else is explaining. All of the first 

respondings and I'm telling you they really have thought about this, but the public I don't think 

knows it and according to what I've heard tonight, I would -- and that meeting I went to, that was 

two years ago when I heard that one. When they did get up and explain all that. 

(DPCA-Collamer-34) 

 

Comment: Evacuation planning. The exact comment that was made about getting out of an 

area around San Onofre on a Friday afternoon at 5:00 was said 20 years ago. We still don't 

have an answer for it now. 

Being a resident of Laguna Beach, when the evacuation plans were set up, Laguna Beach 

residents were told that they were going to be hosts for people that would have be evacuated 

and the city council of Laguna Beach said hosts? We're leaving, too. 

So, we haven't come up with the solutions to these problems and we're adding new ones and 

the new one that I would particularly like to address today is the containment structure of San 

Onofre [see identifier DPCA-PACK-44 for the comment on San Onofre]. (DPCA-Pack-43) 

Comment: The other thing is regarding the testing of the emergency preparedness out at 

Diablo and at all of the plants. 

When I was a supervisor, I had the privilege, actually, of being part of that, and I think I was 

never more surprised in my life, at some of the shortfalls that were there. 

Let's start with the first one. The first one is they're always scheduled everybody always knows 

when they are. It's 8:00. The donuts and coffee will be ready by 7:30. Okay. 

What happens on a holiday? What happens when it's not convenient for everybody? 

You're not taking into account what we have seen happen in real emergencies, and that is the 

kind of, "Oh, my gosh, where's so and so?" I don't think you even know where all your 

emergency personnel live, at a moment's notice. 

And how are you going to get them in when you have people trying to get out? 
Appendix A 

 A-339 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

I saw the people in charge, in the control room, double-counting buses, saying, oh, we'll get the 

students out from Cal Poly with buses, and then I'm kind a going, How many do you have? And 

now we have even less. Okay. 

Things that, if it were a random time, where are your bus drivers? Where are the buses? It's 

never done random and it needs to be done at least once when everybody isn't totally ready for 

it. Because what we have seen around the United states, in Katrina, under a chlorine cloud in 

the Midwest, was that what was predicted to happen did not happen. 

Now we can't make sure that everything's going to be perfect, but you can at least run through a 

mock effort when everything isn't stacked in your favor, and see what happens, and then deal 

with the best that you can do. 

And I know that's all we'll ever be able to do. But people have got to stop talking as though 

everybody's going to be taken care of -- rest homes, prisons, and everything. It's not going to 

happen. And you all know that. 

So the lead people, to not be prepared for the best available that they can do, is really going to 

only add to confusion, not solve it, or mitigate it. (PBCA-Pinard-19) 

Comment: Someone needs to point out that we are failing. We're failing on many levels. Let 

me give you your report card to the nuclear industry, the NRC, and nuclear technology, in 

general. 

Disaster response capability. F. We can have an earthquake or a human error at Diablo, and 

experience catastrophic damage here. Our nation is not good at responding -- I like what 

Peg Pinard pointed out about our ability to respond to disaster training [see identifier 

PBCA-Pinard-19 for the referenced comment on emergency planning and evacuation]. 

(PBCA-Biesek-43) 

Comment: What else was -- well there are plenty of things missed. You weren't going to look 

at emergency planning. Well that's taking off the table again some of the main issues that the 

public is concerned about. Have there been site specific, are there site specific differences? 

Obviously nuclear reactors, many of them are originally licensed to operate in sparsely 

populated areas. Pilgrim is an example of that because Plymouth was considered out in the 

boondocks. But as 30 years, 40 years approaches, these heretofore sparsely populated areas 

are now more densely populated areas. 

However, the infrastructure has often not changed. That is a site specific, pertinent factor. To 

say well this isn't important because FEMA does a foolish biennial exercise or we have full faith 

in our emergency plans is not credible. Why isn't it credible? Our community hasn't approved 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-340 

the plans for years. The neighboring community has not approved the emergency plans for 

years and we are not different. And so to have these levels really of smoke screens, and that's 

what I feel like we are dealing with. 

 

We justify or you justify taking emergency planning as an issue we are not going to discuss 

because you are basing it on the false assumption that the emergency plans in the biennial 

exercises demonstrate everything is a okay. Well here is a quick example. The emergency 

plan is based upon the keyhole concept. If you read NUREG 0654, I'm probably going to have 

to get really strong glasses but if you read that, you'll see they are saying you evacuate two 

miles around, then there is a keyhole, evacuate all or a portion in the keyhole from two to five, 

maybe from five to ten and then when you pass the ten mile finish line, all is fine. 

And the evacuation time estimates done by KLD are based upon that concept of that's what's 

going to happen, okay? But there is a fundamental flaw going on because that is based upon 

the straight line Gaussian plume, that plumes will blow the radiation in a straight line. However, 

that's not applicable because in complex situations, you need a variable trajectory model 

because the wind is variable. What is a complex situation? In a coastal area, either by a lake 

or the ocean, or river valleys or hills or considerable vegetation, mountains, and how do we 

know this? 

Well the NRC told us so, that's how we know this. The NRC has warned, since the early '70s, 

that in complex situations, the straight line Gaussian plume is not applicable. Again in the '80s. 

Recently, of this very year, the NRC, one of their chief emergency planners, LaVie is his name, 

and he made a presentation, which is on atoms, and slide after slide after slide describes how 

and where the straight line Gaussian plume is not applicable for emergency plans. 

And the New York Attorney General and Pilgrim Watch has brought this forward in this NR 

SAMA adjudications, but the New York Attorney General has done a pluperfect job in filing a 

motion for summary disposition in the Indian Point license renewal based on the fact that the 

straight line Gaussian plume is -- no, he didn't say that, what I'm thinking, is not appropriate at 

that site, just as the same expert witness said, in the current ongoing adjudication of Pilgrim, not 

in a coastal site, citing not only NRC documents that high, citing DOE documents that high. 

EPA, for example, does not even recommend [ATMOS] in complex situations in their --. Well 

you don't want to know, Part W, but you go on and on and on. And so, therefore, the 

foundations done of emergency planning is fallacious. However, you use, here in this 

document, in a rather shameful manner, that because the plans are okay, because FEMA says 

they are okay, then therefore we can blow it off and it's something we don't have to discuss. 

(NMA-PW-12)
Appendix A 

 A-341 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Comment: In 1983, in response to the 1979 reactor core melt at Three Mile Island and studies 

such as the 1975 Reactor Safety Study, NRC announced its Safety Goal Development Program 

based on a "defense-in-depth approach...in order to prevent accidents from happening and to 

mitigate their consequences" through "siting in less populated areas" and "emergency response 

capabilities." 48 Fed. Reg. 10772, 10775 (1983) ("Safety Goals Policy Statement"). Thus, NRC 

acknowledges that emergency planning and evacuation measures can mitigate the 

environmental impacts of a radiation release. As such emergency planning and evacuation 

measures should be examined as part of the NEPA analysis that takes place as part of the 

process to determine whether or not an operating license should be renewed. 

The Proposed GElS continues to exclude from the environmental impact review of relicensing 

any analysis of the actual effectiveness of emergency preparedness and evacuation planning in 

the event of a radiological emergency at a relicensed nuclear power plant. The NRC also does 

not consider this issue at any other stage of the relicensing proceeding. The State of New York 

objects to this exclusion of emergency planning and evacuation from the NEPA analysis, 

particularly as it relates to Indian Point, where effective evacuation is critical if environmental 

impacts from a design basis accident or a severe accident are to be mitigated. 

NRC itself has indicated with regard to emergency planning, these "regulations are premised on 

the assumption that a serious accident might occur and that evacuation of the EPZ might well 

be necessary." In the Matter of Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 

and 2), 22 N.R.C. 681, 713 (ALAB Oct 22, 1985). Each licensee is required to establish 

emergency preparedness plans which are to be implemented in the event of an accident, 

including protective action measures for the public. 10 C.F.R. § 50.47. Given that federal 

agency action under consideration and review is the decision by NRC to renew a NRC 

operating license and given that NRC does not allow the State to have any decision-making role 

in NRC's siting of a reactor or the renewal of its operating license, NEPA imposed on the NRC 

the obligation to undertake a transparent and comprehensive review of the plans to ensure that 

on- and off-site emergency evacuation plans can mitigate environmental impacts in the event of 

a radiological emergency. The plans must provide for two emergency planning zones (EPZs); 

(i) a plume exposure pathway EPZ (requiring preplanned evacuation procedures) of about 16 

km (10 miles) in radius and (ii) an ingestion exposure pathway EPZ of about 80 km (50 miles) in 

radius. 10 C.F.R. § 50.47. Other standards include appropriate ranges of protective actions for 

each of these zones; provisions for dissemination to the public of basic emergency planning 

information; provisions for rapid notification of the public during a serious reactor emergency; 

and methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential off-site 

consequences in the event of a radiological emergency condition. 1996 GElS at 5.2.3.3. Once 

a major radiological release occurs, effective emergency and evacuation plans are the only 

method of substantially mitigating the immediate public health and environmental impacts of 

radiation exposure. Nevertheless, the 1996 GElS excludes emergency planning and evacuation 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-342 

as a mitigation measure that must be analyzed before a plant's license is renewed. 1996 GElS 

at 5-10; Table 9 at pages 9-2 through 9-6. 

Despite the fact that effective emergency planning is the sole method of substantially mitigating 

the immediate impacts of a serious radiological release, the NRC's Proposed GElS continues to 

exclude any consideration or analysis of a license renewal applicant's emergency planning and 

preparedness in the environmental impact review process. Proposed GElS at 1-10. The 

exclusion of emergency preparedness from the environmental review continues despite the 

NRC's stark acknowledgement in its 1996 GElS that "evacuation can have a significant 

influence on early fatality risk" (1996 GElS at 5-24) and early fatalities are surely an 

environmental impact of a radiological emergency. 

The effectiveness of emergency preparedness and evacuation is particularly critical at Indian 

Point and at other plants near large population centers which would likely not be granted an 

original operating license today because they would fail to meet key license criteria with regard 

to population density and the difficulties it raises for evacuation planning. 10 C.F.R. § 100.21(h). 

As NRC's former director of the Office of State Programs said in 1979, "it is insane to have a 

three-unit reactor on the Hudson River in Westchester County, 40 miles from Times Square, 

20 miles from the Bronx...[it is] one of the most inappropriate sites in existence," Robert Ryan, 

NRC's Director of the Office of State Programs, Report of the Office of the Chief Counsel on 

Emergency Preparedness to the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, 

October 31, 1979. 

Rather than require license renewal applicants near densely populated areas to establish the 

actual efficacy of their emergency preparedness plans in order to continue operating their plants 

for another twenty years, the NRC determined that there is "no need for a special review of 

emergency planning issues" before a license is renewed because oversight of emergency 

preparedness and evacuation plans is “ongoing and outside the regulatory scope of license 

renewal." Proposed GElS at 1-11, 1-12. In other words, NRC assumes that its ongoing 

regulatory process ensures adequate emergency planning. 

Developments since the 1996 GElS make the NRC's confidence in the ongoing regulatory 

process untenable and demonstrate that effective emergency preparedness and evacuation 

plans will almost certainly not be in place in the event of a radiological emergency. For 

example, the NRC's conclusion that the ongoing regulatory process is adequate to protect 

people in the event of an emergency is premised, in part, on the assertion Section 1.7.3 of the 

Proposed GElS that "nuclear power plant owners, government agencies, and State and local 

officials work together to create a system for emergency preparedness and response that will 

serve the public in the unlikely event of an emergency." (emphasis supplied). The NRC also 

asserts that "each plant owner is required to exercise its emergency plan with the NRC, FEMA, 

and offsite authorities at least once every two years to ensure that State and local officials 
Appendix A 

 A-343 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

remain proficient in implementing their emergency plans." Id. at 1-11. Thus the Proposed GElS 

assumes that the licensee's emergency and evacuation plan will create a smooth integration of 

the various government agencies that would be involved in an emergency, and that a continuing 

testing of the efficacy of that integration between federal, State and local officials will be 

conducted. 

However, changes in the real world since the 1996 GElS wholly undermine the NRC's 

assumptions about the smooth interlocking of the various agencies involved during an 

emergency. For example, the Proposed GElS's assumption that plant owners, "government 

agencies and State and local officials work together to create a system for emergency 

preparedness” (Proposed GElS at 1-10) is clearly unwarranted; since 2003, the county 

governments of Westchester, Rockland, and Orange have refused to provide the annual 

certification for the emergency plans based on their concern that those plans are inadequate to 

protect the public and have refused to participate in exercises based on them. See, e.g., 

January 17, 2003 letter from E. Diana, Orange County Executive, to E. Jacoby, New York State 

Emergency Management Office, ML030350231. The NRC is thus left to rely on Executive 

Order No. 12657, signed by President Reagan in 1988, that applies "whenever State or local 

governments, either individually or together, decline or fail to prepare commercial nuclear power 

plant radiological emergency preparedness plans," and specifically requires that "FEMA shall 

substitute its own resources for those of the State and local governments only to the extent 

necessary to compensate for the nonparticipation or inadequate participation of those 

governments." Exec. Order No. 12657, Section 2(b)(2) (Nov. 18, 1988). 

However, the State and Federal Governments are not realistically in a position to step in and 

implement evacuation plans for the counties which are closest to the problem but have declined 

to participate or cooperate. Although FEMA may claim confidence in its ability to carry out an 

evacuation plan in the absence of local government cooperation, Hurricane Katrina exposed 

such judgments as risky and questionable. Even the White House's report on Katrina noted that 

"[w]ith respect to evacuation─fundamentally a State and local responsibility─the Hurricane 

Katrina experience demonstrates that the Federal government must be prepared to fulfill the 

mission if State and local efforts fail. Unfortunately, a lack of prior planning combined with poor 

operational coordination generated a weak Federal performance in supporting the evacuation ... 

" The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina − Lessons Learned, United States White House, 

Washington, D.C. (Feb. 2006) at 56. The potential failure of first responders and emergency 

professionals to respond to catastrophic emergencies in a timely way, and the possibility of 

panic ensuing from a fast breaking emergency scenario undermines the Executive Order's 

conclusion that the federal government will just get the evacuation 'job' done regardless of 

reality. See Declaration of Raymond C. Williams (Nov. 27, 2007) at ¶¶ 26, 28 ("Williams 

Decl.")(ML0734001931)(Ex. D). 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-344 

In fact, in the 1996 GElS, the NRC recognized that the "changing environment" in which a plant 

exists during the license renewal period, particularly an increase in the general population in the 

vicinity of a plant, can cause an increase in public risk as the plant continues to operate, 

"because the number of people that will need to be evacuated or otherwise protected from 

radiation exposure will increase. 1996 GElS at 5-11. As the NRC acknowledged in the 1996 

GElS, these "changing environment" impacts are "noncontrollable," and therefore their potential 

for increasing risk as well as the magnitude of any such increase in risk must be "specifically 

examined." 1996 GElS at 5-11. 

The NRC's attempt in the 1996 GElS to "specifically examine" the increased risk due to future 

population growth is flawed, as it relates to Indian Point. For example, the 1996 GElS purports 

to predict increases or decreases in accident consequences risks during a plant's relicensing 

term, in part by applying certain risk factors to population figures within the 50 mile radius at the 

middle year of the license renewal. 1996 GElS at 5-20 - 5-25. Table 5.3 of the 1996 GElS 

asserts that the population within the 50 mile radius of Indian Point in 2030, (the middle year of 

license renewal) will be 15,195,541 and the population in the highest frequency wind direction in 

the 50 mile radius will be 602,427. These population figures are substantially underestimated, 

considering that the 50 mile radius population in is already more than 17,000,000. See Edwin 

Lyman, Chernobyl on the Hudson? The Health and Economic Impacts of a Terrorist Attack at 

the Indian Point Nuclear Plant (2004) at 23 (extrapolating 2009 population from 2000 Census. 

data)(available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/ documents/nuclear_power/indianpointhealths 

tudy.pdf). Thus, the NRC's alleged continuing review of emergency preparedness and 

evacuation planning cannot be relied on, if the NRC is assuming a substantially smaller 

population in the vicinity of the plant in 2030 than actually exists in 2009 when a substantially 

larger population will likely exist in 2030 during the middle year of license renewal. 

In sum, the NRC's on-going oversight of emergency preparedness and evacuation plans for the 

EPZ of Indian Point has been wholly inadequate to ensure that the public is protected during a 

radiological emergency. Therefore, the effectiveness of the NRC-approved emergency plans 

must be considered in the NEPA analysis of the Indian Point license renewal application as a 

Category 2 site-specific issue. Indeed, because emergency evacuation is such a critical method 

of mitigating or avoiding the severe acute health impacts of radiation exposure, the 

effectiveness of emergency planning and evacuation must be considered in the NEPA analysis 

of all license renewal applications, not just Indian Point's, as a Category 2 issue because sitespecific conditions will predominate in devising effective evacuation plans. (NYS AG-14-8) 

Comment: I call for serious study regarding what can be termed a "multiple" emergency 

planning and evacuation scenario -- which obviously would consider various factors relating to 

evacuation scenarios as well. And, seeing that roads and other transportation arteries are 

different around each nuclear power facility, thus the issue should be deemed "Category 2." 

Some of the multiple scenarios within a limited time frame which must be thoroughly assessed 
Appendix A 

 A-345 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

are the combination of a sizable earthquake, serious nuclear accident, and damaged and thus 

difficult to access and successfully travel along evacuation routes. Another such scenario would 

involve a sizable earthquake, tsunami, and damaged and difficult to access evacuation routes. 

(Campbell-31-1) 

Comment: Emergency Response Planning: The NRC considered the need for a review of 

emergency planning issues in the context of license renewal and concluded that programs for 

emergency preparedness at nuclear plants apply to all licensees, that all operating licensees 

must keep up with changing demographics and other site-related factors (GElS, p. 1-11), and 

that there is therefore no need for a special review of emergency planning issues in the context 

of an environmental review for license renewal (GElS, p. 1-12). However, the public has 

expressed considerable concern about the adequacy of evacuation plans and emergency 

preparedness plans, particularly with regard to access to emergency routes in the event of an 

earthquake or terrorist attack. Although the NRC and utilities routinely conduct table-top 

exercises, people are concerned about the lack of real testing of these plans and whether such 

plans will work in an actual emergency. Some have expressed concern that the infrastructure is 

not adequate to evacuate large populations, such as the more than 12 million people who live 

within a 50-mile radius of SONGS. Another common concern is that evacuation routes might be 

blocked due to traffic congestion or damaged roads, for example, following a major earthquake. 

Clearly the population potentially impacted by the release of radioactive materials following an 

accident or attack on a nuclear power plant and the viability of emergency preparedness plans 

vary from plant to plant. As such, the NRC should include an evaluation of emergency planning 

as a Category 2, plant specific issue. (CEC-9(1)-6) 

Comment: Emergency Evacuation Impacts Not Considered: The Revised GElS clearly and 

unequivocally states that "NRC will not make a decision or any recommendation on the basis of 

information presented in this GElS regarding emergency preparedness at nuclear power plants." 

Revised GElS, Section 1.7.3. The Revised GElS states that existing emergency plans "cover 

preparations for evacuation, sheltering, and other actions to protect residents...." Id. The 

Revised GElS concludes that the Federal Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA") "has the 

lead in overseeing offsite planning and response...." ld. 

Under NEPA, a reviewing agency is required to consider the impact on the environment 

resulting from the total effects of the contemplated action and other past, present, and 

"reasonably foreseeable" future actions. See 40 C.F.R. 1508.7 (1990). Furthermore, NEPA 

mandates that federal agencies contemplating "major federal actions significantly affecting the 

quality of the human environment," 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), are obligated to include in the 

recommendation or report on the anticipated action an environmental impact statement ("EIS"), 

as "evidence that an agency has considered the reasonably foreseeable environmental effects 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-346 

of a proposed major action before making a decision to take the action." Town of Orangetown 

v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 29, 34 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984). 

To meet the mandates of NEPA, the Revised GElS must identify and discuss all anticipated 

adverse impacts in a clear and comprehensive fashion, including any adverse unavoidable 

environmental effects resulting from the implementation, alternatives to the proposed action, the 

relationship between short-term uses and the long-term maintenance of the environment, and 

any irretrievable commitments of resources involved in the proposed action. Such a detailed 

statement "insures the integrity of the agency process by forcing it to face those stubborn, 

difficult-to-answer objections without ignoring them or sweeping them under the rug" and serves 

as an "environmental full disclosure law so that the public can weigh a project's benefits against 

its environmental costs." Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs (Sierra Club II), 

772 F.2d 1043, 1049 (2d Cir. 1985); see also Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 

490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989). (CT AG-10-7) 

Comment: This Revised GElS contains no consideration of the larger scale impacts of an 

accident or attack on emergency evacuation or response. NEPA requires a consideration of all 

potential impacts from a proposed government project. Nowhere does NEPA allow an agency 

to decline to examine the environmental impacts of a project because some other agency may 

have a role. The emergency evacuation plan is a central and critical element of the NRC's 

reactor permit and regulatory program. Emergency response and evacuation plans will differ in 

certain respects based on local conditions. But many elements can and should be standardized 

in order to provide uniform and consistent national standards. For example, protocols for 

notifying state and local officials and the public can and should be standardized. Similarly, 

computer modeling of evacuation and emergency training and response procedures should be 

common to all power stations.10 Thus, the NRC's NEPA review of the potential impacts 

resulting from operation of nuclear reactors, and the spent fuel pools and dry cask storage 

facilities for an additional 20 years must include an analysis of the impacts of standardized 

elements of emergency response and evacuation for nuclear power stations. 

[

10 As an example, the Final Exercise Report, Oct. 24, 2004, (ML 050190165) regarding an emergency exercise at 

Indian Point noted that the evacuation order was given in English to Spanish-speaking residents near the power 

plant, Section 1.3, that inaccurate information was given to the public, Section 2.1, that government officials failed to 

communicate with each other, Section 2.3.1 and that, in one case, an automated telephone system was incomplete 

and radiation dose assessment personnel were not notified of the staged "accident." Section 2.4.1 These kinds of 

systemic errors and mistakes could happen at any facility across the country and the environmental consequences 

need to be evaluated and addressed.] 

This requirement is particularly important because an accident or attack at a nuclear power 

facility would cause not only a potential catastrophe for the local population, but would have far 

reaching downwind effects.11 As was demonstrated by the 1986 disaster at the Chernobyl 

nuclear power station in the Ukraine, not only are people in the immediate vicinity affected by a 
Appendix A 

 A-347 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

major release of radioisotopes, but so are vast areas at great distances potentially 

contaminated, creating disastrous public health and environmental consequences for 

communities many miles from the actual site. Further, these adverse impacts can continue for 

many years after the event. Consequently, NRC must evaluate the impacts to human health 

and safety and the environment of an immediate accident or attack on the entire potentially 

impacted downwind environment, as well as the collateral impacts of the long-term relocation of 

large numbers of displaced citizens who live in the immediate vicinity of an affected plant, as 

well as the potential millions more who live within the 50-mile radius, in the event of major 

downwind contamination.12

[

II Emergency planning for Indian Point, for example, includes plans covering both a 10-mile radius emergency 

planning zone ("EPZ") and a separate 50-mile radius ingestion pathway EPZ. The 50-mile radius EPZ includes 

substantial portions of the State of Connecticut, including its largest city, Bridgeport, and its most populous county, 

Fairfield. The immediate consequences of an evacuation order would affect approximately one-third of the population 

of Connecticut. In 2003, James Lee Witt, the former director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA), issued a report detailing the deficiencies in the emergency evacuation plan for the Indian Point EPZ. Mr. 

Witt concluded that safe evacuation of the area surrounding Indian Point is highly unlikely, if not impossible. James 

Lee Witt Associates, Review of Emergency Preparedness of Areas Adjacent to Indian Point and Millstone (2003).] 

[

12 Indian Point Independent Safety Evaluation, July 31. 2008, p.5.] (CT AG-10-8) 

Comment: Emergency Preparedness: The NRC will not make a decision or any 

recommendations on the basis of information presented in this GElS regarding emergency 

preparedness at nuclear power plants. Nuclear power plant owners, government agencies, and 

State and local officials work together to create a system for emergency preparedness and 

response that will serve the public in the unlikely event of an emergency. The emergency plans 

for nuclear power plants cover preparations for evacuation, sheltering, and other actions to 

protect residents near plants in the event of a serious incident. 

The public and the states are discovering new information that increases the foreseeability of 

simultaneous events such as earthquakes, hurricanes and floods and/or attacks on the reactor 

or waste storage sites, with attendant lack of access to emergency routes, or impacts of such 

simultaneous events upon emergency routes as well as offsite radioactive releases. The need 

to address multiple emergency scenarios should be considered in the NRC's GElS and in 

Emergency Planning proceedings. (A4NR-11-8) 

Comment: Failure to Require an Assessment of Emergency Preparedness: A fundamental 

flaw with the Revised GElS is the NRC's continued narrow scope of the environmental review 

which, inter alia, precludes assessment of emergency preparedness at nuclear power plants.47 

The NRC rationalizes that "[b]efore a plant is licensed to operate, the NRC must have 

reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a 

radiological emergency."48 The Revised GElS further explains how NRC's finding of reasonable 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-348 

assurance is founded upon compliance with NRC regulations and guidance, which require that 

nuclear power plant licensees routinely demonstrate effectiveness of their emergency plans.49

[

47 See id. at 1-10, 1-11 ("The NRC will not make a decision or any recommendations on the basis of information 

presented in this GElS regarding emergency preparedness at nuclear power plants.")] 

[

48 See id. at 1-11.] 

[

49 See id. 1-11.]

However, this reasoning is flawed since NRC's emergency preparedness regulatory scheme is 

inherently deficient, and, as such, reliance upon those regulations is misguided. Indeed, due to 

the purely procedural nature of the emergency planning standards found in 10 C.F.R. § 

50.47(b), which fail to set actual benchmarks for determining what constitutes a workable 

emergency plan, there is no guarantee that a particular plan would actually be effective in light 

of site-specific concerns.50

[

50 Riverkeeper explained at length the deficiencies of the emergency preparedness regulatory scheme in recent 

comments on a recent proposed update to the emergency planning regulations. See Riverkeeper's Comments on 

NRC's Proposed Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations (Oct. 19, 2009), ADAMS Accession No. 

ML093100527 (hereinafter "Riverkeeper EP Comments"). Riverkeeper provides these comments in further support 

of the comments made herein, for your consideration in the instant rulemaking proceeding, as Exhibit E.] 

This is starkly apparent when examining the situation at Indian Point. Of the nation’s 

commercial reactor sites, Indian Point, located just 24 miles north of New York City, (35 miles 

north of Times Square) tops the list as the nuclear power plant with the greatest population 

density within a 10-mile radius (at least 300,000) and 50-mile radius (approximately 20 million 

people).51 This represents nearly a doubling of the population since Indian Point's initial 

licensing. This high population density, coupled with the nature of the region's infrastructure 

(prone to severe congestion), present serious impediments to effective emergency evacuation. 

Indeed, a 2003 traffic study performed for Entergy by KLD Associates determined that 

evacuation times for the Emergency Planning Zone around Indian Point had doubled since 

1994. The original estimate was 2.5 hours for people to proceed with evacuation, with a total of 

5.5 hours for complete evacuation. KLD's 2003 estimates increased mobilization time to 4 

hours, while complete evacuation of the region in good weather conditions could take up to 

9.5 hours and in snow conditions up to 12 hours.52 Shadow evacuation, which is not adequately 

addressed by NRC emergency planning regulations and guidance, would further increase this 

time. Based on these evacuation time estimates, which apply only to the narrow 10-mile 

Emergency Planning Zone, it is clear that many residents could not be evacuated in time to 

avoid exposure to high doses of radiation under a traditional release scenario, much less a fastbreaking release. 

[

51 See, e.g., James Lee Witt Associates, LLC, Review of Emergency Preparedness of Areas Adjacent to Indian Point 

and Millstone (2003) (hereinafter "Witt Report") at 4, 81-82. The NRC has previously acknowledged that Indian Point 

has the "highest population within 10, 30 and 50 miles of any nuclear power plant in the U.S. At 50 miles, its 

population is more than double any other plant site." See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Consolidated Edison 
Appendix A 

 A-349 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Company of New York: Indian Point, Units 2 and 3, Memorandum and Order, January 8, 1981, at 6; see also Indian 

Point Draft Supplemental EIS" at Table 2-1.] 

[

52 Indian Point Energy Center Evacuation Time Estimate, Tbl. 1-1, p. 1-12, KLD Associates, Inc., 2003.] 

According to an independent analysis of Indian Point's emergency plan commissioned by 

former New York Governor George Pataki in 2003 and authored by former FEMA director 

James Lee Witt, the radiological emergency plan for Indian Point is badly flawed, unworkable 

and key components are unfixable. Witt found that "...the current radiological response system 

and capabilities are not adequate to...protect the people from an unacceptable dose of radiation 

in the event of a release from Indian Point...”53 Even the NRC has voiced concerns associated 

with the location of Indian Point: in 1979, Robert Ryan, the NRC's Director of the Office of State 

programs, stated "I think it is insane to have a three-unit reactor on the Hudson River in 

Westchester County, 40 miles from Times Square, 20 miles from the Bronx...[Indian Point is] 

one of the most inappropriate sites in existence.”54

And yet, due to the lack of enforceable standards, NRC consistently finds the requisite 

"reasonable assurance," in the Indian Point emergency plan, despite the glaring problems that 

would hinder effective evacuation at the facility. 

[

53 Witt Report at viii.] 

[

54 Report of the Office of the Chief Counsel on Emergency Preparedness to the President's Commission on the 

Accident at Three Mile Island, October 31, 1979, p. 5.] (Riverkeeper-20-12) 

Comment: Failure to Require an Assessment of Emergency Preparedness: The NRC's 

emergency preparedness regulations are further deficient because they fail to fully consider the 

effects of accidents or intentional attacks involving onsite nuclear waste. The likelihood for such 

a scenario is not insignificant given the vulnerabilities of such facilities, for example, those at 

Indian Point: the spent fuel pools at Indian Point are not housed under containment, but rather 

in non-reinforced cinderblock industrial buildings which are admittedly penetrable by aircraft; the 

dry casks in the Indian Point ISFSI are stored on an outdoor concrete pad, lined up in rows that 

are easily visible from the air and the Hudson River. Moreover, numerous reports indicate that 

nuclear power plants remain likely targets of terrorist attacks.55 The results of such an 

occurrence could potentially be catastrophic. For example, at Indian Point, an attack on the 

densely packed IP2 or IP3 spent fuel pools would result in contamination of a significant portion 

of the 10-mile emergency planning zone and the 50-mile ingestion pathway zone. A 2006 

National Academy of Sciences Study concluded that storage pools are susceptible to fire and 

radiological release from intentional attacks.56 The environmental impacts of a fire in a spent 

fuel pool may be severe, extending over a geographic area larger than a state's legal 

boundaries and continuing for decades.57 Federal government reports note that a radioactive 

release could begin in less than an hour. 

[

55 For example, a 2006 study by the National Academy of Sciences on security risks posed by the storage of spent 

fuel at nuclear plant sites, confirmed that attacks by civilian aircrafts remain a plausible threat. Nat'l Acad. Of 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-350 

Sciences., Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage: Public Report (2006) (hereinafter "2006 

NAS Study"). The study found that attacks on spent fuel pools are attractive targets since they are less protected 

structurally than reactor cores and typically contain much greater inventories of medium and long-lived radionuclides 

than reactor cores. Id.] 

[

56 See 2006 NAS Study at 49, 57.] 

[

57 See generally Gordon R. Thompson, "Risk Related Impacts from Continued Operation of the Indian Point Nuclear 

Power Plants" (Institute for Resource and Security Studies) (November 28, 2007) (hereinafter "Thompson Report"). 

Riverkeeper provides this report in further support of the comments made herein, for your consideration in the instant 

rulemaking proceeding, as Exhibit F.]

And yet, NRC's emergency preparedness scheme, including the pending proposed update, fails 

to adequately require that nuclear power plant licensees are capable of dealing with such 

severe radiological consequences.58 This simply further demonstrates how emergency plans 

may not provide the needed "reasonable assurance" that the public would be protected in the 

event of an emergency. 

[

58 See generally Riverkeeper EP Comments.] 

Therefore, it is clear that compliance with existing emergency preparedness regulations and 

guidance does not necessarily guarantee adequate emergency preparedness at nuclear power 

plants in light of all relevant factors. Indeed, the Revised GElS's statement that "[t]hrough its 

standards and required exercises, the Commission reviews existing emergency preparedness 

plans throughout the life of any facility, keeping up with changing demographics and other site 

related factors,”59 is utterly belied by the foregoing. The need to address emergency 

preparedness during the license renewal environmental review process, thus, quickly becomes 

apparent. 

[

59 See Revised GElS at 1-11.] 

This becomes even clearer when examining nuclear power plant siting regulations: were 

Entergy applying for a license to build a new nuclear power plant where Indian Point is now 

located, it is unlikely they would be allowed to do so, based on its proximity to such a highly 

populated area.60 The regulations for reactors built after 1997 require that every site must have 

an exclusion area and a low population zone.61 These regulations define low population zone 

as "the area immediately surrounding the exclusion area which contains residents, the total 

number and density of which are such that there is a reasonable probability that appropriate 

protective measures could be taken on their behalf in the event of a serious accident.”62 The 

regulations do not specify a permissible population density or total population within this zone 

because the situation may vary from case to case.63 The regulations go on to say whether a 

specific number of people can, for example, be evacuated from a specific area, or instructed to 

take shelter, on a timely basis will depend on many factors such as location, number and size of 

highways, scope and extent of advance planning, and actual distribution of residents within the 

area.64 As far as Indian Point is concerned, there is no low population zone, therefore if Entergy 
Appendix A 

 A-351 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

were applying to build a new nuclear power plant as opposed to a relicensing it would likely not 

be permitted. 

[

60 See 10 C.F.R. Pts. 100.3, 100.10(b), 100.11, & 100.21(h).] 

[

61 10 C.F.R. § 100.21(h).] 

[

62 10 C.F.R. § 50.2.] 

[

63 Id.] 

[

64 Id]. 

Therefore, if held to the same standard as a new nuclear power plant, an evaluation of 

emergency preparedness would likely preclude license approval. It defies logic to then exclude 

consideration of this issue in a license renewal review, given significant changes to the baseline 

environment upon which initial evaluations were made. The NRC cannot continue to hide 

behind a set of deficient regulations. The NRC should, thus, include emergency preparedness 

as a site-specific Category 2 issue for review, and require an assessment of all relevant 

concerns, including population changes, transportation/traffic issues, varying radiological 

consequences, etc. (Riverkeeper-20-13) 

Comment: B. Draft Incorrectly Determined That Emergency Planning & Safeguards Are 

Outside Review in License Renewal: 

1. Emergency Preparedness, a. NRC's Rationale Lacks Merit- Emergency Planning Deserves 

to be in Scope 

The Commission incorrectly determined that there is no need for a special review of emergency 

planning issues in the context of an environmental review for license renewal (NUREG-1850). It 

is outside the scope. 

The rationale provided in the Draft says the emergency plans for nuclear power plants cover 

preparations for evacuation, sheltering, and other actions to protect residents near plants in the 

event. Before a plant is licensed to operate, the NRC must have "reasonable assurance" that 

adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. 

Therefore, the Commission has determined that there is no need for a special review of 

emergency planning issues in the context of an environmental review for license renewal 

(NUREG-1850). In sum, decisions and recommendations concerning emergency preparedness 

at nuclear plants are ongoing and outside the regulatory scope of license renewal. 

PW finds NRC's position and rationale without merit. 

(1) The Draft says that, "Before a plant is licensed to operate, the NRC must have "reasonable 

assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a 

radiological emergency." However, as PW explained in Section 1 of this comment, "reasonable 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-352 

assurance" is a meaningless term because NRC never defines what level of proof − clear 

preponderance of the evidence presented – is required for there to be "reasonable assurance" −

51% or > than 90% certainty. Therefore, "reasonable assurance" is a meaningless term. 

(2) Local and State officials, at many sites, believe the plans won't work, along with the public. 

The reasons for their lack of confidence are explained below. The net effect is that the NRC's 

expressed confidence in planning further undermines the public's confidence in NRC and in this 

GElS process. 

(3) There are site specific differences in preparedness due, for example, to the size of the 

population in relation to available emergency response infrastructure and resources. 

Local and State officials, at many sites, believe the plans won't work, along with the public. It is 

reasonable to assume that County Leaders take annual certification of evacuation plans for 

Indian Point seriously, and therefore, refusal to certify the plan is quite significant. 

Examples: 

• Indian Point: Since 2003, the Counties of Westchester, Rockland, and Orange have 

refused to provide the annual certification for the emergency plans.14 

• Pilgrim: The Towns of Duxbury and Kingston Massachusetts have refused to certify the 

radiological plans and procedures for Pilgrim. In order to ascertain local responder's 

honest views it is necessary to have anonymous questionnaires because responders 

fear losing their jobs if they give the "wrong answer" and want to avoid missing out on 

additional pay provided. 

• Vermont Yankee: Through most of this decade, the towns of Brattleboro, Dummerston, 

Guilford, Halifax and Marlboro declined to certify the RERP. 

[

14 New York State Notice of Intention to Participate and Petition to Intervene, Contention 29, NRC Docket Nos. 50-

247-LR and 50-286-LR, November 30, 2007, at 267.] 

Public Believes Plans Won't Work: The State of New York's Attorney General's Office 

described in NYS's Motion to Intervene a survey to determine the opinion of local responders 

and officials around Indian Point. The survey was conducted by Ecology and Environment, Inc. 

for the New York State Emergency Management Office in July 2004 and February 2005 to 

provide a baseline, and again in July 2006 to determine changes. In 2004, 69 percent of 

respondents indicated that they would not follow advice from public authorities. The follow-on 

survey conducted in 2006 saw that number drastically increase to 91 percent. First responder 

intentions and attitudes found among the general populace work together15. NYS summarized 
Appendix A 

 A-353 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

their assessment and said that, "The population and transportation constraints unique to Indian 

Point likely will result in failure of the evacuation plan." 

[

15 Ibid, at 264, 267] 

Prior to the NYS Attorney General's filing, the Witt Report at Indian Point concluded that local 

responders and the public lacked confidence in the plan. 

More recently, public speakers at public meetings held during license renewal at Pilgrim, 

Vermont Yankee, Millstone, and Indian Point repeatedly stated that emergency plans would not 

work. For example: The Town of Plymouth's appointed Nuclear Affairs Committee's 

Recommendations to the Board of Selectmen, Town of Plymouth, January 2006 said that, "from 

many perspectives, it is clear that current evacuation plans, well-conceived and well-intended as 

they are, stand little chance of working in case of a rapidly evolving event." 

Sandia Survey − Methodologically Unsound: Despite the foregoing, NRC commissioned Sandia 

to determine how people will respond in a radiological disaster at a nuclear reactor, 2008. The 

results of the survey were published in NUREG/CR 6953. Vol. 2. The purpose of the study was 

to determine if people within the EPZs knew what to do in a radiological disaster at a nuclear 

reactor and whether they would implement protective actions if asked to do so. Generally the 

study concluded that respondents were well informed about what to do in an emergency and 

would follow directions. However, the study was methodologically weak and its results 

unreliable. 

What's wrong with the survey? Examples: 

• Sample Size: The telephone survey randomly administered to 821 households in 

communities located within 10 miles of nuclear power plants across the country. At that 

time 4,873,774 persons lived within the 10-mile EPZs of the 104 operating nuclear 

reactors. NRC received 800 replies to the survey that represents 

0.016414384417496586% of the EPZ populations of the 104 operating reactors – a not 

impressive sample. 

• Demographics of Survey Respondents: The report does not break down respondents by 

reactor site, only by Region. It is clear that the demographic characteristics and history 

surrounding each reactor will affect response. Surveys to be meaningful must be site 

specific. For example: James Lee Witt Associates analysis of preparedness and 

planning for Indian Point16, at 11.2.1.3, pointed out that each reactor site was unique; 

therefore each reactor should be surveyed and surveyed every two years in order to 

gain realistic expectations of public behavior. At Indian Point, "Having lost many lives in 

the 9/11 tragedy, they may be especially vulnerable to concerns about terrorism; 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-354 

accordingly, their behavior may be markedly different from what may be expected at 

other regions and locations." Also it is reasonable to expect that public behavior and 

attitudes living in EPZs will vary if the EPZs are located in sparsely populated versus 

more congested areas; areas with higher education levels versus less educated; and 

EPZs with larger transportation dependent populations. Further as the Witt Report 

pointed out, "The survey should not be confined to those within the 10 mile EPZ because 

there are significant health and safety issues related to public behaviors beyond that 

zone." 

[

16 Review of Emergency Preparedness of Areas Adjacent to Indian Point and Millstone James Lee Witt Associates, 

2003] 

Reasons why local/state officials, at many sites, and the public believe the plans won't work, 

examples17. 

[

17 See: Pilgrim Watch's October 19, 2009 Comments Regarding NRC 10 CFR Parts 50 and 52 RlN 3150-A110 

(NRC-2008-0122) Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations and to Pilgrim Watch's Comments 

Regarding Draft Released for Public Comment, May 18, 2009: Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological 

Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG 0654/FEMA-REP-1 

Supplement 4, October 18, 2009] 

• Planning is based on false assumptions: 

The biological impact and amount of radiation likely to be released is minimized 

in planning. PAGS are not based on BEIR VII; plans ignore releases from large 

accidents-e.g., spent fuel pool fires; accident interaction between the pool and 

reactor; and TMI releases continue to be misrepresented. 

The Affected Area: Airborne emissions are assumed to only affect 2 miles 

around the site, and a "key hole" from 2-10 miles. This is wrong because it is 

based on a simplistic straight-line Gaussian plume model not suited for complex 

sites. It is non-temporal and non-spatial. Local officials and the public know that 

advanced variable models are needed along with met towers placed off site in 

surrounding communities to provide real-time data. 

Dispersion: The plans assume that airborne radioactive releases rapidly 

disperse to "safe" levels, limiting the EPZ to 10-miles when the impact is likely to 

be much larger. This is because we know that local meteorology/geography 

(e.g., sea breeze, plume concentration as it travels over water, gravity drainage, 

stagnations and reversals − are likely to contain, not disperse, a plume. 
Appendix A 

 A-355 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

• Notification, sirens primary system: Notification is a key component in emergency 

preparedness and planning. Sirens are essentially simply outdoor warning systems, we 

do not sleep or many do not work outside; worse backup power is not required. This 

does not provide reasonable assurance. The public knows that redundancy is required, 

such as requiring rapid dialing systems, electronic roadside signboards etc. Emergency 

responders often lack compatible communications equipment. 

• Evacuation Time Estimates: ETE's are not currently required to be updated. The 

proposed change to require updates does not include important variables such as an 

increase in the percent of children (transportation dependent), changes in the 

infrastructure and shadow evacuation. of ETE's prepared by KLD are based on "best 

case scenarios, e.g., not peak traffic periods. 

• Reception Centers: are not equipped to monitor 100% of the population within 12 hours 

as required by NUREG 0654, J-12; instead they are only required to service 20 percent 

of the population. 

• Biennial Exercises: Exercises are predictable and do not reflect a wide range of 

challenging events that can occur such as: fast breaking events; infrastructure failures, 

such as LOOPs, damage to evacuation routes, attack on another reactor impacting the 

state; exercises held in the evenings, during holidays, and announced; exercises 

involving the ingestion pathway. Exercises do not all require progression to a General 

Emergency so that offsite response is tested. 

b. Emergency Planning − Category 2 Issue: Site specific variables affect emergency 

planning. For example new information regarding local demographic characteristics and 

egress routes would affect environmental impacts. These deserve an opportunity for 

hearing. (PW-6-19) 

Response: Emergency preparedness and planning are part of the current operating license 

and are outside the scope of the environmental analysis for license renewal. Emergency 

preparedness programs are required at all nuclear power plants and require specified levels of 

protection from each licensee regardless of plant design, construction, or license date. 

Requirements related to emergency planning are in the regulations at 10 CFR 50.47 and 

Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. These requirements apply to all operating licenses and will 

continue to apply to facilities with renewed licenses. The NRC has regulations in place to 

ensure that existing emergency preparedness plans are updated throughout the life of all plants. 

For example, nuclear power plant operators are required to update their evacuation time 

estimates after every U.S. Census, or when changes in population would increase the estimate 

by either 25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is less. Additionally, the NRC assesses the 

capabilities of the nuclear power plant operator to protect the public by requiring the 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-356 

performance of a full-scale exercise—that includes the participation of various Federal, State, 

and local government agencies—at least once every two years. These exercises are performed 

in order to maintain the skills of the emergency responders and to identify and correct 

weaknesses. Within the context of license renewal, the Commission considered the need for a 

review of emergency planning issues during the 1991 rulemaking proceedings on 10 CFR 

Part 54, which included public notice and comment. As discussed in the statement of 

consideration for rulemaking (56 FR 64943, 64966-67; December 13, 1991), the programs for 

emergency preparedness at nuclear power facilities apply to all nuclear power facility licensees 

and require the specified levels of protection from each licensee regardless of plant design, 

construction, or license date. As a result, the Commission determined that, “[t]here is no need 

for a licensing review of emergency planning issues in the context of license renewal” 

(56 FR 64966-67). 

Where the comments deal with standards for new nuclear power plants, the NRC believes that 

its safeguards and security requirements for operating licenses are comprehensive and robust 

to assure continued safe operation. The safe operation of nuclear power plants is not limited to 

license renewal but is dealt with on an ongoing basis as a part of the current operating licenses. 

Safety issues and concerns are addressed by the NRC on an ongoing basis at every nuclear 

power plant. Safety inspections are and will be conducted throughout the operating life of the 

plant, whether during the original or renewed operating license term. If safety issues are 

discovered at a nuclear power plant, they are addressed immediately, and any necessary 

changes are incorporated into the current operating license. As such, the regulatory safety 

oversight operating reactors is ongoing and outside the regulatory scope of license renewal. 

No change was made to the GEIS as a result of this comment. 

Economics and Need for Power 

Comment: We were asking that these most important considerations on the list and so forth 

not only be retained in the area of public participation because that's the most important thing to 

most of us right now. Is that we have the transparency and the -- what's the word? 

Accountability. We have to get accountability now on the money thing because that was kind of 

a joke. Somebody said about -- what about the billion -- millions of dollars that they're putting in 

their pockets there on this? 

But, it isn't. Because when the California Public Utilities Commission was deliberating this, they 

asked specific things from Edison. What the money was going to buy and they asked to have a 

list of what remuneration was for the top levels of the administration and the owners and so forth 

and Edison declined to provide it. Declined to provide it. 
Appendix A 

 A-357 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

And to me, that one fact was just final proof that our California Public Utilities Commission 

wasn't in charge. They weren't running it. They had to let that go because in all levels of our 

Government the people who are running it and making the decisions and giving themselves the 

money make sure they have the laws with them before they do it. They make it so that they 

didn't break any law. Okay. So, I think we have to pursue that right away. 

But, what I needed to say here is that we want these things to be made prerequisites for the 

ability of Edison or any other in the country to put our money into making their 600-page 

documents and in this hearing, in the testimony that was given on this, Edison's asked for four 

years of money to put together that document and you know that it's the same pattern on the 

national level. Coming into Congress with a bill like that. A lot of times they don't even have time 

to read it. 

Well, in this case, the Division of Ratepayer Advocates didn't have time to look into it enough 

that they could protect us and they know it and we know it. 

But, anyway, if it were a prerequisite, we wouldn't be giving 4.4 million of our money to Edison 

to make us live under the terrible stress on our minds. I live two miles from that plant. That we 

live on all these years. That they're making us pay so that they can put the information on the 

paper enough that they can get it through and if we aren't pretty active, they'll get it through 

because they're in charge. They're running it. 

Okay. So, the prerequisite. If a few good people here who have anything to say about it at all 

can get that in there, any of these things, the prerequisites and I'm not even going to read them. 

But, we have five here that we've suggested. (DPCA-CREED4-47) 

Comment: And we studied -- the League studied energy two or three years ago and we found 

it extremely complex and that's kind of how I would like to begin my comments. 

I think it's pretty hard for most residents to understand energy and all the complexities of it. 

I have a letter that the Mayor of San Clemente wrote to CPUC Commissioner and it talks about 

being grateful for having workshops in San Clemente, but how little they felt informed at the end. 

That they didn’t feel that they really had a good understanding of what they needed to know and 

I feel that transparency is part of the problem. 

I don't understand the budget process. I'm not sure how many of you understand the budget 

process, but I would like to know how these things are factored in. One other gentleman tonight 

mentioned those. I don't understand the cost of delivery for our electricity. I don't know what is 

factored in. I don't know if the storage of waste is. If the security and the -- I did go to one of 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-358 

the NRC meetings where they had teams from different agencies coming up and reporting on 

their activities and their plans. I don't know if that's factored in. 

I would like to know how much the CEOs of Edison make. I just -- I would like to know the 

mitigating costs of the reef. I believe it was, somebody can probably correct me, 500 million or 

something to build the reef off of our coastline here very close to us and I don't know whether 

that's factored in and I don't know whether the problem that caused it has been fixed. That is a 

concern I'm sure. 

These are things that I bring up as comments because they're things that I'm not sure of and I 

think most of us would like to know a little bit more about that. (DPCA-Exelby-28)

Comment: I have given the Nuclear Regulatory Commission people here copies of article and 

I’d like to just add a few words. 

If one considers the cost of the whole nuclear fuel cycle from the mining of uranium to the 

thousands of years of waste storage, it becomes obvious that nuclear power is the most 

expensive, uses the most fossil fuel to produce and store and is the most polluting and most 

dangerous of possible energy sources. 

I get information to verify this from a report of Dr. Helen Caldicott which I gave a copy to some 

of you. (DPCA-UNASFV-2) 

Comment: Helen Caldicott, J. W. Storm Van Leone and Philip Smith are three of the few 

scientists who have analyzed the balance between the amount of fossil fuel energy needed to 

produce the nuclear energy fuel cycle for one 10,000 megawatt nuclear reactor. It may be 

impossible for most laymen to consider a petro joule of energy, one million billion joules and the 

several hundred of petro joules of fossil fuels needed for the nuclear fuel cycle, but it is not 

impossible to accept the obvious concept that it takes more fossil fuel expenditures for one 

reactor than the reactor can produce in its lifetime. 

Dr. Caldicott reports that it takes 162 tons of natural uranium each year from the most 

productive ore in sandstone and shales for one nuclear plant. If the uranium is from granite ore, 

40 million tons must be mined or 80 million tons after providing for chemical treatment of the 

ore. The extraction of uranium from this granite rock would consume over 30 times the energy 

generated from the uranium. 

Uranium is in short supply. If all electricity worldwide were to be generated from nuclear power, 

all the uranium would last nine years. In the case, uranium from high-grade ore would last three 

years. 
Appendix A 

 A-359 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

In addition to the truth of negative energy from nuclear power after using fossil fuels to produce 

it, the monetary costs have not been honestly reported. What is the cost to the public of the 13 

billion in subsidies in the 2005 energy bill? What is the cost of the stranded investments paid by 

customers of nuclear energy when a plant lasts only 28 of the promised 40 years of life and then 

they pay again to rebuild such plants as San Onofre 1 and 2? 

What does the price -- Anderson Insurance Companies, what do they protect from loss from the 

cost to taxpayers? How much do taxpayers pay for Homeland Security which has done little or 

nothing to secure the existing 103 nuclear plants? What are the medical costs for the hundreds 

of individuals who have contracted cancer, leukemia and injured DNA from the operation and 

accidents of nuclear plants especially Three Mile Island, Simi Valley and Idaho Lab S1? 

(DPCA-Scott-11) 

Response: The regulatory authority over licensee economics, including utility employee 

compensation and rates charged to consumers, falls within the jurisdiction of the States and, to 

some extent, the FERC, and is therefore outside the scope of the license renewal environmental 

review. NRC regulation 10 CFR 51.95(c)(2) states: 

The supplemental environmental impact statement for license renewal is not 

required to include discussion of the need for power or the economic costs and 

economic benefits of the proposed action except insofar as such benefits and 

costs are either essential for a determination regarding the inclusion of an 

alternative in the range of alternatives considered or relevant to mitigation. 

CEO salary information of publicly traded corporations should be disclosed in their annual 

reports, and costs included in the rate base for electricity generation should be available from 

State or Federal regulatory rate-making authorities. No change was made to the GEIS as a 

result of this comment.

Comment: The other thing is the financial status of people when they apply to the NRC for 

things. We had PG&E applying for being able to have dry cask storage at the time they were 

going to be filing for bankruptcy. It didn't really make sense. (PBCA-Pinard-21) 

Response: The financial qualifications of a license renewal applicant to safely operate the 

plant is outside the regulatory scope of the GEIS because the financial qualifications are 

considered as part of NRC’s oversight of all power plant licensees whether or not they have 

applied for license renewal. An applicant to construct and operate a nuclear power plant must 

demonstrate its financial qualifications at the time of initial licensing. 

The NRC does not systematically review the financial qualifications of power reactor licensees 

once it has issued an operating license, other than for transfers under 10 CFR 50.80. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-360 

No change was made to the GEIS in response to this comment.

Comment: And so I will not take any time to add to the comments specifically relating to these 

issues of concern with the GElS, except to say that there's one very interesting paragraph in the 

GElS, and I say it's an interesting paragraph because of the many things we think the NRC is 

not giving us, and I point to those people who look at the things they do give. 

Here's one that we found of particular interest. Section S1 from the Generic Environmental 

Impact Statement. And it goes like this. 

"Unless there are findings in the safety or the environmental reviews that would lead the NRC to 

reject a license renewal application -- I will add, parenthetically, no license renewal application 

has ever been rejected, to date, close parentheses. Back to the document. 

"The NRC has no role in energy-planning decisions. State regulatory agencies, system 

operators, power plant owners, and, in some cases, other federal agencies, ultimately decide 

whether the plant should continue to operate." 

A very important paragraph and clause. In other words, all the very important comments made 

about this document here tonight may be moot, and irrelevant, if the state decides, in advance 

of PG&E's application, that the state does not find it in the ratepayer's best interest, that the 

state does not find it economic, or, in terms of reliability, reliable to rely on nuclear power 

20 years hence. 

The state Public Utilities Commission, and the state Energy Commission, can simply decide that 

the utility shall not be allowed to relicense the plant. Therefore, the concerns of this Generic 

Environmental Impact Statement, and even the required subsequent visits of the members of 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to our state and county would be completely irrelevant and 

unnecessary. (PBCA-Weisman-22) 

Response: The commenter is correct that, although a licensee must renew its license to 

operate a reactor beyond the term of the existing license, the possession of a renewed license 

is just one of a number of conditions that must be met to continue operation. This is because 

the NRC does not have a role in the energy-planning decisions of State regulators and licensee 

officials. Once a license is renewed, other factors and entities such as State regulatory 

agencies and the owners of the nuclear power facility will ultimately decide whether the facility 

will continue to operate. This final decision will be based on economics, energy reliability goals, 

and other objectives over which the other entities may have jurisdiction. Moreover, given the 

absence of the NRC’s authority in the general area of energy planning, the NRC’s identification 

of a superior alternative does not guarantee that such an alternative will be used. See the 
Appendix A 

 A-361 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

response to comment ANR-11-13 for additional discussion. No change was made to the GEIS 

in response to this comment.

Comment: The need for power is not the NRC's mandate. Regulating nuclear power and 

protecting the publics' health and safety are its mandate. As appear to be indicated in the 

language of this section, there should be no consideration of need for power in the GElS or any 

other NRC decision this is a state decision. (A4NR-11-10) 

Comment: GElS Should Not Exclude Need for Power: The California Public Utilities 

Commission (CPUC) is in the process of determining whether or not continued reliance on 

nuclear energy is in the best economic interests of the people of California. PG&E's decision to 

apply for license extensions 15 years in advance of the expiration of the current licenses raises 

questions regarding its intentions toward the coming CPUC conclusion. 

Again, the GElS excludes the issue of the need for power. Before asking ratepayers to further 

invest in the continued operation of a nuclear facility, the NRC must require data-driven answers 

to the question of cost vs. benefit. This must be a Category 2 issue. (SLOMFP-13-3) 

Response: The need for power is outside the scope of the GEIS. As stated in GEIS 

Section 1.7.5, the NRC will not make a decision or any recommendations on the basis of 

information presented in this GEIS regarding the need for power at nuclear power plants. The 

NRC regulates the civilian use of radioactive materials; it does not promote their use. As such, 

the purpose and need for the proposed action (i.e., license renewal) has been defined in the 

revised GEIS as follows: 

The purpose and need for the proposed action (renewal of an operating license) is to provide an 

option that allows for power generation capability beyond the term of a current nuclear power 

plant operating license to meet future system generating needs, as such needs may be 

determined by State, licensee, and, where authorized, Federal (other than NRC) decision 

makers. 

10 CFR Part 51.95(c)(2) states: 

The supplemental environmental impact statement (SEIS) for license renewal is 

not required to include discussion of need for power or the economic costs and 

economic benefits of the proposed action or of alternatives to the proposed 

action except insofar as such benefits and costs are either essential for a 

determination regarding the inclusion of an alternative in the range of alternatives 

considered or relevant to mitigation. 

No change was made to the GEIS as a result of this comment.
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-362 

Comment: Someone needs to point out that we are failing. We're failing on many levels. Let 

me give you your report card to the nuclear industry, the NRC, and nuclear technology, in 

general. 

Insurance and risk management. F minus. Worse than F here. PG&E filed for bankruptcy. 

They're down the road. We're left "high and dry." This happened already, as an example, a few 

years ago. There is no insurance provision to cover losses from a catastrophe at Diablo, and if 

we became Chernobylized, what would that -- how would that play out? 

That means we may lose our homes, our community, our dreams, and PG&E and the 

U.S. Government get to walk away without paying for their mistakes. (PBCA-Biesek-45) 

Response: The financial qualifications of license renewal applicants are outside the regulatory 

scope of the GEIS. See the response to comment PBCA-PINARD-21 for additional information 

about financial qualifications. 

Costs associated with nuclear incidents are governed by the Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries 

Indemnity Act (Price-Anderson Act; 42 USC 2210). The Price-Anderson Act is a Federal law 

that governs liability-related issues for all nonmilitary nuclear facilities constructed in the United 

States before 2026. The main purpose of the Act is to provide prompt and orderly 

compensation to the public who may incur damages from a nuclear incident, no matter who 

might be liable. 

The Act provides “omnibus” coverage—the same protection available for a covered licensee or 

contractor indemnifies any persons who may be legally liable, regardless of their identity or 

relationship to the licensed activity. Because the Act channels the obligation to pay 

compensation for damages to the licensee, any party with a claim only needs to bring its claim 

to the licensee or contractor. 

Power reactor licensees are required to have the maximum level of primary insurance available 

from private sources (currently $375 million) and are also required to participate in a Secondary 

Financial Protection. Under this program, should an accident at any participating power reactor 

result in injury or damage in excess of the $375 million layer, all power reactor operators will be 

charged a retrospective premium, up to a maximum of $111,900,000 per reactor per incident. 

These insurance levels are subject to adjustments due to inflation at five-year intervals. The 

last adjustment was made in August 2009. 

There currently are 104 power reactors that participate in the Secondary Financial Protection 

program, creating a combined level of protection under both the primary and secondary layers 

of approximately $12 billion. 
Appendix A 

 A-363 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

In the event of a nuclear incident involving damages in excess of the limits established in the 

Act, Price Anderson does include a specific provision that obligates Congress to take 

appropriate action to assure full compensation for all unresolved public liability claims. 

Aging Management 

Comment: Section 2 – Procedural Issues: A. Public Involvement & Input Restricted –

Recommended: The Honorable Gregory Jaczko's said in a speech entitled, "A Regulator's 

Perspective on New Nuclear Reactor License Applications," September 24, 2009 that, “NRC is 

built upon a solid foundation of a talented workforce dedicated to the safety and security mission 

of the agency, and guided by sound safety regulations. This solid foundation is strengthened by 

public involvement and input, and by our being open and transparent about what we do and 

why. I am confident that we can successfully meet these challenges in an effective way, with 

safety at the heart of our decisions. “[Emphasis added] 

5. Commitments: NRC has "resolved" issues brought forward in license renewal 

proceedings by issuing commitments. The Cumulative Usage Factor (CUF) is an 

example brought forward at Vermont Yankee, Oyster Creek, Indian Point and Pilgrim's 

proceedings. Unless commitments are resolved prior to granting a license to Renew, 

the public has no ability to review the Applicant's actions in regard to the commitments 

and issue a timely response. In order for NRC to comply with Chairman Jaczko's wise 

counsel that NRC staff "is strengthened by public involvement and input, and by our 

being open and transparent about what we do and why" ─ all commitments must be 

resolved first before a license renewal is issued. (PW-6-25) 

Response: Applicant commitments made with regard to safety matters such as CUF, 

“cumulative usage factor,” a concept associated with the fatigue analyses of certain 

components, are addressed in the license renewal safety review and are outside the scope of 

the environmental review for license renewal. Renewed licenses are typically issued several 

years or more before the period of extended operation (the time after the original operating 

license would have expired) begins. During the safety review of a license renewal, it is not 

uncommon for the applicant to make commitments to the NRC that it will implement required 

aging management or maintenance programs, procedures, inspections, or reviews prior to 

entering the period of extended operation or by a specified date. Since the renewed license is 

issued some time before the period of extended operation begins, it is not necessary that all of 

the applicant’s commitments be implemented at the time the renewed license is issued. 

However, prior to entering the period of operation, the NRC performs an inspection to verify that 

any license conditions that were added to the renewed license, such as requiring the licensee to 

update its FSAR, or specific testing requirements deemed necessary for license renewal, 

commitments made by applicants during the license renewal process, selected aging 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-364 

management programs, and license renewal commitments revised after the renewed license 

was granted, are implemented in accordance with 10 CFR Part 54. No change was made to the 

GEIS in response to this comment. 

Comment: The GEIS fails to account for the added radioactivity and added stress on the 

facility and its components due to extending the operating license for a nuclear reactor. Plus, 

the destination of all spent fuel, mixed waste, low-level waste, and other kinds must be clear in 

order to have a reputable and thorough environmental impact statement on this long-lived issue. 

(Campbell-31-22) 

Comment: Seeing that there is deterioration of the equipment of a nuclear power facility during 

its operation, seeing that there is already serious refurbishing and replacement of components 

(sometimes replaced by substandard or even counterfeit equipment) of such facilities even a 

decade before the expiration of some of their operating licenses, and seeing that imperfect 

humans operate such facilities, please explain the logic which would renew operating licenses 

for nuclear power facilities since there seem to be increasing problems when there is aging of 

components at nuclear power facilities? (Campbell-31-13) 

Comment: "Current regulations require a licensee to demonstrate that reactor pressure vessel 

embrittlement does not exceed a screening limit corresponding to a 1 in 200,000 year 

probability of a through-wall crack formation.” 

NRC has a proposed new regulation which would expand this requirement to a one in a million 

year probability, but would allow for use of a less conservative methodology for assessing that 

probability. 

The NRC reports that under current methodology, ten reactors, including Diablo Canyon Unit 1, 

are likely to exceed the screening limit during the course of a 20 years license renewal, and 

therefore, would not be eligible for license renewal unless they could reduce the embrittlement 

rate, or demonstrate that operating the reactor would not pose any undue public risk. Wow! 

When were we going to find out about that? 

So, in other words, if it won't make it for a 20 year relicense, you don't make it safer, you just 

change the standard, which so far apparently has been good, and was good enough to apply to 

all these other reactors. (PBCA-Weisman-23) 
Appendix A 

 A-365 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Comment: Aging Plant Issues: The draft GElS appropriately requires licensees to have aging 

management programs for plant components, but it neglects to describe how these programs 

will be evaluated and how quality assurance programs will be maintained. In the license 

renewal proceeding for the Pilgrim Nuclear Station the NRC judged the adequacy of the plant's 

Aging Management Program simply on whether it provided "reasonable assurance" that the 

components would perform the functions outlined in 10 C.F.R. Section 54.4(a)(1)−(3). This 

standard is insufficient to ensure reactor safety over a 20-year license renewal period. For 

example, the problem of substandard or counterfeit plant replacement parts should be 

addressed within a plant's aging management plans. SONGS faced such a problem with its 

new steam generator, which had defective welds. Aging management plans should include 

plans for guarding against the procurement of substandard or counterfeit parts and for detailed 

inspections of all new parts. 

In addition, as we enter an era of large numbers of aging and refurbished nuclear power plants, 

it is important that the NRC begin developing additional proactive methods for identifying agerelated safety problems before they become significant. In license renewal application 

proceedings, individual plants should be evaluated in detail for aging issues and trends to 

identify preliminary or potential "anticipatory indicators" of safety problems related to plant 

aging. Trends could include steam generator tube cracking, vessel head corrosion, 

embrittlement, repeated unplanned reactor shutdowns, long-term problems, and/or repeated 

failures in safety-related equipment. These issues must be considered Category 2 issues and 

evaluated on a plant-specific basis. 

In the case of California reactors, which are located in seismically active regions, the combined 

effects of age-related degradation and the risk and potential impacts of an earthquake should be 

evaluated. For example, earthquakes are considered possible initiating events for the 

development of through-wall cracks that could challenge the integrity of a reactor pressure 

vessel. In addition, the cumulative effects of marine salt spray corrosion should be evaluated 

for coastal plants, such as California's nuclear power plants. 

Given the plant-specific nature of these issues, age-related plant degradation issues must be 

reconsidered as Category 2 plant-specific items in site-specific license extension proceedings. 

(CEC-9(1)-5) 

Comment: The most dangerous times for any nuclear power plant are: Initial start-up or during 

a restart, and during a shut-down, especially an emergency shut-down. 

Three Mile Island Unit II, for instance, had been in commercial operation for less than three 

months when it partially melted down. It was only slightly different from, slightly more powerful 

than, Unit 1, which, today, was relicensed by the same careless Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission we seek redress from today as well – for another 20 years – until April 19, 2034. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-366 

Some of Three Mile Island Unit l's parts will be 60 years old when it is finally "retired"- irradiated, 

thermally heated, pressurized, chemically embrittled, and cycled on and off hundreds or even 

thousands of times. 

The Emergency Core Cooling Systems, mandatory for all commercial reactors, have never 

actually been tested, and many scientists have asserted that their calculations have indicated 

the ECCSs may not work when needed. Not only that, but several ECCSs, such as 

Monticello's, were found to be completely inoperative several decades after installation, and 

would definitely not have worked. Control rods have jammed, fuel rods have been bent, 

plutonium has escaped... and one reactor, Davis-Besse, nearly corroded all the way through 

before anyone noticed! Except maybe the filter salesman. 

Many of San Onofre's sea-encrusted, rusted, dilapidated parts will be 60 years old, too, if it 

makes it to retirement age. 

And with all the NEW parts they are installing at San Onofre right now – miles of pipes, dozens 

of pumps, scores of valves, hundreds of new sensors, drum after drum of electrical cables – 

there will be new pressures and fluid flows throughout the system, new control mechanisms, 

and even relatively new, or completely new, operators. People quite a bit younger than the 

plant itself, who don't know how hard people fought to stop it in the first place. Who don't know 

that almost all our fears have ALREADY been realized, from cancers in the community because 

of the plant, to fraud at the plant, to piling nuclear waste problems, to threats of terrorism. Yes, 

it was all foreseen. 

Right now, one by one, each of San Onofre's two remaining operable reactors are being rebuilt, 

top to bottom. That is, pieces of them are being replaced, top to bottom (even the fog lights, 

and certainly the sump pumps). But despite the retrofit, vastly more pieces are never being 

touched, never even being inspected. 

How much inspection can such a small crew as the NRC leaves "'on site" really do? There is 

only one inspector for every couple of hundred workers. 

Furthermore, a climate of cover-up still exists at the plant, according to whistleblowers this 

author has talked to. And no doubt no one from The Shaw Group wants to expose their 

mistakes, since they are all new at the site and the last group o[f] operators – Bechtel and their 

subcontractors – were fired en masse after about 40 years of running the most dangerous thing 

on earth, on August 30th, 2009. 

During the retrofit – a different division of Bechtel is doing that work – the danger is probably a 

lot less than during an average day the plant is running. Criticality is not occurring at the shutdown reactor. Water isn't screaming through the system at enormous velocities and pressures. 
Appendix A 

 A-367 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Lazy, sleepy operators on mood-altering cardiac beta blockers for health problems due to sitting 

all day long aren't using inaccurate and faulty instrumentation to monitor the whole thing and 

stop it from melting down. 

So I'm less scared when the plant is shut down than at any other time. But the restart AFTER 

this major retrofit will be an especially dangerous time. 

And then, the continued operation of the plant for 20 more years may well spell doom for SoCal 

at some point – for any of a million different reasons. The old welds might start failing, let alone 

all the new ones that weren't done right, or were done right in Japan or elsewhere in the world, 

but didn't get shipped properly to America, or broke during installation. And nobody reported 

anything, because of the climate of cover-up. 

During the actual retrofit, at least the reactor that is being refitted is not increasing the quantity 

of spent fuel with nowhere to put it by an average of 250 pounds per day per reactor, as 

happens each day the reactor is operating (500 lbs per day for San Onofre altogether, when 

both reactors are running). That's in addition to the tritium which is released and poorly tracked, 

and the hundreds of pounds per year of noble gases which are not tracked or stopped in any 

way at all, and the daily releases of radioactive isotopes of all known elements, in varying 

quantities, as allowed by ALARA. (Hoffman-30-1) 

Comment: At minimum, all underground pipes and tanks should be inspected and their 

condition verified. AII capsules implanted in reactor vessel walls to indicate embrittlement 

should be pulled and evaluated before relicensing proceeds. (Shaw-15-4) 

Comment: And then also San Onofre also needs to be considered unique in that I understand, 

I'm not too enthused about replacing the steam generators here, and what they're doing to the 

facility, but San Onofre apparently have to open up the entire reactor vessel and sort of put 

caulking on it or whatever to – it’ll be safe, you can be assured. (PBCA-Campbell-34) 

Response: The NRC's environmental review for license renewal is confined to environmental 

impacts associated with the extended period of operation for nuclear power plants. These 

comments which concern aging management issues provide no specific information about 

environmental issues or the environmental review, and are, therefore, outside the scope of the 

environmental review. 

As part of the license renewal process, the NRC performs a safety review to determine whether 

there is reasonable assurance that activities authorized by the renewed license will continue to 

be conducted in accordance with the current licensing basis (CLB). The CLB is the particular 

set of NRC requirements applicable to a licensed operating nuclear power facility. The CLB 

includes the applicant’s written regulatory commitments for ensuring compliance with and 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-368 

operation within the applicable NRC requirements and the plant-specific design basis. See 

response to A4NR-11-4 for a detailed list of what the CLB includes. The intent of the NRC’s 

safety review is to determine if the applicant has adequately demonstrated that the effects of 

aging will not adversely affect any systems, structures, or components, as identified in 

10 CFR 54.4. When the plant was designed, certain assumptions were made about the length 

of time the plant would be operated. During the renewal process, the applicant must also 

confirm whether these design assumptions will continue to be valid throughout the period of 

extended operation or whether aging effects will be adequately managed. The applicant must 

demonstrate that the effects of aging will be managed in such a way that the intended functions 

of “passive” and “long-lived” structures and components (such as the reactor vessel, reactor 

coolant system, piping, steam generators, pressurizer, pump casings, and valves) will be 

maintained during extended operation. For active components (such as motors, diesel 

generators, cooling fans, batteries, relays, and switches), surveillance and maintenance 

programs will continue throughout the period of extended operation. 

If additional aging management activities are needed, the applicant may be required to establish 

new monitoring programs or increase inspections. For instance, applicants should specify 

activities that need to be performed (such as water chemistry and inspections) to prevent and 

mitigate age-related degradation. These activities increase the likelihood that the program will 

be effective in minimizing degradation and that a component is replaced if specified thresholds 

are exceeded. No change was made to the GEIS as a result of these comments.

Comment: The General Accountability Office has documented the widespread use of 

counterfeit and substandard parts in nuclear reactors. That's a problem and something to be 

concerned about. 

At one of the Diablo Canyon independent safety committee meetings, Per Peterson, one of the 

commissioners, said to this effect, that having an old power plant is like driving an old car. That 

it drives but it doesn't have any airbags and it's not as safe. 

And this means that there's old parts in there. One of the things I'm concerned about are the 

aging parts, and we don't know how many are in there. This is one that was discovered 

because there was a problem. This is a buried firewater pipe break. You can see how corroded 

and horrible it looks. 

When I asked how many more are down there, they said we don't know, and we won't know 

until one of them has a problem. If we have one, we know that there are more. 

The other disturbing picture that I have is the damage to a corner spent fuel rod, and basically 

they didn't know what the root cause analysis was. They only had a probable cause which was 
Appendix A 

 A-369 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

debris fretting, which means that debris was floating around there but they don't know what 

debris. That's pretty disturbing also.

So the escalating potential for accidents in aging reactors has received nationwide attention, 

and derogatory audits from the NRC's own Office of Inspector General. 

The General Accountability Office has documented the widespread use of counterfeit and 

substandard parts, like I said, in nuclear reactors. So that's pretty disturbing. (PBCA-Cochran-4) 

Comment: The issue of these parts, it was made earlier about them not being up to standard, 

to what we would have put in an original plant. 

You know, we take better care of our cars than that. My husband won't buy a replacement part 

if it's not manufactured original, cause they're more reliable. And that's just for a car. 

I would suggest that as national security policy, parts for these nuclear reactors need to be 

made in America. The parts, the pieces need to be made in America and the parts need to be 

made in America, so that they are always readily and immediately available. That should be 

national security. (PBCA-Pinard-17)

Comment: In 2003, the only member of the public to comment at the NRC's GElS meeting on 

license renewal submitted the following comments: 

• components have been identified as substandard or counterfeit − making it impossible to 

judge expected lifespan; 

• Federal oversight has been lacking, allowing undiscovered degradation, i.e. Davis-Besse 

plant. 

The problem of substandard parts, or in this case defective large components, was recently 

demonstrated at the San Onofre Nuclear Station (NRC meeting with Southern California Edison, 

ADAMS No. ML092440095 dated 09/02/09). The NRC's GElS acknowledges on page 4 -127, 

“...the majority of construction materials and technology components are expected to be 

imported." What is unclear is if by "imported" the GElS is referencing "imported" to mean from 

outside the town/county of the reactor, or "imported" as from a foreign location. 

The NRC should investigate the potential liability and reduction in safety margins from 

counterfeit and/or substandard large component replacements at aging reactors and incorporate 

their findings in the final GElS. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-370 

If the international push for constructing new reactors proceeds, then the problem of counterfeit 

and substandard parts will be exacerbated. 

The escalating potential for accidents at aging reactors has received nationwide attention and 

derogatory audits by the NRC's own Office of Inspector General. Additionally, the General 

Accounting Office (GAO) has documented the widespread use of counterfeit and substandard 

parts in nuclear reactors. Finally, in a deregulated electric market, or a hybrid such as currently 

exists in California, the licensee is motivated to cut costs by delaying expensive repairs. There 

is thus an economic disincentive to find and remedy problems. Hence, the GElS must require 

that site-specific issues be performed by the NRC, not the licensee.1 

[

1

 Federal Register Notice.] (A4NR-11-16) 

Response: The issue of substandard and counterfeit parts is an ongoing safety issue, and thus 

outside the scope of the environmental review for license renewal. However, the NRC has long 

recognized that the issue of substandard or counterfeit parts raises potential safety questions 

that licensees must effectively address through their 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, quality 

assurance programs. As early as 1989 in NRC Generic Letter (GL) 89-02, “Actions to Improve 

the Detection of Counterfeit and Fraudulently Marketed Products” (NRC 1989), the NRC 

described its perspective on good practices in procurement and dedication that licensees should 

follow. This letter also provided the NRC’s conditional endorsement of an industry standard 

(EPRI 1988) on methods of commercial-grade procurement and dedication. These efforts have 

been ongoing and continue today. For example, on September 1–3, 2009, the NRC 

participated in the Electric Power Research Institute Joint Utility Task Group Procurement 

Forum in Denver, Colorado. The Joint Utility Task Group Procurement Forum provides an 

opportunity for nuclear procurement personnel to exchange information and to work together to 

address common industry issues related to procurement of materials and services. The forum 

included discussion of the potential for counterfeit parts entering the supply chain. Section 4.8.2 

of the revised GEIS was updated to clarify that the majority of construction materials and 

technology components are expected to be purchased in other parts of the United States or 

overseas.

Other 

Comment: If you have seen this article, please say so. I don't want to take time. It's in the 

New York, was in the New York Times about three days ago. I'm going to do something very 

bad. I'm going to make the NRC look good. 

And if I can just read parts of it, I found it interesting. In the first place, I did not know that 

Westinghouse, that has been known for building the worst plants, had been purchased by 

Toshiba, maybe a long time ago. I don't know. 
Appendix A 

 A-371 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

But looking up Toshiba, their vision, and the Japanese are known for their vision, that by the 

year 2050, we will have a very blessed land, environmentally, that will include all forms of 

energy, which means they will also have our nuclear plants as part of that mix. 

I personally don't plan on being here, and I'm thinking any of you will either, but I found that very 

interesting in this article, and I'm just going to pick out a few things here. 

But one of the things the NRC did is reject the design by Westinghouse for a new reactor, 

because a key component might not withstand events like an earthquake or a tornado. 

This could cause delays in building 14 planned reactors in the United States, including Georgia 

and South Carolina. 

And I am thinking this is pertinent because June Cochran, another June, made mention, briefly, 

of the smaller plants, and today, going over this, I wondered if -- are they going to have new 

regulations for them? It seems they're being approached a little bit differently. 

One of the things they're doing--it says the staffs, agency--is a glitch in the move towards 

licensing changes adopted by the Commission in 1990, and so forth, and their buildings will be 

different in order to protect them from external events like earthquakes, tornados and high wind. 

They will have a shield that's 35 inches of concrete, sandwiched between two sheets of steel, 

each of which is an inch thick. The existing Westinghouse reactors, designed in '60 and '70, do 

not have shield buildings. 

In another shift, the new design puts the emergency cooling water on the roof -- you probably 

already know this -- so that no pumps will be needed if power goes out. They will have the 

water that they need in case of an accident, and so forth. 

They also believe that the shield wall will protect them from the impact of an airliner. The part I 

found disturbing is something that we're all so used to, and it's the arrogance of the companies 

involved. In spite of the fact that they say they're going to fix this very fast, which scares me, 

don't fix it fast, take your time with the faults that – with the part that is not considered to be 

good. 

They are already clearing the land and ruining the environment in, I believe it's Georgia and 

South Carolina, and they don't expect there to be a problem. And yet they have now 

determined what kind of work they need to do to demonstrate the structure’s safety. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-372 

So I see, having followed the plant there since before it was built, that my wish is that the NRC 

continues to do a good job. It sounds like they're looking at these plants like we wish they 

would have looked at ours. 

I'm a little disturbed, the land's all cleared, the plants are all gone, the animals are probably all 

dead, and they still haven't come up with the right piece for the plant, and approved is so – I 

guess I'm comparing the two, hoping that we, being the "dinosaur plants," will get the same 

oversight as the 14 smaller new plants are supposedly going to have. (PBCA-SLOMFP2-13) 

Response: New reactor designs and licensing are outside the regulatory scope of license 

renewal. However, the NRC believes that its license renewal process is comprehensive and 

robust to assure continued safe operation. NRC’s review of an application for license renewal 

has four components: a safety review, an environmental review, inspections, and an 

independent review by the ACRS. 

The NRC performs a safety review of the information provided in the application (as 

supplemented with additional information provided by the applicant at the NRC’s request). The 

results of the NRC’s safety review are documented in a publicly available safety evaluation 

report. 

The result of the license renewal environmental review is published in a publicly available plantspecific draft SEIS, and the public is invited to comment on the draft SEIS. Then, after 

considering all public comments, the NRC issues the final SEIS. 

Teams of inspectors with experience in nuclear plant safety visit the site and verify that the 

applicant has implemented its aging management plans as committed to in the application. The 

results of plant inspections conducted as part of the license renewal are documented in 

inspection reports and are made publicly available. The results are also included in the safety 

evaluation report. (These inspections are in addition to NRC’s ongoing regulatory oversight 

program for all operating reactors, which also includes inspections.) 

The ACRS is an independent panel of experts that advises the Commission on matters related 

to nuclear safety. The ACRS reviews the applicant’s safety analysis report, the NRC’s safety 

evaluation report, and the results of the onsite inspections and makes its recommendation to the 

Commission regarding issuance of the renewed license. 

No change was made to the GEIS as a result of this comment.

Comment: I wanted to just make a brief comment for the guy that was commenting on my 

document. Oh, what did I do with my document now? Well, anyway, here -- here we go. Yes.
Appendix A 

 A-373 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

The careless Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Well, in the next paragraph, two incidents are 

mentioned which I think indicate a careless Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The emergency 

core cooling system at Monticello was unavailable for 30 years. Thirty years because the 

shipping bolts had not been removed when they installed it. So, who knows whether it would 

have worked and who knows who should have figured that one out, but my guess is the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission should have. 

And then the other one is the Davis-Besse reactor. The comment about except maybe the filter 

salesman which makes no sense unless you know what actually happened there and what 

actually happened is the reactor pressure vessel had got a hole about as big as a football and 

over they estimate I think it was about three months it took for that hole to develop what 

happened? Well, the filters kept getting clogged and they kept replacing them, but nobody 

figured out why except maybe the filter salesman. (DPCA-AHoffman-25) 

Comment: I'm the Chairman of the Patrick Henry Democratic Club of America. A club that has 

members from California to New York. The Patrick Henry Democratic Club is also part of a 

coalition for nuclear safety. 

Several things have come to my attention. One is a list of concerns of a number of 

professionals regarding what's going on in San Onofre. Most of this has been documented in 

various articles you can find in your newspapers. 

One, officials at San Onofre were caught falsifying five years of hourly safety logs, fabricating 

five years of safety patrols that never took place. Real -- right? 

Two, Edison has a history of putting unqualified workers into positions where public safety could 

be endangered. 

Three, San Onofre has been repeatedly caught leaking radioactivity into the water and air. 

Four, San Onofre [came] close to a Chernobyl level meltdown when the safety systems were 

offline during the wildfire that almost hit the plant in 2007. 

Six, there is an epidemic of -- oh, excuse. Five, certain types of cancer such as breast cancer 

and leukemia are at a national high in Orange County. Think of it, Orange County gets to be 

number one in something. Cancer. Think about it and there are especially cancer pockets as 

you get closer to the plant. 

The other night, I was talking to a young woman from Dana Point who had breast cancer. 

Genetically, she said it was impossible. Her doctor was absolutely shocked. She knew of a 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-374 

number of other people who had -- because it wasn't in their genes or in her lineage. She knew 

of a number of other people who had impossible cancers. 

You know, it's amazing these cancer pockets that pop up and nobody from the NRC seems to 

have noticed this. 

Six, there is an epidemic of cancer among small animals. What's really interesting about these 

cancers among the small animals is that a lot of them don't fit the traditional modes. Our little 

seven pound Eskie died at six years of age, it should have lived to 20, of a cancer similar to 

bone cancer, but not quite that the doctors couldn't even identify it was so bizarre and we've 

heard of other small animals receiving similar types of cancer here in Orange County. 

Seven, radioactive kittens were found near San Onofre. 

Eight, San Onofre is expensive to operate and run. The PUC has agreed to pass off costs of 

renovation to the public. 

Nine, Edison officials have repeatedly denied past radiation leaks despite documented findings 

of those leaks. 

Ten, on October 14th, 2009, citizen watchdogs observed readings of 180 times the normal level 

of radiation in Mission Viejo approximately 18 miles from San Onofre on a gamma-fed radiation 

detector. Neither San Onofre officials nor any public agency notified the public nor warned the 

public with -- or supplied them with potassium iodine pills. Schools were not warned. Santa 

Ana levels 29 miles away were elevated seven to ten times normal level. 

Now, you know, if somebody tells me something about a radiation detector, I'd want to see it. 

Right? Wouldn't you? 

Well, you know, this -- on Saturday, last Saturday, a radiation detector was connected up in 

Santa Ana and the gamma-fed -- the normal level for the gamma-fed is one flash per every 

60 seconds. That's normal. This is seconds not minutes. I mean so, instead of getting one 

flash for every 60 seconds, you have multiple flashes per second. 

The average seems to be what I would say would be about 120 times the normal level and in 

this section, you can see it's about 360 times the normal level of radiation. 

We are not informed when we have major increases. Nobody cares and when we were at the 

disaster preparedness meeting in Orange County we found that they're waiting for somebody in 

San Onofre to pick up a little yellow phone. These guys who faked five years of safety reports. 
Appendix A 

 A-375 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Eleven, Orange, Los Angeles, San Diego County residents are not notified when radioactive 

waste travels through their community. For example, recently a truck took radioactive waste 

from San Onofre to the Port of Long Beach where it was turned away because it was 

radioactive. It set off the radiation detectors there. Okay. Then it drove back to San Onofre. 

The only reason it made news is that it was turned away. 

Twelve, which matters more? Edison's profits or your kids' lives. Thank you. 

(DPCA-PHDCA-41) 

Response: The specific issues contained in these comments address operational events and 

issues associated with the operation of nuclear power plants. The evaluation of operational 

events and issues associated with the operation of the San Onofre nuclear generating station is 

outside the scope of the review of the revised GEIS and will not be considered for changes to 

the revised GEIS. In addition, the economics of operating San Onofre, including the licensee’s 

profits, are also outside the scope of license renewal and would be addressed by the State ratemaking authority. 

However, the staff offers the following about the NRC’s oversight of nuclear power plants. To 

ensure that nuclear power plants are operated safely, the NRC licenses the plants to operate, 

licenses the plant operators, and establishes license conditions for the safe operation of each 

plant. Every NRC licensed nuclear power plant must comply with all health, safety, and 

environmental requirements contained within its license as well as comply with all other Federal, 

State, and local requirements for continued operation. The NRC provides continuous oversight 

of nuclear power plants through its Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) to verify that they are 

being operated in accordance with NRC regulations. This oversight includes having full-time 

NRC inspectors located at the plant and periodic safety inspections conducted by NRC 

inspectors based in an NRC Regional Office. The inspections look at a plant’s compliance with 

NRC’s regulations that include the following: plant safety (routine and accident scenarios), 

radiation protection of plant workers and members of the public, radioactive effluent releases, 

radiological environmental monitoring, emergency preparedness, radioactive waste storage and 

transportation, quality assurance, and training. 

No changes were made to the GEIS in response to these comments.

Comment: I’m a previous resident of San Clemente for six years and I actually lived pretty 

close to San Onofre for a long time. 

Anyway, I have several comments. One, Attorney General Jerry Brown on the NRC. The NRC 

is continuing to piece by piece cut out public participation and expanding its state's agreement 

authority to prohibit state protective agencies and commissions from consideration of radiation 

related issues. NRC is approving the retention of the lethal wastes onsite where they are 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-376 

generated first for 30 years and now 60 years without even site specific safety proceedings. 

That's one. (DPCA-Scott-10) 

Response: This comment relates to the NRC’s Agreement State program and storage of 

nuclear waste. The NRC provides assistance to States expressing an interest in establishing 

programs to assume NRC regulatory authority under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 

amended. Section 274 of the Act allows the NRC to relinquish to a State part of its regulatory 

authority to license and regulate byproduct materials, source materials (uranium and thorium), 

and certain quantities of special nuclear materials. The mechanism for the transfer of NRC’s 

authority to a State is an agreement signed by the Governor of the State and the Chairman of 

the Commission, in accordance with Section 274b of the Act. The Agreement State program is 

outside of the scope of nuclear power plant license renewal and as such, the GEIS. 

Comments relating to the storage of nuclear waste are addressed in Section A.2.1.10 of this 

appendix. 

No changes were made to the GEIS as a result of this comment. 

A.2.1.17 Editorial Comments 

Comment: General Comment: Additional language should be added to make it clear that 

facilities with hybrid or combination cooling, (e.g., facilities using both once-through and closedcycle cooling systems or helper towers) fall under the more stringent once-through cooling 

system portions of the document, and not just the closed-cycle cooling system. (EPA-3(1)-1) 

Response: The stringency of an NPDES permit depends on various factors, such as the 

cooling system type (as noted in the comment) and the characteristics of the receiving body of 

water. No distinction is made in the GEIS regarding specific permit requirements, which are set 

by EPA or State offices (if EPA has delegated its Clean Water Act authority to the State). No 

change was made to the GEIS in response to this comment.

Comment: Page 2-1, lines 25 to 38: A box appears having the title “Alternatives to the 

Proposed Action Considered in the GEIS.” Three bullets appear in the box. The text of the 3rd

bullet reads as follows: 

• Offsetting generation capacity using conservation and energy efficiency (demand-side 

management) or purchased power. 

To clarify that “Purchased power” is a stand-alone alternative to the proposed action of 

license renewal, consider modifying the 3rd bullet and adding a 4th bullet as follows 

(strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 
Appendix A 

 A-377 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

• Offsetting generation capacity using conservation and energy efficiency (demand-side 

management) or purchased power. 

• Purchasing sufficient power to replace the capacity supplied by the existing nuclear 

power plant. (NEI1-7(4)-29) 

Response: The NRC agrees that adding a separate bullet clarifies that purchasing 

replacement power is considered a separate alternative; therefore, the suggested change has 

been made to the introduction to Chapter 2 of the GEIS.

Comment: Page 2-5, line 41: The draft updated GEIS states that Table 2.1-1 presents a 

summary of the environmental impacts of the proposed action. 

Consider adding a reference at the end of the sentence on line 41 indicating that the bases for 

the impacts summarized in Table 2.1-1 are discussed in Section 4.12.1. (NEI1-7(4)-30) 

Response: The text in Section 2.1.4 has been modified to indicate that the basis for the impact 

determinations presented in the Table 2.1-1 is found in Chapter 4 of the GEIS in Sections 4.2 

through 4.13. 

Comment: Page 2-30, lines 20 to 22: Consider changing the sentence in lines 20 to 22 to read 

as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

The proposed action and new nuclear energy alternatives all may have low-probability but 

potentially high-consequence accidents in comparison to the non-nuclear alternatives under 

certain specific conditions. (NEI1-7(4)-31) 

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. Since an initiating event is required for any 

accident to occur, and those events occur only under certain conditions, the addition of “under 

certain specific conditions” at the end of the referenced sentence as suggested by the 

commenter was not deemed necessary. No change was made to the GEIS in response to this 

comment. 

Comment: Page 2-35, Table 2.4-5, (2nd header row): For consistency with text (page 2-28, 

line 16) and Table 2.4-4 (page 2-34), the heading for the 7th column should be changed from 

“Energy Conservation” to “Demand-Side Management”. (NEI1-7(4)-33) 

Response: The column referenced by the commenter was already titled “Demand-Side 

Management.” For consistency with the text in Chapter 2, the column was renamed “Energy 

Conservation.” 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-378 

Comment: And then, lastly, we have to make the staff aware of a number of factual corrections 

in Table 3.1-1 and also Appendix C. These are tables and an appendix that talks about specific 

characteristics of the various utilities involved with the plants themselves, but more recent 

information may be available, we feel, that points out the various characteristics that are 

included in these, both table and the appendix. 

We would also like to point out the information that needs factual correction does not affect any 

of the assessments that have been undertaken by the staff. (NMA-NEI-3) 

Response: The text in Table 3.1-1 and Appendix C of the GEIS has been updated based on 

more recent information to reflect any changes in the characteristics of individual nuclear power 

plants.

Comment: Page 3-3, lines 21 to 23: Sentence reads as follows: 

However, five facilities with once-through cooling also have cooling towers that are used to 

reduce the temperature of the water before it is released to the environment. 

The above-quoted statement appears to be in error because Appendix C to the draft updated 

GEIS lists six once-through cooling facilities with cooling towers as follows: Browns Ferry, 

Monticello, Peach Bottom, Prairie Island, Sequoyah and Vermont Yankee. Consider changing 

the sentence to read as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

However, fivesix facilities with once-through cooling also have cooling towers that are used to 

reduce the temperature of the water before it is released to the environment. (NEI1-7(4)-34) 

Response: Section 3.1.1 of the GEIS was corrected as a result of this comment.

Comment: Page 3-6, Table 3.1-1, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2: The entry in Table 3.1-1, 

column labeled “Condenser Flow Rate (103 gpm),” is “16” for Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2. 

Verify that the “Condenser Flow Rate” for Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 is 16,000 gpm. 

According to the ANO Unit 2 license renewal application, the flow rate for makeup water to the 

cooling tower(s), which is different from and should be much less than the condenser flow rate, 

is 16,000 gpm. (NEI1-7(4)-35) 

Response: The entry for the condenser flow rate for Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 in 

Table 3.1-1 of the draft revised GEIS was incorrect. Table 3.1-1 has been modified in response 

to this comment.
Appendix A 

 A-379 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Comment: Vol. 1, Page 3-8, Table 3.1-1: Based on the renewed license for the Oyster Creek 

Nuclear Generating Station, change the entry in the Table 3.1-1 column labeled "Year License 

Expires" from "2009" to "2029" (ML090980482). (Exelon-17-1) 

Response: Table 3.1-1 of the GEIS has been updated to reflect current license status for those 

plants with recently renewed licenses.

Comment: Vol. 1, Page 3-8, Table 3.1-1: In the Table 3.1-1 column labeled "Nearest City," the 

entry for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station should be changed from "Atlantic City, PA" to 

"Atlantic City, NJ.” (Exelon-17-2) 

Response: Table 3.1-1 of the GEIS has been corrected based on this comment.

Comment: Pages 3-13 to 3-15, Table 3.1-2 and page 3-16, Figure 3.1-4: Table 3.1-2 lists all 

U.S. commercial nuclear power plant sites and reports the type of cooling system used at each 

site. Three schematic diagrams are provided in Figure 3.1-4 to illustrate the types of cooling 

systems listed in Table 3.1-2. 

Not all entries in the Table 3.1-2 column labeled “Cooling System” correspond to a schematic in 

Figure 3.1-4. For example, “closed-cycle cooling pond,” which is the entry in Table 3.1-2 for the 

“Cooling System” at the South Texas plant, is not depicted on any of the three schematics in 

Figure 3.1-4. Similarly, no schematic in Figure 3.1-4 shows a cooling system consisting of 

“natural draft cooling towers and cooling pond,” which is the entry in Table 3.1-2 for the “Cooling 

System” at the Fermi plant. Furthermore, the distinction between a “closed-cycle cooling pond” 

and a “once-through cooling pond” is not illustrated in Figure 3.1-4. 

To address the issues mentioned above, consider changing the “Cooling System” column in 

Table 3.1-2 by making the entries for plants with cooling ponds more consistent with one 

another. Alternatively, Figure 3.1-4 could be modified to better illustrate the differences 

between the following three cooling system types: (1) cooling pond [Braidwood, LaSalle, Wolf 

Creek]; (2) closed-cycle cooling pond [South Texas]; and (3) once-through (cooling pond) 

[Clinton, H.B. Robinson, Summer]. (NEI1-7(4)-36) 

Response: Table 3.1-2 of the GEIS was modified to provide more consistent descriptions of 

cooling systems that use cooling ponds. Figure 3.1-4 is intended to provide a conceptual 

overview of cooling systems; it is not designed to show every variation or to illustrate sitespecific features. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-380 

Comment: Page 3-17, lines 30 to 33: The text indicates that NPDES permits for nuclear power 

plants limit thermal changes, concentrations of biocides and other chemicals that have been 

mixed with condenser cooling water, and flow rates of condenser cooling water discharges. 

To clarify that NPDES permits control pollutants in discharges to surface waters from nuclear 

power plants, whether they use once-through cooling water systems or closed-cycle cooling 

water systems with blow down, consider modifying the sentence in lines 30 to 33 on page 3-17 

to read as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

Discharges of condenser cooling water (once-through systems) and blow down water (closedcycle systems) containing Bbiocides and other chemicals used for corrosion control and other 

water treatment purposes are mixed with the condenser cooling water and discharged from the 

system, with limits on flow, concentrations, and thermal changes authorized by the States under 

the appropriate NPDES permits, which establish limits as necessary on flow rate, chemical 

constituent concentrations, and thermal changes. (NEI1-7(4)-37) 

Response: The NRC staff agrees that the suggested changes clarify the NPDES discussion; 

therefore, Section 3.1.3 of the GEIS was modified in response to these comments.

Comment: Page 3-21, lines 16 to 19: Sentence reads as follows: 

All activities related to hazardous wastes – including storage, treatment, shipment, and disposal 

– are conducted pursuant to permits issued by the EPA or the State, if authorized, per the 

regulations issued under RCRA (see Section 3.11.2). 

Because a permit is not necessarily required if hazardous waste is stored on-site for less than 

90 days or if the facility is a small quantity generator, consider making the following change in 

the above-quoted sentence (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

All activities related to hazardous wastes – including storage, treatment, shipment, and disposal 

– are conducted pursuant to permits issued by the EPA or the State, if authorized, per the 

regulations issued by the EPA or the State, if authorized, under RCRA (see Section 3.11.2). 

(NEI1-7(4)-38) 

Comment: Page 3-21. lines 21 to 26: Sentence reads as follows: 

There are also some routine or nonroutine releases from power plants that may have hazardous 

components, including boiler blowdown (continual or periodic purging of impurities from plant 

boilers), water treatment wastes (sludges and high-saline streams whose residues are disposed 

of as solid waste and biocides), boiler metal cleaning wastes, floor and yard drains, and 

stormwater runoff. Principal chemical and biocide waste sources include the following: ...
Appendix A 

 A-381 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Because releases of wastewaters from nuclear power plants are regulated under NPDES 

permits, consider changing the above-quoted sentence as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; 

italics font = addition): 

There are also some routine or nonroutine releases from power plants that may have hazardous 

components, including boiler blowdown (continual or periodic purging of impurities from plant 

boilers), water treatment wastes (sludges and high-saline streams whose residues are disposed 

of as solid waste and biocides), boiler metal cleaning wastes, floor and yard drains, and 

stormwater runoff. With the exception of water treatment wastes, these releases would be 

regulated in accordance with each plant’s NPDES permit. Principal chemical and biocide waste 

sources include the following: ...(NEI1-7(4)-39) 

Comment: Page 3-22, lines 13 to 15: Sentences read as follows: 

If the treatment plant is offsite, the sanitary waste is collected in underground tanks, tested for 

radioactivity, and sent offsite periodically. Any releases to surface water from onsite sewage 

plants are subject to NPDES permit limits. 

Because some sites send sanitary wastewaters directly to a publicly owned treatment works 

(“POTW”) without first collecting it in tanks, consider changing the above-quoted sentences as 

follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

If the treatment plant is offsite, the sanitary waste is either collected in septic underground

tanks, tested for radioactivity, and sent offsite periodically, or the sanitary waste may be tested 

for radioactivity and discharged directly to a POTW. Any effluent releases to surface water from 

onsite sewage plants are subject to NPDES permit limits. (NEI1-7(4)-40) 

Response: Section 3.1.5 of the GEIS was modified in response to these comments.

Comment: Page 3-23, lines 25 to 27: Sentence reads as follows: 

As described in Section 3.11.4, sanitary waste is either treated onsite or collected in 

underground tanks and then shipped offsite to be treated at a local sewage treatment plant. 

Because some sites send sanitary wastewaters directly to a publicly owned treatment works 

(“POTW”) without first collecting it in tanks, consider changing the above-quoted sentence as 

follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

As described in Section 3.11.4, sanitary waste is either treated onsite, or collected in septic 

underground tanks and then shipped offsite to be treated at a local sewage treatment plant, or 

discharged directly to a POTW. (NEI1-7(4)-41) 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-382 

Response: Section 3.1.6.3 of the GEIS was modified in response to this comment.

Comment: Page 3-35, lines 13 and 14: Text in lines 13 and 14 on page 3-35 reads as follows: 

However, special permit conditions may be applicable under various regulatory jurisdictions for 

facilities located in EPA-designated nonattainment areas. 

Because the conditions in all permits are intended to ensure that impacts are minimized, 

consider changing the above-quoted text to read as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics 

font = addition): 

However, special permit conditions may be applicable under various regulatory jurisdictions for 

facilities located in EPA-designated nonattainment areas to ensure that impacts to air quality are 

maintained at minimal levels. (NEI1-7(4)-42) 

Response: Section 3.5.2 of the GEIS was revised as suggested.

Comment: Page 3-53, box labeled “Clean Water Act”: First bullet reads as follows: 

• National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitting is required for 

wastewater discharge rate and chemical concentration limits. 

Make the following changes in the first bullet to better reflect the requirements of the federal 

Clean Water Act NPDES permitting program, which are not uniformly implemented across all 

states (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitting is permits are required for 

wastewater discharges rate, which impose controls on effluents, including cooling water from 

electricity generating plants that may include limits on flow rate and chemical concentrations 

limits. (NEI1-7(4)-45) 

Response: The section and associated text box cited by the commenter have been revised 

and are now located in Section 3.5.1.2 of this revised GEIS. However, a discussion relevant to 

the scope of NPDES permits, consistent with the interpretation presented by the commenter, is 

provided in Section 3.5.1.2.

Comment: Page 3-53, Lines 15-20: Delete sentence "AII. ... and individual states" and replace 

with: "Provisions of the Clean Water Act (CWA) regulate the discharge of pollutants into waters 

of the United States. The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) requires 

that all facilities which discharge pollutants from any point source into waters of the United 

States obtain an NPDES permit. An NPDES permit is developed with two levels of controls: 
Appendix A 

 A-383 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

technology-based limits and water quality-based limits. NPDES permit terms may not exceed 5 

years, and the applicant must reapply at least 180 days prior to the permit expiration date. EPA 

is authorized under the CWA to directly implement the NPDES program; however, EPA has 

authorized many States to implement all or parts of the national program.” (EPA-3(1)-5) 

Response: The NRC staff agrees that the suggested changes provide clarity to the 

requirements under the CWA and the NPDES permit process. Section 3.5.1.2 of the GEIS was 

updated in response to this comment.

Comment: Page 3-53, lines 22 to 28: Sentences read as follows: 

CWA Section 401 requires an applicant for a Federal license to conduct activities that produce 

discharge into navigable waters to provide the licensing agency with a certification from the 

State. This certification implies that discharges will comply with CWA requirements (33 USC 

1341). If the applicant has not received Section 401 certification, the NRC cannot issue a 

license, including a renewed license (10 CFR 51.10(c)). NRC recognizes that some states 

include a 401 certification in the NPDES permit. 

Make the following changes to the sentences in lines 22 to 28 on page 3-53 to more accurately 

reflect the 401 Water Quality Certification process and associated issuance (strikethrough font = 

deletion; italics font = addition): 

CWA Section 401 requires an applicant for a Federal license to conduct activities that may 

cause a discharge of regulated pollutants produce discharge into navigable waters to provide 

the licensing agency with a water quality certification from the State. This certification, which 

typically has no expiration date associated with it, implies that discharges from the project to be 

licensed will comply with several CWA requirements, as applicable, including that the project will 

not cause or contribute to a violation of state water quality standards. (33 USC 1341). If the 

applicant has not received a Section 401 certification, the NRC cannot issue a license unless 

the State regulatory agency has waived the requirement. Waiver is automatic if the State does 

not respond to a certification request within one year (or less, if set by federal regulation. See 

33 CFR Part 336.1(b)(8)(iii) (state waiver occurs after six months for projects awaiting Corps of 

Engineer permitting); 40 CFR 121.16 (waiver of state certification after “reasonable time” for 

processing, usually limited to six months). For facilities, seeking including a renewed license 

(10 CFR 51.10(c)), the NRC assumes that an NPDES Permit issued for the project (which, by 

law, must satisfy at least the same standards as a separate 401 Certification) implies new or 

continued certification by the state, unless state-specific regulations specify otherwise. 

recognizes that some states include a 401 certification in the NPDES permit. (NEI1-7(4)-43) 

Response: The NRC has revised Section 3.5.1.2 of the GEIS in response to this comment to 

more accurately clarify the Section 401 Water Quality Certification process, and to note that 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-384 

some NPDES-delegated States explicitly integrate their 401 certification process with NPDES 

permit issuance.

Comment: Page 3-53, lines 32 to 34: Sentence reads as follows: 

NPDES permits for nuclear power plants may impose maximum temperature limits for effluents 

(which may vary by season) and/or a maximum temperature increase above the ambient water 

temperature (referred to as “delta-T,” which also may vary by season). 

Make the following change because NPDES permits associated with nuclear plants may impose 

either specific limits or other conditions to control effluent temperature (strikethrough font = 

deletion; italics font = addition): 

NPDES permits for nuclear power plants may impose maximum temperature limits or other 

specific conditions for effluents (which may vary by season) and/or a maximum temperature 

increase above the ambient water temperature (referred to as "delta-T," which also may vary by 

season). (NEI1-7(4)-44) 

Response: Because the focus of Section 3.5.1.2 is thermal effluents, and other permit 

conditions are discussed prior in Section 3.5.1.2, the suggestion to include “or other specific 

conditions” was not made. However, the word “maximum” was deleted to be more broadly 

inclusive of temperature requirements.

Comment: Page 3-53, Line 32: Delete "may" because NPDES permits need to include the 

proper water quality-based limits for temperature or the limit agreed upon via a thermal variance 

under section 316(a) of the Clean Water Act. (EPA-3(1)-6) 

Response: Section 3.5.1.2 of the GEIS was revised in response to this comment.

Comment: Page 3-53, Line 35-36: Delete "Another approach ....and temperature" for 

accuracy, as this is an element of a 316(a) thermal variance (which is not being discussed in 

this paragraph) and not a water quality standard-based limit. (EPA-3(1)-7) 

Response: Section 3.5.1.2 of the GEIS was modified in response to this comment.

Comment: Page 3-54, Lines 6-7: Replace sentence "Section 316(a)... with "Facilities may 

apply for a thermal variance from their NPDES temperature limitation under Section 316(a) of 

the CWA. The facility must be able to demonstrate that the requested variance is more 

stringent than necessary to assure the propagation of a balanced, indigenous population (40 

CFR § 125 Subpart H) in order to receive an alternative thermal effluent limitation. The 

alternate thermal effluent limitation is only good for the term of the NPDES permit (5 years), and 
Appendix A 

 A-385 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

the facility must reapply each permit term for the permitting authorities review and approval." 

(EPA-3(1)-8) 

Response: Section 3.5.1.2 of the GEIS was revised in response to this comment.

Comment: Page 3-54, lines 7 to 9: Sentence reads as follows: 

Section 316(b) deals with cooling water intakes and ensures that intake structures are designed 

with the best available technology to minimize impingement and entrainment of aquatic 

organisms. 

To increase consistency of the text with the language in the CWA, change the phrase “minimize 

impingement and entrainment of aquatic organisms” at the end of the quoted sentence to 

“minimize adverse environmental impact.” (NEI1-7(4)-47) 

Comment: Page 3-54, Lines 7-10: Replace sentence “Section 316(b)...” with “Section 316(b) 

of the CWA requires that the location, design, construction, and capacity of cooling water intake 

structures reflect the best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact 

and is also regulated under the NPDES program." (EPA-3(1)-9) 

Response: Section 3.5.1.2 of the GEIS was revised in response to these comments.

Comment: Page 3-54, Lines 9-16: Replace entire section beginning with "For ..." until the end 

of the paragraph with: "There are three rulemaking phases addressing cooling water intake 

structures. Phase I (enacted in December 2001) is for new facilities (see40 CFR § 125.83) with 

a design intake flow greater than 2 million gpd (7.6 million L/d) and that use at least 25% of 

water withdrawn used for cooling purposes (40 CFR § 125 Subpart I). Phase II (enacted in 

July 2004) applies to existing large, electric generating facilities with a design intake flow of 

50 million gpd (189 million L/d) or more and that use at least 25% of the water withdrawn for 

cooling purposes (40 CFR § 125 Subpart J). The Phase II Rule was suspended on July 9, 

2007. The latest information regarding this matter is located at: 

http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/316b. 

The Phase III Rule (enacted June 2006) established national standards for new offshore and 

coastal oil and gas extraction facilities with a design intake flow greater than 2 million gpd (7.6 

million L/d) and that use at least 25% of water withdrawn used for cooling purposes (40 CPR § 

125 Subpart N). 

Existing facilities with a cooling water intake structure that are not currently subject to a national 

rule require Section 316(b) NPDES permit conditions that reflect best technology available for 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-386 

minimizing adverse environmental impact on a case-by-case, best professional judgment (BPJ) 

basis (40 CFR. §§ 125.90(b) and 401.14).” (EPA-3(1)-10) 

Comment: Page 3-54, Lines 18-25: Delete the entire paragraph discussing the Phase II of the 

rulemaking. The relevant portions are included in the previous comment. (EPA-3(1)-11) 

Comment: Page 3-54, lines 21 and 22: Sentence reads as follows: 

However, effective July 9, 2007, Phase II was suspended. 

To improve clarity, consider changing the sentence spanning lines 21 and 22 on page 3-54 to 

read as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

However, effective July 9, 2007, Phase II was suspended after several of its key provisions 

were remanded by the Second U.S. Court of Appeals. (NEI1-7(4)-48) 

Comment: Page 3-54, lines 22 and 23: Sentence reads as follows: 

According to the Clean Water Act, intakes are to be designed by using the best technology 

available for minimizing any environmental impact. 

To increase consistency of the text with the language in the CWA, change the phrase 

“minimizing any environmental impact” at the end of the quoted sentence to “minimizing adverse 

environmental impact.” (NEI1-7(4)-49) 

Response: Section 3.5.1.2 of the GEIS was revised in response to these comments.

Comment: Page 3-54, Line 36: Replace "State regulatory agencies" with "EPA or authorized 

State authorities." (EPA-3(1)-12) 

Response: Section 3.5.1.2 of the GEIS was revised in response to this comment.

Comment: Page 3-55, Line 1: States − "Actions may include reviewing the permit for 

appropriate parameter levels, setting and compliance schedule for the applicant, and, in a worse 

case scenario, withdrawing a permit and disallowing the legal ability to discharge." Change to 

"...setting a compliance schedule for the applicant, assessing fines... " (EPA-3(1)-13) 

Response: Section 3.5.1.2 of the GEIS was revised in response to this comment.

Comment: Page 3-55, lines 28 and 29: Sentence reads as follows: 
Appendix A 

 A-387 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

It may be injected at the intake or targeted at various points (such as the condensers) on an 

intermittent or continuous basis. 

To more completely reflect plant operations from injection to discharge, consider adding 

language to the sentence quoted above, as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = 

addition): 

It may be injected at the intake or targeted at various points (such as the condensers) on an 

intermittent or continuous basis with a dechlorinating agent injected into the effluent prior to its 

discharge to the environment. (NEI1-7(4)-50) 

Response: Section 3.5.1.2 of the GEIS was revised to state that dechlorination may occur prior 

to discharge.

Comment: Page 3-56, lines 22 to 31: First sentence of the paragraph on lines 22 through 

31 reads as follows: 

The quality of groundwater may be affected by water from nuclear power plant cooling ponds 

that has seeping into the underlying surficial aquifer. 

All remaining sentences in the paragraph discuss the potential for soil and groundwater 

contamination from leaks and spills during storage and use at plant sites of hydrocarbon fuels, 

solvents, and other chemicals. 

Consider deleting or moving the sentence on lines 22 and 23 on page 3-56 to a new, separate 

paragraph. The new paragraph should discuss the source of concern about groundwater 

contamination from cooling pond seepage. As written, the paragraph fails to draw any 

relationship between the discussion of chemical leaks and spills and the potential for 

contamination from cooling pond seepage. (NEI1-7(4)-51) 

Response: Section 3.5.2 of the GEIS was revised to clarify that operations at nuclear power 

plants may affect groundwater quality, and that seepage from cooling ponds was just one 

example.

Comment: Page 3-56, lines 26 to 31: Sentences in lines 26 to 31 read as follows: 

Examples from plant-specific SEISs include leakages or spills of gasoline (with methyl tertiary 

butyl ether, or MTBE) at fuel tank storage areas, spills of fuel at transfer or filling stations, 

solvent leakages from storage area drums, spilled or sprayed solvents, and underground line 

leaks of hydraulic oil or diesel fuel (NRC 2006b, 2007c). These incidents have involved 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-388 

regulatory oversight, with authority falling under State regulations for hydrocarbons and under 

RCRA for other chemicals. 

To make the last sentence in lines 26 to 31 on page 3-56 more complete as it relates to the 

examples provided in the first sentence, consider changing the last sentence to read as follows 

(strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

These incidents have involved regulatory oversight, with authority falling under State regulations 

for hydrocarbons and under RCRA for other chemicals, and offsite aquifers were not affected. 

(NEI1-7(4)-52) 

Response: NRC has revised the text as suggested by the commenter except that NRC has 

added the phrase “and offsite groundwater users were not affected” in lieu of “and offsite 

aquifers were not affected” as suggested by the commenter. The NRC revised the text in this 

manner because the former statement is consistent with the information and findings presented 

in the SEISs prepared for the Palisades and Oyster Creek plants, which were used as examples 

of past spills at nuclear power plants.

Comment: Page 3-56, lines 33 to 40: Sentences on lines 33 to 40 read as follows: 

Radionuclide releases, primarily tritium, to groundwater have become an issue in recent years 

because of incidents at the Indian Point, Braidwood, Callaway, Dresden, Byron, and Palo Verde 

plants (NRC 2007d). The NRC (2006c) has examined the issue and noted the leaks are 

generally not observable because they are underground and because many plants do not have 

on-site groundwater monitoring wells. Although the plants are not under any specific regulatory 

requirements to have on-site groundwater monitoring programs, they are required to perform 

surveys, evaluate, and document the event and the hazard of known spills or leaks of 

radioactive material.... 

Because tritium releases are the subject of an ongoing initiative, consider changing the 

sentences quoted above as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

Radionuclide releases, primarily tritium, to groundwater have become an issue raised concern 

in recent years because of incidents at the Indian Point, Braidwood, Callaway, Dresden, Byron, 

and Palo Verde plants (NRC 2007d). The NRC (2006c) has examined the issue matter and 

noted the leaks are generally not observable because they are underground and because many

some plants do not have not been required to have on-site groundwater monitoring wells. 

Although the plants are not under any specific regulatory requirements to have on-site 

groundwater monitoring programs, they Even so, NRC licensees are required to perform

surveys, evaluate, and document, and report the event and the hazard of known spills or leaks 

of radioactive material. ...” (NEI1-7(4)-53) 
Appendix A 

 A-389 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Response: The NRC agrees with the suggested changes, and Section 3.5.2 of the GEIS was 

revised in response to this comment; however, further clarification was added that onsite 

groundwater monitoring wells are not required unless an onsite well is used for drinking water or 

irrigation water.

Comment: Page 3-57, lines 1 to 9: Sentences on lines 1 to 9 read as follows: 

[Additionally it is important to note that] all plants are required to submit an annual report, which 

is publically [sic] available, to the NRC which summarizes the types and quantities of radioactive 

material released into the environment. In response to these groundwater events, the Nuclear 

Energy Institute (2007a), which represents the nuclear industry, committed to the NRC to have 

sites-specific groundwater protection programs in place at each site by July 31, 2006. These 

programs cover the assessment of plant systems and components, site hydrogeology, and 

implementation of groundwater monitoring programs, To monitor the actions of the nuclear 

industry, the NRC updated its inspection procedure to include this issue as part of its routine 

radiological inspection at all nuclear power plants. 

To clarify the text on lines 1 to 9 on page 3-57, consider modifying the paragraph to read as 

follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

[Additionally it is important to note that] all plants are required to submit an annual report, which 

is publically available, to the NRC that summarizes the types and quantities of radioactive 

material released into the environment. 

[NEW Paragraph]In response to these groundwater events discoveries of underground 

radionuclide releases at nuclear power plants, the Nuclear Energy Institute (2007a), which 

represents the nuclear industry on policy issues, developed the Ground Water Protection 

Initiative. Each plant voluntarily committed to the NRC to have an action plan to develop the 

site-specific groundwater protection programs in place at each commercial nuclear power plant 

site by July 31, 2006. These programs cover the assessment of plant systems and 

components, site hydrogeology, and implementation of groundwater monitoring programs. To 

monitor the actions of the nuclear industry, the NRC updated its inspection procedure to include 

this issue as part of its routine radiological inspection at all nuclear power plants. (NEI1-7(4)-54) 

Response: Section 3.5.2 of the GEIS was revised in response to this comment.

Comment: Page 3-76, lines 21 to 24: Text in lines 21 to 24 on page 3-76 reads as follows: 

To date, EFH assessments have been completed as part of the license renewal process for 

three nuclear power plants (Pilgrim, Vermont Yankee, and Oyster Creek) and as part of the 

extended power uprate evaluation for the Hope Creek plant. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-390 

Because an EFH assessment has also been completed at Brunswick, make the following 

change to the text in lines 21 to 24 on page 3-76 (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = 

addition): 

To date, EFH assessments have been completed as part of the license renewal process for 

three four nuclear power plants (Brunswick, Pilgrim, Vermont Yankee, and Oyster Creek) and 

as part of the extended power uprate evaluation for the Hope Creek plant. (NEI1-7(4)-61) 

Response: The text in Section 3.6.3.2 of the GEIS was revised to indicate that EFH 

assessments were performed at a number of plant sites, rather than serve as a comprehensive 

list of all EFH assessments performed. 

Comment: Vol. 1, Page 3-105, Table 3.9-7, Row labeled "LaSalle 1,2": 

a. Column labeled "Annual Occupational Dose (rem) Maximum" reports a value of 

 "0.16." 

b. Column labeled "Annual Occupational Dose (rem) Minimum" reports a value of 

 "0.11." 

a. Based on annual reports submitted to the NRC by the LaSalle plant, the "Annual 

 Occupational Dose (rem) Maximum" should be changed in Table 3.9-7 from "0.16" to “0.50.” 

b. Based on annual reports submitted to the NRC by the LaSalle plant, the "Annual 

 Occupational Dose (rem) Minimum" should be changed in Table 3.9-7 from "0.11" to "0.15." 

(Exelon-17-4) 

Response: The values in Table 3.9-7 of the GEIS were changed as requested.

Comment: Vol. 1, Page 3-108, Table 3.9-8, Row labeled "Three Mile Island 1": Column 

labeled “Annual Collective Dose (person-rem/reactor)" for the year 2004 reports a value of "0." 

Based on the 10 CFR 20.2206(b) Three Mile Island Personnel Radiation Exposure Report for 

2004, submitted to NRC on March 17, 2005, the "Annual Collective Dose (person-rem/reactor)" 

for the year 2004 should be changed from "0" to "3." (Exelon-17-5) 

Response: The value in Table 3.9-8 of the GEIS was changed from “0” to “3” as requested. 

Comment: Vol. 1, Page 3-109, Table 3.9-8, Row labeled "Oyster Creek": Column labeled 

“Annual Collective Dose (person-rem/reactor)" for the year 2000 reports a value of "614." 

Based on radiation protection records for the Oyster Creek plant, the "Annual Collective Dose 

(person-rem/reactor)" for the year 2000 should be changed from "614" to "625.” (Exelon-17-6)
Appendix A 

 A-391 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Response: The value in Table 3.9-8 of the GEIS was changed from “614” to “625” as 

requested.

Comment: Vol. 1, Page 3-111, Table 3.9-9, Row labeled "Three Mile Island 1": Column 

labeled “Annual Measurable Occupational Dose (rem)” for the year 2004 reports a value of 

“0.00.” 

Based on the 10 CFR 20.2206(b) Three Mile Island Personnel Radiation Exposure Report for 

2004, submitted to NRC on March 17, 2005, the "Annual Measurable Occupational Dose (rem)" 

for the year 2004 should be changed from "0.00" to "3.4." (Exelon-17-7) 

Response: The value in Table 3.9-8 of the GEIS was changed from “0.00” to “0.03” based on 

the staff’s review of the personnel radiation exposure data for Three Mile Island, Unit 1 

contained in NUREG-0713, Volume 31. The staff was unable to verify the value “3.4” in the 

licensee’s occupational export report for 2004.

Comment: Vol. 1, Page 3-112, Table 3.9-9, Row labeled "LaSalle": Column labeled "Annual 

Measurable Occupational Dose (rem)" for the year 1996 reports a value of "0.29." 

Based on annual reports submitted to the NRC by the LaSalle plant, the "Annual Measurable 

Occupational Dose (rem)" for the year 1996 should be changed from "0.29" to "0.31." 

(Exelon-17-8) 

Response: The value in Table 3.9-9 of the GEIS was changed from “0.29” to “0.31” as 

requested.

Comment: Page 3-120, lines 31 to 33: Text in lines 31 to 33 on page 3-120 reads as follows: 

An annual survey (land census) identifies changes in the use of unrestricted areas to provide a 

basis for modifying the monitoring programs to reflect a new exposure pathway or a different 

site-specific dose calculation parameter. 

Because some facilities conduct surveys at frequencies other than annual, consider making the 

following changes to the text in lines 31 to 33 on page 3-120 (strikethrough font = deletion; 

italics font = addition): 

An annual A periodic land use survey (land census) identifies changes in the use of unrestricted 

areas to provide a basis for modifying the monitoring programs to reflect a new exposure 

pathway or a different site-specific dose calculation parameter. (NEI1-7(4)-63) 

Response: The suggested change has been made to Section 3.9.1.3 of the GEIS.
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-392 

Comment: Page 3-121 and 3-122, Table 3.9-14: Four columns in Table 3.9-14 provide annual 

dose information for selected nuclear plants. The columns are labeled “Total Body,” “Gamma,” 

“Beta,” and “Critical Organ.” 

In Table 3.9-14, consider adding an explanatory note, or modifying the column titles, to clarify 

that the entries in the columns labeled “Gamma” and “Beta” represent “ground-level air dose,” 

as the sentence in lines 39 through 41 on page 3-120 states. (NEI1-7(4)-64) 

Response: The suggested change has been made to Table 3.9-14 of the GEIS.

Comment: Page 3-126, Table 3.9-18: In the Table 3.9-18 column labeled “Radionuclides 

Detected,” the entry for the Callaway Plant reads as follows: 

Tritium, cobalt-58, cobalt-60, cesium-134, and cesium-137 

The NRC is encouraged to change the above-quoted entry for Callaway from “tritium, cobalt-58, 

cobalt-60, cesium-134, and cesium-137” to “tritium.” Tritium was the only radionuclide found 

outside the monitoring wells in the numerous samples conducted near the well location. The 

other radionuclides were found in the French drain of the manhole but not found outside the 

well. Therefore, the mentioned radionuclides other than tritium were not released to the 

environment. (NEI1-7(4)-66) 

Response: The table referenced in the comment was adapted from the Task Force Report 

(NRC 2006). This table shows the inadvertent release of radioactive liquids and includes the 

radionuclides listed. Radioactive cobalt and cesium were detected in the surface soil inside the 

manholes where the valves are located. The detection in the surface soil implies release of 

activity. No change was made to the GEIS in response to this comment. 

Comment: Page 3-126, Table 3.9-18: In the Table 3.9-18 column labeled “Source of Release,” 

the entry for the Callaway Plant reads as follows: 

Vacuum breaker valves on the circulating water blowdown line 

The NRC is encouraged to change the above-quoted entry for Callaway from “vacuum breaker 

valves” to “air release valves.” (NEI1-7(4)-65) 

Response: The suggested change has been made to Section 3.9.1.3 of the GEIS.

Comment: Page 3-128, Table 3.9-19: Four columns in Table 3.9-19 provide information about 

doses from inadvertent releases of radioactive liquids at nuclear power plants. 
Appendix A 

 A-393 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

To clarify the nature of the dose calculation for Indian Point that is reported in the Table 3.9-19 

column labeled “Maximum Water Contamination (pCi/L) at Offsite Locations,” consider changing 

the entry to read as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): Approximation 

made in dose calculations Dose calculated conservatively (NEI1-7(4)-67) 

Response: The suggested change has been made to Section 3.9.1.3 of the GEIS.

Comment: Page 3-130, lines 14 to 16: The text in lines 14 to 16 on page 3-130 reads as 

follows: 

The coefficients used (Table 3.9-20) are the same as those recently published by ICRP in 

connection with a revision of its recommendations (ICRP 1991). 

Because the date of the cited reference (1991) is not recent, consider revising the sentence in 

lines 14 through 16 on page 3-130 to read as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = 

addition): 

The coefficients used (Table 3.9-20) are the same as those recently published by ICRP in 

connection with a revision of its recommendations (ICRP 1991). (NEI1-7(4)-68) 

Response: For accuracy, the suggested change has been made to Section 3.9.1.4 of the 

GEIS.

Comment: Page 3-133, Lines12-17: add "Clean Water Act" (EPA-3(1)-14) 

Response: Section 3.9.2 of the GEIS has been modified to add the CWA to the list of Federal 

Acts that the EPA administers.

Comment: Page 3-133, lines 19 to 25: The text in lines 19 to 25 on page 3-133 reads as 

follows: 

Nuclear power plants are required to submit to the EPA and the State annual reports of the 

environmental releases of listed toxic chemicals manufactured, processed, or otherwise used 

above Federally and State-identified threshold quantities. Disposal of essentially all of the 

hazardous chemicals used at nuclear power plants is regulated by RCRA or NPDES permits. 

Nuclear power plants are required by the NRC to operate in compliance with all permits, 

therefore minimizing the impact on the environment, workers, and the public. Therefore, the 

health impacts from chemicals on workers and the public are considered small. 

The first sentence in the above-quoted text (lines 19 to 21 on page 3-133) refers to reporting 

required under Section 313 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-394 

(EPCRA) as implemented by U.S. Environmental Protection Agency regulations 

(40 CFR [Part] 372). The statement is somewhat misleading, however, because many nuclear 

power plants manufacture, process, or otherwise use such small quantities of toxic chemicals 

that the threshold quantities for reporting under 40 CFR [Part] 372 are not triggered. Also, many 

nuclear power plants are not required to obtain RCRA permits since they neither dispose of 

hazardous wastes on site nor store hazardous wastes for longer than RCRA allows without a 

permit (90 days for large quantity generators or 120 days for other generator types under most 

conditions). Therefore, the last three sentences in the above quoted text (lines 21 to 25 on 

page 3-133) are also somewhat misleading. Accordingly, consider changing the text in lines 

19 to 25 on page 3-133 to read as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

Nuclear power plants may be are required in some instances to submit to the EPA and the State

annual reports of the environmental releases of listed toxic chemicals manufactured, processed, 

or otherwise used that are above Federally and Stateidentified threshold quantities, depending 

on state regulations or other specific circumstances. Disposal of In addition, management, 

including treatment, storage, disposal, and release to the environment, of essentially all of the

hazardous chemicals used at nuclear power plants is regulated by RCRA, FIFRA, TSCA, or 

NPDES permitsthe Clean Water Act. In the case of releases to state and federal waters, the 

Clean Water Act requires that nuclear power plants obtain NPDES permits, which establish 

protective release limits and controls as well as monitoring and reporting requirements. RCRA, 

FIFRA, and TSCA also establish reporting requirements that frequently apply to management of 

nonradioactive hazardous chemicals at nuclear power plants, and some nuclear power plants 

may undertake activities that require a RCRA permit. Nuclear power plants are required by the 

NRC to operate in compliance with all permitsapplicable environmental laws, regulation, and 

permits, thereforethereby minimizing the impact on the environment, workers, and the public. 

Therefore, the health impacts from chemicals on workers and the public are considered small. 

(NEI1-7(4)-69) 

Response: To more clearly state the requirements for the management of hazardous materials 

under various Federal statutes, the suggested changes have been made to Section 3.9.2 of the 

GEIS.

Comment: Page 3-136, lines 17 to 26: The paragraph in lines 17 to 26 on page 3-136 

describes a study published in 2006 that discovered Legionella-like amoebal pathogens to be 

16 times more likely to occur in samples from cooling towers located at industrial, hospital, 

municipal, university, and public building sites that in samples from natural environments such 

as rivers, creeks, lakes, and ponds. The last sentence in the paragraph states that this 

discovery “justifies the need for monitoring.” 

The cooling towers tested during the study described in lines 17 to 26 on page 3-136 were not 

comparable with those used for condenser cooling at nuclear power stations. Therefore, it is 
Appendix A 

 A-395 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

unclear what monitoring at any nuclear power plant might be “justified” by the referenced study. 

Consider changing the last sentence in the paragraph (lines 25 and 26) to read as follows 

(strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

According to this study, the probability of infected amoebae occurring in cooling towers is 

16 times higher than in natural environments., which justifies the need for monitoring.

(NEI1-7(4)-70) 

Response: The suggested change has been made to Section 3.9.3.2 of the GEIS.

Comment: Vol. 1, Page 3-137, lines 33 to 35: Text in lines 33 to 35 on page 3-137 reads as 

follows: 

For some plants, such as Hatch, Quad Cities, Peach Bottom, and Monticello, NPDES permits 

set limits on the maximum daily temperature for the discharge. 

The current NPDES permit (issued December 1, 2000) for the Peach Bottom Atomic Power 

Station does not contain a maximum daily discharge temperature limit. Rather, the permit 

requires that the discharge water temperature be monitored and reported. Accordingly, the 

following modification is suggested to the text in lines 33 to 35 on page 3-137 (strikethrough font 

= deletion; italics font = addition): 

For some plants, such as Hatch, Quad Cities, Peach Bottom, and Monticello, NPDES permits 

set limits on the maximum daily temperature for the discharge. (Exelon-17-9) 

Response: The suggested change has been made to Section 3.9.3.4 of the GEIS.

Comment: Page 3-150, Table 3.11-1: Three columns in Table 3.11-1 on page 3-150 provide 

volume, activity, and number of shipments of the solid low-level radioactive waste shipped 

offsite from each of ten nuclear power plants during 2006. A fourth column in Table 3.11-1 

indicates the number of reactors at each nuclear power plant site. For the Indian Point and San 

Onofre plants, the number of reactors is given as “3 (Units 1, 2, and 3).” Footnote (b) explains 

that at both of these sites, Unit 1 is shut down. 

Because the closed units at Indian Point and San Onofre generated none of the low-level 

radioactive waste quantities reported in Table 3.11-1, consider changing the entries in the 

column labeled “Number of Reactors” for both Indian Point and San Onofre from “3 (Units 1, 2, 

and 3)” to “2 (Units 2 and 3).” Table 3.11-1 appears to be intended to provide information on 

LLRW disposed of from operating units. The quantity of waste reported for SONGS Units 1, 2, 

and 3 is the total volume of LLRW from Unit 1 that was undergoing active decommissioning in 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-396 

2006 and the LLRW from Units 2 and 3 that are operating units. For further clarity, retain 

footnote (b) explaining that at both sites, Unit 1 is shut down. (NEI1-7(4)-73) 

Response: To clarify the status of Unit 1 at Indian Point and San Onofre with respect to 

decommissioning, text describing the status of those reactors has been added to footnote (b) in 

Table 3.11-1 of the GEIS; however, the entries in Table 3.11-1 were not changed.

Comment: Page 153, Figure 3.11-2: Figure 3.11-2 contains a map showing the locations of 

Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSIs) that are licensed by the NRC. 

Consider updating Figure 3.11-2, to show the licensed ISFSIs at the Indian Point, Vermont 

Yankee, and Limerick nuclear power plant sites. (NEI1-7(4)-74) 

Response: Figure 3.11-2 of the GEIS has been updated as suggested in the comment.

Comment: Page 3-154, lines 28 to 29: Text in lines 28 and 29 on page 3-154 reads as follows: 

“The types of hazardous waste that nuclear power plants generate include waste paints, lab 

packs, solvents, and lead batteries.” 

Because “batteries” are not hazardous waste if they are reclaimed or managed as universal 

waste, consider changing the text in lines 28 and 29 on page 3-154 to read as follows 

(strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

The types of hazardous waste that nuclear power plants typically generate include waste paints, 

lab packs, and solvents, and lead batteries. (NEI1-7(4)-75) 

Response: Section 3.11.2 of the GEIS has been revised as suggested in the comment.

Comment: Page 3-155, lines 21 to 23: Text in lines 21 to 23 on page 3-155 reads as follows: 

“The only disposal facility that is authorized to receive mixed LLW for disposal at present is the 

EnergySolutions facility discussed under Section 3.11.1.1 on LLW.” 

The validity of the statement in lines 21 to 23 on page 3-155 should be verified before 

publication of the final updated GEIS because on September 10, 2009, the Texas Commission 

on Environmental Quality issued a Radioactive Material License for disposal of low-level 

radioactive waste in a unit to be constructed at the Waste Control Specialists, LLC facility in 

Andrews County, Texas. (NEI1-7(4)-76) 
Appendix A 

 A-397 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Response: The text in Section 3.11.3 of the GEIS has been revised to clarify that the WCS 

facility in Texas has also been authorized to receive mixed LLW.

Comment: Page 3-155, lines 36 to 38: Text in lines 36 to 38 on page 3-155 reads as follows: 

“Some power plants collect their sanitary waste in septic tanks and empty the tanks periodically, 

shipping the pumped sewage to a local sanitary waste treatment plant.” 

Because some nuclear power plants discharge sanitary waste directly to a POTW, consider 

changing the text in lines 36 to 38 on page 3-155 to read as follows (strikethrough font = 

deletion; italics font = addition): 

Some power plants discharge directly to a POTW while others collect their sanitary waste in 

septic tanks and empty the tanks periodically, shipping the pumped sewage to a local sanitary 

waste treatment plant. (NEI1-7(4)-77) 

Response: Section 3.11.4 of the GEIS has been revised as suggested in the comment.

Comment: For each environmental resource identified in the draft updated GElS, Chapter 4 in 

the GElS identifies and evaluates environmental consequences of the proposed action and the 

environmental consequences of alternatives to the proposed action. However, industry notes 

that a parallel structure for presenting the analysis in each section has not been adopted. For 

example, the discussions of environmental consequences of the proposed action are explicitly 

divided for some but not all resources into separate sections for continued operations and 

refurbishment activities. Also, these discussions are divided for some but not all resources into 

separate sections for operations and construction. 

Similarly, the discussions of environmental consequences of alternatives to the proposed action 

are explicitly divided for some but not all resources into separate sections for fossil energy 

alternatives, new nuclear alternatives and renewable energy alternatives. Also, the section on 

environmental consequences of renewable energy alternatives addresses different renewable 

energy sources for some resources than for others. These inconsistencies in format and 

content reduce the clarity and transparency of the draft updated GEIS by making it difficult to 

make comparisons among the conclusions in the various sections. Industry encourages the 

NRC to adopt and apply a clear and consistent format for discussing environmental 

consequences in Chapter 4 of the final updated GElS (OBIL-NEI-8) 

Comment: Page 4-9, lines 16 to 41 and Page 4-10, lines 1 to 7: Text in section 4.2.2, 

“Environmental Consequences of Alternatives to the Proposed Action,” is divided into two 

subsections labeled “Construction” and “Operations.” 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-398 

The purpose and scope of the text in Section 4.2.2 is not clear. Consider whether better clarity 

could be achieved by structuring Sections 4.2.1 (Proposed Action) and 4.2.2 (Alternatives to the 

Proposed Action) with parallel formats. That is, with numbered subsections labeled consistently 

in both sections, for example – “4.2.1.1 Land Use” and “4.2.2.1 Land Use”; “4.2.1.2 Visual 

Resources” and “4.2.2.2 Visual Resources.” In subsection 4.2.1.1, land use impacts of the 

proposed action would be addressed, and in subsection 4.2.2.1, land use impacts of the 

alternatives could be discussed. If constructional and operational impacts will be presented 

separately for the proposed action, they should be presented separately for each alternative to 

the proposed action (or for each category of alternatives—Fossil Energy; New Nuclear; 

Renewable Energy). At minimum, consider clarifying which alternatives to the proposed action 

are expected to cause the impacts described by the introductory text in Section 4.2.2 on page 4-

9, lines 16 to 41 and page 4-10, lines 1 to 7. 

Please generalize this comment and also apply it, as appropriate, in the following sections of the 

draft updated GEIS: 

• 4.3, “Air Quality and Noise” 

• 4.4, “Geology and Soils” 

• 4.5, “Hydrology” 

• 4.6, “Ecology” 

• 4.7, “Historic and Cultural Resources” 

• 4.8, “Socioeconomics” 

• 4.9, “Human Health” 

• 4.10, “Environmental Justice” 

• 4.11, “Waste Management and Pollution Prevention” 

(NEI1-7(4)-82) 

Response: The discussion of alternatives in Chapter 4 of the GEIS has been revised to 

provide a consistent treatment for each resource area and alternative to license renewal.

Comment: Page 4-10, lines 16 to 20: Text in lines 16 to 20 on page 4-10 is labeled 

“Construction – ...” 

Although the text in lines 16 to 20 on page 4-10 of the draft updated GEIS is labeled 

“Construction – ...” it appears to address both construction and operations impacts. Consider 

creating a separate paragraph labeled “Operations – ...” (NEI1-7(4)-84) 

Response: The text in Section 4.2.2.1 of the GEIS was modified as suggested in the comment.

Comment: Page 4-13, lines 25 and 26: Text in lines 25 and 26 on page 4-13 reads as follows: 

Emergency diesel generators and fire pumps typically require State or local operating permits.
Appendix A 

 A-399 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Because emergency diesel generators and fire pumps are typically listed as insignificant 

activities in permits based on their minimal operational run times, as the draft updated GEIS 

states in lines 37 to 40 on page 4-13, consider changing the above quoted text in lines 25 and 

26 on page 4-13 to read as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

Emergency diesel generators and fire pumps are typically listed as insignificant activities in 

require State or local operating permits as discussed below. (NEI1-7(4)-85) 

Response: Permits are required in most jurisdictions, and, under the recently promulgated 

Federal National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for reciprocating internal 

combustion engines, which will generally be administered by the States, additional emergency 

generators and fire pumps may require permits and may no longer be considered insignificant. 

No changes were made to the GEIS in response to this comment. 

Comment: Page 4-13, line 37: Text in lines 37 and 38 on page 4-13 reads as follows: 

Most, if not all, State air pollution regulations provide exemptions for air pollution sources that 

are not routinely operated, ... 

Delete the term “, if not all,” in line 37 on page 4-13 of the draft updated GEIS. (NEI1-7(4)-86) 

Response: Section 4.3.1.1 of the GEIS was revised as suggested.

Comment: Page 4-30, lines 3 to 7: Text in lines 3 to 7 on page 4-30 read as follows: 

Hydrologic conditions at all nuclear power plants and associated transmission lines have been 

well established during the current licensing term. However, continued operations and 

refurbishment activities could have an impact on water resources during the license renewal 

term. This section describes the potential impact of these activities on surface water and 

groundwater resources. 

For completeness, consider changing the last sentence (lines 6 and 7 on page 4-30) in the 

above-quoted paragraph to read as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

This section describes the potential impact of these proposed activities and alternatives to these 

proposed activities on surface water and groundwater resources. (NEI1-7(4)-90) 

Response: Section 4.5 of the GEIS was revised in response to this comment.
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-400 

Comment: Page 4-31, lines 17 and 18: Text in lines 17 and 18 on page 4-31, which is one 

bullet in a list of issues related to impacts on surface water that may occur during the license 

renewal term, reads as follows: 

• Water use conflicts for plants with cooling ponds or cooling towers using makeup water from a 

river with low flow (evaluated in the 1996 GEIS) 

The draft updated GEIS provides no definition for the phrase “river with low flow,” which is used 

in line 18 on page 4-31. To clarify the meaning of the phrase “river with low flow” throughout the 

draft updated GEIS, consider providing a definition on page 4-31 of the draft and also in chapter 

2 (Table 2.1-1). (NEI1-7(4)-91) 

Response: A definition of a river with low flow had been added to Section 4.5.1.1 of the draft 

revised GEIS, which was based on the 1996 GEIS. The term “low flow” was used in the 

1996 GEIS to define the difference between plants located on “small” rivers versus those on 

“large” rivers as related to annual river flow. This was discussed in Section 4.5.1.1 of the draft 

revised GEIS. Nevertheless, NRC has subsequently determined that the use of the terms in 

categorizing river flow is of little value as any river, regardless of size, can experience low flow 

conditions of varying severity during periods of drought and as further influenced by specific 

conditions in the affected watershed. Thus, the term “low flow” has been deleted from use as a 

qualifier in describing environmental issues in this revised GEIS. 

Comment: Page 4-35, lines 33 to 37: Text in lines 33 to 37 on page 4-35 reads as follows: 

Discharge of cooling water is monitored through individual State NPDES programs. The flow 

rate and chemical content of the water at discharge outfalls are regulated by State oversight in 

accordance with the NPDES permit. Wastewater discharge is also covered through NPDES 

permitting, and it includes biochemical monitoring parameters. Discharge from building drains is 

also addressed in the NPDES permit. 

To more accurately describe the NPDES permit program, consider changing the text in lines 33 

to 37 on page 4-35 to read as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

Discharges of cooling water and other plant wastewaters are is monitored through individual 

State NPDES programs via NPDES permits. The NPDES permit for a nuclear power plant 

contains requirements that limit the amount of pollutants that may be discharged at permitted 

outfalls. The permit also typically contains biological monitoring parameters that are primarily 

associated with the discharge of cooling water. The flow rate and chemical content of the water 

at discharge outfalls are regulated by State oversight in accordance with the NPDES permit. 

Wastewater discharge is also covered through NPDES permitting, and it includes biochemical 

monitoring parameters. Discharge from building drains is also addressed in the NPDES permit. 

(NEI1-7(4)-92) 
Appendix A 

 A-401 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Response: Section 4.5.1.1 of the GEIS was revised in response to this comment.

Comment: Page 4-37, lines 12 and 13: Text in lines 12 and 13 on page 4-37 reads as follows: 

Cooling ponds will also require makeup water as a result of naturally occurring evaporation, 

evaporation of the warm effluent, and possible seepage to groundwater. 

Because seepage would only be expected to occur in an unlined pond, consider changing the 

text in lines 12 and 13 on page 4-37 to read as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font 

= addition): 

Cooling ponds will also require makeup water as a result of naturally occurring evaporation, 

evaporation of the warm effluent, and if the pond is unlined, possible seepage to groundwater. 

(NEI1-7(4)-93) 

Response: NRC disagrees with this comment. While installation of a liner for cooling ponds is 

an effective mitigation measure, seepage to groundwater is still possible due to liner 

degradation over time, direct physical damage that causes leakage, or via overtopping of the 

cooling pond itself. Use of the term “possible” covers all possible contingencies. No change 

was made to the GEIS in response to this comment.

Comment: Page 4-37, lines 35 to 40: Text in lines 35 to 40 on page 4-37 reads as follows: 

The SEIS for the Wolf Creek plant in Kansas identified a site-specific water use conflict with a 

small to moderate impact (NRC 2008a). Makeup water for the Wolf Creek cooling lake (Coffee 

County Lake) is withdrawn from the Neosho River downstream of John Redmond Reservoir. 

The ecosystem downstream of this reservoir includes an endangered fish species, the Neosho 

madtom (Noturus placidus), which may be affected by the plant's water use during periods 

when the lake level is low and makeup water is obtained from the Neosho River. 

Because the discussion in the subsection containing lines 35 to 40 on page 4-37 of the draft 

updated GEIS focuses on water use conflicts among municipal, agricultural and industrial users 

of surface water resources, the above-quoted paragraph does not provide a pertinent example. 

Rather, it is an example of a water use conflict between a nuclear power plant user and aquatic 

communities that rely on surface water for their livelihood. Water use conflicts of the latter type 

are discussed in Section 4.6.1.2 of the draft updated GEIS (page 4-102), and this example is 

repeated there. Accordingly, consider deleting all of the text in lines 35 to 40 on page 4-37. 

(NEI1-7(4)-94) 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-402 

Response: Section 4.5.1.1 of the GEIS was revised in response to this comment to remove the 

text requested by the commenter.

Comment: Page 4-38, lines 5 and 6: Text in lines 5 and 6 on pager 4-38 reads as follows: 

Availability problems for downstream habitat and users have also been identified as a conflict at 

the Palo Verde plant in Arizona and may be anticipated at other plants. 

Based on the recent Palo Verde license renewal application, the above-quoted sentence 

referring to Palo Verde water use conflicts should be deleted from lines 5 and 6 on page 4-38 

because, given the constant rate of use of recycled water by Palo Verde and the projections for 

increase of treated effluent in the area, water use conflicts with respect to the Gila River are 

expected to be much less influenced by Palo Verde than by decisions of municipalities to either 

discharge or reuse portions of their effluent. (NEI1-7(4)-95) 

Response: Based on the finding in the Palo Verde SEIS of SMALL impact relative to water use 

conflicts, the text in question was revised to remove the reference to Palo Verde.

Comment: Page 4-38, lines 23 to 41 and Page 4-39, lines 1 to 5: Text in lines 23 to 41 on 

page 4-38 and lines 1 to 5 on page 4-39 consists of a subsection titled “Effects of Dredging on 

Water Quality.” 

The discussion in the subsection titled “Effects of Dredging on Water Quality” should be 

modified to acknowledge that the process for obtaining a permit from the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers (USACE) to dredge pursuant to Section 404 of the Clean Water Act includes an 

environmental review pursuant to NEPA. If the dredging might affect threatened or endangered 

species or Critical Habitat, as established under the Endangered Species Act, the USACE must 

consult with the National Marine Fisheries Service and/or the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 

before it makes a permit decision. In issuing any permit under the Section 404 permitting 

process, the USACE also considers other aquatic impacts, archeological resources, tribal 

concerns, and the permitting requirements of state and local agencies. 

This comment should also be applied to other sections in the draft updated GEIS that discuss 

the effects of dredging on water quality. (NEI1-7(4)-96) 

Response: Section 4.5.1.1 of the GEIS was modified to better clarify the requirements under 

the CWA for dredging and the related permitting process. 

Comment: Page 4-38, lines 27 to 30: Text in lines 27 to 30 on page 4-38 reads as follows: 
Appendix A 

 A-403 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Whether accomplished by mechanical, suction, or other methods, dredging disturbs sediments 

in the surface water body and affects surface water quality. In pristine locations, the impact will 

affect the turbidity of the water column. 

The intent of the above-quoted statement is to say that in clear water conditions, the turbidity 

will be more noticeable. But, dredging may affect turbidity in any water. Accordingly, consider 

changing the text in lines 27 to 30 on page 4-38 to read as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; 

italics font = addition): 

Whether accomplished by mechanical, suction, or other methods, dredging disturbs sediments 

in the surface water body and affects surface water quality. In pristine locations, tThe impact 

will temporarily affect the turbidity of the water column. (NEI1-7(4)-97) 

Response: The staff agrees with the proposed changes, and Section 4.5.1.1 of the GEIS was 

revised to state that dredging disturbs sediments in the surface water body and affects surface 

water quality by temporarily increasing the turbidity of the water column. 

Comment: Page 4-39, lines 31 and 32: Text in lines 31 and 32 on page 4-39 reads as follows: 

“Operational activities during the license renewal term would be similar to those occurring during 

the current license term and would not affect groundwater resources.” 

Because several groundwater impact issues have been determined in the draft updated GEIS to 

be Category 2 issues, which suggests that operational activities do have some effect on 

groundwater resources, consider revising the sentence in lines 31 and 32 on page 4-39 to read 

as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

Operational activities during the license renewal term would be similar to those occurring during 

the current license term and would not affect groundwater resources. (NEI1-7(4)-98) 

Response: Section 4.5.1.2 of the GEIS was revised in response to this comment. 

Comment: Page 4-45, lines 33 and 34: Text in lines 33 and 34 on page 4-45 reads as follows: 

Furthermore, contaminants present in the soil can act as long-term sources of contamination to 

underlying groundwater. 

Because some spills are incidental or minor and are immediately remediated so that no 

contaminants are remaining in the soil, consider changing the text in lines 33 and 34 on page 4-

45 to read as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-404 

Furthermore, contaminants present in the soil can act as long-term sources of contamination to 

underlying groundwater, depending on the severity of the spill. (NEI1-7(4)-99) 

Response: Section 4.5.1.2 of the GEIS was revised in response to this comment.

Comment: Page 4-45, lines 36 and 37: Text in lines 36 and 37 on page 4-45 reads as follows: 

Based on previous plant-specific reviews, these types of groundwater and soil contamination 

problems have occurred at many operating plants. 

To improve consistency between the contents of previous Supplemental Environmental Impact 

Statements for Nuclear Plant License Renewal prepared by the NRC and the draft updated 

GEIS, consider changing the sentence in lines 36 and 37 on page 4-45 to read as follows 

(strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

Based on previous plant-specific reviews, these types of groundwater and soil contamination 

problems have occurred at some many operating plants. (NEI1-7(4)-100) 

Response: Section 4.5.1.2 of the GEIS was revised in response to this comment.

Comment: Page 4-47, lines 33-36: Text reads as follows: 

On the basis of occurrences at several nuclear plants, the impact of radionuclide releases to 

groundwater quality could be small or moderate, depending on the occurrence and frequency of 

leaks and the ability to respond to leaks in a timely fashion. The issue is considered a 

Category 2 issue. 

The above-quoted statement appears to conflict with the conclusion from the NRC’s Liquid 

Release Lessons Learned Task Force Final Report issued on Sept. 1. 2006: “Although there 

have been a number of industry events where radioactive liquid was released to the 

environment in an unplanned and unmonitored fashion, based on the data available, the task 

force did not identify any instances where the health of the public was impacted.” 

The NRC is encouraged to revise the potential impact classification of radionuclides released to 

groundwater to Category 1 and to amend the language on lines 33-35 as follows (strikethrough

font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

On the basis of occurrences at several nuclear plants, the impact of radionuclide releases to 

groundwater quality could be is expected to be small or moderate, depending on the occurrence 

and frequency of given the improved onsite groundwater monitoring for leaks and the enhanced 

ability to respond to leaks in a timely fashion. The NRC does not consider these inadvertent 
Appendix A 

 A-405 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

releases of radionuclides to groundwater to be a health risk to the public or workers. The issue 

is considered a Category 2 1 (NEI1-7(4)-15) 

Response: This new Category 2 issue evaluates the potential contamination and degradation 

of groundwater resources resulting from inadvertent discharges of radionuclides into 

groundwater from nuclear power plants. Within the past several years, there have been 

numerous events at power reactor sites which involved unknown, uncontrolled, and 

unmonitored releases of radionuclides into the groundwater. As described in the revised GEIS, 

the majority of these inadvertent radionuclide releases have involved tritium. However, other 

radionuclides, such as cesium and strontium, have also been inadvertently released. These 

inadvertent releases have been caused by leakage from spent fuel pools and buried piping, and 

in one case, the failure of pressure relief valves on a liquid effluent discharge line. 

On the basis of the available information and experience with these leaks, the NRC concludes 

that the impact to groundwater quality from the release of radionuclides could be SMALL or 

MODERATE, depending on the magnitude of the leak, the radionuclides involved, and the 

response time of plant personnel to identify and stop the leak. As there are currently no NRC 

regulations that would require the timely identification and termination of an inadvertent leak of 

radionuclides, there is no information available which would enable NRC to make a generic 

assessment. Therefore, the issue will remain as Category 2, and each applicant for license 

renewal will be required to submit site-specific information on its groundwater protection 

program in its environmental report. No change was made in response to this comment. 

Comment: Page 4-47, lines 40 and 41: Text in lines 40 and 41 on page 4-47 reads as follows: 

Construction - Construction-related impacts on hydrology (land clearing during and impervious 

pavements) would alter surface drainage patterns and groundwater recharge zones. 

To better clarify the meaning of the above-quoted sentence, consider changing the text in lines 

40 and 41 on page 4-47 to read as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

Construction - Construction-related impacts on hydrology (land clearing during and impervious 

pavements) would alter surface drainage patterns and groundwater recharge zones. 

(NEI1-7(4)-101) 

Response: Section 4.5.2 of the GEIS was revised in response to this comment.

Comment: Page 4-47, Section 4.5.2 (Environmental Consequences of Alternatives to the 

Proposed Action): Throughout Section 4.5.2, “Environmental Consequences of Alternatives to 

the Proposed Action,” including subsections 4.5.2.1 through 4.5.2.3, potential surface water 

impacts and potential groundwater impacts should be distinguished. Also, for consistency, it 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-406 

would be helpful if conclusions about potential impacts from construction and potential impacts 

from operations were presented in each subsection, even if the conclusion consists only of a 

cross reference to an earlier subsection, or indicates that the technology involves no activities 

creating a source of impacts to surface water or groundwater. (NEI1-7(4)-102) 

Response: Surface water and groundwater discussions are combined in the brief alternatives 

descriptions. Clarification was added to Section 4.5.2 of the GEIS that the construction 

discussion applies generally to each alternative.

Comment: Page 4-60, Line 17: Revise sentence "The NPDES permits... " to read "The 

effluent guideline relevant to nuclear power plants allows a maximum chlorine effluent limitation 

of 0.2 mg/L, which is less than those concentrations reported to have no adverse effects on 

laboratory animals. A facility may have a more stringent effluent limitation for chlorine 

depending on relevant water quality standards, and thus an NPDES permit may require a more 

stringent limit." (EPA-3(1)-16) 

Response: In order to clarify the chlorine effluent limits and NPDES permits, the suggested 

change has been made to Section 4.6.1.1 of the GEIS. 

Comment: Page 4-60, Line 8: States, "Although water screening guidelines have not been 

established for terrestrial biota, compliance with NPDES permits ensures that nonradioactive 

contaminant concentrations discharged from the cooling system are low enough to have only 

small impacts on water quality and aquatic communities," Change to−"...compliance with 

NPDES permits should ensure that nonradioactive contamination concentrations discharged 

from the cooling system ... " (EPA-3(1)-15)

Response: The suggested change has been made to Section 4.6.1.1 of the GEIS.

Comment: Page 4-61, lines 19 to 23: Text in lines 19 to 23 on page 4-61 reads as follows: 

In the past, the use of copper alloy condenser tubes in the cooling systems at the H.B Robinson 

plant in South Carolina and Diablo Canyon plant in California resulted in the discharge of copper 

in the liquid effluent, which was observed to have adverse effects on the morphology and 

reproduction of resident bluegill populations. 

Because Diablo Canyon is located on the ocean and bluegill is a freshwater species that would 

not occur there, consider changing the above quoted text in lines 19 to 23 on page 4-61 to read 

as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

In the past, the use of copper alloy condenser tubes in the cooling systems at the H.B. 

Robinson plant in South Carolina and Diablo Canyon plant in California resulted in the 
Appendix A 

 A-407 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

discharge of copper in the liquid effluent, which at the Robinson plant was observed to have 

adverse effects on the morphology and reproduction of resident bluegill populations (Harrison 

1985). (NEI1-7(4)-103) 

Response: Section 4.6.1.1 of the GEIS was updated to differentiate that bluegill populations 

were affected at H.B. Robinson and abalone were affected at Diablo Canyon.

Comment: Page 4-80, Line 34: States − "Entrainment occurs when planktonic organisms pass 

through the intake screens and travel through the condenser, cooling system." Delete 

"planktonic" because all life stages of aquatic organisms are subject to entrainment, not just 

planktonic life stages or organisms. (EPA-3(1)-17) 

Response: Section 4.6.1.2 of the GEIS has been modified in response to this comment.

Comment: Page 4-80, Lines 35-37: Edit sentence beginning "Aquatic organisms..." to read 

"Aquatic organisms that can be entrained include all life stages of fish, shellfish, 

macroinvertebrates, zooplankton, and phytoplankton." (EPA-3(1)-18) 

Response: Section 4.6.1.2 of the GEIS has been modified to better explain entrainment in 

response to this comment.

Comment: Page 4-83, lines 4 to 9: Text in lines 4 to 9 on page 4-83 reads as follows: 

For the Wolf Creek plant in Kansas, the NRC concluded that impingement during continued 

operation of the plant could have small to moderate impacts at the makeup water screen house 

during periods when river water levels were low, because fish would have less available habitat 

to use as a refuge and would likely be exposed to greater pumping frequency and volume 

removals from the Neosho River (NRC 2008a). During most of the license renewal term, the 

impacts of impingement would be small (NRC 2007d). 

Because the above quoted text discusses the Wolf Creek plant in Kansas, it does not make 

sense to use the Reference “NRC 2007d,” which refers to World Wide Web URL 

http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-licensing/col.html, to support the conclusion in lines 8 and 9 on 

page 4-83. Please verify the validity of the citation. (NEI1-7(4)-104) 

Response: Section 4.6.1.2 of the GEIS has been modified to reference the Wolf Creek SEIS in 

response to this comment.

Comment: Page 4-84, Line 9: Change to − "Physical stresses presented during impingement 

are affected by screen wash frequency, spray pressure, screen rotation speed, and screen 

modifications intended to reduce stress associated with fish separation and handling." Low 

pressure spray is often used to return fish to a waterbody, whereas a high pressure spray is 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-408 

used for debris removal. (U.S. EPA. Technical Development Document for the Final Section 

316(b) Phase II Existing Facilities Rule (EPA 821-R-04-007). Chapter 4. February 2004) 

(EPA 3(1)-19) 

Response: Section 4.6.1.2 of the GEIS has been modified in response to this comment.

Comment: Page 4-86, Lines 6-21: Replace paragraph with the following: "Section 316(b) of 

the CWA requires that the location, design, construction, and capacity of cooling water intake 

structures reflect the best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact 

and is regulated under the NPDES program. There are two rulemaking phases relevant to 

nuclear power plant cooling water intake structures. Phase I (enacted in December 2001) is for 

new facilities (see 40 CFR § 125.83) with a design intake flow greater than 2 million gpd 

(7.6 million L/d) and that use at least 25% of water withdrawn used for cooling purposes 

(40 CFR § 125 Subpart I). Phase II (enacted in July 2004) applies to existing large, electric 

generating facilities with a design intake flow of 50 million gpd (189 million L/d) or more and that 

use at least 25% of the water withdrawn for cooling purposes (40 CFR § 125 Subpart J). The 

Phase II Rule was suspended on July 9, 2007. The latest information regarding this matter is 

located at: http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/316b. Existing nuclear power plant facilities with a 

cooling water intake structure that are not currently subject to a national rule require 

Section 316(b) NPDES permit conditions that reflect best technology available for minimizing 

adverse environmental impact on a case-by-case, best professional judgment (BPJ) basis 

(40 CFR. §§ 125.90(b) and 401.14). Any site-specific mitigation required under the NPDES 

permitting process should result in a reduction in the impacts of continued plant operations." 

(EPA-3(1)-20) 

Response: Section 4.6.1.2 of the GEIS has been modified in response to this comment.

Comment: Vol. 1, Page 4-90, lines 35 to 37: Text in lines 35 to 37 on page 4-90 reads as 

follows: The heated discharges from the Oyster Creek plant in New Jersey increased the 

distribution and abundance of a nonnative, tropical-subtropical, wood-boring shipworm species 

(Teredo bartschi). 

Because all causes of the increase in shipworm distribution and abundance in Barnegat Bay 

were not definitively identified, the following modification is suggested to the text in lines 35 to 

37 on page 4-90 (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

The heated discharges from the Oyster Creek plant in New Jersey contributed to an increase in 

increased the distribution and abundance of a nonnative, tropical-subtropical, wood-boring 

shipworm species (Teredo bartschi). (Exelon-17-10) 

Response: Section 4.6.1.2 of the GEIS has been modified in response to this comment.
Appendix A 

 A-409 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Comment: Vol. 1, Page 4-101, lines 28 to 30: Text in lines 28 to 30 on page 4-101 reads as 

follows: 

The intake and discharge canals at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station in 

New Jersey have been dredged approximately every 3 to 10 years (NRC 2007b),... 

Based on the dredging frequencies reported for Oyster Creek Generating Station in the NRC's 

site-specific environmental impact statement for Oyster Creek license renewal (NUREG1437,Supplement 28 [January 2007], page 2-18), and the fact that in the years when dredging 

occurred only part of either the intake canal or the discharge canal, but not both, was dredged, 

the following modification is suggested to the text in lines 28 to 30 on page 4-10 (strikeout font = 

deletion; italics font = addition): 

Portions of either theThe intake canal and or the discharge canals at the Oyster Creek Nuclear 

Generating Station in New Jersey have been dredged approximately every 3 to 10 years (NRC 

2007b)... (Exelon-17-11) 

Response: Section 4.6.1.2 of the GEIS has been modified in response to this comment.

Comment: Page 4-116. Use Historic Properties for title. (BIA-19-13) 

Response: The term “historic properties” is used when discussing Section 106 compliance 

activities and “cultural resources” is used when generically referencing the resource. The 

terminology in the text discusses historic and cultural resources in general. This subject matter 

is consistent with NRC regulations. The NRC considers historic and cultural resources as an 

all-inclusive term that includes prehistoric, historic, and cultural properties. No changes were 

made to the GEIS in response to this comment.

Comment: Page 4-117, lines 30-40; page 4-118, lines 1-41; page 4-119, lines 1-41; page 1-20, 

lines 1-36: Would these paragraphs or portions of these paragraphs fit better in the Affected 

Environment chapter? (BIA-19-15) 

Response: The referenced text relates to the types of information that would be used in plantspecific assessments of the impacts of license renewal on cultural resources. The text does not 

describe the affected environment of plant sites. No changes were made to the GEIS in 

response to this comment.

Comment: Page 4-139, Table 4.9.1.1-3: Table 4.9.1.1-3 contains information about dose to 

the maximally exposed individual (MEI) from gaseous and liquid effluent releases during the 

years 1999 through 2003 for three nuclear power plants that recently replaced steam 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-410 

generators. Included is information for Arkansas Unit 2, except during the year 2000 for which 

the site’s annual effluent release report was not available. 

Consider adding the following information from the 2000 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release 

Report for Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 to Table 4.9.1.1-3 on page 4-139 because the 

current draft updated GEIS data are inaccurate: 

Gaseous Effluents Liquid Effluents 

Total Body 

(mrem) 

Gamma 

(mrad) 

Beta 

(mrad) 

Critical Organ 

(mrem) 

Total Body 

(mrem) 

Critical Organ 

(mrem) 

3.15 x 10-2 2.70 x 10-3 2.21 x 10-3 3.15 x 10-2 3.00 x 10-3 3.90 x 10-3

(NEI1-7(4)-107) 

Response: The referenced table entries in Section 4.9.1.1 of the GEIS have been modified to 

reflect current data for Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2.

Comment: Page 4-142, lines 32 to 34: Text in lines 32 to 34 on page 4-142 reads as follows: 

Nuclear power plants are required to submit to the Federal EPA and the State in which they are 

located annual reports on the environmental releases of listed toxic chemicals manufactured, 

processed, or otherwise used that are above Federally and State-identified threshold quantities. 

The above-quoted text (lines 32 to 34 on page 4-142) refers to reporting required under Section 

313 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) as implemented 

by U.S. Environmental Protection Agency regulations (40 CFR [Part] 372). The statement is 

somewhat misleading, however, because many nuclear power plants manufacture, process, or 

otherwise use such small quantities of toxic chemicals that the threshold quantities for reporting 

under 40 CFR [Part] 372 are not triggered. Accordingly, consider changing the text in lines 32 

to 34 on page 4-142 to read as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

Nuclear power plants may be are required in some instances to submit to the Federal EPA and 

the State in which they are located annual reports on the environmental releases of listed toxic 

chemicals manufactured, processed, or otherwise used that are above Federally and State

identified threshold quantities, depending on state regulations or other specific circumstances. 

(NEI1-7(4)-108) 

Response: The suggested changes have been made to Section 4.9.1.1 of the GEIS. 

Comment: Page 4-172, Lines 19-20: Replace "Liquid effluents" with "Wastes discharged to a 

waters of the United States" (EPA-3(1)-22) 
Appendix A 

 A-411 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Response: To clarify what would be regulated by a NPDES permit, the suggested change has 

been made to Section 4.11.2.2 of the GEIS. 

Comment: Page 4-201, lines 16 to 19: Text in lines 16 to 19 on page 4-201 reads as follows: 

Potential impingement and entrainment losses of special status fish species could also 

decrease. Reactor shutdown could also decrease impacts on EFH, although only minimal 

adverse effects have been identified for the operating plants for which EFH assessments have 

been prepared (i.e., Pilgrim, Vermont Yankee, and Oyster Creek plants). 

The above-quoted sentences from lines 16 to 19 on page 4-201 appear to be out of place within 

the paragraph that spans lines 8 to 24 on page 4-201. Consider moving the above-quoted 

sentences to the end of the paragraph. 

Also, because EFH assessments have been prepared at nuclear power plants other than 

Pilgrim, Vermont Yankee, and Oyster Creek, consider changing the text in lines 16 to 19 on 

page 4-201 to read as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

Potential impingement and entrainment losses of special status fish species could also 

decrease. Reactor shutdown could also decrease impacts on EFH, although only minimal 

adverse effects have been identified for the operating plants for which EFH assessments have 

been prepared (i.ee.g., Pilgrim, Vermont Yankee, and Oyster Creek plants). (NEI1-7(4)-109) 

Response: Section 4.12.2.1 of the GEIS has been revised in response to this comment. 

Comment: To be consistent and accurate, the definitions in the glossary for entrainment and 

impingement should be the same as presented in the text box on page 4-80. See Draft Generic 

EIS, p 7-18; lines 6-7 & p 7-24; lines 33-34, respectively. (NYS DEC-12-11) 

Response: The suggested change has been made to Chapter 7 (Glossary) of the GEIS.

Comment: Page 7-1: Advisory Council for Historic Preservation is actually Advisory Council 

on Historic Preservation. Do you want to define Area of Potential Effect (APE) and Historic 

Property? (BIA-19-20) 

Response: Chapter 7 (Glossary) of the GEIS has been modified to correct the title for the 

Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, and to add the definitions “area of potential effect” 

and “historic property.”
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-412 

Comment: Page 7-22: Global Warming. Definition should indicate that the predictions are 

based on models similar to those climatologists use for predicting temperature and weather 

patterns. (BIA-19-21) 

Response: The NRC disagrees that the suggested addition is necessary for the definition of 

global warming. No change was made to the GEIS in response to this comment.

Comment: Page 7-36, lines 17 and 18: Text in lines 17 and 18 on page 7-36 reads as follows: 

Reference reactor year (RRY): Refers to one year of operation of a 1000-MW electric capacity 

nuclear power plant. 

For consistency with the draft updated GEIS text in lines 30 to 33 on page 4-176, consider 

changing the definition of Reference reactor year (RRY) in lines 17 and 18 on page 7-36 to read 

as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

Refers to one year of operation of a 1000-MW electric capacity nuclear power plant operating at 

an 80% availability factor to produce about 800 MW-yr (0.8 GW-yr) of electricity. 

(NEI1-7(4)-111) 

Response: The suggested change has been made to Chapter 7 (Glossary) of the GEIS. 

Comment: Vol. 2, Page C-6, line 6: Based on the NRC List of Power Reactor Units 

[http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/list-power-reactor-units.html], change the entry in the row 

labeled “Licensee” from “Commonwealth Edison Company” to “Exelon Generation Company". 

(Exelon-17-13) 

Comment: Vol. 2, Page C-12, line 6: Based on the NRC List of Power Reactor Units 

[http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/list-power-reactor-units.html], change the entry in the row 

labeled “Licensee” from “Exelon Corporation” to “Exelon Generation Company". (Exelon-17-14) 

Comment: Vol. 2, Page C-20, line 6: Based on the NRC List of Power Reactor Units 

[http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/list-power-reactor-units.html], change the entry in the row 

labeled “Licensee” from “AmerGen Energy Co.” to “Exelon Generation Company”. 

(Exelon-17-15) 

Comment: Vol. 2, Page C-60, line 6: Based on the NRC List of Power Reactor Units 

[http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/list-power-reactor-units.html], change the entry in the row 

labeled “Licensee” from “Exelon Corporation” to “Exelon Generation Company”. (Exelon-17-16) 
Appendix A 

 A-413 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Comment: Vol. 2, Page C-62, line 6: Based on the NRC List of Power Reactor Units 

[http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/list-power-reactor-units.html], change the entry in the row 

labeled “Licensee” from “Exelon Corporation” to “Exelon Generation Company”. (Exelon-17-17) 

Comment: Vol. 2, Page C-76, line 6: Based on the NRC List of Power Reactor Units 

[http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/list-power-reactor-units.html], change the entry in the row 

labeled “Licensee” from “AmerGen Energy, LLC” to “Exelon Generation Company”. 

(Exelon-17-18) 

Comment: Vol. 2, Page C-76, line 14: Based on the renewed license for the Oyster Creek 

Nuclear Generating Station, change the entry in the row labeled “License Expiration” from 

“2009” to “2029”. (Exelon-17-19) 

Comment: Vol. 2, Page C-82, line 6: Based on the NRC List of Power Reactor Units 

[http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/list-power-reactor-units.html], change the entry in the row 

labeled “Licensee” from “Exelon Co.” to “Exelon Generation Company”. (Exelon-17-20) 

Comment: Vol. 2, Page C-116, line 6: Based on the NRC List of Power Reactor Units 

[http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/list-power-reactor-units.html], change the entry in the row 

labeled “Licensee” from “Exelon Corporation” to “Exelon Generation Company”. (Exelon-17-21) 

Response: The suggested changes have been made to Appendix C of the GEIS.

Comment: How about inserting an introductory paragraph discussing the technical bases for 

the GElS analyses? (BIA-19-22) 

Response: Appendix D serves as the technical basis for GEIS analysis, broken down by 

resource area. For each resource area, there is a description of the bases used by the NRC in 

its analysis of impact. For a discussion of the technical basis for a particular resource area, 

please refer to the appropriate section in Appendix D. No change was made to the GEIS as a 

result of this comment. 

Comment: Page D-13, lines 18 to 26: Text in lines 18 to 26 on page D-13 describes the 

contents of the maintenance plan that a State must implement in an area that has been 

redesignated under the Clean Air Act from “nonattainment” status to “attainment maintenance” 

status. In lines 24 to 26 on page D-13, the text reads as follows: 

The NRC will ensure coordination of licensee with the appropriate EPA Regional Office and/or 

State air quality office before any plants begin major construction or refurbishment activities. 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-414 

To more accurately reflect the interaction among the licensee, the NRC, and the EPA Regional 

Office in the event that major construction or refurbishment activities are conducted at a nuclear 

power plant to support license renewal, consider changing the above-quoted statement in lines 

24 to 26 on page D-13 to read as follows (strikethrough font = deletion; italics font = addition): 

The NRC will ensure coordination of assure that the licensee has coordinated with the 

appropriate EPA Regional Office and/or State air quality office prior to beginning before any 

plants begin major construction or refurbishment activities in a non-attainment maintenance 

area. (NEI1-7(4)-112) 

Response: Section D.2.2.2 of the GEIS has been revised.

Comment: Page F-4, Lines 19-30: Replace paragraph with: 

"As authorized by the Clean Water Act, the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 

(NPDES) permit program controls water pollution by regulating point source that discharge 

pollutants into waters of the United States. The NPDES program requires that all facilities which 

discharge pollutants from any point source into waters of the United States obtain an NPDES 

permit. An NPDES permit is developed with two levels of controls: technology-based limits and 

water quality based limits. NPDES permit terms may not exceed 5 years, and the applicant 

must reapply at least 180 days prior to the permit expiration date. A nuclear power plant may 

also participate in the NPDES General Permit for Industrial Storm Water, due to storm water 

runoff from industrial or commercial facilities to waters of the United States. EPA is authorized 

under the CWA to directly implement the NPDES program; however, EPA has authorized many 

States to implement all or parts of the national program. Section 401 of the CWA requires 

States to certify that the permitted discharge would comply with all limitations necessary to meet 

established State water-quality standards, treatment standards, or schedule of compliance.” 

(EPA-3(1)-23) 

Response: Section F.3 of the GEIS has been modified in response to this comment.

Comment: National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permits [Section F.6.1]: Replace 

language with: 

"Requires a permit prior to the discharge of pollutants from any point source into waters of the 

United States or State. Each permit holder must comply with authorized discharge levels, 

monitoring requirements, and other appropriate requirements in the permit." 

Water Quality Standards: Add to the end of paragraph "Water quality standards are enforced 

through the NPDES permit." (EPA-3(1)-24) 
Appendix A 

 A-415 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

Response: Table F.6-1 in Section F.6 of the GEIS has been modified in response to this 

comment.

A.2.1.18 Miscellaneous Comments 

Comment: Pilgrim Watch supports and incorporates herein comments submitted by 

Riverkeeper Inc., Tarrytown, New York and the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility, California. 

(PW-6-31)

Comment: We have made comments at previous meetings, as I mentioned. Because we – we 

do understand that the comments provided at the public meetings are being documented, we 

don't see any reason – to repeat those here today. We do have a few additional comments we 

are making today. We will be making additional comments at the remaining two public 

meetings. Of necessity, these comments are somewhat at a high level, and I just wanted to 

clarify. I – do appreciate that as – as one who has put out draft documents before, when you 

see the high level document, you initially have the reaction of well, what are you talking about, 

specifically? You know, give me some examples. Show me what you've got. 

Our issue is just simply timing. We want to be sure we've thoroughly vetted the comments that 

we've drafted before we begin to drop into the details and share those. So – so I ask that you 

not be disappointed that we might go through the next two public meetings still without delving 

down into those details. What I – what I would suggest is that we will make sure that we are 

very clear with our examples and details in our written comments that we provide. And, in fact, 

we would welcome an – an opportunity, either near the end of the comment period or following 

closure of the comment period, whichever is more appropriate, at that time, to meet with you 

and to discuss even further the comments that we provide. That's not atypical from what we 

have done in the past, particularly where there are very, very extensive comments. So we – 

we'd be happy to discuss that possibility with you. And again, timing would be the simple issue. 

(RMD-NEI1-3) 

Comment: I would like to add my support for the comments made by Mary Lampert of PiIgrim 

Watch on the revision of the GEIS for license renewal, and I refer to the new information 

footnoted in her commentary as the basis for my comments. (Shaw-15-1) 

Response: These comments are general in nature. The NRC’s responses to the referred-to 

specific comments are addressed elsewhere in Section A.2 of the GEIS. No change was made 

to the GEIS in response to these comments.

Comment: The first comment is that the – we appreciate that the staff has rearranged the 

issues along the lines of resources; we think this actually adds better transparency to the 

process for members of the public and members of the industry as well, in that we think it much 
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-416 

better correlates what the issue is with where the potential impacts might arise, so we're very 

supportive of that. 

At the same time, though, we see that the staff has aggregated some issues of similar nature 

together, and the caution that we would offer is that, in doing so, there was some aggregation of 

issues that were previously Category 1 with issues that were Category 2. 

And as they're conveyed in the Table B-1 that's in the proposed rule, absent additional detail at 

the level of the rule, it creates at least the appearance that some issues have been actually 

moved from being Category 1 to Category 2. 

Reading the other materials, I don't think that's the intent, but we express the caution about the 

unintended consequence that, in any formal challenge, intervention, or other type of process, 

boards, courts, and others tend to focus on the rule itself rather than supporting guidance or 

supporting technical documents. 

They're going to do their own plain reading of the rule and make their own interpretation, and so 

we would be concerned that questions might arise later associated with sufficiency on the 

previously Cat 1 issues that were simply grouped in with an overall reading of Cat 2. 

I'll add as a comment, though, that in reading the handout that you have, which provides more 

detail than the Table B-1 that is actually in the proposed rule, it's much more clear what the 

pedigree is for the various issues, but again, I think some of that is lost with the way that it's 

summarized in the actual table that's in the proposed rule. So that's a caution. 

Our suggestion is that if the comment, once we provide it with more supporting information, 

seems to have some validity, it would seem to us and now I draw heavily on the handout that 

you had – that in effect you already have a template by which you could break the issues out in 

somewhat more detail; still listed adjacent to each other to connote their similarity, but in a way 

where it's much more clear that Cat 1 issues have actually remained as Cat 1 issues. But that 

distinction I think now is lost in the table that's actually in the rule. 

That could have the effect, then, of reducing not only the burden and what the licensee might 

feel they need to submit, but also could obviate certain follow-on processes to the license 

renewal process where there would have to be some form of adjudication to reach a decision. 

Another comment is that we also see that – oh, by the way, I did intend to give an example of 

that. The example I note that's illustrated excellently in the proposed rule versus your handout 

is on the impingement and entrainment of aquatic organisms. 
Appendix A 

 A-417 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

In your handout you very clearly show what was a 2 and what was a 1, but in the actual 

Table B-1 that's all rolled up and is simply listed as a 2. So that would be a good example to 

look at. We probably use your handout, as matter of fact, for aiding and developing our 

comments to show an example of how we think you could resolve the issue. (AGA-NEI-1) 

Response: No Category 1 issues are consolidated with any Category 2 issues in the final rule 

or revised GEIS. The proposed rule and draft revised GEIS had consolidated two Category 2 

issues, “Entrainment of fish and shellfish in early life stages (for plants with once-through 

cooling and cooling pond heat dissipation systems)” and “Impingement of fish and shellfish (for 

plants with once-through cooling and cooling pond heat dissipation systems)” with the 

Category 1 issue, “Entrainment of phytoplankton and zooplankton (for all plants)” (74 FR 38124, 

38136). Under the proposed rule and draft revised GEIS, the consolidated issue would have 

been a Category 2 issue, with an impact range of SMALL to LARGE. Subsequent to the 

publication of the proposed rule and draft revised GEIS, the NRC determined that such 

consolidation would have the effect of making “Entrainment of phytoplankton and zooplankton 

(all plants),” which is an issue generic to all plants (Category 1), a site-specific issue 

(Category 2). As there is no basis to support making the “Entrainment of phytoplankton and 

zooplankton (all plants)” a site-specific issue, the NRC determined not to adopt the proposed 

change. Similarly, the proposed rule and draft revised GEIS had consolidated the Category 2 

issue, “Heat shock (for plants with once-through and cooling pond heat dissipation systems)” 

with four Category 1 issues, “Cold shock (for all plants),” “Thermal plume barrier to migrating 

fish (for all plants),” “Distribution of aquatic organisms (for all plants),” and “Premature 

emergence of aquatic insects (for all plants)” (74 FR 38124, 38136). These issues were 

proposed for consolidation to facilitate the environmental review process because they are all 

caused by thermal effects. The final rule and revised GEIS reorganize the two “Thermal 

impacts on aquatic organisms” issues to separate out these Category 1 issues, which are 

consolidated into a new Category 1 issue, “Infrequently reported thermal impacts (all plants).” 

No changes were made to the revised GEIS as a result of this comment.
Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-418 

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Source Material.” 

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Special Nuclear Material.” 

10 CFR Part 71. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Energy, Part 71, “Packaging and 

Transportation of Radioactive Material.” 
Appendix A 

 A-419 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

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Appendix A 

NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-420 

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Appendix A 

 A-421 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

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NUREG-1437, Revision 1 A-422 

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Appendix A 

 A-423 NUREG-1437, Revision 1 

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Revision 1. Preparation of Environmental Reports for Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal 

Applications. 




UNITED STATES 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS
 

 

NUREG-1437, Vol. 2

Revision 1

Generic Environmental Impact Statement for 

License Renewal of Nuclear Plants