AT ITS

SCIENCE AT ITS

SECURITY WORST

BEST

A Special Investigative Panel 

President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

JUNE 1999

A Report on Security Problems at the 

U.S. Department of Energy

APPENDIX
AT ITS

SCIENCE AT ITS

SECURITY WORST

BEST

A Report on Security Problems at the 

U.S. Department of Energy

A Special Investigative Panel 

President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

JUNE 1999

P F I A B

APPENDIX
Chronology of Events A-1

Chronology of Reports on DOE A-15

Damage Assessment of China’s A-25

Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Information

Presidential Decision Directive 61 A-27

Bibliography A-29

Map of DOE Field Facilities A-35

P F I A B

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS P F I A B
1976 U.S. Government assesses that China may step up efforts to acquire relevant

nuclear technology. 

1977 Department of Energy established, from the Energy Research and

Development Administration, Federal Energy Administration, and elements

of several Cabinet Departments. 

May: Classified GAO report cites the need for an independent group to

assess the adequacy of safeguards for nuclear material, and to assure the

health and safety of the public from nuclear operations. In response to this

and to DOE Inspector General reports, the Assistant Secretary for Defense

Programs establishes an independent, inter-agency group to report to him on

the adequacy of safeguards at weapons labs. The group finds that safeguards at sensitive facilities are not effective, while DOE’s Office of

Safeguards and Security was giving these facilities passing grades. 

August: James R. Schlesinger becomes Secretary of Energy.

1979 Travel to PRC begins by U.S. persons associated with U.S. nuclear weapons

program; travelers face Chinese elicitation efforts.

January 1: U.S. normalizes relationship with China. 

August: DOE Secretary Schlesinger leaves office. Charles W. Duncan Jr.

becomes new DOE Secretary.

September 21: GAO produces “DOE’s Erroneous Declassification of Nuclear

Weapons Design Document.”

1980s FBI completes espionage investigation begun in late 1970s. Case is not prosecuted because suspect and foreign agent do not confess.

1980 March 18: GAO produces, “Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing and the Problem of

Safeguarding Against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons.”

October 16: China conducts last atmospheric nuclear test.

P F I A B

DOE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AND SECURITY CHRONOLOGY

SECURITY AND CI CHRONOLOGY A-1
1981 January: DOE Secretary Duncan leaves office. James B. Edwards becomes

new DOE Secretary.

1982 DOE’s Inspection and Evaluation program initiated. Program designed to

focus on specific elements of a given protection program and consists of

three distinct phases—interviews, evaluations and testing. Program results

to be reported to the responsible Assistant Secretary and the Secretary. 

August 20: GAO, in classified report, strongly recommends the reinstitution

of a high-level group independently reporting to the Under Secretary on the

state of safeguards at DOE.

November: DOE Secretary Edwards leaves office. Donald Paul Hodel

appointed new Secretary of Energy.

1983 January 31: DOE issues classified policy statement characterizing potential

threats to DOE facilities. DOE indicates, “this statement provides a consistent basis for the identification of vulnerabilities and the design of corrective

actions at the Department’s nuclear facilities.” 

July 8: President notifies Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy of

his interest in strengthening the White House role in monitoring and overseeing programs concerning the security of U.S. nuclear weapons facilities.

The Secretaries are instructed to provide quarterly status reports on security

improvement programs, and any reports required by Congress, to the NSC. 

1984 April 24: DOD publishes “Nuclear Weapon Systems in China,” which estimates that the Chinese will not try to match the two superpowers in terms of

nuclear capabilities, but will continue to seek Western technology support

for their underground nuclear test program. 

May: DOE establishes Central Training Academy to provide courses for protective force personnel in “tactical response, hostage negotiations, crisis

management, and protective force supervisory skills.” DOE designates

Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) as the single focal point for safeguards and security matters in DOE (residing in Defense Programs). The

Office of Security and Quality Assessments is created, also reporting directly

to the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs. 

July 2: In the Annual Report on Domestic Safeguards for 1983, DOE states

that despite “improvements and initiatives” to the physical security program,

“significant protection problems remain at many DOE facilities.” DOE

believes that the potential threat currently posed by the insider is serious and

requires the institution of additional controls and personnel reliability features at our facilities.”

A-2 SECURITY AND CI CHRONOLOGY P F I A B
1985 February: DOE Secretary Hodel leaves office. John S. Herrington becomes

new Secretary.

June: DOE annual report to the President for 1984 states “Notwithstanding

the progress that has been made [regarding major physical security construction projects], protection problems remain at a number of our nuclear facilities.”

August: DCI plans to meet with Secretary of Energy to discuss controls on

foreign nationals’ access to the U.S. national laboratories. 

September 13: DOE draft position paper on foreign visitor controls states it

is clear that DOE has a “problem with foreign visitors and the control/regulation of them.” 

1986 Unpublished U.S. Government report discusses Chinese efforts to obtain

U.S. nuclear information. 

January 28: Representative John Dingell, Chairman of the House Energy

and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, sends letter

to President Reagan regarding security vulnerabilities at the weapons laboratories. Rep. Dingell highlights additional management problems at DOE and

the labs, and a lack of confidence in the inspection and evaluation function

at DOE.

May 1: GAO produces report, “DOE Has Insufficient Control Over Nuclear

Technology Exports.”

1987 March 10: GAO produces report, “DOE’s Reinvestigations of Employees Have

Not Been Timely.” (DOE was unable to eliminate the case backlog until 1993). 

May: DOE’s Inspector General reports a defective background investigative

process at DOE.

June: DOE’s Office of Security Evaluations finds several personnel security

process errors at three DOE facilities.

August 17: GAO produces report, “Nuclear Nonproliferation: Department of

Energy Needs Tighter Controls over Reprocessing Information.”

December 29: GAO produces report, “DOE Needs a More Accurate and

Efficient Security Clearance Program.”

1988 April: DOE’s Inspector General finds lack of accountability and insufficient

timeliness in processing security clearances.

P F I A B SECURITY AND CI CHRONOLOGY A-3
April 4: Minutes from a counterintelligence staff meeting, chaired by FBI

Director, include an observation that “a significant problem we have had is

that there were no real controls or focal points for tracking scientific visitors

to China. Another problem was that academicians were rather naïve in their

understanding of Chinese intentions, and it became very important to ensure

that they were given a defensive CI briefing.” 

June: DOE’s annual report to the President for 1987 comments, “As stated

last year, DOE continues to be concerned about the potential threats posed by

an insider, a knowledgeable and trusted individual who has been granted

access to classified information or sensitive facilities. The threat posed by

insiders is potentially more difficult to address than that of outsiders.”

June 27: President signs and issues National Security Decision Directive

309, “Nuclear Weapons Safety, Security, and Control,” tasking DOE and

DOD to “determine the adequacy and effectiveness of physical security

measures and coordinate their efforts including exchange of technical and

operating data.” DOE shall prepare an Annual Report on Nuclear Weapons

Domestic Safeguards and Security ... that shall describe the current state of

protection of all DOE domestic nuclear weapons facilities.” The President

further directs that he should be briefed on these reports annually. 

October 1 1988 - August 8, 1989: FBI assigns official to DOE to evaluate CI

program and to provide advice to DOE. FBI official found DOE management

above the Counterintelligence Division inaccessible “which prevented him

from securing the approval for the direct communication of urgently needed

guidance to the field for the implementation of a vibrant counterintelligence

program.”

October 11: At a meeting, a DOE official briefs on the diverse nature of the

security problems and the physical measures taken at the various Energy

facilities which differ both technically and geographically. The official

expresses the opinion that Energy had done “essentially all that can be done

against the outsider threat.”

October 11: GAO produces report, “Nuclear Nonproliferation: Major

Weaknesses in Foreign Visitor Controls at Weapons Laboratories.”

November: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) staff briefed on

DOE’s counterintelligence activities. 

November 9: GAO produces report, “DOE Actions to Improve the Personnel

Clearance Program.”

December 12: Army CI officer provides a briefing to the interagency counA-4 SECURITY AND CI CHRONOLOGY P F I A B
terintelligence group on a GAO audit, “U.S. and Foreign Participation in

R&D at Federal Laboratories.” The GAO investigation concludes that most

laboratories do not perceive the foreign presence as a problem.

1989 January: DOE Secretary Herrington leaves office.

March: James D. Watkins becomes new Secretary of Energy.

May: Secretary of Energy delays the annual security report to the President

because he personally wants to assure himself of the adequacy of security

measures.

June: GAO produces report, “Nuclear Nonproliferation: Better Controls

Needed over Weapons-Related Information and Technology.” 

1990 January: Secretary of Energy Advisory Board (SEAB) is chartered as the

highest level external advisory board in DOE. The SEAB reports directly to

the Secretary. SEAB members form subcommittees and task forces to report

on various issues for the Secretary.

April: DOE provides “1989 Annual Report to the President on Safeguards

and Security.” The report states that “ensuring proper and cost-effective protection of DOE domestic nuclear weapons facilities is, and will continue to

be, one of the highest priority efforts in the Department.” Concurrently, the

Department will continue to pursue courses of action to mitigate the “insider

threat,” optimize its internal oversight function related to protection of

weapon facilities, and ensure a reasonable and proper balance between safety, environmental, and safeguards and security responsibilities.”

April: GAO produces report, “Nuclear Security: DOE Oversight of Livermore’s

Property Management System is Inadequate.” (The Annual Report to the

President in 1991 refers, in part, to this report, stating that “it has been determined that the primary cause of the document control problem was the number

of document control systems which operated independently at the laboratory.”) 

April 6: DOE Secretary Watkins removes intelligence function from Office

of Defense Programs (DP) and creates Office of Intelligence (IN) as a separate departmental element.

May 13: DOE issues supplemental policy guidance on protection against the

potential insider threat. 

June: Interagency working group prepares a study of specific threats to U.S.

Government facilities from visiting foreign nationals; finds several DOE CI

deficiencies.

P F I A B SECURITY AND CI CHRONOLOGY A-5
June: DCI plans to meet with the Secretary of Energy to discuss concerns

about the general lack of counterintelligence awareness at DOE facilities

around the country, and the slow progress toward improving DOE’s CI programs. 

October: GAO produces report, “Nuclear Safety: Potential Security

Weaknesses at Los Alamos and Other DOE Facilities.”

1991 February 8: GAO produces report, “Nuclear Security: Accountability for

Livermore’s Secret Classified Documents is Inadequate.”

March 21: GAO produces report, “Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs

Better Controls to Identify Contractors Having Foreign Interests.”

May 16: GAO produces report, “Nuclear Security: Property Control

Problems at DOE’s Livermore Laboratory Continue.”

June 1: DOE provides 1990 Annual Report to the President which states, in

part, that “significant improvements must be made immediately in safeguards and security areas involving planning and management, personnel

security, and the accounting for classified parts.” 

July 5: GAO produces report, “DOE Original Classification Authority Has

Been Improperly Delegated.”

July 8: Report from Energy Secretary Watkins on Safeguards and Security

at DOE Nuclear Weapons Facilities highlights previous security problems at

DOE and efforts to fix the deficiencies. It also notes that the report is not on

the safety of nuclear weapons but rather on the safeguarding of classified

information and materials. 

December 13: GAO produces report, “Nuclear Security: Safeguards and

Security Weaknesses at DOE’s Weapons Facilities.”

1992 April: At request of SSCI in FY92 intelligence authorization act, a community report cites insufficient resources in CI program, understaffing of debriefing elements, and lack of current threat information.

June: GAO produces report, “Nuclear Security: Weak Internal Controls

Hamper Oversight of DOE’s Security Problem.”

October 30: GAO produces report, “Nuclear Security: Safeguards and

Security Planning at DOE Facilities Incomplete.”

October: DOE Order on counterintelligence issued. 

A-6 SECURITY AND CI CHRONOLOGY P F I A B
October 7: DOE and FBI formalize relationship for conduct of CI activities

in Memorandum of Understanding. MOU’s purpose is to “define procedures

that are mutually acceptable to the FBI and DOE regarding the conduct and

coordination of counterintelligence activities and investigations involving

DOE programs, facilities, or personnel in the United States.”

November: DOE’s Office of Security Evaluations’ report for FY 1992 to the

Secretary states, “Management and oversight problems ... continue to be the

root cause of many other deficiencies noted in Security Evaluation inspections

during FY 92;” and the “Department’s Protection of Information programs suffer from lack of adequate guidance and a fragmented approach for protecting

information.”... “As noted in the past two reports, problems in management

and oversight represent the most significant weakness in the Department’s

safeguards and security program.” ... “Security systems continue to be plagued

with potential single point failures and inadequate life cycle planning.”

November 16: GAO produces report, “Nuclear Security: Improving

Correction of Security Deficiencies at DOE’s Weapons Facilities.”

1993 January: DOE Secretary Watkins leaves office. Hazel R. O’Leary becomes

new DOE Secretary.

February: The Annual Report to the Secretary on Safeguards and Security

for 1992 finds that “less than satisfactory ratings in the area of classified

matter protection and control stem in large part from the need for site management to assume responsibility for completion of self-assessments and

provide training for document control.” Another security program “has suffered from a lack of management focus and inconsistent procedural execution throughout the DOE complex. The result is that personnel are seldom

held responsible for their disregard, either intentional or unintentional, of

security requirements.”

April: In the Annual Report to the President for 1992, DOE states that there

is “an extensive reorganization of the laboratory safeguards and security

organization underway to more effectively and efficiently administer the laboratory program.”

May 10: GAO produces report, “Efforts by DOD & DOE to Eliminate

Duplicative Background Investigations.”

August 12: GAO produces report, “DOE’s Progress on Reducing Its Security

Clearance Workload.”

1994 January: The Annual Report to the Secretary on Safeguards and Security

for 1993 states that there is “growing confusion within the Department with

P F I A B SECURITY AND CI CHRONOLOGY A-7
respect to Headquarters’ guidance for safeguards and security. At this time,

there is no single office at Headquarters responsible for the safeguards and

security program. Most recently, a number of program offices have substantially expanded their safeguards and security staff to office-size organizations. These multiple safeguards and security offices have resulted in duplication of guidance, unnecessary requests for information/clarification, and

inefficient program execution. Unchecked, this counterproductive tendency

threatens the success of the overall safeguards and security effort.”

March: FBI detailees to DOE are recalled to FBI “to address internal FBI

needs,” because of “lack of control of the CI program by DOE Headquarters

[which] resulted in futile attempts to better manage the issue of foreign visitors at the laboratories.”

April: The DOE Safeguards and Security Annual Report to the President for

1994 states that DOE’s “safeguards and security community has begun to

aggressively respond to the Secretary’s goal of openness and public access to

government information while recognizing the need to provide appropriate

and effective security policy and procedures.”

June: Intelligence report states Chinese visitors to U.S. are attempting to

acquire U.S. technology through the recruitment of experts.

1995 January: The 1994 Annual Safeguards and Security Report to the Secretary

finds that information security management programs “generally reflect deficiencies in self-inspection programs, control of access to classified and

caveated information, and training regarding handling of classified information.” Many findings regarding information security “are directly due to a

lack of organizational and administrative detail on the part of those being

inspected. Overall, findings and surveys, much like last year, continue to

reflect deficiencies in self-inspections and procedural requirements or inappropriate or inadequate site guidance ... In the area of classified matter protection and control, like last year, marking, accountability, protection, and

storage deficiencies are most numerous.” 

February: DOE Office of Counterintelligence subordinated to Office of

Intelligence.

July: DOE senior officials discuss possibility that China may have classified

U.S. nuclear design information with CIA, FBI and White House senior officials in several meetings this summer.

Summer: Analytical working group meets on China’s nuclear weapons program and possible access to U.S. information. Group concludes that China

has obtained classified U.S. information but disagrees on impact.

A-8 SECURITY AND CI CHRONOLOGY P F I A B
August 3: GAO produces report, “Poor Management of Nuclear Material

Tracking Capabilities Makes Success Unlikely.”

1996 January: DOE’s annual safeguards and security report to the Secretary notes

that among the disturbing trends in 1995 are “severe budget reductions,

diminished technical resources, increased responsibilities, and reduced mission training, which have undermined protection of special nuclear material

and restricted data.” The report states that “continued budget cuts and

diminishing resources have reduced protection program operations to a level

of ‘single point failure.’” The report also reviews personnel security, and

finds there are cases of “identified individuals who held security clearances

for convenience only.” Problems are “symptomatic of the lack of management attention to basic information assurance concerns.”

January 23-27: China Arms Control Exchange (lab-to-lab) Workshops:

CTBT Verification and Monitoring Technologies, and Nuclear Materials,

Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A), in Beijing.

March: DOE Deputy Secretary initiates study of foreign visits and assignments to labs.

March 25-29: China Arms Control Exchange (lab-to-lab) Workshop:

Cooperative Monitoring Technologies, in Albuquerque.

April 13: DOE briefs Deputy National Security Advisor and senior NSC and

CIA officials on “China’s Nuclear Weapons Programs: Strategic Directions

and Foreign Contributions.”

May: DOE Administrative Inquiry is completed.

June 17-20: China Arms Control Exchange (lab-to-lab) Workshop:

Atmospheric Sciences (#1), in Livermore, CA.

September: The 1995 Annual Report to the President (not forwarded to the

White House until March 1997) is issued. Citing declining resources, DOE

states that “many program elements have been reduced to minimally effective levels,” and without “adequate investment, [and] senior level management support ... the nation’s special nuclear material stockpile could be

placed at increased risk and our international leadership in nuclear nonproliferation will be diluted.” Increased use of computer systems for handling

classified and sensitive unclassified information “increases the potential and

probability for ‘hacking’ and for covert collection of information from

unprotected or lightly protected systems.” Simply stated, “Classified and

sensitive unclassified information related to special nuclear materials and

weapons production is increasingly at risk.”

P F I A B SECURITY AND CI CHRONOLOGY A-9
October: DOE Office of Counterintelligence expanded; CIA CI expert designated to run office.

October: Intelligence reports cite several foreign countries are actively seeking U.S. nuclear information.

October 16: DOE’s Office of Intelligence forwards a plan to better detect

espionage through training and awareness briefings.

November 21: DOE Deputy Secretary meets with lab directors and heads of

DOE field offices to review foreign visitors and CI programs. DOE HQ, field

offices, and labs directed to begin implementing new measures to strengthen

foreign visitor and CI programs. Labs tasked to produce threat self-assessment.

1997 January: The 1996 Annual Report on Safeguards and Security for the

Secretary states, “Important security functions are operating under conditions of ‘single-point failure.’” DOE’s aging safeguards and security systems

are cited as nearing the end of their useful lives, and “they no longer provide

the necessary level of protection required in today’s security environment.”

March 12: Federico Pena confirmed as Secretary of Energy.

April 4: FBI issues report (in response to the FY97 Intelligence

Authorization Act) to the Community Management Staff for transmittal to

Congress and DOE. Report addresses: CI program oversight, foreign visits

and assignments, CI analysis, professional training/CI awareness, and investigations.

April 7: FBI Director Freeh meets with Secretary of Energy Pena to deliver

the April 4, 1997 report.

April 28: DOE Office of Intelligence organizes a Counterintelligence Senior

Advisory Group to provide recommendations for DOE’s CI problems.

June 19-29: China Arms Control Exchange (lab-to-lab) Workshop:

Atmospheric Sciences (#2), in Beijing.

July 14: Briefing on possible espionage provided to Secretary of Energy

with options for remedies.

July 29: DOE briefs National Security Council staff on “China’s Strategic

Nuclear Modernization Program: DOE Nuclear Weapons Laboratory

Contributions to Chinese Strategic Breakthroughs.” 

A-10 SECURITY AND CI CHRONOLOGY P F I A B
August 6-8: China Arms Control Exchange (lab-to-lab) Workshop: Control

of Nuclear Technologies, in Beijing. 

August 12: At the conclusion of a DOE briefing on China’s possible possession of U.S. warhead design information, FBI Director recommends that

“DOE quickly and ‘furiously’ develop a plan to stop erosion of 20 years.”

September 2: NACIPB/NACOB reports that the “working group has recognized that systemic and serious CI and security problems at DOE have been

well documented over at least a ten year period. Information received from

CI and security professionals at DOE indicate that few of the recommendations in the past studies have been implemented.”

September 25: GAO produces report, “Department of Energy: DOE Needs to

Improve Controls Over Foreign Visitors to Weapons Laboratories.”

October 15: DCI and FBI Director meet with Secretary of Energy and

Deputy Secretary to discuss CI problems and reforms. Participants agree to

develop action plan that will serve as basis for Presidential Decision

Directive (PDD), acknowledging that reform from within DOE is difficult.

November 6: Letter to Secretary of Energy from DCI and FBI Director states

“the culture and structure at DOE have consistently prevented meaningful

reforms which could begin to counter the foreign intelligence threat to sensitive weapons programs and dual use technology.”

November 6: DOE’s Office of Security Affairs submits “Report on the Status

of the Department of Energy’s Safeguards and Security Program, October

1997” to the Secretary. The cover letter states, “in all candor, we have been

hampered in meeting [safeguards and security] obligations by organizational

obstacles and competing internal interests.” The report contends that “by

far, the most pressing issue is the Department’s current unsatisfactory

method for managing its safeguards and security program. Simply put, the

current method does not work as intended.”

1998 February 11: President signs PDD-61. 

March: U.S. Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS) Support Staff

(NSS) produces assessment report on DOE Nuclear Weapons Related

Security Oversight Process. The report finds that DOE’s ability to “exercise

comprehensive oversight, provide critical expert advice and status assessment to senior management, and identify corrective actions and monitor

their implementation is problematic due to three significant issues: 1) a lack

of nuclear physical security expertise at all levels of the oversight process; 2)

ad hoc structuring of Safeguards and Security functions throughout the

P F I A B SECURITY AND CI CHRONOLOGY A-11
Department; and 3) placement of oversight functions in positions which constrain their effectiveness.” DOE’s initial response to the above list of findings was “without references to specific examples in the body of the report,

these issues cannot be validated.”

March: DCI and FBI Director meet with DOE lab directors to discuss the

importance of the new initiatives.

April 6-May 15: DOE CI Director begins PDD-61-mandated 90-day study

with team visits to eight DOE operations offices and nine national laboratories.

June 30: Secretary Pena resigns.

July 1: Acting Secretary receives 90-day report. 

July: Joint Technology Demonstration (lab-to-lab Exchange), Nuclear

Materials Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A), in Beijing.

August 18: Secretary Richardson sworn in. 

October 6: GAO produces report, “Problems in DOE’s Foreign Visitor

Program Persist.” 

November: Per PDD-61, report published on the foreign collection threat to

DOE, stating that DOE is being aggressively targeted for nuclear, sensitive,

proprietary, and unclassified information.

November: During an internal inspection of a lab, DOE finds that the

“underlying cause of these security breaches has been personnel who lack

adequate security awareness and training, and who do not demonstrate an

attitude conducive to effective security.”

November 13: Secretary Richardson submits CI Action Plan to NSC.

December 9: Secretary Richardson meets with lab CI directors, and HQ CI

and Intelligence staff to discuss implementation plan.

1999 January: First phase of a Special Security Review is completed for the

Secretary. The recommendations include: establishing an integrated security

management system; formalizing and differentiating the roles and responsibilities of each DOE organization; optimizing safeguards and security

resources; strengthening human reliability programs; and incorporating security responsibilities into safety concerns.

A-12 SECURITY AND CI CHRONOLOGY P F I A B
January 3: U.S. House of Representatives publishes “Final Report of the

Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial

Concerns with the People’s Republic of China” (classified version). 

January 25-30: Joint Technology Demonstration (lab-to-lab Exchange),

Nuclear Materials Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A), in Beijing.

February 3: DOE’s CI Implementation Plan completed and delivered to

Secretary Richardson.

February 19: GAO produces report, “Concerns with DOE Efforts to Reduce

the Risks Posed by Russia’s Unemployed Weapons Scientists.”

March: DOE forwards the “annual” safeguards and security report from the

past two years to the President, citing that there is “concern that attitudes

regarding the protection of critical information are moving toward a lessattentive state of awareness.” 

March 4: DOE Counterintelligence implementation plan (per PDD-61) issued

to labs. 

April 6: DOE temporarily shuts down all classified computers at LANL,

LLNL, and SNL for security review.

May 11: Secretary Richardson announces new security organization at DOE,

under the responsibility of a “security czar.” 

P F I A B SECURITY AND CI CHRONOLOGY A-13
A-14 SECURITY AND CI CHRONOLOGY P F I A B
PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF SENSITIVE

NUCLEAR DATA, MATERIALS, AND TECHNOLOGY

Sep 1979 GAO/EMD-79-109/DOE’s Erroneous Declassification of Nuclear Weapons Design. Los

Alamos, sometime between 1971 and 1976 -- while under AEC, incorrectly declassified

very sensitive weapons design information, which subsequently was found in publicly

accessible library in Los Alamos.

Mar 1980 GAO/EMD-80-38/Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing and the Problems of Safe-guarding Against the

Spread of Nuclear Weapons. Improper measuring, storing, and verifying of quantities of

nuclear materials. 

Sep 1982 DOE/Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) Inspection Report on Albuquerque Area Office,

Los Alamos National Lab (LANL), Sandia National Lab (SNL), and Rocky Flats Plant.

Classified findings 

May 1984 DOE/Office of Safeguards and Quality (OSQ) Assessment: LANL, SNL, LLNL. Classified

findings.

Jan 1985 DOE/OSQ Assessment: Inspection Report on Albuquerque Area Office, LANL, Mound

Facility. Classified findings.

Feb 1985 DOE/OSQ Assessment: Inspection Report on DOE Germantown and Forrestal Locations.

Classified findings.

Jun 1985 DOE/OSQ Assessment: Inspection Report on SNLL, LLNL, San Francisco Operations Office.

Classified findings.

Jan 1986 U.S. House of Representatives: Letter of Rep. Dingell letter to the President. Inadequately

trained guard force personnel; inadequate protection of classified information; inability

to track and recover special nuclear material. 

Nov 1986 DOE/OSQ Assessment: Inspection Report on LANL, Albuquerque Area Office. Classified

findings.

Apr 1987 DOE/OSE: Inspection Report on San Francisco Operations Office and SNLL. Classified

findings.

Aug 1987 GAO/RCED-87-150/DOE Needs Tighter Controls Over Reprocessing Information. Transfer of

sensitive nuclear technology to proliferating nations. DOE funding of research that may

involve foreign nationals from countries that have not agreed to Non-Proliferation Treaty.

P F I A B

CHRONOLOGY OF SECURITY ANALYSIS

REPORTS OF DOE, 1980-1999

CHRONOLOGY OF DOE SECURITY ANALYSES A-15
Jun 1989 GAO/RCED-89-116/Nuclear Proliferation: Better Controls Needed Over WeaponsRelated Information and Technology. Insufficient control over weapons-related information and technology. 

Dec 1990 DOE Safeguards and Security Task Force/Freeze Report. Lack of clear and concise physical security standards; inconsistent measurements of nuclear material.

Aug 1991 DOE/IG-296/ Department-wide Audit of the Visibility Over the Status of Nuclear Materials.

Nuclear materials routinely reported as “in use” or “needed” when they were actually

“excess” to any defined requirement.

Dec 1991 GAO/RCED-92-39/Nuclear Security Safeguards and Security Weaknesses at DOE's Weapons

Facilities. Noncompliance with two-person rule for access to nuclear material; physical

security personnel unable to demonstrate basic skills. 

May 1992 DOE/IG/INS-L-92-02/Control of Classified Documents at DOE Savannah River Operations

Office. No review of Savannah River classified document controls by DOE Headquarters

Office of Security Evaluations Between 1985 and 1990. 

Jan 1993 DOE/IG-319/ Administration of Conflict of Interest Relating to Tech Transfer at LANL.

Conflict of interest by LANL employees, who made decisions, used government

resources, and took privileged information to further personal financial interest in spinoff business. 

Feb 1993 DOE/OSS/ 1992 Annual Report to the Secretary. Aging equipment; lack of adequate system performance testing. 

Aug 1994 DOE/IG/INS-O-94-05/Inspection of Physical Security Operations at LANL TA-18 Site. LANL

not in full compliance with DOE physical security requirements because of LANL's

failure to meet deadline for completion of site safeguards and security plan. 

Jan 1995 DOE/OSS/Status of Safeguards and Security, Fiscal Year 1994. Numerous deficiencies in

marking, accountability, protection, and storage of classified material. 

Mar 1995 DOE/IG/S941S012/ Albuquerque Vault Classification. Inadequate procedures for protecting

combinations to security containers/areas.

Jun 1995 DOE/Annual Report to the President on the Status of Safeguards and Security at Domestic

Nuclear Weapons Facilities. Aging security systems. 

Jan 1996 DOE/OSS/Status of Safeguards and Security, Fiscal Year 1995. Aging security systems. 

Sep 1996 DOE/Annual Report to the President on the Status of Safeguards and Security at Domestic

Nuclear Weapons Facilities. Aging safeguards and security systems and protective forces;

inadequate inventory procedures for some facilities. 

Jan 1997 DOE/OSS/Status of Safeguards and Security for 1996. Classified findings.

Nov 1997 DOE/OSA/Report to Secretary on Status of DOE Safeguards and Security Program. Aging

physical security systems and protective force. 

A-16 CHRONOLOGY OF DOE SECURITY ANALYSES P F I A B
Jun 1997 SNL/Factors Contributing to Current Risk Levels in DOE Complex. Classified finding.

Apr 1999 DOE/23rd Annual Report to the President on the Status of Safeguards and Security at

Domestic Nuclear Weapons Facilities. Aging security systems.

Feb 1999 GAO/RCED-99-54/Concerns with DOE’s Efforts to Reduce the Risks Posed by Russia's

Unemployed Weapons Scientists. DOE may have provided Russian scientists with dualuse, defense-related information that could negatively affect national security. 

PERSONNEL SECURITY

Jul 1984 DOE/Ninth Annual Report on Domestic Safeguards. Classified findings.

Jul 1986 DOE/IG-228/Retention of Security Clearances at DOE Headquarters. Ineffective procedures for systematically withdrawing clearances after employee termination. 

Mar 1987 GAO/RCED-87-72/DOE's Reinvestigation of Employees Has Not Been Timely. Personnel

security reinvestigations not conducted on timely basis (DOE unable to eliminate case

backlog until 1993). 

May 1987 DOE/IG-238/Selected Aspects of DOE’s Personnel Security Program. Employees granted

clearances higher than required; majority of employees not reinvestigated in last 5 years;

defective investigative process.

Jun 1987 DOE/OSE Inspection Report on Albuquerque Operations Office, LANL. AL and SNL. Lack of

procedure to establish eligibility requirement for SCI clearance if family member nonUS citizen; lack of timely conduct and analysis of reinvestigations; Albuquerque failure

to include security infraction notices in personnel security files. 

Dec 1987 GAO/RCED-88-28/DOE Needs a More Accurate and Efficient Security Clearance Program.

Inefficient security clearance program: clearance processing delays; inaccurate clearance

data bases; need-to-know problems. 

Apr 1988 DOE/IG-255/Timeliness in Processing DOE Headquarters Security Clearances. More than

100 days average time for processing applications after necessary forms initially completed; lack of accountability for tracking applications and ensuring timely processing;

decisions based on investigative reports not made in timely manner.

Mar 1990 DOE/IG/WR-O-90-02/Nevada Operations Office Oversight of Management and Operating

Contractor Security Clearances. Four areas employing 928 “Q” cleared employees who

had no access to classified material and no clear need to know. 

Apr 1990 DOE/IG-281/Inspection of LLNL’s Drug-Free Workplace Program. Absence of random

drug-testing program at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and no original plans to implement program without federal requirement.

Nov 1990 DOE/IG/WR-B-91-01/Richland Operations Office of Management and Operating Contractor

Personnel Security Clearances. Insufficient number of trained staff in Personnel Security

Branch; significant backlog of personnel security clearances awaiting adjudication. 

Dec 1990 DOE/Safeguards and Security Task Force (Freeze Report). Security clearance processing

P F I A B CHRONOLOGY OF DOE SECURITY ANALYSES A-17
time exceeds any reasonable standard; OPM delays in investigation not challenged by

DOE; resources to implement Personnel Security Assurance Program not provided. 

Sep 1991 DOE/IG/WR-B-91-08/Review of Contractor’s Personnel Security Clearances at DOE Field

Office, Albuquerque. Albuquerque Field Office granted “Q” clearances to 1,058 contractor lab and plant employees who did not need to access classified information.

Dec 1991 DOE/IG/WR-V-92-06/Audit of Internal Controls That Assure FY 1991 Costs Claimed by and

Reimbursed to LANL Are Allowable Under DOE Contract #W-7405-ENG-36. LANL requested “Q” clearances for more than 500 people not needing access to classified information.

May 1992 DOE/IG-310/ General Management Inspection of the Department of Energy’s Nevada Field

Office. Defense personnel allowed access to SRD without full background investigation;

security clearances reinstated without conduct of required supplemental investigations;

individuals designated “holders” for classified documents, without being assigned

responsibility for safeguarding documents.

Mar 1993 DOE/IG-323/Review of DOE’s Personnel Security Clearance Program. DOE granted security

clearances to individuals not specifically requiring access to classified material; processing

clear cases averaged 43 working days, 174 calendar days to process derogatory cases. 

Aug 1993 DOE/IG/S9IJS010/Personnel Security Clearance Suspensions and Revocations at the DOE

Albuquerque Field Office, Based Upon Security Infractions/Violations.Deficiencies and

inconsistencies in handling of security infractions/incidents by certain national labs and

processing of related personnel security actions by Albuquerque.

Aug 1993 GAO/RCED-93-183/Nuclear Security: DOE’s Progress on Reducing Its Security Clearance

Workload. Ineffective management by DOE of personnel security cases containing unfavorable information; some DOE contractors not verifying important information on

prospective employees. 

May 1995 DOE/IG/INS-L-95-07/Inspection of LANL-Alleged TA-55 Security Violation. LANL employees who were not personnel security assurance program cleared had been provided

access to the material access area at TA-55 site. 

Jun 1998 DOE/OCI/Mapping the Future of DOE’s CI Program. Classified findings.

FOREIGN VISITORS AND ASSIGNMENTS

Dec 1986 DOE Special Project Team/Operation Cerberus Report. Scant data available at DOE headquarters on number and scope of foreign nationals at DOE facilities; approval authority

for foreign visits and assignments not centralized.

Oct 1988 GAO/RCED-89-31/Major Weaknesses in Foreign Visitor Controls at Weapons Laboratories.

Failure to obtain timely and adequate information on foreign visitors before allowing

them access to labs; lack of enforcement by DOE of internal control mechanisms for

approving, monitoring, and reporting foreign visits; no internal review of foreign visitor

program; no integrated system to obtain and disseminate foreign visitor information to

DOE field offices; inattention to sensitive subjects discussed with foreigners.

Dec 1990 DOE Safeguards and Security Task Force/Freeze Report. Security would suffer little if

A-18 CHRONOLOGY OF DOE SECURITY ANALYSES P F I A B
records checks were to be discontinued. 

Oct 1993 DOE/IG-337/Use of Intelligence Information to Identify the Foreign Interests of Entities

Involved with DOE Programs. Failure by DOE to take action to implement provisions of

Public Law 102-484 regarding award of certain departmental national security contracts

to companies owned by entity controlled by foreign government.

Nov 1996 Deputy Secretary of Energy/Curtis Plan. Classified findings.

Sep 1997 GAO/RCED-97-229/DOE Needs to Improve Controls Over Foreign Visitors to Weapons

Laboratories. Less than fully effective procedures for obtaining indices checks on foreign visitors and controlling dissemination of sensitive information. LANL allowed

unescorted after-hours access to controlled areas, to preserve “open campus atmosphere.” Lack of clear criteria for identifying visits that involve sensitive subjects.

Result: sensitive subjects may have been discussed with foreign nationals without DOE

knowledge and approval.

Dec 1997 DOE/IG/CR-L-989-02/FMFIA 1997. Large and increasing numbers of foreign nationals

visiting labs raised concern about access and potential compromises of classified, sensitive, and proprietary information.

Oct 1998 GAO/T-RCED-99-19/Department of Energy: Problems in DOE’s Foreign Visitors Program

Persist. As in 1988, visitors with ties to foreign intelligence services gained access to

laboratories without DOE and/or laboratory officials' advance knowledge of visitors'

connections. As found by GAO in 1988 and 1997, procedures for identifying sensitive

subjects lack clear criteria and controls to ensure that visits potentially involving such

subjects are reviewed by DOE.

Jun 1998 DOE/OCI/Mapping the Future of DOE’s CI Program. Classified findings.

Feb 1999 DOE/IG/CR-L-99-01/FMFIA 1998. Large and increasing numbers of foreign nationals

visiting labs raised concern about access and potential compromises of classified, sensitive, and proprietary information.

INFORMATION SECURITY.

Sep 1982 DOE/OSS Inspection Report on Albuquerque Area Office, LANL, SNL, and Rocky Flats Plant

Classified finding.

May 1984 DOE/OSQ Assessment: LANL, SNL, LLNL. Classified findings.

Jan 1985 DOE/OSQ Assessment: Inspection Report on Albuquerque Area Office, LANL, Mound

Facility. Classified findings.

Feb 1985 DOE/OSQ Assessment: Inspection Report on DOE Germantown and Forrestal locations.

Classified findings.

Mar 1985 DOE/OSQ Assessment: Albuquerque Operations Office, SNL. Classified findings.

Jun 1985 DOE/OSQ Assessment: Inspection Report on SNL and SNLL and San Francisco Operations

Office. Classified findings. 

P F I A B CHRONOLOGY OF DOE SECURITY ANALYSES A-19
Nov 1986 DOE/OSQ Assessment: Inspection Report on LANL, Albuquerque Area Office. Classified

findings.

Jan 1987 DOE/OSE: Inspection Report on DOE Headquarters. Classified findings.

Apr 1987 DOE/OSE: Inspection Report on San Francisco Operations Office and SNLL. Classified

findings.

Jun 1987 DOE/OSE: Inspection Report on Albuquerque Operations Office, SNL, and LANL. Classified

findings.

Apr 1990 DOE/Annual Report to the President on the Status of Domestic Safeguards and Security at All

Nuclear Weapons Facilities. Classified findings.

Dec 1990 Safeguards and Security Task Force/Freeze Report. Inadequate oversight and control over

Secret document inventory; responsibility for classified and unclassified computer security split between two DOE organizations, thereby diluting computer security expertise;

inadequate professional development programs for computer security specialists. 

Feb 1991 GAO/RCED-91-65/Nuclear Security: Accountability for Livermore’s Secret Classified

Documents Is Inadequate. Inadequate accountability for documents at Lawrence

Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) classified; 1990 GAO inventory identified

12,000 missing secret documents. As of January 1991, over 10,000 still missing.

1986; Jul 1991 GAO/RCED-91-183/DOE Original Classification Authority Has Been Improperly Delegated.

Untitled Information Security Oversight Office report. Improper delegation of original classification authority to contractors, in violation of E.O. 12356, 1982.

Jul 1991 DOE/Annual Report to the President on the Status of Safeguards and Security at All Domestic

Nuclear Weapons Facilities. Classified findings.

Nov 1992 DOE/OSE Annual Report: Safeguards and Security Oversight During Fiscal Year 1992. Lack

of adequate guidance; fragmented approach for protecting information.

Feb 1993 DOE/OSS/1992 Annual Report to Secretary. Less than satisfactory ratings in classified

matter protection and control.

Jan 1994 DOE/OSS/Status of Safeguards and Security, Fiscal Year 1993. Inability of DOE to identify

its most sensitive information; failure to properly accredit systems processing classified

information; lack of controls to provide access authorities and proper password management; no configuration management; improper labeling of magnetic media; failure to

perform management reviews.

Apr 1994 DOE/Annual Report to the President on the Status of Safeguards and Security at Domestic

Nuclear Weapons Facilities. At LLNL, decentralized computer security management

lacked aggressive technical oversight and complete enforcement of critical program elements; computer security program application favors users at expense of security implementation. (U)

Jun 1995 DOE/Annual Report to the President on the Status of Safeguards and Security at Domestic

Nuclear Weapons Facilities. Improper accreditation of laptops; data transferred from

A-20 CHRONOLOGY OF DOE SECURITY ANALYSES P F I A B
higher classified systems to lower systems without proper review; inadequate audit

trails; improper password controls. 

Jan 1996 DOE/OSS/Status of Safeguards and Security, Fiscal Year 1995. Lack of management attention to basic information assurance concerns at a time of “increased interconnectivity

with relatively uncontrolled entities.”

Jan 1997 DOE/OSS/Status of.Safeguards and Security, Fiscal Year 1996. Computer system interconnectivity growing exponentially, increasing risk to DOE information assets.

Jun 1998 DOE/OCI/Mapping the Future of DOE’s CI Program. Classified findings.

1998 DOE/IG/198AL001 Improper Export of Software. LANL improperly transferred particular

computer software program to PRC and Russia; no criminal violations found, but LANL

failed to obtain proper US Department of Commerce license approval.

Nov 1998 DOE/OSE/Safeguards and Security Inspection of LANL. Classified findings.

Apr 1999 GAO/Key Factors Underlying Security Problems at DOE Facilities (April 20, 1999 GAO

Congressional testimony). Inadequate separation of classified and unclassified computer

networks at LANL in 1988, 1992, and 1994; classified information discovered on

LANL unclassified computer network in 1998. 

1999 DOE/23rd Annual Report to the President on the Status of Safeguards and Security at

Domestic Nuclear Weapons Facilities. Numerous incidents of classified information being

placed on unclassified systems, including several since the development of a corrective

action plan in July 1998.

SECURITY MANAGEMENT, PLANNING, AND OVERSIGHT.

Jun 1985 DOE/OSQ Assessment: Inspection Report on SNLL, LLNL, San Francisco Operations Office.

Classified findings.

Jan 1986 U.S. House of Representatives: Letter of Rep. Dingell to the President. Misleading system of

rating DOE inspections of safeguards and security. 

Dec 1986 DOE/Special Project Team/Cerberus Report. Lack of adequate short- and long-term planning in DOE's safeguards and security program; insufficient intelligence support for

DOE facility security; insufficient standardization of security methods, equipment, and

strategies at DOE weapons sites.

Jun 1988 DOE Annual Report to the President on Domestic Safeguards and Security. Classified findings.

Oct 1990 GAO/RCED-91-12/Potential Security Weaknesses at Los Alamos and Other DOE Facilities

Mar 1991 and GAO/RCED-92-39/Nuclear Security: Safeguards and Security Weaknesses at

DOE’s'Weapons Facilities. Inability of DOE to track, monitor, and correct security deficiencies at DOE facilities. 

Dec 1990 Safeguards and Security Task Force/Freeze Report. Classified findings.

P F I A B CHRONOLOGY OF DOE SECURITY ANALYSES A-21
Feb 1991 GAO/RCED-91-65/ Nuclear Security: Accountability for Livermore's Secret Classified

Documents is Inadequate. Inadequate DOE oversight of LLNL's document control program. 

Mar 1991 GAO/RCED-91-83/DOE Needs Better Controls to Identify Contractors Having Foreign

Interests. Inadequate controls for identifying DOE contractors having foreign interests. 

Jun 1992 GAO/RCED-92-146/Weak Internal Controls Hamper Oversight of DOE’s Security Program.

Lack of system at DOE to oversee and monitor exceptions to DOE safeguards and security orders.

Oct 1992 GAO/RCED-93-14/Safeguards and Security Planning at DOE Facilities Incomplete.

Incomplete safeguards and security planning at DOE facilities. As of fall 1992, DOE

had not completed plans for 15 of its 27 sensitive facilities. 

Nov 1992 DOE/OSE/Annual Report: Safeguards and Security Oversight During Fiscal Year 1992.

Numerous overlapping and confusing safeguards and security inspections; management

and oversight problems represent most significant weaknesses in DOE’s security program; inadequate life cycle planning of security systems.

Nov 1992 GAO/RCED-93- 10/Improving Correction of Security Deficiencies at DOE’s Weapons

Facilities. Insufficient DOE validation of corrective actions.

Feb 1993 DOE/Office of Safeguards and Security, Report to the Secretary: Status of Safeguards and

Security. In Violation of Laws, Losses, and Incidents of Security Concern Program, lack

of management focus resulted in personnel seldom being held responsible for disregard

of security requirements.

Jan 1994 DOE/OSS/Status of Safeguards and Security, Fiscal Year 1993. No single office at DOE

Headquarters responsible for safeguards and security program; duplication of guidance,

unnecessary requests for information, inefficient program execution.

Nov 1996 Deputy Secretary of Energy/Curtis Plan. Classified findings.

Sep 1997 GAO/RCED-97-229/Department of Energy: DOE Needs to Improve Controls Over Foreign

Visitors to Weapons Laboratories. Failure to provide detailed oversight of the national laboratories' CI programs.

1997 DOE/OSA/Report to Secretary on Status of DOE Safeguards and Security Program.

Fragmented and dysfunctional security management structure.

Oct 1998 GAO/T-RCED-99-19/Department of Energy: Problems in DOE’s Foreign Visitor Program

Persist. Failure to evaluate effectiveness of security controls over information in laboratory areas most frequented by foreign visitors.

1998 DOD/NCCS Support Staff/DOE Nuclear Weapons -Related Security Oversight Process.

Classified findings.

Jan 1999 Special Security Review/Internal Report to the Secretary. Classified findings.

A-22 CHRONOLOGY OF DOE SECURITY ANALYSES P F I A B
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

Jun 1990 Classified report.

Apr 1992 Classified report.

Apr 1997 GAO/RCED-97-128R/Department of Energy: Information on the Distribution of Funds for

Counterintelligence Programs and the Resulting Expansion of These Programs. Indirect and

inconsistent funding for CI programs; despite additions to overall CI program funds,

eight DOE facilities significantly reduced budgetary support for their CI programs.

Apr 1997 Classified report.

Sep 1997 GAO/RCED-97-229/Department of Energy: DOE Needs to Improve Controls Over Foreign

Visitors to Weapons Laboratories. DOE CI programs not based on comprehensive assessment of foreign espionage threat.

Jun 1998 DOE/OCI/Mapping the Future of DOE’s CI Program. Classified findings.

P F I A B CHRONOLOGY OF DOE SECURITY ANALYSES A-23
A-24 CHRONOLOGY OF DOE SECURITY ANALYSES P F I A B
Chinese strategic nuclear efforts have focused on developing and deploying a survivable longrange missile force that can hold a significant portion of the U.S. and Russian populations at risk

in a retaliatory strike. By at least the late 1970s the Chinese launched an ambitious collection

program focused on the U.S., including its national laboratories, to acquire nuclear weapons

technologies. By the 1980s China recognized that its second strike capability might be in jeopardy unless its force became more survivable. This probably prompted the Chinese to heighten

their interest in smaller and lighter nuclear weapon systems to permit a mobile force.

China obtained by espionage classified U.S. nuclear weapons information that probably

accelerated its program to develop future nuclear weapons. This collection program

allowed China to focus successfully down critical paths and avoid less promising

approaches to nuclear weapons designs.

• China obtained at least basic design information on several modern U.S. nuclear

reentry vehicles, including the Trident II (W-88).

• China also obtained information on a variety of U.S. weapon design concepts and

weaponization features, including those of a neutron bomb.

• We cannot determine the full extent of weapon information obtained. For example,

we do not know whether any weapon design documentation or blueprints were

acquired.

• We believe it is more likely that the Chinese used U.S. design information to inform

their own program than to replicate U.S. weapon designs.

China’s technical advances have been made on the basis of classified and unclassified

information derived from espionage, contact with U.S. and other countries’ scientists,

conferences and publications, unauthorized media enclosures, declassified U.S. weapons

information, and Chinese indigenous development. The relative contribution of each

cannot be determined.

Regardless of the source of the weapons information, it has made an important contribution

to the Chinese objective to maintain a second strike capability and provided useful information for future designs.

P F I A B

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OF CHINA’S ACQUISITION

OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS INFORMATION

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT A-25
Significant deficiencies remain in the Chinese weapons program. The Chinese almost certainly are using aggressive collection efforts to address deficiencies as well as to obtain

manufacturing and production capabilities from both nuclear and nonnuclear sources.

To date, the aggressive Chinese collection effort has not resulted in any apparent modernization of their deployed strategic force or any new nuclear weapons deployment.

China has had the technical capability to develop a multiple independently targetable reentry

vehicle (MIRV) system for its large, currently deployed ICBM for many years, but has not

done so. U.S. information acquired by the Chinese could help them develop a MIRV for a

future mobile missile.

We do not know if U.S. classified nuclear information acquired by the Chinese has been

passed to other countries. Having obtained more modern U.S. nuclear technology, the

Chinese might be less concerned about haring their older technology.

A-26 DAMAGE ASSESSMENT P F I A B
The Department of Energy (DOE) has stewardship of vital national security capabilities,

from nuclear weapons to leading edge research and development projects. These capabilities, and related DOE programs, are important not only to the strength of our Nation, but

within the framework of international cooperation, to the lessening of global threats. We

must therefore ensure the security of these critical programs through the application of an

effective and coordinated counterintelligence (CI) program. To enhance counterintelligence

capabilities at DOE, President Clinton directed in February 1998 that the following initiatives be implemented:

The CI and foreign intelligence (FI) elements of DOE will be reconfigured into two independent offices, which will report directly to the Secretary of Energy. The Secretary may

delegate regular management of these two offices to the Deputy Secretary.

The Director of the new Office of CI (OCI) will be a senior executive from the Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The OCI will be staffed by DOE CI professionals, augmented

by detailees from other Intelligence Community agencies as appropriate.

The Director, OCL will have direct access to the Secretary of Energy, the Director of Central

Intelligence (DCI), and the Director, FBI.

All CI and FI activities at DOE and the laboratories will continue to be included in the

National Foreign Intelligence Program and, as such, are subject to policy and programmatic

guidance by the DCI and applicable Congressional oversight.

The laboratory directors will be directly accountable to the Secretary of Energy for the performance of the CI program at their locations. Existing DOE contracts with the labs will be

amended to include CI program goals and objectives and performance measures to evaluate

compliance with those contractual obligations. CI personnel assigned to the laboratories

will have direct access to the laboratory directors and will concurrently report to the

Director, OCI. CI oversight functions previously designated to DOE operations and field

offices will revert to the OCI.

The National CI Policy Board (NACIPB) will oversee implementation of the Directive and will

continue to coordinate and/or provide other CI community resources, support and oversight to

the DOE CI program as needed.

P F I A B

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE NO. 61

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE 61 A-27
When appropriate, the NACIPB may refer problems and concerns not resolved by the NACIPB

and Director, OCI, to the Energy Security Management Board, established by the National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998.

The incoming Director, OCI, will prepare a report for the Secretary of Energy ninety days

after his arrival, to include progress on the initiative, a strategic plan for achieving

long–term goals, and recommendations on whether and to what extent other organizational

changes may be necessary to strengthen CI. In preparing the report, the Director will consult with laboratory directors and other appropriate DOE personnel.

The Director, OCI, will initiate an internal inspection process to review annually DOE’s CI

program and provide results to the Secretary of Energy.

The Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, DCI, and Director, FBI, as involved principals,

will provide support to the Secretary of Energy in the implementation of the directive and

continuation of an effective CI program. Such support will include provision of personnel,

investigative and analytic resources. These principals will receive copies of the initial ninety–day report of the Director, OCI, the annual inspection reports of the CI program and any

reports generated by the Director, OCI, concerning significant policy or operational issues.

The new CI and FI offices will ensure that their operational and analytic efforts and results

are integrated, mutually and throughout DOE and the laboratories, to provide the greatest

level of protection to our national security interests.

The OCI and DOE Office of Security Affairs will, in coordination, develop and implement specific security measures to reduce the threat to classified and sensitive information at DOE, its

field activities and the national laboratories. The Office of Security Affairs will provide timely

notification to the OCI of any potential CI problems developed through these procedures.

The Secretary of Energy will establish an Office of Foreign Visits and Assignments at DOE

Headquarters to facilitate the participation of qualified foreign nationals in DOE projects.

The Secretary will develop procedures and practices for this Office which will meet the

needs of DOE’s vital national security programs while providing protection from possible

foreign threats.

Within 120 days, the Secretary of Energy will advise the Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs on the actions taken and specific remedies designed to implement

this directive.

A-28 PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE NO. 61 P F I A B
Boyer, Paul, By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age. Chapel

Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985.

Department of State memorandum, “China Arms Control Exchange Workshops,” undated 

DOE chronology, April 13, 1999 

DOE Field Fact Book, May 1998 

DOE, “Annual Report to the President on the Status of Safeguards and Security at Domestic Nuclear

Weapons Facilities,” June 1995 

DOE, “Annual Report to the President on the Status of Safeguards and Security at Domestic Nuclear

Weapons Facilities,” September 1996 

DOE, “Department of Energy First Tier Organizations, Terms of Office,” undated 

DOE, Office of Counterintelligence, “The Foreign Intelligence Threat to Department of Energy Personnel,

Facilities and Research, Summary Report,” August 1990 

DOE, “Office of Safeguards and Security Inspection Report on Albuquerque Area Office, Los Alamos

National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory, and Rocky Flats Plant,” September 1982 

DOE, “Office of Safeguards and Security, Report to the Secretary: Status of Safeguards and Security,”

February 1993 

DOE, “Office of Safeguards and Security, Status of Safeguards and Security, Fiscal Year 1993,” January

1994 

DOE, “Office of Safeguards and Security, Status of Safeguards and Security, Fiscal Year 1994,” January

1995 

DOE, “Office of Safeguards and Security, Status of Safeguards and Security, Fiscal Year 1995,” January

1996 

DOE, “Office of Security Affairs: Report to the Secretary on the Status of the DOE Safeguards and

Security Program,” November 1997 

P F I A B

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF MAJOR UNCLASSIFIED SOURCES

Note: The following list does not include citations for several hundred classified reports and documents provided to the PFIAB by CIA, FBI, DOE, NSA, DOD, and DOJ.

BIBLIOGRAPHY A-29
DOE, “Office of Security Evaluations Annual Report: Safeguards and Security Oversight During Fiscal

Year 1992,” November 1992 

DOE, “Office of Security Evaluations: Inspection Report on DOE Headquarters,” January 1987 

DOE, Office of Security Affairs, “Report on the Status of the Department of Energy’s Safeguards and

Security Program, October 1997,” November 6, 1997 

DOE, “Plutonium: The First 50 Years. United States Plutonium Production, Acquisition, and Utilization

from 1944 Through 1994 

DOE, Robert Daniel memorandum to Secretary Watkins, January 12, 1993 

DOE, Special Project Team, “Operation Cerberus Report,” December 1986 

DOE/IG/198AL001, “Improper Export of Software,” 1998 

DOE/IG/CR-L-989-02, “FMFIA 1997,” December 1997 

DOE/IG/CR-L-99-01, “FMFIA 1998,” February 1999 

DOE/IG/INS-L-92-02, “Control of Classified Documents at DOE Savannah River Operations Office,”

May 1992 

DOE/IG/INS-L-95-07, “Inspection of Los Alamos National Laboratory: Alleged TA-55 Security

Violation,” May 1995 

DOE/IG/INS-O-94-05, “Inspection of Physical Security Operations at Los Alamos TA-18 Site,” August

1994 

DOE/IG/S941S012, “Albuquerque Vault Classification,” March 1995 

DOE/IG/S9IJS010, “Personnel Security Clearance Suspensions and Revocations at the DOE Albuquerque

Field Office, Based Upon Security Infractions/Violations,” August 1993 

DOE/IG/WR-B-91-01, “Richland Operations Office of Management and Operating Contractor Personnel

Security Clearances,” November 1991 

DOE/IG/WR-B-91-08, “Review of Contractor’s Personnel Security Clearances at DOE Field Office,

Albuquerque,” September 1991 

DOE/IG/WR-O-90-02, “Nevada Operations Office Oversight of Management and Operating Contractor

Security Clearances,” March 1990 

DOE/IG/WR-V92-06, “Audit of Internal Controls That Assure FY 1991 Costs Claimed by and

Reimbursed to Los Alamos National Laboratory Are Allowable Under DOE Contract #W-7405-ENG-36,”

December 1991 

DOE/IG-228, “Retention of Security Clearances at DOE Headquarters,” July 1986 

DOE/IG-238, “Selected Aspects of DOE’s Personnel Security Program,” May 1987 

A-30 BIBLIOGRAPHY P F I A B
DOE/IG-255, “Timeliness in Processing DOE Headquarters Security Clearances,” April 1988 

DOE/IG-281, “Inspection of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s Drug-Free Workplace Program,”

April 1990 

DOE/IG-296, “Department-Wide Audit of the Visibility Over the Status of Nuclear Materials,” August

1991 

DOE/IG-310, “General Management Inspection of the Department of Energy’s Nevada Field Office,”

May 1992 

DOE/IG-319, “Administration of Conflict of Interest Relating to Technology Transfer at Los Alamos

National Laboratory,” January 1993 

DOE/IG-323, “Review of DOE’s Personnel Security Program,” March 1993 

DOE/IG-385, “Special Audit Report on the Department of Energy’s Arms and Military-Type Equipment,”

February 1, 1996 

DOE, “Response to the Cox Commission Report: The Benefits of Department of Energy International

Scientific and Technical Exchange Programs,” April 1999 

GAO/Key Factors Underlying Security Problems at DOE Facilities,” (Statement of Victor S. Rezendes,

Director, Energy, Resources and Science Issues, Resources, Community, and Economic Development

Division, GAO, in testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on

Commerce, House of Representatives), April 20, 1999 

GAO/AIMD-95-165, “Department of Energy: Poor Management of Nuclear Materials Tracking

Capabilities Are Limited,” August 3, 1995 

GAO/EMD-79-109, “DOE’s Erroneous Declassification of Nuclear Weapons Design Document,”

September 21, 1979 

GAO/EMD-80-38, “Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing and the Problems of Safeguarding Against the Spread of

Nuclear Weapons,” March 18,1980 

GAO/RCED-86-144, “Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Has Insufficient Control Over Nuclear Technology

Exports,” May 1, 1986 

GAO/RCED-87-150, “Nuclear Nonproliferation: Department of Energy Needs Tighter Controls Over

Reprocessing Information,” August 17, 1987 

GAO/RCED-87-72, “Nuclear Security: DOE’s Reinvestigation of Employees Has Not Been Timely,”

March 10, 1987 

GAO/RCED-88-28, “Nuclear Security: DOE Needs a More Accurate and Efficient Security Clearance

Program,” December 29, 1987 

GAO/RCED-89-116, “Nuclear Nonproliferation: Better Controls Needed Over Weapons-Related

Information and Technology,” June 19, 1989 

P F I A B BIBLIOGRAPHY A-31
GAO/RCED-89-31, “Major Weaknesses in Foreign Visitor Controls at Weapons Laboratories,” October

11, 1988 

GAO/RCED-89-34, “Nuclear Security: DOE Actions to Improve the Personnel Clearance Program,”

November 9, 1988 

GAO/RCED-90-122, “Nuclear Security: DOE Oversight of Livermore’s Property Management System is

Inadequate,” April 18, 1990 

GAO/RCED-91-12, “Nuclear Safety: Potential Security Weaknesses at Los Alamos and Other DOE

Facilities,” October 1990 

GAO/RCED-91-183, “Nuclear Security: DOE Original Classification Authority Has Been Improperly

Delegated,” July 5, 1991 

GAO/RCED-91-65, “Nuclear Security: Accountability for Livermore’s Secret Classified Documents Is

Inadequate,” February 8, 1991 

GAO/RCED-91-83, “Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs Better Controls to Identify Contractors

Having Foreign Interests,” March 25, 1991 

GAO/RCED-91-141, “Nuclear Security: Property Control Problems at DOE’s Livermore Laboratory

Continue,” May 16, 1991. 

GAO/RCED-92-146, “Nuclear Security: Weak Internal Controls Hamper Oversight of DOE’s Security

Program,” June 29, 1992 

GAO/RCED-92-39, “Nuclear Security: Safeguards and Security Weaknesses at DOE’s Weapons

Facilities,” December 13, 1991 

GAO/RCED-93-10, “Nuclear Security: Improving Correction of Security deficiencies at DOE’s Weapons

Facilities,” November 16, 1992 

GAO/RCED-93-14, “Nuclear Security: Safeguards and Security Planning at DOE Facilities Incomplete,”

October 30, 1992 

GAO/RCED-93-183, “Nuclear Security: DOE’s Progress on Reducing Its Security Clearance Work

Load,” August 12, 1993 

GAO/RCED-93-23, “Personnel Security: Efforts by DOD and DOE to Eliminate Duplicative Background

Investigations,” May 10, 1993 

GAO/RCED/AIMD-95-5, “Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. International Nuclear Materials Tracking

Capabilities are Limited,” December 27, 1994 

GAO/T-RCED-96-260, DOE Security: Information on Foreign Visitors to the Weapons Laboratories,

undated 

GAO/RCED-97-128R, “Department of Energy: Information on the Distribution of Funds for

Counterintelligence Programs and the Resulting Expansion of These Programs,” April 25, 1997 

A-32 BIBLIOGRAPHY P F I A B
GAO/RCED-97-229, “Department of Energy: DOE Needs to Improve Controls Over Foreign Visitors to

Weapons Laboratories,” September 25, 1997 

GAO/RCED-99-19, “Department of Energy: Problems in DOE’s Foreign Visitor Program Persist, October

6, 1998 

GAO/RCED-99-54, “Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns With DOE’s Efforts to Reduce the Risks Posed

by Russia’s Unemployed Weapons Scientists,” February 19, 1999 

Hewlett, Richard G. and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield: A History of the United States Atomic Energy

Commission. May 1969

Los Alamos National Laboratory, “Draft Chronology,” undated 

New York Times, “Abstract,” August 5, 1977 

Representative John Dingell letter to the President of the United States, January 28, 1986 

Representative John Dingell letter to Warren Rudman, March 24, 1999 

Senate Armed Services Committee, Transcript of Committee Hearing, April 12, 1999 

US Congress, “DOE, and Congressional Committee Jurisdiction,” June 3, 1999 

US Nuclear Command and Control System Support Staff, “Assessment Report: Department of Energy

Nuclear Weapons-Related Security Oversight Process,” March 1998 (FOUO)

P F I A B BIBLIOGRAPHY A-33
P

FIAB

Major DOE Field Facilities

SOURCE: U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY

MAP OF DOE FIELD FACILITIES A-34